

Border Fixity:
When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors

by
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B.A., International Relations
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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of “border fixity” – a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory – has become prevalent in world politics. Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of “border fixity” has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states – states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions – are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely.

This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border fixity by studying and comparing four cases. Two cases are taken from the era prior to the establishment of the border fixity norm: Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740, and Argentina from 1810 to 1880. Two cases are taken from a world in which the norm of border fixity is present: Lebanon from 1943 to 2005, and Congo from 1960 to 2005. Despite some variations, the case studies and the comparison between them largely confirm the argument stated above: Border fixity perpetuates state weakness and, in regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, good fences often create bad neighbors.

Thesis Supervisor: Stephen W. Van Evera
Title: Professor of Political Science

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Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of “border fixity” – a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory – has become prevalent in world politics.¹ Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Have fixed borders made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among of the major causes of war,² many observers might assume that the norm of “border fixity” has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states – states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions – are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common.

While territoriality and borders received surprisingly little attention in the international relations literature up until the 1990’s, more recent research has found a very important trend in the way we treat international borders. Conquest and annexation of one’s neighbors’ land, commonplace in the history of the state system, is no longer on “the menu for choice” for post-WWII leaders and states. A practice that excluded such endeavors gradually developed into a strong and institutionalized international norm, which I term “border fixity.”

¹ Others have called this phenomenon the norm of “territorial sovereignty,” and the norm of “territorial integrity.” Both those terms, however, might confuse it with a general prohibition on intervention, which does not exist. I will further discuss these definitions in chapter 1.

² Gary Goertz, and Diehl, Paul F., *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1992), Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 306-13, John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 123-52.

This norm, no doubt, has contributed much to international peace and stability in regions such as Europe (save for the Balkans), North America and South America. By contrast, however, I maintain that in regions where states have been socio-politically weak, such as in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, Central America, as well as large parts of Asia and the former Soviet Union, the border fixity norm might have adverse consequences for both domestic and international relations. I posit that this norm is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness, since it deprives the state of key factors that were historically motors of state building: territorial threats and territorial opportunities (henceforth: territorial pressures). In early modern Europe and elsewhere, these pressures played a fundamental role in creating strong institutions and strong “in-group” feelings that furthered the cohesiveness of states. Today, states in the developing world do not face these territorial pressures; thus they are devoid of this crucial tool for creating strong institutions and internal cohesiveness. Weak states today, moreover, are not “selected out” of the system, as they used to be, but keep on surviving. In turn, weak or failed states are more likely to become the source of international conflicts in a world of fixed borders because (a) they are more likely to be the site of civil strife, which often spills across borders by increasing incidences of cross-border ethnic intervention, insurgency and counterinsurgency; (b) they increase the opportunities for other states’ predation (in a non-territorial, i.e., economic or political, sense).³

Taken separately, each of these relations is an important arena for investigation, to which this dissertation contributes new arguments. First, it contributes to the understanding of the perpetuation of state weakness in much of the developing world and the increasing phenomenon of failed and failing states. It argues that the norm of border fixity has much to do with these

³ As territorial predation is banned in an age of border fixity, predation here means the attempt by one state to take over and exploit the other state’s economic assets or political system of control.

worrisome developments. Second, it contributes new observations on the subject of the sources of civil conflict, by maintaining that it is often resulting from the combination of state weakness and border fixity. Third, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of the changing nature of war from primarily an interstate practice to primarily intrastate or transnational one. It makes the case that the norm of border fixity and, by extension, state weakness, play a major role here as well. In this regard, the dissertation adds to existing but limited understanding of the causal relations between state weakness and interstate and transnational conflict, by spelling out the mechanisms by which such relations materialized.

These contributions notwithstanding, however, it is the combination of the effects of the norm of border fixity on the weakness of states and of states' weakness on furthering international conflict, rather than each of these phenomena by themselves, that is the main focus of this research. It is the confluence of these processes – the proposition that a norm which intends to make the world a more peaceful one actually, under some conditions, makes it more conflict prone – that makes the argument presented here both counterintuitive and theoretically new.

The dissertation explains, elaborates and tests the causal mechanism discussed above through a study of four cases. Two of these cases are studies of weak states in a world of flexible borders, that is, a world in which the border fixity norm is absent. The other two cases are current cases, of weak states in a border fixity world. These cases are presented in Table 1 below:

Table. 1: Case Studies

| Border Fixity Norm | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Present | Absent |
| Congo (1960-2005)* | Brandenburg-Prussia (1640- 1740)* |
| Lebanon (1950- 2005) | Argentina (1810-1980)* |

* A note on the use of states' names: Some of the states in this study have changed their official names during the duration of time studied here. Brandenburg-Prussia has turned into the Kingdom of Prussia in [18?]. I use both names interchangeably. Argentina was called Rio de la Plata in 1810, then changed to The United Provinces of the River Plate (or, alternatively, The United Provinces of America), and Finally to Argentina. I use the name Argentina in general and the other names when appropriate. Congo has been called The Republic of Congo (1960-1971), Zaire (1971-1997) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997-today). I was the generic term Congo and the other names as appropriate. Note the difference with the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

The criteria for choosing the cases is based on the one hand, on their similarities in terms of socio-political strength (or, rather, weakness) and, on the other hand, their different setting in terms of prevailing international norms regarding borders. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, all the states in this study were, at the starting point, weak, or very weak states. While Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina were part of a world in which international borders are flexible and given to changes, however, the same would not be true for Lebanon and Congo. Thus, using Mill's method of difference, this research design allows me to examine the effects of the existence or absence of the border fixity norm on the conduct and outcomes of policies. In addition, within each group I chose cases that diverge considerably in terms of geography and other factors, so as to maximize the generalizability of the conclusions.

I pursue the study of the effects of the border fixity norm using two different research techniques, *process tracing* and *structured focused comparison*. Process Tracing is a methodology designed for focused causal analysis of case studies. The idea is that in order to

decipher the working of a causal mechanism, one needs to closely examine the process by which it occurred, and observe congruities and divergences between the theory and the actual empirical process in the cases.⁴ This method is especially beneficial for studying a new causal mechanism that was not studied before, since it can generate observations that can illuminate the working of such mechanism. In each case, then, I strive to observe and identify the process by which the border fixity norm relates to eventual policies and outcomes of relations between the state studied and its neighbors. For this purpose I chose to study cases that include many observation points, that is, each of them was engaged in long-term relations with at least two neighbors. The dissertation supplements the process tracing analysis with a structured focused comparison, a methodology designed to elicit theoretical generalizations from a comparison of several cases. The comparison is “focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case... and structured because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that historical case.”⁵

The dissertation proceeds as follows: The first chapter will examine the subjects and arguments existing literature on territories, borders and the way they relate to relations between states. It will then analyze, more specifically, the origins, development, and strength of the border fixity norm. Chapter Two discusses the concept of the socio-political strength of the state, a crucial intervening variable in explaining the different effects that border fixity would have on

⁴ On the method of process tracing see Alexander L. George, and Bennett, Andrew, *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205-32, Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research," in *Comparative Historical Research*, ed. James Mahoney, and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for the Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 64-67.

⁵ Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approached in History, Theory, and Politics*, ed. Paul G. Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68, quotation from pp. 61-62. See also George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, pp. 67-124.

different states. It then goes on to theorize the relations between the socio-political strength of the state and its relations with its neighbors, mainly in terms of peace and conflict. More specifically, it analyzes the effects of a flexible border world – with the territorial threats and opportunities it produces – on weak states. It then compares these effects to those produced by a border fixity world. This chapter also lays down five theoretical hypotheses about these effects.

Chapter three's role is to examine the pre-conditions for state building and development of a socio-politically strong state. It discusses several explanations for the persistence of state weakness in the developing world, and inspects, in the light of these explanations, the conditions in the four cases studies here prior to the beginning of the study period. The specific goal of this exercise is to determine whether the two cases that are taken from the world of flexible borders possessed features that would pre-conditioned them to success in the process of state building, as compared to the two border fixity world cases. In other words, it questions whether Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 and Argentina in 1810 were more likely candidates, a priori, to become stronger states than Lebanon in 1943 and Congo in 1960.

Chapter four, five and six, and seven, then, are the empirical case studies. In each case I explore, first, the socio-political strength of the state at the beginning of the study period. Second, I inspect the international environment in which the state resides, with a particular emphasis on the prevalent territorial norms and practices. I look both at the "big picture" of territorial norms and the more specific equation of territorial pressures that the state in question faced. Third, I analyze the effect the international effects of this external international environment on the process of state building in each case. Fourth, in the two current cases, Lebanon and Congo, I also examine the relations between the border fixity norm, the persistent weakness of the state and the international conflicts in which the state gets involved. This point

is only studied separately in these two cases, since the absence of significant prospects of state strengthening in them calls for more emphasis. In the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina this process is studied as a part of the examination of their relations with their neighbors.

The last chapter compares the effects of the border fixity norm, or its absence, in the four cases. It utilizes the data and observations drawn from the case studies in order to compare them along similar lines of inquiry. It examines the differences and similarities presented in the processes of state building in the various cases and questions to what extent these processes were affected by the border fixity norm. It then compares, as well, the combined effects of border fixity and persistent state weakness on the relations between a state and its neighbors. The chapter concludes with an inspection of whether the hypotheses presented in chapter two were corroborated by the cases and the process discussed in the theory fits the reality of the cases.

Based on the thorough examination of the cases and the comparison among them, I conclude that border fixity indeed had and keeps on having profound effects on the way states conduct their relations with other states. This effect, however, is dependent on the socio-political strength of the state. In the cases studied here, of weak states, the norm of border fixity exacerbates and perpetuates the initial weakness, and ends up causing more conflict and instability. In many of the regions of the developing world, therefore, good fences do not make good neighbors. In fact, they often make bad ones.

Before I proceed, however, a few words of caution are in place. First, the theory of border fixity is probabilistic, rather than deterministic. It claims, for instance, that the norm of border fixity is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness in already weak states, not that it will always do so. It argues that for most weak states border fixity is a source of conflicts, not that it

will necessarily be so. Thus, a few counter examples would not necessarily refute the argument advanced here. Such factors as strong leadership or existing political culture could affect the currents predicted by the theory, but they would have few incentives to do so, and they would face formidable obstacles in this task. Second, while the dissertation examines the effects of border fixity on states in a dichotomous way (that is, the border fixity norm either exists or not, states are either strong or weak), the actual world is, of course, much more complicated. In terms of state strength, especially, there are probably more grays than either black or white. While the dichotomous presentation was chosen for reasons of simplicity and parsimony, I acknowledge the continuous nature of state strength, and partially deal with it in my case studies and in the concluding chapter. For the purpose of developing and testing a new theoretical framework, which this dissertation does, however, the nominally strict differentiation is still valid.

Chapter 1: Perceptions of Borders

“All but gone are a whole series of terms, such as ‘subjugation’ and ‘the right of conquest,’ which even as late as 1950 or so formed a normal part of legal discourse in a work on international law...”⁶

Territoriality and borders are essential parts of the modern sovereign state and of the state’s international relations⁷. The first section of this chapter surveys the arguments on states’ territoriality and borders within and outside the discipline of International Relations (IR), in order to situate my research in the context of past and present research. The studies of territory and borders, and especially of different norms that define the way we think about borders, have been developing in recent years, but they still contain an important gap and leave much to be desired, as will be discussed below. The aim of this dissertation is to start filling this gap or, more appropriate to the title, start mending this wall. The first section surveys arguments in. The second section, then, introduces the concept of the border fixity norm and discusses the development, status and strength of this norm.

A. Territories and Borders

Throughout history, many, if not most, of the international conflicts between states, as well as their international agreements, were about their territories and their borders: their location or their functions. Historically, territory and borders issues are probably the primary underlying cause of wars, as well as international agreements, between states. As John Vasquez argues, “territory is a peculiarly sensitive area for human collectives. They will fight over it more readily than over any other question, and any issue linked with territory becomes subject to violence and

⁶ Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 352.

⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

the use of force.”⁸ Because this knowledge is anything but new, and because modern IR studies are about interactions (be it diplomacy, trade, war or other kinds) between political entities enclosed within some territorial boundaries, it is surprising to find how little has been done in this discipline by way of theorizing territorial boundaries. “International relations scholars rarely examine how definitions of populations and territories change throughout history and how this change alters the notion of legitimate authority.”⁹ As one scholar reflects, “it is truly amazing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking at.”¹⁰

To be sure, discussions of specific territorial conflicts abound, but generalizations and theoretical analysis of the system that is built of territorial states, and the nature and function of borders has been scarce.¹¹ This ignorance is not wholly surprising, though, since one often does indeed not look at the ground on which he or she walks, or at least not problematize it. Such a practice is usually justified, since one needs a solid base as a foundation for any human endeavors. However, when significant changes occur, which transform the nature of this base, it calls for a serious investigation, which is what the current study aims at.

Since the late 1980’s, however, a slow but encouraging development in the writings about territoriality and borders has occurred. This emerging literature can be broadly divided into three categories: theoretical conceptualization of territoriality and borders; the relations between

⁸ Goertz, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, pp. 1-31, Holsti, *Peace and War*, pp. 306-13, Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, pp. 123-52. Quotation from p. 51.

⁹ Samuel J. Barkin, and Cronin, Bruce, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Ruls of Sovereignty in International Relations,” *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): p. 107.

¹⁰ John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (1993): pp. 139-74.

¹¹ An exception is John H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” in *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*, ed. John H. Herz (New York: David Mckay Company, 1976). And John H. Herz, “The Territorial State Revisited,” in *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*, ed. John H. Herz (New York: David Mckay Company, 1976). Hertz discusses the centrality of territoriality in the system of modern states and the influence of modern weapons system on this feature in the 1950’s.

territories and identities; and the study of territorial changes. Below, I discuss some of the most important works in each of these categories. To some extent, the emerging literature in all these three categories serves as a basis for identifying and studying the effects of the border fixity norm.

a) Territoriality and the Modern State System

I. Territoriality as a variable

The two main basic theoretical contributions of the literature in this category are, first, the observation that territoriality, borders, and their relations with populations, are variables rather than constants, and second, the discussion in the different dimensions of international borders. Below, I discuss these two issues.

Although the knowledge that territoriality plays a crucial part in the modern world and that it differs, in that respects, from previous international orders, is not new. This knowledge, however, was hardly developed in the modern political science literature. One of the reasons for this lack of interest was the change in focus that the study of relations between territory and politics took at the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. This trend, centered on geopolitics and the writings of Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder¹², was rooted in the premises that there are certain geographic constants that determine the value and character of land in different regions of earth, and that states need to take account of these characteristics in order to be able to prevail in their struggle with other states. Important German scholars at the turn of the century and through WW-II made geopolitics the center of their attention, but also gave it an additional twist: Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, among

¹² See Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)," *The Geographical Journal* 170, no. 4 (2004), Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of the Sea-Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican, 2003).

others, attempted to create a much more “organic” view of geography and mixed it with racial theories. Their political geography, eventually, became an important part of the Nazi propaganda machine.¹³

After the defeat of the Nazis the study of political geography was discredited, and for a good reason. This trend, however, was one of the sources of the lack of interest in the study of territoriality in human and political affairs noted above. In the 1980’s, however, the interest in the subject of territoriality and borders slowly began to reemerge with a novel approach that discusses territoriality from a distinctively different approach: as a variable rather than a constant. Friedrich Kratochwil pointed out the broad historical context, in which political entities and their ordering principles could have different relations to territories. He distinguishes, first, between territorial and non-territorial orders and, second, between imperial and state-system orders within the territorial category. It does so by using the case of Mongolia, which has gone through the transformation from a nomad society (non-territorial) through being a periphery of the Chinese and Russian empires, to being part of the state-system.¹⁴ This empirical example helps Kratochwil to argue that “boundaries are important because of their role in mediating exchanges.” The types of relationships that are mediated, however, depend on the rules by which societies are ordered. Whether the boundary differentiates between an empire and its outside (“barbarian”) environment, between estates of feudal lords with overlapping authority or between equal and sovereign states, makes a huge difference.¹⁵

¹³ See John A Agnew, "Global Political Geography Beyond Geopolitics," *International Studies Review* 21, no. 1 (2000): pp. 91-99.

¹⁴ Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," *World Politics* 39 (1986): pp. 29-31.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*: pp. 32-37.

A further development in the understanding of territoriality was the discussion of the differences in the concept of territoriality in modern and pre-modern systems of political entities. John Ruggie distinguishes three such differences: first, the modern state, in contrast to some of its predecessors, is based on disjoint territory; second, in contrast to nomadic societies, this territory is relatively fixed¹⁶; and third, modern territoriality is exclusive.¹⁷ Hendrick Spruyet adds some more models of relations between the political entity and territoriality in his discussion of the Italian city-states and the German city-leagues¹⁸.

The main contribution of this group of authors is the notion that the modern territorial state is just one of several historical models of relations between a political entity, its territories and its borders. Grasping this helps us understand the dynamic character of these relations, and thus set the stage for understanding the changes in the relations we see in today's world.

II. *Dimensions of Borders*

A second important theoretical observation is that international borders might be distinguished along two distinct dimensions: their functions and their location. As Kratochwil notes, a significant part of international relations revolves around the management of these two dimensions: manipulation of the *location* of the boundaries and management of the types of exchanges mediated by them (that is, their *function*). The European balance-of-power system, for instance, was based on the former, using consistent attempts to alter territorial boundaries in order to control great-power rivalry. Changing the boundaries' functions, on the other hand, was used mainly around the edges of European empires and their colonies. Various institutional

¹⁶ Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond." Ruggie, though, use here "fixed" in a looser and weaker sense than I use it in this study.

¹⁷ Ibid.: pp. 139-74.

¹⁸ Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

arrangements, including spheres of influence, protectorates, suzerainties, and buffer zones were used to manage the relations between empires and their environment and among the empires themselves.¹⁹

Granted, the division between location and function of borders is somewhat artificial, as these dimensions are often interdependent. Indeed, as shown by Jeffery Herbst's study of African borders in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, the location of borders itself might serve as their most important function.²⁰ Nevertheless, the analytical distinction is still useful and it helps me define more clearly the puzzle of this study. While the dissertation concentrates on the location of the borders, one should never lose sight of the dimension of borders' function, since they are closely intertwined. Moreover, since I argue below that significant manipulation of location of boundaries in the current state system is practically obsolete, the manipulation of boundaries' function takes an even greater importance, within the limits of legitimate tools, in an international order based on sovereignty.

b) Identities, Territories and Borders

A second area in which the new literature on territories that emerged since the 1980's has made a significant contribution, is the intersection between territories and identities. The research in this subject demonstrates how institutions like "state" and "sovereignty" could take on different meanings, either territorial or not. This literature also points to the malleability of territorial definitions of states and ethnic groups, and the content of territorial identities.

One question that is dealt with here is whether the nation is defined in territorial or in national terms. Rodney Bruce Hall, for instance, demonstrates, using the comparison of France

¹⁹ Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality," pp. 37-41.

²⁰ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

under Napoleon the III and Prussia under Bismarck, that “a state” could mean very different things with different consequences for international relations, depending mainly on historical societal developments.²¹ Similarly, Samuel Barkin and Bruce Chronin argue that the concept of “sovereignty” is neither fixed nor constant. They maintain that the international system adopts, at different times, different definitions, some of them based on the state (i.e., territorial), and some on the nation (i.e., not necessarily territorial), thus changing the context and conduct of international relations.²²

Students of geography, as well, have struggled with similar subjects.²³ Some works, for instance, are focused around the notion that different geographically related identities, on different “scales,”²⁴ are “nested” within other, broader identities. When cultural and political identities overlap or are in disjuncture between different scales, one should expect to see tension. This is true especially when asymmetry exists between the political state and the cultural nation, both of which are geographical entities.²⁵ Empirical and historical works in this discipline, too, started to emphasize more the shifting and constructed nature of geopolitical perceptions, rather than their natural characteristics.²⁶

²¹ Rodney Bruce Hall, “Territorial and National Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security Policy,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2/3 (1999): pp. 145-97.

²² Barkin, “The State and the Nation.” Also discussing changes and continuities in the interpretations of sovereignty is Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,” (1999). In a similar manner, the various authors in the volume titled *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, examine the correlations of identities, borders and orders, with a heavy emphasis on the social process that changes their relations and connotations. See Mathias Albert, Jacobson, David and Lapid, Yosef, ed., *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

²³ For a review of some recent works see John A. Agnew, “Global Political Geography beyond Geopolitics.” *International Studies Review* 21,1 (2000): 91-99.

²⁴ The term “scales” refers more or less to what a political scientist would call “levels of analysis.”

²⁵ See the various articles in Guntram Herb, and Kaplan, David H., ed., *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale* (Lahman, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

²⁶ See, e.g. Gertjan Dijkink, *National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain* (New York: Routledge, 1996). The book surveys the geopolitical visions of the place a nation occupies (or should occupy) in the world. By examining visions that were entertained by elites and people in Germany, Britain, the US, Argentina, Australia, Russia, Serbia, Iraq and India, the author stresses the important role played by these myths of place and destination in achieving pride and/or legitimizing violence in a world of physical and ideational constraints

This body of literature, then, serves as my ontological basis, as it shows territories, borders and identities that are related to them to be social constructs. This conceptualization is important to the theory of border fixity, as will be discussed below, since it makes clear that the supposition that borders are, and should stay, fixed is a social construct as well, and not a material reality, even though it has some very material consequences.

c) Territorial changes

A third thread in the developing literature on borders is the one that focuses on territorial and borders' changes. This literature is especially important for my research, since it establishes the empirical anchor for my arguments.

An important part of this literature consists of statistical works, which survey territorial changes, their frequency, the manner in which they are done, and the conditions under which they should be expected. Most of the works in this group are part of, or are based on, the "Correlates of War" project. The main findings that arise in these works are: a) If one examines the period of the modern state-system (since Westphalia in 1648), territorial disputes are the most common underlying cause of war.²⁷ b) The two factors that seem to correlate most with territorial war are (not surprisingly) contiguity (sharing a border), and previous territorial disputes.²⁸

A second group of works on territorial changes tries to analyze the conditions under which we should expect to see such a change and the process by which the change would take place. Arie Kacowicz, for example, conducts a survey of territorial changes that were done peacefully, and goes on to study the conditions that enabled and/or encouraged such changes. He finds that

²⁷ Vazquez, *The War Puzzle*, 123-52. See also Goertz, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, Holsti, *Peace and War*.

²⁸ Goertz, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*.

the most important variables for a peaceful resolution of territorial dispute are the distribution of power (somewhat asymmetric distribution is helpful), regime type (similarity helps), and the congruence of norms regarding international relations.²⁹

Ian Lustick and his colleagues study the process by which a nation decide to expand or contract territorially, and the role of hegemonic ideas and their breakdown in such processes.³⁰ Similarly, Monica Toft, by examining cases in which ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union are in conflict with their states, discusses the perceptions of core territories, and how perceiving a certain territory as “indivisible” makes armed conflict much more likely.³¹ Taylor Fravel, examines China’s territorial dispute behavior and argues that leaders tend to delay the resolution of territorial disputes, unless certain conditions compel them to either compromise or escalate the dispute.³² All these works are of great value to the study of borders, yet they neglect to notice the general process by which, over time, territorial changes, and especially violent territorial expansions, are becoming obsolete. Here is precisely where the literature on the norm of border fixity, which will be discussed in the next section, emerges.

B. The International Norm of Border Fixity

a) Defining Border Fixity

This section explains and elaborates the meaning and scope of the border fixity norm. After defining the norm, I discuss its origins and evolution. I then examine the existence and

²⁹ Arie M. Kacowicz, *Peaceful Territorial Change* (Columbia, South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

³⁰ Brendan O’leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Callaghy, Thomas, ed., *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).

³¹ Monica D. Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

³² Tylor Fravel, “The Long March to Peace: Explaining China’s Settlements of Territorial Disputes ” (Stanford, 2003).

strength of the border fixity norm, demonstrating that the norm today is well internalized, in thought and in practice, over and above the reasons (some of them material) that gave rise to it in the first place.

What do I mean by saying that border fixity is a norm? While there is no consensus among social scientists about the meaning of “norms” and their ingredients, the definition that is often used by political scientists describes norms as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.”³³ The focus of the definition above is the word “proper” which I read as either “the morally right thing to do,” or “the commonly accepted thing to do.” The first of these meanings is an ethical one, stressing the “oughtness” of an action, while the second meaning treats norms as a legal or social convention, thus it is more positivistic³⁴ in nature.³⁵ I submit that the norm of border fixity takes both of these values of “proper;” different actors, at different times, have been playing by the rules of border fixity either because they feel it is the ethical thing to do, or because they do not want to stand out and suffer the legal or social consequences of such act.³⁶

By the norm of border fixity, then, I mean *the prohibition, on the part of most states and the international community in general, of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory, regardless of any internal or external conditions.* Basically, I am referring to the same phenomenon that Mark Zacher has termed “territorial integrity” and Tanisha Fazal calls

³³ The definition is taken from Peter J Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.

³⁴ In the sense of positive law, or *de-facto*.

³⁵ For the definition of norms as moral construct see Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996). For a more practice-dependent approach see Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 4 (1986). Gary Goertz, *International Norms and Decision Making: Punctuated Equilibrium Model* (Lenham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

³⁶ For a similar approach, see Arie M. Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

“territorial sovereignty.”³⁷ Both of these terms, however, are inadequate to accurately portray the phenomenon in question, since territorial integrity and sovereignty can be breached without challenges to the formal borders.

In order to clarify the term border fixity it is also important to note what cases are not included under this phenomenon. First, since we talk about conquest and *annexation*, it should be clear that political, economic, or even military interventions that do not include annexation or intent of annexation (e.g., Syrian control of Lebanon and US occupation of Iraq) would not be categorized as a breach of the norm. Second, since the definition talks about *foreign* conquest, it also excludes cases of national unification, such as the German reunification (1990) or Vietnam’s unification (1976). Lastly, since the definition relates to cases of homeland territory, it does not include the process (now largely finished) of de-colonization. The British did not lose their homeland when they gave up India and neither did the Portuguese when they ceded control in Mozambique, and thus these cases are not included as breaches of the border fixity principle.

The issue of secession is a more complicated one. While secessions are not an integral part of the norm of border fixity, as defined here, they are not unrelated either. Opposition of the international community to attempts of secession is usually not as fierce as that of foreign conquests, but the norm against secessions is still a strong one. While in some special cases certain territories were allowed to secede and create their own country (such as those in former Yugoslavia and in East Timor), a far greater number of secession movements face a formidable international opposition to their exit attempts. Furthermore, except for very few cases, the borders of the smaller new states that are created after the breakup of empires (such as in Asia,

³⁷ Tanisha M. Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm," in *A paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association* (San Francisco, California: August-September 2001), Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001).

the Middle East and Africa in the 1940's- 1960's and the former Soviet Union in 1993) are amazingly similar to existing internal (administrative) borders within the empires. Thus, while secessions are not a part and parcel of the border fixity norm, they are regulated by a closely related, although a bit weaker, attachment to the territorial status quo.

b) The Origins and Development of the Border Fixity Norm

The international norm of border fixity is an outgrowth of several distinct factors, some ideational and some material, which, in the aftermath of World War II, have combined to produce a new and effective norm. I submit that none of these factors, by itself, is sufficient to explain the spatial and temporal adaptation and endurance of the norm. Rather, their unique combination is what makes border fixity a globally accepted strong norm.

I. The Idea of Border Fixity

The idea that a forceful conquest does not entitle one state to annex the territory of another state has its roots as far back as the 18th century, with the beginning of the theory of popular sovereign rights. Until the 20th century, however, this idea had no real political manifestation.³⁸ This situation began to change by the end of the First World War, with Woodrow Wilson's ideas of the desired new world order. The quarrel over borders, Wilson thought, was a major cause of war, and Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, translating Wilson's ideas into a legal international document, declared that "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political

³⁸ One exception is the application of the *uti-possidetis*, the principle that borders should reflect those of the pre-existing colonial lines, which was implemented since the 19th century in the limited scale and scope of Latin American relations. See Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*.

independence of all Members of the League.”³⁹ The President of the United States was by no means intent on banning the use of force in international relations, though. In words depicting precisely the border fixity norm, Wilson told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1919, “I understand that article [Article 10 of the League Covenant] to mean that no nation is at liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed intervention; it is destroyed by the retention of territory, by taking territory away from it.”⁴⁰ The Kellogg-Bryan Pact and the advent of the laws of war, which increasingly declared belligerent occupation to be a temporary condition, as well, contributed to the advance of the idea of border fixity between the wars.

These ideas about changing the international norms with regard to borders, however, were working at cross-currents with both power realities and other, more influential ideas (such as isolationism in the US and fascism in Europe) of the time. Thus, the idea of border fixity utterly failed to prevent the territorial grabs of the 1930’s and War World II. The same ideas, however, served as the glue that has cemented the new norm of border fixity, once the supporting material conditions were in place, after the war ended.

II. Material Factors and Rational Calculations

One of the most important material factors that have contributed to the development of the phenomenon of border fixity after World War II is that the nature of the economy has changed dramatically over time, culminating in the second half of the twentieth century. As the value of land as a means of production decreases, and as the value of technology and the human mind as

³⁹ <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/www/league-covenant.html>

⁴⁰ “A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” August 19, 1919. Arthur Stanley Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).. Cited in Fazal, “The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm.”

such a means increases, territorial conquest should become less and less important. Within the context of the debate about the peace among advanced industrial powers, Karl Kaysen made the case that this fundamental change in the economics of states was indeed a defining factor in bringing about this peace.⁴¹ One might extrapolate from Kaysen's proposition and suggest that the phenomenon of border fixity, as well, might be a result of the decreasing value of land; that people are no longer trying to conquer foreign land because it is simply not worth it (economically).

If the argument about the devaluation of land stresses the benefit side of the cost-benefit equation, the nuclear weapons explanation concentrates on the cost side. This argument, as well, has also been raised in the context of the debate about the lack of armed conflict among advanced industrial states (and among the great powers in particular) since the Second World War. Nuclear deterrence has created a situation in which no rational actor would risk going to war with another nation who has, or might easily develop, a nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons, and especially thermo-nuclear ones, have indeed changed the rules of the game in Europe and beyond it- in relations between the nuclear powers.⁴²

⁴¹ Carl Kaysen, "Is War Absolute? A Review Essay," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 81-103. Empirically, there are very few studies of this question, yet the one serious study which examined whether the Nazi conquests of advanced industrial societies during WW-II paid off, has largely refuted the assertion above: the German's managed to mine the conquered industrial states (such as France and Czechoslovakia) in a fairly efficient manner and extract significant portion of their industrial capacity. Indeed, Peter Liberman finds that resistance was much fiercer in rural areas, as opposed to urban and industrial ones. See Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press). This proposition sounds plausible, although the empirical evidence is scarce. Yet, even if one agrees with Liberman with regard to the Second World War occupations, he or she might still argue that in later years, when advanced economies are built more on knowledge and less on heavy industry, Kaysen's argument would be correct.

⁴² See, for instance, John L. Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10, no. 4 (1986), Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). John Mueller, moreover, argues that even without nuclear weapons a modern war between advanced industrial nations has become unthinkable, and not only in rational terms, but also in sub-rational ones. See John E. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (Rochester, New York: Rochester University Press, 1996).

Jeffrey Herbst offers yet another explanation for border fixity, which might add to our understanding of the origins and development of the norm, in his analysis of Africa's post-colonial stable borders. According to Herbst, African leaders, in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, all faced a similar problem: how to project the power of a weak government over huge distances of scarcely populated land and difficult terrain. The very rational solution of the states who gain their independence in the 1960's and 1970's was, like that of their colonial counterparts, to maintain the current (colonial) borders, arbitrary and irrational as they are. This logic, Herbst maintains, stands at the heart of the phenomenon of Africa's leaders insistence on clinging to their existing borders.⁴³

The last argument that can contribute to our understanding of border fixity is that it is the American hegemony over international affairs that created and maintained the phenomenon of border fixity. This argument, in essence, combines ideational and material ingredients: it recognizes the power of the norm, only maintains that the "norm entrepreneur" that is responsible for the origination and maintenance of the norm is the United States of America. Tanisha Fazal has been arguing along this line and using both case studies and statistical research aiming to corroborate it.⁴⁴

All of the above material factors, I submit, played an important role in the origination and enhancement of the border fixity norm.⁴⁵ In the same manner that the initial ideas of border fixity could not be materialized in a hostile material environment, however, the material factors would not have been sufficient, by themselves and without the "glue" of the ideational component, to

⁴³ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

⁴⁴ Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm."

⁴⁵ For the role of material interests and factors in the development of norm see Martha and Sikkink Finnemore, Kathryn, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).

create and maintain a strong norm of border fixity. Importantly, most of the material factors that might have contributed to the development of the border fixity norm have limited geographical applicability. The logic of Kaysen's argument about the decline of value of the land applies, for instance, to only a portion of the states or regions of the world, the advanced industrial ones, while the phenomenon of border fixity is almost universal. In many parts of the Developing World land (or what lies beneath it) is still the leading factor of production, more important for the national economy than industry. Yet, border fixity still holds, even in the oil-rich Middle East and the parts of Africa that are endowed with gold, diamonds and other precious minerals. Similarly, the merits of the nuclear factor in understanding the absence of war between nuclear nations notwithstanding, as an explanation for the rise of the border fixity norm this argument still suffers from the same limited geographical application. In nuclear-free regions, such as Latin America and Africa, the principle of border fixity holds in the same manner that it does in regions in which nuclear weapons have been introduced. It cannot be the case, moreover, that these regions are protected by "extended deterrence," since war still occurs in the developing world; just not territorial war. Herbst, on the other hand, may well be right about Africa, and the same argument could reasonably be made also with regard to South America and some parts of the former Soviet Union. Yet again, this logic cannot be applied universally. In the relatively compact and well-governed Europe and in the densely populated Asia, borders nevertheless remain almost entirely fixed.

The explanation of border fixity as a result of American hegemony is not untrue but is insufficient. For one, while the US mostly supported the establishment and maintenance of the border fixity norm, so did other states. Fazal notes, for instance, the difference between the 1965

American intervention in the Dominican Republic and the one in 1916.⁴⁶ Yet, one could also point to a very similar difference between Soviet behaviors in annexing the Baltic States in the 1930's and in only intervening (not annexing) Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, in order to establish American hegemony as the most important factor in instituting the border fixity norm, one has to see an across-the-board visible American involvement in suggesting, enforcing or otherwise promoting the norm. While we see some cases of such a behavior (Wilson's promotion of the principle in the League of Nation, Eisenhower's 1956 pressure on allies in the Suez Crisis, and the 1990-91 reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), we hardly see any American influence in other areas. For instance, Germany's recognition of its post-war boundaries was not a result of US pressure. Similarly, Americans were hardly involved in the drafting of Africa's strong resolution against border changes.

c) The Norm of Border Fixity: Existence and Strength

To some degree, each of the factors outlined above probably contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the practice. These forces and logics have acted like distinct vectors pointing to the same direction. Nevertheless, without the normative "glue," the change in the way people (and especially elite) think about conquests and annexation, the change of practice would have been partial and temporary. As this is not the focus of the dissertation, I do not attempt here to evaluate the weight of the different factors. Regardless of these weights, I maintain that today the norm of border fixity exists, over and above the factors that allowed it to rise. By looking at the practice of states, at the institutionalization of the norm, and about speech evidence, this section shows that border fixity is today a strong and internalized norm. Thus,

⁴⁶ Tanisha M. Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit," in *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association* (Honolulu, Hawaii: 2005).

even if some of the material factors mentioned above is to change (e.g., the American hegemony) the norm still stand strong.

I. Practice

In order to argue that a norm is strong, one has to show that a congruent practice is in place; that most actors, most of the time, comply with the commands and rules which the norm proscribes (or prohibits). To be sure, practice itself does not prove beyond doubt the existence of a strong norm, since it could be simply a matter of coercion or rational benefit. A norm cannot be strong, however, without a visible manifestation in terms of practice.

Conquest and annexation of one's neighbor's land was a constant feature of the state-system since its inception in Westphalia in 1648 (as well as of most other historical systems). When Frederick the Great of Prussia invaded Silesia (an Austrian province) in 1740, he knew that as long as he held the power to conquer and control it, his rule in the land would not be questioned by other states (save, perhaps, the one that lost the territory). Similarly, when the United States annexed the huge territories on its southern and western frontiers as a result of its victory over Mexico in the Mexican-American War of 1846-8, it needed to supply few explanations to the international community. This was just how things were done.

In a sharp contrast to that order of things, today, as Charles Tilly writes, "the continued rise of war couples with a fixation of international boundaries. With a few significant exceptions, military conquest across borders has ended, states have ceased fighting each other over disputed territory..."⁴⁷ In a similar vein, Donald Horowitz has shown that cases of irredentism are rarities

⁴⁷ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992), p. 203.

in our world, although the theoretical potential (for instance, due to cross border ethnic kin) for irredentist claims is huge.⁴⁸

Mark Zacher, however, was the first one to conduct a systematic study of the changing norms regarding borders. In a 2001 article, Zacher finds that what he termed the “territorial integrity norm” is a very strong international norm. He finds very few exceptions to the rule that conquest and annexation of other states’ territories is no longer viewed as a legitimate act.⁴⁹ Tanisha Fazal largely corroborates Zacher’s empirical findings, though her work advances a different causal explanation for the rise of this norm, which she calls the norm of “territorial sovereignty.”⁵⁰

Table 2: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory, 1815-2000

| Year | Cases of Military Conquest |
|-----------|----------------------------|
| 1816-1850 | 13 |
| 1851-1900 | 57 |
| 1901-1950 | 34 |
| 1951-2000 | 10 |

Source: Correlates of War Database, in Tir, Jaroslav, Philip F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz, 1998. “Territorial Changes, 1816-1996.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 16: 89-97. With modification to extend the data to 2000. The definition does not include brief occupations, which were promptly reversed by either the belligerents or by other powers (e.g., Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1991).

Indeed, as Table 2 shows, there were very few cases of *foreign military conquest of homeland territory* since 1950 (in comparison to earlier periods of the territorial state system).

The use of the term “homeland territory” comes in order to control for cases of de-colonization

⁴⁸ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88. See also Ian Lustick, “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): pp. 653-83.


⁴⁹ Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm.”

⁵⁰ Fazal, “The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm.” Fazal’s causal explanation, the American hegemony, is discussed below.

and breakup of empires, which are territorial changes but are not included in the norm in question here. Considering the fact that the first period in the table is only 35 years and that in 1850 the state system included only 39 states, as compared to 197 states in 2000, this data is all the more impressive, under the assumption that a system with more states in it is likely to produce more territorial conflicts.

In order to account for these factors, therefore, I take two steps. The first one is to divide the number of conquests and annexation by the number of the recognized states in the state system (those which are counted in the data). Thus, one can compute the average number of conquests and annexations *per state* for each period. The result is shown in Figures 1.

Figure 1: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory Per State, 1815-2000




* Data Source: Correlates of War Database, in Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz. "Territorial Changes, 1816-1996." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 16 (1998), pp. 89-97 (adjusted to include 1997-2000 data and to fit my definitions).

As the number of states in the system does not necessarily reflect the actual chances of engaging in territorial war, however (Peru and Norway are unlikely, for instance, to engage in a

territorial war), I take here another step. Figure 2 below portrays the number of conquests per decade, divided by the number of contiguous dyads (that is, states that share a common land border) existing in the international system for the same decade. Thus, it presents the average chances of neighboring states to engage in a war against each other that results in a conquest and annexation.

**Figure 2: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory
Per Contiguous Dyad, 1820-2000**



* **Data Source:** Data taken from the Correlates of War project. Data on number of conquests and annexations: Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz. "Territorial Changes, 1816-1996." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 16 (1998), pp. 89-97 (adjusted to include 1997-2000 data and to fit my definitions). Data on contiguous dyads: Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19 (2), pp. 58-66.

As these figures reveal, incidents of foreign conquests and annexations of homeland territory, declining from the beginning of the 20th century, decreased dramatically since 1950.⁵¹ The ten cases of conquest are: Israel from Syria, 1967; Israel from Jordan, 1967; Israel from Egypt, 1967; Iran from the UAE, 1971; India from Pakistan, 1971; Libya from Chad, 1973; Israel from Syria, 1973; Turkey from Cyprus, 1973; China from South Vietnam, 1974; and Armenia from Azerbaijan 1991-4 (a border case between foreign conquest and secession). Since the mid 1970's, moreover, only one case could qualify for this category (Armenia since the early 1990's). The vast majority of the states, almost all the time, then, practice border fixity.

Beyond the direct evidence of state practice, moreover, the reaction to the breach of a norm can serve as important evidence to its strength. The way states reacted to gross violations of the norm of border fixity, then, can tell us some important thing about the degree to which the norm is internalized. In 1956, when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt after the latter nationalized the Suez Canal, the reaction of the world was mixed. While the Eastern Block and most Non-Allied states opposed the tripartite move, of course, some Western states supported it (notably Germany). What was surprising, however, is the reaction of the United States. Although an ally of Britain and France, and not on good terms with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the US condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and (Israeli) withdrawal to the international borders. Britain, France and Israel had to give in to the American pressure and withdraw their forces.⁵²

The international (and American) reaction to Israel's conquests of 1967 (the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert from Egypt, East Jerusalem and the West bank from Jordan and the Golan

⁵¹ Zacher's figures are only slightly different, since he looks for cases which actually resulted in territorial change, and does include changes in "non-homeland" territories (thus, for instance Iraq's conquest of Kuwait is excluded while India's conquest of Goa is included). See Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 218.

⁵² See, for instance, Donald Neff, *Worriers at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press, 1981).

Heights from Syria) was much milder, since many perceived it a defensive war on the part of Israel. This reaction, though, is still instructive. While Israel's allies, and the US in particular, did not demand an immediate return to the status quo ante, none of them recognized Israel's claims to these territories. Although Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem⁵³ and the Golan Heights (in accordance to its own domestic laws), not a single other state accepted these changes as legal.⁵⁴ In its peace accords with Egypt, Israel was compelled to return every inch of Egyptian territory. While it is anyone's guess what future Syrian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli agreements would look like, a significant deviation from 1967's borders is unlikely. This is so regardless of the fact that there is no doubt about Israel's military superiority in the region, a fact that a century ago would have most likely resulted in a legitimating of its territorial expansion. The international community has responded similarly also to India's territorial gains in its 1971 war with Pakistan, to the Turkish occupation of part of Cyprus (1974 to present), to the Chinese 1979 war with Vietnam, and to Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabach (from Azerbaijan, 1991-present).⁵⁵ Indeed, "so strong has the prevalent bias toward the status quo ante become that it prevailed even in those cases when the defeated plainly did not have any ability to eject the victor."⁵⁶

By 1990 the norm of border fixity was much stronger, and the international reaction to Iraq's conquest and annexation of Kuwait was similarly more decisive. What was remarkable about the reaction to Iraq's invasion, however, was its scope. Not less important is the participation of most of Iraq's Arab neighbors (17 out of 21 states) within the Coalition forces. To be sure, that some of the Arab states have joined the international coalition that repelled Iraq from Kuwait

⁵³ Note that Ian Lustick argues Israel never actually did annex Jerusalem, since it decided on a municipal, rather than the national, border. See Ian S. Lustick, "Reinventing Jerusalem," *Foreign Policy* 93 (1993-1994).

⁵⁴ Sharon Korman, *The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 250-60, Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 231-32.

⁵⁵ Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, p. 352, Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 228-29.

⁵⁶ Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, p. 352.

could be interpreted solely in terms of balance of power. One should not take lightly, however, the tremendous challenges that an Arab state faces when aligning with the West against a fellow Arab state.⁵⁷ That they were able to do so, I submit, owes at least partially to the strength of the prohibition against conquest and annexation of other states. Moreover, even those few states that supported Iraq's move (e.g., Jordan, Yemen, Cuba and Sudan) did not recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.⁵⁸ Both primary and secondary practice, then, confirms the existence and strength of the border fixity norm.

Finally, American and EU positions in the crisis in former Yugoslavia fit this pattern as well: while recognizing the secessions, the Western Powers insisted that all sides would accept their boundaries at the time of secession, which they finally did the 1995 Dayton Peace Conference, and in the Bilateral treaties signed between Serbia and Croatia and Serbia and Bosnia.⁵⁹

II. *Words*

The words of people, and certainly those of politicians, often do not accurately reflect what they think and definitely not what they do. Words and narrative, however, do play an important role in public life and they do often represent what is accepted (or normal) to say in a given society. Speech evidence with regard to the question of borders, therefore, is an important indicator for the existence and strength of the norm. In this sense, one can observe a striking historical difference in the way elites understand the reality and the norms with regard to borders, with the watershed being somewhere in the early 1950's.

⁵⁷ Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 231. On Arab considerations and difficulties in aligning with the West see Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): pp. 233-56.

⁵⁸ Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, p. 353.

⁵⁹ Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 224-28.

In an 1869 speech, answering a plea by a Polish delegation to the Prussian Parliament, the German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, proclaimed, "Gentlemen, if you contest the right of conquest, you cannot have read the history of your own country. It is thus that states are formed."⁶⁰ Bismarck, uttering these words many years before Charles Tilly's famous dictum that "war made the state and the state made war,"⁶¹ was right. Conquest and annexation of one's neighbors land was the norm rather than the exception. In a his 1905 book, *Frontiers*, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, reflects on the passing century: "The majority of the most important wars of the century," Curzon writes, "have been Frontier wars. Wars of religion, of alliances, of rebellion, of aggrandisement, of dynastic intrigue or ambition ...tend to be replaced by Frontier wars, i.e. wars arising out of the expansion of states and kingdoms..."⁶²

At the dawn of the twentieth century, then, it appeared that territorial wars and border changes were, if anything, on the rise, and certainly legitimate. Yet, it took only a few more years for ideas to start to change. As discussed before, Wilson and his contemporaries failed, of course, to bring about the desired change in state practices. Yet, the idea of border fixity has started to take root and as the guns on WW-II fell quiet, a very different norm was taking shape, although slowly and gradually. Thus, By 1971, another German Chancellor's words sounded very differently from those of Bismarck: In his Nobel Prize for Peace lecture, Chancellor Willy Brandt asserted, "Looking at the matters from the realities of the situation, that meant not questioning any one's territorial integrity but rather recognizing the inviolability of frontiers."⁶³ Similar sentiments are reflected by the words of other important world leaders, perhaps nowhere

⁶⁰ Quoted in Korman, *The Right of Conquest*, p. X.

⁶¹ Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁶² George Nathaniel Curzon, *Frontiers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).

⁶³ See Willy Brandt, *Peace Policy in Our Time* (Nobel Lecture) at: [http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-lecture-e.html]. Accessed: 8/3/2006

more eloquently than in the words of US President Bill Clinton. "This era," President Clinton asserted, does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood."⁶⁴

It is often the case that when a norm is internalized to a sufficient degree, one is hard pressed to see verbal expressions of the normative ideas. When the norm is breached, however, these expressions are easier to detect. One such rare opportunity was the Iraqi conquest and annexation of Kuwait in 1990. "If we let [the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait] succeed," Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said, "no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of the jungle takes over."⁶⁵ "Dictators," she declared somewhere else, "must be stopped. They must not be able to march into other peoples' territory, rule their lives, take away their whole mode of existence and just get away with it."⁶⁶ James Baker, the American Secretary of States, expressed similar feelings: "Let no nation think it can devour another nation and the United States will somehow turn a blind eye. Let no dictator believe that we are deaf to the tolling of the bell as our fundamental principles are attacked."⁶⁷ Baker also responded in a similar way to the war in former Yugoslavia: "The United States and the rest of the international community will reject any Serbian claims to territory beyond its borders."⁶⁸

II. Institutionalization

Ideas do not fly in the air, however, and even a very good and convincing idea needs some form of institutionalization in order to spread and take root. When one assesses the strength of norms, their degree of institutionalization is, therefore, a crucial factor. Without being

⁶⁴ William J. Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Greeting to the Peoples of Pakistan," ed. the Office of Press Secretary White House (March 25, 2000).

⁶⁵ Tanisha M. Fazal, "Violating the Norm against Conquest: The Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait," (Columbia University, 2003), p. 40.

⁶⁶ "Front Line", PBS, Oral History- on Gulf War, at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/thatcher/1.html>

⁶⁷ Fazal, "Violating the Norm against Conquest: The Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait," p. 40.

⁶⁸ Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 228.

institutionalized, norms are more fragile and easier to change. Institutionalization, especially of the formal kind, makes the norm more “sticky” and resistant to alteration.

The UN Charter (1945), its system of trusteeship and later resolutions (mainly those regarding de-colonization and self-determination) gave the principle powerful legal backing.⁶⁹ Article 2(3) in Chapter I of the UN Charter, for instance, declares that all members should “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” and the General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970 declares that “No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat of use of force shall be recognized as legal.” Note that war and the use of force *per se* are not completely prohibited by the UN Charter (under certain circumstances, notably self –defense and collective security, war is permissible). Territorial annexation, however, is prohibited even as a result of a just war— that is, a war of self-defense.⁷⁰

Regional agreements echoed these principles, and, in some instances, went beyond them. Early post-war regional charters, such as these of the Arab League (1945) and the Organization of American States (1948) mention the territorial integrity of members, but do not emphasize it. Later declarations of regional organizations, however, make this principle a center stage. The 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU), includes article 3, which strongly support territorial integrity. At the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of States and Government at the following year, a resolution was accepted, as a reaction to Moroccan and Somali breach of the border fixity principle, which called all members “to respect the borders existing on the achievement of national independence.” All the African states, apart from Morocco and Somalia, supported the

⁶⁹ Korman, *The Right of Conquest*, pp. 133-99.

⁷⁰ For such an interpretation of the international law, see *Ibid.*, pp. 199-214.

resolution.⁷¹ The successor of the OAU, the African Union (AU), in its 2000 constitutive act, lists the respect of the borders existing on achievement of independence as one of its most important principles (second only to independence and sovereignty). The CSCE's The Helsinki Final Act, which was signed in 1975 by 35 European and North American states, including both NATO and Warsaw Pact states, declares that "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State."⁷² Both the EU and NATO demanded that East European states that aspire to join the organizations in the 1990's will peacefully resolve and conclude accords with neighboring states about any outstanding territorial conflicts, prior to their acceptance.⁷³

Let me sum up the argument made thus far. Even though it is a relatively "young," in terms of human history (about half a century), border fixity is today a strong international norm. The vast majority of the states, with very few exceptions, adhere to this norm. While a number of economic, political and technologic factors have contributed to the creation of conditions amenable to the rise of the norm and its maintenance, the change of ideas and perceptions about borders has been the critical factor. To wit, the practice of border fixity today does not rely anymore on any of the material conditions that might have been part of its development. Territorial expansion is just not on the menu of choice for the 21st century state.

⁷¹ Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 222.

⁷² See Helsinki Final Act, Chapter III, Available at: [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf] accessed on 8/3/2006

⁷³ Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 222.

Chapter 2: Weak States and Norms of Borders

A. The Socio-Political Strength of States

The international norm of border fixity has very significant effects in terms of international relations. These effects, however, are hardly similar across the globe. This chapter argues that variations in states' socio-political strength greatly influence the way they are affected by the border fixity norm. It argues that for these states the norm of border fixity has negative effects on the prospects of state building and subsequently also on their relations with their neighbors. I first define and discuss the term "socio-political strength" of the state. Second, I discuss the effects of territorial threats and opportunities on the process of state building in a flexible borders world (i.e., in the absence of the border fixity norm). Lastly, I explore the differences that result from the introduction of this new norm to international politics. In this vein, I look at both the effects on the state building process and on the state's relations with its neighbors. In the course of this chapter I also present five hypotheses, which will direct the course of the investigation in the empirical chapters.

All states share some common features. Yet the sense in which states are "like-units" is very restricted.⁷⁴ Apart from a thin layer of ostensibly similar form, state's internal characteristics vary in a way that often affects the way in which a state reacts to its external environment. Domestic characteristics that influence a state's conduct towards its external surrounding are

⁷⁴ Structural (or Neo) realism, a strong tradition in the study of international relations, treats states as "like-units," in the sense that they are all autonomous political units that face similar tasks (though they differ markedly in their abilities to perform these tasks). First and foremost among these tasks is safeguarding the survival of the states in an anarchic world. See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 29-54, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 93-97. This approach to the study of world politics certainly has its merits. It is highly parsimonious and based purely on structure and therefore one does not need to bother oneself with the intricacies of the politics of agents and with interaction between structure and agents.

many, and may vary from military, to economic, to social structures.⁷⁵ Without discounting the importance of these features, the current research focuses on a different internal attribute of states, and one that is crucial to their relations with their neighbors: socio-political strength.

There is no consensus in political science about the concept of state strength. Among scholars of international relations, state strength is often synonymous with power: military, economic, or otherwise. In comparative politics literature, the term state strength usually signifies the comparative position of the central government's institutions vis-à-vis their civil society. Joel Migdal, for example, defines the strength of states according to their "capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways."⁷⁶

Both of these conceptions of state strength are useful and often justified by the nature of the research in which they are applied. Both, however, are too narrow for my purposes. The international relations definition is narrow in the sense that it does not include all relevant subjects of strength/weakness. Thus, for instance, present-day Russia would be a stronger state than the Netherlands according to the IR definition, but not to mine. The definition of comparative politics, on the other hand, is narrow in the sense that it does not conceive the civil society as a part of the state. In this literature, for instance, the United States is considered a

⁷⁵ Realists stress the importance of military capabilities, e.g. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Others emphasize the importance of the economic structure. See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 3 vols. (New York and Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, 1974-1988). Still others stress the differing cultures, see, e.g., Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁷⁶ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 4-5. See also Peter J Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

weak state,⁷⁷ a notion that does not fit my purposes either. I suggest marrying the more holistic view of the state in international relations literature with the deeper view of comparative politics (and sociology). The result should include the entirety of the state, but also look at relations between the different components of the state in order to determine its strength.

Barry Buzan suggests a simple model of the state that is more in this line of thinking. His model consists of three basic components. The first component is its *physical base*: its population, territory, natural resources and man-made resources. The second is the state's *institutional expression*: its governmental machinery, including executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, as well as the norms, laws, and procedures by which they operate. The third component is the *idea of the state*. "In a properly constituted state," Buzan tells us, "one should expect to find a distinctive idea of some sort which lies at the heart of the state's political identity. What does the state exist to do? Why is it there? What is its relation to the society it contains? Why does a state have a particular size and form, when a glance at any historical atlas will reveal a variety of possible alternatives?"⁷⁸

Kalevi Holsti adds to Buzan's model by maintaining the importance to this scheme of the notion of legitimacy. Legitimacy is of crucial importance to both the institutional base of the state and to its ideational one. Legitimacy, Holsti notes, can be summed into two general dimensions, vertical and horizontal. The first establishes the relations between society, political institutions and regimes (the 'right to rule'), while the second defines the boundaries and criteria for membership (who is included and who excluded) in the political community.⁷⁹ In other words, in a strong state one should find not only a legitimate and functioning governmental

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, "Policy Making in a Weak State," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Harper Collins, 1989).

⁷⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner, 1991), pp. 57-111. Quotation from p. 70.

⁷⁹ Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.82-98.

mechanism but also a degree of cohesiveness as a society and identification with the state as such. Thus, to the extent that a state possesses these two components – functioning institutions and social cohesiveness – it is a strong state. To the extent that it does not – it is socio-politically weak.

I define the *socio-political strength of the state*, then, as the capacity of the state to maintain a monopoly over legitimate use of force, its ability to rule effectively over its society (including extracting sufficient revenue and providing sufficient public goods), and its ability to maintain a reasonable level of social cohesiveness and identification of its residents with the state as such.⁸⁰ The stronger the state, therefore, the stronger will be its performance in the following criteria: (1) preservation of a monopoly over the use of legitimate force; (2) the level of taxation and other means of revenue extraction; (3) efficiency and control of state bureaucracy; (3) reach and breadth of state institutions, in areas such as courts and education system; (4) extent and geographic location (i.e., distance from center) of public spending; (5) cohesiveness of the society and level of identification of the residents with their state as such. The following two sections discuss the way socio-politically weak states are affected by different perceptions of borders, or different international norms regarding borders.

B. International Conflict and State Building in a Flexible Borders' World


One cannot fully comprehend the effects of the border fixity norm on weak states in today's world without grasping the crucial effects that territorial wars have played in the process of state building since the early modern period (as early as the 16th century for some parts of Europe). Hence, this state system, in which foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory was a

⁸⁰ For fairly similar use of state strength see *Ibid.*, Definition in pp. 82-83. and Robert I Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States: Causes and Indicators," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003).

legitimate practice (henceforth “flexible borders’ world ”) is the subject of this section, while the following section is devoted to the effects of the change in border norms, i.e., the border fixity world. It is, then, time to present the first hypothesis (The paths a state can take and their likely consequences are illustrated in Figure 3 below):

Hypothesis 1: A world in which there is no normative prohibition on conquest and annexation (flexible borders’ world) is likely to result, over time, in socio-politically stronger states.

Figure 3: Flexible Borders’ World- Effects on Weak States



Why should a flexible borders’ world affect the process of state building? I posit that such a world provides states with incentives and opportunities to develop stronger and more capable institutions, and that it creates pressures that often translate into the achievement of a more cohesive society. Moreover, when states do not react in keeping with these incentives and pressures, they frequently have to face “punishments,” in the form of territorial losses or even elimination of the state altogether. These three components of the Hypothesis 1 are discussed below.

a) Flexible Borders and the Strength of the State Institutions

In terms of the institutional facet, state strength can be greatly enhanced by external territorial threats. The “bellicist theory,”⁸¹ which served initially to explain the political development of states in early modern Europe, can serve as our starting point. Although the original argument of the theory comes from Otto Hintze, it was mainly developed by the work of Charles Tilly, and further elaborated in several other important studies.⁸² Put simply, the idea is that external geopolitical pressures— war and the threat of war – on a territorial entity, requires mobilization, and the larger and more comprehensive this threat, the greater the degree of mobilization needed. Mobilization means more extraction of resources and more recruitment of soldiers. While this new stream of power might enable the central authority to thwart the external threat, it can also serve as a means to ensure future financing (often by coercion) and greater centralization of power. Moreover, a bigger military needs a larger and more effective administrative capacity that might, especially given the newly acquired power of the state, spillover to civilian functions as well. This process, then, is a self-enforcing one, and possessed of a powerful internal logic. Note that this logic is not limited to external threats. It might as well apply, although perhaps to a lesser degree, to opportunities of territorial expansion, which could also supply the needed incentives and means for mobilization.⁸³

⁸¹ I borrow the name from Miguel A. Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2002).

⁸² Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Otto Hintze, “The Formation of the State and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics,” in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*, Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.”

⁸³ Max Weber makes such an argument in Max Weber, “The Prestige and Power of the Great Powers,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

International war, many students of early modern Europe agree, played a major role in the political development of the European states and in particular in strengthening these states and making them more cohesive. As Tilly argues, “war made the state and the state made war.”⁸⁴ State building in early modern Europe was facilitated by the “military revolution,” “the process whereby small, decentralized, self-equipped feudal hosts were replaced by increasingly large, centrally financed and supplied armies that equipped themselves with ever more sophisticated and expensive weaponry.”⁸⁵ This “revolution” occurred in south Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and gradually expanded westward, northward and eastward, making fighting wars a more expensive and more intensive business.⁸⁶ The development of standing armies profoundly increased the need of states to extract resources from their society and, at the same time, greatly enhanced their ability to coerce their population in order to achieve these means. This change in the need for extraction necessitated the creation of new and more efficient bureaucracies to manage taxation and distribute resources. Where these efforts succeeded, they did not disappear after the war ended. The administrative innovations strengthened the state in a permanent way, and, in the long run, spilled over to include ever-increasing functions and served much more than the narrow military function that they were created to fill.⁸⁷

It is important to note, though, that these changes, this process of state formation, was largely unintended: “No one designed the principle components of national states – treasuries, courts,

⁸⁴ Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” p. 42.

⁸⁵ Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, pp. 10. *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 10.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-74, Samuel E. Finer, “State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 103-06, Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 20-37, William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 63-125.

⁸⁷ Gabriel Ardent, “Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations,” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*, Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.”

central administration, and so on. The usually formed as more or less inadvertent by-product of efforts to carry out more immediate tasks, especially the creation and support of armed forces.”⁸⁸

b) Flexible Borders and State Cohesiveness

Second, a common external threat could forge a common internal identity. As we know from extensive research in social psychology and sociology, people often find belonging to a group (the “in-group”) to be a good vehicle for fulfilling their personal needs (such as gaining self-esteem and affection). Yet membership in one group is also defined in negative terms, i.e., not belonging to another group (the “out-group”). Moreover, stereotypes, discrimination, and even hostility among groups frequently develop even in the absence of any substantial grounds. Hostility towards the “out-group,” it seems, is often the preferred strategy that groups develop in order to bolster their own “in-group” cohesiveness.⁸⁹ Of course, the same logic should work even better when the conflict of interests with outside groups is real and not only imagined. Thus, the more a group as a whole is faced with threats to their existence from outside, the more they tend to “rally round the flag” and achieve internal cohesion.⁹⁰ On the other hand, opportunities for

⁸⁸ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*, p. 26.

⁸⁹ See, for example, Henry and Turner Tajfel, John C., “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in *Psychology in Intergroup Relations*, ed. Stephen Worchel, and Austin, William G. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7-24. For a more sociological view, see Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliation* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955). and Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Illinois: 1956).

⁹⁰ Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, pp.87-110. For the effects of both international and domestic (ethnic) conflict on group identity, see Janice Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen Olster, Aall, Pamela (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp.189-208. Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (1996): pp. 247-48. One example of such a process is the effect of external threats on Israeli society. Israel, one of the few cases in the post-WWII world in which the legitimacy of the state’s existence is still questioned by its neighbors, managed to create a strongly cohesive society out of very divergent populations. One of the main reasons for this success of the Israeli “melting-pot” was the external threat. Once this threat receded, after 1967, the cohesiveness of the society did not advance much further. Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Cost of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

territorial expansion can also serve to strengthen the bonds of a society, as they can elevate its view of itself and might be tied to perceptions of “manifest destiny.”⁹¹

Not every war, though, exerts similar pressure on states. As Lewis Coser tells us, in order for external threat to induce internal cohesion it needs to be perceived as a threat to the group as a whole.⁹² By definition, non-territorial wars cannot endanger the survival of the state *as such*. Moreover, even if a territorial war is not aiming at eliminating the state as a political entity altogether, it is still more likely to be perceived as a threat to the population of the state as a whole: though the regime or some groups in the population might be in danger, it is much harder to “sell” this attack as an assault on the collective in-group.

Public and elite acceptance of an increased fiscal burden and increased central control, critical components of state building, are unlikely to be a result of civil wars, for instance. One recent study of the political economy of internal wars argues that “Unlike the war economies of classical war, civil war economies rarely contribute to state capacity and economic development.”⁹³ Similarly, another recent study, employing statistical methods, finds no relations between internal war and the states’ extractive capacity.⁹⁴ Similarly, in circumstances involving a conjuncture of civil conflict with international intervention, people are more likely to view the outside intervention as hurting some groups but helping others. In other words, the drive for the regime to try to mobilize resources from its population is still there even in a non-territorial war,

⁹¹ See Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988). Eugen J. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 159-62.

⁹² Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, pp. 93-95.

⁹³ Karen Ballentine, and Sherman, Jake, “Introduction,” in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, ed. Karen and Sherman Ballentine, Jake (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

⁹⁴ See Cameron G. Thies, “State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Countries Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004).

yet the ideational component, the “in-group-out-group” collective perception necessary for the long-term mobilization, might be lacking in such situations.⁹⁵

The wars in early modern Europe were so effective as an engine of state building precisely because they threatened the states’ territories. As such, these wars accentuated in-group-out-group emotions and attachments. In the long run, a state that is built solely on coercion is unlikely to survive, but the wars in early modern Europe, being territorial wars, provided states with at least a minimal degree of legitimacy and minimal identification of its population with the state, as the threat they posed was not limited to a certain group or to the ruler (as many wars in the Middle Ages were). To be sure, talking about national identity prior to the French Revolution would be anachronistic. Yet a certain degree of identification with the state did exist in some European societies even prior to this date, albeit predominantly on the elite level. This more cohesive identity was arguably important to the survivability of the institutional reforms discussed above.

c) Flexible Borders and “Natural” Selection

In a flexible borders’ world, weak states, over time, are more likely to be “selected out” (i.e., taken over) by stronger ones. The two reasons that posit external pressures and opportunities as causes of state strength, the institutional and the legitimation, are not competing; rather, they are complementary. When a state is under threat, it needs to mobilize both its institutional powers (create a more efficient bureaucracy, raise more taxes) and its social cohesiveness (in-group-out-group notions) in order to survive. Moreover, neither of these reasons why territorial war often

⁹⁵ Here I diverge from the idea put forth by Jeffrey Herbst, “War and State in Africa,” *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990). and by Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” Herbst and Desch argue that the lack of international wars (of any kind) is what weakens the Third World states, whereas I maintain that only a particular kind of war, a war of territorial conquest, has this kind of effect.

promotes states' strength should be applied automatically in an instrumental way. While war, on its face, provides incentives to change, the decision whether to do so and in what way is up to political decision makers, and to their followers. Still, war often is the final arbiter between correct (self-empowering) decisions and wrong (self-defeating) ones.⁹⁶

The argument that is made here, therefore, is not a functionalist one. It is not that states necessarily supply the need, apparent in the modern territorial era, of providing a strong and centralized security.⁹⁷ The external environment of the state system is seldom very transparent or easy to interpret. Even when rulers do read "correctly" the message sent by their external environment, they often find it too hard or too costly to implement. The argument is that they might or might not "read" these signals that their external environment sends; but if they read it wrongly, they are unlikely to survive the fierce territorial competition.

Students of early modern Europe do not necessarily agree on the precise effects that external threats and opportunities had on the type of the future regime of the state (or whether such effects were actually exerted). However, little dissent exists concerning the effect of these threats, as described above, on state building per se. Even Hendrik Spruyt, who locates the rise of the modern state at an earlier era, and places much more emphasis on the economy than on the military revolution, agrees that military effectiveness served, in the last account, as an arbiter between the various forms of political organization, and eventually gave the national state an upper hand over its rival forms, the city-state and city league.⁹⁸ In such a way, international war (and especially territorial war) eventually "made" the decision between the "national state" and

⁹⁶ Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, pp. 32-33, Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*, Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making." pp. 32-33. For a discussion of the imperatives of the anarchical state system and the ensuing "natural selection" among states, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁹⁷ For an argument of this sort, see Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State."

⁹⁸ Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, pp.31-32.

its rival political institutions, as well as between states. Those political entities that could master both the material wherewithal and the ability to mobilize their resources and populations survived. The map of Europe from the 15th century until the end of the Second World War has seen constant changes and those who could not compete effectively often fell to the sidelines of history. As Tilly points out, the number of “states,” or independent political entities, that existed in Europe at the start of the 16th century depends on one’s definitions of “independent.” Tilly suggests that, regardless of the definition, no less than 80 and no more than 500 such entities existed in Europe at the time. In 1900 there were only 25.⁹⁹ Tanisha Fazal finds that the occurrence of “state death,” defined as “a formal loss of foreign policy making power to another state,” has been frequent throughout history. Almost 25% of the states that existed in the system since 1816 have “died,” most of them violently, and this number is much higher for previous generations. Since WW-II, however, cases of violent “state death” are a rarity.¹⁰⁰

Although the research and theorizing on state building concentrates on early modern Europe, there is no reason to assume that a similar logic cannot be applied, perhaps with some modifications, to other times and places. Indeed, what little research that was done outside of European confines tends to prove the point made above, rather than refute it. Victoria Hui, for instance, examined geo-political pressures and state mobilization in the “warring states” period of ancient China, and finds that, far from being oblivious to the threats and incentives of power, the process of “natural selection” worked even more profoundly on Chinese states of the period, allowing one (Qin) to conquer the rest and become an empire, by way of self-empowering

⁹⁹ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*, p. 45. See also Miguel A. Centeno, “Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America,” *American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 6 (1997), Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.”

¹⁰⁰ See Tanisha M. Fazal, “State Death in the International System,” *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): p. 320.

tactics.¹⁰¹ Both Miguel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves examine the effects of war on state building in 19th century Latin America. While there are important differences between these two authors, they agree that war did play a significant role in this process, and that the levels of geopolitical pressure largely correspond with the levels of state building.¹⁰² In the Middle East, Michael Barnett studies the (exceptional for this period) territorial pressures and territorial wars between Israel and Egypt, and notes their profound effects on state building mechanisms in these two states.¹⁰³ The logic of the bellicist theory, then, does not apply solely to early modern Europe.

A world in which the norm of border fixity does not exist; in which territorial threats and opportunities abound, then, is likely to result over time in states that are socio-politically stronger. What should be the observable implications of this proposition, as put forth in Hypothesis 1? What are the features, in other words, that we should look for when examining the empirical cases that are drawn of this world, of 17th century Brandenburg-Prussia and 19th century Argentina? The observable implications that are inferred from the discussion above are listed here¹⁰⁴:

1. The states should be weak to begin with. Hence, one should observe the state as having no effective monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; weak state institutions, with limited geographic reach and limited subject areas of engagement; limited ability to extract

¹⁰¹ Tin-Bor Victoria Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (2004).

¹⁰² Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, Fernando Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000).

¹⁰³ Barnett, *Confronting the Cost of War*.

¹⁰⁴ Note that these observable implications do not include the verification of the process, discussed above, of states being "selected out" of the state system as "punishment" for their enduring weakness. The reason for this omission is that the current research is built around case studies of states, not of the system, and it does not include a study of a state that failed this process in the era of flexible borders. For such a study (of Poland), see Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, pp. 140-56.

resources from its residents; limited supply of public goods; and a low level of social cohesiveness and identification with the state.

2. Borders should indeed be given to change and that conquest and annexation should be common practices in the area and time frame under investigation. Moreover, these conditions should be translated into strong and consistent territorial pressures: territorial threats and territorial opportunities.

3. The need of the state to defend or expand its territories should manifest itself in attempts of the central authority to create an ever-expanding military force, to suppress other sources of military ability (militia, feudal forces, etc.), and to strive for a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Moreover, the central authority should be willing to take considerable political and economic risks in order to fulfill these conditions.

4. There should be a direct link between territorial pressures and military expansion, on the one hand, and taxation on the other hand. The greater the territorial threats (and therefore the need to sustain a bigger military), the greater the efforts given to extraction should be. Moreover, we should also observe the willingness of the government to usurp the taxation authority of other bodies (towns, nobles) and place it in its own hand, using force if need be.

5. There should be a link between the degree of territorial pressures and the degree of bureaucratic innovations and expansion (both geographic and in terms of subject areas) of state administration. Furthermore, a process in which bureaucratic innovation starts with direct link to the military but spills over to civilian administration should be observed. Areas of administrative expansion could include, but are not limited to, the judicial system, public education, and census.

6. The greater burden on the state's residents should be translated into more vocal demands, and over time also more state consent to, greater provision of public goods. These

public goods would most probably vary with historical era, cultural traits and economic conditions, but they might include investment in infrastructure, social services, and political rights.


7. Greater territorial threats and, to a lesser extent, territorial opportunities, should be manifest in a higher degree of social cohesiveness and identification with the state. We should observe fewer attempts of secession, rebellion, or internal violent strife, fewer cases of alignment with outside forces against one's own state, and more manifestations of patriotism and rallying round the flag.

C. State Weakness and International Conflict in a Border Fixity World

In a flexible borders world, then, weak states face strong territorial pressures, both threats and opportunities, which force them either to transform themselves into stronger socio-political entities, or to face the consequences of not having done so. In contrast, weak states face nothing of the kind in a world in which the prevailing norm is border fixity. In regions where most states are weak (as defined above), the border fixity norm might have adverse consequences for both domestic and international relations. I posit that this norm is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness, since it deprives the state of a key factor that was historically a motor of state building: the external threat to its borders and its survival. The norm of border fixity, thus, is at least partially responsible for the increasing phenomenon of state failure and weakness. Weak states in a state system that espouse the norm of border fixity, in turn, are often a source of international conflict. Rather than improving the chances of peace, then, the norm of border fixity actually fosters conflict in some parts of the world. The logic of this argument is illustrated

in Figure 4 below. As argued in the chapter above, today's world is largely one in which the norm of border fixity prevail. This section discusses the effects of this norm on states' strength in regions where most states were weak (or not yet existed) when the new norm started to take shape, after World War II. It then relates this weakness to international conflict.

Figure 4: Border Fixity Effects for Weak States



a) Border Fixity and the Perpetuation and Exacerbation of State Weakness

Hypothesis 2: The border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the weakness of already weak states.

Fixed borders do not cause states to be weak in the first place, but they might perpetuate this unfortunate condition in states that are already weak by (a) denying the incentives and coercive

capabilities that came traditionally with the threat of territorial wars and the opportunities of territorial expansion; (b) supplying counter-incentives to state building through the logic of “moral hazard;” and (c) preventing the process that used to eliminate weak states and further strengthen more efficient ones prior to 1950.¹⁰⁵

The proposition that state weakness is perpetuated or exacerbated by fixed borders stems directly from theories the theories of state building discussed above. Since the study of state building has gained much more attention and acceptance than that of state stagnation and disintegration, we can generally rely on the fruits of this study and extrapolate for the negative cases. Granted, state stagnation or disintegration does not necessarily stem from the lack of the same factors that are available for state building, but I argue that in this case it actually is so. The pressures and incentives that enabled and encouraged state building in other times are not available for current-day state builders.

Like states in early modern Europe, most states in the current developing world find themselves in the early stages of state building.¹⁰⁶ However, developing states in the 20th and 21st centuries are devoid of the very incentives – the threat to ones’ territory and survival as a state, on the one hand, and the opportunities for territorial expansion, on the other – that made many European states succeed in that venture. Therefore, it is at least plausible to expect that developing states will face great difficulties in building strong states out of the initially rather arbitrary collection of people and communities they incorporate. In most of the few cases in the Post-WW-II world in which there was a real and significant threat to the territorial integrity and

¹⁰⁵ A number of other works agree with my general point here, although they refer to the effects of war in general rather than a war of territorial conquest, as I argued above. For example, see Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?”, Herbst, “War and State in Africa.”

¹⁰⁶ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 21-46, 193-94.

the survival of the state, such as in Israel, Taiwan and South Korea, there was indeed a process of healthy state building, much more so than in most other developing states.¹⁰⁷

By embracing the idea of fixed borders, the international community agreed, in essence, to preserve the shell of the state, no matter how hollow it might be from within. This phenomenon is what Robert Jackson called “juridical statehood.”¹⁰⁸ Even without considering the lack of the “positive” effects of war, the juridical statehood provides rulers in already weak states with strong incentives to abandon investment and control in the periphery, thus making the state even weaker. The logic of Jackson’s argument is simple. In order to achieve the minimum strength for the state, rulers must invest many resources in different parts of their countries. They must invest, first of all, in an attempt to gain the monopoly over the means of violence (policing). This, by itself, is an expensive project. But coercion alone is seldom sufficient to establish one’s authority over a populated territory. One has to develop a strategy of investment in the basic needs of the citizens. Building infrastructure and creating viable educational, judicial, and bureaucratic institutions are all complicated and expensive tasks as well, but without them, the legitimacy and authority of the state (in the eyes of its citizenry) is doubtful.

Yet the juridical statehood guarantees a state “membership” in the community of nations (with all the economic and prestige benefits that it includes, e.g., World Bank loans and UN membership), and as long as one controls the capital city, he or she can be assured of his or her status as the head of this state. “The system,” Jackson concludes, “is like an insurance policy: The policy holders, and consequently the main beneficiaries, are the rulers and regimes- not the

¹⁰⁷ See, for instance, Barnett, *Confronting the Cost of War*, Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, pp. 142-205. Though some states that faced territorial threats (such as Pakistan or Jordan) did not grow stronger, they were not eliminated from the map, as they would have been, in all probability, in previous eras.

¹⁰⁸ Robert H. Jackson, “Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of International Affairs* 46, no. 1 (1992): pp. 1-16.

people...”; hence the “moral hazard.”¹⁰⁹ In the absence of any juridical or military threats to the external recognition of a state as such, rulers have few incentives to engage in the costly and often dangerous role of trying to control (and attract) the periphery.¹¹⁰ Building the complex mechanism that is required for a modern system of direct taxation, as well, is expensive, complex, and politically risky. Whenever rulers could avoid it, either because the lack of strong fiscal pressure (as the need to defend against a territorial threat would pose), or because of the availability of cheaper substitutes, they will.¹¹¹ Moreover, the creation and maintenance of a well trained army and an efficient bureaucracy, two central institutions of state building, is not only costly, but can be perceived as dangerous to the position of the ruler himself in that they constitute potential competitors.

Regions that are thus marginalized and neglected can hardly expect any outside support in their quest for self-determination, not to mention attempts to join neighboring countries. They have no exit option. To the contrary: the international community is likely to come to the help of the central government against any attempt to change the territorial status quo.¹¹² The consequences, again, are the weakening of the state, and sometimes its complete disintegration, the ultimate form of which is “a failed state” or “a collapsed state,” the kind that one might find at some point in time in Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia) and the Middle East (Lebanon), and quite

¹⁰⁹ A “moral hazard” is a term used in the insurance industry to depict the risk that the existence of insurance would make the policyholder to behave carelessly about the insured item.

¹¹⁰ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-12, 40-59, 74-81. Quote from p. 6.

¹¹¹ For arguments to this effect, see Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

¹¹² Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: Weak States, the International Community, and the Perpetuation of Civil War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), William Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 1-40. Quote from pp. 8-9.

frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia, Chad, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and my case, the Zaire/DRC are only the most obvious examples).¹¹³

In contrast to what happened in the past (and discussed above), then, states today do not “die.” The mechanism of “natural selection” that eliminated many weak states prior to WW-II (or enabled stronger states to swallow them) does not operate anymore, thus practically guaranteeing the survival of the weak states.¹¹⁴

How large is the phenomenon of weak states? I am not aware of any study that defines state weakness in similar ways and measures the global extent of the phenomenon over time. That weak states are pervasive, however, is not in doubt. Robert Rotberg has argued that while in the last decade only seven states could be strictly defined as failed or collapsed, “several dozen more, however, are weak and serious candidates for failure.” Similarly, the authors of a 2005 comprehensive study cosponsored by the *Fund for Peace* and *Foreign Policy* have compiled a list of 60 weak and failing states, which include countries from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the former Soviet Union, Latin America and Europe. The study identifies 20 of these states as being in “critical” condition, 20 more “in danger” and another 20 as “borderline.”¹¹⁵

In the two case studies of weak states in a border fixity world, Lebanon since 1943 and Congo since 1960, we should observe at least a significant part of the following list:

1. The norm of border fixity should be manifested in words and deeds for the time under investigation, and perhaps in the specific region of the state as well. It should also be translated

¹¹³ Rene Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes," review of Reviewed Item, *African Studies Quarterly*, no. 1(3) (1997), <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/1/3/3.htm>, Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 45-79, Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States.", I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

¹¹⁴ Fazal, "State Death in the International System."

¹¹⁵ Robert I Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): p. 85. Fund For Peace, *Failed States Index* (Fund For Peace, 2005 [cited]); available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/program/fsi/fsindex.php>.

to the absence, or the minimal level, of territorial threats and opportunities the state is facing. Situations in which neighbor states presumably had both the interests and the ability to annex part of the state's territories, or to eliminate the state as a whole, but yet avoided this practice, should present particularly good evidence.

2. The lack of territorial pressures should be translated into a lack of serious efforts to create and maintain a strong fighting military. The government should be either not interested enough in this project to confront opposing groups within its own society, or not interested at all, for the fear of the military as a competing center of power. Instead, various domestic groups with various resources and agendas should appropriate the use of force in the state.

3. The capacity of the state to extract resources from its residents should be low and its motivations to struggle to achieve such capacity lacking. Direct taxation, in particular, might be neglected, as it is the toughest to administer and the most risky politically. The state should concentrate, instead, on funding opportunities which are easier to achieve, politically, but less sustainable than direct taxation (such as taxes on imports and borrowing from foreign powers).

4. Administrative innovations and greater bureaucratic control of the society should be either not attempted or failed for lack of resources and motivations of the central authority to overcome opposition. There should be no visible links between military and civilian administration.

5. The provision of public goods should be either very limited or, in case it is more substantial, shown to be motivated by ideological preferences of the center, not by pressure to compensate the residents for the burden impose on them by the state. Moreover, the pattern of public good distribution is important as well. As the borders of the state are immune to change,

we should expect weak states to neglect the periphery, especially that of border area, in terms of investment and services.

6. We should not see a development of a coherent national identity and increased loyalty to the state. Instead, wars that are non-territorial in nature should only increase internal cleavages as they would not be seen as a threat to the whole population of the state, and perhaps even as opportunities for some.

b) Fixed Borders, Weak States, and International Conflicts

Thus far I have presented the argument that border fixity is a major cause of perpetuation and exacerbation of state weakness. This section goes a step further and argues that socio-politically weak states, and the combination of such states with the norm of border fixity, are a source of many international violent conflicts.

Clausewitzian wars, in which two regular armies meet each other in the battlefield, are rarity in today's world. The Israeli-Arab wars of the 1960's and 1970's or the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000 are the exception, not the rule, of the post World War II world. Instead, the wars of today look strikingly different. These "wars of the third kind,"¹¹⁶ are made mainly of two types: civil conflicts, such as the one going on intermittingly for several decades in Sri-Lanka, and transnational conflicts – wars that involve both states and non-state actors. The multifaceted conflict in western Africa in the 1990's and early 2000's could serve as a good example. Of all wars between 1945 and 1995, 77% were internal wars. Of the reminder, the so-called interstate wars, moreover, many were in fact transnational wars, such as the one between Armenia and

¹¹⁶ Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, pp. 19-40.

Azerbaijan in the early 1990's. In short, although war is still very much a part of our life, its nature (and where it is fought) has transformed dramatically in the last sixty years.¹¹⁷

As this chapter argues, and as the empirical chapters corroborate, much of this trend could be attributed to the combination of socio-politically weak states in a border fixity world. Like in earlier eras, security and opportunism remain important factors in the instigation of conflicts in regions of weak states in an era of border fixity. The mechanisms by which they operate in these circumstances, however, are profoundly different from the "traditional" ones. These mechanisms are specified below.

I. Border Fixity, Weak States and Internal Strife

Hypothesis 3: Weak states in a world that embraces the border fixity norm are rife with internal violent conflicts because they create conditions favorable to "emerging anarchy" and to motivate the practice of "internal scapegoating."

The first mechanism through which weak states might be a source of international conflicts is through spillover of internal strife, and such strife is frequently spurred by state weakness. Since the end of the Second World War, internal wars have been much more common than conventional state vs. state wars.¹¹⁸ One study, for example, counted 126 such conflicts out of a total of 164 wars fought from 1945 to 1995.¹¹⁹ Another finds that about three quarters of the

¹¹⁷ Data from Ibid., p. 22. See also Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

¹¹⁸ Ted R. Gurr, "Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen Olster, Aall, Pamela (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 163-88.

¹¹⁹ Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, p. 22.

armed conflicts in the 1990's were wars between organized communal groups or governments.¹²⁰ These figures are even more impressive when one considers the fact that civil wars tend to be much more prolonged than interstate wars.¹²¹ Communal wars are a common feature in regions occupied by relatively young states, such as Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.¹²² That some regions are more prone to civil and communal wars than others cannot be explained solely by the existence of ethnic or other minority groups within the region's states. Most states in the world contain such groups, but the distribution of civil or communal strife is still uneven. What explains this pattern of internal conflicts is often the strength of the state. The weaker the state, the more likely it is to be involved in civil or communal wars.

The outbreak of communal fighting is often the result of two processes, both of which are characteristic of weak states: "emerging anarchy" and "internal scapegoating." The first, emerging anarchy, is a condition that arises as the state's ability to enforce order and provide internal security decreases, the potential danger that one group poses to another increases. Under such circumstances, groups within the state, whether affiliated by ethnic, religion, or other source of identity, might start to fear for their security. This fear could be a result of calculations about motives and capabilities of other groups, or simply a result of the uncertainty built into the situation. In the absence of a higher policing authority, groups might be inclined to use a worst-case scenario as their guide of action. Not doing so might be perceived as imprudent.¹²³

¹²⁰ Peter Wallensteen, and Sollenberg, Margarita, "Armed Conflict, 1989-98," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): pp. 593-606.

¹²¹ Hironaka, *Neverending Wars*.

¹²² Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, pp. 19-21. Civil wars were common in Latin America as well, but there, the motives, at least during the Cold War era, were more often ideological rather than ethnic.

¹²³ The latter is the logic behind the "security dilemma," a situation in which the action that one group takes for defensive purposes is inevitably perceived by the other group as offensive, and vice versa. For the original argument about the "security dilemma" see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978). For the application to ethnic conflicts, see James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Violence," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David A. and Rotchild Lake, Donald (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 115-25, Stuart J.

At the same time, the weakness of the state's authority enables some groups to believe in their ability to win a civil war or to gain from predatory behavior. Although the post-Cold War literature on internal security dilemma largely neglects the importance of greed and opportunism in explaining the eruption of violence in failing states,¹²⁴ these are important factors in the equation of civil strife, and they are both closely related to state weakness. James Fearon and David Laitin, for instance, find that state weakness the most important factor that creates opportunities for insurgency, and thus the best predictor of the existence of civil wars in the post-World War II world.¹²⁵

Although fear and greed (or opportunism) are theoretically distinct sources of internal violence, it is often hard to tell them apart in practice since they might have similar manifestations. It is also reasonable to assume that the same actors could be motivated by both at the same time. This difficulty of telling security considerations from predatory ones notwithstanding, however, both are clearly results of the emerging anarchy, and both clearly increase the likelihood of the eruption of civil war.¹²⁶

The second process that might relate state weakness to internal fighting is what I term internal scapegoating. Politicians' attempts to compensate for the lack of institutionalized ways to attain legitimacy in weak states by "playing the ethnic card" might have threatening

Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War," *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996): pp. 150-52, 57-59, David A. and Rotchild Lake, Donald, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): pp. 48-52, Sarah K. Lischer, "Causes of Communal War: Fear and Feasibility," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, no. 22 (1999): pp. 331-35, Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35 (1993).

¹²⁴ On this point, see Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Causes and Failures," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹²⁵ James D. Fearon, and Laitin, David D., "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003). See also Ballentine, "Introduction."

¹²⁶ Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation," pp. 53-76.

consequences for inter-communal relations.¹²⁷ In order to gain the support of some segments of the population without having to resort to expensive practices of state-building, leaders might choose to incite or promote internal conflict, with the hope of riding an ethnic wave to political and economic gain. These practices might take the form of “divide and rule” tactics or an explicit or implicit siding with one group against another, for instance, by an exclusion of some groups, branded as “foreigners” or “foreign agents.” This “internal scapegoating” is likely to be more common in an era of border fixity, since groups that are discriminated and excluded lack an exit option. Secession and (even more so) irredentism are not viable options in a world in which borders are fixed. This practice is likely to further increase both communal fear and communal opportunities for predation, and thus the incidences of civil conflicts. Thus, the weaker the state is, the greater the likelihood of civil violence to erupt.

Of course, these relations are often circular, where a protracted civil war might magnify the state’s weakness. Yet examples of cases in which a strong state falls into a civil war and emerges from it as a weak one are few. Yugoslavia is perhaps one such case, but it was considerably weakened as a single entity even before the war broke out. The fact that civil wars often further weaken already weak states, in any event, does not contradict the argument made above.

When we look at the cases of Lebanon and Congo, then, we should observe that:

1. As the state gets weaker, groups within the population express increasing fear and attempt to organize for self-defense against the potential threats from other groups. These practices, in turn, should be shown to lead to escalation into heightened (internal) security dilemma or even to outbreak of civil wars.

¹²⁷ See Janis Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen Olster, Aall, Pamela (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 93, Lake, “Containing Fear,” pp. 53-56.

2. As the state gets weaker, attempts to use the state's absence for predatory gains by some groups should be observed.

3. As the state gets weaker and institutional ways to obtain legitimacy disappear, politicians revert to a practice of internal scapegoating, and in effect excluding some groups from the national whole in order to attract the support of other groups. These practices should not be influenced by proximity of the excluded group to the state border, as these politicians are aware of the fact that territorial changes are not an option.

II. Border Fixity, Weak States and Spillover of Conflict Across International Borders

Hypothesis 4: Internal strife in weak states in a world that embraces the border fixity norm tend to spillover and turn into international conflicts and possibly international wars, through the mechanisms of refugee insurgency and kin-country syndrome.

Weak states tend, then, to supply a fertile ground for civil and communal strife. These struggles, in turn, are frequently not contained within the state and tend to affect neighboring states, often even leading to international conflicts.¹²⁸ Spillover of internal conflicts might occur in two ways, both related to fear and insecurity. The first has to do with refugee flows and cross-border insurgency, the second with "kin-country syndrome." Refugee flows are often the vehicle through which internal fighting spreads to neighboring countries. Internal wars, most notably

¹²⁸ Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-32. These dynamics are significantly different than those often described in the literature of the causes of war, as this literature often concentrates on the Western world and on great power relations in particular. On these differences, see Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 17-19. See also Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," pp. 233-56.

ethnic conflicts, tend to produce more refugees than interstate conflicts.¹²⁹ These refugees, especially those settled in camps not far from the borders of their homeland and those with relatively high group cohesion prior to the expulsion/flight, are often the source of cross-border infiltrations and attacks. When their home country reacts with retaliatory strikes, the conflict might well escalate into a full-scale international war. It is worth reiterating that the threat the insurgency and the counterinsurgency pose is not to the survival of the states or to their legal territorial integrity but, rather, to individual or group security and, in many cases, to the security of the regimes in both countries.

This process, though, does not develop in all cases, but only under certain circumstances. Refugee flows are more likely to result in international conflicts in cases where weak states are involved. The governments of such states lack the capacity either to resettle refugees (thus supplying them with incentives to integrate with local populations, rather than continue targeting their home countries) or to force them to abandon their armed struggle to avoid retaliation by their state of origin.¹³⁰ The Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the communist rule there can serve as one example.¹³¹

The second mechanism that might lead from internal civil war to an international one is what has been called the “kin-country syndrome,” which develops when ethnic fault lines do not

¹²⁹ For such findings, see Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," *International Security* 21, no. 1 (1996): pp. 5-42. See also Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," pp. 3-7, Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 143-63.

¹³⁰ See especially Sarah K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 28-31. Also see Ted R. Gurr, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts since 1945: Which Groups, Where, and How," in *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 4-5, I. William Zartman, "Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation," in *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 27-42. In addition, refugees often create and exacerbate pressures, economic, social or otherwise, in their host country. Specifically, if the refugees happen to belong to an ethnic group also existing in the host country, it might change a volatile ethnic balance there. Consequently, the host country might try to block the refugee flow by force, thereby increasing the likelihood of armed skirmishes with their home country.

¹³¹ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, pp. 42-72.

correspond to international borders, and when ethnic groups in one country are alarmed by the grievances of their brethren across the border.¹³² This syndrome might well lead to increasing tensions between neighboring states and, ultimately, to an international war and/or intervention.¹³³ Saddam Hussein's Iraq, for example, reacted through military means to the assistance Iraqi Kurds received from their kin in Iran. Turkey, similarly, often intervened in Iraq to suppress attempts by Iraqi Kurds to assist their co-ethnics inside Turkey's borders. These conflicts, as well as many similar ones, did not involve demands to redraw the international borders. They were simply about denial of aid by external states to internal challengers.¹³⁴ Although the physical potential for the kin-country syndrome to occur exists everywhere, weak states are a much more likely venue. This is the case since the populations of these states have less affinity to their states, and since, as explained above, these feelings are less likely to change in the absence of external territorial pressures.

To observe the occurrence of a spillover process, one needs to detect the following:

1. That significant movements of refugees across the borders results from civil conflicts within the weak state or its neighbors (which often are also weak).
2. That the weak state is unable at the minimum and unwilling at the maximum to prevent the refugees from arming themselves and engaging in guerilla warfare with their "sending state" across international borders.

¹³² Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): pp. 35-39, Rene Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Failure to Potential Reconstruction," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation, 2003), pp. 5-6. Stuart Kaufman refers to a more specific phenomenon that he calls an "external affinity problem," a strategic situation in which a minority in one state is a majority in the larger region (e.g., The Tamil minority in Sri-Lanka as compared to the Tamil majority if one adds the Indian state of Tamil-Nadu to the equation). See Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War," p. 153.

¹³³ See Stephen M. Saideman, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy & International Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1-35, 203-22. For a counterargument, see Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 603-27.

¹³⁴ Gurr, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts," pp. 16-17.

3. That the decision of the neighboring state to engage in international war (or conflict short of war) with the weak state is directly related to these cross-border insurgency wars with armed refugees. Evidence could be either verbal or by inference from the conduct of the war and the diplomacy which might accompany it.

4. That decisions to intervene also stem from concerns to the security and grievance of communities within the weak states that are excluded and discriminated against and have kin across the borders.

III. Border Fixity, State Weakness and External Predation

Hypothesis 5: State weakness in a world that embraces the border fixity norm promotes the possibility of international conflicts because it creates opportunities for external non-territorial predation.

International wars are not always the product of fear (mutual or unilateral). Some wars are, to a large degree, a product of opportunism or greed.¹³⁵ Obviously, the opportunities for territorial revisionism are greatly reduced in a world of fixed borders. However, greed might still play a significant role in this world. Put simply, the fact that one state cannot legally annex its neighbor's territory does not mean that it cannot abuse this territory for its own economic gains, or cannot attempt to politically control its neighbor (including changing its regime¹³⁶). These

¹³⁵ Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90-121.

¹³⁶ On the proposition that territorial conquest was replaced by intervention for regime change, see Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit."

opportunistic predatory policies are, again, more likely to be found in regions where states are weak, simply because it is easier to exploit such states.

The reasons weak states are a more likely victim of neighbors' greed are twofold: first, internal allies are much easier for an outsider to find in weak states than in strong ones. Second, although it does not have to be the case, many weak states become, with time, also weak in terms of military power. It is hard to maintain a strong and cohesive military when the state is falling apart and when taxes are not forthcoming. Furthermore, a strong military is, as argued above, in itself a potential threat to the central government. The combination of institutional, ideational and military weakness, in turn, makes the state extremely vulnerable to just this kind of predatory politics on the part of its neighbors.¹³⁷ While these policies may not always bring about an officially declared war, they do often result in international conflict of some sort, sometimes involving more outside parties. Libya's intervention in Chad, for example, was based on such dynamics.

Again, these opportunistic neighbors do not seek territorial expansion, but political and economic gains. If the "greedy state" is itself weak, we might also expect that the gains would be personal, or of a limited group, rather than of the state as a whole. The threats that are created by these predatory policies, nevertheless, are significantly different than those created by "traditional" territorial threat since they are often perceived as threats to some particular group within the victim state, rather than to the state as a whole. These incursions on the state's economic assets or its political independence, therefore, do not generate the expected ingroup-outgroup dynamics. As Lewis Coser notes, "the relations between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low

¹³⁷ Buzan, *People, State and Fear*, p. 113, Benjamin Miller, "When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace," *International Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (2005).

that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worthwhile, or actually see the outside threat to concern 'them' rather than 'us'."¹³⁸

When looking at the empirical cases we should observe these motivations, of greed, opportunism, and predation, manifested as well. Such motivations can be inferred from speech evidence (e.g., references to the economic or political potential in internal discussions), from action (e.g., targeting of areas that are particularly given to economic exploitation, or, alternatively, the political center) and from the lack of competing explanations for the interventions.

The next chapter will survey the preconditions of the four cases, while the four subsequent chapters investigate in depth the four study cases.

¹³⁸ Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, pp. 93-95. Quotation from p. 93.

Chapter 3- Weak States: Preconditions to State Building

At this point in the discussion, before delving into the study of cases of the effects of border norms on weak states, it might be wise to pause and look more closely at the connection— at the core of my thesis (and in Hypothesis 1 and 2) – that a flexible borders’ world facilitates state building while a fixed borders’ world perpetuates states’ weakness.

This chapter looks at the conditions of the four case studies at the start of the period examined here. It surveys the initial circumstances in which Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640, Argentina in 1810, Lebanon in 1943, and Congo in 1960 found themselves. It questions whether the two former cases had not enjoyed, in fact, an initial advantage over the two latter cases; advantage that *a priori* positioned them to fare better in the task of state building, regardless of norms about borders. The chapter draws on existing literature in order to investigate the ways in which this might be, or might not be, true. It compares the four cases, at this initial stage, along four variables: economic preconditions, arbitrariness of the borders, availability and potential quality of bureaucracy, and size and population density.

While the results vary, I find that in general neither Brandenburg-Prussia nor Argentina was better positioned to become a success story of state building. Nor were Lebanon (in particular) and Congo doomed to fail in this endeavor because of their intrinsic characteristics.

A. Economic Conditions

The first question asked is whether Prussia and Argentina were better situated than their later counterparts, in economic terms, to succeed in the state building process. In particular, this

questions asks whether Prussia and Argentina were endowed, in advance, with more economic resources – especially capital – or potential to achieve them, than Lebanon and Congo.¹³⁹ This question makes sense, as the project of state building is a capital extensive business; a highly expensive endeavor that will presumably be harder to achieve if the state does not have access to capital or commodities it can sell for capital.¹⁴⁰

Yet the fact is that not only were Prussia and Argentina not in a better position vis-à-vis Congo and Lebanon, in that sense, but the contrary might be true. Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 was a very poor agrarian state. While its Rhinish provinces were somewhat more developed, with prosperous towns and trade, they, too, declined in the 17th century. The economy of the bulk of the Hohenzollerns territories, including East Prussia (apart from Königsberg) and of Brandenburg itself was based on poor agricultural land, cultivated by serfs. These lands were mostly poor (Prussia was termed “the sandbox of Europe”) and many were not cultivated for the lack of human resources. Commerce, to the extent it existed, was very limited in scope and scale. Although there was no major economic crisis prior to the war, there were also no great prospects of growth.¹⁴¹ Finally, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) made matters in the Hohenzollerns’ domains much worse. The war wreaked havoc in Brandenburg-Prussia’s villages and towns. Foreign armies roamed the country, looting and killing whoever crossed their path. Economic

¹³⁹ Another question that might be asked about the economic preconditions of these states in terms of their place in the “world economic system.” Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that a state’s place in this system – at the core, the periphery or semi-periphery – determines its chances of development, economic or otherwise. See Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*. Yet, Wallerstein’s theory (and dependency theory in general) does not withstand the scrutiny of the cases studied here. By looking at the criteria this theory offers for placement in the world system, that is, the nature of the major commodities the state is specializing in producing, one cannot explain either the relative success of Argentina (a producer of primary products- mainly meat, wool and grains) or the failure of Lebanon (a finance and trade center).

¹⁴⁰ On the important role capital has been playing in the state building process, see Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*, p. 16-37.

¹⁴¹ Finer, “State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” p. 135, William W. Hagen, “Seventeenth-Century Crisis in Brandenburg: The Thirty Years’ War, the Destabilization of Serfdom, and the Rise of Absolutism,” *The American Historical Review* 94, no. 2 (1989): pp. 306-14, Jonathan R. White, *The Prussian Army: 1640-1871* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 2-3.

and Buenos Aires a modern metropolitan city. If anything, however, this growth was the result of a successful process of state building, not a precondition for it.

In comparison, both Lebanon and Congo were actually endowed with some economic preconditions that made them better candidates to sustain state growth. Congo, although predominantly agrarian, enjoyed a high level of natural deposits in its soil. The same factor that made it a coveted prize for European colonialism could, at least in theory, make it a rich state. Copper, zinc, diamonds and gold were and still are all found in abundance under the Congolese soil. These factors make Congo a potentially rich country. If it stays a weak and poor one, then economic potential is hardly to blame.

While Lebanon did not enjoy significant amounts of natural deposits, it became, by independence, a center of commerce and financing. The WWII years brought Lebanon an economic boom, which was sustained by the needs of the British forces in the Middle East. The economic growth did not stop with the war, however, and generally persisted up to the breakup of the civil war in the 1970's. With its banks, its trading houses, its vacation attractions for tourists and its liberal atmosphere, Lebanon came to be termed "Switzerland of the Middle East."¹⁴⁶ "By independence Lebanon had the highest per capita income in the Arab East, the lowest rate of illiteracy, the best developed infrastructure and, for all its emphasis on banking and services, the largest share of manufacturing within national income."¹⁴⁷

Clearly, then, the availability of either capital or commodities that could be sold for capital did not favor Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina over Congo and Lebanon. Capital, though, may interact with other aspects that affect state building (including border norms) in a more

¹⁴⁶ Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 151-69, Roger Owen, "The Economic History of Lebanon, 1943-1974: Its Salient Features," in *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, ed. Halim Barakat (Washington, DC: Croom and Helm, 1988).

¹⁴⁷ Owen, "The Economic History of Lebanon," p. 28.

activity almost ground to a halt, and hunger and plague took their toll on the population as well. The population of towns and villages had fallen 20 to 90 percent below their prewar figures.¹⁴²

Argentina, as well, was a very poor country at independence. For most of the period of Spanish colonization of Latin America (from the early 16th century to the early 19th century), what is today Argentina was a backwater province of the Spanish Empire. The economic and administrative center of the South American colony was Peru, with its Lima port. Buenos Aires, in fact, was not legally allowed to serve as a port for shipping merchandise across the Atlantic until the late 1770's. All international trade had to go across the Andes to Lima.¹⁴³ In 1810 Buenos Aires was, in fact, growing, but it was a far cry from the prosperous cosmopolitan center it would become a century later. Export and import was minimal and trade between the city and its vast hinterland was still done primarily by barter. In other words, Argentina at the time had "few of the assets considered essential for a Latin American state. It had minerals but no mines, land but little labour, commerce but few commodities. The economy of Buenos Aires emerged from its colonial past not as a primary producer but as a pure entrepôt."¹⁴⁴ If Buenos Aires was a poor place at independence, Argentina's interior was even more so. Buenos Aires' rural hinterland was little developed and accounted for no more than 20% of the meager export of the port (the larger part was silver from Potosi, in today's Bolivia). The wars of independence, moreover, disrupted the economic lifeline of Argentina's interior, the trade with the mining center of Potosí (in current day Bolivia), leaving the region in even more dire economic straits.¹⁴⁵ By the end of the 19th century Argentina would, indeed, be one of the fastest growing economies

¹⁴² Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, pp. 88-89, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis," pp. 314-15, Howard, *War in European History*, p. 29.

¹⁴³ Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2003), pp. 41-42.

¹⁴⁴ John Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," in *Argentina since Independence*, ed. Lesslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8, David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 79-96.

subtle way. While capital is a necessary ingredient of state formation, some forms of capital (or, rather, some sources) can also be harmful for this process. In particular, if the capital comes “too easy;” if the state does not have to create and maintain sophisticated and efficient administrative and bureaucratic tools in order to assure the extraction of capital; if the center does need to confront and coerce (or make bargains with) rival power bases in order to obtain the capital – we might not see a healthy process of state building.¹⁴⁸ As we shall see in the Argentinean case, the relatively easy profits for the state from tariffs and export taxation, and the availability of foreign loans, hindered state building and made it less complete. The same could be true with regard to Congo’s mineral resources, but research on the relations between the presence of natural resources and state weakness is inconclusive.¹⁴⁹ We have, then, to remember the importance of capital availability, and the fact that it can work in both ways, when the cases are discussed in the following chapters. Nevertheless, we should also keep in mind that Argentina managed to construct a fairly strong state *despite* the avoidance of creating an elaborate and efficient system of direct taxation, while Congo did not.

B. Legacies of Colonialism: Arbitrary Borders

Probably the most common and popular explanation for the lingering weakness – institutional, economic, ideational (legitimacy) and otherwise – in developing world states has to do with the legacies of colonialism. Colonialism, the spike of expansion that made mostly European powers to take hold of most of the lands in the world and subdue their people, certainly

¹⁴⁸ For elaboration of this discussion, see, e.g., Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics.", Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*.

¹⁴⁹ For the discussion of the argument that readily available natural resources hinders state building see Fearon, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," pp. 94-115, Nicholas Van de Walle, "The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Politics," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). On the specific case of Congo see Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 147-76.

had, and keeps on having, far-flung effects on the societies it colonized. The discussion in this section and in the following one, however, concentrates on two specific arguments about the legacies of colonialism; the arguments that relate more closely to the perpetuation of state weakness. This section discusses the arbitrariness of borders, while the next examines the administrative legacies of colonialism.

The problem with the post-colonial borders, so the argument goes, is not that they are fixed, but where they are located. The borders imposed by the European colonists in Africa, Asia and the Americas were largely arbitrary and did not conform to economic, social or political pre-colonial realities. Thus, these borders often divided ethnic groups between two or more states while, at the same time, creating new political units of groups that either had no prior association or were often bitter rivals. The colonial borders also, in most cases, took very little account of geographic or economic realities. The pre-colonial states, for the most part, adopted these arbitrary borders directly, either because of outside pressure to do so, or because of the interests of their own elites.¹⁵⁰ As John Ravenhill, for example, argues, “the arbitrary division of the continent by the European powers, with little or no respect for preexisting social and political groupings or even, sometimes, for ‘natural’ geographical features, has immensely complicated the tasks of nation and state building faced by African governments.”¹⁵¹ The new states, in other words, encompassed a group of citizens so diverse and not cohesive; ethnic, religious and economic cleavages so deep that no amount of territorial pressure could force into one strong whole.

¹⁵⁰ Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

¹⁵¹ John Ravenhill, "Redrawing the Map of Africa?" in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, ed. Donald Rothchild, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 283.

One should only take a glance at the two contemporary cases of weak states studied here to understand the force of this argument: Lebanon, in this sense, was an artificial political entity, created by the French mandate in 1920, in order to weaken Syrian nationalists and to foster the power base of their allies in the region, the Christian Maronites in Mt. Lebanon. Thus, they add to Mt. Lebanon, in itself a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, the city of Beirut, the predominantly Shiite Muslim south and predominantly Sunny Muslim Bakaa and Tripoli. The result was (and is) a state torn by deep ethnic and religious cleavages, in which no group is strong enough to control the others, but all groups are strong enough to make imposing threats against the others; hardly a panacea for state building.¹⁵² Congo, similarly, was an artificial creation of Belgium's colonialism, and encompasses a multiplicity of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, none of them big or strong enough to practically dominate the others.¹⁵³

The logic of the arbitrary borders explanation is strong, and I would not dispute it here. My argument, rather, is twofold: First, that arbitrariness is the rule, rather than the exception, even in European states. Second, I also argue that the arbitrary nature of the borders in the Asia and Africa would not have been such a great barrier to state building if they were subject to territorial threats, opportunities and changes.

Borders are almost always arbitrary. They are not a natural phenomenon but a social construct, erected, physically or emotionally, by men. Borders, everywhere in the world, often divide people arbitrarily, with people on either side of the borders deferring hardly differing, in the first place, in terms of culture, language or otherwise. Indeed, as Saadia Touval noted, "in

¹⁵² Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 62-64, Eyal Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 1-8.

¹⁵³ For a basic source on ethnic divisions and ethnic politics in the Congolese society, see Crawford Young, and, Turner, Thomas, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 138-48. For data of ethnic and other social divisions see CIA Factbook, at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html>

this respect [of arbitrariness] there is probably no great difference between international borders in Africa and international borders on other continents.”¹⁵⁴

Many international borders in Europe, most notably those that divided Germany prior to 1870, were not “natural” in any meaningful sense. Brandenburg-Prussia in the period studied here (1640-1740) is certainly a case in point. As Samuel Finer notes, “There was no *state* of Prussia. There was a clutch of distinct territories- states if one wishes- which had all come, by the accident of hereditary descent, under the dominion of George William of the ruling line of the Hohenzollerns.”¹⁵⁵ Arbitrary borders are not necessarily, then, a product of colonial rule. They can be a product of other social processes, in accordance with the prevailing practices of the time. Brandenburg-Prussia’s borders were, moreover, as far from “natural” as one can imagine. The state was scattered all across the plains of Northern Germany, from the banks of the Rhine in the west to East Prussia on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and it was territorially discontinuous, divided into three main blocks.

In terms of social cleavages, as well, there is no *a priori* reason to believe that the population of Brandenburg-Prussia was in 1640 closer to forming a cohesive group (the term nation was not yet in use, of course) than our more modern cases, Congo and Lebanon. Most residents shared a common language (albeit with different vernaculars), but so do the residents of Lebanon. Religious cleavages ran deep and high. The Catholic/Protestant division demarcated political and social struggle in Europe for centuries. The Thirty Years War, which was still ongoing in 1640, was primarily a religious war. The majority in Brandenburg-Prussia was Protestant, but it included a significant Catholic minority, concentrated in the provinces of Cleves and Mark, along the Western frontiers of the state. One should not assume that this cleavage was less salient

¹⁵⁴ Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Finer, “State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” 134-45.

or less a potential obstacle to state building than, say, the one between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, between Kassaians and Katangese in Southern Congo, or that between Hutu and Tutsi in its Eastern provinces.

When we look at most European states today we see a relatively homogenous society, ethnically speaking (excluding more recent immigrants). Yet this picture is more a result of the process of state building (and of war and ethnic cleansings) than the pre-conditions that enabled it to appear. In the mid-17th century Brandenburgians saw the Prussians or the people of Cleves as foreign, not as part of the "self." There was no form of national identity, of course, since the whole idea of defining one's identity by nation was still unknown to Europeans prior to the French Revolution. The economic and social structure, as well, differed markedly in different provinces. Whereas cities in Cleves and Mark, for instance, were the center of economic life and possessed a great degree of Autonomy, the rural lord, the Junker, was the economic and social center of society in East Prussia.¹⁵⁶ The population of the different regions could, in other words, be considered, in many senses, as different ethnic groups. Were Brandenburg-Prussia an African state, one might suspect that these groups would be called "tribes."

Nineteenth-century Argentina poses no less of a problem for the theory that relates the legacies of colonialism and arbitrary borders on state building. Argentina, after all, was a product of colonial rule no less than Congo or Lebanon. The arbitrary borders of the Spanish Viceroyalty of the Rio-de-la-Plata were drawn to suit the interests of the metropolis, not those of either the native or local Creole (that is, descendants of the colonizers, who were born in South America) population.¹⁵⁷ "Bourbon administrators thus ignored the racial, economic, and cultural

¹⁵⁶ For a classic review of Brandenburg-Prussia at mid 17th century, see F.L. Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1954).

¹⁵⁷ Carlos Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20, no. 1 (1988): pp. 152-53.

distinctions among the regions that comprise the new Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. The coherence of the viceroyalty was only apparent, since its territorial boundaries had been determined by calculations that were external to the conditions of the area."¹⁵⁸ Colonial arbitrariness, then, should apply to Argentina just as it applies to Lebanon and Congo. The reason Argentina today seems ethnically and culturally a more homogenous place than many of the developing world's states is because of processes that occurred after its independence: the territorial losses of Paraguay, Upper Peru (Bolivia) and Banda Oriental (Uruguay), the destruction of the Indians in the Pampas and in Patagonia, and the assimilation of numerous waves of European immigrants.

To be sure, then, one can accept that for a state to possess less arbitrary borders and a more homogenous population would make the task of state building easier. Nevertheless, these are not necessary conditions for the creation of a strong state. Strong and continuous territorial pressures could overcome the lack of such initial cohesiveness.

C. Legacies of Colonialism: Administrative Capacity

A second theory that relates Africa's and Asia's colonial past to the current inability of many of their states to emerge out of their perennial weakness has to do with bureaucratic and institutional capacity. The colonial powers, by virtue of their centralization of power in a faraway metropolis, and by unwillingness to share bureaucratic functions, at least mid-range and high-level, with locals, created a situation of permanent infancy of the colonies and did not prepare

¹⁵⁸ Mark D. Szuchman, "From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole: Revolution, Change, and Restoration in the Rio De La Plata," in *Revolution and Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860*, ed. Mark D. Szuchman, and Brown, Jonathan C. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). See also Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism." For a description of the diverse population of the Rio de La Plata, see Tulio Halperin-Donghi, *Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period*, trans. Richard Southern (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3-40.

them to the kinds of missions they would need for a serious state building project, once the colonizers were gone. Moreover, the argument also emphasizes the lack of human material able to perform these bureaucratic tasks, in terms of education and literacy.¹⁵⁹

According to this logic, the fact that the cases of Congo and Lebanon, which are discussed at length below, owe much of their inability to accumulate significant socio-political strength as states to their lack of bureaucratic tradition, trained manpower, and an educated pool through which to develop these capacities. It is certainly the case that Congo was, bureaucratically speaking, unprepared for independence in 1960. While the Belgian colonizers used local African chiefs as a form of local state authority, their rule was otherwise direct, brutal, and involved very little local participation, especially in the upper bureaucratic echelons.¹⁶⁰ The story is different for Lebanon, which enjoyed a relatively high level of autonomy from the French mandatory powers. Although France definitely had the power of the last arbiter in Lebanese politics and administration, a power that it occasionally used, it did not block the development of an indigenous political leadership and bureaucratic administration. Thus, the (Lebanese-written) constitution, a parliament and a Lebanese government were all created and functioned, to some degree, during the 1920-1943 French Mandate. These institutions served as relatively sound foundations for the independent Lebanese state, once it was established.¹⁶¹

While the variant of the colonial legacy argument that emphasizes administrative capacity might, on its face, seem to have some merit with regard to Congo, it applies less to the Lebanese case. Moreover, an investigation of the two cases of successful state building reveals that

¹⁵⁹ See Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, pp. 274-75. See also Migdal's case studies.

¹⁶⁰ For a short review of the Belgian colonial policies in Zaire, see Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 30-41.

¹⁶¹ Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, pp. 61-75, Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979), pp. 33-36, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 25-40.

Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina, as well, did not possess significant administrative capacity in 1640 and 1810, respectively.

Early 17th century Brandenburg-Prussia did not enjoy the existence of a well-trained bureaucratic machinery simply because such machinery had not yet been “invented.” To a significant extent, it was the innovations of this state (and other parallel developments in Europe) that created the core concepts of modern bureaucracy in the 17th and 18th centuries.¹⁶² In 1640, however, it possessed no statewide administration. Frederick William “merely owned a number of scattered principalities, each with its own government and institutions.”¹⁶³ The ministers of the Privy Council, which was supposed to be the government of the entire territory, for instance, admitted that they know little about what happened beyond the province of Brandenburg.¹⁶⁴ What little local administration existed, was managed by cities and the rural nobility, without common standards and often on an ad hoc basis.

Joel Migdal argues that “the medieval European town played an important role in the creation of such an autonomous class [fit for serving as state officials], the burghers, outside the framework of the feudal society.”¹⁶⁵ Yet Brandenburg-Prussia did not have a well-developed class of town burghers, that, being autonomous of medieval civil society and relatively educated, could serve as the backbone of a modern bureaucracy. The Prussian administration of the 17th and 18th centuries was, by and large, based on the nobility and on the output, administrative, ideological and human, of the officer corps.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² For classical analyses of this development, See Hintze, “The Formation of the State.”, Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

¹⁶³ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, p.253.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹⁶⁵ See Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, p. 174.

¹⁶⁶ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*.

The Argentinean case possesses even more similarities to the two current cases, in that Argentina was a Spanish colony from the early 16th century to 1810 and, as such, suffered from syndromes similar to what Congo and Lebanon experienced. The Spaniards did not leave behind a legacy of developing a strong local administrative capacity. While local *creoles* ('white' descendants of Spanish origin who were born in America) were incorporated to some degree into the local administration, they were systematically excluded from the higher posts. As Benedict Anderson notes, in the 300 years of Spanish rule in Spanish America, only 4 of the 170 appointed viceroys were Creoles, and the rest *peninsulars* (born in Spain), despite the fact that the latter made up only 5% of the 'white' population in the region. A similar ratio is also observed in the Church's hierarchy.¹⁶⁷ These conditions and policies applied everywhere in the Spanish empire.¹⁶⁸ In this vein, in 1815 Simon Bolivar described the Spanish rule in their Latin American possessions to his friend in Jamaica:

We have been harassed by a conduct which has not only deprived us of our rights but has kept us in a sort of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs. If we could at least have managed our domestic affairs and our internal administration, we could have acquainted ourselves with the processes and mechanics of public affairs.¹⁶⁹

Rio de la Plata was no exception; therefore, Carlos Escude is right to argue that "as such, the Viceroyalty had a structure which could not be maintained without the mediation of a superior authority and power: the Spanish empire."¹⁷⁰ Clearly, the infant regime in Buenos Aires did not carry favorable chances of success in creating a strong state in 1810 Argentina.

Another variant of the weak administrative colonial legacy is that the colonial rule did not leave behind societies sufficiently endowed with an educated manpower that could potentially

¹⁶⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 56-59.

¹⁶⁸ On the late colonial administration in the Rio de la Plata, see Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, pp. 59-78, Szuchman, "From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole."

¹⁶⁹ Simon Bolivar, *Selected Writings of Bolivar*, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New York: The Colonial Press, 1951).

¹⁷⁰ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 153. On the late colonial administration in the Rio de la Plata, see Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, pp. 59-78, Szuchman, "From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole."

fulfill the administrative functions of modern state machinery. The question in this respect, then, is whether the cases in which one finds a successful project of state building differ a priori from those in which, eventually, the project fails, in terms of literate manpower able to create a functioning administration. Hence, one needs to compare the level of literacy in Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 and Argentina in 1810 to these of Lebanon in 1945 and Congo in 1960.

A look at the numbers reveals a picture in which the Argentinean case hardly enjoyed better standards of education prior to the start of their state building project. In fact, Argentina was probably less well situated in terms of literacy rates. The first fairly reliable number that we have of Argentinean levels of literacy is from its first national census in 1869, and it shows that only about one third of the population was literate.¹⁷¹ This number is roughly equal to the level of literacy in Congo at independence, which was about 20-25%,¹⁷² but significantly lower than that of Lebanon, which stood in 1950 at about 45-50% literacy.¹⁷³ Moreover, though data is not available, literacy rates in Argentina on the eve of independence are likely to have been even lower than these indicated in the census, sixty years later. While data for literacy rates in 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia is not available, I find no reason to believe, given the general conditions of the period and the lack of schools, let alone public schools, that it had a larger pool of educated people from which to recruit its bureaucrats and administrators.

In short, there are no substantial grounds to presume that Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina enjoyed preconditions more conducive to state building in the sense that they were better positioned to create a stronger functioning administration and bureaucracy. While having the bureaucratic experience and the educated manpower prior to the beginning of the state building

¹⁷¹ Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, p. 118.

¹⁷² The data is from 1965. See Peter Flora, "Historical Processes of Social Mobilization: Urbanization and Literacy 1850-1965," in *Building States and Nations: Models and Data Resources*, ed. Shmuel N. and Rokkan Stein Eisenstadt (London: Sage, 1973), p. 247.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

process is certainly a plus, it is not a necessary precondition for the creation of a strong state. In Argentina and Brandenburg-Prussia, these capacities were more a product of the process of state building (and thus of territorial pressures) than conditions that enabled it to happen. The fact that Congo did not possess at independence either a working bureaucratic machine or a sufficiently large human pool with which to man such a machine, did not, therefore, preclude a future process of state building. The higher level of literacy and the more experienced administration it had hired from the French, moreover, should have been an asset for Lebanon's state building. Yet, as we shall see below, they were not sufficient for this process to occur in a satisfactory way.

D. Population Density

A fourth precondition to state formation that one should consider is based on the combination of geography and demography. Jeffery Herbst argues that scarce population and vast lands created the endemic inability of governments in Africa (not only in the post-colonial era, but in the colonial and pre-colonial as well) to penetrate and control their hinterlands. The logic of this argument, again, is sound: a low level of population density should make, at least in theory, territorial conflicts less salient, and cause governments to have both less incentive and less means to extend their rule much beyond their capital city, or perhaps to a few other population centers. Thus, Herbst argues that the African states' choice of maintaining weak states, only loosely controlled by the center, is a rational one, given their preconditions.¹⁷⁴ At first glance, indeed, Congo might be almost Herbst's ideal type. It is a vast land (approximately the size of

¹⁷⁴ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

Western Europe), with a relatively low population density, in which transportation and communication would be hard by any standard measure.

Could population density be, therefore, the crucial variable that differentiates between successful and unsuccessful cases of state building? A closer at population data reveals a largely negative answer. When Herbst compares population density in different parts of the globe, he does so for the same timeframe. Yet a comparison of Europe and Africa in 1975, for instance, is not relevant to our case (nor to his). The relevant comparison, instead, should be between today's (or 1960's Africa) and Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Indeed, according to Herbst's own data, population density in 1500 Europe (13.7 people/sq. kilometer) is roughly similar to that of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1975 (13.6). Nineteenth-century's Latin America's population density, moreover, was significantly lower (3.7-people/sq. kilometer in 1900) in comparison to Sub-Saharan Africa. These numbers do not suggest any advantage, in terms of pre-conditions to state building, to Europe or Latin America over Africa, as they should have, according to Herbst's theory.

Furthermore, if one looks at the specific numbers of population density in the cases studied in this dissertation, the results are even clearer. Table 3 shows population density in the four cases studied here at the "starting point" of the research.

Table 3: Population Density at Research Starting Point (people/sq. kilometer)

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Brandenburg-Prussia 1640 | Argentina 1812 | Lebanon 1943 | Congo 1960 |
| 7.3 ¹⁷⁵ | 0.18 ¹⁷⁶ | 103 ¹⁷⁷ | 6.6 ¹⁷⁸ |

As becomes clear from Table 1, Herbst's theory cannot serve as a viable alternative explanation for the perpetuation of state weakness, at least in the cases studied here. While Congo's population density at independence is roughly comparable to that of 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia, they are much higher than that of Argentina at independence.¹⁷⁹ Lebanon's population density at independence is significantly higher than all other cases, and in 1943 it is even higher than the average for Europe. One cannot argue, then, that low density of population deprives states of a crucial prerequisite for building a strong state. Population density, in other words, cannot explain why Prussia and Argentina succeeded where Lebanon failed.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ Population data based on a rough estimate in Sidney B. Fey, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786* (New York: Henry Holt, 1937). Area data taken from Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia.*, p. 202, fn.2 and p. 229, fn. 1. Area data, which in the original is in Square Prussian Miles, is translated into Square Kilometers. 1 Square Prussian Mile = 56.74 Square Kilometers.

¹⁷⁶ 1816 data, population of the Argentine Federation was approximately 0.5 Million people. See Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, p. 114.

¹⁷⁷ Population number based on a 1942 partial census (made for war rationing purposes. Reported in Harvey H. Smith, et. al., *Area Handbook for Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969). Area data from 2006, CIA World Factbook <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html>

¹⁷⁸ Population number from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, at <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/> and are data from CIA World Factbook <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html>

¹⁷⁹ Even if one considers population density for the entire Rio de la Plata area, rather than for Argentina alone, the number is still around 4.5 people per square kilometer- lower than that of Congo. Rio de la Plata had a population of about 1 million at 1810. See Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, p. 41.

¹⁸⁰ Note, also, that Fearon and Laitin have found that courtiers with higher population density are *more likely* to be involved in civil wars, which they closely relate to state weakness. See Fearon, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."

Vast territories, on the other hand, are probably an obstacle to the maintenance of government control, and thus to state building. In a world of border fixity, however, these attributes are likely to be “self-adjusting:” if a state cannot control a particular tract of territory, it is likely to lose this territory to another, who can. Argentina’s experience, indeed, reveals such practices.¹⁸¹

E. Conclusions: No Prior Advantage

The process of state building is complicated and protracted. It is also a varied process, which can take several paths and is influenced by a multiplicity of factors. This section aimed to discuss the variables most commonly believed to be the major preconditions for successful state building. It finds that Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina did not enjoy favorable preconditions over Lebanon and Congo for developing a strong state, judging by either of these criteria.

Comparing the preconditions in these four cases, the above discussion established that the argument regarding population density simply does not stand up to the scrutiny of a simple comparison at the relevant time, and a high population density, therefore, can not be considered a determinant of state strength. While a literate population, a sound administrative base and a relatively homogenous population would certainly make state building more likely to succeed, none of them should be considered a precondition to strong statehood either. Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina succeeded despite not possessing most of these characteristics. Lastly, the possession of capital (or commodities that one can exchange for capital) is crucial to state building, but it can work both ways. Too easy access to capital can be as harmful to state building as the lack of such access. As we shall see below, strong territorial pressures can

¹⁸¹ See Escude, “Argentine Territorial Nationalism.”

overcome both the relative lack of capital (in Brandenburg-Prussia) and its relative abundance (In Argentina). The argument, thus, is not that all these variables do not matter when it comes to state building. They do matter and some of them, in particular, might interact with the norms of borders in interesting ways. Nevertheless, the argument is that one cannot deduce from the initial intrinsic conditions of either Brandenburg-Prussia or Argentina that they were destined to create strong states. Nor can one take these conditions as a proof that either Congo or Lebanon was doom from the start to stay weak or get weaker.

Chapter 4: Brandenburg-Prussia, 1640-1740

After laying down the theoretical argument about the effects of differing normative framework with regarding to borders in weak states, and after establishing a "level playing field" with regard to the preconditions of state building, this chapter studies the first case of a weak state in a flexible borders' world: Brandenburg-Prussia, from 1640 to 1740.

The case of Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740 (from 1701 renamed the Kingdom of Prussia) is studied here as a case of a state building process in a weak state in an environment in which borders are flexible (that is, not fixed, amenable to changes) and there are no strong normative obstacles to conquest and annexation. The time period of 1640 until 1740 was chosen to fit the requirement of such a case. 1640 is the year in which, in the midst of the Thirty Years War, Frederick William (later to be called "the Great Elector") accedes to his throne as the Elector of Brandenburg. His state, at that point, was an extremely weak one. A century later, after enduring a series of ferocious territorial wars, the King of Prussia (Brandenburg's successor) ruled over a strong state, which also competed for power among the European Great Powers.

As the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia 19th century Argentina (explored in the ext chapter) did not have significant advantage, in terms of state building, over the two contemporary cases (Congo and Lebanon), and as they faced a significantly different international environment, in terms of territorial pressures, the historical cases serves me here as a basis for comparison with the more recent ones. In that capacity, the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina will serve to test Hypothesis 1, which stated that a system of flexible borders is likely to result, over time, in stronger states. The Brandenburg-Prussia case, indeed, strongly confirms this hypothesis:

starting as an extremely weak state and facing a very harsh international environment, where its territories were often threatened by strong enemies, Brandenburg-Prussia gradually developed into a much stronger state, in socio-political terms: in 1740 the state had a complete monopoly over the use of violence, a sound taxation system, an efficient bureaucratic machinery, a relatively strong record of state services, and a fairly cohesive society, at least at the elite level.

This section, first, examines the weakness of Brandenburg-Prussia at the “starting point” in 1640. Second, it studies the geo-political pressures working on Brandenburg-Prussia during the period under examination and shows how such an environment creates incentives and supplies the vehicles through which a gradual process of state strengthening may take place.

A. Brandenburg-Prussia in the Mid 17th Century: Weakness Across the Board

The 1640's Electorate of Brandenburg hardly enjoyed conditions favorable to a rapid process of state building. As these preconditions would be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 8, suffice it to say here that Brandenburg was geographically scattered, economically poor, and deeply divided along religion and class cleavages. The population was sparse and the devastation of the Thirty Years War great. Competing claims of sovereignty, moreover, precluded any centralization.

Indeed, in the mid 17th century Brandenburg was an extremely weak state (if a state is at all the right expression for this political unit). In geographical terms Brandenburg was a collection of disconnected territories. “There was no *state* of Prussia. There was a clutch of distinct territories- states if one wishes- which had all come, by the accident of hereditary descent, under the dominion of George William of the ruling line of the Hohenzollerns”¹⁸² These separate

¹⁸² Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 134-45.

provinces with no territorial continuity stretched from the banks of the Rhine River (Cleves and Mark) in the southwest to the shores of the Baltic Sea in the northeastern province of East Prussia, more than a thousand miles away. Brandenburg itself, with Berlin as its capital, stood roughly in the middle. This fragmented geography, as will be discussed later, situated Brandenburg-Prussia in a maelstrom of geopolitical pressures.

At an age in which transportation was difficult (especially in the winter) and communication slow, the geographical disparity discussed above was translated, quite inevitably, to political disunity. The state's institutions were weak, inefficient and challenged from below and from above. The reach of the prince and the state was almost non-existent. "When the thirty Years War engulfed Brandenburg and the other Hohenzollern possessions," F.L. Carsten tells us, "no progress at all had been made toward their unification and the creation of common institutions."¹⁸³ Since throughout most of this war the Hohenzollerns' territories were largely occupied by either Imperial or Swedish forces, the Elector's George William's control was, if anything, even weaker during the war than before it broke down. The young Frederick William, who took over the Hohenzollern's title in 1640, inherited an extremely weak state with a profoundly limited reach into its own territories.

The challenges to the Prince's authority came first and foremost from below: A lingering institution from the Middle Ages, the *Estates*— the representatives of the nobility, the clergy and the cities' bourgeois— constituted one of the most important foundations of the society of the European states. Note, though, that the Estates were not a unified statewide institution, but a local one. In early 16th century Germany, the position of the Estates was as strong as ever.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, 88.

¹⁸⁴ The German Estates at the turn of the 16th century retained two of their traditional components: the nobility and the towns, while the third, the clergy, gradually disappeared as a consequence of the reformation. Nevertheless,

“They [the Estates], and not the prince, were the real rulers of the country, controlling the finances and the administration, the Church, and the Universities, as well as all appointments in state and Church.”¹⁸⁵ The Estates in the Hohenzollerns’ territories— Brandenburg, East Prussia, Mark and Cleves— were reluctant, to say the least, to give away any portion of their power to a central authority.

At the same time that Frederick Williams’ authority was questioned from below, it was also restricted, if loosely, from above. As a German Prince within the domains of the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick was officially a vassal of the Emperor in Vienna. This dualism of Prince and Emperor should not be exaggerated. It would probably mean very little if the Austrian Emperor were a weak power. He was not, however, and the Hohenzollerns’ obligation to serve the Habsburg Emperors played a significant role in many decision in Brandenburg-Prussia. Although the Hohenzollerns were by no means always loyal to their Emperor, they could not ignore either the power or the moral authority of the Habsburgs.¹⁸⁶ Parts of the Elector’s domains, however, were situated outside of the confines of the Holy Roman Empire. In this part, East Prussia, the Elector of Brandenburg was nominally a suzerain of the King of Poland. Though this arrangement did not translate into actual Polish authority in the province, it did play into center-periphery politics in Brandenburg-Prussia. The Junkers (Prussian nobles) often turned to “their King” (the king of Poland) to counter the ambitious of “their Prince” (the Elector of Brandenburg).¹⁸⁷


with the division of nobility to higher and lower ranks, the triangular structure of the institution remained intact. See *Ibid.*, 165-78.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 66.; George A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 1-3.

¹⁸⁶ On the position of the Emperor vis-à-vis the Princes after the Thirty Years War, see John G. Gagliardo, *Germany under the Old Regime, 1600-1790* (New York: Longman, 1991). Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany 1640-1840* (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 3-21.

¹⁸⁷ See, for instance, the account of the Elector’s struggle with Königsberg’s Estates, in Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, pp. 202-28.

Figure 5: Map of Brandenburg-Prussia, 1618- 1740



* Source of Map: *World History at KMLA* [<http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germany/braabsfor.html>]

B. Territorial Pressures in a Flexible Borders' World: 17th and 18th Centuries

Europe

The geography of Brandenburg-Prussia, no doubt, was an open invitation for international pressures. Like most German states, it enjoyed little in the way of easily defensible natural borders. Yet, in addition to these difficulties, the fact that the Hohenzollerns' territory was not continuous but fragmented into three principle blocks of territory (see map above), presented a further complication.¹⁸⁸ These scattered territories bordered, furthermore, some of Europe's

¹⁸⁸ Dennis E. Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, 1996), 221.

strongest powers: France and the United Provinces on the west, Austria on the south, Poland and Russia on the east and Sweden on the north. Indeed, Brandenburg-Prussia was a party to a significant number of wars in the century from 1640 to 1740, most of them wars that involved territorial issues. Table 3 shows a list of these wars.

As the military revolution expanded to north Europe (discussed in Chapter 2), the small German states felt its burnt more than any other: the Thirty Years War (1608-1648) devastated most of Germany, Brandenburg-Prussia included, and the occupation of Brandenburg-Prussia by foreign forces made this geopolitical threat clear and omnipresent.

The fact that Brandenburg-Prussia's territory was surrounded by many other small and vulnerable German states, on the other hand, served as a potential geopolitical opportunity; a constant temptation to expand. The basic ingredients for strong geopolitical pressures (both threats and opportunities), then, definitely existed in the Prussian case. The degree of actual pressure, nevertheless, fluctuated. We need, then, to examine each era more closely.

For the first of the Hohenzollerns state builders, the Great Elector Frederick William, strong geopolitical pressures did exist and they were perceived as such by the Elector. The record shows quite clearly that the Electors' relentless efforts to transform the existing social order in Brandenburg-Prussia during his reign in power were born predominantly because of the urgent need to defend his territorial possessions (or even the survival of the state) against strong and competent external forces.

Table 4: Brandenburg-Prussia's Wars, 1640-1740¹⁸⁹

| Years | Name of War | Participants |
|-----------|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1626-1648 | Thirty Years War | Most European States, including the Holy Roman Empire (Habsburg), France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, Poland, and all German states (Alliances varied greatly) |
| 1655-1660 | First Northern War | Sweden, Russia and Denmark Vs. Poland and the Empire (Brandenburg-Prussia first allied with Poland than with Sweden) |
| 1672-1678 | Dutch War of Louis XIV | Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Empire and the Dutch Republic, against France, England, Münster and Cologne |
| 1675-1679 | Swedish-Brandenburgian War | Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Dutch Republic and Denmark against Sweden |
| 1686-1687 | Habsburg-Ottoman War | Ottoman Empire vs. the Empire, Poland and various German states (including Brandenburg-Prussia) |
| 1689-1697 | War of the Grand Alliance (Or War of | Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Empire, England Spanish Netherlands, and Savoy- |

¹⁸⁹ Years for war express the years in which Brandenburg-Prussia's troops participated in the war.

| | | |
|-----------|----------------------------------|--|
| | the League of Augsburg) | Piedmont against France |
| 1701-1713 | War of the Spanish Succession | Prussia allied with the Empire, Portugal, the Netherlands, England and Sardinia, against France, Spain and Bavaria |
| 1713-1720 | Great Northern War | Prussia allied with Russia, France, Denmark, Saxony and Hanover, against Sweden, Poland, and the Ottomans |
| 1733-1738 | War of Polish Succession | Prussia allied with the Empire, Saxony and Russia, against France, Spain, Sardinia and Bavaria |

** Sources for Table 3: Philip G. Dwyer, "Introduction," in Philip G. Dwyer, ed., *The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830* (New York, Longman, 2000), pp. 18-19; World History at KMLA, available at: [<http://www.zum.de/whkmla/military/germany/milxprussia2.html>], accessed 8/2/2006.

Frederick William's ascendance to the position of the Elector of Brandenburg took place in the midst of the Thirty Years War, in 1640 (Brandenburg was involved in the war since 1626). As a teenager, the prince felt the brunt of war directly, as he had to flee Berlin to Königsberg (in East Prussia) for fear of foreign occupation. Most Hohenzollerns' territories (which were acquired gradually through a combination of diplomacy and marriages) were occupied throughout the war by the Dutch, the Swedes or the Imperial armies of the Habsburgs. All these armies, whether enemies or allies of Brandenburg, robbed the country of any possible asset they could lay hands on; looting, killing and coercing both the towns and the countryside to pay heavy

taxes. The prince saw his father's futile attempts to rely on diplomatic alliances and foreign aid to regain his lands¹⁹⁰

In fact, Frederick William himself, as a young ruler, tried to use the same tactics: he switched alliances between the Habsburgs and Sweden for the Swedes' promise of leaving his territories. Without a credible way to enforce it, however, the Elector soon discovered this promise to be nothing but an empty shell. Sweden's forces left Brandenburg's territory, eventually, only when they faced a threat to their rear from a Danish assault. As will be discussed below, Brandenburg-Prussia succeeded, eventually, to survive the war and preserve its pre-war territories, by raising a sufficiently strong army by 1648.

The peace that followed the Thirty Years War, however, proved short and elusive. The 1655-1660 Polish War (or the First Northern War) started as Charles X, king of Sweden, intended to attack Poland, moving through Hohenzollern's land in East Pomerania and the ports of East Prussia, in his efforts to turn the Baltic Sea into a "Swedish Lake." Had Frederick William agreed to cooperate with this Swedish plan he stood a reasonable chance of both losing these territories to the Swedes and alienating the king of Poland, still a significant regional power and the Elector's nominal feudal lord (as the Duke of Prussia). A policy of passive neutrality, therefore, was unlikely to profit Brandenburg-Prussia's interests. And indeed, by clever diplomatic maneuvers, backed by efficient (though still not very large) army forces, Brandenburg-Prussia was able not only to keep its lands intact, but to profit from the Polish war by making Prussia an autonomous state (no longer a Polish vassalage). The army was not kept as

¹⁹⁰ Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, 1-2, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis.", White, *The Prussian Army*, 4-5.

is after the Treaty of Oliva ended the war, though, but was reduced to a skeletal force that enabled it to mobilize again quickly in case of emergency.¹⁹¹

Such an emergency, though, was forthcoming. In 1667 Frederick William faced a new threat, this time to his western provinces, Mark and Cleves. This threat came from the prominent military force of the era: Louis XIV's France. Louis desired to expand France's borders to the Rhine River. The main opponents to such an attempt were the Dutch, but in order to fight either the Spanish Netherlands or the United Provinces, Louis had to cross through German land, including that of the Hohenzollerns. For the next decade, the "Sun King" would make repeated attempts at destroying the Dutch and, on the way, their German allies. Louis faced, at the start, an overwhelming coalition that included the United Provinces, England, Sweden, and the German Princes (with the reluctant support of the Habsburg emperor). This alliance, however, did not last long, and Louis was able to isolate the Dutch and their German allies, with Frederick William at their head.

The Hohenzollern's western provinces suffered greatly under repeated French attacks and occupation, yet the greatest threat to Prussia was still to come. As Frederick William was trying to recover from a painful defeat by the French in the winter of 1675, he got alarming news: Sweden had invaded Brandenburg's lands and was threatening Berlin. Frederick William could not react immediately but had to wait for the spring to come. Then, with a surprising and decisive move that bought him the popular title of "The Great Elector," he returned with his forces to Brandenburg and managed to defeat the great Swedish army before it was able to take Berlin.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ White, *The Prussian Army*, 26-31.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 32-45.

The Great Elector's Brandenburg-Prussia, then, faced imminent external threats during his reign, stemming from both its geographical characteristics and its powerful neighbors. Generally speaking, this threat was genuine, not an artifact of Frederick William's desire for power. The Elector definitely took what opportunities he had to expand the state's power but, in light of the evidence, it would be fair to say that these opportunities were almost always an outcome of the successful repelling of territorial threats.

Although the reign of the two next rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia, from 1688 to 1740, was a less turbulent era, their basic conditions did not change much: they still faced a hostile external environment, in which one's military power was almost the sole guarantee of one's territorial integrity. Frederick III, who reigned from 1688 to 1713 (after 1701, as the King of Prussia, his name changed to Frederick I), used his army mainly at the service of the Austrian Emperor. Thus, Brandenburgian regiments were involved on the Austrian side (against France and its allies) in 1688-1689, in the War of the Grand Alliance, and in 1701-1714, in the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁹³ In that way, he also assured the Emperor's approval to some minor territorial expansions, which he gained by inheritance, diplomacy or money. Thus, Prussia gained the Counties of Moers and Lingen in 1702 and the towns of Neuchatel and Recklenburg in 1707. King Frederick William I (1713-1742) was involved in the Great Northern War (against Sweden) between 1715 and 1721. Prussia's success in this war gained it a portion of Swedish Pomerania. All these wars involved both opportunities and risks to Brandenburg-Prussia. Thus, Philip Dwyer concludes that all of Prussia's wars in the 18th century were fought with territorial acquisition as an important goal. "This does not mean that Prussia went to war only with

¹⁹³ On these wars and the Prussian Army role in them, see *Ibid.*, 47-62.

territorial gains in mind, but that at one stage or another territory became an important objective in whatever war was being fought.”¹⁹⁴

Moreover, even if one’s army does not take a direct role in territorial conflicts, the fact that such conflicts are taking place in one’s close strategic environment entails a constant need for alertness, readiness and preparations to war. Thus, the fact that reign of Frederick William I was a relatively peaceful one does not mean that the sole purpose of his massive military buildup was for parade ground purposes. The Prussian army was a great deterrent in an age in which the small German princedoms were still a coveted price in the territorial squabbles of the surrounding great powers.

One can conclude, then, that in the century under investigation in this chapter, Brandenburg-Prussia faced continuous external territorial threats. Even though these threats vary in the level of danger they pose to the state, they were always present. While in the earlier years these threats manifested in severe wars that reached the heart of the Electorate, the 18th century saw less direct threats to the core and more general tension and threats to peripheral territory. Part of the change in the nature of threat, no doubt, could be attributed to Prussia’s own acquired military strength, which made it less an easy pray for stronger powers and more a coveted ally. The Electorate, and later the Kingdom, also had opportunities for territorial expansion, which they took, though much more cautiously than Prussia will do in the times of Frederick the Great (after 1740).

¹⁹⁴ Philip G. Dwyer, "Introduction: The Rise of Prussia," in *The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830* (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2000), pp. 17-19.

C. Territorial Pressure and State Building

At this point, we should recall hypothesis 1, that a flexible borders' world provides incentives and opportunities for states to become socio-politically stronger. The following discussion is an attempt to corroborate this hypothesis.

a) Monopolizing the Use of Legitimate Force

As made clear above, the expansion of state power (in essence, at the 17th century, those of the Price), were widely resented by local elite in Brandenburg-Prussia. Both the Nobility and the towns resisted the notion that the state needs a standing army in times of peace. The hitherto situation was that no such army existed in the service of the state, and in times of need, the Estates would recruit and finance local militias to defend their lands.¹⁹⁵ These improvised military arrangements, as we have seen, were no match for the modernized armies of Sweden, France, the United Provinces (Netherlands) and the Habsburgs, that roamed the north German plains in the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, even under the extreme duress of that war the Estates were keener to preserve their own power than to submit much needed resources for the defense of their "state." When, in the final years of the war, the Estates of Brandenburg were at last willing to provide some funds for Frederick William's army, it was more out of gratitude for steps the Elector took to purge this army from corrupt colonels and rebellious mercenaries, which blackmailed and looted towns in which they resided, than out of a need for protection from outside powers.¹⁹⁶ By the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, Frederick William, a quick learner,

¹⁹⁵ Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 89.

¹⁹⁶ Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, 1-3.

managed to raise an army sufficiently significant to assure the Hohenzollerns their sustained rule in all the territories they possessed before the beginning of the war.¹⁹⁷

As soon as peace came with the 1648 treaty of Westphalia, the Estates sought a return of the *status quo ante* wherein the town's elite and rural nobility enjoyed much autonomy and much say over both domestic and state affairs. This state of affairs did not include a standing army. The assumption of the Estates was not that international war in the manner of the one just concluded was here to stay, but that peace had come back and their prerogatives and leverages over policy and taxation should be restored as well. Thus, the Estates of Brandenburg argued in a letter to Frederick William in 1650, "The Swedes...are bound by the agreement [the Treaty of Westphalia] not to use force against Your Electoral Highness." Rather than increasing the taxes in order to raise a powerful army, they suggested to the Elector to "place your trust in a friendly settlement and in your fellow Germans."¹⁹⁸ Brandenburg's Estates argued, further, that "it was unlikely that Pomerania, Prussia, or Cleves would help them in a similar contingency: therefore Brandenburg should not mixed up in the quarrels of foreign provinces."¹⁹⁹

Frederick William, on the other hand, sought to apply the lessons he learned in the Thirty Years War and to emulate the Great European Powers by building a standing army in times of peace, to serve as a permanent deterrent and as an insurance policy for renewed war. In this endeavor, he faced an uphill struggle against the Estates. The traditional leadership of the towns (which also represented them in the meetings of the Estates), by and large opposed the measures of centralization offered by the Elector.²⁰⁰ In East Prussia, a fierce struggle of Königsberg's

¹⁹⁷ White, *The Prussian Army*, 5-10.

¹⁹⁸ Louis L. Snyder, ed., *Documents of German History* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 91-92.

¹⁹⁹ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, p. 185.

²⁰⁰ Whereas some elements of the burghers and artisans in the towns of Brandenburg did organize to support the center's steps, it was purely for economic reasons (namely, the hope that nationalized tax would elevate some of

commoners and burghers to resist the Elector's sovereignty and taxation (including a call for Polish intervention on their behalf) resulted in coercion of Frederick William's rule 1653 in. In the Western provinces of Cleves and Mark, where the towns were traditionally stronger, the initial result of the struggle did not favor the Elector. He was denied taxes, the right of recruitment and the right to station troops in the territory without achieving prior consent of the estates.²⁰¹

The greater challenge for the Elector's centralization designs, nevertheless, came from the direction of the nobility, the stronger and more important component of the Estates. After all, "the Junkers were not only the chief holders of power in the economy and body politic; they also possessed the highest social status in terms of prestige, deference, esteem and honor."²⁰² To the extent that the newly created absolutist state benefited the Junkers²⁰³ there is a general agreement that the initiative was not of the Junkers', and the changes in the direction of centralization of authority and monopolization over the means of power were more often than not bitterly opposed by Brandenburg-Prussia's nobility. The "bargain" of 1653, to the extent that it was such, was more an attempt by the Junkers to constrain the Elector's effort than an initiative to promote them.²⁰⁴

As Brandenburg's Estates feared, the next war was forthcoming. The main protagonists at the 1655-1660 Polish War were Sweden and Poland, but Brandenburg-Prussia played an important role. There are conflicting accounts as to the question of whether Brandenburg's involvement in

their own disproportional burden). These hopes were, in the end, frustrated by the tendency of the Elector to back the nobility in most conflicts between it and the towns. See *Ibid.*, 193-99.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 185-252.

²⁰² Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*, 27-34.

²⁰³ This is an issue of a debate among historians. The traditional view (see *Ibid.* ; Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia.*) is that the recess of 1653 and similar later agreements represent a *modus vivendi* between the power of the Prince and the central government and the of the Junker nobility. Hagan 1989,, on the other side, sees in the recess more a dictate of the Elector than a compromise between two comparable forces.

²⁰⁴ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis."

this war between Sweden and Poland was a genuine act of self-defense or part of Frederick William's plot to guarantee a standing army under his command, despite the Estates' opposition.²⁰⁵ What is not conflicted is that Brandenburg's involvement in this war was a major impetus for the consolidation of the state's monopoly over the means of violence. As the war ended in the Treaty of Olivie, the standing army was reduced in size but not took apart, as was customary before.²⁰⁶ This army assisted the Elector in finally coercing Cleves and Marks' Estates and securing his rights of taxation and recruitment in all of his territories.²⁰⁷ By the end of end of the Great Elector Frederick William's reign, in 1688, Brandenburg-Prussia had a 30,000 man strong peacetime army, and the state arrogated to itself the sole right to recruit, finance and train the military forces within its borders.

Accordingly, while the Elector Frederick III (1688-1713, King Frederick after 1701-1713) took more interest in the court politics and in promoting the arts than both his father and his son, he kept on expanding Brandenburg's army to 40,000 troops in 1713. Frederick kept his military tuned by deploying it in the service of the Habsburg Emperor against Turkey and France.²⁰⁸ The reign of Frederick William I (1713-1740), the next Prussian king in line, was characterized by massive militarization of Prussia. Frederick William I is often regarded as the "father" of the Prussian army, because of the increasing power of this institution that he personally was

²⁰⁵ Hans Rosenberg argues that the involvement in this war was an opportunistic move on the side of Frederick William, who "began to base his shifty policy on the flimsy fiction of permanent state of war, on the 'necessity' for perpetual military mobilization. Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*, 35-36. Jonathan White, on the other hand, maintains that Frederick William was "reluctantly drawn into a conflict on his eastern border" as a consequence of aggressive Swedish policy. White, *The Prussian Army*, 26.

²⁰⁶ White, *The Prussian Army*, 26-31.

²⁰⁷ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, pp. 229-52.

²⁰⁸ He used the military, moreover, to increase Brandenburg's (and his own) international standing by gaining the Emperor's approval to make it a kingdom in 1701, and henceforth, Frederick gain the title of the Prussian King Frederick I. In fact, the Emperor Leopold, who gave this title only reluctantly to Fredrick, sought to insult Frederick by announcing him "a King in Prussia" (rather than "the King of Prussia"), but Frederick took this as an achievement. He was named "King in Prussia" and not in Brandenburg in order to avoid a second title of King within the realm of the Holy Roman Empire (which Eastern Prussia was not part of). See White, *The Prussian Army*, 47-62.

responsible for, and because of his personal interest in military affairs. The King also initiated a sweeping reform of the military organization (the Canton System, to be discussed below). Yet, oddly enough, his was a peaceful era. Frederick William's foreign policy was cautious and moderate, and he made no attempts to use his formidable army for gaining subsidies (as his father did) or expanding the realms of his kingdom (as his son will). At least partly as a result of his military's deterrent effect, he was also spared the necessity to employ his army to defend his lands, as his grandfather was obliged to do.²⁰⁹

Table 5: Brandenburg-Prussia's Military Size

| Year | End of Reign | Size |
|------|---|------------------|
| 1640 | Elector George William | No Standing Army |
| 1688 | Elector Frederic William | 30,000 |
| 1713 | Elector Frederick III/ King Frederick I | 40,000 |
| 1740 | King Frederick William I | 80,000 |

b) Extraction of Revenues

Brandenburg-Prussia's changed geo-strategic situation, then, dictated the need for a standing army, even in peacetime, and for the monopolization of the means of violence. Yet, these moves were dependent, first and foremost, on the states' ability to extract the resources needed for maintaining and expanding the army. As indicated above, taxation was, before 1640, the prerogative of the local Estates: the crown was constitutionally banned and physically incapable of deciding and implementing an independent taxation policy. The changing of the financial

²⁰⁹ Rodney Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," in *The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830*, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2000), pp. 59-66, White, *The Prussian Army*, pp. 63-78.

landscape in the next 100 years went hand in hand with the process of monopolization of the means of violence, each of them serving as a necessary condition and as means of implementation of the other. In this 100 years taxation of Brandenburg-Prussia's population was centralized, modernized and increased manifolds.

As the Thirty Years War was approaching its end, the Elector wished he could continue the flow of taxation to its coffers in order to sustain the state's standing army, so as to be prepared for future wars in a still dangerous area. Through a series of struggles with the Estates in his various territories, not always successful, Frederick William gradually manage to impose two forms of permanent taxes on his subjects. In the towns, an indirect tax, the *Excise*, outgrew from wartime contributions to mercenary armies. Though initially intending to impose this tax on its entire territory, the elector gave up to the Junkers demands and imposed the Excise only on the towns. A direct tax, the *Contribution*, was collected in the countryside, but this, again, exempted the nobles.²¹⁰

This dual taxation system endured until the Napoleonic Wars, but the method of their assessment collection and administration changed significantly. Collection and administration of the *Excise*, for example, was under the responsibility of municipal authorities and the town's *alderman* until the 1670's. Then, the Elector entrusted the overseeing, collection and auditing of these taxes to the *commissarius loci* (the local branches of the *Generalkriegskommissariat*, the General War Commissaries). This was initially a military agency, structured in a hierarchal way and controlled by the crown.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Rudolf Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 268-70.

²¹¹ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, 196-97, Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 91-92.

The burden of taxes in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia was, no doubt, a very high one, in comparison to the standards of the times. In 1688, for example, Prussia was extracting from its population twice the per capita sum in taxes than France (with a much more prosperous population) did. An efficient tax system managed to turn this burden into high revenues for the state, which, in addition to the taxes, enjoyed a large income from the crown's domains.²¹² During the Great Elector's reign, Brandenburg-Prussia's revenues trebled to over 3 million thalers, while its portion that came of taxes (about half in 1688) quadrupled.²¹³ The grandson of the Great Elector, King Frederick William I, has done much to restructure the machinery of taxation, making it more efficient and more centralized. He thus managed to do away with any foreign subsidies (which were still substantial at the time of his father), while increasing the number of troops in his army from 40,000 in 1713 to 80,000 in 1740 and leaving a substantial war chest for his successor.²¹⁴

This financial burden, of course, was not carried equally: the peasants and the towns suffered much more than the nobility. Even for the latter, however, this burden sometimes seemed excessive. In 1717, for example, the East Prussian nobility complained in a letter to King Frederick William I that his new taxes would ruin the country. "The whole country will be ruined?" the king bluntly replied, "I don't believe, but I believe the Junkers' right to political opposition will be ruined. I will stabilize the princely sovereignty like a rock of bronze"²¹⁵ By the time of his successor, King Frederick II ("Frederick the Great"), however, little resistance to the state's internal expansion is evident.

²¹² Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," 295-96, Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 97-98, Edgar Kiser, and Schneider, Joachim, "Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia," *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 2 (1994): 187-204.

²¹³ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, p. 266.

²¹⁴ Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism."

²¹⁵ Quoted in Hagen Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," in *The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830*, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2000), 207-08.

The military, indeed, received the lion share of the tax revenues. Systematic data is hard to find, but some examples could well illustrate the point. The taxes collected by the relatively inefficient system during the reign of the Great Elector (1640-1688) were never sufficient to finance his 30,000-man standing army. This fact explains the Frederick Williams' extraordinary efforts to pursue more payment of taxes, and to manage them more efficiently, as well as his willingness to risk highly contentious struggles with the Estates.²¹⁶ Even during the reign of the least militaristic of the Hohenzollerns, King Frederick I (1688-1713), the army got 2.2 million thalers of the 2.5 million thalers that were collected annually as tax revenue. While this number does not include data from the domains of the king himself (most of the 1.5 million thalers of revenue from there went for the court's expenses and for investment in civilian projects, such as universities and infrastructure), they also not include considerable foreign subsidies (some 14 million thalers during Frederick I reign), which were given in return for military assistance and were by and large directed back to the military. All in all, then, Frederick I, often regarded as the one Prussian king who neglected the army, allowed it to swallow more than half of his overall income.²¹⁷ By 1740 (the year of Frederick the Great's ascendance to the throne), roughly 80 percent of Prussia's expenditures (of about 10 million thalers) went to the army. The results were that Brandenburg-Prussia could pitch in the international arena well beyond its relative size, population or economic development.

c) Development of State Bureaucracy

The development of the highly effective (relative to its time and the existing technology) and centralized Prussian bureaucracy is connected at its heart to both the military and the taxation

²¹⁶ Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*, 250-52.

²¹⁷ Linda Frey, and Frey, Marsha, *Frederick I: The Man and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 156-57.

discussed above. The civilian bureaucracy has gradually developed out of the military one, and its chief object was the enhancement of the state's revenues, which served primarily for military purposes. As Otto Hintze commented, "It is no secret that the eighteenth century Prussian administrative organization derived its characteristic features from the commissarial authorities that had chiefly developed out of the military commissary."²¹⁸

Until the Thirty Years War, regular peacetime administration (like the extraordinary wartime taxation) was the domain of local and provincial nobility. As discussed above, during the reign of the Great Elector the military authority (and related taxation) were appropriated by the Prince and his central apparatus. Gradually, the military administration, working under the authority of royal decrees, rather than under the traditional rule of law, was expanded to include more and more civilian functions, until it virtually swallowed the old administrative mechanism.

The General War Commissaries was a body that the Great Elector created as an extraordinary measure designed to mobilize scarce resources "in face of a dangerous military situation in which the country's sovereignty was threatened."²¹⁹ However, with the 1672 war against France (and the later one against Sweden) these functions swelled. The Commissaries (through the *commissarius loci*), which at first concentrated on collecting taxes for military purposes, intervened more and more in local administration, appointments and regulations. By the 1680's these state officials were already in charge of most municipal tasks, including policing, judiciary and administrative appointments. The autonomy of the town's traditional authorities was greatly eroded. "These tax collectors were the standard-bearers of the royal authority in every part of the

²¹⁸ Hintze, "The Formation of the State," 269.

²¹⁹ Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 92.

Elector's territories, and inevitably their duties led them to encroach upon the jurisdiction of local magnates and municipal administration." ²²⁰

The second wave of administrative reforms took place under the reign of Frederick William I (1713-1740). This wholesale reorganization of the state apparatus consisted of a few parallel moves. First, it centralized the organization of administration, under the new name of the General Directory (at the top level) and the Board of War and Domains (at the provincial levels). In contrast to the old General War Commissaries, these new bodies were to include also the administration of the King's personal domains. Second, it deepened even further the authority of the commissars at every level while, at the same time, broadened the geographical scope of their authority to include all Prussian territories (some parts, such as East-Prussia and Pomerania were not included under the Commissaries authority hitherto). Third, the civil administration ceased to be under the authority of the military command and gained its own relative independence (still subject, of course, to the decrees of the King). ²²¹

When the civilian administration was again separated from that of the military, then, it already possessed all the characteristics of the latter. Now, by the mid eighteenth century, both the military and the civilian administrations worked under the same strict and direct control and supervision of the monarch, and by virtue of secret decrees, rather than open and regular rules. ²²²

Another administrative innovation of Frederick William I was the military organization of Prussia by the "Canton System," a centrally controlled regional system of recruitment and administration of the military, which further enabled the penetration of the military into civilian

²²⁰ Quotation from Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, 14. See also Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, 196-97, Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 91-92.

²²¹ Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 143-44, Hintze, "The Formation of the State," 272-75, Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*, 39, 155.

²²² Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 141, Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," 61, Kiser, "Bureaucracy and Efficiency," 194.

affairs and the militarization of the Prussian society. Moreover, the military affected civilian bureaucracy in yet another way. From the mid seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, military veterans (and especially wounded veterans) came to dominate administrative recruitment and gain preferences over any civilian with no military background for bureaucratic appointments. In that way the Prussian military dominated not only the structure of civilian administration, but also its spirit. The harsh and disciplined style, which characterized the Prussian military, came to typify the civilian administration as well.²²³

d) Services and Public Goods

As discussed in chapter 4, another indicator by which to measure the effects of the pushing and pulling of geo-strategic territorial pressures is the extent and the distribution of states' investment and the supply of social services and / or political rights. When a ruler faces a territorial threat from outside he or she should be willing to bargain with his or her subjects and reach political and economic compromises in order to gain political support, manpower, or money for the military.

In the age of absolutism, "giving away" political rights was, of course, not a part of the Brandenburg-Prussia's Hohenzollerns' agenda.²²⁴ In the 18th century this drive for absolutism might have been predominantly ideological. In 1640, however, the centralization of the state was chiefly, as discussed above, a reaction to external threat and the perception that the state's weakness stems first and foremost precisely from the existing political rights of the Estates. In a limited sense, though, the Great Elector was willing to compromise with his nobility, in order to

²²³ Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," pp. 56-66, Kiser, "Bureaucracy and Efficiency," 194-95, Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*, 64-65.

²²⁴ For some possible reasons, see Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*.

gain their political and financial support. In what is termed “the bargain of 1653,” Frederick allowed Brandenburg’s Junkers to enhance their control over their own estates and become, in effect, almost absolute rulers of their lands and their peasants. The Junkers also were, for the most part, exempt from paying the Excise tax, which fell disproportionately on the town’s burghers. In return, the Estates (controlled by the nobility) agreed to finance, for a limited time, Frederick’s standing army. As discussed above, this enabled the Elector to coerce his way to an ever-expanding strength of the military and the state. Yet, the bargain of the crown with the nobility, which expanded later under more or less similar conditions to other parts of the Hohenzollern’s territory, withstood the test of time and extended until the 19th century. While the Junkers were given a great authority over their lands and their peasants, as well as substantial exemptions from taxation, they served as the backbone of the army and the state bureaucracy.²²⁵

When looking at supply of public goods and economic investment in historical cases, one should move cautiously, since the concept of the welfare state and the extended role of the state in investment and in bettering the life of its citizens is a feature of the 20th century, and thus hardly fit as a yardstick by which to measure an Early Modern European case. One needs to examine each historical case in light of its specific historical context.

Taking this into account, we can nevertheless draw some very interesting insights from Brandenburg-Prussia’s investment and social policy. While a very harsh and militaristic society (especially under King Frederick William I), Brandenburg-Prussia was one of the most advanced welfare states by the standards of the 17th and 18th centuries. The rulers of the Hohenzollern house between 1640 and 1740 realized that a better educated, healthier and safer society could serve as the basis of a better army and produce more surplus to sustain this army. “While [King Frederick William I] sought to bring efficiency to the courts, to civil service, and to business

²²⁵ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, pp. 202-28, 70-74, Hagen, “Seventeenth-Century Crisis.”

ventures,” Jonathan White tells us, “the underlying purpose of his reforms was to create a state that could support his vast military organization.”²²⁶ Accordingly, they invested in various aspects of public life in their territories. Public safety was a prime consideration, and policing of both urban and rural setting, although always limited in success, advanced significantly. Firefighting in the towns developed as well. Urban development was promoted by such measures as building of roads, wells and street cleaning. Measures were taken to advance the public health and both private and public schooling, at every level.²²⁷

In terms of economic policy, as well, the Hohenzollern rulers’ aim was to create a larger base for taxation and recruitment. Accordingly, they sought to expand both agriculture and commerce. They faced huge obstacles in this endeavor, though. The poor soil and the scarcity of labor, the result of the Thirty Years War, greatly diminished the agriculture in Brandenburg-Prussia. The rulers tried to overcome these obstacles through restricting the freedom of peasants, but also through the encouragement of immigration, and providing of incentives to the cultivation of new (or deserted) tracts of land.²²⁸

The position of the industry was even less hospitable. In addition to the chronic scarce of labor, the towns’ industry and commerce suffered from both competition with cheaper and better quality imports and, most notably, from the result of the state’s own taxation system. In order to solve the issue of foreign competition, Brandenburg-Prussia, in par with the mercantilist dogma of the day, prevented import of many items.²²⁹ For the Hohenzollerns, economic development was more important than religious denomination and, thus, they accepted the Huguenots (which

²²⁶ White, *The Prussian Army*, p. 73.

²²⁷ For a comprehensive survey of these policies see Reinhold A. Dorwart, *The Prussian Welfare State before 1740* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

²²⁸ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, p. 269.

²²⁹ Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," p. 60-61.

were deported from France) and various other immigrants and refugee communities²³⁰ to settle in their towns, and their entrepreneurial spirit indeed helped to create some initial industry. By and large, however, the heavy burden of taxation virtually stifled economic enterprises, and Prussia-Brandenburg's towns' commercial activity remained weak in comparison to their counterparts in Western Europe.²³¹

As indicated above, not only the extent of government spending is important, but its direction as well. Continuing territorial threats might promote investments in the periphery, in the form of military defense or of economic investments. Investment in the center, or the capital city, is, of course, likely to continue, but is not likely to be very disproportional to investment in other areas.

Again, systematic data on the distribution of funding and forces in the 17th century Brandenburg-Prussia is not available. However, it is clear that the Great Elector was not concentrating his monies and forces in the center, at the expenses of the periphery (as we will see happens in today's weak states). Brandenburg's Estates, for example, feared after the Thirty Years War that by raising taxes to pay for the protection of faraway territories such as the lower Rhine provinces or those in the Baltics, it would draw itself into war, rather than avoid it, and further even more the burden on its already improvised population. These lands, they argued, are foreign and not worthy of their scarce resources. The Prince, however, had his own agenda, and it did not include the giving up of territory (to the French, in this case).²³² Apart from the decisive war with the Swedes in 1675 and some crucial battles during the late stages of the Seven Years War, Brandenburg-Prussia's frequent exercising of its military forces in the period of this

²³⁰ These included also Jews that were expelled from Vienna in 1671, Waldensians from Piedmont in 1686, and Mennonites. www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germany/braabsdom.html

²³¹ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, pp.267-68.

²³² *Ibid.*, 183-84, Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*, 246.

study was overwhelmingly in defense of peripheral provinces or in attempts to expand territory (which was, inevitably, also to become a new periphery). Therefore, one can conclude that the flow of money took usually took a centrifugal shape, rather than centripetal one.

Although Frederick III (later Frederick I) spent much more in Berlin, and especially in his court, than in other parts of the state, his son, Frederick William I, revert back to the habits of the Great Elector in terms of investing: the court was again reduced to bare minimum and the army regained its primacy.

In terms of the public spending, services and investment facets of state building, then, Brandenburg-Prussia of 1640-1740 portrays a mixed picture. The state of the Hohenzollerns was, compares to its era, a welfare state. It supplies towns with such common goods as public safety, roads, water sources and cleanliness. In terms of assisting economic development, however, the Hohenzollerns largely failed in their effort, mainly since it collided with the constant need for cash to pay for the oversized army. Even the one area in which they failed to promote state building, then, could be attributed to the Prussian need to both secure their territorial possessions and augment them.

e) Ingroup Cohesion

As stated in Hypothesis 1, a flexible borders' world should, at least in theory, create threats and opportunities that are likely to strengthen the socio-political cohesiveness of states. Has this happened in Brandenburg-Prussia between 1640 and 1740? The answer is yes, but only in a very limited sense.

As seen from the discussion above, the drive for state building and centralization was overwhelmingly a top-down process, and not vice versa. However, one can still argue that while

the territorial pressure did not by itself create a cohesive community out of the scattered territories of the Hohenzollerns, it facilitated this process in two ways. First, while the Thirty Years War and subsequent geopolitical pressures do not seem, by themselves, to bolster the legitimacy of the Hohenzollern rule, they certainly eroded the legitimacy of the rule of the Estates. In the towns, the leadership of the *alders*, the old town nobility, was increasingly questioned and challenged.²³³ In the countryside, meanwhile, the war created a sense of anarchy regarding the peasant-lord relations.²³⁴ With the legitimacy and power of the Estates thus decreasing, the new initiatives of the center to gain more and more control over Brandenburg-Prussia were better positioned to succeed. It is unlikely that the Estates would have given up their powers without putting up a much fiercer resistance had the war not crippled their legitimacy already.

Second, while patriotism at the popular level certainly did not exist in 17th and 18th Brandenburg-Prussia, the nobility gradually developed a considerable attachment to the state. Through their service at the army and at the state bureaucracy, the Junkers come to see the fate of the monarchy as their own fate. By the end of the Great Elector's reign, "the officers' corps became a reliable, strictly monarchical corporation, animated by common ideas; its members began to feel themselves not as Pomeranian or Prussian [in the limited sense of coming from East Prussia], but as owing loyalty to a wider entity, the Hohenzollern state."²³⁵ Accordingly, they could (and were) be used by the crown against the Estates of their own province, even though being part of it.²³⁶

²³³ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, pp. 193-99.

²³⁴ Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis."

²³⁵ Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, p. 272.

²³⁶ *Ibid.* While in the first part of the 18th there were still remnants of suspicions towards the Crown among the territorial elite, they never amounted to anything closer to an open rebellion. For a discussion of this issue, see Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism."

D. Brandenburg-Prussia: Summary

To sum up the Prussian case: Brandenburg-Prussia of 1640 was a very weak and vulnerable state in a very rough environment, in which territorial wars and territorial conquests were becoming the norm. These pressures compelled the Great Elector and his successors to embark on the costly and often dangerous path of state building. They confronted the resistance of the Estates, mainly the nobility, and endured this opposition through a combination of coercion and cooptation. Gradually, the state gained the monopoly over the use of force and the means to sustain this force. The state penetration of the society deepened as the needs of the ever-expanding military required bureaucratization and centralization of authority. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is strongly supported by the Prussian case: state institutions indeed grew stronger as a result of the threats and opportunities supplied by an international environment in which territorial conquests and annexations are prevalent. One could not that easily confirm the role of Hypothesis 1b in this case. While the legitimacy of the old order in Brandenburg-Prussia's society did weaken as a result of the wars, and while there are some hints for the Prussian elite developing a stronger affiliation of the state, there is no strong and direct evidence to confirm the link between territorial pressures and the strengthening of the in-group socio-political cohesion in this case. Hypothesis 1c, which relates the strengthening of the state to a mechanism of selection, could not, of course, be deduced from a single case study. One can only say, at this point, that while Brandenburg-Prussia gathered strength some of its neighbors did not take the same path, a fact that will cost them dearly, in territorial loss. The ultimate example, though by no means the only one, is Poland, which lost its independence in the late 18th century.²³⁷

²³⁷ Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, pp. 140-56.

Chapter 5: Argentina 1810-1880

The purpose of the case of 19th century Argentina is to add another layer of verification to the relation between territorial wars and state building in an era in which borders were not fixed. By studying a case outside of Europe, and one that is situated in a different time frame and a different context (post-colonial), this section also broadens the application of the theory and sets the stage for the study of the contemporary cases, which are discussed in the next chapter.

In the first half-century after its 1810 independence, Argentina as a single state was virtually non-existent. By the 1880's, however, Argentina was much stronger state. Although probably still weaker than 18th century Prussia, it saw significant progress in the project of augmenting state authority, legitimacy, and institutions. In a similar way to the study of Brandenburg-Prussia that was conducted in the previous section, this section documents the Argentinean case from 1810 to 1880 in order to study the effects of territorial war on the state building process. Again, I follow the Hypothesis 1, offered above with regard to weak states in a system in which the border fixity norm is absent, and assess whether the Argentinean case fits this hypothesis. I find that Argentina largely fits this hypothesis, but with a twist: as the territorial pressures on 19th century Argentina were less severe than these endured by Brandenburg-Prussia, the end result of state building was significant, but still less total than in the former case.

A. Buenos Aires and Rio de la Plata in 1810: A City Aspires to be a State

The Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata was established in 1776 as an attempt by the Bourbon kings of Spain to reform their South American empire in the face of their declining power vis-à-vis other European powers, most of all, Britain. The results, however, were both domestic (South

American) discontent and an escalating international competition in the Atlantic Ocean and its South American shores. In 1806 this competition led to a British occupation of Buenos Aires. Eventually, Spain regained control of the Viceroyalty capital, but the force that defeated the British was a local porteño (natives of Buenos Aires) militia, not the Spanish troops or the Viceroy, who escaped to Cordoba. This victory gave Buenos Aires a glimpse of independence and a first experience of the waning power of Spain.²³⁸ When, in 1810, news arrived from Europe that Napoleon Bonaparte has seized control of Spain and deposed the King, Buenos Aires was first among the Latin American colonies to react: a gathering of influential citizens in Buenos Aires, the *cabildo abierto* (open town meeting), seized – in the name of the Spanish King, Ferdinand III – power from the Spanish Viceroy of the Rio de la Plata (River Plate). Thus began the wars of independence of what would later become Argentina.²³⁹

As discussed in Chapter 6, the Rio de la Plata, part of which would become Argentina, enjoyed in 1810 little in the way of favorable conditions for a successful project of state building. It was a vast land, sparsely populated, and containing within its nominal borders diverse groups of people, who often had different cultural traits, distinct social systems, and opposing economic interests.

Geographically speaking, Buenos Aires faced the almost impossible challenge of uniting an area encompassing about one third of the continent. Rio de la Plata could be divided roughly into five regions, differing vastly in cultural, economic and geographical traits (See Figure 6). First, the province of Buenos Aires was characterized by the economic combination of reliance on

²³⁸ Lyman L. Johnson, "The Military as Catalyst of Change in Late Colonial Buenos Aires," in *Revolution and Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860.*, ed. Mark D. Szuchman, and Brown, Jonathan C. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, pp. 41-53.

²³⁹ Johnson, "The Military as Catalyst.", David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 73-76, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 41-43.

foreign trade (as the entrepôt for the system of rivers of the Parana and the Uruguay), and by the pastoral economy of its vast hinterland. What became the littoral provinces—Entre Rios, Santa Fe, and Corrientes (within the colonial borders of Buenos Aires Intendency) and Misiones, to which one could add Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay)—were dependent to a significant degree on the trade over the Parana and Uruguay. The littoral economy, a mix of agriculture, small industry and livestock, was vulnerable to foreign competition and to Buenos Aires' control (and taxation) of the navigation of the rivers. Therefore, it was bent on demands for protectionism. The Intendency of Paraguay was the most isolated region and differed markedly from the rest of the country in its demographic traits. A large portion of the population was Mestizos (a mix of Spaniard and the indigenous Guarani) and its economy was based on agriculture, and especially on the yerba mate crop. The Interior provinces included the Intendancies of Salta and Cordoba and the Governorship of Chiquitos. While different from each other, all shared an economic orientation toward the east, whether the mines of Potosi, or Chile, across the Andes. Lastly, Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia), included the colonial Intendancies of Potosi, Charcas, Cochabamba, and La Paz, as well as the Governorship of Moxos. It was a traditional economic center of the Viceroyalty, with its huge silver mines, and an insatiable need for mules and tools for the mining enterprise. Upper Peru's social structure was different than that of other provinces, and was based on a more rigid differentiation between the Indian majority and the small white (Creoles and *Peninsulares*- Spaniards) upper class. In this sense, as well as economically, Upper Peru resembled Peru more than it did the rest of the River Plate area.²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Halperin-Donghi, *Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina*, pp. 3-64, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 1-15.

As in 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia, here geographical, social, and economic disunity translated into political disunity. In the first half of the 19th century, Argentina did not exist as a single state. Even after the wars of independence subsided in the earlier 1820's and Spain was finally defeated as an important factor in South American politics, the country (now significantly smaller, with the succession of Bolivia and Paraguay, and Uruguay under Brazilian control) was by no means a unified whole. For the next 30 to 40 years, Argentina found itself in the grip of a constant struggle between the center and the provinces, in which the center never achieved a full control over the entire territory. "The elimination of the royal authority resulted in fourteen autonomous provinces based largely on colonial municipalities. In this situation the *caudillo*²⁴¹ emerged as the principal element of local order."²⁴²

Argentina was engaged in a constant struggle between the hegemonic pretensions of Buenos-Aires and the centrifugal drive for autonomy of the provinces. Civil wars and wars among the various caudillos were commonplace in Argentina in the first part of the 19th century.²⁴³ That ultimate condition of stateness, a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, then, was clearly lacking.

The breakdown of colonialism and the protracted wars of independence, moreover, left Argentina's administration and governing machinery (to the small extent that it existed before) a shambles.²⁴⁴ In this area, as well, the reach of Buenos Aires was very limited in the first decades after independence. Most of the taxes Buenos Aires could extract, because of its strategic

²⁴¹ Caudillos were semi-feudal ranchers who oftentimes exhibited typical warlord characteristics and commanded private militias.

²⁴² James R. Scobie, *Argentina: A City and a Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 91.

²⁴³ Fernando Lopez-Alves counts at least seventeen such cases of civil war and major revolts against the central government between the end of the independence wars and 1880. See Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 160-61. See also Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 30-41, J.G. Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," in *States in History*, ed. J.A. Hall (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 255-56.

²⁴⁴ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 51.

location, were import and export duties. Other, more direct, taxing, was virtually impossible, first and foremost because of the lack of territorial control, but also due to the lack of institutions needed to collect and manage these monies.²⁴⁵ The judiciary system, as well, was for the most part given to the administration of the local caudillos, rather than being a part of the central state administration, and the schools were the sole prerogative of the church. Until 1857 there was not even a common constitution that applied to the whole of Argentina.²⁴⁶

The authority of the central government in Buenos Aires was challenged on two different levels. The first level, until about 1824, was the Spanish reluctance to see its colonies taken. Spain posed a significant and continuous challenge to the revolutionary regime in Buenos Aires not only because it was still a formidable military and naval power, that had various degrees of success against the porteños' army, and successfully denied Buenos Aires the control of Paraguay, Upper Peru and, up to 1814 also Uruguay (more details below). Spain also posed a challenge in terms of the continuous support it received from various segments of the population in the River Plate provinces.

The second level of challenge was the reluctance of the provinces to accept the superiority and the control of Buenos Aires. Cast either in the form of attempts to succeed or in federalist language (and usually both at different stages), the provinces of Paraguay, Upper Peru, Banda Oriental, the Littoral, and the Interior were in a constant struggle with Buenos Aires over the legitimate form of relations and political governance in the former Rio de la Plata. As the center did not possess the power to subjugate the separatist or federalist aspiration of the provinces,

²⁴⁵ Miguel A. Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *American Journal of Sociology* 6 (1997).

²⁴⁶ Halperin-Donghi, *Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina, 1516-1987*, pp. 79-80.

these challenges often translated into *de facto* long periods of independence and separate rule for the center and the provinces.²⁴⁷

B. Territorial Pressures in 19th Century South America

“Looking at the nineteenth century South America...one sees patterns of peace and war, interventions, territorial predation, alliances, arms-racing, and power-balancing quite similar to those found in eighteenth century Europe.”²⁴⁸ Argentina was no exception and, as can be seen in Table 6 below, it engaged in international wars almost throughout the entire 1810-1880 period, with only short respites. Most of these wars involved multiple campaigns and often multiple adversaries.

The wars of independence, which lingered from 1810 to the early 1820's, were viewed very differently from different vantage points. From the Spanish point of view these were simple rebellions, which had to be crushed, by brutal force if necessary. Spain could not afford to lose Rio de la Plata, not so much because of its intrinsic value as because of the precedent the loss might set for its entire colonial possessions. For the provinces, it was at the same time a war for independence from Spain and from the pretensions of Buenos Aires. While some elites in the provinces still saw the 1810's Spain as a legitimate ruler, they did not think the porteños enjoyed a similar mandate. What matters most for the purpose of this study, however, is Buenos Aires' point of view, which depicted the war as being both about asserting the Creole right of independence from the Spanish empire and about their legal and practical right to inherit the entire Spanish Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata and as well as preserving its borders. In these tasks, they faced many challenges and threats.

²⁴⁷ Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization.", Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina.", Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 113-31.

²⁴⁸ Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, p. 152.

Table 6: Argentina's International Wars, 1810-1880²⁴⁹

| Name of War | Year(s) | Participates | Territorial Results? |
|--|-------------------------|--|--|
| Wars of Independence | 1810-1824 | Rio de la Plata (Argentina) against Spain and Royalists in Upper Peru (Bolivia), Paraguay, Banda Oriental (Uruguay), and against Brazil (Portugal) | Loss of Upper Peru, Paraguay and Banda Oriental |
| Cisplatine/Uruguayan Independence | 1825-1828 | United Provinces (Argentina) against Brazil. Both had supporters in Banda Oriental | Uruguay gains independence |
| Invasion of Peru-Bolivia Confederation | 1837-1838 | Buenos Aires and Chile vs. Peru-Bolivia Confederation | <i>Status-quo ante</i> |
| Guerra Grande/War of La Plata | 1836-1851 | Buenos-Aires and some Argentine Provinces vs. Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Britain, France, and some Argentine provinces | Argentina repels invasion attempts and survives the naval blockade |
| Triple Alliance/Paraguayan War | 1864-1870 | Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay vs. Paraguay | The Triple Alliance wins Argentina gain some territory |
| War with the Indians | Repeatedly 1810-1979 | Buenos Aires and Provinces Vs. Indian tribes | Buenos Aires expand southward |

²⁴⁹ Sources: Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 44, Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 160-63, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 41-53, 93-104, 13-25, 313-32, 67-69.

The most intense threat to the whole revolutionary project was presented, until spring 1814, by the Spanish presence and control of Montevideo. Even if one discounts the possibility of the Spanish forces in the Banda Oriental to pose, by themselves, a threat to Buenos Aires, their base could have served as a launching ground from two directions. Montevideo, as a port that lies on the banks of the Plata River, closer to the mouth of the Atlantic than to Buenos Aires, some 125 miles away, could have served as an entrepôt and a base camp for re-conquest expeditions from Spain. The proximity of Montevideo to Buenos Aires also made it a center of the re-conquest plans of the Spanish forces in Peru, the center of the South American colony. Indeed, after two expeditions that tried to wrest Montevideo from the Spanish and failed, by 1814 “it become critical [for Buenos Aires] to capture Montevideo in order to eliminate it as a base of operation for the Spanish navy, as a possible port of disembarkation for a Spanish Army, and as a potential supply center for Royalist army moving southward from Upper-Peru.”²⁵⁰

In May 1814 the Spanish surrendered in Montevideo, but while the city was captured by Buenos Aires, the countryside was ruled by local (Orientales) *caudillos*, headed by Jose Artigas. In 1816, however, Brazil (still a Portuguese colony) entered the fray in the Banda Oriental, and by 1820 it defeated both the overstretched forces of the United Provinces of South America (Argentina’s name after the 1816 Congress of Tucuman) and Artigas. Portugal annexed Banda Oriental in 1819, calling it the Cisplatine Province of Brazil.²⁵¹

Upper Peru, with the declining but still important silver mines of Potosi, was a much-coveted prize for both Argentina and the Royalists still entrenched in Lima. As early as 1809, La Paz was the first city in Latin America to declare independence from Spanish rule. Nevertheless, as the

²⁵⁰ Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, p. 41-50, quote from p. 49.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

Viceroy's forces soon defeated the rebellion, the region remained a Royalist stronghold for years to come. Forces from Buenos Aires and other Argentinean provinces tried repeatedly to take possession of the provinces of Upper Peru. Some of these expeditions indeed succeeded in conquering significant parts of it, but reinforcements from Peru always managed, with significant help of the local elites, to restore the Spanish rule. On the other hand, Royalist attempts to use Upper Peru as a base to regain the east provinces of Argentina failed as well: "Annually between 1817 and 1822 the Royalists in Upper Peru invaded Rio de la Plata... the revolutionaries of Rio de la Plata felt, therefore, seriously threatened by Royalist forces."²⁵²

The repeated failure of the expeditions to Upper Peru persuaded one of the leading figures who joined the revolution in Buenos Aires to try a different method to deal with the persisting Spanish threat. Jose de San Martin, who would become second only to Bolivar in the pantheon of Latin American liberators, figured that the only way to rid Rio de la Plata of the Spanish menace was to attack the core of the Spanish empire: Lima. He assembled, trained, and equipped a force of over 5,000 men, who crossed the Andes in 1817, to advance on Santiago (Chile), and eventually take Lima by sea. Although it was Bolivar who ultimately defeated the Spanish at Upper Peru, San Martin's forces did much to enable this scenario, allowing Bolivia to declare independence by 1825.²⁵³ Thus, by the mid 1820's, Buenos Aires lost the hope of controlling Upper Peru, but was no longer threatened by the Spanish forces operating from this high altitude base.

Compared to Argentina, the struggle for Paraguay was much shorter and more decisive. Asuncion was remote, hardly accessible, and offered neither the coveted silver of Upper Peru nor the strategic location of Montevideo. A combined force of Spanish troops and Paraguayan

²⁵² Ibid., pp. 52.

²⁵³ Ibid., pp. 41-70. See also Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, pp. 80-83.

Creoles defeated the expeditionary force sent by Buenos Aires and forced its leader, Manuel Belgrano, to sign a truce. In effect, this truce led to the independence of Paraguay, as an 1811 rebellion led by Jose Francia deposed the Spanish rule. Francia became the dictator of an independent Paraguay.²⁵⁴

By the mid 1820's, Spain was routed throughout South America and no longer posed a threat to the new nation (on paper) of the United Provinces of South America (Argentina). Throughout the decade and a half of the independence wars, as well as several decades after them, the center in Buenos Aires was in a constant struggle with many of the provinces in the Littoral and the Interior. These struggles are dealt with below, in a discussion of the consolidation of power.

The United Provinces enjoyed only a brief respite between the international wars, and in 1825 they were already engaged in another war with Brazil (which was by now independent of Portugal), the Cisplatine War, or the War of Uruguayan Independence. The United Provinces, together with their Orientales allies, challenged Brazil's rule in Montevideo. Brazil, as well, was supported by its share of the local population, although they were probably less numerous than the supporters of the United Provinces. The war was conducted by land and by sea, and included a Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires. After three years of fighting, the war drew to a stalemate, with neither side managing to claim a decisive victory. Both Brazil and the United Provinces faced serious internal challenges and thus they agreed to British mediation, which brought the conflict to an end by creating a new independent state, Uruguay, as a buffer state between the two.²⁵⁵

The late 1830's saw the abortive attempt by the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires (the United Provinces did not function as a single entity at the time) to invade the newly

²⁵⁴ Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 83, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 44-45.

²⁵⁵ Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, pp. 102-03, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 93-104.

established confederation of Peru and Bolivia. The main reasons for Rosas' involvement in that war between the confederation and Chile were a territorial dispute over the province of Tarija and a perception of the confederation as a possible future threat to the United Provinces.²⁵⁶

The same years also saw the beginning of what came to be the Guerra Grande, a war which lasted, on and off, for fifteen years. This was a war that mixed internal and external struggles for power. The Guerra Grande pitted Buenos Aires (led by Rosas), its Federalist allies in the provinces, and the Blancos party in Uruguay, against the Unitarists (the liberal porteño party, mostly exiled in Montevideo), the Colorado party of Uruguay, and France and Britain. In the war's later stages, Brazil also joined the forces opposing Rosas. While involving a prolonged (and not very effective) naval French and British blockade of Buenos Aires and occasional land invasions of the province, the protagonists never really threatened the United Provinces as a state or its borders. The fight was, instead, over political control in both Buenos Aires and Montevideo. In December 1851, a coalition of forces, led by General Justo Jose Urquiza, finally defeated Rosas and ended his prolonged and controversial rule over Buenos Aires.²⁵⁷ Although internal war between Buenos Aires and the provinces, as well as campaigns against the Indians persisted (to be discussed below), Argentina was free for the next dozen years from an international war.

The next international war, the last in which Argentina was involved in the 19th century, was the War of the Triple Alliance, or the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870. This war involved an alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against tiny Paraguay. Despite the obvious imbalance, this was a long, protracted war, and the bloodiest in the history of South America since the wars

²⁵⁶ Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 117-18.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-23.

of independence.²⁵⁸ For Argentina, now nominally unified under the presidency of General Bartolome Mitre, the involvement in the war arose from both defensive and expansionist motives.²⁵⁹ On the expansionist side, Argentina and Paraguay disputed the control of an area 36,000 square miles wide. Argentina won this territory after the defeat of the Paraguay. The fact that gaining this territory was entered into the contract of the Triple Alliance in advance proves it was not simply an afterthought of the victory, but one of the wars' motives.

The more serious reason for Argentina's involvement in the war, however, was defensive in nature. Argentina was threatened by Paraguay for three distinct yet related reasons. The first reason was that Paraguay, despite its small size and limited resources, managed to field a formidable military, in South American terms. The "Prussia of South America" had between 38,000 and 57,000 men under arms,²⁶⁰ and its leader, Francisco Solano Lopez, entertained hopes of playing a major role in the regional balance of power. Indeed, it was Lopez who brought Argentina into the war by invading its territory and seizing the city of Corrientes on the Paraguay River, on his way to Uruguay. Second, even more than the direct threat it posed, Lopez was a threat to Argentina through his active attempts (and his likely potential) to create alliances with forces inside Argentina's Littoral and Interior to challenge Buenos Aires once again. The precarious national unity that Mitre's government was trying to achieve was constantly threatened by centrifugal forces in the provinces, which sought autonomy and a lifting of Buenos Aires's burden. *Caudillos* uprisings, like "El Chaco" in La-Rioja province in 1863, were common throughout the 1860's. Lopez was a natural ally in those revolts and, thus, a grave

²⁵⁸ Paraguay lost almost its entire male population, about 300,000. Brazil lost 100,000, Argentina 20,000 and Uruguay about 1,500. See *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²⁵⁹ For surveys of the war, its origins and its causes, see Diego Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models," *Latin American Research Review* 22, no. 2 (1987), Pelham H. Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 312-32.

²⁶⁰ For different estimations, see Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance," pp. 54-55, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, p. 314.

threat to Buenos Aires.²⁶¹ David Rock, therefore, argues: "Mitre needed little inducement to join forces [with Brazil and Uruguay] as he feared that an alliance between Lopez and Urquiza might emerge and subsequently support dissident *caudillos* like Veraola [the heir of "El Chaco"] in the interior".²⁶² Mitre's aim was, therefore, "to remove the internal threat to his regime by kicking away its external props."²⁶³

Paraguay, though, was a threat in yet another, less direct, sense. It stood as a fairly successful example of separatism (from the Rio de la Plata) and of *caudillo*-like anti-liberal rule. It was the model that the Argentinean Interior was lacking. A war on Paraguay and on Lopez would also be, therefore, a war upon separatism and upon *caudillismo* as a socio-political principle, which Mitre perceived to pose a great threat to Argentina.²⁶⁴ It is no wonder, then, that Juan Batista Alberdi (the author of the 1853 Argentinean constitution and a prominent figure in the opposition to Mitre) argued that "The problem of Paraguay is nothing more than another face of the problem of Argentina's interior. The question of the provinces is the sole cause and origin of the Paraguayan war."²⁶⁵

Lastly, one should pay attention to the wars with the Indians. The Indians were, of course, not a foreign state per se. They were, however, a foreign threat to Argentineans, and a mostly territorial threat at that. By the early 1800's the Indians of the pampas, known collectively as the Ranqueles, were not very numerous, but controlled (or at least prevented others from controlling) huge swaths of land in the southern part of the province of Buenos Aires. Although the Spanish crown claimed the entire Southern Cone of the continent as its own, it never colonized or

²⁶¹ William H. Kattr, *The Argentine Generation of 1837: Echeverria, Alberdi, Sarmiento, Mitre* (London: Associated University Press, 1996), pp. 240-64, F. J. McLynn, "The Causes of the War of Triple Alliance: An Interpretation," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 33, no. 2 (1979): pp. 36-37.

²⁶² Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 127.

²⁶³ McLynn, "The Causes of the War of Triple Alliance: An Interpretation," pp. 36-37.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*: pp. 37-38, Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," p. 286, Nicholas Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 237-38.

²⁶⁵ Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, p. 237. See also Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 276.

controlled the pampas south and west of Rio Salado (not very far from the city itself), or Patagonia. These territories were considered by other powers as *res-nulius*, no-man's land. The Indians of the plains, as a response to the repeated encroachments on their land, often attacked villages and towns, killing or enslaving their residents. The Buenos Aires government replied with almost annual expeditions during the 1820's and the building of border garrisons. Three big expeditionary forces, in 1828, 1833 and 1879, claimed much of this Indian land for "white" settlements and ranching.²⁶⁶

By 1980, Seventy years of warring came to an end. The War of the Triple Alliance was the last international war in which Argentina was engaged for the next one hundred years (until the Falklands War). It sealed sixty years of almost constant international wars, which involved a significant territorial component. While these wars were often protracted and at times intense, and consisted of significant threats to Argentina as a state (and its earlier manifestations), they were also somewhat limited. As Miguel Centeno argues, the wars of Latin America (both international and civil) never reached the level of total war experienced in Europe, North America (the American Civil War) and Asia. As a rule, they neither involved similar levels of destruction and death nor entailed similar levels of mobilization.²⁶⁷

Centeno explains this limited level of warfare as a combination of formidable physical limits (the Andes and the Amazon forests-- although the latter applies less to Argentina), the scarce resources with which to fund war, and a culture/ideology that did not include total war in its vocabulary. "Latin American states," he argues, "did not have the organizational or ideological

²⁶⁶ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 150-51, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 2-3, Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, pp. 97-98, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 367-69.

²⁶⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, pp. 33-66. Note, however, that the statistics used by Centeno might be somewhat misleading. As he does not include data for Europe before 1815 and as he aggregates results that include the 20th century, the important and relevant comparison of 17-18th century Europe to South America in the 19th century is blurred.

capacity to go to war with one another.”²⁶⁸ Yet, this argument is of limited value. As is discussed below, Prussia in the early 17th century lacked both the resources and the culture of organized large-scale warfare. It is precisely the geopolitical reality that caused both these factors to change. Second, if Centeno’s argument is true, we should have seen more war and violence in 20th century than in 19th century South America, as the state became stronger and better organized. The case, however, is quite the contrary. While Argentina was involved in war for most of the 19th century, it was a party to only one short war in the following century.

What, then, can explain the level of warfare in 19th century Argentina (and South America in general)-- significant but still somewhat limited? Arie Kacowicz suggests an explanation that might have more merit than Centeno’s in this case. He advances an argument that stresses the role of international norms of peace, which gradually developed in Latin America after its independence, but became more pronounced towards the end of the 19th century. The most important of these norms, as applied to this research, is the legal doctrine of *uti possidetis*, which stipulated that the Latin American states were the rightful successors of Spain and Portugal in exercising territorial authority over the same (administrative) borders at the time of independence.²⁶⁹ Formal recognition of *uti possidetis* (it was adopted by the Panama Congress of 1826, the Lima Congress of 1847-48, and the Caracas Treaty of 1883) did not result in immediate respite from international wars or, for that matter, territorial wars.²⁷⁰ Nevertheless, this principle did apparently impose some constraining effect. From the end of the independence wars (which, of course, were not subject to *uti possidetis*), and once the map of South America was consolidated around the mid 1820’s, not a single state was erased from that map. South

²⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 66-100, quote from p. 66.

²⁶⁹ Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*, pp. 59-60, 71-124. See also Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 145-46.

²⁷⁰ On this point, see Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, p. 153, Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*, p. 77.

America had no Poland, no Burgundy, or, for that matter, no Bavaria (all sovereign European states which lost their status to an occupying force, temporarily or eternally). Even when the male population of Paraguay was virtually annihilated, and disputed territories were appropriated by Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay was not wiped off the map-- it survived. As opposed to wars in Europe, then, the wars of Latin America, Argentina included, were not all-out wars, but limited through some common agreements or constraints.

C. Territorial Pressures and State Building

Before examining the effects of territorial wars on state building in Argentina, let us again recall hypothesis 1a. The hypothesis claimed that a fluid border system provides incentives and opportunities for states to become institutionally stronger. What follows is a discussion in the Argentinean case: to what extent we can observe in Argentina in the period of 1810-1890 the expected process, which leads from external territorial threats and opportunities to a successful project of state building.

a) Monopolizing the Use of Legitimate Force

At the start of the struggle for independence in 1810, Argentina did not exist as a nation and so, by definition, it possessed no national army. The forces that took hold of Buenos Aires and expelled the Spanish Viceroy were city militia, not a national army. In towns across the Rio de la Plata, ad hoc militia filled similar roles. The process of building a regular modern national army took more than half a century and was much less linear than in the above example of Brandenburg-Prussia.

For most of this half-century, there was no central control of the state and the various forces that controlled the towns of Argentina had their own military or semi-military forces. In the countryside, the local *caudillos* had their own troops, consisting mainly of their *gauchos* peons. Very gradually, however, a more unified military institution emerged from this plethora of forces. Wars, international and internal, have been among the most important forces that affected this process.

The wars of independence were fought by a variety of military forces. At the initial stage, small town militias in the interior of the Rio de la Plata, with or without assistance from Buenos Aires, seized control of the local government, oftentimes without bloodshed.²⁷¹ As the Spanish forces reorganized and seek the help of Lima, the war took the shape of expeditionary military forces that were sent from Buenos Aires to Paraguay, Upper Peru, and Uruguay. These forces were mainly of an ad hoc character and included mostly porteños, strengthened some elements from the provinces. In Uruguay, a local force of gauchos, led by Jose Artigas, fought alongside the porteños, until their ultimate defeat by Brazil. The one exception to this rule was the army of Jose San Martin. San Martin was a former officer in the Spanish military, who join the revolutionaries in Buenos Aires in 1812. Expressing skepticism in the option of re-conquering Upper Peru in the conventional way, San Martin built an invasion army in Mendoza, which resembled in many ways more the regular European armies of the time than the semi-regular forces used in other fronts of this war. San Martin used this army to cross the Andes, take Chile by force, and then attack by sea the Spanish stronghold at Lima.²⁷²

The destruction of the independence wars notwithstanding, the revolutionary armies in the Rio de la Plata were relatively small, as were their opponents'. Belgrano's expeditionary force

²⁷¹ Scobie, *Argentina*, p. 90.

²⁷² Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 50.

that eventually ceded Paraguay included no more than 1400 soldiers and militia. In the three attempts to conquer Upper Peru, the revolutionary forces never exceeded 5,000 troops, and the same is true for the campaign in the Banda Oriental. San Martin crossed the Andes to Chile with fewer than 6000 men.²⁷³ Once the threat of Spanish *reconquista* receded, the Argentinean army was demobilized and it shrunk down to 2,500 men (before the start of the Cisplatine War).²⁷⁴ This tiny army could not, by any stretch of imagination, exercise effective control of the means of violence in a country as vast as Argentina. The independence wars, moreover, accelerated the emergence of competing forces, the *caudillos* and their *gaucho* armies. These local landowners and warlords, not the national army, came to control the provinces, as well as the countryside in the province of Buenos Aires.²⁷⁵

The core of the urban militia of Buenos Aires remained a basis for future mobilization, and such an occasion was soon coming. The Cisplatine War, 1825-1828, entailed a larger mobilization. The United Provinces' military force in the conflict amounted to about 20,000 and consisted of both land army and navy.²⁷⁶ In the aftermath of this war, the army that fought in Uruguay came back to a state of anarchy. The attempt of the generals Lavelle and Paz to use this army to seize power in Buenos Aires and Cordova, respectively, however, was short-lived. Their forces were eventually defeated by the rising power of Juan Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires and his allied *caudillos* in the provinces.²⁷⁷

It was an internal conflict, with *caudillos* from the Littoral raids on Buenos Aires, that led to the rise to primacy of Buenos Aires's rural elite, and ultimately to the stabilization of the province by Juan Manuel de Rosas (governor from 1829 to 1832 and again from 1835 to 1852).

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 226, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 44-52.

²⁷⁴ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 227.

²⁷⁵ Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," pp. 265-68.

²⁷⁶ Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 102.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 103-04.

During Rosas' tenure, military pressure, from foreign forces, from opposing forces in the provinces, and from the Indians at the frontier, led to a monopolization and centralization of power in province of Buenos Aires. Rosas' fall led to a similar process, though less pronounced, in the provinces of the Littoral and the Interior.

Rosas established an army that was composed mainly of the rural poor and numbered around 20,000 men. As discussed above, Buenos Aires was engaged in the *Gurra Grande* for most of his time in office, and the army was "an active one, constantly engaged in foreign wars, interprovincial conflicts and internal security."²⁷⁸ Rosas used the occasion of foreign war and blockades and the threat of invasion to employ his army as an instrument of internal coercion. "The military establishment," consisting of the regular army and the militia, existed... not only to defend the country but to occupy it, not only to protect the population but to control it."²⁷⁹ In 1830 a British observer noted: "...owing to the system of police established under [Rosas] government, all, whether rich or poor, who were implicated in the violation of the established laws of the country were sure to suffer... crimes, robbery and outrage are almost unknown."²⁸⁰ Rosas, in addition, combined the core of the preexisting urban militia of the city with his own rural followers to create a more militarized and more centralized state in the province of Buenos Aires. The campaign against the Indians in the pampas, as well, helped Rosas' centralization of power. The territorial acquisition provided ample land resources with which he could (and did) reward his followers, especially the army's officers. Indeed, Rosas exploited his victory over the Indians and the muscle this campaign created to greatly strengthen his position, and he was

²⁷⁸ Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 27-28.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁸⁰ Quoted in John Lynch, *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel De Rosas 1829-1852* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981), p. 117.

virtually given unrestricted powers to govern the province.²⁸¹ “External aggression and a high level of perceived threat,” then, “strongly marked the first period of state making, leading to militarization.”²⁸²

Eventually, however, the reaction to Rosas created an alliance of internal and external forces (the latter including France, Britain, Brazil, and the *Colorados* in Uruguay) that managed to field a larger army than that of Buenos Aires. The anti-Rosas alliance, led by Urquiza, had almost 30,000 men in arms in the decisive battle of Caseros, the bulk of them Argentinean, as against Rosas’s 20,000 men.²⁸³ Resting on the crown of his victorious army, Urquiza established a national confederation based on a principle of more balanced relations between the port and the hinterland. While the union produced by this victory was brief (as Buenos Aires soon vied for independence), it created in the Littoral and the Interior a state more unified than before and more akin, in this sense, to the one in the province of Buenos Aires (although not as strong). The Confederation declared the creation of a “national army” as its top priority (although such an army never materialized in during the life span of the Confederation).²⁸⁴

Ultimately, though, Argentina was reunited by force in 1859, when the confederation subjugated the renegade province (and city). Another rebellion by Buenos Aires in 1861 produced the opposite result, as General Bartolome Mitre and his porteño army seized the military control, and the presidency, of the Argentine Confederation and renamed it the Argentine Republic. Although years would pass before Argentina would be completely pacified and before the balance between Buenos Aires and the provinces would become stabilized, 1861

²⁸¹ Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 2-3, Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, pp. 97-98, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 367-69.

²⁸² Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, pp.179-86, quote from p. 80.

²⁸³ Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, p. 123.

²⁸⁴ Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, p. 188.

signaled an important advance for the notion of Argentina as one state, and this unification was achieved by military force.

The war that is most tied to Argentina's consolidation as a state is the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). As argued above, this war was perceived to create a multi-level threat to Argentina, not least of this threat related to the ties, actual or potential, between external leaders and *caudillos* in the interior and littoral. On the eve of the war, the Argentine government established a standing national army, which consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and was, at its core, an expansion of the Buenos Aires militia.²⁸⁵ The beginning of the war, however, forced (or enabled) Mitre to augment the army to strength of 30,000 men. This army, ostensibly raised to fight the external war, served, at the same time, to crush internal dissent and rebellions (some of which, no doubt, were provoked by the burdens of the war itself and the policy of forced conscription). The most significant revolts occurred in the remote western parts of the Interior, in which the *caudillos* "El Chaco" and later Varela were defeated during the war with Paraguay. So intense was the internal fighting that the some of the casualties of Argentina's military from these internal conflicts amounted to almost half those of the war itself.²⁸⁶ "The army that returns from Paraguay," in short, "is much better equipped to suppress internal revolts."²⁸⁷ Indeed, the last of the *caudillo* challenges to the unity of Argentina, that of Ricardo Lopez Jordan, a strongman in Entre Rios who assassinated Urquiza and took control of the province in 1870, was crushed in 1874 by the army.²⁸⁸ The army further consolidated in the aftermath of the war with the establishment of the Military Academy, the creation of a

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 189, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 41-42.

²⁸⁶ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 143-44, H. Kutra, *The Argentine Generation of 1837: Echeverria, Alberdi, Sarmiento, Mitre* (London: Associated University Press, 1996), pp. 258-159, Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, p. 128, Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, p. 238.

²⁸⁷ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 112.

²⁸⁸ Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 129.

professional officer corps and the Law of Recruitment, all institutionalized within a short time span after the war's end.²⁸⁹ Argentina would know many more political rebellions and *coup d'états*, but from this point on, the rebellions always attempted to capture the national government, not to challenge its authority or achieve regional autonomy.

The wars with the Indians also helped the state building project. The success of the national army in the 1879 "desert campaign" against the Indians catapulted its commander, General Roca, to the seat of the President, and the troops the national army established and galvanized for these campaign helped Roca crush an attempted rebellion in the capital. The prestige of the campaign and the muscle of his troops, then, enabled Roca to disband the provincial militias in 1881 and place officially the monopoly over the use of violence squarely in the hands of the central government.²⁹⁰ The process that started with the consolidation of the monopoly of the use of force in the province of Buenos Aires, thus, lastly expanded by 1880 to include the entire country, and this expansion could largely be attributed to the threats and opportunities provided by external military pressures.

b) Extraction of Revenues

In contrast to the monopolization of the use of force, the process and development of the state's ability to extract resources from its population differed significantly in Argentina from the example of Prussia. External pressures did not, as a rule, lead to greater fiscal demands of the states upon their citizens. This was the case because, as discussed above, the level of external threat was significant yet still limited, and because Argentina had other, easier, means to finance its wars. The availability of foreign credit and the possibility of indirect taxes, in the form of

²⁸⁹ Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," p. 42.

²⁹⁰ Ezequiel Gallo, "Society and Politics, 1880-1916," in *Argentina since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 79-83, Scheina, *Latin America's Wars*, pp. 367-69.

tariffs and export fees, as well as money printing, relieved Argentina of the need to create a strong system of extraction, thus somewhat crippling, in the long run, its state building efforts.

As in Europe, war and escalating threats greatly expanded the military expenses of the state in Latin America. These expenses were overwhelmingly devoted to the war-fighting efforts. Until the mid-1860's Argentina's military and financial expenses (covering the cost of war debt), for instance, never fell to less than 75% of the government's total budget and often exceeded the 90% mark.²⁹¹ The response to these military expenditures and the way in which Argentina tried to pay for them differed significantly from the Prussian (or British or French) model. In the early 1820's, indeed, there were some attempts to impose direct taxes, in the form of land taxes on the new territories usurped from the Indians in the pampas, and capital taxes. These schemes, however, either did not materialize or were circumvented, and never yielded more than 3% of the government revenues.²⁹²

Instead, Argentina, in its various forms, used three main tools to pay for the substantial financial burden imposed on it by war. The first such tool was borrowing money from foreign sources (mainly private British institutions). This borrowing swelled Argentina's national debt. By 1841, for instance, the government's debt stood at 36 million pesos, about 21 times its total income for that year. Although later years saw some decline from this incredible ratio, the debt was still much higher than revenues.²⁹³ The second measure that was commonly used by Argentinean governments to deflect the costs of war was printing money, thus creating inflationary pressures. During the Cisplatine War, the value of one ounce of gold in Buenos Aires rose more than sixfold. As Miguel Centeno argues, this practice represents evidence of the

²⁹¹ Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," pp. 1571-75. The slight decline in this measure after 1865 is attributed by Centeno to the economic boom, not to decreased expenses.

²⁹² Ibid.: p. 1578, Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 99.

²⁹³ Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," p. 1585.

strength of the government, as it shows its monopolization of the issuance of money, and also represents the inability of the government to either agree or enforce its society to carry the financial burden of war.²⁹⁴

The third way in which Argentina, like some other Latin American states, dealt with the increasing fiscal burden of war was by imposing indirect taxes, chiefly tariffs and export fees. As compared to direct taxation on capital, property, or income, custom, the taxation of import and export is a much less burdensome practice for a government. It requires, first, a much smaller and less sophisticated bureaucratic mechanism to perform. As Centeno rightly notes, "a few soldiers in the main port could provide considerable income."²⁹⁵ While managing cross-border commerce on Argentina's western and northern borders may have been somewhat difficult, the volume of this commerce, given the geographic obstacles and Bolivia's mining industry's decline, was not very significant. International commerce through the Atlantic, on the other hand, was much more significant and increasing in volume. Buenos Aires was strategically situated at the mouth of the network of several rivers (Plata, Uruguay, Parana, Paraguay). This location enabled it to exercise almost a monopoly and situated it in a predominant position in terms of custom extraction. Politically, as well, taxing international commerce, especially imports, is a much easier and less risky task than taxing domestic land or capital. As tariffs are indirect taxes, they are much less likely to result in a popular revolt. It is easier for one to reckon with not receiving a sum in the first place than with having to depart with money that is already in one's pockets. Indeed, for the years for which data is available from 1820 to 1880, Argentina's customs almost never constituted less than 80% of the government's ordinary income. It was

²⁹⁴ Ibid.: pp. 1584-85. See also Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, p. 102.

²⁹⁵ Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," p. 1587.

often more than 90% of the income.²⁹⁶ On the downside, however, customs are a much less reliable source of income than taxes and widely depend on the fluctuation of international commerce. More importantly, relying on custom does not enable (or enforce) one to develop the bureaucratic capacity that was observed in the Prussian case discussed above.

c) Development of State Bureaucracy

The development of the bureaucratic and administrative capacity of the state in 19th century Argentina shows a mixed picture. As compared to the Prussian case discussed above, administrative expansion of the state in Argentina was less linear and somewhat less profound. The degree to which this development was tied to the pressing needs of the military was also less obvious. Nevertheless, the state's administrative penetration into the society and its administrating capacity did improve very significantly by 1880, and these improvements were often tied to military development and, hence, to territorial pressures. Argentina's record of administrative development also shows a dialectic quality similar to the one exhibit by its monopolization of the use of force. The wars of independence led initially to disintegration, and only through a long and protracted struggle between Buenos Aires and the provinces did a new political and administrative entity emerge, which gradually became a fairly strong state.

As discussed in Chapter 6, the depth and breadth of the Spanish administration, and the degree of *Creole* participation in this bureaucracy were limited, local in nature, and hardly maintainable without the superior authority of the crown.²⁹⁷ The wars of independence managed to secure the Spanish departure from South America. However, as Centeno reminds us, "not only did the Spanish-American Empire dissolve into several nations (a process that continued through

²⁹⁶ Ibid.: pp. 1579-81. See also Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, p. 197.

²⁹⁷ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 152-53.

the 1820's), but even within the new borders, governments exercised little authority and had even less control. Civilian administration was destroyed throughout the continent."²⁹⁸

Through the first decade of the war of independence (1810-1820), political turmoil in Buenos Aires accompanied the fractured nature of the war. Old colonial institutions, such as the *cabildo*, were replaced by new (the Congress), and the original *junta* by a *triumvirate* and later by a single President. The Congress, as well, managed to achieve a declaration of independence of the United Provinces of the River Plate in July 1816 in Tucuman and acceptance of a constitution in 1819. All this, however, hardly brought political stability, as a widening gulf between Unitarians and Federalists emerged. This fracture echoed the increasingly obvious disconnect between Buenos Aires' legal claim as heir of the Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty and the reality, in which economic and military fragmentation prevailed.²⁹⁹ Thus, the "national institutions had completely disappeared by 1820."³⁰⁰ Not until 1860 did a fragilely unified Argentina again appear on the map.

This continuous national fragmentation notwithstanding, however, one cannot ignore institutional and bureaucratic development in those forty years between 1820 and 1860. These developments, rather than on a national (i.e., Argentine) level, took place in the provinces, chief among them Buenos Aires. The 1825-1829 war with Brazil accelerated the already very tense relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces, with the pressure of the provinces' *caudillos* bringing about official annulment of the constitution and a declaration of the United Provinces as a confederation, rather than a unified state. Manuel Dorrego was forced to change his title from the President of the United Provinces to the Governor of the province of Buenos Aires. This act, while confirming the disintegration of Argentina, started the consolidation of Buenos Aires.

²⁹⁸ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 51.

²⁹⁹ On the political developments in Buenos Aires in this period, see Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, pp. 79-94.

³⁰⁰ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," p. 154.

Rosas, who was the Governor (and the dictator) of Buenos Aires from 1829 to 1851, tightened his control over the countryside in the province mainly through the use of the institution of the "Justice of Peace." This office was established already in 1821, but under Rosas it was expanded and given much more authority and responsibility. The Justices of Peace (who often were *estancieros*-- land owner ranchers) became the agents of the government in all manners, from policing and judging the population to presiding over (mostly fake) elections, to administering the census. Yet the judges' most important function, at least for the purposes of this research, was the role of the militia commander. The military force used by the Justices of Peace as a tool of coercion and the extreme measures they used brought about the pacification of the province (as discussed above) and a fairly high degree of state penetration into the province's territories.³⁰¹ The military force that developed to fight wars, then, also facilitated the centralization and pacification of the province of Buenos Aires. "Under this regime," in turn, "the *gauchos* of Buenos Aires evolved into a rural proletariat easily drafted into the army."³⁰² At least in a limited sense, then, Buenos Aires implemented a policy not far removed from the Prussian model, a policy built on the concentric functions of the landowner class, the militia and the state's bureaucrats.

In his relations with the other provinces, Rosas was content to use personal ties and allegiances as opposed to institutional ones. He adamantly opposed propositions to adopt a new national constitution or to expand the formal bureaucracy beyond the borders of Buenos Aires. Only in the field of foreign relations (and, of course, in controlling international trade) did Rosas insist on a monopoly over the provinces. While his influence, through allied *caudillos* in the

³⁰¹ Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, p. 162, Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, pp. 116-17. Granted, Rosas also used the newly acquired strength of his state apparatus to intimidate and suppress political opposition.

³⁰² David Rock, "State Building and Political Systems in Nineteen-Century Argentina and Uruguay," *Past and Present* 167 (2000): p. 183.

Littoral and the Interior, was significant, it never amounted to a real monopoly over foreign relations matters. In 1840, for instance, the province of Corrientes signed a boundary treaty with Paraguay (conceding some territories which were later gained back by Argentina in the War of the Triple Alliance) and, a decade later, Entre Rios under Urquiza allied itself with Brazil against Rosas himself.³⁰³

It was not until the fall of Rosas in 1852, then, that the reorganization of Argentina on a national scale could start to take place, and even then by fits and starts. Interestingly, in the first decade after the fall of Rosas (1852-1861), it was the provinces, rather than the center in Buenos Aires, that attempted to create the institutions of Argentina on a national, though loosely confederative, scale. The confederation, led by Urquiza, accepted in 1853 a common constitution and tried to strengthen its hold on the country. However, while the Urquiza had the military power, he lacked the economic backing that Buenos Aires possessed. The port city, thus, was able to proclaim its independence.³⁰⁴ While this attempt of the Argentine Confederation at national consolidation did not succeed, it set the stage for the unification of the country in the following decade, this time under Buenos Aires's sponsorship.

In 1862, General Bartolome Mitre, after defeating the forces of the Confederation, created the newly termed Republic of Argentina, and became its first president. As in the area of use of force monopolization discussed above, the administrative penetration into the society in Mitre's first years in office was very limited. But here as well, the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) helped Mitre consolidate the state. The institutional and bureaucratic innovations of this period included the first nationwide census, which was done amidst the war, in 1869. A national census proves a relatively high degree of organization, as it requires the authority of the

³⁰³ Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," p. 154.

³⁰⁴ Rock, "State Building and Political Systems," pp. 185-86.

government to ask difficult questions, the apparatus to perform the census, and the ability of the government to protect this apparatus.³⁰⁵

In the 1870's, under presidents Domingo Sarmiento and Avellaneda, Argentina saw a continuation of the same pattern of building the bureaucracy and enhancing state penetration into the society, oftentimes through the use, or threat of the use, of military means. Indeed, as provincial resistance was eradicated, the troops of the national army enforced the authority of the Justices of Peace in the provinces, the national judicial system (enacted by a 1862 law) and the Argentine Civil Code (drawn up in 1865-1868). These acts created a situation in which "the central government was highly visible and was able to extend services to faraway provinces."³⁰⁶ The project of state building, or at least its administrative facet, reached fruition in the early 1880's as the city of Buenos Aires was federalized, a common currency was introduced for the first time, and other functions, such as primary education and the census, were transferred from the authority of the church to that of the state.³⁰⁷ As one British minister observed at the time, "There is hardly a province in the Republic the Governor of which is not accessible to the suasion of the Chief of the Executive."³⁰⁸

d) Services, Public Goods and Political Rights

The other side of the equation of state building is the supposition that, over time, the need of the state to impose greater demands on its population as the result of stronger external territorial

³⁰⁵ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 110.

³⁰⁶ Lopez-Alves, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 162, 88-89, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 41-42.

³⁰⁷ Gallo, "Society and Politics," pp. 79-83, 97-98.

³⁰⁸ Quoted in David Rock, "State-Building and Political Systems in Nineteenth-Century Argentina and Uruguay," *Past and Present* 167 (2000): p. 195.

threat would require some form of compensation. Yet, observing 19th century Argentina, it is hard to find much supportive evidence that such a compensation process took place.

Government supply of services and public goods seems to be more in line with the ideological conventions of the rulers than with territorial wars. When president Rivadavia established the University of Buenos Aires in 1821, for instance, one does not find a direct relations to war or territorial pressures.³⁰⁹ While as the governor of Buenos Aires Rosas greatly increased the oppressive power of the state and its penetration into the entire province, he left the system of education solely in the hands of the Catholic Church. Rosas did so not as a state builder but as a social conservative. Similarly, when liberal presidents Mitre, Sarmiento, and Avellaneda reversed this education policy in the 1860's and 1870's, they seemed to follow their ideological convictions as well, not a military-driven incentive.³¹⁰ The federal government's educational subsidies to the provinces quadrupled in the 1870's, for instance, and helped to enhance the ties between center and periphery, but there is little evidence of their relevance to territorial pressures. In terms of political rights, as well, the pattern is similar: liberal Presidents broadened the suffrage while conservatives either limited it or abolished popular elections altogether.³¹¹

The distribution of one form of goods in Argentina in this period directly related to the practice of territorial war is land ownership rights. This form of compensation was given to soldiers, especially those involved in the wars of conquest against the Indians. Yet rewarding soldiers with land is more akin to the practice of a feudal society than to modern state building, and thus not a proof of the thesis in this research. If anything, this practice, which was widely

³⁰⁹ On the Buenos Aires University and Rivadavia's education policy, see Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, pp. 85-97.

³¹⁰ Gallo, "Society and Politics," p. 82, Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, p. 165.

³¹¹ See Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization.", Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, p. 130, Rock, "State Building and Political Systems," p. 42.

accepted under Rosas, squarely fit the patrimonial form of the Argentine society under his rule.³¹²

e) Ingroup Cohesion

Did territorial wars enhance ingroup cohesion on 19th century Argentina, as is expected in hypothesis 1(b)? Again, the answer is mixed, although it tends more toward the positive. With not much of a base to begin with, Argentinean territorial identity gradually developed through the 19th century to one, not very coherent but still existing, identity. Despite the long periods of physical and political divisions, the notion of one Argentina (with different names) nevertheless was preserved (or created, depending on where one stands).

As discussed in chapter six, Latin American *Creole* elites were not thinking in national terms in 1810. Indeed, in 1813 Manuel Belgrano, one of the leaders of the first *hunta* to lead independent Buenos Aires, offered rules for schoolchildren's patriotic instruction. Yet in these rules he emphasizes American patriotism, not an exclusionary Argentinean ideology. The "other" in his recommendation is Spain or the Europeans, not other South American neighbors.³¹³ Although the *Creole* elite had perhaps some vague concept of regional identity at the time of independence, it scarcely amounted to a nationalist concept. Discussing Benedict Anderson's suggestion that such an identity did emerge in the region, Miguel Centeno, then, is right to assert that "[there is] no evidence that any large part of even the white population thought of themselves as a nation *separate from their Creole neighbors* [emphasis in original]."³¹⁴ Indeed, as the wars of independence proved, at least a significant part of the elites

³¹² Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*.

³¹³ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, p. 172.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-73, quote from p. 72. See also Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, pp. 1-23.

of Upper Peru, Paraguay, and Banda Oriental did not see themselves as part of a common identity in the Rio de la Plata.

The wars of independence did not result in national unity in Argentina, but they did create a territorial reality that started the creation of an Argentine identity. Bolivia and Paraguay now acquired the status of independent states, a status that was recognized by most Argentine elites. It took more time for Uruguay to reach that point, but after the 1828 arbitration, Uruguay too was considered a separate entity. "The threat of the Spanish reconquest, however, forced the remaining towns of the Viceroyalty to co-operate for their common defense. The first faltering steps towards nationhood had been made."³¹⁵

The political cleavages and the civil war that characterized the next four decades was not, of course, a site of national cohesiveness. Nevertheless, one should note an interesting fact about this period: While vehemently defending their autonomy and practical rights, the *caudillos* of the Argentine provinces did not attempt, as a rule, to declare official independence. The conflicts were about federative or Unitarian structure, about economic interests of Buenos Aires versus those of the provinces, and about the power to make these decisions: not about sovereignty. "By mid century," David Rock tells us, "a majority of Argentina's political leaders considered themselves members of an autonomous society and polity forged by the struggle for independence."³¹⁶ The international wars of this period played a fairly minor role in facilitating a common identity as they were mostly about political or commercial influence, not about territorial control, and because they were targeted not toward Argentina as a whole but toward certain provinces or cities. Thus, the French, British and Brazilian blockades of Buenos Aires

³¹⁵ Scobie, *Argentina*, p. 91.

³¹⁶ Rock, "State Building and Political Systems," p. 183.

could hardly be seen as a threat to Argentina as a whole, and reaction, in terms of forging of a common identity, was therefore mute.³¹⁷

Once the country was again united, in 1861, the government did indeed try to use external threats, or their appearance, as internal “glue.” At the beginning of the War of the Triple Alliance in 1865, President Mitre played on the national sentiments of Urquiza, the strong Entre Rios *caudillo*. Mitre managed, in the end, to dissuade Urquiza from allying himself with Paraguay against his country.³¹⁸ While the war as a whole was not popular and while it generated much dissent, Argentina did come out of the war a more united nation.

One indication of the role of external threats (and the defense against them) is the centrality of the theme of war and territory in national indoctrination, revealed through such practices as the writing of history, and through erection of monuments and iconization of heroes. In this area, as well, the picture is mixed. Centeno notes that, as compared to Europe, Latin American iconography of military leaders (as opposed to other, scientific, intellectual, and artistic figures) is less salient. In Argentina, accordingly, street names, stamps, public monuments, and other venues display their share of military heroes (mainly from the wars of independence), but not to the extent of military iconization in Europe. Interestingly, however, these displays were much common during the 19th century (with its abundance of wars) than in the following one (with only one short war).³¹⁹

The role of war and territorial threats as it relates to opportunities in the writing of official history is a particularly interesting theme in 19th century Argentina’s attempts to create a stronger national identity. This is so since two of the Argentina’s prominent Presidents were personally engaged in this endeavor. Mitre, the first President of the republic, organized, researched and

³¹⁷ Rosas still used these pressures to create more unity within the province of Buenos Aires.

³¹⁸ On the exchange of letters, see Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 241-48.

³¹⁹ Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, pp. 198-209.

partially wrote an extensive historiographic series of volumes termed “Gallery of Argentine celebrities.” This project, which became part and parcel of Argentina’s official history, does reflect an interest in elevating military figures (it includes the study of three generals and one navy commander), but they are “balanced” with non-military personals.³²⁰ Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who replaced Mitre in office, is considered one of Latin America’s prominent writers. Sarmiento’s work, however, emphasizes the domestic—ideological and cultural conflict, rather than the external-territorial one.³²¹ The territorial dimension of Argentina’s past international wars, nevertheless, is well ingrained in history books and schools. The perception that Argentina suffered from great territorial losses (the breakup of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, losses to Chile in Patagonia, and to Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands) is an integral part of Argentina’s political culture even today.³²² Thus, while territorial wars might not be the most salient factor in the creation of Argentinean identity, they most certainly are a factor.

D. Argentina: Summary

The Argentine experience of state building through territorial wars is in some respects similar to that of Prussia and yet significantly different in other respects. As the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata started to disintegrate in 1810, there was no single candidate who could fill the authority gap. Out of this very weak (or nonexistent) state gradually emerged a mildly strong one by the early 1880’s. The process by which this transformation occurred was greatly influenced by strong territorial threats and ample territorial opportunities. These pressures are more

³²⁰ On Mitre’s “Gallery of Celebrities,” see Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, pp. 188-213.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-87. Sarmiento’s prime dichotomies are “civilization” and “barbarism,” not national ones. See his most famous novel, written in 1845, Domingo F. Sarmiento, *Facundo, or Civilization and Barbarism* (New York: Penguin, 1998).

³²² Dijkink, *National Identity & Geopolitical Visions*, pp. 72-85, Escude, “Argentine Territorial Nationalism,” pp. 152-65.

pronounced in the area of achieving a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and building a functioning bureaucracy and administration. The role of external pressure is less clear in the areas of state extraction capacity and state provision of rights and services. In terms of forging a common Argentinean identity, the evidence is mixed. It seems that territorial wars played a role here, but a limited one.

The reason Argentina displayed a significant process of state building, yet a more limited one than that in Brandenburg-Prussia, which was discussed above, could be attributed to a number of factors, such as geographic vastness and availability of financial tools to replace direct taxation. The main factor determining this process, however, seems to be the limits to territorial expansion and territorial acquisition established by a still weak but already significant set of regional norms, chief among them the norm of *uti possidetis*.

The most common view in Argentina is that during the 1810's and 1820's Argentina suffered tremendous territorial losses, and Buenos Aires, as the rightful successor of the Spanish Viceroyalty, could not hold onto or suppress the "renegade" provinces of Upper Peru (Bolivia), Paraguay, and Banda Oriental (Uruguay). Only very gradually could the capital city recapture its control of the other Argentinean provinces by 1860. As Carlos Escude aptly notes, though, the same process could be seen from a very different perspective: If Argentina is not seen as the heir to the Spanish Viceroyalty (which, in practical terms, it was not) but as a new political entity, the story of 19th century Argentina could be seen as a gradual territorial expansion. The core in Buenos Aires acquired, mostly through the use of force, more territorial control until, by the 1880's, it reached the size of present-day Argentina. Looked at from this perspective, Argentina's story does not seem so much different from most European stories of state

expansion. Whether one chooses the expansion or the contraction narrative territories and territorial wars clearly played an important role in Argentina's state building process.

Chapter 6: Congo, 1960-2005

The last two chapters surveyed two historical cases of weak states. This chapter and the next one, by contrast, examine two current cases. The main purpose of these two cases is to explore and analyze the effects that the major changes in the norms regarding international borders exert on the strength of the state and, by extension, on its relations with its neighbors. In other words, these cases test the arguments of Hypotheses 2-5 (in chapter 2 above), which relate between the border fixity norm and international conflict in regions in which most states are weak.

The findings of this chapter largely corroborate Hypotheses 2,3, and 4. Congo, a weak state in 1960, further weakened, to the verge of a total collapse in the late 1990's and early 2000's. Its weakness, combined with the guarantee of border fixity, greatly contributed to the eruption of communal tensions and fighting. Civil strife spilled across Congo's border to involve neighboring states, mainly through cross-border insurgency activity and retaliations and through cross border kin relations. Hypothesis 5, however, is only partially corroborated. Predatory intervention, motivated by greed or desire for political control, had much less explanatory power regarding the Congolese case.

A. Congo 1960: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength

When Congo gained its independence in 1960, it showed all aspects of a very weak state, including regional fragmentation, crisis in central authority, and a high level of political

violence.³²³ Nevertheless, it was not a hopeless case of weakness, and possessed some apparent potential to become, with time, stronger.

Figure 7: Map of Congo's



* Source: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/congo/rpt0705.html

³²³ Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 41-42.

Congo was created by Belgium in the twilight of the colonial “scramble for Africa” in 1908, and was the sight of one of the most brutal colonialist regime. It was, in this sense, an arbitrary and artificial entity. Indeed, the state’s population is divided to around two hundred separate ethnic groups. The largest four of these groups, combined (Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and mangbetu-Azande), amount to no more than 45% of the population. Linguistically, the diversity is almost as pronounced. The languages most spoken are Lingala, Kingwana, Kikongo and Tshiluba, as well as the colonizer language, French. Religious cleavages also exists, with about 50% of Congolese are Catholic, 20% Protestant, 10% Muslim and 10% Kimbanguist.³²⁴ In addition to the inevitable hardships this composition imposes on creating a cohesive national state, many of Congo’s groups are much closely related, culturally, socially and sometimes economically, to kin across the state’s border. Hutu and Tutsi tribes in East Congo, for instance, are much more likely to have social and economic ties to affiliated tribes in Rwanda or Burundi than to Kinshasa.³²⁵

Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, this arbitrariness and diversity of population within the state is not unique. Although political divisions along ethnic lines (like in Katanga’s secession attempt, which was quelled by the use of foreign troops) were prevalent during the chaos that followed Congo’s independence, this fact might be misleading. In reality, ethnicity became the primary source of mobilization not because of prominence of multiple rigid ethnic identities, but because the state as such lacked a significant degree of legitimacy, a unifying idea, and the institutions to enhance and enforce this idea (to a significant extent, as a result of Belgian colonial policies). In fact, scholars of Congo note the considerable degree of fluidity of the Congolese ethnic identities at the time.³²⁶

³²⁴ Data from the CIA Factbook. Insert source, at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html>

³²⁵ For a basic source on the Congolese state and society, see Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*.

³²⁶ See John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 200-04, Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 40-42.

In economic terms, Congo in 1960 was a poor state and mostly agrarian, but its soil contained large amounts of natural resources, that has a potential of sustaining a strong state. Congo was also a vast state (see map below) with relatively sparse population (6.6 per square kilometers in 1960), yet not much more so than Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 and much less than Argentina in 1810. After Congo's rough and anarchical "entrance" to the world scene with its independence from Belgian rule, the reins of power in Kinshasa were caught in 1965 by the Chief of the Army, Mobutu Sese Seko, who established what proved to be one of Africa's most enduring regimes (1965-1997). Coming as a remedy to the anarchical "all against all" war, Mobutu's formula of a "nationalist" and highly centralized state initially gained some legitimacy in Congo (perhaps more an effect of exhaustion than a positive consensus).³²⁷ This could have been, in theory, a beginning of a serious attempt of state building. One should not, therefore, assume that Congo was, from the get go, a precluded story of failure as a state.

B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Congo

By Congo's 1960 independence border fixity was already a fairly strong norm of world politics, as indicated in chapter 1. In Africa specifically, moreover, the norm of fixed borders is deeply rooted. In light of the arbitrariness of African borders in an ethnographic sense and in historical context,³²⁸ one would expect that they would be constantly shifting. Still, as Jeffrey Herbst argues, "there is widespread agreement that the boundaries are arbitrary, yet the vast majority of them have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800's, when they were first

³²⁷ Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 42-44.

³²⁸ See, for example, Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*.

demarcated.”³²⁹ Only two territorial changes have occurred since African states gained their independence from the colonial Europeans. Yet, even these two cases could be regarded, at least in some senses, as compatible with the principle of keeping the colonial borders intact. The Moroccans regard the Western Sahara case, which was a disputed land for a long time, could be considered as still a part of the de-colonization. The secession of Eritrea in 1993 does not clearly contradict the principle of preservation of colonial boundaries either, since Eritrea was not a part of Ethiopia in the colonial age.

Aware as they were of the conflict between the borders they inherited and the geographic and ethnic realities of their continent, the post-colonial African leaders still chose to preserve these borders and to sanctify them as unchangeable. This choice was made primarily under the mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which endorsed the principle of fixed borders from its 1963 inception. Article 3 in the OAU declaration pledges that all member-states adhere to the principles of “non-interference in the internal affairs of states” and “respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.” Despite some challenges to these principles, the organization, as well as the overwhelming majority of its members, have always stood firmly behind them. Many OAU resolutions correspond to the principle of border fixity. Resolution A.G.H/16.1 of July 21, 1964, for instance, incorporates the rule of *uti possidetis*: “All the member States are committed to respect the frontiers existing at the time of their independence.”³³⁰ The AU, which replaced the OAU, cites similar principles in its 2000 constitutive act.³³¹

³²⁹ Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa,” *International Organization* 43, no. 4 (1989): p. 673. See pp. 683-685 on the stability of African borders during the colonial era. See also Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

³³⁰ Cited in Michael-Cyr D. Wembou, “The Oau and International Law,” in *The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years*, ed. El-Ayouty Yassin (London: Praeger, 1994), p. 16. See also Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, pp. 109-12.

³³¹ http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article4

Note, though, that the African norm against changing borders even goes beyond that of the general international community. Border changes, including secessions, are prohibited by the African norm. Nevertheless, I consider this a variant of the international norm of border fixity, rather than a separate phenomenon. The principles are the same, although they took a more extreme turn in the case of Africa. From the point of view of the individual state, moreover, this norm is still “international,” regardless of whether it originates in the region or in the broader international community.

Nor was this support of existing borders only a theoretical matter. In the case of the civil war in Nigeria, for instance, the organization, as well as a great majority of its members, stood resolutely against Biafra’s attempts to secede, and so did the two superpowers.³³²

The Congolese, moreover, did not have to venture far from home to understand the implication of this international norm. Three secession attempts in Katanga (Shaba), one in the early 1960’s and two in the 1970’s, were thwarted not by the Congolese army, but by foreign troops who, in essence, were guarding border fixity. UN forces were responsible for reincorporating of Katanga in Congo in the 1963. In the 1970’s Moroccan, French, and Belgian troops (with US aid) prevented an offensive by rebels who were supported by Angola to take over Shaba.³³³

The rebellion/invasion of 1996-7 was not a challenge to Congo’s borders either. Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebellion, made that point very clear early in 1997: “The world should know what are the real issues in Zaire. The integrity of Zaire is not an issue – no one is

³³² Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa,” pp. 686-687.

³³³ Thomas M Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 206-09, Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 74-75, 248-57.

threatening that integrity.”³³⁴ Even in the late 1998, when more than half of Congo’s territory was occupied and practically controlled by foreign forces from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe, no attempt was made to challenge Congo’s legal status as a sovereign or to annex any parts of Congo.³³⁵

Thus, border fixity in the African continent is a consistent fact, despite interests of some states to the contrary, and despite the lack of a set enforcement mechanism. Congolese elite could learn this fact by following the continent’s diplomatic conferences and meetings, or simply by looking at the common practice. They could be assured, in other words, that the location of their borders does not depend in any measure on their own conduct.³³⁶

C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness

The fact that Congo, like most other developing states, was a very weak state at its independence, some 40 years ago, is not surprising. Most states are largely weak as they gain their independence (though prolonged strife against a foreign occupant can at least furnish a new state with the needed legitimacy). What is not so self-explanatory is the fact that Congo, again like many other states in Africa and Asia, has remained an extremely weak state to this date, and even more so today than in the 1960’s. This section will argue that much of this fact can be attributed to the border fixity norm, so endorsed and strengthened, as we have seen, by the African states, the OAU, the UN and the international community in general. I will proceed by

³³⁴ Cited in Thomas M Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," in *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*, ed. Ian S. Lustick and Thomas Callaghy O’leary Brendan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 124.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³³⁶ Jackson, *Quasi-States*, pp. 87-90, Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Africa’s ‘Scramble for Africa’: Lessons of a Continental War," *World Politics Journal* 17, no. 2 (2000): pp. 11-20. Jackson argues that the OAU, as well as the UN and the superpowers during the Cold War, practically guaranteed African states that their borders would remain fixed, regardless of what happens within them.

examining the efforts of state building, or lack thereof, in five core areas. These areas, as determined in the definition of state weakness given above, are: monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, revenue extraction, state bureaucracy and institutions, distribution of public goods, and ingroup cohesion.

a) Monopolization of the Means of Legitimate Violence

When there is no threat to its external borders, a government can afford to have an inefficient, weak and corrupt military. In Zaire, “the main role of the armed forces remained internal security, with little thought or energy going to national defense.”³³⁷ Such a military does not require much investment or sacrifices on the part of both the state and its citizens.

Moreover, a weak military poses less of a potential coup threat to the ruler. Mobutu, therefore, systematically withdrew resources from Zaire’s army, channeling them, instead, to his loyal (and largely recruited from his home province in the Equator) Presidential Guard.³³⁸ It was “the very importance of the military in Zairian *politics* ... which results in Mobutu’s extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and de-professionalize it.”³³⁹ When faced with internal rebellion, as was the case in the two Shaba rebellions in the 1970’s, Mobutu was obliged to utilize foreign troops (from Morocco and France) to cover up for Zaire’s deficient army.³⁴⁰ By the 1990’s, instead of being paid by the state budget, Zaire’s military got a free hand to loot and seek ransom as a routine way of

³³⁷ Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-98* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 114-15.

³³⁸ David Sharer, “Africa’s Great War,” *Survival* 41, no. 2 (1999): pp. 89-106.

³³⁹ Michael Shafer, quoted in Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 274.

³⁴⁰ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 206-09.

survival, and its commanders became economic entrepreneurs. Mobutu, rather than trying to prevent this situation, encouraged it and attempted to benefit from it.³⁴¹

Nor did things changed much after Mobutu's regime fell. Despite the country being torn by civil and interstate war, for example, the DRC's military expenditures in 2003 stood at a low 1.4% of the GDP.³⁴² Any ruler of Congo has few incentives to do otherwise: even when foreign troops controlled much of its territory, Kabila's government was still the official and recognized sovereign of its entire original territory. Thanks to the norm of border fixity, no enemy from without could have threatened its juridical sovereignty and no internal secession attempts could get the crucial international support it needed in order to succeed.³⁴³

b) Extraction of Revenues

As discussed above, the ability and willingness of the state to tax its citizenry is both a sign of a strong state and the means to sustain such a state. Mobutu's Zaire was not one. Zaire's tax collection system was inefficient, corrupt and extremely weak.³⁴⁴ Zaire's tax revenues throughout the 1970's and 1980's amounted to merely 6-11% of the GDP, and only a quarter to one third of that were taxes on income and capital revenues. These figures plunged to about 5% of the GDP by 1995 and 4% in 2000.³⁴⁵ Already in the mid 1980's, "in most places the state no longer performed even the basic function of official revenue collection."³⁴⁶ Moreover, Given the

³⁴¹ Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 40-41, Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 159-62.

³⁴² CIA, "The World Factbook, 2004." At <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>. The actual figure is probably much lower, moreover, since the official GDP does not include the huge informal/illegal sector of the economy.

³⁴³ Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications for Policy," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

³⁴⁴ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, pp. 194-204.

³⁴⁵ Data from the *World Bank Development Indicators*. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>. Compare, for instance, to 30%-38% for the same years in France and 16%-19% in the United States, with very low levels of taxation in Western terms.

³⁴⁶ Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," p. 118.

fact that, by the 1990's, many of the transactions were conducted outside of the formal Zairian economy, the actual tax burden on the citizens was probably even much smaller.³⁴⁷

Mobutu relied, instead, on short-term policies, external support, and debt, for sustaining the patrimonial network through which he controlled the state. "Zairianization," the policy of seizure by the state of vast lands and commercial enterprises of foreign nationals within Zaire, which was implemented in 1973, is an outstanding example. One of the main aims of this policy was boosting the President's means of serving his personal clientele. "The cement of clientage was access to resources. The sudden takeover of this huge zone of the economy offered a vast new pool of goods for patrimonial distribution to deserving members of the political class."³⁴⁸ Accordingly, the majority of the enterprises seized from foreigners were distributed among the political and economic elite, as a private property, rather than becoming a state property.³⁴⁹

c) Bureaucracy and State Institutions

The first few years of Mobutu's rule saw some ostensibly serious attempts at institution building. These attempts, however, were largely meant for external consumption. Moreover, they quickly gave way to reliance on a network of clients for most state functions. The absence of a process that would lead from the need to create a strong military that would defend the borders, to taxation efforts, to strong state institution, meant that Mobutu was not compelled to embark on this costly and risky endeavor. The juridical safety network supplied by the international and African norms of border fixity served as an incentive for Mobutu not to take the road of building an efficient and strong bureaucracy. The creation of the *Movement Populaire de la Revolution* (MPR), as the sole political party in the state, attempted to generate legitimacy for the new

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 328. See also Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, p. 152.

³⁴⁹ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, pp. 191-92.

Mobutu regime, as well as providing it with organizational tools to penetrate the civil society. In the late 1960's, when Mobutu attempted to expand his institutional control to additional spheres of influence, this was often done through the vehicle of the MPR. Attempts to wrest the education system from the control of the church, to secure the MPR's control over the military, and to monopolize the regional and local authorities were all aspects of this policy.

This appearance of an expanded state in the early days of Mobutu's regime, though, is misleading. Many of the efforts were made for external consumption. Repeated public relations campaigns promoted new "ideologies" such as "authenticity" (1971), "Zairianization" (1973), "Radicalization" and, finally, "Mobutism" (1974).³⁵⁰ Mobutu sought to combine a reality of dependence on Western interests with an appearance of a Third World leader. In order to get American and other Western support and loans, Mobutu agreed to serve as a forward base of the American efforts to overthrow the left-leaning regime in Angola. Yet, he also aspired to be an African, or Third World, leader, an aspiration likely to conflict with this pro-western stand. His nationalist rhetoric and presumptuous projects were meant to offset this problem in the eyes of other African leaders. The campaign of "authenticity," for example, was a cheap strategy to appear anti-western to the Third World without having to pay the political and economic price for it.³⁵¹ "Zairianization" also came because "with Mobutu at this juncture grasping for continental leadership, it was uncomfortable to be outflanked in economic self-assertion by

³⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 233-76, Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 54-71, 185-247, 326-62. While "Zairianization" and "Radicalization" carried with them an economic policy that allowed the state to seize private assets belonging to foreign nationals, "Authenticity" (which emphasized the need to replace colonialist and Western frames with authentic African ones) and "Mobutism" (which in essence was a sanctification of everything that Mobutu said) resided in a more pure ideological domain.

³⁵¹ Kevin C. Dunn, "Imagining Mobutu's Zaire: The Production and Consumption of Identity in International Relations," *Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2000): pp. 245-51.

another giant state [Nigeria] of tropical Africa.”³⁵² Thus, policies that on their face seem to strengthen the means available to the state, were actually geared at external audiences.

Mobutu’s Zaire, moreover, “had a dual character: formally institutionalized, in party and administration, but informally patrimonial and personal.”³⁵³ In the mid 1980’s, Zaire was “an early modern leviathan, but a lame one.”³⁵⁴ On the one hand, the state was highly centralized and authoritarian, much like the absolutist state of 17th and 18th century Europe but, on the other hand, its reach was extremely limited. To the extent that the state exercised its tasks at all, it did so by an apparatus that was bureaucratic in name but patrimonial in reality.³⁵⁵ In other words, the whole state system was dependent on Mobutu’s personal rule and the personal loyalty owed to Mobutu (and his money) by so-called “bureaucrats,” “policemen,” and “soldiers.” The state as an entity separate from its ruler did not exist in any meaningful sense.³⁵⁶ This structure of rule is of great importance since it implies that the project of state building will be carried out only so long as it serves the personal interest of the ruler (and his clientele officeholders). Seen through these lenses, what appeared first to be an expansion of the Zairian state in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s could have been, after all, nothing but an expansion of the personal network of Mobutu’s rule.

By 1973-4, even the pretence of efforts to promote state building was abandoned with a rapid deterioration in all areas of public policy. Faced with a growing debt to external creditors and

³⁵² Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 327.

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 397. Max Weber uses the term “patrimonial” to denote a regime that is, for most practical purposes, an extension of the ruler’s household. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 231-32, 1010-44. Such a regime includes, among other features, “appropriation of public offices as the elite’s prime source of status, prestige and rewards; political and territorial fragmentation through the development of relationships based on primordial and personal loyalties; and the use of private armies, militias, and mercenaries as chief instruments of rule.” Jean-Claude Willaime, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 2.

³⁵⁴ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, p. 409.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 164-84.

declining revenue base, due to falling prices of copper and the colossal economic failure of “Zairianization,” Mobutu finally had to make some tough choices. When he had to decide between continued public spending and continued enrichment of his own clientele (and, of course, himself), Mobutu opted for the latter, opening an era of state decay and collapse.³⁵⁷ The proximity of this turn in policy to the end of the secession crisis in Nigeria might be telling. Although there is no evidence to corroborate these suspicions, one might speculate that once the commitment of the international community to the fixed borders of Africa was proven beyond doubt, Mobutu could assume that Zaire’s borders are equally as sanctified. He would not have to pay in territorial currency for the results of his policies.

Mobutu had two main reasons why for dismantling whatever apparatus was still in place, instead of attempting a hard and expensive project of state building. First, he needed to sustain his expanded net of personal clients under conditions of ever-tightening resources in the face of a decline in foreign aid and local production through the late 1970’s and the 1980’s. At the same time, when the central authority does not need to uphold some minimal popular legitimacy (because its sovereignty would not be challenged from without) it does not need to invest in bettering the life of its people.³⁵⁸ Thus, “Mobutu rejected the pursuit of policies or the building of institutions that would have served the collective good. Instead, he consolidated his own authority by monopolizing resources...”³⁵⁹. The second reason Mobutu did not attempt to create a stronger state apparatus is that an efficient bureaucracy, much as a strong army, might serve as an independent power base that could threaten Mobutu’s own rule in times of crises. He chose,

³⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 71-77.

³⁵⁸ This is not to deny that the regime could be sometimes interested in such an investment for other reasons.

³⁵⁹ Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," pp. 14-15.

then, to shrink more and more Zaire's bureaucratic apparatus, relying instead on the network of clients, mainly through regional strongmen, for continuing revenues.³⁶⁰

As explained above, the argument is not that the border fixity norm directly creates incentives for rulers to avoid a healthy building of state institutions. The argument is, rather, that state building was always a very risky and expensive process that rulers and elites would avoid, if they could. However, so long as they faced serious and continuous territorial threats, as well as opportunities for expansion, and so long as they did not have the safety net of the "juridical state," rulers could avoid state building only at their peril. And if they did, they were often "punished" by stronger neighbors. Could Mobutu, for example, sustain such a consistent policy of weakening his own state institutions had he been the ruler of a large country in the heart of 17th century Europe? One might suspect the answer is no.

Mobutu's regime, despite these extreme deficiencies, did not collapse until the mid-1990's.³⁶¹ When Laurent Kabila took over Kinshasa in 1997, he "inherited less a state than a fiefdom. Normal state functions had been replaced by patronage."³⁶² Though Mobutu's personality (or, one might say, megalomania) shaped much of Zaire's policies during his long reign, Kabila faced more or less similar structural incentives: With the fixity of his state's borders underwritten by the international community, he had little incentive to embark on the tortuous road of state building. Indeed, Kabila's short term in power revealed some of the same tendencies discussed above, such as the construction of a clientele network instead of an efficient bureaucratic

³⁶⁰ Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 149-52.

³⁶¹ Partly, because Mobutu himself and his regime were heavily subsidized by the US: "for a quarter of a century the Mobutist state was able to compensate for its lack of internal legitimacy by drawing huge dividends from its international status as the staunchest ally of the United States in Africa." Rene Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes," review of Reviewed Item, *African Studies Quarterly*, no. 1 (3) (1997), <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/3/2.htm>. See also Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 151-53.

³⁶² Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 92.

hierarchy, and playing ethnic groups against each other.³⁶³ As a result, Kabila's Congo remained "an institutional clone of its predecessor."³⁶⁴

d) Services and Public Goods

As discussed above, provision of public goods is also an indicator of the strength of the state. Moreover, it is not only how much money is spent, but also where it is spent (purpose and location) that is important. In Mobutu's Zaire, the government spent little on public goods, and it spent it mostly on extravagant projects, rather on the much more needed public services. Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the government monies is telling, where large parts of the country's population were basically marginalized in terms of government expenditures. Had the government needed to enhance the legitimacy of the state and assure, in particular, the allegiance of populations closer to international borders (so as to prevent irredentist aspirations), the policy of public goods distribution might have been different.

In terms of economic investments, Mobutu directed much of the public spending towards huge, highly visible, and often misguided, projects, such as the building of the Ingha-Shaba Dam and constructing a high-power grid to transfer the energy produced there to the Shaba mines. On the other hand, while the portion of the state budget that was given solely to the discretion of the President grew from 28% in 1972 to 95% in 1992, the state's expenses on social services dropped from 17.5% in 1972 to virtually nothing in 1992.³⁶⁵ The portion of the budget devoted to the President went either into Mobutu's own pocket or to the sustenance of his network of clientele. This pattern of state expenditure points again to a policy that is aimed at gaining

³⁶³ See Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire."

³⁶⁴ Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 52.

³⁶⁵ Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, p. 154.

“cheap” legitimacy, both internal and external, at the expense of a real, and politically less beneficial, public good.³⁶⁶

Moreover, these characteristics have grown stronger the further from the capital one looks. Since the control of the capital city is the only condition put by the international community for the recognition of one’s government’s sovereignty, it was the only asset that Mobutu’s regime still needed to invest in (apart from sustaining the flow of cash from Zaire’s natural resources through local strongmen). Between 1969 and 1972, for example, Kinshasa, with about 6% of Zaire’s population, was allocated 31% of government-approved investment projects, and Shaba got about 47% of the investment (which went virtually all to the mineral mining industry), despite the fact that it was a home to less than 13% of Zaire’s population. In contrast, Kivu province, with 15.5% of the population, was allocated only 1.53% of the investment projects and Kasai, with almost 20% of the state’s population was given virtually no investment.³⁶⁷

The extent to which the periphery was neglected can be best exemplified by the fact that, in 1996, until Kabila’s forces conquered Kisangani (the third largest city in Zaire) the Kinshasa government was unconcerned about the rebellion in the Kivu province.³⁶⁸ It was hardly a challenge to the state borders and it did not at all affect the position of Mobutu’s government in any international body.

³⁶⁶ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, pp. 184-94.

³⁶⁷ For this data, as well as various other measures and analyses that portray the marginalization of any province beyond Kinshasa and the “copper belt” region in Shaba, see Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 78-91..

³⁶⁸ Christain R. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of the International Order in Central Africa," review of Reviewed Item, *African Studies Quarterley*, no. 4 (1) (2000), <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a2.htm>.

e) Ingroup Cohesion

In many African states, the identification of the population with the state is tenuous at best.³⁶⁹ Congo is no different, although it is very hard to determine the level of loyalty to the state in the absence of multiparty elections, reliable polling or other accurate measures to gauge the degree of support of the citizens for their state, and the location of its borders. Moreover, with an extremely authoritarian regime like that of Mobutu, it is often hard to tell whether resistance is directed at the political power of the dictator, or at the state as such.

Bearing these factors in mind, one can still detect a few signs of the overall low legitimacy of Mobutu's Zaire in the eyes of its own populace. One such sign might be the rebellions that aimed explicitly at secession from the state. There were three such rebellions in the Shaba (Katanga) region, in the early 1960's and, again, in 1977 and 1978, in the short history of Congo since its independence. A second factor that might indicate a low level of state legitimacy is the size of the unofficial (or parallel) economy. Smuggling, tax evasion, unregulated trade and extensive use of the black market, as well as the withdrawal to non-commercial agriculture, all can be seen as forms of disengagement and disapproval of the state. All these practices abound in Zaire, and got more pronounced with time.³⁷⁰ "The informal sector," the US State Department analysis concluded in 2005, "now dominates the [Congolese] economy."³⁷¹ Lastly, one can infer the level of illegitimacy of the basic structure of the state from the practices of its leaders. Mobutu,

³⁶⁹ For some general discussion of this aspect, see Michael Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa," in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, ed. John W. Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 51-82, Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa," in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, ed. Donald Rothchild, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 121-48.

³⁷⁰ For the general argument, see Victor Azarya, "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa," in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, ed. John W. Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 83-100. For the case of Congo, see Janet MacGaffey, "Civil Society in Zaire: Hidden Resistance and the Use of Personal Ties in Class Struggle," in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, ed. John W. Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 169-89.

³⁷¹ See the US Department of State country background profile at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm . See also Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," p. 118.

specifically, “has occupied just about every possible ideological position in a whirl of legitimating eclecticism.”³⁷² The fact that he has spent so much effort on such campaigns, suggests exactly the lack of genuine legitimacy and loyalty of the population to the state. While these are non-direct measures of legitimacy, they are as good indicators as one could expect in a case of a state run by an authoritarian regime.

Kabila’s DRC, like Zaire before it, was threatened by external intervention, but these threats were not translated into a process of state building since they were not territorial threats and especially since the survival of the state as such was not endangered. As explained by Lewis Coser, in order for external threats to produce internal cohesiveness, the threat has to be perceived as a threat to the whole.³⁷³ The external threat in Congo, rather, was perceived in ethnic terms: a threat to some, an opportunity to others, as it could change the internal balance of power but not Congo’s borders. Therefore, the 1998 invasion could not generate a genuine process of creating a more cohesive society in Congo, much like previous foreign interventions.³⁷⁴

f) Conclusions: Border Fixity and State Weakness in Congo

Mobutu’s Zaire was a weak state at its inception, and it did not get any stronger. On the contrary, after a few encouraging signs in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the state began a long and gradual decline into the status of a failed (or collapsed) state in the 1990’s. The method of governing Zaire, from the utter disregard to the creation of strong civil and military institutions, to the meager efforts to extract resources from the population and, on the other hand, to distribute

³⁷² Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, pp. 410-14. Quotation from p. 12.

³⁷³ Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, pp. 93-95.

³⁷⁴ On the way different ethnic groups in Congo allied themselves with the different external interveners, see Thomas Turner, “The Kabila’s Congo,” *Current History* 100, no. 646 (2001): pp. 215-18.

goods, and the patterns of this distribution, is telling. This behavior, though not directly proving the relationship between the ever weakening of the state and the norm of border fixity, nevertheless points to the absence of any concern for the survival of the state as such (as opposed to the regime itself), and to the viability of its territorial boundaries.

D. State Weakness, Civil Conflict, and Conflict Spillover in Congo

This section explores the proposition, drawn in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, which connected state weakness to international conflict through the expansion of internal conflict across borders. This expansion, it concludes, greatly contributed to the outbreak and the protracted nature of war in Congo. Spillover of the genocidal ethnic conflict from Rwanda to Zaire/DRC and back played a major role in the eruption of this conflict. Somewhat similar processes (although on a smaller scale) were also evident in relations between Zaire and Burundi, Uganda, and Angola. Predatory motivations, enhanced by Congo's weakness, were also present. Yet, these were in most of the cases secondary to security motivations in neighboring countries decisions to intervene in Congo. This section outlines the process of the spread of these ethnic wars over the African borders and explains why the weakness of the region's states, and mainly Congo, facilitated this process.

Throughout its independent existence, Zaire was a nuisance to its neighbors, frequently interfering with their internal affairs and backing guerilla movements fighting the regimes in Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and other states in the region. What brought the massive interventions of 1996 and 1988, however, was first and foremost a spillover of internal strife across the Great Lakes region of Africa. Towards the end of 1996, an armed rebellion against Mobutu's regime in Zaire began at Kivu province, by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du

Congo-Zaire (ADFL), backed by Rwandan forces and supported by most states in the region. The rebellion, which was led by Laurent Desire Kabila, rapidly defeated the collapsing Zairian armed forces. By May 1997 the ailing Mobutu fled into exile and Kabila took over Kinshasa and established the state under a new name: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, this proved to be only the first phase in a protracted war. Kabila soon alienated a significant number of his former allies, both internal and external. A new rebellion began in August 1998 in eastern Congo and a massive intervention by Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces pushed rapidly towards the capital. This time, however, Kabila turned to other foreign forces to save his collapsing regime, and soon Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, Sudanese and Chadean forces counter-intervened and managed to prevent Kinshasa from falling. Nevertheless, the war did not end there. For over four years foreign troops and local rebels controlled much of the vast Congolese territory. Casualties were immense, with estimates run as high as 3.8 million dead as a direct or indirect result of the war.³⁷⁵ The economic and health situation, bad as it was, has further deteriorated. With famine and diseases being abundant, the ongoing instability serves as a permanent impediment to any prospects of a better future.

Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and was replaced by his seemingly more rational and flexible son, Joseph Kabila, as the DRC's president. After numerous previous attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement failed to materialize, the December 2002 Pretoria Accord has been a significant stride toward the end of the conflict, achieving a withdrawal of all foreign troops and the creation of a transitional government which includes rebels and opposition parties. What has been labeled "Africa's Great War" reached its end. The fighting between the

³⁷⁵ According to the most comprehensive survey, conducted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in 2004. This number includes both military and civilian casualties, as well as death caused directly by the violence and those caused by indirect consequences (e.g., famine and epidemics) of the fighting. See http://www.theirc.org/pdf/DRC_MortalitySurvey2004_RB_8Dec04.pdf.

Congolese army and various local militias, however, is still far from over, and Rwanda is still threatening a renewed invasion, should the Congolese government support of the Hutu rebels not stop. The disastrous results of the war will probably be felt for many years to come, even if a political reconciliation is reached. The tremendous death and suffering, the displacement and the damage to infrastructure and to the fabric of the society will probably take decades to heal.³⁷⁶ The discussion below concentrates on the causes of the Congo War (if one lumps together the 1996 to 2002 period) and its relations with the state weakness and, indirectly, with the border fixity norm. Specifically, it

a) State Weakness and Civil Conflict in Zaire and Its Neighbors

Emerging anarchy and “internal scapegoating,” it was argued in Hypothesis 3, make weak states much more likely to slide into civil conflicts and internal wars. Both of these factors, indeed, played a significant role in Congo (and in some of its neighbors), leading, eventually, to the international conflagration.

I. Emerging Anarchy and Communal Strife

Over the years of Mobutu’s rule (1965-1997), low level violent civil conflicts kept on simmering, though usually away from the public eye. These conflicts erupted several times. The first two incidents involved the Katangese rebellions in the late 1970’s, in which Katangese rebels, apparently assisted by Angola, twice tried to seize control of areas in the Shaba (formerly Katanga) region. That Zaire had to use Belgian and Tunisian troops to quell these rebellions

³⁷⁶ Comprehensive sources on the war are still scarce. For a decent beginning, see John F. Clark, ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

indicates the role of state weakness in allowing them to erupt in the first place.³⁷⁷ In addition to these two incidents, which were highlighted since they involved foreign countries and possible Cold War connection, Zaire had suffered from continuous tensions between its multiple ethnic groups. In the early 1990's, these tensions erupted to fully-fledged internal wars. In the two main peaks of these wars, hundreds of thousands Kasai people were driven out of their home in the Shaba province, and some 10,000 Banyarwanda³⁷⁸ were killed and 250,000 become refugees in North Kivu.³⁷⁹ These patterns could not have been happening in a strong state without the government and military stepping in. But in Zaire, "Three months and several thousand deaths [after the breakup of violence] the authorities had done nothing."³⁸⁰ As these internal wars came on the heels of the obvious signs of Zaire's failure and disintegration (as mutinies and collapse of the army and a crisis of legitimacy in Kinshasa), the *Economist* thus concluded, they are "a symptom of Zaire's chronic ungovernance."³⁸¹

II. Internal Scapegoating

Yet, these incidents of ethnic wars were not only a result of lack of governmental means to establish order. One finds plenty of evidence for the use of internal diversionary tactics in Congolese politics. The ethnic dimension of Zairian politics became more salient as Mobutu lost popular legitimacy and as external powers repeatedly intervened to prevent secession attempts.

³⁷⁷ Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle*, pp. 206-09, Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 74-75, 248-75.

³⁷⁸ Banyarwanda is the collective term for North Kivu groups that migrated from Rwanda and Burundi to Congo, mostly in the pre-colonial era. While technically they include also the Hutu of the same origins, the term Banyarwanda, increasingly became synonymous with all Congolese Tutsi. In South Kivu, the Tutsi tribes are mostly referred to as Banyamulenge. See Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," p. 120, Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 49-50 and fn. 26.

³⁷⁹ Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 41-43. Chris McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of Hatred and Expediency," *The Guardian*, September 24 1993.

³⁸⁰ McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of Hatred and Expediency."

³⁸¹ "Zaire: Folly by the Numbers," *the Economist*, August 7 1993.

While the strategy of demobilizing ethnicity as a political and cultural vehicle was at the core of Mobutu's declared policy, he came, in practice, to rely more and more on an inner circle of a rather coherent ethnic makeup. This circle concentrated heavily on Equatorian and Lingala speakers, to the exclusion of other groups in the Zairian population. This was especially true within the security apparatus and in the most sensitive financial posts.³⁸² Mobutu, it is clear, used the diversionary card to manipulate the (il)legitimacy of his rule. Though "divide and rule" tactics were commonplace throughout his tenure and across Zaire, these tactics were particularly pronounced in the North and South Kivu provinces, where a large population of Tutsi (Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge) resides. Increasingly during the 1980's and 1990's Mobutu sought to portray these groups as "foreigners" so as to gain the support of other groups in Kivu, which were competing with the Banyarwanda for resources and land. The 1991 law that cancelled the citizenship rights of the Banyarwanda and their right to hold public office is a good example of this policy, and it was done "mainly to create a scapegoat for Zaire's many problems and to distract the attention of the populace from their real source of misery."³⁸³ The injection of armed Hutu militia fleeing their defeat in Rwanda in 1994 considerably added to the already violent civil strife in east Congo, as will be discussed below.

Mobutu's successor, Kabila, exploited similar tactics as well, targeting in particular the Banyamulenge, and branding them as Rwanda's "internal spies." Although Kabila's policy of exclusion seem to come more as a reaction to intensified xenophobic feelings what intensified Kinshasa, they too originated from a lack of alternative ways to gaining legitimacy in a weak

³⁸² Young, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, pp. 152-57.

³⁸³ Quote from Jermaine O. McCalpin, "Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War," in *The African Stakes in the Congo War*, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), p. 46. See also Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, p. 161. Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," pp. 119-24, Kisangany N.F Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of Un Peacekeeping Failure and International Law," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (2000): pp. 166-67.

state, and resulted in international war. By the end of 1997, “the choice [Kabila] faced was either to hang on to his Rwandan protectors, and suffer an even greater loss of legitimacy, or to free himself of their embrace and face the consequences.”³⁸⁴ Still, Kabila chose to perform the “breakout” from Rwanda by not only ordering “all foreign troops” out of the country but also by encouraging his army to take part in a massacre of hundreds of Tutsi residents of Kinshasa.³⁸⁵ Instead of just heeding the public mood, then, he tried to ride this wave of hatred to gain a new legitimacy. At least in the short run, this was a successful strategy, since Kabila’s popularity was indeed elevated by the new policy.³⁸⁶ As will be discussed below, Kabila’s new exclusionary policies greatly affected the outbreak of the second Rwandan invasion.

Zaire’s growing weakness in the 1990’s, then, generated ethnic conflicts and internal wars, in particular in the Kivu provinces in the east. Yet, Zaire’s weakness and its internal conflicts were not the only factor at play. Indeed, the key event that triggered the chain reaction that ended with the Congo War was the genocide in a neighboring state, Rwanda, itself a very weak state.³⁸⁷ The combination of Rwanda’s civil strife and Zaire’s weakness is what brought about, eventually, the Congo War.

³⁸⁴ Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic of Congo,” p. 45.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ David Sharer, “Lines on the Map,” *The World Today* 1998.

³⁸⁷ Since this is not its focus, this paper does not dwell on the question of Rwanda’s weakness. Suffice it to say that Rwanda is ranked as the 12th weakest state in the “Failed States Index” (see Fund For Peace, *Failed States Index* (2005 [cited July 1 2006]); available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2005.php>.) and that although its government is fairly efficient in African terms the state is weak in legitimacy and identity terms. Within Rwanda all the following processes occurred repeatedly, but most prominently in the 1990’s: control of the state by one ethnic group (Hutu and then Tutsi) to the exclusion of the others; intra-ethnic outbidding (because of the role of ethnicity as almost the sole source of legitimacy); inter-ethnic security dilemma (in the absence of a strong protector). See René Lemarchand, “Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes,” *African Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1997).

b) Spillover of Internal War

I. Armed Refugees and Spillover to International Conflict

The mechanism through which the Rwandan civil war spread into Congo is similar to the one described in Hypotheses 4: First, the flow of refugees across the border and the Hutu militants' use of refugee camps as a base for insurgency into Rwanda made these camps a hot contention point between the host country (Zaire/DRC) and the sending country (Rwanda). Second, the presence of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo made any ethnic conflict in one of them more likely to spread to the others. In both of these processes, the weakness of the states involved (especially that in Congo) made the states both unable and unwilling to rein in militants who steered cross-border tensions, thus exacerbating the problem and making it one not only between ethnic groups, but between states as well. Both the Rwandan-backed rebellion against Mobutu in 1997 and the Rwandan/ Ugandan/ Burundian invasion of the DRC in 1998 were, to a significant degree, products of these process of conflict spillover.

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a massive flow of Hutu refugees left the country, fearing retribution at the hands of Tutsis and the government, now controlled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The leadership of the Hutu militants enthusiastically encouraged this fear and massive exodus.³⁸⁸ The Rwandan refugees settled in camps in Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi. In Zaire, between 1 and 1.5 million Hutu Rwandan refugees were located in huge camps in South and North Kivu, the easternmost provinces of the country, in close proximity to the Rwandan border. Among these refugees were some 50,000 to 100,000 former

³⁸⁸ Sarah K. Lischer, "Internal Conflict and International Contagion: Refugees, Rebels, and Humanitarian Aid," in *the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association* (Boston: 2002), pp. 13-14. For a comprehensive source on Rwanda's genocide, see Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994* (London: Hurst, 1995).

Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) soldiers and members of the militant Hutu paramilitary, the *Interahamwe*, which was largely responsible for the genocide. These groups were highly organized and well armed, a fact that made them a classic example of “a state in exile.” The presence of the Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire and their domination by the militant groups seem to be the primary cause of both phases of the international intervention in this country. Under the leadership of this militia, “the refugee camps were turned into military bases from which regular cross-border incursions were launched in order to destabilize the new Rwandan government.”³⁸⁹

A massive exodus of refugees after a military defeat in a civil war is commonplace, and among these refugees, there are often many guerillas and ex-soldiers from the losing side. These occasions, however, do not necessarily turn into border wars of incursion and retaliation. If the host state is both willing and able to prevent refugee camps from becoming bases for insurgency, these border wars may be avoidable. The Rwandan Hutu refugees who filled the camps of western Tanzania, for instance, were prevented from using these camps as a base for launching attacks on Rwanda by forceful policing and efficient sealing of the border by the Tanzanian military.³⁹⁰ Moreover, Tanzania extended citizenship to these Hutu refugees, thus reducing their level of resentment and increasing chances of peaceful integration into the local population.³⁹¹

In a sharp contrast to Tanzania, and despite many similarities in the composition of population and economic conditions,³⁹² Mobutu’s Zaire was both unable and unwilling to provide the necessary control of its borders with Rwanda (or any other neighbor, for that matter) and the adjacent refugee camps. Mobutu not only avoided confronting the Hutu militants and

³⁸⁹ The quote is from Christain R. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of the International Order in Central Africa," *African Studies Quarterley* 4, no. 1 (2000): p. 2. See also Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," p. 165, Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, p. 82, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 90-92.

³⁹⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, pp. 91-111. Note that the fact that Tanzania has shown some aspect of a stronger state than Congo does not necessarily contradict the theory advanced here, which argues that states are less likely to get stronger under border fixity, not that they *cannot* get stronger.

³⁹¹ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p. 238.

³⁹² See Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, pp. 108-11.

ignored repeated Rwandan requests to do so, but also allowed (or directed, it is hard to tell) his army to assist them. Zairian officers facilitated the arms trade of the *Interahamwe* and cargo companies related to Mobutu's regime made this trade available. Zaire's army also availed military camps and headquarters to the commanders of the Ex-FAR forces, and were heavily involved in the militants' extortion and suppression of the camps' civilian refugees.³⁹³ Mobutu regularly met with senior elements of the Hutu militants, including the former Rwandan army Chief of Staff.³⁹⁴ Although Mobutu never tried seriously to disarm the Rwandan Hutu militia, it is quite obvious from the rapid crumble of its army in the face of the 1996 rebellion that he would not have succeeded in that even if he had the motives. Since these militants intended explicitly to replace Rwanda's regime (and perhaps also further the "unfinished business" of genocide) and since Rwanda's government largely represented the Tutsi minority, this insurgency was viewed from Kigali as a grave threat.³⁹⁵ Note, though, that the threat was not to Rwanda's territory but to the Tutsi population and the Tutsi regime. Thus, Paul Kagame, Vice-President of Rwanda, told diplomats in early 1996, "if the international community was unable to stop the delivery of weapons to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and the military training in the refugee camps, the Rwandan government could decide to take *preventive military action* [my emphasis]."³⁹⁶

³⁹³ Human Rights Watch painstakingly documented this Zairian Involvement in the Rwandan Hutu military activities in Zaire. See Kathi L. Austin, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide," (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

³⁹⁴ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, p. 85.

³⁹⁵ Bruce Baker, "Going to War Democratically: The Case of the Second Congo War(1998-2000)," *Contemporary Politics* 6, no. 3 (2000), Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2, Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 1-4, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 90-92.

³⁹⁶ Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," p. 3. See also Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo.", Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 168.

The same dynamics, though perhaps on a lesser scale, worked between Mobutu's Zaire and other neighbors, such as Burundi, Uganda and Angola.³⁹⁷ For Burundi, where a minority Tutsi controlled the government and largely excluded the majority Hutu, the story almost resembles that of Rwanda. Refugee camps around Uvira (in South Kivu), which hosted some 150,000 Burundian Hutu refugees, were since 1995 a breeding place for the Hutu rebellion against Burundi's government. The Conseil National pour la Défense (CNDD) mounted its attacks on Burundian soil using these camps as a rear base. Burundi's backing of the war against Mobutu was largely due to these threats to its regime, and to the efforts to eradicate them.³⁹⁸ Uganda shared similar concerns. Three of Uganda's armed opposition groups, most notably the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), had also found safe havens in Eastern Zaire.³⁹⁹ Again, whether Mobutu was just allowing these groups to operate from Zairian soil or actively assisting them, the interests of Uganda in sponsoring a friendlier regime in Kinshasa and a possibility for direct action in Eastern Zaire against the rebels is clear. This primary concern of Uganda was evident in its (successful) attempt to obtain official permission to enter the DRC in pursuit of rebels endangering its borders and population, once Kabila was in power.⁴⁰⁰

The case of Angola is an even clearer example of intervention in a neighboring state designed to thwart a domestic foe assisted by this state. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was actively fighting the Angolan government from its 1975 independence until 2002. Mobutu's Zaire was the primary lifeline for UNITA. Zaire served as a channel for diamond smuggling from Angola (an estimated half a billion dollars annually) and

³⁹⁷ All of them ranked among the 60 states in the "Failed States Index." See Fund For Peace, *Failed States Index* (Fund For Peace, 2005 [cited]); available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/program/fsi/fsindex.php>.

³⁹⁸ Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 95.

³⁹⁹ John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2001): p. 271-72, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2.

⁴⁰⁰ Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 272-73.

weapons bought with this money. It served as a ground for UNITA's rear bases and, not less important, as a conduit for the financing of the movement provided by the US and South Africa (until the early 1990's) against Angola's socialist government. Mobutu himself gained huge profits from these transactions by playing a middleman and extracting fees for his good services. Thus, Angola happily supported Kabila's effort to oust the friend of its worst enemy- Mobutu.⁴⁰¹

Laurent Kabila's accession to power in Kinshasa in 1996 changed the players but not the structure of the situation. Congo (now DRC) was still an extremely weak state. The DRC was still unable to prevent all (or even most) attacks on its neighbors arising from its lands. Kabila certainly did not set this mission as a priority of his regime. The consequences were that almost the exact same problems that caused the initial burst against Mobutu were now the reason some of the DRC's neighbors aspired to oust Kabila. His inability and unwillingness to disarm the Hutu's militia who were operating in the DRC's eastern provinces remained Rwanda's largest concern. As Rwanda's old ally Kabila turned away from fulfilling its security needs, Kigali sought to replace him with someone more sympathetic, as it had done with Mobutu before. The massive invasion, as well as the method of choosing a local ally to head the march to Kinshasa, was strikingly similar to the first invasion (1996).⁴⁰² Similar concerns, apparently, were driving Burundi to participate in this second invasion, attempting to eradicate Burundian Hutu rebels that were operating along the Tanganyika Lake, endangering the country's borders.⁴⁰³

The official Ugandan explanation of the 1998 intervention stressed the need for Uganda to flush out guerilla bases in Eastern Congo, that served the ADF in its raids on villages over the

⁴⁰¹ Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States*, pp. 151-62, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 96-97, Thomas Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War," in *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 75-83, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 14.

⁴⁰² Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-48, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 92, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 12.

⁴⁰³ Baker, "Going to War Democratically," p. 269.

Ugandan border. At the minimum, Kabila had done nothing to rid his soil of these rebels. At the maximum, as the Ugandan government alleged, he allowed Sudanese assistance in arming and training to the ADF, hoping to get their aid for his army as well. Uganda's claims of finding "smoking guns" pointing to the involvement of the Sudanese in arming and training the ADF are quite reasonable too, given Sudan's policy that "any enemy of Uganda is a friend of ours" (because Uganda assists the rebels of Southern Sudan in their prolonged fight against the Khartoum government).⁴⁰⁴ Uganda, though, was not content with conducting limited operations against the ADF or even with establishing a "security zone" next to its Congolese border. Its involvement in the Rwandan initial airlift that intended to take hold of Kinshasa and its sponsoring of rebel groups in the Equator, more than 1000 miles away from its western border, testify to its broader goals. Museveni (Uganda's President) apparently concluded that a long-term solution to his country's security problems was dependent on a friendlier (and more efficient) regime in Kinshasa.⁴⁰⁵

Angola, an ally of Rwanda and Uganda in their drive to oust Mobutu, found itself this time on the other side of the war, supporting Kabila and opposing Rwanda and Uganda. It was Angolan troops, together with Zimbabweans, that managed to save Kinshasa from falling once again into the hands of Rwandan-backed rebels (the RCD). How can we explain such an unusual scenario? Again, considerations regarding its internal war seem to account for the Angolan policy. Kabila disrupted the flow of UNITA's weaponry and diamonds through Congo, and, as much as Angola was not satisfied with Kabila's handling of his government, this disruption was

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.: pp. 268-69, Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 271-73, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 95-96.

⁴⁰⁵ Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 272-73, 78-81, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 95-96. Note that this pattern is consistent with what Tanisha Fazal argued is a post WW-II trend to replace the practice of territorial conquests with attempts at regime change. See Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit."

the critical factor for Luanda. Angola seems to have thought that a new regime in Kinshasa might give Savimbi a renewed opportunity to establish his supply routes.⁴⁰⁶ Rumors of UNITA and Mobutu sympathizers' connections with the rebels and with Kigali fueled Angolan suspicions even more, eventually bringing about the decision to heed Kabila's request and send in troops.⁴⁰⁷ That curbing UNITA's activity was the primary factor that prompted Angola's intervention on behalf of Kabila's government is evident from Angola's prompt withdrawal from Congo now that Savimbi is dead and UNITA is, at long last, defeated.

II. Kin Relations Across Borders

The other mechanism of spillover described in chapter 2, the "kin-country syndrome," worked here as well. Like Rwanda, Burundi, and Western Tanzania, eastern Congo is a home for both Hutu and Tutsi ethnics (along with other ethnic groups). Yet, unlike Burundi and Rwanda, until the 1990's there were relatively few tensions between these two groups. Rather, both Hutus and Tutsis in eastern Congo, known collectively as Banyarwanda, were resented by other ethnic groups, who thought of them as aliens (although many of the Banyarwanda immigrated to this area more than 200 years ago).⁴⁰⁸

The Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee flow, however, shuffled the cards in all of central Africa. Hutu Zairians and Indigenous Zairians allied themselves with the Rwandan Interahamwe against the Tutsi, both those native to Zaire and those relative newcomers from Rwanda. Violence was soon forthcoming; the Interahamwe and ex-FAR elements in the refugee

⁴⁰⁶ Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 95, Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War.", Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 14.

⁴⁰⁷ On possible connections between the rebels and Rwanda and UNITA, see Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," p. 6, Sharer, "Lines on the Map," p. 295. On Kabila's appeal to Angolan intervention, explicitly promising to keep pursuing anti-UNITA policies, see Francois Misser, and Rake, Alan, "An African World War?" *New African*, October 1998, p. 14.

⁴⁰⁸ Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 166-67, Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 49-52, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.

camps attacked and killed thousands of Tutsi in North and South Kivu in 1996. While the Hutu and the indigenous groups gained the support of Mobutu, the Tutsi were pushed to find refuge in the support of the (now Tutsi ruled) Rwandan government. "The 'kin-country syndrome,' then, asserted itself with a vengeance, driving Hutu and Tutsi, irrespective of other distinctions, to opposing camps."⁴⁰⁹ This conflagration would not have happened if Zaire was a stronger state, capable of securing interethnic order, and if its leaders had incentives to prevent ethnic exclusion as a measure for gaining legitimacy.

The active exclusion of the Tutsi in Zaire was one of the primary causes of the rebellion against Mobutu and, because of kin relations to Rwanda, of the Rwandan intervention in Congo.⁴¹⁰ In October 1996, after being issued a decree commanding them to "return" to Rwanda within six days. This situation only exacerbated the fears of the Tutsi in Rwanda, which were already engaged in violent conflict with Hutu militia and their local backers. The Banyamulenge, therefore, turned to Kigali for military support. This, together with the Hutu cross-border attacks described above, led to the massive Rwandan attack on the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire (and, apparently, also to massive slaughter of civilians), which started the rapid crumbling of Mobutu's regime.⁴¹¹

Similarly, the 1998 Rwandan invasion was a result, in addition to the security problem, of DRC's ethnic policies regarding the Banyamulenge. Early in 1998, Kabila decided to neglect his allies in the struggle against Mobutu in order to restore his popularity in Kinshasa. Tutsi ministers in his government were ousted, and after issuing a decree for all foreign troops (i.e.,

⁴⁰⁹ Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.

⁴¹⁰ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p. 238.

⁴¹¹ Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 167-79, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," pp. 6-7, Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 2-4, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 13.

Rwandan) to leave the country, a massacre of the Banyamulenge (as well as anybody with Tutsi-looking features), encouraged by the army, took place in Kinshasa. Furthermore, Kabila failed to fulfill his promise to Rwanda to bestow citizenship on the Banyamulenge. Again, along with Kabila's inability and unwillingness to disarm the Interahamwe, the exclusion of their brethren from the DRC was the "red line" that propelled Rwanda to attempt a second march on Kinshasa.⁴¹²

Civil war in Rwanda spilled over through a massive flow of refugees to Zaire. The refugee camps, in turn, served as a base for Hutu insurgence, as well as stirring up ethnic fighting within Zaire. This fighting provided even more incentive for Rwanda to intervene on behalf of its Tutsi kin across the border. The weakness of Zaire/DRC, both in 1996 and 1998, did not allow it to forcefully intervene in the ethnic conflict and assert the state's monopoly over the means of violence, which would have prevented the Hutu militia from staging the cross-border attacks. Moreover, the illegitimacy of Kinshasa's rule made it use ethnic exclusion of the Tutsi as a vehicle for gaining such legitimacy. This policy left Rwanda little choice but to assert its role as the protector of the Tutsi, whether they resided on its soil or outside of it. Similar processes, especially regarding the cross border insurgency and retaliations, were at work in the cases of Burundi's, Uganda's and Angola's intervention in Congo as well. On a more fundamental level, as argued above, the border fixity norm makes the creation of a more coherent and inclusive state identity, one that would take the sting out of the two processes described above, much less likely.

c) State Weakness and Foreign Predation

The ban on territorial annexation that is entailed in the border fixity norm does not preclude any form of predation across borders. Hypothesis 5 stated that state weakness promotes the

⁴¹² Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-46, Misser, "An African World War?" p. 15.

possibility of international conflicts because it creates opportunities for neighbors to intervene in order to exploit the weak state, economically or politically.

“Africa’s ‘scramble for Africa,’” Jeremy Weinstein argues, “is a primary cause of the rise of the interstate war on the continent.”⁴¹³ This section explores this outright exploitation of the collapse of the Congolese state as a cause of the war. Opportunism and greed, it concludes, were apparently significant factors in the policies of many of the actors involved in the Congo War, but they do not seem to be the prime reason for going to war, except for the case of Zimbabwe.

Three states involved in the war over Congo stand out as states that have fewer reasons to be directly threatened by the situation in Congo, either in terms of the spread of a civil war or of other cross-border security threats. This is simply because Namibia, Chad and Zimbabwe, all employing troops backing Kabila’s regime in the second phase of the war, have no border with Congo. Their motives for involvement, therefore, have to be sought elsewhere. In the case of Namibia, evidence of economic interests is obscure, though it is worth noting that the opposition accused the President of sending troops to defend his family’s mining interests in the DRC.⁴¹⁴ The case of Chad is also ambiguous, but one can suspect at least two economic inducements for employing troops in Congo. First, it is believed that Chad got financial benefits from Libya’s Gaddafi who considered this a way to exert his influence in sub-Saharan Africa, in return for intervention in Congo. Second, Chad might have had its eyes on the gold mines of northern Congo.⁴¹⁵

If some ambiguity resides in these two cases, the same cannot be said about Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congolese conflict. Harare had three main reasons for intervention in the

⁴¹³ Weinstein, “Africa’s ‘Scramble for Africa,’” p. 18. For a similar way of explaining the war, see also Marc Lacey, “Congo Tires of War, but the End Is Not in Sight,” *New York Times*, July 15 2002.

⁴¹⁴ Baker, “Going to War Democratically,” p. 274.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*: p. 269, Sharer, “Lines on the Map,” p. 295.

DRC, all of them having to do with opportunism. First, Kabila and his ADFL movement owed the Zimbabwean government large sums that were lent to it during the rebellion against Mobutu. Zimbabwe was afraid that if Kabila's regime would be ousted, it would not get its money back.⁴¹⁶ Second, though Zimbabwe, as a state, probably lost money from the Congolese adventure, the extension of patronage politics from Zimbabwe to Congolese territory hugely benefited some private interests. President Robert Mugabe openly stated the potential economic profit in the DRC to be one of the chief reasons for Zimbabwean involvement and publicly encouraged businesses to exploit the intervention to promote their profits. Both the army as an organization and his heads as private businessmen were heavily involved in production and trade of diamonds, gold and copper from the parts of the DRC controlled by Zimbabwean troops, securing lucrative deals with Kabila's government. Other businessmen associated with the ruling ZANU-PF party and cronies of Mugabe took their share of the profits as well. The armies of Zimbabwe and the DRC, for example, were partners in a joint project of mining and selling gold and diamonds, in particular in the mines of Mbuji Mayi. Another example is the contracts of supplying the Zimbabwean troops in Congo, which were accorded to a private transportation company owned by none other than the Zimbabwean Chief of Staff.⁴¹⁷ The concentration of the Zimbabwean troopdeployment around important mining towns, as well, is a testimony to these interests.⁴¹⁸ Third, Mugabe also hoped to exploit the Congolese conflict for promoting his own ambitions of political saliency and regional leadership in Southern Africa (in the face of the prestige and natural advantages enjoyed by South Africa in this respect).⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁶ Misser, "An African World War?" p. 14, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.

⁴¹⁷ Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 268, 74-75, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.

⁴¹⁸ Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," pp. 15-16.

⁴¹⁹ Misser, "An African World War?" p. 14, David Shearer, "Lines on the Map," *The World Today* 1998, p. 295. Shearer, "Lines on the Map," p. 295; Misser and Rake, "An African World War?" p. 14.

The backers of Kabila's government, though, have no monopoly on the economic exploitation of Congo through military intervention. Uganda and Rwanda apparently had their hands full in this respect as well. While the exploitation motive apparently played a secondary role to the security one, at least at the time of the invasion, their entrenchment in East Congo might have been, at least in part, a consequence of acquired economic interests of civilian and (mainly) military elites. Suffice it to say that Uganda and Rwanda, like Zimbabwe, have been registered from 1999 as diamond exporters, despite the lack of this natural deposit in their soil.⁴²⁰ A 2001 UN report documents the great extent to which Rwandan and Ugandan military forces and civilian companies exploit their respected occupied territories. The document, as well, traces the relations between these individuals and companies to the highest echelons in Kigali and Kampala.⁴²¹ However, while greed seems to have played an important role in the escalation of the war and the prolongation of the Ugandan and Rwandan presence in Congo, it does not seem to have been the main reason for their first engagement. The fact that both countries left DRC's territory, eventually, is also indicative that economic greed, while important, was not more important than security considerations. Congo's weakness served to enable this economic exploitation, and, as a 2003 UN panel of experts claims, "in the absence of a strong, central and democratically elected government that is in control of its territory, illegal exploitation will continue and serve as the motivation and the fuel for continued conflicts in the region."⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 275,78. Legitimate and illegitimate trade between Uganda and the Congolese territories controlled by it flourished, and it seems that high-ranking officers, as well as the Ugandan president are among the prime beneficiaries of it. Similar accusations, though on a lesser scale, have been brought against Rwanda as well. See Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 275-78, Turner, "The Kabila's Congo," p. 217, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 17.

⁴²¹ "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2001), S/2001/357.

⁴²² "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2003), S/2003/1027.

In addition to the economic motives, political predation, encouraged by Congo's weakness, also played a significant role in facilitating the war. The facts that a regime change was a realistic possibility and that political allies within Congo were readily available to all the protagonists greatly enhanced the probability of breakup of the war in both its phases. Simply put, if Kigali had not perceived the opportunity to change the regime in Kinshasa to one it favors (both in 1996 and 1998), and if it had no potential Congolese allies in this endeavor, it would have to reconsider, if not the entire invasion at least its extent and ambitions. The aim of Rwanda's 1996 invasion, Rene Lemarchand tells us, was to "wrestle the Mobutist monster to the ground and make the whole of Congo safe for Rwanda."⁴²³ Rwanda succeeded in its first attempt and almost succeeded in its second, precisely because of Congo's weakness as a state. Similarly, the apparent Angolan involvement in the assassination of Laurent Kabila could also be viewed as political opportunism to replace a leader of a weak state with a more favorable one.⁴²⁴ Granted, without the underlying security motivations, these predatory moves would not have been necessary in the first place, but once security threats are in place, the weakness of the state (Congo, in this case) provides relatively cheap opportunities for political and economic predation, and the potential exacerbation of conflict that comes with them.

E. Summary: Congo

To be sure, throughout modern history, some rulers have read wrongly the equation of their external pressures and domestic constraints, and avoided the risky and costly policy of state building. In an international environment in which borders are not fixed and states do not have a safety net, however, such "hollow shell states" could not have survived. They were likely to be "selected out" of the system by their stronger and more efficient neighbors, or at least lose

⁴²³ Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 43.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., pp. 216-17, Turner, "The Kabila's Congo," pp. 52-53.

significant territories. This, however, is not the case in the current international environment, and states like Mobutu's and Kabila's Congo remain "alive" and territorially intact even when they do not function as a state at all. If border fixity results in the perpetuation and exacerbation of state weakness, one would at least expect that it would curb external conflict. As this chapter shows, however, this might not be the case, and the consequences could be disastrous.

The case study of Congo largely corroborates the Hypothesis 2-5. Though an indirect proof, the pattern of Congo's leaders' behavior and governing definitely points to border fixity as a very significant factor that contributed to the weakening of the state in Congo. Congo's growing weakness, in turn, was confirmed as a major cause of its internal wars, especially in the 1990's, and the spillover of these wars (as well as the civil wars in neighboring weak states) were strongly confirmed as a major reason for the outbreak of the bloody war in the Great Lakes Region, first in 1996 and again in 1998. Greed, as well, was an important factor in the war: it played a major role in Zimbabwe's involvement and was an important contributor to the prolongation of the involvement in the conflict for most of the other actors. Yet, it was not Rwanda's Burundi's, Uganda's, or Angola's primary reason to go to war.

Chapter 7: Lebanon, 1943-2005

The case of Lebanon, like that of Congo in the previous section, is intended to study the effect of the norm of border fixity on weak states. These two cases are very different in nature, yet the processes through which they are affected by border fixity share many similarities. Through the lenses of the Lebanese case, this section again examines the validity and strength of hypotheses 2-5, which taken together argue that in regions where most states are weak, the border fixity norm is likely to result in more international conflicts. These hypotheses dealt, first, with the assertion that the border fixity norm perpetuates and exacerbates state weakness; second, with the argument that weak states are more likely to be the site of internal conflicts; third, with the proposition that internal violence in weak states tends to spill over to international conflicts through mechanisms involving refugee flow and the kin-country syndrome; and fourth, with the claim that foreign political and economic predation are also more likely in such circumstances, creating a situations in which violent international conflicts are even more probable.

The Lebanese case largely corroborates these hypotheses. The norm of border fixity made Lebanon's socio-political weakness a permanent fixture, and this weakness greatly contributed to the eventual breakout and continuation of the civil war in 1975. This civil strife spilled over to involve outside parties, most notably Syria and Israel, with refugees and opportunities for predation playing an important role in the process. Kin affiliations played a lesser role. This chapter explores, first, the degree of socio-political strength (or weakness) of the Lebanese state at independence. Second, it surveys the lack of territorial threats and opportunities, and the way this absence affected the Lebanese polity. Third, the chapter investigates the role of the state's

weakness in fostering civil strife; fourth, it discusses the spillover of the conflict to include neighboring states. I argue that, although a weak state in 1943, Lebanon had nevertheless the potential to become stronger with time. However, this was not to happen, to a great extent as a result of the border fixity norm. This state's weakness led Lebanon through numerous crises and, eventually, to a full-blown civil war. The spillover of the Lebanese civil war to involve both Syria and Israel was also a fruit of Lebanon's continuous weakness as a state. In the era of border fixity, this weakness, and the potential for internal and external violence it carries with it, are likely to persist.

A. Lebanon 1943: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength

Lebanon, like most other states, was born a weak state. It was not uniquely weak, however, and even possessed some factors that should have given it the potential to become a stronger state. This section outlines the conditions of Lebanon's starting point as an independent state in 1943, so as to set the stage for the discussion of the persistent weakness, and civil and international conflict that follows.

The fact that Lebanon was a creation of the French Mandate is well known. Indeed, given the League of Nations mandate over what was broadly defined as Syria, France decided to divide the territory into a few smaller territorial segments. *Gran Liban*, or Greater Lebanon, was the first such "state" to be established, in 1920. It included the areas of Mt. Lebanon, the town of Beirut, the southern coastal strip of Tyre and Sidon and Jabal Amil to the South of Mt. Lebanon, Tripoli and its surrounding to its north, and the Beqaa Valley to its East (see Map no. 1 below). Structured this way, Greater Lebanon was a political creation that never existed as such before. Although overwhelmingly Arab in ethnic and linguistic terms, the territory of Lebanon included

within its borders a large variety of confessional (religious) communities, with diverse affiliations and various economic and political interests. The communal/confessional diversity of Greater Lebanon is presented in Table 6 below, which is based on the 1932 census.⁴²⁵ The creation of a separate political entity of Lebanon was, then, an artificial French act.


Yet to acknowledge Lebanon's artificial borders is not necessarily to agree that these borders were altogether devoid of logic or that they were completely at odds with the culture and interests of the local population. Three elements are important to note, in this respect: the autonomous nature and history of the Mt. Lebanon region, the appeals of the local population, and the contemporary perceptions of requirements of stateness. First, the core of the Greater Lebanon territory, the Emirate of Mt. Lebanon, had been an autonomously administrated unit in the Ottoman Empire since the late 16th century. The Emirate was ruled by a successive of Druze, Sunni Muslim and Maronite Christian Emirs until the mid 19th century.⁴²⁶ Since 1861 Mt. Lebanon had been administered as a special *sanjak* (district) within the Empire, under the name of *Mutasarrifiyya*. The *sanjak* was given greater autonomy and was accountable directly to Constantinople, rather than to Damascus or other local centers. The *Mutasarrifiyya* developed a very distinct political culture and characteristics, which included the power-sharing of the more numerous Christian Maronite community and the smaller but more coherent and Druze community. This order, in place until World War I, was also characterized by its reliance on a small oligarchy of notable families (*zu'ama*), both Druze and Maronite. As the Maronite population grew faster and as their communities exploited European ties to gain more rapid economic development, the Maronites came to dominate the Mt. Lebanon region by the time of

⁴²⁵ The census was conducted by the Lebanese government and the French mandatory authorities.

⁴²⁶ Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, p. 4.

the French Mandate⁴²⁷. This relatively consolidated core, which included a sense of uniqueness, a Maronite supremacy, but also a formula of power-sharing with minorities, could be argued, then, to provide the logic behind the French creation of Greater Lebanon.

Figure 8: Map of Lebanon



* Map Source: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html>

⁴²⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-5. Samir Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

Table 6: Communal Divisions, Lebanon 1911, 1932

| Community | Mutasarrifiyya, 1911 (% of population) | Greater Lebanon, Census 1932 (% of population) |
|------------------|---|---|
| Maronites | 58.3 | 29.0 |
| Greek Catholics | 7.7 | 5.9 |
| Greek Orthodox | 12.6 | 9.8 |
| Other Christians | 0.8 | 5.7 |
| All Christians | 79.4 | 50.4 |
| Sunnis | 3.5 | 22.5 |
| Shi'is | 5.6 | 19.8 |
| Druze | 11.4 | 6.8 |
| All Muslims* | 20.5 | 49.1 |
| Jews | — | 0.5 |

* The Druze are included in the Muslim tally, in accordance with the original statistical practice.

** Source: Eyal Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 7.

Second, like other communities in the territories occupied by the western powers in World War I, Mt. Lebanon sent a delegation to the Versailles Conference, which argued for an independent state status and expansion of territories for this future state. In this limited sense, the French initiative was also in line with local interests (albeit those of the Maronites in Mt. Lebanon, and not those in the adjacent areas).⁴²⁸ Third, the addition of other territories to that of Mt. Lebanon might indeed be perceived as an attempt to augment the power of a local French

⁴²⁸ Kais M. Firro, *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 16-19.

ally, the Maronites, but it could also be seen as consistent with the standard thinking of the period, which sought sufficient territorial size as a prerequisite for viable states (e.g., the creation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).⁴²⁹

In terms of political institutions, Lebanon was in 1943 weak, but not extremely so. For one, there was a sense of continuity, as the *Mutasarrifiyya* embodied the two principles that became the most important features of Lebanon's politics to this day. The principle of sectarian representation (or, in other terms, consociationalism) remains the organizing principle of Lebanon's politics, while the semi-feudal, patron-client character of the society, ruled by families of *zu'ama*, is the defining trait of politics within this formal organizing principle.⁴³⁰ Second, the French mandate indeed attempted, to some extent, to provide the state-in-the-making with the kind of tutelage that was envisioned in the League of Nations' mandate system. Lebanon adopted its own unique constitution, written by Michel Chiha, a Lebanese. The constitution was based on the principles of confessional representation and power-sharing between the various sects of the society. It had a Parliament and a government, headed by an elected President, as early as 1926. Lebanon thus did not share a similar colonial experience with pre-1960 Congo or pre-1810 Argentina. This political system, though, was still subordinated to French whims, and thus not governing independently. When the French governor thought the Parliament's work too cumbersome, for example, he dismissed the body. Furthermore, security or other French interests, of course, overrode those of the Lebanese counterparts.⁴³¹

In terms of the development of bureaucratic institutions, the picture was similar: "The achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴³⁰ Farid El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 50-56, Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, pp. 146-65.

⁴³¹ Albert H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (Beirut, Lebanon: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 180.

conditions which would make possible a transition from a medieval to a modern society.”⁴³² Thus, law and order were established throughout the territory, a judicial system was erected, a state system of schools created, and a census conducted. The French-created bureaucracy, however, still left much to be desired, especially in the areas of taxation and agrarian policy. This bureaucracy, moreover, enjoyed a very limited legitimacy, based both on relatively poor performance and ideological objections.⁴³³ Lebanon, hence, underwent some political and administrative development, but an inherently limited one, before its independence.

In terms of legitimacy and identification with the state, Lebanon as a freshly independent state faced challenges from below and from above. From below, the overwhelming challenge was created by the expanded definition of Lebanon’s borders far beyond the confines of the relatively tight *Muttasarrifiyya*. This expansion created a whole new demographic balance, which greatly contributed to the weakness of the state. While the Christians amounted to almost 80% of Mt. Lebanon population, their share of the population of Greater Lebanon was only slightly larger than 50% in 1932. The single largest Christian community, the Maronites, constituted only 29% of the new state’s population, as opposed to almost 60% of that of the *Muttasarrifiyya* (see Table 1 above). Large segments of the population of Greater Lebanon were oriented, economically and in terms of identity, toward other centers, rather than toward Mt. Lebanon. The Sunni Muslim population of Tripoli and its surroundings, for instance, saw themselves as Syrians, not Lebanese, and were used to serve as the Mediterranean outlet of Damascus. The Shi’is of the south and the Beqaa, as well, were not affiliated, either culturally or economically, with Mt. Lebanon. Some of the more prominent figures in Beirut’s Christian community were avid Arab nationalists and/or advocates of Greater Syria, which included

⁴³² Ibid., p. 174.

⁴³³ Ibid., pp. 169-78. See also Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Lebanon (see below).⁴³⁴ Although this sectarian division was not primordial, and not completely immobile, by the 1943 independence it acquired a fairly stable and “sticky” nature, which would make the consolidation of a state a hard task.⁴³⁵

From above, rival group identities competed with the Lebanese one, and thus with the legitimacy of the state. On the largest scale, the claim that Islam should have a political manifestation, and that Muslims should all be a part of a single polity, at least in theory, was a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Yet similar notions, so long ingrained in the culture and politics of the Middle East, still linger. Second, an Arab nationalist movement, starting in the late 18th in reaction to the decline of the Ottomans and to ideas of nationalism emanating from Europe, had a strong claim to Lebanon. In contrast to Islam, Arabism was, in the case of Lebanon, inclusive, as the overwhelming majority of the population was ethnically and linguistically Arab. Most Sunni Arabs in Lebanon, as well as many Christians, saw themselves, first and foremost, as Arabs. Indeed, some of the more prominent early Arab ideologues were of Lebanese Christian (mainly Greek Orthodox) origins.⁴³⁶ Third, together with the pan-Arabic notions, and considered either as a part of them or separately, an identity of Greater Syria nationalism was very popular at the time and enjoyed considerable support in Lebanon and Syria. This identity was based, at least partially, on historical reality. Lebanon, like Syria and the British mandates of Trans-Jordan and Palestine, were all part of a loosely defined region of *Bilad-al-Sham*. Again, a considerable portion of both Muslim and Christian elites in what became Lebanon supported the idea of

⁴³⁴ Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 33-36, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 5-7.

⁴³⁵ Arguably, the ethnically dominated character of the politics in Lebanon since the mid 19th century is more a result of an imposition of Ottoman and (mainly) European perceptions of Mt. Lebanon's society than their natural state of being. Until the peasant rebellion of 1859-60 Mt. Lebanon was more a horizontally, class-oriented society, than a horizontal one, divided by ethnic affiliations. See El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, p. 117, Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 67-72, Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, pp. 59-144.

⁴³⁶ Firro, *Inventing Lebanon*, pp. 37-41, Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 82-86, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, p. 9.

Lebanon as a part of a larger Syrian identity, which should have a political expression as a single state.⁴³⁷ All of these competing identities added to Lebanon's challenges and augmented its "external affinity problem."⁴³⁸

The arrangement that allowed sectarian coexistence in Lebanon was the "National Pact" (*Al Mithaq al- Watani*) of 1943, which was essentially a compromise between the seemingly contradicting identities of Christians and Muslims. The pact was an informal agreement between the Maronite leader Bishara al-Khoury and the Sunni Leader Riad al-Solh. It contained two closely related dimensions: the internal and the external. The internal dimension concerned the distribution of power within Lebanon's polity. In terms of this dimension, the pact was, in essence, an extension of the *Muttasarrifiyya* system of Mt. Lebanon to the whole country. This included the distribution of governmental, political, bureaucratic, and military posts according to the confessional quota system. The quotas were divided with accordance with the 1932 census, by a ratio of 6:5 between Christian and Muslims, respectively. In the same manner, the two leaders verbally agreed that the President of the Republic would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the House a Shi'a Muslim, and so on.⁴³⁹

The external dimension of the National Pact was at least as important as the internal one. It concerned not only Lebanon's future foreign policy, but also the identity of the state, defined against the backdrop of its external environment. In the pact, the Christians agreed to give up the French patronage and keep a Lebanon with an "Arab face," while the Sunnites consented to

⁴³⁷ Firro, *Inventing Lebanon*, pp. 19-22, Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon*, p. 19, Daniel Pipes, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁴³⁸ On this term, see Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War."

⁴³⁹ A good discussion of the pros and cons of the Lebanese "National Pact" is Latif Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 73-90. See also El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 38-40, Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985), Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, p. 36, Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 44-46, Walid Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 87-90.

Lebanon's independence and agreed to stop their efforts to reunify Lebanon or some of its territory with Syria or any other outside Arab entity. In terms of foreign policy, it was agreed in the pact that Lebanon would join the newly born Arab League, but that it would demand from the League assurance for its sovereign independence and its boundaries' integrity.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, Khoury, the first President of the independent Republic states, "The National Pact was not merely a settlement between two confessional communities but the fusion of two ideologies: one that called for melting Lebanon into another state, and the other that called for its retention under foreign protection."⁴⁴¹

Lebanon, then, was a weak state in 1943, but not extremely weak. It enjoyed some basic political developments and institutions, as well as a measure of established bureaucracy. It was in some sense an artificial creation of the French Mandate, but it possessed a strong identity at its core, Mt. Lebanon. The Lebanese identity was challenged from below and from above, but these challenges were at least potentially mitigated by a political compromise between elites of the more numerous and influential confessional groups in the Republic. Farid El-Khazan argues that "at the time of independence...no Arab state, particularly in the Arab East, had acquired greater power, whether political or military, and had greater legitimacy than the Lebanese state." While this argument might be somewhat exaggerated, it is certainly true that Lebanon was not in a particularly bad position in terms of state building as of its 1943 independence.

B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Lebanon

In the wake of World War II, the norm of border fixity began to gain strength in the international community, as discussed in chapter one. The Arab world was no exception, nor was

⁴⁴⁰ Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, 36; Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, 139; Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 62-63.

⁴⁴¹ Quoted in Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 79.

the Middle East in general, apart from the dispute over Palestine/Israel. The acceptance of this norm, in words and in practice, created a situation in which Lebanon suffered from no territorial threats and “enjoyed” no prospects of territorial aggrandizement. Greater Lebanon of the French mandate became the Republic of Lebanon after 1943, but its borders remained the same. As a state, Lebanon participated in one international war, in 1948, and it was subject to one short civil war in 1958, as well as one prolonged conflict, lasting from 1975 to 1989, which involved both civil war and international (Israeli and Syrian) intervention. None of these conflicts was territorial in nature, although they often involved the occupation of territory. None of them changed Lebanon’s international borders or created sovereign political entities inside Lebanese territory.

Lebanon joined as one of the founders of the Arab League in 1945. In the preparatory discussions that predated the establishment of this Arab organization of states, Lebanon, being the smallest state and fearing the Hashemite schemes of creating anew the Greater Syria idea, strongly advocated the acceptance and formal guaranteeing of the territorial status quo. Indeed, the Arab League Pact emphasized the safeguard of the member-states’ sovereignty and independence,⁴⁴² and the Alexandria Protocol, a document issued by the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, stated specifically that:

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² For the pact, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm> [accessed 7/6/2006]. For a discussion on Lebanon’s role in the pact, see Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, pp. 62-63, Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, p. 36, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 97-102.

⁴⁴³ The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/alex.htm> [accessed on 7/6/2006].

Despite the efforts among some important Arab figures, chief among them King Abdullah of Jordan, the unification of the Arab states east of the Mediterranean as Greater Syria did not come to pass, then. With the support of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Lebanon's independence, and its borders, gained the formal recognition of the Arab League, Jordan and Syria included.⁴⁴⁴ Despite international interventions and civil wars, these borders (in their formal sense) were never challenged in any serious way.

As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon officially participated in the 1948 war against the newly established Israel. While Lebanon was not forced into the war – both President Khuri and Prime Minister Sulh actively advocated it – the state's stakes in this war and its participation were limited. The Lebanese army stayed in defensive positions as the Arab invasion started on May 15, 1948, but facilitated the transfer of weapons and arms to the "Liberation Army," a paramilitary force composed of Syrian and Lebanese volunteers. This war did involve some limited territorial ambitions and territorial threats. On the one hand, in the first stages of the conflict, Lebanon entertained some hopes of territorial spoils in the area designated for its occupation in northern Palestine (although these gains were secondary in the calculus of entering the war to the desire for acceptance in the Arab world and also to domestic considerations). On the other hand, when the military fortune turned around, Israeli troops took control of a narrow strip of southern Lebanon (and were greeted by local villagers, especially the Maronites). Even then, Lebanese diplomats still hoped to achieve some territorial acquisitions in the (now Israeli) northern Galilee, or at least some neutralized zone there, in return for their agreement to a

⁴⁴⁴ Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 97-102.

ceasefire.⁴⁴⁵ By the end of 1948, however, Lebanon was eager to end the war with a *status quo ante* agreement. The 1949 armistice agreement, therefore, simply confirmed the mandatory borders between the two countries as their international borders, and this agreement was respected until the late 1960's.⁴⁴⁶

While Arab states (chief among them Syria and Egypt), the US (the marines were sent to Beirut in 1958 under the Eisenhower Doctrine) and Israel were involved in subsequent politics in Lebanon, none of these interventions amounted to a territorial conflict per se. The most significant foreign interventions were, of course, those of Syria (1976-2005) and Israel (1982-2000). Despite prolonged periods of direct or indirect occupation, however, Lebanon's official borders remained intact. In fact, they were never really questioned. As these interventions will be discussed below, suffice it to say here that neither Syria nor Israel attempted any annexation of Lebanese territory, despite their actual occupation of it and their military ability to do so and despite (in the Syrian case) of a readily available ideological argument for such an action.⁴⁴⁷ In fact, in 1976 Syrian President Hafez Assad confided, in an internal discussion with Syrian administration functionalists, that among the most important reasons for his intervention in Lebanon was the attempt to prevent its territorial partition along sectarian lines.⁴⁴⁸ Israel, on its part, never erected in Lebanon any form of civilian settlements, as it did in territories it occupied in 1967 from Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Finally, as of 2005, there were neither Syrian nor Israeli

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 145-57. See also Oren Barak, "Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multi-Ethnic Identity and the Making of the Lebanese Army," *History and Memory* 13, no. 1 (2001), El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 112-13.

⁴⁴⁶ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 112-13.

⁴⁴⁷ On Syria, see Naomi Joy Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon: The 1975-76 War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). On the Israeli intervention, see Ze'ev Schiff, and Ya'ari, Ehud, *Israel's Lebanon War*, trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

⁴⁴⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 65.

soldiers on Lebanese soil,⁴⁴⁹ which strengthens the notion that their occupation of parts of Lebanon had a non-territorial nature to begin with.

Hence, one can conclude that while Lebanon faced initially some territorial pressures, both in the inter-Arab arena and in the conflict with Israel, these threats waned as time progressed and an era of border fixity ensued. The effects of this state of affairs are dealt with in the coming sections.

C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness

What kind of effects did the absence of territorial pressures, or the border fixity norm, have on Lebanon? This section details these effects with regard to the process of state building and political development (or the lack thereof), and the next section concentrates on the effects on Lebanon's international relations.

a) Monopolization of the Means of the Violence

Monopolizing the legitimate use of violence in state-owned military and police, this essential part of any strong state, was lacking in the Lebanese case. Lebanon's army has been, as a rule, weak, ineffective, and unable to exert its authority over other segments of the society, which often exercised organized violence as a regular practice. This trend was, of course, most pronounced during the 1975-76 civil war and in the decade that followed, but it was apparent long before the war. The weakness of the army stemmed first and foremost from the fact that

⁴⁴⁹ This excludes the Sheba Farms, a small area under Israeli occupation that is recognized by the UN to be a Syrian, rather than Lebanese, land.

Lebanon, between 1949 and 1976, “having no territorial claims to neighboring countries and having no occupied land to liberate...had no war to wage and no enemy regimes to topple.”⁴⁵⁰

The Lebanese Army (LA), like most other state institutions, was inherited from the French Mandate.⁴⁵¹ After its mainly nominal participation in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the LA remained a weak institution. The weakness of the LA had, at least until the 1990’s, two important aspects. First, the size and the resources available for the army were very limited. At independence, it included about 3,000 troops. As late as 1966, the Lebanese armed forces amounted to a mere 10,800 troops, and, a decade later, by the eve of the second civil war, they increased only to 15,200 troops.⁴⁵² Such a small force could neither protect Lebanon’s borders from its much stronger neighbors (in 1975 Syria, for example, had 137,000 regular troops). More important to the current study, however, the small size of the LA prevented it from exercising a monopoly over the use of violence within Lebanon, as will be demonstrated below.

The second aspect of the LA’s weakness was its ethnic structure. The army was initially dominated by the Maronites, especially in the officer corps. Gradually, the command of the army was distributed in a more equitable way, although the Muslims were, before the 1975 war never represented in the officer corps in numbers resembling their share of Lebanon’s population. However, the more acute problem in terms of the army’s weakness was its sectarian nature. That most units were composed of soldiers and officers from a single community played a great role in the institution’s paralysis in terms of controlling civil strife.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵⁰ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, p. 112.

⁴⁵¹ Oren Barak, "Toward a Representative Military? The Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps since 1945," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 1 (2006): p. 78.

⁴⁵² Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, p. 207.

⁴⁵³ Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?," R.D. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," in *The Emergence of a New Lebanon*, ed. Edward A. Azar, et. al. (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 82-84, Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, pp. 211-13.

The result was that the army remained “little more than a gendarmerie with limited powers to keep the peace and to ensure the proper conduct of elections.”⁴⁵⁴ This fact was not a coincidence. At least until the 1975 civil war, the consensus among the Lebanese political elite was that the army should be small and weak, so as not to pose a threat to the civilian political system.⁴⁵⁵ It is hard to imagine that such a consensus, which placed domestic political considerations over those of defense and efficiency of the army, would have been preserved in the presence of a significant territorial threat. The effects of such an absence of threat (or opportunities), and thus of an absence of a national ethos engrained in the army, could clearly be seen in the attempt of the Lebanese army to create exactly such an ethos. While the LA, like most national armies, attempted to build national myths that would portray the army as the savior of the nation’s interest and pride, it had very little substance from which to create these myths. So scarce was the heroic material that the LA had to draw upon a victory in the relatively marginal battle of the Malikiyya in 1948, in which the LA was not actually involved directly, and that resulted in achievements that were rapidly overturned by Israeli forces.⁴⁵⁶

The results of the LA’s weakness were, in the long run, detrimental to Lebanon’s stability and well-being. When civil strife erupted, the army was relegated to the role of an outside viewer (as in the case of the political crisis of 1952) or, at most, an arbiter between the opposing (armed) forces (as was the case in the first civil war, in 1958). The decision of the army’s commander, General Fouad Chehab, to ignore the President’s call to intervene in the war, maintained the LA’s position as the holder of the balance between rival political and communal sects. It neglected, nevertheless, the attempt to retain the monopoly over the means of violence in the

⁴⁵⁴ Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, p. 212.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁶ On the role of the myth of the Malikiyya myth in the building of the Lebanese Army, see Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya.”

hands of the state. Large parts of the country were occupied by forces hostile to the central government (mostly Sunni Muslims), which were supplied from across the Syrian border by kin and relatives. The opposition forces faced not the official forces of the state, but the Phalanges, a Maronite paramilitary militia.⁴⁵⁷ What eventually enabled Chammoun to quell the rebellion was the landing of US Marines in Beirut, in line with the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁴⁵⁸ On the rare occasions when the LA tried to exercise its right to impose a monopoly over the use of violence, it miserably failed. In 1969 the army was unable to impose its rule over the armed Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the refugee camps, and was forced to agree to the humiliating compromise hammered out by Egypt. The Cairo agreement limited the Palestinian activities to their own camps, but allowed them full freedom of action within these confines.⁴⁵⁹ The results were similar in clashes between the army and Palestinian groups in 1973, after Israeli raids in Beirut and Sidon.⁴⁶⁰

By the eve of the 1975 war, then, the LA, devoid of political support, the legitimacy that comes with a significant role in territorial or defensive wars, and the physical power to overcome these deficiencies, was hardly poised to prevent the disintegration of the state that followed. In the early stages of the war, the LA did attempt a limited intervention, but with no positive results. "The army's protracted passivity in the face of an acute crisis, together with political pressure,

⁴⁵⁷ See Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?" p. 78, Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 100, Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 38-39, Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 26-28.

⁴⁵⁸ Ironically, it was precisely the refusal of the army to be involved in the 1958 civil war that made it popular, General Chehab the next elected President of the republic. In the years between the first and the second civil war, and especially under Chehab's presidency, the LA played a pivotal role in the Lebanese politics, operating mainly through its intelligence branch, the Deuxième Bureau. Still, this stronger position of the LA was a precarious one. Eventually, the Intelligence increasing role in politics created a political backlash against Chehab, which culminated in the 1970 election of his (and the army's) opponent, Suliman Franjeh. Franjeh further weakened the military by purging its ranks, an act that left the LA even more helpless as the second civil war approached. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," p. 86-91, Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, p. 212.

⁴⁵⁹ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 140-68, Wade A. Gorla, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943-1976* (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), pp. 105-10, Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, 185-87.

⁴⁶⁰ McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," pp. 91-92.

led to the army's disintegration in 1976."⁴⁶¹ Individuals and whole units mutinied and joined the opposing militias, thus only intensifying the chaos and insecurity.⁴⁶²

The civil war most intensely raged between 1975 and 1976, but was in effect fought until 1989. This war was, of course, the ultimate opposite of monopolization of the use of force. It was, infamously, the site of total chaos, where armed militias roamed the country, erected roadblocks, and murdered and injured opponent combatants and civilians alike. Sectarian violence went unchecked and unopposed, except by violence from the other communities. Crime was rampant and pervasive, and Lebanon served as a safe haven for international terrorists.⁴⁶³ Meanwhile, all efforts to recreate the national army turned sour. As described by Itamar Rabinovich, these efforts led to a vicious cycle: "the army could not be restored without a consensus, this required political normalization, which could not proceed in the absence of an effective and credible state system, which needed the backing of an apolitical, militarily effective army."⁴⁶⁴

The army consequently remained largely irrelevant to the violence in Lebanon throughout the later 1970's and the 1980's. Today Lebanon possesses a much larger army (about 72,000 strong in 2004⁴⁶⁵) and one that is not organized along factional lines. The officer corps, as well, is composed of fairly equal numbers of Muslim and Christians.⁴⁶⁶ The new LA has been successful, as well, in cracking down on some minor attempts to resist its authority by various groups. However, when considering this strengthening of the institution of the LA, one needs to take into account two factors. First, the new LA is a creation of a foreign force, Syria, and thus is not a

⁴⁶¹ Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 47.

⁴⁶² On the LA disintegration of 1976 see McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," pp. 92-97.

⁴⁶³ The sources that describe the perils of the Lebanese civil war are numerous. See, e.g. El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*.

⁴⁶⁴ Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁶⁵ IISS, *The Military Balance, 2005-2006* (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁴⁶⁶ Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?"

representative of a stronger Lebanon, but an imposition from outside. This does not mean such an army cannot be a tool for keeping the country stabilized, but only that this creation does not contradict the border fixity theory. Second, a large part of Lebanon, mainly its South and parts of the Beqaa in the East, are still controlled by a paramilitary militia that answers not to the Lebanese government but to its own leaders, who are influenced by Teheran and Damascus, not Beirut. Therefore, and until the LA will challenge the Hizbullah, it is still too early to talk about the Lebanese army monopolizing the means of violence within its territories.

b) Extraction of Revenues

As discussed in chapter 2 and demonstrated in the preceding empirical chapters, taxation often goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the states' coercive capabilities as a reaction to external, mainly territorial, threats and opportunities. As discussed above, such territorial threats and opportunities hardly existed in the case of Lebanon. As expected, therefore, Lebanon's "government did not have to raise taxes that could have hampered its *laissez-faire* economy."⁴⁶⁷ The level of taxation in Lebanon has been low from the inception of the state, but had hardly risen thereafter, until the late 1990's.

Because Lebanon is situated in the midst of a conflict-ridden area, and itself subject to both a protracted civil war and frequent outside interventions, it is hard to explain the country's low taxation, and, even more so, the relatively low percentage of military expenditures. That is, unless one takes into consideration border fixity, and its negative effects on the prospect of state building. The lack of incentive, in the form of territorial threats or opportunities, indeed freed the state from the need to sustain a large, largely unproductive, military section. Despite the

⁴⁶⁷ Oren Barak, "Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pp.314-15.

significant increase in the number of troops of the LA, Lebanon's military expenditures in 2004, for instance, amounted to only \$540.6 million. This sum was a mere 3.1% of its GDP for this year. This might be sufficient in a "quiet neighborhood," but hardly in the Middle East.⁴⁶⁸ Yet, this character of Lebanon also deprived the state of the tools to overcome local power bases and create a centralized system that would enable it to extract sufficient revenues. Hence, Joyce Starr concludes, "the heart of the government fiscal difficulties lies with its ability—or inability—to levy, collect, and tabulate taxes."⁴⁶⁹

This trend was, of course, much more pronounced between 1975 and 1989, when significant parts of the country were controlled by different militia or foreign forces and were inaccessible to the central government. Such areas were oftentimes subject to the competing (and much heavier) tax system, of the militias. In addition, the tremendous increase in the size of the illegal and unofficial economy during these years meant that the state's ability to tax its population was even smaller than before. This economy was, by definition, outside the boundaries of the regular economy.⁴⁷⁰

The weakness of the state is expressed also within its revenue structure. The percent of indirect taxes, which are much easier to control and need much less coercion, are high. In 2003, for instance, income, capital and property taxes amounted to only 18% of the total revenues of the government.⁴⁷¹ While this weak tax base does not allow for the maintenance of a strong military, it also limits the extent to which the civilian bureaucracy can reach and the level of services the state can provide. These issues are dealt with below.

⁴⁶⁸ Source: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html> [accessed on 7/10/2006]. Compare to it's neighbors military expenditures (as percentage of GDO): Israel's 7.7% and Syria's 5.9%.

⁴⁶⁹ Joyce R. Starr, "Lebanon's Economy: The Costs of Protracted Violence," in *The Emergence of a New Lebanon*, ed. Edward A. Azar, et. al. (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 73.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁴⁷¹ Jonathan Haughton, "An Assessment of the Tax System in Lebanon," (Suffolk University and the Beacon Hill Institute for Public Policy, 2004).

c) Bureaucracy, State Institutions, and Services

Political and bureaucratic institutions form the backbone of the state. In examining the development of these institutions in Lebanon, one encounters the problem of a large gap between the formal structure of politics and bureaucracy, and its actual functioning. While the former appears to be modern, centralized, and rational, the latter often resembles more a traditional, feudal, and fractured society. Moreover, this informal character of the Lebanese government institutions shows remarkable resilience to change, despite civil war, foreign occupation and power shifts at the top.

Most of the Lebanese state institutions, as indicated earlier, either were outgrowths of the Ottoman times' *Muttasarrifiyya* or were inherited from France. The bureaucracy, in particular, was built by the French administration, and its formal structure was remarkably similar to that of France. The hallmarks of the French bureaucracy – extreme centralization, elitist recruitment, rationality, and functional differentiation – all featured prominently, in theory, in the Lebanese system.⁴⁷²

In practice, however, the Lebanese model deviated profoundly from this Weberian model. Underlying the function of the bureaucracy in Lebanon there have been, and still are, two very prominent traits. The first is communalism, or sectarianism. The whole Lebanese political and administrative system is built on the principle of sectarian representation, in accordance with the

⁴⁷² On the Formal structure of the Lebanese bureaucracy, see George Grassmuck, and Salibi, Kamal, *Reformed Administration in Lebanon* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, The University of Michigan, 1964), Adnan G. Iskander, *Bureaucracy in Lebanon* (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1964), Maroun Kisirwani, and Parle, William M., "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period on the Lebanese Bureaucracy: A View from Inside," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 22, no. 1-2 (1987): pp. 18-20.

unwritten but highly acknowledged National Pact of 1943. This does not only refer to the posts of the President, the Prime Minister, and other high government officials, but to the most minor of bureaucrats. This system is also highly rigid, as the allocation of posts is based on a 1932 census, which does not reflect the current demographic or social status, but that can not be changed because of permanent political (sectarian) deadlock on the issue.⁴⁷³ As El-Khazan notes, “the outcome of this contradictory mechanism [between formally centralized but practically decentralized state] translated into a low degree of ‘stateness’ in Lebanon and a permanent dependence of the state on the multi-communal structure of power within society.”⁴⁷⁴

This aspect of Lebanese governance becomes even more salient when intersecting with the second informal trait of the bureaucratic system in Lebanon: its highly patrimonial nature. The concentration of power – political, social and economic – in the hands of a few families of *zu’ama* is a permanent characteristic of this system.⁴⁷⁵ These power bases are the channels through which the government works, and through which taxes are collected and goods are distributed. This function of the Lebanese system is not surprising, as “the ascriptive ties of family solidarity and communal loyalties have for a long time provided the only trustable and meaningful basis for integrating the social order.”⁴⁷⁶ Yet, at the same time, the patrimonial nature of the bureaucratic process – in essence an exchange of goods for loyalty – perpetuates the weakness of the state institutions and preserves the communal and clan ones.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷³ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, pp. 102-20, Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period," p. 20, Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, pp. 146-65.

⁴⁷⁴ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, p. 92.

⁴⁷⁵ In the Maronite community, noted families are Al-Khuri

⁴⁷⁶ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, p. 97.

⁴⁷⁷ This concept is reflected in the Arabic term *wasta*, “the granting of favorable treatment by bureaucrats on the basis of political loyalty, family influence, class or sect.” See Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period," p. 20. Also see El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 50-57, Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, pp. 73-101.

The same problems permeate the political system, from the electoral system to the function of parties to the work of the central government; all issues are translated and carried out through similar patrimonial patterns.⁴⁷⁸ It is no coincidence that one often hears the same family names with regard to Lebanese politics today as in the 1950's, though the first names have changed. The state, then, although strong and centralized on paper, is weak in reality. The state in Lebanon can be the arbiter between different segments of the civil society, the mediator between rival communal groups, or the coordinator of the distribution of spoils among regional strongholds. It enjoys little autonomy to act on its own, however, without an advance consensus of the strong societal forces. The executive branch has no enduring, organized power base.⁴⁷⁹

In terms of services and the provision of public goods the picture is similar. The extent and depth of the services the government provides depend not on the public demand as a return for the burden of the state (which hardly exists), but on the ideological position of the government, on the one hand, and its ability to perform, on the other. Attempts to provide a better and more extended network of public schools, and to erect a safety net of social security, for instance, were highly valued by a broad consensus in Lebanon in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The very limited results of such schemes, however, are a direct result of the inability of even the relatively strong administration of President Chehab (see below) to execute sweeping policy changes.

The pattern of distribution of those public goods that the state does supply is also revealing. Despite the formal state of war with Israel and the often-tense relations with Syria, peripheral areas close to the southern, eastern and northern borders of Lebanon are, as a rule, neglected, in terms of government investment and services.⁴⁸⁰ These practices are understandable in the context of border fixity, as the central government does not feel the urge to protect its border

⁴⁷⁸ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, pp. 73-101.

⁴⁷⁹ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 326.

⁴⁸⁰ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, p. 57.

regions against territorial grabs and therefore does not need to enhance the support of local population.

Attempts to reform the bureaucratic and political system, modernizing and rationalizing it, have generally failed. The most significant pre-civil war attempt was made by President Chehab. Arriving to the position in 1958, not by the traditional path of *zu'ama* (though a descendent of a notable family), and enjoying a wider base of support outside of his own community, Chehab was able to secure a more autonomous base for the state than his predecessors. The “Chehabist” exercise included economic reforms (an attempt to close some of the economic gaps while still retaining a free trade), political reforms (mainly the partially successful attempt to circumvent traditional politics by the use of professionals, military and civilians), and bureaucratic reforms. The latter included a very significant increase in the size of the state administration and some steps toward rationalization and centralization. These administrative reforms had their limits, though: “During the six years of the General’s rule the Presidency grew in power and made substantial changes in the traditional political practices;” Michael Hudson maintained in 1968, “but, when it was all over, the question remained whether or not Lebanon could ever break out of its political stalemate.”⁴⁸¹

Indeed, Lebanon did not escape this stalemate, and the consequences were dire – the 1975-1989 intermittent civil war. Although the political establishment survived, at least ostensibly, during these years, and although the bureaucracy did not completely disappear, the war’s effects of the ability of these institutions to function properly were devastating. While the office of President Suliman Farangiah remained nominally intact, its control did not go beyond the Presidential palace. Although the Parliament kept on meeting and the cabinet kept debating

⁴⁸¹ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, pp. 297-25. Quote from p. 97. See also Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 84.

policy, these were, for the most part, futile talks. The shots were called elsewhere.⁴⁸² The bureaucracy was devastated by the war, with the increasing loss of infrastructure and life, and the vast majority of civil servants vacated their position, and no new staff were hired for seventeen years. Of course, the services that were provided by these offices were greatly hampered, when not terminated completely.⁴⁸³ Indeed, some parts of Lebanon were administered as if they were independent states by the local warlords.⁴⁸⁴

Like the late 1950's and early 1960's reforms in the political system and the civil administration, the post-civil war reforms of the 1990's and 2000's are important but only partial. The reconstruction concentrated on the infrastructure and the economy, but left almost intact the political system of proportional (to the 1932 census...) representation and adherence to broad principles of the 1943 National Pact. Incremental and cautious administrative reforms had some success (for instance, in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture). The "flagship" of administrative reforms, however, was a comprehensive program to transform the civil administration and civil service of the country, under the newly established Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reforms (OMSAR). This process, inaugurated by the first government of Rafik Hariri in 1993, was a complete failure. Sponsored by the World Bank and foreign donors, the expensive project yielded studies, plans and documents, but was never implemented, due to the inability of the government to approve the plans.⁴⁸⁵ Those reforms and reconstructions that were implemented after the T'aif agreement, mainly confined to the

⁴⁸² Barak, "Lebanon," pp. 310-26.

⁴⁸³ Fares El-Zein, and Sims, Holly, "Reforming War's Administrative Rubble in Lebanon," *Public Administration & Development* 24, no. 4 (2004): pp. 279-80, Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period."

⁴⁸⁴ For an example of the Druze-controlled Shuf region, see Judith P. Harik, "Change and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-90," *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 3 (1993).

⁴⁸⁵ El-Zein, "Reforming War's Administrative Rubble in Lebanon."

economic and infrastructure areas, were a result of a stronger government presence, but that of Syria, not Lebanon.

In terms of administration, bureaucracy and provision of public goods, then, the picture of state building in Lebanon is one of continuous, though not total, weakness. Although the need for reform in many areas is clear and the motivations often exist, the ability of the state to pass and implement such reforms is very limited. What hinders Lebanon's ability to build a stronger state bureaucracy that can provide better services to its citizens, is the political and social influence of local, family and communal power bases, that cannot, as a rule, be overcome by the state without the existence of an overwhelming outside trigger, such the one a territorial threat might constitute.

d) Ingroup Cohesion

The creation of ingroup cohesion is an important part of state building, in addition to the monopoly over the use of violence and the bureaucratic and administrative facets of such a process, as discussed in chapter 2. This section examines the cohesion of the Lebanese society and the degree to which the legitimacy of the state and identification with the state have evolved over time. It argues that in terms of ingroup cohesion, by and large Lebanon was and still is a very weak state. While the possibility of either being annexed to a neighboring country or forming a smaller more cohesive state is by now realized by most to be unrealistic, the positive identification of the Lebanese with their state is still very limited.

When the French created Greater Lebanon in 1920, many of its inhabitants, understandably, resisted this idea. Many of the Sunnite elite incorporated into the new state were invested in the project of Arab nationalism and, in particular, in its variant of "Greater Syria." The brief period

of Hashemite control of Damascus, before the French occupation, made it even harder for them to submit to what they saw as unnatural separation from their nation: "The Muslims position was that they has been stripped of their majority states by being detached from the wider community of Islam and grafted onto a small country under Christian domination."⁴⁸⁶ Nor were the Sunnis the only community in Greater Lebanon with such a perception of identity. Many in the Greek Orthodox elite, for instance, favored either Arab unity or a larger Syrian state to a Lebanon dominated by Maronites. Within the Maronite community, some elements advocated a smaller and more homogenous state in the Mt. Lebanon, either independent or as autonomous part of Syria, and many Druze initially also supported such a smaller state (in which they would constitute a significant faction, not a small minority).⁴⁸⁷

Since the Sunnite community was more or less similar in size to that of the Maronite community, and comparable also in terms of wealth and rates of education, Maronite-Sunnite relations came to be the main axis around which the sectarian politics of Lebanon after 1920 focused.⁴⁸⁸ By the early 1940's, and in no small measure as a result of the changing international context, the major factions within the Maronites, lead by Bishara al-Khuri, and the Sunnites, led by Riyad al-Sulh, arrived at the National Pact. To the extent that this agreement stipulated the principle of confessional representation in the government, it proved to be a practical and essential compromise that shaped the political face of Lebanon for years to come. The National Pact, however, no less than a political arrangement, was a search for a common identity. The new Republic of Lebanon was proclaimed a sovereign country with a separate identity but "with

⁴⁸⁶ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 77. On the other hand, in pre-independence Lebanon not all Muslims rejected the idea of an independent Lebanese state. The Shi'a community, gradually came to embrace independent Lebanon, in which Shiites at least were granted the position of a recognized minority, which they did not receive in Sunni ruled Arab countries. See Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 73-75.

⁴⁸⁷ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, Firro, *Inventing Lebanon*, pp. 15-67, Pipes, *Greater Syria*, pp. 100-06, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁸⁸ Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon*, 37-38.

Arab face.”⁴⁸⁹ As such, the pact supplied only a limited and temporary solution, somewhat cosmetic, to the problem of Lebanese identity. The problem of identification with Lebanon, or lack thereof, would resurface, therefore, time and again. In the absence of a sufficiently strong glue to forge the Lebanese into one coherent group, the bonds of their common identity remained precarious, at most. As stipulated by Michael Hudson, “the Pact, however, is a remedy for the symptoms of sectarian strife rather than a cure.”⁴⁹⁰ This weakness of Lebanon in terms of the lack of a common identity remained a constant feature of the state and, of course, erupted fiercely in the civil war.

The Lebanese reaction to foreign invasions by Syria and Israel was both an indicator of this lack of common and, as we shall see below, an exacerbation of these divisions. Both the Syrian and the Israeli interventions were not territorial in nature, even though they involved a conquest of territory. Syria had a variety of motivations for intervening in Lebanon, concerning regional hegemony, transnational concerns over Lebanon’s instability, and domestic reasons (discussed below). Territorial expansion was not among them.⁴⁹¹ Because of its non-territorial nature of Syrian intervention, the Lebanese reactions did not create the same sort of internal cohesion expected in the ingroup-outgroup theory discussed in chapter 2. Different protagonists perceived this intervention in the Lebanese scene not as a threat to Lebanon as a whole, but as a threat to particular actors in the civil war. Since the Syrians changed sides during their intervention, we can see the Lebanese reaction shifting as well. The leftist and anti-establishment parties, which

⁴⁸⁹ On the National Pact, see Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, pp. 44-45, Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, pp. 57-67.

⁴⁹⁰ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 44.

⁴⁹¹ For discussions of the Syrian intervention, see, e.g., Fred H. Lawson, “Syria’s Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, 1976: A Domestic Conflict Explanation,” *International Organization* 38, no. 3 (1984), Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*.

initially supported the intervention, came to deny it as a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty.⁴⁹² The Maronite leaders and the Sunni establishment, initially opposing the intervention, came to embrace it once the Syrians switched their position in their favor.⁴⁹³ The intervention, then, was not perceived as a national Lebanese matter but as a sectarian one. Such a reaction would not have been likely if Syria had invaded Lebanon, claiming openly that it came to annex its territories.⁴⁹⁴

Similarly, different groups within Lebanon perceived the 1982 Israeli invasion differently. If the Syrian position on the territorial issue was somewhat vague, the same could not be said about Israel. South Lebanon was never part of the Biblical land of the Israelites, and, accordingly, it was not a part of the Zionist settlement plan, which was confined to the lands of the British Mandate. Unlike other territories taken by force in Israel's wars (the West-Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Desert), Jewish settlements were not established in Southern Lebanon, and the area (unlike East Jerusalem and the Golan) was never annexed to Israel or claimed by it. Accordingly, the reactions of the Lebanese to the Israeli invasion differ with political and confessional affiliations. While most Sunni and some Christians opposed the Israeli move, some segments of the Maronite community, as well as both Christian and Shi'is in the South supported it, either tacitly or openly.⁴⁹⁵

Although the 1989 T'aif agreement and the reconstruction of the state in its aftermath again tried to sweep the sectarian identities under the rug, they are still very much part and parcel of

⁴⁹² The Aramun Summit, traditional Muslim leaders and Lebanese National Movement (LNM), including the Druze leader Kamal Junbalat, requested Syrian assistance in their fight against the Maronites in January 1976, which led to the Syrian intervention through the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and Saiqah. See Later, when Syria shifted alliances, Junbalat was taking the opposite stand. See Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, pp. 180-92; 206-08.

⁴⁹³ See, for instance, the changes in Camil Chamun's position, *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴⁹⁴ Interestingly, Kata'ib Party leader Pierre Gemayel endorsed the Syrian intervention sighting specifically its foreign minister's commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁴⁹⁵ Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 163-66.

Lebanon today. To an important extent, the problem is that the same political principle that allows some measure of compromise in Lebanon: the basing of the state institutions on the principle of consociationalism, or power-sharing between the various communities, also perpetuates the sectarian identities.⁴⁹⁶ In the absence of territorial pressure these identities are unlikely to fade and a more cohesive Lebanese identity unlikely to appear.

To return and examine the validity of Hypothesis 2a, indicated above, the hypothesis stipulated an argument that the border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the weakness of already weak states. The Lebanese case largely confirms this hypothesis. It is, of course, only speculative to determine what could have happened in Lebanon if borders were not fixed, by virtue of the international norm. Nevertheless, it is clear that through the presence of such a norm, and the absence of territorial threats and/or opportunities, Lebanon's weakness was, and still is, perpetuated. In Lebanon, the state never managed to gain a monopoly over the use of violent means. It never managed to create authoritative state institutions, political, social, or economic, which could penetrate beyond and across communal differences, and it never produced the social cohesiveness, the mutual identity that would sustain and legitimate such institutions. Lebanon was a weak state at independence in 1943. Today, more than sixty years later, it is no less, and arguably more, weak. The next two sections explore the consequences of such perpetuated weakness in a world of fixed borders.

D. State Weakness, Civil Strife, and Conflict Spillover in Lebanon

This section will explore the proposition drawn in hypotheses 2b, 2c and 2d. In essence, these hypotheses (discussed in chapter 2), relate state weakness to international conflicts, through

⁴⁹⁶ For such an argument, see Michael C. Hudson, "The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed," in *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, ed. Nadim Shehadi, and Mills, Dana H. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988).

spillover of internal conflict. Such a process, in a way somewhat similar to the case of Congo, although perhaps more complicated, indeed took place in Lebanon, and brought repeated foreign intervention. State weakness was a prime condition for the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, and a major factor in the causes of the Syrian direct intervention (1976-2005) and the Israeli one (1982-2000), with smaller scale violent actions before and after these dates. This section outlines the process of the spread of the Lebanese civil war over the state borders and explains why the weakness of the state, combined with the norm of border fixity, facilitated this process.

a) State Weakness and Civil Conflict in Lebanon

The discussion in chapter 2 highlighted two important factors that, in a weak state, create conditions that make civil strife more likely: “emerging anarchy” and “internal scapegoating.” Both of these elements were certainly present in Lebanon prior to the 1975-6 civil war. This section deals first with the effects of the weakening state, or the emerging anarchy, on the internal communal conflict and then with its effect on the exacerbation of the conflict that resulted from the presence in Lebanon of an armed Palestinian refugee population. Lastly, it discusses the extent to which practices of “internal scapegoating” further exacerbated internal tensions.

I. Emerging Anarchy and Communal Conflict

State weakness in Lebanon created, in the 1970's, a situation that more and more resembled an emerging anarchy. The basic tenet of the Lebanese society is that of “a collection of

traditional communities bound by the mutual understanding that the other cannot be trusted.”⁴⁹⁷

The weakness of the state and its inability to create a legitimate authority in Lebanon and to equip such authority with a sufficient coercive force that could secure the implementation of policy decision and prevent the emergence of rival power bases was discussed above. This inability of the state to monopolize the use of force resulted, indeed, in the militarization of the communal relations of distrust in the 1970’s. Proliferation of armed militia was easily observable anywhere in the country. This proliferation was partly a reaction to the armed presence of the Palestinians, as will be discussed below, but certainly not solely so. In the wake of the 1969 confrontations between the LA and the Palestinians, and especially after 1973, almost all political parties, and many of the confessional and tribal groups, armed and trained themselves and established militias. In the absence of a leviathan, in other words, the fish felt the need to fend for themselves.

In the Maronite camp, the Kataeb Party, already organized in a paramilitary fashion, was the first to militarize, but other groups, such as that of former President Chamoun, did so as well. Leftist/Muslim parties, like Kamal Junblat’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), did not lag behind and, largely with Palestinian assistance, prepared themselves for a military confrontation as well. In a significant development in the Lebanese landscape, the Shi’a community was militarized and mobilized for the first time. In a huge 1974 gathering in the eastern Beqaa region the Shiite Imam Mussa Al-Sader, called for an armed mobilization of his community.⁴⁹⁸

Fears and ambitions were obviously mixed in the motives of the various Lebanese players. That the Muslims had much to fear was obvious. The Christians, and the Maronites in particular, had controlled the presidency and the command of the army, as well as most institutions in the

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 34.

⁴⁹⁸ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 224-25.

state, by virtue of their slightly superior stand in the National Pact. Armed and mobilized, and perhaps with the backing of the LA, the Maronite militia could have posed a great threat to the Muslim community. Those groups that had less to lose and more to gain from a possible war – the Druze and the Shi'a – were, of course, more mobilized. While the Sunni Muslim establishment was less mobilized at the start of the war, it got more and more involved as the war was prolonged.

It takes a keener eye to understand the Christian fears. It is easy to assume that a group that controls a state's highest civilian and military posts should not be the one that feels threatened. Yet, under the circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, the Maronites were feeling exactly that. These fears emanated not so much from the position of the Maronites in Lebanon itself, but from their position within the larger regional setting. The logic of these fears is well articulated by one of the most prominent Maronites leaders, Pierre Gemayel: "For the Christian in Lebanon," Gemayel asserted, "a Christian President is a symbol. Among twenty one Arab countries, only Lebanon does not have Islam as a religion of state; therefore Lebanon's presidency is a guarantee for Christian's fears."⁴⁹⁹ The Maronites, for instance, often invoked the marginalization of the once-important Coptic Church in Egypt as a symbol of their fears.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁹ Quoted in Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism*, p. 103. To be sure, Arab nationalism should not be confused with Islam. While the first is a modern project (rooted in ancient myths as it is) intends on political mobilization of the society, the second is a long lasting and widespread organized religion. In theory, therefore, both Christians and Muslims have equal place in an Arab state. Yet, the majority of Lebanon's Christians feared being "downgraded" to minority status under Muslim rule, whether it was called Arab or Muslim per se. Their view of the inevitable parallelism between Arabism and Islam was, with the hindsight of time, well founded. As argued by Bernard Lewis, "as the [Arab] nationalist movement has become genuinely popular, so it has become less national and more religious- in other words, less Arab and more Islamic." (Quoted in Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post Colonial State* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 35-73. Thus, Michel Aflak, the founder of the Baat'h party, which now rules both Syria and Iraq, declared that "Islam is to Arabism what bones are to flesh," (Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism*, p. 15. and King Hussein of Jordan maintained that "we are Arabs but the idea of Arab Nationalism is meaningless... other than in its religious context, because Islam and Arabism are like hand to glove." (Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 1. In a direct application of these perceptions of Arabism to Lebanon, Libya's Muammar Kadafi had stated that the Christians of

The two (or more) sides of the Lebanese equation, then, felt threatened, and felt even more so as the state's strength declined: " [the Christians] believed that a union with the Arab world would destroy their independent identity and threaten their existence as a nation. The Muslims position was that they has been stripped of their majority status by being detached from the wider community of Islam and grafted onto a small country under Christian domination."⁵⁰¹ These perceptions were much aggravated by the injection into the Lebanese political scene of the most prominent pan-Arab factor of the era, the Palestinian resistance movement, which is discussed below.

While fear was indeed a primary motive in most quarters of the Lebanese society, it was not the only one: opportunism and predation were also well represented. As Oren Barak observed, "much of [the ethnic cleansing], and particularly the massacres of civilians (e.g., in Tal al-Zaatar and Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, the town of Damur, and the Shuf area), was predatory in nature, not inspired by grievance."⁵⁰²

State weakness breeds internal conflict. In Lebanon, ultimately, it brought the 1975 outbreak of the civil war. While the domestic security dilemma and the motives for communal predation were subdued after 1989 under the Syrian influence (and its iron fist), they did not go away. Many Christians, for instance, felt even in the new century increasingly insecure and disadvantaged in the still precarious and complex Lebanese political equation.⁵⁰³ Although it is certainly too early to assess the implication of the Syrian 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon to the renewed anarchy in the country, the potential for renewed communal violence is there.

Lebanon had no option but either conversion to Islam or submitting to Islamic-Arab rule (Hadad, *Lebanon, the Politics of Revolveing Doors* (Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1985), p. 44.

⁵⁰⁰ Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism*, p. 15.

⁵⁰¹ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 17.

⁵⁰² Barak, "Lebanon," p. 317.

⁵⁰³ Farid El Khazan, "Lebanon- Independent No More: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East," *The Middle East Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (2001).

II. Emerging Anarchy and Palestinian Refugees

In Lebanon, there exists another factor that has made all these internal communal tensions even more intense. While the relations between the Palestinian refugees' actions and external intervention are discussed in the next section, this section deals with their effect on the internal Lebanese relations, under conditions of state weakness and emerging anarchy. As a result of the 1948 war in Israel/Palestine, between 100,000 and 150,000 Palestinian found a refuge in Lebanon, concentrated mainly in fourteen camps.⁵⁰⁴ In a country the size of Lebanon, and one that holds such a precarious confessional balance, this number is significant. As the refugees were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, their mere presence served as a threat to other parts of the population, and to the Maronites in particular.⁵⁰⁵

More than the Palestinian religious affiliation, their national status served to greatly polarize the Lebanese landscape. The question of Palestine has been one of the core issues of modern Arab nationalism, from the early phases of this idea.⁵⁰⁶ It has been a litmus test to one's "level of Arabism" and, at the same time, an often-used tool in the inter-Arab power struggles.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, after 1967, Palestinian came to symbolize for Lebanon's Maronites what was to them the pan-

⁵⁰⁴ Without entering the emotional land mind of the causes of the creation of the 1948 refugee flight, it is prudent to assume that both forceful expulsion and simple flight out of fear joined to produce this massive tragedy. For such a view, see Baruch Kimmerling, and Migdal, Joel S., *The Palestinian People: A History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003, 2003), pp. 156-66.

⁵⁰⁵ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁰⁶ For discussion of early Arab involvement in the Palestine conflict see, for example, Philip S. Khouri, "Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists During the French Mandate," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 4 (1981), Gabriel Sheffer, "The Involvement of Arab States in the Palestine Conflict and British-Arab Relationship before World War II," *Asian and African Studies* 10 (1979).

⁵⁰⁷ Palestine served as one issue that could, supposedly, unite the Arabs, as it was a struggle of Arab population against what was (and is) perceived as a direct penetration of Western agents (Israelis), alien to the region and its inhabitants. This question was, at the same time, a base of disunity. Palestine was the utmost weapon of inter-Arab rivalries, where some leaders often used the other's inactivity or inability in this case to undermine rival regimes or gain hegemony over them. Thus, the issue of Palestine was, at one and the same time, the symbolic *raison-d'être* of pan-Arabism and the practical *raison-d'état* of the particular Arab states. For similar reasoning see Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 9-10.

Arab nightmare. “The Palestinian involvement in Lebanese internal politics strengthened irredentist claims for pan-Arabism. This gave the Maronites strong ground to claim that they were the only community that could truly guarantee Lebanon’s sovereignty.”⁵⁰⁸ Therefore, Farid El Khazan writes, “Of all the variants of pan-Arabism that swept Lebanon, particularly Nasserism in the late 1950’s, the PLO constituted an overwhelming threat to the average apolitical Maronite. To the extent that the PLO was perceived as a menace to communal interests and security, it provoked a populist reaction commensurate with that threat perception.”⁵⁰⁹ The Lebanese Muslims, on the other hand, “found [in the PLO] a vehicle to communicate their demands for political reforms ... Acting on the surging Palestinian power in Lebanon, they were able to challenge existing confessional arrangement and the National Pact itself.”⁵¹⁰

The different reactions to Israeli retaliation strikes that came after Palestinian guerilla raids into Israel reflected this polarization. Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon created waves of refugees, predominantly Shiites, who then populated the shantytowns in the western outskirts of Beirut.⁵¹¹ Furthermore, the Israeli retaliations created a permanent challenge to the legitimacy of the Lebanese government and Army. Too weak to (and not interested in) confronting Israel, the army was constrained from acting against the PLO by local Muslim and inter-Arab opposition. One outstanding example of such a dynamic was the 1968 Israeli raid on Beirut airport, which provoked a heated controversy in Lebanon, with the Muslims and the left demanding action against Israel and the Maronites and the army demanding action against what they saw as the source of Israeli reprisals: the Palestinian commando operations.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 61.

⁵⁰⁹ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 82-83.

⁵¹⁰ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 63.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62. Abul-Hudn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 61-62.

⁵¹² El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 140-41.

The Palestinians were a threat to the Maronite Christians (and, to some extent, also to the establishment's Sunnis) also in a more direct way. Paralyzed by the enormity of their plight, the Palestinians, those in Lebanon included, were not fast to mobilized after their 1948 defeat. The Fatah organization was established in the late 1950's and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the umbrella organization for Palestinian resistance, was established in 1964. It was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, however, that propelled the PLO to a key role in the conflict. The Arab defeat in the war was a proof of incompetence of the regular Arab armies and, therefore, the need for a "Palestinian revolutionary struggle." Yet the PLO had not found easy access to Arab bases of operation. The reasons were quite clear (though not openly expressed): fears of Israeli retaliation and fears of the destabilizing effects of Palestinian ideas of Arab revolution. Thus, Arab states that possessed sufficient power, like Egypt and Syria, used it to curtail PLO activities within their territory and greatly constrained it. Weaker states, like Jordan and Lebanon, had to bear both these destabilizing effects.⁵¹³

The first serious showdown with the Lebanese army came in 1969, when the LA and Palestinian commandos confronted each other throughout the country. This confrontation involved more than six months of armed struggle between the Army and the PLO. The political scene was divided, with the Maronites strongly backing the Army and the Muslims standing, to a greater or lesser degree behind the PLO. This polarization notwithstanding, however, the battles were largely confined to the Lebanese Army and to the PLO guerrillas and did not involve many Lebanese civilians directly. The Cairo agreement, signed in November 1969 under Nasser's auspices, ended the confrontation with the government making formidable concessions to the PLO. While the Palestinians were promised freedom of action in their struggle against Israel and

⁵¹³ Ibid., pp. 106-08.

in handling the refugee camps, their only obligation was a vague promise to coordinate these activities with the government and to abstain from involvement in Lebanese internal politics.⁵¹⁴

The relative success of their 1969 show-down with the LA, and the resulting Cairo Agreement, further proved to the Palestinians that the weakness of the state in Lebanon was a valuable asset for their interests.⁵¹⁵ The early 1970s saw a few crucial developments in the Middle East that further made Lebanon the mainstay of Palestinian resistance. First, in “Black September,” 1970, the Jordanian army cracked down on PLO fighters in refugee camps in Jordan and effectively banned their armed incursions into Israel. This move left Lebanon as the only Arab “front-line state” that “allows” (in fact— unable to resist) Palestinian guerrilla war in its territory. Second, the 1973 October war was perceived, regardless of the final military outcome, to be a great Arab victory. This victory was considered first and foremost an Egyptian achievement. This allowed Egypt sufficient internal legitimacy to start carving its own way to a separate peace with Israel.⁵¹⁶ The interim Egyptian-Israeli agreements served as a polarizing factor in the Arab world, mainly between Egypt and the radicals, including Syria, Libya, Iraq and the PLO. The Palestinians, who had no part in the victory, found themselves during the 1973-5 period in a strange situation: on the one hand, they were frustrated by their exclusion from peace discussions in Geneva and elsewhere. On the other hand, fears of marginalization led them to mount a diplomatic attack that bore some significant fruits, most notably Arafat’s address in the UN and the Arab League conferences in Algiers (November 1973) and Rabat (October 1974), which declared PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”⁵¹⁷ The

⁵¹⁴ See the English translation of the “Cairo Agreement” in Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 185-87. For a thorough discussion of the Cairo Agreement and the clashes preceded it, as well as the agreement’s repercussions, see El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 140-68, Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership*, pp. 105-10.

⁵¹⁵ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 140-68, Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership*, pp. 105-10.

⁵¹⁶ Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East*, pp. 150-51.

⁵¹⁷ El Khazan, *The Breakdown of the State*, pp. 218-23, Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 153-88.

combined results of these developments seemed to be a more confident and more organized PLO that was, at the same time, more determined to show its effectiveness in the armed struggle with Israel. By the eve of the civil war, then, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon developed a capable military organization and a significant degree of autonomy from the weak, and further weakening, Lebanese state. By taking these actions, the armed Palestinian Resistance also contributed very significantly to the rising tensions and polarization between the various Lebanese groups and, ultimately, to the outbreak of the war.

III. Internal Scapegoating

Campaigns of exclusion and internal scapegoating took a different shape in Lebanon than in the Congolese case, discussed above. Since the identity of the state was itself contested, different actors often attempted to draw the lines between inclusion and exclusion in different places, in order to gain more legitimacy within their own community. The Maronites tended to see themselves in the role of the bearer of the Lebanese identity, and often implied that other communities were much less loyal to Lebanon. For them, it was the easiest to target the Palestinian as outsiders: "By redirecting their hostility towards the Palestinians, the Christians managed to gain some release of internal tension."⁵¹⁸ Among the Muslims and the Sunni community in particular, on the other hand, the Christians were often accused of being oblivious or even hostile to the Arab cause. As the inter-Arab arena in the 1970's got hotter (as a result of Egypt's "defection" after 1973), "[t]he resultant tension sought and found an outlet in the open society of Lebanon, where the Maronites ... were cast in the role of villains, irrespective of their motivations or the grounds of their grievances against the Pan-Arabists and the Palestinians."⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, p. 61.

⁵¹⁹ Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence*, 94.

Still, internal scapegoating had probably only a relatively minor and not independent role in instigating the war. It was only adding oil on the already burning fire.⁵²⁰

Lebanon's weakness, then, played a crucial part in the development of communal strife and ultimately the eruption of the civil war. In the absence of a state capable of monopolizing the use of violence and thus providing the common good of security, distrust between Lebanon's various communities mounted, the political parties became militarized and hostilities began. The injection of the Palestinian armed presence into the already tense Lebanese picture further polarized Maronites and Muslim's views of each other (and their disrespect of the state). While internal scapegoating was apparent in Lebanon prior to the civil war, it seems to have been squarely marginal to the main factors – mutual insecurity and the Palestinian role. Border fixity, of course, does not affect any of these factors in a direct way. Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, border fixity played a central role in perpetuating and exacerbating the weakness of the Lebanese state, thus indirectly also enabling internal conflict. Furthermore, in the absence of the border fixity norm, the end result of the war would not have been, in all probability, a continuation of the same weak institutions and the same weak state.

b) State Weakness, Border Fixity and Spillover of Internal War

State weakness in an age of border fixity had, however, even wider results than instigating the civil conflict in Lebanon. The mechanism through which the Lebanese internal conflicts were internationalized and involved – directly and militarily – in both Israel and Syria are, in many ways, reflected in hypotheses 2c. The dynamics of the spread of the civil war involved some

⁵²⁰ One of the factors that might have restrained inter-communal scapegoating before the war was the structure of the Lebanese voting system. This system was built in a way that politicians were voted to fill a confessional quota, but were voted on by all the people in the region, regardless of their communal affiliation

degree of what might be seen as kin relations across borders. But more importantly, they also involved an armed Palestinian refugee presence, insurgency and retaliation.

I. Kin Relations Across Borders

Modern Lebanon, one will recall, includes large territories and populations that were part and parcel of Syria before the 1920 establishment of Greater Lebanon. Most of the confessional communities in Lebanon, like Sunni, Druze, Greek Orthodox and Maronites, have counterparts across the border in Syria. Many families have actual relatives across the borders. These relations did play some role in escalation of relations within Lebanon, as depicted in the kin-country theory. In the 1958 crisis, for instance, a supply of arms and ammunition poured across the border from Sunnis and Druze in Syria to their corresponding kin in Lebanon, as they were perceived to fight a Maronite (and pro-Western) domination.⁵²¹ Similarly, in later periods, Iran was (and still is) the greatest supporter of the Shiite Hizbullah militia, a fact that can be attributed, at least in part, to their religious affinity.⁵²²

Nevertheless, it seems that kin relations did not play a major role in the two most glaring interventions of outside forces in the Lebanese civil war, those of Syria and Israel. Israel, of course, did not have any kin to intervene on their behalf in Lebanon. The Syrian intervention, as well, had very little to do with ethnic or religious affiliation. This can be inferred from one important fact: while the initial Syrian intervention did support the largely Muslim anti-establishment movement, this position soon changed, and Syria stood for a while as the protector of the Maronites. Although the Syrian ruling elites are overwhelmingly Alawis and see themselves as related to the Shi'a community, their support for the Shi'is was also not

⁵²¹ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 100.

⁵²² Judith P. Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 29-41.

consistent.⁵²³ Another counter-intuitive fact is that some of the moderate Arab regimes were backing the Christians, at least partially, rather than their “fellow Muslims.”⁵²⁴ These facts, therefore, cast much doubt at the proposition that kin-country dynamics played a major role in policy decisions. In essence, it seems that outside powers were putting the logic of their state above that of Arab or Muslim brotherhood, while the fighting sectarian groups in Lebanon were simply desperate to get help from any possible source.

II. Armed Refugees and Spillover to International Conflict

A much more important component in explaining the spillover of domestic strife across the borders, and in making sense of foreign intervention in the Lebanese case, has been the role of refugees, insurgency and counter-insurgency, as stipulated in hypotheses 2c. These dynamics were not present in relations between Syria and Lebanon. Although Syria was somewhat threatened by Lebanon’s political radicalization and disintegration, there was no direct security/military threat. With regard to relations between Lebanon and Israel, however, this mechanism played a major role.

The armed presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which was dealt with above in the domestic context, exacerbated the conflict in yet another way. By using Lebanese soil a base for training, preparing, and activating cross-border attacks against their “sending country” – Israel – the Palestinian armed resistance initiated a cycle of insurgency and counterinsurgency that, ultimately, contribute much to the Israeli invasion of 1982. Lebanon as a state had neither the coercive wherewithal to prevent the Palestinian activity nor the means to reach a political

⁵²³ Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, pp. 139-43.

⁵²⁴ Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 86-87.

consensus that would enable such a course of action. The Lebanese government therefore became a bystander to a game that it was to pay for with its own blood and treasure.⁵²⁵

The gradual escalation of this cycle of violence points to its resemblance to the mechanism of conflict spillover outlined in hypothesis 2c: from the Israeli side, the policy in Lebanon from 1968 to 1982 was not, overall, a well-thought-of long-term policy with some ulterior goals. It was largely a reactive policy in response to a situation that was perceived as increasingly dangerous to Israel.⁵²⁶ During the late 1960's and the early 1970's the PLO used its increasingly immune status in the refugee camps of southern Lebanon to recruit, train, and set up military bases in the area. Soon it started to use these bases as a springboard to its penetration to Israel, which started in earnest in 1968.⁵²⁷ For strategic reasons – the long-term costs and the expected international reaction – an all-out reaction of militarily occupying southern Lebanon was not a viable policy to Israel. At the same time, for tactical reasons –the nature of terrain and domestic politics – a totally defensive mode was unlikely to succeed as well. Israel, therefore, decided to retaliate by air strikes or commando operations against the PLO in the Lebanese south. This form of relation retained its primary characteristic of the insurgency-counterinsurgency cycle, while constantly escalating. On May 1970, for instance, PLO fighters ambushed a bus carrying school children in northern Israel. As a response, Israel briefly occupied an area in southern Lebanon and attacked PLO bases in the area. In the year 1974 terrorists infiltrating from Lebanon killed

⁵²⁵ For such an argument, see Barak, "Lebanon," p. 315, Avner Yaniv, and Lieber, Robert L., "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," *International Security* 8, no. 2 (1983). A related argument could be made about the weakness of Lebanon as a state and international terrorism. Lebanon's weakness (together with its open nature as a society) made it in the 1970's a safe haven for various groups of international terrorists, such as the German Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army and Northern Ireland's IRA. While the activities of such groups might also result in international intervention, the study of such dynamics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as they do not touch directly on relations between neighboring states.

⁵²⁶ This is not to argue that the PLO position in Lebanon was indeed a serious strategic threat to Israel's survival. Yet, non-strategic threats, such as threat to the lives and livelihood of the northern part of Israel, are still threats, and one should not assume that a reaction (or even overreaction) to such threat is not defensive in nature.

⁵²⁷ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Vinrage Books, 2001), p. 449.

sixty-one Israelis, most of them civilians. Israel's retaliation, as well, became more severe.⁵²⁸ After a respite during the heyday of the civil war, the PLO resumed activity on Lebanon's southern border after 1976, getting increasingly bolder and more successful in its operations. "All this amounted to an ever-escalating chain of engagements which rather than solving the problem made it worse."⁵²⁹

In March 1978 a Palestinian commando squad, setting out from Lebanon and landing on shore in Israel, hijacked a civilian bus and was only stopped on the outskirts of Tel-Aviv, where the ensuing battle claimed the life of most passengers. Israel, feeling that moderate retaliation was not working, felt compelled to act in a bolder way; thus it prepared for a temporary land invasion, the "Litany Operation." This turned out to be yet another short-term solution. Israel was forced (by the United States) to withdraw, and the United Nations peacekeeping force that was deployed to the area proved incapable of either halting PLO operations or preventing IDF retaliations.⁵³⁰ As the PLO started to fire artillery on towns and villages in the Israeli north, Israel again retaliated by bombing the Lebanese south through artillery and air raids. A cease-fire was achieved in the summer of 1981, but both sides held no illusions about its durability.⁵³¹

As this account shows, then, from 1969 and until the eve of the 1981, a pattern of ever-escalating attacks and counter-attacks characterized the relations between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon. While the government of Lebanon, its army, and its private militias played little direct role in this "game," they were certainly a part of both side's calculations. Israel's retaliations were aimed at two objects. First, and more obvious, were the direct attacks against PLO bases, headquarters and ammunition reserves. By retaliation, however, Israel tried also to convey a

⁵²⁸ Ibid., p. 499, Yaniv, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" pp. 122-26.

⁵²⁹ Yaniv, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" p. 130.

⁵³⁰ Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, pp. 106-07, Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 64-75.

⁵³¹ Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security*, pp. 75-85.

subtler “message,” not to the PLO, but to other parties in Lebanon. Israel recognized Lebanon’s weakness, but its decision makers thought that by applying a steady and increased pressure on Lebanese elite, and especially the Christians, it would make them, eventually, face the PLO head on. This was, for example, the logic behind the December 1968 operation. After several Palestinian attacks in northern Israel and on Israeli civilian airplanes, Israeli commandos raided Beirut’s airport and exploded thirteen Lebanese carriers on the ground. The Israeli hope was that the audacity of the action and the damage to Lebanese property and to its economy would propel the government or, alternatively, the Christian militias, to face the PLO. Indeed, the reaction had some role in the 1969 showdown between the Lebanese Army and the PLO. Yet the Lebanese government proved, not surprisingly, unable to bare the political pressure, and bowed to the PLO’s and other Arab states’ demands in the Cairo agreement.⁵³²

Was the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as well, a part of this cycle of escalating violence, and in this sense a part of the mechanism described in hypothesis 2c? The answer is positive, but only in a limited sense. While the motives of some in the Israeli leadership were far wider than securing northern Israel from PLO attacks (to be discussed below), this basic security motive was a necessary component. Without the establishment of “Fatahland” – the PLO’s controlled enclave in southern Lebanon – and therefore without Lebanon’s weakness, the whole rationale for the invasion would have vanished. The war in Lebanon could not have gained the approval, either of the cabinet or the public, without the background of the repeated guerilla and terrorist attacks from across the border.⁵³³ Indeed, the first phase of the invasion, in which the PLO was driven out of its position within Katyusha missile range from Israel, gained broad support from

⁵³² Ibid., pp. 42-46.

⁵³³ For the broad argument see Yaniv, “Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?” For the

the Israeli public. After the IDF kept advancing north, and so going beyond the 40 kilometers of immediate security imperative, the war became extremely controversial.⁵³⁴

Nor were the dynamics described above to end with the Israeli invasion. As long as Israeli forces were directly controlling parts of Lebanon, until May 2000, the fight against them, either by Palestinians or by Lebanese, could have been seen (and partially was) as a struggle to free Lebanese territory. Once Israel retreated to the international border, the dynamics of relations were astonishingly similar to those of the 1970's. Again, the border area was controlled and administered by a politico-military organization that could not be controlled by the weak central Lebanese government. Even though the ability of the Syrian-made Lebanese military force is probably much stronger today, the political will to activate it against the Hizbullah, at the risk of renewed civil war, is not there.⁵³⁵ The one crucial difference is that the Hizbullah, in contrast with the PLO of the 1970's and 1980's, is not an external force, but one deeply ingrained in the Shi'a population, the largest Lebanese community. This fact would make any attempt to subdue it an even harder task. The cross-border dynamics, with insurgency infiltrations and missiles and massive IDF retaliation, however, is strikingly similar. In the fall of 2003, for instance, Israel and the Hizbullah exchanged fire along the mutual border in a manner that certainly resembled past occurrences. The future, no doubt, will see more such conflagrations.

The vicious cycle of cross-border clashes that entangled Israel in the internal strife of Lebanese communities, from the late 1960's through the 1982-2000 occupation, and beyond, is clearly a direct result of the Lebanon's weakness as a state. The state has been unable, politically

⁵³⁴ Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 170, Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 335-36, and fn. 89.

⁵³⁵ A clear indication of the Lebanese state's weakness, in this context, was the objection of the Lebanese government to the Israeli withdrawal. This objection clearly served the Syrian interest, but could hardly be justified in terms of the interests of Lebanon as a state.

and militarily, to exercise its sovereign authority over the PLO, the Hizbullah, and other organizations, which, in turn, has involved the state in a war not of its own choosing.

c) State Weakness, Border Fixity and Foreign Predation

Hypothesis 2d maintains that the weakness of states in a world of border fixity brings foreign intervention not only because of spillover of domestic strife across the borders but also for predatory reasons. Socio-politically weak states are often also weak militarily and unable, either in terms of means or of political consensus, to mount a successful defense and resistance to outside penetration. Moreover, the state's weakness and incohesiveness enable foreign actors to find (or at least think that they will find) domestic allies, which could serve as proxies or dependents. The weak state is therefore a likely victim of external attempts to politically dominate it, or economically exploit it. Predation, in the sense of gaining political dominance of the Lebanese decision process, was probably the most important goal of the Syrian direct intervention in Lebanon, and the primary motive behind the Israel 1982 invasion. Some economic interests and economic exploitation probably were present as well, although these were secondary for Syria and very marginal for Israel.

Syria's direct military intervention in the Lebanese civil war, which took place in a few phases in 1975 and 1976, and lasted until 2005, was primarily a result of Syrian ambitions of regional hegemony and their fear of Lebanese disintegration. Although Syria had never hidden its irredentist claims on Lebanon, it was deterred from acting upon them, primarily as a result of the norm of border fixity. Syria's territorial ambitions were centered on the idea of a "Greater Syria" – the partially correct notion that under the Ottoman rule, the territory of *bilad al-sham* that incorporated Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine were all an integral administrative

“national” whole.⁵³⁶ Syrian pretensions for regional hegemony were never too far from the surface, but they were greatly enhanced by Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat’s abandonment of pan-Arabism, and Syria’s “success” in the 1973 war. As a result, the Syrian leadership became more and more vocal in their claims during the seventies. Thus, Hafiz Assad’s proclamation in 1972 that “Syria and Lebanon are a single country,” was a surprise to no one.⁵³⁷ Nor were the Syrians confined to words. Since independence, Syria had never established diplomatic relations with Lebanon, so as to show the temporality of the Lebanese state. In the 1970s, it also put much pressure on other countries to remove their delegations from Beirut and move them to Damascus.⁵³⁸ Yet Syria’s goals in its 1976 intervention in Lebanon were much more restricted. Syria realistically recognized the limits of its powers and therefore strictly avoided any official claim to Lebanese territory.

Rather than bluntly pursuing ideological aspirations, Syria’s had four more realistic (and compatible) goals in its Lebanese intervention: First, it strived to prevent any one side from decisively prevailing in the civil war in Lebanon. Such a victory, by either side, could have radicalized the Lebanese scene and possibly have had severe side effects for Syria’s political stability as well. Second, by intervening Syria sought to supply the Christians with an alternative to Israeli support and deny Israel the pretext of intervention against a PLO-dominated Lebanon. Such an intervention could have potentially created a second front on Syria’s flank and created a grave threat to its security. Third, Syria had also an economic interest in Lebanon’s stabilization, and one that was very important for the preservation of the ruling coalition in Damascus. Fourth,

⁵³⁶ Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond and Ehteshami Hinnebusch, Anoushiravan (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 141-44. This was only partially true, as Mt. Lebanon, Jerusalem area and Lebanon’s coastal area were separated for the administrative center in Damascus for much of the Ottoman rule.

⁵³⁷ Pipes, *Greater Syria*, 119-121.

⁵³⁸ Pipes, *Greater Syria*, 121-125. See also Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

and most important, in order to fulfill all these interests; Syria needed to gain hegemony over the decision-making process in Lebanon.⁵³⁹ This it finally achieved only after the Tai'f agreement of 1989.⁵⁴⁰ While in Lebanon the Syrian army, or some elements within the army, certainly engaged in large-scale racketeering, drug trade, and other profitable projects, there is no indication that such endeavors played any role in the Syrian intervention decision.⁵⁴¹

Clearly, the weakness of the Lebanese state was the factor that created or facilitated all these incentives for Syrian intervention, and the factor that enable such intervention. Lebanon's weakness, as we have seen, crippled its military ability to object to any incursion on the side of its neighbors, be they Syrians or Israelis. Lebanon's weakness, especially the weakness of the state's legitimacy, in turn, created opportunities for every invader to find local allies. Indeed, Syria did not lack in Lebanese allies, although these alliances, as discussed above, shifted widely. In the first, limited, phase of the intervention (through the Syrian-dominated Palestinian forces of Saiqa and the PLA), Syria was allied with the PLO and the leftist anti-establishment coalition. Later, after its June 1976 massive direct intervention, Syria found in the largely Christian Lebanese Front and the pro-establishment Sunnis enthusiastic allies.⁵⁴² Alliances kept on shifting, but Syria never found itself devoid of local supporters in Lebanon. Even as both domestic pressure in Lebanon and external pressure on Syria to withdraw mounted in 2005, Syria still enjoyed wide support of many elements of the establishment, Christian and Muslim alike and, importantly, of Hizbullah. While Syria ostensibly strengthened many of Lebanon's

⁵³⁹ For discussions of the Syrian objectives in Lebanon, see Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Syria," pp. 155-56, Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War.", Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, pp. 49-56, Karen Rasler, "Internationalized Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 3 (1983), Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, pp. 176-290.

⁵⁴⁰ On the degree to which the Syrian controlled the Lebanese politics after that date, see El Khazan, "Lebanon-Independent No More."

⁵⁴¹ See Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 252-53.

⁵⁴² Weinberger, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, pp. 176-290.

civilian and military institutions, then, it made sure that Syria would always be perceived as indispensable for the continuation of security and development of Lebanon.

Lebanon's weakness played a crucial role in Israel's predatory invasion as well. Securing itself from Palestinian attacks from the north was indeed a necessary component in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and one without which the government could not have hoped for the public support, as argued above. In the year prior to the invasion, however, the PLO adhered to the unofficial ceasefire and was not firing rockets at the Israeli north or sending infiltrators through the borderline. While the PLO's hardened position in southern Lebanon could have caused problems in the future, the assumption in Israel was that the IDF could fairly easily disarm the organization's military ability in southern Lebanon once it took such steps. What, then, caused Israel to invade in the manner and at the time it did? In essence, the Israeli decision to invade Lebanon in the summer of 1982 stemmed from a combination of four factors. The first was that the strategic situation was very favorable to Israel: with the peace agreement with Egypt, Iran-Iraq war going on, and the rest of the Arab world weakened and divided. Israel was as stronger as ever.⁵⁴³

Second, the Israeli Likud government, in many senses unlike its predecessors, did not have reservations about the use of its military power for political goals, and at least some of Israel's leaders had far reaching strategic goals in mind. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and probably also Prime Minister Menachem Begin, wanted to take advantage of this strategic window of opportunity to engineer a new order in the Middle East; an order in which all other states were either cooperating with Israel or too weak and fearful to challenge her. A cornerstone of this new order would be the strengthening of the Israeli grip on the territories it occupied in 1967 in the

⁵⁴³ Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, pp. 105-07.

West Bank and the Gaza Strip.⁵⁴⁴ One thorny problem stood out as a major challenge to such a design, though, and this problem was the third important factor in the Israeli equation: the PLO. The PLO was such a problem not so much because of its Lebanese presence but because of its influence in the West Bank and Gaza. Standing as a symbol of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO was for the Likud leadership an element that had to be disposed of should they want to proceed with their plan. Breaking the Lebanese military force of the PLO, Sharon reasoned, would enable an alternative, and cause more Israel-friendly Palestinian leadership to emerge in the West Bank.⁵⁴⁵

The fourth factor, and one that was essential for Sharon's plan to succeed, was the weakness of the state in Lebanon. This weakness enabled the Israeli perception that it would not face much resistance in Lebanon beyond that of the PLO and possibly Syria, that it would find in the Phalanges of Bashir Gemayel a strong and loyal ally, and that with the IDF's assistance, the Phalanges would have no difficulties gaining the upper hand in Lebanon and establish in it a regime friendly to Israel.⁵⁴⁶ All of these assumptions, it turned out, were true in the short run but far from it in the long run. While Israeli troops did engage, like their Syrian counterparts, in the looting of Lebanese property, this activity was much more limited and the profits did not play any role in the Israeli decision-making.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ Schiff, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 11-97, Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking*, pp. 362-82.

⁵⁴⁵ Sharon, in fact, has tried to promote such alternative leadership in the occupied territories, the so-called Village Associations, without much success. For the PLO's role in the Israeli plans and perceptions see Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, pp. 362-82, Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking*.

⁵⁴⁶ Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, pp. 112-16, Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, pp. 121-34, Schiff, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 11-61, Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking*, pp. 325-86.

⁵⁴⁷ See Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, p. 253.

E. Lebanon: Summary

The study of the Lebanese case confirms most of the hypotheses that are relevant to a weak state in a world in which the norm of border fixity prevails. The evidence as to the mechanisms revealed in hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, though, do not weigh the same. The norm of border fixity played a crucial role in the fact that, after its 1943 independence, Lebanon did not significantly strengthen as a state and, in many senses, was actually further weakened. The absence of territorial threats and/or opportunity denied Lebanon the ability (or the need) to create and maintain a strong army that could have monopolized the legitimate use of force. Other state institutions, in turn, were suffering from the lack of a central body that could enforce its will on the divided political and social arena. This exacerbating weakness was the *sin-qua-non* of the escalation to a long and protracted civil war in the mid 1970's, mainly because of a situation of "emerging anarchy" and the mutual insecurity that adjoining such a situation. Internal scapegoating played only a secondary role.

One important factor in Lebanon that was not suggested by the theoretical discussion in chapter two is the role that the Palestinian refugees and their actions played in aggravating the tensions between the different communities and political groups in Lebanon. The refugees and their incursions into Israel have been also a main motive for Israel's repeated retaliation against Lebanon since the late 1960's, and a necessary condition in the calculation of the 1982 Israeli invasion. The main motives for the Israeli invasion, nevertheless, were more predatory in nature, and involved Israel's desire to create a new and more favorable order in the Middle East, which included Israeli dominance over Lebanese government and reduced influence of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza. Similar calculations were also the source of the Syrian intervention, from 1976 to 2005. Kin relations seem to have played very little role in either of these states'

involvement in Lebanon, and so do considerations of economic exploitation. Lastly, it is important to note that the Israeli and Syrian occupation of Lebanese territory did not enhance Lebanon's strength as a state precisely because it avoided a territorial challenge to Lebanese presumed sovereignty.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

The individual case studies provide many insights into the theoretical argument of this research. A comparison among them, however, will help to strengthen the argument and extend its validity. This concluding chapter, then, begins with a comparison of the four case studies. It utilizes the data of the case studies to conduct a broad comparison of the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia, Argentina, Lebanon, and Congo. This analysis proceeds along the same lines of inquiry as in the cases, i.e., the level of territorial threats faced by each state; the degree to which this territorial pressure, or lack thereof, was translated into state strength or weakness; the relations between weak states and internal violence in a world of border fixity; the degree to which, in such a world, internal strife could spill across the borders through kin relations and through dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency; and the degree to which this state weakness enables and encourages external, non-territorial, intervention, for predatory reasons. The chapter then continues with a short summary of the findings and a discussion, and concludes with an examination of theoretical and policy implication and with suggesting further research needed.

A. Comparing the Cases: Norms of Borders and Territorial Pressures

The conditions in place in the four cases studied, as explored in Chapter 3, did not predispose some of them to success and the others to failure in terms of state building. Yet, Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina did create a much stronger state than Congo and Lebanon by the end of the period studied here. One is compelled, therefore, to look for explanations for these differences in the processes that these countries have undergone. This section compares the level of territorial threats faced by the state in each of the cases studied above. The differences

between the levels of territorial pressures the four countries faced are very substantial. Clearly, a broad division can be observed between the two “older” cases – Brandenburg-Prussia in the 17th and 18th century and Argentina in the 19th century – and the two “newer” cases – Lebanon and Congo since their independence. As was argued in Chapter 2, the Post War World II world has seen a sea change in the way we treat international borders and, though gradually, this change has amounted to an ever-stronger international norm of border fixity. Accordingly, while the former cases faced repeated and often severe territorial threats, the two latter cases encountered nothing of the sort. While the former had the potential for territorial aggrandizement through the conquest of territories of neighboring states, these opportunities were not available to the latter. Some differences are also apparent in the level of threats and opportunities within each pair of states, however, placing Argentina and Lebanon closer, in a sense, to the imaginary dividing line, and Prussia and Congo at extreme opposites.

In 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia was situated, together with other German principalities, at the core of a violent maelstrom that swept the entire European continent, the Thirty Years War. It faced enormous territorial threats. These threats persisted at a very high level for the better part of the 17th century. While subsequent territorial threats seem to subside somewhat in the late 17th and early 18th century, the potential was always there and the Prussian King and his advisors were continuously on guard for these threats. The strong military they built was, to an important extent, an insurance policy against exactly such an eventuality, as their international environment provided no such instrument. At the same time, Brandenburg could, and did, expand its own territories, with no serious normative impediments. The same ruthless international environment created both territorial threat and territorial opportunities. Argentina, in the same manner, was engulfed in war, both internal and external, for most of the 19th century. Many of these wars

were territorial in nature. In the earlier stages, the center of the new state at Buenos Aires was forced to relinquish demands for territories extending from the Banda Oriental (Uruguay), through Paraguay, to Upper Peru (Bolivia). Subsequent wars involved these as well as other Argentinean territories. Not until the later years of the century could Argentina feel secure within its international borders. The level of territorial threat, however, was not as intense as in Brandenburg-Prussia case, once the wars of independence subsided. At least partially, this reduction of territorial threat was owed to a loose regional normative framework that was established in South America in the second part of the century. The acceptance of the principle of *uti possidetis* did not end territorial wars completely, but circumscribed their scope. Alternatively to the story of territorial threats and contraction, the process Argentina went through in the 19th century can be seen also as one of territorial expansion. From the small core around the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina's *actual* territorial control extended to include the vast territories of the current state. This expansion, though, was again limited by the same principles. While Argentina could gain (or regain, depending on one's position) territories disputed between itself and Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance, it could not annex the entire state, and could not act in a way completely at odds with the *uti possidetis* principle.

Congo, in contrast, faced no serious external territorial threats. In its earlier days as an independent state, it did face a serious secession attempt (of Katanga), but once this was put down, with substantial external help, the territories of this vast state were virtually assured, despite the lack of means to defend them, to control them, or to serve them. While the state was invaded repeatedly in the 1990's and the 2000's, and while foreign armies roamed the country at will, no attempt was made to question its borders. Similarly, no territorial acquisitions were available for Congo, as the international community, and the African one in particular, precluded

such practices from the political menu of choice. For Lebanon the picture was not as clear at first, as it faced some territorial opportunities and threats in its 1948 war with Israel, and the subtle but menacing threat of Syrian irredentism. Nevertheless, as the Post-World War II Middle Eastern international system stabilized, it became clear that Lebanon's borders were practically fixed. When Syria invaded the country in the 1970's and when Israel did the same in the 1980's, territorial acquisitions were out of the question. Political domination was not.

In general, then, it is easy to differentiate between the two cases in which the state faced significant and continuous territorial pressure, Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina, and the two cases in which the state faced no such challenges and opportunities, Lebanon and Congo. A closer look, however, reveals some differentiation within each category, with Brandenburg-Prussia and Congo approaching more the ideal types of success and failure in state building, respectively, while Argentina and Lebanon revealing more of a mixed case.

B. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity and State building

The discussion in chapter 3 suggested that, judging on a whole, there is no reason to think that Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 or Argentina in 1810 were better positioned than Lebanon in 1943 or Congo in 1960 to succeed in the project of state building. All, at their starting points, were equally weak. All had some potential to get stronger, but none had too much potential. This section draws on the data from the case studies to compare the process of state building, or the lack thereof, in the four cases. It examines the way in which differing norms regarding international borders created different pressures and incentives for states, elites, and masses, and the ways in which these differences affected the process of state building. It concludes that while territorial threats and opportunities in Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina led them, gradually

and often reluctantly, to create socio-politically stronger states, the lack of these pressures enabled the elites in Congo and Lebanon to avoid this costly and cumbersome process. The section examines these processes in terms of the same categories analyzed in the case studies.

a) Monopolization of the Means of Violence

What have been the effects of territorial pressures, or lack thereof, on the process of state building? The first aspect to be examined is whether the level of territorial pressure a state faces affects its willingness and ability to gain a monopoly over the use of legitimate means of violence within its own territory and across its borders. The argument made in chapter 3 is that persistent territorial threats and opportunities, first, create the incentives for the central authority to vie for forming a stronger military force, and second, that the establishment of such a force then serves as a vehicle for extending the government's ability to prevent any opposing centers from physically challenging the state's authority.

The picture presented by the case studies is compatible with these predictions. In Brandenburg-Prussia and in Argentina, there was a gradual (though not always linear) process of state monopolization of the means of violence, while in Lebanon and Congo we see no such process. Moreover, the process itself often resembled the one predicted. The center in Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina used territorial threats to create, acquire, and sustain a stronger army and then used this army to suppress any armed opposition (and oftentimes non-armed political opposition as well). The center in both Lebanon and Congo, on the other hand, was wary of creating a strong military establishment because, first, it was not needed for the defense of the territory and, second, it was a power center in potential competition with the civilian government. External threats that were not territorial in nature, such as the 1976 Syrian

intervention and 1982 Israeli intervention in Lebanon and the 1996 and 1998 multiple interventions in Congo, did not result in a similar process because territorial threats were invoked in the two other cases.

Here as well there are differences within each category. In Brandenburg-Prussia, the process of monopolization of the use of force had been fairly linear and very much followed the logic presented in chapter 2. It was a process that, essentially, looked like a ratchet effect: with every new territorial threat, the center demanded – and either was given or used coercion to secure – a larger and stronger military. When peace eventually came, the level of troops was not considerably reduced, and these troops were often used, in opposition to their initial purposes, to extend the control of the state. Ultimately, with town militia and private armies abolished and the army nationalized, a true monopoly over the use of legitimate force was achieved. The process in Argentina was not quite so linear but it resulted in a fairly strong monopolization of the use of force as well. If one treats Buenos Aires as the center of gravity in Argentina, one can observe a process that begins with a shrinking of territorial control. Only slowly, beginning with the province of Buenos Aires and gradually extending to include the entire Argentina of today, did the center achieve the goal of monopolizing the use of legitimate force. This process corresponds with what was argued above, that the levels of territorial threat and territorial opportunities in 19th century Argentina were somewhat more limited compared to the 17th century Europe.

In both Lebanon and Congo the military was never viewed as an instrument needed to defend the state's border against foreign territorial ambitions or to expand the state's own territorial positions. It was, instead, either an instrument to preserve the prerogative of a minor elite (as in Congo) or to perform a delicate balancing act between different groups in the society (as in Lebanon). In both cases, however, it was also seen as a potential threat to the civilian

government and, therefore, one that needed to be restricted and contained. While Lebanon's army was rebuilt after the end of the civil war and the Taif agreement of 1989, it was done under the auspices of an occupying power, Syria. Moreover, the current Lebanese army, while stronger on paper, still lacks the internal cohesion and, more importantly, the political will to enable a true monopolization of the use of violent means by the state.

b) Extraction of Revenue

The logic of the development of a state's ability to extract resources from its population is fairly similar to the one of monopolizing the use of force. As discussed in chapter 2, the existence of a persistent territorial pressure creates very strong incentives for the state to extract more resources from its society. It also legitimizes such an activity. The availability of a strong military force, at the same time, enables the state to coerce those elements that oppose taxation. As the state is unlikely to relinquish the high level of taxation once the war is over (especially if another one might be coming soon), taxation remains high, even in times when territorial threats have subsided.

The division of the cases here is somewhat different than what described above. Brandenburg-Prussia followed the above predictions closely. The need for the state to extract resources from its population followed directly from the level of territorial threats it faced. Gradually, though persistently, the right to tax was wrested from the hands of local authorities in towns and manors, often by the use of force, and was vested in the state. As it faced formidable territorial threats, Prussia managed to extract a very substantial level of resources out of its fairly poor population. Such a level of taxation enabled it to sustain a military that matched those of states with much larger and wealthier population base.

Both Congo and Lebanon sustained a system with much lower levels of taxation, and an emphasis on indirect taxation. For Congo, the imposition and collection of taxation was well beyond the ability of its inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. It opted, instead, to rely on proceeds from foreign-owned mining enterprises, which were then nationalized by the state. In Lebanon, the defining factor seems to have been ideological. Based on the ideas of *laissez-faire*, the Lebanese government was reluctant to establish a permanent level of high direct taxation (This has changed somewhat under the Syrian-controlled Lebanon in the 1990's). Nor did it need to. Both Lebanon and Congo could resort to strategies that imposed little tax burden on their populations (since they did not need the resources to fend for their territories) and build a strong military for that purpose. Both, as well, did not have the sufficient power to enforce such a policy.

In terms of revenue extraction, contrary to the prediction, Argentina looks more similar to Lebanon and Congo than to Brandenburg-Prussia. Although Argentina faced territorial threats, these were not as formidable as in Prussia, and therefore required less means. In addition, Argentina was able to utilize three important tools to avoid the need for heavy direct taxation. It levied taxes on imports and exports (indirect taxation) and borrowed money from abroad. It also used induced inflation to finance its wars.

c) Administration and Bureaucracy

The administrative and bureaucratic capacity of the state is the third element of state building related to the level of territorial threats and opportunities. In contrast to the monopolization of the use of force and to revenue extraction, the relationship to state building here is somewhat more complex. On the one hand, territorial war provides the incentives for the initial development (to

create a better organized military) and the means to expand the state administration's geographical reach (by ensuring compliance through coercion). On the other hand, the logic of the expanding military and the increasing need for funding also compels the state to expand the depth of this military bureaucracy to include more spheres of action.

Like in the previous areas surveyed, the case of Brandenburg-Prussia follows closely the model. The bureaucracy was created because of military needs, and it expanded its authority to all the Hohenzollern's territories protected by the military bayonets, and gradually deepened its reach to include more and more authority and responsibilities. Interestingly, while much of the bureaucracy went through a process of "civilization" (i.e., passed from the direct rule of the army to that of civilian government), it retained its military character and was staffed predominantly with veterans and retired army officers. In this area as well, Argentina reveals a more mixed reality. The overall picture resembles that of Prussia, in the sense that by 1880 the geographical reach and the breadth of the tasks carried by the state's administration and bureaucracy were greatly improved and showed fairly strong capacity. These processes, however, seem to be only partially connected to Argentina's territorial wars. To be sure, the expansion of this aspect of the state would not have been possible without the monopolization of the use of force, which was itself, as we have seen, a function of territorial threats and opportunities. Similarly, the need for a better organization stems, at least partially, from military needs. In contrast to the Brandenburg-Prussia case, however, the degree of spillover from the military administration to the civilian one is limited. Again, one can attribute this last fact, at least partially, to the lower level of territorial challenges that Argentina had to face.

The administrative capacity and reach of the state in both Lebanon and Congo were (and still are) very limited. In Congo, even in the height of Mobutu's era, when the country was ostensibly

under a centralized rule, the capacity of the state to affect the daily life of its citizens was very limited, and its bureaucracy was inefficient and corrupt. The early attempts at developing seemingly strong institutions were mostly for propagandistic purposes, and were soon abandoned as it became clear that Congo's territory was guaranteed by the international community against both internal succession and external territorial predation.

In Lebanon, the reach of the state, very limited to begin with, was severely crippled by the lengthy civil war and the militia rule in different parts of the country. Programs of reforms after the war has ended hardly improved the situation. In the late 1950's and early 1990's, when the army had much influence on the government, through the presidency of its former commander, General Chihab, administrative reforms were attempted, indeed, but with only limited success. The army, which was not developed to protect or expand Lebanon's territories, was hardly a strong enough institution to affect such reforms.

d) Provision of Public Goods

A fourth aspect of state building suggested in chapter 2 as one potentially related to territorial threats and opportunities, is that of the provision of public goods. The logic of this argument is that a state that inflicts a heavy burden on its society – because of the demands created by territorial pressures under a flexible border system – needs, over time, to somehow compensate them. Coercion alone can be a vehicle for governing only to a limited extent, and in the long run the state needs at least some degree of legitimacy to sustain itself. Presumably, such legitimacy could come from supplying public goods in return for the burden of blood and taxes.

In the two more “extreme cases,” Brandenburg-Prussia, on the one hand, and Congo, on the other, these assumptions seem to fit the reality. As compared to the norms of its own time,

Brandenburg-Prussia had done very well in terms of public goods supply. The construction of roads and water systems and the provision of public safety measures, especially in towns, were quite remarkable for this period. Congo, on the other hand, did a very poor job in providing public goods to its citizens. Generally speaking, areas such as infrastructure, public education and public health only deteriorated with the passing of time. The spatial distribution of goods and investments, as well, is telling. Congo invested the lion's share of its budget (the part that did not go directly into the pockets of the small governing elite, and especially Mobutu himself) in the capital Kinshasa and the mining-rich area of Shaba. Other regions, with more population, gained very little of these investments. In both Lebanon and Argentina, in contrast, the supply of public goods seem to correlate more with the ideologies of the incumbent than in the prospects of territorial threats. In Lebanon, of course, the provision of the public goods, itself was a casualty of the civil war and only slowly recovered.

e) Group Cohesion

The fifth and last aspect of state strength affected by the prospect of territorial wars, or the lack thereof, is the cohesion of the states or, in other words, the level of identification of the population with their state. The results here are apparent on the negative side (i.e., fixed borders leads to low cohesion), but only mixed on the positive side (a flexible border system might lead to some degree of cohesion).

The evidence from the case of Brandenburg-Prussia is weak but still existent. Coming before the age of nationalism, this case should not indicate popular identification with the state. However, at the level of the politically relevant strata, the nobility, cohesion certainly increased with time. While in the mid-1700's one could still hear, for instance, Brandenburgians refer to

other Hohenzollern territories as “foreign,” the same could not be found in the 18th century. It is certainly not the case, moreover, that the Prussians felt themselves to be “German” in any political sense before the Napoleonic Wars. While there is no direct evidence that the cause was territorial threats, the Junkers, although initially ambivalent or outright opposed to the project of state building, gradually came to espouse it and, in a sense, even “possess” it. In Argentina, the process of achieving “national” (or state) cohesion was partial. Despite the periods of political separation some modicum of a sense of being Argentinean still prevailed with most people, and eventually trumped local and regional (i.e., Latin American) identities. Here again it is hard to find evidence that such creation and preservation of Argentinean identity was a reaction to territorial pressures, but this is perhaps the nature of this subject.

In both Lebanon and Congo, however, the absence of a unifying theme – such as territorial threat– is very clear. The absence of such common threats, or common opportunities, perpetuated ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other cleavages in the society, and greatly inhibited the ability of the state to achieve national cohesion, Mobutu’s public relations campaigns notwithstanding. The population of Congo and Lebanon remain very divided to date. International conflicts and foreign invasions that had no territorial ambitions even worsened this disunity, as different segments in the population supported the invaders or were oblivious to them. They were not perceived as a threat to the whole body politic, but to a certain faction of this body, and thus not generating a significant level of ingroup cohesion.

This section, then, has examined the effects that norms regarding international borders exert on the process of state building and on the prospects of states to become stronger in a socio-political sense. It has examined, in other words, the suppositions of Hypothesis 1 (which is relevant to the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina) and Hypothesis 2 (relevant to

Congo and Lebanon). Combined, these hypotheses suggest that a world in which there is no prohibition on territorial conquest and annexation is one in which surviving states are likely to get stronger over time; and that in a world in which such prohibition (i.e., the norm of border fixity) exists, weak states will remain weak or even get weaker.

This section, like the case studies, has compared the four cases in terms of various components of state strength, examining the monopolization of the use of legitimate violence, the extraction of resources, the building of state institutions and bureaucracy, the provision of public goods, and the degree of internal cohesion. The study of Brandenburg-Prussia corroborates the premise of Hypothesis 1 in all of these aspects, with the possible exception of last (in which there are not sufficient indications in either way). In Argentina, the overall picture corroborates Hypothesis 1 as well, although the details are often not as clear and strong as in the Prussian case. The processes of monopolization of the use of legitimate violence and of creating state institutions and bureaucracy follows the theory fairly well, although in a less linear way. So does the level of internal cohesion, in a limited sense. Both the extraction of resources and the provision of public goods, however, seem fairly unaffected by Argentina's territorial pressures. The study of both Congo and Lebanon corroborates Hypothesis 2. The absence of territorial pressures resulted in weak states in all the dimensions explored here. Congo was, in most categories, more extremely weak.

f) The Duration of State

But perhaps, one might suggest, all of the differences noted above between the success of state building in Brandenburg-Prussia and in Argentina and its failure in Lebanon and Congo are simply a matter of the time factor. After all, did it not take Brandenburg-Prussia a full century to

create the fairly strong state which the Frederick the Great inherited in 1740? And did it not take Argentina the better part of the nineteenth-century to reach the point at which it was a fairly cohesive and socio-politically strong state? And is it not, therefore, too early to judge whether the state building project in current-day states of the developing world is a failure or a success? This argument has a point. It did take European states longer time to build their states to a reasonable level than the most states in Africa today exist as independent political entities.

However, one needs to take into account two important factors: First, one should look not only at the start and end point, but also at the trajectory of the state building process. Is the state at all moving in the direction of creating stronger institution and gaining greater legitimacy as a state? Even if the process of state formation is far from complete, one would expect it to move in the right direction. Both Congo and Lebanon, as we have seen, do not show significant signs of a positive trajectory of this sort, while in Argentina and (especially) in Brandenburg, these signs were clear well before their first century of existence as states elapsed.

Second, and not less important – there is no reason to assume that a similar process should take a similar time under different conditions. Technological and ideational advances should have both make the process of state building faster rather than slower. Technological advances in communication and transportation should have created better conditions for the penetration of the central government into its society, and the ability of the government to create an infrastructure that connects various regions of the state. Faster communications should make the state more governable, as it should be much faster today, even in the remote parts of Africa, to communicate between the central authority and its representatives in the periphery. Advances in transportation should enable the government to move its agents (military, bureaucrats, etc.) at a faster pace, and thus better control its territory. The availability of “ready made” models of

administration, moreover, means that a state does not have to “invent the wheel,” like Brandenburg-Prussia did, when establishing governing administration. Therefore, the time needed for a state to create a strong entity out of a weak one, in theory, should have been shorter in the 20th and 21st centuries than in the 17th century.

That one cannot see a positive trajectory in the cases studied here, and that the process does not take a shorter time, therefore, suggests that the problems are real – not an artifact of insufficient time. A simple “wait and see” approach, then, is unlikely to produce much better results of state building, then, a fifty or a hundred years down the road. Given the general trajectory of development and the advances of transportation and communication were we do not see a significant process of state building by now we are unlikely to see it in the coming decades.

C. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity, State Weakness and International Conflict

a) Weak States, Border Fixity and Violent Civil Strife

Hypothesis 3 maintained that weak states in a world in which border fixity is the norm are rife with internal violence. This section considers this proposition with regard to the two case studies of weak states in the contemporary world, in which, indeed, the border fixity norm reigns. Both cases corroborate the hypothesis. Both Lebanon and Congo deteriorated into lengthy periods of internal violent strife between different segments of their populations. In both cases the weakness of the state was a major factor in the outbreak and continuation of violence, and in both cases, as we have seen above, border fixity played an important role in perpetuating and exacerbating this weakness. Both cases included, as well, a factor that was not considered in the

original theory – the role of refugees in instigating internal strife (as opposed to external conflict, which will be dealt with below).

The processes that led from a weak state in a world of border fixity to internal violent conflict were hypothesized in chapter 2 to encompass two separate mechanisms. The first mechanism is that of state weakness creating conditions of “emerging anarchy.” In this condition, groups’ security concerns are on the rise and opportunities for gain from violence increase as well, as the aggression goes unchecked by the state. This mechanism was crucial in understanding the causes of both the Lebanese Civil War in the 1970’s and the late 1990’s rebellions in Congo. In Lebanon the state was perceived as sometimes biased towards the interests of one community (the Maronites) and always ineffective and unable to supply the most basic of public goods: security. Clans, communities, and political parties started to arm themselves. The security dilemma soon increased dramatically, as each militia was perceived, rightly or wrongly, not only to be the defender of its own community, but also a threat to other communities. Similarly, in the 1990’s Congo, as the state deteriorated into complete chaos, ethnic groups were facing a situation in which there was no arbiter in conflicts between them and neighboring groups, and in which there was no security but that which one provided for oneself. Rising tensions erupted in communal wars, leading to a very large number of dead, casualties, and refugees in several parts of Congo, even well before the rebellion of 1996.

The second mechanism that connects weak states in a world of border fixity to civil wars and internal strife is what I have termed “internal scapegoating.” Although rhetoric against this or that community has been found in Lebanon, there is little evidence that this sort of rhetoric played a very significant role in instigating the civil war. In Congo, on the other hand, much evidence exists to this effect. Both Mobutu and Kabila have used internal scapegoating

frequently and in a way that promoted internal hatreds, fear, and discrimination – setting off processes that greatly contributed to Congo’s inflammation in internal wars. They were compelled to do so in the absence of state institutions that could have provided more inclusive means of gaining legitimacy. They were allowed to do so, since this action would not have been resulted, in all likelihood, in secession or annexation of the lands of the excluded people to their kin across the border.

In both the Congolese and the Lebanese cases, a third factor, one that was not included in my initial model, also contributed decisively to the outbreak of violent internal strife. In both these cases an injection of refugees, fleeing conflict in neighboring countries (themselves weak), greatly exacerbated existing tensions and made violence much more likely to erupt. The refugees would have had no such effect had the state been stronger and able to prevent them from turning the camps into armed bases. The refugees’ change in the local balance of power, moreover, would not have been that harmful if a leviathan, a strong and capable state, had been present.

b) Weak States, Border Fixity, and Spillover to International Conflict

Hypothesis 4 stipulated the argument that internal conflict in weak states in a world characterized by fixed borders is more likely to spill over to involve neighboring states. It further suggested two mechanisms that might make such a prospect more likely: the development, under these conditions, of armed insurgency movements among the refugees, and the kin-country syndrome.

Spillover of internal strife has created international conflict in both Lebanon and Congo. It engulfed Israel and Syria in the Lebanese case, and Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, and a few smaller forces, in the Congolese conflict. The dynamics of the kin-country

syndrome have played significant role especially in the case of Rwanda's intervention in Congo. As its kin in eastern Congo – the Banyamulenge – were excluded by the Congolese state (as part of the tactics of internal scapegoating described above) and targeted by rival groups, Rwanda felt compelled to take on the role of their defender. This position was very much influenced by the proximity of these dynamics in eastern Congo to the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. In the Lebanese case, on the other hand, the kin-country syndrome appears to have played a much more marginal role. The potential does exist: there are numerous connections, religious, ethnic, and clan-based, between some groups in Lebanon and their counterparts across the Syrian border. Yet, while these relations were a factor in the first, and brief, civil war of 1958, they did not have such an influence in the much more serious war of 1975-6. Syria, now a stronger state itself, picked its allies and enemies in accordance with its *raison d'etat*, not its ethnic affinity.

In contrast, the dynamics of armed refugee insurgency and retaliation played a major role in the escalation and spillover of the conflict across borders both in Congo and in Lebanon. In Lebanon it was the insurgency of the Palestinian armed struggle, conducted mainly from its bases in the refugee camps in the South, that ignited the cycle of attacks and retaliation. While these actions were apparently not the primary motive of the 1982 Israeli invasion, they were a necessary component, without which it is hard to imagine Israel embarking on the invasion. In Congo, armed refugees operating across the borders of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola were all instrumental in these countries' intervention in Congo in 1996 and again in 1998. In both cases, the state was too weak to enforce its control over its territory and had to acquiesce to the presence of armed refugees on its soil, as well as to the other side's retaliation. The Congolese government under both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila not only was unable to reign in the militant refugees. In fact, it tried to use them to promote its own agenda, since its territories

were immune from territorial punishment by an angry neighbor. Moreover, in both the Lebanese and the Congolese cases, there are examples of neighboring countries that were able to absorb a large number of refugees without letting them lash out at their own country – compare Syria to Lebanon and Tanzania to Rwanda.

c) Weak States, Border Fixity, and External Predation

In addition to spillover, weak states in a world espousing the norm of border fixity are more likely to be involved in international conflict that arise out of predatory motivations of surrounding states. The state's socio-political weakness is often translated, over time, into weakness in terms of its capacity to defend itself against outside powers. Neighbors can abuse this state's weakness in order to gain political and economic control. Neighbors can also take advantage of the incohesiveness of the state's society in order to lure potential internal allies to their side. In both the Lebanese and the Congolese cases, these sorts of motivations were factored into the intervening states' calculations (more so in Lebanon).

Both Syria's 1976 intervention and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon stem, to a considerable degree, from a desire to influence, and in fact dictate, Beirut's policies. It is often very hard to differentiate security considerations from predatory, opportunistic ones. Both were included in the calculus of Israel and Syria alike. Yet, as the goals of their interventions went well beyond that of securing a quiet border with Lebanon, one is compelled to view their actions essentially as political predation. Economic interests, although existing, apparently played a secondary role in Syria's decision and none in Israel's.

Economic gain, on the other hand, was the prime motivation for Zimbabwe's 1998 intervention in the Congo War. Not bordering Congo, Zimbabwe had little to fear in terms of its security. The

pattern of its operations, furthermore, fit well that of economic predation. In addition, acquiring powerful positions in influencing Congo's government was certainly an important stimulus to the interventions of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola. Yet, apart from Zimbabwe, all had interests in controlling Kinshasa precisely because it exported such grave threats to their countries or governments. Political predation per se seems to have played a secondary role to security concerns and kin solidarity in these cases.

D. Summary and Discussion

Despite obvious differences resulting from temporal, spatial, cultural or other variables, weak states across time and space share many similarities. Among other things, they are unable to seize and maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and are unable to extract sufficient resources from their population (especially if this requires direct taxation). Weak states cannot extend their administrative reach as far and as deep as strong states do, and they are usually unable (and sometimes also unwilling) to supply their citizens with basic public goods. Lastly, weak states suffer from low levels of legitimacy as a state among their politically relevant strata.

Yet, with regard to the outside world, weak states in the post WW-II era have faced a very different world than the one faced by their counterparts in previous eras. In short, weak states in today's world, most of them young states, have been "born" into a world in which foreign conquest and annexation of one's homeland territory is banned as a legitimate practice in world policy; i.e., into a world of border fixity. This is supposedly a very positive factor that should save many states, and much blood and treasure. The border fixity norm,

however, also has some severe “side effects,” as the cases of Congo and Lebanon show.⁵⁴⁸

This section, first, lists again the five hypotheses of this dissertation; second, it presents a summary of the findings of the case studies and discusses these findings; and third, in light of the empirical findings, it suggests a few modifications to the original model.

It is time, to reiterate the five hypotheses presented in Chapter 2:

Hypothesis 1: A world in which there is no normative prohibition on conquest and annexation is likely to result, over time, in socio-politically stronger states.

Hypothesis 2: The border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the weakness of already weak states.

Hypothesis 3: Weak states in a world with the border fixity norm are rife with internal violent conflicts because they create conditions favorable to “emerging anarchy” and to “internal scapegoating.”

Hypothesis 4: Internal conflicts in weak states in a world with the border fixity norm tend to spillover and turn into international conflicts and possibly international wars, through the mechanisms of refugee insurgency and kin-country syndrome.

Hypothesis 5: State weakness in a world with the border fixity norm promotes the possibility of international conflicts because it creates opportunities for external non-territorial predation.

How well do these hypotheses withstand the scrutiny of the case studies? Table 8 presents a summary of the findings:

⁵⁴⁸ As mentioned before, one needs to consider the fact that, at the same time, the norm of border fixity has been a very positive force in enhancing peace and stability in regions where most states are socio-politically strong, such as in Europe (save the Balkans), North America and South America.

Table 8: Summary of Findings in the Case Studies

| Hypothesis | Relevant cases | Confirmed? |
|------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | Brandenburg-Prussia, Argentina | Strongly Moderately |
| 2 | Congo, Lebanon | Strongly for both |
| 3 | Congo, Lebanon | Strongly for both (Primarily through the mechanism of “emerging anarchy.” In Congo, the mechanism of “internal scapegoating” also important) |
| 4 | Congo, Lebanon | Strongly for both (Primarily through the mechanism of refugee insurgency. In Congo, the mechanism of “kin-country” also important) |
| 5 | Lebanon Congo | Strongly Moderately (primary motivation only for Zimbabwe) |

In general, then, most of the hypotheses have been confirmed for most cases, although there are some differences in the effects and the order of importance of the different mechanisms at work. A world in which there are no restrictions on foreign occupation and annexation of homeland territory proved to affect positively the development of a strong state both in 17th and 18th century Brandenburg-Prussia and in 19th century Argentina. While the first case followed closely the mechanisms suggested in Chapter 2, however, the second has done so only in some respects, and usually not to the same extent as in Prussia. The reason might be, as hinted at before, at least partially related to the norm of border fixity as well. In Latin America, and especially in South America, international norms regarding the fixity of borders, started to develop earlier than in other parts of the world. Although weak and devoid of practical enforcement (“teeth”), the principle of *uti possidetis, ita possidetis* (“as you possess, you may possess”) has been an important component of the continent’s international politics. The principle, discussed and confirmed in three inter-American Conferences and Congresses, and in


numerous multi-lateral and bi-lateral treaties in the region, slowly gained traction in regulating relations in the continent. To be sure, territorial conflicts still occurred in 19th century South America, as some of the colonial boundaries were disputed or ill defined, and as different states referred to different interpretations of this norm of international law.⁵⁴⁹ Yet, as this principle anchored the borders of the Latin American states to the borders of their predecessor colonies, it set limits on the flexibility of borders in the region. One could argue, then, that a weak version of the border fixity norm did exist in 19th century Latin America and affected, to some degree, the level of territorial pressures faced by Argentina.⁵⁵⁰

Thus, one can think of the border fixity norm not as an abstract dichotomous variable, as presented in the original model, but as a continuous variable, in which the norm can take several different values. This notion is also compatible with the other side of the spectrum, where the norms of border fixity in the Middle East, especially before the 1950's, were apparently weaker and less stringent than those presented in the Congo case. A revised conception of the relations between border fixity and state strength, therefore, is presented schematically in Figure 9 :

⁵⁴⁹ An example of the former is the dispute between Argentina and Chili over the possession of Patagonia. See Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism." An example of the latter is the difference between the Brazilian tendency to interpret the principle as *uti possidetis de facto*, as opposed to the Spanish American countries preference for *uti possidetis de jure*, see Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*, p. 77.

⁵⁵⁰ For a thorough discussion, see Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*. See also Korman, *The Right of Conquest*, pp. 234-38.

Figure 9: Border Fixity and State Building as a Continuum



Another variable that is not included in my theory and apparently had some affect on the willingness of states to embark on the costly and risky process of state building is the availability of other financial sources. Unlike Brandenburg-Prussia, Argentina had the options of borrowing more and of relying on export and import tariffs instead of direct taxation. These options did not preclude the process of state building as a reaction to territorial pressure altogether. Argentina still gained a monopoly over the use of legitimate force and still developed stronger state institutions. Yet, in the long run, the state was not as independent in terms of its policies and not as strong as in the Prussian model, partially because of a lack of an efficient system of direct taxation. This observation is compatible with the existing literature, and could plausibly fit into the same general theoretical framework.⁵⁵¹

While Hypothesis 1 dealt with state building in a world of flexible borders, Hypothesis 2 concentrates on the same process in a world in which the border fixity norm prevails. By the nature of this hypothesis, the evidence here is not direct evidence, as it deals with the effects of

⁵⁵¹ See, e.g., Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.", Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics.", Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992*.

the absence of a phenomenon, territorial pressure, rather than with its existence. Nevertheless, both Congo and Lebanon present a clear picture of continuous and exacerbated weakness, which was shown to be related to this absence. To reiterate, the argument is not that states in the area of flexible borders could not avoid a due process of state building; because they could, and many – Poland is one example – did. They had, however, to bear the consequences, by losing territory or even being eliminated. Neither Lebanon nor Congo had to face such consequences. Despite debilitating state weakness and despite prolonged periods of foreign control over much of their land and/or political power bases, they remain nominally independent and territorially intact. Nor is the argument that weak states in the border fixity era are destined to stay weak. Some states, by virtue of good leadership or other factors – Botswana in one Sub-Saharan African example – do manage to become significantly stronger. Unfortunately, however, these are the exceptions.

Hypothesis 3 was also confirmed strongly for both Congo and Lebanon. In both, the main mechanism through which state weakness was translated into internal civil strife was what has been termed here “emerging anarchy.” In the absence of a Leviathan, the fish had to fend for themselves, and in so doing they created intense security concerns and opportunities for gain in the struggle between different groups within the state. One factor, which lay outside the original framework presented here, but which has been shown to have an important exacerbating effect on internal strife, is that of the influence of refugee flows from neighboring countries. Armed refugees not only entangled the state in external conflicts but also greatly enhanced the chances of conflagration of internal fights. This factor, then, needs to be added to the original theory.

On the other hand, one element included in the theory as leading from state weakness in a world of border fixity to civil strife, is confirmed to be important only in the case of Congo. The politics of internal scapegoating did not seem to constitute a major reason for the deterioration of

Lebanon into a civil war, while it did play a significant (though secondary to emerging anarchy) role in Congo. Further research is needed, then, to determine the conditions under which one should expect internal scapegoating to cause damage to inter-communal relations in a state.

Hypothesis 4, which dealt with the spillover of internal strife into international conflict, was also confirmed in both the Lebanese and the Congolese cases. Here, as well, there are some differences in the mechanisms at work. The key, in both cases, was the existence of armed refugees from conflict in neighboring countries, which, through their cross-border insurgency campaigns against their country of origins, created an ever-escalating cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. This was true for Lebanon's relations with Israel and for Congo's relations with Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola. The other mechanism specified in the original framework, that of the kin-country syndrome, had significant effects only in the case of Congo. The conditions for the working of this mechanism, then, should also be further researched in future studies. On the other hand, Hypothesis 5, dealing with the relations between state weakness and foreign political and economic predation, turned out to be more relevant to the case of Lebanon – where both Syria's and Israel's interventions presented such features – than to Congo, where only Zimbabwe, of the major actors involved, was primarily motivated by greed.

To conclude, then, one cannot but be puzzled by the negative effects on international relations that such a seemingly positive international norm has created. Indeed, for socio-politically weak states, good fences often make bad neighbors. In regions where states are weak, I argued in this dissertation, the norm of border fixity – the prohibition of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory, regardless of any internal or external conditions – increases the incidents of international conflicts. In such situations, fixed borders perpetuate and exacerbate the weakness of the state, which, in turn, is a major cause of internal wars. Under the border

fixity norm, these internal wars tend to spillover and become international conflicts. These theoretical propositions were tested and largely corroborated (though with some reservations and differing emphasizes) in the comparison of cases before and after the ascendance of this norm, at the aftermath of World War II.

E. Theoretical Implications

The argument presented and tested in this dissertation offers five major theoretical contributions to the study of international politics. The first contribution is the recognition of the difference between intentions and results. This is, of course, not a new theme in the study of politics. Yet, in the specific area of studying international norms, the tendency has been to assume away the possibility that “good norms” can have negative consequences. The current research shows that such an approach is imprudent, and that when studying international social norms, one has to explore not only their positive influences but the negative as well.

Second, and closely related, is the observation that the same structural factor, an international norm in this case, might have very different consequences for different sort of actors. The idea that the norm of border fixity has been a positive force in the relations between socio-politically strong states is not studied here, but is probably not very controversial. That the same norm exerts profoundly different effects on actors of a different sort, weak states, however, is a major finding of this study. The more general point is, therefore, that one should not assume that all actors are affected in the same way by similar structural features. The internal attributes of actors filter external inputs in ways that produce diverse outcomes. Our task as social scientists is to decipher the ways in which these filters work and thus understand the mechanisms that translate external, structural conditions into policy outcomes.

Third, this study contributes to our understanding of the interplay between normative and rational variables in international politics. It shows, specifically, how rational calculations might operate within, and be affected by, an overall normative framework – of border fixity, in this case. This study therefore shows that the often polarized debate between the rational choice view of politics and the more constructivist, or normative based, view, is somewhat superfluous. Both norms and rationality affect political decisions and political outcomes. Our task as researchers is to delineate the way in which these broad modes of action work and interact in different settings and under different conditions.

Fourth, this work contributes to the study of territoriality and borders, which was dormant for several decades but has been reinvigorated since the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the dissertation points to the subjective and changing nature of our perceptions of borders, and how and whether they should be legitimately changed. It also directs our attention to the consequences, some of them unintended, of such changes.

Lastly, this work contributes to the debate regarding the causes and consequences of state weakness, in its various manifestations (failed states, collapsed states, etc.). It emphasizes the role of a set international structure in the perpetuation of state weakness in many of the regions of the developing world: not a material structure (i.e., the global balance of power or the World Capitalistic System), but a normative one. It also shows how the logic of international relations for weak states is profoundly different than that of strong states, as domestic politics, relations between groups within the state, and transnational relations between elements within the state and those outside of it play a much larger role than they do in strong states.

F. Policy Implications

“The greatest threats to our security,” US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in a 2005 op-ed, “are defined more by dynamics within weak states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones.”⁵⁵² Though the current dissertation was not concerned in particular with US security, it is, in a sense, an inquiry into the puzzle that this statement poses: it attempts to increase our understanding not only of the reasons why security threats increasingly emanate from weak states, but also how these threats are related to the issue of borders.

In regions where states are weak, as this dissertation has shown, the norm of fixed international borders increases the incidents not only of civil wars, but of international conflicts as well. In such situations, fixed borders perpetuate and exacerbate the weakness of the state, which, in turn, has been a major cause of wars in the last 50 or so years, especially in the Developing World.

The policy implications of these findings, nevertheless, are far from simple and are bound to be controversial, to say the least. This is so mainly because of two important aspects. First, while I find that the border fixity norm to have negative effects on regions in which most states are weak, I also believe that it has very positive effects elsewhere. In regions where most states are strong, or at least sufficiently strong, good fences indeed make good neighbors. To rid the world of this norm would be, therefore, to throw the baby out with the bath water. Second, war is never a good solution to problems: it is costly, in blood and treasure, cruel, and seldom truly solves the problems it sets out to solve. It would be both imprudent and unwise, therefore, to recommend a return to the age of territorial wars.

⁵⁵² Condoleezza Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security,” *Washington Post*, December 11, 2005. This sentiment also echoes the 2002 US National Security Strategy. See President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The White House).

On the other hand, one should not avoid a discussion of a problem if there are no easy solutions. To ostracize and ignore the positive effects territorial war has had in the past on state building would be equally dangerous. The mere understanding of this hitherto unstudied phenomenon is important by itself. That a norm that intends to create conditions of stability and peace actually produces the opposite consequences is a fact worthy of our attention even without immediate policy implications. Nonetheless, I do cautiously offer here two such implications:

1. The international community should also consider some means of applying pressure that might compel states to reform and improve in a way similar to the pressures exerted in the past by territorial wars. The threat of dismemberment from the UN and other international organizations (such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO) might wield some such pressure. As it stands today, even states that cannot be considered states by any positive measure (such as Somalia and the DRC) still retain their seat in these organizations, with all the economic and prestige benefits it entails. Such a threat might induce some of the states in question to attempt a more sincere project of state building (although it will probably still be a weaker incentive than a real territorial threat).⁵⁵³

2. If indeed border fixity is sometimes a cause of international conflicts, we do have to consider revising this international norm. As stated above, I do not recommend deliberate creation of territorial wars as a cure to the ills of weak states. Yet, under some circumstances, the international community (as well as the great powers as independent actors) should consider revisions of existing borders to adjust them to reality (of both control and legitimacy), whether it means accepting secession or even (in rare occasions) annexation of land by a neighbor. In effect, what I recommend here is a returning to the practice of recognition of states on a positive

⁵⁵³ For similar recommendations, see Herbst, "Let Them Fail."

basis, a practice that was the prevalent rule of international law for many decades.⁵⁵⁴ This practice, though, should be clearly demarcated and implemented only in cases where there is a total collapse of the legitimacy and control of the state, and little prospect of reconstruction through conventional means.

Some might argue that these measures would open a “Pandora’s box” of terrible potential. I would counter, however, that in many parts of the world, and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, matters could not be much worse than they are right now. Weak and impotent states are the site (and the main cause) of civil wars, famines, epidemics and, as we have seen in this dissertation, also international conflicts. In terms of casualties, direct and indirect, the Congo War is the worst international conflict since World War II, and is still simmering. Though on a smaller scale, the combined effects of the civil wars, invasions and international interventions in Lebanon are just as devastating. Territorial wars, as bad as they are, are usually easier to control and to end. In the long run, they could immensely increase the strength of the states in these regions, a fact that would lead to more secure states, both from within and from without. Ideally, in most cases the mere threat of territorial losses or loss of international recognition would be sufficient to motivate the process of building stronger states. Even if it should fail, however, the consequences could hardly be worse than those of inaction.

G. Recommendations for Further Studies

I wish to conclude this dissertation by proposing a few avenues for future research, avenues that are suggested by this study. First, the most natural extension of this study is to study the

⁵⁵⁴ For an argument to that effect, see Jackson, “Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa.” See also Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996).

effects of the border fixity norm on strong states. As indicated above, this norm seems to have a very positive effect, enhancing peace and stability in areas like Europe and the America's. Yet these casual observations have to be anchored in substantial research. Another task that should be taken in this context is the analysis of the relative effect of the border fixity norm, as compared to other pacifying influences in areas such as Europe, North America, and South America. It is also possible that our fell understanding of the effects of the border fixity norm will be illuminated by such variables as the timing of adopting this norm; differences that were noticed here in the Argentinean case. In particular, the study of the relations between the strengthening of the *uti possidetis* norm⁵⁵⁵ and the positive effects strong states had on the 20th century international relations in South America,⁵⁵⁶ could be fruitful. Attention should also be given to devising workable solutions to the problems created by the border fixity norm without destroying the whole system, or undermining the positive effects. As indicated above, this is not likely to be an easy task. The importance of this undertaking, however, means that it should be taken on nevertheless, as the benefits are potentially enormous.

Second, the border fixity norm, as studied here, is defined narrowly to include only a prohibition against foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory. Yet, at a lesser degree of strength but at a much broader context, norms of borders include also a norm against secession and partition. Very few such reorganizations of space were allowed since the 1950's. Even when empires collapse, as was the case with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, their successor states are comprised along the same, often arbitrary, administrative lines. A serious inquiry of the effects of such practices and conventions of international politics, as well as into

⁵⁵⁵ Noted by Kacowictz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society*.

⁵⁵⁶ Noted by Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*.

their relation to the norm of border fixity, as defined in this dissertation, could therefore be highly fruitful.

Lastly, the norm of border fixity is related to, yet different from, other norms that have to do with borders and international relations, such as the norms of sovereignty, the norm of non-intervention, and the norm of self-determination. The relations and the cross-influences of these norms, however, are potentially a very important topic, that has not yet received sufficient attention. What might be, for instance, the combined effects of the border fixity and the non-intervention/respect of sovereignty norms on relations between states? Is the apparent rise in interventions designed to achieve “regime change” a logical product of the normative prohibition of territorial annexation?⁵⁵⁷ Are we likely to see the norms of border fixity coming back a full circle as the international community attempts to reverse their negative consequences in weak states? Is there a way to reverse a course of state collapse without resorting to such apparently contradictory measures? And how can the international community uphold, at the same time, the norm of border fixity and the right of people for self-determination?⁵⁵⁸ All of these questions should be on our research agenda in a world that becomes increasingly “smaller,” and one in which the outcomes of state weakness and failure increasingly affect everyone’s security.

⁵⁵⁷ This argument is, indeed, suggested by Fazal, “From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit.”

⁵⁵⁸ I owe much of the insights into these questions to discussions with Kenneth Oye.

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