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ANALYZING ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNIONS: TWO CASE STUDIES  
IN HIGHER EDUCATION\*

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Why the employees in an organization might want to form a union is a central question in labor relations. The recent growth of faculty unionism in higher education provides academics the opportunity to address that question in a spirit of self-inquiry. Garbarino, for example, identified 400 academic institutions with collective bargaining agreements.<sup>1</sup> First, however, a qualification is in order. Most professional associations serving the faculty as unions do not describe themselves as unions, even though they engage in collective bargaining. Previous research identifies some characteristics of institutions with such faculty unions, e.g. public control, favorable state legislation, and inclusion in a centrally administered system of several related units. Nonetheless, a psychological question remains: why do some academics within any given institution want a union while others do not? This article assesses the validity of several current explanations of individual interest in faculty unionism: (1) organizational position, (2) personal background, (3) satisfaction with salary, (4) participation in decision making, and (5) trust in decision making. Since these explanations frequently overlap, this study analyzes their intercorrelations to identify the relative importance of each.

#### Explanations of Individual Desire for Collective Bargaining

In summarizing an early questionnaire survey of faculty in higher education across the nation, Ladd and Lipset emphasize two predictors of union interest: political liberalism and the status of prestige of the individual's institution.<sup>2</sup> Self-described liberalism and holding a position at a lesser institution predict support for unions. According to a later survey of

the University of Vermont by Nixon, low status individuals within the institution hold more militant attitudes, where status includes organizational rank, salary, publication record, and age.<sup>3</sup> Kemerer and Baldrige provide the most extensive list of explanations of individual interest in faculty unions based on their own questionnaire data from a national sample: low salary, high teaching load, low education, low rank, youth, humanities or social science discipline, liberal ideology, dissatisfaction with various aspects of the institution including salary levels and low trust in the administration.<sup>4</sup> These explanations, then, fall into three categories: objective status or position with the institution, personal background of the individual, and subjective attitudes or beliefs about the organization.

Additional explanations in this third, subjective category may also be derived from the relationship of collective bargaining to organizational decision making. Bargaining determines the terms of individual employment by formal representation of individuals in organizational decision making, usually under regulation by the state or federal government. Thus, an individual's view of how decisions are currently made in his or her academic setting might make bargaining seem more or less attractive.

Current decision-making practices can be viewed by individuals from two perspectives, focusing either on their participation in decisions or on the consequences of such decisions. Substantial research in organizational psychology attempts to define and predict the effects of different levels of personal participation in decision making, the former perspective, on individual satisfaction and the quality of organizational decisions.<sup>5</sup> Differential personal participation in decision making, for reasons described below, may also help explain an employee's desire to form a labor union.

Participation, however, only describes an individual's input to decision making. The outcomes of decisions also affect individuals and provide a second perspective on organizational decision making. The main purpose of this research is to explore the usefulness of both views of organizational decision making as explanations of interest in forming a faculty union.

First, individuals differ in their current levels of participation in decision making and these differences may influence interest in a union. Some academics can participate actively in the discussions leading to important decisions, while others must rely on conversations with influential colleagues or, in the extreme, remain completely isolated from these discussions. To begin with, the lower levels of participation in decision making may provide little satisfaction for personal needs for control over the work environment. Indeed, Strauss has argued that college professors desire high participation more than the average worker.<sup>6</sup> Also, low levels of participation may violate professional expectations of faculty influence in institutions of higher education. Allutto and Belasco, in a study of primary and secondary school teachers, confirm that not meeting expectations of participation in decisions predicts militant attitudes.<sup>7</sup> By either argument, then, low personal participation in decision making is expected to be related to a greater desire for bargaining (Hypothesis 1).

Since organizational decisions vary in quality and produce different consequences for each academic, a second aspect of organizational decision making for individuals is the result or outcomes of decisions. Depending on their view of such results individuals may view decision making with either trust or suspicion. Gamson defines trust in any decision-making situation as the expectation that the process will

result in decisions favoring or acceptable to the individuals' interests.<sup>8</sup> According to Gamson, level of trust determines the means of influence adopted by different individuals and groups to change a decision-making system. High trust suggests persuading the authorities; neutrality suggests providing positive inducements to sway decision makers; low trust suggests making use of sanctions and the threat of penalties. We assume that collective bargaining implies to individual academics a rhetoric of demands and the use of threat because of its association, in both private industry and the public sector, with possible work stoppage. It is expected, therefore, that professors who have lower trust in current organization decision making will desire bargaining more (Hypothesis 2). Kemerer and Baldrige, for example, report that low trust in the administration predicts interest in bargaining, but they do not isolate the importance of trust from other overlapping explanations of union interest.<sup>9</sup>

### The Studies

To explore these explanations of desire for faculty unionism, the results of separate questionnaire surveys of academics in two upstate New York institutions are used here. The questionnaires ask individuals the extent of their individual desire for a faculty union and examine most explanations of such an interest listed by Kemerer and Baldrige. The first survey, in April 1974, covers all the full-time faculty at Cornell University. Cornell is a large, research-oriented university including colleges under both private and New York State control. Cornell is a complex, partly-public institution in a state with favorable legislation for public-employee unions.

Thus, despite its research orientation, Cornell has many of the characteristics associated with union support. As of this writing, however, (in September 1976) no union or professional association has attempted an organizing drive.

The second survey covers the full-time faculty at Ithaca College (IC), a small, private college primarily offering undergraduate courses in the liberal arts. Cornell and IC are located in the same upstate city, Ithaca, NY. The survey, in May 1975, came shortly after a collective bargaining representation election among the faculty supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. The faculty at IC, with an 84% turnout, rejected collective bargaining: 62% voted for no representation, 24% for the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.) and 15% for another faculty association that had obtained a place on the ballot after a faculty petition for an election on representation by the A.A.U.P.

The survey respondents at both institutions--56% (778) at Cornell and 39% (109) at IC--are representative of the entire faculties in terms of academic rank and sex. A significantly larger proportion of respondents appears from the state-supported colleges at Cornell than from the private colleges. The same pattern of results appears in both public and private colleges, however.

Desire for unionism is measured by six questions in both institutions; the wording is identical except for the institution's name. Each individual's score is the number of questions answered reflecting a positive attitude towards unionism (Table 1). This dependent variable deserves attention for both conceptual and technical reasons.

First, the measure answers one criticism of the use of attitude surveys on faculty unionism. These six questions range from support for bargaining in general, e.g. is it "ever appropriate for college professors to go on strike," to support for bargaining at the two specific institutions, e.g. "would you vote for or against collective bargaining" at Cornell (or Ithaca College)? (Table 1). Garbarino emphasizes the importance of identifying interest in unionism at the individual's institution, in addition to the more general legitimacy of strikes or collective bargaining for academics.<sup>10</sup> Table 1 shows the importance of this distinction. While 45% of our Cornell respondents can envisage circumstances where strikes are appropriate, only 29% would vote for bargaining at Cornell. Moreover, in the Cornell study these six items form a Guttman scale (Coefficient of scalability = .70). The pattern of the Guttman scale is consistent with Garbarino's observation. Individuals who favor bargaining at their own institution also endorse the items on the general acceptability of bargaining. Rarely do individuals endorse the specific items and reject the general principle. While the six items do not produce so elegant a scale at IC, the same pattern of higher acceptance of general statements also appears (Table 1).

The difference in wording among the six questions may well clarify the paradox of attitude surveys cited by Garbarino, namely that bargaining exists in only a minority of institutions of higher education while a majority of individuals routinely endorse collective bargaining as a general principle. While other surveys of single institutions have relied on questions about the acceptability of collective bargaining as a general phenomenon, this study asks about the desire for bargaining at these specific institutions.

Second, these six questions provide a reasonable measure of desire for unionism on psychometric grounds of internal consistency and validity. Besides the Guttman characteristics at Cornell, the intercorrelations among the items are high ( $r \geq .71$ ), in addition to this evidence of consistency, the six items also demonstrate concurrent validity in the Ithaca College survey where respondents describe their vote in the N.L.R.B. election. The individual's scores on the six-item scale used in both these studies is strongly correlated ( $r = .76, p < .001$ ) with the reported act of voting for either of the two potential bargaining agents in the IC election. At both Cornell and Ithaca the scores of individuals on this measure of desire for bargaining range from 0 to 6; the average score at Ithaca (2.93) is significantly greater than the average at Cornell (2.17) ( $t = 2.97, p < .005$ ).

The two aspects of the individual's views of organization decision making hypothesized to affect desire for bargaining--personal participation and trust--are also measured by indices composed of several questions. First, the measure of personal participation includes several personnel and financial decisions (e.g. hiring new faculty, promoting faculty, appointing department heads, determining salary increases, and allocating the institutional budget). For each decision, individuals select one of five descriptions of their participation, ranging from no input, through prior consultation with the decision maker, to a group decision by vote or consensus. These descriptions are assigned values from 1 (no input) to 5 (group decision). The personal participation in decision making scores for each individual is the average value across a set of decisions. Scores on the nine decisions in the Cornell questionnaire correlate weakly among themselves and the median intercorrelation is low ( $r = .16, p < .001$ ). The Ithaca College

questionnaire only includes six of these questions which were more strongly associated with an interest in bargaining. Their median intercorrelation is somewhat stronger ( $r = .37$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Thus, in both institutions, personal participation varies between decisions. No single decision, however, is very strongly associated with desire for bargaining; the strongest correlation is .17 at Cornell ( $p = .001$ ) and  $r = .27$  ( $p = .01$ ) at Ithaca College. Although the relationship is only moderate, the decision where low personal participation is most strongly related to a desire for bargaining is the same at both institutions, namely allocation of the institutional budget. In order to test the hypothesized overall effect of personal participation at both institutions, the decisions are combined into a single measure rather than analyzed separately.

Trust in the decision-making process is the next hypothesized predictor. It is measured by summing Likert-type questions on how frequently the individual academic can trust both the decision maker and decision procedures at each of three hierarchical levels to make decisions the individual considers appropriate. The hierarchical levels are department, college and university at Cornell and department, school, and college at IC. As with the participation measure, however, the number of questions is reduced between the Cornell and Ithaca College surveys. Because of the high correlation between trust in the decision maker and trust in decision procedures for any hierarchical level, the three questions referring to decision procedures appear only in the Cornell index. The median correlation among the trust items is higher than for the participation questions at both Cornell ( $r = .46$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Ithaca College ( $r = .41$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Lower trust in all three levels--department to university--is associated about equally with desire

for bargaining at Cornell; the correlations range from .28 to .34. At Ithaca College, lower trust in the President of the institution has the strongest correlation ( $r = .38, p < .001$ ), while lower trust in the department head is the weakest ( $r = .14, p = .09$ ). In order to test the second hypothesis, these questions are summed into a single measure of trust in organizational decision making.

The questionnaires also include other explanations of desire for bargaining corresponding to the three categories of explanations from previous research: objective organizational position, personal characteristics, and subjective attitudes about the organization. First, as regards to position in the organization, the organizational status of each academic is measured at Cornell by an index built by assigning numerical values to salary level, any administrative position and academic rank. Administrative positions include department heads up to associate deans at Cornell, but only department heads at Ithaca College because the NLRB's bargaining unit defines the sample at IC. These values are standardized to give each question equal weight and then summed. An index is used because salary level and rank are strongly correlated. At Ithaca College the same measure of organizational status is used, but organizational status is necessarily a less powerful explanation of support for bargaining at IC than at Cornell because academics at higher ranks show more support for bargaining at Ithaca College. Although the index of organizational status at IC combines measures with different relationships with the dependent variable, separate analyses of the two measures (salary and rank) does not change the results and the index is retained for ease of comparability with the Cornell results. Besides organizational status, an individual's academic discipline

in the humanities or social sciences as opposed to biological or physical sciences is also included as a position-related explanation of desire for bargaining.

Next, two characteristics of the academic's personal background are included as potential explanations of desire for unionism. Political liberalism is measured by identifying the individuals' preference in the 1976 Presidential election. Each of thirteen viable candidates as of 1974 and 1975 are assigned a numerical value from conservative to liberal based on the average ranking these candidates received in subsequent interviews with a randomly selected sample of the Cornell faculty. Those interviewees show moderate agreement on their rankings (Kendall's coefficient of concordance = .46,  $p < .01$ ). This relatively low interrater reliability suggests that the findings with respect to liberalism in this study should be interpreted with caution. In addition, the survey respondents also indicate their sex and age on the questionnaire. Because of its high correlation with rank and salary, age is not included in the data analysis, leaving sex and liberalism as personal factors.

Finally, each individual's organizational attitudes are also assessed in one critical area, dissatisfaction with current salary level.

### Results

An academic's view of organizational decision making, as hypothesized, does help explain why some would want a union in an institution of higher education. Table 2 presents the correlations between desire for faculty bargaining and two aspects of organizational decision making from

the individual's perspective--personal participation and trust. Only at Cornell are lower levels of personal participation in decisions also associated with a greater desire for unionism (Hypothesis 1). At both institutions, individuals who distrust the existing process of organizational decision making more, show significantly higher levels of interest in unionism than their more trusting colleagues (Hypothesis 2). At both institutions moreover, distrust is significantly more strongly associated with such desire than are low levels of personal participation (At Cornell  $p < .001$ , at IC  $p < .006$ ).<sup>11</sup>

The relative importance of distrust in organizational decision making rather than low personal participation as an explanation of union interest also appears in Table 3. There, all the potential explanations of support for bargaining are included in a multiple regression analysis to determine the separate validity of each explanation--organizational status, academic discipline, sex, liberalism, and economic dissatisfaction. Distrust is a valid predictor of desire for bargaining at both institutions, even when the effects of all other explanations are statistically controlled. In contrast, the absence of a significant regression coefficient for personal participation in Table 3 shows that personal participation in decision making adds nothing to the other explanations of interest in bargaining. Therefore, while the first hypothesis on the effects of personal participation on interest in unionism is not supported, the second hypothesis on the role of trust is strongly supported.

Table 3 also provides the information from both surveys required to assess the validity of various other explanations of individual interest in unionism developed in previous research. At Cornell, salary dissatisfaction

and distrust in organizational decision making emerge as the best predictors in the multiple regression analysis. Besides their validity as the strongest explanations indicated by the significance levels in Table 3, these two explanations also show the strongest simple correlation with desire for bargaining (Table 2). Political liberalism appears next in terms of significance as an explanation. Finally, a discipline of humanities or social sciences also adds significantly to the explanation of interest in unionism among the faculty. At Ithaca College, distrust and salary dissatisfaction are again most strongly correlated with a desire for bargaining (Table 2). In the more stringent multiple regression analysis (Table 3), however, of these two attitudinal explanations only distrust adds significantly to the prediction of desire for unionism. In addition, the academic disciplines of the humanities and social sciences also emerge as a valid explanation at Ithaca College although not at Cornell.

In summary, these results show some support for each of the three categories of explanations advanced in the earlier review of the literature. Organizational status and academic discipline, both aspects of the individual's position within the organization help explain a desire for unionism. Political liberalism, probably a reflection of the individual's personal background outside the institution, is independently associated with interest in unionism only at Cornell. Finally and most importantly, individual attitudes towards the organization also emerge in these studies as the strongest explanations of a desire for unionism. Salary dissatisfaction and distrust in decision making are most useful at Cornell and distrust again emerges at Ithaca College. Of the two aspects of the individual's view of the decision-making process only this attitude of distrust and not low levels of perceived

personal participation predict a desire for a faculty union.

From a psychological perspective, subjective individual attitudes towards the organization, such as salary dissatisfaction and distrust, result from a combination of objective organizational position and personal characteristics. For example, salary dissatisfaction reflects both current and desired salary levels. Similarly, distrust in decision making reflects not any particular policies or decision practices, but the individual's personal assessment of the decision-making process.

The subjective process of assessment by individuals suggests that differences in organizational position or personal background may influence the desire for unionism either directly or indirectly through organizational attitudes. At Cornell, low organizational status and political liberalism predict a desire for unionism directly beyond the influence of organizational attitudes. In a set of multiple regression equations not reported in detail here, organizational attitudes were regressed on organizational position and personal background to identify indirect effects. Low organizational status and an academic discipline in the humanities or social sciences have such indirect effects. Status differences significantly predict the organizational attitudes of salary dissatisfaction; differences in both status and academic discipline predict distrust in decision making with low status and an academic discipline in the humanities or social sciences associated with distrust. These attitudinal differences in turn are related to a desire for a union. At Ithaca College, there are no indirect effects; academic discipline and distrust in decision making predict an interest in unionism directly.

## Discussion

These studies highlight the importance of an individual's view of the current process of organizational decision making as a reason for some academics to favor the introduction of faculty unionism in an institution of higher education. Collective bargaining constitutes one system of individual participation in organizational decision making, namely representation or indirect participation. Those people who experience little direct personal participation in current decision making were hypothesized to desire collective bargaining in order to change the existing decision system. However, only distrust in the current decision-making system, rather than low levels of personal participation, emerges as a useful predictor of support for bargaining. People with more trust in the existing decision process favor bargaining less regardless of their personal participation in decisions. This finding substantiates and clarifies the high correlation between trust in the administration and opposition to bargaining reported in their national sample by Kemerer and Baldrige.<sup>12</sup> By the multivariate analysis described in Table 3, distrust can be isolated as an explanation for a desire for bargaining even when level of participation in decision making and a range of position-related and personal explanations are controlled statistically.

Since low personal participation has little direct influence on bargaining attitudes, administrative attempts to defuse faculty support for unionism by opening decision processes to individual participation may have little value. In theory, trust refers specifically to anticipated satisfaction with the results of organizational decision making rather than to involvement in the decision process.<sup>13</sup> Until institutions change objectionable policies

to favor (or at least become acceptable to) the individual interests of various academics, the desire for a union by some faculty members will endure. It should be noted, however, that while personal participation has little importance across the entire faculty, at least for the decisions examined here, past research on its other effects suggests that some individuals may respond more favorably to increased participation.<sup>14</sup>

The desire for unions at these two institutions also reflects the drive for economic self-improvement as an explanation of unionism. Because academics are often alleged to attach more value to noneconomic rewards from their work (such as freedom or a sense of accomplishment) compared to most other workers, these studies provide a stringent test of the economic explanation for employees' turning to unionism.

The two institutions in the present study, while not necessarily representative of all higher education, sound a warning both for private, four-year colleges like Ithaca College and for wealthy, research institutions like Cornell. Ladd and Lipset's early study might suggest that faculty members will resist bargaining indefinitely in some high-status sectors of higher education.<sup>15</sup> Based on the present studies, desire for bargaining may represent a selective interest in organizational change focused on economic issues and reflecting distrust in the administration. In a continuing financial squeeze, a growing number of the individuals in any institution may turn to collective bargaining simply to improve their economic positions. In this respect, a study of individual attitudes leads us to expect a wider spread to faculty unionism.

The range of potential explanations for individuals turning to unionism in these institutions suggest a general two-stage causal process

to explain individual interest in unionism.<sup>16</sup> In the first place, certain organizational positions or personal characteristics condition employees to favor unionism. In a second stage, beyond the direct effects of organizational position or personal background, these factors may act indirectly on desire for bargaining through their effect on mediating organizational attitudes such as dissatisfaction with salary or distrust in the administration. At Cornell, for example, low organizational status has both a direct association with the desire for a union and an indirect influence through its effect on both distrust in decision making and dissatisfaction with salary.

The different patterns of prediction of these two institutions suggest the idiosyncratic nature of support for unionism. For example, higher ranking faculty favored bargaining at Ithaca College; as opposed to lower ranking faculty at Cornell. While dissatisfaction with salary and distrust in the administration as organizational attitudes hold some promise as generalized explanations of an interest in bargaining, the particular structure and history of an institution will determine what groups within the faculty hold those subjective predispositions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Garbarino, Joseph W., "Faculty Union Activity in Higher Education--1975," Industrial Relations, Volume 15, Number 1 (February 1976), page 119. Garbarino and Kemerer and Baldrige describe the pattern of interest in faculty collective bargaining both among institutions and among individuals within a given institution. The purpose of this report is to extend and clarify the latter pattern. Joseph W. Garbarino, in association with Bill Aussieker, Faculty Bargaining, Change and Conflict (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Frank R. Kemerer and J. Victor Baldrige, Unions on Campus (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975).
2. Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study 16, August 1973).
3. Nixon, Howard L., II, "Faculty Support of University Authority," Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 1 (March 1975), pp. 114-123.
4. Other studies of single institutions identify a subset of predictors consistent with the Kemerer and Baldrige listing. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus; Peter Feuille and James Blandin, "Faculty Job Satisfaction and Bargaining Sentiments: A Case Study," Academy of Management Journal, Volume 14, Number 4 (December 1974), pp. 678-692; Victor E. Flango, "Faculty Attitudes and the Election of a Bargaining Agent in the Pennsylvania State College System--I," Journal of Collective Negotiation in the Public Sector, Volume 4, Number 2, 1975, pp. 157-174; Jan P. Muczyk, Richard T. Hise and Martin J. Gannon, "Faculty Attitudes and the Election of a Bargaining Agent in the Pennsylvania State College System--II," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, Volume 4, Number 2, 1975, pp. 175-189; Joel Seidman, Alfred G. Edge, and Lane Kelley, "Attitudes of Hawaiian Higher Education Faculty Towards Unionism and Collective Bargaining," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, Volume 3, Number 2 (Spring 1974), pp. 91-119. E.E. Herman and G.S. Skinner, "Faculty Representation: The Vote at Cinnicinati," Monthly Labor Review, Volume 9, Number 3 (March 1976), pp. 44-48.
5. George Strauss has analyzed the effect of participation on individuals in organizational decision making and alternative explanations of those effects. Stogdill recently summarized the research on these effects and Ritchie has described the factors moderating the effects of participation. As an initial explanation of desire for collective bargaining, this research investigates only the effects of participation across the whole sample. George Strauss "Some Notes on Power Equalization," pp. 39-84, in Harold J. Leavitt (ed.) The Social Science of Organization (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (NY: Free Press, 1974); J.B. Ritchie,

- "Supervision," in G. Strauss, R.E. Miles, C.C. Snow, and A. Tannenbaum (eds.), Organizational Behavior: Research and Issues (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1974).
6. Strauss, "Some Notes on Power Equalization," pp. 47-48.
  7. J. Alutto and J. Belasco, "A Typology for Participation in Organizational Decision Making," Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 17, Number 1, (1972), pp. 117-125.
  8. William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1968).
  9. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus, p. 63.
  10. Garbarino, Faculty Bargaining: Change and Conflict, page 53. Ladd and Lipset, for example report the percentages who disagree with the following question, "Collective Bargaining by Faculty Members has no Place in a College or University," Ladd and Lipset, page 27.
  11. The significance test for the difference among two correlations, both involving a common variable is given by Darlington. Richard B. Darlington, Radicals and Squares and Other Statistical Procedures for Behavioral Sciences, (Ithaca, NY: Logan Hill, 1974), page 507.
  12. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus.
  13. Although Gamson notes trust may vary with efficacy or perceived ability to influence decisions, his analysis refers to beliefs about the outputs of a political system. Gamson, Power and Discontent.
  14. Ritchie recently summarized the conditions where participation in decision making by subordinates in organizations was more likely to have positive effects, when: 1) they had relevant skills and information; 2) they perceived that their involvement would affect outcomes; 3) they were motivated to participate and thereby achieve outcomes; 4) they felt that participation was legitimate; 5) the status difference or expertise difference between participants was low; 6) the trust and support exhibited by their supervisor was high. Ritchie, "Supervision."
  15. Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education.
  16. Hellriegel, French, and Peterson have developed a similar model of attitudes towards collective negotiations among secondary school teachers. They expect that satisfaction as an organizational attitude mediates the effect of the institutional and environmental context on teachers' attitudes. As an example, they report that dissatisfaction with salary is the best predictor, in terms of Pearson correlations, of support for teachers strikes. Don Hellriegel, Wendall French, and Richard Peterson, "Collective Negotiations and Teachers: A Behavioral Analysis," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 23, Number 3, (1970), pp. 380-396.

Questionnaire Items

Item	Yes	No	Don't Know
1. Do you think it would ever be appropriate for college professors to go on strike?	Cornell Ithaca 45 55	45 34	10 11
2. Is collective bargaining consistent with the professional standing of college professors?	Cornell Ithaca 44 56	48 36	9 8
3. Would collective bargaining raise or lower the professional status of Cornell/Ithaca College professors?	Cornell Ithaca 8 22	28 33	17 11
4. Would collective bargaining have a positive or negative effect on higher education at Cornell/Ithaca College?	Cornell Ithaca 14 28	51 44	16 17
5. Are you in favor, or opposed to, collective bargaining for Cornell/Ithaca College faculty?	Cornell Ithaca 12 26	20 17	2 0
6. If a referendum were held to ascertain if faculty were interested in collective bargaining, would you vote?	Cornell Ithaca 29 43	24 20	2 0

Item	Neither at All	No Effect	Negative	No Opinion
1. Do you think it would ever be appropriate for college professors to go on strike?	48	34	28	17
2. Is collective bargaining consistent with the professional standing of college professors?	19	10	51	16
3. Would collective bargaining raise or lower the professional status of Cornell/Ithaca College professors?	14	9	28	2
4. Would collective bargaining have a positive or negative effect on higher education at Cornell/Ithaca College?	14	9	24	2
5. Are you in favor, or opposed to, collective bargaining for Cornell/Ithaca College faculty?	20	17	24	2
6. If a referendum were held to ascertain if faculty were interested in collective bargaining, would you vote?	49	48	49	22

a. The questions are presented here as they are worded in the questionnaire. For purposes of Guttman scaling and in the subsequent analysis the responses to questions 2 and 3 were grouped into two categories: negative and positive or neutral. Questions are ordered here according to the grouped percentage responding favorably at Cornell. In the questionnaires, the order of questions was 2,1,3,4,5,6.

b. Percentages refer to those respondents answering each question. Due to incomplete questionnaires, the number of responses varies from 746 to 766 at Cornell and from 107 to 109 at Ithaca.

TABLE 2

Simple Correlations Among Predictors of Desire for Bargaining:  
Cornell University ( $N \geq 653$ ) and, in parentheses,  
Ithaca College ( $N \geq 92$ )

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Desire for Bargaining							
2. Organizational status (low)	.23 <sup>**</sup> (.19)						
3. Academic discipline (humanities or social sciences)	.15 <sup>**</sup> (.30 <sup>**</sup> )	.10 <sup>**</sup> (-.08)					
4. Sex (female)	-.01 (.10)	.10 <sup>**</sup> (.28 <sup>**</sup> )	.16 <sup>**</sup> (-.14)				
5. Political liberalism	.16 <sup>**</sup> (.02)	.11 <sup>**</sup> (.05)	.12 <sup>**</sup> (.18)	-.03 (-.18)			
6. Personal participation in decision making (low)	.22 <sup>**</sup> (.01)	.32 <sup>**</sup> (.09)	-.08 (-.14)	.03 (.04)	-.02 (-.29) <sup>*</sup>		
7. Trust in decision making (low)	.41 <sup>**</sup> (.38 <sup>**</sup> )	.25 <sup>**</sup> (.03)	.11 <sup>**</sup> (-.02)	.05 (.13)	.08 <sup>*</sup> (-.04)	.30 <sup>**</sup> (.27 <sup>*</sup> )	
8. Dissatisfaction with salary	.43 <sup>**</sup> (.36 <sup>**</sup> )	.30 <sup>**</sup> (.17)	.09 <sup>*</sup> (.09)	.01 (-.05)	.00 (.04)	.27 <sup>**</sup> (.11)	.40 <sup>**</sup> (.47 <sup>**</sup> )

\* Indicates significance at  $p \leq .05$ .

\*\* Indicates significance at  $p \leq .01$ .

TABLE 3

## Multiple Regression Coefficients for Prediction of Desire for Bargaining

	<u>Cornell</u> (N=610) <sup>a</sup>	<u>Ithaca College</u> (N=89) <sup>b</sup>
1. Organizational status (low)	.07 <sup>*</sup>	.04
2. Academic discipline (humanities or social sciences)	.07 <sup>*</sup>	.29 <sup>**</sup>
3. Sex (female)	.00	.09
4. Political liberalism	.13 <sup>**</sup>	-.02
5. Personal participation in decision making (low)	.04	-.07
6. Trust in decision making (low)	.25 <sup>**</sup>	.26 <sup>*</sup>
7. Dissatisfaction with salary	.28 <sup>**</sup>	.20

\* Indicates significance at  $p \leq .05$ .

\*\* Indicates significance at  $p \leq .001$ .

a. The multiple correlation at Cornell is .53 ( $p < .001$ ).

b. The multiple correlation at Ithaca College is .51 ( $p < .001$ ).

Date Due BASEMENT

[REDACTED]	APR 9 1990
[REDACTED]	MAY 16 1990
AUG 26 1985	MAR 10 1988
NOV 13 '85	
JAN 13 1986	
MAY 28 '85	
[REDACTED]	
NOV 16 1989	

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MAR 4


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731540 D\*BKS 00037728




HD28.M414 no.935- 77  
Von Hippel, Er/A customer-active parad  
731542 D\*BKS 00037730



HD28.M414 no.936- 77  
Allen, Thomas /The relation of interna  
733225 D\*BKS 00046638



HD28.M414 no.937- 77  
Holland, Danie/Trends in corporate pro  
731544 D\*BKS 00037729




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Driscoll, Jame/Analyzing attitudes tow  
731546 D\*BKS 00037731



HD28.M414 no.939- 77  
Allen, Thomas /The role of person to p  
733231 D\*BKS 00046606



HD28.M414 no. 940- 77  
Tomlin, Breffn/Organizational structur  
733223 D\*BKS 00046641



HD28.M414 no.941- 77  
Lipsky, David /The impact of final off  
733233 D\*BKS 00046605



HD28.M414 no.942- 77  
Allen, Thomas /Research program on the  
733235 D\*BKS 00047056

