

AFDC IN MASSACHUSETTS

by

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ABSTRACT

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by

Robert Simi

There have been many theories developed for the crisis in the AFDC program in the United States. Among the most prominent are Daniel Moynihan's theory on family instability, Piven and Cloward's theory which links the increase in welfare with the increase in civil disorder and finally David Gordon's theory which focuses on increasing benefit levels overlapping the increase in wage levels. What I have done is applied these different theories to data obtained for Boston and when not available for Massachusetts.

My results are that there is a persistence of broken families among nonwhites and that these families along with white families with low income are making their presence felt on AFDC. So to approach the AFDC problem, you must approach the low income family instability problem.

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Introduction

Chapter I

There has been great national concern about the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program in the United States. In 1940, there were 891,000 children supported by this federal program. By the end of 1966 there were 3,526,000. With parents and caretakers the total came to 4,666,000. (It has now passed five million.) The recipient rate for children had risen from 22 per 1000 population under 18 years of age to 48. During 1966 the number of such children increased 6.3 percent, and the cost of the program, 17.4 percent. At a monthly cost of 184.6 million, the AFDC program had now passed Old Age Assistance as the most expensive federal welfare program and had become perhaps the leading conundrum of American domestic policy.¹

Although originally expected to be a "transitional" program which would wither away as the contributory insurance components were broadened, AFDC increased dramatically. A plethora of reasons have accounted for the rise. Important national trends have included the decline of the agricultural

¹ Daniel Moynihan, Crisis in Welfare, Public Interest, pg. 5.

sector, which contributed greatly to population mobility, especially from the south, and urbanization. A corollary of industrialization, mobility and urbanization has been the decline of extended families, which previously looked after their own. A number of other more specific contributing forces can, however, be identified. Population has been broadened; welfare agencies look more favorable on welfare recipients; public assistance has become more attractive relative to earning, and the contributing have not taken over² nearly as fast as AFDC has grown.

Along with the above theories of AFDC growth there has been an ample amount of material published to back these theories. Among the most popular and influential are the following three. First, Daniel Moynihan's theory which emphasizes the increase in family instability; second, Piven and Cloward's theory which links the increase in welfare with the increase in civil disorder and finally, David Gordon's theory which focuses on increasing benefit levels overlapping the increase in wage levels.


What I would like to attempt in my thesis is to take the above theories, analyze them individually, then try to apply them to actual data. Before I can begin the applications, I must successfully develop a testing procedure for

²Sar Levitan, Work and Welfare Go Together, pg. 8, 9.

each theory. When I have completed this preliminary process then I will apply the validation procedure to data which I have obtained for Boston or Massachusetts depending upon the availability to the data.

Chart I below illustrates my procedure for each theory.

Chart I



Before I move on to the theories, I would like to present a brief chapter by chapter summary.

Chapter II begins with a description and analysis of Moynihan's theory which is developed in his controversial study The Negro Family A Case For National Action. In the second section of this chapter I will develop a valid testing procedure for his theory and finally in the third section I will apply this procedure to data for Boston or Massachusetts.

Chapter III begins with a description and analysis of Piven and Cloward's theory which is developed in their book on the functions of Public Welfare entitled Regulating the

Poor. In the second section I will develop a valid procedure to test their theory and finally in the third section I will apply this test to data for Boston or Massachusetts.

Chapter IV begins with a description and analysis of David Gordon's theory which is developed in his article in the Public Interest entitled Income and Welfare in New York City. In the second section I will develop a valid procedure to test his theory and finally in the third section I will apply this test to data for Boston or Massachusetts.

Chapter V begins with conclusions based on my results along with the policy implications that are involved. I conclude my thesis by making a few suggestions for future research.

Chapter II

The first section of this chapter will contain a detailed summary of Daniel Moynihan's report entitled "The Negro Family" The Case for National Action. This first half will also include any personal comments or analysis which I wish to submit. In the second section of this chapter I will attempt determining a valid testing procedure for Moynihan's theory and finally in the third section I will apply this test to data which I have obtained for Massachusetts.

The Negro Family

The Case for National Action

After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 many administration officials in Washington felt that this act had solved a good part of the civil rights problem. But there was a sharp contrast between this optimistic mood and the depressing figures on social and economic status. So late in November of 1964 Daniel Moynihan decided to write a report on the Negro family for internal use in the government:

I woke up a couple of nights later (that is, after one such conversation with a highly placed optimist) at four o'clock in the morning and felt I had to write a paper about the Negro family to explain to the fellows how there was a

problem more difficult than they knew and also to explain some of the issues of unemployment and housing in-terms that would be new enough and shocking enough that they would say, "Well, we can't let this sort of thing go on. We've got to do something about it."¹

Moynihan sought to present a sharply focused argument leaning to the conclusion that the government's economic and social welfare programs existing and prospective ones, should be systematically designed to encourage the stability of the Negro family.²

With this brief introduction I will now proceed to explain and analyze in detail Moynihan's report.

The first chapter discusses the Negro American Revolution beginning with the political, administrative and legal events which occurred to make the movement possible.

The political events were three. First, the Negroes themselves organized as a mass movement. Second, the Kennedy-Johnson Administration committed the federal government to the cause of Negro equality. This had never happened before. Third, the 1964 presidential election was practically a referendum on this commitment; if these were terms

¹ Rainwater and Yancy, The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy, pg. 26.

² Ibid., pg. 27

made by the opposition, they were in effect accepted by the
3
president.

The administrative events were threefold as well. First, beginning with the establishment of the president's committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and on to the enactment of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, the federal government has launched a major national effort to redress the profound imbalance between the economic position of the Negro citizens and the rest of the nation that derives primarily from their unequal position in the labor market. Second, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 began a major national effort to abolish poverty, a condition in which almost half of Negro families are living. Third, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked the end of the era of legal and formal discrimination against Negroes and created important new machinery for combating covert discrimination
4
and unequal treatment.

The legal events were no less specific. Beginning with Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954, through the decade that culminated in the recent decisions upholding title II

3
Daniel Moynihan, The Moynihan Report "The Negro Family,"
pg. 1.

4
Ibid., pg. 2.

of the Civil Rights Act, the federal judiciary, led by the Supreme Court,⁵ has used every opportunity to combat unequal treatment on Negro citizens. It may be put as a general proposition that the laws of the United States now look upon any such treatment as obnoxious and that the courts will strike it down wherever it appears.

With these events as a background the Negro now faces the problem of attaining not only opportunity but actual results. As Nathan Glazer has put it, "The demand for economic equality is now not the demand for equal opportunities for the equally qualified: it is now the demand for equality of economic results...the demand for equality in education...has also become a demand for equality of results,⁶ of outcomes.

Surprising as it may seem there are no real federal programs that insure the outcome. They all only make opportunities available.

Moynihan concludes his first chapter by commenting on the prospect for equality. In order to insure the Negro his proper place in society there must be something done about his social structure, in particular the Negro family. This

⁵
Ibid., pg. 2.

⁶
Nathan Glazer, Commentary, pg. 34.

leads directly to the second chapter which focuses on the Negro American family.

Moynihan claims that at the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family. And furthermore since the family is the basic socializing unit of American life social policy should be aimed in that direction.

He makes an interesting point about what the mass media and the development of suburbia have done to the image of the American family. They have created it as being a highly standardized phenomena. Therefore it is easy to assume that a difference in family structure is not a cause for difference among individuals or groups of individuals.

But in actuality there is one truly great discontinuity in family structure in the United States, that between the white world in general and that of the Negro American. The white family has achieved a high degree of stability and is maintaining that stability. By contrast, the family structure of lower class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many urban centers is approaching complete breakdown.⁷

In order to substantiate the above statement about Negro family instability Moynihan includes data on dissolved

⁷
Daniel Moynihan, Op. cit., pg. 5.

marriages, illegitimacy and female-headed families. This of course assumes that these are valid indicators of family instability. I do not question this assumption and I would like to include Moynihan's charts about Negro family instability for two reasons. First, for illustrative purposes and second, so that I am able to comment on them effectively.

He begins by stating that nearly a quarter of urban Negro marriages are dissolved and uses Chart I to support his argument. The figures are certainly convincing but I would be interested in seeing the results if the below table were crosstabulated with income. I'm wondering if family instability and dissolved marriages may be more associated with economic factors rather than race. Or put in a different manner, would the below differences disappear if the table only considered white and non white families with income levels less than some arbitrary low value such as \$4,000.

Chart I
Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Females with Husbands
Absent or Divorced, Rural-Urban, 1960


	Urban		Rural nonfarm		Rural farm	
	Nonwhite	white	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White
Total, husbands absent or divorced.....	22.9	7.9	14.7	5.7	9.6	3.0
Total, husbands absent..	17.3	3.9	12.6	3.6	8.6	2.0
Separated.....	12.7	1.8	7.8	1.2	5.6	0.5
Husbands absent for other reasons.....	4.6	2.1	4.8	2.4	3.0	1.5
Total, divorced.....	5.6	4.0	2.1	2.1	1.0	1.0

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960, Nonwhite Population by Race, PC (2) 1c, table 9, pp. 9-10.

The next factor Moynihan considers is illegitimacy. He claims that nearly one quarter of Negro births are now illegitimate. Both white and Negro illegitimacy rates have been increasing, although from dramatically different bases. The white rate was 2 percent in 1940; it was 3.07 percent in 1963. In that period, the Negro rate went from 16.8 percent to 23.6 percent.

As chart II indicates there is no real discrepancy on the rate of increase since 1940 between whites and non-whites. If the chart could be extended back in time I'm sure the results would be quite fruitful. Also if the chart could be duplicated holding income constant you might possibly see the discrepancy in the base disappear.

Chart II




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Ibid., pg. 8.

As a direct result of the high rate of divorce, separation and desertion almost one fourth of Negro families are headed by females. While the percentage of such families among whites has been dropping since 1940, it has been rising among Negroes.⁹

Chart III illustrates the rising incidence of single-headed families with women among Negroes. Again a cross-tabulation with income might present different results.

Chart III



Another measure of family instability is children reaching the age of 18 having lived all their lives with both their parents. For Negroes this figure not only represents a majority of the children but is also steadily increasing.

To complete the cycle the breakdown of the Negro family has led to a startling increase in Welfare dependency. At present, 14 percent of Negro children are receiving AFDC assistance, as against 2 percent of white children. Eight percent of white children receive such assistance at some time, as against 56 percent of nonwhites, according to an extrapolation based on HEW data.¹⁰

Moynihan concludes his second chapter on the Negro family with a very powerful hypothesis; the steady expansion of the AFDC program, as of public assistance programs in general, can be taken as a measure of the steady disintegration of the Negro family structure over the past generation in the United States.¹¹

In the third chapter of his report, Moynihan considers the possible roots of the Negro family disintegration

¹⁰
Ibid., pg. 12.

¹¹
Ibid., pg. 14.

problem. He traces it back to the period of American history when slavery was in existence. American slavery was profoundly different from, and in its lasting effects on individuals and their children, indescribably worse than any recorded servitude ancient or modern.

In his report, Moynihan takes an excerpt from Nathan Glazer comparing Brazilian and American slavery.

In Brazil, the slave had many more rights than in the United States: he could legally marry, he could, indeed had to, be baptized and become a member of the Catholic church, his family could not be broken up for sale and he had many days on which he could either rest or earn money to buy his freedom. The Government encouraged manumission and the freedom of infants could often be purchased for a small sum at the baptismal font. In short: the Brazilian slave knew he was a man and that he differed in degree, not in kind, from his master.

In the United States the slave was totally removed from the protection of organized society (compare the elaborate provisions for the protection of slaves in the Bible), his existence as a human being was given no recognition by any religious or secular agency, he was totally ignorant of and completely cut off from his past, and he was offered

absolutely no hope for the future. His children could be sold, his marriage was not recognized, his wife could be violated or sold (there was something comic about calling the woman with whom the master permitted his to live a "wife"), and he could also be subject, without redress, to frightful barbarities--there were presumably as many sadists among slaveowners, men and women, as there are in other groups. The slave could not, by law, be taught to read or write; he could not practice any religion without the permission of his master, and could never meet with his fellows, for religious or any other purposes, except in the presence of a white; and finally, if a master wished to free him, every legal obstacle was used to thwart such action. This was not what slavery meant in the ancient world, in medieval and early modern Europe, or in Brazil and the West Indies.

Moynihan continues by drawing from Pettigrew and emphasizing the lasting and destructive effects of American Slavery on the Negro family.

Psychologists point out that slavery in all its forms sharply lowered the need for achievement in slaves...Negroes in bondage, stripped of their African heritage, were placed

in a completely dependent role. All of their rewards came, not from individual initiative and enterprise, but from absolute obedience--a situation that severely depresses the need for achievement among all peoples. Most important of all, slavery vitiated family life...since many slaveowners neither fostered Christian marriage among their slave couples nor hesitated to separate them on the auction block, the slave household often developed a fatherless matrifocal ¹³ (mother-centered) society.

Once the slave was emancipated, any effort by the Negro male to regain his masculinity and father-figure were severely thwarted. The "sassy" nigger was lynched. So the Negro women continued her role as the dominant member in the Negro family.

Urbanization has also played an important part in the destruction of the Negro family. E. Franklin Frazier describes this effect in his book The Negro Family in the United States.

In many cases, of course, the dissolution of the simple family organization has begun before the family reaches the northern city. But, if these families have managed to pre-

serve their integrity until they reach the northern city, poverty, ignorance and color force them to seek homes in deteriorated slum areas from which practically all institutional life has disappeared. Hence, at the same time that these simple rural families are losing their internal cohesion, they are being freed from the controlling force of public opinion and communal institutions. Family desertion among Negroes in cities appears, then, to be one of the inevitable consequences of the impact of urban life on the simple family organization and folk culture which the Negro has evolved in the rural south. The distribution of desertions in relation to the general economic and cultural organization of Negro communities that have grown up in our American cities shows in a striking manner the influence of selective factors in the process of adjustment to the urban environment.¹⁴

In every index of family pathology--divorce, separation and desertion, female family-head, children in broken homes and illegitimacy--the contrast between the urban and rural environment for Negro families is unmistakable.

Still another factor in determining the stability of the Negro family is unemployment. As chart IV and V indicate

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Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States, pg. 340-341.

there is definitely a relationship between unemployment rate and separated women. An interesting point is that there is a one-year lag between unemployment and separation. This could mean that Negro families tend to stay together for a year despite unemployment.

In general terms, Negro families have the largest number of children and the lowest incomes and therefore, many Negro fathers literally cannot support their families.

Because the father is either not present, is unemployed, or makes such a low wage, the Negro woman goes to work. Fifty-six percent of Negro women, age 25 to 64, are in the work force, against 42 percent of white women. This dependence on the mother's income undermines the position of the father and deprives the children of the kind of attention, particularly in school matters, which is now a standard feature of middle-class upbringing.

(Charts IV and V on next page.)

Chart IV




Chart V

The worst part of the problem is that the dimensions are increasing due to the extraordinary growth of the Negro population. Since 1950, the Negro population has grown at a rate of 2.4 percent per year compared with 1.7 percent for the total population. If this rate continues, in 7 years, one American in eight will be nonwhite.

A cycle is at work; too many children too early make it most difficult for the parents to finish school. Low education levels in turn produce low income levels, which deprive children of many opportunities, and so the cycle repeats itself.

In the fourth chapter Moynihan elaborates on this tangle of pathology. Although nearly half of the Negro population is considered middle-class, most of the children in these families usually do not escape the influence of the unstable lower class. Therefore, they are constantly exposed to the pathology of the disturbed group and constantly in danger of being drawn into it. This is truly unfortunate because E. Franklin Frazier has suggested that the middle-class Negro American family is, if anything, more patriarchal and protective of its children than the general run of such families.

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E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie, pg. 32.

The next point that Moynihan continues to develop is that of Negro matriarchy. A fundamental fact of Negro American family life is the often reversed roles of husband and wife. This is true not only in family life but also in education and employment. As charts VI and VII indicate Negro females stay in school longer (VI) and tend not to fall behind as much as the male (VII). Again it would be interesting to see if these results differed if you held income constant.

Chart VI

Color and sex	Median school years completed
White:	
Male	12.1
Female	12.1
Non white:	
Male	9.2
Female	10.0

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished data.


Chart VII

Age	Male	Female
7 to 9 years old	7.8	5.8
10 to 13 years old	25.0	17.1
14 and 15 years old	35.5	24.8
16 and 17 years old	39.4	27.2
18 and 19 years old	57.3	46.0

Source: 1960 Census, School Enrollment, PC(2) 5A, table 3, p. 24.

As a result of this higher education attainment Negro females gain better employment and more income as Chart VIII indicates.

Chart VIII



Not only do Negroes attain a lower level of education but they also tend to perform lower on intelligence tests. Eighth grade children in central Harlem have a median IQ of 87.7 which means that perhaps a third of the children are scoring at levels perilously near to those of retardation. Although this is a very startling statistic, it is debatable whether or not the IQ is a fair measure of intelligence.

A variable which seems important in enhancing the performance of students is the presence of the father in the home. The IQ's for males, females and a combined group with fathers in the home are always higher than those who have no father in the home.

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Moynihan concludes this fourth chapter by commenting on the effect of broken homes on juvenile delinquency and crime. The combined impact of poverty, failure and isolation among Negro youth has had the predictable outcome in a disastrous delinquency and crime rate.

The Armed Forces could play an essential role in restoring the masculinity absent in the Negro male but unfortunately, due to the Armed Forces Mental Test, many Negroes do not qualify. This test roughly measures ability that ought to be found in an average 7th or 8th grade student. A grown young man who cannot pass this test is in trouble. Fifty-six percent of Negroes fail it.

In his final chapter Moynihan states his Case for National Action. The purpose of his study was to define a problem rather than propose solutions to it. The reasons being that just, some feel that the problem does not exist, second, that the problem is too interrelated and finally

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Deutch and Brown, Social Issues, pg. 27.

many feel that the problem may be out of control. With these in mind Moynihan simply states what the national effort should be directed at. Namely, the question of family structure. He concludes his report with the following statement.

The policy of the United States is to bring the Negro American to full and equal sharing in the responsibilities and rewards of citizenship. To this end, the programs of the Federal government bearing on this objective shall be designed to have the effect, directly or indirectly, of enhancing the stability and resources of the Negro American family. 18

I will now begin attempting to determine a valid testing procedure for Moynihan's theory on the breakdown of the Negro family. I will be applying this method to the state of Massachusetts in the third section.

Probably the best approach would be the utilization of regression analysis with the incidence of AFDC as a possible dependent variable and female-headed families, dissolved marriages and illegitimacy as possible independent variables. But due to two reasons, I was not able to use regression analysis.

First, although I do have substantial knowledge about the regression process I was unable to obtain computer time.

Second, even if I did manage to acquire some computer time, the data necessary was simply unavailable.

Below I have offered a possible equation for welfare incidence. The purpose of illustrating this equation is to give an indication of how difficult a welfare relationship could be. Equations 1, 2 and 3 are taken from Elizabeth Durbin's Doctoral Dissertation entitled Family Instability, Labor Supply and The Incidence of Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

(1)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WADC} = & a_{10} + b_{10} a_1 + (b_{11} + b_{10} + b_1) (R) + (b_{12} + b_{10} b_2) (C) \\ & + (b_{13} + b_{10} b_3) (Y) + (b_{14} + b_{10} b_4) (Sm) \\ & + b_{15} (Sf) + (b_{16} + b_{10} b_6) (O) + b_{10} b_7 (X) + E_3 \end{aligned}$$

The variables are defined as follows:

WADC = Incidence of ADC recipients in the population.

R = Rejection Rate of ADC applications.

C = Proportion of dependent children, or the population under 18 years of age divided by the population 18 - 64.

Y = Current family income.

Sm = Proportion of unskilled males in total male employment.

Sf = Proportion of unskilled females in total female employment.

O = Proportion of persons over the age of 65 in the population over 65, as a control variable for both Fund WADC.

X = Exogenous factor affecting the proportion of female-headed families.

F and E = Error terms.

Actually equation (1) was a combination of equations (2) and (3) where F represents the proportion of female-headed households.

(2)

$$F = a_1 + b_1(F) + b_2(C) + b_3(Y) + b_4(Sm) + b_6(O) + b_7(X) + E_1$$

(3)

$$WADC = a_{10} + b_{10}(F) + b_{11}(R) + b_{12}(C) + b_{13}(Y) + b_{14}(Sm) + b_{15}(Sf) + b_{16}(O) + E_2 \quad 19$$

19

Elizabeth Durbin, Family Instability, Labor Supply and the Incidence of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, pg. 136-8.

As you can see her equations also include other socio-economic variables. If I attempted using a similar equation I would probably have little time or effort remaining to examine the other two hypotheses.

Despite the many variables that Moynihan cites in his study the one that seems the most important in the continuance of family pathology among Negroes is female-headed families. So in testing Moynihan's theory, I will concentrate on this variable.

I will begin by observing data on Massachusetts from the 1960 and 1970 Bureau of the Census Reports focusing on the number of families which are both female-headed and which possess children under the age of eighteen. This will include female-headed families that have been separated legally or illegally, widowed, divorced or single. Once anyone of these situations prevailed the family is automatically eligible for AFDC payment.

So what these figures for 1960 and 1970 represent is the "risk population." Namely, families which possibly could be included in the AFDC rolls. My first observation would be noting if the female-headed families have increased

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Although there are two exceptions; first, if the family income or assets are over the maximum level and second, since the passage of the AFDC-UP program there may be two parents present and unemployed.

proportionately from 1960 to 1970. In this observation I will also include figures which represent total families, white families and nonwhite families. Ideally I would also have liked to crosstabulate with an income variable but again the data was unavailable.

The second step in the process will be to observe the change in the number of broken families on AFDC. Broken families as opposed to families who are on AFDC due to the death, incapacity or unemployment of the husband. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Services published documents entitled Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study and Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study which include such data. But there are two major problems. First, the 1961 publication does not include data for Massachusetts and second, there is no categorization by race. I have posed a few assumptions that could correct these difficulties.

The final step in the process will be to compare the female-headed families on AFDC with the total number of female-headed families. This proportion will be calculated for total families, white families and nonwhite families for both 1960 and 1970. The reason why I have chosen to make a distinction between total white and nonwhite families is to

determine if female-headed families is a race oriented phenomena.

Chart IX summarizes the process for testing Moynihan's theory.

Chart IX		Change <u>from</u>	to
I. <u>Total</u>			
Proportion of female-headed families with children aged less than 18.		1960	→ 1970
<u>White</u>			
Proportion of female-headed families with children aged less than 18.		1960	→ 1970
<u>Nonwhite</u>			
Proportion of female-headed families with children aged less than 18.		1960	→ 1970

(Part II and III continued on following page.)

II.	<u>Total</u>	<u>Change</u> <u>from</u>	→	<u>to</u>
	Proportion of broken families on AFDC.	1960	→	1970
	<u>White</u>			
	Proportion of broken families on AFDC.	1960	→	1970
	<u>Nonwhite</u>			
	Proportion of broken families on AFDC.	1960	→	1970
III.	<u>Total</u>			
	II/I	1960	→	1970
	<u>White</u>			
	II/I	1960	→	1970
	<u>Nonwhite</u>			
	II/I	1960	→	1970

Although this may not be the most sophisticated testing procedure, with the data I have available it is probably the most effective.

In this final section of chapter II I will utilize my validating procedure on data which I have obtained for Massachusetts. Due to the unavailability of some of the data I will have to modify the procedure as presented on the previous page. I will explain the modifications as I proceed. Chart X below summarizes the new approach.

		Chart X	Change <u>from</u>	<u>to</u>
Test (1)	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Total</u></p> Proportion of female-headed families with children aged less than 18.		1960	→ 1970
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Nonwhite</u></p> Proportion of female-headed families with children aged less than 18.		1960	→ 1970
Test (2)	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Total</u></p> Percentage of families on AFDC which are "broken families".		1960	→ 1970
Test (3)	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Total</u></p> Proportion of "total" broken families on AFDC.		1960	→ 1970

If you compare chart X with chart IX you will see that the differences occur in the race comparisons. The data was just not available by race.

The validating procedure is comprised of three separate tests as illustrated above. The first test considers the proportional change in female-headed families from 1960 to 1970. This includes families which have been separated, legally or illegally, widowed, divorced or single. One may argue that widows should not be included but for simplicity purposes they will be included. The 1960 census material only contained figures for the total and nonwhite families. I was going to make the assumption that I could determine the figures for white families by simply subtracting the nonwhite from the total. But upon testing this assumption for 1970 census data, I discovered I was incorrect. The 1970 census data had the following breakdown:

Total Families

White Families

Negro Families

Persons of spanish speaking Families

Unfortunately for some unknown reason the columns did not total so I did not make the assumption for the 1960 census data.

Chart XI considers the change in female-headed families from 1960 to 1970 for total families and for nonwhite families for Massachusetts.

		Chart XI	
<u>Total families</u>		Married male wife present	Broken families including male-head
1960	1,292,404	1,107,160	185,244
percent		85.7	14.3
1970	1,390,982	1,176,221	214,761
percent		84.6	15.4
<u>Nonwhite</u>			
1960	27,047	19,693	7,354
percent		72.8	27.2
1970	38,319	23,681	14,638
percent		61.8	38.2

Source - 1960 Bureau of Census Special Characteristics of Massachusetts.

1970 Bureau of Census Special Characteristics of Massachusetts.

These figures do tend to support Moynihan's argument in that the broken families do increase from 14.3 to 15.4 per cent for the total families and 27.2 to 38.2 for the nonwhite families. But these figures in chart XI also include

female-headed families which do not possess any children and therefore would not be eligible for any AFDC benefits.

Chart XII illustrates the proportional change for families with children.

Chart XII

Total

	Broken families with children			Total	Proportion of total families
	1 child	2 children	3 or over		
1960	26,073	16,089	14,691	56,853	4.5 per-
1970	34,949	24,519	29,584	89,052	6.4 per-
					centage change 42.2
			<u>Nonwhite</u>		
1960	1,409	1,132	1,703	4,244	15.8 per-
1970	3,415	2,945	4,570	10,930	28.5 per-
					centage change 80.5

Source - Same as chart XI

Although the results for the total families figure mildly supports Moynihan's theory, the results for the nonwhite families is more convincing. By just observing the percentage change ²⁰ you would have to admit that the broken families phenomena is more common in nonwhite families. If

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For total families $6.4 - 4.5 = 1.9$ as a percentage of 4.5 and for nonwhite $28.5 - 15.8 = 12.7$ as a percentage of 15.8.

you isolate the nonwhite data you can see that while the number of families increased by less than half the number of broken families doubled while the number of broken families with children increased by two and a half.

The second test involves observing the change in percentages of the broken families on AFDC from 1961 to 1971. Again a major problem has arisen with the data. In the 1961 HEW study entitled Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study there was no data included for Massachusetts. So I made a couple of assumptions then computed the data for Massachusetts. The assumptions were first, that the percentage figures for each category in Massachusetts were identical to the ones for New England. This is a rather weak assumption so I will also include the national percentage figures to strengthen the test. Second, since I needed a total family AFDC figure for Massachusetts, I went ahead and extrapolated what the figure would be assuming that the AFDC families in Massachusetts grew proportionately to the AFDC families in New England or stated mathematically....

$$\frac{\text{AFDC families in NE in 1961}}{\text{AFDC families in NE in 1971}} = \frac{\text{AFDC families in Mass. in 1961}}{\text{AFDC families in Mass. in 1971}}$$

So with these assumptions, I produced the data illustrated in chart XIV (which is on the following page).

Another problem that arose, as mentioned before, was that there was no categorization by race. The remaining two tests will only include a total figure.

Chart XIII illustrates the results for the second test mentioned above. This includes families which are on AFDC due to divorce, separation, desertion, not married to mother and absent for other reasons.

Chart XIII

	Nation	Mass.
1961	62.4	72.8
1971	74.1	77.2

Sources - Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study

Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study

Chart XIV

1961 Region	Total	Dead	Incapa- citated	Divorce	Sep- arated	Deserted	Not married to mother	Impri- soned	Absent for other reasons	Other status	Unem- ployed
U.S.	822,700	59,900	143,500	118,500	70,800	138,900	192,100	34,800	5,000	13,500	47,700
U.S. %	100.0	7.7	18.1	13.7	8.2	18.6	21.3	4.2	.6	2.2	5.2
New Eng.	23,490	5.4	10.3	24.8	14.4	13.8	19.4	2.5	.4	1.7	7.3
Mass.	*12,674	5.4	10.3	24.8	14.4	13.8	19.4	2.5	.4	1.7	7.3

1971

U.S.	2,523,900	108,700	246,300	358,700	398,800	382,700	700,000	53,300	31,300	89,500	152,600
U.S. %	100.0	4.3	9.8	14.2	15.8	15.2	27.7	2.1	1.2	3.5	6.1
New Eng.	134,000	2.7	7.3	23.7	22.4	10.8	19.3	2.1	1.5	5.5	4.6
Mass.	72,300	2.6	8.0	24.2	23.6	10.7	17.0	3.0	1.7	3.6	5.7

* Extrapolated Figure

Sources - Same as chart XIII

For Massachusetts and New England all figures except total are percentages.

As you can see even with an estimate for Massachusetts there still is a mild increase in broken families on AFDC from 1961 to 1971.

The final test considers the proportional change of broken families on AFDC to total broken families, or stated mathematically...

$$\frac{\text{Broken families on AFDC (A)}}{\text{Total broken families (B)}}$$

Chart XV presents these results for Massachusetts.

Chart XV

A/B for Mass.

1961 22.3

1971 81.2

Sources - Bureau of Census 1960 Special Characteristics
of Massachusetts

Bureau of Census 1970 Special Characteristics
of Massachusetts

Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study

Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study

The results from chart XV are quite remarkable. For some reason, the broken families in Massachusetts have really increased their numbers on the AFDC rolls.

In concluding this chapter on Moynihan's theory, I would have to admit that first, the broken families phenomona is more characteristic of nonwhite families and second, that broken families have been a major cause of the increasing welfare rolls. In the final chapter I will comment on the policy implications of these results.

Chapter III

In the first part of this third chapter I will analyze and summarize Piven and Cloward's fascinating book on the functions of public welfare entitled Regulating the Poor. In the second part of this third chapter I will attempt developing a valid procedure to test their hypothesis concerning the welfare crisis. I will conclude this chapter by applying this test to data obtained for the city of Boston.

I will exclude the first two parts of their book from my summary because the contents are not completely relevant. What the first two parts of their book actually contains is background material for the final part which focuses on relief and the urban crisis. Since they develop their hypothesis quite effectively in this final part of their book I will give a chapter by chapter description.

They begin this third part by describing the welfare explosion of the 1960's. During the 1950's the AFDC rolls rose by only 110,000 families, or 17 percent. But from December 1960 to February 1969, some 800,000 families were added to the rolls, an increase of 107 percent in just eight years and two months. In the course of the 1960's, then,

the nation experienced a "welfare explosion" for all practical purposes, traditional restrictions collapsed and the relief money poured out.¹

The most striking feature of the welfare rise is the fact that the rolls went up all at once--by 31 percent in the first four years of the decade and 58 percent in the next four years. Put in another way, 71 percent of the huge welfare increase during the 1960's took place in the four years after 1964. (Chart I.) It was truly an explosion.

Chart II gives an indication of who the contributors were to the welfare explosion.

In summary, the welfare explosion occurred in all regions, and in both urban and rural countries. But the explosion was far greater in urban areas and among those urban areas it was a handful of the most populous northern cities that showed the largest rises. Finally, most of the increase occurred all at once, in just a brief period after 1964.²

Before beginning to develop their own hypothesis, Piven and Cloward comment on three other explanations of the

¹ Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor, pg. 183-4.

² Ibid., pg. 189.

welfare rise.

Chart I
AFDC Caseload Increase By Area ^a

	% Change 1950-1960	% Change 1960-1969 ^b	% of 1960-1969 Change Occurring After 1964 ^c
National Total	17%	107%	71%
Regions ^d			
Northeast	26	180	69
North Central	27	78	59
West	38	161	72
South	0	54	86
Deep South ^e	7	57	98
Other South	-3	52	81
121 Major Urban Counties ^f	35	165	71
5 Most Populous ^g	26	217	75
116 Remaining	41	135	68
78 Northern	41	175	70
43 Southern	18	121	80
All Less Urban and Rural Counties ^h	6	60	71
Northern	17	87	62
Southern	-3	34	93

^a Includes AFDC-UP. For further definitions, see Source Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.

^b December of each year except February 1969.

^c The periods being compared are approximately equal, the earlier being four years, the latter four years and two months.

^d As defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

^e Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina. The remaining 12 Southern states comprise the Other South, as noted in Appendix, Source Table 1.

^f A county with a main city of at least 100,000 persons. In 1960, there were 121 such counties, and they contained 130 main cities. See Source Table 2 for an enumeration of these counties and a discussion of definitions.

^g Counties with a main city of at least one million persons; New York City, which contains five counties, is treated as a single county.

^h Counties which do not contain a main city of at least 100,000 persons. For convenience, we have referred to these counties as "rural" throughout this text. Strictly speaking, many are not rural, for they contain small cities. A more accurate but awkward designation would be "less urban or rural."

One hypothesis points to continued migration of the black poor from the South. Another attributes the increase to rising formal benefit levels. And the third fixes responsibility on the presumed deterioration of the "Negro Family."³

Chart II

Area Contribution to the Welfare Explosion^a

	% Contributed to the National AFDC Increase in	
	1950-60	1960-69
National Total	100%	100%
Regions		
Northeast	33	39
North Central	34	17
West	33	26
South	0	18
Deep South	.05	6
Other South	-.05	12
121 Major Urban Counties	80	70
5 Most Populous	23	34
116 Remaining	57	36
78 Northern	74	60
43 Southern	6	10
All Less Urban and Rural Counties	19	30
Northern	25	22
Southern	-6	9

^a See preceding table for notations and definitions.

³
Ibid., pg. 189.

As you can see, they comment on two of the hypothesis that I intend to use in my thesis; Moynihan's and rising benefit levels. But Piven and Cloward emphasize that the premise that the relief rolls automatically grow when the pool of people eligible for relief grows is extremely doubtful. They proceed to say that this defect makes the explanations at best incomplete.

As chart III illustrates, black migration has actually been slowing down.

Chart III

Period	Net Negro Out-Migration From the South	Average Annual Rate
1910-1920	454,000	45,400
1920-1930	749,000	74,900
1930-1940	348,000	34,800
1940-1950	1,597,000	159,700
1950-1960	1,457,000	145,700
1960-1966	613,000	102,000

The number of black families moving northward in the 1950's was greater than in the 1960's, yet the northern regional increases were from three to seven times larger in the 1960's. In the northeast, for example, the rolls rose by 26 percent in the 1950's, but by 180 percent in the 1960's. New York and Los Angeles experienced great in-migration during the 1950's, not only by southern blacks but by Spanish-speaking families as well. Nevertheless, the rolls in these counties went up by only 16 and 14 percent,

respectively. During the 1960's, however, the rolls in both counties quadrupled (300 percent and 293 percent respectively) despite the fact that in-migration by blacks had⁴ slackened.

In the 1950's, the national average level of payment per recipient rose almost by half thus greatly enlarging the pool; but in fact the rolls rose a mere 17 percent. In the south, furthermore, average payments went up by half but the rolls remained absolutely unchanged. During the 1960's, these patterns were reversed: a national increase of only one third in average payment was accompanied by more than a doubling of the rolls. In short, neither decade provides⁵ evidence to support the rising-payment-level thesis.

I would be more interested in seeing the amount of people that were affected by rising benefit levels, followed by the percentage of these people that were added to the rolls. What Piven and Cloward might be implying above is that a 50 percent rise in the benefit level should reflect approximately a 50 percent rise in the rolls. This would obvious-

⁴
Ibid., pg. 190.

⁵
Ibid., pg. 191.

ly not be true unless the rolls were nearly equal to the population affected by rising benefit levels.

In disagreeing with Moynihan's explanation Piven and Cloward use a few different arguments. First, they disagree with Moynihan's assertion that "the steady expansion of the AFDC program, as of public assistance programs in general, can be taken as a measure of the steady disintegration of the Negro family structure over the past generation in the United States."⁶

What Piven and Cloward argue is that the weakening of the family signified a weakening of social control, especially over the young, and it was the young who were the most prominent in the disorders of the 1960's. Disorder, in turn, was a critical force in producing more liberal relief practices. So, in essence, what Moynihan did was simply jump to the conclusion that AFDC rolls rose due to the changing structure of the black family when in reality there was an intervening variable.

Another conclusion that Moynihan makes is about the increase in female-headed families on AFDC.

In a detailed examination of this hypothesis, Lurie

⁶
Daniel Moynihan, Op.cit., pg.14.

found that even if all of the new female-headed families in the period between 1959 and 1966 had received AFDC assistance, only about 10 percent of the AFDC increase would have been accounted for. "It is clear, then, that the rise in the number of families receiving AFDC cannot be explained by the rise in the number of poor families headed by females."⁷

Finally Moynihan states that urbanization leads to family deterioration. It turns out a family-deterioration argument would have to explain why, during the 1950's, families were more likely to deteriorate in cities of less than one million persons, whereas in the 1960's the vulnerable families had shifted to cities of over one million persons. What such an explanation would be is not readily apparent.⁸

But of greater importance what none of these explanations account for is the striking fact that 71 percent of the welfare rise in the 1960's took place after 1964. What must be explained, in short is not why the pool of eligible families grew, although the existence of a pool of unemployed

⁷ Irene Lurie, An Economic Evaluation of AFDC, pg.131.

⁸ Piven and Cloward, Op. cit., pg. 195.

poor is one precondition for a welfare explosion; what must be explained is why so many of the families in that pool⁹ were finally able to get on the rolls.

The chapter ends with Piven and Cloward stating their own hypothesis that the contemporary relief explosion was a response to the civil disorder caused by rapid economic change in this case the modernization of southern agriculture. They spend the remaining part of the book developing this argument.

The following chapter is about Agricultural Modernization and Mass Unemployment.

No one would disagree that the rural economy of America, especially in the south, has undergone a profound transformation in recent decades. In 1945, there was one tractor per farm; in 1964 there were two. Mechanization and other technological developments, in turn, stimulated the enlargement of farm holdings. Between 1950 and 1969, one million farms disappeared; the three million remaining farms averaged 377 acres in size--30 percent larger than the average farm ten years earlier. The chief and most obvious effect of these changes was to lessen the need for agricultural labor.

⁹

Ibid., pg.196.

In the years between 1950 and 1965 alone, "new machines and new methods increased farm output in the United States by 45 percent and reduced farm employment by 45 percent."¹⁰

When the federal minimum wage law was enacted in 1966, it exerted pressure for greater labor efficiency which leads to more investment in machines and fewer jobs for the poor. Not only did the blacks face unemployment but they also faced desperate, unhealthy poverty.

With these conditions you would expect the relief rolls to swell in the south. But they did not. That the southern rural relief system did not respond to the dislocation of people from agriculture is no surprise. Relief restrictions continued to serve an economic function; while agricultural modernization meant that less marginal labor was needed, it did not mean that none was needed. Low paid workers were still required and a substantial improvement in formal benefit levels, or a marked easing of access to benefits would have put the availability of that cheap labor in doubt.¹¹

Another factor contributing to the condition of the black agricultural worker was the indifference of the plantation

¹⁰
Ibid., pg. 201.

¹¹
Ibid., pg. 209.

owners. Since what happened to these workers did not affect the owners, they just didn't care. So the choices for the poor were clear...work or starve... if there was no work, migrate or starve.

Despite the desperate conditions of many of the poor there was an absence of disorder in the rural south. There were mainly three reasons to explain this situation. First, since the workers became unemployed intermittently, there was no mass upheaval; no real organization. Second, a poor agricultural worker involved in any type of protest was severely reprimanded. And finally, there was always the option available to migrate.

Many of the blacks did decide to migrate but what they faced in the cities was, in general, severe unemployment and underemployment. But the potential for reform did exist due to the large number of blacks. Chart IV gives an indication of the high levels which existed in some central cities.

Chart IV

Average subemployment, nine slum-ghetto areas	33%
Boston (Roxbury area)	24
New Orleans (several contiguous areas)	45
New York City	
Central Harlem	29
East Harlem	33
Bedford-Stuyvesant	28
Philadelphia (North Philadelphia)	34
Phoenix (Salt River Bed area)	42
St. Louis (North Side)	39
San Francisco (Mission-Fillmore)	25

As was the case in the south the relief rolls did not respond to the desperate situation of the blacks. How a good many of the newcomers to the cities managed to survive is far from clear.

Chapter 8 in their book focuses on the rise of disorder in the cities which to Piven and Cloward represent the crucial causal factor in the welfare crisis.

When the blacks left the south they were cut loose from their own traditional institutions especially from the churches and from the established patterns of community relations that shape and direct people's lives.

The potential for disorder unleashed by these breakdowns might have been moderated if the institutional structures of the city had absorbed and integrated the newcomers. What the institutions of the city offered instead was resistance, which worsened the strains toward disorder.¹²

What this weakening of social control led to was the weakening of the family as an agency of social control for the young. Also since the young represent the most volatile age group they are therefore much more sensitive and vulnerable to social change. So when there was a high incidence of

¹²
Ibid., pg. 223.

family breakdown and unemployment, the younger group reflected their dissatisfaction through urban disorders. This was supposedly the missing link in Moynihan's argument.

The main conclusion to be drawn from an appraisal of the disorder of the 1960's is that old patterns of servile conformity were shattered...the trauma and anger of an oppressed people not only had been released, but had been turned against the social structure.

But black disorder had now become politicized as the following rioter characteristics illustrate:

Comparisons of rioters and nonrioters reveal marked differences in attitudes toward economic and political arrangements. First, the rioters were much more likely than nonrioters to possess accurate information about the economic and political condition of blacks. They were also more resentful than non rioters: "69 percent, as compared with 50 percent of the noninvolved, felt that racial discrimination was the major obstacle to their finding better employment." Rioters were more likely to have participated in protest actions (such as civil rights meetings and demonstra-

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Ibid., pg. 227.

tions). Their hostility to whites and their "pride in race" were significantly greater; they were more likely to be contemptuous of efforts by local government in their behalf and they were less likely to feel that "the country was worth fighting for in the event of a major war." They were more knowledgeable about the political system even while they were less likely to feel that traditional electoral arrangements afforded efficacious channel to promote justice and equality for blacks. The rioters were, in short, far more politicized, alienated and rebellious than their non-rioting contemporaries.¹⁴

The final section of chapter 8 deals with the local responses to disorders. The mayors in the cities where the black turbulent population was steadily increasing were faced with quite a dilemma. They had a large number of noisy black people who were not receiving their fair share of municipal services. But in order to give this black population their share of services the mayors would be intimidating their white bloc constituency. Piven and Cloward explain the situation exactly...

During the early 1960's, as black voting numbers in the cities continued to build up and mounting unrest among

blacks gave these notes some power, city governments responded a bit more. To have acceded to some of the demands of blacks--a halt to urban renewal, intergrated schools, access to white neighborhoods, apprenticeships in white unions and the like--would doubtless have spelled the demise of many political leaders tied to traditional white constituencies, so blacks got few concessions in these areas.

What they did begin to get was more relief benefits: more people began to apply for relief, and more of those who applied were admitted to the rolls. In all likelihood, this happened because it was easier to give relief than to grant other concessions. The rising rolls were objectionable to whites, to be sure, but considerably less so than locating public housing projects in white neighborhoods, or inter-¹⁵grating schools or enforcing fair-employment statutes.

But the black population was not the only pressure that the local governments were feeling. The federal government was also getting into the act. Chapter 9 is devoted to explaining the federal intervention.

When the federal government entered into local relief arrangements, in the 1960's it did so in a novel way. Not directly through legislative amendments but rather indirectly

through measures which had the consequence of mobilizing pressure against local relief restriction. In essence it was one level of government working against another.

Federal intervention occurred along three main lines:

- (1) The establishment of new services both public and private, that offered the poor information about welfare entitlements and the assistance of experts in obtaining benefits.
- (2) The initiation of litigation to challenge a host of local laws and policies that kept people off the welfare rolls.
- (3) The support of new organizations of the poor which informed people of their entitlement to public welfare and mounted pressure on officials to approve their applications for assistance.

After seeing the involvement of the federal government one wonders why the intervention actually occurred. Piven and Cloward claim that the black migration northward did much to weaken the grip of the south on the Democratic Party, at least in presidential contests. The trouble was not only

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Ibid., pg. 250.

in the white south. As southern support eroded, the political importance of the big cities in presidential contests magnified, but racial tensions interfered with the ability of urban politicians to produce the traditional ethnic and labor pluralities for the national party. In one city after another, racial strife led to polarization and division within the Democratic ranks. Local Democratic leaders in some cities became so threatened by cleavages in their constituencies that, to avoid further trouble, they simply ignored controversial national candidates and worked mainly to win local contests, a circumstance that severely hurt Stevenson in the campaigns of 1952 and 1956.¹⁷

A way had to be found to prod the local Democratic party machinery to cultivate the allegiance of urban black voters by extending a greater share of municipal services to them, and to do this without alienating urban white voters. It was this political imperative that eventually led the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to intervene in the cities, and that intervention had much to do with creating the welfare explosion.¹⁸

¹⁷
Ibid., pg. 254.

¹⁸
Ibid., pg. 256.

The federal strategy resulted in programs which singled out the "inner city" or ghetto as the target area and produced new organizations which circumvented municipal agencies. In this way the federal government was creating a direct relationship between the national government and the ghettos, a relationship in which both state and local governments were undercut.

The federal government was actually feeding ammunition to the blacks because these programs became the instruments with which the blacks used to get response from the local governments. Local officials were flabbergasted one level of government and political party financing the harassment of the other.

In summary, to reach placate and integrate a turbulent black constituency, the National Democratic administration of the 1960's acted to help blacks get more from local government. To accomplish this goal, it reached past state and local governments--including Democratic ones--to stimulate black demands for service, and in that process it directed rising black volatility into service protests against local government. In this way, the relatively limited funds expended through the great society programs acted as a lever in redirecting (and increasing) the monies that flowed

through local agencies. By turning some of the benefits of these services to blacks, the apparatus of local government¹⁹ was put to work for the national Democratic party.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter federal intervention proceeded along three lines; welfare rights services, promoting litigation and nourishing grass-roots pressure by the poor themselves. Piven and Cloward explain the local consequences of federal intervention by using these divisions.

The type of welfare rights services that became most prevalent in the 1960's was the "storefront service center," staffed by social workers, lawyers, churchmen, students and slum dwellers themselves. Although other great society programs sponsored local centers, OEO's "community action agencies" (CAA's) sponsored most of them--perhaps one thousand in all. "The institution most closely identified with the CAA's was the neighborhood service center. As defined by OEO, neighborhood centers serve a definite target area, offering clients a variety of services or referring them to other facilities...the centers physical aspects range from small storefronts to large structures. Their annual budgets range from a few thousand to more than a million dollars. There were (one or more) neighborhood center

¹⁹ Ibid., pg. 281-2.

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 programs in some 870 communities in 1968.

The effect of these service centers was to expand the relief rolls by making the people more aware through information, by lowering the personal stigma attached and finally by reducing the feelings of helplessness. All combined to expand total relief expenditures.

Chart V and VI illustrate the regional distribution and the total dollar effort on welfare service centers.

Chart V

*Regional Distribution of OEO
 Community Action Agencies
 April 1969*

	NUMBER	%
National	963	100
Northeast	186	19
North Central	233	24
West	140	15
South	404	42
Deep South	121	13
Other South	283	29

Source: OEO
 Notes: Coterminous United States; distributions by urban-rural were not available.

Chart VI

*Total Dollar Effort for Community Action Agencies
by OEO and Localities
Fiscal 1968*

	Millions of Dollars	%	% Urban Dollar Effort	% Rural Dollar Effort
National	1,120	100		
Urban	851	76	100	
Rural	269	24		100
Northeast	249	21		
Urban	220	20	26	
Rural	19	2		7
North Central	241	22		
Urban	196	18	23	
Rural	45	4		17
West	213	19		
Urban	189	17	22	
Rural	35	2		9
South	426	38		
Urban	246	22	29	
Rural	180	16		67
Deep South	156	14		
Urban	73	7	9	
Rural	83	7		31
Other South	270	24		
Urban	172	15	20	
Rural	98	9		36

Source: OEO, Community Action Agency Analysis Report as of 11/22/69.

Notes: Coterminous United States; columns may not total properly because of rounding; dollar effort includes a small proportion of money appropriated by localities as a condition of receiving OEO funds. In this table, we follow OEO's definition of urban: counties with a subdivision containing more than 10,000 persons.

A series of judicial decisions in the 1960's had the effect of undermining some of the regulations by which the relief rolls have been kept down. For decades, reformers had lobbied unsuccessfully for legislative repeal of residence laws, man-in-the house rules, and employable mother rules. But in the 1960's these foundation blocks of the "poor law" were washed away by one court decision²¹ after another.

These changes were brought about by lawyers employed by the different neighborhood service centers. These lawyers promoted institutional change throughout law reform by taking test cases whose outcome affected existing or potential welfare recipients as an entire class.

Chart VII gives an indication of the distributor of attorneys throughout the service centers.

(Chart VII on following page.)

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Piven and Cloward, Op. cit., pg. 306.

Chart VII

*Distribution of OEO Neighborhood Legal
Services Attorneys, Fiscal 1969*

	NUMBER	%	% URBAN ATTORNEYS	% RURAL ATTORNEYS
National	1796	100%		
Urban	1084	60	100%	
Rural	712	40		100%
Northeast	631	35		
Urban	403	22	37	
Rural	228	13		32
North Central	394	22		
Urban	257	14	24	
Rural	137	8		19
West	394	22		
Urban	202	11	19	
Rural	193	11		27
South	377	21		
Urban	223	12	21	
Rural	154	9		22
Deep South	99	5		
Urban	52	3	5	
Rural	47	3		7
Other South	278	15		
Urban	171	10	16	
Rural	107	6		15

Source: OEO.

Note: Coterminous United States; columns may not total properly because of rounding. In this table, we follow OEO's definition of urban: counties with a subdivision containing more than 10,000 persons.

The grass-roots protest that developed during this period resulted in the formation of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) which sponsored many important and influential demonstrations and campaigns.

In the end of this chapter Piven and Cloward comment on applications and approval rates. In both cases there is a substantial positive change. Chart VIII illustrates the average annual applications received while chart IX illustrates the amount approved.

Chart VIII

Average Annual Applications Received
(in thousands)

	1960-64	1965-68	% CHANGE
National	745	962	29
Northeast	226	280	24
North Central	135	149	10
West	148	285	93
South	236	247	5
Deep South	79	82	4
Other South	156	165	6

Chart IX

Average Annual Applications Approved

	% 1960-64	% 1965-68	% CHANGE
National	59	66	12
Northeast	66	73	11
North Central	62	67	8
West	59	67	14
South	50	58	16
Deep South	44	54	23
Other South	52	59	13

These two measures will be of considerable value when I attempt determining a valid testing procedure for their hypothesis.

In concluding, because the 1960's were a time of profound disorder, both north and south, government responded with measures to ease that disorder. Blacks got a little more from some government agencies and suffered a little less at the hands of others, although considering the magnitude of the political disturbance, it is remarkable to see how few and how modest these concessions were, and how often they turned out to be merely symbolic. Now that ghetto unrest has subsided (at least of this writing), the liberalization of relief practices stands out, for without that concession the victims of agricultural modernization and of persisting unemployment in the cities would remain perilously close to starvation--as so many did in the late 1940's and the 1950's. And although the processes by which the relief expansion occurred were sometimes covert and circuitous, the moral seems clear: a placid poor get nothing, but a turbulent poor sometimes get something.

22

Ibid., pg. 338.

In this last part of Chapter III I will attempt determining a valid testing procedure for Piven and Cloward's theory on civil disorder. I will use this test on data which I have accumulated for the city of Boston.

As in chapter II the best approach would probably involve some type of correlation, regression or causal analysis. Obviously this would require the use of a computer and as stated in the previous chapter I do not have access to one.

Before I attempt devising my own method, I would like to include some helpful information from a Rand Corporation Publication entitled Protest by the Poor: A Study of the Welfare Rights Movement in New York City. It was done in September of 1972 by Larry Jackson and William A. Johnson.

In summary this study is concerned with two broad issues. First, it analyzes the origins, growth and tactics of protest groups involved with welfare in New York City. Second, it examines whether these groups have been responsible in part, for the recent increase in New York City's AFDC rolls. At the same time the study considers other factors, such as, rising grant levels and liberalized acceptances thought to have influenced the city's caseload.

23

Larry Jackson and William A. Johnson, Rand Corporation: Protest by the Poor, pg. 5.

I am more interested in the second part of their study which deals with the relationship between rising welfare incidence and group disorder. This corresponds directly to Piven and Cloward's theory.

Jackson and Johnson begin their model by stating that at any point in time a change in caseload (C) can be expressed as a function of the acceptance rate (r), applications (A), and the closings rate (K). This relationship is illustrated by the following equation:

$$C = r A - KC$$

Which states that the increase in the caseload is equal to openings less closings. The level of closings, however, also depends on the overall size of the caseload. At any point in time, a certain number of cases will turn over as a matter of course depending on the size of the caseload.²⁴

Chart X and XI give an indication of the importance of each one of these three decision variables in determining the use in the welfare caseload.

24

Ibid., pg. 232.

Chart X
 PERCENTAGE OF THE AFDC CASELOAD ATTRIBUTABLE TO CHANGES
 IN DECISION VARIABLES BETWEEN 1966 and 1970
 (Percent)

Component of the Case- Load Increase Due to:	Percent of the Caseload Increase
Higher Acceptance Rates	8.4
Higher Number of Applications Acted Upon	33.1
Lower Closings Rate	25.9
All Three Variables Working Simultaneously	60.6

Chart XI
 DECISION VARIABLES AFFECTING NEW YORK CITY'S
 AFDC CASELOAD
 1966 through 1970

Year	Annual Acceptance Rate (r) (percentage)	Applications Acted Upon (A) (number)	Annual Closings Rate (k) (percentage)
1966	69.6	66,401	32.6
1967	76.1	78,744	28.4
1968	79.1	91,139	25.6
1969	72.8	81,366	25.4
1970	72.1	97,079	21.3

Source: Computed from data presented in New York City, Department of Social Services, *Monthly Statistical Report*, various months.

As the authors point out at the end of this chapter, this exercise is only a beginning. The important question is why each of these three decision variables has changed over time resulting in the unprecedented growth in the welfare rolls.

Jackson and Johnson use two variables to measure Welfare Rights Activity: membership in local welfare rights organizations as a percentage of district caseloads (m) and after April 1968, the number of demonstrations held at each welfare center (b). This is very valuable data yet unobtainable for Boston or even Massachusetts. Still I would like to include their equations in my thesis.

The equations for the three decision variables (r) acceptance rate, (A) Applications and the closings rate (K) are:

$$(1) \quad r = a_0 + a_1 m + a_2 D + a_3 s + E$$

Where:

m = membership

D = demonstration

s = closings for failure to comply with departmental policy test for relative stringing of Welfare Center Administration

E = Error term

$$(2) A = b_0 + b_1 m + b_2 D + b_3 r + b_4 G + E$$

Where:

m, D and E are same as preceding page and:

r = acceptance rate

G = average grant per case

$$(3) K = c_0 + c_1 m + c_2 D + c_3 s + c_4 G + E$$

Where:

m, D, s, G and E are the same also. A problem with the above equations is that G, the grant level, is also a dependent variable so it too has a separate equation. Jackson and Johnson do obtain results but they are not totally convincing, although it is extremely difficult to get impressive results using statistics in social science.

In gathering data for Boston I was able to obtain access to the Public Assistance Monthly Statistical Report. This is a document which is completed by all the cities in Massachusetts then submitted to the Research and Planning office at the State Department of Welfare.

This form contains many important statistics concerning applications, caseload and expenditures. Unfortunately many of these reports were consolidated before I could re-search them. The consolidation procedure excluded many important pieces of data including acceptance rates, closings

25

I will include a sample on pages 78 and 79.

and number of monthly applications. When I spoke to Harold Doherty, Director of Research and Planning, he informed me of the following statement, "When my supervisor told me to clean house, the statistical reports were the first to go." I asked why. Mr. Doherty claimed that no one ever inquired about past statistical reports so they were considered practically useless. Besides, most of the "important" (yet useless to me) information was preserved on the consolidated form.
26

I did manage to obtain the statistical reports for the years 1968 through 1972. I will utilize this data to test Piven and Cloward's theory. What I will do is observe the changes in applications, acceptance rates and closing rates from 1968 to 1972 and compare them to the figures in the Rand study and in Piven and Cloward's Regulating the Poor.

Before concluding this chapter I would like to make a few pertinent comments about my testing procedure. Although I am using applications, acceptance rate and closings to substantiate the civil disorder theory they do possess a couple of common deficiencies.

26

This information only included total figures on recipients and expenditures.

A liberalizing acceptance rate may be concealed due to a number of opposing forces. Working to raise the rates could be a turnover in social workers resulting in liberalized "gatekeepers." Also, changes in eligibility requirements and rising benefit levels could result in an increase in rates. At the same time non-eligible applicants flooding the welfare centers upon hearing of administrative looseness may lower the acceptance rates.

These opposing forces are also at work against the other two measures...applicants and closings.

The other deficiency is the time period from which my data is taken. It does not correspond with the welfare activity period in New York City. Although in Boston it may have been different, I will go on the assumption that my indicators should be similar to the ones that have resulted in New York City due to the disorder. This implies that the Welfare Rights Activity has occurred before the time period of my data.

The following is a brief summary of my testing procedure.

Chart XII

(1)

Δ Applications for Boston \approx Δ Applications for New York City \approx Δ Applications Piven - Cloward

(2)

$$\Delta \text{Acceptance rates for Boston} \sim \Delta \text{Acceptance rates for New York City} \sim \Delta \text{Acceptance rates for Piven - Cloward}$$

(3)

$$\Delta \text{Closings for Boston} \sim \Delta \text{Closings for New York City} \sim \Delta \text{Closings for Piven - Cloward}$$

In this final section of chapter III I will apply the procedure developed to test Piven and Cloward's theory on data which I have obtained for the City of Boston. As indicated by chart XII the procedure examines three separate indicators; applications, acceptance rates and closings. I will look at each measure individually then summarize at the end of the chapter.

Applications

Using the Monthly Statistical Report I have computed a total applications figure for the years 1969 through 1972. I have chosen the second category in the statistical report entitled Applications received during month to compare with Piven and Cloward's data and the Rand data on New York City. Chart XIII illustrates the results for the City of Boston.

Chart XIII

Year	Applications Received during Month
1969	9,014
1970	8,763
1971	15,474
1972	11,529

27

Source: Monthly Statistical Reports January 1969 - November 1972.

If you try to compare the above chart with either Piven and Cloward's data (chart VIII) or the Rand New York City data (chart XI) you will see that there is no relationship whatsoever. Instead of using applications received during month, chart XIV illustrates the results by using applications terminated as a comparative measure.

27

For 1972 I only had the data for 11 months so I computed for the twelfth month by adding on an average month for 1972.

MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT

A. Applications

1. pending from last month
2. received during month
3. total during month
4. applications terminated
 - a. payment authorized
 - b. denied or other reasons
5. pending at end of month

B. Cases Approved for Assistance

1. continued from last month
2. added during month
 - a. new
 - b. reopened
 - c. transferred from other city or town
3. total open during month
 - a. received assistance
 1. many payments
 2. vendor payments for medical only
 - b. received no assistance
4. closed during month
 - a. transferred
 - b. not transferred

(continued on following pg.)

5. continued to next month
6. closed cases receiving payments

C. Payments

1. many payments
2. vendor payments

D. AFDC Recipients

1. adults
2. children

Chart XIV

year	applications terminated
1969	8863
1970	9558
1971	9091
1972	4139

Source: Same as chart XIII

Again trying to compare the charts give no results other than either applications are not a valid indicator or civil disorder was not present. I tend to believe the former.

28

Same as footnote number 27.

Acceptance Rates

I determined my acceptance rates by performing the following division:

$$\frac{\text{payment authorized}}{\text{applications terminated}} \quad 29$$

Chart XV illustrates the results for 1969 through 1972 for Boston.

Chart XV

year	acceptance rate
1969	95.36
1970	95.01
1971	92.18
1972	71.97

30

Source: Same as chart XIII

These acceptance rates are extremely high as compared to either of the ones presented by Piven and Cloward or the Rand study. But I think that these results are favorable to the theory offered by Piven and Cloward. Namely that liberalization in welfare administration expands and contracts depending upon the presence of civil disorder. As the figures clearly show the rates are steadily decreasing reflecting the non-existence of civil unrest. The figures in the Rand study (chart XI) reflect the same result.

29

Measures taken from Monthly Statistical Report.

30

Same as footnote number 27.

Closings

I determined my closings rate by performing the following division:

$$\frac{\text{closed during month}}{\text{total cases open during month}} \quad 31$$

The results for 1969 through 1972 for Boston are given by Chart XVI.

Chart XVI

year	closings
1969	2.08
1970	1.78
1971	2.02
1972	1.83

32

Source: Same as chart XIII

Although Piven and Cloward do not offer any data for closings rate theirs would probably reflect an increase in closings after 1968. This would be due to the contraction of the welfare administration after the disappearance of civil disorder. The figures for New York City show a decreasing rate while my figures for Boston show a bit of both. I would have to conclude that the closings rate is not a good indication.

31

Measures taken from Monthly Statistical Report.

32

~~Same as footnote number 27.~~

It seems that the only valid measure in this testing procedure was acceptance rate at least for Boston, while the other two were not useful at all. But, as mentioned earlier, acceptance rates may be concealed due to opposing faces.

Chapter IV

As in the preceding ones the first half of this chapter will contain a detailed summary of David M. Gordon's theory on the welfare crisis. In essence it will be a description of his article entitled Income and Welfare in New York City in the magazine the Public Interest. In the second section of this chapter I will attempt determining a valid testing procedure for his hypothesis and then apply it in the third section.

Gordon begins his article by stating that before you can begin analyzing the welfare crisis you must investigate income distribution. Serious attention to the shape of the income distribution is overdue, for many recent debates about public policy have depended completely on our assumptions about changes in the dispersion of income. In New York City, examples abound. If we knew how many poor people live in the city and how those numbers had been changing during the 1960's we could begin to choose sensibly among the welter of conflicting explanations for the rapid growth of welfare in New York.¹

As indicated by chart I, the white families in New York

¹
David M. Gordon, Income and Welfare in New York City,
Public Interest, pg. 65.

are better off than the nonwhite.

Chart I

Income Distribution of New York City Families by Ethnicity, January 1968.

INCOME CLASS (\$1000)*	WHITE FAMILIES		BLACK AND PUERTO RICAN		TOTAL	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
0-1	17,000	1.1	20,600	3.3	37,600	1.7
1-2	35,500	2.3	63,100	10.6	98,600	4.6
2-3	55,600	3.6	69,500	11.4	125,100	5.8
3-4	78,800	5.1	120,200	19.6	199,000	9.2
4-5	101,900	6.6	76,800	12.6	178,700	8.3
5-6	173,000	11.2	70,500	11.7	243,500	11.3
6-7	185,400	12.0	60,900	10.0	246,300	11.4
7-8	173,000	11.2	41,400	6.8	214,400	10.0
8-9	132,800	8.6	25,000	4.1	157,800	7.0
9-10	92,700	6.0	18,900	3.1	111,600	5.2
10-11	78,800	5.1	10,400	1.7	89,200	4.1
11-12	63,300	4.1	5,500	0.9	68,800	3.2
12-13	52,500	3.4	4,300	0.7	57,800	2.7
13-14	44,800	2.9	2,400	0.4	47,200	2.2
14-15	37,000	2.4	1,200	0.2	38,200	1.8
15 & over	222,500	14.4	17,600	2.9	240,100	11.1
Total	1,546,000	100.0	608,700	100.0	2,153,900	100.0

* Refers to total income earned during 1967. All numbers have been rounded to the nearest 100. Columns may not add to totals owing to rounding.

Due to the difference in family sizes in chart I Gordon defines five standardized income classes with the following descriptions:

Class I - "poor" families; \$0 to \$3,500 annual income for a family of four.

Class II - "low income" families earning between the

poverty line and the "lower than moderate" budget level; \$3,500 to \$6,000 for a family of four.

Class III - "modest income" families receiving between the "lower than moderate" and "modest but adequate" standards; \$6,000 to \$9,400 for a family of four.

Class IV - "moderate income" families receiving between the "modest but adequate" and the "higher than moderate" standards; \$9,400 to \$14,500 for a family of four.

Class V - "affluent families" receiving above the "higher than moderate" budget level; above \$14,500² for a family of four.

After dividing the population into the above classes Gordon makes the following observations.

- (1) As chart II indicates most people in New York live sparsely.

(Chart II on following page.)

²
Ibid., pg. 71.

Chart II

Distribution of New York residents and families among "constant consumption" income classes, January 1968.*

CLASS	PER CENT OF PEOPLE	PER CENT OF FAMILIES*
I Poor families	15.3	10.7
II Low income families	21.2	18.6
III Modest income families	27.0	27.9
IV Moderate income families	19.5	23.4
V Affluent families	17.0	19.4
	100.0	100.0

* Excluding families with heads sixty-five years or older.

(2) As chart III indicates black and Puerto Rican families are truly over represented in the lower classes.

Chart III

Distribution of families in New York among "constant consumption" income classes, January 1968, by ethnicity.*

INCOME CLASS	PER CENT OF WHITE FAMILIES*	PER CENT OF BLACK AND PUERTO RICAN FAMILIES*
I Poor families	3.7	28.4
II Low income families	13.6	31.1
III Modest income families	29.6	23.3
IV Moderate income families	27.5	13.0
V Affluent families	25.6	4.2
	100.0	100.0

* Excluding families with heads of sixty-five and over.

(3) Households without children live quite comfortably in New York while families with children have more difficulty.

(4) If you take the third observation and differentiate by ethnicity the results are staggering. The large, poor black families make the majority of the lower classes.

(5) As chart IV indicates the distribution of minority households simply lags one class behind.

Chart IV

*Per Cents in Family Size Groups.**

	SINGLES AND COUPLES	ONE CHILD.	4, 5, 6, OR MORE MEMBERS	TOTAL
1 White households in Classes IV-V	57.8	25.9	16.3	100.0
Minority households in Classes III-IV	57.0	26.4	16.6	100.0
2 White households in Classes II-III	19.7	29.7	50.6	100.0
Minority households in Classes I-II	23.2	26.4	50.4	100.0

* Excluding families headed by the elderly.

What these observations lead to is that the population in New York City is divided mainly into four "cells."

(1) White families with children.

(Classes II-III)

(2) White families with children.

(Classes IV-V)

(3) Minority families with children.

(Classes I-II)

(4) White households without children.

(Classes IV-V)

As chart V indicates.

Chart V

Distribution of Residents and Households among
Socioeconomic Groups.*

	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	PER CENT OF TOTAL PEOPLE	PER CENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
Four major groups			
a. White families with children (Classes II-III)	2,161,936	29.4	21.2
b. white families with children (Classes IV-V)	1,466,042	20.0	16.8
c. Minority families with children (Classes I-II)	1,454,009	19.8	12.6
d. White households without children (Classes IV-V)	923,684	12.6	22.9
Six minor groups			
a. Minority families with children (Class III)	356,835	4.9	4.1
b. White households without children (Classes I-III)	271,336	3.7	7.1
c. Minority households without children (Classes I-III)	230,364	3.2	7.0
d. Minority households without children (Classes IV-V)	190,361	2.6	5.0
e. White families with children (Class I)	148,960	1.8	1.5
f. Minority families with children (Classes IV-V)	132,100	2.0	1.8
	7,335,567	100.0	100.0

As a result, these groups dominate the life style of the city's economy. They will continue to do so in the future.

The next question that Gordon addresses is whether the situation has changed since 1960. As charts VI and VII illustrate, whites have improved their economic position since 1960, whereas minority groups have not.

Chart VI

Family Income Distribution for Whites, New York City, 1960 and 1968 Compared (in Constant 1968 Dollars).





Chart VII

*Family Income Distribution for blacks and Puerto Ricans,
New York City, 1960 and 1968 Compared (in Constant 1968 Dollars).*



Finally before moving to the question of the welfare burden, Gordon makes the following conclusions about the changes in poverty in New York City during the 1960's. These conclusions are based on adjusted data from the Social Security Administration.

(1) There has been very little decline since 1960 in the number of New York families living in poverty.

(2) Though slight, the decrease in poor families in New York reflected greater improvement than in the other two large American cities for which similar comparisons can be made.

(3) The composition of poor families in New York has changed radically since 1960.

(4) The absolute numbers of poor minority families increased very rapidly as well.

(5) Both relatively and absolutely, the trends in minority group poverty traced a very different path in New York from that in other central cities.³

In commenting on New York City's welfare burden Gordon claims that the persistence of poverty by itself does not go very far in explaining it. By comparing New York City to Chicago and Los Angeles he found that New York had about

³
Ibid., pg. 79-80.

twice as many poor families as Chicago, but almost three times as many welfare clients. Also New York had around three times as many poor families as Los Angeles - Long Beach,⁴ but almost four times as many people on welfare.

The explanation is probably due to the higher benefit levels in New York. In February 1968, recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children received an average of \$60.60 a month in New York; \$44.70 in Illinois, and \$44.75 a month in California. The ratio of AFDC recipients to numbers of poor families is greater in New York City than in the other two cities by roughly the same degree as the average grants per AFDC recipients in New York are⁵ higher.

Chart VIII represents the size of the New York City Public Assistance caseload as it grew during the 1960's.

Chart VIII
Number of Public Assistance Recipients in New York City.

DATE	NUMBER (TO NEAREST 1,000)
January 1934	411,000
January 1936	533,000
January 1938	807,000
June 1938	872,000
November 1938	961,000
January 1969	995,000

⁴ Ibid., pg. 80.

⁵ Ibid., pg. 81.

Gordon poses three possible hypotheses for these increases. First, the number receiving welfare could have grown because an increasing percentage of those eligible for welfare actually chose to receive it (or because the rules permitting eligibles to receive it had become more liberal). Second, even if the benefits available under welfare had not increased at all, the number of people on welfare could have increased because the number of eligibles increased. This could have occurred because of a downward shift in the income distribution due to in-migration or to the lag of wages behind prices in certain kinds of jobs. Third, even if the income distribution (measured in constant prices) did not change at all as a result of migration or wage-price effects, the number of people eligible for welfare could have increased because the welfare grant levels (measured in constant prices) increased over time, effectively blanketing into eligibility large numbers of the population.⁶

After examining income distribution data Gordon poses the following conclusion; the largest source of the increase in welfare stemmed from the increase in real grant levels, that changes in the income distribution accounted for a

⁶
Ibid., pg. 83.

smaller share, and that those eligible for welfare showed
 no greater propensity to join the rolls.⁷

Gordon concludes his report with the following chart (IX) which has the following implication.

Chart IX

Statistical Components of Increase of People in Families Eligible for Public Assistance (Excluding Those Sixty-five and Over), New York City, January 1964 to November 1968.

	NUMBER	ABSOLUTE INCREASE FROM JANUARY 1964	NET INCREASE	% OF TOTAL INCREASE
1 Number of eligibles in January 1964	605,000	—	—	—
2 Number who would have been eligible in November 1968 if 1964 grant levels were in effect in November 1968	777,000	172,000	172,000	16.8
3 Number who would have been eligible in November 1968 if November 1968 grant levels were in effect and if the January 1964 income distribution had described the situation in November 1968	1,242,000	637,000	465,000	45.8
4 Actual number of eligibles in November 1968, given November 1968 grant levels and November 1968 income distribution	1,621,000	1,016,000	379,000 1,016,000	37.3 100.0

⁷ Ibid., pg. 83.

If New York state had not decided to offer people an income at least equal to what the federal government calls the poverty line, there would be no welfare crisis at all. We would, in its place, have a far greater amount of poverty.

As in the previous two chapters, I will conclude chapter IV by attempting to determine a valid testing procedure for Gordon's theory on rising benefit levels.

I will in essence, be duplicating Gordon's method which he uses in his article for New York City. I will obtain census data for family income in the Boston area then compare this with the income for people on AFDC. This income will be computed by using a monthly benefit level.


Even with this simple test I will have to encounter two major problems. First, census data is only given for SMSA's (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) and therefore, I will have to make some type of assumption or adjustment. Second, there is no average benefit level in existence for Massachusetts or for any other state. The reason for this is that all AFDC cases are not alike. Some families may be receiving the maximum amount while others due to income may be receiving the minimum.

There are two ways to attack this problem. First, I

can simply compute an average by taking the total case figure and dividing it into total expenditures or I can compute standard budgets by using the Public Assistance Policy manual. When I perform this test for Massachusetts I will discuss which method I will utilize.

Chart X briefly summarizes my testing procedure.

Chart X



In this final section of chapter IV I will apply the testing procedure developed above to data obtained for the city of Boston.

The best approach to Gordon's theory probably would have been to compare data on AFDC income and family income for a couple of years, but due to the unavailability of income data for non-census years I will have to limit myself to the year of 1969. What I will do is observe the potential recipients and see how many are actually on AFDC. This will involve three basic steps. First, determining a yearly AFDC budget. Second, determining the amount of families that fall

within this budget range and finally the proportion of these eligibles that are actually on AFDC.

First, determining a yearly AFDC budget. Instead of trying to create an average size for an AFDC family with average problems, I simply took the total payments for each month and divided by the case load for each month. On the Monthly Statistical Report it would be:

$$\frac{\text{cases continued from last month}}{\text{total payments}}$$

Chart XI illustrates the average monthly payments for 1969.

Chart XI

<u>Month</u>	<u>Average Payment</u>
January	304.54
February	277.00
March	276.48
April	234.45
May	292.78
June	270.54
July	265.54
August	282.38
September	260.54
October	362.89

<u>Month</u>	<u>Average Payment</u>
November	276.51
December	283.55
Total AFDC yearly budget:	3386.96

Source: Monthly Statistical Report January - December 1969.

The variation in payments gives an indication of the difficulty that would be involved in trying to determine an average budget in another manner.

The second step is to determine the amount of families that fall within this range. Using the census material I classified the following people as potential AFDC recipients:

Male Head

Married wife present

Wife in labor force

With own children less than 18 (1)

Wife not in labor force

With own children less than 18 (2)

Female Head

In labor force

Widowed

With own children less than 18 (3)

Other marital status

With own children less than 18 (4)

Not in labor force

Widowed

With own children less than 18 (5)

Other marital status

With own children less than 18 (6)

Source: 1970 Bureau of the Census

Massachusetts

Special Characteristics

The results for each income group are illustrated in chart XII on next page.

Chart XII

Income group	Total families
Less than \$1,000	6432
\$1,000 - \$2,000	4970
\$2,000 - \$3,000	7427
\$3,000 - \$4,000	3496 ⁹ (8739)
Total	22,325

Source: 1970 Bureau of the Census

Massachusetts

Special Characteristics

Finally the third step is to determine the proportion of eligibles actually on AFDC. Taking the total case figure from the December 1969 Monthly Statistical Report you come out with an astounding result. The total caseload for December 1969 was 20,825 while the number of families eligible for AFDC in 1969 was 22,325. And the 22,325 families are for the Boston SMSA which includes many of the Boston suburbs.

So, in concluding, the poorer families with children are really taking advantage of their AFDC opportunity.

9

Since the AFDC yearly budget was approximately \$3400 I took four-tenths of the total families falling between the income level 3000-4000 resulting in 3496.

Chapter V

This final chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part, I will draw some conclusions based on my results and comment on the policy implications involved with these conclusions. In the second part of the chapter I will complete my thesis by posing suggestions for future research.

Part I

From the numerous tests that I performed in the preceding chapters, there were three results that stood out:

- (1) The occurrence of broken families among the non-whites.
- (2) The vast increase in the proportion of broken families actually receiving AFDC.
- (3) The success of the low income families with children in getting on AFDC.

Before I draw any implications from these results I would like to mention a few relevant facts about my testing procedures.

- a.) As I stated a number of times in each of the chapters, the best approach to testing the theories probably would have been to utilize some type of Social Science Statistical Program such as SPSS. In this way, I would have been able to measure

mathematically the importance of each of the indicators. But as also mentioned due to the lack of computer time and available data I was not able to apply this approach. My point is that instead of standardizing the tests for each theory I'm faced with analyzing the results individually then having to comment on the success of each theory individually rather than measuring relative effectiveness. For example, instead of comparing the relative contribution of Moynihan's theory against Gordon's, I'm faced with simply stating that for my data they are both contributing to the welfare crisis.

- b.) Since these theories did involve varying amounts of data it was difficult to determine whether or not my data was similar to the data that authors were using for their results. I'm told this inconsistency of data poses many problems in the field of social science research.

What these two facts about my testing and data imply is

¹
Even if I were able to develop a complex regression analysis techniques, I'm sure that the interpretation would be quite difficult.

that my technique was probably not the most sophisticated ever developed. Therefore, when one interprets my results he must keep this in mind. Although with the data, time and other materials I had available I feel my effort was worthwhile.

In making a conclusion about my results I would have to say that in Massachusetts as in most states nonwhite families have more of a tendency to dissolve. And these families along with a greater number of white families with low income and with children are really making their presence felt on AFDC. Obviously, this is not a profound statement because I'm sure that it has been substantiated before and besides, who is the AFDC program supposed to serve? This brings us to the policy implications involved with these conclusions.

I would like to take different approaches to this problem. I'll call the first approach the WIPE-OUT POLICY and the second the LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLICY. These two approaches represent two extremely different concepts that policy-makers would probably follow in designing programs to deal with the problem.²

² These are strictly personal views.

Wipe-Out Policy

This policy has as its objective to wipe-out the AFDC program as much as possible. It also assumes that broken families³ are an unnatural social phenomena and are closely related to income. So what these policymakers would conclude is that you would keep down the AFDC rolls if you could keep families together. This would leave you with widowed mothers, wives whose husbands have been incapacitated and maybe a few divorce cases. This would obviously result in a drastic decrease in AFDC rolls as my charts in chapter II indicate. But then how would the families be kept together? Subsidization of income? Better jobs? These questions are beyond the scope of my study.

Laissez-Faire Policy

These policymakers would indicate that broken families are bound to occur despite income and that welfare agencies should not be concerned because if there were not a large number of people on AFDC there would be desperate poverty among many families.

I tend to believe a bit of both theories. Namely that

³ These include families which are divorced, separated, deserted or not married to mother.

AFDC should be reduced but some policy has to provide for the care of poorer families with children. Despite the varying objectives both policies focus on one phenomena... "the broken family" therein the solution lies.

And finally despite the varying techniques utilized it is quite difficult to choose from different models which are supposed to represent reality. Even though the model may satisfy many tests you cannot consistently and successfully mechanize human behavior.

Part II

4

(Suggestions for future research)

- A. If studies similar to mine could be performed for different cities throughout the United States I'm sure the results would be quite valuable.
- B. Data bases developed specifically for social science research throughout the United States would make research a much easier task.
- C. Finally and most important, if a standardized testing procedure involving all the independent variables related to welfare could be developed, it would make research in that area much easier.

4

There were many minor specific suggestions that I had throughout my study but the ones below are more generalized.

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