

THE URBAN-POOR CHALLENGE
Delivering Services for the Urban Poor:
Government Organizations
versus
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comparative study of government and of non-government interventions in the provision of services to the urban poor. It poses the following questions: (1) what is the division of labor between government and non-government organizations (NGOs) in the delivering of services to the urban poor? (2) in what kinds of interventions do NGOs perform better than government organizations? (3) Why is that performance better?

To answer the above questions, the author contrasts the performance of two development projects for the provision of services to the urban poor in the Dominican Republic, one formulated and implemented by a government organization, and the other by an NGO. This contrast focuses on first, the origin and objectives of each project; second, on the extent to which the beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in all the project's components; and third, on the performance of each organization in achieving its stated objectives.

Although all these questions could not be answered within the limits of this thesis, the findings of this study lead to the two following conclusions: first, that when NGOs take responsibility for providing large scale services, they themselves might constrain their potential roles. This study main findings revealed that the NGO's potential to address urban-poverty projects was limited by: (i) overestimating its own economic and technical capacity to resolve people's needs, (ii) involving the organization in activities outside its field of expertise, (iii) lacking an understanding of the required mechanisms to implement development projects for the urban poor, and (iv) losing its credibility with the people when it did not accomplish its stated goals. The second conclusion showed that in poverty-oriented project, participation is more forthcoming and people are more likely to contribute their time for the common good when they are granted benefits, in kind or in cash.

Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning

To the young generation of people living
in squatter settlements in the
Dominican Republic.

INTRODUCTION

One indicator of urban poverty in developing countries is the growing proportion of people living in squatter settlements. In these countries, squatters constituted about 40 percent of urban residents in 1981 and this number will increase to almost 60 percent by the turn of the century (Sumka, 1987). Furthermore, World Bank studies of Latin American and Caribbean countries indicate that by the 1990s more than half of the poorest of the poor will be concentrated in urban areas. Urban dwellers will make up 90 percent of the very poor of those countries (Cheema, 1986). Although statistics forecast that the highest proportion of poor in Latin American and Caribbean countries will be concentrated in urban areas, the financial constraints of the governments of these countries make clear that they are unable to meet the demand for urban services to this population. In the search for alternative solutions, recent literature on poverty-oriented projects presents non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the current focus of hope. Since NGOs have an agenda for poverty alleviation and evidence shows that these organizations can carry out programs effectively, what might the roles of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) be in delivering services for the urban poor?

Although there are several types of NGOs, this thesis examines only those engaged in the delivering of urban services. It poses the following questions: (1) what is the division of labor between government and non-government organizations in

delivering services for the urban poor? (2) in what kinds of intervention do NGOs perform better than governmental organizations? (3) why is that performance better?

Looking for answers to the above questions, I contrasted the performance of two development projects for the provision of services to the urban poor in the Dominican Republic, one formulated and implemented by a government organization, and the other by an NGO. In order to compare the government and the NGO projects, I have formulated the following statement regarding the nature of the government and non-government sectors. First, since NGOs are usually detached from government and market interests (Turner, 1988), people see them as more credible and trustworthy than government organizations. Therefore, I would expect that the main advantage of NGOs is not only to coordinate the activities of the bureaucracy and the urban poor but also to help the latter to have access to the resources and services of the former.

Second, since NGOs are not constrained by the bureaucratic systems of government agencies (Anzorena, 19), I would expect much more flexibility in the internal organization of an NGO than in the case of a government institution. And since development projects for the urban poor require flexible mechanisms for implementation, I forecast that NGOs are likely to achieve their stated objectives.

Third, since governments seem to be the more appropriate choice for providing infrastructure and services such as water

supply, electric power, and health centers, I would expect that a government organization would have a comparative advantage in these kinds of intervention.

As explained before, these statements are explored with respect to two projects, one a government project, the El Caliche Project, and the other non-government, the Las Zurzas Project. Both are located in the capital city of the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo. (In the context of this study, when I refer to the "government project", I mean the El Caliche project; the "non-government or NGO project" refers to the Las Zurzas project).

Four characteristics shared by these two projects are relevant to this comparison. First, both the government and the non-government sectors were working on the same kind of development projects for the delivering of services to the urban poor: projects upgrading squatter settlements. These projects consist of related interventions--the social organization of the community, the provision of urban services, and the upgrading of the housing--which seek to improve living and housing conditions through physical works. Neither El Caliche nor Las Zurzas had been served either by private sector or by conventional government housing or infrastructure-providing programs.

Second, both organizations used the same kind of intervention to improve living and housing conditions of the urban poor--independent intervention such as implementing programs for the upgrading of infrastructure, the improvement of

housing, the construction of community facilities, and the generation of income. I consider this intervention independent because these organizations could modify or replace one element without creating major disturbance in the functioning of the others.

Third, both projects were implemented at almost the same period. Therefore, they faced the same social, economic, and political opportunities and/or constraints. And fourth both organizations considered beneficiaries' participation as a prerequisite for project implementation. My findings are based, first, upon interviews I conducted during a visit to the Dominican Republic for three weeks in January 1988. I interviewed thirty people including project managers, field staff, and beneficiaries of each project. In order to get a more freely critical perception, I also met with people who had worked in these projects for a period in the past and with observers who were not directly involved. Furthermore, I have used, wherever necessary, materials from office memos and project reports, as well as my own work experience with NGOs, including the one in question, in the Dominican Republic. Second, I relied upon a review of government and NGO interventions into development projects for the urban poor in the Third World in general, and in Latin American and Caribbean countries in particular. In making this review, I became conscious of the scarcity of literature concerning NGOs in the shelter and human settlements field at the urban level.

I hope this study will contribute to the understanding of the present and potential roles of NGOs and that it will identify ways in which governments, NGOs and the urban poor can work together in carrying out development projects.

This thesis is organized in four chapters. In the first chapter, I describe my methodology and define the scope of the present study. I continue with a description of the types of government intervention directed to the problems of the urban poor and a characterization of the activities of the non-government sector in developing countries in general, and in the Dominican Republic in particular.

Chapter 2 is an introduction to the comparative analysis with a description of the problems of the two squatter settlements--El Caliche and Las Zurzas--and the ways in which the government and non-government organizations were addressing these problems. Chapter 3 compares the issues of the beneficiary's participation in terms of patterns of community organization, voluntary labor, and leadership. I then contrast the performance of each project based on an understanding of the sequences of events that lead one organization to surpass another in performance. Finally, the conclusion reviews my findings on the roles of the government organizations and the NGOs in the delivering of services for the urban poor, and raises some questions about government and non-governmental organizations.

1. METHODOLOGY

For this comparative study, I focused first on the origin and objectives of each project; second, on the extent to which the beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in the different components of each project; and third, on the performance of both organizations in achieving its stated objectives.

Beneficiaries' Participation and Voluntary Labor

The need for beneficiaries' participation is particularly significant in poverty-oriented urban development projects. Scholars in this field view participation as a fundamental right; it improves the extent to which community development programs meet the people's needs, and it raises their sense of commitment to both the implementation and on-going use of a project. Active community participation and a partnership between beneficiaries and project implementors is crucial to the success of projects upgrading squatter settlements. Therefore, I compared the patterns of community organization and leadership implemented by each organization.

Voluntary labor is an underlying assumption in poverty-oriented projects so that beneficiaries are expected to contribute their work in building communal facilities. I identified if the beneficiaries of these projects volunteer to work for the common good, and if so, in what kind of interventions and why they did volunteer.

Performance

I will measure the performance of these projects on the basis of the achievement of the project's stated goals in their different interventions; and on the effects of each project on popular participation and access to government resources and services. Performance will also be seen in terms of these projects influence on policy and their potential to be replicated by other organizations. Rather than comparing the final outcome of each project in quantitative terms, I qualify and contrast the sequence of events that each organization pursued to execute the different components of each project. I assumed that this process might reveal what kind of intervention worked and why; and second, that knowing this I could identify the kinds of intervention in which each organization had a comparative advantage.

1.1 Government Organizations

Government intervention directed to the problems of the urban poor can be grouped into three broad types of policies: "being neglect"; "restrictive or preventive"; and "supportive". A being neglect policies apply to the practice of some governments officially ignoring the existence of squatter areas and allocating public resources to other development sectors. Restrictive or preventive policies involve efforts to eliminate or reduce the size of low-income areas. In this case, "squatter settlements are regarded as anomalous or pathological phenomena

which ought to be suppressed or removed"(UNCHS, 1982). In contrast to neglect and restrictive or preventive policies, supportive policies seek to legalize squatter settlements, improve existing structures, and provide assistance for self-help housing. Sites-and-services schemes, squatter upgrading, and aided self-help are examples of this kind of approach (CHEEMA, 1986).

In the Dominican Republic, as in the case of other developing countries, the government has utilized a combination of these three policies. The current administration, for instance, which is especially concerned with "modernization" and in making public works a visible symbol of government achievements, has oriented its actions toward a restrictive policy--the relocation of people from squatter settlements. But, during the last year, the government has moved toward a supportive police so that it is considering upgrading projects as a palliative alternative to the problems of the increasing number of people living in squatter settlements, at this time 65% of the capital city population.

1.3 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Before explaining the NGOs programs and its actions directed to the problems of the urban poor, it seems useful to define and distinguish the different types of non-governmental organizations. By non-governmental organization I mean any group of people working together not for profit but with common and

agreed upon aims and objectives and doing so outside government initiated and controlled projects (NGO New, 1984). The non-governmental organizations include a wide variety of institutions delivering different kind of services. These may include social-service activities (running day-care centers, providing aid to the needy, operating homes for destitute children and elderly); human-capital formation agencies (education, vocational training, and health care); and urban-service provision (dwelling upgrading, building street, and sanitation facilities). Broadly speaking, the non-governmental organizations delivering urban services fall into two main categories: the first consists of national, international, and local NGOs and informal groups that are actively engaged in the improvement of shelter and human settlements at urban or rural levels. The second main category consists of housing corporations; institutions for housing credit; trade unions of construction workers; a professional associations of planners, architects, social workers; etc. Among these main categories, I am primarily concerned on those non-governmental organizations which are actively engaged in the improvement of shelter and human settlements operating at the urban level. In the case of the Dominican Republic, there are few NGOs engaged in the improvement of shelter and human settlements at the urban level. A 1985 directory, for instance, reports 140 NGOs operating in the country of which only one percent is operating in the delivering of services in urban areas.

The basic actions of the NGOs engaged in the improvement of

shelter and human settlements have been to supply urban services for the poor, such as the installation of improved water supplies; hygienic disposal of household and human wastes; and the improvement of shelter (NGO news, 1984). This provision of services by NGOs have occurred with or without interaction with governments. Scholars such as Turner (1988), Berger and Neuhaus (1977), and Anzorena (19), among others, argue that the position and the role of NGOs in this field could change from supplying services to supporting policies. The latter, they argue, would entail (1) ensuring that government concerned are aware of the options that people need, and (2) ensuring that the poor are aware of their options and have access to the knowledge and skill required to combine them into practical programs, controlled or implemented by themselves.

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY

This section describes the common problems of the two squatter settlements where the projects were implemented. Both settlements are compared in terms of demographic, physical, and economic variables. A list of their similarities comes first, then their differences. This is followed by an analysis of the origin and objectives of each project.

2.1 The Problem

According to the 1980 census, about 47% of the Dominican Republic population's of 5.7 million people live in urban areas, in cities of more than --- inhabitants. This percentage is expected to increase to 75% in the year 2,000 (UCLA Latin America Center, 1984). The capital city, Santo Domingo, accounts for 23% of the country's total population, a share that is also expected to increase to about 31% by 2000. In 1980, some 60% (179,000 households) of Santo Domingo's population lived in squatter settlements, forming a center of misery on the northern periphery of the capital city. Of this mass of squatter settlements, two of them--El Caliche and Las Zurzas--which represent about 12% of the total squatter population are the target of this study.

The settlements El Caliche and Las Zurzas are characterized by a high population density, large family size, and poor dwellings. Unsanitary conditions due to lack of adequate infrastructure facilities and municipal services such as sewage, garbage disposal, and flood control are prevalent in these areas. Despite these features in common, they differ in the following

demographic indicators. El Caliche has a population density of 1,075 persons/hectare; whereas, Las Zurzas reports a bigger density, 1,151 persons/hectare. In both cases, these settlements were growing faster (6.5% per annum) than their surrounding urban areas (2.9% per year). Both squatter settlements are compared in Table 1.

Table 1. Comparison of demographic indicators in the squatter settlements El Caliche and Las Zurzas

Demographic Indicators	<u>El Caliche</u>	<u>Las Zurzas</u>
total area	83,700	60,800 square meters
number of dwellings	1,197	1,250 dwellings
number of households	1,544	1,611 households
average persons/dwelling	7.25	5.6 persons
resident population	9,000	7,000 inhabitants
population density	1,075	1,151 person/hect.

Source: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda. (1985) 1984 Annual Report. Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana.
 Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (1986)

Note: Since these statistic are of poor quality, the margin of error is high and their veracity may be questioned.

The residents of these two settlements are, in general, unskilled and poorly educated, and are unemployed or casually employed in the informal sector. The unemployment rate of both settlements is about 16 percent but, of those who are employed 34% of El Caliche's residents have jobs in the public or private sector, whereas only 20% of Las Zurzas' residents do. The rest, 66% of El Caliche's and 80% of Las Zurzas' are engaged in small businesses, primarily self-employed, which provide up to 50% of the family unit's income. These businesses include carpenters,

furniture-makers, food sellers, candy makers, street vendors, bottle re-sellers, shoemakers, launders, and tailors. The median income of El Caliche is lower than that of Las Zurzas. About 80% of El Caliche's residents earn less than the minimum wage (RD\$ 175 or US\$ 75 in 1982); whereas, some 70% of Las Zurzas' residents are below the basic minimum. Regarding levels of education, El Caliche and Las Zurzas have similar rates of illiteracy: 20% and 23% respectively, but in Las Zurzas the highest level of illiteracy is found in the population between the ages of 5 and 24. In contrast, a small portion of El Caliche's young population is at university.

Both settlements were formed during the early 1960's and grew by accretion, with periods of rapid growth which reflect the particular historical circumstances of the country. One event that produced a fast growth in El Caliche, for instance, was the effect of a hurricane in 1979. Hundreds of families lost their housing and relocated to this settlement. The occupation of the land in both settlements was illegal: a portion of El Caliche belonged to the city administration and the rest by a state-owned cement works; in the case of Las Zurzas, one portion was owned by the government and the rest to one of the richest families in the country. Although at that time, none of the landowners had development plans for these areas, today the situation is different. The current government began the construction of a road which will go through both settlements.

About 40% of El Caliche's population and 47% of Las Zurzas'

have lived in these areas for more than 15 years. The rest of El Caliche's residents (60%) have lived in this settlement for 5 to 10 years; the remainder of Las Zurzas' (53%) has inhabited this area for 2 to 5 years. Fifty eight percent of the El Caliche's head of households, as opposed to sixty three in the Las Zurzas, are homeowners. The rest, 42% of El Caliche's head of households and 37% of Las Zurzas', are renters.

Both, El Caliche and Las Zurzas, are located in a topographically difficult and hazardous terrain, but their physical conditions differ in that Las Zurzas is split by a contaminated ravine through which runs an contaminated river. This river is composed not only of the sewage and drainage systems of the northern part of the city and the waste-disposal of 54 industries there, but also of the solid waste of Las Zurzas' residents. At the end of this flow of contamination, there is a natural river which empties into the Caribbean Sea. At the city level, this polluted ravine is a focus of contamination which demands the attention of the government. At the community level, it is the origin of many problems among Las Zurzas' residents: diseases, floods, and landslides during the rainy season. The land-slides threaten 63% of the existing housing which is already in ramshackle condition. Moreover, since this ravine divides the Las Zurzas' irregular pathway and street network that connects this settlement with the main urban system in this area, it presents a severe safety challenge for the children and adults who inhabit Las Zurzas.

As Janice Perlman points out in one of her studies about the "favelas" in Brazil (1986), there are social, economic, and political structures in these settlements. The better off and older residents of El Caliche live on the level ground where a local association built a structure used currently as a school. The poorest residents and the newcomers live in the hills; here these people organized a communal society to improve the paths, sidewalks, and water supply system. Both organizations foundered for lack of funds. The El Caliche residents also organized religious, political, cultural and sports associations in which more than 50% of the heads of families participated.

In the case of Las Zurzas, the poorest squatters live in the area surrounding the ravine, while the better-off inhabit the "Parte Alta" (the High Part). Sixty five percent of those living in the area surrounded by the ravine want to leave the neighborhood, but the rest (35%) want to remain. This decision to move or to stay has been a source of conflict among Las Zurzas' residents; a conflict that is worsening since the current government announced the construction of a road which will interrupt this settlement by either forcing people to move to government's housing in the suburban areas or giving them compensation in cash. As a result, two opposing groups have emerged: one in favor of relocation and the other against it. Those in favor of relocation are the families living in the area surrounding the ravine who are primarily renters. For these people, relocation is an opportunity to get their own housing

from the government. Those against relocation--people living in better area and primarily homeowners--feel that the government will relocate them in "barrancones" (transitional housing) first, and that they will live there for ever without owning another housing. Although this conflict of interests exist, several associations continue their activities in the area, incorporating people from both sides and from the High Part such as "Junta de Vecinos", parents associations, religious organizations, political groups, and cultural and sports clubs.

In sum, the need for urban services--for everything from water to schools and recreation is the common problem of these settlements. For las Zurzas' residents, in addition, the main priority is to build pathways across the "polluted ravine" in order to improve the physical and health environmental conditions. Committees exist in both settlements in order to work in common activities improving the quality of life, but there is not a single committee to work in the interest of everybody, the poorest and the better off, in each settlement.

2.2 The Origin and Objectives of each Project

The genesis of the El Caliche and the Las Zurzas projects was not founded in the immediate needs of these squatters or the social, economic, and political pressures put upon them, but in the institutional goals of the government organization, the National Housing Office (INVI), and the non-governmental organizations, the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral

(IDDI).

The National Housing Office, a government agency organized within the President's Office, chose the squatter settlement El Caliche to implement a development project for upgrading squatter settlements because El Caliche met several of the criteria required for the international organization which would fund about fifty percent of this project. These criteria included: a limit on the number of households participating to about 1,000; government ownership of the parcel as opposed to private; and a settlement with existing agreed upon boundaries. The government staff assumed that if the government organization implemented a project in a community of around 1,000 households, this project would permit a flexible administration and would avoid bureaucratic mechanisms in the implementation process.

The Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI), the first NGO in the country engaged in the field of shelter and human settlements at the urban level (see origin of this institution in Appendix A), selected Las Zurzas because this NGO was interested in developing a guideline for the implementation of upgrading development projects at the urban level. The IDDI's committee of directors assumed that non-government organizations will use this guideline for implementing development projects for the urban poor.

At the institutional level, the objectives of the government and non-government project nearly coincided. Both organizations wanted to create a "model project" for a upgrading squatter

settlement. This model was expected to be replicated by government agencies in one case and by a non-governmental organization in the other. Replicability thus was a common concern. At the community level, the objective of both projects were to enhance the urban, social, and economic conditions of El Caliche and Las Zurzas--1,544 and 1,611 households, respectively. To achieve this objective, both projects agreed upon the following interventions (detailed below): the social organization of the community, the improvement of housing, the creation of community facilities, the upgrading of infrastructure, and the distribution of loans for income generation programs. For the community organization intervention, both organizations assumed that the incorporation of popular participation in the improvement of these squatter settlements would produce better project results. To this end, both institutions organized the residents of these communities in a neighborhood organization designed to encourage people's participate in the solution of their own problems.

The infrastructure program, in both projects, included the construction of streets, paths and sidewalks; the extension of the existing water-supply network; the installation of sewage and waste-water disposal; and the improvement of the existing electrical system. The communal facilities program included the construction of a school and recreational facilities, but in the government project the construction of a health-care center was also planned. To improve housing, the government organization

planned to upgrade 500 units in the first stage (1982-1985) and more than 600 units in the next decade. The government staff distributed loans between RD\$ 300 (US\$ 120)¹ and RD\$ 1,000 (US\$ 400) for building materials; the heads of families then had the responsibility of contracting the required labor force and upgrading their own housing. The non-government organization addressed the improvement of housing without a defined strategy regarding the number of units to be upgraded per period of time. NGO's staff also distributed loans between RD\$ 300 (US\$ 120) and RD\$ 1,000 (US\$ 400). Both projects also considered a revolving fund with credits for small scale businesses.

The differences between both projects' interventions were first, the government project addressed land tenure issues; whereas the NGO project did not because as a non-governmental organization the institution did not have the right to handle land legal issues. Moreover, handling with this legal issues would occupy a great deal of time which otherwise could be spend for physical interventions as suppose to land status. The government project included the allocation of land under a lease system for 15 years which would allow security of tenure for the squatters, but reserved the property rights to the government. The second difference was that the NGO project addressed the concern about environmental conditions. The NGO proposed to cover the polluted ravine described in section 2.1 and build a

¹ US\$ 1 = RD\$ 2.5 at the official exchange rate, 1982.

community center over it. This community center would include a recreation area, a health-care center, a school, and laundry areas. This organization thus took on a major environmental problem of primary concern to the settlers, whereas the government organization did not.

Both projects also differed in strategies each organization used to implement the different programs. Regarding the community organization program, the government project included the whole community in its proposal: the people living on the Hill (the poorest) and the people living on Level Ground (the better off). In contrast, the NGO project's approach worked with the poorest residents first. To this end, NGO's staff began working with only one portion of the community, those living closer to the polluted ravine (the poorest); after three years then the project included those living in the High Part (the better off). Another difference was that the government project assigned administrative responsibilities such as the administration of revolving funds and the accounting and budgeting activities of upgrading the housing and the income generation programs to El Caliche's government organization created. In contrast, the NGO project did not assigned administrative responsibilities to the community.

Regarding economic resources, both organizations dealt with different amount of money. The governmental organization allocated RD\$ 1,330,500 (US\$ 532,200) for its project. The Dominican Government through the National Housing Office financed

51% of this total amount, and the German Society for Technical Cooperation, an international aid agency, granted the rest (49%). The government organization's investment in this project represented a very small percentage of the National Housing Office's annual budget. In 1984, the budget for El Caliche's project represented less than one percent (RD\$ 112,000 = US\$44,800) of the National Housing Office's budget of RD\$31,610,000 (US\$ 12,644,000).

The NGO allocated RD\$ 900,000 (US\$ 360,000) for its project. Seven different international agencies financed this project, the Dominican Government only contributed with permissions, donations (building materials), and technical assistance. In contrast, the NGO project absorbed more than eighty five percent of the NGO's annual budget, while it allocated the rest (15%) for a housing project in a suburban area close to the capital city and for income generation programs in other squatter settlements in the capital city.

Table 2. The GOVERNMENT Project vs. the NGO Project

Project	Target Population	Time Frame	Sources of Fund	Services Offered	Staff	Implemented Agencies
Gov't	9,000 inhabitants or 1,544 households	1982 to present	Dominican Gv't International	Community Organiz. Upgrading Infrast. Community Facilities Housing Upgrading** Income Generation**	Social Workers Engineers Architects Accounter	National Housing Office Ministry of Education Neighborhood Org. FDD*** CARITAS*** INFOTEC*** CDE*** Internat. Consultants
	Budget ----- RD\$ 1,330,500* (US\$ 532,200)					
NGO	7,000 inhabitants or 1,250 households	1984 to present	International -DESWOS*** -FIA*** -USAID*** -CEBEMO*** -MISEREOR*** -ZENTRALSTELLE* -ACTION	Community Organiz. Upgrading Infrast. Community Facilities Housing Upgrading** Income Generation**	Social Workers Engineers Architects Accounter	IDDI*** Neighborhood Org.
	Budget ----- RD\$ 900,000* (US\$ 360,000)					

Notes: * US\$ 1.00 = RD\$ 2.50 at the official exchange rate, 1982

- ** (A) The government organization planned to upgrade 500 units in the first stage (1982-1985) and more than 600 units in the next decade.
 (B) The NGO addressed the improvement of housing without a defined strategy regarding the number of units to be upgraded per period of time.
 (C) The government income generation program was about RD\$ 60,000 (US\$ 24,000).
 (D) The NGO project income generation program was about RD\$ 27,000 (US\$ 10,800).

*** FIA (InterAmerican Foundation).
 USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
 FDD (Fundacion Dominicana de Desarrollo).
 INFOTEC (Instituto Nacional de Capacitacion Tecnica).
 CDE (Compania Dominicana de Electricidad).
 IDDI (Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral).

3. The GOVERNMENT Project vs the NGO Project

The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the project formulated and implemented by the government organization-- Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda--with that of the NGO-- Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral. I contrast them, as described earlier, in terms of kinds of community organizations and leadership approaches; on the extent to which the beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in the different project's components; and in terms of the performance of each project in achieving each of its stated interventions.

3.1 Participation

In the literature of poverty-oriented projects, scholars and practitioners have focused on ways to involve the poor in the improvement of their lives by getting them to participate actively in development projects. Community participation through a variety of community organizations and different kinds of leadership have been key issues of concern. What kinds of community organizations, decision-making processes, and leadership approaches did the government and non-government projects use? How were they different? In what degree did these differences lead one organization to have a comparative advantage over another in achieving the components of these projects?

(A) Local-elite decision making vs. Top-down "Sensitive"

Approaches

To organize the community, both organizations used variations of the local-elite decision making and top-down "sensitive" approaches. The government used a hybrid of the top-down and local-elite decision making approaches, in which the poor have some power over decisions; whereas the NGO applied what Judith Tandler calls a top-down "sensitive" approach. This approach applies to community involvement that is top-down and based on sensitive consultation and interaction with those affected in the project (Tandler, 1982). How has each institution proceeded to set up the local organizations necessary for the implementation of each project?

In the government project, a team composed of three social workers organized the community into a neighborhood organization including the both sectors in which El Caliche is economically and socially divided into--the Hill and the Flat Ground, as addressed earlier, an organization that represented the whole interests of the communities did not exist in El Caliche. The supreme hierarchy of this organization was a general assembly, followed by a board of directors, and several committees such as those on employment, credit, and waste collection and sewerage.

The general assembly was made up of five representatives of each of the 32 family groups into which the social workers divided El Caliche. This division was based on physical and natural boundaries. This assembly, 160 members in total, met

every three months, with 15 days advance notice before convocation. The board of directors was composed of one delegate from each of the 11 areas in which the 32 family groups were located, and met at least every fifteen days.

This organization was officially registered as a non-profit legal entity with the power to represent all the families of the project area, as stated in a 1984 report by the government agency. The responsibilities of this legal entity were, among others, to administer the project--the revolving credit fund and ensure its repayment--and to coordinate with the government agency the activities of other sectoral organizations involved in the project such as the organization in charge of the income-generation component and the one that ran the health program. I will comment on the implications of this division of labor in a later section of this chapter.

The first members elected to the general assembly and the board of directors were the existing leaders and members of the local elites. The reasons were: First, in El Caliche, as addressed in a previous chapter, there were groups and organizations with different interests, but not an organization that represented the whole community interests. Moreover, many of the representatives were not known by El Caliche's poorest residents nor were they inhabitants of the "Hill" area, who were the poorest, newcomers, and primarily renters. Second, the social workers began the project holding meetings and discussions with indigenous leaders and local elites like school-teachers,

religious groups, and the more educated. On the one hand, these discussions were useful in getting the project started in the first phase; on the other hand, the fact that the social workers contacted the local elite first motivated their election as the main members of the neighborhood organization.

As a result, this created organization represented, in many instances, the local elites' interests rather than those of the whole community. In the majority of the cases, this created neighborhood organization represented the homeowners, better off, and long-time residents; whereas the interests of the renters, the poorest, and short-term residents were seldom reflected. Only in a few cases when a problem or a specific situation was affecting everybody, the neighborhood organization represented the interests of the whole community and was the channel of communication between El Caliche's inhabitants and the government decision-makers. That was the case during the substitution of the "legal" electrical system for the existing one. The government pointed out that all beneficiaries had to pay for the new legal electrical system, but the community refused to pay for it: "If we need to pay for the new electrical system, we do not want it. We aren't going to pay for it". Since people were using electrical power without any payment--the illegal electrical system--they appealed to the neighborhood organization. As a result, the government decided to subsidize the new legal electrical system because government officials want to keep the project going in the eyes of the international agency

financing 50% of this project. Though there was not a full representation of the whole community's interests within the elected members of the neighborhood organization, in some instances when the interests of poor and rich were the same, this organization facilitated the resolution of problems affecting both groups.

In the case of the NGO project, the community was organized, as addressed earlier, using the top-down "sensitive" approach. The sequence of events that took place in Las Zurzas was as follows: First, the NGO field staff (two social workers) contacted indigenous organizations such as La Junta de Vecina, the Parents Associations, Undertaker Associations, and religious groups as well. They visited each family of the project area and explained to them the kind of project that would be implemented in the neighborhood. The social workers proceeded to divide the community into sections according to natural spatial division, and to select one coordinator per group. Next, they held a meeting with the coordinator of each of the sectors created and with representatives of indigenous organizations. The main issue in the agenda was Las Zurzas' contaminated ravine and how the project would address this problem. As a result of this meeting, the NGO's staff and the people elected a council committee composed of eight persons. They elected the natural leaders and the better off living in the area surrounding the ravine-- homeowners, lenders, owners of small grocery shops (los dueños de

los colmados), and local political leaders.

The natural leaders and local elite dominated the elected council committee, though the social workers of the non-governmental organization consulted and interacted with both the poorest and the better-off families of the area surrounding the ravine. These leaders, as in the case of the government project, were not necessarily acting on behalf of the community, nor making decisions in the best interest of all the residents. To illustrate, in the upgrading of streets and pathways the members of the council committee were specially concerned with improving first those streets that connected to their housing rather than the ones bringing services to the majority of the people. Since the council committee involved enlightened control by the NGO staff along with control of decisions by the local elite, this organization could not be defined as literally participatory as might be hoped normally in development projects for the poor implemented by NGOs.

(B) Paid "Volunteers"

Voluntary labor and participation in the construction of community services and facilities occurred in both projects, however it was not literally voluntary. Where the number of homeowners were prevalent, voluntary laborers participated and "volunteered" to work in short-term interventions and in activities in which they received compensation for their work, in kind or in cash. People also "volunteered" to work in

interventions in which they would be excluded from the benefit of the activity in question if they did not participate in it, for instance, in the connection of the water system to beneficiaries' housing.

In the government project, the mobilization of people to participate was easier in short-term interventions that benefited a huge amount of people than in long-term activities that did not give them immediate benefit. The construction of streets, paths and sidewalks was successful in terms of people's participation, whereas participation in the construction of the school and health center was not. The latter required several months of intensive construction work, whereas the former demanded several weekends of labor. Furthermore, workers were not participating as actively as was hoped in the construction of long-term structures, because they were resentful that some workers were paid to work whereas they, the unskilled, were not. Active participation was also achieved in the installation of a running-water system because those who did not "volunteer" to work would lose the right to connect the water system to their housing.

In the NGO project, participation also depended upon the kind of benefits people received. Voluntary labor was more easily forthcoming when food was offered in exchange for work. The construction of pathways and sidewalks was possible because the NGO provided food in exchange for labor. Social workers opened small accounts at several grocery shops in which the

"voluntary" laborers could acquire food, drinks, and cigarettes. This finding coincides with the findings of other scholars, e.g. Judith Tendler and Estelle James, and with my field experience in rural development projects. The construction of housing in a rural village was increased dramatically when the social workers prepared food not only for the construction workers, but also for the women and the children who carried water out to the construction works.

When participation determines which people will be eligible to receive project benefits, more voluntary labor was also forthcoming. To illustrate, social workers provided the first opportunity for the project's benefits to those who participated hardest in the construction works, for instance, they were the first to be granted credit. In the case that I found truly "voluntary" participation was because of the commitment of the NGO' field staff. The level of interaction of engineers and social workers not only in the construction works, but also in the common life of the squatters developed a tight relationship between residents and technicians. This relationship of affection provoked that the squatters participated voluntary in the construction works, but just in certain cases.

In both projects, social workers devoted time and energy to explain in the neighborhood organization's meetings the importance of working in voluntary participatory activities for the community as a whole. But none of the participatory activities were truly voluntary: this empirical evidence shows

that people participate and contribute their time for the common good when they are rewarded with benefits in cash or in kind.

(C) Pattern of Leadership

Different patterns of leadership evolved in each of these projects, ranging from traditional and paternalistic to young and formally educated leadership. In the government project two types of leaders emerged: the traditional leaders and the young and "challenging" leaders. In the NGO project the traditional leaders were more common, but currently a version of the challenging leaders is appearing. Why did these different patterns of leadership exist?

In the government project although the first two elections of the neighborhood organization went to traditional leaders, after that a new type of leader arose. The traditional leaders were people in the age between 40 and 60 years who derived their support on the basis of traditional, authoritarian, and paternalistic values. In contrast, the new leaders in their late 20s and early 30s belonged to a young generation of squatters and had a higher educational level. Coming from a younger and better educated generation, their allegiance to traditional leaders was weak. They appealed to a different constituency, one which cut across older social and cultural divisions; they were challenging not only the established leaders in the area, but also the "paternalistic" mechanisms used by the government and the international organizations in the project. These new leaders

questioned, for instance, the performance of government staff and of the international consultants in the community activities. Furthermore, since they had a greater ability to negotiate with external factors than the traditional leaders, the new leaders were the ones who primarily participated in the negotiation process with the government officials who were in charge of the relocation of those residents of El Caliche who were affected by the current administration's construction programs.

In sum, both types of leaders coexisted, each having authority and influence in different sectors of the community. The traditional leaders helped to mobilize people for communal activities, while the new leaders served as links with the government staff--they were more educated and more familiar with administrative requirements. These new leaders were and are helping the squatters to create a channel of communication between the government officials and the neighborhood organization in which people can express their needs and concerns regarding their own settlement, while the old leaders still reflected traditional and indigenous sources of authority and decision.

In the NGO project these changes in patterns of leadership took place at another level. As addressed in a previous chapter, the NGO project began in the poorest area, the one surrounding the "polluted ravine", whose residents had a low educational level. Since low educational levels often go hand in hand with

lower interest to take high responsibilities in community issues at first young and educated leaders did not emerge as they did in the government project. But at the time of my field research, because the NGO was including in the project the better off residents (those living in the "High Part") a new kind of leaders began to emerge. These new leaders in their late 20s and early 30s as in the case of the government project, included not only the young and educated men but women as well. This was a departure, for women had not been included in the first neighborhood committee.

As a result of this experience, the non-governmental organization began to hire some of these leaders and to give them important project responsibilities. Two of the NGO's social workers were residents of the "High Part" of Las Zurzas and one of them was in charge of the social programs of the project. Furthermore, since these leaders had credentials in the neighborhood because of the skills they had acquired through education and since they were acquainted with the residents, they were able to identify those residents who were active in improving the community. Their strategy, therefore, was to propose these people as candidates for the next neighborhood community election, rather than the leaders who hold their positions as result of their status in the community as-- lenders, owners of small grocery shops, homeowners and so forth.

This finding reveals that young leaders with higher educational levels are important sources of leadership and bring

skills and experience relevant to community development programs. They can also create a channel of communication between the implemented organization and the community as well as between other government agencies and the community. Furthermore, since new leaders emerged when the project included the better-off residents this finding may attract attention from government and non-government organizations when they select a target population in their development projects.

3.2 Performance

(A) Narrow vs Wide Trade

There is one aspect of the involvement of government and non-government organizations that stands out. This is their contrasting "trade-oriented" approach: the government organization used a narrow-trade approach, whereas the NGO applied a wide-trade approach.

The government organization took responsibility for some intervention, while the rest of the components were taken over by other public and non-public agencies. The National Housing Office limited its responsibilities to the execution and supervision of the infrastructure work, housing upgrading and community facilities structures. It also coordinated the actions of the neighborhood organization with the activities of other institutions assisting other project's components. The educational programs were assisted by a government organization, the Ministry of Education; whereas the income generation programs

were backed by a non-governmental organization, the Fundacion Dominicana de Desarrollo.

In contrast, the NGO took responsibility for all the components of the project: the improvement of infrastructure, the upgrading of housing, the income generation programs, the construction of community facilities, and the problem of the "polluted ravine" as well. The NGO was working on many things at the same time which limited its ability to perform well.

As a result of these contrasting tendencies, the government project finished the construction of streets, paths and sidewalks, the extension of water-supply network, and the improvement of the existing electrical system; whereas the NGO could not achieve its expected performance in the "polluted ravine" problems--the first priority of Las Zurzas' residents as explained earlier in section 2.2--or in the majority of the other components. Surprisingly, a good performance was achieved in the cases that the NGO oriented toward a "specific-trade" approach. These were the cases in which the NGO implementors devoted time to analyze and understand "specific" activities. In the income generation program, for instance, the NGO used two different approaches: the reinforcement of the existing small enterprises and the creation of new ones. In the first approach, the NGO's staff identified the indigenous small enterprises, learned about their production processes, sources of supply, product markets, and industry structure. The social workers identified around 18

different small enterprises-- food preparers, vegetable vendors, tailors, shoe-makers, etc. Then, they selected some of these enterprises and provided credit and technical assistance. This was the case with the association of "Tricicleros" (vegetable vendors) created by the NGO. The social workers figured out that about thirty percent of the male population was employed in this activity and they had to make regular payments for the rental of their "triciclos" (bicycles). Although one might think that a bicycle is not expensive, none of the squatters had enough savings nor credit to buy one. The NGO created a simple system on which people could rent the bicycles with the option of owning them after one year of payment. With this system, people had access to credit and the opportunity not only to invest in their own business but also to increase productivity.

But when the NGO was creating new enterprises its performance was not as good. An illustration is their effort to establish a sewing workshop. This required a higher capital investment than was required to reinforce existing small enterprises such as the "Tricicleros" Association. It also required a specialized labor force, an understanding of a new enterprise structure, and a search for demand. The NGO invested a huge amount of time training women and economic resources in order to buy the required machines. They invested human capital for they had to learn the accounting and financial systems required for this kind of business first themselves and then teach these systems to the people. Despite this investment of

economic and human capital, the sewing workshop is now closed: the demand was scarce and the administrative and financial systems were deficient.

Working with indigenous small enterprises allowed a better performance than the creation of new ones because squatters themselves had a clear understanding of the production processes, sources of supply, product markets, and industry structure.

In sum, the government agency achieved a good performance when it limited its responsibilities, whereas the opposite was true for the NGO. The NGO was doing too much at the same time. Why did the government organization put limitation on itself while the NGO did not? My finding was that the government organization limited itself not just because of a lack of economic resources but because of according to law the responsibility of the National Housing Office is to provide housing not to create jobs, implement educational training, or establish health-care programs. Since there were other government organizations which were experienced in these fields, the National Housing Office limited its action to its area of expertise.

In contrast, the responsibility of the non-governmental organization seemed ambiguous not only to outside observers but also to their own staff. The NGO wanted to resolve all the people's needs without taking into account its economic and technical capacities. The point I am making is not that the government organization in question is better than the NGO, but

that any kind of organizations must recognize its institutional limits. How can the NGO resolve an environmental problem-- the polluted ravine --if it does not have economic resources or expertise in the field? Why did not the NGO point out this problem to the government and the squatters? Why did not it motivate the squatters ask for government resources? Furthermore, what happened when the NGO did not achieve its stated objectives in the eyes of the Las Zurzas' residents?

(B) Credibility vs. Lack of Confidence

During its first two years the NGO project enjoyed greater credibility among the squatters than did the government project, but when the NGO did not achieve its stated objectives this began to change. The NGO had promised that the ravine would be covered and it was not; neither was a promise to finish the construction of a half-built primary school.

I found that the lack of confidence in the government project was the result of (1) false promises made by local politicians in the past; (2) the period in which the project began to be implemented--just before the national election; and (3) delays in the beginning of the project. In the first phase of the government project, the presence of an international agency counteracted the squatters' lack of confidence in government organizations. Since the international agency was eager to replicate this project's experience in other developing countries, short-term consultants from Germany remained in the

country giving advice and training not only to government's field staff but also to the members of the neighborhood organization and beneficiaries in general. And since Dominican people are inclined to believe that foreign is synonymous with "good" because of cultural and traditional beliefs (what I call the "myth of foreignness"), the presence of these foreign consultants and of an organization outside government interests increased the people's interests in the project and their willingness to participate in the different components during the first months of the project implementation. This confidence evaporated when the new young generation of leaders emerged, as explained in section 3.1c, and when neither the government organization nor the international agency accomplished its stated objectives on time: the project began almost one year late and its components were not finished as expected. The point I making here is that when the government and non-government organizations did not achieve its stated objectives in the eyes of the community, they lacked credibility from the people. Furthermore, when the NGO did not achieve its stated promises, it lost one of its potential quality; people saw them as most trustworthy than government organizations.

(C) Flexible vs Rigid Mechanisms

The upgrading projects for the urban poor require special configuration of the organization involved. Administrative flexibility in the application of the operational criteria is

necessary if the system may respond effectively to the needs of low- and unstable -income families (Vernez, 1976). This requirement suggests the need for decentralization of the savings and loan administrative mechanics at the community level and flexible mechanics at the institutional level.

Contrary to expectations, the governmental organization tried to create flexible mechanisms for the execution of the El Caliche project, while the NGO established "rigid" and, in certain instances, bureaucratic systems. Why did the NGO institute "rigid" systems at the implementation level, while the government organization tried to avoid them?

The government organization, as addressed in section 2.2, decided to choose a community of about 1,000 households because this would allow flexible administration and would avoid bureaucratic mechanisms in the implementation process. The organization, therefore, was trying to decentralize the administrative and financial mechanisms that were constrained the implementation process of its other projects. To this end, government's staff opened a cash account for contingencies such as building materials, transportation, and paid labor force at the community level which the social workers and members of the community organization were able to control. Furthermore, at the institutional level, the National Housing Office assigned to a group of technicians the main project's responsibilities in order to avoid delate in the decision-making process.

In the non-government organization, since donors were constantly pressured to come up with something visible right away and since the NGO project was financed by several international agencies, these posed constraints in the NGO project. The NGO's office staff were aware of donors' periodical accounting, therefore they introduced "rigid" administrative and financial mechanisms and unfortunately, the NGO's field staff underestimated the implications of these mechanisms at the implementation level. In one of my meetings with the NGO field staff, the project manager and the social workers argued that one of the biggest problems facing the project was the delay resulting from administrative problems: "If we need to buy something or pay someone, we must wait for more than one week. We must wait until at least three of the members of board of directors sign out the permission". Regarding the loan administrative mechanisms, the person in charge of the housing upgrading component pointed out: "the administrative requirements are very complicated. It takes a great amount of time. We must fill out about fourteen questionnaires just to lend people RD\$ 300 [US\$ 100]²." These findings reveal a lack of understanding of the administrative and financial mechanisms required for the implementation of development projects for the poor. Since this lack of understanding induced the creation of rigid mechanisms in the NGO project's implementation process; and since the literature often refers NGOs, as opposed to government agencies,

² US\$ 1.00 = RD\$ 3.00 at the official exchange rate, 1986.

as organizations with flexible mechanisms of implementation, this empirical evidence is a counter intuitive finding.

(E) Invisible Achievements

Since government organizations were concerned about visible outcomes that helped government officials to get reelected, the National Housing Office was interested in visible project results. In contrast, the non-governmental organization was concerned about the implementation process through which people learn to gain control over their lives. A government official argued, "we invested around two years in organizing the El Caliche neighborhood, but we achieved physical improvements which are not quite visible in this settlement [this refers to extension of the existing water-supply network, the improvement of the existing electrical system, and the construction of streets, paths, and sidewalks]. We need more visible outcomes". Because of this lack of visible achievement during the first stages of this project, the government agency is changing its approach toward providing services to the urban poor. Currently, the government is not investing time in organizing a community, but is going there to inform the people about the resources that this government agency is able to invest in such neighborhoods. People then have the responsibility of organizing themselves in order to gain access to government resources. Another change of attitude is that government officials recognize the need of giving people an incentive in cash or in kind to participate in

the delivering of services.

Although the non-governmental organization was being pressured by some donor agencies to achieve a visible outcome, the NGO staff invested its time in the slow process of organizing the community and in inducing changes in the decision-making process in the neighborhood committee. As explained in section 3.1c, the non-government organization took time to hire new leaders, gave them important project responsibilities, and induce those people who were active in the community to join the neighborhood committee.

If the government organization were to formulate its projects under the assumption that communities will organize themselves, what might happen to those communities which do not have the capacity to organize themselves? Might the role of non-governmental organizations in the delivery of services then be both to assist the urban poor in organizing themselves and to help them obtain access to the government's resources and services?

4. CONCLUSION

Although all the questions posed in this comparative study of government and of non-government interventions in the provision of services to the urban poor, could not be answered within the limits of this thesis, my findings lead to the following four conclusions:

(1) this study reveals that when NGOs take responsibility for providing large scale services, they themselves might constrain their potential roles. My findings show that the NGO in question limited its potential role by: (i) overestimating its own economic and technical capacity to resolve people's needs, (ii) involving the organization in activities outside its field of expertise, (iii) lacking an understanding of the required mechanisms to implement development projects for the poor, and (iv) losing its credibility with the people when it did not accomplish its stated goals.

If human and financial resources are mobilized and used to achieve societal goals through government and non-government organizations, their institutional capacities become critical in development projects. The non-governmental organization was very ambitious: its project was formulated without its recognizing of its own institutional capacity. The NGO was involved in many activities and took on difficult tasks; its commitment to resolving the people's problems some what overtaxed its economic and technical capacity. Moreover, since in the eyes of the community it had not achieved its stated objective, it lost an

important quality compared to the government organizations: its credibility. The people saw NGO's as more believable and trustworthy than government organizations.

Surprisingly, the presence of an international non-governmental organization in the government project changed people's perception of that government. Although both organizations, the government and international agencies, also lost credibility because of their inability to meet their established deadlines, the presence of the International NGO helped to show that the government organization was seeking to upgrade people's lives, and not considering only the political benefit.

(2) a second conclusion is that in poverty-oriented projects participation is more forthcoming, and people are more likely to contribute their time for the common good when they are granted benefits in kind or in cash.

(3) this study also shows that different kinds of leadership may bring experience and skills relevant to development programs. For instance, the coexistence of traditional and challenging leaders as addressed in this study may lead to the creation of a channel of communication not only between the implemented organization and the community but also between other government agencies and the community.

(4) finally, the need of governments in developing countries for visible achievement may lead government organizations to formulate their development projects for the urban poor under the

assumption that communities will organize themselves to have access to government' resources. In this case, the question arises: might not the role of NGOs in development projects for the poor be simply to assist people to organize themselves and to help the poor gain access to government services and resources?

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6. APPENDIX A: The Origin of the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI)

The Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI) had its roots in another non-government organization, the Inter-Institutional Housing Council (CII-VIVIENDA). CII-VIVIENDA began as a result of a natural disaster. At the end of August 1979, the Dominican Republic was hit by the most devastating hurricane the Caribbean had seen in more than a century. This hurricane brought new urgency to the chronic shortage of adequate housing in the Dominican Republic. As the island's residents undertook the clean-up got underway, representatives of several public and private organizations met informally to share ideas and plan new lines of attack to cope with the situation. This group decided to form a non-governmental organization, CII-VIVIENDA, in which government officials had decision-making power. These people kept working as a consolidated organization for four years until a change of government administration arrived. Since the government influenced the NGO's board of directors decision-making process, this change of administration caused abrupt transformations in the structure of this institution. As a result, about seventy percent of the technical and administrative staff left this non-governmental organization. One year later in 1984, these professionals with experience in non-government organizations created the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral. This new NGO, obviously, emerged without any participation from government organizations in its decision-

making process. The contribution of the government was only in materials and permissions. This new institution, IDDI, focused its attention in urban areas, rather than concentrated its activities in the rural areas. Why did this NGO work in urban areas rather than in rural areas? Two reasons motivated this change: the first was social-political movements that had their major roots in the squatter settlements of the capital city. In April 1984, as the Dominican Government began to implement another round of "adjustments" demanded by the International Monetary Fund, hundreds of squatters participated in a demonstration against these adjustments. At least a hundred protesters were killed, several hundred were wounded, and more than 1,000 were arrested. Since the majority of the demonstrations came from squatter settlements, this alerted the attention of local and international authorities. This attention made easier for IDDI to work in squatter settlements at the urban level because the institution could channel international funds rapidly and obtain more credibility from local authorities even though it was still in its first year of operation. The second reason was that working in the capital city the organization could contact local elites and powerful persons easily; furthermore, the institution would spend less on vehicles' operation not only for its field staff, but also for current and potential donors and visitors from international aid agencies.