ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by

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Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
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Abstract

This dissertation examines why national and international policies intended to protect limited natural resources in developing countries are not effectively implemented. It employs a comparative case study analysis to show the obstacles to environmental policy implementation in three developing countries, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Kitts, and three foreign assistance agencies, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States.

The decision making process within the countries and donor agencies is closed, preventing key stakeholders from participating. In two instances, the mutually reinforcing behavior of top officials in the countries and the donor agencies led to decisions that prevented natural resources from being protected. In all three cases, strategies to implement environmental policies failed to account for four major elements; national politics, behavior in the donor agency, the culture of decision making and economic necessity. Key stakeholders, parties that had a major interest in the decision making process, were excluded in all three cases.

The existing decision making process in both developing countries and donor agencies is dysfunctional. It excludes key stakeholders and fails to account for the four major elements of policy making in developing countries. An alternative approach to decision making is proposed, a negotiated partnership for sustainable development. By applying the theory of negotiation and conflict resolution a more open decision making process can be created that accounts for the interests of the stakeholders and integrates the four major elements of the public policy process. A negotiation model is proposed to help promote an open decision making process. It includes preconditions, specific procedural steps and advice on how to implement them.

Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Professor of Urban and
Environmental Planning

PREFACE

Despite the recent surge of interest in the environmental problems in developing countries, there has been little success in finding effective ways to resolve them. The purpose of my research has been to find out why these problems seem so intractable. There is really no precedent for the complexity they contain. The fields of development planning, economic development, political science, community participation, anthropology and environmental planning all offer valuable insights into the knotty nature of environmental problems, but solutions are harder to come by.

One thing that is becoming increasing clear is that environmental problems cannot be separated from the intricacies of national culture and politics. Any solution to the environmental crisis, one that promotes lasting change in the public policy processes of affected countries and the many agencies that are hooked into international development, has to account for the crucial roles of culture and politics.

If the public policy process is to respond to the environmental crisis in a meaningful way, which will require substantial reforms, a approach has to be found to account for the complex nature of the problem. One way to accomplish this is to apply the theory and practice of the

emerging field of negotiation and conflict resolution. A basic premise of conflict resolution is that all of the parties affected by an action should have a voice in an open dialogue to express their interests. Then, out of this sharing of interests emerges a collaborative effort to solve what is perceived as a common problem. The parties find that they have more in common than they imagined. Adversarial behavior diminishes, people talk openly, common ground is forged to create an elegant solution that everyone is satisfied with. If all goes well, the parties may find themselves better off than before. This model of decision making does work, as experience has shown in the United States and Europe, but it remains largely untested in developing countries.

I believe that a collaborative negotiation process can be successfully used to address environmental problems in the developing world. But the differences in political systems and national cultures between developed and developing countries require the United States-based model of negotiation to be modified to accommodate them. Despite the difficulties involved, I believe that a negotiated partnership holds the greatest promise for effectively addressing the complexities facing the global commons.

My goal in writing this dissertation is to examine the reasons why efforts to protect natural resources are failing, and how they can be improved. Advice is offered to

policy analysts to enable them to more accurately account for the constraints and opportunities in donor agencies and developing countries when attempting to protect limited natural resources. To accomplish this, I have tried to tell this story from the perspective of people who are involved in international development, in developing countries, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations.

The case study format that I use to tell this story has required me to interpret key events that have occurred in different countries and organizations. Obviously, the cases are told from my vantage point. Experts from the Caribbean and donor agencies have reviewed the cases, and several suggested changes have been made to ensure accuracy. However, any errors that remain are my own.

Acknowledgements

There are several people to whom I am grateful for offering the support, guidance and inspiration that helped me endure while completing this work. My greatest debt is to the people of the Caribbean. During my travels in the region there were many obstacles, real and imagined, but when they seemed the greatest, someone was always there to tell me that my work was important to his or her country, that an outside, unbiased voice like mine would help them protect their islands, and that I shouldn't give up. I am glad I listened to their advice, and I only hope this work

makes a small contribution to help the islands survive.

My adviser at MIT, Larry Susskind, has given me the intellectual guidance, with great patience, to teach me how to ask the right question. This is much easier said than done, and I am grateful to him for his enduring support and always creative insight. H. Jeffrey Leonard has inspired me by the quality of his work, and through his leadership in international conservation. Lloyd Rodwin has given me the great benefit of his long experience, reminding me that there are many competing values to contend with when promoting my environmental ideals, and his advice is gratefully acknowledged. Lynton Caldwell encouraged me to return to school after several years in the world of consulting, explaining that he and his colleagues had laid the ground work for future opportunities in international environmental policy. His support was timely, and I am indebted to Professor Caldwell for his encouragement and thankful for the opportunities that his life long dedication, and that of many others like him, has created for me and my colleagues.

Funding has been provided by the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, the Organization of American States, the Richard D. Irwin Foundation and the Eastern Caribbean Natural Areas Management Program, and I thank them all. Several people in the Caribbean have helped me understand the people and politics of the Caribbean; to Ed Towle of the

Island Resources Foundation, Yves Renard of the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute, David Staples of Hood Sails, Victor and Sheila Williams of St. Kitts and Mervin Williams of St. Lucia, thank you for your insights that have provoked my thinking and refined my work. My appreciation is extended to Dr. Euna Moore of the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies at the University of the West Indies; her support gave me creditability in the region that opened many doors.

I want to thank my colleagues at MIT, especially Scott McCreary and Eileen Babbitt, whose advice has saved me many headaches. I am deeply indebted to both Scott and Eileen for their unyielding belief in my work, and our joint pursuit of the Ph.D. Eric Dolin and Bruce Stedman helped me focus on the major themes in the dissertation, and to them I am grateful. The staff at MIT has also been very supportive, especially Rolf Engler, Maria Hortaridis and Sandy Wellford.

My family and friends have been incredibly supportive, and have always been there when I have needed them. My parents, Allan and Mary Gamman, have supported my endeavors unceasingly; they have kept me going when my task seemed truly overwhelming. My mentor and dear friend Richard Cooley has served as my role model, and in the midst of hardship, has reminded me in his gentle way why I am doing this work. Ray Evans, whom I served as a teaching assistant

in Ornithology at Feather River College, showed me the intricate beauty of the natural world, strengthening my environmental ethic.

I am appreciative of Bob Brauchli's support which enabled me to initiate a relationship with the White Mountain Apache Tribe, which has showed me the importance of respecting cultural traditions when trying to understand the subtleties of man's relationship with the environment. To John Jostes, Teresa and Pat Gamman, David Boghossian, Elizabeth Bartle, Bryan Harvey, Lynn Griesemer, Hugh O'Doherty, Ida Koppen, Leila Zaloui, Ed and Ann Gilbride, Ori Seron, Kelley Quinn, Martha Danly, David Hersten, Ron Hunter, Randy Rutsch, Lynn Hottman, Sara Gaar, Bob and Carol Allen, and the gang back in Santa Cruz, Declan and Donna Gallagher, Kevin Gallagher, Louis and Joanna Runeare, Barbara Wright, Jay Leite and many more, thank you for your friendship and love. Your constant encouragement has allowed me to fulfill a part of my dream.

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CHAPTER ONE

Statement of the Problem and Introduction to the Cases

This dissertation tells a story about the failure of laws and policies that are supposed to protect the natural environment in developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s the rapid destruction of tropical ecosystems caused a major controversy that is still raging. In the Caribbean, which has been the focus of my research, fisheries are being depleted, fresh water supplies polluted, reefs destroyed, forests illegally cut and entire large stretches of coast eroded. Large development projects displace local villages and fail to create the economic opportunities their supporters promise. Experts question if the current rate of development can be sustained in the long run, given the environmental problems that are surfacing.

In response to the environmental crisis that exists in many parts of the developing world, environmental groups in the United States have pressured Congress to force international development assistance agencies, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Inter-American Development Bank, to reform their

lending practices to protect the environment. New laws have been adopted, policies written, regulations introduced, and consultants sent abroad to implement them, but this approach has not worked. As a result, limited natural resources that are under severe pressure to feed fast growing populations, pay off foreign debt and improve the standard of living continue to be mismanaged. If this trend continues, there may not be enough natural resources left to provide economic and political stability in the future.

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the reasons why national and international policies created to stem the tide of environmental destruction in developing countries often fail. I will present four basic propositions, which I believe to be true, that show why this is happening. The first three propositions relate to conditions in developing countries that prevent environmental policies from being implemented.

First, national political leaders often exert near total control over a closed public policy process. Development decisions are made in private. Stakeholders that have a interest in preserving natural resources, and who provide vital services for the society, such as farmers, fishermen, herders, foresters and charcoal producers, are excluded from development decisions. National planning agencies and civil servants are controlled by powerful ministers who believe that environmental planning causes

unnecessary delays in the development process. Civil servants who believe that their government has an obligation to reject projects that damage the environment may loose their jobs, and occasionally face even greater risks. A St. Lucian familiar with one development controversy in that country said: "Civil servants, when faced with pressure from the political leadership, may bleed inside if they disagree with a development project, but can't speak due to politics, it is too dangerous to their families." Governments respond to the political aspirations of leaders who favor short term solutions to economic problems and wish to remain in power.

Second, many developing countries possess unique cultural characteristics that outsiders, such as donor agencies, do not understand. When outside parties attempt to intervene in the political process, which happens when donor agencies introduce new environmental policies as a condition of approval for development projects, they fail to understand the strong influence that culture has on the public policy process. In countries which have a low level of political and economic development, the affects of culture are especially pronounced.

The pace of life in countries with tropical climates is slower than it is in continental societies. It takes a long time for new public policies to be accepted, as politicans wish to slowly gauge their effect on the society. People often develop indigenous methods of dealing with

political problems, and guard against interference by outside parties, a distrust born from a long history of political and economic dependence on more powerful countries.

Political decisions are made based largely on personal relationships, man-to-man communication, ties within political parties and patronage appointments. An one man who has worked in St. Kitts for several years said: "Outsiders don't understand the tremendous intensity of politics, everything is political. A large part of the culture is political, intense personal communication is part of culture, and most conversations are political." I call the close relationship between politics and culture the "culture of decision making." If outsiders do not understand this phenomenon, they will not be able to effectively work within the political systems of developing countries.

Third, decisions to develop limited natural resources are based primarily on economic factors. National policies that strongly favor development have been created to respond to persistent high unemployment, balance of payment deficits and the need for hard currently to buy imported food, oil and other necessities. But, the way that governments have responded to these economic problems conflicts with their own environmental policies, effectively cancelling them out.

For example, in St. Lucia, and several other countries,

the Cabinet offers financial incentives to outside investors, such as repatriation of profits, a waiver of duty on construction materials and subsidies for infrastructure. These incentives are usually given before civil servants have a chance to evalute the effect of a project on national environmental policies. The incentives constitute an informal political approval, overriding any environmental policies that exist, preventing them from being implemented. As an official in St. Lucia said: "Cabinet approval of concessions does suggest what government wants, and whose wrath will be incurred if a project is denied."

A second way that economic conditions prevent environmental policies from being effective is the lack of financial incentives to protect natural resources. In most instances, countries have not developed a strategy to implement environmental laws and policies, and part of this void is a lack of economic incentives to promote conservation. Donor agencies that possess the financial resources to establish such linkages also are failing with their environmental policies.

Donor agencies have made some progress in making reforms in their lending programs to protect the environment. But this progress has been piecemeal and generally ineffective. This is because there are countervailing forces at work within donor agencies. Environmental technicians, of which the donors have very

few, try to enforce policies intended to lessen the damage that projects cause, while top agency officials, who are often political appointees, seek to complete projects and maintain the flow of development assistance without delay. The top officials generally prevail, with the result that environmental concerns are not integrated into project design and implementation.

The donor agencies have other systemic problems as well. Most donors place a strong emphasis on environmental analysis at the front end of a project, but do not give enough attention to how to protect natural resources when it is being built. Since environmental protection depends on the effective implementation of specific measures to protect natural resources, this means that environmental policies are undercut and resources damaged. In addition, several donors delegate the responsibility for implementing environmental policies to countries where projects are located, where governments almost always lack the resources and political will to carry them out. National political leaders depend on the prestige that large donor-funded project bring, and exert tremendous pressure to get them approved and built, even though " Projects may be a white elephant, they but are big and look good," as a senior civil servant said in Barbados. By defining development within the constraints of the single project cycle, the donors have created a system that is biased against the long term

solutions that are needed to resolve complex environmental problems.

The Need to Create an Open Public Policy Process

As I have described, there are several constraints that cause environmental policies to fail. Efforts to protect limited natural resources sometimes take one or two of these constraints into account. More often, they fail to account for any of them. My dissertation explores the way national politics, the culture of decision making, economic necessity and the behavior of donor agencies affect the implementation of natural resource management policies. I suggest a series of strategies I believe will take account of these four forces and will allow natural resource management policies to be effectively implemented.

I do not believe that developing countries can design, adopt and implement environmental policies on their own. They lack the requisite political will, and are resistance to the institutional reforms that are needed. The closed decision making system in these countries needs to be opened. To do this, countries need more support and guidance from donor agencies and environmental NGOs. Donor agencies have a major stake in the development process. They possess substantial financial and human resources that developing countries need to support environmental reform. These resources give donors the leverage to promote reforms

in borrowing countries.

In addition to donor agencies, there are two other stakeholders that need to be brought into the decision making process. Environmental NGOs and natural resource users both have an important role to play. NGOs need to keep pressuring donor agencies to allocate more resources to the reform movement, and most importantly, to take more of a leadership role by creating a new framework within the development process to overcome the obstacles to environmental policies that exist in their own agencies.

Natural resource users provide vital services for their societies. Fisherman, farmers and herders provide food and jobs, helping countries to conserve much needed foreign exchange for other purposes. Charcoal producers provide fuel for cooking and heating. These are only a few of the different resource users who have special knowledge about the natural environment. This native knowledge can be tapped to help develop strategies for managing limited natural resources that is necessary to sustain economic growth, but this is rarely done.

To implement environmental policies, a new paradigm needs to be created. Rather than trying to awkwardly squeeze environmental reforms into existing development procedures, donor agencies should sponsor a new collaborative negotiation process to overcome the obstacles to environmental protection and account for the interests of

parties that have a stake in natural resources. I propose that donor agencies work cooperatively with political leaders, resource users and environmental NGOs in developing countries, as well as international environmental NGOs based in the United States, to negotiate how specific strategies can be created to protect natural resources that are now damaged by development projects.

To accomplish this, I describe a series of steps that treat this open decision making process as a negotiation process. Each of the four major stakeholders can help make a negotiation process work. National political leaders can allow civil servants to objectively evaluate development proposals to determine how fragile natural resources can be protected, rather then making decisions in private without the benefit of objective criteria or professional expertise. Political leaders can also let resource users and NGOs have a voice in the public policy process.

Donor agencies can work to implement their own environmental policies by accounting for the behavior of their professional employees, often political appointees, who prefer to maintain the flow of project funds rather than yielding to recommendations made by their own environmental technicians. Environmental NGOs in the countries can create downward linkages with resource users to establish a local base of support, showing them how economic and environmental concerns can be linked to increase pressure on politicians

to preserve the natural resources they depend on. NGOs can also educate donors and international NGOs of the need to understand the local culture of decision making, the interplay between culture and the political system, when they try to implement policies to protect the environment. International environmental NGOs can contribute their expertise in natural resource management, project administration, education and fund raising, and develop closer ties with local NGOs who are familiar with local political systems, cultural and economic conditions.

Next, I discuss the pre-conditions for a successful open decision making process and characterize the tasks that need to be done at each step and ways of doing them. Finally, I analyze the idea of negotiation from the perspective of the stakeholder groups, and talk about why and how they might be motivated to move in this direction.

The Case Study Approach

To gather evidence to support my major ideas, I have used cross-national comparative case research, based on information gathered in three Caribbean countries and international organizations headquartered in Washington, D.C. Several sources of information were used to create the chain of evidence in the cases, including open ended interviews, public and private reports, newspaper archives, and my own experiences living and working in the region.

The evidence was then organized in three ways; an annotated chronology of key events, and summaries of the major themes and lessons that emerged from each case. After the evidence was collated, I refined my major working hypotheses that formed the framework for each chapter.

I encountered some difficulties during the field research, due to the politically sensitive nature of the cases, and my participation in policy dialogues that are generally not open to outsiders. All of the cases were extremely controversial, due to the large size of the projects, the political stakes involved, and in two instances, substantial opposition to them. But, I found that it was a major benefit to be in the countries when the controversies were unfolding. Insights into the public policy process were easier to obtain by examining them through the lenses provided by the cases. It gave meaning to my major themes, such as the role of culture in policy implementation, that would have been very difficult to quantify in any other way.

To maintain my objectivity, interviews were conducted with people from a variety of backgrounds who represented a wide range of opinions about the relationship of economic development and environmental management. I presented myself as an outside participant-observer, gathering factual data to describe why environmental policies were failing in the three countries. My affiliation as a research associate

with the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies at the University of the West Indies, Barbados, gave me the credibility that was required to gain access to the people I interviewed. In most instances this affiliation, combined with my role as an outside observer, was advantageous. It created the legitimacy that was needed for people to share confidential information about how their political systems work.

To gather the information needed to construct the cases, I interviewed a total of sixty eight people in four countries; Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and the United States. Among those interviewed were senior civil servants, appointed and elected politicians, representatives of NGOs, as well as representatives of the three donor agencies involved in the cases, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States. With follow-up interviews to check facts and keep track of events in the cases as they unfolded, I made more than 100 separate contacts with the sixty eight parties.

Primary sources in each country received drafts of each chapter, and were asked to check my chronology of key events for accuracy, and to review my basic propositions, such as the relationship of culture to the public policy process. The resulting comments helped me refine the cases.

All interviews were kept confidential, and were

recorded by taking notes by hand; I did not use a tape recorder, as I felt it would inhibit the subjects. A few people I interviewed were not comfortable with my role as a participant-observer, but this only happened with a few senior civil servants. Ironically, these people invariably referred me to other people, such as recently retired senior civil servants, who proved to be among my most valuable sources of information.[1]

Why the Caribbean?

I selected the Eastern Caribbean as the focus of this study for several reasons. The environmental problems in the three countries I have chosen, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados, are well documented. The study sites are easily accessible, so carrying out a research program does not present any major obstacles.

These tropical islands all maintain a delicate ecological balance, so the affects of over-development are easily seen. In spite of damage to the environment due to the stress of centuries-old intensive plantation agriculture, many natural resources that are needed to sustain human settlements survive in relative abundance, including fisheries, rich soil, forests and fresh water. As in other developing countries, these resources are under

[1] Please refer to Appendix A for additional explanation of the sources of information for the cases, and the research design and methods that were used.

severe pressure to feed a fast growing population, to pay off foreign debt, and to improve the local standard of living.

All three of the countries I have selected to study are democratic with small public institutions and policy making processes that are easy to understand. The existence of clear environmental problems, simple public policy processes and the dilemma posed by the demands of economic growth on limited natural resources make these countries an ideal subject. Despite some differences, the islands are representative of other nations with similar environmental problems, enabling this research to be applied to other developing nations.

Most importantly, if national and international agencies are serious about stopping environmental degradation in the developing world, the small size and accessibility of these islands present the best opportunity to do so. If effective solutions cannot be found to the environmental problems in the Eastern Caribbean, there is little hope they can be successfully addressed in other, more complex societies within the developing world.

Attempts have been made in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados to implement new environmental policies to protect natural resources. Unfortunately these efforts have generally failed, resulting in the degradation of island ecosystems. To understand the extent of this problem, the

environmental laws and policies of these countries need to be examined.

International foreign assistance agencies have also played a key role in environmental policy making in all three countries. Even though these agencies claim to have an interest in promoting environmental values, in many instances the projects they sponsor fail to do so. To understand why this is true, the environmental laws and policies of international agencies also need to be examined.

The Case Studies

St. Kitts

National environmental legislation in St. Kitts includes laws to control the use of land, forests, water, beaches, wildlife and public areas. In most instances, no regulations have be created to implement legislation, and if regulations do exist, they are not enforced.

The Town and Country Planning Ordinance was passed in 1949 but has no regulations to implement it. The Land Development (Control) Ordinance, passed in 1966, requires that development plans be approved by the Minister of Development, but there are no regulations to accompany it.[2]

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[2] Information about the history and status of older laws relating to different aspects of natural resource management is contained in the Description of National Legislation Related to Natural Resource Management, Report 1SKN, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource Management Project, November, 1986.

As a result, there are no controls over new developments being built on steep hillsides, on fragile soils or in areas with flooding problems from intense seasonal rainfall.

A Forestry Ordinance was adopted in 1904 with the Chief Agricultural Officer in charge of regulations intended to control clearing, burning and charcoal production. This legislation does not include provisions to establish and manage forest reserves. Field surveys in 1989 showed that this law remains largely unenforced. The result is clearing and burning of forest areas that contribute to erosion and siltation of downstream water catchment areas.

The Pesticides Act of 1973 does not have any regulations to implement it, and pesticide misuse and contamination of neighboring lands are growing problems. The Pesticides Board accompanying the Act has apparently stopped functioning.[3] Sand mining on beaches is supposed to be regulated by the Beach Control Ordinance. To stop illegal sand mining, which provides beach sand at low cost to make the foundations for new buildings, a quarry was opened up near the Canada Estate in the mid 1980s to protect the nearby beach. However, mining of the beach has continued, degrading the adjacent mangrove habitat in Greatheeds Pond and destabilizing the coastal sand dune system.

Fish that are caught and marketed by local fishermen

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[3] Ibid.

are a major source of protein for the people of St. Kitts. The Fisheries Act of 1984 allows for the regulation of shellfish such as lobster and conch that are heavily fished and exported to earn foreign exchange. However, both fisheries remain largely unregulated, resulting in a severe decline of the local fishery (SK 13). The Watercourses and Waterworks Act adopted in 1973 established a Water Board to manage fresh water resources. Its responsibility includes pollution abatement. A field survey of the many drainage channels on the island, including a river that drains into the main beach in the capital of Basseterre, shows that water pollution is evident in virtually every settled area.

The existence of these environmental problems was confirmed during a workshop with civil servants responsible for resource management in St. Kitts in 1987. During the workshop, problems documented included the improper dumping of industrial waste in the main harbor in Basseterre, unregulated dumping of garbage in watercourses, uncontrolled construction in coastal areas, destruction of coral reefs, coastal erosion, the failure of beach protection projects, and the removal of mangroves due to sand mining.[4]

In 1985 the Parliament passed legislation establishing an Environmental Department with a wide range of duties,

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[4] The proceedings of the workshop are summarized in the Report on the St. Kitts-Nevis Coastal Resource Management Project, John K. Gamman, prepared for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource Management Project, August 1987.

including taking over all functions related to environmental management from the Physical Planning Section of the Central Planning Unit.[5] The department has not been funded and has no staff. The responsibility for environmental concerns is scattered among various ministries, so that no one office is accountable for them.

After the 1989 national election the Cabinet eliminated the ministerial portfolio for the environment, which had been held by the Premier of Nevis, the sister island of St. Kitts. This action reflected the low priority given to environmental protection by the national political leadership. The failure of the St. Kitts government to enforce its own environmental legislation was an indication of what would happen when the government decided to intensively develop the island's southeast peninsula.

USAID and the Southeast Peninsula Development Project

In early 1984 representatives of the St. Kitts government asked the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide financial and technical

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[5] Fernaldo Soler, 1988. Development Control and Physical Planning: The Case of St. Kitts and Nevis. Prepared for the Organization of American States Department of Regional Development and the OECS Natural Resource Management Project. This report summarizes the administrative structure of the physical planning process in St. Kitts and problems that it has encountered due to the lack of a clear mandate from the political leadership. It also predicts how these problems will be increased with the added responsibility of the Southeast Peninsula Development Project.

assistance to develop the island's southeast peninsula as a major tourist destination. Since the Agency first became involved with the southeast peninsula project in St. Kitts, one of its stated goals has been to carry out the mandate of the U.S. Congress to preserve the island's natural resources. But the efforts of USAID to protect the environment of the peninsula have not been successful.

The 4000 acre peninsula is considered to be one of the best examples of a native wildlife area in the Eastern Caribbean. Its abundant natural resources include coral reefs, salt ponds, sea grass beds, mangroves, and wetlands. The fragility of these resources makes them particularly vulnerable. They could easily be destroyed given the lack of a strong national policy to protect them.

Officials within USAID's Regional Development Office in the Caribbean (RDO/C) expressed their concern about the peninsula's natural environment as early as mid 1985: "RDO/C considers the adoption of a land use and environmental policy as essential to guiding the development of the peninsula along an appropriate path".[6]

As required by its Congressional mandate, USAID is required to assess the potential adverse environmental

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[6] St. Kitts - Nevis Country Supplement to the Caribbean Regional CDSS, 1986-90; Regional Development Office/Caribbean (RDO/C), June, 1985. The CDSS outlined USAID's strategy for developing the project. It was intended as a way to diversify the economy by expanding it into non-sugar agriculture, tourism and light manufacturing.

effects of its projects by preparing Environmental Impact Assessments to mitigate damage to natural resources. The stated purpose of this procedure is to "...permit consideration of alternatives and mitigating features in project design".[7]

In early 1986 an independent consultant completed the Environmental Assessment. It identified several possible environmental impacts of the project, including coastal erosion, damage to reefs, wetlands and mangroves, degradation of the marine ecosystem, destruction of wildlife habitat, and disposal of dredge materials. The report contained several recommendations intended to mitigate this environmental damage, including the establishment of special conservation zones, formation of a new Environmental Unit within the government to improve its capability to address environmental problems, and preparation of building guidelines and a Land Use Management Plan.[8]

In July, 1986, the Land Use Management Plan was published. It also contained several recommendations to protect the natural resources on the peninsula. Key recommendations included: 1. Adopt legislation establishing

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[7] USAID, 1988. AID Policy Paper: Environment and Natural Resources. The Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID, Washington, D.C. The U.S. Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act in 1981 to require that USAID prepare environmental impact assessments.

[8] Island Resources Foundation, 1986. Environmental Assessment Report on the Proposed Southeast Peninsula Assess Road, St. Kitts, West Indies.

an advisory board to oversee planning and environmental aspects of the project. 2. Adopt laws for beach control, marine pollution, fisheries management, and parks and protected areas. 3. Establish an Environmental Unit within the Planning Unit. Most importantly, the report stated: "Prior to commencement of Southeast Peninsula construction projects, Government needs to provide the necessary legal and administrative framework within which an orderly but creative process of development can take place without causing environmental damage".[9]

In September, 1986 the Project Grant and Loan Agreement financing the project was signed by St. Kitts and USAID. In November, Parliament approved the Southeast Peninsula Development and Conservation Act establishing a five member advisory board. The board is appointed by the Minister of Development, and is responsible to reviewing development proposals and conservation guidelines for the peninsula. In response to pressure from USAID, Parliament then passed the National Conservation and Environment Protection Act in April, 1987 (SK 12). Major elements of the Act included a comprehensive law to replace outdated environmental statues that were outdated and unclear, and establishment of a national Conservation Commission to implement the law.

Over the next two years, consultants prepared several reports documenting the natural resources on the peninsula,

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[9] Ibid, page 5 of the Executive Summary.

and recommending how the government should preserve them. The road penetrating the peninsula, the largest part of the project, was completed in early 1990. But at the time the road was completed, the government had still not taken several measures to increase its institutional capacity for environmental planning.

By mid 1990 the advisory board was functioning, reviewing development proposals that included 140 and 400 acre residential projects, and a 250 room hotel. Yet, the Conservation Commission still was not appointed, despite repeated assurances from the Attorney General that its appointment was imminent (SK 12, 17, 21; Soler, 1988). The Chairman designee of the Commission resigned, after saying that the government was not interested in incorporating conservation into the peninsula developments (SK 8). The National Conservation and Environment Protection Act was not implemented, the Environmental Unit still did not exist, and laws for beach control, marine pollution, fisheries, parks and protected areas remained unenforced. The outlook for the natural resources on the peninsula, despite a long and involved program to increase the environmental accountability of the government, was not good.

St. Lucia

In St. Lucia, legislation exists that is intended to regulate several aspects of natural resource management, but

it is only partially enforced. This has resulted in environmentally destructive land use practices and pollution problems that degrade the island ecosystem. The Forest, Soil, and Water Conservation Ordinance, originally adopted in 1946 and amended in 1983, is intended to regulate forestry activities, promote conservation and establish forest reserves.[10] The law is accompanied by enforcement powers including fines and criminal prosecution. However, it is estimated that only 10.8% of the forested areas on the island are protected. This has led to deforestation on steep slopes cleared for agricultural production, causing erosion and sedimentation problems.[11] A field survey in 1989 showed that forest lands are being cleared for agriculture, grazing and charcoal production in many parts of the island.

The Water and Sewage Authority Act established an enforcement mechanism to regulate water pollution, but raw sewage is discharged directly into the main harbor in Castries posing a health hazard. Similarly, the Pesticide Control Act adopted in 1975 established a board empowered

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[10] For a description of all of the environmental legislation in St. Lucia, refer to the Description of National Legislation Related to Natural Resources Management for St. Lucia, Report 1 SLU, prepared for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resources Management Project, November, 1986.

[11] Taken from Short Run Gain - Long Term Pain, a Report of an Environmental Retreat held for Community Leaders at the Pastoral Center, Marisule, October 14-15, 1987. This report discusses several types of environmental problems in St. Lucia and recommends ways to help resolve them.

with enforcement capabilities, but no regulations have been enacted to control pesticide use.[12] This lack of enforcement has allowed water supplies to be contaminated by toxic chemicals used for agricultural production.

In addition to these regulatory problems, the political leaders of St. Lucia have forestalled several efforts by civil servants to create a comprehensive national policy for the environment. In 1982 a National Environmental Commission was proposed by the Chief Forestry Officer. The purpose of the Commission was to establish a government agency to eliminate overlaps and gaps in the jurisdiction of natural resources, and to form a national consensus on the environment. All of the major interest groups from both the public and private sectors were to be represented on the Commission. However, the Prime Minister felt that the Commission would delay development projects so it was never given its official Terms of Reference by the government (SL 6). As a result, there is no organization within the government to coordinate the resolution of environmental problems. The failure of the national planning authority to perform long term planning, due to a refusal by Cabinet to authorize the required legislation, has contributed to this

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[12] Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resources Management Program, 1986.

problem.[13]

The Pitons Controversy: A National Park or a Resort?

The Pitons controversy involves two competing proposals to develop the same site in the Piton mountains. One project is sponsored by private international investors proposing to develop a large tourist resort on the Jalousie Estate, a 316 acre parcel in the saddle between the Gros and Petit Pitons, two forested peaks on the Caribbean Sea that are the national symbols of St. Lucia. The second project is the establishment of a Pitons National Park, proposed by the Organization of American States.

The two proposals are in conflict as the Jalousie Estate would house the park headquarters under the OAS proposal, but would be developed as the tourist resort under the proposal by the private investors. Both projects have involved attempts to implement environmental policies to protect natural resources.

The proposal to privately develop the Jalousie Estate started in 1981 when the Cabinet issued an Alien Landholding License to Sir Colin Tennant. This decision also started the Pitons controversy, as when the Cabinet issued the license, it reversed its own earlier decision to acquire the

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[13] Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and Physical Planning: The Case of St. Lucia. Prepared for the OAS and OECS Natural Resource Management Project. This report outlines the administrative framework of the national planning process and makes several recommendations about how to improve it.

site as part of a Pitons National Park. Tennant never did build a resort on the site, and in 1988 sold it to the Swiss-based M-Group Resorts, who then received a new license from the Cabinet. The Development Control Authority gave the new developer an Approval in Concept for a tourist resort on the Estate shortly after they purchased it.

After it gave conceptual approval for the resort, the DCA required that the developer provide an Environmental Impact Assessment to ostensibly protect the natural resources of the Estate. However, the scope of the Assessment was limited to site planning concerns, and did not include an evaluation of whether or not the Jalousie Estate was an appropriate site for the resort. The Assessment was written by a consultant hired by the developer. It was rejected by the DCA as being biased in support of the project. A second Assessment was then prepared by a new consultant hired with the assistance of the United Nations Development Program (SL 5). This assessment was accepted by the DCA as adequately addressing a limited range of site planning concerns.

When the Cabinet issued the second Alien Landholding License in 1988 to the Swiss-based M-Group Resorts, it also granted financial concessions (repatriation of profits, duty free import of construction materials, etc.) and a promise that the government would use public funds to build the major access road needed to serve the project. These

decisions by the Cabinet placed immense pressure on planning officials to approve the project, even though the environmental assessment process was not finished. In the words of an official familiar with the project; "The development permit itself is not before the Cabinet, but Cabinet makes its wishes well known with its tacit support, so the choice to not develop the site is no longer feasible for DCA technicians" (SL 5).

When the government granted the Approval in Concept for the resort, plans for the project were not available to the public. The approval was granted without a public hearing, preventing environmental groups or concerned citizens from voicing their concerns. Before the Development Control Authority finished reviewing the second environmental assessment, and before it had issued any permits allowing the site to be developed, the developer posted "No Trespassing" signs on the beach and main road, pre-empting the long standing public use of the site for fishing, boating, and picnicking. The developer then brought a bulldozer to the beach, proceeded to grade it, and started construction of a jetty as part of a marina to serve resort guests. Meanwhile, the government started to build the access road it had promised the developor, also without the required permits.

At about same time, in early 1989, the Department of Regional Development of the Organization of American States

was submitting a formal proposal to the government for the Pitons National Park. The proposal stated: "The proposed development of a large private hotel on the Jalousie Estate is incompatible with the overall concept of the Pitons National Park and could also hamper the conservation or preservation of the unique cultural and natural attractions of the area."[14]

A group of businessmen from the nearby town of Soufriere who had formed the Soufriere Development Committee (SDC) had asked the OAS to prepare the proposal. The main objective of the national park was to provide economic opportunities for this remote part of the island that were compatible with the natural environment. The vision of park planners was to create growth strategy that was environmentally sustainable.

When the park proposal was given to the government, it was not released to the public. The government did not adopt the proposal. In mid 1990 the Organization of American States closed its St. Lucia office. It had not met it objectives to create a national park that would protect the natural resources of the Jalousie Estate and surrounding lands. In mid 1990, the government gave the developer permission to build the resort. Neither the government or

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[14] Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for the Development of the Pitons National Park. Department of Regional Development, Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs, General Secretariat, OAS.

OAS had met their objectives to protect the fragile natural resources of the Pitons. A second large tourist project, the La Gros Piton Resort Village and Aerial Tramway was proposed in mid 1990, carrying 250,000 tourists a year to an eleven acre resort built on the top of the Gros Piton.[15] It appeared inevitable that the environment of the Pitons would be drastically changed, with the government pursuing an agressive strategy to intensively develop the area.

Barbados

Like St. Kitts and St. Lucia, Barbados has many laws intended to protect the environment, but they are generally not enforced and have resulted in serious damage to natural resources. The Beaches Protection Act of 1890 prohibits removal of sand from the foreshore, while the Fisheries Regulation of 1904 is supposed to regulate the harvesting of sea turtles and sea eggs.[16] Yet, the beaches of the south coast were heavily mined to supply construction materials during the building boom of the 1970s, and remain unstable, while sea eggs and sea turtles are becoming scarce due to over-exploitation and habitat destruction (B 16).

Legislation exists to establish marine reserves, but

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[15] Earl Bousquet, Changing the Face of the Pitons. In the St. Lucia Star, March 31, 1990.

[16] See A Review of Coastal-Related Legislation in Barbados, Kenneth Atherley, Coastal Conservation Project Unit, March, 1987. Sea eggs are taken from sea urchins and are a delicacy in the West Indies.

coral reefs are harvested to sell souvenirs to tourists, damaged by boat anchors, and degraded by raw sewage and agricultural runoff.[17] The Tree Preservation Act was passed in 1981 but lacks an enforcement mechanism, so trees continue to be illegally harvested, causing deforestation, erosion and sedimentation that damages water catchment areas.

The Coastal Conservation Project Unit has recommended that a comprehensive Coastal Zone Management Act be passed but the government has taken no action. Government officials have publicly stated that competing uses are depleting limited natural resources, such as reefs and beaches.[18] If poor enforcement, badly written legislation and a lack of awareness by the public have not contributed enough to Barbados' environmental problems, the political leadership sent a strong message that there will be no improvements in the near future when it replaced the Ministry of Tourism and the Environment with the Ministry of Sport and Tourism in 1987. This action dropped the

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[17] Wayne Hunte, Ph.D., 1989. Short-Term Perspectives and Marine Resources in the Caribbean. The 25th Anniversary Lecture Series of the University of the West Indies. Dr. Hunte is Director of the Bellairs Research Institute in Barbados. This paper summarizes several environmental problems related to the coastal zone and marine environment that exist in Barbados and throughout the region.

[18] Leonard Nurse, Ph.D., 1988. The Barbados Coast: A Planning and Management Evaluation. A paper given at the OAS Workshop on Coastal Zone Management, Miami, Florida, December 12-16, 1988. Dr. Nurse is Project Manager of the Coastal Conservation Project Unit.

environment to a sub-Cabinet position in the government, reflecting a de-emphasis of the environment by the political leadership.

The Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor

In 1982 the government of Barbados asked the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to provide the financial and technical assistance needed to build a large fisheries harbor in the capitol of Bridgetown. The harbor is a large project, especially by island standards. It includes slips for 150 boats, a boat repair facility, an ice plant and fish processing facilities, a vending area, rum shop and fuel docks. To build the harbor required massive cutting and filling of coastal land, and construction of a large breakwater to guard against storm surges. The jetty and harbor are next to the Constitution River which houses several boats and drains a large part of urban Bridgetown.

Between 1982-84 the IDB undertook several steps to evaluate the feasibility of the project, including a Country Programming Paper, and orientation and analysis missions for its Washington, D.C. staff that resulted in a Project Report. A Loan Proposal was then prepared and submitted to the Bank's Board of Directors as the last step prior to executing a Project Agreement. The Barbados government and the bank signed the Project Agreement in late 1984.

While evaluating the feasibility of the harbor, the

bank did not examine its potential adverse impact on the natural environment. Possible environmental impacts included depletion of local and regional fish stocks, sedimentation of the harbor mouth and the adjacent river mouth, and degraded water quality in the harbor due to improper waste disposal from live-aboard fishermen.

One of the projects major objectives was to increase the production of the fishing industry. Technical experts from the Bank assumed that the population of flying fish, the mainstay of the Barbadian fishing industry, was sufficient to sustain the increased fishing pressure the harbor would create (B 34, 43, 17, 42) [19], but this judgement was made without any scientific evidence about the status of the fishery. In addition, when the government decided to redesign the harbor and extent the large breakwater in 1986, the Bank had the opportunity to assess the effects of the project on coastal resources, but decided to proceed without doing so (B 17, 31).

Several reasons have been given by Bank officials to explain why the environmental impact of the fisheries harbor was not integrated into the evaluation, design or

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[19] In 1982 the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization issued the Report of the Barbados Fisheries Development Project, sponsored by the FAO Investment Center. The report included a "quick and dirty" estimate of the sustained yield of the Barbados fishery. It estimated than an annual yield of 20,000 tons can be sustained. This is more than three times the peak fish catch which occurred in 1983. There was no scientific evidence to support the estimate (B 24).

construction of the harbor. One official said that the project simply "Pre-dated the environmental period of the Bank" (B 34). Other officials explained that the Bank focuses on analyzing projects, not implementing environmental safeguards, as bank staff in the regional offices are not trained in environmental management (B 35, 42). Whatever the reason, a multi-million public investment was made without evaluating its negative impact on the environment, including the ability of the fishery to sustain it. Recently, in response to pressure from international environmental groups and the U.S. Congress, the Bank has initiated reforms to strengthen its capacity to integrate environmental concerns into its projects. However, its current proposal is to delegate the implementation of a new Environmental Impact Assessment process to borrowing countries which lack the political will and technical resources needed to make such a program work.

CHAPTER TWO

The Important Role of Interest Groups in the Development Process

I hypothesize that it is the relationship between interest groups within a country, and a policy making process that excludes key stakeholders, that causes decisions to be made that are environmentally destructive. The failure of environmental policies can be explained by examining how interest groups use their relationships with political leaders to exert control over the development process.

National political leaders want to maintain their power, and do this by supporting large development projects that are environmentally destructive but highly visible to voters. Bureaucrats want to enforce policies to protect fragile natural resources, but are dependent on politicians for their jobs. This prevents them from enforcing environmental policies. Political leaders and civil servants are two interest groups among many that influence the development process and how natural resources are managed.

The Importance of Interest Group Politics

Interest groups play an important role in the formation and implementation of public policies. They represent their constituents by forming a link between citizens and their government and different political factions within the political leadership. By studying how individual interest groups behave and relate to each other we can find out how they influence government and its policy-making process.[1]

The emphasis on the importance of interest groups in policy making reflects the theory that society does not consist of a monolithic organization such as the state, but in Catlin's words is "an aggregate of individuals organized into various groups, sometimes contrary, sometimes mutually inclusive, sometimes overlapping."[2] The importance of interest groups in developing countries, such as the island states of the Eastern Caribbean, often reflect the power of the individual who values political goods more than the

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[1]Jeffrey M. Barry, 1984. The Interest Group Society, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Barry discusses the roles and functions of interest groups, including the roots of a group theory of politics. This work was based on experience in the United States but contains a good overview of interest group theory.

[2]George E.G. Catlin, 1930. A Study of the Principles of Politics, London: George Allen and Unwin, as discussed in Interest Groups in American Society, L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, 1972, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. The author describes interest groups as a political concept within the context of democratic societies.

health of the natural environment.[3]

The behavior of interest groups offers insight into the reasons why there is often a gap between the purpose and result of national policies. While policy making is often seen as a formal and predictable process, unintended consequences often result. By examining the interplay between interest groups we can explore aspects of the policy-making process that may not be revealed by an analytic policy analysis.[4]

In the context of the Eastern Caribbean it is essential to examine how different interest groups, including the political leadership and agencies of the government interact, as policy implementation depends largely on the politics within the executing agency.[5] An analysis of the

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[3] See Catlin, Principles of Politics, pp. 371-375, for a discussion of how the desire for personal power often influences the behavior of individuals involved in the policy making process. Catlin describes the thirst for power as one where political goods are valued more than peace and order in society, a corollary to how the desire for power motivates politicians to make development decisions that damage the environment.

[4]Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, 1969. The Political Economy of Change, Berkeley: University of California Press. The field of political economy has been developed to examine aspects of the public policy process that are not clearly identified by standard analytic research methods.

[5]Jamal Kahn, 1982. Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris Publications.

informal linkages between interest groups portrays the evolution and direction of policy change.

Characteristics of Interest Groups in the Eastern Caribbean

Governments and public institutions in the Eastern Caribbean are small, and so are the number of interest groups, so that relatively few individuals exert great influence over the policy-making process. Interest groups themselves are usually small, with no more than a few members. Typically, a single official within a small agency, with close personal ties to a minister or senior civil servant, is the chief representative of an interest group.

The role of the individual within an interest groups is magnified due to an emphasis on personalism and charisma in the region. The effect of personalism and charisma are amplified, due to the emphasis on informal relationships, oral traditions and "man-to-man" politics that characterize decision making.[6]

The development of interest groups, and their relationship with governments, has not been static. As the economies and political systems of countries have matured,

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[6] Ibid. Khan describes the importance of personal ties between elites and politicians and the importance of this within the informal decision-making mechanisms that influence public policy implementation (pp. 43-44, 76).

the strategy and influence of key interest groups has changed. Bureaucratic elitism and interest group manipulation, dominated by land owners, sugar producers, and general importers, has been augmented by formalized political parties, trade unions, and influential outside groups such as international foreign assistance agencies and multilateral development banks (MDB).[7] With the increase in international development assistance in the region, the importance of outside interest groups, such as the MDBs, has grown.

Local interest groups influence political leaders and bureaucrats responsible for carrying out environmental policies. These groups include local land owners, the business community, industrial and trade associations, the tourist industry, and private investors. Some interest groups which have a stake in implementing environmental policies are not as influential. These groups include environmentalists, educators, community groups, and resource users such as fishermen and farmers who depend on the health of the environment for their livelihood.

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[7]Ibid., p. 43.

Interest Groups and Stakeholders

There are some important distinctions between interest groups and stakeholders. Interest groups are existing organizations with an expressed interest in the outcome of a public policy decision. Stakeholders also have, as the name implies, a stake in the outcome of a government decision or policy, but may not be organized into a group.[8] In many developing countries, stakeholders that have an interest in minimizing the adverse environmental effects of development decisions do not have a formal voice in the decision-making process. Stakeholders who have an interest in promoting effective environmental policies are generally newly organized and do not belong to existing interest groups.

By identifying and examining both interest groups and stakeholders, it becomes evident who is included and who is left out of key policy decisions that cause environmental destruction. The ability of different parties, whether they are organized into groups or not, to strengthen or weaken environmental policies is a result of their underlying

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[8] Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes, New York: Basic Books (pp. 11, 13, 25, 103-104, 239-240). The authors discuss how to identify stakeholders, the need to involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process, and how to include stakeholder attitudes and perceptions in negotiations and policy making.

interest, who represents them, and their strategy of influence. The issue of who has access to power and how they use it is also important.

Parties that have an interest in public policy decisions that impact the environment can be divided into two groups, those that are included in development decisions and those that have a stake but are left out. Parties that are typically included in development decisions include the political leadership, private investors and developers, local civil servants, labor unions, and selected members of the local business community.

Parties That are Included in Development Decisions

The Political Leadership

The national political leadership is headed by the Prime Minister, who is leader of the majority party and chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prime Minister also holds a major cabinet portfolio, usually doubling as Premier and Minister of Finance or Planning. The Prime Minister often exerts great personal influence in an informal manner through one-on-one conversations and public oratory, reinforced by charisma and the force of personality.

In recent years in the Eastern Caribbean, since many

countries have gained national independence, political parties have become better organized. The emergence of community-based political parties, reinforced by patronage appointments of party members to top government jobs, creates an intense loyalty to the political leadership. The concentration of power among a few political leaders is further accentuated by their tendency to make decisions personally, without bringing outsiders into the policy making process. Outsiders can be senior civil servants, technical experts from foreign assistance agencies, or members of the public. The Prime Minister sits atop a network of influence, persuasion, pressure, and obligation, fueled by relative isolation that perpetuates particularistic role play and factionalism based on political ideology, party affiliation, and social class.[9]

The Prime Minister, Cabinet, and top officials such as permanent secretaries have a primary interest in staying in power. They do this by promoting policies that increase

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[9] Khan, Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience, pp. 50, 51, 76. Khan also discusses the work of Simey, who cautions that management issues in the West Indies tend to become submerged in a welter of conflicting personalities (T.S. Simey, 1946. Welfare and Planning in the West Indies, Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Also see Monte Palmer, 1985. Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas, Itasca, IL: Peacock Publishers. Palmer describes the role of charismatic politicians in political development, including how such leaders operate outside the boundaries of traditional authority.

economic growth, reduce unemployment, and preserve foreign exchange. The agenda of economic growth is often highlighted by large, highly visible development projects which are approved just before or after national elections.

In most of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean, virtually all decisions that affect natural resources are made directly by political leaders with little or no input from the public. The Cabinet or a single minister usually initiates and must approve all large development projects. The wide range of decisions made by political leaders is a sign of the ubiquitousness of government as the major stakeholder in these societies.

Private Investors and Developers

When development projects are proposed and funded by private investors, they usually directly approach the political leadership to "test the waters," instead of first applying for a development permit using formal planning procedures. In this way an informal project approval may be obtained from a member of the Cabinet, usually a minister with the portfolio similar to the project (ie. a resort developer will approach the Minister of Tourism) prior to submitting the project to the national planning authority.

When a project is formally submitted to the planning agency for its review, developers benefit from pressure

exerted on civil servants by political leaders through party affiliation, patronage-dominated relations, subservient relations, and direct interference.[10] Private investors and political leaders have complementary objectives, to bring in foreign exchange that promotes investments and economic growth.

Civil Servants

Civil servants involved in development decisions that impact natural resources work in a central planning unit, physical planning office, or in some specialized area of natural resource management (fisheries, forestry, agriculture, or water quality). An office within the central planning unit, usually either Town and Country Planning or the physical planning section, is the lead agency for evaluating development projects. To understand how civil servants influence the outcome of development projects, it is necessary to review how the planning process typically works.

When a proposed project is reviewed for conformity with

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[10] Khan, Public Management. He discusses the dominant factors in the relationship between politicians and civil servants which were confirmed by my field work. In all of the countries studied, it was found that civil servants working in planning agencies feel pressured to promptly review and approve development proposals, often ignoring time-consuming environmental requirements (B 2, 22, 30; SL 5).

planning laws and policies, the chief planner is responsible for informally consulting with technical experts in other agencies (fisheries, forestry, agriculture, water engineering, public works, transportation, coastal management) to determine how a project will impact natural resources. The consultative process used for evaluating projects is informal, and the way that it is used depends on the discretion of the chief planning officer, who reports directly to a permanent secretary and a minister. When planning officials are pressured to approve projects that have received informal approvals from ministers or the Cabinet, the input of natural resource managers is usually ignored.

This abuse of the consultative process usually results in developments that damage natural resources. For example, in the late 1980s permission to build the Sierra Hotel on the south coast of Barbados was denied by all government agencies, including the office responsible for managing coastal resources. But the hotel was built because a key minister had a financial interest in the project (B 3). This project resulted in severe beach erosion that affected the new hotel and adjacent properties. Numerous interviews with local officials and subsequent field observations showed that it is not uncommon for projects to be approved in this ad hoc fashion in Barbados, St. Lucia or St. Kitts.

The general interest of civil servants involved in natural resource management is to carry out government policies in a way that meets their professional standards and protects the resources. This is very difficult for several reasons. Planning agencies operate under the same financial and technical constraints as other ministries, and as a result, their staffs are routinely overworked. The planning authority only makes recommendations; its decisions are not binding, but are referred to the lead minister who reports to Cabinet which makes the final decision. By placing the responsibility for development decisions, including the enforcement of environmental protection standards, in the political directorate, authority is effectively removed from the civil service.

In addition, the way in which natural resource managers are spread among disparate ministries which have narrowly-defined responsibilities for different sectors of public management prevents a coordinated approach to evaluating the environmental effects of development projects. Civil servants are in a double bind; they wish to use their technical training to integrate natural resource management with development planning, but find it politically infeasible to implement environmental policies due to their close personal ties and dependency upon the political

leadership for jobs.[11]

Unions and Trade Associations

Unions and trade associations are indirectly involved with the development approval process. In the past several years these groups have increased in size and solidified their place in Eastern Caribbean society. Due to the overwhelming need for foreign exchange and employment, these groups often publicly support large development projects.

A case in point is the National Workers Union in St. Lucia, the largest union in the country with 5,000 members. The union publicly supported construction of a large tourist resort in the proposed Pitons National Park, in the belief that it would generate local jobs and increase government support to rebuild the west road connecting Castries with Soufriere.[12] Unions and trade associations generally support the ruling political party in its effort to attract foreign investment. They utilize local media and regular meetings of their membership to support projects that provide jobs, which in turn weakens the authority of civil servants officials who lack the resources and jurisdiction to

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[11] Ibid.; see page 76.

[12] The St. Lucian Weekend Voice newspaper, Saturday, May 13, 1989.

respond.[13]

Members of the Business Community

The members of this interest group are individuals and companies in the local business community who benefit directly from the economic benefits often credited to development projects. Their interest in a specific project are usually represented directly by themselves, as opposed to representation by a trade association or chamber of commerce. It is common for key members of the business community, who also belong to the ruling party, to be appointed to influential government advisory boards or commissions where they can represent their own interests.

The business community promotes its influence through close ties to political leaders in a variety of ways. For example, politicians are depending more and more on their patrons in the business community to provide money and manpower in national election campaigns. It is also common for politicians, both elected and appointed, to own a local business, or have a financial interest in one. For example, a member of Parliament may have a local business as a

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[13] John Forester, 1989. Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley: University of California Press. Forester discusses, in Chapter 3, how the exercise of private economic power combines with politics to counteract the implementation of plans. He describes how this contributes to the intensely political nature of the planning process.

contractor, supplier, or attorney for a developer or investor. When such a politician meets with other political leaders to determine if a project should be approved, he represents his own business interests as well. This creates a pro-development liaison between political leaders and the business community that values economic development more than environmental protection, and places these individuals in conflict with parties often left out of the policy making process whose primary interest is the protection of natural resources.

Parties That are Left Out of Development Decisions

Stakeholders that are left out of the policy-making process when development decisions are made often lack direct and personal access to the political leadership. Many of these stakeholders are unorganized and have no formal representation. This includes local resource users such as farmers, fishermen, and small landowners. If these parties are organized, such as a farming or fishing cooperative, they usually are hesitant to become advocates in the policy making process, as this behavior will place them in competition with established political leaders.

Other stakeholders that are usually excluded from policy making include those that have recently organized and have not been in existence long enough to build the personal

relationships with political leaders needed to affect the policy dialogue. These groups can include environmental groups, regional universities, and research centers, based in the country, region, or abroad.

Stakeholders that are unorganized or that have recently formed, such as environmental groups, need to increase their political power to obtain a stronger bargaining position when negotiating with political leaders. [14] Governments in the region have not agreed to share authority with most stakeholders, so they have little influence in the public policy process.

The Public, Including Resource Users and Beneficiaries of Development

Individual ministers and the cabinet control the development review process, so there is no opportunity for members of the public to take part in development decisions. Formal public meetings to obtain the feedback of local citizens are not held.

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[14] Peter Bartelmus, 1986. Environment and Development, Boston: Allen and Unwin. Bartelmus describes the major stages in the national planning process and how the potential for ecologically sound development is affected at each stage. He cites a report prepared in 1976 by the United Nations Environment Program, titled "Ecodevelopment," which recommends that "the style and rate of development ... be determined by those people most affected." However, this recommendation did not account for the political realities of existing power structures and the difficulty of gaining access to them.

If the political leadership decided to sponsor public hearings, it is uncertain what effect it would have, given a cultural pre-deposition against community participation, a perception of powerlessness, a sense of self-doubt and the acceptance of dependency.[15] However, the lack of public participation means that resource users (farmers, fishermen, and charcoal producers, etc.) who have special knowledge of local environmental conditions are not consulted during the development review process. Local knowledge of the natural environment is hard to find, given the general rejection of land-based manual labor due to its association with slavery. This condition, combined with illiteracy among rural dwellers who tend to be the resource users, means that it would take a concerted effort to tap the knowledge of these individuals. In general, members of the public who may have an interest in preserving environmental quality are few in number, unorganized, and not consulted.

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[15] G.E. Mills, 1966. "Educating and Training for the Public Services in the West Indies," Journal of Administration Overseas, July 5, 1966. Also see Edwin Jones, 1976, "Bureaucracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism in Small States: A Review in Terms of the Current Literature," in Vaughan Lewis (Ed.), Size, Self-Determination, and International Relations: The Caribbean, Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research.

Local Environmental Groups

Environmental stakeholders are a disparate group, and include individuals who are experts in natural resource management, historians, anthropologists, architectural preservationists, and naturalists. These parties are often organized into small non-government organizations by one or two key individuals originally motivated to carry out a specific task, such as the preservation of a particular area, building or wildlife species.

Pro-environmental groups and individuals have a limited capacity to affect public policy decisions for several reasons. These groups are small in size and lack the staff that would enable them to work on more than a few small projects at once. Most are self-supporting and must find a way to financially support themselves, as few organizations have the official support of national governments. Exceptions to this are the National Trusts in St. Lucia and Barbados which are officially recognized by their governments. However, organizations such as these must be careful to not alienate political leaders by taking sides in environmental disputes or they can be branded as anti-government or as being aligned with the Opposition party. To keep government sponsorship, these quasi-governmental organizations have to remain politically neutral, so they are not able to serve as advocates for the environment in

most disputes.

Most environmental groups have been formed in the last few years. They lack the public base of support needed to be effective political organizations, and find it very hard to increase their constituencies. This is due to the public's lack of awareness of environmental concerns, and a perception that environmental protection results in lost economic opportunities. In addition, governments are often skeptical or suspicious about the role of non-governmental organizations in general.[16]

Environmental stakeholders are usually motivated by a personal environmental ethic, which is difficult to translate into the economic terms that politicians understand.[17] This dilemma will require local NGOs to develop new strategies if they are to make any substantial contribution to protecting the natural resources in the countries of the Eastern Caribbean.

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[16] See Summary Report on Eastern Caribbean Non-Government Organizations, Island Resources Foundation, Washington D.C. and the U.S. Virgin Islands, June, 1987. This report lists all of the NGO's in the region in each country that have or could have an interest in promoting environmental protection, and discusses the limitations NGO's face when trying to affect national public policies.

[17] Max Weber, 1958. "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth and Mills (eds.), pp. 77-128. Weber talks about the "flame of pure intentions" and the "ethic of responsibility" in relation to political decision making.

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations

This group of stakeholders includes educational institutions, small regional foundations specializing in natural resource management, and environmental groups based in the region and the United States. The following descriptions are not meant to be exhaustive, but are included to give a general idea of the organizations that are involved in the Eastern Caribbean.

The Centre for Environmental Studies and Natural Resource Management (CERMES) at the University of the West Indies, Barbados, trains students in a new degree program, several of whom are now employed by governments in the region. The Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA) is the oldest environmental NGO in the region, and is located in Barbados. Seventeen countries belong to the CCA. It sponsors conferences, coordinates training, advises governments and conducts environmental education programs. The Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANRI), formerly the Eastern Caribbean Natural Area Management Program, has offices in St. Lucia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It coordinates several natural resource management projects in the region, and is helping several countries increase their institutional capacity. The Island Resources Foundation, located in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C., also works with several countries. It provides technical

environmental services, works with USAID to prepare national environmental profiles for several countries, has a new program to organize small NGOs throughout the region, and has published many papers on a wide variety of environmental topics.

These organizations are providing a valuable contribution to natural resource management in the region by training technicians, developing programs to improve environmental management, and performing field research. However, because governments in the region do not have formal mechanisms to allow these stakeholders to participate in the policy-making process, they generally do not become directly involved in development decisions. Two other factors influence their involvement in the political process. Regional organizations, such as CCA, cannot become directly involved in local politics out of fear that they will alienate their members in government. It is politically more acceptable to serve a regional coordinating role, and this helps assure a longer life for the organization. In addition, regional organizations lack the creditability within each country to work effectively on local environmental issues. In general, organizations have to have a local institutional presence on an island to have legitimacy, and to know enough about the political system and culture to be effective.

An additional factor preventing these organizations from being effective is the prevailing view among political leaders in the region that environmental concerns are obstacles to development. If these groups take a pro-environment stand on a given project that political leaders deem too strong, they will lose their access to the government, rendering them ineffective in the future. However, these organizations are collectively helping the region to slowly form an environmental tradition.

Case Studies from the Eastern Caribbean

The role of interest groups in the development process, and how they affect environmental policy implementation, is the subject of the following case studies. The cases describe large development projects in three countries, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Barbados. By using the collective evidence from the cases, I will show why attempts to implement environmental policies have failed.

Country and Case Descriptions

St. Kitts

Discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1493, St. Kitts became the first permanent British settlement in the West Indies in 1624. It is one of several small islands in the Leeward Group. St. Kitts became independent in 1983, and

has a Parliament, headed officially by Queen Elizabeth II who is represented by a Governor General. There is a unicameral legislature, the fourteen-member House of Assembly, which has eleven members elected by the public and three that are nominated by the House (two on the advice of the Prime Minister and one on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition).[18]

The Prime Minister leads the majority party and heads the Cabinet, which consists of five Ministers and the Attorney General. The legal system is based in English common law. The Cabinet is the highest executive body, and is directly responsible for formulating and implementing national policy.

Each government department (e.g. Labor, Finance, Tourism, Agriculture) is headed by a Minister. Civil servants within each department report directly to a Permanent Secretary, who in turn advises the Minister who submits recommendations to the full Cabinet. The Cabinet makes final policy decisions which are then approved by the House of Assembly. The portfolio for Minister of the Environment was held by the Premier of Nevis, the sister

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[18] For a more detailed history of St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados see; J.H. Parry and Philip Sherlock, 1971. A Short History of the West Indies, London, MacMillian, or, Eric Williams, 1984. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. New York, Random House.

island to St. Kitts which has its own central government, but this portfolio was dropped in 1988.

The 46,000 residents of St. Kitts and Nevis live on two islands that measure slightly more than 100 square miles. Its citizens are mainly of African descent, whose ancestors were brought to the region to provide slave labor for sugar plantations. Adult literacy is estimated to be about 90 percent.[19] The national economy is largely dependent upon sugar which accounts for over 50 percent of its export revenue. Efforts are underway to strengthen the economy by diversifying the agricultural base and providing new facilities for tourism. Economic problems have increased in the 1980s, as indicated by an external debt of $40M, a 20 percent rate of unemployment, and a current account deficit.[20] Domestic savings have declined continuously since 1978, adding to fiscal difficulties caused by the

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[19] Refer to the Caribbean and Central American Databook, published by the Caribbean and Central American Association, Washington, DC, 1988; and Khan, Public Management, for a thorough description of how the political system in St. Kitts has evolved.

[20] The most recent statistics for unemployment are from the 1986 World Bank Economic Report, but during my field work it was evident that the large influx of capital for the Southeast Peninsula Development Project has lowered the unemployment rate considerably. The actual unemployment rate appears to be much lower than 20%, and some observers indicate the work force is near full employment considering the large number of Kittians who work in the informal sector and would not appear in official statistics as being employed.

deteriorating financial performance of the sugar industry.[21]

The Southeast Peninsula Development Project

The 4,000-acre peninsula on St. Kitts is unique in the Lesser Antilles, as its large wilderness area has remained relatively undisturbed. The intact ecosystem includes a wide variety of marine and terrestrial resources, some of which are in danger of extinction.[22] Within the six square miles of the peninsula, a very small portion of which is developed, are found ten arcuate bays, several coral reefs, salt ponds, sea grass beds, mangroves, wetlands, eleven beaches, and a diverse pattern of wildlife habitats including grasslands, forested hillsides, and valleys. Natural resources that are particularly limited or sensitive have been included in proposed parks and protected areas, as part of the planning for the project. Proposed protected areas and their associated natural resources include marine reserves at South Friars Bay (conch), Majors Bay (lobster), Guana Point (coral), and wildlife reserves at Nags Head

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[21]The World Bank, 1986. St. Christopher and Nevis Economic Report, Washington DC: The World Bank.

[22]Robert Norton, 1988. Resource Management Plans: Wildlife Resources. Prepared for the Southeast Peninsula Board, St. Kitts and Tropical Research and Development, Inc. Norton gives a full description of natural resources on the peninsula, and recommends management alternatives to assist preservation efforts as the peninsula develops.

(birds), and North Canoe Bay (endangered sea turtles). Seventeen sites have been classified as "Landscape and Conservation Management" areas, to protect sand dunes, ponds, steep slopes, peaks, scenic vistas, forested areas, wildlife habitats, and beaches. Eleven areas have been identified as Historic and Archaeologic sites.[23]

The project elements include a 6.4-mile-long road to provide access to the peninsula, in addition to public utilities (water, power, and communication), to serve future tourist developments including hotels, condominiums, houses, shops, duty-free concessions, marinas, and a possible cruise ship port. Construction of the road has been funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The USAID loan agreement includes a grant for $1.14M, a loan of $11.40M, with St. Kitts contributing $4.1M, for a total package of $16.64M.

The project has been closely tied to the National Development Plan for St. Kitts. The Five Year Plan for 1986-90 emphasizes the development of the tourism sector to lead national economic growth. The general objectives of increased tourism include generating foreign exchange earnings, providing jobs, and a secondary boost to local

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[23] Island Resources Foundation, 1986. Environmental Assessment Report on the Proposed Southeast Peninsula Access Road, St. Kitts, West Indies.

manufacturing and agriculture. The Plan contains specific objectives, including 800 new hotel rooms, the doubling of tourists from 50,000 to 104,000 annually, and an increase in tourist revenue from $20M to $50M.[24]

Prior to the peninsula project, the government had no organized national growth strategy. The Five Year Plan was coordinated with the project, as evidenced by a 1985 study on tourism prepared for USAID, which concludes that "the maximum value of the peninsula lies in its ability to broaden the island of St. Kitts as a tourist destination" as it will increase tourist visits, add investor interests in providing a tourist infrastructure, and improve foreign exchange earnings.[25]

St. Lucia

St. Lucia is located in the Lesser Antilles. The native Carib Indians fought off attempts by English settlers to colonize the island between 1605 and 1641. The island was finally settled by the French in 1650, and changed hands several times between the British and French until it became a British Crown Colony in 1814 under the Treaty of Paris.

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[24] National Development Planning of St. Kitts and Nevis: 1986-1990.

[25] J. Beekhuis, 1985. Preliminary Outline of a Tourist Strategy for USAID and the English-Speaking Eastern Caribbean. Bridgetown, Barbados, USAID, the Regional Development Office for the Caribbean.

St. Lucia was one of several trading centers in the Caribbean where commodities such as timber, livestock, and provisions for the sugar industry, including slaves, were traded with European cities and Spanish and French colonies in the region. The French culture has maintained its dominance in St. Lucia, as expressed by a French Patois that is widely used. Most St. Lucian's are of African descent, brought to island to supply labor for the sugar industry in the 17th century.[26]

St. Lucia is a Constitutional Monarchy. The top executive officer in the state is the Governor-General, who is appointed by and represents the British Sovereign as Head of State. The Prime Minister is the top elected official in the country, leads the majority party, and has to have the support of the House. The Parliament consists of a seventeen-member House of Assembly that is elected by universal adult suffrage, while the eleven-member Senate is composed of members appointed by the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Governor/General. The

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[26] Refer to Gordon K. Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the Modern West Indies, New York: Monthly Review Press, and Parry and Sherlock, 1971. A Short History of the West Indies, London: MacMillan. These two books trace the growth of the West Indies, including the early colonial period, the relationship between fierce land wars in the region as related to power struggles in the metropolitan capitals of Europe, and the transition of colonial political systems into modern democratic governments.

legal system is based on English common law.

The 140,000 residents of St. Lucia, which measures 238 square miles, depend on income from private remittances by St. Lucians living abroad, and income from agricultural export crops, chiefly bananas. Growth of the banana industry stabilized the economy in the 1950s, but uncertainty over the future of banana sales, and the inherent instability in depending on monocultural export crops, has caused the government to aggressively promote tourism as a source of jobs and foreign exchange.

Current economic indicators include an annual growth rate of 1-5 percent, 20-25 percent unemployment, and heavy dependence on imports of manufactured goods, food, machinery, fuels, and chemicals, which are not produced in the country. A $34M national debt also requires an accumulation of foreign exchange, placing additional importance on the growth of the tourism sector.[27]

St. Lucia is mountainous, with fertile inland agricultural valleys, and is ringed by beaches, small

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[27] Caribbean and Central American Association, 1989. Caribbean and Central American Databook, Washington, DC: Caribbean and Central American Association; and The World Bank, 1987. St. Lucia; Economic Performance and Prospects, A World Bank Country Study, Washington, DC: The World Bank. Both of these reports contain detailed information about current economic conditions and trends in St. Lucia, and contain data on the political system, international trading partners, and a summary of economic conditions in the last decade.

harbors, and bays. The centerpiece of the case study are the Gros and Petit Pitons, tall green peaks rising dramatically from the Caribbean Sea. The Pitons are considered the symbols of St. Lucia, as illustrated by their presence in the national flag.

Development of the Jalousie Estate in the Pitons

The case involves two competing proposals to develop the 316-acre Jalousie Estate, a former plantation located on the beach between the Gros and Petit Pitons. A variety of proposals have been put forward since 1981 to include the Estate as a centerpiece of a proposed Pitons National Park which would encompass 1,600 acres of surrounding land and include a visitor's center to be built on the Estate.

Businesspeople and community leaders from the town of Soufriere, near the Pitons, have formed the Soufriere Development Committee, which has received assistance from the Organization of American States to prepare a proposal for the acquisition and development of the Pitons National Park. While the centerpiece of the proposed park is the Jalousie Estate and surrounding lands, it includes a comprehensive plan to redevelop the coastline of Soufriere to stimulate economic development in the area.

The proposal for the national park included a park headquarters and visitor facilities on the Jalousie Estate,

surrounded by a 25-acre botanical garden, a spice and fruit tree plantation, a reserve for the protected St. Lucia parrot, a mini-zoo, a small jetty on the beach to service small boats and water taxis, a combination bar/restaurant, museum, and picnic, camping, and hiking areas. The park would serve as a field laboratory for research activities by educational and scientific organizations and the natural sciences. A funding source for the initial $1.63M needed for land acquisition, roads, and buildings was not included in the park proposal.[28]

The competing proposal to develop a tourist complex on the Estate is sponsored by the M-Group, a Swiss-based company, which has received an Alien Landholding License from the Cabinet to purchase the site and approval from the Development Control Authority to build on it. The tourist

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[28] Organization of American States, February 1989. Proposal for the Development of the Pitons National Park, prepared by the Department of Regional Development, Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs for the Government of St. Lucia Tourism Development and Coordination Project. The St. Lucian government, through the Soufriere Development Program, requested technical assistance from the OAS in 1985. This report summarizes the results of the planning process for the proposed national park, and includes economic conditions, natural and cultural resources, how the project would be executed, and an assessment of its financial benefits. The OAS plan is accompanied by a Master Plan for the redevelopment of Soufriere, prepared by the Soufriere Development Program. It includes a resort hotel closer to Soufriere as an alternate the Jalousie project, a waterfront market mall, restaurants, hotels, commercial facilities, condominiums, a spa, and anchoring area for large cruise ships.

resort involves a $25M private investment to build about 120 cottages and suites, sporting facilities, a health spa, and docking facilities for yachts.[29] When the Cabinet granted the license it also gave the developer financial incentives (duty-free import of construction materials and goods for the hotel, a multi-year tax holiday, and expatriation of profits), and agreed to build the access road to the Estate at government expense.

The natural resources at stake in the Pitons include the beach, prime near-offshore fishing grounds, open space uses on the Estate, the vegetation and wildlife within the relatively intact mountain ecosystem, and natural hot springs and mineral baths. The proposed park also includes important cultural and archaeological resources from past human settlements in the area.

Both of the projects are consistent with a national policy to diversify the agriculturally-based economy by promoting tourism. The St. Lucia National Plan calls for developing the island as a tourist destination through improved marketing and airline services, to provide foreign exchange, stabilize employment, and benefit local businesses

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[29] The Voice newspaper of February 18, 1989, summarizes the elements of the proposed resort. Official information from the government about what the project includes has not been available. Several local newspaper stories have been pieced together to help understand key elements of the case.

that provide supplies to hotels and resorts. The Plan also promotes "harmonization of the growth of tourism with regional development thrusts," which is compatible with the regional growth strategy in the national park proposal. The Plan, and statements by the Prime Minister, reflect a target of 3,000 new hotel rooms in the country by the year 2000. There are currently about 2,000 hotel rooms.[30]

Barbados

Barbados was discovered by an English sea captain and claimed in the name of King James in 1624. He found a lush island that was uninhabited and covered by dense forests. The island developed quickly, and by 1640 had a population of 30,000, comprised mainly of immigrant landless farmers tending tobacco and cotton crops. These indentured farmers were bound to English landlords, and were a forerunner to

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[30] Government of St. Lucia, 1980 (?). St. Lucia National Plan: Development Strategy. The Plan promotes the development of tourism, but also notes that it can disrupt "the socio-economic balance, aggravated by the fact that the sector is extremely susceptible to external influence at times of international boom and recession." The Plan also states: "a more specific social problem requiring close monitoring concerns local participation and interaction of tourists and residents." On April 11, 1989, the Prime Minister addressed Parliament regarding the Pitons controversy. He indicated his commitment to developing the resort facility while supporting the Park proposal. It is important to note the public position taken on this controversy by the Prime Minister. As the top political official and Leader of the Majority Party, a public pronouncement is at least as important as objectives contained in the National Plan.

slave laborers imported to provide labor to the sugar industry.

Barbados has one of the oldest parliamentary democracies in the western hemisphere. The foundation of its political system was motivated by an "assault on the oligarchy." The island gradually gained greater independence into the 1900s, as urged on by widespread riots in the West Indies in the late 1930s by residents demanding political independence. A history of strong unionism fostered the development of democracy, promoted by the Barbados Labor Party and the Barbados Workers Union. Barbados remained a colony of Britain under the old representative system, and was granted independence in 1961.[31]

The national government is headed by the Governor-General, who serves as the Head of State and is appointed

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[31] In The Growth of the Modern West Indies, Lewis describes how the attitude of West Indians towards outsiders was formed by the involvement of Colonial English interests as the region developed. He tells a story about how England appointed a Commission in 1956 to recommend a list of sites for a new federal capital in the West Indies. The commissioners knew nothing of life in the West Indies, and "brought with them the social values of Englishmen for whom the West Indies have traditionally been a promising employment agency or pleasant vacation spot". Lewis tells of an incident in Grenada reporting the remarks of a Dr. Groome, who said that "the Federal House of Representatives surely did not need an audience of gilded tourists to applaud its deliberations." He mentions the attitude of the British towards the Colonies, "which has always had something of a chauvinistic paternalism about it."

by the British Sovereign. The top executive officer is the Prime Minister, who leads the majority party and is chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Governor General as the member of the House of Assembly who is capable of commanding the support of a majority of its members.

Parliament is a bicameral body, with a Senate and a House of Assembly. The Senate is appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of other political leaders, while the House of Assembly is elected by universal adult suffrage. The normal term of office is five years, but the majority party may require elections at any time to seek support for its policies.[32]

The 270,000 residents of Barbados live on an island measuring 166 square miles with a density of over 1,600 people per square mile, one of the highest population densities in the western hemisphere. Over 90 percent of the population is of African descent, with Europeans, Indians, and Orientals the minority groups. Barbados is known for maintaining cultural and social traditions imbedded in its English Colonial heritage (the political system, school system, and great popularity of cricket).

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[32]Caribbean and Central American Association, 1989. Caribbean and Central American Databook. Washington, DC: Caribbean and Central American Association.

Similar to other islands in the West Indies, Barbados is heavily dependent on external markets. The economy is based mainly on international tourism and agriculture that are highly sensitive to external economic fluctuations. During the 1970s Barbados broadened its economic base through the rapid development of a manufacturing sector, but the international recession of 1980-1981 created serious pressures on the national economy.[33]

The Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor

The fisheries harbor project originated within the political directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1983. Its facilities include dock space for 150 boats, a boat repair facility, ice plant, processing area, boning and vending facilities, a rum shop and grocery, four fuel docks, and a large jetty constructed of several hundred interconnected cement dojos (B 17, 22, 29).

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[33]The World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum. Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, January 16, 1984. Barbados has a trade deficit of about $300M, as it must import food, fuels, building materials, chemicals, and machinery. It has an external public debt of $642M, and an unemployment rate estimated at about 18 percent. Like other islands in the region, Barbados is adopting economic policies to diversity agriculture, strengthen manufacturing, and increase tourism to expand and stabilize the economy. Barbados has no industrial raw materials, apart from small quantities of oil and natural gas. Its primary natural resources are fertile soil, fresh water, a tropical climate, and white sand beaches.

The Fisheries Harbor was financed with a $12.3M funding package from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Project Agreement also includes technical components to strengthen the institutional capacity of the National Fisheries Division to improve fishing gear technology, processing, and marketing operations. These programs are underway and end in mid-1990 (B 17, 31, 42).

The Fisheries Harbor Project is consistent with national planning objectives contained in the Barbados Development Plan, 1983-1988. The Plan states: "The main factors which have tended to inhibit the growth of the [fishing] industry are inefficient marketing and distribution systems and inadequate facilities for servicing and shelter." The Plan also contains policies to improve marketing, upgrade the local fleet, and increase the efficiency of fishing operations, so that the industry meets 75 percent of local protein. Several specific projects are outlined in the Plan, including construction of a large fisheries harbor in the capital city of Bridgetown.

The natural resources at stake with the development of the Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor include both terrestrial and marine resources, local and regional fisheries, the stability of the interface between the near-offshore marine environment and a major river basin, and overall local

water quality.

The Importance of Interest Groups in Development Decisions in the Eastern Caribbean

It is my belief that environmentally destructive decisions take place in the Eastern Caribbean because key stakeholders are excluded from the policy making process. In addition, these decisions can be best be explained by examining the relationship between interest groups that are included in policy making, and the relationship between these groups and political leaders.

Executive authority for creating and implementing public policy in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados is held by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Members of the Cabinet are selected from elected members of Parliament by the Prime Minister. Both the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by members of the majority party, which consolidates the control it has over the policy making process.

The Prime Minister, also known as the Premier, is the head of state, exerting great influence over the Cabinet and civil servants in different ministries, even though the Governor General officially heads the Parliament as the representative of the British sovereign. This influence is

consolidated by appointing ministers to the Cabinet who are sympathetic to the Premier's policies, and by giving top positions in the civil service to loyal party members. As the architects of the national policy making process, the Prime Minister, Cabinet and top civil servants work together to promote policies that will help keep them in power and win the next election.

The national political leadership itself is a special interest group that maintains relationships with other special interest groups who have a stake in how government policies are carried out. Politicians want to stay in office. Developers want to profit from their investments. A link exists between these private and public interest groups that serves to reinforce both of their objectives.

How Political Leaders Represent Pro-Development Interests

In all three countries, the political leadership represented pro-development interest groups to support development projects that had environmental problems. In each case, the developers used a different strategy of influence. Certain stakeholders were included in the policy making process while others were excluded.

St. Lucian's describe the Piton mountains as "the breasts of their mother". These twin peaks, towering over the land as they rise from the Caribbean Sea, are widely

recognized as the symbols of St. Lucia. They appear on the national flag, and on the logos of countless businesses. Should a resort be built between the Pitons, privatizing an area where a national park is proposed? In the words of St. Lucia writer Derek Walcott: "When the tribe sells the Pitons it has sold its mother, it has turned her into a prostitute".[34]

How the Prime Minister and Cabinet Represent the Interests of the Developer

In November, 1981, the Cabinet issued an Alien Landholding License, required of all foreign landowners, to Sir Colin Tennant, enabling him to buy the Jalousie Estate. Tennant planned to develop the 316 acre site, located in the heart of the Piton mountains, as an exclusive tourist resort. By granting the license the Cabinet reversed its earlier decision to acquire the estate as the key parcel within the proposed Pitons National Park. However, the developer apparently lacked the funds needed to build the resort, so the site remained undeveloped throughout the 1980s.

A series of events took place from late 1988 to mid-1989 underscoring how the Prime Minister and Cabinet

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[34] Taken from Jalousie Argument Borders on Prostitution, St. Lucia Star, August 26. 1989, by Derek Walcott.

represented the interests of the developer. In late 1988 the Cabinet issued a second Alien Landholding License to a new developer, the M-Group, a Swiss based holding company. Although there is no public record of the meeting at which this decision was made, officials close to the project reported that the Cabinet granted substantial economic concessions to the developer such as repatriation of profits, waiver of duties on construction materials and supplies for the resort, and a multi-year tax holiday (SL 15). The Cabinet also gave an unusual incentive to the developer by approving public funds to build the main access road to the site.

In January, 1988, the Development Control Authority (DCA) gave the developer an Approval in Concept for a resort project without a public hearing. It is important to realize that the Prime Minister holds the portfolios for Planning and Finance. This gives him control over policy decisions involving financial concessions and planning approvals. In the words of one senior civil servant: "When Cabinet approves economic concessions for the project it does suggest what the government wants, and whose wrath will be incurred if the project is denied. Cabinet makes its wishes well known. The choice not to develop the site is no longer feasible" (SL 5).

The Prime Minister took action in March, 1988, to show

that he was willing to use his authority to represent the interests of developers. He made headlines in local newspapers when he presided over a ground-breaking ceremony for the Windjammer Landing Villa Hotel. This project has 190 individual villas spread over several acres above the Caribbean Sea, and includes a beach with private recreational facilities. It is a large project. At the ceremony, the Premiere joked that "We are all participating in a criminal activity". He was right, as the DCA had not issued any permits for the project. The civil servants in the DCA were badly embarrassed. They fined the developer and appointed an ad hoc commission to issue conditions under which the project could be built. The villas were completed in 1989. (SL 13; The Star, April 30, 1988). The action of the Prime Minister showed how far he was willing to go, including flagrantly breaking national laws, to support the interests of private developers.

The Prime Minister took a similar action that reflected his control over the national planning process when he used the occasion of his annual address to Parliament in April, 1988, to publicly support the developers of the proposed resort at the Jalousie Estate. During this widely reported speech he said: "...Government has indicated its approval to an investment group to proceed with a touristic development on lands between the

Pitons, without encroaching upon lands which have been earmarked as a National Park and nature reserve." At the time, the project had not received approval from the Development Control Authority.

The response to the Prime Ministers public support of the project was swift and blunt. Newspapers printed editorials within the week asking how a large resort could possibly be built in the center of the proposed park without degrading it.[35] When the Cabinet secretly gave the landholding license and financial concessions for the resort, while taking no action to implement the park proposal, it clearly showed that the government favored the resort.

The Developer's Strategy of Influence

The developer enlisted the support of other political leaders in addition to the Prime Minister. In February, 1988, the developer presented EC$100,000 to the Soufriere

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[35] The St. Lucia Star's editorial of April 22, 1989 was titled; "Must We Always Choose Sight Unseen"? It mentioned that the government had not taken any public position on either the resort or park, and concluded by saying; "It would do us all a world of good if the government came clean with all the facts of the matter. We should not be required yet again to make our choices in the dark of ignorance". The editorial in the St. Lucia Voice of April 29 was titled; "Piton Confusion". It said that the resort and park cannot both be located in the same area, and declared; "It is high time that the government make its position clear".

Hospital Committee. The payment was personally delivered to the Minister of Health, who also holds the portfolio for the Environment. In March the Minister of Communication and Works initiated construction of the access road. In May, after several newspapers published editorials condemning the way that the Cabinet secretly approved the resort despite the estates value as a national park, the Minister told a reporter; "Government fully supports the tourism development project, approval has been granted in principle to the Jalousie Plantation Company, the developers, and it's just a matter of time before approval is granted in full for the commencement of construction" (Weekend Voice, May 20, 1989). The same minister threatened to revoke the broadcast license of a local television station planning to televise a public hearing sponsored by the Concerned Persons on the Environment, an environmental group concerned about the negative impact of the resort (SL 4, 8, 13, 15).

It is generally believed that the developers were represented in negotiations with the political leadership to gain support for the project by a local attorney, who is also chairman of the M-Group (the developers company) and Director of the St. Lucia Tourist Board. He also obtained the support of the national tourist industry for the resort. In April, when the Prime Minister used his

speech to the Parliament to state his public support for the resort, he also announced that he was increasing the subvention to the Tourist Board by EC$5 million, thereby linking the project to a national effort to increase tourism.

The developer also funded a grassroots organizing effort in the impoverished town of Soufriere near the Pitons. A local Mason was hired to circulate a petition in support of the project. In May, the National Workers Union, the largest union in the country with 5000 members and over 400 in Soufriere, announced its support for the resort.

All of these actions reflect a focused effort by the developer to orchestrate how the political leadership and public were organized to support the project.

How Political Leaders in St. Kitts Control the Public Policy Process

In St. Kitts a small group of political leaders, with the advice of influential members of their political party, possess the power to make public policy decisions that effect the environment. Throughout the decision making process for Southeast Peninsula Development Project, the same few people have represented the government.

The primary representatives of two main interest

groups, the national political leadership and landowners on the peninsula, have been the Prime Minister, the Minister of Development and the Attorney General. The Minister of Development and the Attorney General have represented the government in its negotiations with USAID over the past several years. In turn, the Minister of Development has represented peninsula landowners in these negotiations (SK 12).[36]

The control that the Minister of Development exerts over the development process in St. Kitts, and how the implementation of environmental policies is discouraged, can be seen by examining his role in the government. His ministerial portfolio includes Agriculture, Lands and Housing in addition to Development. His responsibilities include overseeing the Central Planning Unit which reviews development applications for the country. His multiple portfolio makes him responsible for the enforcement of most environmental laws. He controls the Southeast Peninsula Land Development and Conservation Board, an advisory body coordinating all development activities on the peninsula.

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[36] When the Southeast Peninsula Development Project as initiated in the early 1980s, its 4000 acres were divided into twenty-two parcels owned by about 30 private parties. The peninsula was the only part of St. Kitts in left in private ownership after the government formed the National Sugar Corporation in 1975 and nationalized all of the sugar plantations in the country. No working plantations existed on the peninsula at the time.

By holding these positions of authority, the Minister is the major force in forming national policies that determine how decisions are made that favor development or the environment. The way that the Minister is choosing to favor pro-development interests can be seen by examining some of his actions.

The Minister appointed five members to the Southeast Peninsula advisory board. The Board is responsible for making recommendations to the Minister to provide for the development, conservation and management of the peninsula.[37] The Minister takes recommendations from the Board to the Cabinet who makes all final decisions which are then ratified by the House of Assembly.

However, the individuals appointed by the Minister only represent development interests. No member of the Board has a background or interest in natural resource management or conservation. Board members include the Permanent Secretary of Tourism, a Senator who also is a private electrical contractor, a landowner/hotelier, a private engineer and the public works engineer. The hotelier is a major landowner on the peninsula and is a

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[37] The full purpose and jurisdiction of the Board is contained in the Southeast Peninsula Land Development and Conservation Act passed by Parliament in late 1986. The Act was required by the Loan and Grant Agreement executed by St. Kitts and USAID in Article 5, Section 5.1(a).

founder of the Peoples Action Movement party, the majority party in the country. He is a member of the governments inner circle and wields much political influence (SK 8, 14, 17). He represents the interests of large landowners and the tourist industry, and supports intensive development of the peninsula, including projects he is sponsoring (SK 25). He perceives the role of the Board as a "coordinator for developers" (SK 18). This is in contrast with the legal mandate for the Board which is to evaluate development proposals, control pollution, preserve environmental quality, and implement environmental protection plans.[38]

The Failure of National Environmental Policies

USAID required that St. Kitts pass new comprehensive environmental legislation to replace outmoded and ineffective laws in an attempt to improve how national environmental policies are implemented. The National Conservation and Environment Protection Act (NCEPA) was passed in April, 1987. It required the establishment of a National Conservation Commission to oversee environmental management on St. Kitts and Nevis, including the southeast peninsula. The government delayed gazetting (issuing public notice) the Act until mid 1989 due to concerns of

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[38] Ibid.

peninsula landowners that its provisions for public access to the coast would adversely effect their property rights (SK 3).

More importantly, the Conservation Commission was still not operational as of mid 1990. The designated chairman of the Commission resigned to protest the lack of action by the government to implement the Act (SK 23). The government's decision to not empower the Conservation Commission appears to be part of a strategy by the Minister of Development and the Cabinet to set a precedent that allows large projects to be built on the peninsula without any political interference (SK 8).

The failure of the government to enforce the NCEPA is consistent with other policy decisions that favor pro-development interest groups. The Land Use Management Plan prepared for the Southeast Peninsula project strongly recommended that a new Environmental Management Unit be established within the Central Planning Unit, but this has not occurred. Virtually all of the environmental laws in St. Kitts remain unenforced.

The authority to control public policy decisions that affect the environment is held within the closed circle of a few top political leaders. The chain of command that controls decisions favoring the use of the peninsula for intensive commercial development starts and ends with the

Minister of Development, the Prime Minister, and the Attorney General, who have thus far favored pro-development policies while refusing to implement policies intended to protect the island's fragile natural resources. Given the obvious lack of enforcement of environmental laws throughout the country, and the lack of political will to mitigate environmental damage that development of the peninsula will bring, the future looks bleak for one of the most important wildlife areas in the Eastern Caribbean.

The Bridgetown Fishing Harbor

The development of the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor shows that when large projects, often funded by donor agencies, originate in the political directorate of a country, strategic political interests cause environmental problems to be ignored (B 2).

Expansion of the fishing industry has been a major goal of the Barbados government for fifteen years.[39] To carry out this policy, the Minister of Agriculture initiated two projects in the early 1980s. The first was a small fishing complex at Ostins on the south coast. The

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[39] The Barbados National Development Plans for the years 1979-83, 1983-88 and 1988-93 describe how the fishing industry will be improved with the intent of decreasing food imports, lowering the balance of payments deficit, and providing additional food protein for the population.

second was a major fishing harbor in the capital city of Bridgetown. This project, also known as the Cheapside harbor after the neighborhood where it is located, was initiated by the Ministry in 1983.

The Strategy of Influence of Political Leaders

When he initiated and successfully completed the project, the Minister of Agriculture represented his own interests and those of the national political leadership, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The primary interest of the leadership is to stay in power. At the beginning of the project, the Minister formed a coordinating committee with representatives from relevant government offices, assigned his Permanent Secretary of the Special Projects Division to be in charge of it. These actions consolidated the authority of the ministry within the government, giving it the political mandate necessary to build the harbor.

The significance of the project being originated in and coordinated by the political directorate is emphasized by the following observation by a government official: "Projects such as the fishing harbor are often decided by one man, the Minister of Agriculture in this case, who decides that the project is good, and will be visible, so investigations of concerns like the environment are frowned

upon, so bureaucrats don't or can't review them. Projects like this may be a white elephant, but they are big, and look good" (B 22).

In 1983, after the Ministry of Economic Affairs reviewed the project, the government asked the Inter-American Development bank to provide funding for it. The Bank agreed in concept, and after conducting its own economic analysis, the Project Agreement was signed in November, 1984. With the funding now in place, the Ministry of Agriculture had to obtain permission from national planning authorities before construction commenced.

Political Control of the National Planning Agency

In Barbados the planning authority is the Town and Country Planning Department. In September, 1985, the Ministry submitted a site plan to the Department. It included slips for 150 boats, facilities for boat repairs, weighing, processing, and storing fish, a fish market, fuel docks, grocery, rum shop, and a large jetty to protect against storm surges (B 17, 22, 29).

When TCP evaluates a project like the harbor, it solicits feedback from other government agencies that have relevant expertise or jurisdiction related to it. This is called the "consultative process". On one hand this

process gives the planning authority considerable flexibility. For example, it theoretically gives natural resource managers the opportunity to have input into the planning process so that potential environmental problems can be identified. On the other hand, the informality of this approach reduces the accountability of the planning process because the minister who oversees the planning department determines whose input to accept. The result is that planning authorities give up control of the development review process to the political leadership.

As part of the consultative process, TCP contacted the Coastal Conservation Project Unit, the national agency responsible for coastal management. The CCPU happens to be funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, the sponsor of the fishing harbor. Officials at the regional office of the Bank asked the government to have the CCPU review the project (B 17). The CCPU had not been asked by the Ministry to help with the design of the harbor (B 20). After reviewing the project, the CCPU staff identified four major areas of environmental concern, including: 1. Long-term degradation of harbor waters from sewage disposal from live-aboard fishermen; 2. Adverse effects of dredging; 3. Changes in coastal dynamics caused by the breakwater, which could cause siltation of the harbor mouth or adjacent river mouth, and 4. The impact of increased fishing pressure on

limited fish stocks in the region (B 5, 20). No scientific information existed to address any of these concerns.

In January, 1986, Town and Country Planning approved the site plan for the harbor. The environmental concerns pointed out by the CCPU were not mentioned or included in the conditions of approval (B 22). During the 1988-89 fishing season the catch of the Barbados fishing fleet dropped 40%. It is not known if this is a cyclical drop or the result of over-fishing (B 29).

The political leadership was the primary pro-development interest group in this case. It wanted to build the harbor without the possible delays that would be caused by researching potential environmental problems, even though the result could be the decline of the regional fishery and sedimentation of the harbor. The manner in which the government pushed this project through the permit process, ignoring environmental concerns, supports the contention that large projects do not receive a thorough environmental evaluation when they are initiated in the political directorate, especially if politicians want the project approved before a national election (B 3, 20).[40]

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[40] There was a national election in May, 1986, four months after the project was approved. In interviews, civil servants said that ministers push large projects through the planning process when are national elections coming up to convince voters that they are productive. This means that large projects, that normally require the most careful

How Civil Servants are Prevented from Implementing Environmental Policies

While national policies are formulated by political leaders, civil servants are often responsible for implementing them. At the same time that civil servants work to implement environmental policies, they are dependent on political leaders for their jobs. The relationship between politicians and civil servants prevents environmental policies from being implemented. The events that took place in all three countries shows how this happens.

After the Cabinet granted an Alien Landholding License to Sir Colin Tennant in 1981, reversing its earlier decision to acquire the Jalousie Estate as part of a national park, a senior planner in the Central Planning Unit wrote the "Proposed Policy of Development at the Pitons, Soufriere". It included several recommendations to the Cabinet to protect the natural resources on the Estate, stressing its importance to the country. But, the Cabinet refused to adopt the report, so these recommendations were not implemented, despite the efforts of the Central Planning Unit.

The Chief Forestry Officer (CFO) was the most

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planning, often receive the least attention from planning technicians.

outspoken environmental advocate in the government. He founded the Environmental Commission which the Prime Minister has refused to certify, so it remains an unofficial body. In late 1988, the Ministry of Tourism asked the CFO to attend a meeting of officials who had voiced concern about the environmental impact of the resort project. He voiced concerns about the protection of the sites prime agricultural lands, and asked the Ministry to provide information showing how these lands would be protected if the project was built. The Ministry failed to provide the information requested, and excluded the CFO from further discussions about the project (SL 6).[41] Similarly, the Chief Fisheries Officer has an interest in seeing that the prime fishing grounds adjacent to the Estate are protected, but has no direct voice in the policy process to present this viewpoint.

When the Organization of American States submitted the formal Proposal for a Pitons National Park to the government in March, 1988, it had to go through official channels. The report was submitted to the Permanent Secretary of Planning who controlled its distribution. The Permanent Secretary is also the Assistant to the Prime

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[41] The Chief Forestry was the first civil servant to advocate environmental reform in St. Lucia. He retired in 1990.

Minister, who is also Minister of Planning. When interest groups supporting the inclusion of the Jalousie Estate in a national park wanted to obtain information in the park proposal which summarized how the park would generate more economic benefits than the resort, the report was not available for them to use because its distribution was controlled by the Permanent Secretary.
SL 9).

The frustration of civil servants who want to implement policies intended to protect the environment is summarized by a St. Lucian close to the Pitons controversy: "Civil servants, when faced with pressure from the political leadership may bleed inside, if they disagree with the development project, but can't speak out due to politics; it is too dangerous to their families" (SL 4).

The hesitancy of senior civil servants to pressure political leaders to implement environmental policies is also the result of a thwarted reform movement they initiated in the 1970s. Individuals who had recently returned to St. Lucia after obtaining graduate degrees abroad started meeting to express their concerns about the process of economic development in the country. But, their jobs were threatened, and they realized that without holding political office reform was not possible (SL 8).

St. Kitts

The small size of the government in St. Kitts gives political leaders near total control over civil servants who could use their jobs to carry out environmental policies to protect the natural resources on the southeast peninsula. There are several ways that the political system exerts control over civil servants, preventing them from being involved in the planning process for the peninsula.

The Physical Planning Section of the Central Planning Unit is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Development. It has a dual responsibility for evaluating development proposals and examining the possible adverse environmental affects they could cause. But it remains unclear what the role of the PPS is in the development process for the Southeast Peninsula. The PPS is the only agency responsible for environmental planning, but it has no formal liaison with the peninsula advisory board. The Board's staff offered to train planning officials in environmental planning to help build the governments institutional capacity, but were refused by the Minister of Development (SK 17).

The problems caused by the lack of integration between planning authorities and the Board were summarized in a 1988 which stated: "It is imperative that planning(s)

standing, and management and tenure policies with respect to the southeastern peninsula be defined. Given its high touristic potential it could be subject to all sorts of pressures, speculative and expansionist, in the near future".[42] The decision by the Minister of Development to not integrate the national planning process with the development of the peninsula has prevented civil servants from implementing policies designed to protect its natural resources.

Similarly, the government's refusal to create an Environmental Unit and make the National Conservation Commission operational has prevented civil servants from being involved in environmental planning. These policy decisions, combined with the fact that several national environmental laws regulating coastal development, sewage disposal, industrial pollution, garbage disposal and beach mining are not enforced, has created an atmosphere where civil servants know that politicians do not want them to enforce environmental laws.

The political relationship between ministers and civil servants in St. Kitts also prevents the natural resources of the peninsula from being protected. The policy of the

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[42] Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and Physical Planning: The Case of St. Kitts and Nevis. Prepared for the OAS and the OECS Natural Resource Management Project.

government is to strongly support the peninsula project by attracting investors who will fund various commercial projects. If a discussion was allowed among civil servants about how environmental policies should be enforced on the peninsula, it would lengthen the development process, something that political leaders want to avoid (SK 4). Civil servants are forced to follow the government's policy of not enforcing environmental standards due to the control exerted by political leaders over every aspect of the development process.

Environmental Interest Groups Excluded from Development Decisions

St. Lucia

During the controversy over the development of a resort on the Jalousie Estate in St. Lucia, environmental interest groups who wanted to preserve the site as part of a new national park were systematically excluded from key public policy decisions. Two key meetings between the M-Group and government officials that resulted in decisions to support the resort project were not open to the public, preventing pro-environmental groups from attending.

The first meeting was in late 1988 when

representatives of the developer met with the Cabinet to seek a new Alien Landholding License. This meeting resulted in the Cabinet granting financial concessions to the M-Group to encourage development of the resort. The second meeting was in early 1989 when the developer met with the Cabinet and the Development Control Authority to obtain an official Approval in Concept for the resort. This decision, combined with the Cabinet approval, made it unlikely that the detailed site plan for the resort would be rejected.

Environmental interest groups were prevented from participating in any of the decisions that determined the future of the national park. Groups excluded from the decision making process included civil servants responsible for managing natural resources, such as the forest, agricultural uses, and fisheries; the Concerned Persons on the Environment; and individual stakeholders who use live and work in the area. As a government official said: "Development review is not public; the developer presents technical information to the Cabinet without input from others, so there is a bias for the developer due to the process" (SL 5). The lack of public participation has also prevented park advocates from building a local political base to convince politicians of the need for the park (SL 2, 13).

The Concerned Persons on the Environment was an ad hoc group of professionals and community leaders who started meeting in mid 1988 as a result of the secrecy surrounding the resort project and its conflict with the proposed Pitons National Park. Its members included leaders of the Catholic Church, the National Trust, the Naturalists Society, the Soufriere Development Committee, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Conservation Association, and senior civil servants from several ministries. The Concerned Persons was formed to increase the collective bargaining power of its members. To do this they sponsored unprecedented public meetings in Soufriere and Castries to express concerns over the Pitons controversy. The meetings were widely reported in the local press, but offers from its most influential members to meet with the Prime Minister were rebuffed (SL 4, 9).

The Catholic Church emerged as a major public voice in the Pitons controversy. It opposed the resort to protest the secrecy surrounding the public policy process, and was against privatization of the Pitons, which are recognized as the national symbol of St. Lucia as shown by their appearance on the national flag (Catholic Chronicle, No. 4, April, 1989). The opposition of the Church to the commercial development of the Jalousie Estate is notable as an estimated 90% of St. Lucians are Catholic. However, it

is not clear that the Concerned Persons or the Church has had any influence on the government.

Other parties that have an interest in protecting the environment of the Pitons are unorganized stakeholders that use the natural resources in the area for subsistence. This includes several individuals and families who live or work within the boundaries of the proposed park, such as fishermen who use the prime offshore reefs, herders, small farmers, squatters, and charcoal producers. These resource users have not been involved in the planning process for the park or the resort. Their interests in maintaining a healthy natural environment are represented indirectly by the Concerned Persons, but they have no direct access to the public policy process, including the Prime Minister, the Cabinet or the Development Control Authority.

The closed public policy process in St. Lucia prevented all environmental groups from participating in the decision to use the Jalousie Estate as a private resort or a national park. In early 1990 the government gave its final approval for the resort and the Organization of American States closed its St. Lucia office. The proposal for the Pitons National Park has not been accepted by the government. Soon after the resort was approved, another developer submitted plans for the Gros Piton Resort Village and Aerial Tramway, a resort on eleven acres at the summit

of the mountain with a tram to ferry 250,000 people a year.[43] Planning authorities are deciding whether to issue an Approval in Concept for it. The privatization of the Pitons is becoming a reality. It seems likely that within a few years the natural environment of the Pitons will be irreversibly changed by several large tourism projects, contrary to the goals of the proposed Pitons National Park.

St. Kitts

Environmental stakeholders in St. Kitts face a similar situation. There are no environmental interest groups on St. Kitts. Individuals that depend on the natural resources of the peninsula are few in number. There are a few herders, one charcoal producer, and several squatters. These parties are unorganized, lack any formal representation, and have no voice in the decision making process. St. Kitts does have small organizations that promote the preservation of historical homes and the famous Brimstone Hill Fortress, as well as a horticultural society, but they have not been involved with the peninsula project. The Historical and Conservation Society in the neighboring island of Nevis has not been directly involved with the project.

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[43] Earl Bousquet, 1990. Changing the Face of the Pitons. An article in the St. Lucia Star, March 31, 1990.

There are several reasons why there are no environmental interest groups in St. Kitts. There is a general lack of awareness among the citizens about the need to protect the environment. The low level of political and economic development on the island has discouraged such a group from forming, as it would be perceived as anti-development and anti-government. The government controls the flow of information in the society. The only two regular newspapers on the island are published by the majority and opposition political parties. The only radio station on St. Kitts is run by the government news agency (ZIZ Radio). The Public Information Officer decides what issues to air on the radio and what stories to send to regional newspapers. Differences of opinion between the few individuals involved in policy making, including both civil servants and politicians, are deemed confidential, and people restrain from "airing their dirty laundry in public" (SK 4).

Since no organized environmental interest groups exist in St. Kitts, and the flow of information is controlled by the government, environmental issues are not part of the public policy debate. The result is a total lack of political pressure on the political leadership to protect the fragile natural resources on the southeast peninsula.

Barbados

Barbados does not have a tradition of supporting local environmental interest groups. Historically the public has not been concerned about the environment, and there was no public debate about the environmental consequences of the fishing harbor. However, a public dialogue about environmental problems is starting to occur (30, 33).

There are two pro-environmental interest groups in the country, the Barbados Environmental Association and the National Trust. The BEA has several members from the civil service and business community. It was started in the late 1980s to promote an anti-litter campaign called "Keep Barbados Beautiful", funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. The Trust has successfully promoted the preservation of historical buildings and landmarks. Both of these groups are hesitant to become involved in a public dialogue about larger environmental issues facing Barbados because of the risk they would be branded as anti-government.

The potential does exist for a public debate on environmental issues to take place in Barbados due to the openness of the media. Barbadians have an adult literacy rate of over 90% and support three privately owned daily newspapers. Indirect public participation in the policy making process occurs through several national radio call-

in shows.[44] At most times of the day at least one call-in show is on the radio. These shows are reportedly listened to by Cabinet ministers, and have resulted in the government taking action on issues of concern to the public, such as an investigation of health concerns at a major chicken plant in 1989.

Radio call-in shows could serve as a surrogate for public hearings which are not part of the national planning process. However, the fear does exist among civil servants, who are among the best educated and environmentally aware citizens, that their voices will be recognized on the radio by politicians who will exact retribution for any criticism leveled at the government.

Two key events occurred in Barbados during the late 1980s that raised the public consciousness about environmental issues. The Trading Post fire destroyed an industrial warehouse storing large amounts of toxic chemicals. For the first time, officials had to find a way to safely dispose of large amounts of contaminated material that posed a public health hazard. The waste was finally burned in the defense department incinerator which caused

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[44] Three of the best known radio call-in shows are Tell It Like It Is, Getting Down to Business, and Gottaerperk (which roughly means to catapult or to shout directly). These shows are a good example of "bottom up" participation in the public policy process.

additional questions to be raised about resulting air pollution problems. The controversy about how to safely dispose of the toxic material from the warehouse became a major public issue, and was in newspapers and on call-in shows for several days.

The second event was a fire that destroyed the White Park Road farm and garden shop housing pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers. The resulting air and water pollution and subsequent clean-up problems also heightened public awareness of the dangers of toxic waste disposal.

As a result of these key events, workers who are exposed to toxic materials in their jobs are demanding that they be provided with safety clothes, and the fire department has started to train personnel in how to deal with fires involving toxic materials. Public consciousness about environmental issues in general has risen in the past few years since cable television has been available on the island. News accounts of international environment problems such the Greenhouse effect, depletion of the ozone, deforestation in the Amazon and oil spills now reach many Barbadian households, and has marginally increased their level of awareness of similar issues in their own country (B 1, 3, 12). This combination of local and international key events and conditions could lead to an opening of the policy dialogue concerning environmental

issues in general, and the affects of large development projects on limited natural resources on this tropical island.

Summary

How interest groups affect the public policy process can be determined by studying their content and behavior. Interest groups are an important element of the political system in the Eastern Caribbean, and their behavior can explain the gap between the purpose and result of national environmental policies that are supposed to protect the fragile natural resources of the region.

In all three countries political leaders used similar strategies of influence to promote the interests of pro-development interest groups. These strategies included accepting money from developers, refusing to allow public participation in decision-making, holding private meetings to informally approve projects, using public funds to give economic incentives to developers, and excluding key environmental stakeholders from the policy making process.

The political leadership in all three countries exerted their formal and informal authority to discourage civil servants from implementing environmental policies. Ministers regularly overrule civil servants and disregard their recommendations to protect natural resources.

Governments have dropped their ministerial portfolios for the environment, limit access to information that supports environmental interests, including the restriction of the free press on St. Kitts, and focus on short-term planning horizons that favors quick solutions to current economic problems.

Political leaders also used their informal authority to discourage the implementation of environmental policies. They have created a pro-development atmosphere by continually disregarding existing environmental laws while maintaining strict control over civil servants through patronage appointments and party loyalty. Political leaders have also rebuffed the efforts of civil servants to create new national policies for environmental protection, such as the Environmental Commission in St. Lucia, by withholding the official backing of the government.

Local environmental groups are forming in the region, but they lack the access to political leaders that is needed to influence public policies. Regional environmental organizations have had little influence on local development decisions. Resource users remain unorganized and have no voice in the public policy process, even though they stand to lose the most when decisions are made that lead to the destruction of natural resources.

Given the pro-development bias of political leaders,

the access to the government that pro-development interest groups have, and the exclusion of environmental stakeholders in national policy making, the future for the limited natural resources of the islands looks bleak.

It is clear that an approach to development decisions that includes the interests of all stakeholders needs to be created if natural resources are to be protected. But other crucial elements reflective of the public policy process in developing countries also need to be taken into account. Culture plays an important role in decision making, especially as it affects the interactions between donor agencies and national governments. The interplay between culture and politics, what I call the culture of decision making, also needs to be accounted for in development decisions.

CHAPTER THREE

The Culture of Decision Making and Environmental Policy Implementation

Culture affects public policy implementation in two ways. First, the patterns of behavior, customs and beliefs that people acquire as members of a society shape the way they perceive the settings in which they operate. Second, decision making and particularly, the way power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, the ways that political leaders relate to the governed, and the norms of responsibility for civil servants constrain the way policy options are evaluated.

These two effects of culture on public policy implementation in the Eastern Caribbean are inseparable, and the link between them has to be understood to see why it is difficult to implement new environmental policies. Often, when new environmental policies are adopted by developing countries, they are based on models borrowed from the United States or Europe. This is especially true when international foreign assistance agencies require that new national environmental legislation be adopted as a condition

of development assistance. In almost all instances, these imported policies do not take adequate account of cultural conditions. Because cultural conditions are not respected, efforts to implement new environmental policies often fail.

Some General Characteristics of Culture

According to Edward T. Hall, "Culture directs the organization of the psyche, which in turn has a profound effect upon the ways people look at things, behave politically, make decisions, order priorities, organize their lives, and last but not least, how they think".[1]

In addition to examining the importance of the "other culture", it is important for a person to contemplate his or her own beliefs and customs. This is especially true when a person is working in an unfamiliar culture attempting to find ways to implement new public policies. How a person is perceived and the biases, beliefs and customs he or she brings to a foreign country can lead to personal misunderstandings that undermine their work.

Weiss (1987) identifies several "ghosts" that can make it difficult to understand the effect of culture on policy implementation.[2] By ghosts he means factors that can

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[1] Edward T. Hall, 1976. Beyond Culture. Garden City, New York; Anchor Books.

[2] Michael Weiss, 1987. Negotiation and Culture: Some Thoughts on Models, Ghosts, and Options. Dispute Resolution Forum, National Institution for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C., September, 1987.

obscure the identifiable elements of a national, regional or local culture and make it difficult to determine exactly what mix of personal, societal or institutional factors affect how people behave. The ghosts Weiss sees include: 1. how people are affected by different political, economic and legal systems and organizations within a national culture; 2. the wide variation in individual behavioral styles people use to negotiate and communicate; 3. the changes that take place over time in a culture; and 4. how to account for individual versus group of behavior in a culture.

Most cultures, whether they are national, sub-national, or local exist on a continuum ranging from totally homogeneous to widely varying heterogeneous. In heterogeneous cultures, or those lacking long historical traditions, it is harder to separate the ghosts and focus on the underlying elements of the cultural milieu. In smaller more homogeneous cultures, such as those of countries in the Eastern Caribbean, the elements of culture are easier to identify.

Once identified, important cultural factors can be integrated into efforts to implement new public policies to increase the likelihood they will succeed. The context of a culture, and the beliefs, language and behavior of its members must be taken into account in designing and seeking to implement new policies.

Cultural Context

Hall and Hall describe "context" as "the information that surrounds an event and is inextricably bound up with the meaning of that event".[3] Events combine with the cultural context to produce different outcomes. Certain indicators can be used to evaluate, and to some extent predict, how different cultural contexts will affect the implementation of new public policies.

Different cultures have different cultural contexts. Countries in northern Europe tend to be low context, a characteristic shared with white Americans. Countries in Latin America, Southern Europe, and the Caribbean have high context cultures. People from low context cultures, where the models for new public policies often originate, are described by Hall and Hall as being monochronic. People from high context cultures, typical of societies in developing countries that adopt imported public policies, are described as polychronic.

Monochronic individuals are seen as those who operate on strict time deadlines, show little flexibility, and require great amounts of information to make a decision. Polychronic people are more committed to people and human

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[3] Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, 1987. Hidden Differences. Garden City, New York, Anchor Press. The Halls discuss the importance of several elements of culture and how they affect human relationships, including time, space, personal space, and time as structure.

relationships, are more willing to be flexible and deviate from a fixed plan or strategy, and consider social relationships to be more important than strict objectives. These differences have significant implications for the effectiveness of public policies that are transferred without variation from low context to high context cultures.

Belief Systems

Belief systems are at the foundation of culture. A belief system is made up of the values and attitudes expressed by individuals, family groups and communities who draw upon past events, experiences and traditions to form beliefs about issues of importance to their society. Elements of a belief system that relate to the public policy process include perceptions about the validity of the government and its leaders, and the acceptance of laws and regulations that control personal behavior. This includes how people accept or reject the role of government in implementing environmental laws that alter personal habits.

Belief systems may be represented by a variety of people, including religious leaders, village elders, clan heads or women, who may not hold formal leadership positions in the government. The values and attitudes of a belief system may be expressed in ways that are difficult for outsiders to understand, such as localized spoken languages, and non-verbal behavior. It is generally very difficult to

understand a belief system, and know how to operate within its norms, without living in a culture for many years. If an outsider does not understand a culture and its belief system, he or she will have a hard time getting their message across.[4]

In some ways it is even harder to become familiar with the culture and belief system of small communities, such as an island or rural village. The tradition of social interdependence among residents of smaller, insular communities may prevent an outside party from gaining the legitimacy needed to influence public policy.[5] This can happen even when an outsider and local people speak the same language.

Written and Spoken Language

The languages of a society, both written and spoken,

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[4] See Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, 1987. Hidden Differences. Garden City, New York, Anchor Press; and Pierre Casse, 1981. Training for the Cross-Cultural Mind. Washington, D.C., The Society for Intercultural Communication.

[5] Sally Engle Merrie, 1987. Cultural Frameworks of Mediation. Prepared for the Workshop on Transcultural Issues in Dispute Resolution, University of Hawaii, June, 1987. Merrie discusses how conceptions of conflict and dispute resolution, common occurrences when new public policies are adopted, are embedded within cultural frameworks. How people view conflict, and traditions for resolving it, develop in response to conditions that can be unique to a specific culture. Since the adoption of new public policies, such as environmental policies, changes the status quo, conflict will result. Knowing how the members of a society deal with conflict can help an intervenor gain creditability while designing an implementation process that fits local conditions.

reflect the underlying culture. If language differences exist it will invariably lead to misunderstandings. To understand a culture, to be able to get inside of it and perceive the world as its members do, a person has to understand its languages.

There are two main types of language differences that hamper cross-cultural communication. The first type of difference relates to written language, and the second relates to spoken language. It is important to consider how both types of language impact the effectiveness of new policy initiatives.[6]

When public policies originate in a developed country, including legislation, administrative guidelines and regulations, they typically take the form of long written documents filled with complex legal and technical terminology. For example, environmental legislation may include words like "wildlands", "zoning" or "parks and protected areas". These words have a clear meaning in the United States or Europe, but are often not understood by officials in countries that lack a tradition of carefully

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[6] See David Olsen, 1977. From Utterance to Text: The Bias of Language in Speech and Writing. Harvard Educational Review, 47(3); and David Olsen, Nancy Torrance and Angela Hildyard (eds.), 1985. Literacy, Language and Learning: The Nature and Consequences of Reading and Writing. New York, Cambridge University Press. This book discusses the differences between written and spoken language, how these two kinds of discourse vary with oral and literal competency, and the ways that culture can affect communication when a native language is used.

controlled land use and conservation.

Similarly, differences in the use of spoken words are also rooted in culture. In many developing countries, oral traditions are the main way that people communicate, including political leaders who are responsible for implementing public policies. Even if both countries involved in the transference of policies use the same language, such as the United States and an island in the English-speaking Caribbean, residents of the developing country will often use a localized version of the language, such as creolized English.

Alleyne describes the Caribbean as having extremely complex languages and almost every type of linguistic phenomenon, including trade and contact jargons, creole languages and dialects, ethnic vernaculars, and non-standard dialects.[7] In St. Lucia, the official language is English, but everyday conversations are spoken in a French-based patois. When people do speak English it is often not the standard form. On several occasions while in St. Kitts I have heard visitors ask local residents: "What language are you speaking"? The inevitable reply was: "English". Kittians speak English, but it is spoken very quickly with a heavy accent, and can be hard for foreigners to

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[7] Mervyn C. Alleyne, 1985. A Linguistic Perspective on the Caribbean. In Caribbean Contours, Sidney W. Mintz and Sally Price, (eds.), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

understand.

Public policies that originate in developed countries are based on their written tradition, not accounting for subtle differences in written language, and larger differences between written and spoken languages that can exist between people from industrialized and developing countries. Under the best of circumstances, these differences lead to misunderstandings that hinder policy implementation, because the parties simply aren't communicating. Under the worst of circumstances, open conflict can result. An example of how this happens can be shown by the history of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand.

The signatories to the Treaty in 1840 were representatives of the Sovereign of England and Chiefs representing several Maori tribes. The English signed versions of the Treaty written in English, while the Maori chiefs signed multiple versions written in Maori. The controversy over the Treaty has centered on the Maori right to "tino rangatiratanga" (unqualified exercise of their chieftainship) over their "taonga" (lands, villages, and all their treasures). There was, and remains, no literal translation into English of these words. This has led to continuous conflicts over natural resource management in

many parts of the country.[8]

Behavior

It is important to consider behavior as an element of culture because the successful implementation of new public policies depends on effective interaction with people from different cultures who will interpret behavior and exhibit behavior quite differently. The emotional, verbal, and behavioral cues that people use to transmit information vary among different cultures. To build the personal relationships demanded of high context people in developing countries, one must understand the meaning of behavioral cues that may not be obvious, even to people that have spent considerable time observing them.

Behavioral cues range from subtleties such as dress, posture, and composure to more obvious behavior like patterns of speech, where people sit around a table, and who speaks first during a meeting. These cues are often related to a standard of etiquette that if breached can lead to a lack of trust and deterioration of the relationship. It can be difficult to grasp the specific characteristics of non-

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[8] Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, November, 1988. This report discusses how the Treaty of Waitangi has affected environmental management decisions, and the miscommunication that has occurred over the different language versions of the Treaty. New Zealand has created an independent Waitangi Tribunal that deliberates to resolve conflicts arising from language in the Treaty, but basic misunderstandings about how it should be applied to environmental conflicts persist.

verbal communication in a given culture.[9]

Non-verbal language is harder to understand than the spoken word. Non-verbal cues such as the use of silence and eye contact can vary widely among cultures. Direct eye contact, long silences between spoken words, and the time between interventions possess different meanings for different cultures.

Scollen describes a communication system that varies among different ethnic groups. Ethnicity is important to consider because policy dialogues between developed and developing countries often involve interethnic communication. The way in which the components of this system are used and perceived affects the quality and outcome of interethnic communication. Some of the components of the system include the traditions, skills, knowledge, group membership, linguistic resources and politeness phenomena that people bring to a conversation.[10]

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[9] Susan Goldstein, 1986. Cultural Issues in Mediation: A Literature Review. Program on Conflict Resolution Working Paper 1986-1, University of Hawaii at Manoa. Goldstein discusses how cultural factors such as attitudes towards conflict and confrontation, verbal and non-verbal communication, self-disclosure, reason, logic, and self-perception within the larger cultural context need to be understood to resolve conflicts between different cultural groups.

[10] Ron Scollon and Suzanne B.K. Scollon, 1981. Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication. Norwood, New Jersey, Ablex Publishing. The Scollons discuss how interethnic communication is affected by communication styles, and how the content and structure of information affects exchanges between people from different ethnic groups. They also discuss the concept of discourse as politeness

Understanding how the politeness phenomena differs between cultures can be crucial to successful communication in a cross-cultural or interethnic dialogue. For example, if a person from a high context or indigenous culture uses long pauses while talking, and the other person from a low context or mainstream culture is used to short spaces between words, a basic misunderstanding usually occurs. The indigenous person, using long pauses out of politeness, will think that the mainstream person doesn't know how to listen, and the mainstream person will think that the indigenous person is not adept at expressing complete thoughts. Both are wrong. By deferring to politeness this kind of miscommunication can be lessened.

Things Go Wrong When Culture is Ignored:

Bad Communication

When people from different cultures enter into a policy dialogue, they use different kinds of communication systems. When one party to the dialogue, typically from a developed country, employs a formal system, based on laws and administrative structure, and the other party, typically from a developing country, prefers more personalized, informal methods of communication, it is very difficult to reach a common objective, such as implementing a new public

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phenomena, and offer suggestions for improving interethnic communication by incorporating politeness in cross-cultural dialogue.

policy. If a person using the formal approach is an alien to the society, it can prevent an informal, personal relationship from developing. This in turn can hinder the establishment of personal trust and reinforce the perception of the formal party as an outsider who does not accept the social norms that exists within the local culture.

As noted by Nader and Todd: "In particular, it is important to see how things work in societies where the boundaries between formal and informal systems are often blurred, and can be crossed when convenient by participants who understand and use the total system for specific ends, and where law often plays a secondary role...".[11]

In many instances, conflicts arise when new public policies are introduced because they infringe on a societies informal system. These conflicts occur because the status quo, the equilibrium of society, is being disturbed. They may be marked by internal competition, strife, disturbances, disputes, quarrels, and struggles, which relate to the cohesion of the underlying social process. In developing countries, especially when an indigenous population is involved, the underlying social process is often more

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[11] Laura Nader and Harry F. Todd, Jr. (eds)., 1978. The Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies. New York, Columbia University Press. This book focuses on the anthropology of law by examining ten actual disputes from different countries, and discusses why certain types of outcomes take place based on the relationship between the formal legal system and localized, informal styles of resolving conflict.

important than the formal legal process. The personal ties, bonds, and cooperation that define formal surface relationships constitute this social process.[12] Yet, outsiders rarely understand how the social process works in a community that is unfamiliar to him or her. The result is bad communication, and the start of a ruined relationship that will almost certainly prevent the attainment of a mutual objective.

Ruined Relationships

Culture is intertwined with political and economic conditions, especially in societies where dependency has marked the relationship. It is difficult to separate the cultural elements that affect a relationship from political and economic factors. Societies who are historically dependent on more powerful countries, for whatever reason, possess a form of cultural dualism based on the convergence of their traditional lifestyles and dependency on the outside group.

On one hand, relying on outsiders for new policy initiatives may be frowned upon, as members of the society would rather control their own affairs. At the same time,

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[12] Max Gluckman, 1965. Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford, Basil Blackman. Gluckman discusses the application of social anthropology to political struggles and social order, especially in relation to rights to land and property, which are comparable to control over natural resources.

societies that are dependent on outside parties to meet their basic human needs such as food, education, and public infrastructure can experience a weakening of their self-determination. As self-determination weakens, so does the ability to control internal affairs. This is often complicated by other costs of dependency, such as massive emigration which drains the community of educated professionals and skilled laborers, and financial concessions to outside investors to promote economic growth, which in turn accelerates changes in traditional lifestyles and culture.

Within dependent societies there is often a feeling of exile, as people feel they have no control over their own destinies. Communities can feel so disenfranchised that outside parties are allowed to maintain control over the policy making apparatus. This allows outsiders to exert control over the political system, reducing sovereignty and reinforcing feelings of dependency and exile.

Elements of Culture in the Eastern Caribbean

The indigenous Amerindian culture of the Eastern Caribbean region included the Arawaks and the Caribs, who were undisturbed for centuries until Europeans started to colonize the islands in the 15th century. Although the Caribs, who were more warlike than the Arawaks, successfully defended some islands for many years, by 1630 there was a

steady flow of Spanish, British, Dutch and French immigrants. With the advent of plantation agriculture in the 16th century, nearly five million Africans were forcibly brought to the Caribbean to provide slave labor. Abolished in the 1830s, slavery formed the basis for the current Afro-Caribbean culture that dominates life in the region.[13]

The cultures of the islands have much in common due to a shared plantation history, but they all possess unique characteristics based on the relationship with their particular European colonizer. This has created tremendous cultural diversity among the small societies in the region. The massive scale of social and economic change in the region makes it difficult to trace how the residents of any particular island formed their cultural identity, but some general statements can be made.[14]

The indigenous Indian people who first populated the islands were exterminated and replaced by a bipolar society

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[13] In Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience, Khan summarizes the pre-colonial history of the region, and how political power gradually shifted from the metropolitan capitols to the islands. In From Columbus to Castro: A History of the Caribbean, (1970, New York, Random House) Eric Williams discusses how power struggles between European colonialists were fed by a world economy fueled by monopoly control of gold, sugar and slaves in the Caribbean, and the resulting impact of European cultures in the region.

[14] In The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area Sidney W. Mintz (Journal of World History, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1966) argues that the mix of historical traditions, diverse origins of Caribbean populations and complicated history of European cultural impositions make it useless to assign a single definition of culture to all Caribbean societies.

whose resources were controlled entirely by forces outside of the region. This resulted in a strong dependency on outside governments and institutions for political and economic control, and created distinct social classes based on skin color. These social classes originated with the master-slave relationship. People were, and still are in many areas, classified by skin color, with white the upper class, colored (light-skinned black, brown, yellow and red)the middle class and black the lower class. The white upper class are typically creole-elites, white descendants of European heritage. The smallest islands in the region such as St. Kitts are more ethnically homogeneous, but still have a creole-white upper class that retains significant economic power, although opportunities for non-whites are increasing. Other islands, such as St. Lucia, tend to be controlled by a light-skinned upper class, who distinguish themselves from all others of all shades.[15]

The importance of color-based class lines is explained here to underscore the complexity of Caribbean societies. However, there are many exceptions to rules based on skin color. The importance of skin color is decreasing as the

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[15] H. Hoetink, 1985. "Race" and Color in the Caribbean. In Caribbean Contours (Mintz and Price, eds.), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Hoetink describes how the meaning attached to skin color and ethnicity evolved in the Caribbean, and why it is different than in other societies due to the colonial history in the region. He quotes Lowenthal (David Lowenthal, 1972, West Indian Societies, London, Oxford University Press) regarding the relationship between skin color and political control of St. Kitts and St. Lucia.

region modernizes and people of all classes benefit from better economic opportunities.[16] But, the societies of the islands still place significant emphasis on the role of the individual.

The plantation system diminished the strength of African traditions as African blacks were assimilated into a European-based creole culture. This prevented the creation of a unified culture. In the vacuum of an overarching culture, individualism started to dominate the island societies, a type of behavior modeled on the old master-slave relationship.[17] Individualism has had a strong impact on the political development of the islands. Several countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean have been ruled by charismatic and personalistic men who serve as top political leaders for several years at a time.[18]

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[16] During my field work several Barbadians observed that a black middle class is emerging on that island, and in St. Kitts, perhaps one of the most stratified society's in the region, recent economic opportunities support several small and mid-sized black-owned businesses.

[17] In The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area, Mintz hypothesizes that a distinct quality of Caribbean social organization, especially in local cultures with a long plantation era such as those of the Eastern Caribbean, is the heavy emphasis on individual dyadic ties, compared to membership in larger social groups based on family. He proposes that this is an adaptive response to the intense westernization, long colonial history, heterogeneous population origins, and special economic history of the Caribbean.

[18] In the West Indies this has included several Prime Ministers, including Vere Bird Sr., Antigua; Dr. Eric Williams, Trinidad and Tobago; Errol Barrow and the Adams family in Barbados; and John Compton, St. Lucia; who all

While some members of the island communities have benefited from the opportunities of individualism, the bulk of the population has not. The people in the islands continue to delegate responsibility for social control to a few strong individuals, a pattern that started in the plantation era when they had no choice. This has helped create a modern culture where people seem to distrust innovation, are unwilling to take risks to change the status quo, do not engage in long term planning, and have a perception of helplessness in controlling their lives.[19] I heard these sentiments expressed during personal interviews with civil servants who repeatedly said that their governments lack the capacity for long term planning (B 10, SK 4, SL 6).

In addition to individualism, feelings of alienation and exile among West Indians affect their cultures and

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served for many years (Bird and Compton are still in office).

[19] See Khan's Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience, Chapter Three for a psychological-attitudinal profile of the Eastern Caribbean. He describes these societies as experiencing perceived powerlessness and incapacity for self-governance, so that "policy makers tend to create an impression of being powerful", and "Decisions on all ranges of questions tend to be made by them personally...". The observation of W.A. Lewis (The Industrialization of the British West Indies, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, 1957) that "West Indians wait for something to happen" helps to explain how people in the region do not take the initiative to create social change, leaving the responsibility for policy change to a few strong individualistic political leaders who also often prefer not to take the initiative.

political systems, preventing the region from developing.[20] These characteristics are embedded in the culture and influence how people think about their governments and political systems. A feeling of exile is the result of forced migration during slavery, when millions of Africans were taken from the Ivory Coast. Having arrived in the West Indies, they lived in exile from their African homeland. Their feelings of dispossession were magnified because they were given no control over their new lives in the Caribbean, They were torn from their African culture and were prevented by the plantation system from choosing a new culture to replace it, a double-exile.

In the words of the West Indian poet Derek Walcott:

> Where shall I turn, divided to the vein?
> I who have cursed
> The drunken officer of British rule, how choose
> Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
> Betray them both, or give back what they give?
> How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
> How can I turn from Africa and live? [21]

Mintz notes that many Caribbean researchers have been

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[20] Neville C. Duncan, 1982. Political Systems and Constraints on Cultural Sovereignty in the Anglophone Eastern Caribbean. A paper presented at the Conference on Culture and Sovereignty in the Caribbean, November 20-23 in Grenada. Duncan says: "A consideration of the concept of alienation is vital because development is essentially a process that restores man to himself". He goes on to quote Marx that all developments in human history tend "toward a single goal of eliminating alienation among men and, thus, revealing to them that they are masters and creators of their own social world".

[21] From the poem A Far Cry from Africa, by Derek Walcott, in Derek Walcott: Collected Poems, 1948-84. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

struck by the relative absence of community-based activity in the region. There is a general weakness in community organizations, including those focusing on church, school, political and social activities. This may result from the lack of control that West Indians experienced for several generations.[22]

Dependency, Insularity and Distrust of Outsiders

There are several aspects of island culture that contribute to the insularity in the Eastern Caribbean. The process of colonialization initially produced a "culture of silence". Africans brought to the islands as slaves were prevented by their masters from keeping their native culture alive. They were forbidden to practice ceremonies and rituals that portrayed their mythology of life and death.[23]

In turn, the generations of slavery helped the

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[22] Mintz, The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area. Mintz states that the plantation system has contributed to the development of a national identity in some Caribbean societies, but in many others has retarded their development. He mentions that the elements of the plantation system that have created this situation are forced labor and forced immigration.

[23] See Paget Henry, 1983. Decolonization and Cultural Underdevelopment in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy and Development (Paget Henry and Carl Stone, eds.). Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Henry describes how Africans brought to the Caribbean sought to define a new West Indian identity to replace the cultural heritage left behind on the Ivory Coast. Anglicization was brought into the Eastern Caribbeancame with the plantation system, further suppressing the development of a regional culture based on the African experience.

former Africans to form a strong collective identity, based on their economic oppression and desire to be free people. This group identity, born from a common experience as victims of a racist slavery mentality, has not been allowed to fully develop because of the islands geographical isolation, and continued economic and political dependency on larger nations outside of the region. These factors have also created a mentality, common among islands around the world, of "insiders and outsiders".

In the words of a Kittian, "an outsider is an outsider, (but) if you are from here, everyone assumes you know everyone else" (SK 8). There is an established interdependency among islanders who are tied together by the need to survive with limited resources and capital. There is always the expectation that "outsiders come with a hidden agenda" that "grows out of our past misuse" (SK 4). This has led to a grudging acceptance of outsiders who are basically not trusted.

Many West Indians believe that white outsiders are often racist, or at least carry an air of superiority, looking down on their small societies. This has been attributed to an ignorance of West Indian culture and the needs of people who live in small island communities (SK 4). This has amplified the insularity of the region that exists due to its geographical isolation and plantation history.

Growing Influence of the United States

While European colonialization of the region has left a strong legacy, the cultural milieu is constantly evolving in response to internal and external conditions. The uniqueness of the Caribbean, always recognized in the region because of its religious expressions, linguistic diversity, native music (calypso and steel drum) and annual Carnivals, is now known throughout the world. Bob Marley brought reggae to a worldwide audience, along with an awareness of its Rastafarian roots. An amazing number of writers have emerged on the literary scene, including Walcott, Lamming, Naipaul, Aime Cesaire, and Braithwaite. But the most influential factor affecting the modern culture of the West Indies may be its growing relationship with the United States.

The United States has largely replaced Europe as the metropolitan power in the region. Immigration to the United States from the West Indies more than tripled from 1951 to 1980.[24] Large scale immigration started when islanders had moved outside of the region to find work when the plantation economy severely eroded in the mid 1800s. This trend is accelerating because the regional and local economies cannot support the rapidly growing population.

The Caribbean has grown increasingly dependent on the

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[24] United States Bureau of the Census, 1984. Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 126.

United States to buy export crops and finance development. The growth of tourism and industrialization has caused building booms on several islands. The influx of development has changed traditional land use patterns, displaced communities, and degraded natural resources. Resorts are being developed on beaches that displace local fishermen, and new highways are dividing old villages.[25] Satellite dishes have brought American cable television to the most remote communities. Political leaders choose U.S.-style development to bolster island economies. The result is a dilution of the cultural diversity in the region, another obstacle for West Indians trying to find their own cultural identity.

The Culture of Decision Making

There is a close relationship between culture and politics among the islands of the Eastern Caribbean. The ways in which culture and politics interact has a major effect on how new public policies are carried out, including

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[25] See A Close Encounter of the Third World: West Indian Fishermen and Supertankers, by Stephen Koester, Cultural Survival Quarterly, 11(2), 1987. Koester documents how the new Hess oil refinery at Cul de Sac Bay on St. Lucia has displaced several fishermen who can no longer fish. They cannot move to another sites as it would result in "war" with other fishermen who already have claimed them. The fishermen who are displaced depend on artisinal techniques that they can no longer use. In Gros Inlet on St. Lucia, a resort destroyed two fishing beaches. These and similar developments threaten artisinal fishermen throughout the region, who use techniques their ancestors brought from Africa.

policies intended to protect the environment.

"Outsiders don't understand the tremendous intensity of politics here, **everything is political.** A large part of the culture is political; intense personal communication is part of the culture, and most of the conversations are political" (SK 19). "Party politics is usually all of an issue. Most organizations are split by party loyalties; opposition members will oppose just to oppose, not due to any factual position. Common people are not included in this, just party leaders, so people develop apathy due to being left out; (the) realities of politics go far beyond parties; it tells where the power lies" (SL 7).

These observations by West Indians show how deeply politics are imbedded in their culture. The power of politicians grows from the dependency on individualism that grew out of the plantation system. In many ways, the plantocracy of the colonial era has been replaced by a modern political plantocracy. This is especially true of small islands that have a low level of political and economic development. Strong personalistic leaders are chosen to run the government. These leaders are often paternalistic and have been repeatedly re-elected despite obvious corruption.[26]

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[26] Lindel Smith, 1981. Caribbean Quarterly. 27(1), March, 1981. Smith discusses St. Kitts as being one of the true plantation economies in the Eastern Caribbean, with a socio-economic structure that lends itself to an extreme form of paternalism. He mentions how low levels of political and

The politics practiced in the Eastern Caribbean can be termed "man-to-man politics" as virtually all decisions are made verbally among a small group of political leaders and their supporters. This concentration of power is magnified by two factors. First, no public record exists of most policy negotiations, including Cabinet meetings. This lack of accountability reduces the chances that policies that are adopted will be implemented. Second, politicians use civil servants to carry out their political agendas, causing public institutions to become heavily politicized.

Another reason that political power is so concentrated is a phenomena that can be called "one person-many hats." This describes how people, usually men, develop several skills on an island. Typically a person will gain acceptance by becoming proficient in many roles, usually combining politics and business, allowing them to wield political and economic influence. It is common to have politicians and business leaders exert strong influence over public policy because they wear many hats. This is part of

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economic development in the region leads to a highly personalistic form of government, with primary importance placed on leaders, and that due to the small size of the islands this is likely to continue for some time.

The observation about leaders being re-elected despite obvious corruption is based in part on the re-election of Vere Bird Sr., long time Prime Minister of Antigua, in 1987 even after it was publicly revealed that a contract to pave the airport had included large side-payments to his son, also a government official, who then took on the nickname "Runway".

the island culture.[27]

There are other cultural norms that shape how political decisions are made in the Eastern Caribbean. One such norm is the lack of public involvement in the political process. This is due to a sense of alienation among the citizenry, a lack of community organizations, and a fear among political leaders that members of the Opposition will use public forums to attack government policies.[28] The result of this closed system of decision making can be called the "culture of decision making".

A handful of individuals control the national policy making process. The societies in the region are small. It is virtually impossible for anyone to disagree with the political leadership without it becoming public knowledge. This includes civil servants who are responsible for implementing public policies. For example, St. Kitts, St.

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[27] The "one person many hats" phenomenon can be seen be looking at the career of two individuals on St. Lucia. Clem Bobb is an influential businessman who owns an insurance company, a television station, is a former member of the development control authority, is founder of the Soufriere Development Committee, and is a member of the Tourist Board and School Board. Gabriel Charles was the Chief Forester, founder of the Environmental Commission. Chairman of the Parks and Protected Areas program, Vice-Chairman of the Beaches and Parks Commission, and on the governing board of the National Trust.

[28] Interviews with current and ex-officials in the region revealed that public forums are not encouraged in general in the Eastern Caribbean. Political leaders feel that politically sensitive issues "could generate too much interest among the public and stretch out the process too long" (SK 4). Public forums can also be used by opposition groups to undermine the government.

Lucia and Barbados have radio call-in shows that allow citizens to express their opinions on political issues. Civil servants fear that their voices will be recognized, so they don't call to express an opinion, although they may know the most about an issue.

In these tightly controlled political systems, everyone knows everyone else. Rumors spread like wildfire. If a person disagrees with the government, they are seen as directly challenging the authority of an individual in the government, such as the Prime Minister. With the exception of conflicts between the Majority and Opposition parties, public disagreements are deemed unacceptable behavior. Even when civil servants break from the political leadership due to private disagreements, they generally remain silent because they do not want to make enemies.[29] This informal code of silence quiets potential adversaries, due to a desire to maintain personal relationships and long term social stability in the community.

The countries of the Eastern Caribbean, in the tradition of the English Commonwealth to which they belong, use the British system of regulation. Under this system, civil servants use their discretion to enforce government regulations, such as pollution laws. But this approach

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[29] One former civil servant described this informal code of silence as "not airing your dirty laundry in public" while an official involved in the Pitons controversy alluded to it when he said that civil servants can't get involved as they fear for their families (SK 4).

does not work for two reasons. First, the islands lack the tradition of a highly trained and professional civil service that is needed to effectively use the British system. Second, government ministers oversee all actions of individual civil servants, maintaining control over the smallest policy decisions. Civil servants are not allowed to use their discretion. For example, they know that they will be overruled by a minister or permanent secretary if they try to force industry to comply with environmental laws, as the violator will appeal directly to an ally in the political leadership for relief. The civil servant is then rebuked and his or her decision overturned. Once this happens there is a reluctance to repeat the experience, so subsequent attempts to enforce the law are not as enthusiastic. The result is that many laws remain unenforced (SK 2).

Policy Implementation and the Courts

An important cultural norm that affects how policies are implemented relates to the judicial system in the Eastern Caribbean.[30] In developed countries when a public policy, such as a regulation to control water pollution, is

[30] Barbados has its own judicial system, while St. Lucia and St. Kitts are part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States judicial system. Both systems are similar. The first level of judicial review is the High Court followed by the Court of Appeal. Decisions made by the Court of Appeal may be appealed to the Privy Council in London.

not enforced, an individual or civic organization can usually sue to force the government to obey the law. The situation in the Eastern Caribbean is very different, and is related to the West Indian culture.

The societies in the Eastern Caribbean are not traditionally legalistic (B 19). Personal relations are very important, so disputes are settled informally rather than using an adversarial legal approach that would damage personal relationships. The chances are that a disputant has a relative or friend in the Majority party, or in the leadership of the Opposition. It is less expensive, takes less time, and is probably more effective to use personal influence to settle disputes, rather than using the courts. This informal approach is used although it would seem to lessen the formal, legal accountability of political leaders and the government. The public also lacks confidence in the courts due to past incidence of corruption, and most people don't have the money to hire an attorney. There is no tradition of legal assistance to provide poor people with legal representation (B 14).

Informal dispute resolution is not used to enforce environmental laws because "they are not catching politically" (B 10). Few people are concerned about environmental problems, certainly not enough to form a national constituency. One reason there is so little public support for more effective environmental laws are the

cultural norms that relate to how people in the region feel about the natural world.

Perceptions of the Environment

A few important themes describe how the people of the Eastern Caribbean perceive the natural environment. These themes are a plantation heritage, subsistence agriculture, and natural disasters. All three themes collectively form what can be termed a cultural attitude towards the environment.[31]

The hallmark of the plantation era was the master-slave relationship. The master used every means at his disposal to force the maximum possible effort from the slave, amid inhuman hot and humid conditions. As a consequence, many people now have an aversion to manual labor. People who perform manual labor, including resource users such as fisherman and farmers, are looked down upon (B 3, SK 11, SL 14).[32] As a result, many people have a negative perception of the natural landscape, associating it with the

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[31] See Yves Renard (ed.), 1979. Perceptions of the Environment: A Selection of Interpretative Essays. Bridgetown, Barbados, Caribbean Conservation Association. This collection of articles focuses on different ways that small communities of resource users use and think about the environment.

[32] When asked to explain this, a former Peace Corp worker on St. Kitts who worked with fishermen for several years said that they are generally described as "someone with an empty stomach and a wet ass" (SK 19).

plantation era.[33] The idea of conserving the natural landscape in its native state free of human impact is not a part of the culture. There is no conservation tradition in the region. Environmental issues have only garnered limited public attention in the last few years.

Natural disasters also have influenced how the environment is perceived. The islands are subjected to frequent large scale natural disasters including incredibly intense rain storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts, heat waves and earthquakes that damage crops, buildings, and literally wipe out entire communities.[34] There are two consequences for the environment. First, it is perceived as hostile, which indeed it is. Second, limited human and financial resources must be allocated to repair the damage that results. This dilution of limited institutional resources, combined with the cultural bias against long term planning, prevents environmental management programs from

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[33] On St. Kitts, if a student does poorly on high school placement tests, it is said that he or she is headed for "the green college", a derisive name for the sugar cane fields (SK 19).

[34] Hurricanes in 1979 and 1980 wiped out the banana crop in St.Lucia, the largest earner of foreign exchange. In June, 1987 a rain storm caused widespread damage on Nevis and knocked out a main power plan in St. Kitts. In 1989 Hurricane Hugo destroyed or damaged half on the buildings on Nevis and caused heavy damage on St. Kitts. Local residents say that it takes months to recover from the psychological affects of these disasters, and for life to resume a normal pattern due to the severe disruption they cause.

being implemented.[35]

Of course there are other factors that determine how people perceive and value the environment, including economics, social class, and educational background. But culture is a dominant factor, and if not accounted for in the public policy process, will hinder attempts to enforce environmental policies.

Lessons from the Eastern Caribbean

St. Lucia

In St. Lucia, the culture of decision making played an important role in the Pitons controversy. St. Lucia's political leaders supported the development of a private resort on the Jalousie Estate in 1981 by granting Sir Colin Tennant an Alien Landholding License for the property. This reversed an earlier Cabinet decision to purchase the Estate as part of the proposed Pitons National Park.

Officials close to the project feel that Tennant's reputation as the successful developer of the island of Mustique in the Grenadines helped him garner support from St. Lucia's politicians. The Prime Ministers of St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are cousins. This family tie is thought to be a major reason why the license was

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[35] See Khan, Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience. This finding is consistent with Khan's research which found that a belief in organized life and long term planning is limited in the region.

granted (SL 16). The support of the Prime Minister was essential, as he has ruled the country for most of the post-independence period, reflective of the regional tradition for charismatic politicians to stay in power for long periods of time. There are other ways that the importance of family ties, combined with party loyalty, have affected the Pitons controversy.

The St. Lucia National Trust, established in 1975, is the main government agency responsible for natural resource management, including the maintenance of several important wildlife areas. The Trust was the first agency to document the ecological importance of the Pitons, and recommended that the Jalousie Estate be preserved in open space as early as 1975.[36] But the official voice of the Trust has been silenced during the Pitons controversy because the chairman of the Trust is also the leader of the Opposition. If the Trust were to publicly oppose the resort project, it would be branded as anti-government and a tool of the Opposition (SL 13, 16). This would destroy the creditability of the Trust within the government and hamper its other conservation activities that require the support of the political leadership. So, the Trust has remained silent.

Another potential supporter of the proposed park is the St. Lucia Archaeological and Historical Society. The Prime

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[36] Robert Devaux, 1975. St. Lucia Historical Sites. Castries, St. Lucia, the St. Lucia National Trust.

Minister's wife is Vice-President of the Society. But, if she were to support the park proposal, opposing the resort, she would be publicly opposing her husband. She has remained silent. Thus, family ties have also nullified the Society as a source of support for the park. In both instances, the Opposition's silence has supported the government's position of promoting pro-development policies that lead to environmental damage. And there is another way the government silenced its opponents.

The government used the threat of alienation to attack opponents of the resort. The Soufriere Development Committee, made up of community leaders from Soufriere, supported the proposed park and opposed the resort. They ostensibly supported the park because of the economic opportunities it would provide, although some observers felt that their primary motive was to promote their own financial interests. Nonetheless, the Committee supported conservation of the Jalousie Estate (SL 6).

Members of the SDC were active in lobbying the government to drop its support of the resort and support the national park, individually and as members of the ad hoc environmental group Concerned Persons on the Environment. However, when one particularly influential member of the SDC started publicly supporting the park, word swept the island that he was "a rumored member of the Opposition" (SL 4). This label was intended to alienate him from the community

and the government, damaging his personal reputation as well as his extensive private business interests. In all probability this tactic discouraged him from further public opposition to the resort (SL 12).

The citizens of Soufriere adhered to another norm of the cultural of decision making by accepting how the developer of the resort influenced the government to support his project. When the owners and developers of the Jalousie Estate gave a EC$100,000 donation to the Soufriere Hospital Committee in February, 1989, residents of Soufriere saw the eventual construction of the resort as "a done deal" (SL 20). At the time, the developer had not received permission from the national planning authorities to build the project. Nonetheless, once the people of Soufriere saw the money change hands between the developer and the political leadership, they saw the park as a lost cause.[37]

The Pitons are an essential part of St. Lucia's culture. As one St. Lucian said: "They are seen as the guardians of the island. They have entered the psychological consciousness of the people, as shown by stories told about them in wedding ceremonies that relate

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[37] This was reflected in comments made to me in the streets of Soufriere by local residents during the annual carnival, and in the words of the song "Jalousie's Wedding" sung by the 1989 Calypso King, Alman. The lyrics of this Calypso tune talk of the "wedding" between the developers of the resort and politicians, that the Jalousie Estate has been lost to outsiders, the people of Soufriere have nothing to say about it, and will gain nothing from it.

the importance of a strong, durable bond in marriage. The Pitons are seen as symbols of the country. If they are given away, anything in the country can be given away. They are a focal point for all of our national concerns" (SL 7). Another said: "The Jalousie Estate is the bosom of St. Lucia. The people know this and have to be involved. The resource users, like charcoal cutters, have to be trained as resource managers" (SL 2).

If the planning team from the Organization of American States, who prepared the proposal for the Pitons National Park, could have tapped this popular sentiment to protect the Pitons, it may have gained the national support needed to be successful. There was a lack of grassroots participation when the park was being planned. This occurred in part because the government disapproves of public meetings, but park proponents also seemed to underestimate the importance of culture in the public policy process (SL 8). As one official said: "The OAS park proposal was prepared with the input of a small group of technicians, not reflecting the people of Soufriere, but their own views of the area" (SL 2). This had several repercussions.

First, it prevented local people from becoming politically organized to challenge the culture of decision making that has kept this isolated part of the island relatively powerless in national political affairs. Second,

it prevented local people from becoming involved in promoting the park as a way to provide development opportunities consistent with the scale of the local community, minimizing disruption to the culture, compared to the large resort at the Jalousie Estate. Third, it prevented people from being educated about what a conservation-oriented national park is. As one observer said; "To the average St. Lucian, a park is a soccer field; the concept of setting aside a large area as a wildland, without any obvious productive human use, is foreign (SL 6)". The park planning process could have been used as a vehicle to increase local understanding of environmental conservation, and to help make it an element of the national culture. Finally, it would have allowed planning technicians to create a park to meet the specific needs of local people. This could have included enlisting the many resource users in the area (small farmers, herders, charcoal producers, fishermen) to become resource managers to protect the local environment, also helping to create an environmental tradition for the island.

St. Kitts

The culture of decision making that exists on St. Kitts leads to a type of government similar to the plantocracy that existed in the plantation era, with politicians replacing foreign elites. This is due to the relatively low

level of political and economic development on the island, and the importance that Kittians place on electing strong leaders.[38] A very small group of politicians and party loyalists control the public policy apparatus, supporting a pro-development policy agenda which prevents environmental policies from being implemented.

The planning process for the Southeast Peninsula Development Project is controlled by a two key political leaders, illustrating the premium given to individualistic behavior by the island's culture. The Minister of Development and the Attorney General have been the chief negotiators for the government with USAID. The Minister has a broad portfolio with jurisdiction over the peninsula advisory board, the Central Planning Unit, and agencies related to housing and agriculture. He exercises total control over the peninsula's development, and fails to enforce environmental policies in the rest of the country. He epitomizes the culture of decision making that exists in the country.

The Southeast Peninsula Development Project is simply huge by island standards. Its 6.4 mile long road, costing $17 million, runs over steep coastal hillsides while

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[38] See Lindel Smith, 1981. Elections and Politics in the Eastern Caribbean. Caribbean Quarterly, 27(1), March, 1981. Smith hypothesizes that politics in St. Kitts are less sophisticated than other countries in the region due to its low level of political development, leading to a highly personalized brand of public policy.

skirting numerous beaches and bays. The road was built to provide access to provide access to 4000 acres of undeveloped land, and in this it has succeeded. But, the project was designed and carried out with little thought given to its cultural impact. The constraints that the Kittian culture impose on the political system were ignored by USAID when it designed a program to implement policies to protect the abundant natural resources on the peninsula, and this has led to severe problems.

USAID took several steps intended to protect the natural resources of the southeast peninsula. It required that politicians pass national conservation legislation, hired consultants who cataloged natural resources and recommended how to manage them, and prompted the government to establish an advisory board to oversee the development of the peninsula. USAID envisioned that these and other policy-oriented elements of the project would be operational by the time the road was completed. But, this has not happened.

In St. Kitts, as in other Eastern Caribbean countries, policy implementation is a long, slow process. It is based on "man-to-man" communication and trust between individuals that takes years to develop. It takes most outsiders several years to be accepted by local people, such as political leaders, and to be aware of the numerous subtleties that are simply very difficult for outsiders to

understand, such as classism, power relationships and the way that the culture of decision making works.

Outsiders trying to promote policy reform, including USAID, operate on a fixed, fast paced schedule, reflective of continental lifestyles and institutional protocols. But St. Kitts continues to have a pace of life reflective of the tropical heat, humidity, and one-on-one relationships that mirror the insularity and interdependence of island living. As a result, many of the environmental policies designed by USAID are taking years, rather than months, to be adopted.[39]

Another factor leading to the slow acceptance of new policies is the desire to preserve harmony in the society. When a new policy is introduced, it causes conflict with traditional values. For example, the National Conservation and Environment Protection Act contained a definition of beach and foreshore that was disliked by land owners on the peninsula as it could adversely affect property values. Sensitive issues such as this are generally discussed bit by bit over a long period of time. After the new idea has had a chance to sink in, which may take a year or two, it may be acted on. This pattern of gradual disclosure of new

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[39] When discussing how slow the public policy process works in St. Kitts, one official paraphrased a top politician who was protesting a policy change; "Man, you are laying too much on the people" (SK 4). This response has been given to efforts to preserve the natural resources on the peninsula, which have been proceeding slowly. In the words of an official close to the project, the country is learning **very slowly** how to deal with the planning process for the peninsula (SK 25).

information is done out of a need to preserve harmony in the society, and will not change due to pressure from outsiders.[40]

A continental bias has underlain the entire environmental planning process for the peninsula, designed by outsiders who don't understand the scale of St. Kitts and how its culture influences the political process (SK 4).

Barbados

Although it is more developed politically and economically than St. Lucia or St. Kitts, Barbados possesses some of the same cultural characteristics common to countries in the Eastern Caribbean. It has a political culture that favors strong individuals, a plantation heritage that has alienated many people from direct involvement in the public policy process, including the advocacy of environmental issues, and a closed decision

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[40] As described by a former government official, the slow process of policy implementation has several distinct steps. Unlike the United States, there is a huge gap between a law and the regulation to implement the law. Once a law is adopted, discretionary guidelines are informally developed by civil servants to carry out the law. As the voluntary guidelines are used more and more, the government starts to think about creating formal regulations. Politicians "test the waters" with the guidelines to find out what kind of regulation is politically feasible. Then a way has to be found to present the proposed regulation in a simple and concise manner. This process requires that civil servants responsible for implementing new policies possess a lot of political skill, are patient, can work effectively in an informal manner behind the scenes, and do this all without much in the way of financial and technical resources.

making system that favors development over environmental protection. Because the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor originated in the political directorate of the national government, the cross-cultural problems affecting policy implementation in the Pitons controversy and the Southeast Peninsula project did not exist. But, problems did arise when the government chose a Canadian consultant to design the harbor who was unfamiliar with conditions in the tropics. This in turn raises a concern about the suitability of sophisticated technologies used for the harbor, which is also related to the island culture of Barbados.

Several Barbadians familiar with the fishing harbor were alarmed when the consultants designing it seemed to be unfamiliar with the tropical conditions in which they were working. Specific mistakes in the design included the ice processing plant which was originally designed based on the ambient temperature of sea water in the Atlantic Ocean rather than the warmer Caribbean Sea, and the improper placement of input pipes that caused the pumping system for the ice plant to be destroyed, delaying the opening of the harbor for several months. Civil servants who were knowledgeable about the day-to-day operation of the Barbados fishing fleet, and how the operation of the plant would be constrained by the technological knowledge available in the country, felt that the foreign consultants were not paying

attention to these concerns. They found it very difficult to influence the design of the facility. Finally, after much conflict between the consultants, the Ministry of Agriculture, who employed them, and the Fisheries Division, the government designated a liaison between the consultant and the government to address these concerns (B 13). Still, many government officials close to the project, after seeing the smaller fishing harbor at Ostins fail, feel that the Bridgetown project will be a "white elephant" because it depends heavily on sophisticated technology (B 22).

Cultural conditions could influence the technical feasibility of the Bridgetown project in two ways. First, political leaders operating within the culture of decision making are likely to reward their political patrons with jobs with in the new facility. This will place an emphasis on filling jobs with local people who lack the management skills to operate the harbor. Second, when any one of the many pieces of machinery in the facility (pumps, motors, scales, water and electrical lines, cranes, the ice plant, etc.) breaks, as will inevitably happen in the harsh tropical environment, it is doubtful if replacement parts will be available on the island or in the region. The large scale of the project, with its many complex inter-connected components, appears to exceed the technological constraints of the island. Although the project included some technical training, Barbados does not have the trained personnel to

operate it or the replacement parts to fix its equipment when it breaks. The project was not adapted to the technological and cultural limitations of the island.

Summary

Culture and political decision making in the Eastern Caribbean are inseparable, and the link between them has to be understood to find new ways to implement policies intended to protect natural resources. When environmental policies are adopted by developing countries in the region, often as a requirement of development assistance, they are based on models from the United States and Europe. In almost every instance, these imported laws do not take adequate account of local and national culture, and as a result, fail.

The elements of a culture that must be taken into account include: language, kinship, attitudes towards formal authorities, attitudes towards outsiders, the importance between informal and formal systems used to resolve conflicts, and the role of non-verbal behavior cues in communication. The different cultural perspectives of people who are either polychronic or monochronic have to be examined so that misunderstandings do not occur when public policies are transferred from developed to developing societies. It is crucial to understand the use of written versus spoken language, especially in countries whose

residents have a strong oral tradition, and to design a specific strategy for policy implementation that respects how people within a cultural group use language in their everyday life.

Culture is interconnected with the political and economic conditions in countries, especially in societies that have been dependent on outsiders to meet their basic human needs. Understanding how dependency has shaped a society, and possibly undermined its self-determination, is essential to designing public policies that work.

To implement environmental policies it is critical to know how to account for the special characteristics that make up a countries unique culture. In the Eastern Caribbean, the plantation system that dominated the region from the early 16th century until the mid-1800s formed the basis for the Afro-Caribbean culture that is dominant today. The premium on individualism, a distrust of outsiders, and pervasive feelings of alienation and exile are the legacy of the plantation era. These elements of culture, combined with the small size of the societies, have had a pronounced affect on the public policy process.

Outsiders often simply don't understand intensity of politics in the Eastern Caribbean. Intense personal communication is part of the culture. Public policy decisions are controlled by the loyalty to people and political parties among top political leaders. "Man-to-

man" politics is dominant, reflecting the vitality of personal relationships and need for trust.

The distrust of outsiders, a strong desire for self-governance, the small size of public agencies and the politicalization of civil servants make innovation and creativity in policy making very difficult. People prefer to settle disputes informally rather than to risk damaging personal relationship by resorting to the courts. This lack of legal leverage weakens pro-environmental interest groups trying to strengthen environmental policies.

The way that people in the region perceive the natural environment affects the way that natural resources are managed. The plantation system's abuse of people through manual slave labor has created a negative perception of the landscape. There is no widespread conservation tradition in the region. The concept of setting aside large areas for wildlife and public use is not widely understood. Natural disasters are a regular occurrence, and recovering from them diverts limited technical and financial resources away from long term efforts to improve natural resource management.

An overarching cultural theme that relates to the efforts of outsiders trying to intervene in the regions political systems is the vast difference between island and continental cultures. It is simply very difficult for people from large continental countries to fully appreciate the huge differences between their cultures and those that

exist on small and geographically isolated islands. The linkages between culture and policy making in an island environment, including the use of oral traditions to convey information, social interdependencies, and the affect of a tropical climate on the pace of business and life largely define how these societies operate, and are often not understood by people from continental cultures in the United States and Europe.

In the three countries studied, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados, among the elements of culture that cause environmental concerns to be ignored are: concentrated political power through individualism, family ties and party loyalty; the risk of alienation to environmentalists; and the citizens acceptance of a closed political system. The elements of culture that cause international foreign assistance agencies to fail in their attempts to implement environmental policies are: use of massive projects that are out of scale with the islands; not understanding how long it takes for new policies to be accepted; the pervasive distrust of outsiders in the region; and the use of sophisticated technologies to convey information and operate projects that are in conflict with the cultural norms in the islands.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Relationship Between Economic Conditions and Environmental Policy Implementation

In the Eastern Caribbean and developing countries in general, the basic imperative for economic growth drives development decisions. In the face of severe economic pressures, governments favor large development projects that are designed to provide major financial benefits. It is these large projects that often cause the most environmental damage. Environmental policies intended to protect the environment are seen as obstacles to economic growth and are often ignored.

Attempts to improve environmental policy implementation cannot be separated from the economic realities that political leaders face on a daily basis. These realities include the history of dependency on the North Atlantic states, problems with diversifying national economies, a shortage of foreign exchange to finance imports, persistent high unemployment, and the difficulty in achieving regional integration. To help understand how these elements of the regional economic system have evolved, and in turn how they

relate to environmental policy implementation, I will first briefly describe the economic history of the Eastern Caribbean.

Economic History of the Region

The history of how the economies of the islands in the Eastern Caribbean developed is tied to what happened in the wider Caribbean region. When Christopher Columbus made the first of three voyages to the region in the late 15th century it marked the beginning of the colonial era which did not end until the independence movement in the later half of the 20th century. The hallmark of the colonial era, which lasted more than 300 years, was the mercantile system that controlled the economies of the island states.

The mercantile system was based on a triangular trading pattern between Africa, the Caribbean and Europe. The entire system was managed and capitalized by various European powers in the metropolitan capitals, and exploited the people and resources of their colonies in the Caribbean. Slaves were brought from Africa to the islands, where sugar and rum was picked up and brought to Europe. Finished products were then taken back to the Caribbean to feed and cloth the expanding population, completing the cycle. The financial rewards were great. By the end of the 18th century one third of England's trade was taken up by the sugar industry. Profits from the slave trade were also immense. The sovereigns of Spain, the Netherlands and

England granted licenses to allow traders to buy and sell slaves, and received large fees in return.[1]

Several economic patterns that were established in the plantation era persist today. Because virtually all fertile soil was planted in sugar, no land was left to grow crops. As a result food had to be imported, creating a dependency that has grown in recent years as the population of the islands has increased.[2] Food and consumer durables that must be imported continue to drain national treasuries of highly prized foreign exchange. A common expression in the region is that "The islands consume what they don't produce, and produce what they don't consume".

The geographical isolation of the islands and their small size made them ideal candidates for colonialism and external dependency. Although the plantation economy has changed to some extent, most island economies in the Eastern Caribbean, especially the smaller islands such as St. Kitts, are still struggling to escape from their multiple burdens. Most of these economies are still underdeveloped and dependent on external decisions.[3] This is due in large part

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[1] For a description of the sugar and slave trades, see A Short History of the West Indies, by J. H. Parry and Philip Sherlock, 1971. London, Macmillian Caribbean.

[2] See Jamal Khan, 1987. Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean Experience. Dordrecht, Holland, Foris Publications.

[3] Dr. Colin Clarke, 1988. Sovereignty, Dependency and Social Change in the Caribbean. In South America, Central America and the Caribbean, London, Europa Publications.

to the general neglect given the West Indies by its colonizers after the sugar economy declined in the 19th century. The reasons for this neglect are important elements of the modern economic problems in the region; the economies are small, the expense of communicating and transporting supplies over the long distances between islands and the continents is great, and the relatively small population base means a small political constituency to voice its demands to the international community.[4]

Current Economic Realities

A common characteristic of all island economies in the region is their vulnerability to external circumstances. This partly reflects the cycle of low domestic savings and low investment that existed for many years. In the 1960s foreign investors became interested in the region, spending foreign exchange to build hotels and resorts, refurbish sugar plantations and develop mines. As a result, the region has experienced positive economic growth over the last several years, but at a slower rate than was

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[4] Gordon K. Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the Modern Indies. New York, Monthly Review Press. Lewis describes why political and economic reform was so late in coming to the West Indies, and how England in particular contributed to this retardation of development. Reforms leading to independence were slow and piecemeal, and it was not until the end of colonial era in the 1960s that West Indians were appointed to important administrative posts, in lieu of the British who had historically been assigned to important positions in the region.

anticipated in the 1970s.

The flow of foreign capital, a necessary component for development because of the lack of domestic savings in the region, slowed when initial investment opportunities were exhausted.[5] The decline of the global economy in the 1980s brought disruptions to the island economies due to declining commodity prices, unstable currencies (especially the fall of the US dollar), and wide variations in export prices. Nonetheless, a moderate rate of overall growth has lifted most Eastern Caribbean countries to an intermediate position between industrialized nations and the rest of the developing world.[6] This has been due in part to large grants and low interest loans made to countries by development assistance agencies that have funded a wide variety of projects. This new source of capital has made up for the decline in private foreign investment and contributed to the positive growth rate of the last few years.

In general, economic growth has been based on the diversification of exports, but has been unsteady and highly reactive to fluctuations in the world economy. The region

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[5] Richard Fletcher, 1984. Resources and Expectations in the English-Speaking Caribbean. In The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1975.

[6] Robin Chapman, 1988. Latin America and the Caribbean:Economic Problems. In South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1988. London, Europa Publications.

is oriented heavily toward international trade, and there is no reason to believe this will change.[7] The economies of the islands are unstable because they are typically dominated by one sector, and if adverse conditions affect that sector, the whole economy suffers. One obvious example was the affect of hurricanes in 1979 and 1980 that destroyed most of St. Lucia's banana crop which accounts for about 50% of its total exports.

Because the countries in the region must import large amounts of food and consumer products their external debt is increasing, requiring large payments to service it. Growth in the economy depends on an increase in the value of exports that earn foreign exchange. As debt payments increase so must export earnings if the economy is to grow.

All of the islands have large trade deficits, but they are partly or wholly offset by increased earnings from tourism, remittances from citizens working abroad, and grants. Although their debt to service ratios have steadily increased, reflecting the rise in debt and decline in export earnings, compared to other developing countries the overall performance of the island economies has been good.

The region's overall terms of trade improved in the

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[7] See DeLisle Worrell and Compton Bourne (eds),, 1989. Economic Adjustment Policies for Small Nations: Theory and Experience in the English-Speaking Caribbean. New York, Praeger. This book discusses macro-economic conditions and trends in the region, including the important role of trade, capital movements, fiscal and credit policies.

late 1980s due to an expansion of tourism and a decline in international interest rates.[8] As a comparison, the debt to service ratio for larger countries in Latin America has grown much faster, requiring massive structural adjustments to enable external debt obligations to be met, reversing much of the economic progress made since the 1960s.[9]

Although it is difficult to document precisely due to poor record keeping, language differences, and the existence of a vibrant informal economy, high rates of unemployment have been a persistent problem in the Caribbean. Every country has seen a mass migration of its workers that have moved to another country to find work and send remittances back home. Remittances are a major source of foreign exchange for all of the islands and without them the expanding foreign debt could not be paid off.

Unemployment has several root causes. The most obvious is the underdevelopment that plagues the region and the inability to provide investment capital, through domestic savings or foreign investment, to diversify national

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[8] World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries: Economic Situation, Regional Issues and Capital Flows. A World Bank Country Study, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

[9] Wendell A. Samuel, 1988. Foreign Assistance in the Caribbean: Another View. Samuel proposes that even though the debt service ration of Eastern Caribbean countries is fairly low, their lack of resiliency to variations in the world economy makes them particularly vulnerable. Evidence of this is that most of the foreign debt of the islands is owed to international aid organizations because they lack the economic stability to attract commercial loans.

economies fast enough to provide jobs for the expanding population. Unemployment rates of 20% to 30% in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors are not uncommon. Industrialization has not occurred fast enough to employ workers who have left the agricultural jobs, creating a major labor surplus.[10] The persistence of both unemployment and underemployment mean a loss of productivity for the island economies of the region, and perpetuates a cycle of poverty, poor health and frustration that prevents people from enjoying productive lives.[11]

The Multi-Sectoral Economy

The economy of the Caribbean, including the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, is still dependent on the interest and activity of major investment centers outside of the region, mainly in the United States, Canada, and Europe. The island economies are based on a narrow range of domestic products that are increasingly subject to competitive pressure from the global marketplace and instability due to

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[10] Ransford W. Palmer, 1984. Problems of Development in Beautiful Countries: Perspectives on the Caribbean. Lanham, Maryland, North-South Publishing Company. Palmer describes the reasons for underdevelopment relating to small resource-poor islands in the region, and why early strategies to reduce unemployment through industrialization have failed to live up to their expectations.

[11] Kempe Ronald Hope, 1986. Economic Development in the Caribbean. New York, Praeger. Hope describes the effect of unemployment and underemployment on the economies of the region, and the relation to a fast growing population.

scarcities of foreign exchange, technical expertise and raw materials.[12] Economic conditions in the region can best be described by briefly reviewing the status of agriculture, manufacturing and tourism.

Agriculture: Boom or Bust

The agricultural sector has historically been based on the production of single commodity export crops that garner large amounts of foreign exchange, such as sugar on St. Kitts and bananas on St. Lucia. Problems caused by depending too heavily on export crops, including regular natural disasters, labor unrest, and oscillation in world prices for agricultural commodities, has caused an increased emphasis on diversifying national economies to prevent them from being subject to these uncertainties.

The problems of depending too heavily on export crops is illustrated by the situation in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados. In St. Kitts, the sugar industry, which was nationalized in 1975 so the government could centralize its management and production, accounts for about 60% of domestic exports and employs 25% of the working population. The industry has been in decline since the 1960s.[13] In 1986 the United States imported 12,500 tons of sugar from St.

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[12] Hope, 1986.

[13] South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1988. London, Europa Publications.

Kitts, but this declined to 8,000 tons in 1988 and 1989 due to a U.S. sugar import quota. The amount of sugar harvested in 1989 was substantially less than 1988, a drop from about 25,000 tons compared to 18,000, due to Hurricane Hugo and a shortage of cane cutters on the island.[14]

In St. Lucia the banana crop has been the mainstay of the economy. The government initiated a costly program in the early 1980s to reorganize the industry and increase its efficiency. Foreign earnings from this single crop have increased more than fivefold since 1983. Despite a slow recovery from damage incurred during hurricanes in 1979 and 1980, the largest earner of foreign currency brought in a record $65 million in 1989.[15] But by world standards St. Lucia's bananas are expensive. Most of the annual crop is purchased by the United Kingdom which pays more than the world price to be helpful to its former colony. St. Lucia benefits from the Lome' Convention under which its bananas have first preference in the United Kingdom market, but this may not continue after the European Community consolidates in 1992. The new unified European market could produce bananas cheaper than St. Lucia, substantially reducing the

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[14] The figures on the tonnage of sugar produced in 1988 and 1989 are from Caribbean Insight, 13(3), London, West Indian Committee, March, 1990. A shortage of cane cutters was noted in field interviews with sugar estate managers in 1989, who have to use imported labor to supplement local workers.

[15] Taken from a report on St. Lucia in the Latin American Monitor: the Caribbean. 6 (10), December 1989, London, Latin American Monitor Ltd.

value of its crop and the foreign exchange it earns.[16]

In Barbados the importance of sugar has declined steadily since the early 1960s but still accounts for about 5% of the gross domestic product. Stagnating production in the mid 1980s contributed to a general slowdown in the economy, and efforts are underway to diversify into non-sugar agriculture and related agro-industries. Production has continue to be hampered by poor operating efficiencies and low crop yields. The government initiated a program of price supports in 1983 to support the industry, but the low price of sugar on the world market, in part due to the weakness of the US dollar, has contributed to the general sluggishness of the economy.[17]

Efforts are underway throughout the Eastern Caribbean to diversify agricultural production, shifting emphasis from sugar and bananas to small plot row and fruit crops, to provide local foodstuffs and decrease the amount of foreign exchange spent on food imports. The failure to expand local food supplies impedes economic development in general because it uses limited resources that cannot be utilized by other sectors of the economy as it expands. Problems with securing title to arable land and being able to pay for

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[16] Taken from Guyana, Barbados, Windward and Leeward Islands, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, and A Survey of the Caribbean in the Economist, August 6, 1988.

[17] World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum. Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, the World Bank, Washington, D.C., the World Bank, 1988; and Thorndike, 1988.

expensive agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation systems are barriers to diversification.

The pattern of allocating limited land, human and financial resources to continue producing large scale export crops has been hard to change. To deal with these problems, governments are being urged by the World Bank and other donor agencies to review existing economic incentives, support services and public policies that are hindering diversification.[18] However, given the politically sensitive nature of making changes to the economic and political status quo, such as large scale land reform, it is doubtful that the changes needed to alter the pattern of agricultural production will occur as long as tourism and foreign remittances continue to compensate for expenditures spend on importing food.

The problems of depending on agricultural export crops that are shared by these Eastern Caribbean countries has motivated them all to increase their reliance on international tourism to contribute to their economic stability.

The Emergence of Tourism

The rapid growth of tourism in the 1980s catalyzed the economic growth among the islands of the Eastern Caribbean

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[18] World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries: Economic Situation, Regional Issues and Capital Flows.

with few exceptions. Countries have pursued aggressive strategies for promoting tourism because of its multiplier effect in the economy. Tourism increases local incomes, stimulates investment and employment and raises foreign exchange earnings.[19] It also benefits other sectors of the economy, especially agriculture which in many islands is capable of providing increased quantities of fruits, vegetables and meat to meet the needs of tourists. The manufacturing sector also benefits as the demand increases for tourist-related products.[20]

In the mid 1980s countries in the region initiated efforts to formally integrate tourism into national economic planning. The relatively young industry started to aggressively promote its benefits. The result has been an emphasis on improving the public infrastructure, such as airports, roads, public utilities, waterfront areas and duty free concessions to serve new resorts and cruise ships. This trend can be seen by reviewing the experience with tourism in Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Kitts.

Barbados aggressively promoted tourism in the 1970s. Several major resorts were built on the south and west coasts and daily chartered air flights were started to bring Americans, British and Canadians to the island. A new

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[19] Hope, 1986.

[20] Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre, 1988. The Contribution of Tourism to Economic Growth and Development in the Caribbean. CTRC, St, Michael, Barbados.

airport was built with the financial assistance of the Canadian government in the early 1980s and several other government sponsored programs started to improve the quality of the tourism experience. But by the mid-1980s the revenue from tourists started to drop as other destinations in the Caribbean and South America provided better facilities and benefited from more favorable exchange rates. Real wages have fallen in the industry in recent years.[21]

St. Lucia promoted tourism later than Barbados but is emerging as a major visitor destination. The St. Lucia National Development Plan promotes development of the tourist industry as a major part of the island economy. Hotel rooms on the island have grown from 700 in 1973 to 2500 in 1989 and several projects have been recently completed or are underway. The Caribbean Development Bank estimates that 2000 new rooms are needed to accommodate an expected increase in visitors from Europe. The governments commitment to the industry is reflected by its plans to rebuild the west coast road and construct a dam to supply additional water. A major new power station is under construction and a duty free shopping area was recently added to the harbor in Castries to accommodate cruise ship

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[21] The World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum. Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, the World Bank, Washington, D.C.; The World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries: Economic Situation, Regional Issues and Capital Flows.

passengers.[22] These projects are consistent with the recommendation of the World Bank that hotel capacity should be expanded by strengthening the national Tourist Board, increasing promotional efforts and improving infrastructure.[23]

As the least developed of the three islands, St. Kitts has only recently started to develop its tourist industry, but it has adopted a very aggressive posture to promote it. The government has a program to grant incentives to develop the Frigate Bay area and the USAID funded Southeast Peninsula Development project recently provided access to 4000 acres of land for resorts, condominiums, a marina, cruise ship facilities, duty free shops and houses. Cruise ship stop-overs increased in the mid 1980s but decreased in 1989, apparently due to a lack of tourist facilities on the island. With the decline in the sugar industry and its uncertain future, St. Kitts is banking heavily on tourism to provide the impetus for economic growth well into the 21st century.

Tourism is viewed by the island governments as the savior of their unstable and marginal economies. Although tourism provides many economic benefits, it does have drawbacks. The demand for tropical tourism varies with the

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[22] Taken from the Latin American Monitor-The Caribbean. 6(10), December, 1989, London, Latin American Monitor Ltd.

[23] The World Bank, 1988.

health of the international economy. As a luxury product, tourism responds to the ebb and flow of the national economies in the countries where tourists originate. For example, tourist arrivals in the region declined in the periods 1973-75 and 1981-83, corresponding with a drop in income in the U.S.[24] In addition, a large portion of the earnings from tourism go towards financing imported goods to supply the industry and do not enter the local economy.[25]

In the region there has been a trend of building all-inclusive resorts, such as Club-Med and Couples, where visitors do not have to ever leave the confines of the hotel complex during their stay. Many of the hotel rooms in St. Lucia are of this type. This prevents lower income people, who tend to be self-employed vendors and craftsmen located in urban areas far from the resorts, from sharing in the economic benefits of tourism.

In some communities in the region, such as Bridgetown, Barbados, public officials are expressing concern that the demands of increased tourism will exceed the carrying capacity of the island. The tourist-related building boom in Barbados has caused widespread coastal erosion, increased the runoff of raw sewage into the ocean killing large portions of the reef system, placed stress on fresh water supplies during the December-April dry season and

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[24] Worrell, 1987.

[25] Palmer, 1984.

contributed to increased overcrowding in the downtown (B 30,33).

Manufactering: Mixed Results

The islands have had mixed results from attempts to expand their manufacturing sectors, despite substantial financial incentives offered to entice international companies to locate in the region. A shortage of raw materials and spare parts are a major limiting factor to the growth of this sector. The electronics industry, which assembles completed components from parts made abroad, showed an increase of 26% in 1984, but declined in 1986 due to a deterioration in the U.S. market and competition from Asia. There are several businesses specializing in the production of food, beverages, tobacco, clothing and chemicals. The sizable garment industry has been hurt by trade barriers in Trinidad and Tobago. In the last five years several international companies have registered in Barbados to benefit from a tax agreement with the U.S., but in general Barbados is not competitive due to its limited marketing capabilities and the high cost of living.[26]

The small size of St. Kitts and St. Lucia has made it difficult for them to develop sizable manufacturing sectors. In St. Kitts the government has tried to encourage manufacturing by promoting electronics, clothing and shoes.

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[26] Thorndike, 1988; and the World Bank, 1988.

Several garment operations have closed due to trade restrictions imposed by the CARICOM market.[27] These restrictions require St. Kitts, as a CARICOM member, to impose tariffs on goods imported from outside of the CARICOM area.[28] This has served to protect some infant industries in the region while causing others to close or curtail operations. The recent increase in local wages has also made this sector less competitive.

In St. Lucia the manufacturing sector accounts for only about 10% of the gross domestic product. The island supports a wide variety of small scale industries producing for local and international consumers including beverages, food, wood and paper products and textiles. St. Lucia is one of the most industrialized of the small islands in the Eastern Caribbean due to the quality of its infrastructure. The Hess Oil Corporation built a major oil storage area at Cul de Sac Bay in 1983 but it has not had the anticipated spin-off effects for the local industrial economy.[29] A

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[27] Europa Publications, 1988. CARICOM stands for the Caribbean Community. It as founded in 1973 for the purpose of promoting economic integration through a common market. Headquartered in Guyana, CARICOM brings together Caribbean heads of state to foster regional cooperation in economic, health, educational, communication and industrial relations. Description taken from: Island Resources Institute, 1989. Organizational Profiles: A Guide to Donor Organizations and Technical Assistance Agencies.

[28] The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1989-90. London, the Economist.

[29] World Bank, 1985. St. Lucia: Economic Performance and Prospects. A World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C.

refinery to accompany the oil terminal was never built due to the worldwide decline of the oil industry in the 1980s. The government has provided a Customs Free Zone to attract international firms but this has had mixed success.

The same themes appear repeatedly when experts discuss the problems that impede improvements in the economic climate of the region. These themes include the lack of political will among governments to aggressively pursue regional integration, the desperate need to diversify island economies, the instability of depending on mono crop exports for foreign exchange, growing trade deficits, uneven production in the agricultural sector, and continued dependence on the North Atlantic states, especially the United States, for outside capital and technology needed to fuel growth. To understand the economic ramifications of the relationship between the Eastern Caribbean and the North Atlantic states, I will describe how this situation has developed.

The Eastern Caribbean and the North Atlantic States

Patterson describes how the increasing close relationship between the United States and the Caribbean is causing more direct and immediate economic influence by the former over the later. This is characterized by the flow of investments, loans and remittances from the U.S. and profits, flight capital and illegal capital (ie. drug money)

to the U.S.[30]

The islands were colonies dependent on the United Kingdom until the independence movement started in the 1960s. St. Kitts was the last country to gain full independence, in late 1983. The economic dominance of Britain ended with the independence movement and was quickly replaced by the United States, but this did not immediately translate into closer political ties between the U.S. and the Caribbean.[31]

After the independence movement created several new sovereign states in the Eastern Caribbean, the United States did not step in to fill the vacuum left by the British. The attention of the U.S. government in the region was on Latin America, and the people of the West Indies continued to look to the British for support and guidance. However, the British did not offer much in the way of support in the post-independence era, probably reflective of a desire to

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[30] Orlando Patterson, 1987. The Emerging West Atlantic System: Migration, Culture, and Underdevelopment in the United States and the Circum-Caribbean Region. In Population in an Interacting World, William Alonso, ed. Cambridge, Harvard Press.

[31] Neville C. Duncan, 1986. External Development Aid: New Policy Considerations. University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados. Duncan mentions that the islands in the Eastern Caribbean were eager to accept foreign aid from the United States in light of the relatively small contributions the British made to the region after independence. He mentions the "paltry independence assistance to each of the EC states as a grant and another 5 million pounds sterling as aid".

rid themselves of their island dependencies.[32]

After it became clear that Castro was going to remain in power in Cuba, foreign policy analysts in the U.S. government realized that persistent underdevelopment in the region could lead to political instability, and this in turn could impinge upon the security of the United States.[33] The involvement of Cuban technicians in Grenada, and the bloody revolution there in 1983 solidified the belief of the U.S. government that it should take a greater interest in the region.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative took effect in 1984. It is an attempt by the United States to promote economic progress in the region, and to strengthen its financial ties to the islands. The Initiative has three central components. It allows duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods, provides emergency economic and military funding, and creates tax incentives for U.S. investors in the island economies.[34] The CBI also established the CBI Center which in cooperation with USAID provides information about opportunities for investment and export in the region,

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[32] Clarke, 1988.

[33] Richard Brown, 1984. U.S. Relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean. In The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy. Congressional Research Service, 1985.

[34] Kenneth I. Boodhoo, 1984. Economic Dimension of U.S. Caribbean Policy. In The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region.

and promotes joint U.S.-Caribbean ownership of industry which could reduce the regions economic dependency.[35],[36]

While the CBI has promoted some direct investment in the region, including the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, it has not been as effective as it could be in providing economic security. Key exports such as textiles and leather goods are excluded, and many goods that were entering the U.S. were already benefiting from lower tariff levels through the Generalized System of Preferences.[37] Despite the existence of the CBI, exports from the region have grown at a slower rate than other developing countries as a whole.[38] This indicates that the economic problems of the region are due to structural problems that are difficult to resolve.

Another standard used to measure the success of the CBI is the extent to which it encourages indigenous growth in the region. The quest for economic self-reliance has spawned several attempts at regional cooperation within the Caribbean community.

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[35] Caribbean Basin Information Center and USAID, CBI Business Bulletin, 7(2), February, 1989.

[36] William Demas, 1975. Situation and Change. In Caribbean Economy, G. Beckford (ed).

[37] Congressional Research Service, 1985. The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Policy.

[38] World Bank, 1988.

Regional Cooperation and Integration

The crucial need for increased cooperation among the newly independent and widely scattered islands of the Eastern Caribbean has been a clarion call in the region for decades. This is because there is a direct relationship between the size of a country and its economic efficiency. A cooperative institutional arrangement between countries could compensate for the small size of the island economies. Such an arrangement could standardize taxes, tariffs, currency and the flow of workers. Trade and monetary agreements are the basic reason for integration. These could provide economies of scale for production, marketing and investing, benefiting each individual country and the region as a whole.[39] While virtually all of the political leaders in the region agree that regional integration is essential for the modern development of the islands, it has not been achieved, and political and economic fragmentation continues to haunt them.

For a variety of reasons repeated attempts to formalize an institutional arrangement to foster regional cooperation, or regional integration as it is sometimes called, have failed to achieve expectations. The history of the short-lived West Indies Federation illustrates some of the most obvious problems that are obstacles to achieving regional integration.

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[39] DeLisle Worrell, 1987.

The West Indies Federation came into being in 1958 after many years of negotiation. Its purpose was to create a single economic and political entity from the many English-speaking islands, including the entire Eastern Caribbean. This was before any of the islands became independent; they were still British colonies. If the Federation had lasted until 1962 it would achieved independent as a "super-colony".[40]

This attempt to create a central federal government was short-lived, and some historians believe was destined to fail. Jamaica was the most economically powerful country in the Federation and despite its early leadership to form a cooperative union, pulled out after a voter referendum supported this move in 1961. The people of Jamaica apparently believed, with justification, that it would more advantageous to pursue independence on their own, rather than diverting resources to support the smaller, poorer islands in the Eastern Caribbean. Shortly after Jamaica withdrew from the Federation, Trinidad did the same, causing the union to fall apart.

The most obvious reason for the failure of the Federation was the uneven economic power of the islands. Jamaica and Trinidad had the most to lose and least to gain so they opted for independence as separate entities. The smaller islands were left to fend for themselves. This

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[40] Clarke, 1988.

disparity in economic power still exists today, but it is only one reason why the attempt to form a central, federal union failed.

The Federation was designed by the British, and reflected their perspective of the region. Its political arm would been made up of what Lewis termed "an indigestible plethora of politicians" including a Governor-General, five Governors, a minimum of five Commissioners and about fifty-five ministers without portfolio.[41] The size and complexity of this political body, and the constant calculation its members would have to make of the local and regional payoffs of their actions, makes it doubtful that it would have been able to operate effectively.

Every potential member of a cooperative movement calculates if they will be better or worse off if they join. Political leaders have to convince their constituencies in each country that they will be better off economically if they cooperate, while at the same time at the regional level arguing that they are worse off than other islands, so they can claim more gains from the cooperative venture to justify their participation at home. Since the governments have to pay attention to the demands of each islands leaders to justify integration, democratic political systems probably

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[41] Gordon Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the Modern West Indies. New York, Monthly Review Press.

pose an obstacle to the integration process.[42] In addition, the insularity, geographical isolation and independent path that each island pursued in its political and economic development also contributed to the collapse of the Federation.[43]

In the region, each island has developed independently based on its own set of cultural, political and economic conditions. Any institutional program to foster cooperation between the islands has to account for these factors. This is very difficult to accomplish given the diversity in the region, and the desire of national political leaders to maintain the sovereignty of countries they govern. There are several efforts currently underway to promote regional integration. They are less ambitious than the Federation, and are forming the basis for the cooperation needed to jointly address the economic problems of the region.[44]

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[42] W. Andrew Axline, 1979. Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism. New York, Nichols Publishing. Axline describes how the special characteristics of the political systems in the Caribbean make regional integration difficult. He discusses the pattern of regional negotiations and how coalitions shift in the midst of a multi-national dialogue.

[43] Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies.

[44] In 1987 several political leaders in the Eastern Caribbean initiated a movement to create a political and economic federation by strengthening the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. But, in response other leaders said that a new unitary state was a kind of colonialism, and would promote the influence of foreign powers. These differences are typical of the current obstacles to regional integration. See Gary Brana-Shute and Rosemary Brana-Shute, 1989. The

Regional Economic Programs

There are several programs and institutional arrangements to improve regional economic integration. The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) illustrate the dominant strategies being used to promote economic integration.

The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) was founded in 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas whose goals were the coordination of economic policies, regional institutions to improve credit and finance, regional trade and the investment capital. The one area where CARICOM has been successful is its initiation of free trade between member nations, but problems even in this area reflect the difficulty facing any attempts at improving regional cooperation.

In 1977 Guyana and Jamaica, both members of CARICOM, were forced by their own desperate economic condition to violate the communities free trade agreement by restricting imports from fellow member states. Both countries later reinstated CARICOM imports, but their temporary cessation

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that a new unitary state was a kind of colonialism, and would promote the influence of foreign powers. These differences are typical of the current obstacles to regional integration. See Gary Brana-Shute and Rosemary Brana-Shute, 1989. The Anglophone Eastern Caribbean and British Dependencies. In Latin America and the Caribbean Record, New York, Holmes and Meier.

showed the fragility of the community.[45] The economic integration sought by the CARICOM initiative has also been hampered by different exchange rate policies among its members. Because countries receive no compensation for sudden changes in exchange rates, several responded in the mid 1980s by placing restrictions on regional trade, nullifying the communities trade agreement.[46]

The invasion of Grenada deepened the divisions already caused by the many devaluations and trade restrictions implemented by individual countries. Regional trade restarted in the late 1980s, and in 1989 the community initiated work on harmonizing structural adjustment, credit and exchange rate policies.[47]

The Caribbean Development Bank was established in 1969 as the first regional lending agency in the Eastern Caribbean. All seventeen English-speaking countries are members. The chief purpose of the Bank is to raise funds from several sources; the main trading partners of the region (U.S., United Kingdom, and Canada), the European Community, Latin American nations and other international lending agencies (World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank). The main benefit of the Bank is its ability to raise

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[45] Payne, 1981.

[46] Worrell, 1987.

[47] World Bank, 1988; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989.

capital from outside of the region, and to provide these funds to member countries with concessions such as low interest rates.

The Bank has initiated several projects aimed at improving regional economic integration, focusing on agricultural, fisheries, and food supply, in addition to regional transportation facilities. It also coordinates national and regional economic development programs with CARICOM, and has improved the institutional capacity in the region by assisting several, such as the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute, the Caribbean Tourism Organization, and the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce.

The Eastern Caribbean Common Market is made up of the island countries of the Eastern Caribbean, who are also members of CARICOM. Its purpose is to coordinate the positions of members on CARICOM related issues, and to aggregate their efforts to compensate for the differences in size and level of development between the mini-states and larger CARICOM members such as Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. The ECCM also serves as a clearinghouse that its members can use to gain access to technical expertise from a variety of economic sectors, such as agriculture, tourism and manufacturing.[48]

The existence of the ECCM reflects the separate

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[48] Khan, 1987.

identity and economic problems of the mini-states in the Eastern Caribbean, due to their limited economic, technical and human resources. Integration in the context of the Eastern Caribbean means cooperation on three levels; between the island mini-states on an area basis; between the mini-states and larger countries in the Caribbean, including mainland nations in Latin America on a regional basis; and between all Caribbean countries, both island and mainland nations, and their trading partners in the North Atlantic region, Europe, and the rest of the world.

There are many other organizations working to improve regional cooperation and integration, too many to list here, such as the family of the United Nations. These organizations are working to plan, coordinate and implement a wide range of economic development activities, ranging from cooperative training in different industries to financing and building new roads, airports, electric plants, and water supply facilities, in addition to providing emergency relief for natural disasters.

Institutional Linkages for Economic-Environmental Concerns

In recent years, several organizations whose primary responsibility has been economic development have initiated programs in environmental resource management, in response to the growing deterioration of natural resources in the Eastern and wider Caribbean. This reflects a growing

realization by economic planners that sustainable economic growth is dependent on prudent management of limited and often fragile natural resources.

The Caribbean Development Bank issued a directive in early 1989 requiring that the environmental impact of all of its projects be evaluated prior to loan commitments. The Bank also sponsored a regional conference in environmental issues to advise members how to improve project design to mitigate environmental damage. However, even though the Bank theoretically has the leverage to enforce environmental protection through loan conditionality, it has not created any mechanism to require that countries implement these new policies. By the time projects are selected for funding, the pressure to complete them makes enforcement of environmental standards very difficult (B 3).

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) is primarily responsible for promoting regional cooperation for economic development, but has recently become interested in a wide variety of environmental policy issues. It has sponsored a project on the effects of tourism in the wider Caribbean with case studies on several islands, and has examined the socio-economic impact of climate change in the region.[49]

CARICOM held its first conference on environmental

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[49] Island Resources Foundation, 1989. Organizational Profiles: A Guide to Donor Organizations and Technical Assistance Agencies. Washington, D.C., IRF.

issues in mid 1989. It was attended by ministers, top civil servants, educators and professionals and resulted in the "Port-of-Spain Accord on the Management and Conservation on the Environment". The Accord prioritizes environmental issues shared by all countries in the region, including; local management of toxic and hazardous materials, and the dumping of toxic materials that originate outside of the region; coastal protection and marine pollution; solid and liquid waste management; forest and watershed management; housing and human settlements, and several others.

The Accord contains several general recommendations for addressing these environmental problems, such as preparation of national environmental plans and policies, but lacks specific measures to enforce them. However, it does strongly recommend that CARICOM countries establish institutional arrangements to enhance the integration of environmental management at "the political, technical and administrative levels. That the Accord even mentions the political process is an encouraging sign.

There are several regional environmental programs working to strengthen the linkage between economic and environmental issues to improve natural resource management among the islands. The Natural Resource Management Project of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, headquartered in St. Lucia, has sponsored several country studies examining the adequacy of environmental policies,

and the relationship between community development programs and environmental management. The Department of Regional Development of the Organization of American States, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. and field offices throughout the region, has assisted several countries in preparing economic development plans. These have included projects in integrated development, tourism, agriculture, and downtown revitalization. Both OAS and OECS-NRMP only provide assistance when a government has requested it.

The United Nations Environment Programme sponsors the Caribbean Action Plan, administering it from its office in Kingston, Jamaica. UNEP convened governments from throughout the region for its first meeting in Cartagena de Indias in 1983 which resulted in two agreements; the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region; and the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region.[50] Subsequently in 1987 at its fourth intergovernmental meeting in Guadeloupe, additional protocols were added to support specially protected areas and wildlife. These protocols include provisions for establishing protected areas to preserve marine and terrestrial resources for recreational, educational and

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[50] Lynton Keith Caldwell, 1984. International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press.

scientific use.[51]

Working with ECLAC, regional environmental organizations and country governments, UNEP is facilitating the integration of economic development and natural resource management by creating agreements designed to carry out its protocols. However, the procedure for implementing the protocols is limited to language requiring the parties "...take all appropriate measures to protect, preserve and manage..." affected resources. The agreements lack legal provisions binding the signatories, so they are not enforced.

There are many smaller non-governmental organizations working to integrate economic and environmental linkages in regional and local development strategies. These include the Caribbean Conservation Association (Barbados), the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (St. Lucia), the Eastern Caribbean Natural Area Management Program (U.S. Virgin Islands), the Centre for Environmental Studies and Natural Resource Management, University of the West Indies (Barbados), and the Island Resources Foundation (U.S. Virgin Islands). These organizations are involved in a wide variety of projects throughout the Eastern Caribbean, including training conservation technicians, preparing

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[51] United Nations Environment Programme, 1988. Report of the Meeting of Experts for the Development of a Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean, held in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, October 24-26, 1988.

National Conservation Strategies, analyzing the specific environmental costs of different agricultural, tourist and industrial projects, and providing governments with objective criteria to make environmental policy decisions.

The Southeast Coast Project

A project undertaken by the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute (CANRI,formerly ECNAMP) on St. Lucia illustrates how a small organization can effectively use economic incentives to promote environmental protection. The southeast coast of St. Lucia was facing severe environmental problems. Fishermen dynamited reefs to collect lobsters, sea urchins were over-harvested, nesting bird colonies were destroyed by people taking eggs, charcoal producers stripped hillsides bare, sand mining was rampant on beaches, and raw sewage flowed into prime fishing and beach areas.[52]

To resolve these major environmental problems, CANRI focused on solutions that would raise the personal income of people causing the damage. This created a link between the equity needs of the poor and environmental management. A multi-year public participation program resulted in the establishment of the Maria Islands Nature Center, funded by the World Wildlife Fund and administered by the St. Lucia

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[52] Details of the case are taken from interviews with Yves Renard, coordinator of the Southeast Coast Project and co-founder of the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute, and the World Wildlife Fund Letter, Conservation and Development in St. Lucia, No. 3, 1988.

National Trust. Its purpose is to manage the wildlife on the island and to coordinate an environmental program for local residents.

A key part of the project focused on the problems of the local fishing community, which was marginal due to its lack of organization. After working extensively with many fishermen, CANRI received permission from the government to build a facility to store and market fish at Palmis. In addition, fishermen were trained in more effective fishing techniques, as they had been resorting to dynamiting reefs and over-harvesting local species. This program addressed the problems of the fishing community by creating economic incentives, consisting of better marketing and more efficient fishing practices, that also protected limited fisheries resources. The project also created sea moss farms to produce a material used in beverages used to promote good health, a fuel wood plantation to provide charcoal producers with trees and a solid waste management program. The success of the CANRI project reflects the need to integrate economic and environmental concerns on the community level to protect limited natural resources.

The Case Studies

In St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Barbados there are no economic incentives to promote environmental protection. On the contrary, the short term economic gains derived from

large development projects is a disincentive to protecting natural resources. Environmental standards are typically perceived as obstacles to development. The following case studies show how this occurs.

When the St. Lucia Cabinet granted permission for the M-Group to purchase the Jalousie Estate it granted several financial incentives to the developer. These incentives promoted the resort at the expense of the national park which would have protected the site's fragile natural resources. Incentives granted to the developer included repatriation of profits, waiver of duties on construction materials and supplies for the resort, and a multi-year tax holiday (SL 15). In addition, the government took the unusual step of granting a direct subvention to the resort, agreeing to construct the major access road to the Jalousie Estate with public funds.

The park project, although supported by previous governments who had voted to purchase the Jalousie Estate as public open space, has not been officially supported by the government. Although it would require a modest capital outlay estimated at $1.63 million for acquisition of the estate and surrounding lands, the government has not indicated it is willing to provide the necessary funds. Given the $57 millon that is budgeted for capital improvements in St. Lucia in 1990, it appears that the government could afford to fund the initial costs of the

park if it so desired.

In St. Kitts the 4000 southeast peninsula was owned by less that thirty parties, most of whom owned large parcels measuring 200-900 acres each. The peninsula is the only area in the country with large parcels in private ownership, as all land in sugar production on the main part of the island was nationalized in 1975. The installation of the road caused land values to increase dramatically in a short period of time, providing a direct incentive to develop the peninsula as rapidly as possible, before environmental policies intended to protect its abundant natural resources were operational.

It was estimated that the owners of the peninsula paid about $8.5 million in 1985 dollars for it, equal to $2500 per acre. In 1990 large parcels in prime locations were selling for about $50,000 per acre, an increase of 2000%.[53] Several purchasers were foreign investors buying large parcels, reflecting the strong demand for resort sites in the region.

As a condition of approval for the USAID funded project, St. Kitts was supposed to take several steps to protect the environment on the peninsula. A National Conservation Commission was to be operational, and a new

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[53] Data on 1985 land values taken from a report titled Potential for Recovery of Public Investments and Costs: Southeast Peninsula, St. Kitts. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Washington, D.C., May 28, 1986. Data on 1990 land sales from personal interviews conducted in St. Kitts.

Environmental Unit created in the national planning office to help implement laws and regulations to protect the marine and terrestrial resources on the peninsula. These steps were not taken by the time the road was complete, and the first development proposals submitted to the government.

It is apparent that the tremendous increase in the value of the peninsula, coupled with the governments strong desire to strengthen the tourism economy, created major financial incentives to develop the peninsula as rapidly as possible, without the possible delays that environmental policies would cause. In turn, there were no incentives to protect the peninsula's natural resources.

The economic development process in both St. Lucia and St. Kitts is geared to attract private projects that are given financial incentives to attract foreign exchange. This system of incentives is contrary to national policies intended to protect the environment. As long as this conflict exists, public policy decisions will continue to be made that favor economic growth while causing fragile natural resources to be destroyed.

In Barbados, the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor was build without any precautions to mitigate against environmental damage. Even though civil servants in the Coastal Project Planning Unit warned of possible problems with coastal hydrology, sedimentation, water pollution and the sustainability of the fishery, the Ministry of Agriculture

ignored these concerns.

The basic economic incentive for building the harbor was immense, as a large part of Barbados' trade imbalance occurs because the island has to import food. The project was proposed in several National Development Plans as part of the solution to the islands economic problems. The harbor will theoretically improve the efficiency of the fishing industry and reduce the expenditure of scarce foreign exchange for imported protein. Of course, this will only happen if the fish population in the region is sustainable, which is highly suspect after a 40% drop in the fish catch during the 1989 fishing season.

The environmental concerns of civil servants were ignored because of the perceived importance of the project to the national economy. Conducting the necessary field research to evaluate the full extent of the project's impact on the environment would have been time consuming, compounding the uncertainty as to whether it would proceed. The project's feasibility was already uncertain due to its razor-thin rate of return, estimated at 12.1%, compared to the IDB's minimum requirement of 12% (B 42).

As a result, the government now has a harbor which may contribute to the national debt. The harbor already depends on a government subsidy to operate (B 26). If the regional fish catch continues to decline, it will reduce the revenue to the harbor, requiring the government to increase the

amount of its subsidy. This will subject the operation of the harbor to the general instability that exists in the island economy. In addition, if the environmental problems that were forecast occur, such as sedimentation of the river mouth, the government will have to pay to fix them, causing a further drain on the treasury. This was allowed to happen because the potential environmental costs of the project were treated as external costs not associated with the project.

Lack of Long Term Economic Planning

The government of St. Lucia favors the resort at the Jalousie Estate because the national economic planning process favors short term solutions. The short term economic benefit of the resort is mainly derived from the creation of a few dozen jobs, mostly for unskilled labor, and income from a 12.5% hotel room tax (SL 13). Although the developer publicly said in early 1989 that the resort would create several hundred construction jobs to benefit locally unemployed people, these benefits were reduced when he chose a Brazilian company to build the resort, despite the existence of qualified companies in the region.[54] It does not appear that the resort will result in any substantial economic benefit to the island other than a

[54] Weekend Voice, February 18, 1988; and Caribbean Insight, 13(3), March, 1990. London, the West Indian Committee.

modest contribution to the treasury from the room tax, and whatever money tourists spend when they leave the confines of the resort. But the trickle-down or spin-off effects are expected to be minimal as the project will be an exclusive destination resort, with its health club and convention facilities designed to keep visitors on the site.

The Pitons National Park would provide far more economic benefit to the local community. It would generate about 500 jobs by the third year of operation, growing to nearly 1200 by the year 2000.[55] The governments push to replace the banana crop, which accounts for over 60% of its foreign exchange earnings, is causing it to focus on short term solutions, although the park could become operational by 1991-92, about the same time as the resort.

The government has made a policy decision that hotels are the answer to its economic problems. It has geared the national budget and capital improvement program to promote the tourist sector, creating a bias against other development alternatives that require a longer planning horizon to implement.

As described in Chapter Three, the cultural tradition

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[55] Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for the Development of the Pitons National Park. The Department of Regional Development, OAS, Washington, D.C. The operating income for the park needed to create the 500-1200 jobs would be derived from admission fees and proceeds from it's concessions (restaurant, bar, botanic garden, fruit and spice plantation, mini-zoo and glass bottom boat) and the sale of tourist souvenirs.

of the islands creates an aversion to risks, and the small size of public institutions make it difficult for them to undertake innovations in public policies. These factors, when combined with the long term economic risk that the park represents, causes governments to favor solutions that are perceived as being more certain.[56]

The economic development strategy of St. Lucia's government is to aggressively pursue international investors to build new tourist projects. Once it provides the basic infrastructure and permission to build the hotels, the government does not have to incur any additional risk to collect revenue from the projects. It does not have to make the many day-to-day decisions that the hotel owners will be required to make, or risk additional public funds to generate revenue.

The proposed Pitons National Park is a public project. To plan, design and implement the parks Master Plan would require the government to continuously allocate limited financial and technical resources in perpetuity. Just to get it off the ground would require a complex series of government actions that are difficult to make given the limited technical resources in the country SL 6, 12). To

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[56] Ibid. To build the park the government would risk at least EC$4,500,000 for initial expenses, and probably much more as the owners of the Jalousie Estate would not be willing sellers, plus an estimated EC$700,000 a year for operating expenses. The return on this substantial public investment depends on the continued strength of the world tourism market.

keep it operating and generating revenue would compel the ongoing commitment of several new civil servants, as existing government employees are stretched to their capacity (SL 5). St. Lucia does not have the institutional capacity to carry out large public projects such as the park, which require substantial inputs for design, construction and operation.[57]

The similar situation exists with the Southeast Development Project on St. Kitts. The Land Use Management Plan for the project recommended that large portions of the peninsula with outstanding wildlife and open space values remain undeveloped. The natural resources in these areas are supposed to be protected by implementing a conservation program, but the government has not been willing to make the financial commitment to support it.

By using the financial and technical resources of the tourist industry, the governments are avoiding the risk associated with using their own limited resources. This is an important factor that limits the ability of governments in the region to undertake development projects that preserve the environment, such as the Pitons National Park and the southeast peninsula, which both represented opportunities to create large tourist projects while leaving

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[57] Fernaldo Soler, 1988. Development Control and Physical Planning: The Case of St. Lucia. OAS and OECS. Soler evaluates the capacity of the government to support projects that require long range planning, and finds that it lacks the institutional capacity to do so.

the natural environment intact. This could have been done by leaving the sites in their natural state, installing minimum improvements, and catering to the growing international clientele for "nature tourism". This approach would have required far less capital, but would be somewhat less certain than the tradition approach to tourism of building resorts on every beach and a cabana under every palm tree.

Summary

In the countries of the Eastern Caribbean economic uncertainties cause governments to choose large development projects that damage fragile natural resources. Among the economic realities these countries face are dependency on the North Atlantic States, a lack of diversification, persistent high unemployment, and a shortage of foreign exchange to pay for imported food and consumer durables. Although their recent economic performance has been better than developing countries in general, vulnerability to price shocks for exported agricultural commodities make the regional economies unstable.

There have been several attempts to integrate the economies of the islands by promoting regional cooperation. Regional economic integration could compensate for the small size of the islands by providing for economies of scale for production, marketing and investing. But problems rooted in

the different cultures and political systems of the islands have prevented integration from taking place. Nonetheless, there are several efforts underway to improve regional cooperation, such as CARICOM and the Caribbean Development Bank, helping to build the tradition of cooperation needed if integration is to work in the long run.

Because domestic savings are too low to finance development, the islands must look outside of the region for investment capital. The best investment opportunities were exhausted in the 1970s, so the island economies are increasingly dependent on international development assistance agencies, such as USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank, to provide capital. These agencies have been funding large projects intended to diversify island economies, with a heavy emphasis on tourism and agriculture.

Regional Organizations such as CARICOM, the CDB and UNEP are working to promote more effective linkages between economic development and environmental preservation. The results have been mixed. Regional environmental agreements, such as the UNEP protocols for protection of wildlife areas, lack enforcement mechanisms that bind governments. Several NGOs are integrating economic and environmental planning, with the Southeast Coast Project on St. Lucia managed by the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute being the most notable example.

The government of St. Lucia chose to support a private

resort on the Jalousie Estate rather than the Pitons National Park because it is promoting growth of the traditional tourist industry to alleviate its economic problems. The government of St. Kitts chose to develop the 4000 acre Southeast Peninsula for the same reason, but has instituted only a few of several recommended measures to protect its natural resources, deemed to be among the most abundant in the Eastern Caribbean. In Barbados, the government built the largest and most technically complex fishing harbor in the region, but failed to evaluate the environmental impact it could cause.

In all three instances, economic incentives favored large development projects and undercut environmental protection policies. There are no economic incentives for preserving natural resources. In addition, the uncertainty of depending on long range economic planning using public funds prompted both St. Kitts and St. Lucia to pursue traditional, capital intensive tourist projects rather than developing nature tourism that would both earn foreign exchange and preserve the natural resources of the islands.

CHAPTER FIVE

Development Assistance Agencies and Environmental Policy Implementation

International development assistance agencies, such as the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development, have been under increasing political pressure to implement environmental policies. Yet, conditions within these agencies have prevented many of these policies from being enforced. The lack of enforcement within the agencies reinforces the behavior of political leaders in developing countries who also fail to protect the environmental by implementing their own national policies. The result is the continued destruction of limited natural resources.

As the three case studies will show, efforts to improve the environmental accountability of the donor agencies are in conflict with many elements of the development process. The goals of donor agencies involve several competing objectives, including economic growth, good foreign relations and in recent years, conservation of natural resources. Many developing countries depend on the foreign investments created by donor-sponsored projects. These

factors create a tension between environment and development that makes it difficult for donor agencies to implement their own environmental policies.

The Necessity for Development Assistance

Theories of what development is, and how it can best be achieved, have undergone constant revision in the last thirty years. Early theories perceived economic growth as consisting of a series of linear stages through which all national economies have to proceed. With adequate domestic savings, foreign aid and investment, all developing countries could theoretically create their own independent, industrialized economies. The linear stages model was succeeded by the neoclassical structural change model and international dependence paradigm, the later an attempt to reflect the importance of political relations and equity in development planning.[1]

More recent theories of development have focused on how countries can achieve long term self reliance. As a result, development assistance has shifted to include the needs of rural communities by integrating the agricultural sector into growth strategies that have focused on industry as the engine of the economy. Integrated development strategies have now become quite sophisticated. As a result,

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[1] For a complete discussion of the different theories and models of development see Michael P. Todaro, 1985. Economic Development in the Third World. New York, Longman.

development assistance in the Eastern Caribbean includes a wide range of urban and rural projects designed to diversify the traditional plantation economies of the islands. But, as discussed in Chapter Four, the island economies have a whole set of problems, including geographical isolation, small size, the high cost of doing business over great distances, and difficulties of achieving regional economic integration that have prevented them from becoming more fully developed.[2]

The islands are heavily dependent on foreign investment because they lack sufficient domestic savings to provide the capital needed to fund development of the manufacturing, agricultural and tourist projects needed to diversify their economies.[3] To stimulate private investment in what are considered to be marginal economies, they are heavily

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[2] Ransford Palmer, 1984. Problems of Development in Beautiful Countries: Perspectives on the Caribbean. Lanham, Maryland, North-South Publishing Co. Palmer describes the problems of peripheral development shared by the island economies of the Caribbean. The historical dependence on metropolitan centers in the plantation era is being succeeded by a continued dependence on foreign investors and donor agencies because the region lacks the domestic resources to develop on its own. But, it is my observation that integrated development strategies are showing positive results in lessening dependency somewhat. Whether this continues to happen will depend on the strength of the tourist economy and what happens to preferential import quotas for agricultural crops in the U.S. and the European Community in the 1990s.

[3] For a discussion of the need for outside investment and how it relates to national growth strategies in the Eastern Caribbean, see; Ransford Palmer, 1984. The Commonwealth Caribbean: Crisis of Adjustment. In The English Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service, 1985.

reliant on donor agencies. The donors provide the money and technical assistance needed to build infrastructure, such as roads, utilities and major public facilities, creating a financial climate that is more conducive to private investment. Donor agencies use several types of development assistance to funnel aid to the Caribbean.

Development Assistance Programs

There are basically two kind of development assistance agencies, multi-lateral and bi-lateral. Aid given from one government to another is considered bi-lateral assistance, while multi-lateral assistance is from agencies that give aid on behalf of several governments, such as the multi-lateral development banks (MDBs). Grants and low interest loans, known as concessional financing, fund a wide variety of projects. In the Eastern Caribbean, capital from donor agencies has made up for the decline in private foreign investment, and has been largely responsible for the continued rate of positive growth in the 1980s.

There are several bi-lateral and multi-lateral organizations that provide financial and technical assistance in the region. The World Bank is the largest multi-lateral lender in the world, providing aid through its three institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction, the International Development Association and the International Finance Committee. As with all MDBs,

the Bank uses capital contributed from its members to raise additional funds in international money markets. It then finances projects by giving loans to recipients at lower interest rates than are available from commercial banks. Funds raised from its members also allow the Bank, and other MDBs, to provide soft loans to lesser developed countries and projects that have a low rate of return.

The Bank funds some projects in the Caribbean through its regional division for Latin America and the Caribbean, and provides funding for the IDB and Caribbean Development Bank so they can conduct their own development programs. The Caribbean Development Bank is the smallest of the regional MDBs. Founded in 1970, its members include all of the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean, three Latin American states, and five non-regional members from Europe and Canada. Several countries, including the United States, make substantial contributions to the Bank by contributing to its Special Development Fund. As its charter requires the CBD to promote economic cooperation and integration among its members, it focuses on promoting projects that meet this objective. Most projects funded have been in the agricultural, transportation and industrial sectors. In 1987 the Bank made its first loan to assist a structural adjustment program in a member country, made in association

with the World Bank.[4] The European Development Fund, the development agency of the European Community, the Canadian International Development Agency and the United Nations Development Program also provide substantial assistance to the region.

The largest regional bank in the world, the Inter-American Development Bank, funds several projects in the Eastern Caribbean. The IDB was organized in 1959 and is owned by forty-four countries, including twenty-seven from North and South America and sixteen from outside of the region that were admitted in 1976. The focus of the Bank's aid programs are the developing countries in South American and the Caribbean.[5] The Bank was set up so its members can have greater participation in adopting lending policies that meet the needs of the region, and pursue regional economic integration as a part of the Inter-American system.[6]

The headquarters of the IDB is in Washington, D.C. It also has regional offices in many countries. It is managed by a Board of Governors, with one Governor and an Alternate Governor appointed by each member. The voting power of each

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[4] Caribbean Development Bank, 1988. Basic Information. CDB, Bridgetown, Barbados.

[5] General information on the operation and organization of the IDB is derived from Eurofi, Ltd., 1988. Development Aid: A Guide to National and International Agencies; London, Butterworths.

[6] R. Peter DeWitt, Jr., 1977. The Inter-American Development Bank and Political Influence. New York, Praeger.

member is linked to its share of the Bank's capital stock. Latin American members have the most votes, followed by the United States. Canada and other non-regional members hold small percentages of capital stock.

Projects that are proposed by developing countries in the region are presented to the Bank for funding at an annual Donor's Conference in Washington, D.C. All countries seeking aid and all donors providing it attend this conference, where projects are tentatively selected by agencies who tend to specialize in certain types of development assistance (ie. providing infrastructure, agricultural technology, support for manufacturing, tourism, etc.). Over the past several years the IDB has lent between $ 2.3 and 3.0 billion each year. This includes projects in the Eastern Caribbean such a new highway system, sewage project, and fishing harbor in Barbados.

The IDB uses a system for evaluating and implementing projects that is common to most donors. Once a project is tentatively selected by the Bank it goes through a standard project cycle that takes 12-24 months to complete. A Country Programming Paper puts a project in the pipeline, followed by an Orientation Mission in the field to help the borrower prepare the loan application. Next, the Bank forms a Project Committee, and dispatches an Analysis Mission to prepare a Project Report. The Report includes information on the national economy, the experience of the Bank in the

type of project to be funded, how the objectives of the project will be carried out, and the steps needed to execute it. A Loan Proposal is then prepared and submitted for approval to the Bank's Board of Directors, who delegates authority for project implementation to a field office.

Department of Regional Development of the OAS

The Organization of American States is a regional body that provides technical assistance to its members, but is similar to a multi-lateral development agency. The charter for the OAS was created in 1948 and gave a new name to the structure of the inter-American system. Its broad purpose is to promote economic, social and culture progress in the America's. The policy of the OAS is set by its General Assembly which has an elaborate system of special committees, conferences, commissions, institutes and boards specializing in a wide range of issues.[7] The General Secretariat is controlled by the Cabinet and Secretary General, assisted by an Advisory Groups, and in turn by a tier of Executive Secretariats and Secretariats, each specializing in a different topic.[8]

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[7] M. Margaret Ball, 1968. The OAS in Transition. Durham, Duke University Press. Ball discusses the organization and functioning of the OAS, including how its numerous specialized agencies work.

[8] O. Carlos Stoetzer, 1965. The Organization of American States - An Introduction. New York, Praeger; and The Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1987-88, General Secretariat of the OAS.

The Department of Regional Development of the Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs was created in 1963 as the Natural Resources Unit. It provides technical advice to design development projects that are based on the sustainable use of natural resources. In the Eastern Caribbean the Department coordinates with the IDB and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to evaluate the feasibility of development projects and to increase the institutional capacity of island governments to carry out environmental planning.[9]

The Department is staffed by specialists in natural resources, economics, regional developing planning and related areas, and currently is sponsoring several technical cooperation projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its staff was substantially reduced in 1989 when plans were announced by the General Secretariat to shift organizational resources into other areas of the OAS, but it continues to operate in several countries.

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID is the main development assistance of the United States government, carrying out bilateral economic assistance through several programs and organizations. The Administrator, assisted by a Deputy Administrator, oversees

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[9] Taken in part from a Summary of Services Provided by the Department of Regional Development, General Secretariat of the OAS, 1989-90, OAS, Washington, D.C.

the actions of the agency, and is responsible to the Secretary of State on matters of policy and budget, while retaining authority for administration and operations. The Agency is part of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, so the President has the power to fill many senior offices with political appointees.

USAID works closely with the departments of State and Treasury to coordinate its program so that it is consistent with the direction of the governments foreign policy and budget priorities. Several committees and subcommittees of the Senate and House of Representatives oversee its policies and projects.[10] USAID uses a method of analyzing and designing projects similar to other donors. It generally requires that goods and services purchased by recipients be provided by American suppliers and consultants.[11]

To coordinate its projects in the Eastern Caribbean USAID has an regional development office in Bridgetown,

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[10] John Horberry, 1984. Development Assistance and the Environment: A Question of Accountability. Doctoral dissertation in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[11] Wendell A. Samuel, 1984. Foreign Assistance in the Caribbean: Another View. University of the West Indies, Barbados. USAID uses "double-tiered" aid; it requires the recipient to use development funds to buy exports from the United States, including equipment, professional services and raw materials originating. This requirement helps insure that funds are used for the purpose they are intended, but can prevent recipients from using them to achieve development objectives that they prefer. However, recipients need hard currency so accept these terms in project agreements, as the alternative may be no project at all.

Barbados, which has a Director and Deputy Director who are responsible for policy decisions. Projects in the region are targeted in three key sectors, agriculture, light manufacturing and tourism, and stress linkages to the private sector and providing improved public facilities to support economic growth. Between 1982 and 1987 the regional office sponsored a wide variety of aid projects for the islands including several in Grenada after the U.S. intervention in late 1983, roads and power plants in St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica, water supply in Antigua and the Southeast Development Project in St. Kitts. Expenditures during this period were about $110 million, not including a region-wide program to improve agricultural production and management known as HIAMP.[12]

In addition to its large presence in the Eastern Caribbean, USAID is sponsoring other programs in the Caribbean/Latin America region to promote unity with the United States. The Central American Initiative is currently providing about $8 billion in economic assistance; in El Salvador USAID projects involve public works, health care and repair of facilities damaged by that country's war.[13]

USAID and other donors active in the Caribbean have

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[12] USAID Regional Development Office for the Caribbean, 1988.

[13] For a full description of USAID's programs, funding procedures and scope of activities, see Eurofi, Ltd. 1988. Development Aid: A Guide to National and International Agencies; London, Butterworths.

showed an increasing interest in incorporating environmental safeguards in their projects, and undertaking major policy initiatives to include these concerns in their long range planning. A series of events that started in the 1980s has caused USAID and other donors to take environmental concerns more seriously.

Environmental Reform in the Donor Agencies

Since the early 1980s donors have come under increasing pressure, mainly from U.S. environmental groups, to consider the effects on the environment when they fund development projects. This concern arose from a basic belief that the health of the natural environment is integrally linked to the social and economic well being of people in a society, especially in countries with marginal natural resources. The political movement to improve the environmental policies of the donors also reflects the difficulty of implementing new policies in these large and complex institutions.

There are several reasons why donors have been slow to adopt more effective environmental policies. Such policies represent a major change in the direction of development assistance. The established interdependencies, decision making mechanisms and centers of power makes it very difficult to implement new policies in large institutions.[14]

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[14] Eugene Bardach, 1977. The Implementation Game: What Happens When a Bill Becomes a Law. Cambridge, MIT Press.

Entrenched bureaucrats who are threatened by new policies form coalitions that promote their self-interest, short-sightedness and resistance to change.[15] The resistance to change that individuals often bring to a policy dialogue is compounded by the inherent difficulty of integrating environmental factors into the complexities of evaluating and designing large development projects.

Hirschman stresses how complex the development process is, especially when projects are enmeshed with natural resources. He proposes that a "long voyage of discovery" is needed to properly integrate the two. His "hiding hand principle" holds that development planners underestimate the effort it takes to implement a project, and overestimate their ability to solve difficulties that arise.[16] Sachs mentions how development is defined very narrowly, often ignoring local conditions, including the natural environment.[17] International donors have difficulty implementing new environmental policies for several reasons, including rapid staff turnover in field offices that are

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[15] Deborah Stone, 1988. Policy Paradoxes and Political Reason. Boston; Scott, Foresman and Co. Stone describes how personal qualities such as emotion, passion, irrationality, self-interest, short-sightedness and raw power motivate people, such as entrenched bureaucrats, during their involvement in the policy making process.

[16] Albert O. Hirschman, 1967. Development Projects Observed. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute.

[17] Ignacy Sachs, 1987. Development and Planning. New York, Cambridge University Press.

responsible for project implementation, a lack of field personnel trained in natural resource management, miscommunication between field offices and headquarters, and the lack of an environmental tradition among development planners.

Sparked by international concern over the severe environmental damage being caused by large donor-funded projects, such as the Polonoroeste Project in Brazil, the Narmada Valley Dam in India, and transmigration in Indonesia, U.S. environmental groups have worked to reform MDB lending policies.[18] Because the United States Treasury contributes millions of dollars to various donors, including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and of course, USAID, environmentalists focus on the Congressional budget process to voice their concerns. As a result, several donor agencies have instituted procedures to protect natural resources.

The Working Group for Multilateral Assistance is made up of several agencies, including USAID and the U.S. Treasury, and helps review about 500 MDB projects a year. The USAID Early Warning Project Notification process was initiated in 1982 to identify environmental problems of MDB projects early in the planning process. The 1987 and 1988 Appropriation Acts required the U.S. Treasury to instruct

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[18] Sierra Club, 1986. Bankrolling Disasters: International Development Banks and the Global Environment. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books.

U.S. executive directors of MDBs to promote new environmental review processes.[19] Most importantly, in 1987 the Congress passed legislation as part of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Act requiring that specific actions be taken to integrate more effective environmental protection policies into the operations of MDBs. In 1988 a second Congressional mandate was passed making the previous years requirement a permanent part of the authorizing legislation for MDB funding.

The 1987 and 1988 legal reforms were major steps forward in promoting donor accountability for environmental reforms. Treasury Department must now present detailed progress reports each year to Congress that document how each donor is implementing the Act. The progress reports evaluate the environmental programs of the donors in several areas including the adequacy of their environmental staff, whether bank presidents have appointed environmental advisors, provision of career incentives for environmental staff, protection of indigenous people and consultations with NGOs in the field.[20] Thus far the progress of the MDBs

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[19] Statement of R. Augustus Edwards III, Deputy Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency in a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, June 16, 1988.

[20] Statement of James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury, and Progress Report in Implementation of Environmental Reform in Multilateral Development Banks, presented during hearings before a Subcommittee of Appropriates, United States Senate, March 30, 1988.

has been mixed.

One reason that the MDBs have been slow to adopt reforms is a conflict with their primary mission, which is to move funds as efficiently as possible. Environmental requirements take time to meet, and often slow down projects. Professionals within the banks do not like to see projects delayed. [21] Environmental reforms have occurred on paper, but actual implementation in developing countries is proving to be much more difficult.

Inter-American Development Bank

The IDB was under heavy pressure from the Congress for several years before it started to initiate policy reforms in the mid 1980s. The Bank established an Environmental Management Committee in 1984, ostensibly to evaluate the adverse environmental effects of its projects. However, the Committee consisted of existing in-house profes ional staff, the managers of key Bank divisions, that had a stake it promoting projects. The committee was widely perceived as a political committee of insiders. Its members had no expertise in environmental management. In early 1988 a Congressional oversight committee called the Bank's performance in implementing environment reforms the worst

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[21] See John Horberry, 1985. The Accountability of Development Assistance Agencies: The Case of Environmental Policy. Ecology Law Quarterly, 12 (4), Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.

of all of the MDBs.[22] In mid 1988 testimony by U.S. environmental groups characterized the Bank's inaction as moving "...from a posture of recalcitrance and foot-dragging on the environment to one of outright resistance...".[23] There were two main reasons why the IDB was lagging behind other MDBs in instituting environmental reforms, aside from internal resistance from Bank professionals.

First, there was resistance from two influential Bank members, Brazil and Venezuela, who felt that environmental policies should not be imposed that could hamper project funding (B 44).[24] Second, the United States was sending a message to the Bank that it supported reform in general, but objected to specific measures needed to implement stronger

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[22] Taken from a comment made by Senator Kasten to Mr. Malpass, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations, Department of the Treasury during a hearing before the Subcommittee on of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, March 30, 1988.

[23] Statement of Stephan Schwartzman before a hearing of the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, June, 1988.

[24] The opposition of Bank members to environmental reforms is related to the larger North-South debate over environmental reform. Many developing countries believe that they should not have to sacrifice economic growth if they agree to protect natural resources. Developing nations have formed the "Group of 77" to negotiate as a block with developed nations on global environmental issues. For example, several rapidly industrializing nations, such as Brazil, India and Mexico, believe that restrictions on hydrocarbon emissions to mitigate the Greenhouse effect will constrain their use of energy and slowing industrialization. They are seeking compensation in exchange for pollution controls. See United Nations Environment Programme's North America News, 5(1-2), February, 1990.

environmental standards in the MDBs. This occurred because the U.S. Treasury was lukewarm to the idea of environmental reform, despite pressure from the Congress, as it could interfere with its ability to contribute to U.S. foreign policy. Treasury officials expressed this concern when they opposed a requirement that MDBs prepare environmental assessments for their projects as it: "...would paralyze our ability to act cooperatively and constructively with other member countries".[25] Treasury was sending a message to the Bank and Congress that it only supported environmental reform up to a point.

The Bank started making reforms in 1987 when a Senior Environmental Specialist was hired to advise its Environmental Management Committee, but this was only one staff position among the Bank's 2400, a very small commitment. During the same year the Bank held a environmental training seminar for its staff, and in 1987 invited South American environmental organizations to attend a meeting with finance ministers on natural resource issues. But there was no follow-up and business continued as usual.

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[25] Statement of David Malpass before the Subcommittee on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, June 16, 1988. This statement reflected the resistance of Treasury to a suggestion that the MDBs be required to conduct detailed environmental impact assessments on their projects. Treasury apparently felt that this would give environmental concerns a higher priority than economic factors, which are a key element of U.S. foreign policy. As a result, foreign policy initiatives based on economic cooperation could be compromised.

The Congress strengthened its support for MDB reform in 1988 by amending the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The amendment requires that environmental impact assessments be prepared for all MDB projects starting in January, 1991, to allow Bank officers to evaluate the environmental effects of projects. If this information is not provided at least 120 days prior to the presentation of a project to a banks Board of Directors, the U.S. representative has to vote against it. This change in the law requires that environmental concerns be addressed as part of all project evaluations by the MDBs.[26] It is expected that the MDBs will conform to this requirement to avoid forcing the United States to oppose their projects (B 44). As a result the IDB accelerated its effort to reform.[27]

In early 1989 the Bank created a new Environmental Unit with a staff of fifteen in its Project Analysis Department. The Unit is responsible for reviewing all projects and operations of the Bank, and for designing a program for integrating environmental management into its technical

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[26] An Amendment Extending the Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act to Recommendations for the United States Vote in International Financial Institutions. U.S. Senate Calendar No. 918, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Report 100-498.

[27] The IDB does fund some environmental improvement projects such as reforestation in Haiti, coastal conservation in Barbados, soil conservation in Jamaica, and an integrated natural resource management program in Paraguay. These projects make up a very small part of the IDBs overall budget. Inter-American Development Bank, 1988. The IDB and the Environment, Washington, D.C.

cooperation and sector lending programs. It is also attempting to formalize environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures. But, under the IDBs current proposal, the responsibility for implementing the results of EIAs will be with borrowing countries, which will make implementation subject to the political pressures within national governments.

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID started to adopt environmental reforms in response to a law suit filed against it in 1975 by several U.S. environmental organizations. The suit contended that as an agency of the U.S. government USAID was required by the National Environmental Policy Act to systematically document the adverse environmental effects of its projects. USAID immediately moved to settle the suit and initiated negotiations with environmental groups and the Council on Environmental Quality. As a result, USAID issued an Environmental Policy Determination requiring that it initiate a process to evaluate the environmental consequences of its projects, mitigate any related impact, and assist countries to improve their capability to integrate impact assessment into development projects.[28]

Since the settlement of the NEPA suit the Agency has instituted several reforms to integrate environmental

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[28] Horberry, 1985.

protection in its developing planning activities. It has appointed Environmental Officers to its regional mission offices, and allocates a substantial portion of its budget for environmental activities such as preparing national environmental profiles, training to improve the institutional capability of borrowers, the DESFIL project (Development Strategies for Fragile Lands), and major programs to promote biological diversity, conserve forests and regulate pesticides.[29]

Although much progress has occurred to include environmental factors in its overall mission, USAID has had problems implementing some policies. Urged by Congress, the Agency initiated an Early Warning System in the early 1980s to evaluate the environmental effects of projects proposed by other donors. The purpose of this program is to advise U.S. Executive Directors of the MDBs if bank projects will damage the environment, and to have USAID share this information with other donors. However, this project never was fully implemented, requiring the amendment to NEPA requiring that environmental information be developed prior to votes on bank projects.[30]

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[29] USAID, 1988. AID Policy Paper: Environment and Natural Resources. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID, Washington, D.C.

[30] During testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and the Environment in mid 1988, the National Resources Defense Council reported that only one of eight projects rejected by U.S. MDB Directors appeared on an AID list, and that the

USAID is currently proposing to sponsor a multi-year regional environmental plan for the Caribbean, a project initiated in the Regional Development Office in Barbados. This project reflects USAID's interest in promoting environmental conservation practices in the region, and would build on its program to prepare national environmental profiles for several islands. Funding is uncertain with President Bush's recently announced plans to increase foreign aid to new governments in Nicaragua and Panama, which may force the Agency to cut the budget of the regional office and the regional environmental plan.

Organization of American States

The Department of Regional Development of the Organization of American States has always based its technical assistance program on the efficient use of natural resources. A major objective of the department has been to improve the linkage between natural resources, social and economic development. It has sponsored projects to promote development of renewable energy resources, and to reduce the hazards from natural hazards. In the Caribbean the department's recent and current projects include a natural resource assessment for agricultural development in Antigua,

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information used did not influence non-U.S. Directors, who approved the projects despite being aware that they would cause environmental damage. Taken from a letter from David A. Wirth, NRDC, to Senator Terry Sanford, Chairman of the Subcommittee.

training assistance for small hotels in Barbados, an integrated development project in Grenada, design of a national park system in Trinidad and Tobago, a natural resource data base in St. Lucia, and tourism projects for several islands.[31]

The OAS responded to budget crisis amid shifting priorities in 1989 and cut several staff positions in DRD by offering employees early retirement. As a result, its activities in the region have been substantially reduced, and some projects in the planning stage have not been implemented, such as the Pitons National Park in St. Lucia.

All of the donor agencies have encountered difficulties when attempting to implement policies intended to protect the environment. This failure has been most apparent when large development projects are involved. The history of projects in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados shows why this has happened.

The Case Studies

How Politics Affect the Performance of Donor Agencies

It had been a "long dream of national politicians and landowners to open up the valuable assets" of the 4000 acre southeast peninsula of St. Kitts (SK 5). The undeveloped

[31] Organization of American States, Department of Regional Development, 1989. Summary of Services Provided by the Department of Regional Development.

beaches and protected bays on the peninsula, a part of St. Kitts that few citizens had ever visited, presented some of the most mouth-watering investment opportunities in the Eastern Caribbean. It presented a chance for huge financial returns to the peninsula's thirty or so landowners, and a chance to diversify the sugar-based economy.

Except for a few scattered homes and a small hotel, the peninsula and its abundant natural resources were untouched. In 1980, prior to independence, the government asked the British Development Division of the Overseas Development Administration, part of the European Economic Community, to conduct a feasibility study for a new road to connect the peninsula to the main part of the island. Consultants prepared a preliminary road design and completed the feasibility study. The study concluded that a six mile long road would pay for itself if accompanied by a diversified development program including farming, salt mining, tourism, and freight hauling across a narrow channel to the sister island of Nevis. However, the BDD believed that the study's economic projections were unrealistic, and that the project was not feasible, so it dropped it. This decision was based on a road that would cost about $3 million to build (SK 1).

After the British refused to build the road, the government of St. Kitts turned to the United States for assistance. In early 1984, shortly after St. Kitts gained independence, its political leaders approached the USAID for

support. The U.S. invasion of Grenada, about 350 miles to the south of St. Kitts, had occurred a few months earlier. The invasion was an indication of the United State's renewed interest in the Caribbean.[32]

Shortly after representatives from St. Kitts met with USAID officials in Washington, D.C., the Agency's Deputy Administrator, its second most powerful official, directed the Regional Development Office in Barbados to "get a project going in the next 30 days" (SK 12). This directive put the project at the top of the Agency's agenda, and sent a clear signal to the Barbados office the project was to proceed without delay. The strong political support that the project got from the leadership of USAID later undercut efforts to protect the fragile natural resources on the peninsula.

Following its Congressional mandate to protect the environment, USAID sponsored the completion of numerous,

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[32] The United States has expressed a strong interest in supporting the tradition of parliamentary democracies that exists in the Eastern Caribbean. Its invasion of Grenada in 1983, after ultra-leftist Leninists massacred 100 innocent people, including Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, reflected a statement by Sally Shelton, a former Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, in 1980 and repeated on several occasions: "(the) U.S. will support progressive forces...who are committed to economic and social development and who respect democratic processes". See Anthony Payne, 1981. Change in the Commonwealth Caribbean. London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs. After Bishop had taken office by a bloodless coup in 1979, he suspended the constitution and cancelled elections, to the consternation of the U.S. government. See Wendell Bell, 1986. The Invasion of Grenada: A Note of False Prophecy. The Yale Review, 1986.

detailed studies that cataloged the natural resources of the peninsula, and recommended how to protect them. The studies included an Environmental Impact Assessment, a Land Use Management Plan, and a Developer's Handbook.

Yet, when consultants for USAID were preparing environmental reports for the project in 1989, the Environmental Officer in the Caribbean office was not allowed to even review them. This was because the Washington, D.C. office had sent word to the regional office "not to make waves on the environmental aspects of the project" (SK 11). Clearly, the timely completion of the project was a priority of USAID officials in Washington, D.C., who are political appointees. The Administrator of the Agency reports to the Secretary of State on matters of policy. It appears that U.S. foreign policy interests in the region, in the wake of the Grenada invasion, were served by funding a large, high-profile project in St. Kitts. This foreign policy interest, and a desire to promote U.S. business interests during construction of the road and subsequent tourist facilities, pressured USAID regional staff into finishing the project as soon as possible, before the environmental policies it had recommended, such as a National Conservation Commission and a new Environmental Unit, were in place.[33] As a result, the natural resources

[33] USAID has played a major role in promoting U.S. business interests in St. Kitts, both during planning and construction of the road, and facilitating investment

of St. Kitts are now at great risk, as the government lacks the institutional capacity to protect them.

Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank have said that the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor pre-dated the "environmental period" of the Bank (B 34). Given the resistance of the Bank to instituting environmental reforms, which it started in earnest in 1990, this may be true, but it does not tell the whole story.

The Barbados government asked the Bank to fund the harbor in 1982. The Project Agreement was not executed until November, 1984. In the same year the Bank established an Environmental Management Committee EMC). The EMC, a political body whose members were also the heads of the Bank's main departments, could have required that the environmental impact of the project be evaluated, but it did not, despite the fact that important natural resources were at stake. There are several possible reasons why the Bank did not conduct an environmental analysis of this large project.

First, the Bank did not have formal environmental review guidelines. As a result, environmental review

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opportunities in tourist projects that will follow the road. In May, 1986 the Agency organized a "hotel investment mission" in St. Kitts. Attending were top corporate officers from the hotel industry including Hilton Inns, Club Med, Divi Hotels, Ramada International, Resorts International and several real estate companies. The contractor for the road was from Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory, the engineer was from a U.S. company, and over $1 million was spend on U.S. environmental consultants.

procedures for projects were applied unevenly, with no objective criteria to guide Bank staff. It was up to the discretion of the staff, overseen by the EMC, to decide how and if an environmental analysis should be performed. The lack of formal environmental procedures reflected a general reluctance by the Bank to be held accountable for the environmental consequences of its projects.[34] The historical resistance of key Bank members, such as Brazil and Venezuela helped create this situation. In addition, political differences between the Bank's Washington, D.C. headquarters and the Barbados field office also weakened its capacity for environmental protection.

In 1986 when the Barbados government proposed extending the large breakwater for the harbor, the Bank's technical staff in the Barbados office was opposed. They felt that extending the breakwater could cause sedimentation of the harbor and adjacent river mouth, significantly increasing the long term cost of the project. The staff also questioned the use of the sophisticated technology used for the harbor, since a much smaller pilot fisheries project at Ostins on the south coast was "a disaster", with the ice plant inoperable most of the time (B 17).

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[34] In mid 1990, the Bank's new Environmental Protection Division issued new procedures for carrying out an Environmental Impact Assessment process. The Division now employs several experts in various aspects of environmental management. It is still overseen by the EMC.

Bank staff in the Barbados office used the opportunity presented by the redesign of the breakwater to try and address the environmental impact of the project. It requested the government to consult the national Coastal Conservation Project Unit, which is funded by the Bank, when the Barbados Ministry of Agriculture, as the sponsor of the harbor, was seeking a permit for it from national planning authorities. The CCPU recommended that additional studies be done to assess the environmental impact of the project, including the affect of increased fishing pressure on the fish population, and possible problems related to sedimentation, water quality, and coastal hydrology. However, the Bank's staff in Washington, D.C., apparently did not support this request, which was also opposed by the Barbados government, so the project proceeded without any environmental evaluation.

The history of both the Southeast Peninsula Development Project and the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor showed a resistance among senior officials in USAID and the IDB to including environmental concerns in large projects. There also seems to be a conflict between politically appointed professionals whose main goal is to facilitate projects, and technical staff who are concerned with carrying out environmental policies. The influence of the professionals is stronger than the technicians, so policies to protect the environment are not carried out. One reason for this is the

lack of career incentives within the donor agencies.

Lack of Environmental Incentives

The professionals within the donor agencies who are in charge of key departments and offices responsible for choosing and approving projects do not have any career incentives to implement environmental policies. When the job performance of career professionals employed within the donors are evaluated, one of the most important criteria is related to how many projects they successfully complete. As a result, upper level professional staff members aggressively promote projects. Since environmental concerns can interrupt projects and hamper the flow of funding from the donor to the borrower, they are not given a priority as part of the project cycle.

In the case of USAID, Mission Director's are given job performance ratings based on how efficiently they spend money. With large projects like the Southeast Peninsula Development Project, which cost nearly $17 million, job advancement depends on project completion. The St. Kitts project was the last major project completed by the Mission Director for the Caribbean office, who left the region shortly after the road was completed. Clearly, he too wanted the road built without delay.

The Inter-American Development Bank has instituted some career incentives for its technical staff who carry out

environmental surveys and assessments, but it does not offer any such incentives for professionals in charge of project design, approval or execution. Since the Bank does not reward professionals for integrating environmental concerns into development projects, but does reward them for promoting the flow of project funds, it is unlikely that policies intended to protect natural resources will be implemented. This problem is exacerbated because donors focus on large projects that are planned and implemented using a fixed cycle.

Problems with the Single-Project Cycle

The donors all use a similar process, based on a established cycle, to organize and process projects.[34] Policy-based environmental reforms require the strengthening of public institutions in borrowing countries. It is very difficult to strengthen institutions within the constraints of the project cycle. This is a major reason why environmental policies that accompany large projects are not implemented. The project cycle serves as a bias against policy reforms that cannot be easily accomplished as part of

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[34] The basic steps in the project cycle are: 1. designing the project concept, 2. examining and helping refine a national growth strategy, 3. creating a financial package that is feasible, 4. analyzing and documenting technical issues, including environmental concerns, 5. approving the financial package, usually a loan and smaller grant, and 6. building the project. Inter-American Development Bank, 1983. The Programming, Processing and Approval of IDB Loans. IDB, Washington, D.C.

its established sequence of events.

In St. Kitts, USAID required that the government adopt a series of environmental policies to protect the natural resources on the undeveloped southeast peninsula. The intent of the Agency was to have these policies in place and working by the time the project was completed. But, in the words of an official familiar with the project, USAID "did not see that the environmental planning process established a presence in government, before building the road" (SK 17).

One of the conditions that USAID imposed on the St. Kitts government was that it adopt a new comprehensive national environmental law. The intent of the National Conservation and Environment Protection Act was to replace fragmented, outmoded legislation, and to create a National Conservation Commission to oversee its implementation. A U.S.-based attorney specializing in conservation law visited St. Kitts and drafted a preliminary law. The purpose of the preliminary draft was to obtain comments from the St. Kitts government. But, the government was under pressure to adopt a national environmental policy to avoid a delay in the project. As a result, the government adopted the law without giving the attorney the chance to modify it to fit local political and cultural conditions, which would have increased the possibility that it would be implemented (SK 22). The result was a law that does not work. It does not

focus on the practical problems of implementation encountered in the St. Kitts government. The government has yet to enforce any of its provisions. The National Conservation Commission has not been appointed, despite numerous promises of the Attorney General to do so. Once it signed the project agreeement with St. Kitts, USAID lost any leverage it could use to urge the government to enact environmental reforms, as the funding for the project was guaranteed (SK 12).

Once construction of the road to the peninsula was started, Kittians and USAID environmental staff were shocked at the damage it caused. The original road design, prepared years earlier by a British consultant for the British Development Division, had been replaced by a computer-generated design requiring 50-110 meter vertical cuts and fills exposing over eight acres of earth and bisecting the crown of Timothy Hill.[35] The scarring of the hill, and subsequent risk to nearby coral reefs and mangroves due to sedimentation, was contrary to USAID's entire effort to promote the environmentally sensitive development of the peninsula.[36] What was originally supposed to be a small, two

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[35] USAID, 1988. Amendment to the Environmental Assessment Report for the St. Kitts Southeast Peninsula Development Project.

[36] Joshua C. Dickenson, 1989. Environmental Impact Assessment. An informal paper presented to USAID and the DESFIL planning team. Dr. Dickenson is President of Tropical Research and Development, Inc., a major participant in the environmental planning process for the peninsula. His brief

lane road now resembled a highway, out of scale with the island environment, and symbolic of what had gone wrong with the project. USAID simply tried to accomplish too much in too short a time.

Another problem with adhering to the project cycle was the handling of the environmental experts for the project. Originally, the contract for the DESFIL team, responsible for drafting planning guidelines and staffing the government board that review development applications, was to expire in July, 1989. The road was not even physically completed. The government still lacked a counterpart for the USAID environmental team, as its Central Planning Unit had basically dissolved the year before (SK 12). The DESFIL contract was extended a few months, and the Chief of Party retained as an independent consultant, but the discontinuity that resulted would not have been necessary if the institution-building aspect of the project, essential to implementing the environmental policies accompanying the project, had been initiated earlier and continued after the road was constructed. A similar situation occurred when the Inter-American Development Bank sponsored the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor in Barbados.

The Bridgetown Fishing Harbor followed the standard project cycle. The dominance of the single-project model

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paper summarizes some of the difficulties of implementing environmental reform in developing countries, and integrating them into USAID projects.

of development was a major reason environmental concerns were ignored, and also poses problems for the current environmental reforms underway at the Bank.

It is clear that the professional and technical staff of the Bank was under tremendous pressure to complete the harbor. They did not want to tolerate the delay that would occur if the environmental concerns voiced by the regional staff and the Barbados Coastal Conservation Project Unit were examined in detail. There are several reasons why the Bank felt pressured to ignore environmental concerns and maintain the pre-determined project schedule.

The Bridgetown project was the first major fisheries project undertaken by the Bank (B 17, 31). It wanted to complete it as soon as possible to establish an successful track record for projects of this type. The Bank also did not want to deviate from the project cycle because delays could increase the cost of the harbor. Increased costs could not be tolerated because the rate of return for the harbor was estimated at 12.1%, characterized by IDB officials as "razor thin" because it barely met the acceptable rate of return of 12% established by the Bank (B 42). It would take valuable time, not accounted for in the project cycle, to determine if the project would negatively impact the environment. As a result, environmental studies were not done. The Bank's use of the project cycle causes other problems that are obstacles to environmental reform.

When the Bank reviews the environmental aspects of a project, it is done in the analysis portion of the project cycle. The analysis is done by Bank staff in the Washington, D.C. headquarters. This reflects the Bank's focus on analysis at the front end of a project, resulting in less institutional resources being available for project implementation (35, 42). It is the Bank's field offices that are responsible for project implementation, including monitoring and enforcing any environmental requirements handed down by Washington. It is here that the environmental performance of the Bank drops off sharply.

Even though the field offices are responsible for implementing projects, including enforcing conditions to protect natural resources, they do not have technical staff trained in environmental planning. Personnel in the field offices are chosen for other skills, such as engineering, economics or project management. The result is that staff in the field offices are generally unaware of the Bank's environmental policies, and are not trained to enforce them (B 42). This has caused a real weakness in the ability of the Bank to implement environmental reforms in the field. This problem will still exist, and may get worse, if proposed environmental reforms take place as planned.

As part of the effort to make the Bank more accountable to environment concerns, it has created a new Environmental Unit. This is a very positive step. The Bank is

instituting new Environmental Impact Assessment standards. The current proposal is to formalize these standards for all projects, and to have borrowing countries carry out the actual environmental analysis (B 44). But given the tremendous emphasis that political leaders in developing countries place on promoting economic growth, and the control they exert over civil servants, it is very unlikely that the Bank's strategy of delegating authority to the borrower will succeed.

The Bank is proposing to provide technical assistance to civil servants in its client countries to teach them how to do environmental analysis in the hope they will implement its new environmental policies. However, as my case studies in the Eastern Caribbean show, the missing ingredient in borrowing countries is not technical expertise, but political will and economic incentives that promote conservation, and the Bank's proposed policy provides neither.

Problems with Large Scale Development Projects

Donors use large scale projects because they provide the greatest economic impact. While large projects can provide the best opportunity for improving economic conditions, they present their own kind of difficulties. Large projects are complex, often requiring several mid course corrections before they are successfully completed.

Large projects also require that the borrowing country has the institutional capacity to implement them. When institutional capacity is limited, new aspects of the development process, such as environmental policies, do not receive adequate attention.

The proposed Pitons National Park on St. Lucia was a large project that encountered these problems. The objective of the Organization of American States in proposing the park was to use promote economic growth while protecting natural resources. This is a very positive goal, and to support it OAS staff prepared an elaborate feasibility study enumerating the benefits of the park. The study showed that the Park would generate far greater economic benefit that the private tourist resort which the government has favored on the same site.[37] But, the OAS linked the proposed park to a large, complex plan to redevelop the entire waterfront area of Soufriere, the nearby town.

When the OAS presented the park proposal to the government, the Soufriere Development Committee (SDC) unveiled its Master Plan for Soufriere. The SDC is a group of influential businessmen and community leaders whose goal is to promote economic growth in this remote park of St. Lucia. The centerpiece of the Master Plan is the proposed

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[37] Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for the Development of the Pitons National Park. Chapter 4.0, Financial and Economic Assessment.

Pitons National Park.

The Master Plan is a multi-faceted program to redevelop and revitalize Soufriere. The components of the Plan include the National Park, cruise ship facilities, condominiums, a marina, shops, restaurants, bars, offices, several small hotels, and dozens of tourist-related retail businesses, such a travel agency, SCUBA shop, bicycle rentals, etc. The Plan also envisions new parks, a health spa and a new road through town to serve the projects.[38] This ambitious plan would involve a complete redevelopment of the waterfront, requiring the relocation of a garbage dump, oil storage facility, sewage outfall and senior citizens home.

When the OAS and the SDC linked their projects together, they created what would likely be the largest project ever undertaken in St. Lucia. Implementation of this combined project, or the park by itself, requires a long term planning program. But, it has been documented that St. Lucia does not have the institutional capacity for long term planning.[39] Project implementation would also

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[38] Nick Peter Troobitscoff and Frank Alfred Hamilton, 1988. Master Plan for Soufriere Regional Tourism Maximization Strategy, commissioned by the Soufriere Development Program.

[39] Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and Physical Planning: The Case of St. Lucia. Sponsored by OAS, Department of Regional Development, and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource Management Program, Economic Base Resource Management Plurinational Project. Soler points out that "...when forward planning is done it reaches a plateau and never goes further ahead. What's more, whatever

require a complex series of political decisions and government actions that are difficult to obtain given pressing day-to-day problems in the country, and the limited technical and financial resources within the government (SL 6, 12).

The goal of promoting economic growth while preserving limited natural resources is a good one, and consistence with the projects that the Department of Regional Development sponsors. But the massive size of the project, especially when linked with the Soufriere Master Plan, is well beyond the capability of the government. The same is true of environmental components of the Southeast Peninsula Project in St. Kitts. In both instances, the donors adopted environmentally-sound policies but could not get them implemented. But the lack of local institutional capacity to implement such massive policy initiatives should not have been a surprise to the donors.

Consultants for the Organization of American States and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States have analyzed the institutional capability for natural resource planning in these countries.[40] They have found that public

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forward planning is done is strongly oriented to urban design or to critical issues which are already in themselves a problem" (pg. 29).

[40] Fernaldo Soler analyzed the planning capability of St. Kitts and St. Lucia in 1988 for OAS and OECS. The Natural Resource Management Project of OECS has documented the inability of both countries to implement environmental laws in its series of reports on Harmonization of Environmental

institutions have significant problems implementing existing laws, and have little capacity for long term planning and public management. As an official familiar with efforts to increase the institutional capacity of the St. Kitts government said: "The country is learning very slowly how to deal with the planning process; this kind of change takes a long time here" (SK 25). If the donors had targeted additional resources for institution building, and designed smaller scale projects that were easier to implement, it would have helped these small countries to pursue environmentally-sound development projects.

Summary

International development assistance agencies have been under increasing political pressure, mainly from U.S.-based environmental groups and the Congress, to institute environmental reforms. There are several competing objectives that are part of the development process, including the need for economic growth and the use of development assistance to carry out foreign aid policies, that have slowed environmental reform. In particular, the dependence of many countries on donor agencies for foreign investment has made it especially difficult to implement environmental reforms because of their desperate need for investment capital.

Legislation issued in 1986.

Since the early 1980s when the United States passed the Caribbean Basin Initiative and invaded Grenada to oust a pro-Leninist government, it has reasserted its foreign policy interest in the region. As a result, the amount of development assistance from the U.S. has greatly increased. Two agencies that the United States uses to promote development and continue its program of unification with the Caribbean and Latin America are the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development. These agencies spend millions of dollars each year in the Eastern Caribbean. Both agencies are attempting to implement environmental reforms required by the Congress, but have had mixed results.

USAID has effectively integrated environmental concerns into a wide range of activities, but has trouble carrying out reforms in the field because of overarching political interests that control the Agency. In the case of USAID and its Southeast Peninsula Development Project on St. Kitts, a 1984 directive from the Agency's Deputy Director to "get a project going in the next 30 days" sent a clear signal to the Caribbean Regional Development Office to complete the project without delay. The project was accompanied by several new environmental policies, included in the project by the regional staff, that have been only partially implemented, placing the abundant natural resources of the peninsula at great risk. The Agency did not allocate

sufficient resources to provide the institutional capacity for environmental reform in the government prior to building the project. USAID also failed to plan "beyond the road", and underestimated the time and money it would take to enact change in the government.

In 1984 when the IDB undertook the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor it totally neglected the possible environmental impact of the project. The 12.1% rate of return for the harbor barely met the 12% minimum required by the Bank, so delays to conduct environmental research were not tolerated. Recent reforms within the Bank may improve its environmental accountability, but the current plan to delegate responsibility to recipient countries to carry out their own environmental assessments in not likely to succeed. The political pressures in developing countries is too great to carry out objective, complete and accurate environmental studies, and national governments lack the resources to implement any policies that result.

Other major problems that prevent donor agencies from implementing their own environmental policies include an excessive dependence on large-scale projects that overwhelm the institutional capacity of governments, a lack of career incentives within the agencies for professionals that promote environmental policies, and constraints of the standard project-cycle that prevent them from carrying out long term programs to protect natural resources.

Chapter Six

An Open Decision Making Process to Improve Environmental Policy Implementation

We have seen how environmental policies fail because they do not adequately account for political, cultural and economic conditions. Environmental concerns are treated as tangents to the development process, as policies, laws and regulations intended to preserve limited natural resources are treated as "add ons" to it. Policies intended to protect natural resources are seriously constrained by the temporal limitations of the standard project cycle, and the lack of political will within donor institutions and countries to embrace procedural reforms that threaten the way they do business.

Environmental policies and the natural ecosystems they are supposed to protect do not fit neatly into existing institutional niches. There is a limit to the responsiveness of policies that are imported, ignore local culture and exclude key stakeholders. I hypothesize that all of the major stakeholders need to participate in a policy making process that is more open. An open process it needed to design

strategies for environmental policy implementation that integrate politics, economics and culture, transcending the barriers erected by the traditional approach to development which treats them as separate, unrelated components. An open process needs to account for the interests of all of the stakeholders affected by developing, including donor agencies, national politicians, resource users and environmental NGOs. If any one of the stakeholding groups is left out, it will leave a gap the others will use to pursue their own policies, counteracting the best efforts to strengthen and promote environmental reform.

Programs to improve environmental policy implementation must account for four key factors: politics within national governments, politics within donor agencies, the role of national culture, and a near total reliance on short-term economic development strategies. Any attempt to improve the way that environmental policies are implemented has to systemically account for these factors on an country-by-country basis. Efforts to improve environmental policies have to originate in three key groups; donor agencies, national governments in developing countries and non-governmental agencies specializing in environmental policy.

The Closed Dysfunctional Approach

Environmental policies, especially those that are required by donor agencies as a condition of development

projects, are created by a decision making process that is basically closed. This process reflects the priorities within donor agencies and borrowing countries that promote development without seriously considering the environmental damage that will result.



THE CLOSED DYSFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING

Figure 6.1

Existing Conditions that Maintain a Closed Dysfunctional Approach

- ***Need of Donor Agencies to Maintain an Uninterrupted Flow of Development Funds***
- ***Desire of National Political Leaders to Stay in Power***
- ***Perceived Necessity to Attract Foreign Investment***
- ***Donor's Preference to Maintain Centralized Control of Development Process***

This process is dysfunctional because it excludes key stakeholders and ignores several vital elements of policy making, such as the culture of decision making in developing countries and the behavior of donor agencies. Top policy makers in donor agencies and borrowing countries are motivated to promote development that causes environmental damage because of four main factors; the need to maintain the flow of development funds, the desire to stay in power, a preference to keep centralized control of the development process and a perceived necessity to attract foreign investment. The result is a closed, dysfunctional approach to development decisions that promotes the degradation of limited natural resources.

This closed approach promotes environmental degradation in several ways. When civil servants within government agencies that are responsible for natural resource management (ie. forestry, agricultural, fisheries, etc.) are excluded from development decisions, so are resource users whose livelihoods depend on the health of the environment. Information about the environment, such as the stability of a local fishery or the productivity of agricultural land that may be impaired by a development, is not considered by decision makers. Environmental NGOs, which have the expertise to promote economic stability by training resource users how to produce more efficiently while protecting the natural resources they depend on, are also excluded. The exclusion

of these two groups increases the likelihood that fragile natural resources will be damaged.

Perhaps the most important element of this closed approach is how it reflects the behavior of the key decision makers who are involved. National political leaders know that the primary interest of political appointees and professionals in the donor agencies is to keep projects moving so they are completed as quickly as possible. Political appointees and professionals in the donor agencies know that political leaders in the countries control the political process, and that their highest priority is to attract foreign investment by approving projects that they favor.

The behavior of policy makers in the countries and donor agencies is mutually reinforcing. Both groups realize that if environmental policies are enforced, projects will probably be delayed. Decisions to ignore or downplay environmental concerns set precedents that influence civil servants and environmental technicians, who know that their superiors will not look favorably on their efforts to enforce policies intended to protect natural resources.

The mutually reinforcing behavior of policy makers within donor agencies and developing countries is exacerbated by the procedural constraints of a centralized development process. The steps in the development process are predetermined. There is not enough flexibility within the project cycle to accommodate major new policy initiatives such as environmental

laws and regulations. Environmental reforms are usually included in the development process by slightly modifying the existing project cycle, rather than instituting new procedures that are tailored to the special characteristics of environmental problems. It can take several years to implement new environmental policies, especially when they represent a major shift in the way that a country makes decisions. Public institutions need to be reformed, personnel hired and trained, and funds provided to pay for them. It is difficult to complete these tasks within the temporal and financial constraints of the standard project cycle.

For example, environmental impact assessments are now being done by several donors in an attempt to protect natural resources, but they have limited influence on how projects are actually implemented. By the time that a project is identified, a tentative financing package assembled, and a funding commitment obtained, the momentum that has been created prevents the recommendations in an environmental analysis from being enforced. This happened with the Southeast Peninsula Project on St. Kitts. Despite a long, complex program funded by the project sponsor, USAID, to promote environmental reforms in the country, most are not implemented due of the tremendous economic and political pressure to approve projects. In the case of the Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor in Barbados, environmental concerns were ignored entirely because of the political pressure to build

the project as quickly as possible. These cases appear to support the proposition that environmental reforms cannot be fit into the straitjacket of the project cycle.

The existing closed development process is also unable to account for the importance of the culture of decision making in developing countries. Even if legitimate environmental investigations are prepared for projects, subsequent recommendations to protect natural resources are not implemented because they do not conform to local cultural norms. The public policy process in developing countries is based on personal relationships, family ties and party loyalty. Political leaders lack the necessary political will to carry out environmental reforms. The project cycle does not allow for allocating sufficient time or financial resources to design and carry out a multi-year program of environmental policy implementation to address these issues.

Even though donor agencies are subject to varying degrees of government oversight, their decision making process is heavily weighed towards promoting development and maintaining a flow of projects. This philosophy is consistent with recent budget increases in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which are intended to provide funding for an increasing number of development projects each year. While the Banks are under pressure from U.S. environmental groups and the Congress to accelerate environmental reforms, they are simultaneously funding more and more projects. These two

objectives are in conflict, which has motivated the Banks to adopt environmental reforms in a way that causes the least disruption to the project cycle and subsequent flow of funds.

Thus far, countries and donor agencies have attempted to adopt policies using a fragmented approach that reflects their own short term economic and political interests. In addition, the nature of most large scale environmental problems that are occurring in developing countries, such as depletion of fisheries, forests, and agricultural soil, water pollution and widespread health problems, require long term solutions. Environmental damage shows up years after projects have been approved and built. There is no accountability for environmental damage in less developed countries that are dominated by short term political and economic interests.[1]

The combination of economic, political and cultural factors that prevent environmental policies from being effectively implemented can be accounted for in a more open approach to development and policy making.

An Open Functional Approach

In order for environmental policies to be effectively implemented, I believe that the public policy process needs to open up, to become more accessible. To do this, a new model of decision making needs to be implemented that

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[1] John L. Seitz, 1988. The Politics of Development: An Introduction to Global Issues, page 143. New York, Basil Blackwell.

integrates the essential elements of the implementation process and involves all of the affected stakeholders.



THE OPEN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING

Figure 6.2

Preconditions for Achieving an Open Functional Approach

- *Resolve Conflicting Behavior within Donor Agencies Between Political Appointees and Environmental Professionals*
- *Determine How Economic Pressures Constrain New Policies*
- *Account for National Politics in Borrowing Country that will Hinder Implementation Strategies*
- *Examine how Culture of Decision Making, the Interrelationship Between National Politics and Culture, will Affect Implementation Process*

This more open approach to policy implementation, which integrates environmental protection with the development process, cannot be accommodated within the constraints of the existing development paradigm. One way to implement a more open policy making process is to have the stakeholders participate in a collaborative dialogue that uses a negotiation process.

A Negotiated Partnership for Sustainable Development

The parties involved in international development can improve environmental policy implementation by participating in a collaborative negotiation process. A negotiation model needs to be created to reflect the specific needs of the development process, to fit within a framework that is acceptable to the participants, while improving the effectiveness of environmental policies on the national and international levels.

The model would be based on similar cooperative efforts that have been undertaken to protect the environment. Different negotiations that have addressed international environmental concerns include the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Montreal Protocols for reducing chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the Treaty for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, and recent

agreements to swap debt for nature in South America.[2]

These agreements were reached using the single-text model of negotiating. The parties reached a consensus by slowly modifying a single text that was ultimately transformed into a final agreement. This approach was used because the purpose of the negotiations was for the parties to reach an overall agreement on one basic issue, although several sub-issues existed which made the negotiations very complex. The model I am proposing must create a *negotiation process* that will be continually repeated with each project, compared to a negotiation that deals with one monolithic issue one time. Several pre-conditions have to be met to establish a creditable negotiation process designed to integrate environmental policy implementation into the development process.

Preconditions Themes of the Negotiation Process

Several preconditions need to be met before a negotiation process can commence. These preconditions are similar for any negotiation that involves many parties and several issues, but in this instance, need to account for the complexities of the international development process, and the political

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[2] Lynton Keith Caldwell, 1984. International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press. Caldwell discusses conventions, treaties and regional agreements that were reached by negotiation.

and cultural conditions that are found in most developing countries. The first precondition relates to who will participate in the negotiation process.

Participation

It is essential to establish who will take part in the negotiation process, as a stable result requires that all of the parties who are affected by it have a voice at the bargaining table. A negotiation can only be successful if it involves all of the stakeholders who have an interest in the outcome. In the context of environmental disputes in developing countries, the issue of participation is complicated by the high stakes generated by large donor-funded development projects.

Each of the stakeholders has a different motivation to participate in this open decision making process. Donor agencies will benefit from a development process that accounts for environmental factors as it helps create a more certain investment climate, promoting long term economic growth that is environmentally sustainable. Donors are also motivated by the need to implement their own environmental policies, as mandated by the U.S. Congress and their own governing boards. By taking part in a more open approach to policy making, donors will fulfill their mandate to promote development that meets basic human needs and promotes long term self-reliance.

National political leaders also are motivated by several factors to participate in a more open development process. International pressure on the donor agencies will eventually force them to stop funding projects that cause environmental problems. Unless political leaders encourage changes in the development process that lead to better protection for natural resources, at some point they may not be eligible to receive development assistance. This in turn will create serious political problems at home for national leaders.

In addition, by preventing key stakeholders from participating in the public policy process, politicians have generated resentment that will cause long term political instability, contrary to their own primary self-interest which is to stay in power. National politicians need to create a greater degree of political stability in their governments, by increasing the institutional capacity to implement public policies, which will enhance their self-reliance and reduce political and economic dependency on outside parties.

In many instances, civil servants in borrowing countries have taken the initiative to take a more active role in development decisions, but have been stopped by political leaders who exert near total control over the political process. Civil servants who are responsible for natural resource management (ie. forestry, fisheries, agriculture, land use planning, etc.) have often invested in a specialized college education to train them for their work, and have made

a personal and professional commitment to express their environmental values when participating in the public policy process. The positive motivation of civil servants is also shown by their involvement in political reform movements, attempts to open up the policy dialogue in countries where political leaders place strict limits on who can participate in decision making. Two examples of reform movements are the participation of civil servants in environmental interest groups in St. Lucia and Barbados that are attempting to influence political leaders.

Environmental technicians in the donor agencies are motivated to take part in a negotiation process by the same basic reasons as civil servants; a desire to place environmental concerns higher on the agenda of the policy process, to convince administrators to allocate additional institutional resources to environmental reform. Being able to participate in a negotiated dialogue that places environmental concerns higher on the policy agenda, in essence creating a "level playing field" for the stakeholders, is a major motivation for both civil servants and environmental technicians to take part in a more open process.

Local resource users, such as farmers, fisherman and charcoal producers, are motivated to take part in a negotiation process as it will give them access to the political system that they haven't had. In addition, it is a way of tapping their specialized knowledge of the local

natural environment. If this special knowledge is included in the design and implementation of development projects, it has the potential to reduce environmental damage. In turn, this will keep the local resource base intact, enabling resource users to continue their livelihoods.

International and local environmental NGOs are motivated as they will gain political influence by being brought into the mainstream of the public policy process. It will allow international NGOs to efficiently target where their limited resources can best be used, in countries where environmental policies are integrated into the development process. Local NGOs will be able to form coalitions with international NGOs, to receive financial and technical assistance, while providing crucial insights about the operation of national political systems. Local NGOs will become stronger as they use the framework of a formal negotiation process to work more closely with resource users, increasing the political influence of both groups.

Participation also involves how the right stakeholders will be chosen to take part in the negotiation process. It is important that all parties that have a legitimate interest in the outcome of a project be included, in order for the outcome to be stable. One way to identify the parties to be involved is to perform a stakeholder analysis at the onset of the negotiation. Because the public policy process in many developing countries has been closed, and due to the

close relationship between local culture and politics that is difficult for outsiders to understand, the analysis should be termed a "culturally-based stakeholder analysis." The following section on Steps in the Negotiation Process explains how to conduct such an analysis.

Representation and Assistance for Weak Parties

After the stakeholders have been chosen, the negotiation process has be designed to make sure they are adequately represented. This is necessary because of the severe power imbalances between key stakeholders within the closed policy making process. Civil servants are routinely overruled by political leaders. Resources users are often poor and uneducated. They lack access to political leaders and do not know how to participate in the public policy process. In donor agencies, environmental technicians are often overruled by professionals or political appointees. If these parties attempt to participate in a new, more open policy dialogue, they are subject to political retribution and personal persecution by more powerful stakeholders.

To ensure a successful negotiation, guarantees have to be made to protect stakeholders that are politically and financially weak. Civil servants who fear political retribution may require legal guarantees to protect their jobs, careers and families. Resource users are usually poorly organized and may not be comfortable with the formal

atmosphere surroundings in which negotiations usually take place. Resource users and other stakeholders may need technical and financial assistance as they are at a disadvantage because they lack scientific resources, are illiterate or are simply not willing to attend public negotiating sessions. For example, resource users often depend on each days catch or harvest to feed their families, and may need to be paid compensation to attend negotiation sessions.

The party that convenes the negotiation should be responsible for initially determining what type of assistance each stakeholder will need to take part. In turn, this implies that a successful negotiation may depend on long-term institution building to improve the capacity of weak parties to take part in a public policy dialogue. Efforts to increase the institutional capacity of NGOs and resource users may have to be undertaken before these parties can take part in the negotiation process. Institution building can include training in basic administrative skills, (ie. bookkeeping, fundraising, use of the media), policy analysis and conflict resolution. Once the institutional capacity of the weak parties is improved, subsequent negotiations can be initiated more easily.[3]

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[3] See Janet M. Chernela, 1989. The Role of Indigenous Organizations in International Policy Development: the Case of an Awa Biosphere Reserve in Colombia and Ecuador. Florida International University, the State University at Miami.

Guarantees that give legal protection to weak stakeholders, provide compensation for lost wages and or establish a program for institution building can be part of a pre-negotiation agreement between all of the parties.

Even if the weak stakeholders are guaranteed that they will be legally protected, they may be unwilling to openly participate in the negotiation. Fear of retribution can be quite strong, especially in countries where environmental advocates have been labeled as anti-government, imprisoned or publicly denounced. Such actions often silence the most ardent critic of government policy. If parties are unwilling to participate even with guarantees, it is the responsibility of the convener and the neutral party that organizes and manages the negotiation process to ensure that the interests of parties who are not physically present will be adequately represented. The party that convenes the negotiation has other responsibilities as well.

Legitimacy, Sponsorship and the Neutral

The issue of legitimacy is particularly important in the context of political systems that are not highly developed, and when the public policy process lacks a

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Chernela mentions that international funding agencies attached conditions that required the government in Ecuador to include an NGO representing an indigenous tribal group, which strengthened the bargaining positions of both indigenous and environmental groups in the negotiations for a new biosphere reserve.

tradition of public participation. The participants in a negotiation have to believe that the process they are engaged in is valid and genuine. If the stakeholders do not believe in the legitimacy of the negotiation process, or that it should be used to resolve a specific conflict, a formal negotiation will probably not work. To give the required sense of legitimacy to a negotiation process, it needs to be convened by a legitimate party.

A negotiation process should include several key elements to gain legitimacy from its participants. First, a successful negotiation has to account for the attitudes and perceptions of the stakeholders.[4] Second, the negotiation process has to represent the interests of all of the key stakeholders. Third, the stakeholders have to be shown how they can gain from participating in the negotiation process. In developing countries, this is particularly important given the anticipated skepticism of weak parties who have historically been excluded from the public policy process or strong parties who are afraid that they will lose power if they participate.

All of the stakeholders are responsible for creating legitimacy in the negotiation process. Donor agencies have the financial resources that give them the leverage that may

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[4] Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York, Basic Books. See pages 25, 101-103 for a discussion of stakeholder attitudes and perceptions, and the need to include all stakeholders in a negotiation.

be needed to convince other stakeholders to participate. The capital that donors bring to the development process may be needed to convince national politicians that a participatory approach to development is needed to protect natural resources. Conversely, borrowing countries may want to initiate a negotiation so they can convince donors to fund projects that meet local needs. NGOs can lend legitimacy to a negotiation by agreeing to provide technical support and scientific information about natural resources to be affected by a particular project. By showing a willingness to initiate or participate in a negotiation, all of the stakeholders can help legitimatize the process.

There are several ways that a negotiation can be convened. Any stakeholder that has the institutional capacity and motivation to improve environmental policies can act as the convener. This can include a donor agency, a government ministry or a local NGO. Donor agencies have the financial and technical resources that a negotiation requires, and are motivated by a need to promote environmental reforms as part of the development process. This makes them a likely candidate to act as the convener for a negotiation process.

National governments can also convene a negotiation. They possess the political leverage to convince other stakeholders to come to the bargaining table, and can benefit from institution building programs that accompany the negotiation process. Local NGOs have several advantages that

enable them to act as conveners. They are familiar with the national public policy process, possess knowledge about natural resources and often have existing relationships with donor agencies that sponsor projects.

To be legitimate, a negotiation process also has to account for the cultural differences of the parties involved. Negotiations about development projects will usually involve parties from different cultures. Representatives from a donor agency are often from the United States or Europe, and may be relatively new on the job due to the job rotation most agencies use. Representatives from international NGOs probably have a similar background, while those from the national government, local NGOs and resource users in the country are from the local culture. To account for cultural differences, the convener can use an elicitive feedback process which is described in Step 4 of the negotiation process in the following section.

A legitimate negotiation process should also include initial ground rules to protect stakeholders who are politically weak. Ground rules can include commitments to protect weaker parties from political retribution, an agreement to de-personalize the debate so parties can focus on their real interests, and the responsibilities of the

chairperson.[5] These provisions also relate to the accountability of the stakeholders, and their ability to keep commitments made during the negotiation.

The parties may also benefit from a pre-negotiation condition that governs how they will communicate with the media. The parties can designate a media subcommittee and establish written guidelines describing who, how and when the media will be informed of the progress or results of the negotiation. Establishing media guidelines as a pre-condition of negotiation can also help prevent the negotiation process from being used by the opposition to attack the majority party. This step may be needed to convince the majority party to approve the government's participation in the negotiation process. Allowing a member of the opposition party, especially one who is knowledgeable about environmental issues, to take part in the negotiation will often be necessary to create a negotiated outcome that is politically stable.

To to be legitimate a negotiation should be assisted by a neutral helper. Different negotiations usually require different types of help. There are several different methods of dispute resolution that can be used. The two types that are appropriate for negotiations involving environmental

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[5] Susan Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988. Managing Public Disputes. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. See pages 118-124.

policies in developing countries are facilitation and mediation.

A facilitator is a neutral person whose primary role is to organize the negotiation, to make sure that it gets started, and to help participants understand the process they are engaged in. The facilitator is concerned more with the procedural aspects of the negotiation than its substance. A mediator is also an outside neutral party, but takes a more active role in the negotiation process than a facilitator. The mediator is skilled in identifying areas of potential agreement, helps the participants discuss the substance of their differences, and assists them in creating a packaged agreement that advances the interests of all of the parties.[6]

The convener, whether it is a donor agency, the government or an NGO, needs to examine the needs of the negotiating partners and determine whether a facilitator or a mediator is needed. Because of the complex nature of environmental disputes, it may be desirable to chose a neutral who is qualified to serve as both a facilitator and a mediator. Negotiations that initially need process-oriented help often need substantive assistance as they progress. A facilitator should be capable of making the transition to a

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[6] The roles of the facilitator and mediator are derived from a summary of Dispute Resolution Methods, National Institute for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C. Also see Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, who differentiate between assisted and unassisted forms of negotiation, and describe what each entails.

mediator during a negotiation, as he or she gains trust from the stakeholders.

It is crucial that the helper be perceived as neutral by all of the parties. Even if the convener perceives itself as being neutral, if other stakeholders perceive it as having a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation, it needs to bring in an outside party to act as a neutral helper, rather than supplying the helper from its own staff. There are several professional organizations that specialize in negotiation who can advise the convener how to find a suitable helper.

The qualifications of the neutral helper are very important. The credibility of the entire negotiation program depends on the sensitivity they exhibit when choosing a neutral that meets the needs of the stakeholders, and who is someone that they trust. I believe that a mediator in this context has to possess two major qualities.[7] First, the mediator needs have substantial expertise in issues related to environment/development conflicts, in addition to expertise in the procedural aspects of a negotiation process. Second, the mediator has to have experience in cross-cultural negotiations, and be able to design a negotiation strategy

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[7] There are other qualities that any good mediator should possess, such as good communication skills, the ability to analyze a conflict, design a strategy for dealing with it, and managing a process filled with conflicting personalities and large amounts of data. See Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988, pages 191-193.

that reflects the cultural norms of the stakeholders.

Once a mediator has been chosen who possesses the necessary qualifications, it usually will be necessary to find a co-mediator from the borrowing country who is an expert in the local culture, including the indigenous language, and the culture of decision making within the political system. A multi-cultural mediation team will give a negotiation the credibility and substantive expertise that it needs to deal effectively with the complexities of environment/development disputes and their underlying cultural component.

Accountability

In societies where key stakeholders have been uniformly excluded from the public policy process, the negotiation process has to include provisions to assure the accountability of the participants. Accountability relates to the capability and willingness of the participants to be held answerable for their actions, during and after the negotiations. To address these concerns in the negotiation process, the convener should help the participants understand their duties and responsibilities to the process, and each other. This is especially important in situations when stakeholders have not had the benefit of legal protection.

An example of how the lack of legal protection can inhibit stakeholders from participating in a policy dialogue is the case of planning legislation in the many developing

countries. The duties and jurisdiction of planning authorities are ambiguous. Planning legislation is unclear, and lacks precise language that would empower civil servants to carry out planning laws. Permit systems are typically full of loopholes and inconsistencies. Civil servants are hesitant to promote environmental reforms within this uncertain framework, as the legal system does not afford them legal protection from political retribution. The convener can help the parties devise ground rules or legal protection in the pre-negotiation stage.

The concept of accountability also includes the need to use objective criteria in a negotiation process. In developing countries, policy decisions are often made without fully considering how development will impact the environment. The environmental impact process is an attempt to remedy this shortcoming. However, an environmental analysis is only effective if it is translated into a binding commitment. Guarantees that borrowing countries will implement the findings of environmental assessments need to be linked to conditions contained in their lending agreements with donor agencies. A negotiation process that accompanies each project can provide the framework for establishing agreements that improve the accountability of the environmental assessment process, and its use of objective criteria.

The convener should consider who can best represent the stakeholding groups during the negotiation. This relates

to the ability of the representatives to make binding commitments on behalf of their constituencies. Deciding who the representatives will be is of particular importance in developing countries because of the intensely personal nature of the political process, and the difficulty that may be encountered by outside parties, such as donor agencies, when they try to convince governments to enforce the specific elements of an agreement, such as new environmental policies.

For a negotiation to be successful, the agreement that comes out of it has to be implemented. The ability of the parties involved to follow through on commitments they make on behalf of the organizations they represent, such as politicians who represent the government, is crucial. If agreements are not kept, trust between the parties can be severely damaged. It is particularly important that this be guarded against when parties are involved in a formal negotiation process for the first time.

The convener, with the advice of the neutral, can identify individuals from each stakeholder group that have the authority to speak for the organization they represent. From the donor agency, this should include representatives from the headquarters who are responsible for project design and finance, and staff from its field office who are responsible for project implementation and environmental protection. It is important that both groups participate on behalf of the donor.

For the government, representatives should include senior civil servants from key ministries, such as finance and planning, that have close personal relationships to political leaders and are aware of the institutional capacity within the government to implement different aspects of the negotiated agreement. Whenever possible, permanent secretaries should be selected. Officials from ministries that are responsible for implementing environmental policies should also be present. The possibility that governments will change after national elections has to be accounted for, so that new political leaders are bound by agreements made by a previous administration. Representatives from the NGOs and resource users will probably be evident as these groups are small and don't have many members to serve as negotiators.

If the resource users or other stakeholders are not sufficiently comfortable to be physically present at the negotiating sessions, the neutral needs to determine how their interests can be represented at the bargaining table in their absence. Their interests can be represented by a coalition partner who shares the same interests and is willing to speak for them during the negotiations. The neutral can represent a party who is not present by reminding the other stakeholders of the importance of considering the interests of all parties to create an outcome that is durable and stable. The convener should start to think about which strategy is appropriate

before the negotiations start.

After the pre-conditions for a successful open policy dialogue are met, the actual negotiation process can start. The negotiation process can be organized by using a series of steps.

Important Steps to Make an Open Decision Making System Work

To strengthen and promote environmental reform, several steps can be included as part of a negotiation process. They are offered here as one way to address the constraints to environmental policy implementation that exist in borrowing countries and donor agencies. The steps do not have to be followed exactly. There are many ways to strengthen environmental policy implementation. The following steps are one way.

The steps can be initiated at many places in the project cycle, depending on when the stakeholders decide that a negotiation process is needed. If the objective of the stakeholders is to develop a coordinated strategy to implement environment policies that accompany a development project, they may want to initiate negotiations at the beginning of the project cycle when a project is still in the conceptual stage, before the parties have developed firm ideas about it that can hinder the implementation process.

Steps in the Open Decision Making System

1. Evaluate institutional capability of borrower
2. Conduct cultural stakeholder analysis
3. Choose facilitator or mediator
4. Design elicitive model for negotiation process

5. Initiate negotiations for implementation strategy
6. Create performance standards to link implementation plan with project agreement
7. Agree on time frame and procedure for post-project evaluation of implementation plan

1. Evaluate Institutional Capacity of the Borrower

Evaluating the institutional capacity of the borrower is necessary to determine the likelihood that environmental policies accompanying projects will be implemented. This can be done by a donor, an NGO or the country itself. To evaluate institutional capacity several tasks need to be carried out. As with the other steps in this process, these tasks can be undertaken by any qualified analyst, usually working for the convener or neutral. Throughout the following discussion of the steps, I will use the word analyst to describe the person who carries them out.

First, the analyst should conduct interviews with civil

servants in the borrowing country and with environmental NGOs in the region to determine if existing environmental laws and regulations are being implemented. If a preliminary analysis shows that these policies are unenforced, the analyst should identify where the bottlenecks are in the local political process. Bottlenecks typically include a closed public policy process, lack of public participation, political limitations placed on national planning agencies, unclear and conflicting environmental statutes, and laws that lack administrative guidelines to implement them. Once bottlenecks are identified, the stakeholders can start to develop linkages between the project and an institution-building program to improve the chances that project-specific environmental protection measures will be carried out.

An important goal of this initial step is for the stakeholders to start to understand how the national culture of decision making affects the public policy process of the borrower. This includes the pivotal role that political leaders play in policy implementation, how they depend on man-to-man communication to change policy, and the sustained effort the donor must make to build the personal relationships with national leaders that are needed to effectively promote environmental reform.

2. Conduct Cultural Stakeholder Analysis

Conducting a cultural stakeholder analysis involves identifying all of the parties that will be affected by the proposed project. It provides a detailed road map of how the political system includes and excludes parties affected by development projects. This analysis requires formal consultations with NGOs that are familiar with the political system and culture of decision making in the borrowing country. Many stakeholders, especially resource users who are typically excluded from the public policy process, are hard to find. They may be politically or socially alienated, and unwilling to participate. But, they possess valuable information about fragile natural resources that project planners need.

As part of the cultural stakeholder analysis, the analyst should identify who the stakeholders are, their interests in the project, who represents their interests and how their interests are in conflict. This will show who makes policy decisions, and whose interests they represent. By identifying the most powerful stakeholders, it will become clear what parties have to take part in the negotiation to secure a binding commitment for the negotiated agreement.

The stakeholder analysis will also show who is excluded from the decision making process. Often the interests of unorganized stakeholders, such as resource users who provide

vital services for the society, are not represented by the political system. The analyst can use this information to design a process for including stakeholders that have not been part of the public policy dialogue, which is also needed to reach an agreement that is enforceable.

3. Choose facilitator or mediator

The convener, in consultation with the stakeholders, should choose an outside party to serve as the neutral. Having assessed the institutional capacity of the borrower and identified the interests of the stakeholders, the convener can now assess, in cooperation with the neutral, whether facilitation or mediation is needed.[8]

Given the complexity of environmental disputes, and the widely varying interests of the stakeholders, the neutral should be capable of acting as a facilitator or a more active mediator. To maintain the accountability of the negotiation, the neutral should be approved by all of the parties who are taking part. The donor agency should have a list of qualified neutrals that can be circulated to the parties, so that one person can be chosen by consensus. If the mediator is not from the local culture, he or she should select, in

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[8] See Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987. In chapters 4 and 5 the authors discuss under what circumstances facilitation and mediation should be used.

consultation with the stakeholders, a co-mediator.

At this point the convener and mediator will normally design a strategy to motivate the stakeholders to take part in the actual negotiation.[9] The convener may have to provide incentives to the stakeholders to get them to participate in the negotiation. The neutral can help with this step by identifying the benefits that each party is likely to derive from the negotiation process, such as providing increased institutional capacity for the government or giving the donor a method of implementing mandated environmental policies. It is likely that environmental NGOs will want to participate, as this may be the first time they have a voice in strengthening environmental policies.

4. Design an "elicitive model" for the negotiation process

The negotiation model most often used in the United States depends heavily on a "top-down" approach which can bias the proceedings to favor the convener or the parties with the most sophisticated communication skills. To account for this, the convener should incorporate an elicitive

[9] Susskind and Cruikshank discuss the typical tasks that a mediator will carry out when assisting the negotiating parties. These tasks include helping to set the agenda for the negotiating sessions, to help the parties summarize the issues they are most concerned with, and to structure the discussion so that all of the parties are given a voice in the proceedings. See pages 142-143 of Breaking the Impasse for a description of other responsibilities of the mediator.

feedback process into the negotiation model. To use this approach, the convener elicits from the participants how they deal with conflict, acting as a catalyst rather than a negotiation expert, to frame the process within the setting of the local culture.[10] The mediator elicits stories from the stakeholders about what has happened to past environmental policies, whether they succeeded or failed, and why. This work can be started in the pre-negotiation stage before formal negotiations commence, and continued in the actual negotiation sessions.

The elicitive approach should recognize the difference between formal and informal authorities, and how they need to be included in an implementation process that reflects local cultural norms. For example, informal authorities, such as church leaders and village elders, may be able to exert social pressure to encourage compliance with environmental protection policies more effectively than government officials who are limited by a lack of trained personnel and a flawed regulatory system.[11]

The benefit of this approach is that it elicits the experiences of the participants to identify bottlenecks in the policy implementation process, in the context of the local

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[10] John Paul Lederach, 1988. Summaries of The Transfer Model and the Elicitive/Catalyst Model. Mennonite Conciliation Service, Akron, Penn., USA.

[11] Lederach, 1988.

culture of decision making. It will allow the implementation plan for environmental policies that results from the negotiation to be based on local conditions, opportunities and constraints. To properly use an elicitive approach, the mediator may need to have a co-mediator from the local culture, especially if the stakeholders include indigenous people or residents from a rural community.

5. Initiate negotiations to design implementation strategy

The convener, with the assistance of the mediation team, initiates the actual negotiations to design an implementation strategy for environmental policies. Negotiations can take place in any location agreed to by the stakeholders, but in general it is desireable to hold them in the country where the project is located. The first step in the actual negotiations are for the neutral to explain the protocols, also called ground rules, that govern the proceedings. The protocols should be agreed to by all of the participants to establish a procedural context for the discussions.[12] The mediator should tell the parties in clear terminology what the purpose and expected outcome of the negotiations are, namely, to reach a binding agreement linking development and

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[12] See Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, and Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988, for a discussion of what type of protocols and ground rules should be established.

the protection of natural resources.

Two important elements of the negotiation process that should be given special consideration relate to the culture of decision making. First, all of the stakeholders should participate in the negotiation sessions, and be able to represent their constituencies. This could cause a problem for national political leaders, who may want to send civil servants to represent their interests, and then be able to change the position of the government without being accountable to the rest of the stakeholders.

The second element of the negotiation process that deserves special attention is how to account for the importance of informal and formal authorities in policy making. Typically, negotiation sessions take place in the setting of a modern office. If the culture has an indigenous population, who are often among the resource users who have special knowledge about natural resources, they may wish to conduct discussions among their constituents in a traditional setting. For example, in New Zealand when the indigenous Maori engage in negotiations with the politically dominant European culture, they take part in the primary negotiation sessions with other stakeholders, but also sponsor their own informal negotiations on the marae, their traditional meeting place, to gain consensus among members of the local community.

If indigenous people are among the stakeholders, the negotiation process should make allowances for them to conduct

discussions in their own community throughout the negotiations. The mediator should pay special attention to these informal proceedings, as they may show how informal authority figures in the society can help implement the final negotiated agreement.

6. Create performance standards to link implementation plan with project agreement

Once the stakeholders have agreed how to design and enforce environmental policies, they need to negotiate performance standards. Performance standards are a tool that allows the parties to objectively evaluate the success of the final negotiated agreement, and provide guidelines for enforcing it. The final agreement typically consists of a series of actions to be taken by each of the parties to strengthen environmental policies. Each action that is agreed to should be accompanied by an objective standard that can be reviewed to determine if a specific party is implementing it.

For example, the government may be required to establish a procedure for civil servants to review permit applications by developers, so they can prepare an objective analysis for the cabinet before it approves a project. The accompanying performance criteria could specific a date by which the cabinet will start using the objective analyzes,

and require the government to show the donor each year how development decisions have been affected by the new procedure. Or, the donor may require the government to include unorganized resource users as participants in development decisions. Such a requirement could be monitored by a NGO that prepares a required annual report, based on interviews with fishermen, farmers and other individuals, documenting if and how they were contacted by the government when projects were being reviewed, and if any mitigation measures resulted in actions that actually protected natural resources.

Additional elements of an agreement might require the donor to provide funds to increase the institutional capacity of local environmental NGOs or ministries responsible for natural resource management prior to a project being built, while the government would agree to let these organizations take part in the planning process as projects are reviewed. Again, annual reports prepared by a neutral party can accompany each action that is agreed to.

It is crucial that the performance standards be realistic, and conform to the cultural norms of the borrower. It is common for the parties, even those from the country, to be think that they can increase institutional capacity in a year or two. Performance standards should account for the tendency to make unrealistic time estimates by using a multi-year schedule that lasts three to five years.

The final agreement will be stronger if it is linked

to the project agreement between the borrower and donor. The parties may choose to include provisions that tie fulfillment of the agreement to a phased payment schedule. When specific actions are taken as specified in the agreement, funds are then released for the development project. This will create direct financial incentives for the parties to carry out their responsibilities under the agreement.

7. Time frame and procedure for post-project evaluation of implementation plan

The final agreement should include clear language that describes how the parties have agreed on a time frame and procedure for post-project evaluation of the implementation plan. This is essentially a summary of the performance criteria that accompany each action agreed to by the parties. To avoid miscommunication between the parties, and to make sure that each one knows what is expected of it, the final agreement should include a separate section summarizing the actions and performance standards agreed to by each party, and the penalties to be assessed if they fail to live up to the agreement.

To design an effective model for protecting natural resources in developing countries, the agenda's for the stakeholders have to integrate four major elements of public

policy implementation; national politics, the culture of decision making, economic conditions and the behavior of donor agencies. It is the connections between these four elements of policy implementation, and the involvement of the major stakeholders, that will enable a collaborative negotiation process to succeed.

A integrated system to implement environmental policies is based on the active participation of four main parties; donor agencies, national politicians, resource users and environmental NGOs. By following the steps to open up the decision process, the stakeholders can work cooperatively to help resolve several of the problems that prevent environmental policies from being implemented. The open system of decision making will have a better chance to succeed if the major parties take the following actions.

Advice to the Major Parties

Donor Agencies

First I will offer advice to donor agencies. There are several actions that donors can take during the negotiation process to help make it work, to help ensure that a more open system of decision making is put into place that will help preserve natural resources. The first action relates to starting the negotiation process.

Providing Start-up Resources

Donor agencies possess financial and technical resources that they can bring to the negotiating table. In many instances, the other stakeholders will need these resources to be able to take part in a negotiation process, due to the general shortage of manpower and money in developing countries. If these resources are made available to other stakeholders, in return for agreements to participate in a collaborative negotiation, they can be used as incentives to open up the environmental policy process. Donors may find that this is more effective and less risky than making massive one-time policy interventions which often overwhelm the institutional capacity of the borrower.

Creating Linkages to Build Institutional Capacity

Donor agencies can help to support a more open decision making process by allocating more resources to increase the institutional capacity within countries and their own agencies. Countries need to improve their performance in three areas; policy analysis, natural resource management and long term planning. Institution building for countries is needed on both the local and national levels as well as regionally. Regional organizations, such as NGOs, quasi-governmental organizations and regional coordinating bodies, such as common economic markets, can serve as conduits to increase international learning between countries. Donors

should target regional organizations as well as national governments and local NGOs for institutional support. Donors can help an open policy making process work by providing support to stakeholders through regional organizations when governments resist making changes on the national level. This can include funding regional training centers that specialize in teaching skills such as conflict resolution, environmental leadership and project management.

To support the negotiation process, donors should make sure that the borrower has sufficient institutional capacity to provide a trained counterpart during the actual negotiations, someone who will available to help implement the final agreement. This is crucial given the shortage of trained personnel in many countries. In most instances, this counterpart will be from a ministry dealing with planning, land use or economic development.

Donor agencies also need to build their own capacity for environmental planning. In many instances, field offices that are responsible for getting projects built do not have staff trained in natural resource management. As a result, it is almost impossible to enforce policies, or a negotiated agreement, intended to protect the environment. In addition to hiring properly trained personnel in field offices, donors should pay special attention to who they assign as their representatives to a negotiation. It is important that they include field staff who are responsible for project

implementation. It is critical that the negotiation process be linked with the implementation process of both the donor and country.

The donor should be aware that a negotiation for implementing environmental policies linked to a single project may need to be tied to a multi-year program to build the institutional capacity in the borrowing country. It may take two or three years to increase the institutional capacity of local environmental NGOs and selected ministries within the borrowing country before a negotiation can be successfully carried out. If a country is hesitant or unwilling to be involved in a negotiation, out of fear that it will cause unwanted political change or upset the status quo, the donor may be able to overcome this resistance by offering long term assistance to build up its institutional capacity for policy analysis and development planning, which will increase the self reliance of the borrower.

Adopt Career Incentives

Donors can help motivate their employees to initiate a negotiation process to implement environmental policies by offering them career incentives. When donors evaluate the job performance of their employees, they do not include criteria to rate how effectively they have included environmental policies in individual projects. This is in contrast with the criteria that donors currently use, which

rewards employees for completing projects and moving funds as efficiently as possible, which acts as a disincentive for implementing new environmental policies.

Policy-based career incentives could be added to promote the acceptance of environmental reforms. This may include evaluating how effectively employees incorporate environmental reforms into projects using the collaborative negotiation process. If the negotiation model is incorporated into the project cycle as a way to improve cooperation between the stakeholders, and strengthen environmental policy implementation, employees should be financially rewarded. This is part of the institution building that donors need to undergo to increase their own capability to protect limited natural resources affected by development projects.

Invent Economic Incentives

In most instances, environmental policies will remain unenforced unless they tied to economic incentives. The most direct way that donors can link economic and environmental policies is to make the negotiation process part of the project cycle. If this is done, direct economic incentives can then be created to tie implementation of negotiated agreements to project cost/benefit. One approach would be to estimate the cost of carrying out all of the actions agreed to during the negotiation process, and add it to the overall project budget. This is essentially a way of accounting for

the environmental cost of a project. If the project is not profitable enough to pay for the environmental policy implementation package, it should not be funded. This will provide a direct economic incentive to protect natural resources.

The donor can use *contingent agreements* as part of the negotiation process to link a comprehensive institution-building program to one project or a series of individual projects it sponsors, as it is common for a donor to fund multiple projects in the same country. A contingent agreement could use performance standards to link the successful completion of a series of several finite steps in an institution-building program for the funding of individual projects. As the government completes each step of the program, the donor then funds another project. This could provide the capital the borrower needs, which provides the economic incentive to carry out long term environmental reforms.

Incorporate Cultural Constraints into Implementation Plans

A combination of cultural constraints make it very difficult for donors to implement environmental policies in developing countries. The negotiation process needs to take cultural conditions into account, or despite everyone's best efforts, environmental policies will remain largely unenforced. There are several kinds of cultural constraints

that require the special attention of the donors agencies.

In general, policy changes occur slowly in developing countries, especially by the continental standards used by donor agencies and their consultants. For example, the transition from environmental laws to guidelines is very important. This transition represents the progression of an abstract concept into public policies that affect peoples lives. In less developed societies people notice this kind of change, and take a long time to accept it. Political leaders, who control every aspect of the policy-making apparatus, reflect the hesitancy of the culture to change. Personal relationships have to be developed between political leaders and those advocating change for it to actually take place. Often there is no institutional memory left in the countries when expatriate experts are in charge. Time is not spent in the field soliciting the participation of local and regional environmental NGOs.

When involved in a negotiation process to implement environmental policies, donors, as well as other stakeholders, can account for cultural factors by addressing the following questions.

1. How will the slow rate of change in the borrowing country, where new policies may take several years to take effect, be accounted for in the implementation strategy and conditions for a project?

2. How will the implementation program will be designed

on a small scale so it can be understood by political leaders?

3. How will the agencies representatives create the personal trust with senior civil servants and political leaders to build the man-to-man relationships needed to influence the political process?

4. How will the agencies representatives overcome the tendency of the borrower to treat them as outsiders? This may require building long term relationships with regional NGOs who can advise donors how to design an implementation strategy that is compatible with the culture of decision making in the country.

5. How will policy reforms be translated into a form of the local written and spoken languages that political leaders can easily understand, instead of relying solely on "planning techo-speak". Local experts can be hired to perform the translation, so that recommendations are presented one small step at a time, consistent with local cultural norms.

6. What needs to be done as part of the negotiation process to overcome the fears of local stakeholders, including alienation and exile from the political process and a general distrust of risk-taking and innovation?

National Political Leaders

National political leaders are faced with tough choices. If they promote economic development in a manner that excludes efforts to preserve natural resources, such as fresh water,

fisheries, forests, agricultural soils and forests, large scale environmental degradation will continue, and their economic and political dependency on western industrialized nations will grow. If they promote environmental reforms too aggressively, they may scare off foreign investors, which can lead to a slower rate of economic growth.

It is important that national political leaders take part in the negotiations to design an effective strategy to implement environmental policies. The largest donor agencies, including the World Bank, U.S. AID and the Inter-American Development Bank, are under immense pressure from environmental groups and the U.S. Congress to stop funding programs that damage natural resources. If countries continue to propose projects that cause environmental damage, donors may have no choice but to reduce or eliminate their level of funding, resulting in substantially less direct foreign aid. To avoid this situation, political leaders can support a series of steps that are needed to increase the institutional capacity of their governments to promote development projects that are both profitable and environmentally sustainable.

Allow Stakeholders to Participate

First, to send a clear message to the donors that they support projects that are environmentally sound, political leaders should empower their governments to fully participate in the negotiation process. This will accomplish several

objectives. It will build local institutional capacity for policy analysis and long term development planning, maintain the flow of money from the donors for future development, and protect the natural resources that are needed to support it. By participating in a collaborative policy dialogue, and giving legal protections to local stakeholders, politicians will in turn gain the leverage to ask donors to provide long term funding for institution-building that cannot be accomplished in a single project cycle.

Slowly Open Up the Public Policy Process

Political leaders should slowly open up the national policy making process. Environmental interests groups are growing in developing countries. It is just a matter of time before they become strong enough to mount effective challenges to the government. But, political leaders can turn the opposition of environmental groups to their advantage by using their leadership to initiate environmental reforms.

An initial step in this process could be to delegate authority to civil servants to provide an objective analysis of development proposals. Political leaders often approve projects without the benefit of an objective policy analysis. Civil servants should be allowed to objectively compare development proposals to national environmental policies before the cabinet makes any decision to support a project, such as granting landholding licenses or financial

concessions.

The second step that is needed to open up the policy making process is to allow civil servants who work in different offices to openly communicate laterally between ministries when they are dealing with common issues related to natural resource management. One way to do this is to form Local Natural Resource Planning Groups, made up of civil servants who are responsible for different aspects of natural resource management and environmental planning. The offices that typically would be included are planning, land use, finance, fisheries, agriculture, forestry and water resources. These groups could also help the government coordinate national policy making, creating consistency that would help when it takes part in the negotiation process.

Institution Building to Increase Self-Reliance

In return for participating in the negotiation process, national political leaders could make a side agreement with the donor agencies, requesting multi-year assistance that is necessary for institution-building to improve their indigenous capacity for development planning and policy analysis. If governments make the case that efforts to improve their institutional capacity cannot be successfully completed within the constraints of the single project cycle, they may be able to convince donors to provide soft loans and grants needed to do so. By improving the quality of decision making in

their public policy processes, governments will reduce their dependency on outside experts who are not familiar with political and cultural conditions in the developing world.

Environmental NGOs and Resource Users

These groups can have the greatest impact on the public policy process if they form a coalition to promote reforms in both donor agencies and national governments. Participation in the negotiation process offers the opportunity to form a coalition. These stakeholders need to work together to create a common agenda that makes the most efficient use of limited resources so they are not at cross purposes.

There are two types of environmental NGOs to which I am offering advice, international groups headquartered in Washington, D.C. and the small local and regional organizations that exist in most developing regions. Each of these groups needs to understand how their particular strengths and weaknesses have to be accounted for when they engage in a negotiation process to promote environmental reform.

The strengths of international NGOs include political access to the U.S. Congress, which they can use to promote environmental reforms in donor agencies, their ability to obtain funding and the practical experience they have obtained by participating in conservation projects all over the world.

Their weaknesses include a lack of creditability with political leaders in developing countries, who are often distrustful of outsiders, the difficulties inherent in operating in countries that possess many different cultures and the troublesome First World bias they bring to conservation.

Environmental NGOs located in developing countries are able to operate effectively in the local political system and are aware of cultural norms that underlie the public policy process. They are weak because they are small, lack adequate financial support, and often do not have the direct access to political leaders that is needed to influence development decisions. By combining their efforts, international and local NGOs can use each others strengths to compensate for their weaknesses.

Identify and Train Environmental Leaders

The policy making process in many instances is greatly influenced by a few people with strong personalities who have developed the skills needed to operate successfully within the political system. One way to influence public decision making is to train individuals who are likely to assume leadership positions in their countries. No one knows local political and culture conditions as well as those who have grown up and worked in a country. For example, only local people really understand the subtleties and opposition

politics with any particular government, and how the local culture of decision making influences political leaders.

To train future leaders who are likely to place environmental problems higher on the public agenda than is currently the case, local NGOs can identify civil servants and political leaders that show exceptional promise. Local NGOs are familiar with local people and conditions, and in most instances are able to judge the likely candidates are for advanced training. Once candidates for environmental leadership training are selected, international NGOs, in cooperation with supportive donor agencies, can use their expertise in administering and funding training programs to train the candidates. Training could include conflict resolution techniques, communication skills, project administration and policy analysis. This should be on ongoing program, part of an institution building effort in selected regions. Ideally, it would take the form of a permanent training center, perhaps a joint effort of more than one NGO, with field offices where training would take place.

It is important that the training be designed specifically for the political and cultural conditions encountered in developing countries. In addition to training future leaders, this approach will build coalitions between future decision makers, NGOs and donors, as well as promoting learning between governments. This is a form of technology transfer from industrialized countries to developing nations

that supports sustainable development.

Link Environmental Reform to the Negotiation Process

International NGOs should use their access to Congress to urge donors to open up their decision making process, to make it accountable for the environmental damage caused by development projects and to build the institutional capacity for environmental reform in both donor agencies and developing countries by adopting the model of collaborative negotiation. The negotiation process could be carried out as part of the standard project cycle, to be completed before donors make funding commitments for projects. International groups can also pressure donors to provide more soft loans and grants fund multi-year programs to increase the institutional capacity of governments to enable them to participate in a negotiation process.

Strengthen Relationships Between NGOs and Resource Users

Local NGOs should develop programs to strengthen their relationships with resource users such as farmers, fishermen and charcoal producers. There are two ways to do this. First, NGOs can talk to resource users to educate them about the environmental damage caused by traditional forms of development, such as large tourist resorts, that damage fishing grounds, close off access to the coast, etc. Second, NGOs can work with resource users to help make them more

efficient producers. This can be done by sponsoring programs to examine how resource users operate, and then designing a strategy to increase the efficiency of their operations in a manner that is environmentally sustainable.

This could include observing the habits of local fishermen that may be environmentally harmful, such as dynamiting reefs or overharvesting certain species. The NGO could work with fisheries biologists to identify species that can be safely harvested, and train fishermen in the techniques needed to catch them. Then, the NGO could act on behalf of a fishing community to seek funding from a donor agency to build facilities for storing, processing and marketing the fish that are caught.

By creating this kind of downward linkage with resource users, NGOs will generate economic and political leverage for both groups. This can translate into stronger political influence with the government, which is turn will strengthen both stakeholders during the negotiation process.[13] If international NGOs participate in this effort, coalitions will be formed between local NGOs, international NGOs, and resource users, increasing the political leverage and influence of all

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[13] Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988. Managing Public Disputes. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. See pages 216-18. Carpenter and Kennedy discuss the value of being able to reward the other side for cooperation, the importance of a sound alternative, and the ability to cause harm by increasing a cost. Stakeholders who are excluded from development decisions can offer all of these incentives to political leaders in exchange for their participation in decision making.

three parties.[14]

Other Models for Strengthening Environmental Policies

I believe that the integrated negotiation model that I have presented will be the most effective way to open up the decision making process so that it includes unrepresented stakeholders and integrates political, economic and cultural issues in way that is needed to resolve complex environmental problems. It reflects the important role that cultural, political, and economic conditions play in the development process, and can be tailored to meet the specific needs of different countries. However, this are other methods for resolving international environmental problems.

Several environmental problems cut across national boundaries. These include air pollution, acid rain, the Greenhouse effect and depletion of the earth's protective ozone layer. During international negotiations to stabilize the earth's climate, developing countries have formed the Group of 77 to bargain with industrialized nations as a block. The Group of 77 believes that by agreeing to an international

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[14] See H. Jeffrey Leonard, 1989. Environment and the Poor: Development Strategies for a Common Agenda. New Brunswick, Transaction Books. Leonard describes strategies that combine environmental protection with improving the quality of life for poor resource users; see pages 31-43. In The Human Dimension in Environmental Planning, (Jeffrey A. McNeely and David Pitt, eds., London, Croom Helm, 1985), Pitt discusses the effectiveness of linking resource users to national environmental planning programs; see page 283.

treaty to reduce emissions of chlorofluorocarbons and hydrocarbons, developing countries may have to reduce industrial production processes that will slow down economic growth. They argue that countries that have already developed have caused the most global pollution, and should bare most of the burden for resolving the problem. This is just the most recent development in the twenty year old North v. South debate that has marked international environmental negotiations since the 1972 Stockholm conference on the environment.

Developing countries believe that industrialized nations should compensate them for reducing air pollution. Compensation would be in the form of cash payments for foregone economic opportunities and assistance in developing new technologies to substitute for ones that are causing the most pollution. The Montreal Protocols specifically called for developed nations to accelerate their efforts to provide new technologies to the developing world. This is starting to happen as the United States and other countries agree to provide some technical and financial assistance to developing nations. However, Caldwell and others believe that existing international institutional arrangement are not adequate to deal with the complexities of global environmental problems.[15]

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[15] Lynton K. Caldwell, 1984. International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press. See Chapter 9.

Countries seem to value national sovereignty more than environmental stability. Many international treaties and conventions have been adopted, as transboundary problems require international solutions. But the international community has been slow promote the institutional and legal reforms that must accompany these complex agreements. In addition, international agreements take too long to implement, lack formal mechanisms to achieve compliance, and address problems on an ad hoc basis.

In response to the difficulties of implementing international agreements, it has been suggested that regional negotiation centers be established to address transboundary problems on a scale that is easier to grasp. Regions often share similar cultures, languages and political systems. One possible model is to for countries to sign global environmental treaties, and delegate implementation to regional centers or quasi-governmental organizations. This could combine the strengths inherent in international cooperation, while accounting for the weakness in implementing agreements on an international scale. This approach would decentralize environmental policy implementation to the regional level, but it is unclear how a regional strategy can secure a binding commitment without violating the national sovereignty of countries that participate.

Another model of implementation would take decentralization one step further. It is based on the

assumption that countries have too many differences to cooperate effectively, and that international interventions infringe on national sovereignty. An example would be the differences between the island nations in the Caribbean. Even though these countries seem to share much in common, they have different languages (English, French, Spanish and Dutch, plus many creolized versions), political systems (socialism in Guyana, communism in Cuba, many parliamentary democracies and several countries still administered from the United States and European capitals), cultures and legal systems. Under a decentralized model, it is assumed that countries will support the indigenous change needed to reform environmental policies. Solutions could include local people organizing a Green Party to pressure the political leaders to undertake reform. But, in developing countries that lack a tradition of public participation and open political dialogue, this approach may not be work.

Summary

The current approach that donor agencies and developing countries use to design and implement environmental policies does not work. It does not work because they use a closed decision making process. It does not adequately account for the interests of several key stakeholders, including resource users, local and international environmental NGOs, civil servants and environmental technicians. It also fails to

account for the role that four elements of the public policy process play in environmental policy implementation. The four elements are: national politics, the culture of decision making and economic necessity in developing countries, and the behavior of donor agencies.

The behavior of policy makers in donor agencies and developing countries that promotes development which damages limited natural resources is mutually reinforcing. To account for the interests of stakeholders that are now excluded from environmental policy making, and to integrate the crucial four elements of the public policy process, a new open system of decision making should be adopted. This new open system can be implemented using a negotiated partnership for sustainable development. It will be hard for the closed system of decision making to become more open, but this has to be done to preserve limited natural resources for future economic growth.[16]

A negotiation process can be designed to open up the public policy process, but the first obstacle that has to be overcome is to convince borrowing countries and donor agencies to participate in a more open policy dialogue. There are significant incentives for both parties to participate. Donor agencies will be subject to more and more political pressure

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[16] See Appendix B of this dissertation for specific recommendations to strengthen environmental policy implementation in the Eastern Caribbean.

from the U.S. Congress and international environmental organizations to implement environmental reforms that work. If the donors fail to adopt more effective strategies for protecting natural resources, their funding may be curtailed.

Similarly, borrowing countries may not be eligible for development assistance unless they promote effective environmental reforms. By accounting for environmental factors in development decisions, national political leaders will blunt the growing opposition from pro-environmental interest groups at home and abroad, creating political stability that will allow them to stay in power. By increasing the institutional capacity within their own governments for policy analysis and environmental planning, as an element to the development process, politicians will enhance national self-reliance and reduce political and economic dependency on outside parties. National governments and donor agencies will benefit from integrating economic and environmental factors in a manner that promotes sustainable development, which in turn will create a more certain investment climate.

As major stakeholders, donor agencies and borrowing countries possess the political and financial leverage to convince the other to take part in a more open process. Once a decision is made to open up the policy dialogue, a collaborative negotiation process can be convened by any one of the stakeholders.

National politics and the culture of decision making in developing countries are obstacles that will be hard to overcome. National political leaders have close ties to developers and make decisions to support their projects in private without public participation. The exclusion of the public from policy making has included the absence of an open press and media, with the government controlling the flow of information that reaches its citizens. Political leaders exert control over civil servants using party loyalty and family ties as leverage to enforce their pro-development policies. This discourages civil servants from working to enforce environmental policies that parliament has passed, often as a condition of approval to receive funds from donor agencies.

Local environmental groups, NGOs and resource users do not have the personal access to national political leaders that is needed to influence the public policy process. Policy decisions are made based on personal trust, political loyalty and intense man-to-man communication that outsiders, such as donor agencies attempting to implement environmental policies, simply do not understand. Cultural differences are complicated by the role of informal authorities in decision making, a resistance to innovation, which includes adoption of new policies that change the way people relate to their government, and a general distrust of outsiders attempting to intervene in the political system, due to a history of economic and political dependency. In short, outside parties

trying to make policy interventions are hindered because they do not understand the cultural norms and political practices that combine to create national culture of decision making. But there are ways to manage these differences in a new open decision making process.

These concerns can be accounted for in the prenegotiation phase of an open process by meeting a series of preconditions, and in the second phase by following a series of steps. The convener of a negotiation, whether it is a donor agency, country or an NGO, can design the process to include stakeholders that are excluded from the political process, such as local resource users and NGOs. Ground rules can be established to protect civil servants in the countries and environmental technicians in the donor agencies. These can include legal and procedural protections to shield them from political retribution for participating in an open dialogue. Weak stakeholders can be provided with financial and technical resources, including training in economic development and conflict resolution, to place them on a more equal basis with more powerful stakeholders. The convener, working with a neutral facilitator or mediator, can create protocols to help the participants in the negotiation understand their responsibilities to each other and the process, and show them the importance of using objective criteria in their arguments instead of relying on subjective judgements that favor parties that traditionally have been the most powerful.

The mediator can choose a co-mediator from the local culture to help in designing a negotiation process that accounts for the culture of decision making. The mediation team can carry out several specific steps, such as conducting a culturally-based stakeholder analysis and using an elicitive model of communication that is weighted towards local cultural norms, to account for cultural biases. If donors include the funds and technical expertise needed to support long term institution building in countries where they sponsor development, several culturally-related constraints to implementing effective environmental policies can be resolved. Long term institution building is needed to promote the personal trust, man-to-man communication and cultural awareness that is necessary to design and carry out policies that work.

The difficulty of accounting for economic factors when designing environmental policies can also be addressed in a negotiation process. Local NGOs can strengthen their coalitions with local resource users who provide vital services for their societies. Resource users are generally not organized. If NGOs promote downward linkages with resources users, and help them to become more efficient producers, both groups will gain more political and economic leverage, giving them a greater voice in development decisions. If donors promote long term institution building in borrowing countries, it can help harmonize conflicting

economic and environmental policies, and promote economic incentives to protect natural resources.

The behavior of donor agencies that prevents environmental policies from being enforced can also be accounted for in a negotiation process. Negotiations should include representatives from the field offices and environmental units of the donors, so that the policy dialogue includes their viewpoint. These parties are responsible for designing and implementing strategies to protect natural resources, but are often overruled by political appointees who do not want to interrupt the flow of development funds. By including all of these parties in a collaborative negotiation, implementation strategies can be created that incorporate the environmental reforms that donors are supposed to be carrying out.

The stakeholders can also undertake initiatives outside of the negotiation process to help make it more effective. Donor agencies can take the leadership in promoting effective environmental policies by creating economic incentives that protect natural resources. They can use contingent agreements that link institution building with the approval of individual projects. As a country builds its capacity for protecting natural resources, the donor can then provide funds for development projects. This provides an incentive for countries to increase their own capacity for environmental protection. Donors should also provide career environmental

incentives for their employees to financially reward them for creating and promoting environmental reform, including use of the collaborative negotiation process. NGOs should coordinate their efforts to identify and train talented individuals who will serve as the next generation of leaders in their governments. This could take the form of a permanent training center to build skills in conflict resolution, interpersonal communication and policy analysis.

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APPENDIX A

NOTES ON SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND RESEARCH METHODS

To prepare for field work in each country, I conducted a series of background interviews with researchers and professionals involved in environmental planning and economic development in the Caribbean. Contacts within various donor agencies and NGOs gave me access to public and private documents discussing the status of the public policy process in the Eastern Caribbean. I used these documents, the background interviews, my experience in the region and several published references focusing on politics, culture, anthropology, economics, public administration and natural resources to formulate an approach for carrying out the field work. All of the background and reference material that I used is cited in the body of the dissertation.

The approach that I used to create the case studies is described by Robert K. Yin in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1984. Cases were chosen in three different countries with similar political systems to illustrate the different obstacles to implementing environmental policies. The cases have several common elements; they all involve large development projects designed and funded by donor agencies, fragile natural

resources are at stake, and efforts to protect the resources have generally failed.

After I identified the cases in each country that I wanted to examine, it was necessary to obtain access to politicians, civil servants and other key sources who possessed the special knowledge I needed to create them. This was crucial as public policy decisions in all three countries are difficult to document, as many Cabinet decisions and other major deliberations of government officials are not a matter of public record. In most instances, my association as a Research Associate with the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies (CERMES) at the University of the West Indies, Barbados, and a Fellow of the Organization of American States was sufficient to convince my sources that I was an objective party. However, in St. Lucia I was told that access to key sources would not be granted unless I registered as a researcher with the National Research and Development Foundation, agreeing to sign a contract that guaranteed the Foundation access to my findings. Thus, finding a suitable institutional auspices was an essential element of preparing for the actual field research.

The field research was designed so that I would serve as a Participant-Observer, relating the story of each case from the vantage points of key parties who played integral roles in them. Multiple sources of evidence were used to

prepare the cases. To establish multiple sources of evidence, I compiled a collection of written evidence to form a data base for the cases. Written evidence included papers from the archives of the University of the West Indies, Barbados, and several types of documents from the collections of national libraries in Barbados and St. Lucia, including National Plans, newspaper articles, planning documents, and special studies related to natural resources, economics and culture, including agriculture, forestry, anthropology, coastal planning, tourism and land use control. All of the sources I used are cited in the text of the dissertation. The library at the National Research and Development Foundation in St. Lucia was a valuable source of local information.

Several national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also provided background information to prepare me for field work and in-country interviews. The library of the Island Resources Foundation in Washington, D.C., compiled and managed by Edward and Judith Towle, was invaluable. Staff at the Organization of American States provided several reports prepared for the Economic Base Resource Management Plurinational Project sponsored by the OAS and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP). These reports discuss the capabilities of St. Lucia and St. Kitts to undertake development control and physical planning

activities, and include several recommendations to improve institutional capacity in these areas.

A series of reports describing the status of national legislation relating to natural resources management in St. Lucia and St. Kitts, sponsored and provided to me by the OECS NRMP, provided excellent summaries of the status of environmental planning in these two countries. A comprehensive review of coastal-related legislation in Barbados, by Kenneth Atherley of the Coastal Conservation Project Unit, was also helpful.

Before traveling to each country to conduct interviews, I also had a series of discussions, over a period of two years, with a range of people who have long experience working and living in the Caribbean. The Towles of the Island Resources Foundation, Janos Zimmerman and Mervin Williams at the OECS NRMP in St. Lucia, Victor Williams in St. Kitts, David Staples in Barbados, Dr. Euna Moore at CERMES and Richard Meganck, formerly of the OAS, all provided me with the benefit of their experience in the Eastern Caribbean.

Once the background data for each case was collected, I formulated a series of questions to ask of my sources in each country. Each source was asked essentially the same set of questions. The questions were designed to establish a chain of evidence for each case. I wanted to find out how each project was initiated, who sponsored it, paid for it

and supported it politically. The key decisions leading up to project approval, made by both officials from national governments and donor agencies, as project sponsors, were generally not in a written record. The only way to obtain this information was to conduct interviews with a wide variety of people in each country. In total, I interviewed sixty-eight people in four countries, including the United States, and had about one hundred total contacts with them.

A wide range of people were interviewed, who had a diverse set of opinions on the environment/development dialogue. These included elected and appointed officials, such as; an Attorney General, Permanent Secretaries and senior civil servants in ministries of development, agriculture, tourism, fisheries, planning, coastal management and finance, the heads of national planning authorities, the Director of a national development corporation, members of the port authority, staff from a national sugar corporation, and the chairmen of national advisory boards for conservation, development and historical preservation.

Several officials from the donor agencies, USAID, the Inter-American Development Bank and OAS, were also interviewed, in their headquarters in Washington, D.C. and in regional offices in the Eastern Caribbean (the USAID regional office in Bridgetown, Barbados, the Inter-American Development Bank representatives office in Barbados, and the

OAS field office in St. Lucia). These sources included the managers of the three projects; the Southeast Peninsula Development Project in St. Kitts, the Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor in Barbados and the proposed Piton's National Park in St. Lucia, and specialists from the donor agencies in economic development, environmental planning, engineering and rural development.

Research officers from several quasi-government agencies were interviewed, including the Caribbean Tourism Organization, Barbados, who provided information about the importance of the regional tourist economy. The USAID-funded planning team in St. Kitts gave me numerous planning studies and background documents for the Southeast Peninsula Road Project. Directors from various Chambers of Industry and Commerce briefed me on the economic status of each country, and gave me insights into the local political system. Officials from the St. Lucia National Trust explained the history of conservation activities in the country, and members of the Barbados Association for the Environment described the history of their attempts to influence national conservation policy.

The President of the Barbados Fishing Cooperative, staff from the Folk Research Centre in St. Lucia and the Director of the West Indies/USAID Caribbean Justice Improvement Program, Barbados, provided data on the regional fishery, the importance of the Piton's to the culture of St.

Lucia and the legal and judicial framework in individual countries and the Eastern Caribbean region. The Technical Advisor to the Caribbean Office of the European Development Fund in Bridgetown, Barbados, provided vital information about the history of the Southeast Peninsula Development Project in St. Kitts. The Vicar General of the Archdiocese of St. Lucia was extremely helpful in explaining how senior civil servants in that country have attempted to reform the national public policy process, and how the reform movement related to the Piton's controversy.

In addition to members of official organizations, I also spent considerable time interviewing lay people, to ensure that the cases reflect the viewpoint of resource users. I had long conversations with fishermen, farmers and forest guides in all three countries. These conversations were unstructured, and yielded useful insights into the way that politics, economic and culture intertwine to form an informal framework for natural resource management.

All interviews were initially conducted in person, with multiple follow-up conversations with key sources via telephone for a year after the field work, to ensure that the cases reflect current events. In all instances, in person and when using the telephone, I took notes by hand, and did not use a tape recorder. There are two reasons for this. First, I felt that it was essential to establishing personal trust with my sources, given the informality of

interpersonal dialogue in the countries. This informality reflects the dominance of the oral tradition in the region, which as I mention in Chapter Three, contains the elements of intense person-to-person dialogue and requires an acute awareness of the surroundings and cultural ambiance in which the interview is conducted. By taking notes, I was forced to tune in to the surroundings, and carefully listen to the person being interviewed, to know when to push for more information, usually of a politically sensitive nature, and when not to.

The second reason I depended on hand written notes was that all of the cases were the subject of intense political debate in the countries, and within the donor agencies. This included the sensitive nature of the environmental reform movement among the donors. I felt that my informants would be unwilling to discuss elements of the cases that were clearly of a politically sensitive nature with a tape recorder in front of them. I am sure that one reason why I successfully elicited candid comments on the political aspects of the cases was the confidentially promised to my sources. Hence, in the body of the dissertation, interviews are cited with a letter followed by a number (ie. B 12, SK 7, SL 1), signifying the country where the case is located (B = Barbados, SK = St. Kitts, and SL = St. Lucia), and who the source is. Each number refers to a person interviewed.

My descriptions of the key events in the cases were

mainly derived from the interviews, newspaper articles and project-related documents on file in government offices and donor agencies. In almost all instances, key events, such as a decision by Cabinet or a donor agency, were confirmed by more than one source. The environmental consequences of the projects were documented by field visits in each country, accompanied by local residents or officials from the government or donor agency. My experience as a land use planner and environmental analyst helped me understand what I was seeing (ie. the cause and extent of beach erosion, degradation of offshore reefs, deforestation, results of intensive coastal development, etc.).

I did encounter difficulties during the field research. These included logistical problems, such as a shortage of operable telephones, understanding local dialects, and finding out how to get around in each country. Gaining physical access to the three project sites was often difficult. Sympathetic officials, landowners and local guides accompanied me to all of the sites, to explain the elements of each project, and to avoid encountering problems with legal trespass.

Precautions were taken to avoid intervening in the outcome of each case. If participants asked me for advice about how to create a strategy to strengthen environmental policies, I explained that it was not my role to provide that kind of information. This approach, coupled with my

association with local and regional research institutions, allowed me to remain neutral.

After the initial interviews were completed, and all of the background materials summarized, I prepared three documents for each case; an annotated chronology of key events, and summaries of the major themes and lessons. Next, I analyzed these documents to develop new, specific propositions that the evidence would support. The resulting propositions relate to the relationship of mandated environmental policies to four major themes; national politics, the culture of decision making, economic conditions and the behavior of donor agencies. Chapters Two through Five describe these relationships in the context of specific events and conditions within each case.

The criteria for the findings in each chapter related to the effectiveness of environmental policies. In all instances, fragile or limited natural resources were identified by governments, outside experts or donor agencies, and policies adopted to protect them. In general these policies failed. When adopted policies were compared to the actual or likely environmental damage generated by the projects, these inconsistencies were interpreted as the findings for the cases, and specifically, how the four major factors identified contributed to the degradation of natural resources.

APPENDIX B

Recommendations for Strengthening Environmental Policies in the Eastern Caribbean

The following recommendations for improving environmental policy implementation in the Eastern Caribbean are derived from my field research, the case studies in Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Kitts, and interviews with numerous officials in government, NGOs and donor agencies. In addition to following these recommendations, the stakeholders in the region can improve natural resource management by adopting a more open decision making process, the negotiated partnership for sustainable development that is discussed in Chapter Six. These recommendations are addressed to national political leaders, local and regional environmental NGOs and donor agencies active in the region.

Recommendations for National Political Leaders

It is important that top policy makers take concrete steps to improve their environmental accountability with donor agencies. All of the donor agencies in the region, including the largest (World Bank, IDB and USAID) are under immense pressure from U.S.-based environmental groups to stop funding projects that damage natural resources. If countries continue to follow economic policies and propose

projects that are harmful to the environment, donors may have no choice but to slow down their funding programs, resulting is less direct aid to the islands. There are several steps that political leaders should take to assure the continued financial support of the donors. These steps are:

- **Re-establish Environmental Ministries;**
- **Strengthen Local Institutional Capacity;**
- **Enhance Regional Environmental Cooperation;**
- **Establish Regional Council for Tourism and the Environment;**
- **Create Regional Tourism Strategy;**
- **Determine Benefits of Nature-Tourism;**
- **Develop Strategy for Reducing Economic-Environment Conflicts in Economic Planning;**
- **Sponsor Unified Strategy for Donor Assistance.**

Re-Establish Environmental Ministries

To send a clear message to donors that they support development projects that are environmentally sound, the Prime Ministers of St. Kitts and Barbados should re-establish cabinet-level environmental ministries. Both countries had Environmental Ministries in the recent past. St. Lucia created and assigned this portfolio in 1989. The Ministries should perform two functions, related to policy

and projects.

Procedures should be established within the Ministries to streamline the development approval process. The Ministries should be responsible for coordinating input from all government offices that deal with different aspects of environmental management. This will prevent unnecessary delays when projects are evaluated. In addition, the Ministries should coordinate all environmental policy input to the political leadership, eliminating overlapping jurisdictions and the confusion that results.

Strengthen Local Institutional Capacity

St. Lucia's Prime Minister should formally gazette the long-delayed Environmental Commission. The EC members represent over twenty interest groups from the private and public sectors. By taking this initiative, the Prime Minister would make sure that the environmental consequences of development projects are considered, while at the same time including interest groups in the public policy process that will lead to long term political stability.[1] If this

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[1] See Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York, Basic Books. The authors discuss the importance of giving all of the people affected by a policy decision a voice in the outcome. If countries such as St. Lucia, which has a democratic tradition and free press, continue to exclude environmental groups from development decisions, it will lead to political instability and undermine the legitimacy of the government. The problems caused by the exclusion of key stakeholders in the decision of the St. Lucia government to support the resort on the Jalousie Estate is

step is not taken, politically damaging controversies such as the Pitons controversy will happen time and again.

To minimize disruption to the political process, and to insure that the Commission does not slow down the overall rate of development, it should be accompanied by a set of procedural rules. The rules should establish a time limit, such as sixty days, during which the Commission can make recommendations on a project. Protocols to guide how the Commission communicates to the Prime Minister should also be agreed upon, perhaps delegating direct communication to the Chairman.

In St. Kitts, the Prime Minister should instruct the Minister of Development to restaff the Central Planning Unit with at least two people with college degrees in natural resource management, and establish a formal link between the Southeast Peninsula Advisory Board and the Unit. The Prime Minister should also approach donor agencies to seek funding for the proposed Environmental Unit, the National Conservation Commission, and the implementation of the St. Kitts/Nevis National Coastal Plan prepared by OECS.

In all countries the Prime Minister's should direct the appropriate minister to establish Local Resource Groups. Members would be civil servants from different agencies responsible for natural resource management, such as agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The purpose of LRGs is

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evidence of this.

to promote lateral communication across ministries among natural resource managers. The LRG could be set up as an advisory group to the Ministry of Environment, and assisted by a part-time staff person from the Ministry.

Enhance Regional Environmental Cooperation

Politicians should also work cooperatively at the regional level, within the framework of existing organizations, to coordinate an integrated approach to natural resource management. This is advisable because economic growth in the region is now oriented strongly towards international tourism. These visitors come to the region because of its healthy natural environment; clean beaches, living coral reefs, and the tropical setting.

When the quality of one islands environment deteriorates tourists stop coming, because they can go to another island that is clean and healthy. This has already happened in Barbados, where tourism has dropped off sharply since the 1970s. It is no coincidence that in the last fifteen years Barbados has experienced serious problems with beach erosion, water pollution, destruction of coral reefs and a shortage of flying fish, the national symbol which every tourist wants to eat. St. Kitts, Nevis, St. Lucia and Grenada are all experiencing similar problems on a smaller scale.

To prevent the same environmental problems from leap-

frogging from island to island, political leaders from each island should appoint permanent counterparts to two key regional organizations, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO). CARICOM issued the Port-of-Spain Accord on the Management and Conservation of the Caribbean Environment in June, 1989. A key part of the Accord recommends that all governments should designate counterparts to work with regional and international groups, such as donors and environmental organizations. As a first step in integrating economic and environmental concerns, Prime Ministers should appoint at least one counterpart, at the ministerial level, to fulfill the terms of the Accord.

Establish Regional Council for Tourism and the Environment

Prime Ministers should work with the Caribbean Tourism Organization to establish a permanent Regional Council for Tourism and the Environment (RCTE), and then appoint to it a second counterpart with environmental expertise. Local environmental NGOs should be invited to participate so that governments can use their expertise to help develop a regional strategy for tourism-based development. This initiative builds on a statement by the Secretary of the CTO that private and public participation in planning is necessary to develop regional tourism without damaging

natural resources.[2]

The goal of both programs should be to promote regional cooperation on issues cutting across the economic and environmental sectors, and to promote regional economic integration by transferring management and problem-solving skills between countries. This is needed because of the shortage of well trained economists within the region, and the efficiency of learning from the experience of others[3].

CARICOM and the CTO are existing organizations, so it will be efficient to work within them. Participants in the RCTE program should initially focus on how one sector, tourism, affects the environment, to avoid dissipating its energy on broad environmental issues that are very difficult to address. The RCTE cooperative tourism project should initially undertake two tasks.

Create Regional Tourism Strategy

First, it should work to develop a Regional Tourism Strategy to promote the type of tourism development that provide maximum financial benefit to the islands. Special attention should be given to evaluating the drawbacks of high density, large projects that have caused the most

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[2] Jean Holder, 1988. Tourism and Environmental Planning: An Irrevocable Commitment. Caribiana, 1(1), Caribbean Conservation Association, July, 1988.

[3] James McElroy, Bruce Potter and Edward Towle, 1986. Challenges for Sustainable Development in Small Caribbean Islands. Island Resources Foundation Occasional Paper 46.

environmental damage in the region. This traditional form of tourism development is based on massive high-density projects that benefit a few foreign investors and requires huge capital investments for roads, utilities, marinas, etc. I believe that research will show that this model of development, which typically is based on financial incentives (ie. tax holidays, expatriation of profits, waivers of duty for supplies, etc.) that greatly diminish its net public benefit, is not as profitable for national treasuries as is commonly believed.

The benefits of projects based on the construction of several smaller, low-density buildings, which cater to visitors who stay longer and tend to visit throughout all the seasons of the year, should be evaluated. This type of land use creates projects that cause far less environmental damage, and provide a more even flow of foreign exchange throughout the year.[4]

Determine Benefits of Nature-Tourism

Nature-tourism is one model of development that should be examined. Several islands in the region, including St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Dominica have relatively intact rainforest areas that tourists now visit, largely on an

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[4] Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome McElroy, 1988. Tourism Styles and Management Strategies in Small Caribbean Islands. Prepared for the Midwest Association of Latin Amercianists at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, October 20-22, 1988.

unorganized basis, because they are remote, and possess high nature resource values, including unique wildlife species such as the St. Lucia parrot. The RCTE should conduct research, using the strong research capability of the CTO, to determine the market for nature tourism, where projects could be located, and how much they would cost.[5]

After the RCTE has determined what models of tourism development can be created without causing severe environmental damage, it should prepare a collective funding strategy and that the member countries can present to the Washington, D.C. Donor's Conference.

Develop Strategy for Reducing Environment-Economic Conflicts

CARICOM should work on a broader set of public policy issues that reflect the interdependency of economic and environmental issues, including;

1. How to reduce the inter-sectoral conflicts between economic and environmental concerns. It is common for countries to have conflicting economic and environmental

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[5] The Ladakh Project, 1988. Ecological Steps Towards a Sustainable Future. The Ladakh Project, Bristol, England. The RCTE should examine the history of the Ladakh Ecological Development Group, a non-profit society in Ladakh, India, that works with donors to promote sustainable development which is consistent with the local cultural heritage. The Ladakh Project, based in England, works in several countries to promote development that fits with the local environment. Also see; Cultural Survival Quarterly, 14(1), 1990, Breaking Out the Tourist Trap. Cultural Survival, Cambridge, MA, USA. This special issue has several case studies of tourism projects in developing countries.

policies. For example, the Southeast Peninsula Project in St. Kitts was promoted by government because it attracted foreign exchange to the island. At the same time, it was in conflict with national policies intended to protect the environment. When this happens, economic policies predominant, even if scarce natural resources are lost. CARICOM should sponsor a cooperative regional effort to determine how countries can create economic incentives for conservation of natural resources.

2. The inclusion of specific goals in the National Development Plans for each island that are needed to achieve more effective environmental protection. The Plans should recognize that wise management of natural resources is needed to assure continued economic growth.

3. The development of objective criteria that national politicians can use when determining whether to approve projects that damage natural resources. A simple model should be developed that predicts the general cost of environmental damage, such as siting a hotel so close to the beach so that it erodes away, and how much the government will have to spend to repair the damage at a later date.

Sponsor Unified Strategy for Donor Assistance

CARICOM should coordinate the preparation of a unified strategy for seeking assistance form donor agencies to improve each islands institutional capacity for

environmental management. A Steering Committee of the CARICOM environmental organization should be designated as the liaison to all natural resource management projects prepared by donors. Participants can then present a group funding proposal at the Washington, D.C. donors conference to enable a comprehensive approach to improving institutional capacity.

Recommendationns for Non-Governmental Agencies

There are two main kinds of environmental NGOs to which I am offering advice, international groups that influence donor policies and have headquarters in Washington, D.C., and regional groups that are located in the Caribbean. Each type of group has particular strengths that can be used to promote environmental reform. But, several measures can be taken to foster the necessary cooperation between these organizations that share common goals but are separated by thousands of miles, different cultures and conflicting priorities.

Please refer to Chapter Six for additional advice for NGOs.

The steps that NGOs should take to help protect the limited natural resources of the region include:

- **MDB Reforms to Strengthen Environmental Policy**

Implementation;

- Uniform Standards for Environmental Review;

- Conditions for Aid to Regional MDBs;

- Extend Project Cycles;

o Establish Caribbean Coordinating Council;

- Increase Institutional Capacity of Regional NGOs;

- Sponsor Pilot Projects for Public Participation;

- Use Legal System to Enforce Environmental Laws.

MDB Reforms to Strengthen Environmental Policy

To build on their success in achieving general policy reforms in the MDBs, international groups can now work with the banks to adopt specific measures to accelerate the rate of reform in the Caribbean. They should encourage the MDBs to adopt uniform policies for donors and borrowing countries to promote policy implementation and improve the legitimacy of the environmental review process.

Uniform Standards for Environmental Review

MDBs should also be encouraged to require that all countries in the region adopt uniform standards for environmental review. Standards should include criteria for conducting initial environmental assessments, hiring qualified consultants which also train in-country counterparts, administrative procedures that shield consultants from being pressured by developers, and

requirements that each EIA mitigation measure be incorporated into the permit for a project to protect specific local resources.

International NGOs should also encourage donors to require that borrowers be required to consult with all parties affected by a project, including residents, resource users and domestic NGOs during the environmental assessment process. Uniform standards for implementing environmental review procedures need to be created and enforced. If all countries are not subject to the same specific standards, it will allow islands that don't have them to have a competitive advantage in attracting foreign investment.

Conditions for Aid to Regional MDBs

The World Bank should be encouraged to require environmental reform as a condition of its contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank. These regional banks receive loans and lines of credit from the World Bank with no environmental conditions. If the World Bank is serious about environmental reform, its contributions to the regional banks should be accompanied by conditions that EIA procedures will be implemented on any projects it funds.

Extend Project Cycles

All donors should be encouraged to relax and extend the

schedules and funding for projects that are accompanied by requirements to increase the institutional capacity of borrowers for environmental planning. While preparing testimony for Congress to advocate this reform, international NGOs should consult with local and regional NGOs to determine how much time is needed to do this.[6] This task and several others require that a formal structural relationship be created between international and regional NGOs to promote environmental reform as efficiently as possible.

Establish Caribbean Coordinating Council

One international NGO with a strong interest in the region should form a Caribbean Coordinating Committee, and invite NGOs from the region to participate. The Committee should initially focus on one part of the region, such as the Eastern Caribbean. The Committee can help regional NGOs obtain funding from foundations and donors, and develop a joint work program that prevents duplication among its members. The U.S. sponsor of the Committee will have to provide initial funding for its Caribbean counterparts.

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[6] Some environmental NGOs in the region that are knowledgeable about local political and cultural conditions include the Island Resources Foundation, U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C.; the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute, St. Lucia and U.S. Virgin Islands, the Caribbean Conservation Association, Barbados, and the Center for Resource Management and Environmental Studies at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.

This approach requires a substantial commitment from a U.S. NGO, similar to efforts underway in Latin America and Africa, albeit on a smaller scale. It may require that organizational resources be shifted from U.S.-based operations to fund small NGOs in the Caribbean. Its success will depend on how much value U.S. NGOs attach to preserving the islands, much like the decision that donor agencies must make to divert additional resources into institution-building to promote environmentally sound development. Without this kind of cooperative effort, the environmental damage that has occurred in the last twenty years will rapidly accelerate, given the aggressive pursuit of large tourism projects by virtually every island government.

Increase Institutional Capacity of Regional NGOs

There are several tasks that should be undertaken by the Caribbean Coordinating Committee. It can identify effective regional NGOs and provide financial and technical resources to fund them, and work with civil servants to design a strategy to place environmental reform on the agenda of island governments. It is crucial to strengthen the coalition between NGOs and civil servants. NGOs in the region are small, and civil servants few in number. Promoting working coalitions between NGOs and civil servants is an important part of institution-building.

This is a multi-year effort, and will take different

forms on various islands. Regional NGOs should identify civil servants and political leaders who are effective advocates of environmental reform. The Committee should train these individuals in environmental leadership and community organizing in workshops held in the region, preferably with the sponsorship of an existing organization, such as the United Nations Environment Programme or the Caribbean Conservation Association. This program would be geared to sharpening the skills of committed individuals who are already skillful at operating in the political culture of the islands. It is important the this training take place in the region rather than the U.S. so that it reflects actual conditions in the region.

Pilot Projects for Public Participation

The Committee should choose a series of pilot projects in the region associated with proposed donor-sponsored development projects and design a public participation program for them. Local NGOs can serve as sponsors so that island governments are assured that this effort is non-partisan. The purpose of the program is to include users of natural resources, such as farmers, fisherman and charcoal producers, in the development process. The model for this program should be the Southeast Coast Development Project on St. Lucia sponsored by the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute. A series of case studies should be produced

outlining the history of each project and the steps taken to promote public involvement.[7]

Use Legal System to Enforce Environmental Laws

The CCC should consider if legal can be used action to promote change. In consultation with regional members, a test case could be selected where environmental laws are being violated, and a legal suit filed to force corrective action. This would be a powerful precedent. No such case has ever been filed in the Eastern Caribbean. The plaintiff would have to be carefully chosen to minimize retribution.

The CCC should help regional members organize strategies for placing environmental issues on the agenda of national electoral campaigns, and create press campaigns to encourage politicians to open development decisions to the public. Elections have not included public discussion of environmental issues in the past. The CCC should also assist in the development and funding of school curricula that teaches children the value of conservation. Campaigns that have proven effective usually focus on a single issue, such as conservation of the St. Lucia Parrot.

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[7] Local resource users possess a wealth of information about natural resource management that is not used in the development process. For example, Klee discusses how local knowledge is used in the South Pacific to manage fisheries; see Gary A. Klee, 1985. Traditional Marine Resource Management in the Pacific. In Culture and Conservation, Jeffrey A. McNeely and David Pratt (eds.), Dover, New Hampshire, Croon Helm Publishers.