

17

INTEGRATING DISASTER AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AFTER NATURAL DISASTERS:
LESSONS FROM PVO RESPONSE IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

Caroline Clarke Guarnizo

Masters of City Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1984)

B.A. Political Science
University of Washington (1981)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Urban and Regional Planning

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 1991

© Caroline Clarke Guarnizo, 1991. All rights reserved.

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

Signature of Author _____
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
September 1991

Certified by _____
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Bishwapriya Sanyal
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by _____
Lawrence E. Susskind
Chairman Ph.D. Program
Department of Urban Studies and Planning



INTEGRATING DISASTER AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AFTER NATURAL DISASTERS:
LESSONS FROM PVO RESPONSE IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

Caroline Clarke Guarnizo

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Urban and Regional Planning

ABSTRACT

This study examines how private voluntary organizations (PVOs) provide aid in the wake of disasters in the Third World. The specific aim of the study was to understand PVO efforts to integrate disaster and development assistance. The historical reasons why disaster and development aid are institutionally separated were analyzed as well as why this separation is unhelpful for reducing the threat of disasters in practice. A final objective was to examine in detail a post-disaster model of integration including the obstacles encountered in implementation.

A two step methodology was used. First, a review was made of disaster-related literature across disciplines and of PVO programs in order i) to develop an analytical perspective that treats the intersection of disaster and development, and ii) to map the integration models in use. Second, a case study of one PVO's post-disaster program (in Armero, Colombia) was undertaken to illustrate in detail the integration process, including obstacles and key relationships.

The research found that PVO efforts to integrate disaster and development assistance have generally faltered because of institutional factors. Integrating the two must contend with conflicting program and management styles of the aid provider(s), competition for limited resources, institutional competition, project rigidity resulting from the relief commitment, a dependency relationship, and establishing an effective relationship with the affected state. To promote integrated disaster reduction, new ways for enhancing cooperation among the different actors must take place. Institutional jurisdictions must be transcended and new arrangements promoted. Development agencies, in particular, must be encouraged to play their role in the disaster reduction process.

Thesis Supervisor: Bishwapriya Sanyal
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to my thesis supervisor, Professor Bish Sanyal, for his valuable guidance and encouragement, and to Professor Reinhard Goethert, who saw this project through from its beginning. I also want to thank Professor Ralph Gakenheimer for his advice and support toward the completion of my dissertation.

The staff of Save The Children in Westport and Colombia deserve special mention for its dedication to community-based development in times of disaster. Jairo Arboleda, then Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, made it possible to start this project and provided his personal and professional commitment. I am thankful to Luz Angela Castro, Oscar Medina Urbano, Dario Antonio Toro, Norma Constanza Amador, Gloria Ortiz, and Alberto Villar in Armero, for the lessons we learned together. This thesis is dedicated, of course, to the Armeritas.

I thank MIT for affording me an intellectual community and a work space. I also want to mention my friends Assia Khellaf and Mitsy Canto for reading various drafts of this dissertation.

Finally, my deep appreciation goes to my parents whose support was unfailing, and my husband, Luis Eduardo, who shared with me every moment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
ABSTRACT	3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	5
TABLE OF CONTENTS	6
INTRODUCTION	11
I. Issues	11
II. Research Strategy	12
A. The Central Case Study	13
B. Data Collection and Analysis	14
III. Organization of the Thesis	15
 PART I: ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM	 17
CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of Disaster Practice	20
I. Brief History of Disaster Studies	20
II. The Disaster-Development Relationship in Disaster Studies and Practice	 26
A. The Ecologist Perspective	27
- Disaster Causation and Impact	27
- Implications for Practice: The Ecologists and Disaster Assistance	 31
B. Disaster Research Begins to Shift	34
C. The Critical Perspective	37
- Disaster Causation and Impact	37
- Implications for Practice: The Critical Perspective and Disaster Assistance	 41
III. A Distinct Area of Study and Practice: The Disaster and Development Intersection	 42
Theory: An Emerging Perspective	42
 CHAPTER 2: The Institutional Dimension of Disaster and Development Aid	 50
I. The Importance of Private Voluntary Organizations in Disasters	51
II. The Disaster-Development Rift	55
III. The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid	58
IV. Framing the Problem: The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid	 62
V. The Present Institutional Setting of Disaster Assistance	69
A. The Donors	69
B. The Foreign Disaster Assistance Community	73

CHAPTER 3: Practice: Integrating Disaster and Development Aid Programs	77
I. Integrating Disaster and Development Assistance	79
A. Pre-Disaster Integration	79
B. Post-Disaster Integration	81
II. Institutional Approaches to Disaster-Development Linking Process	85
A. Models and Scenarios	87
- The Multiple Program Approach	88
- Integrated Relief and Recovery Approach	89
- Integrated Recovery and Development Approach	91
- Shaping Development out of Relief Approach	92
B. Central Components of Institutional Linking	95
III. What is a Viable Linking Approach?	97
A. From Linking Patterns to Effective Linking Strategies	98
B. The Obstacles to Linking Disaster and Development Aid after Disasters	100
 PART II: THE CENTRAL CASE STUDY	 105
CHAPTER 4: Pre-Disaster Conditions: Armero's Economic and Political Vulnerabilities	106
I. Introduction	106
II. Historical Development of the Municipality of Armero	109
III. Apparent Prosperity of Valley Hides its Fundamental Vulnerabilities	113
A. Economic Vulnerabilities	114
B. Political Vulnerabilities	118
- Exclusionary Political System Produces Unprecedented Violence and Reinforces Regional Power Structure and Loyalties	119
- The Frente Nacional: Implications for Modern Political Relations with the Colombian State	125
CHAPTER 5: El Ruiz Avalanche Disaster, Colombia	129
I. Disaster Vulnerability	129
II. November 13, 1985	131
III. Damage	134
IV. Aid Agencies and Resurgir	136
V. Chaos Settles into Discernible Patterns	140
VI. Emerging Antagonisms Between People, State, and Aid Providers	142
A. Between Center and Region	143
B. Between Political Factions	143
C. Between People and Traditional Leaders	146
D. Between People and Aid Providers (Public and Private)	147
CHAPTER 6: Save The Children's Project Armero	153
I. The Initial Response	153
II. The Emergency Relief Project	155
III. The Transition to the Agency's Standard Development Programs	159
IV. The Phase-out of Relief: The Launching of a Crisis	160
V. Phasing-in the Development Programs: Coping with the Crisis	164

PART III: INTEGRATING DISASTER RESPONSE WITH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS . . .	169
CHAPTER 7: Shaping Development Programs out of Relief: An Effective Post-Disaster Integration Strategy?	170
I. Introduction	170
A. The Paradox	170
B. Shortcomings of the Literature	173
C. Project Armero's Program Strategy	174
D. Two Unexpected Outcomes of the Post-Disaster Program Strategy	177
II. Building Development on Relief: How effective was the strategy?	180
A. Hindering the Transition to Development Programs	180
- Multi-Sectoral and Complex Relief and Development Programs make the Shift More Difficult	181
- Development Objectives Compete with Relief for Project Resources	182
- The Agency-Beneficiary Relationship Established in Relief was Inappropriate for Development	184
- Minimalist Approach Unwittingly Results in Comprehensive Relief for a Few	186
- Relief Criteria for Selecting Beneficiaries Collides with Development Program Requirements	187
- Beneficiary Participation in Relief does not Necessarily Prepare for Participation in Development: Putting the Cart Before the Horse	190
- The Relief Assistance was an Inefficient Way to Introduce Development Programs	191
B. Easing the Transition to Development Programs	193
- Setting Internal Administrative Base	193
- Setting the External Administrative Base: Relationships with the State and Other Aid Organizations	195
- The Long-Term Program Foundation is Set During Relief	197
III. Project Armero's Transition	198
A. SCF's Phase-Out of Relief was Contingent on Breaking Material Dependency and the Introduction of Development	199
B. The Components that Bridged Relief and Development in Project Armero	201
CHAPTER 8: The PVO and Beneficiary Relationship in Transition	206
I. Introduction	206
The Concept of "Dependency": Manifestations, Origins, and Strategies for Coping	207
II. The Case: Dependency Relationship in Project Armero	217
A. The Agency does Dependency-Mitigating Relief and Still Suffers Dependency	217
B. The Internal Origins of Dependency	222
- Psychological Factors	222
- Human Resource Factors	226
C. The External Origins of Dependency	227
- Post-Disaster Factors	227
- Pre-Disaster Factors	229

D.	SCF's Relief Response as Origin of Dependency	231
	- Relief Response Unwittingly Reproduced a Traditional Dependency Relationship	233
III.	Conclusion	241
	A. Theory	242
	B. Practice	246
	Endnote #1	250
	Endnote #2	251
	CHAPTER 9: The Relationship Between the PVO and the Government	252
I.	Introduction	252
II.	The PVO-Government Relationship: Range of Observed Relationships and the Factors Influencing Their Emergence	255
	A. Non-Disaster Environment	255
	B. Disaster Environments	259
	- Government Response: Dilemmas of Disasters	259
	- PVO Response: Dilemmas of Disasters	262
III.	The Armero Disaster: The Government of Colombia (GOC) and PVOs	266
	A. Before the Disaster: PVO-Government Relationship in Colombia	266
	B. Immediate Institutional Interests: Political Crisis Influences the GOC's Actions in Armero Disaster	269
	C. The Institutional Landscape After the Disaster: Resurgir and the Public Sector Agencies, Private for-profit Sector, IGOs, and PVOs	271
	- Political Interests Guide Disaster Policy and Impact Institutional Environment	276
	D. Save the Children (SCF) and the Government of Colombia (GOC)	282
	- The Relationship in the Emergency and Beyond	282
IV.	Conclusions	288
	CHAPTER 10: Conclusions and Recommendations	291
I.	Principle Findings	291
II.	Recommendations	298
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	305
	APPENDIX 1: Definitions of Relief, Recovery, and Development Programs	326
	APPENDIX 2: The Case Agency: Save The Children Federation.	328
	APPENDIX 3: Theories of the Disaster-Development Relationship	333

INTRODUCTION

I. Issues

The purpose of this research is to investigate how private voluntary organizations (PVOs) provide aid in the wake of disasters in the Third World. The specific aim of the study is to understand PVO efforts to phase disaster response into long-term development work, and to understand the mechanics of this integration process. The study is based on the review of a broad selection of secondary cases of post-disaster programs in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and the analysis of one central case study.

Although the international aid community has not ignored the twin problem of disaster response and development assistance in principle, they have treated them as largely separate activities in practice. PVOs, like their UN and governmental counterparts, tend to specialize in either disaster response or development. This began to change in the mid-1980s, however, when the famine spreading throughout Africa forced practitioners to rethink the relationship between poverty, disasters, and development. It also forced them to rethink how to provide disaster assistance; it was clearly no longer a simple question of dispensing relief until things returned to normal.

The international aid community has to address both short- and long-term needs, and to do so in a mutually reinforcing way. But, the arbitrary divisions between relief and development assistance perpetuated by institutional jurisdictions are proving unhelpful in practice. Agencies have missed important opportunities to use their

disaster response to support later development activities, and to use development aid to address the underlying vulnerabilities that, unless ameliorated, will insure the reoccurrence of disasters like the rolling African famines.

PVOs are particularly appropriate institutions through which to study the integration question precisely because many of them have been doing both relief and development programs for some time. PVO efforts to integrate the two aid types have had only mixed success. The how and when to phase from relief into development work, for example, is still a major sticking point of these programs. Previous studies have focused on ways to improve emergency relief, but they have largely ignored the mechanics of their integration with subsequent development programs.

The present research will examine why integration efforts have faltered in practice. We will analyze the institutional process of integrating emergency response with development after a disaster in order to identify and understand the key factors. The underlying objective is to give policy-makers a better understanding about what may be viable strategies for managing integrated disaster reduction.

II. Research Strategy

A two step methodology will be used. First, a review will be made of disaster-related literature across disciplines and of PVO programs in order i) to develop an analytical perspective that treats the

intersection of disaster and development, and ii) to map the integration models in use. Second, a case study of one PVO's post-disaster program (in Armero, Colombia) will be undertaken to illustrate in detail the integration process, including obstacles and key relationships.

A. The Central Case Study

Presently, there is a relatively small body of knowledge about program approaches used by voluntary organizations after disasters. Few PVOs have undertaken thorough evaluations of their post-disaster programs. In addition, the subject is a very complex one. The diversity of disaster types, the variety of voluntary agencies and their possible responses, and the complicated nature of post-disaster work itself all make it difficult to identify what makes a PVO able to implement development after disaster. For these reasons, the dissertation's focus on a central case is warranted.

The agency has an interesting history of intervention in relief and development that makes it a fitting case study. In the 1970s, Save The Children (SCF) moved away from strictly charity assistance in its regular programs but continued the special work in disaster and refugee relief around the world. Today, the agency professes a philosophy of "helping communities to help themselves" and regards itself as a "long-range development organization" (Atkin 1988). With its highly articulated development approach (CBIRD - Community Based Integrated Rural Development), SCF's disaster relief efforts have been particularly conscious of the long-term impacts of relief aid.

B. Data Collection and Analysis

Most of the central case material was collected during the first year of the Project, from January of 1986 to January of 1987. The opportunity for a researcher to observe and participate in a disaster event and in an agency's response is rare. I had the invaluable opportunity to analyze the case as it was unfolding. Moreover, because this study attempts to understand how an agency coped with the specific difficulties of a post-disaster project, the perception from someone on the "inside" rather than outside of the case study is particularly valuable (Yin, 1984). The potential of biases that my involvement may produce is checked by using several sources of data to construct the case and by reviewing other post-disaster projects for corroborating or disconfirming interpretations (McCall and Simmons, 1969; Murphy, 1980).

For the central case, primary source data is used -- my field notes, project documents (Project Design, First Year Report, budget, memos), headquarter documents (emergency communiques, press releases, memos, financial reports), and interviews (case agency personnel and disaster professionals in Colombia). The background information about the region and the disaster comes from numerous secondary sources (Colombian government reports, press clippings, and international disaster documentation from agencies such as USAID and UNDRO). For the mapping of practice, I draw upon several sources of secondary cases including, the International Relief/Development Project (IRDP) at Harvard and a sampling of PVO field reports.

III. Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into three main parts with ten chapters in all. Part I examines the theoretical and institutional origins of the separation of disaster and development aid, why separation is unhelpful for disaster reduction, and what we know about PVO efforts to integrate the two aid types.

Part II presents the central case study of the Armero Disaster including: the economic and political processes in the Armero Valley that exacerbated the impact of the disaster and limited the affected population's resources for coping and recovery; a description of the disaster and the post-disaster environment; and the description of Save The Children's project from the initial relief response to the transition to its community based development programs.

Part III analyzes in detail the strategy that the case program implemented for integrating their disaster response with development programs. It identifies and evaluates the set of challenges that the case agency faced in the process, looking at program and management factors, the agency's relationship with its program beneficiaries and with the Colombian government.

The final chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations of the dissertation. It outlines where aid agencies can begin to develop viable institutional mechanisms for managing overlapping responsibilities in disaster response and longer-term reduction efforts.

P A R T I

ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Before the turn of the century, natural disasters were the subjects of scientific research and tourist accounts. Interest in the social aspects of such events did not emerge until the 1920s, but even then remained largely descriptive. Between the 1950s and 1970s, disaster research in the social sciences was the exclusive domain of a school of thought which was grounded in behavioralism and functionalism, "human ecology". They looked at how individuals and organizations responded to crisis and disasters. Their theoretical dominance was challenged in the mid-1970s by a group of disaster researchers interested in the structural questions. This alternative group used marxist analysis to investigate questions of disaster causation for the first time. In the last ten years, the debate among these two approaches to disaster research has produced a shift in the fundamental premises and concepts of the field.

One very important shift resulting from the debate is the clear recognition of the relationship between disasters and development. This theoretical relationship has very important implications for the practice of disaster and development assistance -- the subject of this research. To prepare for disasters, we also have to understand development and its role in creating or ameliorating disaster vulnerability. To insure sustainable development, we have to understand disaster causes and consequences. Professionals from both camps are providing important lessons from the field which are contributing to the theoretical debate.

In this light, the present section departs from other reviews by treating the intersection between disasters and development as a distinct field of study. In so doing, we examine the origins of the present research problem: why disaster and development assistance are separated and why today this separation has become framed as a problem.

The international aid community has historically organized disaster and development assistance as largely separate and distinct activities. Recently, however, researchers and practitioners are finding that the division between the two aid types is not only out of sync with current thinking in disaster research, but is also unhelpful for reducing the threat of natural disasters in practice. We will examine both the theoretical and institutional origins of the separation of disaster and development aid.

Chapter One concentrates on the academic disaster literature. First a short history of the development of disaster studies is presented. Then, the review cuts across the diverse disciplines engaged in disaster research in order to characterize two primary perspectives underlying them. The review focuses on how each perspective understands the relationship between disasters and development and illustrates how this affects the organization of disaster response in practice.

Chapter Two reviews the institutional dimension of the research problem by looking at the history of the U.S. private foreign aid sector. The review focuses on the institutional and programmatic dynamics that contributed to the current separation of disaster and development aid. In addition, this chapter outlines parallel contexts (refugees and environment) in which aid agencies must grapple with the same problem of linking short-term emergency aid and long-term

development. This chapter will show how *private voluntary organizations* (PVOs) came to frame this separation as a problem.

Finally, Chapter Three will review what current theory and practice can tell us about the research issue before us -- *how PVOs link disaster and development assistance*. We will draw on both the literature and field experience to chart the boundaries of current knowledge about programs and institutions.

In sum, this introductory section of the thesis will address the following questions,

1. What are the theoretical and institutional origins of the separation of disaster and development practice?
2. Why is their separation problematic? How did it become framed as a problem?
3. What do we know about PVO efforts to link disaster and development aid?

Theoretical Underpinnings of Disaster Practice

I. Brief History of Disaster Studies

Modern disaster research is generally acknowledged to have begun with the pioneering work of Samuel Prince, a sociologist, who documented a French munitions ship explosion in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1917. Over two thousand people died, six thousand were injured, and ten thousand were left homeless by the ensuing fire. Prince documented some of the sociopsychological responses in the wake of the disaster. He also posed some of the first arguments about crisis and social change. Although Prince looked at a man-made disaster, social scientists quickly applied his inquiry to the study of natural hazards.

With the onset of World War II, subsequent research focused primarily on the behavior of individuals and groups after crisis and disaster. Sociologists studied, for example, the effects of bombing on human behavior and social organizations and looked at how families, communities, and organizations responded in emergencies and post-emergencies and adjusted to stress (O'Riordan 1986). In 1953, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council created the Committee on Disaster Studies¹ for the support of this research.

¹This was later reorganized into the Disaster Research Group. Other research centers on natural hazards (with geography, sociology, and interdisciplinary foci) at the Universities of Delaware (Disaster Research Center), Colorado (Institute of Behavioral Science), Ohio (Disaster Research Center in 1963), Chicago (Natural Hazards Research Group) and the University of Bradford (Disaster Research Unit in 1973), to name a few. These, and other research groups, provide important journals and newsletters for the community of disaster researchers.

Although the initiation of disaster research is attributed to sociologists, it is the geographers who have dominated the field since the 1950s (Curson 1989). Beginning with Gilbert White's 1945 study of human adjustments to floods, geographers have studied the changing relationship between people and their physical environment. Geographers primarily investigated how individuals and communities perceive risk and the decisions they take to adjust to that risk.² Unlike the sociologists, they also studied the natural hazards themselves -- droughts, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, etc. -- to understand the cause of disasters. Geographers' view of disasters causation was environmentally deterministic -- that is, the natural event was the cause of a disaster.

An important stimulus for the work of disaster researchers was the interest in developing an ecological approach in geography in the late 1950s which stressed the "mutual relations" of people and environment.³ Building upon Barrow's 1923 pioneering work, natural hazards researchers took an active role in shaping ecological approach in geography. A parallel interest was developing in sociology at the same time. It was Amos Hawley's early work on urban systems (1950s) and a group of

²See Curson 1989, White and Haas 1975, White 1974, and Hewitt and Burton 1971 for a sampling of literature.

³This move formed part of the overall move away from environmental determinism in Geography. In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the dominant idea guiding research in U.S. geography was that environment determined culture. By the 1950s, geographers had become uncomfortable with this and many alternatives were posed -- one of which was the development of human ecology (Porter 1980).

sociologists of the "Chicago School"⁴ who contributed substantially to the development of the approach in sociology.⁵

Briefly, ecology is the study of adaptation to the environment. Human ecology, as its name implies, is the study of people's adaptation to the environment: "A human ecosystem is a population response to the necessity of maintaining a workable relation to the environment" (Hawley 1986). The process of adaptation is generally considered at the group level, analyzing the division of labor as the primary form of human adjustment to a harsh environment.⁶ Often criticized for its ahistorical approach, human ecology uses systems models which tend to rely on theories of general equilibrium.⁷ "The task of human ecologists is to describe systems and to explain the interconnections among people and environments which sustain the system and keep it equilibrated." For disaster researchers, the ecology approach seemed a particularly appropriate way to understand the interaction between human beings and the extremes (natural hazards) in their environment.

The ecological approach is still considered to be the dominant paradigm in disaster research today (Oliver-Smith 1986; O'Riordan 1986; Hewitt, 1983). Besides sociologists and geographers, disaster

⁴Including, Robert E. Park, Roderick McKenzie, and Ernest W. Burgess.

⁵For an in depth review of the development of the Human Ecology School see Hawley (1986) and Gerald Young (1983).

⁶Ecology's strict adherence to the study of groups as a fundamental component of its approach as well as to the assumption of stable equilibrium have changed over the years. See Orlove (1980).

⁷Although not the subject of this review, there have been many variations within human ecology. They have ranged from neofunctionalism, neoevolutionism, and "processual" approaches which all attempt to address perceived shortcomings in the ecological approach.

researchers in many other disciplines have used the framework of adaptation and adjustment to shed light on their fundamental questions. For example, psychologists study disaster situations in order to analyze individual adjustments to crisis, stress, and trauma as well as their coping processes and recovery (Green 1982; Cohen and Ahearn 1980; Perry and Lindell 1978; Bates et al. 1963).⁸ Anthropologists study communities' cultural adjustment to risk and impact of extremes in nature (Oliver-Smith 1979; Schwimmer 1969; Wallace 1956a, 1956b; Firth 1959; Belshaw 1951).⁹ Economists look at the local economic impact of disasters and community economic recovery after disasters (Rubin et al. 1985; French et al. 1984; Geipel 1982; Wright et al. 1979; Friesema et al. 1979; Haas et al. 1977; Rogers 1970; Dacy and Kunreunther 1969).

Early on, ecologists focused almost exclusively on questions of individual and organizational behavior in disaster response (Mileti et al. 1975; White 1974; Dynes 1970; Barton 1970; Clifford 1956). A bit later, however, researchers also began to study societal responses to disruption and crisis and the implication of disasters for social change more generally (Kreps 1984; Bates 1982; McLuckie 1970; Demerath and Wallace 1957). Historical and social factors that shape individual risk perception and decision-making in response to disasters were introduced (White 1974; Hewitt and Burton 1971; Fritz 1961). The ecologist school continued in disaster research essentially unchallenged until the 1970s.

⁸For a good summary of where the psychological literature is today, see Laube and Murphy 1985.

⁹For a brief review of the development of disaster research in Anthropology, see Oliver-Smith (1986).

With all the attention on the impact and consequences of disaster, very little research was directed to understanding the origins, or causes, of disasters during the post-war period. While sociologists largely ignored the issue of disaster causation, geographers simply attributed it to the natural agent. Although these researchers studied how social and economic variables put people at risk to disasters and then limit their abilities to cope in the aftermath, no one considered social or economic factors to be important causal variables.

In the mid-1970s, however, the focus of disaster research took a decisive turn. Sparked by evidence that disasters unequally impacted poor countries and poorer sectors of industrialized countries, a systematic inquiry into the origins of disaster was launched. This research demonstrated the role of humans, their institutions, and social systems play in making people susceptible to disasters. A group of anthropologists and social geographers working in third world contexts had begun to look at social, economic, and political processes which cause people to live in hazardous locations and assume vulnerable economic relationships.¹⁰ These authors criticized the ecologist perspective for its lack of comparative method as well as for its ethnocentric assumptions on which generalized theory was based.¹¹

A small group of these disaster researchers took the analysis a step further. Using marxist dependency analysis, they argued that the structural causes of disasters could be found in the historical social

¹⁰Anthropologists include Torry (1978, 1979a, 1979b) and Oliver-Smith (1979). Social geographers include Waddell (1977), Wisner, O'Keefe and Westgate (1977), O'Keefe, Westgate and Wisner (1976).

¹¹For a summary of the methodological debate see Oliver-Smith (1986).

and economic processes themselves.¹² This critical perspective links disasters with the "development of underdevelopment" theory and argues that the marginalization process is what directly increases vulnerability of human populations.

They studied how social forces can alter natural processes -- how certain forms of development, for example, can lead to deforestation and soil erosion -- thereby precipitating disasters. The root causes of disasters, the critical perspective argues, are certain structural relations which often lead to deteriorating environments and underdeveloping populations which, when they meet, cause disasters. This new research directly challenged the behaviorist focus and the environmentally deterministic view of disaster causation of the ecologist school.

While not embraced wholesale, many of principles proposed by the critical perspective have gained wide acceptance by researchers and have entered into mainstream thinking in the last ten years. For example, disasters are no longer considered to be caused by uncontrollable natural events acting on passive populations. Curson (1989) writes,

the "act of God", the independent operation of incomprehensible and uncontrollable forces, is no longer seen as the dominating element of a disaster situation. Disasters are always more prevalent where human populations occupy vulnerable positions.

With the acceptance of humans' role in disasters, policy has focused on disaster mitigation. Mitigation is also shifting from being a largely scientific or technical endeavor to reduce physical risks to one which

¹²In Hewitt's Interpretations of Calamity (1983), a collection of articles by the primary authors of this alternative interpretation of disasters is assembled. Hewitt himself in the introductory article details the criticism of the ecologist school and formulates the alternative position.

addresses the social and economic variables as well. Another change is that development is no longer accepted as the force which will inherently reduce population's vulnerability to disasters; its potential for increasing the risks of disaster is also recognized. Essentially, the ongoing debate between the critical perspective and ecologists has stimulated the reexamination of a number of fundamental concepts and premises of disaster research.

Growing importance is also being given to the relationship between disasters and development. To prepare for disasters -- both their causes and consequences -- it is now acknowledged that we also have to understand development.

It is only in this last decade that researchers -- both academic and professional -- have begun to study disasters in the context of development. A growing number of case studies examine how development aid affects vulnerability to disasters. Similarly, studies looking at how disasters "set-back" development efforts are also on the rise. Indeed, it is now generally accepted that development strategies should address underlying socio-economic vulnerabilities to disasters and that relief strategies should be designed to support subsequent development activities.

II. The Disaster-Development Relationship in Disaster Studies and Practice

With the development of the two primary perspectives in disaster research in mind, we now look at how they have influenced the current separation of disaster and development assistance in practice. By examining how each perspective understands two fundamental elements of disasters -- what causes disasters and what determines the extent of


disaster impact -- we will analyze their view of the disaster-development relationship. Then, we examine how each perspective has influenced the organization of disaster aid.

A. The Ecologist Perspective

- Disaster Causation and Impact

Ecologists accept the physical or "natural"¹³ origin of disasters. The disaster agent -- the volcano eruption, drought, earthquake, flood and the like -- is an aberrant event of nature which results from the extremes in normal geophysical processes. These hazardous events represent the potential for damage. It is only when they meet with a human population, that they trigger disasters (UNDRO 1986; Wijkman and Timberlake 1984). In this view, populations *suffer* natural disasters but do not directly *cause* them.

1 Direction of Disaster Causation



¹³Of course, the ecologist view draws a distinction between "man-made" disasters (war, refugees, industrial accidents) and the more "natural" events.

Since the 1970s, ecologists have also begun to examine how people may *exacerbate* disaster impact (Grayson and Sheets 1979; White 1974). Some people are more "vulnerable" to disaster agents than others. Certain socio-economic factors within *development* -- such as, patterns of population growth, settlement, land use, technology use, and migration - place populations at more risk to disaster agents and heighten their potential to do damage (Advisory Committee on the IDNDR 1987).

Despite the recognition of these aggravating factors, ecologists argue that people are vulnerable to disasters ultimately because of how they perceive risk and the individual choices they take in response to their perception. Very simply, people live in hazard-prone areas because they consider that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks (O'Riordan 1986). Curson (1989), for example, argues that,

Although disasters result from the interaction of natural and social systems the two cannot be considered as causative (Burton et al. 1978). Natural and social environments are inherently neither malevolent nor benevolent but largely neutral to their human populations. Primarily it is people who by the nature of their philosophies, attitudes and behavior modify or transform this environmental neutrality into either a useful resource or a potentially disastrous scenario. (emphasis mine)

They treat vulnerability as the end result, as a *condition*. Development processes or systemic forces that may create vulnerability are outside of the ecologists' research focus and understanding of disaster causation.

The concepts above are embodied in definitions¹⁴ of disasters used by

¹⁴Although there is still no one accepted definition of disasters, the many definitions in use do illustrate for us the overwhelming focus on the study of disaster impact and the key assumptions about the disaster-development relationship embedded therein. Even within one discipline, such as sociology, there is no single definition which is either agreed upon or that is particularly helpful for directing their

ecologists. Early definitions largely formulated disasters as either the physical agent itself or the physical consequences of the agent (Curson 1986). In the early 1960s, one of the first socially-oriented definition of disasters was advanced by Charles Fritz (1961) who said a disaster was an,

accidental or uncontrollable event concentrated in time and space in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of it undergoes severe changes. The social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented.¹⁵

More recent working definitions have reflected the now central concept of *vulnerability* -- the state of people's capacity to cope with disaster events. It is the lack of ability to cope with an event which makes an event disastrous instead of simply hazardous. A geographer, Heathcote (1979), defines disasters as: "extreme geophysical events greatly exceeding normal human expectations in terms of magnitude or frequency and causing significant material damage to man and his works." Another disaster specialist, Frederick Krimgold (1976), said "disasters can be defined as crises that overwhelm, at least for a time, people's capacities to manage and cope".

This simple perusal of earlier and later definitions reflects the enduring preoccupation with the *impact* as the defining element of a

research (Quarantelli 1986, 1987; Dynes 1986).

¹⁵The above definition reflected researchers' early focus on rapid-onset, natural disasters. The definition is insufficient today as most disaster researchers study events not included in this definition, like the African droughts, which are slow-onset disasters, or the Bhopal disaster, which was tragically man-made.

disaster. It is here, through their concept of vulnerability, that the ecologists articulate the disaster-development relationship.¹⁶

The amount of damage caused by disaster agent differs depending on the country's state of development (Funaro-Curtis 1982). The general assumption of the ecologists is that the more underdeveloped a country or a region of a country is, the more it will suffer damage to life and property in a disaster. It does not go unnoticed that a volcanic eruption in Japan kills only a fraction the number that a similar eruption in Colombia does.

Recently, ecologists have also recognized that disasters affect development. Disasters are seen to cause, what has been called, "the development set-back problem". That is, the damage caused by disasters represents a constraint for societies in the process of "modernization" (Funaro-Curtis 1982; Burton et al. 1978; Kates 1975). The loss of human life and the decline of people's standard of living -- through the loss of jobs, homelessness, health problems, malnutrition, and displacement - - that result from disaster events represent not only human tragedy but also a decline in a nation's human capital much needed for development. In terms of physical capital, governments must increase current and capital expenditures for relief and reconstruction purposes while their revenues (income tax receipts and exports) decline due to the disaster. Governments must also divert public funds away from development purposes towards reconstruction. In this way, "disasters constitute an acute

¹⁶Very early disaster researchers did not see any relationship between development (level and process) to disaster impact (or causation, for that matter).

development problem because they affect people, property, and entire economies" (Funaro-Curtis 1982).

- Implications for Practice: The Ecologists and Disaster Assistance

The ecologist view has been the dominant influence in how disaster assistance has been structured since the end of World War II. With research's concern for disaster impact, it is not surprising that focus in practice has been on the emergency itself and the short period immediately following. Disaster assistance's general objective is to best protect lives and property from danger and to return to normal as quickly as possible. In the language of ecologists, the objective has been to improve society's capacity to adapt and to quickly return to equilibrium. Because people were seen as passive receivers of disaster impact, disaster planning emphasized the development of high-technology hazard prediction schemes and more efficient management schemes, stressing logistics and coordination of emergency relief.

Ecologists argue that people locate in hazard-prone areas because their perceptions of risk are different from some "scientific" assessments (O'Riordan 1986). As a result, people need to be educated as to the real hazards they face and how they can cope with them. Disaster mitigation professionals have naturally assumed this role and have harnessed western technology and organizational experience in this effort (O'Riordan 1986; Davis 1975). Since the 1970s debate, a more judicious use of technology is being promoted. With the greater interest in understanding indigenous adaption processes, aid is being refocused to support, rather than replace, the local communities' coping mechanisms.

In their studies of disaster recovery processes, researchers characterized different phases, or stages, of the post-disaster period - emergency, rehabilitation/reconstruction, and development.¹⁷ Each stage has "different problems, varied sets of issues and contrasting types of reactions..." (Mileti et al. 1975, pg. 100). Post-disaster stages have their corollary in disaster aid: a "logical" division of labor in the organization of a disaster response. Naturally, emergencies require different assistance packages than do the stages of recovery and rehabilitation, and altogether different than development. Different agencies with different objectives and operational styles provide emergency and reconstruction aid packages and programs.¹⁸

Just as disasters are largely seen as uncontrollable events of nature or war that interrupted the normal course of development, so disaster aid is seen as a temporary parenthesis in development assistance. An economist, Eaton (1989) summarizes this commonly-held differentiation between the two types of assistance,

...relief aid, intended to maintain current consumption levels during a shortfall in income that is perceived as temporary, and development aid that is intended to raise investment and future consumption.

The schism between the disaster and development assistance is indeed quite marked.

¹⁷Haas et al. (1977) distinguished four phases: 1) emergency, 2) restoration, 3) replacement and reconstruction, and 4) commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction. Others distinguish only three phases: emergency/relief, recovery and reconstruction.

¹⁸The dominant conceptualization of foreign assistance emerges from this stages framework. For working definitions of relief, recovery, and development aid, see Appendices.

As we will explain in more detail in Chapter 2, the emphasis on phases has been reflected in a generalized separation of relief and development aid -- both institutionally and programmatically. The U.N. system, for example, has the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) which responds with emergency relief aid after disasters and is quite separate from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). Within USAID there is a separate Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance (OFDA) which has generally been limited to the provision of only short-term aid. In fact, an entire relief network has emerged which has traditionally been quite separate from the development complex (Kent 1987).

Likewise, the private foreign aid sector has also provided disaster relief and development aid separately -- either through agencies specialized in one or the other aid type, or by having separate divisions within the same agency doing each. Different kinds of professionals and management schemes have been in play for the two aid types. Relief agencies have been characterized by their specialized staffs and reliance on centrally managed logistical support and short-term intervention. Agencies doing reconstruction and development work have tended to be concerned with participatory management and a long-term impact horizon.

When assistance is provided separately, success is measured by how well the agency does each set of activities -- that is, doing relief quickly and efficiently, rehabilitation and reconstruction appropriately. It is assumed that the completion of these stages allows the resumption of the community's development trajectory. Linear continuity is assumed between them.

In summary, the ecologist perspective envisions disaster causality originating in the extreme physical event; the risk for doing damage is then exacerbated by its meeting with a vulnerable population. Vulnerability, itself, is the result of individual behavior and choices. In terms of impact, the ecologists see that disasters and development mutually influence one other. A disaster can negatively affect a nation's push for development through the "set-back" problem and, conversely, the level of development place people in conditions of vulnerability, thereby determining the extent of the disaster impact. Ecologist research has focused on the processes of human adaptation to crisis events and on the definition and study of *post-disaster* stages. Most practical attention has been placed on problems encountered during the emergency period. The assumption that outside relief aid is usually necessary in disasters has pervaded the aid community. The stress on disaster stages has resulted in an institutional division of labor between those who provide disaster and those who provide development assistance.

B. Disaster Research Begins to Shift

...these are crucial times to be involved in disaster research. Not only are the events and processes of disasters becoming more acute, but the methods and theoretical approaches to understanding the contexts, causes and consequences of disasters are in a state of flux.

- Oliver-Smith (1986).

Beginning in the 1970s, a few anthropologists and social geographers undertook new research directions which challenged the dominant view of the ecologists. Their research produced a series of recurrent and consistent findings which led to a fundamental reconceptualization of

disaster causation. With sufficient historical data for the first time available in the 1970s, researchers analyzed the type, frequency, location, and damage of disasters throughout the globe. Researchers found that the frequency and gravity of disasters have been increasing since the 1940s and that they were disproportionately affecting poor Third World countries (O'Keefe et al., 1976).¹⁹ Dworkin (1974) and Thompson (1982), two surveys of the world disaster situation showing this apparent trend, were widely accepted by disaster researchers.²⁰ From his review of disaster surveys performed in the previous decade, Kates (1980) noted that among poor nations "per capita deaths [are] perhaps a hundred times greater; relative per capita damage perhaps [are] ten times greater than among rich nations" in the wake of a disaster.²¹ In 1981, Fernandez published an article arguing that disaster-prone areas shared common features -- those characteristic of underdeveloped areas.

Shah (1983) and Hagman (1984) presented evidence suggesting that the number of disasters were growing, but without a concurrent increase in the number of natural events (earthquakes, storms, etc.). Other researchers found no evidence of climatic changes that might explain the

¹⁹Disaster statistics suffer serious problems of reliability and comparability across nations. However, estimates have been made and do, arguably, support certain conclusion drawing.

²⁰For methodological reasons, these surveys did not include wars, famines, epidemics, or industrial disasters which account for, by far, the most deaths (Curson 1989).

²¹These studies have been followed up by even more alarming studies of the global disaster situation in the 1980s. Kent (1987) cites that over the fifteen-year period between 1970 and 1985, developed countries suffered only "3 percent of the world's major disasters, accounted for less than 1 percent of all disaster-related deaths (0.05 percent) and severe social disruptions (0.0469 percent) due to major disasters".

increase in disasters (O'Keefe, Westgate and Wisner 1976). The reason, then, had to lie on the other side of the equation -- with increasing vulnerability of populations. Researchers began to investigate with more rigor the issue of vulnerability in order to explain the growing number of disasters.

This research led to a reexamination of the role of development in causing disasters. During this period, studies of a number of slow-onset and long-duration types of disasters were undertaken. The drought in the Sahel and famines in Bangladesh brought to light the issue of causality like no study of earthquakes or volcanic eruption ever had. French radical intellectuals focused on colonial and post-colonial international political-economic system to explain the origins of the Sahelian famine of 1968-1974.²² A consensus was emerging that it was people, in the way they dealt with the environment and structured their social and economic systems, who actually created conditions for disaster agents themselves (Kent 1987).

The once obvious distinction between man-made and natural disasters also fell by the wayside. Disasters were often generated by forces much more complicated than previously thought. A myriad of interrelated factors -- poverty, political instability, technology, for example -- all may precipitate and exacerbate any given disaster. A man-made disaster may trigger a natural disaster or vice-a-versa. Take this scenario, for example: A war prompts an outflow of refugees from an agricultural area leaving it short of farmers to plant and harvest

²²See Franke and Chasin (1980) for discussion of the work of the French Agriculturalists.

which, in turn, threatens the onset of a famine (Kent 1987). These multifactor disasters have been dubbed, "complex disasters".

These related investigations -- into disaster frequency and impact globally and into disaster causation -- changed the way disaster research had been conducted. No longer researched in isolation, disasters and their relationship with development emerged as a major orienting theme. Even ecologists now agree that all disasters have, at their root, populations' vulnerability. Nevertheless, this concept of vulnerability has been a key point of debate -- whether it results from individual decision-making (ecologist view) or also from the social and economic organization of the population (structuralist view). It is to this latter perspective that we now turn.

C. The Critical Perspective

- Disaster Causation and Impact


Emerging from the research of the 1970s, a group of disaster researchers using marxist analysis now turned to investigate the previously neglected area of disaster causation. In contrast to the ecologists' environmental determinism, the critical perspective argues that it is the *interaction* between human beings and their environment which cause disasters.

This interaction works in two ways. Similar to ecologists, the critical perspective stresses that a vulnerable population must be present to interact with the physical agent in order to have a disaster. However, rather than being an exacerbating factor, a population's vulnerability is itself a causal variable of disasters. Together with the physical agent, vulnerability "triggers" the event (Susman et al. 1983). The second way the human-environment interaction causes a

disaster is when people directly alter their physical environment, thereby creating the conditions which engender disaster agents themselves. Deforestation is a clear example of human beings changing the environment and putting themselves at risk. The two variables which interact to cause a disaster are a vulnerable population and a deteriorating environment.

This perspective studies the roots of these two causal variables, which they argue to be structural in nature, not behavioral. Using the "development of underdevelopment" perspective (Seidman 1974; Rhodes 1970; Frank 1969), they argue that the marginalization process -- the interplay between external (foreign domination) and internal factors (economic structures) -- is what leads to vulnerable populations and deteriorating environments. Unequal relations create dependency, cause populations to migrate and disrupt economies and societies (Waddell 1983). Population and other social pressures cause the progressive destruction of the environment. From the local to the international level, social systems create vulnerability to disasters (Morren 1983; Torry 1979).

2 Direction of Disaster Causation



Thus, natural disasters are not aberrant events, but the results of "normal" social and economic relations -- they are *characteristic* features of societies and place (Oliver-Smith 1986; Hewitt 1983). Baird et al. (1975) defined disasters to be "the extreme situation which is implicit in the everyday condition of the population". Disasters are "parts of processes with spatial, temporal, and other properties" (Morren 1983). Thus, this perspective argues that there is a direct relationship between development and disaster vulnerability.

Jeffrey (1981) distinguishes the marxist concept of vulnerability from that of the traditional view explaining that,

It is not sufficient to list certain "factors" which may affect vulnerability, but rather the relationships between and among them must be clearly established. ...it is not sufficient to list such factors as history of settlement, government policies and agricultural practices as affecting vulnerability. It is necessary to go beyond a consideration of discrete causes and to focus on the system of relations. (emphasis mine).

Therefore, it is insufficient to argue that population growth is the cause of soil erosion due to over-farming or that a city's uncontrolled growth into hazardous areas is the cause of a landslide (Torry 1986; Zaman 1986; Jeffrey 1981). Rather, population movements, for example, have to be understood in relation to the process of national development, both economic and political. The poor are forced to leave relatively secure forms of adaptation and move into hazardous locations and economic relationships (Susman et al. 1983). Population growth and its location cannot, therefore, be isolated as a singular causal factor in disasters.

Researchers using marxist analysis have focused on changing economic relations -- the emergence of commercial cultivation for export -- and the progressive destruction of the environment due to population and

other social pressures (Waddell 1983). They have studied slow-onset disasters, like famine, which tend to be linked with environmental degradation in rural conditions in pre-industrial societies. These provide the best illustration of how social and economic exploitation and environmental abuse are themselves causes of disasters.

Wisner et al. (1977) study colonial and neo-colonial periods in Kenya to show how the penetration of capitalism into the arid zones resulted in the expropriation of land and the diversion of credit and marketing facilities away from the traditional peasantry. This "development" all but destroyed the traditional land use and herd management systems in the rural areas. With a restricted land base, over-farming and erosion obviously ensued thereby increasing farmer's vulnerability to drought.

Baird et al. (1975) analyze the origin of the large number of deaths resulting from Hurricane Fifi in Northern Honduras in 1974. Earlier, large companies had taken over the region for the cultivation of bananas for export displacing great numbers of peasant farmers from the fertile valleys. They were forced to clear and cultivate the surrounding hillsides thereby increasing the potential for soil erosion. When Fifi struck, the peasants were literally swept off the hillside.²³

In sum, the critical perspective consistently argues that there is a direct relationship between development and disasters. More than isolated factors, it is the process of capitalist development in third world societies which makes their populations more vulnerable to disasters. Furthermore, people are not passive actors upon which

²³Jeffrey (1981) looks at similar processes in her analysis of vulnerability and disasters in Indonesia. Hagman (1984) also reports similar factors which are increasing the populations' vulnerability to drought and flooding in various Latin American countries.

disaster fall; they are often active agents of disasters through their interaction with the environment. Vulnerability -- manifested in deteriorating environments and underdeveloping populations -- also determines the extent of disaster impact.

- Implications for Practice: The Critical Perspective and Disaster Assistance

These analysts have worked primarily at the levels of research and criticism of the effects of the relief system. The debate that they have sparked, however, has engendered a constructive shift in mainstream research and practice away from the strict emergency focus to one on disaster mitigation and prevention.

The critical perspective criticizes the direction and aims of much of traditional disaster assistance, particularly what they see as an overemphasis on the emergency and the resulting emphasis on technological solutions. As it is, they argue, relief aid simply reinforces the status quo before the disaster -- the process of development which produced such vulnerability in the first place (Susman et al. 1983). Traditional reconstruction aid restores things as they were (Hewitt 1983). In this light, disaster assistance is hardly neutral. It promotes further dependency which will, once again, encourage the deterioration of the physical environment and marginalization of the population, ultimately increasing vulnerability to disaster (Susman et al. 1983; Cannon 1977; O'Keefe and Wisner 1976). The current constellation of disaster and development aid allows the redomination of unequal relations.

Waddell (1983) argues, "...it is highly unlikely that any relief strategy, however well conceived, can modify the structure of the

economy or concomitant social order." To reduce the threat of disasters, they argue, disaster mitigation assistance must address the fundamental questions of economic dependency and patterns of social relations. Rather than pervasive, high-tech solutions, aid providers would do better to understand the social, economic and political processes in order to direct relief to support local coping mechanisms.

Disaster mitigation planning, therefore, must be concentrated within development planning (Susman et al. 1983; O'Keefe and Conway 1975). Because exploitation is an important disaster cause, the development planning context must be socialist in nature (Susman et al. 1983; Wisner 1978, 1976; Wisner et al. 1977; Cannon 1977; Westgate and O'Keefe 1976a). When post-disaster relief is required, it should be "based on the preservation and reinforcement of indigenous responses and involve a minimum of external intervention (national or international)" (Waddell 1983). This perspective calls for a new disaster planning model which would include socialist development planning to reduce vulnerabilities (proactive approach) and relief aid that is non-dependency generating (reactive approach).

III. A Distinct Area of Study and Practice: The Disaster and Development Intersection

Theory: An Emerging Perspective


The critical perspective has stimulated a vital and productive debate over basic premises and concepts within disaster research. Concurrent with this theoretical challenge, providers of disaster and development aid have also been facing, for the first time, a set of dilemmas in the field which challenge the traditional disaster practice. I argue that

together these challenges represent a watershed in disaster studies and planning -- a major rethinking of the disaster-development relationship. The reorganization of aid is currently underway.

Today, a new current of thought about disasters and their relationship with development is emerging from the ranks of disaster and development practitioners. In their attempt to make sense of the practical dilemmas, they have borrowed principles from the ecologist and critical perspectives. This perspective embraces the findings that challenge the traditional view of the "natural" separation of disasters and development. At the same time, however, it resists, as the only alternative, the negative prognosis for disaster and development aid argued by the critical perspective at the other extreme. Instead, these practitioners and experts recognize the *variability* of the relationships between disasters and development and argue a positive prospect for practice.

Today, the understanding of what constitutes a "disaster" is much broader than before. In the last decade alone, the understanding of the factors that engender and compound disasters are far more clearly recognized (Kent 1987). While it is impossible to pull out one definition of disasters used by practitioners, it is possible to generalize about the direction of causality accepted by most: Natural hazard plus vulnerable population produces disaster. Populations are vulnerable because of a number of factors inherent in certain development processes and natural hazards are occurring more because of environmental mismanagement and abuse resulting in its serious deterioration.

3 Direction of Disaster Causation



Disaster professionals from the field are helping to define new approaches in disaster planning. The dilemmas that they face have caused many to question the basic assumptions underlying the way disaster assistance is provided.

The practical dilemmas which practitioners face in the field arise from an apparent dichotomy between relief and development which was first articulated in the 1970s.²⁴ Traditional emergency relief had apparent negative consequences for development. After the cyclone and civil war hit Bangladesh in the early 1970s, critics of the relief system and the relief community itself began to reassess the effectiveness and impact of the aid. (This was the first time that humanitarian aid had come under any scrutiny.) They found that development programs which followed disaster aid often had to deal with the damaging consequences of inappropriate relief aid provided earlier, and were often impaired by dependencies created by the overly pervasive and invasive relief assistance.

²⁴This will be elaborated in greater detail in the next chapter where we will review the history of private foreign assistance.

Since this time, the literature evaluating and cataloguing relief's impacts on development has continued to grow.²⁵ Analysts found, for example, that many of the relief "solutions" actually left the populations even more vulnerable to disasters than they had been before. Ian Davis (1981) notes countless occasions where housing built after earthquakes ignored seismic-resistant codes. On other occasions, the inappropriate provision of food aid and other in-kind relief has been widely criticized for atrophying the local production and marketing channels and hindering the economic recovery of disaster-struck regions (Hay 1986). Disaster aid's propensity to create or reinforce communities' dependency on outside materials and expertise has been widely illustrated (Rolfe et al. 1987; Lincoln Young 1983; Cuny 1983; AFSC 1982).

At the project level, relief programs have impeded the introduction of development programs. Bates (1982) documents a common problem which emerges when a relief and a development program met in close geographical proximity in Guatemala after the earthquake in 1976. He gives the example of a relief agency who gave away houses to villagers while a development agency attempted to recruit them for a self-help housing scheme in which they must contribute their labor. Obviously, the two different activities and approaches clashed, thwarting the latter's efforts.

Aid providers continue to encounter the disaster-development relationship in a variety of their work settings. In their work with grassroots environmental projects, with refugees, and particularly with

²⁵Linden (1976), Lissner (1977), Dudasik (1979), Shawcross (1984), and Harrell-Bond (1986) are all practitioners.

the mega disasters like the rolling African Famine during the 1980s, aid providers must manage the intersection between poverty, development, and disasters. In all these areas, practitioners have tried to structure short-term aid which meets immediate needs in an emergency without creating new dependencies and to follow relief with long-term development work.

The theoretical debate represented by the behavioral versus the structuralist approach to disaster causation resonated with many practitioners and the dilemmas they were facing. From their experience, they have long recognized that disasters and development are unequivocally related. However, they saw that the disaster-development relationships may also take various forms. Like the ecologists, they have seen how underdevelopment puts increasing numbers of people at risk to natural hazards and has resulted in more deaths. Like the critical perspective, they have seen how greater development (particularly in terms of high technology) has increased the risk of disasters.

To explain these different outcomes, some experts have attempted to analyze disasters within the explicit context of development (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Franklin 1985; Cuny 1983). That is, they frame the concept of vulnerability specifically as a development problem. The process of development contributes directly to a population's vulnerability. Anderson and Woodrow (1989) write,

Vulnerabilities refer to the long-term factors which affect the ability of a community to respond to events or which make it susceptible to calamities....Vulnerabilities precede disasters, contribute to their severity, impede effective disaster response and continue afterwards.

This group does stress the circumstances which put people at risk to disasters, like population growth, land-use, and technology. While

clearly not the marxist variety of social relations, the analysis of these factors nonetheless go beyond the superficial perusal given them by the ecologists. These development factors, in fact, are at the center of much of their work. A recent World Bank report (Kreimer 1989) put it this way,

Extreme events are integral components of the environment. However, the extent of damage that results from them is to a significant degree a function of the decisions made, activities undertaken, and technologies utilized during the process of development. In many cases, costly losses produced by an extreme event are preventable.

However, by looking at factors rather than processes, practitioners stop short of the marxist structural analysis of vulnerability. Instead of changing political and economic structural processes, practitioners are most interested in knowing how to adjust to these factors in order to mitigate the impact of future disasters.

The over arching importance of development factors in the disaster equation led professionals to explore how disaster assistance can deal with the social and economic dimensions of disasters. Practitioners take as a starting point that *development* must be the ultimate objective for all disaster intervention -- both for mitigation and post-disaster response. Disaster professionals resist the marxist interpretation that disaster aid cannot mitigate disasters because it always reinforces the political and social status quo (which engendered poverty and vulnerability in the first place). Aid *may* do that. Or, it may foster economic change which leads to political and social reform.²⁶ Most take

²⁶In fact, the disaster professional in the PVO sector works from an understanding of "alternative development" in which empowerment and the eradication of poverty towards self-reliance are the key concepts in an appropriate development.

a positive view of development and aid -- which argues that if it is properly directed, aid may allow populations to decrease their vulnerability to disasters.

Recently, professionals are looking for principles to aid them design their disaster response. Some use a concept of *development* which includes its relationship with disasters. Anderson (1985) summarizes the concept of development as "a process through which people's vulnerability (economic, social, political, personal) is reduced." It is this "development" that this emerging perspective argues should be the objective of all disaster aid.

To address both short-term immediate needs and long-term risk-generating factors, professionals are increasingly arguing that it is important to integrate disaster and development aid in practice as well as in principle. Before disasters happen, development activities must be directed to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate their impacts; after a disaster occurs, disaster assistance provided should be linked with development programs which reduce populations' vulnerability to future disasters.²⁷ Bender (1989) and Kreimer (1989) stress that disaster mitigation and prevention should be "integral components" of development. In practice, however, relief and development aid are still often miles apart. We will look at what we know about integration of disaster and development assistance in practice in Chapter 3, "Practice: Integrating Disaster and Development Aid Programs".

²⁷For a sampling, see Kreimer and Zador (1989), Kent (1987), Kibreab (1987), Hay (1986), Gorman and Foote (1985), Cuny (1985), Anderson (1985), Bates (1982), AFSC (1982), and Kates (1980).

In sum, this review of the disaster literature has shown that most theorizing about the relationship between disasters and development has focused on the redefinition/reconceptualization of disaster causation and what role development plays in this. This theorizing is also intricately linked with practical considerations in disaster and development assistance. Above, we have outlined how the changing conceptualizations have directly translated into the way that disaster aid has been structured in the post-War period. Likewise, recurring practical dilemmas have also motivated the reexamination of the accepted conceptualization of disasters and development and reorganization of practice.

The Institutional Dimension of Disaster and Development Aid

The relationship between disasters, relief and development represents one of the major recurrent themes in the history of private foreign aid.²⁸ From the initial motivation for private aid to cross borders, to their shift from welfare to development programs, to attempts to reconcile apparent contradictions between disaster assistance and long-term development aid. This history of the understanding of the relationship between disaster relief and development aid and its institutional setting is at the same time the backdrop and the origin of the present research.

The link between theory and practice is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the area of foreign assistance. The three theoretical perspectives outlined in the previous chapter have had direct consequences for the organization of disaster relief and its relationship (or lack of it) with development assistance. This chapter presents a more complete review of the history of private foreign assistance, charting the evolution of the institutional dimension of the theoretical issues discussed earlier.

First, we will examine how private foreign assistance resulted in the institutional separation of relief and development aid. Next, we will sketch the present institutional setting of international disaster assistance with special reference to the factors that conspire to keep

²⁸This history of private foreign assistance is drawn primarily from Sommer (1977), Bolling and Smith (1982), Cuny (1983), Kent (1987).

the two aid types apart. Following, we will chart the changes in foreign assistance (emerging contradictions) and in the global environment (mounting pressures) that, together with the conceptual transformations documented above, culminated in the identification of the disaster-development split as the major obstacle to international disaster reduction assistance.

I. The Importance of Private Voluntary Organizations in Disasters

Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have joined with governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and special relief agencies in responding to the tremendous human suffering. Although the smallest actor in terms of dollar resources, PVOs play central roles in disasters which give their actions a far greater impact than mere dollars invested would suggest. The resources, expertise and coordination which PVOs provide are substantial and crucial to disaster response.

As a group, the PVO sector actually represents an important source of assistance for both relief and recovery. Hingson (1981) cites the private international assistance²⁹ raised and delivered 15% of the foreign assistance received in Kampuchea through 1981. In the case of the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, the sector provided the extraordinary 48% of the total international assistance received by those affected by the disaster. In absolute dollars, these percentages were equivalent to \$110 million in Kampuchea and \$75 million in Guatemala.

In the last fifteen years, the PVOs have demonstrated their growing capabilities and professionalism in disaster assistance roles. On the

²⁹These figures for the private international assistance includes North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

home front, they play the important role of alerting the general public of disasters and provide a channel for donations to those affected. Many times, PVOs are already on the scene doing development work when the disaster strikes. They send immediate assessment reports from the field, alerting the aid community and potential donors of needs and priorities sometimes days before any disaster personnel can make it to the affected area. PVOs often send their own disasters experts who work hand-in-hand with those of the UN and donor governments in assessing damage and planning the relief response.

While not always the svelte, unencumbered action agents they portray themselves to be, PVOs often do have more organizational and programmatic options than the large IGOs and donor governments. For example, the agency can choose to establish their own project on the ground, to channel funds to a local group or enter into joint projects with a local agency. Often, they can also resist spending their funds during the emergency period and, instead, use them for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The charter of bilateral and multilateral relief agencies often explicitly prohibit certain of these organizational arrangements and usually restrict both aid periods and types of aid.³⁰

Because they are largely involved in field operations, PVOs often occupy a special niche in disaster response. Especially in communities

³⁰Other organizational advantages often contributed to PVOs are, in fact, elusive most of the time. For example, donors will often give their money to the PVOs because they believe they will deliver the aid more directly to the affected communities. In particular circumstances, PVOs are seen to provide a welcome alternative to the government-to-government channels which are seen as cumbersome or politically-charged. While true in some cases, some PVOs were able to get relief to those who needed it in countries at times when donor governments and even the IGOs were not allowed in. In most cases, however, PVOs are not more able to escape political pressures than are other donors.

where they already have programs, PVOs may be more likely to work through the local leaders and encourage broad community involvement in the disaster relief and reconstruction activities. These agencies are able to reinforce local efforts that may be overlooked by larger relief programs. Through their development work, the PVOs are already familiar with communities' traditional forms of mutual aid and self-help in normal times. In times of disasters, the PVOs will often work with the affected community's traditional response and mechanisms for coping in crisis -- unlike their larger relief counterparts who often respond reflexively with massive food and material assistance.³¹

Just as the above characteristics and roles make PVOs attractive to donors, they have also made these agencies attractive to donor governments and IGOs. Through their many relationships with other relief actors, PVOs have assumed greater importance. To avoid political pressures, governments will often chose to channel funds through PVOs instead of directly. To improve their operations on the ground, intergovernmental organizations are increasingly using the grassroots knowledge of the PVOs by working jointly in disaster response. Governments of the affected country have also tended to become more interested in PVO activities. To enlist PVOs to "fill the gaps" of their own relief activities, host governments very often share funds, personnel, and material with PVOs. In many cases, these arrangements

³¹These advantages in theory are not always translated to advantages in practice. Too often, the opposite is true. Like all outsiders, PVOs new to the scene may feel their relief projects threatened by local leadership, or are in a huge rush to do something visible to send pictures to home office. Like all aid agencies working in an emergency, PVOs too feel the pressures to centralize and take control over their relief activities at the expense of their development principles.

allow PVOs to multiply the impact of their work and to insure its sustainability.³²

Finally, the PVOs are particularly well positioned to contribute to integrating disaster with development assistance. The standard development projects that many PVOs undertake, in fact, already have a significant disaster mitigation dimension. Although not called disaster mitigation per se, projects which work with communities to plant trees, terrace hillsides, and to introduce sustainable agricultural techniques are, in fact, tackling the problems of environmental degradation which is intricately linked with disasters. Development programs which aid communities to improve land tenure arrangements or change market relationships also seek to reduce certain economic dependencies which reduce the communities array of coping options in times of crisis. And as PVOs explore more how to directly reduce the incidence and extent of disasters, they are coming back repeatedly to these kinds of projects. As a result, PVOs are in a unique position -- because of their grassroots knowledge and growing professionalism in sustainable development -- to move from emergency relief activities to disaster mitigation in their standard programs.³³

³²Many PVOs may also feel that their work is threatened by too close relationships with host governments, particularly those governments who are seen to be part of the problem rather than the solution.

³³All of the above strengths of the PVO sector is not to meant to gloss over the many negatives. These agencies are subject to a myriad of pressures which limit their abilities to respond effectively in disasters. Not to mention the tremendous difficulties inherent in responding to a crisis event. Because of their own religious or charity principles/mandates, many PVOs put on themselves their own limits to what, when, and where they can intervene. Very often, PVOs end up competing with each other for victims, program turf, and recognition. In an effort to insure funding, they often try as hard as possible to distinguish themselves from the other agencies at times making it near

With the importance of PVOs in mind, we now turn to the review of the historical developments in private foreign aid. Specifically, we will explain how disaster relief and development aid emerged as separate types of foreign aid and why, in the last decade, this separation became framed as a problem in practice.

II. The Disaster-Development Rift

U.S. private voluntary assistance overseas dates back to before 1900. At its inception, all private voluntary assistance was humanitarian, first responding to crises caused by political conflict and famine, then by rapid onset disasters and wars. Private relief assistance from the U.S. was provided for thousands of Santo Domingans fleeing revolutionary unrest on their island in 1793; in the 1820s, aid was sent to the Greeks during the time they were fighting the Ottomans; and in 1847, assistance was sent during the Great Irish Famine. These efforts were ad hoc missionary-style responses to specific events.

In 1882, the best known relief organization, the American Red Cross, came into being.³⁴ After World War I, other private organizations emerged such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Rockefeller and the Carnegie Corporation among others, forming for the first time, "a cadre of trained administrators and overseas fieldworkers" (Sommer 1977).

impossible to coordinate joint projects.

³⁴"During and after the First World War, the Red Cross movement remained the single most important landmark in the evolution of humanitarian relief." (Kent 1987, pg. 35)

Today's relief operations grew out of approaches developed to help in the relief and reconstruction of Europe after World War II. During the post-war period through the 1960s, disasters were treated in isolation from development. Immediately following the war, PVOs played an important role in meeting emergency and short-term relief needs, relieving the misery of war victims, displaced and malnourished people. Their tasks consisted primarily of logistics. Few PVOs, however, participated in long-term recovery activities. At the time, these agencies and their activities were assumed to be temporary because the countries of Europe would quickly be able to return to normalcy.

By the early 1950s, the needs in Europe had subsided and the PVOs began to look for other roles. The relief agencies began to apply their experience from Europe to refugee problems arising in trouble spots in the Third World as well as to provide relief assistance in the wake of natural disasters often in the newly independent nations. At this point, they also began to involve themselves with longer-term recovery activities. But their role in the occasional conflict or disaster did not seem to be enough to occupy the many PVOs which had emerged in the wake of the War.

The PVOs' desire for institutional stability coincided with the emergence of the development field as a "major institutional growth industry" for foreign aid sector generally (Kent 1987). The development funds, however, were in the hands of the international governmental organizations and their brand of development (large-scale capital transfers and investment, infrastructure projects, and the extension of trade) was not possible for PVOs to undertake. Although the PVOs were acquiring development concerns, most of them were still oriented towards

relief and humanitarian assistance with little vision of their role in development. Because of the paucity of funds and the PVOs' still limited development perspectives, the comparatively large and wealthy IGOs generally considered the smaller and poorer PVOs as amateurish do-gooders. An institutional division of labor had emerged in which both sides kept their distance.

In addition to institutional skepticism, the division of labor also reflected the dominant attitude shared by all that disasters were simply temporary setbacks. While the IGO sector believed that for economic development, the developing countries needed outside aid, they believed that these same nations were able to handle the temporary disruptions caused by disasters. As a result, disaster relief was primarily the task for national governments complemented with a relatively small amount of foreign humanitarian aid, which the private voluntary sector appropriately provided. Foreign governments still sent "sympathy" and material aid in the wake of disasters, but theirs was by no means important responsibility for relief or recovery.

This neat division of labor between the IGOs and PVOs began to change in the next ten years. With the influence of the U.N. movements in community development in the 1960s, PVOs were able to make their first concrete steps away from relief and humanitarian aid as their primary activities. The number of new international PVOs shot up and both old and new agencies alike embraced community development as their institutional mandate. With albeit restricted funds from public donors, they were able to undertake small-scale projects directly aiding the poor in rural communities in the Third World. These grassroots projects eventually came to symbolize appropriate assistance and increasingly

drew attention, and funding, from the IGOs and donor governments. However, at this early stage of the PVO shift towards development, relief and recovery work in the Third World continued to be the PVO sector's mainstay activity.

In the early 1970s, the provision of relief and humanitarian aid also entered into serious question for the first time in its history. As PVOs gained more experience in the new setting, they began to find that many of the approaches they had employed in war and refugee relief in Europe made little sense in the Third World. Partially influenced by the new "development" PVOs, they found that their emergency-focused, centrally administered, logistics approach effective for post-war and refugee relief omitted activities necessary for the social and economic post-disaster recovery of Third World countries. For example, their relief distribution bypassed or replaced local markets and institutions and often completely neglected the affected communities' indigenous mechanisms for coping with disasters. There was a growing awareness that recovery from disasters was not a simple matter of "bouncing back" but depended in large part on a given country's development.

III. The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid

The contradictions between post-war relief practice and the disaster-recovery needs in the Third World came to a head in the early 1970s. After the cyclone and civil war hit Bangladesh in the early 1970s, the relief community, unhappy with its performance, began to reassess the effectiveness and impact of relief aid. Research into the approaches used to provide relief assistance produced reports of inappropriate aid, dependencies, and counterproductive consequences. Similarly, review of

other relief efforts found that few of the agencies had much experience in the countries where they were responding and fewer still employed personnel with the appropriate expertise for the kinds of disasters they were facing. The foreign aid community generally began to reexamine the very principles underlying the understanding of disasters and disaster relief.

This uproar over humanitarian aid was accompanied by the consolidation of many PVOs' move away from the relief -- both philosophically and in their standard assistance programs. In 1973, Robert McNamara gave his now-famous speech changing the World Bank's focus to programs directly targeted to reduce poverty. International PVOs followed suit and began their definitive transformation into private development organizations. By this time, the vast majority of the PVOs had some kind of development role.³⁵

But development's gain was disaster relief's loss once again. The PVOs themselves had firmly relegated disaster relief to second-rate status just as their IGO counterparts had done 15 years earlier. The newer, "more serious" business of development had usurped the PVOs' traditional relief and humanitarian focus. The PVOs now too argued that relief assistance had little long-term effect on the reduction of poverty. Unless the root causes of poverty could be ameliorated, they argued, populations would never be able to break out of the cycle of poverty and, among other things, would be unable to better cope with

³⁵As PVOs further evolved their own brand of development, rooted in community development, towards what today is generally called the "assisted self-reliance" approach to development, their role in the foreign aid sector generally changed. The IGOs and donor governments began to recognize the role and potential of PVOs in development. They increased their funding of PVOs and implementation of joint projects.

disasters. Many feared relief aid might even worsen poverty in the long-run through its tendency to create dependency on outside resources and expertise. PVO agency philosophies often reflected these concerns. Thus, the institutional and professional disdain for charity firmly reinforced the schism between relief and development aid that had emerged during the 1960s.

Although some in the development community did claim that "the era of relief was ended", this view was clearly premature. The need for disasters relief and humanitarian assistance would simply not go away. Not only were more people dying from natural disasters than the decade earlier³⁶ but also improved media technology brought disasters immediately stateside. As awareness of the Third World and their problems grew, the public put increasing pressure on the foreign aid community to respond.

The PVOs also were using the increased public awareness to their advantage. During the 1970s, appeals during disasters allowed PVOs to increase their visibility and image as effective people-to-people, grassroots alternative for development as well as relief. In turn, the donating public carefully scrutinized the effectiveness of these agencies in times of disaster equating their performance with overall agency effectiveness. Demonstrating their competence in relief was critical for PVOs' organizational security, not to mention survival.

As a result of increasing importance of disaster projects, the PVOs now devised a number of internal institutional arrangements. Development PVOs formed new departments for disaster relief and their

³⁶Six times more people died each year in natural disasters in the 1970s than the 1960s (Tinker and Philips 1986).

importance within the organizations began to grow. However, it was rare to find an agency in which the specialized units interacted much with the mainstream development departments within the same agency. It was even rarer to find a project manager in an agency that had both disaster and development experience. The kind of disaster relief was still primarily a logistics exercise delivering relevant materials, resources, and expertise.

Curiously, although PVOs' institutional interests in development were increasingly linked to disasters (visibility, image, and funding), the agencies still did not make the programmatic link between the two. Even development PVOs still handled relief as an altogether distinct aspect of aid -- organizationally and programmatically. When, in the 1970s, disaster research -- in particular, the work of the Marxists geographers -- brought the relationship between development, vulnerability, and disaster impact into the mainstream of thinking, PVOs continued to provide disaster aid in the old way. It took a huge shock to the aid community for them to reexamine their disaster practice.

At the end of 1984, world attention began to focus on a disaster event of unprecedented proportions. In Africa, a famine was spreading through the continent claiming the largest number of human lives since World War II in Europe (Tinker and Philips 1986). As the enormous proportions of the disaster became clear, the international community mobilized to provide immediate aid to stem the rising tide of death. The devastation and duration of the famine were overwhelming.

Battling a disaster of such magnitude and duration forced practitioners to rethink the cause of such disasters -- focusing on their relationship with development. Most importantly, they were forced

to rethink their own approaches to disaster practice. PVOs looked at their efforts throughout the famine -- they were so busy meeting emergency needs that they could not even begin to go after the underlying problems of the continent which were causing the famine itself. The problems were clearly linked to development which, unless corrected, would insure the continuation of famines.³⁷ PVOs asked themselves how they could change the conditions which make people vulnerable to disasters in the first place.

Similarly, they took a hard look at the purpose of providing disaster relief. They asked themselves, as development agencies what was the objective for their disaster assistance? What should be their role in disaster response? How should they design their short-term emergency actions to insure long-term rehabilitation and development that gets at underlying vulnerabilities?

IV. Framing the Problem: The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid

The need for disaster assistance was clearly on the rise, PVOs were responding to more disasters than the decade before, and with the famine in Africa, the PVOs were dramatically faced with the urgency of getting their houses in order. Their exploration of the questions surrounding the link between disasters and development has shaped the PVO sector in the 1980s. Cuny (1983) observes that,

³⁷It was all too evident that Africa's process of development neglected the agricultural sector upon which the majority of Africans depend for their livelihood. Overcultivation, overgrazing and deforestation resulted in desertification -- a position of extreme environmental, economic, and social vulnerability. In these conditions it only took the onset of the next drought, which are typical in the drylands, to trigger the rolling famine.

The growing awareness by volags of the connection between disaster response and development is the single most important trend in disaster programs today. More agencies are taking a hard look at their performance and the relationship between their post-disaster programs and longer-term development activities.

After the African famine of the 1980s, many PVOs began to revamp their disaster programs to not simply relieve human suffering after disasters, but also to reduce vulnerability to disasters in the first place and to prepare prone communities to cope with them when they do occur. Consensus grew that prevention, mitigation and preparedness were the most appropriate points for which PVOs to enter to address the disaster-development relationship.

Today, many agree that the major obstacle to taking this proactive stance, and to effective disaster reduction assistance generally, is the historical organizational and programmatic separation of disaster and development aid itself. The institutions responsible for disaster reduction policies do not connect with the development system in many countries.

While the events in Africa provided a critical push, similar imperatives to reduce the threat of disasters were arising from a broad range of work settings. PVOs' concern for i) environmental impacts of development, ii) their direct experience of the development setback problem, iii) the concern for project sustainability, and finally, iv) the soaring number of refugees worldwide who require permanent solutions have all led practitioners to reexamine the link between their disaster and development aid programs. We will look at each in turn.

Not just in the African famine but through their grassroots work generally, PVOs have been keenly aware of the growing crisis of the environment. This has been a particularly strong motivator for linking

disaster and development aid. The world's forests are rapidly diminishing and, in many parts of the world, the lands are suffering from catastrophic degradation of one sort or another. For those PVOs working with the poor, it is very clear that the development problems of the poor have intrinsic environmental aspects. Shortages of arable and pasture land have caused over farming, decreasing productivity, and have accelerated populations' move into ecologically fragile areas. The poor have the weakest entitlement to land and other resources and, as a result, they are the ones being pushed onto marginal lands and contributing to environmental degradation (although they are often less destructive than large commercial developers). In the 1980s, the global community reached a turning point in its perception of the relationship between environment, poverty, and economic development.³⁸ With the advent of the African famine, disasters were also added to this equation.

PVOs, in particular, have been at the forefront of promoting development approaches and technology that redress environmental degradation and which are environmentally sustainable. For example, PVOs have introduced more efficient stoves that reduce amount of fuel wood needed to cook in rural areas throughout Latin America. Agencies have worked with communities to plant fruit trees in hilly areas to provide increased nutritional and economic resources while at the same time to reduce soil erosion. A 1984 United Nations Environment

³⁸The World Commission on Environment and Development published its report, Our Common Future in 1987 which many have seen as a clear indication of this turning point in world perception (Lewis 1988).

Programme report praised PVOs as the most effective agencies in the campaign against desertification.

During this decade, many PVOs saw their own brand of development programs as the means to check environmental degradation. By doing so, they would also be working to prevent and mitigate future disasters. In tracing the causes of the African famine and the likely solutions, a clear distinction was made between the kinds of development programs in terms of their consequences for disasters. The large-scale, urban-based development policy and projects were linked to environmental degradation and the exacerbation of economic inequalities -- clearly part of the problem. On the other hand, the small-scale, technologically appropriate, grassroots projects undertaken by the PVOs in their standard development programming were tackling the problems of poverty and environmental degradation -- trying to change precisely those conditions which make people more vulnerable to disasters.

Agencies have also struggled with the disaster-development relationship in their other kinds of development projects. They directly feel the negative impact that a disaster inflicts on their existing development projects. Agencies commonly become involved in disaster relief response in an area where they are already working (Cuny 1983). They do so in order to, among other reasons, protect (or recuperate) development gains already made. However by responding, they frequently have to divert human, financial, and organizational resources away from ongoing development activities in order to meet the new set of immediate demands. The agency's standard development program and project goals are setback.

PVOs working in disaster prone areas also recognize the flip side of the setback problem. Development projects that do not address the population's fundamental position of vulnerability will themselves not have any lasting impact. A development project is sustainable when it can continue an appropriate level of benefits after the outside intervention ends (USAID 1988). This is obviously jeopardized in areas repeatedly suffering disasters. A housing program, for example, cannot continue to render its stream of services if the project area is flooded every year outstripping the community to cope.

For PVOs, sustainability is an important indicator of their projects' effectiveness -- can an agency pull-out and leave behind a functioning, self-reliant project or is the project dependent on the intervening agency for its survival? Their experience in responding to disasters are prompting agencies to examine how disasters affect their ability to do sustainable development. Specifically, can agencies enhance broad-based local participation and strong local institutional capacity -- two important ingredients for sustainable projects. The IGO sector, which increasingly evaluates PVO performance in order to provide them funding, also uses project sustainability as an important measure of effectiveness.

Finally, the growing crisis of refugees worldwide have encouraged aid providers to look for ways to link emergency relief with "durable solutions". While statistics are notoriously unreliable, estimates of refugees world wide put the number around 15 million (The Economist 1989). Their sheer numbers reflect the fact that refugees can no longer be seen as a transient phenomenon. Already by the early 1980s, many were arguing that aid "solutions" had to go beyond short-term relief to

long-term development programs to help refugees gain a self-reliant existence, whether they are resettled back home or in a new place (UNHCR/ILO 1982).

To compound the crisis, the growth of refugees is taking place in the least developed nations, most are in Asia and Africa. UNHCR reported in 1987/88 that,

a majority of the countries listed as least developed (less than US\$400 per capita GDP) are, or recently have been, involved in refugee or refugee-like situations as sources, sanctuaries or both.

Mostly of rural origins, the refugees flee to similar areas in the receiving countries where the majority of the population is already living in conditions of poverty -- poor areas receiving poor refugees. A massive influx of refugees often has tremendous social and economic impact on the receiving population.

In these settings, the objective of "durable solutions" is an issue of poverty alleviation and integrated development for both refugees and the host country. Refugee assistance cannot be effectively provided in isolation from development assistance. Practitioners have consistently argued that income-generating schemes and resettlement projects targeted for refugees have to be integrated into the ongoing development of the region for them to work.

Since the early 1980s, concerns over the skyrocketing costs of handling the growing numbers of refugees, the large donors looked increasingly to the PVO sector as implementing partners.³⁹ In doing resettlement projects with refugees, PVOs face another set of

³⁹Kent 1987 notes that in 1981 the first International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I) was an important shift to the recognition and reliance on PVOs.

development implications of relief assistance. Particularly in situations in which relief aid is comprehensive and prolonged, a relationship of dependency between the agency and the refugees often develops. The dependency relationship has many manifestations in the context of these projects -- the expectation of indefinite donations and reluctance to participate on the part of refugees and paternalistic assistance on the part of the aid agency. While dependency is a very complex topic and often contradictory in its usage as a term, practitioners have said "it is a visible factor" and one that must be dealt with by PVOs initiating income-generation and resettlement schemes with refugees (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Rolfe et al. 1987; Cuny 1983; AFSC 1982).⁴⁰

Through their prolonged work with refugees, PVOs recognized that "the way [in which] relief assistance is provided influences the settlement initiatives of the refugees and their further integration process" (Apfel 1987). They faced the need to develop effective strategies to phase their relief into development assistance.

From the above it is clear that PVOs have faced the intersection of relief and development aid in a wide variety of settings and have had to cope with the issues within each. The position that the PVOs occupy in disasters has allowed them to be important innovators during the 1980s. For policy-makers, the PVO sector has generated valuable experience for how to approach the disaster-development connection in practice.

In the next chapter, we will review the different approaches that the PVO sector take to integrate disaster and development assistance. But

⁴⁰The dependency relationship is dealt with in detail in Chapter 8.

first, we will briefly describe the present constellation of actors that make up the disaster response network. Despite efforts to the contrary, the loosely functioning disaster response network has made little progress on coordinating disaster with development aid in practice.

V. The Present Institutional Setting of Disaster Assistance⁴¹

A. The Donors

Today, a wide range of actors provide assistance in times of disaster. By far the most critical actors are the governments and organizations of the affected countries themselves. They are responsible for disaster prevention and mitigation, they are the first on the scene when disaster strikes, and they bear primary responsibility for relief operations. They also provide more resources to the relief effort than do foreign donors -- about two to one more resources (Kent 1987; Brown 1979).

In this overview of foreign disaster assistance, however, we focus on international donors -- of primary interest is the private voluntary sector, but much larger in terms of resources transferred are foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations. These foreign donors interact with a wide range of actors within the affected country, including the national and local government and quasi-governmental organizations, indigenous PVOs and, of course, the affected communities themselves.

Donor governments provide, by far, the largest amount of foreign relief assistance coming from the outside. The USAID Office of Foreign

⁴¹This section is drawn primarily from Green (1977), Brown (1979), Kent (1983 and 1987), and Macalister-Smith (1985).

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the world's largest donor and is authorized to donate up to \$3 million for any single disaster and, if need be, can go to congress for additional appropriations.⁴² Nevertheless, the U.S. government takes great pains to see that disaster relief is kept separate from development assistance. Although within USAID, the OFDA is its own office. Disaster aid is limited in terms of amount and the time period; its use is carefully stipulated for relief only. Since the early 1970s, the OFDA has also been involved in emergency preparedness and prevention activities as well as disaster response.⁴³ They work closely with other disaster organizations and, in the case of emergency, channel funds and materials directly to the governments of the affected country as well as through IGOs and PVOs.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) include a range of organizations. Regional and economic groups often play a part in disaster relief, such as the European Community, the Organization of African Unity, Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The development planning and financing institutions, such as the World Bank, will also often play a role in disaster reconstruction. However, the United Nations (UN) organizations are by far the most active and

⁴²Aid provided by governments is always seen to have some political implications, especially when it is direct government-to-government transfers. The U.S. government often supports friendly governments with aid while bypassing unfriendly governments. Also, disasters provide another way for supporting U.S. producers through food subsidies and technology sent for relief. These have been documented extensively. To lessen some of the political implications, governments will channel funds through the IGOs and directly to the implementing PVOs.

⁴³The OFDA was instrumental in organizing the different disaster preparedness projects (notable in the Caribbean) as well as funding training in emergency management throughout the world.

pervasive. In times of disaster, there are at least 16 U.N. agencies which can become involved in disaster relief activities -- for example, there is UNHCR, UNDRO, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, ILO.

The IGOs do not usually directly distribute relief on site, but rather channel resources to those working on the ground (recipient government officials and voluntary organizations). Compared to bilateral aid, the financial contributions of most IGOs to relief are relatively small. IGOs are also known to be slow to respond in emergencies, encumbered by their bureaucracies.⁴⁴ They are often accused of being overly concerned with their own institutional interests rather than those of the affected.⁴⁵ To their advantage, however, IGOs have the very important element of "access". They are usually familiar with conditions of the country (resources, infrastructure, operations) from existing working relationship with government which can be used to their advantage in a disaster response. The host government also knows the IGOs and will call upon them for aid when disaster strikes. They have often played the role of "lead agency" coordinating to various degrees foreign relief assistance.

The IGOs still predominantly respond with disaster assistance only after an event. UNDRO and UNHCR respond with humanitarian relief aid during the emergency period. The World Bank is an important provider of

⁴⁴However, UNICEF, whose mandate does not require it to seek the approval of member governments to intervene, can often take quicker initiative than other IGOs.

⁴⁵In particular, the U.N. system encounters special problems that make it difficult for its different agencies to act cooperatively or with a common voice. Their uncertain mandates and the inconsistent use of U.N. agencies by governments has led to competition and rivalry between the agencies (Kent 1987).

reconstruction and rehabilitation aid after the emergency period which is critical for recovery. Over the years, the Bank has moved to include economic, as well as physical, recovery projects. In general, these development planning and financing institutions, however, are still reluctant to deal with disaster management (prevention, mitigation) on a non-crisis basis. Although some funds recently have been made available for longer-term prevention activities,⁴⁶ the funds are scarce and most come not from the mainstream development agencies, but from humanitarian assistance agencies (Kreimer and Zador 1989).

The number and variety of PVOs providing disaster aid, as mentioned earlier, has increased tremendously since the War. They provide the least amount of resources of the above donors but the total amount that the PVO sector provides to a given disaster is significant and are critical actors for the reasons outlined earlier. An intervening PVO may often both fund others' operations and/or implement its own relief project on the ground. In disasters which often represent delicate political situations, PVOs are often seen as taking an independent stance and working directly with people rather than governments (although this is frequently not the case in reality).

The Red Cross is the principle PVO network for mobilizing and distributing international assistance in times of disaster. However, unlike the Red Cross, most PVOs are primarily involved in development

⁴⁶Most notably (from Kreimer and Zador 1989): After the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, the World Bank's Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project was allocated to prevention and mitigation activities -- namely, seismic engineering research and a program for the structural reinforcement of schools and health care facilities subject to earthquakes. The World Bank's La Paz Municipal Development Project (1987) allocated one third of the funds to mitigate landslides and floods which had been plaguing that city for centuries.

programs and disaster relief is only one component of their work. During the last fifteen years or so, PVOs have developed specializations in their disaster response. CARE, for example, is well known for its logistics ability in handling large scale food distributions. Oxfam is noted for its clean water schemes and camp operations and Save The Children for their expertise in dealing with problems faced by children. Others are known for their work and disaster technology in particular sectors such as housing or agriculture. In addition to emergency relief and reconstruction, PVOs also are increasingly involved in emergency preparedness activities.

B. The Foreign Disaster Assistance Community

Many analysts throughout the last twenty years have attempted to bring some coherence to the actions of this group of actors providing disaster relief. Many hoped to form an "international disaster relief system" in the 1970s, arguing that there was at least some potential to respond to disasters in a coordinate and predictable manner (Kent 1983; Cuny 1983; Brown 1979; Green 1977). But by the end of the 1980s analysts have largely accepted that what they have is not a formal system, but rather a loose "network" of actors whose disaster response is still largely lacking coordination, reliability, and formality.

During the 1960s, the international response to disasters was almost without exception uncoordinated, ad hoc response of a large number of donor agencies of great variety. There were very few links between PVOs and government donors for funding disaster response. PVOs maintained

little contact with each other during disaster relief operations,⁴⁷ nor did they coordinate funding appeals or logistical arrangements. Governments of affected countries -- even those of disaster prone countries -- rarely had disaster or emergency plans or any kind of planning mechanisms.

However, the large number and variety of actors responding in any given disaster and the growing awareness of the inappropriate and highly politicized nature of the relief being provided spawned an effort to improve relief aid and its coordination.⁴⁸ During the 1970s, the media, interests groups as well as recipient governments levied intense pressure on the foreign aid community to improve its provision of relief. The U.N. and its major agencies received much of the attention and they undertook considerable organizational changes--creating specialized units or departments to deal solely with disaster relief, preparedness, and prevention. Most importantly, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) was created in 1971.

PVOs also began to rethink their isolated approach to disaster relief. During the 1970s, they too created international, regional, and domestic coordinating mechanisms for their disaster aid. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies created the Voluntary Agency Steering Committee in 1972 to help coordinate the international relief response and information sharing of the major private voluntary groups.

⁴⁷The League of Red Cross Societies were an exception. Early on, they provided information to The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (a clearing house for PVOs).

⁴⁸In the late 1960s early 1970s, a string of severe disasters captured the attention of the First World which, among other things, revealed that the international aid community was unprepared and unsophisticated in its disaster response.

IGOs also began to coordinate disaster relief with the PVOs during the 1970s -- the League of the Red Cross and UNDRO, for example, have worked out a rather effective coordinating arrangement. These mechanisms reflected the sector's recognition that coordination is an important aspect of effective relief.

However, into the 1980s effective coordination of relief response proved to be generally difficult and efforts to do so inevitably fell short of their goals. No actor is free from contending pressures that influence their ability to structure their response. Extreme logistical conditions are characteristic of disaster situations which make it difficult to pool information or resources. Deep organizational differences along the lines of agency priorities, mandates, and approaches have kept many agencies at arms length from each other. Coordination between the PVOs has been particularly difficult because of their fund raising need to differentiate themselves from the pack.⁴⁹ Sometimes the lack of exchange between actors in the same disaster is simply a result of the low priority that different agencies give to liaison relationships. On the ground, however, PVOs will more often form coordinating groups especially if there is a permanent field personnel; these, however, tend to be ephemeral. In 1987, Kent concluded that,

the myriad of actors with relief roles could not easily be honed into a system, either informal or formal. The diversity of interests and approaches alone meant that greater systematization was an elusive if not impossible goal.

⁴⁹Many PVOs appeal to the same general donor public for funding. This competition at the coffers is not conducive for collaboration on site. Some PVOs, however, have managed to get together to make joint appeals after a disaster and to agree on the use of the collected funds.

Today, while foreign disaster aid frequently suffers from the difficulties described above, the efforts to coordinate have produced an institutional network of sorts which has reduced much of the duplication and haphazardness characteristic of disaster aid through the early 1970s. The IGOs have stockpiled emergency materials in different regions of the world for faster response; governments are establishing and reinforcing national emergency plans. With the shift towards disaster prevention and preparedness, disaster experts have developed new technologies and mechanisms for improving disaster response. The governments of the affected countries, rather than the international community itself, have often proven to be the best coordinators of disaster relief (Kent 1987; Franklin 1985).

PVOs have come a long way from the kind of disaster assistance that they provided during the post-World War II era. Their experience with environmental deterioration, refugees, and disasters have led them to recognize the need to act pro-actively and to address the underlying disaster vulnerabilities. The loosely functioning disaster response network, however, has made only limited progress on the issue of integrating with development aid. The next chapter reviews the efforts in this area.

Practice: Integrating Disaster and Development Aid Programs

We have seen both the theoretical and practical reasons for integrating the two aid types in the previous two chapters. A new consensus among disaster experts has emerged which recognizes that it is people, in the way they deal with the environment and structure their social and economic systems, who actually create conditions for disaster agents to do damage. Similarly, researchers agree that development is no longer accepted as the force which will inherently reduce a population's vulnerability to disasters; its potential for increasing the risks of disaster is also recognized. That is, populations are at risk because of a number of factors inherent in certain development processes, like population growth, land-use, and technology.

In practice too, aid providers can no longer afford to ignore disaster vulnerabilities which untreated insure the continuance of disasters and which threaten the sustainability of their development programs. They now argue that in order to effectively address both emergency needs and the long-term risk-generating factors, they must integrate these objectives in operations.

This chapter will examine what we know about institutional efforts to integrate disaster and development aid programs on the ground. Although a topic of discussion for some time, efforts have been spotty and evaluation of experience equally so. This chapter, therefore, seeks to fill in our knowledge about disaster-development practice.

This chapter then first identifies the integration efforts, both PVO and others, that are currently taking place in two instances -- before and after disasters.⁵⁰ Then, through the review of a selection of cases of PVO programs, this chapter makes a preliminary mapping of disaster-development linking efforts in the post-disaster period. While not meant to be definitive, this typology is the first of its kind and attempts to identify both overall linking approaches and the important components in the link. The typology will raise issues that will be explored in detail throughout the remainder of the dissertation using the central case study of Armero, Colombia.

By examining practice, this research finds that there is in fact a specific stage that aid agencies manage, the transition stage, to phase relief into development. This stage entails management strategies, programs, and agency-beneficiary relations. Post-disaster programs moving to development also encounter a variety of recurring problems or obstacles with which they must cope; these too will be outlined.

Despite their efforts, the present research confirms others' observations that few agencies have successfully resolved the issue of linking. Our mapping of practice, however, provides us with the starting point for evaluating what may be viable approaches to the integration of disaster and development aid in the PVO sector.

⁵⁰No attempt is made to evaluate how widespread their use is, however. Indeed, the starting point is that integration of disaster and development aid is still the exception rather than the rule.

I. Integrating Disaster and Development Assistance

Institutional and program approaches to disaster response have artificially and unnecessarily separated the two aid types over the years. Hay (1986) asserts that "...the arbitrary divisions between relief and development assistance are unhelpful in practice...". Kibreab (1987) calls the separation of relief and development assistance a "false dichotomy" perpetuated by institutional jurisdictions. Cuny (1983) asserts that aid providers have missed important opportunities to use relief to aid development. As a result of the separation, the move from relief to broader and longer-term development programs, in many cases, has simply not been made (Kent 1987; Sommer 1977).

More disaster and development professionals are arguing that there is no reason that disaster relief should be artificially separated from development objectives and continue to have negative developmental impact. Unlike the critical perspective, practitioners argue that there is nothing inherently evil about outside assistance. A major thrust of their work explores how to restructure both disaster and long-term development aid to mutually support each other in order to reduce vulnerability to disasters. There are two instances in which PVOs attempt to integrate -- before and after disasters.

A. Pre-Disaster Integration

Before a disaster happens, *development* programs in hazard prone areas include components which prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disaster impacts. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) incorporates hazard assessment and mitigation into some of their regional development plans. They have also placed disaster specialists in development planning (Bender 1989). The World Bank, too, has

recently included a mitigation component in a non-emergency municipal development project in La Paz, Bolivia. The Bank has also given "freestanding" disaster mitigation loans to Mexico to address a range of their disaster risks which form part of their country portfolio of loans. The regional and intergovernmental organizations have been relative late comers to disaster-related development aid.⁵¹

The private voluntary organizations, on the other hand, have long been involved in disaster-related development, even before these projects were called such. As mentioned earlier, they have worked with communities to reforest lands, terrace erosion areas, introduce more efficient wood burning stoves, educate farmers about environmentally sound agricultural practices and food storage schemes, implement rural water resource projects in drought prone areas, and encourage local saving societies to mention just a few of the kinds of development projects that have disaster mitigation objectives. Many small- and medium-scale projects were not targeted at economic growth (like the larger IGO projects) but rather emphasized social and economic security.

The PVO sector has also led other institutions in their recognition of the affected communities as important resources in times of disaster. Traditional forms of mutual self-help, leadership, and social organization are all mechanisms that communities use to cope with hardship and stress. In their non-emergency projects, many PVOs seek to strengthen communities' capabilities prior to a disaster as a proactive

⁵¹These institutions are, at the same time, watching keenly that the disaster mitigation components do not replace existing development funds destined for new investments.

strategy to mitigate disaster impact and to aid recovery (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Sykes 1989).

B. Post-Disaster Integration

After disasters, there seem to be two major approaches to promote the linking of relief and development assistance in use. The first approach reorients relief itself -- what and how it is provided -- in order to bring it into line with development objectives. The approach downplays the distinction between stages after a disaster and argues that "development principles" can be introduced from the very beginning. As Cuny (1983) notes,

It should be clear now that relief and reconstruction programs cannot be viewed or carried out as separate or distinct operations. They must be conducted in the same manner as development programs.

The reorientation of relief represents a major break from the traditional way relief has been provided in the immediate post-war period -- a logistics approach that was invasive, pervasive, and devoid of beneficiary participation. Instead, this new focus for disaster relief is in accordance with development objectives. Relief aid, delivered in a fashion that "builds on local resources and capabilities, reinforces local decision-making power, and is sensitive to indigenous social structure and culture", can encourage development later (Snow 1987). Operationally, this usually means that post-disaster interventions must include beneficiary participation in relief (needs assessment, administration, and evaluation) and long-term objectives from the project's initiation.

Reoriented (or, "development-oriented") relief, then, has moved away from its top-down, logistics approach. The amount of aid needed has

been reassessed downwards in most cases. Technology which is more appropriate for third world settings and for project sustainability has been introduced. The collected experience of reorienting relief to support subsequent development has been growing (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Apfel 1987; Rolfe et al. 1987; Cuny 1985; Reiff 1985; Bates 1982; UNHCR/ILO 1982).

Related to reorienting relief, this first approach also advocates integrating development objectives into disaster recovery programs. For example, a project which not only restores but also improves irrigation and food storage infrastructure to redress the vulnerabilities revealed by the disaster. These intermediate programs resemble the pre-disaster integration efforts mentioned above, but are shorter in duration and specifically linked with reconstruction activities. They also advocate the incorporation of disaster prevention and mitigation into development programs. In general, evidence suggests that these adjustments have made relief aid more appropriate, less dependency generating, and more complementary to the development programs that may follow.

The second approach -- and the subject of this thesis -- to promote the integration of disaster and development assistance complements the reoriented relief approach. This second one is the creation of *institutional arrangements* for making the transition from relief to disaster-resistant development.⁵² Disasters provide the momentum to revamp out-dated institutional arrangements -- specifically, to overcome

⁵²Sometimes PVOs do not want to link their relief programs with longer-term development programs because to do so is outside of their agency's mandate (as in a strictly relief agency) or the situation simply may not warrant it (the affected population is managing its own recovery and sufficiently accessing resources). These situations, while not infrequent in disasters, are not our present concern.

institutional jurisdictions in order to manage overlapping responsibilities from the short- to long-term disaster reduction activities. PVOs use programs, management strategies, and relationships with beneficiaries and the host State to shift the disaster response to development.

This second approach is receiving much less research attention. There is no comprehensive look at how PVOs make the program transition after disasters nor at what the process itself entails. Project reports and academic writings are littered only with fragmentary references to linking. Rolfe et al. (1987), for example, have collected and catalogued some data on how PVOs use income-generation projects with refugees to bridge from relief to development. Cuny (1983) observed that some PVOs use relief assistance as a way to gain a presence on the scene, to then introduce their longer-term programs.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been looking into how to integrate emergency and development assistance. The Technical Support Service of UNHCR, for example, has promoted activities that link refugee aid to development programs since 1985. They have been exploring inter-agency means for doing so, such as doing joint projects with development agencies in several countries. Another of their models involves "the expansion of development projects which previously took no account of refugees to benefit the latter, with UNHCR raising the funds for the refugee component." (UNHCR 1987/1988)

Overall, the literature's treatment of institutional linking models has left many questions unanswered. For example, a recent book reviews different approaches to disaster assistance and suggests that some may offer "a viable model for linking emergency relief with development"

(Anderson and Woodrow 1989). The authors reference a particular example in which the "viable model" included the implementation of a sequence of post-disaster programs -- leading from the most temporary, interim programs, to medium-term "disaster prevention programs" (which greatly resembled integrated rural development projects) and, finally, to longer-term governmental development programs. The programs appeared to target the same geographical region. The authors suggested in passing that one viable linking model would be this progression of projects within one region.

This example, however, did not evaluate in any detail its proposed model for linking. Like the literature generally, this case begs a number of questions. Can we say that "viable linking" is one in which an agency's portfolio shifts from mostly relief projects to mostly development projects? Or, should the project participants move to a development program be the variable defining affective linking? Does the fact that the emergency, medium-term, and long-term projects are contiguous with one another signal that integration of disaster and development objectives has taken place? Or, does linking imply some kind of coordination and interaction between? What are the problems that these post-disaster integration efforts commonly meet, and how do programs overcome them?

Important answers to these questions are to be found on the ground, in the arena of implementation. The transition is not solely a question of institutional coordination, as the literature at times seems to imply. From our review of post-disaster programs, we find that PVOs use programs and management strategies, and the relationships with their program participants and the host government in different ways in order

to institutionally link aid programs and to insure the transition from disaster response to development.

We now turn to a characterization of what is involved in the disaster-development linking process generally and, from our review of PVO practice, of what are the components of such a linking.

II. Institutional Approaches to Disaster-Development Linking Process

Agencies which intervene after a disaster make a number of decisions about when to intervene and what kind of aid to provide. Equally important, they also define how to integrate objectives and insure the move to the development programs after relief. They are faced with a wide array of implementation questions. They must decide if they will meet the variety of needs that are found in the disaster aftermath or concentrate their efforts in one sector. The relationship between activities must also be defined -- whether to closely build development out of their earlier disaster programs, for example. With many felt needs of the affected populations, PVOs must decide whether to concentrate their efforts with a particular group of beneficiaries or geographic area. Do they sequence their own programs from the most temporary and interim to more permanent activities or do they coordinate with other programs? In answering issues like these, agencies define post-disaster approaches to link emergency aid to development programs.

The point at which agencies ought best to phase-out relief is rarely clear. Although agencies know that they ought to limit the duration of relief, at what point is relief best stopped? Do they just stop after some arbitrary amount of time? Although somewhat harsh, it is argued, this kind of "jolt" may be the best way to encourage aid recipients to

speed up their own recovery efforts and/or to return to traditional coping strategies. Or, do they phase-out relief only after certain recovery trends and programs have "taken hold"? Proponents of this view argue that until people are able to return to work and permanent solutions, such as housing, are in place, that cutting off relief is not only inhumane but also counterproductive.

Still, neither approach provides precise indicators for when to stop relief and both belie the very strong pressures that agencies often face to continue relief assistance. Moreover, the wrong choice may have some alarming results. Introducing development criteria too early may render both the relief and development aid ineffectual and even damaging (Rolfe et al. 1987). Prolonging relief wastes valuable resources and encourages dependency (Cuny 1983).

These examples of the implementation issues that PVOs must face in order to move from relief to development underscore the importance of understanding the mechanics -- the "how to" -- of making the transition. They must determine how program and administrative arrangements will begin to meet development objectives. Are relief activities built-upon or themselves remodelled into development programs? How does the management of the project change to support new programs? How will the beneficiaries' organization and the relationship with the agency translate from relief to development? What relationships external to the project -- for example, with the state, other PVOs, and development trends -- need to be established or transformed to permit the programs or their benefits to be sustainable?


This transition is an issue which few aid organizations have successfully resolved. However, they have been attempting to do it, even if in an ad hoc manner much of the time. The objective of the present focus on the institutional mechanisms for linking aid is to begin to fill the gaps in this area of disaster literature. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, is concerned with first order of exploratory research -- the identification and categorization of PVO linking practice.

A. Models and Scenarios

We draw a preliminary mapping of PVO practice which characterizes four linking models. These models include the different arrangements of assistance, as indicated by the circles below, arranged across the post-disaster stages from emergency to development. Each assistance circle may include different kinds of programs, management strategies, and relationships. The intersection of these circles indicates institutional areas where assistance overlap with each other and what is referred here as institutional linking. Alongside these models are included short vignettes of actual post-disaster programs drawn from the literature.

The present mapping may refer to post-disaster programs in which a single agency does both relief and development programs as well as to cases in which more than one agency is involved.

- The Multiple Program Approach



The PVO undertakes a number of different activities/programs in the affected area after the disaster in order to meet a variety of post-disaster needs. The agency provides emergency relief as well as stop-gap recovery programs and, eventually, longer-term development programs.⁵³ These programs do not deliberately complement or supplement each other, although there may be some overlap of beneficiaries or implementation period. Although contiguous programs, the phase-out of relief is not coordinated with phase-in of other programs.

Example 1⁵⁴: In the wake of the disaster in Armero, Colombia, Catholic Relief Services responded with much needed emergency assistance -- medicine, clothing, personal hygiene supplies, and food -- to many of the camps and shelters in the Armero Valley. A bit later, CRS also implemented some interim programs that included the creation of short-term paid activities (tree planting and cleaning parks) and well-digging. The idea of these programs was to aid communities until their usual water supplies were restored and villagers could find permanent income sources (or they were restored or created). For the longer-


⁵³The different post-disaster programs will be defined later in this chapter.

⁵⁴Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).

term, CRS began a variety of development projects which included, among others, the construction of housing and the funding of small-scale enterprise development (loans, training, revolving funds). All these programs were undertaken in different localities throughout the Diocese of Ibagué which included the city of Ibagué, the Armero Valley, and some mountain communities above the Valley.

Example 2⁵⁵: After the earthquake in Guatemala in 1976, outside PVOs flooded the affected areas. The Salvation Army distributed free food. The American Red Cross and the Mennonites constructed over 10,000 temporary houses for disaster victims. World Neighbors initiated a *lamina* (roofing) program that subsidized the sale of roofing materials and provided training and technical assistance for anti-seismic construction techniques. All four agencies implemented their programs through local grassroots organizations with some overlapping of geographical area and implementation periods.

- Integrated Relief and Recovery Approach



The agency does both emergency relief to meet immediate needs and recovery programs at the same time, side by side, with the same beneficiaries. The agency does not follow its disaster intervention

⁵⁵Adapted from Bates et al. (1982).

with any specific development program or attempt to channel their efforts into other development plans. Rather, through its relief and recovery programs the PVO hopes to set up the appropriate environment and infrastructure conducive for development activities to take off.


Example 1⁵⁶: Catholic Relief Services in Thailand was asked to manage health care provision for the Greenhill Site B refugee camp. CRS stressed prevention and public health education in addition to the traditional curative medical services. During their stay in the camp, some residents were trained as health workers and the medical center was staffed with Khmer personnel, with CRS doctors playing a supportive role. There was no provision made to have these trained Khmer health workers to join specific long-term program upon their departure from camps. However, they will take their skills with them when they return to Kampuchea.

Example 2⁵⁷: In 1979/1980, over one million refugees entered Somalia from Ethiopia, most ending up in thirty-five refugee camps. The American Friends Service Committee and Quaker Peace Service (British Quakers) were invited to implement a "flexible development program" in one of the refugee camps (Daray Macaane) in Northwest Somalia. The program encouraged income generation projects, including individual gardens and a small business loan and assistance scheme. The program focused on interim projects to supplement aid received in the camp and skills that the refugees could take with them when they left the camps to resettle.

⁵⁶Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).

⁵⁷Adapted from Rolfe et al. (1987).

- Integrated Recovery and Development Approach



The PVO responds with recovery programs with the explicit intent of incorporating them into broader development programs which include disaster-related components. This emphasis does not build on relief efforts in the area (theirs or anybody else's).


This is the most common kind of linking used by development agencies whose mandates do not include disaster relief. It has, however, been used mostly for the physical realm of disaster reconstruction.

Example 1⁵⁸: In late 1984, CARE began to distribute food in Kordofan, one of the largest regions of Sudan in response to the urgent needs of the famine (1983-1985). They also operated a supplementary feeding program for pregnant and lactating women and children under five, a high-risk group. In the midst of their relief project, CARE began thinking about the long-term environmental factors that had brought on the current drought and famine. By the end of 1985, they had designed and begun implementation of an agroforestry extension program with the Forestry Department of Sudan (Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources) to halt continued desertification and to restore the viability of agricultural activities in Kordofan.

⁵⁸Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).

Example 2⁵⁹: As a result of the 1973 drought in Mali, five thousand people sought refuge in a government relief camp in the town of Goundam. By 1974, several thousand refugees still remained in the camps; they were primarily nomadic herders who were unable to reinstate their former lifestyle. An agricultural resettlement project -- a new village named Tin Aicha -- was begun with 100 nomad families on land granted by the local commandant on the shore of Lake Faguibine. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was asked to support the work of other Malian groups by "provid[ing] technical assistance and funds for community projects" in the new village. AFSC worked in the community through 1980.

- **Shaping Development out of Relief Approach**



The PVO initiates its relief response with the specific motive of beginning a particular development project. Relief activities are transformed into standard development programs and the beneficiaries of the relief program move along into the longer-term programs too. This approach is essentially a linear process -- it builds on a single

⁵⁹Adapted from AFSC (1982).

project and location, rather than many different projects and/or localities.⁶⁰

Example 1: After the Armero disaster, Save The Children set up an emergency camp for survivors. The camp provided its residents with shelter, food, water, medical care, and soon initiated small income earning activities. Three months later, the agency bought a farm and hired permanent staff with development expertise who consolidated plans to implement with camp residents an integrated recovery project.

Six months after establishing the camp, they began transforming the temporary relief and recovery measures into long-term, self-help programs -- an income generation program, housing, education, and primary health care programs were all initiated.

Example 2⁶¹: In Santo Domingo, Philippines, the Volcano erupted endangering a number of villages targeted for work by the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR). The IIRR rerouted their newly trained "rural reconstruction facilitators" (RRFs), initially scheduled to begin community development work in the villages, to live in the evacuation centers and work as part of the disaster response team of the municipality as "action coordinators". While not participating in the distribution of material relief supplies, the RRFs worked in the organization of the residents. The RRFs saw that the centers were organized according to village, they consulted the residents and helped

⁶⁰A slight variation on the above is when the agency has a development project in an area when disaster strikes. In response, the agency adds a relief component to its ongoing project. When disaster passes, the agency phases out the relief and returns to its original development project, perhaps with some new disaster-related components added.

⁶¹Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).

them form groups to maintain the evacuation centers and to solve immediate needs. After three months, the people returned to their villages and the RRFs also went to the villages to begin their original tasks of community development. They formed interest groups in their villages and began simple projects that had rapid success.

Example 3⁶²: Three different PVOs were working with cereal banks in many small villages in Burkina Faso to develop community capacity to manage their own food security. When the drought of the early 1980s struck, the long-term viability of the cereal banks was threatened, and relief grain was necessary to both thwart the immediate threat of famine and to safeguard the development gains that had been made.

The cereal banks responded to the crisis in a number of different ways. Some became conduits for relief grain donated from the outside (by the government, international donors, PVOs) to the villages at risk, others took their own funds and bought extra grain from outside sources to loan to their villagers, others provided free assistance from their "solidarity funds" to those in need, and still others received donations of grain to replenish their stocks as the drought passed. After the drought passed, the cereal banks returned to their usual food security (development) function.

The above modeling of practice depicts a range of solutions which PVOs have devised to move to development after disasters. Some agencies begin sooner than others and emphasize either the earlier or later programs. Some stress recovery activities and their incorporation into

⁶²Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).

development programs, while others stress the more immediate relief and intermediate, stop-gap recovery needs. Some agencies more closely coordinate their aid programs, having the earlier programs complement and supplement the following ones, while others address needs as they present themselves in the post-disaster situation gradually shifting to all development programs. Different funding arrangements are also reflected; an agency may undertake recovery programs as part of their existing relief or development programs or in addition to them, with extra funds.

B. Central Components of Institutional Linking

Our review of post-disaster programs also uncovered that PVOs use different mechanisms to link programs. These components can be grouped roughly into three program elements: 1) programs (type and use), 2) management strategies (internal organizational arrangements and external relationships), and 3) the relationship between agency and the program participants. Below, we will outline these components.

Activities/programs: It is the replacement of temporary projects with permanent solutions which is the link to development programs. A common example is the agency that provides tents during the emergency and then introduces a housing program in the development stage. Agencies with specific expertise -- like housing or health -- tend to follow this model. Other agencies may work in multiple sectors and transform their activities from temporary to durable solutions. Programs also overlap each other in implementation periods -- ie. the phasing in of recovery and development programs before the finish of the relief programs. The programs may not be targeting the same beneficiaries, however.

For a single agency, this overlap of programs can be conceptualized as a "portfolio" of aid programs meeting the variety of needs in a post-disaster situation. The agency, over time, changes its portfolio from doing more relief programs to more development programs. The link is the replacement of various temporary measures with permanent solutions, and the transformation of others into development programs.

Management arrangements: The institutional infrastructure set during the relief response takes on the planning and implementation of the development programs, thereby providing the link between the two aid types. For example, some relief programs may use local staff, decentralized decision-making, longer time scale and funding period. This kind of management structure can lead the shift to new development tasks. Or, an agency may set about to change their more traditional, logistics management arrangements in order to take on longer-term programs.

The agency may also manage its external relationships -- that is, with public and private efforts -- to link with longer-term resources and to shift to sustainable development benefits. Or, the PVO may target their programs to benefit both victims and other area populations in the affected region. This shared relationship with the affected region provides the link between the two programs. Some disaster and development programs are suitably targeted at regions rather than individual beneficiaries because they provide social goods -- such as regional infrastructure.

Relationship with beneficiaries: Here, it is the PVO's relationship with the relief beneficiaries which provides the link. For example, village leaders and community committees work with an agency in

different programs. It is the relationship or association established with the community during the relief response bridges into development programs.

In other cases, the program participants themselves may move (either individually or in groups) to durable solutions. A program that resettles refugees from camps to agricultural settlements would fall here, for example.

In sum, then, the components that PVOs use to bridge the gap may be a contiguous meeting of programs in the same region or with the same general population; the disaster-related activities themselves are transformed or built upon into permanent solutions or sustainable programs; the agency's administration and management established the program's presence in the area and serves the short-term to long-term objectives; and finally, the beneficiaries themselves move between programs, or they provide the organization and relationship to work into development programs. More common than any single linking component is the combination of these linking components; disaster assistance may link with development through the institutional infrastructure, relationship with program participants, and its programs elements.

III. What is a viable linking approach?

A. From Linking Patterns to Effective Linking Strategies

Broadly speaking, linking disaster with development programs consists of shifting programs from short-term, temporary measures meeting immediate needs to programs which would provide permanent solutions to long-term needs with the goals of becoming self-sustaining. The shift requires the phase out of certain relief activities, the replacement of

various temporary measures with permanent solutions, and the transformation of others into development programs. One agency may attempt to make the link with their own programs or more than one agency may be involved in the linking.

A successful linking, then, is one in which the disaster *programs* shift to development programs which themselves also include disaster reduction objectives. But it is not enough that the programs shift; the program beneficiaries must also make the transition and be involved in the development process. If either of these two elements does not make the transition, then the linking has been incomplete.

Our mapping of linking patterns and their components above does not tell us which approaches are more effective for bringing about a successful linking of disaster with development programs. Just because we identify a contiguous meeting of emergency, medium-term, and long-term projects in a common geographic area does not mean that a viable approach for phasing relief into development has been found. Programs which do not build upon each other may be ineffective in terms of people's or area's recovery and development. Neither does an integrated transition to development programs necessarily produce success as we will see in our central case study where most of the original beneficiary families did not progress in the process. While not prescriptive in itself, our mapping does, however, allow us to identify some preliminary areas of PVO practice which warrant further exploration.

We can see from our review of secondary cases that much of what passes for linking disaster with development assistance actually falls short. The first linking model, the multiple program approach, suggests

some possible shortcomings. Because the agency takes a "shotgun" approach to disaster needs over time, the effects of earlier activities may dissipate before they can complement or supplement the programs in the next stages. By not linking the programs or beneficiaries directly, the opportunity to speed the phasing-out of relief by hooking on to new recovery and development programs may be lost.

The second linking model, the integrated relief and recovery approach, is also likely to experience the similar dissipation of efforts. This model puts great emphasis in the program participants providing the link to development programs, rather than any formal institutional or programmatic linking mechanisms of the agencies themselves. That being the case, factors which promote sustainability -- particularly in terms of hazard reduction and disaster mitigation -- are introduced during the recovery period with no programmatic follow-up later. However, sustainability is a long-term process; the programs that might be necessary to insure it do not necessarily bridge into the longer-term.

The third model, the integrated recovery and development approach, appears to be the most successful currently at integrating short- and long-term objectives. These programs also tend to work with the same beneficiaries and in the same program sectors -- such as housing -- from recovery to development. However, the integration tends to focus largely on infrastructure and rebuilding programs (zoning, building codes) while less on making social programs or economic reactivation programs address disaster vulnerabilities.⁶³

⁶³Oliver-Smith (1990) notes that reconstruction type recovery programs are most often linked with infrastructure works, technology programs, and knowledge transfer type development programs. Much more

The fourth model, the shaping development from relief approach, integrates its programs from the short- to the long-term. Importantly, the approach uses the recovery programs to create the conditions for phasing out relief and, at the same time, to introduce development programs. However, an agency's involvement in relief programs, which may by necessity be comprehensive and direct, can produce their major obstacle (dependency relationship) to working with the original beneficiaries to transform programs to recovery and development.

B. The Obstacles to Linking Disaster and Development Aid after Disasters

Linking disaster and development aid is, at the same time, one of the most proclaimed concepts in principle and the least implemented in practice. Everyone agrees that the two must be linked. Theory has given ample justification for it; practitioners have pointed the way to do it. And yet, disaster and development aid are still largely separate, they seldom come together without clashing, attempts to link them frequently fall short of objectives, and disaster-related development programs too often remain in institutional no-man's land. Why has disaster-development linking been slow in coming?

At the macro level, the obstacles are found primarily within the aid system and result from pressures felt by the bilateral donors, affected governments, and other larger international institutions, such as the U.N. agencies. While the following obstacles are not the rule for PVOs, they do affect them because PVOs enter into formal partnerships with these other aid actors and must operate within specified parameters. In

difficult (and less written about) is linking disaster programs with development programs promoting institutional building or local empowerment towards greater social equity and justice.

the field, PVO post-disaster projects are greatly affected by the actions of others.

Donor governments want to maintain a strict distinction between emergency funds (humanitarian and short-term only) and regular development funds. They provide the latter according to their foreign policy considerations. By keeping them separate they are able to avoid being "ensnared" into providing long-term aid to countries after disasters (Kent 1987). As a result, donor governments often restrict the time period of funding to a few months or specify that the funds can be spent on relief items only. Both these stipulations preclude implementing agencies, including PVOs, from moving into medium- and longer-term recovery and development projects and often make it difficult for them to include beneficiary participation because of the pressure to spend the money quickly. When aid goes to an "unfriendly" country, the donor government may stipulate that aid may not be provided through the recipient government (ministries, regional or local) thereby guaranteeing that the funds will not be spent on development-oriented programs.

Other pressures in the aid system that keep the two aid types apart are questions of resources and expertise. Development agencies are hesitant to take on disaster-related development projects (prevention, mitigation) because they do not want to over-extend their limited resource base. They see these projects as competitors for existing funds rather than as add-on projects which bring their own funding. As a result, fewer funds are dedicated to disaster-related activities and to their PVO implementers.

After disasters, the integration of disaster and development programs in many cases simply does not happen because no institution, governmental or nongovernmental, picks up the disaster-related development needs. Over the years, relief agencies, through their close association with disasters and their victims, were the first to recognize the need for comprehensive solutions to fundamental disaster vulnerabilities. However, they were the least prepared to provide this kind of aid. On the other hand, those with the required skills and resources -- the large national and international development agencies -- were the least attuned to disasters and, as a result, to disaster-related development needs. This, however, is changing (as explained earlier) as development agencies see the sustainability of their development projects being threatened by disasters.

In the PVO sector, there are other institutional obstacles hindering the integration of disaster and development aid. As we discussed earlier, the shunning of relief work by some development-minded PVOs and the persistence of the relief-only approach of others has kept the two aid types apart, not to mention the competition among PVOs generated by funding mechanisms. Some of these are changing; others are not. Inter-agency coordination, while common, continues to be an area of particular difficulty.

An important set of obstacles for PVOs to integrate disaster and development aid, then, is found at the micro (project) level. There are those obstacles which are internal to the projects themselves: agencies have very different mandates, objectives, and administrative styles that often clash in the field after a disaster. At their base, these conflicts arise from different roles of the aid provider(s), competition

for resources (human and material), institutional competition (between agencies or branches within the same agency), project rigidity resulting from the relief commitment, as well as the more widely reported manifestations of dependency relationship that hinders the shift to development program criteria.

Then, there are those obstacles which originate from the post-disaster environment more directly -- the extent of the disaster impact (social, economic and physical). In particular, the pervasive and prolonged relief aid can set the conditions for dependency on outside material assistance. Dependency influences the relationship the agency can establish with its program participants and makes it more difficult for the agency to phase relief into development programs. Just as important are the pre-disaster conditions of the affected region -- the economic relationships, political traditions, development trends, and characteristics of the population. These external factors set parameters for PVO program and management choices and influence their effectiveness.

The above mapping of linking approaches and their components does not tell us which are more effective in practice. Before agencies can design better strategies to get to development programs after disasters they need to understand the obstacles in the integration process. Through the central case study of Save The Children's Project Armero, we will now explore in detail the linking process, relationships, and obstacles of one approach for integrating disaster and development aid.

PART II: THE CENTRAL CASE STUDY

Presently, there is a relatively small body of knowledge about program approaches used by voluntary organizations after disasters. Few PVOs have undertaken thorough evaluations of their post-disaster programs (Franklin 1985; Cuny 1983). The subject is a very complex one. The diversity of disaster types, the variety of voluntary agencies and their possible responses, and the complicated nature of post-disaster work itself all make it difficult to identify what makes PVOs able to integrate disaster and development assistance after disasters. For these reasons, the dissertation's focus on a central case is warranted.

Because of the limited knowledge and the complexity of the subject itself, this case of the Armero Disaster places special attention on the context and the temporal dimension in which the project unfolds. Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate how the economic and political processes in the Armero Valley exacerbated the impact of the disaster and limited the affected population's resources for coping and recovery. Chapter 5 describes the Disaster itself and sets the post-disaster context in which the case agency implemented its programs. Chapter 6 sets out Save The Children's project from the initial relief response to the transition to its community-based development programs.

Pre-Disaster Conditions: Armero's Economic and Political Vulnerabilities

I. Introduction

This chapter traces historical processes that shaped key relationships in the disaster and afterwards. Specifically, the Valley's outward-oriented development pattern and its traditional relationship with the Colombian State were key factors which exacerbated the impact of the disaster and limited the affected population's resources for coping and recovery.

Following is an analysis of the conditions that put the area at risk, concentrating on the economic and political processes.⁶⁴ Throughout the chapters to come, the pre-disaster conditions and processes of development will remain important explanatory themes.

In 1985, Armero, a town of 30,000 inhabitants, was the bustling center of the rich agricultural region of Northern Tolima. Nestled at the foot of the *Cordillera Central* (Colombia's central mountain range), it was the cross-roads between the coffee-producing mountainous region and the sorghum, peanut, and rice producing valley. Armero had become the region's most important commercial center and was home to the valley's modest agro-processing industry.



Geographically, Armero was right in the middle of the country -- just 140 km from Bogotá, 113 from Manizales, and 84 from Ibagué. The municipality, which includes the city of Armero and the surrounding

⁶⁴My intent is not to be exhaustive in this analysis, but to highlight the most important pre-disaster conditions (and their historical roots) that influenced the post-disaster conditions.

small hamlets and countryside, was composed of 432 km², with the city itself occupying 3.86 km² in 1973 (see map).⁶⁵ Prior to the disaster, the municipality's population was over 45,000. In the discussion that follows, when talking about the Armero Valley we will be referring to the area from the banks of the Magdalena River to the skirts of the cordillera central, including Méndez, and Guayabal to Mariquita -- but not the *cordillera* communities or *meseta* of Lérída.

Approximately 88% of the municipal land is plains; the rest is mountainous area in the *cordillera*. Both regions represent very different histories -- including climates, peoples, land tenure systems, and development patterns. Of temperate climate, the *cordillera* was made up of small communities of *minifundias* who produced coffee as well as smaller cultivations of subsistence crops. The Valley, on the other hand, had an average temperature of 91° F. and included some of the most fertile land in the country because of repeated flooding by the Lagunilla River (1775, 1845, 1950). The area was developed in large *haciendas* with highly mechanized crops. While the mountain region directly above Armero depended on the town for markets, in general the settlements of the *cordillera* were oriented towards the other side of the mountain. Throughout this chapter, we treat the Armero Valley as our primary focus of analysis.

⁶⁵Data taken from Zarate (1982), Volume 5, which cited 1973 data from IGAC and DANE (Banco de Datos), Bogotá.



II. Historical Development of the Municipality of Armero

The Spanish colonized the region in the 1500s pushing out and exterminating the indian tribes during the first century of occupation.⁶⁶ During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the land of the now Armero Valley was used primarily as pasture and for the extraction of wood. A marketing center from the late 1800s, the city of Armero sprang up along a major crossroad connecting the region to all of the primary cities -- Bogotá, Manizales, Cali, Neiva, Dorada, Medellín - - as well as outlets on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Armero was not formally founded (constituted as a *caserío*) until 1885 when it was known as San Lorenzo y Tasageras (names of the two meadows where it was erected). Workers of the largest hacienda, El Santuario, which grew tobacco and raised cattle invaded the land. The workers settled there because it sat at the crossroads of two major roads and the sawmill and a small train station had been built by the English settlers. Although all products and people moving through the region had to pass through San Lorenzo, the town grew slowly for the next 30 years.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, tobacco had made the region famous throughout Colombia and as far away as Europe. There were also gold and silver mines in the surrounding hills of the *cordillera* which reached the height of importance at this time. The region's world famous tobacco and the high price of silver attracted foreigners to

⁶⁶The *Panches* were established in the northern and central regions of Tolima. The *Pijaos* were situated in the west along the *cordillera central*. Tolima was one of the first areas of the country to be colonized. Many of the cities of the region -- Ibagué, Mariquita, Honda -- date back to that period.

Northern Tolima -- especially the English who managed the financial and banking sectors. With the fall of the price of silver and the many strikes by miners in the 1840s, the English came down into the Valley and invested in tobacco, soon controlling most of its production. On the streets and sidewalks of San Lorenzo (Armero), the tobacco was dried. Coffee, silver, and woods were all marketed out of the region by train which passed through the town.

Guayabal had been virtually destroyed during the War of a Thousand Days (*La Guerra de los Mil Días*) from 1889 to 1902 (Oquist 1980; Dix 1967). As a result, the designated municipality was transferred from Guayabal to San Lorenzo in 1908. At that time, the town had grown to 2,000 people. The name of the town was then changed from San Lorenzo to Armero in 1930 to honor a local hero of the Independence.

Between 1930 and 1938, a bonanza of rice in the Valley and coffee in the mountains drove the development of the region. With the relative prosperity of the area, Armero grew to a town of 9,000 in 1948 as people from all over the country as well as Europe arrived to work in the Valley's agriculture. From 1938 to 1963, cotton replaced rice as the main driver of the Valley's development. The success of cotton was invested in the booming town. New banks, shops, small industry, iron works all opened. The town's cattle fair was the second most important in the central part of the country after Giradot. The flourishing town, surrounded by cotton fields, was given the nickname of the White City (*La Ciudad Blanca*), from this period.

In the Armero Valley itself, there was little pressure for land by the agricultural workers. Nevertheless, in the *cordillera* and other regions of Tolima and the country, struggles for land had been ongoing

since the 1930s.⁶⁷ Primarily a reflection of the fighting between the two dominant parties -- the Liberals and the Conservatives -- the struggle for land and political dominance spawned the bloodiest period in Colombia's history, *La Violencia*, which lasted over ten years.⁶⁸ This violent conflict, that took place primarily in the countryside, resulted in massive migration out of the rural areas to the towns and cities throughout the country. It was the major drive of urbanization in Colombia's history.

During *La Violencia*, the rural violence was notoriously severe in six departments (like states) -- Tolima being one of the six. In the Valley, the city of Armero suffered just eight days of violence with looting and vandalism; when the cotton harvest began, the violence was put aside. A military mayor was appointed from 1953 to 1957 and the city experienced relative calm and progress. But, in the coffee region just above Armero, there was a great deal of violence with many deaths.

Throughout the period of *La Violencia* (1948-1958), a situation of unrest continued in the *cordillera* and spread throughout the Valley. Some of the large landowners abandoned the region for Ibagué and Bogotá. Armero swelled with people fleeing rural violence from all over the country. Partly due to the violence suffered in the other small towns,

⁶⁷The 1930s was a period of Liberal Party dominance, having abruptly displaced the Conservative Party hegemony of the first thirty years of the twentieth century. The Liberals introduced agricultural reform and other important social legislation, particularly between 1934-38. Non-elite groups had been competing for power and influence, even by the end of the 1920s. The working class was increasingly organized, as an important strike on the banana plantations in 1928 demonstrated. All of this threatened the traditional landowning class and the Church.

⁶⁸More on this following.

Armero became the most important center in the area, overtaking Líbano and Guayabal. Despite the violence, the cotton bonanza managed to maintain some stability in the area for a bit longer.

By 1957 (with the fall of the military government), however, the Armero region had suffered gravely. Farms were abandoned, the economy of the region was in shambles, many families had left for the large cities, and there was insufficient work for the abundant labor that had arrived fleeing the violence. Worse yet, cotton production entered a disastrous crisis by 1963 and with it the city of Armero stagnated. Due to political arrangements at the national level, the municipality entered a period of unprecedented disorder as fierce regional politicking distorted public administration.⁶⁹

From the early 1960s to the time of the disaster, the development of the Armero Valley was based on two primary crops -- rice and a new crop, sorghum. As in the past, the Valley's agriculture production was tied to foreign markets; this specialization produced a continuous series of boom and bust. Furthermore, large cattle raising enterprises had expanded throughout the Valley. The city had now grown to a population of approximately 29,000 by the mid-1980s.

In 1985, the area was still one of the most productive agricultural areas of the country -- sorghum, rice, cotton, peanuts, and corn respectively being the municipality's most important products. It was

⁶⁹This situation is a direct reflection of the new political arrangements of the *Frente Nacional* (National Front) in which the two parties shared evenly the executive power and the state apparatus. Although the *Frente Nacional* formally ended in 1974, the impact of this power sharing continues to this day. The Department of Tolima is one of the worst cases in the country of poor planning due to particularly fierce regional politicking. More on this in the next section.

calculated that the Armero Valley produced 20% of the country's agricultural product. The agricultural sector was the most important employer of labor in the Valley.

Armero was the primary market for small producers of the Valley and *cordillera*. Although Armero had no sizable agro-industry (it sent all of the products to Ibagué and Bogotá for processing), the city was the primary banking and financial center after the departmental capital. Five banks had branches there. The city also housed a branch of the University of Tolima's School of Agriculture, an important center of experimentation and development. The city's regional hospital, mental hospital, high schools, and transportation network provided important services for the population of the Valley. A rich cultural tradition, Armero had an Archeological Museum and a nationally recognized dance troupe of regional tradition. The commercial farmers, a sophisticated group who sent their children abroad to study, had homes as well as their grower associations and cooperatives in the city.

III. Apparent Prosperity of Valley Hides its Fundamental Vulnerabilities

Despite appearances of prosperity, Armero's development was built on a precarious foundation. The region's almost absolute dependency on outside economic and political relations placed it in a vulnerable position when the disaster struck. We now examine in detail the Valley's outward-oriented development and its traditional relationship with the Colombian State and the conditions of economic and political vulnerability which these produced.

A. Economic Vulnerabilities

In the Armero Valley, agriculture was the most important employer; labor had few other alternatives. For all of Tolima, the agricultural sector employed 51.7% of the labor force in 1984. The service sector and commerce employed 18.6% and 11.2 percent respectively. Jobs in these sectors were almost exclusively located in the departmental capital, as were the jobs in manufacturing which employed just 6%.⁷⁰ Armero and its Valley were even more skewed towards sole dependence on agricultural employment than was the department as a whole.

The concentrated land tenure patterns⁷¹ and commercial agricultural production in the Valley produced one of the highest concentrations of salaried agricultural workers in the entire country. For Tolima generally, 68.4% of agricultural employment is concentrated in commercial production -- 5.5% of the employed are patrons or employers, only .78% are permanent employees, and a full 62% of the agricultural

⁷⁰Plan de Desarrollo del Tolima, Table 8, "Tolima, Estructura del VAB y del Empleo por Ramas de Actividad, 1984".

⁷¹ Proportional Distribution of Land Ownership
in the Municipality of Armero, 1981

<u>Farm size (ha.)</u>	<u>Owners (%)</u>	<u>Land surface (%)</u>
0-1	12.84%	0.90%
1-3	10.54	0.55
3-5	9.50	1.11
5-10	16.49	3.48
10-30	25.78	12.28
30-100	15.66	24.17
100 +	9.19	58.31

Source: Catastro de Armero, 1981. (includes *cordillera* and plains)
That is, 24.85% of the landowners own 82.48% of the land (in parcels over 30 hectares; 58.31% are over 100 hectares) and 49.37% of landowners own 6.04% of the land (in less than 10 hectare parcels).

For the entire department of Tolima, 64.6% of the landowners own 9.3% of the land in less than one hectare parcels, and 9.6% of the landowners possess 64.9% of the land in plots greater than 50 hectares (data for 1984; from Plan, vol. I, Table No. 18).

workers are seasonal and day laborers. The rest of the agricultural employment (31.6%) were small farmers -- small owners and family labor.⁷² Although data are not available for the Armero Valley alone, this concentration is again likely to be even greater because the coffee cultivations in the cordillera which are the bulk of the small farms would not be included.

Because of these characteristics, agricultural labor in the Valley is highly sensitive to fluctuations in economic activity in the exterior making the sector a particularly unstable source of employment. When, in the early 1970s and then again in the early 1980s, the country experienced severe recession, the Armero region felt the impact directly and immediately. Inflation was high, credit dried up, prices of production inputs (machinery, fertilizers and pesticides) rose. The agricultural work force was squeezed and unemployment rose. This situation has been steadily exacerbated by the gradual conversion of some large haciendas to intensive cattle raising, an activity which absorbs much fewer labor than even mechanized farming. The influx of laborers during *La Violencia* as well as seasonal immigration from other regions, kept the agricultural wages low relative to the rest of the country. High unemployment has obligated labor to seek work in the urban commercial sector -- primarily in small commercial activities, many of them in the informal sector -- which was gaining in relative importance (Plan, "Aspectos Económicos", 1985). For many, the only

⁷²These figures taken from Plan, Volume I, Table 16, "Distribución de la población ocupada en la producción empresarial y campesina por posiciones ocupacionales en el Departamento del Tolima". Elaborated by Miguel Osorio Castro, based on data from DANE, the Ministry of Agriculture, SENA, and others.

solution has been to leave the region.⁷³ Unlike in traditional *campesino* regions, agricultural workers in the Valley do not have traditional coping mechanisms in hard times: they do not have their own subsistence crops nor formal patron relationships with their employers to sustain them.

The Armero Valley's continued development along past lines was becoming obviously unsustainable. The Valley had staked its development on an export-oriented model that was depended solely on agriculture production.⁷⁴ By 1985, the area's production was in unabated decline.

The agricultural and cattle raising area is saturated and the lands after much exploitation demand ever more effort to maintain their levels of production.

- Plan, "Aspectos Económicos", pg. 65.⁷⁵

Erosion was a problem in some areas and the limited coverage of irrigation also limited agricultural growth in the region. Neither had the Department of Tolima been able to successfully develop their manufacturing sector. Industry in the department grew extremely slow and never really diversified.⁷⁶ As a result, capital had few alternatives in the region other than where it was to begin with -- in

⁷³The population figures for the rural and urban areas of Tolima reflect this clear trend:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
1951-1964	1.79	4.57	0.28
1964-1973	0.79	2.74	-0.85
1973-1985	1.06	1.92	0.10

Source: Plan, Volumen II, "Diagnóstico Departamental". Documento Anexo III Demográfico y DANE Resultados Preliminares del Censo de Población.

⁷⁴The dependence on the export sector was far higher than the national average. See Plan, Volume I, (1985), pg. 69.

⁷⁵All translations are the author's unless otherwise indicated.

⁷⁶Much slower than the national average. For the reasons that industry never grew in Tolima, see Plan. Volume I, pp. 66-70.

commercial agriculture -- thereby reinforcing the prior concentration. Much of the capital left the Valley. Little in the way of developing departmental (internal) markets through improving intra-departmental roads and communication, or warehousing capacity has been done. The agro-industry, similarly, has remained underdeveloped in the region. The economy in the rich Armero Valley has remained undiversified and export based throughout its entire history.

Although Tolima ranked high in terms of socio-economic development relative to the other departments," its apparent prosperity and that of the Armero Valley in particular was, in fact, very misleading. Some of the basic social indicators revealed the area's fundamental contradictions. Infant mortality rates, for example, were 72.5 per 1,000 and 11.7% of the urban population were illiterate -- both high rates for a region of its development standing.

During the economic crisis of the 1980s, Northern Tolima suffered more on average than did the nation as a whole. With already decreasing production, credit dried up and farmers found themselves carrying greater debt burdens than ever before. While the national unemployment rate was 14% in 1984, in Tolima official unemployment was 17.6%. When the national financial transfers were reduced for all departments, Tolima, which was already receiving low transfers, was particularly hard hit.

In sum, when the disaster struck in November of 1985, the economy of the region was already feeling the brunt of a development model which

⁷⁷Tolima ranks 11th out of 33 departments in per capita income, 5th in aqueducts coverage, 10th for sewage coverage, and 7th place for hospital beds per capita. (Plan. pg. 74.)

was having declining results and was reeling from the economic crisis of the 1980s. Increasing difficulties for farmers, weak internal markets, and precarious employment relations characterized the Armero Valley.

B. Political Vulnerabilities

In Tolima, the traditional relationship between the people and the State has been based on a long history of clientalism and patronage, which reflect Colombia's particular political developments. In the Armero Valley, these political relationships contributed to the disaster in the first place, exacerbated its effects, and limited the area's recovery.

The history of political relations produced a particularly weak regional and municipal administrations. In 1985, Tolima's public institutions -- both decentralized national agencies and the regional and municipal administrations -- were some of the most politicized and least technically competent in the entire country (Plan, Volume II, 1985). Writing in 1982, Zarate said that Armero was a particularly serious case, where "the politicking and poor administration end in one of the highest budgets in Tolima" and where, "technical [proficiency] counts for absolutely nothing".⁷⁸ A tradition of exclusionary politics resulted in a lack of base community organization. Weak civic pressure on local government and the decentralized institutions left their administration unchecked to function according to the requirements of politics.

⁷⁸Zarate (1982), pp. 247 and 243, respectively.

- Exclusionary Political System Produces Unprecedented Violence and Reinforces Regional Power Structure and Loyalties

For its entire history, Colombian politics has been characterized by an almost exclusive dominance of two parties, the Liberals and Conservatives.⁷⁹ In modern Colombia, there has been a lack of any substantive ideological differences between the two. Although they have competed fiercely between themselves for political hegemony, they have always been firmly united in maintaining their (elite) control over the distribution of power within the state. Their means of doing so -- through limiting alternative sources of political expression -- has resulted in violent conflict repeatedly throughout Colombia's history.⁸⁰ As James Payne wrote in 1968, "on a scale of political deaths per generation, Colombia has one of the highest levels of political conflict in the world."

Control of Colombia's democracy has been gained and maintained by one or the other party through exclusion. Before 1958, whichever party had control excluded the other completely from the benefits of power. In all of Colombia's history up to that time, only once (in 1861) did power change hands other than as a result of a split within the governing party. The party which won the national administration appointed all

⁷⁹Only Colombia and Uruguay, of the Latin American countries, have preserved the traditional two-party system.

⁸⁰In the first century of its independence Colombia went through thirteen periods of violent political strife, some of them lasting for four to five years at a time. The period, most marking Colombia's history was during 1946 to the mid 1960s, was so sustained and severe, it is called simply *La Violencia* (more on this following). The violence, which is both means and result of political exclusion, continues to this writing. Presidential elections held in May of this year, saw the assassination of four presidential candidates all of whom were alternatives to the two traditional parties.

posts in the public administration, including governors, mayors, and even teachers in the public school system. Of this system, Oquist (1980) writes,

the group that did not control the state could expect only discrimination from it, whereas those persons politically connected with the party in power could expect to monopolize state decision making and the benefits to be derived from state power.

Colombia is a country of political paradoxes. Heralded as the oldest democracy in Latin America, Colombia has a long history of restricting popular participation, a high rate of voter abstentionism, and an active guerilla movement (dating back to *campesino* movements in the 1920s). In more than 25 of the last 30 years, Colombia has been under a "state of siege" which removes all power from the Congress and concentrates it in the president and the armed forces.

During the post-independence period, the major political issues of federalism versus centralism gave rise to the Liberal and Conservative parties in 1849. With freedom from the Spanish, political power devolved to the local *criollo* oligarchy, a group of wealthy landowners, merchants, and clergy who had occupied key economic positions in the state, but had been discriminated against socially by the Spaniards. Within the local oligarchy, those who formed the Liberal party saw their interests best served by a federal system of government, free trade, and the separation of church and state (with the concomitant civil marriage, secular education system, and freedom of religion). Those who formed the Conservative party, on the other hand, favored a centralized system of government, trade protectionism, a close relationship between church and state -- that is, they sought the preservation of the traditional order. It was the Liberals, however, who gained and consolidated power

through the civil wars of 1858-63, holding power until 1885 when the Conservatives won control and held it through 1930.

During the second half of the last century, local *gamonales*["], led repeated violent confrontations (civil wars) between the two parties. These confrontations built up intense party loyalties among the whole population. Such loyalty was based upon kinship and patronage rather than on ideological or political grounds. Large landowners had the power to enlist their agricultural workers on behalf of their own political party allegiances. As a result, party identification was plainly reflected in the geographical distribution of the population, with some areas almost exclusively Conservative or Liberal. As Dix (1967) writes,

The frequency of civil wars and the party struggles they represented -- characteristics less true of most other Latin American nations -- cemented the cohesion of particular communities around one of the political contenders.

To this day, most Colombians in the rural areas traditionally identify with one or the other party through their regional ties and retain this loyalty throughout their lives. In Colombia, Dix goes on to state, "any change in political identification requires corresponding changes in

["]A *gamonal* is a large landowner who is at the same time a political leader in his region. His power is exercised through patronage and clientelism. Local *gamonales* make up the base of the traditional parties. They are either born into this position or are connected to the local families with wealth and prestige (See Santa, 1970). This hereditary leadership system is true at the local, regional and national levels. For instance, ex-presidents Alfonso Lopez, one of the strongest leaders of the Liberal party, is the son of another president. Alvaro Gomez, one of the most important leaders of the Conservative party along with the ex-president Misael Pastrana, succeeded his father, another ex-president. A recent mayor of Bogotá, Andrés Pastrana, was the son of the above mentioned ex-president.

one's closest social and personal relationships," and "to change one's party loyalty is to be considered an apostate and a traitor".

In 1930, after fifty years of Conservative hegemony, a Liberal president was finally elected due to a split in the Conservative party. From 1930 to 1946 the Liberals used their national power to extend their control at the local level. They used both reforms⁸² and violence in what many have termed a sort of revenge against the Conservative party who had held control for so long. However, the Liberal dominance did not last. In the 1946 presidential elections, the Liberal Party was itself divided (between Jorge E. Gaitán and Gabriel Turbay) and lost its political supremacy.

Once back in power, the Conservatives started a campaign of repression against the partisans of the former Liberal party government. The official violence was countered by guerrilla warfare, fueled by the Liberal and Communist parties. The country was once again moving toward a period of civil war. The violence, which had started in 1946, was dramatically sharpened by the assassination of the populist leader and Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge E. Gaitán, in 1948.

Gaitán, from a lower-class background, was a Liberal dissident with a reformist and anti-oligarchical platform. He was supported especially by the urban middle and working classes and despised by both the Conservative and Liberal elite. By 1947, he had reached the leadership of the Liberal Party. In the 1940s, Gaitán had organized UNIR (*Unión*

⁸²One of the most important of these reforms was the Land Reform (*Ley de Tierras*) of 1935, which allowed thousands of peasants to legalize their land. The large landowners strongly resented this reform and, in some cases, did not recognize its legitimacy. The Liberals also implemented labor legislation, union organization, and the modernization of the state's fiscal and financial system.

Nacional Independiente Revolucionaria) that supported landless and poor peasants in their struggle for land. On February 7, 1948, he led an impressive silent demonstration in Bogotá to protest the increasing wave of violence.

Dix, writing in 1967, said,

What is truly significant about the rise of Gaitán was that to date he has been the only Colombian to have attained major political stature by challenging the position of the elite and appealing to the Colombian masses.

A little over a month after the silent march, on April 9, the undisputed hero of the Liberal masses was assassinated in downtown Bogotá. The capital exploded in one of the most massive urban riots of this century.

The violence quickly spread all over the nation. The bloody confrontation between Liberal and Conservative reached unprecedented levels. From 1946 to 1958 an undeclared civil war devastated a broad area of the Colombian countryside. The death toll during *La Violencia*, as the period was known, reached over 300,000 lives -- 112,000 of them between 1948 and 1950 alone.

The Liberal and the Conservative leadership saw the violent events that followed Gaitán's assassination as a serious potential for revolution. A temporary Liberal-Conservative coalition emerged shortly thereafter but, by May 1949, the alliance had ended as the two parties engaged once again in their classic struggle for party control. In the parliamentary elections in June of the same year, the Liberals obtained the majority but, on October 9, 1949, Conservative President Ospina closed the Congress. The Liberal Party then withdrew from the presidential elections held in November.

During *La Violencia*, the military also split along party lines, thereby decreasing the Conservative government's repressive capacity. This division was reflected between the generally Liberal army officers and the extremely sectarian Conservative police. The presence of the state completely disappeared in many areas of the country, while in others its presence only consisted of the police and the army on a temporary basis. In some areas, the mayoral offices and governorships - traditional civilian institutions -- were taken over by army officers.

In hopes of pacifying the nation, the leadership of the two traditional parties united to support a coup d'état led by Army Commander General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla on June 13, 1953. Because the coup enjoyed national political support, the military government was perceived as legitimate. On June 19, 1953, a general amnesty was offered to those involved in the violence which drastically reduced the scale of the conflict.

This period of peace did not last long, however; by late 1954, the scale of violence was once again on the rise. The army instituted a systematic repression of both Liberals and Conservatives. This time, the resurgence of violence corresponded more to socio-economic conflicts than to traditional partisan rivalries. As this became clear, the leaders of both parties came together once again to protect their interests.

By the end of 1956, both parties' leaders had declared their hostile opposition to Rojas who they considered to be an usurper of their rightful power. On May 10, 1957, following a four-day resistance campaign led by a bipartisan coalition, the Rojas government fell. The power was then transferred to a military junta in charge of guiding the

political transition to the assumption of power by a Conservative-Liberal coalition called the *Frente Nacional* (National Front).⁴³

- The Frente Nacional: Implications for Modern Political Relations with the Colombian State

The *Frente Nacional* (FN) was perhaps the most bizarre experiment in democratic government that has been tried anywhere. Basically, the two parties agreed to a strict sharing of power between themselves, which also excluded by law the participation of any other party. Although elections would continue to be held, the votes would be shared equally between the two parties regardless of how they were cast. The intent was to remove the competitive element in the political system which had led to so much violence. The agreement stipulated that, at the national level, seats in Congress were to be divided fifty-fifty and, at the local level, departmental assemblies and municipal councils the same. The presidency was to alternate between the two parties every four years. All official posts in the country -- ministries, governorships, and mayors -- were to be evenly divided between Liberals and Conservatives. Beginning in 1958, this arrangement was scheduled to last through 1974.

Both parties, *and every faction within them*, were to obtain equal treatment, access to political decision-making, and political posts. No one among the socio-economically powerful groups controlling Colombia's traditional political parties would ever have to fear official

⁴³The *Frente Nacional* (FN) was a result of the bipartisan agreement signed in Benindorm which called for the formation of a Civil Front. On December 1957, a plebiscite gave popular endorsement to it. The FN started in 1958 and lasted until 1974, encompassing four presidential terms. For considerations on the formation and development of the FN see Dix (1967), chapter 6.

discrimination. All were guaranteed access to at least some of the benefits derived from political power. Indeed, one of the *Frente Nacional* government's first acts in 1958 was to modify the income tax laws by increasing exemptions, reversing the Rojas' tax reform which had increased tax rates on high incomes.

Despite these obvious immediate gains for the party elites, the FN agreements hurt the traditional parties in the long run. The division of the political seats and bureaucracy was carried to extremes. In places where the population was 100% of one party, some people became nominally of the other party just to fill the 50% of the seats or official posts allocated to that party.

This bipartisan alliance took away one of the basic reasons for party loyalty: opposition to the other party. The inter-party struggles practically disappeared, as factional fighting within each party took their place. Regional *gamonales* grew in importance as control of patronage was already in their hands, rather than the party itself. They competed ever more fiercely and the party fractions grew even more intense. In this way, the *Frente Nacional* strengthened further the patronage system in Colombia.

Each party remains a sort of confederation of small local and regional bosses, whose allegiances to the party are not based on any common ideology. If any party leader dares to promote reforms, he has to negotiate with local leaders, most of whom are not interested in national programs not tied to additional promotion, patronage, or other benefits, but rather to the maintenance of the status quo.⁸⁴ The

⁸⁴Closely related to the problem of organization is the problem of party finance. Since there is no official control over this, the data is not available. Nevertheless, it is well known that the main official

patronage system, based on the power of *gamonales* and the lack of common ideology, consumed the public administration of the country which lost most semblance of civic logic and operated, in large part, according to political interests.

Although the *Frente Nacional* agreements expired in 1974, vestiges of the parity arrangement survive to the present. As mentioned earlier, this political patronage system has been particularly strong in Tolima. The Armero Valley has always been a Liberal party stronghold. The contemporary power struggle in the region was between two departmental representatives, Jaramillo and Santofimio, both Liberals. Armero had been predominantly with Jaramillo, who saw his most important power base in the area erased with the tragedy. Of the closest towns, Guyabal was with the same political camp. However, Santofimio controlled the other nearest town, L rida. He also has more power at the national level as he is on the national directorate of the Liberal Party.⁸⁵

This history of exclusionary politics and vestiges of the *Frente Nacional* arrangements had produced in Tolima, and the Armero Valley, one

income of the parties comes from "voluntary" donations by government employees. Since such donations do not cover all costs of political campaigns, the candidates own contributions, and especially private donations are the core of the party's financial strength. Wealthy aspirants to elected positions are able to obtain good positions on the electoral lists by promising to pay for expenses above and beyond their own campaigns. Additionally, the contributions from the private sector are crucial not only to secure the financial stability of the campaign, but to shape the political agenda of the candidates. (This unregulated and weak party finance situation became the entry way of the drug related money into politics. Since the early 1980s, numerous scandals regarding mafia connections in Colombian politics have affected both traditional parties.)

⁸⁵In the aftermath of the disaster their struggle influenced, in large part, government policy, the relationship with the survivor population, and the options available to the assisting agencies in the zone. More on this in the next chapter.

of the most politicized public administrations in the country and a fierce competition between local leaders for the control of a well-developed patronage system.

These conditions had also resulted in the almost complete lack of base community organization. Before the disaster, few organizations had existed among Armero's poor population who were to make up the great majority of survivors (CINEP 1986). There were no neighborhood associations, unions, or producer groups that were known to be very active (although one association of mobile shoe repairers did exist). The Armeritas were notoriously apathetic catholics with few strong church-related organizations. Only the political parties were well organized and active within the poorer neighborhoods. The lack of organization represented a serious lack of an important resources that communities traditionally use for coping with disasters.

The poor residents of Armero had little contact with government assistance programs. But those who did, interacted with social service programs like family welfare and some primary health care programs. Even the agricultural extension programs were service-oriented. The role of the target community was to organize in order to receive free seeds or the latest round of vaccinations. The survivors understood the government emergency and reconstruction programs in exactly the same way.

In the next chapter, we now see how these conditions exacerbated the avalanche's first round affects -- the government's response and the relationship that emerged between the affected communities and aid providers -- and greatly influenced the area's possibilities for recovery.

El Ruiz Avalanche Disaster, Colombia

I. Disaster Vulnerability

Armero's greatest vulnerability -- its location relative to the active volcano, El Nevado Del Ruiz -- was known long before the 1985 disaster. El Ruiz volcano is located in the northern part of the Andean volcanic chain and Colombia's *cordillera central*. One of its many rivers that originated in the ice-cap, the Lagunilla River, came out of the mountains 70 km. later at the town of Armero and continued to the Magdalena River (see map). The Volcano had long been active. It had exploded at least twice before, in 1595 and 1845.⁸⁶ The latter caused a lahar⁸⁷ very similar to that of the 1985 disaster and, covering the present site of Armero, resulted in one thousand deaths.⁸⁸

The volcano had shown signs of renewed activity since November 1984. A series of earthquakes up to magnitude 4 led the Colombian government to install a seismic monitoring network in July of 1985. An average of 17 earthquakes daily were recorded between July and October of that year. Colombian authorities also had a detailed risk map produced by

⁸⁶There is also evidence that El Ruiz erupted in 1828/29 and in 1832/33 (Herd et al. 1986).

⁸⁷A lahar is a "flowing masses of volcanic debris and other sediment intimately mixed with water". It is estimated that lahars account for at least ten percent of all volcano-related deaths worldwide (Sigurdsson and Carey 1986).

⁸⁸Prior to the El Ruiz disaster, the largest known number of deaths due to lahars occurred at two Indonesian volcanoes -- in 1919, 5,110 people died and in 1822, 3,600 died (Sigurdsson and Carey 1986).

October 7, 1985 which specified the areas of highest risk, including Armero's risk to lahars.⁸⁹

The governor of Tolima, the mayor of Armero, along with other mayors of Tolima and officials of the relevant public institutions all were informed of the hazards. The people in the areas at risk were also provided with some information about what to do in case of an eruption. The second week of September 1985, the newspapers published the risk maps, but were accused of sensationalism and awakening panic in the population. In Armero, several talks on disaster preparedness were conducted in the church. Because there was insufficient knowledge to accurately predict the timing of an eruption, evacuation plans were not enforced. Neither did the at-risk areas have adequate telecommunications equipment to warn populations in the case of an eruption.

On the afternoon of November 13, 1985, rain and ash had begun falling around 5 p.m., causing concern to many in the town. An emergency meeting of the regional emergency committee was called at the Red Cross in Ibagué. But at this point, fearing only a flood, a cautious directive to evacuate people who lived along the banks of the Lagunilla River was given. The local official of the emergency committee of the Civil Defense in Armerocalled Bogotá around 7 in the evening and was told that the ash was nothing to be alarmed about. In turn, he announced the news from the loudspeakers of the church and the local radio station also carried the announcement. Some survivors have said that around 9 p.m. there were confusing radio reports about an explosion

⁸⁹Risk map by the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Geológico-Mineras (INGEOMINAS) and the University of Caldas.

of the volcano. At that time, however, many people were watching the big soccer game or had already gone to bed. There was never a general order to evacuate Armero.

On that day, the risk maps were shown to have been deadly accurate. After the fact, there has been much discussion around why so many people were taken unaware, given the official knowledge of the disaster risk. Many experts argue that the tragic loss of human life could have been largely avoided.

II. November 13, 1985

It was six thirty in the morning and the pilot [flying over Armero] said: Armero has been erased, I'm telling you, Armero has been erased. I flew twice over the site, not believing my eyes or that this was possible. I flew over two times, I swear, it isn't that I've been drugged or that I'm sleepy or some crazy person, Armero is erased. Below one can only see an immense beach. Eighty or eight-five percent has been destroyed.

- pg. 45. Los Ultimos Días de Armero.

Shortly after 3:00 p.m., El Nevado del Ruiz Volcano suffered a small gas explosion which sent ash to the northern towns of Fresno, Mariquita, and Honda between 4 and 5 p.m.. At 9 p.m., the main explosion occurred whose consequences were of enormous proportions. The eruption resulted in the melting of approximately 10 percent of the volcano's ice-cap. Torrents of meltwater, ice, and debris raced down the narrow river gorges on the sides of the volcano. On the eastern side, the most damaging lahar coursed down the Lagunilla river (a drop in elevation of about 4 km.) carrying trees, rocks and soil with it.⁹⁰ In the lower

⁹⁰We will concentrate on what happened in the Armero Valley, however, on the other side of the *cordillera* heavy damage was also sustained. The aid figures we use here will distinguish, where possible, between assistance that reached the Armero Valley and other areas of the country where survivors concentrated.

part of the river, above Armero, a small land-slide had formed a natural damn and a small lake. When the lahar reached the damn it was retained momentarily. But it finally burst the damn and raced towards Armero with even greater intensity.


Shortly before midnight, the avalanche reached the valley below. In just fifteen minutes, the mud had completely covered the town of Armero. As much as 15 meters high of mud had overrun the town, dragging homes, cars, and debris in its path. Eyewitness accounts described building crumpling like paper as the lahar hit. Approximately 22,000 people were entombed in the mud, another 5,000 people injured. Just 15% of the town was left standing (see map). The damage was mind-boggling.

In the hours and days following, most of those who had survived had saved themselves and those around them. The first to arrive on the scene from the outside, the Colombian Red Cross, Civil Defense, and Army, searched the area for survivors. Days passed and people were still being pulled from the mud. Many were found wandering the neighboring countryside in a daze. More than 5,000 people were evacuated, primarily by helicopters. Those requiring hospitalization (approximately 1,200)⁹¹ were sent across the entire country to hospitals that could receive them. Families were separated, with their members ending up in Bogotá, Ibagué, even as far away as Cali and Medellín over 200 km. away. No registration of survivors was done in the first weeks.

In the aftermath of the disaster, schools, soccer fields, and community centers were converted into shelters. Tent camps mushroomed,

⁹¹According to Gueri and Perez 1986.

MAP OF THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE EXPLOSION OF THE VOLCANO,
EL NEVADO DEL RUIZ, IN COLOMBIA ON NOVEMBER 13, 1985



LA ZONA DEL DESASTRE (Tomado de "Semana")

and hastily thrown up temporary housing was built throughout the Armero Valley and Ibagué. Lists of survivors appeared in the doors of churches, radio stations, offices of the Civil Defense. With nightfall, survivors stayed awake in terror. Rumors that children were being spirited out of the area for adoption spread as parents furiously searched for their missing children. Material donations flooded in as official assistance programs, national and international, all scrambled to meet the emergency needs of the affected populations.

III. Damage

Unlike other disasters, in Armero the hardest hit initially were the wealthy. It was their homes, situated along the Lagunilla River to take advantage of the cooling breezes, that were completely destroyed. The poor of Armero, however, lived on the side of town farthest from the river gorge. These neighborhoods were nearest to the small hills where the population was able to escape the avalanche on the night of the tragedy. Thus, the survivor population was made up primarily of the poorest stratum of Armero.

The Armero disaster did such extensive damage that the survivor population was left with very few material resources. Not much was left that could be salvaged to aid in the recovery of the area; the majority of survivors had to start a new life in a new place completely from scratch. From disaster survivors, they became refugees in their own country as they had no home to which to return.

Besides Armero, the avalanche also greatly affected the neighboring populations. The rural areas surrounding the city also had their homes

and work places destroyed in the disaster.⁹² Although the majority of the affected population left the region, large numbers did remain and inundated neighboring towns to stay with friends and relatives. Guayabal, for example, received over 4,000 refugees the first year -- tripling their pre-disaster population. Lérida's population effectively doubled when around 3,000 looked to settle there (Resurgir 1986a).

The Valley's economy was particularly hard hit. All area roads, bridges, aqueducts, telephone lines, and electrical grids were damaged, if not completely destroyed. The Valley lost 129 square km. of prime agricultural land, along with its valuable machinery and infrastructure.⁹³ With the disappearance of the transportation network and Armero, traditional producers in the *cordillera* lost their primary market channels and watched their produce rot. Unemployment in the department reached 21% (from 5% prior) with approximately 70% unemployment among the survivors.⁹⁴

The large influx of donations -- most notably food -- hurt the small producers who were able to get some of their produce to the albeit

⁹²Rural areas affected in Tolima were: Líbano, Murillo, Villahermosa, Casablanca.

⁹³Unfortunately, the estimates of damage are all a bit different. USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (Nov. 22, 1985) estimated that about 60% of the livestock and 30% of the rice, maize, peanuts, and soybeans of the immediate area in the valley were destroyed. Vega (1987) stated that in addition to the city of Armero, 30% of the territory that was the municipality of Armero (its outlying rural land and communities) was covered by mud. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture (Nov. 1985) reported that the valley's three mills and only grain storage warehouses (located in Armero) were all destroyed. The majority of the valley's farm machinery also disappeared as they were stored in the city center in workshops, garages, and shops.

⁹⁴Figures from Actuar 1986 (pg. 6) and Resurgir (January 1986). The unemployment among survivors is a gross estimate; actual figures do not exist.

smaller markets in Guayabal and L rida. Only building materials suppliers and beer hall establishments found adequate demand for their goods in the first six months. With the influx of survivors and assistance agencies to neighboring towns, housing rents skyrocketed. During the entire first year after the disaster, the Valley's economy continued in virtual shambles.

IV. Aid Agencies and Resurgir

The Colombian government jumped in to coordinate the emergency assistance. For the sake of speed, efficiency, and following a long Colombian tradition, the government took a centralized approach, creating the coordinating body, Resurgir, in Bogot . A few days after the disaster, the President of the country appointed military mayors in neighboring towns, such as Guayabal and L rida, who were receiving a great influx of survivors. These military mayors stayed for around a year. There were few opportunities for local government or survivors to participate in decision-making.

Resurgir's primary function was "to finance the activities and works that are required by the social, economic and material rehabilitation of the population and zones affected by the volcanic activity of El Ruiz."⁹⁵ However, faced with the need to act rapidly in a number of areas, Resurgir quickly assumed many more functions. In addition to financing, Resurgir took on the planning, coordination, and implementation of all kinds of reconstruction and rehabilitation projects (Gomez Barrero 1986). In addition, Resurgir had the difficult task of defining who was

⁹⁵Articulo 1  Decreto 3406 de 1985.

an official survivor, a *damnificado*, a designation that made them officially eligible for disaster assistance.

Under overwhelming pressure from the media and donors in the first months, Resurgir played the role of fireman, rushing to put out small and large crises alike. But in taking on more and more, Resurgir found it efficiently could do less and less. With the headquarters in Bogotá over four hours by car from the disaster zone, Resurgir was quickly labelled by those living and working in the zone as "those who do not understand the reality" (Vega 1987). The agency soon found itself as the favorite whipping boy for everything that went wrong in the disaster zone.

Between November 1985 and July 1986, Resurgir's efforts focused largely on relief activities. Over 90% of their expenditures during this period went to pensions, groceries, medicine, and emergency camps and the beginnings of permanent housing construction.⁹⁶ Contrary to world experience, Armero's relief period was particularly prolonged -- it was roughly *three times* the relief period in other disasters (Cuny 1983).

In addition to relief, the government placed primary emphasis on the physical rebuilding of Armero. The first director of Resurgir was a developer whose firm was well known for quick and efficient construction of high income housing. Initially, Resurgir conceived of Armero's disappearance as largely a physical problem -- a town disappeared, one

⁹⁶\$3.155.9 million pesos were donated through Resurgir between November 1985 and June 30 1986. (Gomez Barrero 1986).

had to be erected in its place. Other critical sectors received less attention.⁹⁷

The national and international communities also donated generously to the emergency effort.⁹⁸ With Resurgir, the Red Cross and the Colombian Welfare Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF) erected an entire aid distribution network which functioned through the camps and shelters in the Valley. From November 1985, thirty-five shelters and camps were established throughout the country: twenty-one attended by the Red Cross, five by ICBF with support from Resurgir, and nine self-administered by the sheltered with support from private groups.

This centrist government approach in relief was matched by a diffuse and poorly coordinated PVO and private response. For example, in the first six months alone, over 35 PVOs began recovery programs in the Armero Valley. (The numbers were much greater throughout the entire country.) Their programs consisted overwhelmingly of the construction of housing. These programs generally were slow in getting underway because of any number of problems. L rida, in particular, suffered setbacks of a technical nature. The housing plans had been made based on aerial photographs which grossly underestimated site leveling which was needed. Also, the site chosen for housing in L rida was on pure

⁹⁷Although Resurgir had a unit for economic development, few policy directions emerged in the first year; neither did they coordinate much of the huge inflow of money and resources which largely by-passed the government body (Piedrahita 1986).

⁹⁸Foreign governments, international agencies, foreign NGOs all donated generously. This aid has been catalogued by a number of groups; the OFDA (1985) summary was used in the present research.

rock -- a condition that delayed the laying of infrastructure and skyrocketed costs.

Over the first year, a number of PVOs did initiate micro-enterprise development programs in the area. These began in the midst of the relief period and with families who often were still moving in and out of the Valley. Not surprising, these programs experienced a high rate of default and abuse.

A number of groups attempted to coordinate the different agencies' interventions; but, coordination was the exception rather than the rule. Each agency had its hands full trying to get their program started in the very difficult post-disaster circumstances, leaving little time to coordinate with others. Many coordination meetings (which tried to be national in scope) were called in Bogotá, making it impossible for many of those in the zone to participate. The programs and criteria of the PVOs also differed tremendously and, as a result, agencies found themselves competing with each other to attract beneficiaries and to make headlines. Nevertheless, there were examples of fruitful coordination among smaller groups. Guayabal, for example, had a very positive experience in which the PVOs, government institutions, and municipal administrators met regularly and implemented a number of joint programs.

Overall, the Valley's first year after the disaster was a situation in which there was simply too much aid chasing too few survivors. Agencies -- public and private -- acted with inadequate awareness of the relevant activities of others, resulting in duplicated efforts, missed opportunities, and gaps in coverage.

V. Chaos Settles into Discernible Patterns

According to Resurgir's own July, 1986 report, Informe Final, a total of 28,317 people were classified as official survivors (*damnificados*) and they had spread out in twenty locations all across the country. The survivors with any resources at all left the area to start afresh with relatives in Bogotá, or went to other regional capitals in search of employment.⁹⁹ But throughout the first year, many survivors returned to the area looking for their loved ones in hopes of finding them alive; some stayed, while most left again. It is estimated that about 48% of the survivors eventually settled out of the area entirely, in Bogotá and Ibagué. The next largest group settled in Guayabal (approximately 15%), then Lerida (10%).¹⁰⁰

Those who remained in the Valley divided naturally into two groups: the "floating population" and those who went to live in the shelters and camps.¹⁰¹ The "floating" population, in general better educated and skilled, had possessed a certain level of economic stability before the disaster. Within this group were also small politicians, some

⁹⁹Santana Rodríguez (1989) uses figures of 80% of the survivors left the Armero Valley.

¹⁰⁰These figures are of where people applied for their identification carnets. Although they may not represent the final destination of the survivors, Resurgir and others have taken these figures to be indicators, at least, of resettlement patterns. Over the first year, it became clear that the majority settled outside of the region. (Data: Resurgir. Table No.1, "Población Carnetizada por Resurgir", April 16, 1986, pg. 28. These figures also include the survivors from Chinchiná, Caldas (the other side of the *cordillera*).

¹⁰¹In the disaster's aftermath, an overwhelming majority of refugees (87%) had gone to live with relatives, most of whom lived outside of the region. The remaining (13%) joined the different shelters and camps in various parts of the country, including in the Valley. Most of the sheltered populations were in camps in Ibagué, with Guayabal being the largest encampment in the Valley.

professionals and small landholders as well as agricultural workers and artisans. It was beneath their sense of dignity to live in the camps as "beggars". Immediately after the disaster, these families took whatever work they could and rented rooms in the surrounding villages. Unlike their counterparts in the camps, the "floaters" maintained themselves with very little support from official or private aid agencies. This group of survivors became the most active in the recovery process. They were, for example, the organizers in Guayabal of the local representative committee of disaster survivors and, nationally, of the *Coordinadora de Damnificados de Armero*, a lobbying force for survivor participation in the reconstruction. A year later, this group also won the city government in Guayabal.

The families that lived in the camps, on the other hand, were the poorest, the least skilled, and the least experienced in community organization of the survivors.¹⁰² Our case study camp was representative of other camps in this regard. There, 70% of the residents were functionally illiterate and they possessed practically nothing in the way of community organization experience. Between them, however, they did have wide experience in different productive activities, such as agriculture and animal husbandry, construction, commerce, and petty services (SCF 1985).

The poor went to the camps to receive relief assistance in order to survive. By virtue of living within the established distribution

¹⁰²This is a common occurrence in post-disaster and refugee situations. Apfel (1987) notes that "while the most dynamic people among the refugees try to establish themselves as self-settlers where they find an opportunity to use their skills and capacities, the weakest part of the refugee population opt for organized settlements." (pg. 25)

network, the camp families received many more donated goods and services than the survivors who went to live in the surrounding areas. And, as enormous amounts of free food, clothing, medical attention, household goods continued to flow into the camps, the population's resolve to take the rebuilding of their lives into their own hands waned.

On the one hand, the pervasive relief and the way operations was run created conditions which made dependent behavior a reasonable and effective coping strategy for people who ended up in the camps. On the other hand, the way that aid was managed impeded the Armeritas from feeling the primary actors in their own reconstruction and from taking it into their own hands (Cañon Moreno and Millan 1987). Unfortunately, serious social problems also arose there. Alcohol and drug abuse rose alarmingly, and violence was commonplace within the camps. "The survivors' state of motivation varied between desperation and aggression, the mentality of waiting for charity, the death of hope that leads to inactivity" (CINEP 1986a).

During the first four months or so, few avenues existed for the survivors, either in the camps or outside, to participate in decision-making. "The only right that the survivors have had is to receive aid that others manage and lately to be heard by Resurgir. Legally they do not have representation in Resurgir" (CINEP 1986a). Their lack of organization before the disaster and their instability afterwards made it difficult for any survivor organization to consolidate.

VI. Emerging Antagonisms Between People, State, and Aid Providers

Both the governmental response and the international and national private response was immediate, active, and pervasive. The number of

assistance programs flooding the area created a dynamic of competition between them as they vied for media coverage and attempted to attract beneficiaries. The relief response was poorly coordinated and its duration was particularly long. To further complicate matters, journalists, mayoral candidates, politicians, businessmen, evangelicals, professionals offering their services, and volunteers of all sorts, including the stray adventurer, all passed through the area. Interests of all kinds greatly politicized the aid. The result of this situation was growing antagonisms between people, the state, and aid providers.

A. Between Center and Region

In the Valley, those working in issues of the disaster -- the decentralized institutions, the local politicians, and the appointed mayors -- soon felt bypassed by the government's central management of resources. Officials of Resurgir arrived to the zone by helicopter and their visits were usually short affairs. While those in the field were permanently on the front lines attending the daily problems of managing the post-disaster recovery with insufficient authority and support to do what they believed needed to be done. The predictable friction between those in the field and those in the boardrooms in the capital emerged in earnest.

B. Between Political Factions

The political struggle between the two Liberal Party factions emerged in the redevelopment policy for the Valley. Santofimio asserted pressure at the national level to rebuild Armero in the neighboring town of L rida, his pre-disaster stronghold. Just four months after the disaster, Resurgir designated L rida as the "New Armero" and began to direct the vast majority of resources for the area's rehabilitation

there. In Lérida, Resurgir bought and donated the land and infrastructure to PVOs who would do their housing projects there. On many occasions, survivors were told that they would not receive any government benefits (largely understood as housing and monthly pensions) unless they moved to the town.

On the other hand, Guayabal, Jaramillo's territory, was practically ignored by Resurgir despite the fact that it had more refugees than the former and was legally the new municipality of Armero. Only with pressure from agencies and others working in Guayabal were money and other resources eventually redirected to the Guayabal area as well.¹⁰³

This national level political decision had serious repercussions for already strained social relations in the Valley. Historically, those in Lérida have not liked the Armeritas because Armero, although newer, had grown faster and had become the commercial center of the region, while Lérida remained outside any major development. Many of the wealthy, more traditional farming families lived in Lérida. The designation of the city as the "New Armero" and the invasion of their town by Armeritas produced deeply felt conflicts and overt discrimination against the newcomers.

The Armero disaster also became fodder for political struggles at the local level. In fact, the reconstruction efforts coincided with an election year. The control over the resources that were made available

¹⁰³This same political struggle played out in the national board room of Resurgir as well. The positions within Resurgir were divided between Jaramillistas and Santofimistas. The first Director of Resurgir was a Liberal from Bogotá (Pedro Gomez Barrero). Later, a Jaramillista took over (Carlos Alberto Rocha Jaramillo), and finally a Santofimista (Bernardo Bonilla París). When Bonilla took over, the other camp started to attack his management of the disaster relief in the House of Representatives in Bogotá.

became another element in the patronage system in Tolima. Neighboring towns finally were able to have the school room built or the electric generator that they had been unable to get before the disaster. The other side of the coin was also evident, however: many towns lost out in the partitioning of resources for political reasons. In the camps, as well, political associations sought to recruit members and sometimes pitted groups against each other.

Nationally and locally, politicians from both the left and right greatly politicized the aid efforts, particularly those of the government. The Left argued that the survivors ought to be given free houses, health care, and micro-enterprises -- their entitlements (*reivindicaciones*) in the interest of social and economic justice. The Right insisted that the affected communities should not be required to repay production loans or the partial cost of housing¹⁰⁴ because there were so needy -- a version of the "helpless victim" assumption.¹⁰⁵ This reinforced the growing belief among survivors that all aid providers -- both the State and private -- were obligated to provide them unlimited support.

¹⁰⁴The House of Representatives, led by the Jaramillistas, in congressional hearings tried to rescind a requirement that the NGOs had agreed upon for the housing projects in the area. Specifically, the agencies had agreed among themselves (and Resurgir agreed) that they would all adopt a self-help method and require a repayment of half the cost to community fund. They felt it was critical that some common elements among the various programs be established in order to promote the common objective of empowerment, which was being undermined by give-away reconstruction programs. (Although agreed upon in these meetings, in practice, each agency did what it wanted to. In addition to the different construction methods, the actual quantity and quality of the housing provided by the projects varied enormously.)

¹⁰⁵Chapter 8 will take up this topic in detail.

C. Between People and Traditional Leaders

A general discontentment and indignation quickly emerged among the survivors. The survivors' initial cohesion and pulling together deteriorated as the reconstruction was slow in starting and old political divisions reemerged. Rumors and blame-throwing were rampant in the Valley as survivors tried to make sense of how the disaster had happened and what was to happen next. The governor of Tolima was accused of mismanagement and negligence and much of the blame for the 22,000 deaths was placed on him. The call for his resignation was almost immediate. The town priest, who had slipped out of town the night of the avalanche, was accused of purposefully not warning the residents of Armero about the coming danger as a kind of retribution against the town for its anticlerical activity during *La Violencia*.¹⁰⁶ Both local political and church leaders were suspect, limiting their role in the recovery.

The people of the region also fought among themselves. Area residents, who at first so generously opened their hearts and homes to the survivors, came to feel besieged and to resent the seemingly endless parade of free goods not destined for them. Clashes between the survivor and other area residents became everyday occurrences. This

¹⁰⁶Armero's town priest was one of the first victims of *La Violencia* in the region. The Church was actively on the side of the Conservatives at the time. On April 10, 1948, Armero's priest was dragged from the church (by outsiders, it is said) to the town plaza where he was decapitated and his body mutilated. The assassins made the nuns witness the horrifying event. Shortly thereafter, the Bishop of Ibagué, with Vatican approval, placed a curse on the town. The 1985 avalanche is said to have been God's retribution against Armero for allowing this murder almost forty years earlier. The contemporary priest's own survival of the disaster lent authenticity to the curse for those predisposed to believe.

further made it difficult for the emergence of new leadership that might effectively negotiate survivor and area resident interests towards a more unified recovery.

D. Between People and Aid Providers (Public and Private)

General confusion over aid generated much anger among the survivor population. There were many promises, but the projects seemed slow or nonexistent. Many survivors felt that the aid was their property and that the donations should be distributed equally among them.

While slow to organize themselves to take control of the assistance, many small groups of survivors did come together around protests of the government's handling of donations. Although most survivors were outside of formally organized groups, there were survivors who organized themselves or acquired assistance from different groups, including political groups from the left and right. By January, different ad hoc groups occupied public buildings and called general strikes in various towns to protest the government's apparent inaction and accused the government coordinating body, Resurgir, of being incapable and corrupt (CINEP 1986). In the Valley, survivors demanded that Resurgir transfer donations directly to them, respond faster, continue relief donations, and also give everyone land, houses, and a microenterprise.

The survivors' discontent also manifested itself in a generalized reticence to work in the reconstruction of the area. Resurgir and others had initiated infrastructure recuperation projects that were also to provide much needed employment. But many of them preferred not to

work.¹⁰⁷ So many that it was common practice to bus in workers all the way from Ibagué and to pay their transportation and higher wages. The University of Tolima could not find sufficient workers from the survivor population to harvest the cotton on their experimental farm. All this with a 70% unemployment rate among survivors. Other projects who had the explicit objective of employing survivors had to abandon the idea because of their poor job performance. The project, "Ladrillos por Colombia", which mounted a brick-making factory (materials necessary for the reconstruction) was a prominent example. Having started out with almost 100% workers who were survivors, they had less than 10% just four months later.

The variety of recovery and development programs had created a kind of "supermarket" mentality in the Valley. Survivors bounced between agencies looking for the best deals -- who offered the most and required the least. Agencies found themselves making compromises in order to attract the relatively few beneficiaries. Self-help housing programs found that it was next to impossible to build as planned when right next door another program were giving away ready-made, contractor-built houses. The participants in the former felt it was unfair that they should have to work to receive what another was simply given; they enacted work slowdowns and stoppages which threatened to bring the projects to a standstill. As a result, most self-help construction programs ended up also contract building in order just to finish the housing.

¹⁰⁷Despite the fact that working in no way disqualified them from their monthly government pensions. Pensions were 75% of a minimum salary that a family would receive in normal times.

The PVOs had other difficulties in working with the survivors. After the disaster, the poor survivors were so unstable and their associations so fluid that PVOs found it difficult to build on them or to count on families for any length of time. With the beneficiaries lack of organizational experience, the agencies found it very difficult to implement community-based development projects (to which the failure of self-help efforts also attests). With the slow implementation of recovery projects, the beneficiaries' mistrust of the agencies grew and, in some cases, translated into serious misunderstandings, the spread of malicious rumors, and even acts of sabotage.

The projects which resulted in the Valley sparked one journalist to note,

In this area one observes...the different agencies that have given resources have done so with very good will, but they have not implemented the assistance with suitable and adequate policies that motivate and push the victim community to be creators of their own development.

- El Espectador, "Six months after the tragedy: survivors do not leave limbo", May 16, 1986.

Development work is hard enough in normal times, but after a disaster it is even more difficult. It was within this complex environment, with numerous actors, pervasive aid, and deep conflicts between people, aid providers, and the state, that our case takes place.




Fig. 1. Distribution of active volcanoes in Latin America (from Morris *et al.*, 1979).

From Sigurdsson and Carey (1986).




Fig. 8. A schematic diagram of the generation of lahars or mudflows during the 1985 Ruiz eruption in Colombia. The base of the eruption column, generated by the explosive eruption, was surrounded by a turbulent density current of hot pyroclastic materials, including pumice and volcanic ash, which generated surges and pyroclastic flows over the glacier surface. The heat transmitted from the hot surges led to melting of the glacier surface, generating large-scale floods of meltwater down the volcano's flanks. The floods channelled into the major river valleys, where they eroded the soil and surface sediments, resulting in the formation of lahars or dilute mudflows. During the initial explosive event, the eruption column reached an altitude of 30 km, and fallout of tephra from the plume formed a thin pumice and volcanic ash deposit down-wind of the volcano.

Sigurdsson and Carey (1986).

From Sigurdsson and Carey (1986).

Save The Children's Project Armero

A major challenge that development PVOs face in their post-disaster programs is how to make the transition from relief to long-term development work. One of the most troublesome questions is how and when to phase-out relief and to phase-in development programs. Few agencies, if any, have successfully answered it.

This chapter presents how one agency, Save the Children (SCF)' in Armero, Colombia was able to move from relief to development, albeit with mixed success. Following is a short description of Project Armero's first year, including the agency's entrance on the scene, its relief program, the phase-out of its relief assistance and move to development programs. This case provides the data for in depth review of the program strategy for introducing development (Chapter 7), the relationship between agency and program participants (Chapter 8) and the relationship between agency and government throughout the transition to development programs (Chapter 9).

I. The Initial Response

On November 13, the news of the disaster shocked SCF staff working both in Westport and Colombia. The Colombian staff acted quickly. An emergency committee was formed almost immediately and a small group was sent to the disaster zone (4 hours from Bogotá) to report on the conditions. As the affected area did not fall within the agency's area of operations, the acting director was unsure of the best way to proceed

and contacted headquarters. In Westport, the regional director for Latin America, himself a Colombian, took an immediate personal interest in the disaster. He coordinated the creation of an emergency fund and the formation of an emergency committee to explore options. The two offices maintained hourly contact as both gathered more information about the magnitude of the disaster and the relief needs.

The emergency committee in Westport convened on November 15 and decided that the regional director would go immediately to Colombia to assess the situation and design an immediate response. He left with US\$10,000 and a media specialist from the agency's public relations office. By phone, he directed the Colombian staff to purchase emergency supplies and to rotate staff from the other project areas to the disaster area. Meanwhile, in the States an emergency appeal to donors for contributions had also begun.

In Colombia, no time was wasted. The local staff collected relief supplies and donations which were taken to Armero by one of the field project directors. With a small team, he managed to enter the disaster area before it had been officially closed and, through close coordination with the military mayor, gained permission to participate in the relief operations. Four days after the disaster, the regional director from Westport had joined the local team already in Armero.

Rather than staying in the village, the SCF team went to the hills in the surrounding areas to locate survivors. They found a small group of individuals and families huddled on high ground about 14 kilometers from Armero. The families felt safe on the hillside and refused to come down into the town of Guayabal where the government and international relief agencies were providing emergency supplies and shelter. The team

brought supplies and tents to them and began what soon became a "centro de refugio", or emergency relief camp for survivors on a farm whose owner had also survived the disaster.

II. The Emergency Relief Project

All in need were welcome at the camp. During the emergency/relief phase of the Project, thirty-five families lived for varying periods of time at the camp. At any one time, the camp had approximately 15 to 20 tents. With the staff, the resident families built rudimentary latrines, a communal cooking area which doubled as a meeting place, and fixed up the farm's warehouse for storage. Drinking and cooking water was delivered to the camp by truck. For bathing and washing clothes, the families walked to the nearby river.

As in neighboring camps, the families in the SCF camp were surviving completely on the assistance from outside sources for the first three months. The government was providing occasional basic foodstuffs and by February, was also providing pensions of Col\$4,500 per person per month. SCF provided weekly market baskets of meat, eggs, vegetables, milk, and other provisions. A health post was equipped in the camp and those with more serious medical problems were taken for consultation to the tent hospital in Guayabal and were provided with free medicines. Over the first months, additional services such as child care, training opportunities, and transportation were added.

The first three months the camp was overseen by SCF staff from the other impact areas rotating to Armero on a monthly basis. Although they did not have any disaster experience, the rotating staff were experienced community development workers with a wide range of experience in administering grassroots level programs. They lived at

the camp in order to get to know the residents better and work more closely with them. Their long days were spent buying supplies for the families, overseeing the daily running of the camp, and meeting to coordinate with other relief organizations working in the area.

One of the first things they did was to organize the camp families. Following the models from their own areas, the staff called elections and the families chose a *junta directiva* and formed committees for camp protection, maintenance, and administration of the relief assistance. The *junta*, as well as the committees, had fitful starts and their membership was constantly in flux. General assemblies were held twice a week in which information was shared and decisions made by vote. It was the only camp in the area that had no military presence.

Early on, the *junta* completed clearly defined tasks in the consolidation and maintenance of the camp. They distributed and erected tents for new families, constructed the community kitchen and latrines. They bought the gasoline for the electric generator, watched over the warehouse of supplies, tried to make sure families did not use the drinking water for bathing. With the staff, they also worked out the ground rules for life in the camp which included the residents' responsibilities in community work as well as a process to sanction residents who did not comply.

The committees took care of other maintenance and organizational tasks. The men rotated for night watch duty, for bringing firewood and water, and for the upkeep of the electric generator. The women organized the cooking duty, and formed the backbone of the health and hygiene committee. In addition, other types of groups were formed with a mix of relief and developmental orientation. They included the

children's cooperative which ran a small concessions stand and met together weekly, and the women's group, who shared child care, took turns preparing the children's nutritional snacks, and received small loans for a few chickens and a garden.

These community structures encountered difficulties from the very beginning. Although the *junta* and committees were to act as channels for the families to express their preferences about how to organize the camp resources, the resident's involvement in the camp never reached the point at which they took initiative. Resident participation remained largely at the level of concurring and contributing labor to tasks and plans traced by the agency.

Nevertheless, the community participation during the early relief stage was quite remarkable in this disaster. The relief camp was functioning relatively smoothly, the resident families were out of immediate danger, and by February most men had returned to income generating activities and their families were beginning to provide some things for themselves. Building the camp on resident involvement was remarkable in the Valley where other camps took many more months to initiate mechanisms to achieve the same extent and intensity of participation among their residents.

Two months after the tragedy, an apparent stability had returned to the families living in the SCF camp. As time past, the families had appropriated the camp itself as their own. The farm's barbed wire fences and tent struts were converted into clothes lines; the communal kitchen doubled as a sewing and meeting place. One popular resident erected a covered space and built benches along side his tent for his friends to talk away the long evening hours. Much to the chagrin of the

project staff, families began to construct individual makeshift kitchens with fires along side their tents. For a short time, there was even a brothel working out of one tent which began when some "cousins" came to visit a family residing in the camp.

As more tents filled in the camp site, families began staking out their territory more clearly with the porches and "satellite" kitchens. The walkways between tents were worn and also helped divide private from public spaces. In June, when electricity was installed the camp was full of blenders, radios, and even a fair number of television sets.

These adjustments notwithstanding, the camp remained an uncomfortable place to live. Although on a hill benefitting from the breeze, under the hot sun the tents were like ovens during the day. At night, the entire family slept together with no privacy for the adults. When the rainy season began, water entered some poorly situated tents requiring foundations and small moats to be built around them. During one strong rain storm, a number of tents blew down in the middle of the night. The infrastructure of the camp, while adequate for the most part, was certainly less than convenient. To bathe and wash clothes, the families had to make a fifteen minute hike down to the river -- a tedious march to brush your teeth or with clothes piled in your arms. The latrines were centrally located next to the tents, but the community lost interest in keeping them clean and maintained; they quickly became unpleasant to use and people preferred to go over the hill out of sight in the open air. Drinking and cooking water came on trucks sporadically. While never without water, the uncertainty of its timely delivery kept the water rationed and the agency hounding the

authorities. Living in these close quarters with new neighbors tried many a resident's good humor.

At the same time, the daily routine also brought a certain calm. Families sent their children to study in town and every Saturday, themselves, went to the town market. During the week, all were busy working, running the camp, and taking care of their families. Despite the residents' activity and the physical consolidation of the camp, the atmosphere was full of expectation and waiting...waiting for permanent housing and jobs to rescue them from their state of limbo.

III. The Transition to the Agency's Standard Development Programs

By the end of December, a five-page preliminary project design for the development program was approved in Westport. The report read, "the 27 families of the emergency program are ready to move to the development program which is being defined jointly with the Colombian SCF staff."¹⁰⁸ This two-year program plan proposed to support sixty families in the construction of permanent housing and in the reactivation of employment opportunities. About 5,000 area residents were targeted for programs of education and primary health care. Together, these programs would make up the standard development project sponsored by SCF.

In early February 1986, SCF hired the permanent project director and by mid-March the majority of what would be the permanent local staff had been assembled in Armero.¹⁰⁹ A social worker, agronomist, planning

¹⁰⁸From the preliminary project design: Project Vida Nueva in Tolima, Colombia. Program Plan for Two Years, presented by Jairo Arboleda, December 1985.

¹⁰⁹From this moment on through the first year and a half, the project functioned largely outside of the usual agency administration regimen (communication channels, policy-making, chain of command) and

support person, and administrative staff had joined the Project -- six persons with development skills. (A doctor and architect support joined a few months later.) They assumed the responsibility of the emergency camp from the rotating staff and began to plan the transition to a permanent development program.

With the arrival of the permanent staff, the project priority shifted to the residents' return to work and the reactivation of production activities. The first order of business was the decision of where to locate the project, including both housing and productive enterprises. The camp residents voted overwhelmingly to purchase the farm on which they were camped -- the choice of a rural site reflecting their agricultural capabilities.

SCF purchased the farm at the end of March and the move towards the development program definitively began. With the ownership of the land, investment in permanent solutions could get underway. The credit and employment creation program was the immediate priority. The design of the housing and the other project components also began in earnest.

IV. The Phase-out of Relief: The Launching of a Crisis

SCF recognized that the time was right to begin the development programs to provide permanent, long-term solutions. In terms of building its own institutional base, SCF had approved a two-year budget for the project, hired the permanent project staff, and purchased the farm. Prolonging the relief assistance was consuming a substantial portion of the Project's total resources. Moreover, much of the relief

the decision-making was concentrated in Armero.

was becoming obsolete. As people were back to work, food donations were unnecessary. And with the passing of the emergency health threat, emergency medical treatment was no longer needed. Similarly, families were wearing weary of camp living and permanent housing was needed. In the disaster zone, the rehabilitation of the valley's infrastructure was underway, the economy was recovering (albeit slowly and incompletely), and other assistance programs had begun -- all important support for sustainable development. The time clearly had come to move beyond relief.

And so, the agency began the gradual phase-out its own food donations. In April, the agency stopped supplying the food baskets with the exception of the meat rations (in response to a request of camp residents) and the nutritional supplements for the children. By June, however, all food donations had been cut definitively. Similarly, with the emergency passed and the health committees and weekly doctor visits operating, the agency no longer paid for the families medicines and medical visits. During this period, the project staff was also marginalizing a destructive community leader while, at the same time, trying to develop more leaders and to insure wider resident participation generally. In this rearrangement of power, some who had control over resources in the relief period had lost them. Although the phase-out of relief aid was accompanied by the initiation of the development project -- both the credit program and the design of the housing were underway -- the phase-out measures were extremely unpopular with the camp residents.

The problems between SCF and its camp residents began with the phase-out of relief. A small group of old-timers, about five original

families, complained bitterly and tried to convince the agency not to cut the food rations. Their participation in community activities dropped off sharply and some families threatened to leave to join other projects. A growing split within the community emerged between the old-timers and more recent arrivals. The old-timers had begun to withdraw from camp activities and to actively pit themselves against the agency and those who were participating. They were seeing their position of privilege supplanted by a group of new-comers who were willing to organize and work in the credit program. Quickly, different leaders emerged from these two groups and the wrestling for control began within the camp. What originally was only a protest against the agency's cutting of donations blossomed into a full-scale internal power struggle between old-timers and new-comers. The casualty of the struggle was the entire beneficiary participation.

By the end of April, the community participation was in the throws of a crisis. The families lost interest in running the camp: the maintenance of the camp had already become a thing of the past, the nightly watches no longer existed, the control of water and the cleanup of the latrines disappeared. The current *junta* was on the rocks, most of the committees were empty shells, and the general assemblies had deteriorated into forums for destructive fighting between the two factions of the community. Even the most active new families were discouraged. The community organization that the project staff had dreamed of promoting in the relief stage was no more than an illusion.

A rash of vandalism in the camp directed against the first production projects also broke out. The cattle's watering hole was poisoned, the fence around the sorghum crop was dismantled and the cattle herded in to

trample and eat the new plants, and just before the harvest, over a third of the sorghum crop (planted with a SCF loan) was burned by one of its own partners. Other components of the project were also vandalized -- for example, the instruments of the camp's health post, supplied by the agency, were stolen. Although there was no concrete proof of who did most of these (with the exception of the sorghum burning), the general knowledge within the camp was that the group of old-timers committed the sabotage and vandalism.

When these actions did not result in the agency reverting back to a donation basis, this same small group took their fight outside of the camp. They began a campaign to discredit the agency both locally and nationally. The group went to the national headquarters of Resurgir and to the largest national newspaper, both in Bogotá, to report that the project director was charging families \$10,000 pesos to participate in SCF's housing program and that he had stolen \$18 million pesos that a wealthy American had supposedly donated to the project. They also went to the mayor of Guayabal to repeat the same stories. Neither Resurgir, the newspaper nor the mayor paid any attention to the accounts as they were also receiving the same stories about other aid providers.

This crisis arose at a critical time. Long-term solutions had to be defined and beneficiary involvement was critical for the agency's development objectives. Despite the project staff's best efforts, no viable community forums existed for discussing, taking decisions, and following through. In the middle of this crisis, the project had to find the way involve the beneficiaries in order to implement the community-based approach to the new development programs. At the same time, however, the project staff clearly recognized that working with

the current camp families threatened the viability of a community-based development project.

V. Phasing-in the Development Programs: Coping with the Crisis

To break its destructive relationship with the camp residents, the agency radically restructured its community participation strategy. The agency opened the project up to beneficiaries from outside the camp and requested a firm commitment on the part of the current camp residents who wished to join the development project. In June and July, the staff recruited highly motivated families who were better skilled and more community-oriented than the original camp families. Primarily from the *flotante* community, they had had less exposure to the relief network. Upon passing through a preliminary selection process, the applicant families formed their own housing construction groups or were accepted into an existing one in order to definitively join the project. As the old-timers saw the new families forming housing construction groups and meeting regularly in preparation of building, they too began construction groups so as not to be left out.

At the same time, the agency suspended indefinitely the community-wide general assemblies. Instead, families shared information and acted through their individual housing construction groups. Made up of ten families each, their objectives and tasks were narrowly focused. Finally, to break the over-reliance of the camp residents on the agency, the staff moved out of the camp and their time spent at the camp was limited. Meetings were held at the agency office in Guayabal. Together, these actions were to signal to the camp residents a clear break -- that the project was entering into a new and very different phase.

The crisis demonstrated to the project staff that the relief project had failed to "set the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility with the affected community". The relationship with the camp residents would not provide an effective bridge between the relief and development projects. While the above measures dealt with the deteriorated relationship with the camp residents, the rapid and efficient phase-in of the development programs was the most important mechanism the agency had to completely sever the relief relationship.

The early priority given to the return to work and creation of income opportunities led the agency's phase-in of development project. When all other projects in the Valley were constructing housing, SCF had begun with an economic recovery program. Interest-free loans for farm-based production as well as for other small manufacturing and commercial enterprises were given to many camp families. The agency also directly hired camp residents to upgrade the farm and build a school in Guayabal, and referred them for other jobs in the area. With the reason for relief largely gone, the dismantling of some of the relief support had very compelling logic, even if it lacked a warm reception.

Over the next year, the project staff concentrated on transforming all relief activities into permanent project components as originally envisioned. With the recruitment of the remaining beneficiaries in June, the project shifted its full attention to the construction of the permanent housing. Already in April, families had begun to submit their drawings. By July, the families approved the final design of both the houses and of the village, and bulldozers levelled the construction site. The first construction group broke ground on August 4, 1986.

For the rest of the first year, the employment and production program slowed down as the housing program took center stage. Still, loans were consolidated, training provided, and a few enterprises moved to regular credit sources. The other programs also further their transformation to development programs. The education component, which began as ad hoc literacy and leadership education during relief, moved to formal relationship with governmental programs for vocational and leadership training for adults and the New School system for primary school aged children. The camp's health committee received continued training, joining other health committees in the region. Social integration activities also underwent similar transitions. Over the period, the agency's expenditure for relief was systematically replaced by development expenditures.

The phase-in of development programs also required the administrative arrangements to make some adjustments. From a short, uncertain time horizon, tight headquarters orchestration, emergency operating procedures, and temporary personnel, the project moved to a more secure project horizon, local decision-making, standard operating procedure, and permanent development personnel. Emergency financing was replaced by a defined project budget, and finally, a child-sponsorship finance base two years later. Relationships established with other agencies (both governmental and nongovernmental) to channel relief aid to the project changed to agreements around development resources. The staff had to leave behind relief duties to focus on the new programming.

A little over a year later, fifty-seven survivor families had moved into their new houses and the new hamlet was almost completed with infrastructure and space for small-scale economic activities. The

soccer field and artificial lake (later to be used for irrigating parts of the farm) were completed. A school was being built and the children were already attending classes in a make-shift classroom. All of the men and some of the women had returned to work, a growing number in their own businesses. Families were cultivating sorghum, food, and a variety of fruits on the farm; cattle, pigs and chickens were also being raised. Still far from being optimally utilized, the farm was on its way to providing important sustenance to project families.

P A R T I I I :

INTEGRATING DISASTER RESPONSE WITH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Part III will now analyze in detail the strategy that Save The Children implemented for integrating their disaster response with development programs. The objective is to identify and analyze the set of challenges that the case agency faced in the process.

Chapter 7 evaluates the overall strategy of shaping development programs out of a relief project, looking at program and management factors that hindered and eased the transition to development. The next two chapters analyze the key relationships in the transition from disaster to development assistance. Chapter 8 examines the relationship between the agency and the program participants, addressing the frequently encountered dependency relationship. Chapter 9 explores the relationship between the agency and the host government in order to identify what factors influence the relationship and how it may facilitate the integration of relief with development assistance.

**Shaping Development Programs out of Relief:
An Effective Post-Disaster Integration Strategy?**

I. Introduction

SCF's post-disaster strategy was to use their relief project to establish a presence in the Valley and, from there, to then phase in their standard community-based development programs. This chapter will now assess how effective and efficient this strategy was for introducing the development work.

The task of shaping relief into a development program is a complex one. Its complexity made the strategy particularly difficult. In addition, the relief project itself produced negative consequences for the development program. The relationships and operations from the relief project unexpectedly conflicted with development objectives at the point of transition. We now examine the program strategy of Save the Children (SCF).

The chapter draws on three sources of argument and evidence. The central case, in Chapter 6, sets the overall subject at hand and illustrates particular points. Recent literature highlighting the accepted wisdoms and expected outcomes is reviewed in Chapters 1-3 and referred to here. Finally, other vignettes from post-disaster practice provide a comparison for the central case experience.

A. The Paradox

The program strategy that SCF used in Armero paralleled a notoriously difficult -- some would say, failed -- strategy used in other aid settings. The strategy of starting with social services and branching into development programs has been problematic on both the agency and

program levels throughout the history of PVOs. During the post-war period, PVOs were primarily providers of humanitarian and welfare services. Those who made the shift to become development agencies in the 1970s encountered great difficulties, both internal to their organizations and with their project beneficiaries.¹⁰ As a program strategy, starting with social services and then branching into self-help type projects has also consistently produced disappointing results. From their experience with refugees, Rolfe et al. (1987) note that "it appears difficult to change paths that appear to have been set; for example, switching from grants to loans" (pg. 62). Tendler (1989) found that microenterprise programs who embarked on the strategy had "great difficulty to make the...transition from social and welfare services to the income-generating ones" (pg.46).¹¹ Is there any reason to think that this same program strategy would be effective in a post-disaster project?

There are two primary reasons why the strategy might be applied to disaster situations. First, and most obvious, is the simple need to do so. In a post-disaster situation, all agencies who want to implement development programs must first face the task of moving beyond relief, in one form or another. The agency may have provided emergency relief and now wants to move to development work. Or they may have arrived after the dust has settled and found the terms of relief assistance set by others. In either case, agencies must find a way to turn the focus

¹⁰These difficulties have been well documented. See Tendler (1982), Sommer (1977), and Chapter 2 for additional references.

¹¹For other examples, see Sommer (1977) and Myscliwicz (1988). Sommer (pg. 46) cautioned that, "...the blurring of [relief with development] goals may negate developmental effectiveness."

to development programs. It is an inescapable predicament. It was in response to this apparent necessity, rather than to any deliberate experiment, that our case agency responded as it did.

Second, a growing number of experts now argue that the difficulties involved in introducing development in this way (relief to development) can be worked out. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature has found that relief and development do not fit together well because relief aid has been largely inappropriate (actually undermining development), that it has a propensity to produce or reinforce a community's dependency on outside materials and expertise, and because the two aid types embody very different organizational and management styles.

When framed as such, these obstacles also have obvious solutions. Relief can be made "more appropriate", the pervasiveness of outside aid can be reduced and beneficiaries' participation in their own relief and recovery increased in order to minimize dependency, and relief's management style made more like management for development. By doing this, the literature argues, the friction between relief and development programs can be minimized. These lessons were part of the case agency's repertoire and brought to Armero by the Regional Director for Latin America and later by the Project Director in Armero. They both had good reason to believe that, with those program components incorporated, building development programs out from relief ought to work.

B. Shortcomings of the Literature

The recent literature argues that the problems common to disaster programs can be ameliorated by improving relief delivery. There is ample evidence that these adjustments have greatly improved relief itself (Cuny 1983; Anderson and Woodrow 1989). However, there is little evidence that it has also aided agencies to address the major sticking point of post-disaster programs -- the how and when to phase-out relief and phase-in development aid. Today, it is fashionable to downplay the tension between relief and development programs. The convention of blaming relief aid for all post-disaster ills, so popular in the 1970s and early 1980s, has been replaced by more conciliatory endeavors. Many practitioner-scholars now look for workable solutions -- for ways to make relief "support", "complement", and "encourage" development. However, the gap between the principle of a supportive relief-development relationship and the reality of their too often conflictive association is glaring.

This tension, I argue, arises from the inherent differences between the two post-disaster activities. Relief and development aid still have to respond to fundamentally different needs and as a result are very different from each other. The clash between them in the field often has at its base conflicting roles of the aid provider(s), competition for resources (material and human), institutional competition (between agencies or branches within the same agency), project rigidity resulting from the relief commitment, as well as the more widely reported manifestations of dependency relationship between agency and beneficiaries. The recent literature tends to forget or obscure these differences between relief and development aid. The resultant tensions

and their consequences for subsequent development programs ought not to be so readily downplayed.

As Project Armero clearly illustrated, the transition to development programs did not happen naturally and easily. These conflicts between disaster relief and development programs obstruct the linking of the two programs. And while field experience has demonstrated that the above changes in relief may ease tensions between the two programs, one must be careful not to overstate their effectiveness. Nowadays, it is rare to find a PVO which does not try to incorporate these lessons into their disaster assistance; yet the results have been very uneven.

This chapter now turns to an evaluation of the application of the old program strategy (welfare services to development) in the situation of a disaster. Was building development on the relief project an effective strategy for introducing development programs?

C. Project Armero's Program Strategy

The disaster response "was organized following the good tradition of SCF of helping to meet immediate needs and planning for more sustainable solutions."¹¹²

As in other programs, the agency's strategy in Armero aimed "to shape immediate relief assistance into longer-term, self-help programs" and to use its relief programs to lay "the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility with the affected communities and local governments".¹¹³

¹¹²From the preliminary project design: Project Vida Nueva in Tolima, Colombia, Program Plan for Two Years, presented by Jairo Arboleda, December 1985.

¹¹³Save The Children Federation. "Program Department, Five Year Plan", November 15, 1985.

The relief program would be a natural lead-in for a long-term, development program -- that is, their "standard" program."¹⁴ The formal project objective was to provide affected families with emergency assistance and then to help them through recovery towards self-reliant development.

As we saw, the relief project was conceived as orienting both beneficiaries and agency programs towards the objective of development. Specifically, the agency planned to shape relief into development through two elements: beneficiary participation and laying the administrative and program groundwork for doing longer-term development work in the Valley. By running the camp with the involvement of the beneficiaries, the agency hoped to build resident's capacity to solve problems and organize solutions. Allowing them to take the lead in rebuilding their own lives was to be an important mechanism to move to the development program. With the administrative and program groundwork in place, the emergency project was to lead into a self-sustaining development project.

The agency provided relief assistance with the idea that it would quickly shift to standard development programming. Relief activities would be transformed into full-blown, permanent development programs. From the beginning, the agency had in mind to build upon various relief activities and to replace other temporary measures with permanent solutions. For example, the tents and community latrines would become permanent housing and infrastructure; handouts of food and interim jobs

¹⁴The agency did not explicitly draw parallels between this strategy and other "social-services-to-development-programs" strategy employed in other settings.

would be replaced by self-managed enterprises supported by access to credit and technical assistance. Emergency medical care would be replaced by preventative primary health care and training; quick fix skills training in leadership and management would be replaced by access to government literacy programs, the New School education system, and formal vocational training. This vision of programs to come was provided by the agency's standard CBIRD approach.

The most important administrative element that the agency set in place during the relief period was its bottom-up administration. Beginning with the first decisions about what kind of emergency response to take, the locus of decision-making was in the field. As in its standard development projects, the agency employed local resources and Colombian personnel. As the project got underway, the permanent project staff had a great deal of autonomy to define and implement the Project. Also, the camp residents were included in the structure for communication and decision-making. This grassroots approach gave the project maximum flexibility for planning and implementation of the project.

Setting the administrative base for the subsequent development project also included gaining a "toe-hold" in the post-disaster setting of the Armero Valley. This toe-hold strategy resembled the start-ups of the agency's other Impact Areas with the exception that, in this case, the relief project itself was the entry point. It provided a way for the agency to establish itself as an important actor in the Valley. The making of a good reputation in the area, the cultivation of good relationships with national and local authorities, and showing a "job

well done" to donors all were building blocks for continued work after the relief project was finished.

Finally, the toe-hold included speeding the incorporation of the project into the recovery of the immediate region and community. They wanted to make sure that the agency's recovery program could both take advantage of recovery programs in the area as well as fall within the socio-economic capacity of the Valley. As much as possible, the project tried to build on what was there, to work through the local economic channels and not contribute to their replacement or distortion.

By taking this development-oriented strategy, SCF hoped to avoid the most obvious dependency-creating affects of traditional relief activities and set in motion the Project's development requirements. The starting point was a chaotic post-disaster environment to which the agency had responded with traditional relief assistance. Nevertheless, SCF wanted to establish a post-disaster program that would have an impact well beyond the immediate crisis.

D. Two Unexpected Outcomes of the Post-Disaster Program Strategy

The agency had thrown itself into a very messy and chaotic situation when it responded during the emergency. Coping with the myriad of immediate problems threatened to be all consuming. However, the development perspective allowed the agency staff to step back from the immediate crisis and to act strategically -- to move the Project from relief to development.

In the process, however, the agency was surprised by two unexpected outcomes of their program strategy. The first was the tremendous problems that the phase-out of relief caused. A full blown crisis in

the agency's relationship with the beneficiaries erupted. Certainly, a traditional relief project could be expected to encounter resistance from beneficiaries, but why was this so in the SCF camp where the residents had been involved in decision-making from the very beginning?¹¹⁵ At the transition to the development project, the agency also found its staff and funds being pulled between the relief and development projects in which doing the former well meant not getting the latter off the ground. The relief activities had also established a certain program rigidity that made it difficult to change directions. Earlier commitments were not easily cut. When and how to terminate relief programs produced many dilemmas for the agency despite its transition program strategy. The crisis that the Project experienced -- the relationship with its beneficiaries and the intense internal competition for resources -- threatened to bring the entire project to a grinding halt.

The agency's ultimate objective of moving to development was achieved, but at the cost of efficiency and effectiveness. The relief project did relief well and prodevelopmentally, but as a lead-in for the development project it caused many of its own problems, as seen in Chapter 6. Mixing relief and development objectives for a relief project, in this case, caused the development objectives to suffer.

The second unexpected outcome of the program strategy became clear after the transition to the development project was made. The move to development had been one-sided. While the agency's programs did change,

¹¹⁵A detailed analysis of the origins of the crisis in the agency-beneficiary relationship is the subject of Chapter 8. However, some issues related to program strategy are dealt with in the present chapter.

the beneficiaries of the relief project did not also make the move to the development project, as the program strategy had also envisioned.

Project Armero has been heralded as a "successful" case of linking relief and development. Beginning with an emergency camp serving 35 families, a year later it had built a small hamlet and was working in employment, education, and health with 57 families in the standard style of SCF development projects worldwide. Indeed, Project Armero appears not only to have done relief well in terms of humanitarian assistance and beneficiary participation, but also to have moved beyond relief, transforming that assistance into a long-term cooperative relationship with its beneficiaries.

But on closer examination, the "success" was incomplete. In terms of the beneficiaries of the relief assistance, the project had failed. The agency did not work with a set community over time, facilitating its development. The families that participated in the relief project were not those who ended up in the development project. The relief assistance -- which implied high total and per capita expenditure and great commitment of staff time to develop an effective community apparatus -- was spent on a group of families who did not stay with the project for the long-term. Limited project resources dissipated in relief without having built a constructive agency-beneficiary relationship necessary to usher in the development project.

The agency brought in better skilled, more motivated, community-oriented families to fill the project. The number of original camp residents dwindled as they moved on to other, mostly housing, programs. In the end, only five of the fifty-seven beneficiary families in the

development project -- less than ten percent -- were "old-timer" families who had been with the project since its initiation.

Contrary to plan, SCF's post-disaster intervention, then, was really two separate projects with a completely different set and type of beneficiaries, and a different relationship with them. Linking relief to development worked only in terms of the agency's own institutional goals, but not in terms of a group of beneficiaries.

II. Building Development on Relief: How effective was the strategy?

A. Hindering the Transition to Development Programs

By rectifying many of the shortcomings of traditional relief, SCF did "good relief", as the literature defines it. Project Armero adopted measures appropriate to the Valley's economy, to culture and the risk of future disasters; the beneficiaries were involved in the emergency camp; and the organizational and management style was in line with the agency's standard development projects. But, as we saw, this development-oriented relief did not inherently ease the transition into development programs, as the literature would have us believe. The crisis in the relationship with the beneficiaries and the internal competition for resources were formidable obstacles to be overcome at the point of transition.

The experience of Project Armero indicates that there are some underlying problems in the program strategy of using relief as lead-in to development, at least in the way it was done here. The case suggests that it is not simply a matter of more or less traditional relief that explains the difficulties that emerge to obstruct relief's integration with development programs.

- **Multi-Sectoral and Complex Relief and Development Programs make the Shift More Difficult**

The type of programs which are being linked influences the ease of their coming together. Other cases¹¹⁶ indicate that the simpler, more limited relief and development programs link more smoothly than the more comprehensive, complex ones like Project Armero. The same seems to be true for two programs which are more alike.

Project Armero's relief project was complex and multi-sectoral, as was the development project. This makes the move from one to the other a particularly complex and difficult task. As we saw above, the programs had to change (some phased out, some transformed), as did the general rules of the game vis-a-vis the beneficiaries and program objectives. Contrast this with a relief program during the drought in Burkino Faso. Some of the community cereal banks were experiencing severe strain to meet the needs of the villagers and faced imminent closure. Outside programs decided to distribute emergency grain to vulnerable communities through their banks. This not only provided villagers with much-needed grain, but also allowed the banks to restock after the drought and their non-emergency programs to pick up where they had left off.

In this example, both the relief and development programs were within the same sector -- grain distribution and cereal banks. There were no huge change in activities from one program to the other. The cereal banks were in place before the emergency and they had expertise and

¹¹⁶My review of the literature and a sampling of project cases suggests that conflictive relationships between relief and development programs appear to be the more common variety. However, there are ample examples of programs which apparently experienced less conflictive relationships.

infrastructure to manage relief aid -- that is, to distribute grain. There was also a built-in return to their usual development role after the crisis.¹⁷

Tendler (1989) notes that successful programs are "one-task" types of organizations and not those which require complex transformations. An organization which concentrates on a particular task and does incremental intervention ("simple tasks") is more likely to be successful. The cereal banks provided the "missing ingredient" and a minimalist approach in the relief period. In contrast to Project Armero's experience of severe constraints at the transition to development, the cereal banks project demonstrated a good fit between organization capabilities and the requirements of their chosen task. In sum, the choice of a comprehensive and complex relief program was one factor which made Project Armero's transition to development particularly difficult.

- Development Objectives Compete with Relief for Project Resources

As development programs began, the short- and long-term objectives competed for the project's limited human and material resources. It was difficult for one agency to balance short-term and long-term objectives. Precisely at the period that relief should have been winding down, the agency found itself assuming more relief functions because the camp residents were doing less.

¹⁷This is not to say there are not other problems in the use of cereal banks for coping with the emergency. Fundamental vulnerabilities in the cereal banks became very evident in the course of this emergency -- they were found to not be disaster resistant and they will require outside relief aid in case of another drought. See Anderson and Woodrow (1989) for discussion.

The new permanent project staff was tied to relief to the detriment of the start-up of development programs. For example, the agronomist who was hired to initiate the employment/income program lived at the camp itself during his first months. When he began the loan program,¹¹⁸ he was still overseeing the camp maintenance and the clean-up of the farm, both full-time jobs in themselves. The same was true for the coordinator for social programs. As she began the women's clubs, the literacy program, the New School program, and the interinstitutional coordination she was still the point person for family and social problems in the relief camp. The maintenance of the relief project allowed little time for the staff to plan for and move to the long-term project components.

In the same way, the project's resources were being split between relief and development programs. With the continued need for an emergency camp, the project's resources were tied but, with a fixed budget, as relief expenditures grew, the amount available for the development programs decreased. The relief assistance had to be reduced.

During relief, the close physical and emotional association with the daily life of the camp had increasingly tied the staff to the continuance of relief activities. At the transition point, the agency made some very visible changes in the organization of the administrative arrangements. With the eruption of the crisis, the agency changes some

¹¹⁸This included assisting the formation of enterprises, assessing and coordinating training needs, and establishing monitoring mechanisms. The agronomist's most important task, the detailed Plan for the development of the farm, never got elaborated in the first two years of Project.

very visible ways in which they interacted with camp residents -- specifically, distance was put between themselves. The project director limited the time the staff spent physically at the camp which allowed them to dedicate their time to the housing and other development project components. It also signalled the new relationship with the camp residents.

At the same time, the planning consultant was working on the formal Project Design for the development components. Unlike the other staff members, the consultant did not have fixed responsibilities and could undertake the deliberate planning function without sacrificing current work. The project design document became the central guide for the project and was used in the staff's weekly planning meetings and year-end evaluation. With this document unfolding, the phasing in of the new long-term activities began.

- The Agency-Beneficiary Relationship Established in Relief was Inappropriate for Development

The rules of the game in terms of the agency's relationship with the beneficiaries had to change as the program moved into development programs. In the relief programs, the relationship had many elements of traditional relief. The residents were not a community with a shared history or established leadership; they were a collection of families who ended up together in a camp. Despite their participation in camp maintenance, activities and project decision-making, their relationship with the agency was fundamentally, and unavoidably, based on the transfer of material donations which provided them with comprehensive maintenance. In the process of moving to development, the agency had to withdraw from its delivery role and break the material dependency it had

created. The cutting of donations and tying assistance to active beneficiary involvement represented a profound change in the relationship. Despite all of the agency's efforts to minimize dependency, just such a relationship had emerged and was the main obstacle to the move to development programs.¹¹⁹

Contrast this with the relationship with beneficiaries of two agencies -- one relief the other development -- during and after the drought in Ethiopia. One relief agency provided food to peasant families vulnerable to famine through a food-for-work (FFW) program. The program was innovative in that it paid families to improve their own land instead of the typical public works project that targets community or regional infrastructure. By distributing food aid this way, the program also was able to improve the productive capacity of the peasants' land. The families were also then in a position to later take advantage of the government's agricultural credit program to aid families to recover from the drought.¹²⁰

Both the FFW and the government credit programs are predicated on the same relationship with the beneficiaries. They are both exchanges of goods and services for work/participation in a program designed by the implementing agency. Both the PVO and the government agency are, in the terms of Robertson (1984), accessing a population. The shift from FFW, therefore, does not require the beneficiaries to engage in a new kind of

¹¹⁹The central case study suggests that agencies should not assume that beneficiaries of their relief aid make good candidates for participants in their development programs. This latter conclusion will be treated in great detail in the Chapter 8. We will argue that the strategy of a single agency doing both the relief and development complicated the relationship with the beneficiaries.

¹²⁰Example from Hay (1986).

relationship with the agency. Without this fundamental requirement to change, the relationship is no obstacle for the transition itself. This is true not only for programs like the Ethiopian ones, but also for relief with a minimum of direct transfer of material goods to community-based development programs.¹²¹

- Minimalist Approach Unwittingly Results in Comprehensive Relief for a Few

To set the base for its development programs, the agency worked in many different sectors during relief. This integrated assistance helped the camp residents towards a more complete recovery. However, it also resulted in comprehensive and pervasive involvement of the agency in all facets of camp residents' lives.

The agency's minimalist approach in relief -- establishing only a small camp and resisting the temptation to expand or to take on other camps -- unwittingly resulted in comprehensive relief for the twenty families living in the camp at any one time. For these families, the

¹²¹A similar example took place after the volcano eruption in the Philippines in 1984. Before the disaster, an PVO had been training staff to work in the villages in community development projects. In response to the disaster, a municipal committee designated evacuation centers and coordinated the services with other agencies. The PVO placed some staff in the centers to help villagers organize themselves to maintain the camp and to solve immediate needs. Three months later, the villagers returned home. The PVO staff also went to the villages to begin their original task of community development. They formed interest groups in their villages and began simple projects that had rapid success.

In this example, the PVO was not involved in direct transfer of material goods at all during relief period. The time within the camp was also quite short -- three months until they returned to their villages. Avoiding these elements of traditional relief meant that their relationship with the beneficiaries, even in the camps, was one built around organization, not material transfers. This relationship translated easily and directly to the villages in the community-based development projects.

multi-sectoral relief aid was anything but minimalist. Furthermore, the families stayed in the camp for over a year. Although the relief assistance was necessary, its comprehensive nature hindered the agency's phasing-out of donations, as we saw in the case.

- Relief Criteria for Selecting Beneficiaries Collides with Development Program Requirements

The relief criteria for selecting beneficiaries during the emergency period collided with the agency's development objectives. Under relief, those most encouraged to join the relief project were those who were the worst off and those who made their way to the camp. In the camp, there were families, single people, young and old -- no one was turned away. However, organizational experience, stability, coping abilities, and commitment to community were irrelevant for the participation in relief. SCF's standard development projects usually require a demonstration of a given group's commitment to a project. Its absence is reason enough for the agency to choose not to work with them.¹²² However, when the agency began its development programs in Armero, they were compelled to work with those already in the relief camp, many of whom did not demonstrate the development criteria. The result seriously threatened the viability of the development project which followed.

Families had joined a relief program. Neither they nor SCF had deliberately chosen the other for the development project. This simple fact created a number of problems in the transition period. The initiation of a beneficiary selection process a posteriori which had

¹²²SCF document, "Introduction to Community-Based Integrated Responsive Development (CBIRD)", (pg. 19, 1980).

development criteria allowed the agency to begin to rebuild an effective partnership with its beneficiaries.

The beneficiaries believed that it was the agency's obligation to maintain them. Like survivors of other disasters, the camp residents considered the aid to be, in a sense, their own personal property. As one member of the *junta directiva* expressed about his fellow camp residents, "what the people don't understand is that SCF is private and is here on a voluntary basis."¹²³ Having joined during relief, they did not have to agree to any conditions or demonstrate their community spirit to receive assistance; nor were they ever refused relief assistance if they did not help at the camp. Simply by being a survivor, they had the right to relief. By extension, they thought they also had the right to partake in the development project. Just as they had received food and shelter, they now had the right to a micro-enterprise and house.

Relief criteria meant the agency was tied to the original beneficiaries. So, while the agency's mandate was to assist children and their families, a substantial number of the early residents in the camp were single people. The agency received these individuals into the development project if they wished to continue. Then there were some "problem" individuals who joined the camp in relief and who wanted to stay on. One man was a renowned thief in Armero; one family's "cousins" that came to visit were prostitutes; two families with a long-standing disagreement went after each other with machetes; another man raped a little girl of the camp. The other resident families did not want to

¹²³Meeting with the *junta*. May 14, 1986.

sanction these individuals -- they were afraid of reprisals. After a few concrete episodes, however, the agency worked with the *junta directiva* to have these families leave. Moving these individuals out of the camp also meant moving their wives and children.

At the point of moving into the development project, the agency had to get a firm commitment on the part of the camp residents and complete the fifty-seven families for the housing project. The staff seized this as the opportunity to diffuse the obligation mentality in the camp and to chose beneficiaries who were willing to involve themselves in the development process.

A new beneficiary selection procedure was initiated which required applicant families to interview with the project staff and to provide recommendations and references when possible. The project staff made informal checks about families -- their organizational experience and skills. As the final step, the applicant families had to form their own housing group or be accepted into an existing one in order to definitively join the project. Although the new families did not have to move into the camp during the period of construction, many did.

By initiating this formal selection process with development criteria, the staff chose highly motivated families. Within two months, the development project was full, the housing groups were formed, formal contracts signed, and the construction groups were meeting weekly. The original camp families who chose to stay with the project also had to form construction groups and make a formal commitment to the project for the duration of the housing program. The new beneficiary selection process allowed the agency to dilute the immediate crisis with the camp residents but, it did not repair the relationship with them. The

majority of the relief beneficiaries did not bridge to the development project.

- Beneficiary Participation in Relief does not Necessarily Prepare for Participation in Development: Putting the Cart Before the Horse

SCF wanted to use relief activities to build decision-making and management skills among the camp residents which would help them take control of their future development. As we saw, the strategy did not work.¹²⁴ The agency was unable to establish a cooperative partnership with the beneficiaries.

Nevertheless, the strategy had some apparent logic. The need for camp maintenance and the residents' involvement was obvious: Garbage duty and building a more hygienic kitchen will benefit the health of all in the camp; taking turns to prepare the nutrition snack for the children will benefit all of the children; installing the light posts, building the water tank, or repairing the latrines was for everyone.

But the fact remained glaring -- all of these were temporary solutions. More emergency tasks were not the answer. The relief camp needed to be replaced by permanent solutions -- housing, jobs, a school. After the initial cohesion of the families had subsided, families had little enthusiasm for maintaining what they saw as their state of limbo. The project made the mistake of trying to organize the community

¹²⁴The roots of the crisis with the beneficiaries are found in the relief affiliation itself. Chapter 8 will look in more detail at why the beneficiary involvement in relief did not result in a relationship with the agency that would have allowed the camp residents to have taken the lead in the development process. Characteristics of the Armero disaster and its aftermath, the historical trends of the Valley, the make-up of the survivors themselves, when combined with the agency's relief activities made it very difficult to have established the intended relationship.

participation around something that is not conducive to organization --

the maintenance of a temporary solution.

Obviously, the old free rider problem also had a part to play in the residents' neglect of camp maintenance. This problem is more pronounced at the stage of maintenance of a project than the stage in which everybody's participation is needed in order to bring something into being -- for example, the construction of their houses. More precisely, this strategy of organizing beneficiaries around temporary maintenance tasks suffered from "putting the horse before the cart". In the development process, it is usually through working together first on the construction of the housing that trust, mutual objectives, and social ties are formed that will allow families to then work together to maintain and improve their community upon its completion. In the emergency camp, current development practice was turned upside down. The camp residents were obliged to work together without the usual experience of having done so before, and on temporary rather than permanent solutions.

- The Relief Assistance was an Inefficient Way to Introduce Development Programs

The relief project was an inefficient way for the agency to set the groundwork for its development programs. The aid was soon redundant in a situation where there was an overabundance of relief flooding the area. SCF's emergency camp duplicated services available elsewhere or which could have been assumed by an expert agency. The Red Cross, for example, had ample material resources and expertise in the running of emergency camps and in distributing material aid. Mounting a

comprehensive relief program as the precursor to development programs was hardly the most straightforward mechanism.

Clearly, SCF gained its good name and acceptance through its highly visible activities and community-based work style; no doubt, this aided tremendously in the following stages of work. However, other short-term projects could also have accomplished this, but without inflicting the wounds of relief and paternalism that plagued the project for ever afterwards.¹²⁵ Certainly some useful things were gained for the development programs, but the cost was too high. For an agency whose primary objective was to do long-term development, they spent a great deal of their limited resources during relief.

Other options for relief assistance existed that would have provided SCF an important institutional presence and, in all likelihood, have represented a greater support to the overall emergency management of the disaster. Activities such as, institutional coordination, centers of information, or the organization of sheltered communities and area residents to participate in setting sectoral strategies were not undertaken by anyone until much later (some were never undertaken). These activities would have been well suited to the agency's expertise in community development and would have been more efficient than the concentration of limited resources in the support of thirty-five families for six months at a high per capita cost.

¹²⁵In Chapter 5 we discussed the dependency of survivors throughout the disaster zone in the aftermath of the disaster. SCF joined the scene as a relief provider and inadvertently contributed to the dependency (material and organizational) of its camp residents, as the crisis suggests. Details of this result, despite emphasis on beneficiary involvement, is the subject of the next chapter.

In retrospect, the apparent need for relief did not necessarily mean establishing a full-fledged emergency camp. Camps, although relatively easy to get into, are often hard to get out of. Evidence from other projects in the Valley who waited for the dust to settle before beginning longer-term projects suggest that it is far easier to initiate development where you have not done this kind of direct relief. The Swiss Relief Corp, for example, arrived over six months after the disaster, selected and organized a group of beneficiaries who had been neighbors in Armero, and began a self-help housing project a full year after the disaster. Although the project too experienced problems, the agency was neither tied to problem beneficiaries nor fighting a prior role as relief provider as SCF had had to do.

B. Easing the Transition to Development Programs

While the relationship with the camp residents failed to bridge into the development stage, the administrative arrangements set in place during relief fared much better. The bottom-up management style and the integration of the Project with other development activities in the zone during the relief period both were key in the process of transition to development. Programs, for all their difficulties in relief, also introduced important sectors for later development work.

- Setting Internal Administrative Base

The administrative and management apparatus of the relief project was very similar to the agency's usual development project. The use of local staff and resource, the grassroots level decision-making structure, the extended time frame, and incorporation of community into project planning and implementation all are uncharacteristic of

traditional relief-style administration but, characteristic of SCF's standard development projects. With this development style, the project was able to complete its relief function very effectively.

Moreover, the development-oriented management was able to avoid many of the short-comings of the traditional logistics approach to relief administration. SCF project minimized the inherent tendency towards rigid and authoritarian administration.¹²⁶ The decisions were made at the project level -- at first by the Director for Latin America and the Caribbean Region who was on site and coordinated closely with the country staff for the first three months, and then by the permanent project director. The standard agency procedures were set aside and the communication channels were streamlined between the field and Westport. It was decentralized in its decision-making and included beneficiary participation. The immediate results of this administrative apparatus was a flexible management style that allowed the project to meet local priorities.

The usual problems involved in using volunteers were minimized. Unlike traditional relief projects, all SCF's personnel were Colombian nationals with many years working with the agency. By using their own regular staff, the agency was able to avoid using expensive expatriate consultants who often do not know the disaster context or the agency and who often leave after the disaster period thereby limiting agency learning. Finally, although the time frame for the project was uncertain, the agency did not insist on spending all of the money as

¹²⁶Cuny (1985) argues that private agencies attempting to operate in post-disaster context will be invariably pushed towards adopting these organizational characteristics in order to cope with the "elements of confusion and uncertainty" of the situation.

quickly as possible in the relief stage. If anything, the agency was cautious, preferring to set up only a small camp. By not having time constraints, the project was freer to spend the money on those things, coming a bit later, but more important for the development project.

The administrative arrangements encompassed both product -- the distribution of relief -- and process -- the involvement of locals and institution building with an eye to sustainability. The project staff could decide how much relief to make available, thereby avoiding the common phenomenon of headquarters overloading the project. At the same time, the special "emergency" status allowed the project to bypass the usual administrative requirements which would have been both slower and cumbersome. All of these arrangements permitted the project to move faster and to extend a more resources (per beneficiary) than the standard development projects.

- Setting the External Administrative Base: Relationships with the State and Other Aid Organizations

The agency was also successful at gaining a "toe-hold" in the post-disaster setting of the Armero Valley. Its visibility in the zone and beginning to incorporate the project into the community and regional development trends strengthened the project during the initial relief period as well as easing it into the development stage.

SCF's quick and visible response to the emergency needs as well as its community-based approach earned the agency a reputation for being serious and effective. The open cooperation with the local authorities greatly added to the agency's perceived legitimacy as an important actor in the area. The Colombian and international press featured the agency's activities as an example of a good project. Perhaps the most

visible evidence of the agency's good reputation was the agreement with Resurgir who retroactively purchased the farm from the agency and financed the new village's infrastructure.¹²⁷ Through its relief project and the attention paid to joining the other relief efforts in the Valley, the agency was able to assure itself a great deal of collaboration useful for its continued work in the Valley.

The project also rapidly joined with the other relief and recovery efforts in the Valley, coordinating with other programs--both of international organizations and of government agencies.¹²⁸ The staff attended the formal meetings of association of survivors and political representatives. Many of the project's own activities worked with and benefitted area residents as well as survivors such as, the construction of the school and community center, sponsorship of weekly movies and the town's youth group activities. The project worked within the Valley's economy. Relief supplies and building materials were purchased locally. Labor also was contracted locally from both the survivor and non-survivor populations; salaries were commensurate with area levels.

The agency's relationship with official agencies in the zone greatly facilitated the sharing of relief resources. These relationships transferred easily to the development period later. The government designated the camp an official evacuation and reception cite and

¹²⁷Resurgir was purchasing lots and financing infrastructure for housing projects in Lerida, the preferred town for the relocation of the disaster survivors. Resurgir was under absolutely no obligation to reimburse SCF for the land which it had had no part in selecting or developing.

¹²⁸For example, the national training agency provided training to small, preselected organized groups from the camp. The national family welfare agency, provided training for the camp child care program and the women's groups.

included it in the area's disaster preparedness plans to be used in case of future eruptions. The project had practically unrestricted coordination possibilities with Guayabal's mayor -- the key authority for building permission, access to dump trucks, bulldozers, and other equipment. Likewise, other agencies were eager to do joint projects with SCF, like the boys school in Guayabal, undertaken by SCF, with Resurgir and the International Red Cross.

By linking the project with the local economy and other programs, the administrative arrangements facilitated the changes necessary to effectively bridge the project to development. Unlike traditional relief projects that come and go quickly, SCF's project established key relationships and integrated its relief response with the economic capacities of the region.

- The Long-Term Program Foundation is Set During Relief

During the relief period, the Armero project was able to set the program foundation for long-term. SCF provided nontraditional programs like education, community organization, women's clubs, and children's programs. The agency was also able to act strategically during a very chaotic time. They were able to initiate the relief activities which would be transformed into development program components. Moreover, the agency put its efforts in economic and income reactivation when other aid providers were just building houses. From the beginning, the project worked in sectors that would help beneficiaries to recover beyond the need for relief aid. We saw how the employment and income program led the transition out of relief by aiding families to support themselves.

In conclusion, the relief program complemented the agency's development objectives by providing the administrative and program foundation for the long-term presence in the area. However, the task of shaping the complex relief project into community-based development was ripe with difficulties and contradictions which came to a head at the transition point. Moreover, the relief project itself produced effects that had to be countered for the development programs to take off. It was an inefficient mechanism to introduce development.

That development programs were introduced at all was due to the agency's coping with the problems resulting from relief and to its deliberate attention to the transition stage. It was the transition strategy, not the larger shape-relief-into-development strategy, which allowed the agency to phase relief into development. Project Armero really did two distinct tasks in its post-disaster program: It provided development-oriented relief and deliberately bridged to the development program. The transition to development did not happen spontaneously; it required as much attention as good relief.

III. Project Armero's Transition

The most troublesome element in the project was how and when to phase-out relief and to phase-in development programs. Even with the time for transition clearly identified, it could not happen overnight. The hiring of permanent personnel, purchase of the farm, and returning families to work happened over a five month period, from the end of December to April. The phase-out of relief, beginning with food donations and emergency medical assistance in April, continued

throughout the first year and was overlapped with the initiation of development programs during the period.

A. SCF's Phase-Out of Relief was Contingent on Breaking Material Dependency and the Introduction of Development

With the total destruction of Armero, survivors became refugees in their own country. They could not return to a home that no longer existed, but had to start afresh virtually from nothing. In such extreme circumstances, the complete dismantling of relief assistance was necessarily contingent upon the initiation of concrete recovery opportunities such as permanent housing and employment. For many survivors residing in the Valley, this meant that they would continue to live in camps for over a year.

Residents in SCF's camp were no exception. The physical dismantling of the camp was directly and visibly linked to the completion of the housing construction. In the meantime, the employment and income program allowed the partial dismantling of some of the relief services provided at the camp.

The employment and production program was the cornerstone for the move away from relief. During the transition period, this program also linked its immediate short-term activities to long-term program objectives. Families were referred to interim jobs that also fit their long-term employment objectives, for example. The agency also employed residents in the improvement of the farm which prepared it for their

intensive use later.¹²⁹ As we saw, with families return to work, many relief donations could be stopped.

The most visible element of the emergency program -- the tents and infrastructure -- however, remained. The permanence of the camp made the introduction of strictly development criteria in the programs more difficult. With the camp continuing, the need for its maintenance also persisted. Despite having been able to phase-out some relief aid, the agency and its positive image in the area continued to be tied, in part, to its performance at the emergency camp.

The maintenance of the camp became more difficult, rather than easier, as time past. The living conditions in the camp began to seriously deteriorate as the families' initial enthusiasm for maintaining the camp evaporated (around March/April). The need for more attention to camp maintenance directly competed with the start-up of the development programs. What was the agency to do? The staff could assume more of the maintenance tasks and watch the community contribution shrink, or it could not assume them and watch the living standards at the camp -- already at the low end of acceptability -- deteriorate further.

Moreover, the agency had to commit its staff and resources to the development project -- the permanent housing and income generating programs. The camp residents, too, had mixed objectives. While many complained bitterly about the hardships of camp life, at the same time, they appeared prepared to endure certain camp inconveniences if that

¹²⁹For a detailed description of the employment and production program, see: "Project Nueva Vida, Armero Colombia" (1986) and "Proyecto Nueva Vida, Armero: Reporte Primer Año" (March 1987) both by Guarnizo and Clarke Guarnizo.

meant the housing construction could get underway sooner. They were prepared to make sacrifices for the final promise of moving out of the camp.

In the short-run, then, the agency cut food donations at the same time that it extended some services that families greatly desired. These latter services also formed the beginnings of the longer-term health and education components of the development project.¹³⁰ Most important, the housing construction -- now the clear priority of the families -- was initiated.

The persistent need for the camp, its maintenance and related services, made it difficult to initiate the development programs with the resources available to the Project. With some sacrifices and the initiation of the housing and income generation programs, the slow phase-out of donations and transformation into permanent solutions and development programs began. The complete dismantling of the relief project was finally completed over a year later, in March 1987.

B. The Components that Bridged Relief and Development in Project Armero

SCF had to determine how to do development after relief. We have already reviewed the overall strategy of reshaping relief activities and the case study identified the steps that the agency took. Here, we will interpret the components of the transition.

¹³⁰Among other things, the agency subsidized the children's transportation and school supplies to facilitate their return to school, set up a child care center for the younger children and paid for the instructor and nutritional supplement, and they arranged for the doctor from the health center in town to visit the camp weekly.

Project Armero moved from relief to development programs by first directly attacking the dependency relationship that was the base of the crisis with the beneficiaries. The staff made a set of swift changes in the community participation strategy (new beneficiaries and participation through small housing groups), in the management arrangements (staff distance from camp) and the program strategy (housing priority). These changes were implemented within a period of about two months. Together these actions signalled to the camp residents the ending of the relief and that a new stage was beginning.

The early focus on the economic recovery of the beneficiaries led the move out of relief by allowing the stoppage of food and other donations. The removal -- even partial -- of the material basis of the dependency relationship was the single most important step away from relief. The changes in administration and beneficiary participation acted to "jump start" the agency's development programs. Similarly, the agency worked with government programs and other PVOs to channel resources to the Project's housing and employment programs in an effort to improve the prospects for their sustainability.

As we saw in section II of this chapter, the transition to development encountered a number of difficulties at the transition point, such as competing objectives for the limited project resources, dysfunctional relationship with beneficiaries, and inadvertently comprehensive relief activities. Similarly, the program elements that eased the transition were a flexible, bottom-up administration and functional external relationships (with the state, other PVOs, and the Valley economy) both set in relief. These can be more generally grouped

as the following project components: programs, project administration, and the agency's relationship with the beneficiaries.

The case project's transition to a community-based development program can be defined as the transformation of these three project components to development criteria. Briefly, these transformations were as follows in Project Armero:

The project activities changed from stop-gap, short-term, temporary measures meeting immediate needs to programs which would provide permanent solutions to long-term needs with the goal of becoming self-sustaining. The shift required the phase-out of certain relief activities, the replacement of various temporary measures with permanent solutions, and the transformation of others into development programs.

Indicators of the program transformation included: the phase-out of donations and other temporary measures, the changing ratio of expenditures for donations to employment activities, the change of relief activities into long-term programs (e.g. health, education, social integration), and the changing ratio of investment in the emergency camp to that in programs and permanent solutions

The administrative organization and apparatus also made adjustments to move into development program. The administration took on new functions while abandoning others. From a short, uncertain time horizon, headquarters orchestration, temporary personnel, emergency operating procedures, the administration moved to a more secure time horizon, local decision-making, permanent development personnel, and standard operating procedure. Similarly, the relationship with the state and other programs changed from one of logistical support and ad hoc coordination to formal joint programs with longer time horizons.

Indicators of the administrative transformation include: Voluntary staff were replaced by permanent project staff, the decision-making was consolidated at the project level, emergency financing was replaced by defined project budget, relationships established with other agencies to channel relief aid to the project now began to channel development resources (e.g. brokering for loans instead of shoes), and the percentage of staff time and other resources in permanent activities rose.

The transition of the agency-beneficiary relationship required the agency to manage the dependency relationship resulting from the relief period and to change from a donor to facilitator relationship with the project beneficiaries. To make the transition, the agency had to overcome certain expectations and inertia on the part of the beneficiaries and to limit its own tendency to do more and more for the beneficiaries. In the process, the agency brought in new, more motivated families which ultimately supplanted the original relief beneficiaries.

The indicators of the transition in the agency-beneficiary relationship include: The instatement of beneficiary selection process with development criteria, and the agency matching its approach with the changing state of the beneficiaries (from their initial cohesion to instability to false expectations and mistrust) by suspending general assemblies and emphasizing narrower tasks and participation more geared to individual and family recovery. On the part of the beneficiaries, they moved from "input" participation to "initiative-taking" participation, and eventually to occasional involvement in the definition and implementation of the new development components.

In sum, the transformation of programs, administrative arrangements, and beneficiary relationship (with completely new beneficiaries) provided the bridge beyond relief into standard development programs. The overall program strategy (of shaping development out of the existing relief project) contributed to each component's particular transformation and the Project's one-sided transition.

The PVO and Beneficiary Relationship in Transition

I. Introduction

This chapter deals with an area of recurrent difficulties that PVOs encounter in the transition from relief to development -- namely, their relationship with program participants. Specifically, we will look at the relationship as it relates to those PVOs who want to do development programs after disasters and who, for that reason, look to diminish the conflict which too often emerges between development agencies and disaster survivors, especially those who have participated in the relief system.

This chapter will be divided into three steps. First, we will explore the concept of dependency through the eyes of practitioners. The manifestations of dependency and its postulated origins will be analyzed, as will the reasons for which dependency is problematic and for whom.

Next, this chapter will look at the agency-beneficiary relationship in our case project in order to examine the explanatory power of the common conceptions of dependency reviewed. The manifestations of the dependency relationship in our central case have been described in earlier chapters; however here, we will examine why the *relationship* emerged, why it was problematic for the agency, and why the conventional wisdom of beneficiary participation did not avoid, or at least temper, its emergence.

Finally, we will conclude the chapter with a concept of dependency that stresses the relationship between the aid provider and user rather than the set of behaviors of the latter. Lessons for practice are drawn which are geared to those who are not simply interested in doing relief better, but also in getting to development.

The Concept of "Dependency": Manifestations, Origins, and Strategies for Coping

The relationship between an aid provider and aid user is complex and an area of recurrent problems for practice. This is especially true in post-disaster situations in which relief aid is necessary. The problematic relationship is often framed as dependency, although the use of the concept and its measurement vary tremendously. The "dependency issue", as we will call it for the moment, has emerged repeatedly in PVO field reports, case histories and the relief literature generally. In post-disaster programs, it is particularly troublesome for agencies wanting to help people move towards self-sufficiency.

It is impossible to measure dependency directly (Bates et al. 1982). However, aid providers use the dependency concept to refer to a detrimental relationship and a complex of behaviors. The identified relationship is between outside donors and recipients and is based on the transfer of goods and services. The relationship implies an essential inequality. When this physical relationship creates or reinforces a lack of self-reliance and power within the receiver group, then aid provers consider it to be a dependency relationship. Moreover, this dependency relationship is generally considered to be detrimental when outside resources supplant existing coping and recovery mechanisms,

making it impossible for the affected population and its institutions to sustain the recovery without the outside aid.

Most often, aid workers identify dependency as a number of behaviors on the part of disaster survivors and refugees. For example, when program participants accept handouts but are reluctant to work towards their own recovery and self-sufficiency. Or, when beneficiaries restrict their activities to receiving donations, complaining about the meager help received, and lobbying for more. Aid professionals the world round have described disaster survivors as lacking initiative and waiting for others to find solutions for them. "Inertia", "apathy", and "passiveness" are common terms used to describe dependency. Although dependency is an imprecise concept, "it is a visible factor" for aid providers and one that they must deal with in post-disaster projects (Rolfe et al. 1987).

Although the above manifestations of dependency are commonly reported in disaster and refugee situations, aid providers generally disagree on what dependency is, its origins, and why and for whom it is a problem. Obviously, there is a parallel disagreement over what ought to be done about it. Below is reviewed very briefly the theoretical uses of the dependency concept from which aid professionals' common interpretations will be fleshed out in more detail following.

The concept of dependency originates in essentially two literatures: the macro, *dependencia* school and the micro, behavioralist school. Broadly speaking, they share the same starting point -- dependency as "a state of being determined or significantly affected by external

sources".¹³¹ More than a one-way relationship between two actors (countries or individuals), both literatures speak of interdependence, or a mutual dependence relationship, which is reciprocal but effects the two actors differently. Both levels of analyses speak about dependency as a set of factors that affect an actor's capability to adapt to changing circumstances.

From this common base, the two perspectives diverge, taking different approaches to deal with different issues. The macro approach seeks to explain underdevelopment by understanding economic relationships.¹³² They argue that capitalist development results in the superior power of a foreign society's economic system dominating another society to the detriment of the latter's equitable and articulated development. These analyses remain on the national and international level; the individual nowhere fits into their analyses. The micro approach, on the other hand, uses the concept of dependency relationship precisely to explain individual behaviors which, along with other factors, they argue cause people to be and to remain poor.¹³³

¹³¹Keohane and Nye (1977) is used as indicative of concept used by many of this perspective.

¹³²*Dependencia* theory was a specialized offshoot of the marxian theory of capitalism that emerged in the 1960s to address the difficulties associated with modernization theory. See André Gundar Frank (1966, 1968) and Samir Amin (1974) for the use of the concept of dependency to explain economic underdevelopment. Other authors developing the theory and some representative works include Cardoso and Faletto (1969), Theotonio dos Santos (1970), Cardoso (1973), and Evans (1979).

¹³³This debate over whether structural factors or individual factors determine and sustain poverty is a classic in U.S. social welfare policy. See endnote #1 at the end of the chapter for discussion.

It is this latter psychological and behavioral focus that disaster and refugee aid professionals primarily employ. Professionals believe that dependent behavior may result from either external or internal factors to the individual. The former contends that disaster survivors adopt behaviors to cope with conditions around them -- in this case set by the relief process. Most of the above-noted observations of dependency come from refugee camps where the aid has been the most pervasive. The Refugee Policy Group (RPG n.d.) notes that the way relief is provided creates dependency conditions: "such conditions, and not some 'syndrome' in the minds of refugees, make dependent behavior a reasonable and effective coping strategy for people who find themselves in refugee camps". Similarly, Clark (1985) argues that dependency is rational for those within a system (emergency camp) that rewards such behavior. Waldron (1987) also sees dependency as an adaptive response to imposed social and economic order of the camp -- emphasizing that it is a learned response to dominating external factors.

Lack of alternatives available for survivors to meet their basic needs -- when there is only one source for food, for example -- also may establish a dependency relationship. Emergency programs often do not allow for beneficiary participation in the management of aid. The bureaucratic tendency is to retain decision-making and management of the aid program. As a result, people perceive themselves as passive respondents to the system; soon, the aid program also labels the aid recipients as passive (Clark 1985). The longer this external relationship dominates a person's life and the more extensive is the "aid", the more dependency behavior will entrench.

Researchers also study the psychological process of individual and family adaptation, recently with specific reference to their adaptation to aid programs. Williams (1990) highlights the process in which "external factors...cause a major power shift from internal control to external control over future life decisions" and how this affects the families' potential for action in other spheres (social and economic). In this vein, Schoenmeier (1987) notes,

A person's ability to act, his ability to activate his action potential again and again, to be motivated, and to seize and meet the demands made on him by his environment, require continual confirmation. Thwarting an individual's possibilities for action thus means not only denying him experience necessary for his self-esteem, but also endangering his ability and willingness to perform in the working world. The apathy frequently observed in refugees in camps is the result of their having been continually denied the opportunity to prove themselves.

Finally, scholars have noted that natural disasters often cause profound alterations to the affected population's social arrangements and networks. The destruction of pre-disaster forms of social organization, including traditional leadership structures, may curtail the ability of survivors to mobilize themselves to participate in decision-making for their recovery. Likewise, the disruption of social support and social networks may limit survivors' abilities to help themselves economically; they no longer have access to important resources.¹³⁴ When coupled with raised expectations about what aid is available and what it can accomplish, these alterations explain, at least in part, the incidence of survivors' dependent behaviors.

¹³⁴Bloom (1982), Dean and Lin (1977), Maxwell (1982), Mitchell and Trickett (1980), and Wortman (1984) have all identified social support as an important factor that helps to diminish the effects of trauma and promotes coping and recovery (as cited by Williams 1990).

In sum, disaster survivors may not take active decisions for their own future because of external factors such as the lack of opportunity and resources, or local control of the resources made available.

Aid providers also cite factors internal to the individual that create dependency behavior. Psychologists have long studied the overwhelming emotion of loss that disaster survivors and refugees experience. Loss may be of family members as well as any aspects of their former lives -- material, social, and even their sense of future. Researchers have noted what they call "psychic numbing" when loss is accompanied by violence; this manifests itself as apathetic behavior, detachment, or individuals' inability to feel or relate with others, including their own family (Krumperman 1983). Because of the situations in which survivors find themselves after the crisis event, many are unable to resolve their grief (Baker 1984). It is this unresolved grief, coupled with the accumulation of losses, psychologists argue that greatly affect their response to aid programs and refugee camps and result in dependency behavior (Williams 1990).

Another internal cause of dependency behavior that aid providers cite is the pre-disaster characteristics of survivors themselves. For example, the population may have a cultural or political tradition which has not allowed them to participate in decision-making. Lack of participatory skills, social deference, or fear of assuming more public responsibilities all may result in dependency behavior, at least temporarily. This has certainly been argued in non disaster situations (Hughes 1985). In addition, survivors may have fewer human resources -- certain skills and knowledge which may be important for them to take advantage of assistance in their move towards self-reliance.

Finally, there are some aid providers who perceive that dependent behavior stems from internal personal deficiencies or character weaknesses. That is, disaster survivors or refugees suffer from some "dependency syndrome" which makes them dependent. Clark (1987), among others, has effectively argued that this position "blames the victim" and most practitioners agree, at least in principle. However, in practice aid providers still often see the source of the problem within the survivor or refugee. Aid providers commonly vacillate between two perceptions of their program beneficiaries who they expect "at one moment [...] to be helpless, and at the next independent" (Rolfe et al. 1987).

To recap briefly, we have seen that aid professionals identify dependency primarily as a complex of behaviors on the part of disaster survivors that may be caused by a number of external and/or internal factors. External factors may consist of the direct impact of the crisis event itself -- which destroys social organization and support networks -- and, importantly, the way that aid is provided -- which too often supplants indigenous coping mechanisms, restricts opportunities, and excludes recipients from taking a role in decision-making. Internal factors may consist of survivors' profound sense of loss, their pre-disaster characteristics, and personality traits.

Why dependency is a problem for aid providers has been hinted at above. Dependency is a problem because it restrains people's move towards self-sufficiency. But it is important to see how it is seen differently by different aid providers. Dependency is a problem for relief providers who want to retire their aid, but who see the needs persisting. Although relief providers may see dependency behavior as a

rational mechanism for coping, they are also likely to see it as a negative mechanism because it is people's yielding of their personal power for self-determination. For some relief providers, dependency is an unfortunate, but inevitable, part of providing disaster relief; in extreme situations, getting aid quickly and efficiently to those that need it is more important than worrying about dependency, which can be dealt with later.

For development agencies, however, dependency is acutely problematic. Many of these agencies have philosophies of community-based, participatory development in which they define their roles as that of a catalyst or facilitator rather as the principle "doer" of development. Their development approach is seriously jeopardized when the program participants cannot, or do not, take the initiative to lead their recovery or, worse yet, "abuse" the aid that is provided. In non-disaster circumstances, people's non-compliance with the development rules -- namely, the participation in the definition, implementation and evaluation of programs -- would be reason enough for an agency not to work with a given set of people. But these situations of dependency are too often part and parcel of post-disaster situations. By following relief, development programs encounter significant problems, ranging from apathy and unrealizable expectations to material and organizational reliance, as the following quotes from the field attest,

"Villagers who have a history of handouts after disasters... make high-risk beneficiaries for revolving loan funds." (India)

"The goal of this office was to encourage and motivate refugees to pursue farming and by doing so to become less dependent on the government of Somalia and outside agencies for food rations and other assistance. Incentives were offered to get refugees involved in basic farming...." (Somalia)

"...income-generation and self-employment projects do play an important part in helping refugees to move away from the dependency which comes from receiving aid during the emergency or relief phases." (Africa)

"...both parties were expecting [development] aid to be given in the same way that food, clothes, tents, and other things had been given up to that time." (Somalia)¹³⁵

To get a development program off the ground in a post-relief situation, these agencies have to handle the "dependency issue".

Which brings us to the question of remedies. Today, whether aid providers understand dependency's origin as internal or external, all recognize that the solution is largely in their hands. Obviously, however, what they believe dependency to be -- its origins and how it affects an aid program -- will dictate the particular tact taken to cope with it.

For a while now, aid providers have tried to design disaster relief and reconstruction programs to be less dependency creating. The strategy to limit the time period of their relief assistance -- say, between 60 and 90 days -- is a classic example (Sommer 1977). Another tact is not to give grants: "give grants, you assist them [the refugees] to death" (as quoted by Rolfe et al. 1987). Rather, agencies have reduced direct giveaways and have required contributions from participants -- food-for-work programs are the best known of this approach. Still another strategy is to make clear from the beginning to program participants and staff alike that emergency relief has a definite end and when that end will be. To reduce the potential for dependency, aid providers have reduced the pervasiveness and extent of

¹³⁵Excerpts taken from Anderson and Woodrow 1989, Rolfe et al. (1987), and Young (1983). Emphasis is mine.

the relief assistance.

Besides reducing and shortening relief, aid providers have also tried to change fundamentally the process of relief. As we noted in Chapter 3, the model of a top-down, logistics approach to relief provision has been revised. Efforts have been made to involve survivors and refugees in their own relief and recovery (to psychologically and economically empower them); to strengthen and build upon local institutions (recovery of indigenous social organization and support networks); to focus on education and training (redress pre-disaster deficiencies and build on pre-disaster strengths -- increasing human resources); and other strategies for increasing resources and opportunities necessary for survivors to move towards self-sufficiency.

These development-oriented relief strategies also are aimed to reduce the internal origins of dependency behavior. They seek to help individuals to cope and recover psychologically from loss, thereby reducing the behavioral manifestations of dependency.

Psychological studies of disaster victims have shown that it is important that they be involved in meaningful activities as soon after they have experienced trauma as possible, since participation aids in the psychological coping process. Psychologists have pointed out that participation: builds self-esteem; rebuilds self-confidence; reduces feelings of isolation; reduces lethargy, depression and despondency.

- RPG 1987.

Participation and psychological coping both are objectives in themselves, but they are also mutually reinforcing.

In a post-disaster setting, added poignancy is brought to the element of people's attitude or motivation. After a trauma, emotional anguish can constrain families' pulling their lives together and rebuilding. Williams (1990) suggests that researchers should help aid providers to

identify which are the vulnerable families and to design assistance or special intervention programs precisely to reduce their "psychological sequelae". A somewhat different approach to changing survivors' attitudes, Young (1984) argues that survivors must be given greater power to influence their economic life. Economic power, he argues, will motivate them, giving them greater self-confidence and personal involvement with change and allowing them to overcome apathy and passiveness.¹³⁶

In sum, the concept of "dependency" is widely used in the context of post-disaster aid programs. While practitioners most commonly use the term to describe a set of behaviors of survivors, they also use dependency to describe a relationship between aid provider and user in which the former plays an important part in creating it. Based on these understandings, practitioners have developed different strategies for coping with dependency in order to implement development programs as we have just reviewed.

II. The Case: Dependency Relationship in Project Armero

A. The Agency does Dependency-Mitigating Relief and Still Suffers Dependency

SCF took a number of the approaches mentioned above to mitigate possible problems in the agency-beneficiary relationship from the beginning. The agency limited their response to reduce external dependency creating factors and undertook activities to help camp

¹³⁶Young (1984) argues that apathy and passiveness is often acquired through poverty and oppression. Many have argued that these attitudes persist because of centuries of colonial occupation and excessive state intervention.

residents to cope with internal factors.

Most importantly, SCF staff stressed that the camp residents be involved in all aspects of running the camp and defining longer-term, permanent solutions.¹³⁷ Because of the extent of the damage and the situation of survivors, this involvement took a particular tact. After the disaster, there were few social organizations to recover and badly crippled social support networks were difficult to help because of the dispersal of the survivor population throughout the country.¹³⁸ This social disruption and instability were reflected in SCF's camp as well. Families spent varying amounts of time in the camp; most had not known each other in Armero. Rather than a survivor "community", the camp residents were a collection of families thrown together under very difficult circumstances. In this situation, the agency promoted the formation of new social organizations and support networks -- through the camp committees, women's and youth groups, and small group projects. Because of the camp residents' almost unanimous lack of organizational experience, groups received training in organization and leadership.

SCF also aimed a combination of human resource development activities and the opening of economic opportunities to aid camp residents gain badly needed income and to rebuild self-confidence. Early on, for example, the women were given small loans to raise a few piglets and chickens -- activities they had done in Armero. The return to these activities was a great motivator and their participation in other personal and community activities increased tremendously. During the

¹³⁷See Chapter 6, "The Emergency Relief Project".

¹³⁸See Chapter 5, "Chaos Settles into Discernible Patterns".

relief period, the agency also referred people to training programs or brought training to the camp, initiated a literacy program, supported small group economic efforts which formed in the camp, and referred camp residents to jobs in the Valley. SCF itself also made small production loans available to families and directly hired camp residents to work on the construction of the school and the upgrading of the farm.

Besides camp residents' economic and community participation, the agency also invited a primary mental health program to aid the survivors psychological coping and recovery.¹³⁹ In the camp, the program was run by a small group of psychologists; it was short in duration (approximately 2 months) and voluntary.

Despite the agency's efforts to mitigate dependency, the relationship between SCF and the camp residents shared many elements of dependency described earlier. As Chapter 6 discussed, SCF had set up its camp amidst the other larger relief responses. The relief project was characterized by an unequal relief relationship based on the transfer of goods and services which represented a very significant portion of the residents' resources and opportunities. A strong psychological and organizational relationship was also established with the staff who lived at the camp for the first four months.

The dependency relationship was characterized by a growing paternalism on the part of the agency. As the chief source, or conduit, for material and organizational aid to the camp, the agency found itself providing for the survivors even after they were able, or should have

¹³⁹The mental health program was a collaboration between The Johns Hopkins University, The Javariana University (Bogotá), and the Servicio Seccional de Salud of the Department of Tolima.

been willing, to do many things for themselves. What began as a strong role to get the project up and running evolved into a course of doing more and more as beneficiaries' contribution dwindled.

For their part, the camp residents came to rely on the agency not only for material assistance but also for motivational and organizational aid. In many cases, individuals yielded personal responsibility to the aid provider; a kind of "passive dependency" developed. After the initial cohesion that founded the camp, the residents began withdrawing from camp operations and activities and the junta and committees slid into inactivity (despite best efforts of the agency). As time past, the camp residents initiated a permanent demand for more relief services and donations, not even demanding permanent solutions at that point. Four months later as the shift to development programs began, the agency required that program participants contribute to the process for them to benefit from it. The protests grew louder and the vandalism against community projects and the slandering of the agency grew to a fever pitch. This kind of protest before a voluntary agency is a more "active dependency".¹⁴⁰

The dependency relationship established in relief was problematic for the agency as we have seen saw in earlier chapters. The decline of the residents' involvement in the camp maintenance resulted in deteriorating health conditions and stole staff time from permanent solutions. Also, the manifestations of dependency -- the agency's growing paternalism and program rigidities and the camp residents' expectations, internal power

¹⁴⁰Note that protest is not always considered to be dependency. See endnote #2.

interests, and behavior¹⁴¹ -- obstructed the shift to development activities.

Why were the approaches taken by SCF to mitigate the dependency relationship unsuccessful? The disaster and refugee assistance literature claims that involving the camp residents in assisting themselves will "avoid the all too familiar dependency syndrome of 'over assistance' programmes...." (Rapport 1987/88). But, despite these efforts, the project suffered a severe dependency relationship. The literature further claims that beneficiary involvement in program planning improves the effectiveness of projects, even in emergencies, and that it lays "the foundation for more self-reliant forms of development" (Rapport 1988). We saw in Chapter 6 a case completely contrary to this prospect.

Why did the involvement of people in the decision-making and implementation not avoid dependency in the relief project? Why did the beneficiary participation not set a fruitful relationship for long-term development?

The following sections will analyze why simply involving camp residents in assisting themselves did not avoid the dependency relationship in Project Armero. We will look first at the outcomes of the program to aid camp residents cope with the loss and grief -- that is, what the literature has argued the internal origins of dependency. Here, the residents' participation was critical in aiding them to cope with the emotional and psychological trauma after the tragedy. This

¹⁴¹See Chapters 6 ("The Phase-Out of Relief: The Launching of a Crisis") and 7 (various sections) for discussion of these.

positive outcome, however, did not aid the project to avoid the dependency relationship nor its final blossoming into crisis.

Second, we will show that it was the external factors which were more important in producing dependency. As the literature predicted, factors from Armero's post-disaster environment -- such as, the pervasive and prolonged aid -- did set the conditions for dependency on outside material assistance, and with particular intensity as we have seen. Just as important were the pre-disaster conditions -- the economic relationships and political traditions of the Valley. Together with particular characteristics of the survivors (skills, resources and organization), these external factors also set the framework for the relationships that formed between survivors and aid providers. We will see how SCF inadvertently reinforced these dependency creating conditions despite a relief effort designed to do otherwise. This detailed review of Project Armero's experience will also illustrate why the beneficiary participation did not set a fruitful relationship for long-term development.

B. The Internal Origins of Dependency

We now turn to the internal origins of dependency and what the case agency did to help survivors to cope with emotional and psychological trauma.

- Psychological Factors

People's psychological recovery is an integral element in their total recovery (Cuny 1983). Their psychological stress is not an inherently debilitating "victim syndrome", but dependency is exacerbated by despondency, depression, and other symptoms of emotional distress. Aid agencies do not often design their programs to directly aid the

psychological recovery of disaster survivors; instead, they tend to focus on reconstruction or economic recovery.¹⁴² However, the psychological recovery is also an important element for people to take their own initiative.

In the Armero Valley, emotional distress was a widespread and significant problem. A study done on site by Bruno Lima et al. (1987)¹⁴³ found that,

about one half of adults in tent camps, and patients coming to the health clinics in neighboring towns, had significant levels of emotional distress, most of which warranted a formal psychiatric diagnosis.

The same study also found that distress was not predicted by the individual's experience in the disaster itself, but rather

emotional distress seemed to be more closely related to the social and environmental conditions present after the disaster, such as having lost a job, not having formulated definitive plans for the future, and not knowing a specific date for leaving the tent camps. Also, the aspect of the camp which was most frequently mentioned as being troublesome and upsetting was the behavior of fellow victims, and not the heat, nor the lack of water, nor the poor quality of the tents. (emphasis mine)¹⁴⁴

Survivors are not victims of the uncontrollable disaster event in their past. What aid agencies do in the relief stage does have a tremendous impact on the emotional well-being and recovery of survivors.

¹⁴²In this regard, SCF's encouragement of the survivors' psychological coping process so early was unusual in the Armero Valley. In fact, the psychiatrists of the study complained of the lack of concern for the mental health on the part of other agencies in the Valley.

¹⁴³The project undertaken jointly by Dr. Bruno Lima and Shaila Pai of The Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Hernán Santacruz and Dr. Julio Lozano of the Universidad Javariana, and Dr. Jairo Luna of the Servicio Seccional de Salud, Department of Tolima.

¹⁴⁴Excerpts from the Bruno Lima's introduction for a forthcoming photo book on the Armero disaster and recovery.

Psychological recovery and participation can be sped along by doing the right thing after the disaster; or, they can be stymied by ill-conceived relief responses.

It appears that the approach that SCF took was "the right thing" to aid psychological coping and recovery. Professionals working in the area¹⁴⁵ agreed that the residents of SCF camp were unusual in that they demonstrated less of the manifestations of emotional distress -- "most prominently anxiety, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, suicide and violence" -- relative to other camps (Lima et al. 1987).

Of course, residents of the SCF camp did suffer some symptoms of emotional distress. For example, for almost a year after the disaster each time it rained heavily at night, the camp residents would not sleep from fear and anxiety. It had rained heavily the night of the avalanche. Some people refused to talk about what had happened to them the night of November 13; others refused to ever return to the site of Armero, just 14 km. away. Five months after the disaster, two women on separate occasions chased their own children around the camp with kitchen knives. They then collapsed into comatose states only to recover without any memory of the incident. Shortly after these episodes, two machete fights broke out among different men in the camp. These fights occurred within a week of each other. Both sets of incidents corresponded with waves of similar events in other camps. (These events were monitored by the Department of Health psychologists).

¹⁴⁵Interview with psychologist and nurse from the Departamento de Salud del Tolima, Fall 1986. Dr. Lima interviewed in Baltimore, Fall 1987.

Other symptoms commonly found in the other camps did not persist if they even appear in the first place. A group of psychologists, sociologists, and social workers from SENA-Senalde also noted that "maladjustment in the emotional roles, neglect of the fulfillment of their home duties and decomposition of the family because of disinterest in regrouping" were common in the sheltered population where channels for participation were not particularly frequent at first (article in El Espectador, 16 May, 1986).

However, in the case camp, recovering self-confidence and dignity showed itself through earnest and growing voice in general assemblies, an eagerness to return to work, and returning their children to school early, among others. The consensus of these professionals was that SCF families' early return to meaningful activities -- employment as well as community activities -- had reduced the factors which contributed to emotional distress.

The self-reinforcing relationship between participation and the psychological coping process was corroborated by Lima et al.'s study which looked at survivors residing in four tent camps in the Armero Valley, eight months after the disaster event. Notably, the study found that two thirds of the residents of the SCF camp said they were satisfied with their circumstances in the project of their choice (a "fair to good" rating). This compared with just one third of the respondents of the three other camps in the study who rated their situation favorably.

This feeling of well-being, in turn, influences what we loosely call the survivors' "motivation", "enthusiasm", or "optimism". While difficult to measure its impact scientifically, this quality is

undeniably a key element in the families' struggle for total recovery. From the point of view of the psychologists in the zone, SCF insistence on beneficiary participation, focus on the rapid return to work, and keeping the project moving forward decreased the conditions that contribute to emotional stress. The camp residents early accomplishments provided elements that, in theory, would be necessary to combat dependency -- psychological recovery, positive experiences in problem-solving, and an apparent mechanism for beneficiary-agency cooperation.

Although an effective and appropriate means to organize relief assistance during the first months, neither the families' participation nor the effective relief project translated directly into the development phase of the project. As the project began its shift, the agency-resident relationship deteriorated. As "cooperation and credibility" with the camp families were seriously threatened, the goal of building the foundation for long-term relationship proved to be an elusive goal for SCF's relief project.

- Human Resource Factors

The survivors of the tragedy came primarily from Armero's poor. Before the disaster, these groups had no history of popular organizations; they were accustomed to participate in political patronage networks. The residents of SCF's camp also had a low level of literacy, with 70% of the residents being functionally illiterate. The residents did, however, have a wide experience in different productive activities such as agriculture and animal husbandry, construction, petty commerce, and services. But, after the tragedy they were left without their former sources of employment. The farms where they had been day

workers lay under mud, home gardens and small animals had been swept away, the market for their goods and services no longer existed. They were completely without property (machine or land) or, for the most part, any form of capital.

However, other factors were more important than low literacy and skill levels for influencing the survivors' economic recovery. In fact, both skilled and unskilled among the camp residents found jobs or began small enterprises, most with assistance from the agency. They also received training and technical assistance. More problematic was the general scarcity of jobs and the weak local demand for their goods and services. Social factors such as people's instability, which kept them from a steady job or training program, also was probably more important than individual capabilities for economic recovery.

C. The External Origins of Dependency

- Post-Disaster Factors

The disaster literature repeatedly remarks that inherent in all disasters are factors which can produce dependency on outside material and organizational assistance (Rolfe et al. 1987; Cuny 1983; AFSC 1983; Young 1983; Sommers 1977). In the Armero disaster, all of the dreaded factors were present, and with particular intensity. The extent of the damage was immense which produced severe social and economic disruption in the Valley and required the relocation of the entire affected population. Unlike other disasters, Armero survivors were left with virtually nothing. This situation precipitated an equally immense amount of assistance only available from the outside. Both the governmental response and the international and national private

response was immediate and active. The relief response was also poorly coordinated, overly pervasive and prolonged.

The extreme disaster impact and the situation of the survivors resulted in particularly unequal relationships between aid givers and receivers. On the one hand, the survivors who went to live in the camps were the poorest and with the fewest material resources. On the other, the assistance agencies had all that the survivors felt they needed. These agencies assumed a strong role of planner and implementor in order to insure that their projects got running.

Moreover, the Armero disaster was extreme by any standards. The economic disruption limited the resources and options available for recovery and development for those staying in the Valley. The disruption of social organization and support networks was worsened by apparent acts of negligence, political favoritism, and mismanagement of resources by the few traditional leaders left. Most detrimental, however, was the physical dispersion of people and their extended instability which meant that social mechanisms for recovery remained weak or nonexistent.

The tremendously lopsided distribution of resources -- not only material, but social and organizational as well -- made the uneven relationship which developed between outside aid providers and inside aid users practically inevitable. It is no surprise that widespread dependent behavior was observed in the camps and shelters throughout the Valley. The literature widely acknowledges that this

approach can stifle refugee participation, initiative, and self-sufficiency by being inappropriately pervasive during the emergency phase and perpetuating relief activities long after the real emergency is over.

- R.P.G. (n.d.).

Facilitating the development of new social structures takes time; a more equal relationship between insider and outsider also takes time to develop.

- Pre-Disaster Factors:

The Valley's history of export dependency and political traditions exacerbated the disaster's impact, hindering people's recovery and further setting the scene for the dependency relationship that inadvertently arose between survivors and aid providers, such as SCF.

With Armero's disappearance, the survivors were left without their previous sources of urban employment and had to turn to the agricultural sector, the only other employer in the Valley (see Chapter 4). But the agricultural sector had lost land under the mud and itself was in decline because of the recession of the early 1980s and the increasing share of cattle raising which employed even less labor than mechanized farming. Agriculture simply could not absorb the "newly released" labor from Armero.

Furthermore, many Armeritas had more urban skills, such as commerce, services, small manufacturing, and construction. Few of these kinds of jobs existed in the surrounding towns either. Because the Valley's economic production had always been outward-oriented, intra-regional infrastructure and markets were very weak or nonexistent. Even with small production loans, these urban skilled workers had little demand for their products. Many of their small enterprises went broke in the first year. To replace demand would be a lengthy process.

In terms of economic factors, the Valley's outward-oriented development had restricted employment opportunities to the agricultural sector and had stymied the development of internal markets, both

conditions which limited the survivors' opportunities for economic recovery.

As we saw in an earlier chapter, the country's history of exclusionary politics and the vestiges of the *Frente Nacional* arrangements had produced in the Armero Valley one of the most politicized public administrations in the country and a fierce competition between local political bosses for the control of a well-developed patronage system. This same system had also left few community organizations outside the apparatus of the traditional parties. Clientalism and patronage were important ingredients in the traditional relationship between residents of the Valley and the Colombian state.

Furthermore, after *La Violencia* during the 1960s, the Colombian state initiated a type of "reform from above" which was to pacify rural areas in which violence had been severe. The specific aim was to preempt the possibility of marxist guerilla movements reorienting the interparty feud-like conflicts towards a revolutionary movement based on class struggle (Smith 1985). The governments of the *Frente Nacional* initiated a series of social reforms that brought visible material improvements such as accelerated provision of housing and schools and new health clinics to rural areas. At this time, too, *juntas de acción comunal* were established -- community action boards which were set up in both rural and urban areas to improve communities' access to and participation in expanding government programs and services. These relationships with the Colombian state also functioned largely through networks of patronage.

Finally, the Colombian government has a history of offering the poor material benefits and services when threatened by popular unrest. Material benefits, rather than significant access/input into decision-making, has been a successful policy to prevent poor people from mobilizing significantly in opposition to the regime. The poor in Colombia are not particularly politically radical but do want material improvements in the quality of their lives (Smith 1984; Evers et al. 1983). For that reason, they commonly stop their protest without pushing further for political change when the state responds materially to their protests.¹⁴⁶

The meeting of popular protest with material concessions widely characterizes the relations between the poor and the Colombian State; as do networks of clientalism and patronage which function in largely the same way with the added intermediary role of the regional boss and his party apparatus. These mechanisms of interaction were the ones most intact in the Armero Valley after the disaster. As we shall now argue, they also influenced the survivors' interaction not only with the State but also with other aid providers.

C. SCF's Relief Response as Origin of Dependency

SCF's own program strategy resulted in the mixing of traditional relief elements (immediate response, emergency camp, comprehensive aid)

¹⁴⁶Colombian social movements have widely used the mechanism of the *paro cívico* (the civil protest) to demand redress of social grievances. During the 1970s and 1980s, these proved an effective means to gain potable water, electricity, transportation services and the like. The government did use a combination of material concessions and repression to face these protests, but in almost forty percent of the *paros* concessions were made (Santana 1983). In these cases, the protest movement subsided once the government had responded materially.

with elements of development (participation and long-term objectives).¹⁴⁷ Inadvertently, this approach resembled traditional dependency-generating relationships well-known in the Valley. The agency's role vis-a-vis the camp residents mirrored those of the familiar patron and broker in the Armero Valley. By resembling these roles, SCF's relief response contributed to the dependency relationship between with its beneficiaries.

When struck by disaster and then disaster assistance, survivors drew upon their understanding from the past in order to respond to their tumultuous present. An anthropologist, Anthony Oliver-Smith, explains it this way,

In situations of massive change, people will attempt to gain understanding of or control over changed conditions by structuring them in terms of familiar concepts and working out new solutions to new problems with tested understandings from the past.

- Oliver-Smith 1986.

For the survivors at the camp, the apparent patron relationship allowed them to cope with the emergency in a familiar way. However, these well-known patterns also reinforced their expectations of how the recovery and development stages would be that ran counter to SCF's standard development philosophy and plans for its development project. Just five months later when the Project tried to make the transition to development, the relationship that had grown up around relief, even with all the anti-dependency efforts, was incompatible with the development-style assistance; the result was the crisis in the agency's relationship with the camp residents.

¹⁴⁷See Chapter 5 and 6.

We will now offer an explanation for the emergence of this dependency relationship. With the factors from the disaster context and the pre-disaster characteristics of the Valley in focus, we will look at how the agency's relief approach elicited dependency behavior from both itself and the program participants.

- Relief Response Unwittingly Reproduced a Traditional Dependency Relationship

By assuming the complete material support of the camp residents in time of distress, the agency played the role of the traditional patron, shielding its families in times of hardship. In return, the residents gave the agency esteem, information, and cooperation. Even though the residents contributed to the needs assessment and distribution of the assistance, the agency had superior capacity to bestow tangible goods and services as well as to organize the project -- the unequal relationship being the hallmark of a patron-client relationship (Wolf 1966).

Through setting up the camp and aiding the residents materially with donations as well as finding jobs for them and even hiring them directly, the agency gave the impression, at least implicitly, that it was assuming personal responsibility for maintaining the residents. Early on, the agency also initiated discussion with the residents about housing, employment and their futures generally, thereby giving every indication that it was staying and could be counted on for the longer term.

The residents, in turn, began to get to know the agency and to see what benefits were available through their affiliation with the camp. Over the first two months, their confidence grew in the security of

their basic needs and in the agency's continued assistance. The camp residents were more interested in developing the relationship with the agency in order to receive benefits, than to influence the agency or possible programs.¹⁴⁸ As one camp resident explained, "you can get as much as you ask for". Other comments, such as "this agency doesn't need any kind of help from anybody" reflected the sentiments about the capacity of their benefactor. Indeed, both agency and residents had entered into a kind of implicit contract with the other.

Concurrently, this same relationship was experienced by other aid providers and their program participants throughout the Valley. As Wolf (1966) explains,

...the potential competition of patron with patron that offers the client his leverage, his ability to win support and to insist on its continuation. The relation remains reciprocal, each party investing in the other.

Throughout the first six months, over thirty-five organizations arrived to the Valley to begin development programs. The agencies competed with each other to attract and keep groups of survivors. The survivor population moved between these, shopping for the "best deal". Should beneficiaries of one project decide to move, either individually or in a group, this would deny the agency its reason for being there in the first place. In this way, some agencies in the Valley succumbed to pressure to require less contribution from their beneficiaries.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸Nelson (1979) argues that this concern is the client's primary motivation.

¹⁴⁹Many housing projects gave up their self-help methodology to give away houses without any beneficiary contribution. By the end of the first year, however, Resurgir and the agencies began to coordinate among themselves to control who benefited from each project, and that they only benefit from one.

This came close to happening to the SCF project in March, before the farm was purchased, when the new camp leadership met clandestinely with another PVO in the area to see if they would receive their group into their housing project. The other agency appeared to be moving faster; they had land assigned for their project in Guayabal and were making first contacts with potential participants in their program. After talking with many people in the area, the group decided not to go only because they became convinced that SCF offered more in the end.

In April, as the agency was beginning to phase out the donations, the residents applied pressure for their continuance. They complained bitterly and tried to convince the agency not to cut the food baskets. Participation in community activities dropped off sharply and some families again threatened to leave to join other projects. In the face of what appeared to be their benefactor's reneging of his obligation, a group of the residents made up exclusively of the "old-timers" (those who had been with the camp since its very beginning) withdrew their support, esteem, and cooperation from the agency -- that is, they withdrew their part of the patron-client bargain. As we have seen, the families protested as they knew how through complaining, non-participation, and later sabotage.¹⁵⁰

Throughout relief, the agency also operated as the intermediary or broker between the camp residents and the sources of national and international relief assistance (Wells 1982; Tandler 1982). The would-be traditional brokers -- local economic elite, churches, politicians, and the like -- were either no longer present or not up to the magnitude

¹⁵⁰See Chapter 6, "The Phase-Out of Relief: The Launching of a Crisis".

of the job. The links with external resources were, in many cases, critical for families' survival and economic recovery.

SCF bridged the gap between different social groups -- the camp residents, who were exclusively from lower income rural families and working class groups, and the resource providers, who were most often international donors or professional groups from the capital. In essence, the agency functioned as the broker between other patrons and the clients -- a match-maker for agencies with resources in search of an organized group of survivors to service.¹⁵¹ For some cases, SCF also functioned as the co-signer on loans; for others, the agency functioned as the informal guarantor for resources transferred to the camp residents.

The agency was able to augment their own funds with resources from other groups and enlarge the project. As the agency was able to do more, it also improved its reputation in front of its own donors in the U.S., increasing the possibility for their continued support. And through its cooperation with local institutions, the agency gained a reputation as an important actor in the zone. These were all very important considerations for the effectiveness of the agency's longer-term development program to come.

In turn, the camp residents had access to resources and services that they may not have known about or the capability to negotiate themselves. They also experienced contact with different donors, many for the first

¹⁵¹During relief, international groups had all kinds of things to distribute -- blankets, clothes, toiletries, to mention just a few. Later, the Forrest Service looking for someone to give seedlings to and the International Red Cross trying to give small business loans. All were looking for needy and organized groups with which to interact.

time. SCF saw this as the first step towards transferring brokerage skills to the residents so that in the future they might be able to negotiate resources for themselves.¹⁵²

Within the camp, the residents themselves reproduced the broker and patron roles. By involving the community's *junta* to distribute the relief assistance, the agency's participation strategy allowed the emergence of *caudillo*-style leadership, the result of which was the creation of unequal relationships among the camp residents themselves. A system based on favors emerged and struggles for leadership of the *junta* centered around the control of relief resources.¹⁵³

The small group which formed the first *junta* was eager to participate in activities that enhanced their stature as resolvers of the community's problems. Their legitimacy as leaders depended on what they could deliver to the rest of the families. Without hesitation, they transported and distributed the food, clothes, tents, and medical supplies. The *junta* even held the keys to the storage warehouse, with its stockpile of supplies.

The president of the *junta*, in particular, was trying to assume the position of broker between SCF and camp residents. As in the *caudillo* tradition, he wanted to gain the community's allegiance and the right to be their leader because of his ability to deliver. Having the group of families behind him, he could negotiate what he wanted from the agency. As the intermediary, he wanted to become indispensable to both parties.

¹⁵²Part of CBIRD is the "vertical integration" which is essentially this broker relationship.

¹⁵³This phenomenon is commonly expressed in refugee camps (Rapport, no.1, Winter 1987/1988, pg. 8).

So, through both his apparent and real control of goods arriving to the camp, the president enhanced his stature in front of the other camp residents.¹⁵⁴

Some residents gave their allegiance to the president who they believed was "resolving" their problems for them. This group became the lobbying force for the continuation of relief assistance and the distribution of development assistance in the relief-style. They were made up exclusively of "old-timers".¹⁵⁵

Certainly this kind of clientalist leadership relationship can be understood as a kind of participation. The agency, however, had a different view of the desired kind of participation that is more closely described by the term, empowerment. The staff believed that brokerage skills were certainly part of any empowered community, but not to the exclusion of broad participation in the development process. The internal broker and *caudillo* role assumed by the president of the *junta* was threatening to substitute a system of individual alliances for the residents taking more direct and broad involvement in goal setting and decision-making for the Project.

Finally, the emergency camp during the relief period resembled the way in which communities organized in order to participate in the government's programs and services through *juntas de acción comunal*. SCF established the camp in order to distribute donated goods and

¹⁵⁴Arriving to the camp with donated shoes that SCF had asked him to pick up from the Red Cross, he would loudly proclaim, "Come, see what I have managed to get for you...." He also did not give shoes to some families who he did not like.

¹⁵⁵For how this played out, see Chapter 4, "The phase-out of relief: the launching of a crisis".

services. Although the people were asked to organize and be involved in the program, camp residents familiar with government programs understood their participation primarily as a way to collect the assistance.

Moreover, the services provided through the camp structure -- health care, nutrition and child care programs -- were those classically undertaken by the public sector. In Colombian society, it is the State's obligation to provide these services to its people. In fact, in the first few months, SCF was replacing the State and was understood as an alternative to the slow and distant Resurgir.

It is no wonder that the camp residents confused SCF with the State, believing the agency also embodied the same obligation. In particular, the "old-timers" demanded assistance as those it were their basic rights in the same way that they would demand redress of social grievances (*reinvindicações*) from the state. In a sense, disaster aid already belonged to them. They expected the terms of the original relief aid to continue indefinitely.

This relationship limited the overall potential for the camp residents' organization during the relief stage. The residents learned during relief that the point of organizing was to receive goods and services. The initiative to organize in order to plan for their futures was stunted. This became quite clear in the transition to the development programs.

To summarize, the mixture of traditional relief with beneficiary participation reproduced familiar unequal relationship. That SCF's Project functioned as a patron, broker, and extension program is really not so surprising. The extreme nature of the Armero disaster required

that material aid be provided from the outside. Also, the agency had to be highly involved, not only as facilitator of community action but also as the primary actor, to get its project moving in this context. There were many pressures to show visible results from both the program participants and the agency's headquarters. All these factors led the agency to undertake the traditional relief elements, and when the residents initiative began to wane, to make sure that certain relief, and later development, activities were implemented.

It was not necessarily a bad thing hypothetically that the agency would reproduce traditional relationships. Through constructive engagement, new forms can be introduced and the old relationship transformed.¹⁵⁶ The introduction of new relationships between aid providers and users have to be compatible with the existing socio-economic structures and the deeply entrenched organizational norms in order for them to be workable, let alone to introduce change (Marris 1975).

The patron, broker, and extension program relationships represented strong, familiar patterns of behavior for the survivor population. Those who would have normally assumed these functions had died or lost all in the Tragedy themselves. It may perhaps be argued that in the short-run, the agency's occupation of these traditional roles helped the population cope with the crisis in a way that was known to them.

However, SCF's long-term perspective had much more in mind. Unlike the traditional patron and broker, the agency was trying to introduce a

¹⁵⁶SCF recognized that "fostering community participation should be achieved in the initial stages through planning, monitoring, and evaluation rather than by trying to minimize leadership and/or outside intervention" (Buvinic n.d.).

very different relationship between aid provider and user than the traditional ones. The development-oriented principles of participation, enlightened community leadership, egalitarian relationships, community control and self-reliance were untried by the camp residents. As it became obvious that these were unobtainable in the short-run, the permanent staff believed that these principles could be introduced immediately and reinforced gradually. However, the staff did not predict the extent of the dependency generated by their actions in the relief stage.

In the short run the agency's relief approach did not mitigate the dependency relationship inherent to relief activities and probably even aggravated it. The relief project was unable to meet its objective of "set[ting] the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility with the affected community". Through community participation, SCF thought it could avoid the obvious dependencies common to relief projects. While in fact, it was replicating traditional dependency relationships. This became painfully obvious as the project began to shift from relief to development programs. At that point, the traditional relationship and the kind of participation necessary for SCF's standard-style development project came into critical and violent conflict. The agency had to change the rules of the game that had arisen from the traditional understandings and expectations generated by the relief relationship as we saw in Chapter 7.

III. Conclusion

Our exploration of the relationship between aid provider and aid user in the aftermath of disaster helps us to more clearly specify what the

dependency relationship means in these situations and what an agency might do about it in practice.

A. Theory

The origins of the dependency relationship in the Armero case was the meeting of factors within the pre-disaster economic and political relations, the disaster context, and the case agency's relief intervention. That is, external factors were most important in creating dependency relationship but were then exacerbated by particular characteristics of the survivor population itself such as, socio-economic status, education and skills. The pre-disaster economic relations coupled with the severity of the disaster impact left survivors with few individual or social resources with which to face recovery. On the other hand, resources from the outside flooded into the disaster zone. The political history of clientalism predisposed the relationships between aid agencies and survivors to reproduce elements of traditional patron-client relationships. Rather than empowering, however, this logical coping mechanism reinforced dependency that had been first established through material aid in the immediate relief.

To understand the dependency relationship that emerged in Project Armero we must first remove the moralistic overtones which practitioners have used to understand dependency. The focus on individuals and their psychological problems, whatever their origin, has incorrectly stressed survivors' weaknesses and has neglected their capabilities. In fact, in almost all disasters, it is the affected population itself that shoulders the majority, if not all, of the initial rescue and relief activities (Fritz 1968). Most disaster survivors do not live in emergency camps but manage on their own. Adepoju (1982) estimated that

60% of the refugees in Africa lived outside of the camps.¹⁵⁷ In the Armero disaster, an estimated 87% of the disaster survivors managed outside of shelters.¹⁵⁸ Tremendous community cohesion and pulling together in times of crisis are characteristic of disaster situations. People possess the ability to adapt and change both as individuals and as a society to recover from a disaster.

Traditional style relief providers, in particular, have been caught in their own syndrome -- the "poor victim" syndrome -- in which they believe that the disaster survivors are helpless and require their outside aid. This portrayal of survivors is commonplace in the media and fund raising materials. Not surprisingly, this approach elicits a great outpouring of financial and material aid, but it also elicits paternalism -- the pervasive aid criticized above as dependency generating. Harrell-Bond has noted the basic failing of the relief process "lies with the ideology of compassion, the unconscious paternalism, superiority and monopoly of moral virtue which is built into it." This "relief culture" leads to an ignoring of survivors' knowledge of local conditions, traditional coping mechanisms, and sensitivity to what is needed (Kent 1987).

The behavioral focus of many aid observers has tended to deemphasize the significant objective material and organizational relationship between aid provider and user. By focusing, instead, on the relationship, we highlight once again the mutual interests and

¹⁵⁷As cited by Williams (1990).

¹⁵⁸My estimates based on figures from Resurgir documents previously cited.

structures that limit *both* actors -- agencies as well as program participants -- from changing their behavior and actions.

The concept that seems closest to explaining what happened in Project Armero is the one that understands dependency as a relationship between two actors. Most immediately, a dependency relationship is the result of the relief association itself. Both parties -- aid providers and aid users -- are mutually tied in an unequal relationship based on the exchange of material and organizational assistance.

In our case program in Armero, the dependency relationship was characterized by a growing invasiveness on the part of the agency. As the chief source, or conduit, for material and organizational aid, SCF found itself providing for the survivors even after they were able, or should have been willing, to do many things for themselves. This happened not because the staff was unaware of what they were doing, but because they were caught in a dynamic which emerged from being a relief provider in the first place. What began as a strong role to get the project up and running evolved into a course of doing more and more to make up for the beneficiaries' dwindling contribution.

The camp residents, on the other hand, came to rely on the aid provider for material and organizational assistance. A kind of yielding of personal responsibility, or "passive dependency", took place. As the relief stage was prolonged, many people were led to believe that the agency's provision of relief was an obligation and should continue indefinitely. The residents' "participation" then converted to their permanent demand for more services and donations.

The dependency relationship is particularly problematic for an agency who wants to do development programs -- that is, whose final objective

is to aid the community's move to self reliance. These development programs require a willing and motivated community. At the same time, the agency must free up its resources from relief aid that is costly and has only short-term impact to put into permanent, long-term programs. The dependency relationship maintains its grip on the agency's resources for relief, particularly problematic at the relief-development juncture.

In fact, "dependency" is a meaningful construct, and it is troublesome, precisely because there is an outsider in the relationship. Imagine a scenario in which a disaster has occurred in an isolated region of a developing country and little is heard about it outside of the immediate region. The people, through their relationships with traditional elites or officials meet their most immediate needs for food, shelter, and resources to begin rehabilitation of their homes and agriculture. In this scenario, no one worries about limiting the help peasants receive from their patrons; neither does any one worry about how to get families to take initiative to begin solutions that go beyond what the patron is willing and able to give. No one cries "dependency". In fact, this relationship might just as well be called an "indigenous coping mechanism".

This is not to say that dependency is an invented phenomenon; only to say that who it is important to is also an important ingredient here. There is a particular relationship that does emerge between an insider and outsider that not only elicits dependency behavior on the part of the aid receiver, but also on the part of the aid provider.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹What tends to elicit dependent behavior on the part of aid providers are many. Their perceptions of disaster survivors as being weak, helpless, or incompetent may influence them to overwhelm with assistance. Other, less malevolent reasons, are the tremendous pressures and practical requirements of a post-disaster situation that

B. Practice

Unlike normal development programs, post-disaster development programs must cope with acute need, the material relief relationship, disruption of social structures and support networks, a generalized relief culture, and some particular characteristics of camp residents -- all within a compressed and rapidly changing environment. However, PVOs with a longer-term perspective have many more intervention options than the pressures of the post-disaster situation would seem to indicate. The following conclusions are geared to those who are not simply interested in doing relief better, but also in getting to development.

The relationship between the outsider and the insider after an extreme disaster such as Armero is inherently unequal. The imbalance of capabilities cannot be ignored, but must be handled. More specifically, an agency in meeting an acute need and establishing a relationship based on material transfer should be aware of and plan for the potential repercussions of this relief association -- not only for the immediate moment, but later as it impacts reconstruction and development efforts (theirs or others). It is not enough, as the literature leads us to believe, to be development-oriented in relief (involving victims); agencies must anticipate the requirements of the changing relationship between themselves and their program participants.

In Project Armero, the agency faced the classic problem of conflicting relief and development roles. In this case, it was the same agency trying to do both types of aid. SCF at one time was the provider

these agencies encounter.

of material sustenance. Overlapping the relief stage, the agency also took on the role of employer of the same camp residents and then finally to facilitator of self-help and incentive programs. It was difficult for people to change midstream -- to relate in another way to the agency that they had known as a relief provider. Faced with these multiple agency roles, the camp residents held conflicting expectations of the agency.

SCF, who fundamentally involved camp residents in the relief response had to undergo a change in the relationship from relief to development. Despite beneficiary involvement, the relationship during initial months was fundamentally a relief association. Even with the shift to development programs well warned and explained, the camp residents had difficulty seeing the agency in a different light. SCF's initiation of the development of community organization during the emergency stage with a group of families that with no prior relationship with each other and no organizational experience had little effect for the long-term. This is not to say that organization and participation does not have important consequences for relief, such as strengthening psychological coping and speeding recovery. In a less extreme disaster in which much of the community is in tact (not spread all over the country, and without physical home), survivor involvement in relief will translate much easier into a relationship compatible for long-term development work.

From this review of SCF relief project, we submit two preliminary conclusions for why the dependency emerged and why the relief approach (which mixed traditional with development-oriented relief elements) was ineffective to mitigate it in the short-run. First, although the

conditions in a disaster zone set the scene for the emergence of mutual dependency between donors and beneficiaries, the dependency between a particular aid agency and beneficiaries results, in large part, from the decisions taken by the agency during relief. When the agency gets involved and what kinds of activities it undertakes are as important as involving program participants.

An intervening agency can get involved during the emergency/crisis, in the reconstruction activities, or later as long-term development resumes. When an agency does so will determine some of its potential for mitigating or coping with the dependency relationship. Our case suggests that because the agency responded during the emergency, its ability to move to their subsequent development project was made more difficult. All things being equal, the longer the aid provider waits to intervene after a disaster, the less tied he will be to relief, the more flexibility he will have to design the development program and the greater the potential for its effective implementation.

Equally important, the nature of the activities an agency undertakes during the relief period, should it get involved, will also influence the creation of a dependency relationship. If we do a simple taxonomy, an agency may involve itself in any or combination of the following: complete maintenance of survivors (such as a camp), direct transfer of material aid, the donation of material aid but through other intermediate organizations, direct relationship with survivors but with no transfer of material aid (such as organization assistance), or other disaster functions (administrative) such as, institutional coordination between aid agencies or the creation of a center of information (without relief contact with survivors). The aid providers' ability to use these

options of course depends on the severity of the disaster. However, our case suggests that the aid provider that does participate directly in the distribution of material donations during relief will have difficulty in eliciting people's participation in defining and implementing long-term programs.¹⁶⁰

The second proposition resulting from this case experience so far is that the development-oriented approach when mixed with traditional elements of relief does not necessarily mitigate the dependency relationship in the short-run. If the agency distributes directly aid (particularly comprehensive maintenance), it is likely to experience a dependency relationship and may not expect to break it in the relief period; the agency is probably in for a difficult transition. Our case suggests that it is difficult to meet both relief and development needs simultaneously and, by trying to do so, the goals get blurred. This process led to the prolonging of relief by both agency and program participants which reduced the developmental effectiveness of the participation.

The implications of these factors -- when the agency gets involved and what kind of activities -- as well as the mitigating potential of the development-oriented approach when mixed with traditional relief elements must be explored further in other post-disaster project cases.

¹⁶⁰The situation, of course, is more complicated than this simple relationship. The agency that arrives early is often welcomed and greatly appreciated. A deep rapport or identification may develop between the personnel and the survivors because of having gone through the early days together. However, the benefits of this early relationship are often lost when the agency no longer gives away material goods. On the other hand, the agency that arrives later may be perceived as being an *aparecido* -- someone who did not live the tragedy and is now appearing to take advantage of the suffering.

The present case suggests that the substance of the program is equally as important as the process.

Endnote #1

This debate over whether structural factors or individual factors determine and sustain poverty is a classic in U.S. social welfare policy. The former contends that poverty is a systemic result of the dominant mode of production. Macro factors beyond the individual's control, such as the restructuring of the world's economy, the inherent inequality of the capitalist system (which thwarts the possibility of full employment and a just distribution of income), and racism against non-white population are to blame for poverty (Reich 1981; Szymanski 1976; Sackery 1973; Gans 1972; Wachtel 1971). The latter posits that causes of poverty are found at the level of the individual: The poor are poor because they have some particular characteristics that prevent their progress, such as laziness, lack of discipline, moral decay or cultural idiosyncrasies. This is often called the "culture of poverty" explanation of poverty (Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Banfield 1970; Lewis 1968). The individualistic approach may also contend that poverty results from bad luck or from the lack of skills; both of these conditions can be overcome through hard work, cleverness, and the acquisition of new skills and knowledge, that is human capital (Becker 1964).

Key in this discussion is the ideological disagreement over dependency's relationship to poverty which has shaped recent public policy research. Liberals generally agree that dependency is only potentially related to poverty; as a result, they believe antipoverty programs (direct welfare benefits) are more effective at reducing poverty, despite the potential for increasing dependency in the short-run (Ellwood and Summers 1986; Williamson *et al.*, 1975). Conservatives, on the other hand, draw a direct and immediate connection between dependency and poverty -- that welfare programs foster dependency on government assistance and reduce the possibility that participants will ever escape poverty on their own. This perspective argues that anti-dependency programs (job/skill training, education assistance, accompanied by the termination of welfare benefits) offer the best hope for reducing poverty (Mead 1985; Murray 1984; Gilder 1980).

Finally, the present analysis of dependency in a post-disaster context is not attempting to explain poverty, but rather the social phenomenon of the dependency relationship itself. Its role in helping or hindering people to recover from a disaster -- economically, socially, psychologically -- cuts across socio-economic status.

The dependency issue which is the subject of this chapter, while parallel in the above respects to the social welfare issue in the U.S., differs significantly from the former discussion. First and foremost, disaster relief and social welfare are two very different types of assistance. Disaster relief is a short-term, interim assistance whose

termination is a certainty; it is not, as welfare is, a permanent institution which has become part of society's mechanism for coping with poverty. In principle and often in practice, relief does not distinguish between the rich and poor after a disaster; it benefits skilled and unskilled, educated and uneducated alike. Moreover, after a disaster, a large percentage of the affected population may receive it. None of this can be said about welfare in the U.S.

In addition, relief aid takes place within a compressed and dramatic period of time. The many nongovernmental agencies that assist do so voluntarily, not because of civic obligation. The kind of assistance offered, then, varies more (greater agency flexibility) than welfare assistance which is dictated by law.

Endnote #2

Note that protest is not always considered to be dependency. In fact, there is general disagreement over whether this kind of protest reflects dependency or some kind of militancy. In the present analysis, a distinction is made between who is the outsider in the relationship. I argue that there is a difference if the outsider is the State or a voluntary organization. There are distinctly different relationships that each may establish with disaster survivors with different responsibilities/obligations to the insider. Protests before the State for services is a legitimate right of the citizenry; the same action before a voluntary organization while it may improve the PVO's accountability, may also forfeit what an already accountable organization can offer in the community. In disasters, peoples' protests are not always a sign that the aid provided has been inappropriate or unaccountable.

The Relationship Between the PVO and the Government

I. Introduction

Throughout this thesis, we have been analyzing relationships between three main protagonists in the post-disaster situation -- namely, people, the affected country's government, and a wide array of responders (in particular, development PVOs). In Chapter 8, we closely looked at the relationship between the PVOs and people. In this chapter, we will look directly at the relationships between PVOs and governments and, in doing so, indirectly at the relationship between people and their government.

The PVO-government relationship has been the center of discussion in recent years. As northern PVOs try to implement alternative development strategies and to insure their wider impact and sustainability, they must balance their need for autonomy with that for coordination with government development efforts. On the other hand, governments, too, have recognized the growing importance of PVOs within their borders -- their potential for aiding government efforts as well as for threatening their political authority and control over the development process. After a disaster, the tensions between the many, often conflicting, interests are magnified; the stakes for each actor, too, are higher.

There is no single theory on PVO-State relationships, nor is there general agreement on what their central characteristics are. Interpretations range from complementary to antagonistic. Following, the main approaches to the issue will be outlined, first in normal and

then in disaster situations. This chapter first characterizes the relationships in the literature for a non-disaster environment, outlining the factors determining these relationships. Second, this analysis examines the PVO-government relationship in the special situation of a disaster. Our central case study -- Save The Children (SCF) and the Government of Colombia (GOC) -- is used to characterize one such relationship and to identify the factors that determined it. This case will find that the institutional context in Armero was largely set by the initial decisions made by the GOC in response to pre-disaster economic and political interests. Nevertheless, using a flexible strategy on-site, SCF was able not only to tap GOC's resources but also to influence its post-disaster policy. By diversifying its own institutional relationships, the PVO maintained its program flexibility and independence. The agency's shift from relief to development programs was greatly aided by its carefully orchestrated relations with the GOC.

We will focus our attention on the PVO-government interaction within the boundaries of the disaster-affected country, at both local and national levels.¹⁶¹ For our purposes, the term "government" is defined as a "cadre of functionaries in control of the state apparatus of public administration" (Robinson et al. 1986) or, simply, "the regime in power"

¹⁶¹There is now considerable concern -- and a growing literature -- about the relationship international PVOs have with their home governments. As USAID's contribution to PVO's financing grows, for example, so does the discussion about its effects on PVO's policies, strategies, and autonomy. The 1980s saw a dismaying growth of such contributions. Some PVOs receive up to 80% of their funding from the U.S. government. Although an important topic, it will not be treated here.

(Alford and Friedland 1985).¹⁶² The government institutions that we will be referring to in our look at the post-disaster context include: public sector agencies formed by regular ministries and decentralized institutions and their specially-activated, disaster-related units and programs; political authorities including the country's president to the city mayor, party apparatus and factions; and the extraordinary disaster relief/reconstruction body of the government (Resurgir) set up in the disaster's aftermath.

Although our case agency belongs to the U.S. development PVOs, the present analysis also includes indigenous PVOs. We will be focusing primarily on development PVOs, or what Korten (1986) calls "Second and Third Generation" PVOs, that is, those doing "small scale self-reliant local development" and those doing "sustainable systems development", respectively. Both have an abiding interest in insuring sustainable development gains. The latter, however, takes a more integrative approach which includes the,

collaboration with government, and a wide range of other local and national institutions -- both public and private -- toward development of more supportive policies, programs, and institutions.

- Korten 1986.

Korten's categories include a very disparate set of PVOs with a wide range of goals, scope, and operational styles. Of interest to this analysis, however, is their range of relationships with the government (public sector and political authorities). It is this dimension that this chapter will be focusing on. Our case agency evolved from First to

¹⁶²The "State" is a more fundamental construct than government: "a sovereign, institutionalized hierarchy of power justified by law" (Robinson et al. 1986) or, "a separate legal and constitutional order" (Alford and Friedland 1985).

Second Generation during the 1970s. Since then, the agency has collaborated with many echelons of host government activity, although interaction mostly remained at the micro level; it is currently in a period of redefinition of the overall agency's role, working out how it enters the macro-level policy arena.

II. The PVO-Government Relationship: Range of Observed Relationships and the Factors Influencing Their Emergence

A. Non-Disaster Environment

Existing literature has characterized different types of PVO-Government relationships and the links between the actors. Analysts have also outlined contextual as well as institutional factors which influence the particular relationships that emerge, focusing primarily on the different roles each actor plays and the historically-shaped perceptions each has of the other. The literature has concentrated largely on the macro level, analyzing various strategies for collaboration and coordination between the two sectors. The micro level, however, has been neglected. Grounded in the SCF-GOC case, this chapter will shed light on the strategies PVOs adopt in the field to cope with and influence more structural parameters.

From an institutional perspective, research into the PVO-government interactions has identified a variety of relationships and links between the two sectors. Since Tandler's path breaking work (1982), the relationships have generally been broken into some version of the following six: complementarity; filling unoccupied territory; replication or diffusion; government takeover (in some cases, a subcategory of the previous); competition or substitution; and

brokerage. All of these relationships have been the subject of different reviews asking how to improve the functioning of PVO-government collaboration (Smith 1990; Vansant 1989; Uphoff 198; Paul 1988). In particular reference to the informal sector in Latin America, Otero (1990) draws a typology of macro-level government relationships with PVOs ranging from passive to active to directive collaboration.

Others authors have identified specific links between the two sectors. These links include the exchange of resources (financial, material, human), information, experience, methods, influence (policy-making), and authority (Montgomery 1988; Streeten 1987). Finally, besides the type of relationship and specific exchanges, Cernea (1988) outlined different roles that PVOs may play in conjunction with a public sector project's life cycle -- that is, he has remarked the importance of timing and purpose of relationships.

What are the factors that determine how a PVO will interact with a government? Just as with PVO-government relationships, the literature also registers a variety of determinants of such relationships. Some authors stress that government and PVO institutions operate as part of the larger political arena in the country. The larger institutional context sets many parameters where the nature of the State is one of the most important. Under an authoritarian system or a strong state, for example, very little room is left for competition for power. PVOs operating under such conditions are closely regulated by the government and their activities are sharply reduced.¹⁶³ PVOs flourish in

¹⁶³Evidence of this relationship is plentiful, such as in the cases of Indonesia, South Korea, Chile, and Uganda under Idi Amin. See Smith (1985), pg. 11.

environments where the State is nonexistent or weak or operate with only limited effectiveness (Anheier 1987; Uphoff 198 ; Montgomery 1983). Other contextual factors, such as the political institutionalization of paternalism and patronage, also influence PVO-government relationships (Uphoff 198). PVOs are not above the fray but must pay attention to local political constraints and opportunities.

Also influencing PVO-government relationships are each actor's inherent characteristics and their mutual perceptions of one another. Downs and Solimano (1989) remind us that governments and PVOs have different mandates, at least in principle. Governments are concerned about coverage while PVOs are more free to concentrate on quality. Governments must respond to citizen needs in all areas where PVOs may choose where to work and with whom as well as when to leave. Governments must respond quickly or suffer political consequences while PVOs may take more time to weigh their response.

Paul (1988) cites the longstanding antagonism between PVOs and governments, the clash of their cultures, and their operational differences (financing and support services) which have traditionally influenced their relationship -- primarily keeping each other at arm's length. Tandler (1982) has argued that there may be a kind of "natural" division of labor in which PVOs do some things better than governments and vice-a-versa. That is, each actor may have a distinguishable comparative advantage and disadvantage in certain tasks or sectors -- like health or nutrition.

Rather than any comparative advantage, other analysts argue that it is the institutional interests of each actor which most influence how

they interact. Sanyal (198) illustrates that their interests originate both from institutional history and their pursuits of the moment.

Historically development PVOs have been suspicious of government institutions and closely have guarded their independence, when necessary. They have feared that interaction with public agencies would result in cooptation and bureaucratization by larger government goals and resources (Salamon 1987). PVOs do not want to be aligned, or perceived as being aligned, with partisan or corrupt (sometimes considered to be the same thing!) politics of governments. Development PVOs have also historically been concerned with working directly with people (not governments) and maintaining their operational flexibility.

Similarly, governments have historically been skeptical of PVOs. They suspect them of evading taxes, using public monies for personal or partisan gain, of unfairly competing with the private sector, and of being havens for leftist intellectuals and opposition movements (Smith 1985). Governments are doubtful that coordination with PVOs will be productive because of PVOs' small size, and the uncoordinated and disparate nature of the sector (Cernea 1988). Governments believe many PVOs to be inefficient users of resources with only limited effectiveness and impact. Thus, mutual suspicions have historically tempered the interaction between the two.

However, their relations are not always in conflict. More recently, both PVOs and governments have also seen interacting with each other as in their mutual interest. PVOs are concerned with the sustainability of the benefits from their development strategies; they see support from the public sector as often necessary (Streeten 1987). PVOs also are interested in influencing governmental development policy to support

their efforts at the grassroots (Otero 1990). Their interests in encouraging governments to adopt their own methods and to replicate them on a grand scale has also nudged many PVOs closer to government (Vansant 1989). A few PVOs -- Korten's (1986) "Third Generation" ones -- are focusing on these relationships as their primary work.

Governments, too, recognize that PVOs may help to extend government services to areas or sectors of the population where they are not working. PVO services may also pacify popular unrest by delivering demanded goods and services. Through PVOs, governments may see themselves extending their areas of control/authority, inclusionary efforts to extend their patronage system (Robertson 1984).

These interests in support of PVO-government interaction make up the institutions' immediate interests. Depending on the specifics of each situation and actor, these interests may bring the two sectors together in the variety of ways observed earlier.

B. Disaster Environments

After a disaster, the institutional context in which PVOs and governments interact is altered. Consequently, the factors influencing their relationships are significantly different than in non-disaster contexts. The emergency period is characterized by unclear, ambiguous, and uncertain conditions making the definition of goals and taking of decisions a formidable task for affected governments and responding PVOs.

- Government Response: Dilemmas of Disasters

Most affected country governments play the role of central managers (better or worse) in a disaster. It is, after all, the affected

government which has the legal power to initiate international relief assistance for its people. The role that the government adopts to handle the emergency and the subsequent recovery period is an important determinant of the institutional context in which a PVO will work. For example, after the Mexico twin earthquakes of 1985, the government initially rejected international assistance. When the government later accepted international aid, it attempted to keep tight reins over the aid. They even tried to restrict local civil response, although unsuccessfully (Monsivais 1986). In contrast, less than two months later after the volcano explosion and avalanche, the Colombian government actively invited assistance from international and Colombian sources alike. Much of the foreign and national assistance escaped the government's coordination.

The Mexican and Colombian governments chose two different solutions to the same basic dilemma. After disasters, in general governments want to maintain control over relief operations as they are keenly aware of the negative political fallout of mishandled disaster relief. Although for governments to effectively respond to the emergency they may need international aid, such aid can complicate the response. The dilemma is whether to call for assistance and, in doing so, possibly lose control (Kent 1987). The calculation is essentially one of balancing political with humanitarian requirements. How the overall disaster response is then structured provides an important institutional context influencing how responding institutions interact with one another.

In an emergency response after a disaster, it is not clear that there is a division of labor that represents an inherent comparative advantage. Kent (1987) argues that the sheer number of actors on the

scene, their variety, and too disparate interests do not allow interdependencies or shared goals and values to emerge which would facilitate actors to work together in anyway approximating a "system". Nevertheless, there has been a tendency toward specialization among disaster actors and more predictable interactions (both positive and negative) between them. As some countries adopt disaster preparedness plans, the roles of different actors have been more defined. Some of the duplication of efforts and damaging interactions have been reduced, although both are still characteristic of disaster situations.

Besides the shared interest in aiding the afflicted peoples, the interests of PVOs and governments may in fact be more divergent in disasters than in normal times. Governments are especially sensitive to the political dimensions of disasters (Davis and Seitz 1982). Disasters place enormous strains on the infrastructure and administration of most developing country governments -- very few of which have disaster preparedness systems in place (Kent 1987). In Armenia -- where for the first time in its history, the Soviet Union accepted outside aid of any significance and allowed the news media in -- the weaknesses of the Soviet civil defense and health systems were laid bare to the world.¹⁶⁴ Disasters are x-ray like events that not only show the suffering of the disaster-affected peoples, but also reveal the poverty conditions under which many live in the country. Disasters also may point to failures of government policies.

Most important, if the government is able to adequately handle relief, it may earn prestige and authority, globally and within the

¹⁶⁴For an interesting discussion of the political dimension of the Armenian earthquake of 1988, see Libaridian (1989).

country. However, the opposite is more common: governments are almost universally accused of incompetence as opposition groups use the disaster as political ammunition. The handling of the disaster relief becomes general fodder for standing political battles. If the affected governments let in international relief, they may be accused of surrendering responsibility. If they do not, they are accused of not doing enough for their people or obstructing humanitarian aid. In this politicized setting, governments may perceive PVOs -- with their fostering of grassroots participation -- both as a threat to established political order and as a blessing to operations on the ground.

Governments also worry that disaster relief may cause deep divisions between those receiving aid and those who do not. Unaffected populations who watch the parade of relief to disaster victims may become jealous and discontent. Those receiving international assistance may develop new lifestyles and unrealistic expectations. Both situations may be exploited by opposition groups to discredit the current government. Indeed, outcomes of elections after disasters have often hinged on a government's performance in disaster response and recovery (Kent 1987; Cuny 1983; Abney and Hill 1966). Governments have also been known to fall after disasters, as in the case of Nicaragua after the 1972 earthquake (Rosset and Vandermeer 1986; Bommer 1983).

- PVO Response: Dilemmas of Disasters

Aiding afflicted peoples are the primary interests guiding PVOs disaster response. Since the Second World War, however, PVOs have also been guided by the objective of establishing themselves as permanent institutions and then growing and stabilizing. As we saw in Chapter Two, PVO responses to disasters have played an important part in this.

It is common for them to use their disaster response as a way to get a toe-hold in the area in order to introduce their primary objectives, like their longer-term religious, political, or development work (Cuny 1983). Depending on their strategies to promote these interests, PVOs will design their interaction with governments.

Disasters, with their ample media coverage, have also historically provided PVOs with opportunities to increase their exposure to donors and boost their funds. In this high visibility environment, PVOs often try to distinguish themselves from the crowd. They often shun collaboration with other aid providers who may appear, in any way, to conflict or interfere with their particular goals (Kent 1987). Their headquarters needs material -- information and photographs -- to be able to make the case for continued funding at home. That is, the way the PVO sector is structured reinforces the "lone ranger" approach often observed in the field. Some of this competition between PVOs has been reduced by joint funding through PVO umbrella groups at home -- although by no means has the basic tendency been removed.

These historical interests have tended to bring a dilemma. If the PVO works with the government during a disaster, it may increase its resource base and visibility improving its ability to alleviate suffering. However, by doing so, the PVO's people-to-people image may be tainted and its work called into question as the inevitable cries of corruption against the government are extended to those working closely with it. Although this is a dilemma that underlies decisions PVOs make vis-a-vis their interaction with governments, more immediate institutional interests most often provide the deciding factor of PVOs' resolution of the dilemma.

PVOs will have a variety of different immediate interests in the period following a disaster. The PVO may have more funds than it usually has for its regular development programs; the agency then is not so worried about stretching their resources as spending them (Cuny 1983). Being efficient may not be as important and PVO duplication of government services may result. Or, the PVO may insist on maintaining an alternative route to beneficiaries because of specific problems of government corruption, overloaded and slow bureaucracy or dangerous political motives (Kent 1987). That is, after disasters the intention of working directly with affected peoples and bypassing even local government may be more pronounced than in normal times. Harrell-Bond (1984) calls this open competition between PVOs and local government officials, "battles for sovereignty". Just as the PVO's interest in independence may be sharpened in a disaster, the PVO's interest in improving their general capacity may be sharpened as well. A PVO working in the affected area before the disaster, for example, may now be interested in dramatically scaling-up their operations and they see government disaster resources as the opportunity to do so.

Underlying the PVO-government relationship, then, are two fundamental interests. The government attempts to keep the monopoly over what and how to do things, in order to maximize its legitimacy. The PVO, on the other hand, tries to bypass any constraint to the implementation of its plans as well as to maintain its efficiency and legitimacy vis-a-vis its sponsors and the receiving populations. Sometimes these interests bring the two actors together in collaboration, sometimes they repel them.

These concerns and interests outlined here are determined both historically and by immediate pursuits of the institutions predating the

disaster. The literature has argued that the institutional context, the specific characteristics of the disaster, and specific institutional interests will determine the relationships adopted by PVOs and governments. And yet too little attention has been given to the micro level factors and on-site PVO mechanisms to adapt to specific conditions.

In reality, the relationships established between PVOs and governments are often fluid. PVOs tend to adopt non-conventional, on-the-spot strategies to interact with the government in a disaster. There is a high variability of relationships; they range from almost total independence to almost total dependence. The same agency may itself experience the entire spectrum over the post-disaster period. The specific conditions at the disaster site are also important.

Although the PVO's response are indeed conditioned by the macro factors, it is not possible to correctly forecast the type of intervention or relationship with the government the PVO will establish. Rather, the above-mentioned factors (context, prior relations, disaster characteristics) can unleash new, unexpected conditions that both the PVO and the government can use, resulting in various outcomes. PVOs are often in a better position, due to their size and policy-making structure, to rapidly adapt to changing conditions and are able to set up strategies to promote their own agendas. For instance, PVOs may set examples for government programs to follow or they may "sell" projects to the government allowing the latter to save face in an embarrassing situation.

The following case illustrates the variability of relationships that one PVO established with the host government. The success of the

collaboration resulted in large part from the agency's ability to understand the environment and thereby to access resources and gain some leverage on the state apparatus in benefit of their program participants and area residents generally.

III. The Armero Disaster: The Government of Colombia (GOC) and PVOs

SCF engaged in a variety of relationships with the different levels and representatives of the Government of Colombia (GOC), over the period from the emergency period and beyond. The following section characterizes the SCF-GOC relationships, drawing comparisons with categories in the literature.

A. Before the Disaster: PVO-Government Relationship in Colombia

The Colombian PVO sector is made up of international and national PVOs. The latter can be separated into two groups. The first, and oldest, are those organizations which have taken a social service approach -- many coming from the religious traditions. The other type of PVO is one who has a more recent tradition -- the involvement of the private, for-profit sector in non-profit work. They have set up foundations which channel philanthropy to the lower-income groups. Their activities have centered on productive activities (credit and technical assistance to small enterprises) as well as housing, health and recreation (Smith 1985). Their founders and board of directors are from the Colombian business and industrial elite. They are often regionally based. For example, in Medellín the industrial sector associations and other business people have a PVO which provides business loans and technical assistance (Antioquia Presente) to micro entrepreneurs. In Bogotá, the construction sector (and others)

established a similar PVO provided low-cost housing (Ayudemos). The Department of Tolima, too, has a PVO similar to that of Antioquia (Actuar-Tolima). The Fundación Carvajal, the best known and largest Colombian PVO, was established by the Carvajal Compañía, a large corporation whose services include a printing house and business supplies and services.

The relationships between these agencies and the government have been characterized by relatively more exchange than many of the service-oriented PVOs (with perhaps the exception of those directly linked to the Catholic Church hierarchy). Because of their elite make-up and connections to important for-profit corporations, they have more access to government officials and resources. At the same time, their elite connections have also allowed them to tap international resources as well.

Before November 1985, the Colombian PVO sector played a role of "gap filler",

linking into existing government services for their clients when they can, extending them where necessary, or operating as surrogates in voids left uncovered by government (by its political choice, lack of resources, or both).

- Smith 1985.

Smith (1985) describes the GOC's "preference for bigness, responsiveness to clientelistic demands by local political interests, and deferential attitudes to large business groups" all have limited the government's interactions with the PVO sector. He found that the government's attitudes towards PVOs varies tremendously across level of government, region of the country, and sector; his interviewees from the governmental sectors, however, demonstrated the range of attitudes mentioned earlier, from positive to highly skeptical. As we described

in Chapter Four, the government and the two parties have in place their patronage apparatus, complete with their own voluntary associations at the grassroots (the *juntas de acción comunal*). The local level government, then, sees little reason to have alternative means for citizen mobilization and input in government or policy-making.

For PVOs, the highly developed clientelistic system has traditionally made them suspicious of the government's political motives and has tempered much of their collaboration with representatives of local government. Smith found that PVOs, too, exhibited the same range of attitudes about the government of Colombia as in the literature generally -- primarily being suspicious of government's size and political motives.

Smith also notes that in Colombia, the indigenous and international non-profit sector has historically been free of government regulation and of difficult procedures for their legal establishment. No traditional conflict of note has characterized PVO-government relations (Low Murtra 1983). In fact, PVOs have generally eschewed confrontation with regional power groups, preferring to play a broker role between the poor and the government, primarily at the local level.¹⁶⁵ PVO demands have focused on material and technical needs, rather than challenging the political or economic status quo. The GOC has historically been unable to direct its programs to meet needs of the bottom forty percent

¹⁶⁵It is very common, for instance, for local political leaders (*gamonales*) to set up non-profit foundations to channel monies coming from parliamentary funds to promote their own political agenda and to benefit their supporters. In Armero, too, this occurred. The local political leader, Alfonso Jaramillo, had a PVO (Protecho) organized as a grassroots organization to promote low-cost housing; after the disaster, Jaramillo attempted to resuscitate it.

of the population, the hard-core poor living below minimum wage. It is with this group that the PVOs have traditionally worked.

Just two years before, in March of 1983, an earthquake rocked the Colonial city of Popayán, damaging the historical zone, levelling hundreds of low-income houses, wounding 1,500 people and killing 246. The government responded by creating a centralized corporation at the departmental level (Department of Cauca). Scientists, clerics, and the powerful sectors of Popayan society sat on the corporation but the popular sectors (survivors and PVOs) were omitted (Santana Rodríguez 1989). The President channelled funds through this reconstruction corporation as well as the public and private financial sectors.

B. Immediate Institutional Interests: Political Crisis Influences the GOC's Actions in Armero Disaster

One week before the disaster struck in November of 1985, the GOC found itself in the midst of a serious political crisis. Since the mid-1940s, Colombia has had indigenous guerilla movements within its borders. For decades, the government has tried to destroy them militarily, with limited success. However, in the early 1980s the government of President Belisario Betancur opened negotiations with the leadership of Colombia's long-standing guerilla movements. In 1984, President Betancur signed peace agreements with five guerrilla groups.¹⁶⁶

On November 6, 1985, the M-19, one of the most important of the five, occupied the Supreme Court situated on the main plaza opposite the Congress in downtown Bogotá. The M-19 wanted to use the Supreme Court

¹⁶⁶The FARC, EPL, M-19, and a faction of the ELN.

as a forum to publicly accuse the army of continuing the assassination of their leaders and militants during the cease fire period -- to put the government on trial for their betrayal of the peace agreements. The government answered the occupation by storming the building with tanks and rockets. Driving right up the front steps to the entrance, the tanks fired, setting the Court ablaze. Supreme Court judges (half of all in the country), court officials and visitors, and guerrillas alike were killed. The event shook Colombian society to the core.

President Betancur's handling of the crisis was severely criticized. Although the government closely guarded information, reports of the army's strong arm tactics over the President, the sacrificing of the Supreme Court judges, and the capture and torture of guerrillas (despite the official reports of no survivors) quickly spread. The government was in the throws of a political crisis.

Seven days later, the Nevado del Ruiz erupted and the avalanche wiped Armero off the map. Amidst the severe criticism and suspicion over the Supreme Court incident and peace process, all eyes were on President Betancur. His handling of the Armero disaster was tremendously important for the legitimacy of his government. Moreover, the country was due to undergo elections for president and congress in less than a year.

In this highly charged political context, President Betancur took a personal interest in the handling of the disaster response. He created the national reconstruction agency, Resurgir and, like Popayán, concentrated all decision-making and resources in the agency. Resurgir began as a small coordinating body in the President's Office (*La Presidencia*) with higher than cabinet status. President Betancur

personally chaired Resurgir's Board of Directors which was made up of representatives from the political establishment, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the private sector. Private sector representatives included those from the producer associations from the coffee sector, housing construction, finance, and private family welfare funds (*cajas de compensación familiar*) (Santana Rodríguez 1989). The survivors themselves did not have representation on the Board of Directors, although within the first year they did gain representation on a few committees.

Betancur also invited international relief into the country and called on Colombians to respond. He was keenly aware of the stakes of his actions. And as the Colombian infrastructure and administration predictably strained under the load of managing the enormous relief and reconstruction task, the government did indeed come under tremendous criticism.¹⁶⁷ As the post-disaster period unfolded, the political concerns influenced greatly the activities the government took. Following, we will examine this influence in the case of the government's interaction with the private voluntary sector, SCF in particular.

C. The institutional Landscape After the Disaster: Resurgir and the Public Sector Agencies, Private for-profit Sector, IGOs, and PVOs

Resurgir had less than ten persons working for the first three months. Resurgir began to assume more functions and hired more personnel, borrowing many from other public entities.¹⁶⁸ It divided its

¹⁶⁷For summary of a few of the political battles, see Chapter Five.

¹⁶⁸It was generally considered to have been effective in keeping the administrative costs to a minimum. The administrative costs were just 3.5% of the total expenditures for the first nine months (Gomez Barrero 1986). Just over half of these administrative expenditures went to

work into the areas of risk prevention, social rehabilitation, and social, economic and material reconstruction; each had a series of programs and sub-programs. Resurgir worked directly with survivors as well as through intermediary public sector institutions. These programs were coordinated with a wide range of public institutions. The public institutions included the regular ministries and their local/regional offices, and existing programs. The regional and municipal governments submitted project proposals and aided in the implementation of reconstruction programs within their jurisdictions.

Despite its ample coordinating efforts, Resurgir was reluctant to share policy-making tasks with the other public entities. The Department of National Planning, for example, initially took up the planning for the economic recuperation and reactivation of the affected zones. Planning, a public agency well-known for its quality personnel and operations, was involved in the initial policy-making for the region's economic reactivation. But soon Planning disagreed over policy with Resurgir. Resurgir was most interested in housing and reconstruction and, in fact, only gave secondary attention to the economic planning in the first year. Eventually, Resurgir relieved Planning of these tasks. The economic recovery in the affected areas was poorly coordinated and slow in coming.

Despite interinstitutional frictions, most of Resurgir's work was through the relevant public sector agencies. Unlike Planning which was a policy-making agency, the other public institutions -- like those of

personnel salaries. Salaries were on par with other civil service positions and they were able to contract some very well-qualified personnel.

health, education, social welfare -- were primarily implementers and received funding from Resurgir to do projects. In Tolima, the decentralized public institutions moved largely in accordance with local political interests;¹⁶⁹ Resurgir's mortar-and-bricks type of projects were good for satisfying those. In this sense, the reconstruction assistance, which responded to proposals by departmental and municipal authorities, fit well into the regional patronage system. The interinstitutional collaboration between public agencies met a variety of these interests.

Like before the disaster, the GOC worked extensively with the private (for-profit) sector in the rehabilitation of the Armero Valley. The most important decisions -- policy and program -- were made centrally at the headquarters of Resurgir in Bogotá where representatives of producer groups sat on the board of directors. Resurgir gave contracts, for studies and projects, to large firms from Bogotá. The design and planning of the new city of Lérída, for example, was done by a large private architecture and construction firm, Noriega and Restrepo Ltda. The regional public sector agencies gave construction contracts to firms they had on their own lists of contractors many of whom were from the departmental capital of Ibagué.

Besides benefitting from the reconstruction contracts, the larger-scale private sector also captured the resources targeted for economic reactivation of the zone. Resurgir channeled its initial economic support directly to the traditional private sector in the Valley, the large landowners, and their traditional activities of cotton, rice, and

¹⁶⁹The remnants from the Frente Nacional -- see Chapter Four and Hartlyn (1988).

sorghum (large mechanized crops) and livestock. Special support was given to new investments which would generate employment and production. The majority and the most important economic resources, such as loans and permits to import tax-free agricultural machinery, went to the largest landholders in the Armero Valley.¹⁷⁰ Disaster economic resources were distributed according to pre-disaster patterns.

From the very beginning, Resurgir and National Planning had also decided not to expropriate any land for disaster recovery/reconstruction purposes, even though Resurgir had been explicitly invested with the power to implement these standing legal decrees. It was an explicit policy of Resurgir the directorship not to redistribute the Valley's resources.¹⁷¹ Instead of expropriation, Resurgir bought all of the land that they needed for their projects at prices reflecting the post-disaster inflation. The beneficiaries of these higher prices were, again, the wealthy elite of the Valley who had land to sell.¹⁷²

Resurgir also coordinated the resources and programs offered by the international government organizations (IGOs). Agencies like UNDP, the

¹⁷⁰Just four families received almost all of the first \$1,000 million pesos designated to a special fund for subsidized credit (10% interest rate versus approx. 60% in normal market). Resurgir noted that other credits for the survivors generally were held up because of users' lack of "guarantees" (including collateral and co-signers) (Gomez Barrero 1986; pg. 23).

¹⁷¹Armero's landed elite did not invest sufficient resources in the prevention of erosion before the disaster and there were no incentives to do so afterwards. The same economic activities that were contributing to land degradation were reinforced by the resources made available for disaster rehabilitation.

¹⁷²There was one exception, the Hacienda La Reforma, which was for sale long before the disaster but because of its size had not sold. Resurgir bought it within the first year although it did not have a specific plan for it.

World Bank, and others worked directly through Resurgir with the different government agency counterparts responsible for their particular programs. They worked in a range of programs including housing, economic reactivation, and social services. The beneficiaries of their programs ranged from direct survivors of Armero to affected communities in the surrounding areas.

Resurgir's collaboration with international and local PVOs also continued in the pre-disaster patterns. In the context in which the largest resources were managed by the government and public sector agencies, the PVOs almost immediately, undertook their traditional social service activities aimed at the poorest survivors. Their activities included housing, micro-enterprise development, and some health and education services. They continued to fill gaps for the government programs at the local level. They organized beneficiaries to receive public monies destined for particular activities as well as implemented their own programs. In the case of housing, there was particular collaboration between Resurgir and PVOs. Resurgir provided land complete with services in L rida for PVOs to then implement their housing schemes. Those PVOs who participated, then, provided housing on a designated parcel.

In general, then, the institutional arrangements after the disaster in Armero followed roughly the same patterns as they had in non-disaster periods. The GOC made policy and moved the largest sums of money and resources. The regional and local public sector agencies and government also scrambled to Bogot  for resources. The most important resources for economic rehabilitation of the affected zone responded to interests of the traditional productive elite who were well-organized into

producer associations and well-represented politically on the board of directors of Resurgir. Finally, to target the poorest survivors, Resurgir relied heavily on the PVOs to implement social service activities to the ground.

- Political Interests Guide Disaster Policy and Impact Institutional Environment

Political interests guide governments to make disaster policy and program decisions. They often have little to do with the requirements of disaster-stricken peoples. The case of Government of Colombia was no exception. As we saw, when the disaster hit, the government was under tremendous political pressure to manage well the disaster response. But in addition to the "usual" political interests, disasters are themselves acutely political events. Depending on the extent of damage, the recovery stage becomes the very "stuff" of politics; recovery activities involve the distribution of very sizeable resources. Colombia's very well-developed clientelistic system clicked into action, taking center stage in the actions of the national government and Resurgir -- first in a behind the scenes struggle and later as an open political confrontation between local political factions.

Political interests influenced many of the decisions such as who staffed Resurgir as well as where and how to distribute disaster relief and reconstruction resources. We will look at one particular case which illustrates not only how political interests shape disaster recovery decisions, but also how these policies, in turn, set the parameters in which PVOs work. The government's policy to rebuild Armero in Lérída impacted SCF's capacity to work and, in particular, the relationships it established with the GOC. We will also use this example to review the

results of this relationship; did SCF influence government policy towards the disaster zone?

The government, through Resurgir, envisioned the disaster recovery as the reconstruction of Armero in one place, L rida, despite the dispersal of survivors to all parts of the Armero Valley and the country. In Chapter Five ("Between Political Factions"), we saw how regional political considerations largely determined the decision to rebuild Armero in L rida. In addition, the desire to be seen as doing something for the survivors also led the government to place importance on high visibility projects -- physical reconstruction, concentrated in one place. With the placement of a developer as the first director of Resurgir, the concept of rebuilding a complete town, rather than the absorption of the survivor population in the areas they had relocated, took form.

Large concentrations of resources for reconstruction poured into the town. Resurgir bought large lots and laid the urban infrastructure then gave these lots to any PVO who would do their housing program in L rida.¹⁷³ Resources for economic reactivation also were initially concentrated in L rida. On many occasions, survivors were told that they would not receive any government benefits (largely understood as housing and monthly pensions) unless they moved to the town.

The other side of the now destroyed Armero -- the Guayabal side -- was largely ignored by Resurgir. Yet, there was no legal or cultural

¹⁷³The urbanization costs in Lerida were extremely high. The plans, drawn in Bogot , had been based on aerial photographs which did not indicate the amount of leveling (earth moving) that needed to take place nor the fact that these lots consisted significantly of solid rock making the infrastructure work very difficult.

basis for locating the "New Armero" in L rida. The town of Guayabal was within the jurisdiction of Armero and, therefore, had the legal claim to become the new municipal head. Historically the people from Armero and L rida disliked each other strongly. Even the technical reasons for locating the new town in L rida -- because it was on higher ground -- was weak as people continued to stream into Guayabal where there were more survivors settling and even the Red Cross had offices.

The result of this decision to concentrate reconstruction in L rida set some difficult conditions for intervening PVOs. First, the artificial reinforcement of L rida contributed to the prolonged instability of the survivors. Survivors were reluctant to commit themselves to any project afraid that, by committing themselves to something too soon in another area, they would no longer be eligible for future opportunities in L rida. Those living in the Valley (in locations other than the camps in L rida) were reluctant to move to L rida definitively and waited; those coming in and out of the Valley shopping for opportunities continued to rotate between the different agencies. For many, this period of general instability continued throughout the first year. Such fluidity made it difficult for PVOs to begin their housing programs; those agencies which began small enterprise programs found that many of their beneficiaries moved without repaying loans.

Second, the PVOs which took Resurgir up on their offer of free serviced land in L rida for their housing programs encountered other problems. Most importantly, their formal agreements with Resurgir also tied them to the latter's timetable. They had to wait to be assigned land; this took considerably more time than expected. And as the laying

of infrastructure in the lots encountered difficulties, the PVOs housing construction suffered further delays. The PVOs' dependency on state resources meant they forfeited a certain degree of their program flexibility. SCF bought its land in April, while other programs were finally assigned land months later; some agencies were still waiting for their infrastructure a year later. Lastly, the Lérida policy meant that the bulk of resources for the Valley were bypassing the Guayabal side which meant less resources for those PVOs working with the survivors and area residents there.

By January, a large number of relief and development organizations (Resurgir, PVOs, IGOs, and local authorities and representatives of decentralized public agencies) were working in the Armero Valley. One of the first tasks that SCF's new project director in Armero did was to call for formal coordination between the institutions beginning to work in Guayabal. February 7 was the first meeting in which seventeen agencies (10 private and 7 official) formed the interinstitutional coordinating body. In just a few months, this body had twenty-five agencies actively participating.

The central objectives were to coordinate and to mutually support their institutional efforts in benefit of the population (survivor and resident) in the area of Guayabal. To do so effectively, all agreed that they had to rescue the importance of Guayabal as a regional development center in the eyes of Resurgir.¹⁷⁴ The Guayabal agencies

¹⁷⁴The coordinating body also planned to work together to define a plan of action that would focus on employment generation and the economic development of the region (when all other focus was on building housing). The group aimed to promote the coordination of information and preparation of the community in disaster preparedness in case of a new event. These two objectives were not achieved through interinstitutional coordination. The economic development of the zone

together implemented programs for the town, such as the construction of a school and cultural center, and the celebrations of important festivals and disaster commemoration. While Lérída gained the fame of being a place with institutional infighting and complexity, Guayabal, with fewer actors, was gaining the reputation as the place where things were getting done. The international funders progressively stopped in Guayabal to initiate programs. The press too discovered Guayabal. At the same time, the PVOs working in Guayabal began to negotiate with Resurgir for support on the same terms as PVO programs in Lérída.

Through the constant interaction, the local agencies quickly acquired shared interests in the development of Guayabal. They also came to share the same nemeses -- the Resurgir representatives in Bogotá. Not only the PVOs, but also the municipal authorities and even the local representative from Resurgir identified with the local interests.¹⁷⁵ When the local representatives adopted an advocate position from the field, her relationship with Resurgir in Bogotá became strained and she was eventually removed from her post. Nevertheless, Resurgir generally counted on its own representatives in the Valley to provide information and feedback to the agency. SCF staff met frequently with the representative to pass on their perspectives about the local

remained in the hands of Resurgir. Disaster prevention and preparedness was adopted by SENA with very limited participation of the institutions in Guayabal.

¹⁷⁵There is evidence that this institutional coming together at the municipal level represented a push for more local autonomy and stronger role in local development. Local elections for mayors were held for the first time in Colombia's history in 1988. Previously, all mayors were appointed by governors as political recompense -- as part of the patronage system. This practice insured that the mayors' were accountable to the governor and national party leaders, rather than to their own local populations.

consequences of national reconstruction policy and requests for certain actions by Resurgir. Resurgir-Bogotá did respond to many of the local requests filtered in this way.

Indeed, this local coordination was able to elevate the importance of Guayabal in the recovery of the disaster zone. SCF and the participating agencies were able to pressure Resurgir to designate Guayabal as a central redevelopment point in the Valley. Originally just 300 houses were planned to be built in Guayabal; the number was increased to 1,000. Resurgir also finally contracted for the Urban Development Plan of Guayabal. This plan was discussed in open forums (unlike that for New Lérica where interinstitutional coordination was weak) and the institutional and community participation achieved some reforms in the plan's implementation. By understanding the environment, SCF was able to access and manipulate resources to their advantage and gain some leverage on the state apparatus in benefit of their program participants and Guayabal residents generally.

D. Save the Children (SCF)¹⁷⁶ and the Government of Colombia (GOC)

- The Relationship in the Emergency and Beyond

SCF intervened because of fundamental humanitarian reasons. However, institutionally the agency had other reasons to respond, which became more important as the immediate crisis passed. SCF also saw their response as an opportunity to strengthen their institutional image and capabilities of their regular programs. From the beginning, the agency wanted to demonstrate the importance of involving survivors in their own relief and recovery -- that is, demonstrating the virtues of their community-based development approach even in disaster situations. Although SCF-Colombia had a long history of collaboration with different state agencies, the agency was not widely-known; their disaster response would provide the opportunity to raise their national profile.

During the emergency, the agency's primary goal was to provide needed relief, and to operate unimpeded with access to relief resources. The agency did this by coordinating closely with government and other actors at the local level. First, the staff sought official consent to assist

¹⁷⁶Smith (1985)'s gap-filler role of Colombian PVOs (linking, extending, replacing) is also true for Save The Children (SCF). Integrating their programs and impact areas with ongoing development programs has been part of the agency's CBIRD strategy for two decades. The agency has had both formal and informal agreements with different Ministries; SCF's programs have formed part of national programs such as the New School of the Ministry of Education.

At the project level, SCF has entered into most of the literature's relationships with the state at different times and places. The agency has worked independently in remote areas where the state has no presence; they have also undertaken a range of collaborative efforts as part of their normal way of doing projects. In the health sector, for example, SCF has trained health promoters who organize their villages and work in conjunction with the country's rural health care system. In the local areas, SCF generally had developed good working relationships with the different government representatives and administrators. Transmitting brokerage skills to the poor communities to access government agencies for goods and services is an agency objective.

from the military mayor appointed to coordinate the relief efforts in Guayabal. As the agency established the camp, they continued to share information and coordinate closely with the municipal authorities. This relationship became an extremely important and fruitful one throughout the post-disaster period. Over the initial weeks and months, the mayor and other relief authorities used the SCF camp often for coordination meetings where resources were shared informally. SCF soon gained a very good name with local authorities for the camp's community-run model and its commitment to the survivors. Having arrived early and worked together from the beginning counted in the eyes of local authorities and people. SCF's camp was included on all of the distribution lists for relief supplies that arrived to the Red Cross or Resurgir in Guayabal.

In the first months, SCF's interactions with the GOC included information sharing (perhaps the most important resource at the time), channeling of relief supplies and services to survivors at the SCF camp, SCF received families referred by other authorities (including Resurgir, the Red Cross, and the mayor) and, importantly, moral support between the aid personnel across institutions. SCF crafted its initial relief program to complement the other efforts in Guayabal as well as to provide a model for development-oriented relief. Unlike other PVOs who came to work in Armero, SCF pursued its program activities as independently from Resurgir as possible. The agency made no formal agreements with Resurgir in the first months.

During the emergency relief period, SCF's relationship was primarily complementary with the local authorities, filling the gap for Resurgir by being operational on the ground. Relief supplies and services,

information, administration of survivor families, and moral support made up the exchange between the two institutions.

During the emergency period, SCF had been very interested in setting up its own presence on the scene. However, as the emergency period passed, it became increasingly evident that the SCF camp was duplicating efforts already underway by the Red Cross and Resurgir in the area. For its small size (no more than 30 families at its peak), it was an expensive undertaking (per capita) for the agency and, in terms of pure numbers, did not represent a great percentage of those sheltered. At this point, the SCF camp was duplicating what Resurgir and the Red Cross shelter services.¹⁷⁷

As we saw earlier, the different agencies also got to know each other through the coordination meetings. The informal coordination of relief resources translated into longer-term interinstitutional collaboration. SCF worked closely with local municipal authorities and community groups from Guayabal as part of its regular development programs. Among other informal collaborations, a SCF staff sat on the local review board of the Urban Development Plan for Guayabal. SCF's project director supervised the construction of a new addition to the health post in town. SCF's other staff represented the agency on various conferences on the development of the disaster area.

As a result, SCF was able to make individual agreements with different public sector institutions in order to implement joint projects. These activities extended the agencies' own resources and

¹⁷⁷But because the camp was to be transformed into a permanent housing project, there was no sense of competition -- just inefficiency for the PVO.

increased their ability to do projects and the public sector agencies were able to access more beneficiaries for their programs. SCF was able to capture US\$333,000 to complement the original budget of US\$500,000 in the first year (Guarnizo and Clarke Guarnizo 1987).

From the relief supplies and services which made up the initial SCF interactions with government and PVOs, in the transition stage were characterized by more permanent, development goods and services. For example, through new agreements, Resurgir reimbursed SCF for the value of the farm and of the urban infrastructure by the end of the first year. The same terms afforded to PVOs in Lérida was granted retroactively to SCF. Through other agreements, the National Training Service (SENA) provided SCF with tools and equipment and an instructor and architect for six months for the self-help housing construction; SENA also provided vocational and business training for micro-enterprises and leadership training for the project community's *junta*. SCF invited the Secretaria de Desarrollo del Tolima to reforest the project's farm and to provide a tree nursery complete with a forestry engineer and technical assistance. The agreement with the National Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) with UNICEF monies provided personnel and resources for projects with children as well as other income generating projects for "social development". In the first year alone, the agency had eleven formal agreements for recovery and development programs and countless informal ones.

With these public agencies, SCF played the role of broker. SCF approached the agencies looking for activities for collaboration. It was easier for the public agencies to access their target groups through a PVO at the grassroots which would also guarantee follow up, be a

cosigner of a loan, or simply provide institutional continuity for the length of the project.¹⁷⁸

For the SCF project, these interinstitutional agreements allowed them to diversify their relationships and resources in the field. Later, as funds from Westport became scarce, the project found itself still able to move ahead because of these other resources. They were not dependent on any one source to be able to do its programs.

Throughout the transition period the agency began consolidating the development project in the Guayabal area. The linkages with the government agencies reflected this change of objectives from short-term immediate needs to activities which link people with development resources.

At the national level, coordination meetings with other PVOs who were working in different sectors -- like housing or small-scale enterprise development -- were called. They were held primarily in Bogotá (sometimes in Ibagué). There were obvious logistical difficulty of pulling a staff member from their work to make the trip. But, the agency stopped sending representatives because the results of these meetings were insignificant. They were forums for PVO posturing, advertising, and differentiating themselves from each other. The few guidelines drawn up to provide common criteria for working and to reduce detrimental competition in the field,¹⁷⁹ while agreed upon in meetings, were not followed in practice. In contrast to the local level, SCF's coordination attempts with other PVOs nationally did not represent

¹⁷⁸See Chapter 8 for discussion of SCF's broker relationship.

¹⁷⁹For example, requiring beneficiaries to repay half the cost of the housing to a community fund.

immediate or productive exchanges/interactions. SCF did not become part of any national system or web of organizations influencing macro-level government development policies. In fact, no "system" did emerge.

Instead, the agency focused on those interinstitutional relationships closer to home and those which represented concrete benefits for the agency's programs. Alliances and networks in the northern part of the Armero Valley and the individually negotiated agreements with public agencies did allow the agency to wield more power and to have considerable impact on the local development landscape.

As the development programs began, SCF also directly accessed Resurgir in their central offices; the project director was making more frequent trips to Bogotá for the negotiations of the reimbursement agreements for the farm. To avoid the bureaucratic delays that were plaguing other PVOs who were coordinating closely with the government (waiting to be assigned land and infrastructure), SCF had bought land themselves. It was almost a year later that the project director approached Resurgir to co-finance the project -- to buy the land and finance the infrastructure works as they had done for the projects in Lérída.

By following its own goals of moving from its relief to development style programs, SCF engaged in a number of relationships with the government. Certainly in relief, SCF programs were at different times complements and substitutes to government programs. By working at the local level, SCF at first filled an unoccupied territory. Above all, the agency functioned as a broker between its program participants and the myriad of disaster resources and programs that arrived to the Valley. This became increasingly important in the move to development

programs and the agency making formal agreements with the public sector. There is little direct evidence, however, that the government replicated SCF-style programs (although perhaps the initial camp management influenced Resurgir's camps); there is evidence, however, that the agency did play a part in influencing government policy-making regarding Guayabal.

The relationship that SCF had with the GOC during the emergency was one of coordination for operations at the local level with municipal authorities and representatives of Resurgir and the sectoral ministries; the agency had only minimum interaction with the GOC at the national level. As SCF's program shifted out of relief to long-term activities, the relationships established during the emergency period easily took on new dimensions. The relief goods and services shifted to permanent resources and as more of Resurgir's resources made it to the operational levels of the public sector agencies, SCF was able to tap into more resources for their programs. The diversity of institutional relationships with the public sector and municipal authorities provided the agency relative independence and flexibility to pursue its integrated development objectives.

IV. Conclusions

The determinants of SCF's interactions/relationships with the GOC -- Resurgir, local political authorities, and the public agencies -- were a number of factors largely set in motion by institutional interests. As we have seen, the institutional setting in which SCF was moving was determined by long-standing economic relations, well-developed clientelistic system, and the GOC as the big money mover. SCF was a

small actor with its two-year budget of half a million dollars. In this context of heavy state intervention, SCF diversified its relationships thereby maintaining its institutional independence and flexibility of action, easing the transition to its development programs. Other PVOs who tried to work more closely and adapt to state regulation, found themselves more constrained.

The Armero Disaster provided SCF with new potential to influence the Colombian government. The agency gained much more recognition nationally and across public sector agencies. Formal agreements were signed that were not only related to disaster recovery activities, but also to normal development programs. As Resurgir faded away, the relationships with the GOC have returned to the respective sectoral ministries (at both local and national levels). Because of the name gained for the agency by its involvement in the disaster and the social stature of the new country director, the agency may be in a better position to influence government development policy. However, the traditional relationships with the private (for-profit) sector and clientelistic system continued as before and SCF, like other PVOs, continued its traditional social service emphasis and gap-filler role.

While playing broker between its project participants and disaster-related agencies and resources coming to the Valley, SCF did play a "Third sector" role. But given the poorly organized and dispersed nature of the Armeritas and the multitude of PVOs, it is not clear how important a third sector role the PVOs generally, and SCF in particular, played. By maintaining its independence, the agency was better able to shape its programs according to its own interests as opposed to many PVOs working in Lérída who were dependent on governmental priorities and

timing. In this sense, SCF was able, at least in theory, to represent more the survivors vis-a-vis the government institutions than those more dependent.

In the larger sense, SCF's transition to development programs meant managing its external relationships to link with longer-term resources and to shift to development benefits. Relationships with the government and public agencies were critical for SCF in this process.

Putting in place relationships with the the government that would engender and maintain sustainable development was part of SCF's transition to development programs. Important economic and political factors that affect the recovery of the affected region are of a long-term systemic nature and had to be managed to have sustainable consequences. As the post-disaster environment underwent complex changes, the program's transition paralleled and inter-played with it to be successful. The more general issue, then, is how PVOs interact with their changing environment in order to get to development programs. In this question, their relationships with the State is an important factor.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations of the dissertation. The first part of this chapter presents principle findings from the general PVO and the case study experience of integrating disaster and development assistance. The second part of this chapter outlines where aid agencies can begin to develop viable institutional mechanisms for managing overlapping responsibilities in disaster response and longer-term reduction efforts.

I. Principle Findings

- Practice is out of sync with theory.

In the past fifteen years, a revolution has taken place in the way we understand what causes disasters and, in particular, the role that development plays. The first section of the thesis showed that researchers and practitioners now agree that it is people who create the conditions for disaster agents to do damage. Disasters are occurring more because of environmental mismanagement and abuse. Furthermore, analysts also recognize development's potential for increasing the risks of disaster; it is no longer accepted as the force which will automatically reduce populations' vulnerability. People are vulnerable to natural disasters because of a number of factors inherent in certain development processes like population growth, income distribution, land-use, and technology.

This research's review of practice indicated that PVOs have attempted to reflect the new conceptualization of the disaster-development relationship in their programs. PVOs are trying to integrate the two types of aid in order to mutually support each other. Before a disaster happens, some development programs in hazard prone areas include disaster-related components which aim to prevent and mitigate disaster impacts. After a disaster, aid may be provided in ways that minimize the duration of the emergency and build disaster mitigation into the rehabilitation and development programs which follow.

Despite the new research understanding and program directions, these efforts to integrate disaster and development in practice have faltered. This thesis finds that the difficulties lie in the fact that the institutional mechanisms necessary for putting these goals into practice have not kept pace.

The post-war foreign aid model which separates disaster and development aid into two institutional jurisdictions is still largely in place. Cooperation among the different actors in disaster reduction has been inadequate. Development agencies often do not play a role in the disaster reduction process. PVOs who have tried to bridge the institutional gap have met serious obstacles and have had mixed results, at best.

- To bridge the institutional gap between disaster and development aid, PVOs must cope with a number of challenges.

The remainder of the thesis set about understanding the institutional process of integrating disaster and development assistance after a disaster. Part One of the thesis discussed system level obstacles to integrating disaster and development assistance.

- System Level Challenges

The overarching obstacle to integrating disaster response with development aid is the historical separation between the institutions responsible. As a result of the separation, agencies have missed important opportunities to use disaster relief to support later development activities, and to use development aid to address the underlying vulnerabilities that insure the reoccurrence of disasters. Despite efforts to cross these boundaries, the disaster response and preparedness network remains apart from the development complex.

This institutional division affects PVO efforts to integrate their disaster and development programs in a variety of ways. PVOs, for example, often receive funds from donor governments for their response work. But, donor governments want to maintain a strict distinction between emergency funds and regular development funds because they provide the latter according to their foreign policy considerations. By keeping the two separate, donor governments are able to provide relief aid to a country without being "ensnared" into providing long-term aid afterwards. As a result, these funding policies obstruct integration efforts. They restrict the time period of funding to a few months or specify that the funds can be spent on relief items only. Both these stipulations limit resources to implementing agencies, including PVOs, precluding them from moving into recovery and development projects. The short-term funds also often make it difficult for them to include beneficiary participation and more development-oriented management style.

Other pressures in the aid system that keep the two aid types apart are issues of resources and expertise. Institutional jurisdictions have

created anti-disaster bias within the ranks of development professionals, the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and banks. Many development professionals still equate disaster programs with relief which they have criticized for having little long-term effect on the reduction of poverty. They have generally been slow to see a role for themselves after disasters. The shunning of disaster-related activities is reinforced by scarce resources. Development agencies have been hesitant to fund disaster prevention and mitigation activities which they see competing with existing priorities for funding. For these reasons, the move to development programs after disaster simply does not happen in many cases because no development institution picks up the disaster-related development needs.

- Program Level Challenges

Part Two of the thesis reviewed in detail one specific strategy (integrated relief-recovery-development program) in order to identify and analyze the set of challenges that the case agency faced. These challenges included program and management issues, relationships with program participants and with the host government. Together, these issues provide a *framework of understanding* through which aid providers can evaluate the integration process and plan to cope. Below is a brief sketch of the framework.

• Programming and Management

Our case agency took a program approach to integrating disaster and development aid which consisted of shifting programs from short-term, temporary measures meeting immediate needs to programs which would provide permanent solutions to long-term needs and which would be both sustainable and disaster-resistant. The major sticking point in this

task was the how and when to phase out relief and phase in development aid.

The strategy that our case agency took paralleled a notoriously difficult program strategy used in other aid settings. Shifting from social services to self-help type programs has consistently produced disappointing results in other aid programs. The case agency also found it difficult to change a path that appeared to have been set. Not only were particular expectations difficult to modify, but also commitments that the agency made during relief resulted in a measure of project rigidity, making it more difficult to make timely changes as the post-disaster situation moved beyond the emergency.

The case evidence suggests, for example, that relief objectives will compete with development objectives at the point of shifting; and that for those agencies whose ultimate objective is a development program, a relief project may be an inefficient way to begin. Multi-sectoral and complex relief and development programs also appear to make the shift to development more difficult.

In addition, the case suggests that the management styles in disaster response and development programs ought to be as alike as possible in order to ease integration. The case agency's bottom-up management structure -- local staff, a longer-term time frame, and a response coordinated with other aid efforts -- was instrumental in facilitating the programs transition to development.

- **Interagency Coordination**

Interagency coordination continues to be an area of particular difficulty for all aid providers, including PVOs. They still compete with each other for victims, program turf, and recognition. In an

effort to insure funding, PVOs often try hard to distinguish themselves from the other agencies at times making it near impossible to collaborate.

Despite these persistent problems, coordination among agencies doing similar activities after a disaster has improved over the years. Joint campaigns for raising resources have lessened some of the competition, also allowing PVOs to share information and expertise. Our case documented the experience in Guayabal, an example of fruitful inter-agency coordination, that can occur when agencies are committed to collaboration. Despite these improvements, our review found that coordination between the *different stages* of post-disaster aid has not fared as well.

- **Relationship with the Host Government**

The relationship that our case agency established with the affected country government increased its ability to respond to the disaster and to integrate with regional development programs. The relationship was, however, replete with dilemmas.

Implementing alternative programs and insuring their wider impact and sustainability, the case agency had to balance its need for autonomy with that for coordination with government aid efforts. On the other hand, the government had to balance its need for international assistance that PVOs and others provided with that for political authority and control over the disaster-development process.

The resolution of these dilemmas brought the case agency and representatives of the government agencies together in collaboration around activities at the local level. However, during the initial post disaster period, the agency maintained its autonomy at the national

level. Later, the agency coordinated with national level redevelopment programs. In this way, the agency accessed much needed resources while maintaining flexibility to design and implement its programs.

- **Relationship with Program Participants**

The relationship that a PVO establishes with program participants is an area of recurrent difficulties -- particularly during the transition to development. As the case revealed, even the most collaborative relationships between agencies and people during relief may still create or reinforce a lack of self-reliance and power within the affected group. Despite care to the contrary, outside resources often supplant existing coping and recovery mechanisms, making it impossible for the affected population and its institutions to sustain the recovery without the outside aid.

This dependency relationship is a problem for relief providers who want to retire their aid, but who see the needs persisting. For development agencies following relief, manifestations of the dependency relationship, ranging from apathy and unrealizable expectations to material and organizational reliance, are acutely problematic. When people cannot, or do not, take the initiative to lead their own recovery, the PVOs' adoption of the strict role as a catalyst or facilitator of development is jeopardized.

- **Contextual Factors**

Pre-disaster conditions of the affected region as well as the post-disaster situation set many of the parameters for PVO programs and management choices and influence their effectiveness. In the Armero case, we saw how the Valley's economic relationships and political

traditions influenced the impact of the disaster as well as the resources available for the population's coping and recovery.

The post-disaster environment also influenced what aid providers could do. The extreme social and economic disruption exacerbated further by initial emergency responses conditioned the dependency on outside material and organizational assistance that emerged in the aftermath.

II. Recommendations

New ways for enhancing cooperation among the different actors in disaster reduction must take place. Institutional jurisdictions must be transcended and new arrangements promoted. Development agencies, in particular, must be encouraged to play their role in the disaster reduction process. In a word, institutional mechanisms need to "catch-up" with current thinking in disaster research in order to meet the emerging policy and program priorities.

This research suggests the following places to start in overcoming the separation of disaster and development assistance.

- First, more information needs to be generated about mechanisms used to transcend institutional jurisdictions to link short- with long-term disaster reduction measures.

- Integration Mechanisms

PVOs do, in fact, employ a number of institutional mechanisms to bridge the gap between disaster response and development programs. We studied in detail an integrated relief-recovery-development programs. But they also employ integration mechanisms that entail the coordination between more than one agency -- such as joint projects and coordinated

transfers -- as well as those that are within a single agency -- such as when development programs add-on disaster components.

Disaster response agencies do joint projects with development agencies after disasters. Although these have usually arisen when comprehensive recovery solutions are required, as in resettlement plans, joint projects are also used in less extreme cases. Professionals and resources are drawn from both institutions into a semi-autonomous organization to design and implement programs during the recovery period and into the early stages of development programming.

The coordinated transfer of disaster to development programs is when the most temporary, interim relief activities are followed by medium-term recovery programs, which are finally incorporated into longer-term (often government sponsored) development plans. The coordination may include phasing-over sectoral activities, transferring program participants, or shifting management infrastructure (staff, funding, decision-making, time frame) from one agency program to another.

A single agency may also integrate its disaster and development programs through integrated relief-recovery-development programs, and add-on disaster components in development agencies. In the first, like our central case study, the PVO provides emergency relief with the specific intention of laying the groundwork for a longer-term project. Over the post-disaster period, the PVO transforms its relief activities into its standard development programs. In the second, the PVO expands its ongoing development programs to benefit disaster-affected peoples and regions. The disaster-related projects are housed within the development agency, often with special funds raised for the relief and recovery components.

All these integration mechanisms encounter the various system and program level challenges noted earlier and have had uneven success at bridging institutional gaps. But more importantly, aid providers often do not even attempt any of these means to integrate disaster and development and the momentum to bridge the gap dissipates.

The integration experience must be documented and evaluated, both across disaster types and institutional environments. PVOs can do case studies of their programs in which joint projects, add-on components, and succession of programs were used. This research will help determine which of these mechanisms more effectively cope with the challenges identified in this present research.

In this regard, this dissertation has already identified and detailed the difficulties of the single agency relief-recovery-development strategy to integration. The case evidence of this research clearly illustrated the dangers of blurring the boundaries of disaster and development assistance. PVOs should plan for the likely consequences that relief will have on resources and on the relationship with program participants. Development-oriented relief with beneficiary involvement should be coupled with a transition strategy for shifting to a relationship which is characterized by supported self-reliance.

Clearly, the transition task will be less difficult, although never smooth, when: there is a clear break, there is no confusion over the role and relationship with aid providers, and when the disaster itself is less severe leaving community organization in tact. The case experience suggests that this is more adequately accomplished when rather than melded together, disaster response and development programs

should be clearly demarcated (as when there are two different agencies) and better coordinated.

- Programs

Our case experience underscores the importance of recovery programs as bridges between disaster response and development assistance. Recovery programs provide an intermediate step through which agencies may change their programs; for example, in moving from deliverer of food during relief, to employer of affected people during the recovery, to facilitator of community-based initiatives during development.

They may also help resolve conflicts between the different program and management styles. Recovery programs embody both short- and long-term objectives, thereby providing an area where relief and development agencies can find common ground. In particular, they court development interests. Thus, they are the most likely opportunities for jointly funding activities. In addition, greater focus on recovery programs counters agencies' tendency to prolong relief and to overspend during the emergency.

- Relationship with Program Participants

Our central case reaffirms the common wisdom which says that, even in relief, PVOs ought to establish a relationship with program participants in which the latter take decisions, action, and evaluate their own progress. They can do so by reducing the pervasiveness of their aid and by working through indigenous institutions when possible and appropriate. When social structure and community organization suffer minor damage, program participants are more equal partners and the dependency relationship is likely to be less.

However, the case experience also adds a serious word of caution. When responding to an acute need and establishing a relationship based on material transfer, the agency should be aware of and plan for the potential repercussions of this relief association. Measures to mitigate the dependency relationship should be coupled with a transition strategy for shifting to a relationship which is characterized by supported self-reliance. Particularly important in this is to work with survivors on generating income and other opportunities. That is, aid providers must anticipate the requirements of the changing relationship between themselves and the program participants.

- Relationship with Host Government

In times of disaster the pressures and dilemmas in the relationships between PVOs and host governments are magnified. Our case experience suggests that a PVO who establishes flexible relationships with the host government are more able to access support to move beyond relief.

There is a range of relationships that a PVO can establish with the host government to further disaster-resistant development goals. For example, the PVO may try to influence the government, through demonstration projects, to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. If governments are already doing so, PVO projects may fill in gaps.

- **Second, the international aid network itself needs some revamping to support integration efforts.**

One logical place to start is with the large bilateral and multilateral donors. *Donor agencies* should evaluate the impact of their aid policies on the disaster-development integration process after disasters. They should be encouraged to be more flexible in their

funding policies. The time period for spending emergency funds can be extended and funds allowed to be spent on longer-term recovery programs and disaster mitigation initiatives.

Although the centrality of development professionals for disaster reduction is recognized in principle, they lack the tools to bridge the institutional gap. *Development PVOs* should: Hire personnel with both disaster management and development experience for field positions; educate and train personnel in hazards assessment and disaster mitigation skills; include phase-over activities rather than phase-out activities when appropriate; establish forums to exchange information and share experience in non-disaster times and to draw up flexible agreements between potential partner agencies. That is, PVOs should work out beforehand strategies for bridging the institutional gap.

PVO program experience has proved to be fertile ground for reaping lessons about the integration of disaster response and development assistance. After all, they have been doing both types of aid for at least twenty years now. Emergencies have been the place where aid providers have experimented and tested methods of integrating disaster and development assistance. Emergencies, however, are not the most appropriate time to do so. The detailed case analysis and framework of understanding seek to provide a road map of key institutional issues to allow PVOs to better plan and carry out effective disaster-reduction programs that integrate short- and long-term objectives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

- McCall, George J. and J.L. Simmons. (1969) Issues in Participant Observation. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Murphy, Jerome. (1980) Getting the Facts: A Fieldwork Guide for Evaluation and Policy Analysis. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing.
- Yin, Robert. (1984) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 5. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Chapters 1-3

- Advisory Committee on the IDNDR. (1987) Confronting Natural Disasters: An International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. Also, the Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, U.S. National Academy of Engineering. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). (1982) Tin Aicha: Nomad Village. Philadelphia.
- Anderson, Mary. (1985) "A Reconceptualization of the Linkages Between Disasters and Development," Disasters, Volume 9, Special Supplement: Education for Development in the Context of Disasters, Harvard Graduate School of Education, (July 15-20, 1984).
- Anderson, Mary and Peter Woodrow. (1989) Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster. Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press. Paris: UNESCO.
- Apfel. (1987) Research-Evaluation Study on Refugee Settlement and Settlement Assistance Programmes. Prepared for UNHCR. Draft report on Phase I of Study. (November). Berlin, Germany.
- Baird, A., Phil O'Keefe, K. Westgate and Ben Wisner. (1975) "Towards an Explanation and Reduction of Disaster Proneness." DRU Occasional Paper #11. Bradford, UK: University of Bradford.
- Barrows, H.H. (1923) "Geography as human ecology." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 13:1-14.
- Barton, Allen H. (1970) Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

- Bates, Frederick (ed.). (1982) Recovery, Change and Development: A Longitudinal Study of the 1976 Guatemalan Earthquake. University of Georgia: Guatemalan Earthquake Study.
- Bates, Frederick, C.W. Fogelman, V.J. Parenton, R.H. Pittman and G.S. Tracy. (1963) The Social and Psychological Consequences of a Natural Disaster: A Longitudinal Study of Hurricane Audrey. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council Disaster Study #18. Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences Printing Office.
- Belshaw, C. (1951) "Social Consequences of the Mount Lamington Eruption" Oceana XXI:4:241-252.
- Bender, Stephen. (1984) "Disaster Mitigation as Part of Integrated Regional Development Planning" Proceedings of the International Conference on Disaster Mitigation Program Implementation. Ocho Rios, Jamaica, November 12-16. Center for International Development Planning and Building, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- Berry, Leonard. (1977) "Remote Sensing and Developing Countries: Potential and Problems in the Transfer of a Technology," in The Application of Technology in Developing Countries. R. Belfin Jr. and J. Greenwell (eds.) Tucson: University of Arizona.
- Burton, Ian, Robert W. Kates and Gilbert F. White. (1978) The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cannon, T. (1977) " 'Natural' Disasters and the Third World" in N. Smith, M. Forbes, and M. Kershaw (eds.) Geography, Social Welfare, and Underdevelopment. J. St. Andrews, Geogs Spec. Publn no. 2, St. Andrews.
- Clifford, Roy A. (1956) The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border Communities in Disaster, Committee on Disaster Studies, Report No. 7. Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
- Cohen, R.E. and F.L. Ahearn. (1980) Handbook for Mental Health Care of Disaster Victims. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cuny, Frederick. (1983) Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. (1985) "What has to be done to increase the effectiveness of disaster interventions," Disasters. Harvard Supplement, Education for Development in Disasters.
- Curson, Peter. (1989) "Introduction", in John I. Clarke, Peter Curson, S.L. Kayastha, and Prithvish Nag (eds.) Population and Disaster. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Institute of British Geographers.
- Dacy, Douglas C. and Kunreunther. (1969) The Economics of Natural Disasters. New York: Free Press.

- Davis, Ian. (1975) Shelter after Disaster. New York.
- _____. (ed.) (1981) Disasters and The Small Dwelling. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Demerath, Nicholas J. and Anthony Wallace. (1957) "Human Adaptations to Disaster," Human Organizations, 16.
- Dudasik, S. (1979) "Unanticipated Repercussions of International Disaster Relief." Disasters. 6:1, pp. 8-12.
- Dworkin, J. (1974) "Global Trends in Natural Disasters, 1947-73". Natural Hazard Research Working Paper, no. 26. Boulder: University of Colorado.
- Dynes, Russell R. (1970) Organized Behavior in Disasters. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- _____. (1986) "Future Directions in Disaster Research," Preliminary Paper #110. Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.
- Eaton, Jonathan. (1989) "Foreign Capital Flows", in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.) Handbook of Development Economics, Volume II, chapter 25. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
- Fernandez, Aloysius. (1981) "The Relationship Between Disaster Assistance and Long-term Development" in Ian Davis (ed.) Disasters and The Small Dwelling. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Firth, R. (1959) Social Change in Tikopia: Restudy of a Polynesian Community after a Generation. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. (1969) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Franke, Richard and Barbara Chasin. (1980) Seeds of Famine: Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel. Montclair, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun, and Company Publishers, Inc.
- French, Steven et al. (1984) Restoration and Recovery Following the Coalinga Earthquake of May 1983. Working Paper No. 50. Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science.
- Friesema, H. Paul et al. (1979) Aftermath--Communities After Natural Disasters. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Fritz, Charles E.. (1961) "Disaster," in Robert K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet (eds.), Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Harcourt.

- Funaro-Curtis, Rita. (1982) "Natural Disasters and the Development Process: A Discussion of Issues." Prepared for the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development. Washington. (July)
- Geipel, Robert. (1982) Disaster and Reconstruction: The Friuli (Italy) Earthquake of 1976. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Gorman, Robert F. and Mel Foote. (1985) "Reducing Vulnerability to Drought: The Case of Seguenega," Disasters. Harvard Supplement, Education for Development in Disasters.
- Green, B. (1982) "Assessing Levels of Psychological Impairment Following Disaster," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 170, 544-552.
- Haas, H. Eugene, Robert W. Kates and Martyn Bowden. (1977) Reconstruction Following Disaster. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Hagman, Gunnar et al.. (1984) Prevention Better Than Cure: Report on Human and Environmental Disasters in the Third World. Geneva: Swedish Red Cross.
- Harris, Christopher. (1984) "Educational Policy and the Two Major Approaches to Disaster Relief in the Third World." Paper presented at the Northeast Regional Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society (Weston, MA). (November 22.)
- Harrell-Bond, B.E. (1984) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees -- a Study in Sudan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hawley, Amos H. (1950) Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure. New York: Ronald Press.
- _____. (1986) Human Ecology: A Theoretical Essay. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Hay, Roger W. (1986) "Food Aid and Relief-Development Strategies", in Disasters, 10/4.
- Heathcote, R.L. (1979) "The Threat from Natural Hazards in Australia," in R.L. Heathcote and B.G. Thom (eds.) Natural Hazards in Australia. Australian Academy of Sciences. Canberra: 3-10.
- Hewitt, Kenneth (ed.). (1983) Interpretations of Calamity. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Hewitt, Kenneth and Ian Burton. (1971) The Hazardousness of a Place. Department of Geography Research Publication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Jeffrey, Susan E. (1981) "Our Usual Landslide: Ubiquitous Hazard and Socio-economic Causes of Natural Disaster in Indonesia." Center for Development Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath. (June). Working Paper #40.
- Jones, Barclay B. and James H. Mars. (1974) Regional Analysis for Development Planning in Disaster Areas. Technical Report #88, Cornell University Water Resources and Marine Sciences Center, Ithaca, New York.
- Kates, R.W. (1980) "Disaster Reduction: Links Between Disaster and Development" in Barry and Kates (eds.) Making the Most with the Least: Alternative Ways to Development. New York: Holm and Meier. pp. 137-169.
- Kent, Randolph C. (1987) Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action. London and New York: Pinter Publishers.
- Kibreab, Gaim. (1987) Refugees and Development in Africa: The Case of Eritrea. Trenton, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press.
- Kreimer, Alcira and Michele Zador (eds.) (1989) "Colloquium on Disasters, Sustainability and Development: A Look to the 1990s". The World Bank: Environment Working Paper No. 23 (prepared for internal use). (December).
- Kreps, G.A. (1984) "Sociological Inquiry and Disaster Research," Annual Review of Sociology. 10:309-30.
- Krimgold, Frederick. (1976) Overview of the Priority Area Natural Disaster, United Nations, New York (15th October).
- Kumar, B. Gopalakrisna. (1985) The Ethiopian Famine and Relief Measures: An Analysis of Drought Relief in Botswana, Inter-Ministerial Drought Co-ordinating Committee, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Government of Botswana.
- Laube, Jerri and Shirley A. Murphy (eds.). (19) Perspectives on Disaster Recovery. Norwalk, CT: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Linden, Eugene. (1976) The Alms Race: The Impact of American Voluntary Aid Abroad. London: Random House.
- Lissner, Jorgen. (1977) The Politics of Altruism: A Study of the Political Behavior of Voluntary Development Agencies. Geneva: Lutheran World Federation.
- McLuckie, Benjamin F. (1970) "A Study of Functional Response to Stress in Three Societies," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Columbus, The Ohio State University.

- Mileti, Dennis S., Thomas E. Drabek and Eugene Haas. (1975) Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. Monograph #021, Boulder, Colorado, University of Colorado Institute of Behavioral Science.
- Morren, George. (1983) "A General Approach to the Identification of Hazards and Responses," in Kenneth Hewitt (ed.) Interpretations of Calamity. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Mumtaz, B. (1984) "Mitigation in the Context of Development", Proceedings of the International Conference on Disaster Mitigation Program Implementation. Ocho Rios, Jamaica, November 12-16. Center for International Development Planning and Building, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- National Research Council (NRC). (1979) U.S. Science and Technology for Development: A Contribution to the 1979 U.N. Conference. Washington DC: Department of State.
- O'Keefe, Phil. (1975) Disastrous Relief. War on Want.
- O'Keefe, Phil and C. Conway. (1975) A Survey of Natural Hazards in the Windward Islands. Occasional Paper no. 14, Disaster Research Unit. Bradford University.
- O'Keefe, Phil and Ben Wisner. (1976) "Underdevelopment in East Africa -- a Kenyan Case Study," Environment African. 2 (1&2).
- O'Keefe, Phil, K. Westgate, and Ben Wisner. (1976) "Taking the 'Naturalness' out of Natural Disaster," in Nature. 260 (15 April).
- Oliver-Smith, Anthony. (1979) "Anthropological Perspectives on Disaster and Social Change," Disasters 3:1:95-101.
- _____. (1986) "Disaster Context and Causation: An Overview of Changing Perspectives in Disaster Research," in Oliver-Smith (ed.) Natural Disasters and Cultural Responses. Studies in Third World Societies, No. 36. College of William and Mary. (June).
- O'Riordan, Timothy. (1986) "Coping with Environmental Hazards," in Robert W. Kates and Ian Burton (eds.) Geography, Resources, and Environment. Volume II. Themes from the Work of Gilbert F. White. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Orlove, Benjamin S. (1980) "Ecological Anthropology", Annual Review of Anthropology. 9:235-273.
- Payer, C. (1975) The Debt Trap. London: Penguin.
- _____. (1982) The World Bank: A Critical Analysis. New York: Monthly Review Press.

- Perry, R. and M. Lindell. (1978) "The Psychological Consequences of Natural Disaster: A Review of Research on American Communities." Mass Emergencies. 3, 1105-115.
- Porter, Philip W. (1980) "Geography as Human Ecology: A Decade of Progress in a Quarter Century". American Behavioral Science. 24:15-39.
- Prince, Samuel. (1920) Catastrophe and Social Change. London: Kind and Son.
- Quarentelli, E.L.. (1986) "What Should We Study?: Questions and Suggestions for Researchers about the Concept of Disasters." Disaster Research Center. University of Delaware.
- _____. (1987) "Research in the Disaster Area: What is Being Done and What Should Be Done." Preliminary Paper #118. Disaster Research Center. University of Delaware.
- Reiff, Hans. (1984) "Educational Development, Basic Human Needs and Disaster Relief: Lessons from a few experiences," Disasters. Harvard Supplement, Education for Development in Disasters.
- Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). (1985) "Evaluation Report of Cash for Food Projects". RRC/UNICEF, Addis Ababa (April).
- Rhodes, R.I. (1970) Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Rogers, George W. (1970) "Economic Effects of the Earthquake," in The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964: Human Ecology. Washington DC: Committee on the Alaska Earthquake, National Academy of Sciences.
- Rolfe, Chris, Clare Rolfe and Malcolm Harper. (1987) Refugee Enterprise: It can be done. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Rubin, Claire B., Martin D. Saperstein and Daniel G. Barbee. (1985) Community Recovery from a Major Natural Disaster. Program on Environment and Behavior. Monograph No. 41. Institute of Behavioral Science. Boulder: University of Colorado.
- Sagov, M. (1981) "The Interface Between Earthquake Planning and Development Planning: A Case of the Reconstruction of Huaraz and the Callejón de Huaylas, Ancash, Perú, Following the 31 May 1970 Earthquake," in Ian Davis (ed.) Disasters and the Small Dwelling. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Save The Children Federation (SCF). (1985) "Program Department, Five Year Plan." (November 15)
- Schwimmer, E. (1969) Cultural Consequences of a Volcanic Eruption Experienced by the Mt. Laminton Orokaiva. Salem: University of Oregon Press.

- Seidman, A. (1974) Planning for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. New York: Praeger.
- Shah, B.V. (1983) "Is the Environment Becoming More Hazardous? -- A Global Survey 1947-1980" Disasters. 7:3:202-209.
- Shawcross, William. (1984) The Quality of Mercy. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster.
- Snow, Robert (1987) "Disaster Response Policy Issues." memo. (13 August).
- Sommer, John. (1977) Beyond Charity: U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing Third World. Overseas Development Council.
- Susman, Paul, Phil O'Keefe and Ben Wisner. (1983) "Global Disasters, a Radical Interpretation." in Kenneth Hewitt (ed.) Interpretations of Calamity. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Sykes, Charles. (1989) "The Role of NGOs in the Reduction of Vulnerability", in Kreimer, Alcira and Michele Zador (eds.) (1989) "Colloquium on Disasters, Sustainability and Development: A Look to the 1990s". The World Bank: Environment Working Paper No. 23 (prepared for internal use). (December).
- Thompson, S.A. (1982) Trends and Developments in Global Natural Disasters 1947 to 1981. Natural Hazard Research Working Paper 45, Boulder: University of Colorado.
- Torry, William T. (1978) "Natural Disasters, Social Structure and Change in Traditional Societies," Journal of Asian and African Studies. XIII: 3-4: 167-183.
- _____. (1979a) "Anthropology and Disaster Research." Disasters 3 (#1), pp.43-52.
- _____. (1979b) "Anthropological Studies in Hazardous Environments: Past Trends and New Horizons," Current Anthropology. 20: 3: 517-540.
- _____. (1986) "Drought and Desertification as Constraints on the Agricultural Development of the Western Sudan" in Oliver-Smith (ed.) Natural Disasters and Cultural Responses. Studies in Third World Societies, No. 36. College of William and Mary. (June).
- United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO). (1986) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: Social and Sociological Aspects. Vol. 12. New York: United Nations.
- UNHCR. (1987/1988) "How can Refugee aid contribute to local development?" Rapport. No.1. (Winter) Technical Support Service.
- UNHCR/ILO. (1982) "Income-Generating Activities for Refugees in the

- Sudan." Report of the UNHCR/ILO Inter-disciplinary Mission on the Employment, Income Generating and Training of Refugees in the Sudan.
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (1975) Directory of Disaster Related Technology. Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.
- Van Appeldoorn, G. (1981) Perspectives on Drought and Famine in Nigeria. Allen and Unwin.
- Waddell, Eric. (1977) "The Hazards of Scientism: A Review Article". Human Ecology. 5:1:69-76.
- _____. (1983) "Coping with Frosts, Governments, and Disaster Experts: Some Reflections Based on a New Guinea Experience and a Perusal of the Relevant Literature," in Kenneth Hewitt (ed.) Interpretations of Calamity. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Wallace, A.F.C. (1956a) Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and community Behavior in an Extreme Situation. NAS-NRC Disaster Study #3, Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
- _____. (1956b) "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist 58:204-281.
- Westgate, K.N. and Phil O'Keefe. (1976a) "Some Definitions of Disaster." Disaster Research Unit, Occasional Paper #4. Bradford, UK: University of Bradford.
- _____. (1976b) "The Human and Social Implications of Earthquake Risk for Developing Countries," Journal of Administration Overseas. 4.
- White, Gilbert F. (1974) Natural Hazards: Local, National, Global. New York: Oxford University Press.
- White, Gilbert F. and Eugene Haas. (1975) Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Wijkman, Anders and Lloyd Timberlake. (1984) Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man? Washington DC: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Wisner, Ben. (1978) "An Appeal for a Significantly Comparative Method in Disaster Research," Disasters. 2 (1).
- _____. (1979) "Flood Prevention and Mitigation in the People's Republic of Mozambique," Disasters 3 (3).
- Wisner, Ben, Phil O'Keefe and K. Westgate (1977) "Global Systems and Local Disasters: The Untapped Power of People's Science," Disasters. 1 (1).

- Wright, James et al. (1979) After the Clean Up: Long-Range Effects of Natural Disasters. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Wright, Jean and Sandra Stein. (1974) The Mapping of Post-Agnes Planning and Decision Making, Technical Paper #97, Cornell University Water Resources Science Center, Ithaca, New York.
- Young, Gerald L. (ed.). (1983) Origins of Human Ecology. Benchmark Papers in Ecology. Volume 12. Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania: Hutchinson Ross Publishing Company.
- Young, Lincoln. (1983) "A Report on the Use of Agricultural Credit for Poor Disaster Victims in India," in Disasters, 7/3.
- Zaman, M.Q. (1986) "The Role of Social Relations in the Response to River bank Erosion Hazards and Population Resettlement in Bangladesh" in Oliver-Smith (ed.) Natural Disasters and Cultural Responses. Studies in Third World Societies, No. 36. College of William and Mary. (June).

Chapter 4

- Centro de Investigaciones y Educación Popular (CINEP). (1986) Boletín Informativo. no. 1. (April).
- Departamento de Planeación. (1985) "Elementos para una Política Regional en Colombia". Bogotá. (septiembre).
- Departamento de Planeación, Unidad de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano. (1979a) "La Política de Desarrollo Regional en Colombia". Presented in a seminar entitled, Estrategías Nacionales de Desarrollo Regional en Latinoamérica. Bogotá. (septiembre).
- _____. (1979b) "El Sistema Financiero y su Distribución a Nivel Departamental", in Diagnóstico Regional. Bogotá.
- Dix, Robert H. (1967) Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Oquist, P. (1980) Violence, Politics, and Conflict in Colombia. New York and London.
- Payne, J.L. (1968) Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. New Haven, Connecticut, and London.
- Santa, E. (1970) Sociología Política de Colombia. Bogota, Ediciones Tercer Mundo.

Universidad Nacional, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. (1985) Plan de Desarrollo del Tolima. "Aspectos Económicos," and Volume II ("Diagnóstico Departamental"), and Volume III ("Estrategías y Políticas Departamentales"). Jesús A. Bejarano, General Director of the Project; and Humberto Castaño S., Technical Director of the Project.

Zarate, Cesar. (1982) Materiales Para un Plan Integral de Desarrollo en Armero. Volumes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8. Universidad Nacional (Manizales), and the Comité Desarrollo y Bienestar Social (Armero).

Interviews

Octavio Fajardo. Analyst in the Unidad de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano, Departamento de Planeación.

Jota Uribe. Chief of Macroeconomics Division. Departamento de Planeación.

Chapter 5

Apfel. (1987) Research-Evaluation Study on Refugee Settlement and Settlement Assistance Programmes. Prepared for UNHCR. Draft report on Phase I of Study. (November). Berlin, Germany.

ACTUAR. (1986) "Hacia un Desarrollo Integral de los Damnificados con Base en la Productividad". Anteproyecto. Corporación Acción Por el Tolima. (September).

Cañon Moreno, Luis and Fernando Millen C. (1987) "Dos Años de la Tragedia de Armero (3): Entre el Paternalismo y la Desatención". Article published in the newspaper, El Tiempo. (November 7).

Centro de Investigaciones y Educación Popular (CINEP). (1986a) "Elementos de Análisis Sobre la Reconstrucción de Armero", Boletín Informativo, no.1. (April).

_____. (1986b) "Se Consolida la Organización". Proyectos CINEP. Bolitín no. 2.

Cuny, Fred. (1983) Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gomez Barrero, Pedro. (1986) Resurgir; Ocho meses de realizaciones. (December).

_____. (1986) Informe Final. Presentado a la Junta Directiva de Resurgir, el 9 de Julio de 1986 como balance de sus actividades.

Gueri, M. and L.J. Perez. (1986) "Medical Aspects of the 'El Ruiz' Avalanche Disaster, Colombia", Disasters. 10/2. pp. 150-156.

- Herd, D. and Comité de Estudios Vulcanológicos. (1986) "The 1985 Ruiz Volcano Disaster" in EOS, 67, pp. 457-460.
- Ministerio de Agricultura. (1985) "Evaluación de Perdidas en el Sector Agropecuario en la Zona Afectada por la Actividad Volcánica del Nevado Del Ruiz, El 13 de noviembre, 1985", Informe Preliminar. (November).
- Naciones Unidas Programa Para el Desarrollo. (1985) "El Desastre Natural del Nevado del Ruiz en Colombia, Evaluación Preliminar de los Daños y Algunas Consideraciones para la Acción."
- OFDA. (1985) "Disaster Case Report: Colombia -- Volcanic Eruption". Agency for International Development, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. (November 22).
- Ortiz, Gonzalo Palomino (ed.). (1986) Ecología de un Desastre. SENA, Centro de Formación Ambiental, Regional Tolima.
- Pardo, Carlos Orlando. (1986) Los Ultimos Días de Armero. Bogotá: Plaza & Janes Editores Colombia Ltda.
- Refugee Policy Group. (19) "Final UNHCR Consultancy Report".
- Restrepo, Javier Darío. (1986) Avalancha sobre Armero: Crónicas. Reportajes y Documentos de una Imprevisión Trágica. Bogotá: El Ancora Editores.
- Resurgir. (1986a) "Programa Para la Reconstrucción Física, la Reactivación Económica y la Rehabilitación Familiar y Comunitaria de las Zonas Afectadas", Versión Preliminar. (April).
- _____. (1986b) Boletín Informativo. nos. 2-5, 7, 9, 14, 15. Bogotá.
- Rivera, A. (1986) "Events Leading to Colombia's Ruiz Volcano Eruption and its Results Described", in Min. Eng., 2, pp. 99-100.
- Santana Rodríguez, Pedro. (1989) "La Política Estatal Frente a los Desastres en Colombia," in Santana Rodríguez Los Movimientos Sociales en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional por Colombia. Colección Ciudad y Democracia.
- SCF. (1985) "Census of Emergency Camp."
- SENA. (1985/1986) "Plan de Desarrollo Integrado para la Zona de Influencia Volcán de El Ruiz".
- Sigurdsson, Haraldur and Steven Carey. (1986) "Volcanic Disasters in Latin America and the 13th November 1985 Eruption of Nevado del Ruiz Volcano in Colombia", in Disasters. (October 3).
- Vega, Carlos Mauricio. (1987) "Informe Especial: Armero Vive", in Revista Credencial, Edición 12, (November).

Interviews

Maria Christina Ashner, Resurgir. Bogotá. (September 19, 1986).

Camilo Cardenás, Chief of Armero Projects, United Nations Development Program. Bogotá. (September 19, 1986).

Amparo Parra, Armero Projects, CINEP. (various).

Jaime Piedrahita, Chief of Production and Employment, Resurgir (on loan from Planeación Nacional). Bogotá. (September 18, 1986).

Chapter 6

Anderson, Mary and Peter Woodrow. (1989) Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster. Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press. Paris: UNESCO.

Cuny, Frederick. (1983) Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. (1985) "What has to be done to increase the effectiveness of disaster interventions," Disasters. Harvard Supplement, Education for Development in Disasters.

Hay, Roger W. (1986) "Food Aid and Relief-Development Strategies", in Disasters, 10/4.

Guarnizo, Luis and Caroline Clarke Guarnizo. (1986) "Project Nueva Vida, Armero Colombia. Mimeo.

_____. (1987) "Proyecto Nueva Vida, Armero: Reporte Primer Año". March. Mimeo.

Mysliwiec, Eva. (1988) "Year Zero and Death: The Kampuchean Challenge," in Robin Poulton and Michael Harris (eds.) Putting People First: Voluntary Organizations and Third World Organizations. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Robertson, A.F. (1984) People and the State.

Rolfe, Chris, Clare Rolfe and Malcolm Harper. (1987) Refugee Enterprise: It can be done. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Sommer, John. (1977) Beyond Charity: U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing Third World. Overseas Development Council.

SCF. (1980) "Introduction to Community-Based Integrated Responsive Development (CBIRD)". Mimeo.

Tendler, Judith. (1982) Turning Private Voluntary Organizations Into Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation. AID Program Evaluation Discussion Paper, No. 12. USAID. (April).

_____. (1989) "What ever happened to poverty alleviation?" in World Development, Volume 17, No. 7, pp. 1033-1044.

Chapter 7

Adepoju, Aderanti. (1982) "The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa." in African Affairs, 81:21-35.

Amin, Samir. (194) Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Baker, Ron. (1984) "Is Loss and Crisis Theory Relevant to Understanding Refugees in Africa?" Paper presented at Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, England.

Banfield, Edward. (1970) The Unheavenly City. Boston: Little Brown.

Becker, Gary. (1964) Human Capital. New York: Columbia.

Bloom, Joan. (1982) "Is Loss and Crisis Theory Relevant to Understanding Refugees in Africa?". Paper presented at Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, England.

Buvinic, Myra. (date?) "CBIRD Revisited". Save The Children Federation.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. (1973) "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Futures. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto (1969) Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina. Mexico: Siglo XXI.

Christiansen, Hanne. (1987) "Spontaneous Development Efforts by Rural Refugees in Somalia and Pakistan," in John Rogge (ed.), Refugees: A Third World Dilemma. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Clark, Lance. (1985) "The Refugee Dependency Syndrome: Physician, Heal Thyself". Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group.

Dean, A. and Nan Lin. (1977) "The Stress-Buffering Role of Social Support: Problems and Prospects for Systematic Investigation." Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders. 10:403-417.

dos Santos, Theotonio. (1970) "La crisis del desarrollo y las relaciones de dependencia en América Latina". Mexico.

- Ellwood, David T. and Lawrence H. Summers. (1986) "Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the Problem?" in Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.) Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- El Espectador. (1986) "Seis Meses después de la tragedia: Sobrevivientes no salen del 'limbo'". (16 May).
- Evans, Peter. (1979) Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Evers, Tilman, Clarita Muller-Platenberg, and Stefanie Spessart. (1983) Movimientos barriales y estado: Luchas en la esfera de la reproducción en América Latina. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Frank, André Gunders. (1966) "The Development of Underdevelopment," in Monthly Review. 18(4):17-31.
- _____. (1968) Development and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Fritz, Charles. (1968) "Disasters", in David L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. vol. 4, The MacMillan Company and the Free Press.
- Gans, Herbert. (1972) "The positive functions of poverty." American Journal of Sociology. 78:275-289.
- Gilder, George. (1980) Wealth and Poverty. New York: Basic Books.
- Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. (1970) Beyond the Melting Pot. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Harrell-Bond, B.E. (1984) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees -- a Study in Sudan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hitchcox, Linda. (1988) Vietnamese Refugees in Transit: Process and Change. PhD Dissertation. University of Oxford.
- Hughes, Arnold. (1985) "Alternative Forms and Levels of Popular Participation: A General Survey," in Franklyn Lisk (ed.) Popular Participation in Planning for Basic Needs: Concepts, Methods and Practices. A study prepared for the International Labour Office within the framework of the World Employment Programme.
- Katz, Michael B. (1989) The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

- Krumperman, Andre. (1983) "Psychosocial Problems of Violence, Especially Its Effect on Refugees," in Ron Baker (ed.) The Psychosocial Problems of Refugees. Luton, England: L & T Press, Ltd.
- Lewis, Oscar. (1968) La Vida. New York: Vintage.
- Marris, Peter. (1975) Loss and Change. Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company.
- Maxwell, Mary. (1982) "The Use of Social Networks to Help Cancer Patients Maximize Support" Cancer Nursing. 10:175-281.
- Mead, Lawrence. (1985) Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship. New York: Free Press.
- Mitchell, R. and E. Trickett. (1980) "Task Force Report: Social Networks as Mediators of Social Support, An Analysis of the Effects and Determinants of Social Networks," in Community Mental Health Journal. 16:27-44.
- Morris, Michael. (1988) "Fighting Poverty by Reducing Dependency: The Dilemmas of Policy Assumptions," in Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald (ed.). Poverty and Social Welfare in the United States. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
- Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.). (1981) From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Murray, Charles. (1984) Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980. New York: Basic Books.
- Nelson, Joan. (1979) Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Oliver-Smith, Anthony. (1986) The Martyred City: Death and Rebirth in the Andes. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Pradervand, Pierre. (1989) Listening to Africa: Developing Africa from the Grassroots. New York: Praeger.
- Rapport. (1987/88) "Initial Needs Assessment, Steps in the Right Direction." No.1, (Winter), Technical Support Service, Office of the UNCHR.
- Rapport. (1988) "Involving Refugees in Planning their own Future." No. 2, (Spring), Technical Support Service, Office of the UNCHR.
- Refugee Policy Group. (n.d.) "Refugee Participation: Broadening Our Vision", Final UNHCR Consultancy Report.
- Reich, Michael. (1981) Racial Inequality: A Political Economic Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Ryan, William. (1971) Blaming the Victim. New York: Vintage.
- Sackery, Charles. (1973) The Political Economy of Urban Poverty. New York: Norton.
- Santana, Pedro. (1983) Desarrollo regional y paros cívicos en Colombia. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Schoenmeier, Hermann. (1987) "Refugee Policy: the need to include psychological aspects," in John Rogge (ed.) Refugees: A Third World Dilemma. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Smith, Brian. (1985) Nonprofit Organizations and Socioeconomic Development in Colombia. PONPO Working Paper No. 93. Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.
- Szymanski, Albert. (1976) "Racial Discrimination and White Gain," in American Sociological Review. 41: 403-414.
- Tendler, Judith. (1982) Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation, A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 12, U.S.A.I.D., FN-AAJ-612.
- Tostensen, Arne. (1982) Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination (SADCC). Research report no. 62. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
- Wachtel, Howard M. (1971) "Looking at Poverty From a Radical Perspective," in The Review of Radical Political Economy. 3:1-19.
- Waldron, Sidney. (1987) "Blaming the Refugees" in Refugee Issues. 3:1-19.
- Wells, Miriam. (1982) "Political Mediation and Agricultural Cooperation: Strawberry Farms in California," in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30:413-422.
- Williams, Holly Ann. (1990) "Families in Refugee Camps," in Human Organization, volume 49, no. 2.
- Williamson, John B., Jerry F. Borren, Frank J. Mifflen, Nancy A. Cooney, Linda Evans, Michael F. Foley, Richard Steiman, Jody Garber, Nancy Theberge, and Donna J.B. Turek. (1975) Strategies Against Poverty in America. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
- Wolf, Eric. 1966. "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in M. Banton (ed.), The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies. ASA Monographs. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Wortman, Camille. (1984) "Social Support and the Cancer Patient: Conceptual and Methodological Issues," in Cancer. 53:2339-2360.

Young, Lincoln. (1984) "Planning against disasters with poor agrarian communities: An extension perspective", in Disasters. 8/4. (pp. 243-244).

_____. (1983) "A Report on the Use of Agricultural Credit for poor disaster victims in India," in Disasters, 7/3.

Chapter 9

Abney, F.G. and L.B. Hill. (1966) "Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on an Urban Election." American Political Science Review. 60: 974-981.

Alford, Robert R. and Roger Friedland. (1985) Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the state, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Allen, Tim. (1988) "Putting People First Again: Nongovernmental Organizations and the "New Orthodoxy" for Development: Review Article". Disasters. Volume 14, no. 1. pp. 63-68.

Anheier, Helmut K. (1987) "Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Nonprofits, and Development in Africa," in Powell, Walter W. (ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: A research Handbook. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 415-433.

Baron, Barnett F. (1989) "Philanthropy and the Dynamics of Change in East and Southeast Asia." PONPO Working Paper No. 144. Yale University.

Bommer, Julian. (1985) "The Politics of Disaster -- Nicaragua," in Disasters. 9/4. pp.270-278.

Brown, L. David and Jane G. Covey. (1987) "Organizing and Managing Private Development Agencies: A Comparative Analysis:". PONPO Working Paper No. 129. Yale University.

Cernea, Michael M. (1988) "Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development". World Bank Discussion Paper, No. 40. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Cuny, Frederick. (1983) Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davis, M. and S.T. Seitz. (1982) "Disasters and Governments," in Journal of Conflict Resolution. 26(3):547-568.

Downs, Charles and Giorgio Solimano. (1989) "Toward an Evaluation of the NGO Experience in Chile: Implications for Social Policy and Future Investigation" in Charles Downs, Giorgio Solimano, Carlos Vergara, and Luis Zúñiga (eds.). Social Policy From the Grassroots: Non Governmental Organizations in Chile. Boulder: Westview Press. Published in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund and

the Center for Social Policy and Planning in Developing Countries,
Columbia University.

Friedman, Ray. (1980) "The Role of Non-profit Organizations in Foreign Aid: A Literature Survey" PONPO Working Paper-32. Yale University.

Guarnizo, Luis and Caroline Clarke Guarnizo. (1987) "Proyecto Nueva Vida: Reporte Primer Año". Save The Children. March.

Gomez Barrero, Pedro. (1986) Resurgir: Ocho meses de realizaciones. (December).

Harrell-Bond, B.E. (1984) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees -- A Study in Sudan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hartlyn, Jonathan. (1985) "Producer Associations, the Political Regime, and Policy Process in Contemporary Colombia". Latin American Research Review. 20. no. 3. pp.118-138.

_____. (1988) The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James, Estelle. "The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective", in Powell, Walter W. (ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: A research Handbook. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 397-415.

Kent, Randolph. (1987) Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action. London and New York: Pinter Publishers.

Korten, David C. (1986) "Micro-Policy Reform: The Role of Private Development Agencies". (one of many versions)

Kramer, Ralph M. (1981) Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Libaridian, Gerard J. (1989) "Armenian Earthquakes and Soviet Tremors," in Society. March/April 1989.

Lipsky, Michael and Steven R. Smith. (1987) "Providing Social Services Through Nonprofit Organizations". (loose paper)

Low Murtra, Enrique. (1983) "Las sociedades y las entidades sin ánimo de lucro como alternativas para el desarrollo," in Sociedades comerciales: Ponencias del primer simposio nacional sobre sociedades. Bogotá: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá. 13-27.

Monsivais, C. (1986) "El Día del Derrumbe y las Semanas de la Comunidad," in Cuadernos Políticos. 45:11-24.

Montgomery, John. (1983) "When Local Participation Helps", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Vol. 3, no.1, pp. 90-105 (Fall).

- Otero, Maria. (1990) "The Role of Governments and Private Institutions in Addressing the Informal Sector in Latin America," in Cathy A. Rakowski (ed.) Contrapunto: The Informal Sector Debate Issues in Research Policy. New York: Suny Press.
- Paul, Samuel. (1988) "Governments and Grassroots Organizations: From Co-Existence to Collaboration," in Lewis (ed.) Strengthening the Poor: What Have We Learned.
- Robinson, Scott. S., Yolanda Hernandez Franco, Rosario Mata Castrejon, and H. Russell Bernard. (1986) "It Shook Again -- The Mexico City Earthquake of 1985," in Anthony Oliver-Smith (ed.) Natural Disaster and Cultural Response. Studies in Third World Societies. Publications no. 36. College of William and Mary. (June).
- Robertson, A.F. (1984) People and the State.
- Rosset, Peter and John Vandermeer. (1986) Nicaragua: Unfinished Revolution. The New Nicaragua Reader. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- Salamon, Lester. (1983) "The Non-Profit Sector and the Rise of Third-Party Government: The Scope, Character, and Consequences of Government Support of Nonprofit Organizations." The Urban Institute.
- Santana Rodríguez, Pedro. (1989) "La Política Estatal Frente a los Desastres en Colombia" in Santana Rodríguez Los Movimientos Sociales en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional por Colombia. Colección Ciudad y Democracia.
- Sanyal, Bishwapriya. (198) "Antagonistic Cooperation: A Case Study of Non-Governmental Organizations, Government and Donors' Relationships in Income-Generating Projects in Bangladesh." (mimeo)
- Smith, Brian. (1983) "U.S. and Canadian Nonprofit Organizations (PVOs) as Transnational Development Institutions", PONPO Working Paper - 70. Yale University.
- _____. (1985) "Nonprofit Organizations and Socioeconomic Development in Colombia". PONPO Working Paper No. 93. Yale University.
- _____. (1990) More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Streeten, Paul. (1987) "The Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to Development". Development. No. 4.
- Tendler, Judith. (1982) Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation. A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 12. (April).
- Uphoff, Norman. (198) "Relations Between Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations and the Promotion of Autonomous Development". Rural Development Committee, Cornell University.

Vansant, Jerry. (1989) "Opportunities and Risks for Private Voluntary Organizations as Agents of LDC Policy Change," in World Development, vol. 17, no.11, pp.1723-1731.

ANNEX 1: Definitions of Relief, Recovery, and Development Programs

In its conventional sense, relief aid is considered to be short-term aid that meets emergency and life-threatening needs. The aid is characterized by donations of basic goods and services such as food, shelter, clothes and health care. Delivery of aid has often been through external sources, with an emphasis on speed and efficiency. In principle, the assistance does not distinguish between different social groups but targets all those in need. Moreover, its termination, while not always clear when, is nevertheless a given. The use of this term does not include aid for reconstruction or rehabilitation. As outlined earlier, relief assistance may be more traditional or more development-oriented.¹⁸⁰

A problem with the treatment of development-oriented relief in the literature is the blurring of what is called relief and what, I argue, should more correctly be called "recovery" programs. Some analysts include recovery and reconstruction programs in the category of relief, largely because they are disaster-related and the same relief agency often funds both. This is clearly misleading, however. Recovery aid may be (and arguably, *should be*) more closely tied to development than relief objectives; development agencies also undertake disaster recovery programs. The grouping together of recovery aid under the rubric of relief causes recent literature to miss some key relationships and interactions between early, short-term aid and later, long-term aid.

¹⁸⁰See Chapter 3, "Post-Disaster Integration" discussion on reoriented relief aid.

Our review of the literature and cases suggests the importance of distinguishing between relief, which meet life-threatening needs, and recovery programs, which replace physical and economic losses, restore economic opportunities as well as the emotional well-being of victims (Cuny 1983). This thesis distinguishes two additional kinds of recovery programs: one more linked to relief and the other to development. The first are stop-gap, interim activities which address very specific disaster caused needs but which do not attempt to remedy the underlying problems. For example, an employment program which provides much needed income in the affected area, but which does not include a training component, credit or other means to open up permanent opportunities.

The other kind of recovery programs may be called "disaster-related development" programs. These recovery activities seek to reduce a population's risk to disaster through including disaster mitigation components which make development more "disaster-resistant". They are undertaken during the reconstruction period, but may include medium- or long-term actions. In practice, these programs are often narrowly conceived of as technology to reduce physical vulnerabilities, such as building codes and zoning restrictions. However, they also include programs with a broader understanding of and an assault on social and economic factors that cause vulnerability. Like development programs, these activities seek to change causative factors and counter already accumulated conditions that put people at risk but do so during the process of recovering from the effects of the disaster. Integrated programs to combat deforestation or programs targeted to increase food security rather than growth of production are examples.

Development programs, in this dissertation, refer specifically to PVOs' standard, non-emergency programs. Development aid is distinguished from relief by its longer-term horizon, its focus on permanent, or "durable", solutions and its objective of sustainability. It differs from recovery aid in that its objectives are always long-term and while they may include disaster-related components (hazard prevention and mitigation), programs are moving forward, not focusing on replacement activities *per se*. PVO development programs reflect a wide variety of principles, objectives, areas of expertise, and approaches. Nevertheless, our review of integration efforts suggests the importance of a general implementation approach which works with communities towards self-reliance. These programs often promote the development of local institutions, the education and training of the population, and the support of productive sectors.

Annex 2: The Case Agency: Save the Children Federation

Today, Save The Children Federation (SCF) is a major U.S. international child assistance agency working in over forty countries, including the U.S.. SCF has a clear philosophy of how to provide development assistance. This philosophy has been incorporated into a formal approach which the agency uses in all of their standard development programs. CBIRD, Community Based Integrated Responsive Development, is a grassroots approach that stresses working with communities towards self-reliance.

In its early years, the agency primarily undertook relief assistance. It got its start in 1932 by pioneering hot lunch programs and health care services in the Appalachian area of the United States. During the

First World War, SCF provided clothing, food, and medicines to abandoned children, devastated families and towns. During the 1950s, SCF again supported victims of war, this time in Korea and Lebanon. Here, they made their first attempt with reconstruction assistance. With the influence of the U.N. movements in community development in the 1960s, SCF shifted into community development projects. At the same time, the programs expanded to Latin America with the Alliance for Progress. In the 1970s, the agency developed its integrated community development approach and began to move away from relief assistance. Today in the 1980s, the agency has found itself responding to disasters and refugee crises in South East Asia, Africa, and Latin America in addition to its standard community-based development projects. The agency has long-term projects in Lebanon and Israel's West Bank and Gaza strip as well as continuing famine relief programs in Ethiopia and refugee programs in Somalia. In the year of the Armero disaster, SCF responded to three natural disasters in the Latin American region alone. The agency has accumulated substantial relief experience and are part of a growing worldwide dialogue about the most appropriate role for the private voluntary sector in these situations.

Because of its development focus, SCF's efforts in disaster relief have been particularly conscious of the long-term impacts. Originally, this issue was debated and action taken in the 1970s with their own shift away from charity assistance in their standard programs. They argued then that charity only alleviated the symptoms of poverty rather than targeted their causes. This concern arose in part from SCF's experience in the early 1970s when they, like other PVOs, stopped direct grants to individuals (in the form of check-to-child) and instead pooled

the resources and required community contributions to any project. Those communities who had been working with SCF under the old rules resisted the new way of doing things. In disaster situations, the agency was also concerned that relief might even worsen poverty in the long-run through tying people to charity assistance impeding their ability to move towards self-reliance--the primary goal of SCF's programs.

With the recurring cycle of emergency situations, however, the agency found itself repeatedly in the position of assisting people affected by disaster, war, and famine. So, the agency tried to use this experience to learn how to cope with emergencies in ways that would shorten their duration and facilitate the affected population's move to self-reliant development. They have had some acknowledged successes. In Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, SCF introduced an innovative approach to famine relief with some rather remarkable results. With the help of the beneficiary communities, they brought famine relief to families in their own villages, thereby maintaining community integrity and preserving the base for future recovery and rehabilitation. "The slow but steady recovery of people in these areas is a startling contrast to the abandoned villages and overcrowded feeding centers...."

Over the last five years, Save The Children has gradually diversified its modes of programming assistance in order to reach increasing numbers of children in need. The scenes of our most critically-needed and encompassing programs of the early to mid-80s include relief programs to families displaced by civil war in Lebanon operating in considerable peril; responses to the tragedies of the Boat People in southeast Asia, and victims of the Italian earthquake; income-raising and development programs for refugees in camps in Pakistan, the West Bank/Gaza and Somalia; and over the past year, the distribution of food, medicine and health services to families ravaged by drought and starvation in Ethiopia and Sudan. What

were once "the exceptions" to Save The Children's types of programming assistance, have become, in a time of repeated natural catastrophes and political upheaval, an increasingly significant portion of our overall assistance portfolio.

- SCF, Program Department, Five Year Plan (November, 1985).

The agency felt that bringing a development focus to relief is an important contribution that SCF has made to the practice of post-disaster assistance. Today, they are confident that relief can be linked effectively with development assistance. They are continuing to draw lessons from their experience about how best "to shape immediate relief assistance into longer-term, self-help programs" and in the process to lay "the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility with the affected communities and local governments". At the time of the Armero disaster, however, the agency did not have a general policy for their disaster intervention. They were exploring the development of a manual or set of standardized guidelines for the field offices as well as other activities to improve their disaster response.

However, involvement in relief work presented some practical difficulties for the agency. Relief work takes place in a messy, chaotic situation with the tremendous pressure to respond quickly. It is difficult to get the information necessary to design a relief response that effectively builds on available community resources. In addition, the agency has to mobilize particular expertise at a moment's notice, cope with the financial and logistical constraints, not to mention the issue of when and how to phase out relief and/or introduce longer-term community development projects. The potential for failure is greater given the number of uncontrollable variables at play. In Colombia, for example, the agency had already had one dreadful

experience when it responded to the 1979 Popayán disaster, and the regional staff was concerned whether they could respond effectively to the Armero disaster.

Save The Children - Colombia

Before getting involved in Armero, SCF had been working in Colombia since the early 1960s when the agency first moved into Latin America. One of the oldest and largest country programs, SCF is working in three (four with Armero) rural project sites with a budget in 1985 of approximately US\$800,000. The national office is located in Bogotá where development professionals support the programs in the impact areas. In the impact areas, local staff work in the areas of production and employment, education and training, housing, primary health care, among others. SCF-Colombia has been in the forefront worldwide with their work with women in development as well as the development of appropriate technology for agriculture.

APPENDIX 3:

THEORIES OF THE DISASTER-DEVELOPMENT RELATIONSHIP


DEFINITION OF
DISASTERS

DISASTER-DEVELOPMENT
RELATIONSHIP

PRACTICE

I. ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Origins



- level of development exacerbates disaster impact
- disaster impact "sets back" development
- individual decision-making produces vulnerability

Prognosis

- outside aid is appropriate and necessary
- technology provides mechanism to reduce damage (prediction schemes and emergency relief coordination)

Solutions


- division of labor according to post-disaster stages – i.e. separation of disaster and development aid)

Character

- natural crisis event which tends to be random and aberrant

II. MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

Origins



- process of development causes disasters
- socio-economic structure produces vulnerability

Prognosis

- aid reinforces status quo ante
- marginalization continues

Solutions


- relief to support indigenous coping mechanisms
- incorporate disaster planning into socialist development planning

Character

- event is result of "normal" process of development
- all disasters are man-made

III. EMERGING PERSPECTIVE

Origins



- factors in development exacerbate disaster impact
- disasters threaten development sustainability
- combination of structural conditions and individual decision-making produces vulnerability

Prognosis

- disaster aid may contribute to development

Solutions

- pro-active: link disaster mitigation and environmental management with development planning
- post-event: link disaster relief and recovery aid to development planning