

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE PLANNING AND  
EXECUTION OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN  
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY: A CASE STUDY OF  
PAKISTAN

by  
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
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by Charles George Westwater

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on  
August 14, 1972 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of City Planning.

ABSTRACT

The broad outline of this study concerns development in Pakistan during the critical years 1956-70. My on the scene participation is the coin of vantage for observations, insights, and judgments on events of those years.

Major emphasis is accorded to a large desert reclamation project, the Thal Development Authority, a community in the Abbasia Canal Project, and the urban environment of the city of Bahawalpur. These three areas of my activity offered extensive acquaintance with government, non-government, and foreign personnel.

The impact of their labors and of foreign aid from the United States, the World Bank, and other international bodies, is evaluated in the light of experienced or witnessed events.

The framework for integrating the parts of the study is my own growth as a community organizer, governing as a local mayor, and as a planner for designing, coordinating, and executing diocesan development programs.

The conclusions pertain to the evolution and development of my skills as a planner, and events as they involved the international community. The solicitude of the international community of nations was all out of proportion to the preparedness of Pakistan to assimilate and raises the further question of an international political posture beyond the scope of this study.

Thesis Supervisors: Donald Schon  
Title: Professor

Lisa R. Peattie  
Professor

"A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East".

- Kipling

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## INTRODUCTION

Whatever the wisdom or unwisdom of our nation's involvement in World War II, ambiguity was the lot of the young men who survived. We sought answers to the conflict, and resolved to avoid the errors leading an older generation into two world wars. The war uprooted the provincial aspect of the depression filled lives we knew, and in its aftermath we aspired to the heights. We asked for nothing, and were given the G.I. Bill. It was a time of great personal turmoil, and men decided upon careers unimaginable in the past or foreign to consideration. I wanted to be a marine engineer, but instead became a Catholic priest.

My paternal forbears were mariners for several generations. My grandfather left Scotland as a twelve year old cabin boy. Twenty years and seven shipwrecks later he settled in Boston. My father helped build the largest sailing vessel ever launched, the seven-masted schooner Thomas W. Lawson. Ditty boxes stored in the closet and an occasional visit from half brothers on duty with the fleet in far off Pacific stations fed my boyish imagination. From my mother I inherited an Irish attachment to Catholicism and a grand-nephew relationship to John L. Sullivan, the "Roxbury Strong-boy". My family was steeped in patriotism and a holiday outing often consisted of looking at ships in Boston harbour or visiting historical sites. The same loyalty infused my Catholic faith,

and I identified the democracy of America with christianity. As soon as I reached enlistment age in 1943, I quit high school and joined the navy. In short, I was a young man of sensitive and altruistic beliefs.

Even as I write this prologue I am engulfed with a multitude of conflicting emotions concerning those years. The war had burst bonds of family and friends, as well as catapulting me from milk shakes to scotch and soda. A man does not dive-bomb battleships at 18 years of age and retain his innocence. The experience radicalized me to a need for answers and an understanding that has since motivated my life. Why do young men die? . . . and old men love? Where can the camaraderie of combat be found in a world without war? Why war?


For two years following the end of hostilities I engaged in a number of temporary jobs while searching and seeking an alternative to madness. More from inner compulsion than reflective deliberation, I applied for admission into the Dominican Order. The ensuing eight years of monastic environment exposed me to the ancient truths of philosophy and theology. They were difficult years of monastic discipline, and aggravated by my own unresolved inner conflicts. The opening of a Pakistan mission field in the spring of 1956 offered a unique opportunity for release from monastic confinement and a fresh approach to my personal quest. I volunteered and was selected

in company with three other men.

My initial enthusiasm was intensified by the scarcity of available information about Pakistan. The most primitive of environments was envisioned, and I tried to learn the rudiments of medicine, dentistry, and engineering in three months. The 21-day voyage by freighter to Karachi and the 600-mile trip upcountry via jeep confirmed my imaginative expectations. With only a fortnight's residency in the nation, I was assigned to a new settlement in the Thal Desert. The following pages describe the history of that settlement, the planned development of West Pakistan as I witnessed it during the fourteen year period from late 1956 to early 1970, and the unfolding of my own role as an active agent in the development process. The content of memory and factual occurrences are the source material for interpreting my change in role. The events took place; their significance for this study lies in the accumulated impact on myself.

This is not a story of concise and elaborate historical detail; it is the personal odyssey of one man. A number of other men, both ecclesiastical and secular of diverse nationalities, contributed to the substance of this experience. They are only indirectly responsible for the judgments contained herein. This is not meant to be a polemic or an indictment, but rather a sincere effort to arrive at the truth

of my participation in a critical period of development in West Pakistan. My perceptions and insights, my actions and errors, constitute the framework for viewing events. The idealism that animated me, my value system, and my underlying motivation can be best realized by repeating: I am a man in bondage to questions proposed in my youth. Such a description does not beg the question of bias, but better enables the reader in his understanding and acceptance of my motives. World War II channeled my youthful idealism into the priesthood; the priesthood animated my activity in Pakistan; the experience of Pakistan is the substance of this thesis.



IN THE BEGINNING

# I

## IN THE BEGINNING

Of all the landscapes where men choose to live, the desert is depicted as the least hospitable. Mountains inspire, plains hold promise, oceans fascinate, and jungles challenge.. Deserts, on the other hand, are without life and seemingly without love. But deserts have a peculiar attraction for a certain class of people. Every great religious leader, prophet, mystic, or seeker of spiritual truth has been enamoured by the desert. The desert of this story was just such a place for my ministry as a Catholic priest, and it had a history that long preceded my arrival.

To the peasant farmer of the Punjab Province of West Pakistan, the area called the "Thal" has from time immemorial been synonymous with a wasteland. And indeed, the word is a Sanskrit derivative with exactly that meaning. This swath of desert some 200 miles long and 40 miles wide bordering the eastern reaches of the Indus River on the central plains of West Pakistan is remarkably naked of history. Unlike the other river areas in the sub-continent that can boast an ancient or lost civilization and archeological findings, the Thal has been of interest only to the local inhabitants and until recent times the occasional geologist.

This latter awareness is accounted for by a rich alluvial deposit of soil. Test holes over 900 feet deep show no

significant change in character of the material with depth, and no bedrock has been encountered. Geological considerations indicate that the alluvium may be several thousands of feet thick.<sup>1</sup> This centuries old endowment of the Indus River, as it flowed down from its feedbed in the Himalayas and fanned back and forth across the Punjab plains on its 2000-mile journey to the Arabian Seas, is the wealth of the Thal. A hundred years ago, a civil officer was able to report: "There is no doubt that the Indus did flow down the Thal at one time. I have seen a deed of sale in which Basira, a village in the center of the Thal and equidistant from the Indus and Chenab Rivers, is described as Bet Bet Basira, which signifies the 'edge of the river'."<sup>2</sup>

Recorded history of the few settlements that eked out a livelihood on the river's edge are scarce when not completely non-existent. A scholarly government official told me of a remote village in the northern reaches of the Thal where the men cut their hair so that a lock reached below the earlobe and then curled up. No other village had such a custom, and the only accountable relationship for the practice were the images on ancient Greek coins. Possibly a soldier or camp follower from Alexander's army, marching on its world conquest down the Indus Valley, settled there.

For a few centuries preceding the advent of British

colonialism, a number of nomadic tribes built settlements and claimed vast areas of the Thal for grazing lands. Unlike the Sikh, who conquered and ruled the northern reaches of the Punjab, these dwellers were for the most part too busy fighting the natural elements, when not engaged in conflict with one another, to seek a united rule. Some of these early desert settlements were fortified garrisons and must have been used as trading posts for caravans on their way to the more settled and civilized cities of the Punjab.<sup>3</sup> Such a sparse history is in keeping with the death valley environment so expressive of the Thal and little different from my first exposure. An observant colonial official in the last century aptly described the brutal and harsh nature of the Thal as it affected the people who lived there:

"The prevailing note among the Thal people is their poverty--poverty not only of resource, but also of enterprise and intelligence. A continual struggle with Nature in her most niggard and capricious mood leaves them too exhausted for any other effort. They will not enlist (in the Army), nor take any kind of service, and admit their lack of enterprise with the excuse that they are camelhearted. There is indeed much truth in that comparison, for they have to undertake an immense amount of the dullest kind of labor and on the poorest of diets and for the meanest of rewards.

"How arduous the lives of these people must be, only those who have experienced the scorching sun and devastating sandstorms of the Thal can realize. But the poverty of the Thal carries some compensation in the health enjoyed by its inhabitants, and the age of their men and the strength of their women are a byword in the Thal. Indeed, it is the poverty of poor living only, for there is never any actual famine; and in the worst of times, temporary migration is no real hardship to a half-nomadic people. But they always hark back to the Thal, for their primitive instincts are not yet trained to a civilization which is embellished by the tax collector and court orderly."<sup>4</sup>

As far back as 1870, the government recognized the potential of the Thal. The first known draft for developing an irrigation system was called the "Andrews Plan". It was limited in scope, but it did perform the salutary service of making Thal development explicit. From that time on, hardly a decade passed without another such development scheme being proposed. By the first decade of the present century, all the necessary survey maps of land elevation, existing settlements, and caravan routes were completed.<sup>5</sup> Rearmament of the British empire in preparation for the coming conflict of World War I and its depressing aftermath effectively shelved Thal project proposals for the first third of this century. Finally, in

1939 at the close of the depression years and on the eve of World War II, an irrigation scheme designed for reclaiming half the Thal was implemented. The exigencies of WW II curtailed this scheme after some Rs. 100 million had been expended and about 1500 miles of an irrigation system excavated. It must have been a heartbreaking decision, because the outlay of capital and the effort expended was truly phenomenal considering the poverty of available resources in the Punjab and the climatic conditions during execution.

To speculate on the inspiration and driving force of this first Thal scheme would undoubtedly lead to the statistical analysis of land holdings in the Punjab at the time. An inquiry in 1939 showed that broadly one out of every five owners in the Punjab owned less than one cultivated acre, one in two less than five acres. So small were the owners' holdings that over 50 percent land revenue averaged less than Rs. 2 (about 40¢). The first Thal scheme under British auspices was meant to help rectify this economic and social imbalance.<sup>6</sup>

There is little available data on the first stage of this massive Thal reclamation scheme except that by 1949 only 88,000 acres of land in the 500,000 prepared were being irrigated. The remainder had silted up and colonization had ceased.

\* \* \* \* \*



DIGGING WATER COURSES

The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II signalled the end of the British Empire, and the once undivided sub-continent of India. The colonial masters reluctantly presided over the sudden birth of Pakistan. The social tribulations and cultural cleavage surrounding the independence of Pakistan indelibly birthmarked this newcomer to the family of nations. The Thal project when reactivated bore this stigma throughout its official life, and no segment of the new nation escaped its burden.

With the mass migration of mostly landless peasants into Pakistan during the 1947 partition from India, population pressure on agricultural lands of the Punjab drastically increased. In the already over-crowded district of Lyallpur, there was a growth of 20% from immigration. In addition, there was the disruption of established irrigation operations consequent upon some headwaters lying in India and the canal network in Pakistan. The resulting impasse nearly brought the two nations to armed conflict and was only remedied by the Indus Waters Treaty some years later. But by far and away, the most crippling difficulty was administrative.

The emigrating Hindus and Sikhs who left Pakistan during the upheaval of partition in 1947 were the knowledgeable merchants, accomplished businessmen, and skilled professionals. Every public and private institution was affected; government

departments, universities, hospitals, and research stations, all were deprived of their supervisory personnel. Managerial staff for banks and insurance companies were severely depleted when not completely curtailed, and municipal services almost ground to a halt. The administrative machinery of government was represented by about 100 middle range officials of the former Indian Civil Service; and their desks were packing cases, while crates served for chairs. It is with this background of almost total disintegration of administration that Pakistan as a new nation embarked upon reconstruction and development.<sup>7</sup>

In early 1949 an advisory board was formed to evaluate and counsel government on the reactivation of the Thal project. The Board requested the individual departments of agriculture, forestry, and colonization to submit reports detailing their possible activities and needs. On the basis of these reports, three specialized committees were set up under the aegis of the Board in order to formulate and submit to government a new Thal project. The first of these committees advised the Board concerning land utilization with special emphasis on non-commanded areas, another committee prepared a colonization program detailing the types of colonists and the conditions of their settlement, while the remaining committee drew up plans for mechanization needs in the new project area. The sum of

these reports constituted the basis for the government Act later in the year that formally established the Thal Development Authority (hereafter referred to as "T.D.A.").<sup>8</sup>

Just as the preliminary organization of T.D.A. required the involvement of the concerned government departments, so also the legally promulgated Board of T.D.A. comprised a representation from these same government departments. Of the seven members on the Board, three were from the civil districts of administration encompassed by T.D.A. It is a significant fact for anyone concerned with the planning process in a developing country.

All the existing government departments concerned with the T.D.A. project were involved in its formulation, and members from each of these same departments comprised the Board responsible for the execution of T.D.A. No super-agency was formed, something greater than the totality of its parts; no disruption of existing departmental structures occurred; and there were no overlapping lines of authority to inhibit execution. Rather, the Board was envisioned as an instrument for implementing a project requiring multi-departmental cooperation. These departments had a hundred years of experience in projects of similar scope and could be relied upon to execute the T.D.A. scheme expeditiously and efficiently. What would plague T.D.A. would be a combination of circumstances and

events completely outside the design of the organization.

It is remarkable that T.D.A. as a project was begun in 1949 considering the lack of administrators, technicians, planners, and professionals throughout the nation. Within a year, the shortage of such administrative personnel began to be felt in T.D.A. To somewhat offset a growing disparity between what was happening and what had been envisaged, official reports took refuge in sophisticated economic analysis. Statistics were offered for actual performance, and individual departments succumbed to the new approach. Implementation sputtered, sputtered, and subsided. T.D.A. stagnated and no one seemed concerned.

A comparable situation had arisen on the national scene. Planning as such had been part of Pakistan's colonial heritage, but a breakdown occurred with the upheaval of partition and the reduced effectiveness of every institution in the society from lack of qualified personnel. To merely maintain a minimum of operating efficiency in all government departments proved a herculean effort; and when this scarce resource was siphoned off into other more profitable careers in society, nothing could prevent a further breakdown in the quality of administration. Small wonder that the actual project achievements of the nation in the first few years following partition were very loosely integrated. Projects like the Thal were

carried on because of the momentum and work done prior to partition, rather than from any effective national planning program.<sup>9</sup>

The first impetus to coordinated national planning had come from the member countries responsible for the Colombo Plan. Under their aegis, a six year program beginning in 1950 was compiled in the brief space of three months and adopted by government. The plan consisted of a carryover of projects like T.D.A. or project proposals still on the drawing boards; and it made such optimistic prognostications as a 30% increase in the living standard without any substantiating evidence.<sup>10</sup> The outbreak of the Korean War and its economic rewards to Pakistan obviated any critical examination of the plan.

A whole host of changes took place during the five year period covering most of this attempt at national planning. Planning procedures and substitute committees were legislated, planning objectives and allocation of funds changed; but despite it all, by 1954 there was remarkable growth in industry. However, this better than threefold growth in industrial assets had its counterweight by further aggravating political cleavages in the nation. The use of scarce managerial, technical and skilled personnel to achieve an industrial base created a whole new class of wealthy entrepreneurs. In a society where land possession was traditionally considered the

source of wealth, this new sense of riches to be quickly made in industry distracted the policymakers from the essential needs of agriculture. Failure to correct the imbalance between agriculture and industry was bound to weaken the not too strong political leadership of the nation and endorse exploitation by the new class of industrialists. An Economic Appraisal Committee in 1954 merely glossed over this fact in its report by saying: "...initially, this was unavoidable and did not prove harmful, because the field of development was so large and the needs so obvious that any project was bound to bring in substantial benefits."<sup>11</sup> It is an arguable thesis that robber barons must be created to expedite national growth; but at this early state, it was at least tolerable.<sup>12</sup>

Of more significant import was the Committee's appraisal of introducing foreign advisers in the planning stages. Although the "constitution of a planning group of technical experts has been suggested by some foreign experts, in order to undertake planning in various sectors", the Committee felt that "considering the shortage of qualified persons in the country and other limitations, the existing organization and the procedure for its working appear on the right lines."<sup>13</sup> It was an observation that in retrospect should have been adhered to. Instead, the idea of a five-year plan preempted all other approaches, and the existing procedures of an almost ad

hoc presentation of projects every year were abandoned. This latter approach was much more in accordance with the nation's character. The change in course of planning coincided with the entry of foreign advisers to the Planning Board. From 1954 until the late 1960's, the national planning effort was in greater or lesser measure formed, guided, controlled, influenced, and implemented to a responsible degree by this body of men.

The introduction of fulltime foreign advisers and periodic assignments of consultants coincided with attempts to draft a five-year plan for the period of 1955-1960. The number of advisers on the national planning board was between eight and twelve: small in number, but extremely capable and effective. Considering the lack of qualified personnel on the part of the host country, it was inevitable that these foreign advisers and consultants would shoulder the burden of planning work.

"Most of the advisers and consultants were general economists, but there were also specialists in agricultural economics, industrial engineering, irrigation, power, social services, housing, manpower and public administration. They came from colleges and universities, governmental organizations, and private business. Although most were from the United States, others came from Europe and other parts of the world. The level of competence was high, although none of the first

advisers had had planning experience in underdeveloped countries."<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan had become the world's sixth largest nation at the time of its cleavage from India. The efforts of its founders were so totally concentrated on this political objective that little thought had been expended on the development of the new nation. The will to achieve nationhood was considered sufficient for solving subsequent problems. The inadequacy of this approach was further compounded by an excessive loss of trained organizational, managerial, and technical personnel during partition. This twin disadvantage stifled national planning efforts and crippled the T.D.A. project. Inevitably, while the leadership of the nation muddled through, the people carried the burden. This was nowhere more true than in the colonization of the Thal.

The official Thal Handbook publicly declared: "By the close of the third year, the Thal had lost all that horror which had prevented people from even thinking of developing this tract. The Thal lands were now coveted, both canal irrigated and those outside the command area".<sup>15</sup> The actual conditions were far different for large sections of T.D.A. Lands allocated in the year the Handbook was written lacked water for irrigation, had no medical or educational facilities available for the settlers, and were plagued by official

indifference which resulted in large numbers of settlers deserting their lands due to excessive hardships. A few years later, the Government set up a committee to investigate the lack of performance in the Thal. What was expected to be a million acre settlement scheme in six years turned out to be less than half that amount, and no different than if the colonists had been left to themselves.<sup>16</sup> No public report ever detailed the causes for the disparity between expectations and results in T.D.A.

It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the primal defect of the new nation, namely lack of trained cadres in every department of government and national institution, impaired colonization efforts. My story begins and is inextricably linked to the progress of colonization in the Thal.





FIG. 1 WEST PAKISTAN



ENLARGED SECTION  
VIEW  
THAL DEVELOPMENT  
AUTHORITY

FIG. 2

## II

## ON THE JOB TRAINING

To encourage and begin colonization of 1,427,900 acres of canal irrigated land in T.D.A., government offered tracts of land at minimum cost to a number of groups within the nation. These were former personnel from WW II and the military services in general, minority religious sects, tribal units from the hills, and refugees from the recent partition of Pakistan and India. First colonization efforts proceeded apace but soon slackened because of brutal environmental conditions and a badly administered colonization program. Colonization outlay was insignificant; resources were expended for physical features of the project, not for people. Unless a man has experienced the climatic extreme of 130 degrees of heat in the Thal Desert, he will have difficulty understanding the strain upon men, the problem of animal husbandry, and the need for help. The colonist was harassed by government agents for being absent from lands that could not produce because water was not available, and the responsible canal official was more interested in keeping records than keeping colonists on their lands. Desertion and absenteeism retarded settlement of T.D.A.; still, most colonists remained because possession of land was almost a substitute for God.

Land ownership has a near mystical infatuation for the rural millions of the East. Possession of land, even if less

than an acre, relates its owner directly to the feudal structure of village society; everyone else has a serfdom status. This universal fixation on land ownership expressed itself in a number of ways, not the least being the high rate of murder in the Punjab, or as the proverb put the reasons for crime: "zamine, pani, zananni" - land, water, women.

This passionate desire of poor people to possess land prompted the Catholic diocese of Multan to petition the Pakistan government for a land grant and colonization rights in the Thal. A year and a half passed before the Catholic christian minority village and its future inhabitants were decided upon. These first allottees numbered about sixty and had been selected from the fifteen political districts of the Punjab. Many of the character recommendations accompanying the land applications of these first allottees were of less than a complimentary character. In some minds the Thal was equated with an ideal penal colony for dissident residents. With few exceptions, these christian settlers had come from the tenant farmer class which would in a decade be identified throughout the nation with the disreputable occupation of "sweeper". But they came to the Thal, and they stayed, when many other comparable groups deserted after the first several months of difficulties. The christians had the advantage of unexcelled leadership in the person of a middle aged Indian Catholic

priest, Fr. Thomas Concessao of the Dominican Order. He was thoroughly conversant with the people, their language, and their culture. As one farmer later described him, "He knew our thoughts before we had them".

The first settlers came to the desert without their families. On an appointed day, they met Fr. Thomas at a railway junction some eighteen miles distant from their newly assigned village. They then travelled this distance on foot and came across a scene as desolate as Death Valley. There was only one scrub-like tree in their eighteen hundred acres of rolling sand dunes. Their day of arrival was the 11th of February 1954, a day whose memory the people still retain and hold in the same reverence as Americans do the 4th of July. In a very true sense, this was the birthday of Chak 270 T.D.A., Loreto Village.

Under the most brutal of environmental hardships, Fr. Thomas initially settled a village nucleus of sixty men onto fifteen acre plots; these men were later joined by their families. The settlers immediately encountered the single physical hardship of all desert dwellers--water. About 10 percent of all the artificially irrigated land in the world lies in the Punjab. Without a steady supply of canal water from government constructed canals, the richness that is the Punjab would quickly revert to a wasteland. In the entire village



DESERT LIFE STREAM


scene, water exerts the greatest influence on the allegiance of men, their personal loyalties, and private opinions. As the Punjabi peasant says: "The three most important things in the desert are water, water, water, and in that order."

The christian village shared with countless others a breakdown of administration in the allocation of irrigation water. The one saving strength of the christians was a high quality of local leadership in the person of Fr. Thomas. It could only be a partially compensating factor, because for two years he was unable to obtain an adequate supply of irrigation water. This defect in canal irrigation frustrated everyone and created untold hardships in the first summer of unbearable heat. By the end of two years, development of the christian settlement was at a standstill, with little expectation that things would change. The situation was further aggravated by the discouragement of Fr. Thomas and his request for a transfer from the Thal. I was his replacement.

The bishop deemed ordination to the priesthood and eight years of study in the philosophical and theological disciplines suitable requisites for the assignment. My ignorance of the local language, customs, culture, and even geographic whereabouts, did not inhibit the choice. By profession and aptitude, I was designated a spiritual leader in a society that revered holy men; all other labors were considered


distractions and incidental to that calling. I early voiced the need to do something more and quoted the maxim "an empty belly has no ears", but was admonished about engagement in the social order. Within a fortnight, the village men petitioned and obtained my appointment by government as "lomberdar", or village mayor. Government traditionally selected the religious leader of a christian community as secular head with the tacit agreement that his role would be nominal. The situation confronting me demanded an entirely different interpretation of that mandate. I was thirty years of age and eager to solve the riddle of poverty.

The government designation of the village was Chak 270 T.D.A., and she was named "Loreto" in honor of a famous christian shrine. My first steps toward solution of the problems facing the village were strictly a gut reaction to basic social needs. Not knowing the language and baffled by the newness of the social structure--where food, shelter, and clothing habits were foreign to me--I found the practice of medicine an undisguised blessing. The diagnoses came under the major headings of malaria, typhoid, trachoma, pneumonia, small pox, tuberculosis, and of course malnutrition. Within two months I was assisting in delivering children, extracting teeth, and performing minor surgery. I quickly learned and was called upon to practice as an itinerant doctor for the



LORETO CHAK 270 T.D.A.

INDEX PLAN OF CHAK N<sup>o</sup> 270 T.D.A.



I. B. A. K. Qureshi.  
D. 2-10-59

FIG. 3

## CANAL IRRIGATION AND CROP PATTERNS IN LORETO VILLAGE

Water Course	Acreage		Discharge	Total Acreage
	Kharif	Rabi		
I	147	295	1.85 Cusecs	610
II	148	295	1.31	630
III	131	263	.97	570

## Productivity for 1966

Rabi		Kharif	
<u>crop</u>	<u>acreage</u>	<u>crop</u>	<u>acreage</u>
vegetables	3.82	sugar cane	171.50
oil seeds	7.03	vegetables	4.57
forestry	9.18	tobacco	.18
wheat	522.75	cotton, melons, etc;	30.44
grams	16.53	forestry	9.18
fodder	19.59	bajra & maize	27.03
empty	2.00	fodder	75.57
Total	580.90	Total	318.47

Total Gross Value of Rabi Crop:-----66,662.50 Rs.

Total Gross Value of Kharif Crop:-----69,396.80 Rs.

Gross Value of 1966 Crops:-----136,059.30 Rs.

Net Value of 1966 Crops after water cost and cultivation  
expenses have been deducted:-----45,053.00 Rs.

Net Profit Per Acre Irrigated:-----50.00 Rs.

area.<sup>17</sup>

It afforded me a rare opportunity to learn on the job. Dirt roads, desert tracks, short cuts, and all the myriad ways that small settlements connect and communicate with each other were discovered. Unlike the older and more settled areas of the Punjab, the Thal colonists came from every ethnic caste and tribal group in the nation. I spent desert nights in skin tents with migratory peoples from Afghanistan, bargained with Pataahn traders, medicated partition refugees from India, sang songs with Punjabi children, and broke bread with the poorest peasants. The only demand put upon me, beyond a minimum of medical assistance, was compassion. The poor man's one unforgivable indictment is summed up in two words: "sakt dil", hardhearted.

The immediacy with which I was assigned to this struggling community had its very positive advantages. My preconceived notions of life in the sub-continent were fully verified, and the learning process began in a primitive social environment. Any mistake would be swallowed up in the overall picture of problems, and survival for the community required a leadership responsive to elemental human needs rather than an expertise in governing. No one could second guess my actions because the difficulties permitted the widest latitude of approach. Even the bizarre ideas of buying shoes for the



*THE LOT OF MILLIONS*

people, purchasing supplies of vegetables and meat for the whole village, building houses, and constructing communal cattle sheds could be tolerated. The fact that a foreigner would choose to live under such conditions became a defense for eccentricity with other missionaries.

The Catholic Church has five dioceses administering to the ecclesiastical needs of its adherents who constitute one percent of the population in West Pakistan. For the most part, the concentration of personnel is in the schools, and these schools cater to the elite stratas of the society. Tradition and finance dictated this policy, and the sincere efforts to administer to the other needs of the people were always circumscribed by these constraints. Such a policy curtailed much of the social concern of young missionaries and caused conflicts in the ranks. The social order and the complexities arising from partition posed issues beyond the grasp of traditional policy procedures. Extremely dedicated missionary people performed social works in a variety of ways, but no concerted policy beyond the gospel injunction to "feed the hungry and clothe the naked" was promulgated.

Experienced mission personnel doubted the ability of an American to long endure the trials of the Thal, while encouraging the effort and admiring the new approach. The village people of Loreto wrote a petition to the bishop upon the transfer

of Fr. Thomas and voiced their fears of the unlearned man replacing him. The basic attribute no one considered, and which soon became apparent, was my near ecstasy in a situation proximate to chaos. A challenge other men dream of had become mine to mold and fashion. Notwithstanding the rats running across my bed at night in the adobe dwelling, nor the sickness of the people and the awful sterility of the desert, I experienced the elation of a connoisseur drinking rare wine.

Living by myself posed no real problem. There was too much to do and too little time in which to do it. With a hundred mile distance separating me from my colleagues, I substituted a rapport of confidence with two village leaders. Both were former soldiers, and both conspired to subvert one another. It proved to be a raw edged experience of how the political process works on a primitive level, and I slowly learned the rudiments of leadership. It was helped immeasurably by the structure of family life as it is practiced in the Punjab.

The Punjabis are mostly peasant farmers for whom there is one and only one social reality, the family. The family was composed of all one's blood relatives, including distant cousins, aunts, and uncles, an extended clan with a genealogy traced through paternity. They were bound by an unwritten but all demanding and complex series of rules governing one's

relations and responsibilities to their own family. All other social institutions were seen within a spectrum of attitudes ranging from indifference to rivalry and enmity.

A member of the family had absolute responsibilities to family superiors and absolute rights to be demanded from subordinates in the hierarchy. All ambiguous situations were arbitrated by the head of the family, a position held within each household by the father until it was given to--or taken away by--one of the sons, invariably the male "elder". The Punjabi showed calculated respect to members of other families which were powerful, and haughtiness or indifference towards families less powerful than his own. Thus, the Punjabi survived a harsh history of invasion, conquest, and colonization by a procession of tribal rulers, oriental despots, and colonial masters. The unique family pattern of the Punjab constitutes the real sovereignty of that province, regardless of what regime rules, and that dictum holds true today.

It was my good fortune to be ignorant of these underlying relationships, and be by disposition warmly affectionate with children. Children received priority of medical care, and enjoyed a school milk feeding program supplemented by vitamins from UNICEF. Supplies of food and clothing from Catholic Relief Services were doled out according to the number of children in a family, and festive events meant the

distribution of gifts to children. I spent long periods of time amusing children with a hand puppet, playing a harmonica in their midst, and teaching them hand tricks. They in turn taught me their native songs, the rudiments of the Punjabi dialect, and the lore of village life. Before long they understood my faltering speech and became my means for conversing with their elders. The parents all too often were killing themselves to live, while the children were starving for affection. I was able to supply the material wants of the first, and enjoy the emotional response of the second. The village people in return judged me free from desire of personal gain at their expense and unreservedly dedicated to improving their lot.

Coupled with this process of learning was the acquisition and distribution of relief supplies on a large scale. There is probably no aspect of humanitarian impulse more single in purpose and more difficult in execution. It could hardly be otherwise, when even the very cardboard boxes containing milk powder, the bailing wire on clothes bundles, and empty wheat bag, has a ready utility and a price. It was not uncommon to see children playing on the desert floor with a pair of britches made from an empty flour bag clearly stenciled on the backside, "Gift of the American people; not to be sold or exchanged; use no hooks". Contrary to law, relief

supplies often ended up in the open market and caused grief for aid officials; but the real problem lay in getting such goods to that segment of society in need of them. Tons of such supplies entered the economy in devious ways or rotted on the docks and in warehouses for lack of proper storage and distribution facilities.<sup>18</sup>

No account of village life in the Punjab is complete without a description of the climate which so influences the character of the people. For all practical purposes, there are really only two seasons: summer and winter. When the first hot days begin in late April or early May, every westerner begins to make plans to leave the plains for the more comfortable hill stations. The first month or so of heat is bearable with city temperatures recorded between 110 and 120 degrees (fahrenheit), but the compensating factor of electricity and fans makes it tolerable. In the villages, only human endurance can account for the ability to sustain thermometer readings that can climb to 130 degrees. By ten o'clock in the morning, most work ceases and travel becomes an exhausting effort. Children with their bare calloused feet cannot walk a ten-foot stretch of open ground without alighting under some shade or dropping a copybook to stand on. Afternoon siestas are contests of sheer will power, and the body works overtime just to perspire. When prickly heat sears

the flesh, nature has reached the perfection of the penitential hairshirt. The welcome desert breeze turns into a cursed sandstorm, and dust enters every conceivable crevice, giving rise to eye infections, skin sores, and choked-up lungs.<sup>19</sup>

Winter comes like a thief in the night. One day a man wears a shirt, and overnight he's wrapped in a blanket. It signals the advent of malaria season soon to be followed by pneumonia and general distress for lack of wheat or the money to buy it. In the summer, the peasant can find refuge under the shade of a tree and comfort in the knowledge that the recent spring harvest supplies him his daily bread. In the winter, he shivers from inadequate clothing, and feels hunger for days on end. He will take the one meal prepared for himself and share it with his children, but must close the door to the begging stranger. Sickness will compound his nightmare, and he treats tragedy as a custom. He'll watch his wheat grow and judge eventual salvation or continued sorrow by its proximity to harvest. In the villages, winter weeds out the stragglers of life that populate the unmarked graveyards.<sup>20</sup>

This first winter of 1956-57 was the seeding ground for learning and sustaining the settlers with massive outlays of food and clothing from U. S. relief supplies. Distribution encompassed half a dozen adjacent villages and people coming

from distances up to thirty miles seeking assistance. Any and all surplus supplies in the diocese were commandeered and distributed. But the paramount need was to increase irrigation water, and nothing proved more time consuming or frustrating than efforts expended seeking to arouse irrigation officials. I personally confronted a canal overseer with the written record of daily water flow as registered by him for one distributary with the witnessed fact that no water had been in the lower reaches of the canal in six months. He merely shrugged his shoulders in complete indifference. It could hardly be otherwise when his superior officer, the highest ranking irrigation official in the area, held a handkerchief to his nose when walking through a peasant village reduced to squalor from his own official inaction.

Under conditions rampant in the Thal, government on all levels was either already too burdened, too scattered, or just plain lethargic to effectively assist the villages. The case of Loreto village is unique only because it was made known. There were a dozen other villages on the same eighteen mile length of government canal in dire straits. The first step to clarify the problem was to obtain maps.

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SCENES FROM VILLAGE LIFE



The written word is held in high esteem amongst illiterate people, but it is nothing compared to the reverence peasant farmers reserve for maps. Until a map can be shown, much like evidence in a court, no government official will take interest, other than to offer a sympathetic ear to the complaints of village people. My first efforts to obtain an irrigation map took all of eight months. Trying to interpret it proved a hopeless task until an engineer explained the arcane wording, numbers, and symbols.

When the map was deciphered, it showed a blatant error in the original alignment and construction of the canal. Many letters were written to the irrigation authorities; government engineers were solicited for a visit; administrative officials were apprised of the difficulties; and all to no avail. The estimated cost for repair and alignment of the canal was Rs. 50,000, about \$10,000. It was a sum of money no locally responsible official cared to allocate.

The lack of irrigation water threatened the survival of the village. Large amounts of foreign aid relief supplies were distributed as a temporary relief measure to all the affected villages. Such remedial action highlighted the need of an engineering solution to the problem. For officialdom, the canal in question was only an eighteen-mile stretch in a complex network of several thousand miles of canals. The size of

the reclamation project and the distances involved compounded the problem of official inaction. Lack of roads and the remoteness of the area made it difficult for them to inspect at the site. When official assurances were given, they remained unfulfilled. The problem did not appear to be of such grievous importance to local officialdom. However, for the four or five villages affected by lack of water, government disinterest was tantamount to disaster. Recourse was finally made to the highest irrigation engineer in the province, the Deputy Chief Engineer. He visited the site and commented, "This canal is in worse condition than you described." He immediately allocated government funds for a complete excavation and true alignment of the canal. The critical mark of village survival or dissolution had been passed.

After acquisition of the irrigation map, a similar effort was made to acquire two other essential maps. The first one detailed the individual land holdings of the settlers as allocated by government. Approval from local authorities and bureaucratic intransigency, coupled with misinformation on government records, presented formidable obstacles to obtaining this map. At the same time, a village site map of 120 acres was requested. It marked off the area for village housing, roads, school grounds, and all other allied facilities for a new settlement. In both cases, the same perplexing

difficulties arose and only after persistent effort over many months were the maps obtained.

The three maps are as follows:

1. Irrigation Map - All the information of water rights, land levels, and water distribution are on this map.
2. Land Allotment Map - This map detailed the significant data of individual land holdings, boundaries, and land rights.
3. Village Site Map - The exact location of homes, streets, shops, and other community facilities are reported on this map.

The maps, when once certified by an official signature and government stamp, became the sole arbiters of spatial arrangement for the village people. If the map showed a water course directly transversing a field, then the men would have stormy arguments for its implementation. Of course, such disputes were many times rooted in the quest to have more than a fair share of water or desire to steal a few feet of another man's land. The same was true of the map for the village site, with its determinations of who lived on the house plots allotted. It was an extremely critical feature, because there were always more people desiring to live in the village than the land would accommodate. The maps settled this apportionment of rights.

Very few of the men could read a map; but all were shrewd enough, when in possession of a map, to interrogate the occasional government visitor or tax collector as to its meaning. The maps were sometimes made of poor grade paper and from much wear would lose recognized meaning except that the people had memorized them. When this occurred, men would seem to understand the thread of an argument even though the main prop was deficient. Only when a serious matter arose, in which many men had a stake, would the map again take on its original symbolic importance. Eventually, the three mentioned maps were printed on vellum paper and framed to obviate any doubts when the maps were consulted.

No change could be made on a map once it was duly certified by the government. A change in the map would require almost total unanimity on the part of the farmers and comparable cooperation on the side of government officials. In cases of death, sale of landed property, or inheritance, only the title of possession changed; the physical boundaries and water rights as determined by the maps remained inviolable. Visiting officials or the occasional policeman would request the maps to familiarize themselves with the village or seek to arbitrate a dispute. Most of the time, however, local grievances were settled by the farmers themselves on the basis of the maps as understood and interpreted by them.

Often in the early evening, after the farmers returned from the fields and the long periods of men talking amongst themselves ensued, someone would ask for the maps. To this day I am somewhat at a loss for the definitive answer. Maybe it can be accounted for by the deeply imbued admiration for the feats of English engineers during their days of empire. Bridges were built, roads constructed, canals excavated, and whole areas of new villages settled. Maps must have been in great evidence by the "white sahibs"; and the lesson was not lost on these simple peasant people. Whatever the reason, maps are the silent guardians of the peace, and like constitutions to a nation, maps are the written witness of law for village people.

Even while coping with the problem of canal irrigation, I was laying the groundwork for a subsidized housing program. Other mission personnel of long residency in the nation considered it a give-away program, but the bishop had no objection as long as I could finance it from private subscription. It eventually proved to be the most unique of all the remarkable features of Loreto village. This includes the difference of design, the procedures for construction, and the spatial arrangement on the land allotted by government for this purpose. This prescribed area was excluded from agricultural use and called the village site. In the case of Loreto village,

it comprised 120 acres of rolling sand dunes in nowise distinguishable from the rest of the barren desert. Three or four stone markers placed by government surveyors, and often hidden by slight shifts of sand, served as boundary signs.

The first settlers were too hard pressed for minimum subsistence to have concern about the spatial arrangement of their future village site. All efforts were concentrated on obtaining adequate irrigation water for agricultural needs. The single handpump installed at the base of the most commanding sand dune served the needs of both people and animals. It also marked the temporary location of the village site; an acre of slum in the middle of the desert. Their primitive hovels housing entire families and their animals bred sickness and disease, as well as highlighted the hopelessness of the new settlers. The people and animals were huddled so close that if one man had a cold the rest soon would be coughing. It was a situation proximate to despair.

The first step taken to remedy this social calamity was to obtain the official map of the village site. Its very size of 120 acres made it unique, because most village sites rarely exceeded half that size. However, government recognized the commitment of christians to the cause of education and doubled the original allotment, while at the same time giving carte blanche for development.

I drew up several plans for street layout, house plots, and various community facilities. Only the vaguest of ideas as to what constituted planning guided me. To unperturbably envisage the future for one hundred and twenty acres of apparent wasteland seemed incompatible with the more immediate needs of food, shelter, clothing, and water supply for irrigation. The village site took shape on a piecemeal basis.

The first structure built was a five-room lomberdar's residence. Its location was a random happening; the site was "convenient" (By such capricious actions are future cities founded!). The local mason turned architect and built the house without specific plans and by instinctive skill. Funds for the construction of this building had been allocated by the bishop, and payment to the struggling farmers for their labor supplemented the dole of relief supplies. The house was completed in the spring of 1957 and for the next four years served as the church, additional classroom space, village dispensary, and meeting hall for all official village and government business.

My activities although tolerated were increasingly the subject of concern to my bishop. Funds diverted from prescribed goals of diocesan policy were not lightly tolerated, and any diocesan money invested in construction had to show clear diocesan title for the finished product. Relief

supplies received from government agencies constituted the largest single outlay of goods not pertaining to diocesan finance, and objections arose when the storage of such supplies or their distribution involved diocesan funds beyond a bare minimum. I was spending money for transport and storage of relief supplies far beyond the established norms of the diocese, and openly advocated larger investments on schemes for improving the people's welfare. These pertained to installation of pumps for drinking water, subsidized housing, new agricultural implements and storage facilities for the village farmers, tube-wells for irrigation supplement, and grain grinding machinery to ease the labor of the village women. The bishop permitted funds acquired by private subscription to be used for these purposes, but my sources for such assistance supplied only a fraction of the need. Development agencies that subsidized projects in the social order were unknown to me at the time, so I tentatively resolved the dilemma of financing social programs by juggling the monthly accounts and relying on the benignity of my bishop.

Nothing better typified mission mentality than the use of money and ignorance of finances. Our Dominican headquarters in New York approved a yearly budget for the mission and collected funds for that purpose. Each station staffed by the diocese received a monthly allotment for specific operating

costs and overruns seldom caused a problem. Money for subsistence and the amenities of life posed no difficulty, and some men consistently showed a surplus of funds from unexpended monthly resources. Such surplus funds could be spent at the discretion of the individual missionary, and from training and tradition they invariably saw investment in education and medicine. Funds expended beyond these traditional outlets for social activity were frowned upon. Grants-in-aid or non-collateral subsidies for housing, agriculture, and other social schemes appeared wasteful. Missionaries quoted the gospel dictum that the poor will always be with us, and limited their understanding to the thirteenth century dogma that God takes care of the poor. They refused to acknowledge what the social sciences had been teaching for several decades: given a chance, the poor will help themselves.

The climax came when during a period of flu epidemic I converted the recently constructed lomberdar's house into a make-shift hospital. It alerted everyone to the degree of my involvement in the social order and they could only view with alarm my plans for building subsidized houses in the village. My counter argument that we were building monuments to mockery unless something was done to remedy the deplorable housing situation in the village held little relevance. The priest-worker movement in Europe had been effectively suppressed a

few years before, and no margin for discussion remained.<sup>21</sup> The issue began to disturb me, but it took another decade and a half to resolve.



The assignment of another priest to Loreto village, Fr. Terence Quinn, spared me an open reprimand and possible transfer. He had been my classmate in the seminary and was fully cognizant of my involvement in the social order. His degree in civil engineering permitted him favor with our superiors who had embarked upon an ecclesiastical building program. The lean postwar years had ended and mission funds from a number of outside sources began to increase. The investment invariably went into new schools, churches, convents, rectories, and hospitals. The old style of mission activity had not changed, it only enlarged its field of activity. The construction of a six-room school in Loreto village followed this traditional pattern of mission objectives, but the new school soon experienced an unorthodox use.



Shortly after its completion, an unusually heavy rainfall, a rare phenomena in a desert of little agricultural development, partially destroyed the then existing village hovels. The school building was immediately commandeered as a refugee center for the people, and the entire stock of village housing was dismantled. All the wooden beams and other such building materials were salvaged and a new housing

program instituted. Three basic house designs had previously been selected after collecting data from a number of other areas and interviewing native contractors. These house designs also incorporated what had been observed of the people or experienced with them during the extremes of summer heat and cold of winter. Funds had been obtained by private subscription over a period of months, and our superiors acquiesced.

Width and layout of streets meant adopting some crude yardsticks of measurement. By investigating maps of older established villages, a 35' width was fixed for all roads except the central road, which was to be 60' in order to permit entry of heavy trucks and tractors. This latter design proved a valuable foresight in regards to its intended use, but was harmful to the community insofar as it physically separated the village into halves. People sometimes refer to their village compatriots as "those people over there", meaning the other half of the village site separated by the main road.

Again, without any firm purposeful design in mind, each house plot was bordered by an access road on both the north and south of their respective boundaries. It provided plenty of open space for public movement that everyone seems to appreciate and utilize. Not once has there been a serious complaint registered about people or farm animals traversing





somebody's house plot. Such complaints are endemic in many villages and common to all.


A somewhat more involved problem emerged in assigning individual house plots. Meetings were initially held and the village site map explained. No one could agree on where their house plot should be; some wanted to be next to a settler from their former district of residency, or else complained the land was too high, their fields too far, etc. I cut this gordian knot and assigned house plots in a pattern such that no single former geographic group of new settlers could establish a political dominance over the growing community. Government had selected the settlers from a variety of different administrative districts and this natural political bias was fragmented by assignment of house plots. The villages accepted such a decision without complaint, and the construction of new housing began.

Several features of these homes are noteworthy. The inside height did not exceed 8 feet, and thus provided for ventilation in the summer and containment of heat in the winter. Maximum width of a room was 11 feet, the most economical length of a wooden beam. Wood is dear in the desert, and beams of longer length were prohibitive in cost. The expanse between beams was 5 feet, and wooden slats to carry the load of the reed and mud roof linked each beam. All rooms were

built in multiples of five feet in length for better utilization of the beams. Most rooms were 15' in length. The exception was a small storage room. We had observed the overcrowded conditions of many village houses, where farm commodities or implements lying about reduced the living space for the occupants. To remove this hindrance and at the same time hold down construction costs, we incorporated this feature into the 8' wide verandah designed for each house. By sealing off the last 5' of the verandah and permitting entry from the inside via an archway, convenience and expense had been satisfied. The benefits enjoyed by the people with the addition of this storage room resulted in all future housing of the diocese incorporating this feature.

The verandahs were a luxury for many settlers. As families grew in size, the members blocked off the open archways of the verandah to provide more space for occupancy. A few householders retained the verandah as a useful place for preparing food, sheltered from the seasonal sand storm or infrequent rain shower. With the passage of time, the people planted trees, and their natural shade during the hot summer months replaced this advantage of the verandah.

From privately solicited funds, I subsidized the costlier house building materials of overhead beams, doors, and windows. Relief supplies of food covered the costs of labor



MAKING  
BRICKS...



BUILDING HOUSES



**FINISHING TOUCHES**

for making sun-baked bricks, transport to the building site, and labor construction costs. A ration of food to work, or bricks made, permitted an equitable and expeditious program for building to be undertaken at minimum cost. The entire program took two years, but the critical shortage of housing was remedied in the first six months.

The house plots were roughly a quarter of an acre in size, and each house was recessed thirty feet from the boundary line. This proved to be a mistake. All housing in the sub-continent is built flush from the boundary line to increase the size of the open inner court. Rooms are seldom used for anything but sleeping, because climatic conditions permit practically everything else to be done in the open. By imposing a feature that was an extension of middle class America (namely, the front lawn space) I had wasted precious house plot land. With the passage of a few years, this lapse in judgment was somewhat minimized, as the people themselves built additions to their houses, and invariable to cover the originally recessed land.

The homogeneity of the settlers and the newness of the project area permitted two experiments with local cultural habits. The first such experiment emphasized the health hazard of animals sharing the same quarters as the people. Less by persuasion than by fiat, all cows, oxen, water buffalos,

sheep, and other farm animals were forbidden on the new house plots. "No animals on the village site" became a byword, but enforcement would have been nigh impossible. Too many people refused to abide by this restriction. It either required a member of the household constantly in the field, or else it was an undue inconvenience for a farmer to be absent from his home at night. Surprisingly though, about half the villagers were content to keep their animals in the fields at all times. Several reasons accounted for this fact. Animals provided a rich source of much needed fertilizer, and some fields were too far distant from the village site for the animals to be taken out and returned every day.

The second such experiment with a cultural habit transformed the whole pattern of social relations in the community. It pertained to walls.

With rare exception, all houses in the sub-continent are surrounded by a high, forbidding wall. The exact reason for this custom varies, but it is universal. Once the people of Loreto village became landowners, they subscribed to this universal custom of a wall around their house property. On the other hand, I was hostile to high walls, as an artifice unnecessarily inhibiting social communication. In addition, I had observed some crucial defects of high walls in many older villages. Walls had been built, plastered, and repaired

at the expense of soil from the village road. This caused large deep holes, which became breeding places for mosquitoes and resultant malarial sickness ("malaria is the queen bee of sickness in the East"). Even when walls were kept in a relatively good state of repair, the hidden house deteriorated, because custom dictated that only what could be seen should be kept presentable. And finally, walls failed to keep out the ever feared thief, and actually facilitated his work; once over the wall, a thief had freedom of movement from outside observation and could act without interference. Insofar as all housing was initially subsidized by myself, this norm was able to be temporarily enforced. Fifteen years later, out of 114 house plots, there are less than a dozen with walls. Why was this experiment with an accepted custom successful?

For most of the people, the new house plot was the first time in their lives they had acquired a permanent place of residency. The new custom of no walls had the force of accepted custom within five years, negating the never-experienced custom of owning a house with a high wall boundary. Furthermore, a number of side benefits arose that no one anticipated. Among these was the greater familiarity with neighbors who could be seen and recognized when passing by. Parents were no longer restricted to a limited space and the constant supervision of children inside a walled enclosure;

children played in the streets, and one parent could supervise for many. Family disputes erupted less, because the noise would arouse the curiosity of neighbors, to the consequent embarrassment of the disputants. No stranger entered the village without a large number of people being aware of his presence, and theft was almost non-existent. News traveled faster; the arrival of a marriage party, the dust from a vehicle carrying a visiting official, or the departure of a guest, were witnessed and shared by many people. The scorching summer heats only partially subsided at night, so that any evening breeze unobstructed by the physical barrier of a wall was welcome. In due course of time, trees substituted as boundary markers for house plots and became the source of much needed shade in the summer, with their branches supplying fuel the year round.

At this writing, most residents of Loreto village have built small waist-high walls around sections of their property to mark off a place for sifting wheat, sorting clothing articles, or just for sitting. The pride they have in their homes is exceptional. Several times a year they replaster them inside and outside. Sometimes new rooms are added or an entirely separate house built on the same plot of land. Practically everyone to this day agrees on the advantages of a wall-less village.

Village artisans and shopkeepers, with the approval of the people, were entitled to a half-size house plot on the village site. Skilled craftsmen, engaged in work more important to the farmers, enjoyed a high priority of choice. Two village carpenters and two iron mongers were quickly endorsed by the assembled village men. The delay in assigning shops from lack of certain planning ideas resulted in a number of such shops selling foodstuffs, cigarettes, kerosene, and other variety items, being built by individuals on their house plots. This became the preferred arrangement for shops, and a centrally located area for shops was deleted from the final map. A row of house plots on the farthest reaches of the village site was reserved for a gradually growing cottage industry. A shoemaker, a dyer, a weaver, and several other such artisans reside there after having been approved by the villagers. A small diesel driven grinding mill also occupies a portion of this area, and it serves the entire village as well as the surrounding villages. In one of the more conspicuous and centrally located places on the village site, a meeting house on a 1/2-acre plot was built. It functions as a gathering place for all village business and provides accommodations for visiting officials. Final government approval for the village site as developed was later granted. This official approbation of the village site was then duly recorded in all

legal records pertaining to the village.

In reviewing the housing policy of Loreto village, it now appears that the settlers should have been permitted to choose their own house plots, either by lottery or some other method. My arbitrary decision to prevent clustering of settlers from the same colonizing districts in the Punjab served to retard political growth. By dispersing the settlers I had hoped to create new relationships and unwittingly neglected those that already existed. The first recognized bond between peasants outside their extended family is geographic propinquity. An office clerk will vehemently refuse a petitioner until he discovers they have come from the same neighborhood, and then resolve the issue with the plaintive question: "Why didn't you tell me you were from Lyallpur?" The arbitrary dispersion of settlers on house plots for the fixed purpose of avoiding clusterings of men with similar geographic origins hindered the self-government I sought to effect.

On the physical content of housing, it can be stated that room size and design were copied by later colonists. The recessing of houses and the construction of verandahs was discontinued; recessing proved wasteful of limited land holdings, and verandahs were superfluous. The most distinctive aspect of the housing concerns less the construction than the institution of a new custom; no walls around the property. This

idea was initially enforced to avoid many negative effects caused by high walls in other villages, but the innovation later enjoyed full community support. I am inclined to think that this single feature and its effect upon community life is the principal reason why government designated Loreto as the "model village" of the Thal Development Authority.

Concomitant with the milestones of increased water supply and house construction, education as a major objective of village development took place. Three American Sisters arrived in the fall of 1958 to manage, organize, and teach in the school. Up to that time, the village school had been in operation for several years under the tutelage of partially trained Pakistani teachers, and they acted as a stop-gap measure in education while the more pressing needs of agriculture and housing received attention.

The seeds for a completely different approach to education were contained in the decision of the Sisters to teach in an obscure village of the Thal Desert. In truth, the educational investment of three qualified foreign teachers to Loreto village appeared a considerable waste to not a few observers. Physical facilities for their residency were as yet incomplete and there was no tradition of education with the village people of whom only three could read and one could write. Freedom for choice of assignment had been part of the

Sisters' contract and they chose Loreto village. Their enthusiasm and specific teaching skills laid the foundation for an educational policy that previewed the aggiornamento of Pope John XXIII and would culminate in an educational plan involving the people of the village, the residents of scores of other villages in T.D.A., diocesan policy makers, and myself as agent provocateur. In the meantime, the sparseness of the environment, the unformed structure of the village society, and my own preoccupation with remedying the more flagrant economic needs of the village suspended concern for anything more than the present. The future for education in Loreto village would see a far different approach and it provides material for a later chapter in this story.

\* \* \* \* \*

From the beginning, no one contested my position as a somewhat benign dictator. As long as all the people experienced an equal or similar degree of hardship and I was the source for assistance, the village deferred to my leadership. My means for assistance consisted in the main of massive amounts of relief aid and this artificially sustained the village economy. It was a very weak base for governing. If the relief aid should cease or the economics of the village shift

to the agricultural produce from the fields, the structure of authority in the village would change. But the curtailment of relief aid and the growth of a viable economy determined by field productivity came about with the solution to irrigation supply of water. Once the settlers could exercise their particular skills in agriculture, animal husbandry, and irrigation practices, it was inevitable that some would prove more industrious than others. The increase of irrigation water permitted them increased agricultural productivity which in turn granted the industrious settler a measure of authority in the community. Awareness of this change and the distinct possibility that a haphazard and indeterminate political growth would be inimical to all, I hastened to accommodate an emerging political power.

To this end I read and studied all the relevant Punjab law and land administration manuals. These were few in number and the essential arbiters of all land and water disputes for every local magistrate. A supplement to this approach, and necessary to increase my own understanding of government, was extensive reading of Jefferson, the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Lincoln, the lives of many great leaders, and especially the work of DeTocqueville on "Democracy in America". The latter contained many profitable observations of a colonizing people similar to what confronted me in the Thal. The

principles of government enunciated in this work coincided with my own experience and observations of the people in the village. It became my vademecum for local self-government.<sup>22</sup>

To facilitate a growing political process, the village men were called upon to elect a group of five men to consult with me on all matters pertaining to the welfare of the village community. The object was to avoid any arbitrary action by myself and at the same time give them a greater control over their own affairs. The chosen group followed a pattern of political alliance only vaguely perceived in the past as active in village life. Their initial steps at government took the form of making explicit rules and multiplying laws. Such formulations were contrary to their own traditions and soon discarded for the more time consuming art of persuasion and personal allegiance to the extended family or former geographic residency. The growth of political activity coincided with the growing economic disparity amongst the colonists as a result of their own agricultural endeavors. For the next ten years, political evolution would prove to be anything but a peaceful, gentle process; rather, a dynamic and at times turbulent growth of political power would take place, comparable to the growth taking place within the village and the nation at large.<sup>23</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

One of the more revealing insights of rural life in this period was the universal respect accorded former colonial administrators by the people. One day shortly after arrival in the Thal, I gave a ride in my pick-up truck to a villager and his family travelling the open desert. Upon alighting at his destination he spoke to my Punjabi companion, and said: "It's like the days when the lamb and the lion were together; when the English were here." My own ancestry of Boston Irish and youthful sport of throwing rocks at British sailors on port leave left me unprepared for such an explanation. But the instances quickly multiplied, such as the day a colonist flagged me down in the trackless waste to arbitrate a dispute between himself and his neighbor. He mistook me for a colonial officer and a denial of the identification meant nothing to him because he was convinced that only a foreign colonial master could give him justice. When in conversation with a peasant refugee at a way station, I mentioned my observation that it seemed about eighty percent of the people wanted the English back. The man corrected me by saying: "Sahib, if put to a vote it would be 90%". This was especially true for the village peasantry because the exceptional calibre of ICS (Indian Civil Service) personnel in pre-partition days was a byword in the sub-continent.<sup>24</sup> On horseback, camel, ox-cart, and later by motor vehicle, they travelled and dispensed justice

to the disadvantaged in the most remote of hamlets. More often than not, the colonists in the Thal area referred to me as "Angrezi admi" - the Englishman. It was a tribute of identification with the esteem they accorded their former colonial rulers.

Few acquaintanceships in the nation brought this more sharply into focus than that which I had with the Chairman of T.D.A. for the years 1958 and 1959. Most former English ICS officers had left the sub-continent during partition, but a number had remained at the request of the Pakistan government. Mr. R. D. Howe, the new Chairman of T.D.A. and former ICS officer, received assignation following government investigation of colonization difficulties in the Thal. A railway running the length of the project, construction of some 650 miles of road, about 1500 miles of canal networks, and a million and a half acres prepared for colonization had failed to solve the real problems of inadequate administration to supervise the more particularized needs of the colonists. With an esprit and knowledge of the people unequalled by his predecessors in T.D.A., and an opportunity not afforded his successors, this former colonial administrator revitalized the initial vision of T.D.A. and accomplished much in a short time. His appointment to a higher government post left a sense of indirection amongst his staff, and the management of T.D.A. reverted to

its former posture of uncertainty.

No such uncertainty distracted me. In the space of four years, I had learned the rudiments of community organization, achieved an expertise in village planning and construction, familiarized myself with local government and cultural practices, and acquired an unabashed self-confidence in the uncharted field of village rehabilitation. I had departed from the single-minded dedication of a young priest concerned solely with improving the spiritual welfare of my flock, and adamantly believed there was no contradiction between total engagement in the social order and the clerical profession.

My religious superior at this time was a man of great practical wisdom accumulated in his 17 years as an old China hand. He tolerated most of my seemingly unorthodox activity when not actually bemused by it. No such fraternal acceptance was forthcoming from my fellow priests who like myself had no exposure to the foreign missions prior to the Pakistan assignment. A large part of our growing alienation was due to our equally shared disadvantages. A social situation demanding imaginative and creative initiative had been thrust upon us, but all of us were untrained for the work, new to the culture, and too inexperienced to realize the uniqueness of the challenge. We settled upon a modus operandi in accordance with our first surroundings. I lived alone; my fellow priests

lived in community. I actively engaged in the social order because the needs sat on my doorstep; they resided in the high rent section of an urban setting and could abstract from the social issue after a visit to the slums. I was compelled to experiment and innovate; they resorted to known and practiced mission procedures, even though they were defunct. The situation called for a delicate appraisal of human relations on both our parts; a more persuasive and less abrasive presentation of my convictions to them, and their unbiased examination instead of condemnation of what I was doing in the social order. Neither eventuality came to pass.

The crux of the issue was our training as theologians. A departure from the carefully defined role of spiritual administrator was considered recklessness. Unlike the priest-doctor with his certified talents, or the priest-engineer and his recognized qualifications, I had acquired a distinctive skill on the job. Instead of being evaluated and accepted as such, it was looked upon as a threat to the values and goals of our calling. The bishop and my religious superior in their combined mission experience and knowledge of men tolerated and sought to guide my activity. My confreres, on the contrary, consumed with the missionary zeal of young men, openly and covetly opposed me. It was a human situation fraught with consequences for each of us, and subtlety began to destroy the

bond that banded us together as brothers.

In these formative years, the social issue in the diocese remained confused at best. I was unable to articulate the process of role change that had taken place in Loreto village, but merely able to enact it. My peers could make even less a contribution because they were strangers to the process, and so in the end the bishop tacitly permitted the issue to remain unresolved for more favorable times. The delay merely hardened initial positions instead of securing a mutually helpful compromise and insight into the social issue by all the clergy of the diocese. These unresolved social issues festered, and like the symptoms of a disease, mirrored the sickness of the nation's body politic. The social issue was a nationwide malady, not just a diocesan aberration.

## III

## LEARNING TO GOVERN

What had been unsatisfactorily experienced of national leadership in the limited area of T.D.A. was reflected in the nation at large. The political democracy of Pakistan with its party systems was ineffective, corrupt, and had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. A major cause for this democratic failure was the inability of the political process either ideologically or in any other way to handle public issues in a parliamentary manner.<sup>25</sup> Coalition governments changed frequently, standards of public administration declined, and the growing economic problems finally precipitated a crisis. In October 1958, a little more than a decade after winning independence, the Pakistan Army proclaimed martial law and assumed control of the country.

The advent of Martial Law was greeted by crowds rejoicing in the streets, and people embraced one another as an expression of relief. The Army was the one institution revered and respected by everyone. From tradition and organizational structure, it had always commanded the respect and admiration of the populace. From the first days of colonial rule, the British had enlisted the Punjabi and trained him to be the soldier par excellence of the sub-continent. If the nation had any avocation as such, it was to the military manner of life. Families for many generations had their sons and

grandsons enlisted in the Army, and even in the same companies of the same battalions as their forebears. The takeover of the Army was the answer to the people's distrust of the multiple political intrigues consequent upon partition from India and gave hope to the men of good intention laboring to stabilize and develop the new nation. What had been observed and experienced in the execution of the T.D.A. project was quickly seen to have spread throughout the body politic and was like a cancerous growth in the new nation.<sup>26</sup>

Just how bad was the situation prior to Martial Law and the beginning of Army rule in 1958? As an outsider with only two years residency at the time, I had written home six weeks before the event that "the situation is approaching anarchy". David Bell, who was at that time in charge of American Aid, had earlier told the nation it could question its right to sovereignty if it continued to fail in feeding itself. Another foreign observer and analyst could five years later write in retrospect: "The country could ill afford the heavy burden placed on its impoverished resources. Although many gains had been made since partition, economic growth had been disappointing in spite of mounting development expenditures, increasing foreign aid and the consumption of foreign exchange reserves."<sup>27</sup> With the imposition of Army rule and drastic measures of the new government, "popular confidence in the regime

increased as it gave increasing evidence of political, economic and financial rectitude, political stability and a desire to support measures for developing the economy.<sup>28</sup> In the newspapers and radio addresses to the nation, the word politician became a term of opprobrium, with all nominal leaders stripped of influence, put under house arrest, banished from public life and barred from public activity.

In an interview two years later with a former colonial army officer of long residency and understanding of the nation, I was advised that the Army had made a mistake.<sup>29</sup> They could have accomplished their ends in less than two months; namely, the display of strength necessary to impress and effect the nascent political process. However, instead of returning to the barracks, the Army retained power, and much of the officer corps was soon subverted by emoluments from industrialists, businessmen, and bankers in the form of bribes to cover malpractices in bookkeeping, availability of comfortable residences, and all the trappings of prestige arising from influence in the political sphere.<sup>30</sup>

The military regime in the seat of government with the full approbation of the populace and a no-nonsense approach to the political process was acclaimed by practically all the foreign agencies working in Pakistan, their governments, aid programs, and institutions seeking to help the development of

the nation. They were halcyon days; all steel and cement in the nation was commandeered for the construction of a refugee housing program in Karachi to remove the stigma that the city rivalled Calcutta as the cesspool of the world. Sweeping land reforms were announced, and prices had to be posted for every article sold in the shops of the bazaars. All clerks and other government employed personnel were obliged under penalty of law to be punctual in their work and duty assignments.

For the first time since partition, everyone except the deposed politicians shared the feeling that at last the nation was on its way. The man in the village or on the street believed his trust in the Army would be vindicated and the new leadership needed only time to prove itself. It was the first and last occasion for the military to enjoy the unanimous approbation of political support from the populace.

The new regime infused badly needed life into the flagging first five-year plan. The Planning Commission had been struggling with limited results to build a staff, but Pakistan personnel of the professional calibre required were unavailable, or when available, declined the offer to participate. Much of the difficulty was due to the newness of the planning concept, a lack of political leverage in government, and the general disparate personalities engaged in a new approach to national development. What was true of the planning apparatus

in central government was even more so evident in the districts. For all practical purposes, planning as such was a peripheral activity to government.

This deficiency was underscored by the writers of the draft of the first five-year plan: "We have been deeply impressed in the course of preparing this Plan by the great difficulties which will be encountered in executing it. In virtually every field the country is extremely short of trained technicians and administrators to carry out development work, and what is at least as serious in many fields, the country is also short of organization with sufficient tradition, staff, and experience to implement large development schemes. In a great many cases, the shortage of trained manpower or of experienced organizations, rather than lack of finance, is the factor limiting the speed of development."<sup>31</sup>

The foreign advisers were not entirely happy with the extensive role they were called upon to play in national planning. They made attempts to limit their contribution, but too often found themselves pressed by time schedules and directly intervened in the planning process. Some advisers were able to restrict their activities to an advisory role, but most found it necessary to work, in greater or lesser degree, on the same tasks as the Pakistani staff.<sup>32</sup> Once the precedent was set, and this in the first major attempt of the country at

national planning, the planning process was inescapably westernized. Remedial measures to train Pakistani staff were undertaken, but at no time was a complete in-service program for the staff established.<sup>33</sup> The demands for planning output took precedence over this needed organizational structure. The deficiency persisted throughout the tenure of the advisory group, and all eventual planning suffered accordingly.

The first five-year plan itself was an exceptionally well written and comprehensive model of its kind. Nevertheless, for all the effort expended to produce it, a full year of the plan period elapsed before even the draft was published, and an equal length of time before the plan itself was in operation. Only the fact that a number of the plan's objectives were ongoing projects from the previous period rescued its more salient objectives.

The real impetus for the execution of the plan came from the new military leadership of the Army.<sup>34</sup> Most of the benefits accruing to the nation were due to this leadership. The Army took control of the nation when the plan had still two years remaining and gave the idea of planning a status hitherto unknown. As a consequence, there were notable gains in the national economy. The greatest success was in the industrial order, as in the preceding years before Army rule, and the same social difficulty of excessive wealth in the hands of a

few was aggravated. The industrialists became the new powers of influence, while the former politicians were muzzled. The despised politicians at least knew the people, the new class of industrialists exploited them unmercifully. The Army excoriated the former politicians while seeking favor of a new industrial class far more detrimental to the interests of the nation. Unwittingly, the foreign adviser found himself in collusion with this arrangement of social forces.

Without the overwhelming expertise and prestige of foreign advisers, the military administrators would have had to come to terms with the nation's woeful lack of qualified personnel. Instead, the Army rulers, under the guise of obvious success occasioned by their intervention during the remaining years of the first five-year plan, accelerated the planning process and introduced a second five-year plan, beginning in 1960.

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While the foreign adviser debated the exercise of his newfound influence on the national scene, I was experiencing the deep seated frustration of being unable to reconcile two conflicting roles. The ecclesiastical role of priesthood called for the administration of the sacraments, spiritual

consolation for the sick and dying, and a prescribed number of meditative exercises each day. The admirable aspects of this life were further reinforced by religious vows, with obedience the preeminent vow. Yet, the very nature of the environment in which I found myself and my own understanding of the needs to be met called for a relaxation of rules, a rethinking of current mission procedures, and a reexamination of our role as priests.

At night I would clandestinely write such thoughts in a notebook and on the morrow tear out the pages. They seemed too foreboding, too heretical, too contradictory of the established order. An occasional observation of insight or encouragement from an outsider would confirm me in my role of social activist. I learned to salvage my identity by subscribing to the rules when in the presence of other missionaries in the diocese, and doing otherwise when on my own. Such an accommodation fostered a twofold misfortune; one of generating suspicion of my activities among my fellow priests, and the other of hampering my own need for dialogue with them.

The uniqueness of the Thal experiment and my singular approach had pre-defined the social issue for my confreres and voided dispassionate discussion of the priest's role in the social order. My activity in Loreto village instead of delineating a new role, reinforced the natural conservatism

inherent in religious life. Gradually but perceptibly I found myself on a collision course with the majority of my co-workers. My idealism took no account of a Catholic training that was by tradition conformist rather than adventurous in the social order; a Church conscious of its role in history, and suspicious of other contributors; the herald of a universal doctrine of good news, and wary of individual spontaneity. But I was unalterably happy in my rôle as social activist even while subjected to the growing antagonism of other priests. The open support of both my bishop and my religious superior contributed to my sense of security, and when they assigned me to a new station I readily complied.

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My transfer coincided with the commencement of the second five-year plan for 1960-1965 which signalled the involvement of the World Bank in the financing of development for Pakistan. My new station was in the Abbasia Canal Project, a large irrigated land bordering the vast desert that acted as a buffer between Pakistan and India. Like the Thal project, it had been partially excavated in pre-partition days and colonization took place following WW II. Unlike the Thal project, the Abbasia Canal project straddled the main road and

rail communication system of the nation, so that no village in its 120-mile length was more than a dozen miles from a communication node. The paramount disadvantage was dependency for water from the Sutlej River being diverted by India for its own desert use. This difficulty more than all else pressured the members of the World Bank to underwrite the Indus Basin Plan, the largest multi-national irrigation scheme in the world.<sup>35</sup>

Without the execution of this massive development program, it is highly unlikely Pakistan could survive as a sovereign nation. The signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 forestalled war between Pakistan and India, while committing a consortium of nations to a massive financial obligation. It irrevocably committed the United States to Pakistan, as Aswan Dam did the Russians to Egypt. The plan has been described as essentially a political undertaking rather than a development scheme.<sup>36</sup> Its huge outlay of expenditure compelled the national planners to exclude it from their five-year projections and place it in a category other than national planning. To date, better than 2,500 man-years of outside technical assistance have been used to execute what was essentially conceived as an irrigation-agricultural survival scheme for West Pakistan.<sup>37</sup>

The signing of the Indus Basin Treaty marked the second five-year plan as one of the most ambitious reclamation and

development plans of any nation in the world. In short order, massive doses of foreign aid, large construction projects contracted to foreign firms, studies of nationwide transportation and power schemes by foreign consultants, and a disproportionate allocation of funds to the military took place as accepted policy. Those were heady days, and new government reorganization schemes and new governmental agencies to implement projects of national concern proliferated. With rare exception most of it was a case of disguised forced feeding; the indigenous administrative, organizational, and technical personnel were in too limited supply for the scope of work undertaken. Foreign advisers, foreign consultants, foreign contractors, and foreign aid were the necessary ingredients for the successful management and execution of the second five-year plan. No single project outside of an immediate industrial scheme was completely administered, engineered, and executed by all Pakistani personnel.<sup>38</sup>

The effect of foreign advisers and consultants backed up by large numbers of foreign technicians executing projects with foreign aid was felt in every segment of the society during the second five-year plan. The whole concatenation of political confusion in the post partition period before Army rule, the social dislocation caused by the immigration of countless refugees and the sealing of the borders with India, as well as

the attempt to build a total moslem culture on a peoples who for centuries past had been an integral part of a polygot society, remained unresolved under continued military rule and an avalanche of foreign assistance. The nation headed in a new direction under Army rule and the guidance of foreigners with little heed to the underlying social and political factors disturbing the masses.<sup>39</sup>

Make no mistake, the nation's problems were real enough and there was need for outside help. Coupled with the traumatic dislocation accompanying partition from India in 1947, there was a phenomenal rate of birth increase, a series of disastrous floods, chronic food shortages, and the new menace of water-logging destroying large tracts of the best agricultural lands.<sup>40</sup> If the unbiased observer viewed the situation with alarm, the foreign adviser or consultant who entered the scene was to be extolled for his contribution to rectify the situation.

The foreign personnel came to assist Pakistan as technicians, whether that be in economic planning, industry, engineering, or agriculture. Their jurisdiction was limited even as their influence was extensive. This last feature had the potential for seriously distorting the role of foreign personnel in relation to the nation's unresolved political problems. Without a definitive grasp of the political complexities and

personalities contending for power, economic policies of far reaching consequences were advocated. A more cautious and reticent participation was deemed inexpedient for the sake of accomplishment. The possibility of a singular illustration, a crash program of national development, took precedence. The personalities of the participants, the professional identity of goals, the snowball effect of increased foreign aid plus national leadership compliance and international acclaim, all these factors reinforced one another.

Initial successes in development enhanced the prestige and influence of foreign advisors, consultants, and technicians. They became the miracle antidote for remedying the ills of the country. That the problems underlying the situation might be outside their ken or professional expertise was unquestioned.<sup>41</sup> Their access to resources became an obligation; their services, a debt; and their compliance with the existing social inequity, demanded. To do otherwise was considered "interference in the internal affairs of the nation." All foreign inputs of men, material, and money legitimized a situation inimical to the nation as a whole and profitable to a restricted few.

The momentum of development could hardly have been maintained without the prodigious input of foreign nations, especially the United States.<sup>42</sup> This input in both capital

for financing and personnel for executing development was circular in its effect; foreign advisers planned beyond the capacity of the nation to sustain either financially or administratively, so therefore more finances and more personnel from outside the nation were needed. This last feature negates any possibility of describing such aid as comparable to the post-war Marshall Plan.

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The effects of this new alliance between the military regime of Pakistan and the international community of nations were least visible on the village level, even while evident everywhere else. This was nowhere more true than in the village of Fatimapur, Chak 74/3-R, in the district of Rahimyar Khan. I had been assigned to Chak 74/3-R--meaning the 74th village off the third distributary on the right side of the Abbasia Canal--; the people from custom and convention called it Fatimapur. About 600 people of both moslem and christian belief had been eking out a living for a decade in the village. The extremity of their poverty had reduced some landowners to destitution, and they had sold their lands for a pittance. It was a repeat of a situation all too prevalent in new colony settlement projects; great expectations as new landowners, lack


of irrigation water, compulsory sale of oxen for subsistence sake, sale of land, and reduction to status of impoverished tenant farmer, hired laborer, or migration to the city for employment as a "sweeper".

Unlike the settlers of Loreto village in the Thal Desert, the people of Fatimapur village had organized leadership resources within the community. They were succumbing to forces outside their power to effect, and the hope arose that I might change the situation. My presence in the makeshift quarters of the village school added a little curiosity to an otherwise lethargic community. The whole atmosphere breathed defeatism, and the offer of the village mayor to relinquish his title in my favor was a symptom of community ennui. The people living in their fields isolated from one another contributed to the dissolution of the community and loss of spirit. To prevent further alienation of land holdings and encourage growth of a community spirit became my initial objectives.


The smooth attainment of these ends was made immeasurably more difficult by a change in the diocesan structure of authority. In the past, my socially oriented activities were tolerated, when not fully endorsed, by both my religious superior and the bishop. When my former religious superior became the bishop and his replacement came from my peer group, that amiable relationship ended. The new religious superior

had no forbearance for my social activity and commanded me to engage in sacramental administration to the exclusion of all else. I reluctantly complied, so ingrained was the sense of religious obedience. At the same time, a learning period was required in order to acquaint me with the social situation in which I found myself. Application of previously learned practices guided me during this phase of familiarization.

The key to obtaining all my immediate objectives of instilling new life in the community, teaching myself about this group of people, and reversing the trend of land sales, was to consistently act in an unpredictable manner. Some textbooks would call it an existential approach but it is as old as St. Francis of Assisi and antedates Buddha. It is rooted in a spiritual belief of every man's inestimable worth and a very humanly expressed compassion. This form of action expressed itself in a number of flamboyant and often bizarre actions; always effectively and impressively. If a child on a winter day had no coat, I'd clothe him with my oversize jacket. On an evening visit to a peasant hovel I'd medicate the sick and if need be give the blanket off my bed. No hesitation was shown in sharing with anyone my wallet, my table, or my time. I permitted children to enter into my room unannounced while their elders were held to the respectful rules of a knock for attention. The people perceptibly grew relaxed in my presence



THE CHILDREN AND...



THEIR PRIEST

and once again the village began to hear drums at night, a symbol of the moment's acceptance and tomorrow's hope.

As in my former assignment, insufficient irrigation water for agriculture lay at the root of the people's plight. To increase this water supply became the sine qua non for economic growth. The advantage of experience had taught me the utility of approaching the highest officials to rectify such problems. The Deputy Chief Engineer of my acquaintance (there were four in the Punjab) had retired. A whole year passed before an official of equal authority intervened in my behalf.

The catalytic occasion came about in this manner. A Deputy Chief Engineer was staying at a local government rest house while visiting a relative. Always alert to the fact that high officials can be readily approached by foreigners, especially Americans, I made my presence known and was afforded the opportunity to speak. For two hours, we discussed irrigation and water supply in the area. He disputed my grievances but agreed to visit the village on the following day. Unknown to me at the time, he bore the sobriquet of "father of the Abbassia Canal" because of his engineering contributions.<sup>43</sup>

Of the thousand acres of arable land in the village, about one-third had shown little or no crop productivity in a decade. From that fact alone, the deplorable condition of some farmers could be deduced. Even as the Deputy Chief

Engineer observed the scene, a powerfully built peasant farmer broke into the circle of officials visiting the village and extended a pair of hardened hands with the entreating voice of a man pushed beyond endurance: "Eleven years without water! Eleven years without water!" The officials were visibly shaken, and supplemental water was allocated on the spot.<sup>44</sup>

As a consequence of increased water supply and hope for greater crop productivity, the idea of a cooperative bank was advanced as a possible economic assist to the village farmers. Several twenty mile journeys to the government registrar, many small group conversations with the farmers, and the strong influence of the village school master were necessary to create a receptive atmosphere for instituting the cooperative bank. Yet, despite repeated requests to expedite approval for matching funds from government after the farmers had collected and deposited their share, the idea was aborted from failure and lack of interest on the part of the government registrar. The village was too far away, the weather was too hot, the funds were inadequate, etc., all these reasons were advanced at one time or another by the registrar, contrary to the overwhelming support of the farmers themselves.

To better understand the whole cooperative ideal, I accepted an offer to attend the Rural Academy at Comilla in East Pakistan. It was under the aegis of the government, backed by

the Ford Foundation, and above all, directed by a former Indian Civil Service officer, Dr. Hamid Khan. Of all the Pakistani personnel I've ever met, he proved to be the only one with an insight and workable program to change the feudal structure of village life.<sup>45</sup> My ten day exposure to his methods, ideas, and accomplishments firmly convinced me that the cooperative approach as executed in the Punjab could never be successful on a large scale. Government control and bureaucratic bottlenecks inhibited any possible hope for widespread acceptance amongst the rural peasantry. The observation remains valid today.

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While the national government wallowed in funds received from the international community, little of it percolated down to the village level. Poverty of financial resources plagued me in my desire to effect change in the social order. The bone-clean financial condition of mission dioceses noticeably improved with the economic growth of western Europe and the U. S. during the post WW II period. For the first time in over two generations the plight of the socially concerned missionary could be relieved. Organizations in the free world sought to subsidize worthwhile social projects, and my bishop assisted me in seeking them out. He was an unusual man, and

whatever reluctance or concern he harboured about action in the social order was suspended in the face of a real situation. It is my own judgment that long exposure to poverty without personal action to remedy it will invariably negate the most elemental emotions of human compassion. Foreign missionaries more than other professionals are apt to become immune to the social problems of the people, and acquire a callousness and hard heartedness in direct contradiction to their calling.

All too often the lack of funds to execute programs to remove the more pressing hardships of the people compounded my personal hardship of living in a village. The problems tenant farmers enunciated were always the same, and in short order overwhelmed me with the desire to do something about them. I knew the implications of the problems, the remedial measures to correct them, and the organizational structure of government to assist me; I lacked the time and resources to concentrate on more than one village for a prolonged period of time.

My bishop rendered assistance after receiving complimentary feed back from the village men and viewing the scene. When I confronted him with the desire to reconstruct Fatimapur village, he pledged support and the influence of his office to obtain funds from an international relief organization. The idea of reconstructing the village of Fatimapur with funds from an international agency designed for that purpose was new

to me. In the past, commodity supplies from U.S.A.I.D. (United States Administration for International Development), tool kits from CARE, clothing from CRS (Catholic Relief Services), and medical supplies from UNICEF had been considered the limit of largesse. This new opportunity required discarding the usual missionary styled letter describing death, starvation, and disease. A refinement of the insights and experiences of reconstruction in the Thal had to be spelled out, backed up with pictures, diagrams, statistics, and an itemized cost accounting. I was learning the procedures for project presentation; of even greater import, I defined my own concepts about the social order.

A Reader's Digest article on the reconstruction of Loreto village became my entre and endorsement for seeking funds to do the same thing for the village of Fatimapur.<sup>46</sup> This first project proposal viewed the village scene as a complex social situation and was submitted to an aid giving organization in West Germany.<sup>47</sup> In brief outline, the project requested funding for the following needs:

- 12 pair of bullocks
- 32 duplex-mud brick houses
- 1 three-bed dispensary
- 12 hand pumps for drinking water
- 1 22/24 horsepower grain grinding machine

1 3KW generator

2 season supply of fertilizer

A representative of the organization visited the site and wrote up his own report of approval. Within six weeks, the bishop notified me that a sum of \$12,000 had been deposited in the diocesan bank account for the reconstruction of Fatimapur village.


The single mistake I made in preparing the project request concerned the cost. It seemed astronomical to me, so I pared every possible expense, removing all margin for contingency expenses. The man who approved the project later described my niggardliness: "It was the minnow that almost went through the net". However, I soon realized the rash presumption of thinking that allocation of funds guarantees a successful project. Funds, like the balance sheet for accountants, are only one feature of project implementation. Constant surveillance of all aspects of the project is a keynote for appropriate execution. Such supervision is possible for one village, highly improbable for many villages, and usually disastrous on a national scale.<sup>48</sup>

By employing the techniques and procedures for reconstruction learned in the Thal, Chak 74/3-R, Fatimapur village, took on a new look in a relatively short time. The sources of material supply were close at hand, skilled and unskilled

labor were plentiful, road communication was acceptable, and the people cooperated throughout. The completed three-bed dispensary proved so well adapted to the local needs it became a prototype for the diocese. Laying out the lines of communication on the village site and allocating house plots offered no difficulty. No time schedule for completion had been specified, and delays effecting rapid implementation of the project were few. What did cause some disruption in execution fell outside the purview of the project proposal, namely, the rapid relocation of the people onto the village site and their experience of increased communal contact. As long as they lived separated from one another in the fields, minimum disputes arose; all this changed when they congregated on the village site.

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For the uninitiated, governing village people who can neither read nor write would seem an easy task. Neither in the individual instance, nor when the combined problems of six hundred simple people are multiplied into one massive whole is there any validity for the view. No well-researched rule books for governing village people lay on library shelves. Most of the contingent daily decisions are arrived at on an ad hoc



"TO KNOW THY PEOPLE"



basis, matched against a backlog of similar confrontations.

The few following examples taken at random constitute the common run of jurisprudence approach on the village level.

One morning before the sun was fully in orbit and the day's work began in earnest, the unusual noise of a brawl close to my bungalow broke out. A boy came running to me shouting: "Fight! Fight!" It is of the utmost necessity at all times to exhibit an even disposition in the crises that confront village people; they are too easily excited by the occurrence of events out of the ordinary to add to their confusion by a ruffled demeanor. Walking with a normal gait to the scene of the disorder, I quickly saw that two brothers in their early twenties had been throwing blows, but seeing me coming had desisted and reverted to shouting one another down.

My first action was a sharp command for silence, and during the pause, sobbing could be heard from the elderly widowed mother of the two combatants. I was then far less concerned as to the reason for the inter-family feud than I was for the embarrassment of the widow before her village neighbors. After a brief rebuke to both her sons, the village chokedar, or watchman, was summoned. Another man was sent to bring the double-headed drum used on festive occasions to keep the beat of music. When the chokedar arrived and the drum was on hand, the two young men were told to clasp hands and begin walking

up and down the village streets while the chokedar beat out a tune of attention for all to come and see. Hardly had the two young men walked fifty feet when they began to smile, and everyone else joined them. At the end of their short penitential journey, they both publicly made obeisance to their mother, and asked her forgiveness. Nobody in the village thought the less of the widow, and there has not been a like recurrence in the village of two family members openly brawling.

On another occasion, a runner came in from the village to tell me that two old men were flailing one another with their hands. Upon my arrival at the scene, it was evident that no physical injuries had been inflicted, although one antagonist was lying on the ground supposedly stunned unconscious by his assailant's blows. This subterfuge is common enough amongst villagers, whether it's a woman who became angry with her husband, or a young man rebuked by his father, or as in the present instance between two foolish old men quarrelling. The purpose of such a ruse is to excite the sympathies of the onlookers, thereby making the imposter the virtual victor in the eyes of the people. Rather than reason the matter out with the possum-playing man, I ordered him carried to my verandah and prohibited any and all relatives from visiting him.

As the hot sun began to move across the sky, the shadows that protected him from the heat also moved. The man soon

showed signs of discomfort, and in short order was thirsty enough to vacate the porch without any assistance.

Both men knew an infraction of the village peace had been committed, and waited somewhat in trepidation for the arrival of the police. However, in the circumstances, it seemed too drastic a measure, and besides, interrogation by the police would have been disgraceful for the two old men in front of all the other village people. Rather than be hasty in an alternative decision, and knowing full well that an elapse of time would salve the enmity and keep both the contestors on edge, I reserved judgment until evening time when all the men had returned from working in the fields. At that time, before an assembly of the men, the two culprits requested my pardon and listened to the rebuke registered for the shame they had brought upon themselves and the disgraceful example set before the other villagers, especially the children. The penalty for their offense was then meted out. One party was to invite the other party to his household hearth for tea, and the same was to be repeated the following evening by the other party. It satisfied the demands of justice, prevented a continuing grudge, and averted any further public expression of the matter.

Marriage cases are not too unusual, but do require a particular finesse in handling. Part of the wariness stems

from the nature of local Punjabi customs concerning the subjugated status of women, and is in part rooted in their poverty itself. Often enough, marriage approaches an economic arrangement; she cooks the food, he works in the fields. If either one fails in their obligations, great difficulties arise in the family. It is the underlying reason why many women will neither voluntarily venture forth beyond the village confines nor be permitted to go to the civil hospitals when they are seriously ill.

The crying woman who came to me one evening was accompanied by her mother, who in turn did all the denouncing of her brutal son-in-law. For myself, the old observation that in-laws become out-laws when they intervene in marital affairs still holds true, so I showed the mother-in-law to the door and did my own investigation. It seems that the wife was lazily lying down on the string bed when her husband came in from a heavy day's work in the fields. No food was prepared for him, and possibly he cuffed her a bit, but whatever happened she went home to her mother. My initial remarks were rebukes for her failure to have had her husband's supper prepared, and then I ordered her to remain for the night with one of the staff families. In the meantime, the husband was summoned, and he in nowise presented the spectacle of a brute, but rather of a tired and indignant young spouse. My only

admonition to him was to exercise a little more patience in the future, and to realize that the hot weather was upon us and men's blood got correspondingly warm, as well as the fact that there wasn't such a budget for the village dispensary that I could afford to patch up his wife in the case of a more serious altercation. He humbly accepted the admonition, and apologized for the trouble caused. The one thing he understood clearly was that no attempt was being made by myself to interfere with matters that strictly pertained to his rights as head of the family.

On the following morning, he again returned to complain that his wife refused to cook the family food, and had once again gone back to mother. Rather than delay further, I had them both brought before me and walked them over to a small store room we used for storage of supplies. The walls were completely sealed to prevent infestation by rats, and there was scant space to move about on the inside because of the stored goods. In addition, it stood in the open, fully exposed to the sun's burning rays of heat. Without further ado, the door was unlocked and both the husband and wife told to enter. Upon shutting the door on this windowless room, they were told that when they had come to terms, to inform the chokedar who was standing guard on the outside. Within the hour they appealed. When the door was opened for their release, they were

holding hands like a couple in the park, and dripping perspiration like two refugees from a Swedish bath. There has not been need to repeat the performance, so effective was this singular measure.

Anger at the callousness of minor officials and indignation at the general apathy of those concerned with assisting villagers constantly assails anyone in the seat of immediate village jurisdiction. However, the people themselves contribute the culminating element of exasperation that leaves one completely befuddled. An instance in question is the time trees were planted down the main road leading into the village. Three hours of canal water a week was allowed by law, but rather than demand the authorized supply, I merely told the farmers to see that the seedlings received proper watering. No further reflection was made on the issue until some weeks later when I inquired from the mali (or gardner) how the new seedlings were faring. He told me that they had all died for lack of water. Further inquiry revealed that the farmers thought I planted the trees for myself, and intended to take them back to America. With a maximum of forty-four pounds luggage via air travel, it would have been most difficult, to say the least.

Small cases involving my people and the people of adjacent villages often arose. A policeman came into the

village one time to apprehend a widow who had a flock of children, and who barely subsisted by selling small food commodities in the bazaar or by bartering them for things to be later resold in the village. She had charged exactly two annas (2¢) in excess to a shopkeeper for something worth six annas, and the burly policeman took it upon himself to walk the two miles to take the culprit into custody. My impatience at the underpaid policeman being a party to such pressure on another person even poorer than himself was not long delayed in coming to the surface. After berating him for his needless journey and the loss of shoe leather alone, I pointed out the condition of the widow and the incongruity of his being the instrument for additional hardship. The police constable visibly colored with shame and excused himself. The widow was warned not to repeat the offense in the future, and later in the week to avert a temptation to repeat the offense, I gave her a bag of wheat to help her along.

At another time, an absentee landlord on his semi-annual visitation to his land came to me with a nine-year-old boy in his clutches. A bundle of freshly-cut sugar cane was also laid down before me as evidence of the crime. Insofar as there is almost a natural dislike for absentee landlords who hire tenants to do their work and seldom give a just share of the crops harvested, I confronted this one landlord with the fact

that as long as the crop was standing for harvest, it invited thieves because of his known absence. Little mollified, he kept demanding a just punishment, so I suggested we send the boy to jail for six months. It would assure the offender of at least two meals a day, and possibly better clothing than the rags he was now wearing. This second approach had even less appeal than the first because it seemed too outrageous, so finally I asked the landlord what he intended to do with the bundle of freshly-cut sugar cane. In sheer contempt, he said: "You see to it." Repeating my question and receiving the same answer, I remanded the stolen goods to the boy with the warning not to be near the sugar cane for the rest of the season. Upon the boy's departure, I cut into the landlord with the forceful remark that he was lucky to have any field at all if the concern he showed for his tenants was any criterion of his justice to men. He spoke incoherently in his excitement, but he had been properly stung and further conversation was useless. I walked away in the middle of his expostulations, and never heard a complaint from him since, although I was quite sure some of the poorer people continued to steal his sugar cane.

The ultimate norm for governing village people is be kind, be kind, be kind. Nobody ever went too far wrong in being kind. Extreme poverty demands this regulating principle

of government in the Punjab. Poverty plagues the village peasant at every step of his unshod feet, it serves his meals with the pain of hunger, it chills his unclad body in the winter cold, and dulls his mind in the scorching summer heat. It would be next to impossible for a westerner to long endure the eastern peasant's lot in life without despairing. This does not mean that the peasant must be served a sentimental slop of food and clothing handouts without any recognition of his faults. Rather, it should engender an emphatic conviction that destitution is a far more wicked injustice than the combined crimes the villager commits.

Poverty's poison invariably and indelibly delineates the worst features of peasant character. The universal manifestation of this evil is the harshness of the poor towards one another. There are fleeting flashes of generosity, such as when a man will cancel a ten rupee debt, the equivalent of almost a week's work, but these are too exceptional and too often prompted by exhibitionism. In practical conduct of one poor man towards another equally poor man, the yardstick approximates harshness. For a few annas (pennies), people have been killed in the bazaar, and blood feuds carried on over several generations for the paltry sum of five rupees. The common folk adage that the poor man is his own worst enemy cannot be considered an exaggeration; but palpable poverty is the

underlying cause of this evil.

The failings of the poor man are further faulted by corruption and exploitation on the part of many intermediate grade officials. Instead of being an honest instrument of government, the small official lords it over those whom he is supposed to serve. The politician further frustrates the poor man by being solicitous at election time, and ignores him at all other times. Men with the girth of a whale will criticize the vices of the poor peasant and never reflect that their own well-fed bellies evoke no respect for virtue. When the poverty stricken peasant habitually becomes the prey for the perversion of justice, his vices can hardly be condemned; they are a condition for his survival.

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Even as I carried on the multiple tasks of reconstructing a single village, rendering spiritual service to half a hundred others in a wide area, increasing agricultural productivity, and carrying on local government, the military regime in the seat of national leadership sought to win the allegiance of the people. Martial Law was lifted and political activity on a limited scale permitted, but by no means wholeheartedly encouraged. A facade of participatory democracy,

called "Basic Democracy", had earlier been decreed. It was a pyramidal structure of government with its base in the villages and ever more selective and responsive to the executive the further removed from that base. No party system as such emerged, rather an autocratic presidential rule of benign dictatorship. In practice, the entrenched power of the local landlord combined to support the ruling powers of the military officers, civil service elite, and the new class of industrialists.<sup>49</sup>

The first elections for delegates to the local union councils took place early in the military regime. As the most prominent minority leader in the district where Fatimapur village was located, I was delegated to select a member to fill the seat reserved for minorities on the local union council. In consultation with and approval of the village men, the school headmaster was chosen. Within a few days, his position as the tie breaking vote in a council of eleven members became critical for electing a chairman. Two days and nights saw vehicles and influential residents visit the village equal to all such traffic in the previous ten years of village existence. The primary reason was to persuade me to dictate a course of action for the headmaster, and failing that, to offer him a bribe. Neither approach proved successful, but it did color all enthusiasm for Basic Democracy as an instrument for

improving the people's voice in government. No one of the council members ever discussed the people's immediate needs for better credit facilities, improved rural health, an end to unjust land acquisitions, or sincere interest in the difficult lot of landless farmers.<sup>50</sup> The failure of the newly franchised local leaders to do anything but preserve the woeful conditions of the status quo merely reflected the designs of the ruling classes for their own self-perpetuation. At no time before partition had any leader promulgated a program for real social change, and no subsequent program by the ruling classes corrected that omission.<sup>51</sup>

The attempt by the military regime to create a new institution for governing the masses replicated the error of the former colonial masters in their establishment of law courts. The British instituted courts of law and legal procedures which were alien to the people and in contravention of local custom. As early as 1870, a high colonial administrator warned: "The employment of pleaders and barristers in petty agricultural causes is condemned by native opinion. The native view is, that the matters at issue are extremely simple, that the employment of such an agency unnecessarily adds to the cost of the litigation, - an addition which, in most instances, the parties can very ill afford, - and that the lower classes of legal practitioners are usually men of bad motives, who forment

more litigation than they cure. These assertions are unquestionably true. It is, moreover, also true that for centuries prior to our rule the community have found it practicable to adjust their disputes without the intervention of any legal practitioners; and all the better men among them regard with regret the complication of their dealings with Government by an agency of this nature".<sup>52</sup>

Basic Democracy as a new institution was of this ill-fated genre. The English lettered sign identifying every union council dwelling in remote peasant hamlets testified to its foreign origins. Like their colonial predecessors, the military regime neglected existing and viable institutions in the rural oriented society. The most important one was the *lomberdari*, or position of village headman; in most cases a moribund office, and easily revived. My credentials for this view are based on my deputation by government as the *lomberdar* of Fatimapur village.

The incumbent *lomberdar* had early offered to abdicate his position in my favor; he was powerless to effect any change requiring government intervention. I had recognized the pre-eminent position of the *lomberdar* in the eyes of the people and contrasted it with the impotence of the office in the larger scheme of government. The *lomberdar* only became effective in the larger society if the office holder added something

extrinsic to the office itself. This could be in the form of power contingent upon large land holdings, political influence by civil office or military rank, and by recognized religious leadership. In my own case, the extrinsic addition to the office of lomberdar resided in my foreign nationality and religious role of Catholic priest. My application for the leadership of lomberdar was reluctantly applied for and quickly approved by government. I became the new village mayor with the local reputation for influence with high officialdom.

The most important yet generally under-estimated person in the whole interdependent structure of village life is the lomberdar. Despite the many cited instances where he is just the personal representative of a particular family, rather than a spokesman for the entire village, or the fewer cases where he is too ineffectual in his ignorance to offer any hope of transitional assistance to the village people, he is a focal point for government in the village.

The traditions that make plowing by an ox the accepted form of agriculture are familiar to the lomberdar. He knows the custom whereby a village woman at the open well or hand pump must never be disturbed by the presence of a man. He knows just what farmer can be expected to work hard and employ chemical fertilizer if available, or what small fields in his village will never yield good crops for lack of irrigation

water or poor quality soil. His knowledge of the village under his jurisdiction is like that of a sage, but he is without the proper encouragement or means to implement his wisdom.

The man appointed as lomberdar to collect taxes is the man who can also allay many of his village grievances. It is the lomberdar who must meet the scheduled date for deposit of the people's taxes or suffer removal from his appointed position. More often than not, he supplies a goodly sum of his own money and grants the defectors a period of grace. The people in turn remunerate him via cash or kind as and when they can. This method thus assures the loyalty of each individual villager, permits the lomberdar to strengthen his status, and allows him certain freedom to bring pressure upon recalcitrants. Unless a farmer pays his taxes by a specific date, he can be summoned to the courts and either fined, imprisoned, or suffer the loss of his land. The latter recourse is seldom enjoined; it is tantamount to denying a man his life. Couple this hidden authority with the lomberdar's insight into the complexities of inter-marriage amongst his people, the financial state of each peasant family, and the personal portfolio in his memory of each resident farmer, and you have a superbly effective tool to work with.

Whatever his shortcomings, the lomberdar has the established tradition of authority behind him, and innate

recognition on the part of the village peasant.<sup>52</sup> But he is being put in the shadows as a result of the rapid introduction of universal education, better means of communication, and advanced methods of agriculture. He is being relegated to the sole function of a government lackey to assure collection of taxes, and the village suffers accordingly. Instead of making an orderly progress as a result of the ever-increasing stimulus of a world on the move, the peasant is subjected to a multitude of improvements that have specific reference to his life, but lacking the direction of the lomberdar's leadership, he is reluctant to adopt them. The peasant's world of darkness is not being lit up by a candle; it's being illuminated in a blaze of klieg lights. The one guiding hand of long-term acquaintance for the peasant is the lomberdar. The lomberdar knows his people as no government field assistant, or statistician, or foreign advisor can ever hope to know them.

The village people for their part, especially with an illiteracy rate that for all practical purposes approaches ninety percent, are as dumb sheep. Without their headman taking the lead, they are content to close their eyes to the light beckoning them until progress passes them by.

Everyong else deputed to assist the village, be it agricultural assistants, visiting health technicians, or primary school teachers, are given instruction and emoluments for

their contribution to village development. Why not the lomberdars?

It does not mean that his position of authority should be made despotic and invulnerable. On the contrary, if given the proper incentives, he could effect a change in the whole structure of village organization. Such a change would eventually make him only a nominal leader, much like the regents of many modern countries. Once a cooperative has been established, or agricultural output increased beyond the minimal level, or education given its proper position in the scheme of things, authority would no longer be centered in one man's hands; it would of necessity be shared.

As it now stands, the lomberdar is the leader accepted by the peasant people. Whether or not he fulfills all the great expectations of the preceding does not eliminate the fact that he does hold a pivotal position in the present village system. Some nations have tried radical measures to solve the problem of contemporary village life, e.g., wiping out the existing structure entirely and beginning anew. The results do not seem to justify this extreme procedure. To effect a change for the better in Pakistani village life, a recognition of the lomberdar's pivotal position is the first step.

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My own degree of success as lomberdar in governing the people of Fatimapur village was in sharp contrast to the experience of being governed by my religious superior. My every financial decision was second-guessed, despite the extremely well utilized grant for village reconstruction and the visible results. The lack of harmonious relations between us became a byword in the diocese. Recourse proved fruitless because too many of my fellow priests agreed with him and covertly censured my work. This mounting tension coupled with increased involvement in the social order, exposure to the structure and operations of government, and performance of my designated duties as parish priest, began to take its toll. After three and a half years in Fatimapur village, I was physically and emotionally exhausted.

The first sign seemed harmless enough, a slight eye infection; common in dust and sand surroundings. However, after six weeks of infection with no abatement from increased doses of medication, I planned an extended trip to a large mission hospital in Karachi. The lady doctor diagnosed anemia, possible leprosy, and permanent loss of partial vision in one eye. My days of labor in Fatimapur village abruptly ended. After a month's convalescence, I was assigned to a new station; Bahawalpur city.

The prodigy of labor expended in Fatimapur village to

accomplish so much in such a short time had no defenders amongst my fellow priests. The implementation of a comprehensive project for the social order overshadowed any other diocesan endeavor and established its own precedent. It also fueled dormant diocesan jealousies, frustrations, and antagonisms born of ineptitude. Lost to view in these layers of emotional responses was a successful model for village reconstruction.

Fatimapur village contained all the prerequisites for an orderly and systematic solution to the social problems besetting the community before my arrival. By extension, the same probably held true for all villages with any duration of settlement. Established relationships among the people, a decade of continuous land cultivation, a knowledge of what needed to be done, and the community's will to endure, constituted the given elements for my role. I was the catalyst at the opportune time for a community requiring the elementary virtues of intelligent leadership. Reconstruction of the village site with its housing, street layout, planting of trees, village roads, new dispensary, and improved school facilities helped consolidate what the people themselves had long contributed to maintaining their communal identity. Reconstruction of the village site precipitated changes that allowed me to learn and be taught the more subtle techniques

for governing the community. I grew in awareness and understanding of the components comprising the basic structures of the larger society of West Pakistan, acquiring skill and sensitivity as to how the parts interact among themselves. The intensity of my service in Fatimapur village represented more than a passing interim in my mission life, and a diocesan wide disregard of that experience altered my attachment to the diocese. A day would come when it ceased altogether.

#### IV THE END OF AN ERA

Of all the urban centers in West Pakistan, Bahawalpur city with its 85,000 inhabitants best represented the nation's theocratic and agricultural foundations. The headquarters city of a princely state prior to partition, it had no industry. Government employ, commerce in agricultural commodities, hides and wool, upheld the economy. Government offices housed in princely palaces, an army cantonment area, ancient walls around the city, and a leisurely pace of life all added up to a haunting reflection on the days of the British Raj. This attractive quality of former splendour found further reinforcement in the sound of camel bells on the way to market or coming in from the desert, the daily call to prayer from many mosques, the joyful festivities concluding ramazan, the bazaar with its pungent odors, dark alleys, and wooden latticed shutters. No other city evidenced a more islamic culture.

The first Catholic missionaries took up residency in Bahawalpur city in 1956. The large, many-roomed priory for priests at the mission shared ten acres of the city's prime residential land with a new Sister's convent, an English medium school, an Urdu medium school, a fifty-bed hospital, and of course, a cathedral sized church. This imposing congestion of buildings in the city designated by government as the university training center for the moslem religion was not lost

on the local populace. Complaints in the newspaper or occasional gathering of protesting students seldom amounted to much more than an inconvenience. The civil service elite, military officer caste, and wealthy landlords championed the cause of the foreign missionaries in exchange for the opportunity to register their children in the English medium school run by the Sisters.

From the beginning, government had given low priority to education.<sup>53</sup> The best educational institutions of English medium in the country, from primary grades through college, were managed by foreigners; and for the most part mission affiliated. The children of the rich and powerful seldom went elsewhere for their education. A chance conversation with any ranking civil servant or army officer usually touched on the topic of his child's education in the local mission school. Some missionaries labored to spread education among the poorest classes; such efforts garnered real results and provoked debate about the preponderant placement of mission personnel in English medium schools for the rich and privileged. The illiteracy of the poor and their despised social position made them objects of charity in the traditional framework of mission policy. Only gradually did the idea of the poor as a social phenomena demanding specific professional skills permeate policy. Education for the poor was destined

to become the burning issue for foreign missionaries and the Catholic Church in Pakistan; by that time government had taken the initiative.

At the mission station, all the creature comforts of good food, tastefully designed and decorated living quarters, overhead fans and several air-conditioned rooms, did little to compensate me for the rigidity of religious observance. An immoderate monastic discipline prevailed and deterred any endeavour designed to grapple with social conditions outside the mission compound. Sacramental service to fifty villages, visits to the sick of the city, and evening prayers to clusters of sweepers occupied our ministry. The reality of the surrounding social phenomena of poverty crying for insight and leadership, escaped the religious administrator and discouraged me. I mapped the location of all sweeper settlements in the city and knew their problems. It was a temporary opportunity, their problems were manageable; but not for long. Foreign aid, national development plans, the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, all these inputs were upsetting established relationships between the city and the countryside, breaking centuries old customs, and bringing about political and social unrest. All this was taking place and the Church of Anselm, Bernard, and Michelangelo continued to preach an obsolescent moral law to people bleeding for social justice.

My understanding of the social order found reinforcement and clarity from selective reading. The era of Vatican II had begun, and men of stature previously censured enjoyed acclaim. The French Jesuit, DeChardin, in his Phenomena of Man, anchored my thought with the dedicatory phrase: "To those who love the world". A visit to another diocese and a marathon three days writing a project report for a fellow missionary sharpened my skill at observing what needed to be done in the social order and how to go about it. The project in question involved 620 sons of sweepers enrolled as students in primitive educational facilities and little hope for improvement. All the criteria for a successful project were evident; dedication of staff, good management, scholastic achievement of the student body, and maximum use of available space. A tube-well scheme, a sweeper's colony housing subsidy, an agricultural settlement assist, and a medical care grant followed in quick succession. Each project demanded study of the specific situation, submission of a written proposal to one of several international agencies, and a body of correspondence before final approval. The net result of such efforts added up to more financial assist to the diocese from project proposals than by private subscription to individual missionaries. The latter had been a response to the traditional letter of appeal for charity, and project proposals while displacing it had yet

to be recognized as an idea whose time had come. That time would never really come because a new approach to the social situation surrounding the lives of missionaries in West Pakistan called into question too many accepted assumptions; required too great a departure from established procedures; and suggested a painful omission in ecclesiastical studies which called for additional training.

Our training had stressed the hierarchical structure of authority in the Church while ignoring the society in which we would labor. The missions were no exception to this norm, and we learned the nuances of class functions on the job. Pakistan in principle is supposed to be a classless society as prescribed by Islamic beliefs. In actual practice, there exist two distinct groupings in the nation; the rich and the poor. A middle class as such doesn't function in the society. The very rich have often been schooled in England or elsewhere outside Pakistan. They are the offspring of the new class of industrialists, inheritors of the landed wealth, entrenched civil servants, and the military elite. Their orientation is westward, and Americans find them more like themselves than any other segment of society in the sub-continent. And indeed, many of them are as removed from their people as the American tourist.<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, there are the poor. They include the

peasant farmer and his family, the shopkeeper and the day laborer, the millworker and the student, the tax collector and the police constable; in short, the mass of society. For them, the word "American" conveys the idea of money, vast sums of money. To have money, to possess something of worth, to exhibit the signs of wealth in clothing worn, land possessed, animals in the field, or jewelry adorning the body, borders on an obsession for the poor. Perhaps the cause lies in the extremity of poverty experienced by so many. Their penury is tantamount to destitution, and makes beggary an occupation. The universal recognition of the Arab trader as a hard bargainer is no misnomer. He expends prodigious energy grasping for money, conniving for opportunities, scheming for wealth, and plotting a path that makes avarice an unavoidable content of daily life.

The oft repeated theme of envy or violence arising from the marked inequalities between the classes of rich and poor scarcely existed in Pakistan. The first generation of industrialists lived frugally and aroused little envy except for their business expertise.<sup>55</sup> Only when riches by the offspring of the new industrial leaders began to be displayed ostentatiously did inequitable distribution of wealth become a source of conflict. For the most part, the resentment this wealth aroused took place in the cities where large concentrations of

students and industrial workers joined forces.

A much greater and more subtle hostility existed between the urban government employees and the vast population of the countryside. The better trained government employees could seldom be enticed to work in the countryside; only by coercion of government mandate could such assignments be effected. Medical personnel, teachers, agricultural technicians, canal officials, magistrates, the whole body of the nation's trained resources disparaged employment and residency in the countryside. The alienation of the Army from the populace at large never equalled the almost pathological dislike of the nation's trained cadres for assignment to the countryside.

The Army as a national institution had a history of low profile in the country and followed this pattern of conduct after taking the reins of government. The trained cadres, on the contrary, denied the heritage bequeathed them by their former colonial masters. Under colonial administration, civil servants concerned themselves with the most remote hamlet, individual officers of intermediate rank could be found touring and listening to the complaints of the poor, and office bureaucrats were exceptionally well versed in language and local dialect. This healthy relation of government to its subjects for the most part ceased with the departure of the colonials and the upheaval of partition. Work for government

became a source of self aggrandizement and exploitation; it had been present before, now it became rampant, and the populace suffered.<sup>56</sup> My posting in Bahawalpur city reinforced the oft repeated complaint of the people of government disdain for them.

The city was strictly a center for administration to the surrounding agricultural districts. Only the influx of landless farmers into its limited confines indicated a change from pre-partition days. A large number of these new residents became my clients as well as some fifty settlements of christian tenant farmers in the surrounding villages within an orbit of thirty miles. There was a great deal of communication between the rural area and the city, seldom vice versa. Riots in the city would alarm the local administrators of government, while the blatant and widespread hardships of the ubiquitous landless tenant farmer aroused no one. Absentee landlords, destitute tenant farmers, and callous minor officials abounded. It was a situation ripe for anyone preaching a program of violent change.<sup>57</sup>

The poor of the city suffered this same indifference of attention. In Bahawalpur city I had occasion to work closely for a short time with about 2000 christians, most of them "sweepers". They made up 10% of the city employees, and were less than a decade removed from village life. An ox yoke on

the mud wall of a sweeper's hovel crowded into an airless and lightless slum would evoke the remark: "Yes, someday I'm going back to the land". The truth was, they couldn't go back to the villages from whence they came, and even if they could their children wouldn't follow; they had been urbanized by the accident of birth.

Organization and unbiased leadership were the paramount needs of these people. All the elements of social power lay dispersed among them; numbers of people, political shrewdness, individuals of commanding presence, and a labor position of "sweeper" that the society on all levels despised but valued as critical. The individual groupings of slum dwellers had allegiance to a "chaudri", or local leader. The identification of chaudri was summed up in the Punjabi aphorism: "To know a scorpion, touch it". A chaudri's influence did not extend beyond the local group; they were circumscribed by the autonomy of their power. It permitted no sharing, and invited inter-group rivalry. They had their people's welfare at heart while suffering from a myopia of the larger political action possible for their adherents. As a unified body, the sweepers could demand better working conditions, more pay, and decent housing. As it was, they were subjected to extortion from the police, contempt from their employers, and discrimination from the populace. Their greatest asset lay in their willingness

to work and refusal to enter the ranks of the many beggars plaguing the whole society.<sup>58</sup>

My first efforts to organize them met with a ready response from the locally elected assembly member, the newspaper editor, and city officials. Resistance had been encountered in the city of Rahimyar Khan a few years before when the ruling magistrate, the District Commissioner, cautioned me in an aside that any disturbance among the sweepers would be viewed unfavorably by the officials. In the present instance, the sweepers as a body and several chaudris approached me to become their leader. The restrictions surrounding my assignment forbade such a necessary and desired role. My religious superior, as almost all other foreign missionary administrators in the Punjab, considered the Church exempt from an active role in social leadership.

Unable to work directly on the social problems of the sweepers, I was yet able to exercise influence in curtailing extortion by the local police, and keep alive a process for petitioning government for a sweeper's housing colony. The Commissioner, the highest ranking official outside of cabinet rank, used his office in this regard. He had previously granted land rights for a sweeper's colony in another city, and had a known reputation for compassion. He represented the best in the civil service, and shortly thereafter became the

Home Minister, a position comparable to the Secretary of the Interior in the U.S.<sup>59</sup> Officials of equal merit, but of lesser rank, could be found in all branches of government service. They were courteous, kind, and capable. Their singular approach to government, i.e., maintenance of law and order coupled with revenue powers, had been a positive attribute under colonial administration. It figured as a fault in the planned development of the new nation. Indispensable at the time of partition and the only true governing body for the time prior to martial law, they have continued to survive intact through multiple national crises, vast social dislocations, and the partial dissolution of the country. They represent the finest qualities in the nation's character and also bear the censure for lack of fundamental change in the social order. Proud of their traditions and jealous of their prerogatives, they both attract and repel the outside observer. The drafters of the first five-year plan could rightly say of them: "No amount of improvement in the mechanics of public administration, its structure, organization and procedures, and in the skills of its workers will enable it to achieve the desired goal unless there is a change in the outlook of the public service."<sup>60</sup> That change in outlook never came about.

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After a year and a half in Bahawalpur city, by 1965, I was anxious for a less restricted and more congenial assignment. The combination of government inaction for the poor and my religious superior's prohibition on engagement in the social order was barely tolerable. My state of soul contrasted sharply with the military government's euphoria over the incoming reports for the second five-year plan. There was no denying the statistics; they were impressive.<sup>61</sup> Foreign exchange reserves increased and industry became a showcase. One of the major disasters of the nation, floods in the Punjab, had been drastically curtailed where not completely controlled. Food prices held a relatively constant level and the bazaars displayed a wide variety of artifacts. Soft drinks like Coca-Cola and Seven-Up became standard fare at every bus stop, rail station, and cross roads. Some cause for reflection on the whole process of national development and the degree of foreign influence was expressed from time to time in the newspapers or in private conversations. These complaints antagonized government; the foreign community viewed them as the childish rhetoric of the press. The feeling that things had changed and would continue to do so enchanted the vast majority of the people, rich and poor alike.

Prosperity seemed to be on the rise, and the Minister of Finance could confidently assert of the forthcoming third five-year plan: "The targets will be much more ambitious than those of the second plan, as they ought to be."<sup>62</sup> The nation had wedded itself to five-year plans. Few planners contested the fantastic profits of industry approaching 100% or better, the terrible conditions of mill workers, the exploitation and corruption on the docks in Karachi, the only seaport for West Pakistan with its sixty million inhabitants; all these were necessary side effects of economic growth theory and "trickle down" philosophy.

These times marked the golden years of expectations for both Pakistani and foreign leaders. Ten years of administrative shuffling in the planning department, organizational build-up, and influence within government had coalesced with the take-over of the Army, the signing of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, and the approbation of the international community. The hope of establishing a precedent for planning in underdeveloped countries appeared practicable.

The exuberance of high Pakistan government officials was tempered by their counterparts on the district level. Periodic police reports registered an increase of political activity inimical to the ruling regime. Meetings took place at railway junctions, country crossroads, or in village settings

close to the thoroughfares of commercial traffic. The opposition voices ranged over lack of fundamental civil rights, the blatant corruption of the judicial system, the venialty of local officials, police brutality, and the miserable working conditions of industrial labor. Foreigners were shielded from intimations of such activity by their residency in enclaves outside the few large urban centers or in restricted access compounds elsewhere. All the news media either complied with government dictates or faced shutdown. Many foreign advisors, technicians, and engineers spent time in the field under adverse climatic and environmental conditions, and always under the specific time constraint to finish a particular project rather than as critical observers of an unstable political and social scene. Political processes and social disturbances remained outside the purview or interest of most foreign personnel.<sup>63</sup> This lack of recognition and realization of the importance underlying political opposition and social agitation escaped the national planners. It proved to be their singular blind spot and their efforts only held in abeyance these suppressed forces. As long as the nation's leadership remained in military hands, the successes of the planners were secure; their day of reckoning was in the offing.

The Army left to its own devices and enjoying the acclaim of the international community for its domestic policies, took

a militant stand toward its defined enemy, India. An unprecedented supply of arms, especially the U.S. built Patton tank, deceived the military into a conviction of superior strength. This deception was further bolstered by the poor showing of Indian troops in their brief confrontation with the Chinese, and a diversionary thrust by the Pakistan Army into the desolate Rann of Kutch bordering the two countries. This unwarranted illusion of military might permeated the ruling class. The real difficulties of a nation wallowing in poverty and preponderantly dependant upon foreign aid weighed as nothing in the balance. A surprise was in store for everyone.

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The usual newspaper propaganda about Indian suppression of the rights of the people in Kashmir held little interest for me; the claim had saturated the news media for too long. One small incident while visiting a village outside of Bahawalpur city alerted me to the impact such propaganda made upon the more aggressive tribal people. While visiting a small group of tenant farmers I saw some tents not too distant and ambled over out of affection and acquaintance with the tribal people elsewhere in the nation. After a cup of green tea and the usual pleasantries accorded to a visitor, the leader of

the group pointedly asked me: "Is it true they are killing moslems in India?" The question suggested its own answer and my contrary view held no credence for the speaker. Unbridled nationalism coupled with religious fanaticism had aroused many unlettered people in the nation, and even those who should have known better.<sup>64</sup>

A few months later, I took my first extended trip to India and spent several weeks touring the Indian Punjab. The difference between the two Punjabs (so demarcated by partition in 1947) was striking. India evidenced better and more serviceable roads, greater and more apparent agricultural activity, and the engineering feat of Bukra Dam without foreign assistance. The dam had been undertaken following partition and was the primal cause for diversion of water from Pakistan Punjab; it initiated the Indus Basin Waters Treaty and World Bank involvement on an unprecedented scale in Pakistan. No one could gainsay India's pride in the accomplishment, and the contrast to Pakistan impressed any knowledgeable observer.

This same contrasting experience was repeated in Delhi where the society of men and women had a more balanced relationship than in Pakistan. Husbands walked beside their wives in the bazaars and on the streets, young men with their fiances shared tables at restaurants, and the purdah was rarely encountered. To juxtapose this exposure with the city of

Lahore in a brief flight by plane impressed myself as a traveller. The constant and conspicuous congregation of Pakistani men in hotel dining rooms, or public restaurants, or on trains, wherever people gathered; and the strict separation of women by islamic law, always had an air of unreality in Pakistan. It was as if everyone had subscribed to a social contract they knew was bankrupt but were unable to forego. This marked inequality of the sexes in Pakistan spells out more of the national problem than any dozen books on income distribution, political power, or poverty of resources. As I said to a militant young college student: "Until you have to comb your hair to compete for a woman's affection, you'll never make it".<sup>65</sup>

The plane that brought me back to Pakistan was just about the last one before the border between Pakistan and India erupted into full scale war in early September 1965. The two week brevity of the war should not detract from its intensity and the extremes of nationalism and patriotism it aroused. It is doubtful either nation had anticipated escalating the scale of events to such a degree in so short a time.<sup>66</sup> The outcome dispelled the unjustified belief by the Pakistanis of invincibility on the battlefield, but it did weld the nation together and gave the people a feeling of unity. In the aftermath of the conflict, a new sense of nationhood permeated the

population, and the military services, especially the air force, were its symbols. The foreign community felt otherwise, and began to question hitherto unquestioned premises. These centered on the nation's military leadership, the unreality of a nation whose two parts were separated by 1500 miles and as many other differences, and the continued support of a mostly U.S. sponsored development enterprise. Donors of foreign aid entertained doubts. In the end they cooperated from the compulsion of previous commitment and the promise of exciting development reports. No single voice was heard across the land to lead a people mired in poverty and suddenly rich enough to go to war. As a farmer said to me: "When two oxen fight, only the grass gets crushed; the poor people alone will suffer from this war."


The war alerted me as nothing else to the incapacity of my religious superiors to understand, let alone comprehend, the significant changes taking place in the nation. While the conflict centered north of Bahawalpur city, in the Lahore region, the foreign missionaries were under tight police security. My relationship with the local police inspector proved invaluable, and he informed me of the government's blanket disapproval of any movement by foreign personnel and the certainty of expulsion from the country if undertaken. When my religious superior ignored these official pronouncements, I

refused to obey his orders. The resulting breakdown of any allegiance between us expedited my transfer possibilities. A temporary assignment to the Thal quickly became available, and by judicious use of friendship with local officials I obtained the required police permit for travel. My destination was the village of my first acquaintance, Loreto Chak 270 T.D.A.

To leave the mission station at Bahawalpur city with its distorted version of religious life and its prohibitions on activity in the social order entailed less satisfaction than the discomfort of leaving the sweeper colony; their lot held little hope for improvement under the leadership of their priests. The Sisters would continue to teach the children, but in a masculine oriented society unless the priest set the path for progress, the best of women's labors became inefficacious or in the extreme, futile. My motivations also included a conviction that food shortages, inflation, and all the other classic evils consequent upon war would soon engulf the nation. The Thal offered the greatest leverage for effecting the most people without hindrance from religious superiors or officialdom if these things came to pass.

The anticipated crises of food shortage and social disturbances as aftermaths of the war with India failed to materialize. Instead, Loreto village confronted me with impressive changes that had taken place in my years of absence.

# FIG. 4 LORETO VILLAGE SITE



Government had completed the allotment of all uncolonized lands in the village, refugees and relatives had burgeoned the population tenfold, and the physical appearances of the village site had changed with the planting of trees, new buildings, and levelled sand dunes. As one visiting official later remarked: "The place sells itself."

I shared the station with four Sisters who worked in the village school and dispensary, as well as another priest, Fr. Gregory Doherty.<sup>67</sup> He administered to groups of christians in 110 villages of T.D.A. Our preferences for work defined the division of labor; he would service the villages outside Loreto, and I would administer Loreto village. The increased complexity of the scene in T.D.A. facing both of us suggested the idea for planned goals. We discussed every possible avenue of improvement for our people. By reflecting on our own qualifications we arrived at the conclusion that no one else in our leadership role had lengthier continuity of service in the Thal, greater wealth of experience, or more detailed knowledge, experience, and intuition of the Thal.

A first draft focussed on serving some five thousand christians in T.D.A. and a hundred times more moslems. While this rough draft did offer a framework for conceptualizing the whole issue of Thal development, the anticipated cost consigned it to the realm of fancy. Gradually and perceptibly we

narrowed our horizon to the future of Loreto village and its relevance in T.D.A.

By geographic location, proximity to government services, existing physical facilities, personnel and community organization, Loreto village had no peer in the Thal. The negative attributes of the village pertained to poor road access for commercial traffic, and endemic water-logging of agricultural lands. Both needs required government assistance. It called for a policy of deliberately cultivating government personnel and agencies influential with government. In conjunction with this approach, financial sources for project support was stressed. In due course of time, all the elements of a comprehensive development plan for one large village had been specified. We called it the Loreto Master Plan.

In the past, the whim of the resident missionary determined the allocation of scarce resources for a particular mission station. The results were haphazard, and the effects dispersed. One of the purposes of the Loreto Master Plan was to enunciate a program with clearly defined objectives over a period of time. Traditional diocesan practice virtually implied rubber-stamping current needs; the finished Loreto Master Plan explicitly projected and prescribed for a combination of present and future needs. Adaptations, modifications, and reasonable departures from the Plan had been taken into

account; only the requirement to think of the complex social situation as an integrated whole remained constant.

The aims of the Loreto Master Plan as we developed them over a period of two years, are as follows:

1. A planned program and itemization of cost for the purchase of land at strategic points of communication and commerce in the Thal Development Authority.
2. Programs for electrification of Loreto village, construction of a road connecting the village to the rest of the Thal, and development of agriculture.
3. An educationally and architecturally sound expansion program for the Loreto school.
4. A detailed cost analysis and return benefit from the above programs.

Section 1 of the Plan fell to Fr. Gregory because most of his parochial labors concerned the greater Thal area. I was to pursue items 2 and 4, with both of us sharing 3.

All four parts of the Plan overlapped in one way or another; each part portrayed the same social phenomena in a different perspective. Execution of any one phase required simultaneous orchestration with one or more other components of the Plan. The completed Plan related less to the score of written pages detailing its major points than in the learning process experienced by Fr. Gregory and myself. By repeatedly

discussing and interpreting relationships in the social order, we honed our skills. Agreement between us on the formal content of the Plan offered no difficulty; we foundered when decisions had to be made for spending our limited budget surplus. The resulting disagreements strained our personal relationship at times; it in nowise effected our united front when defending or expounding the thesis of planning in the diocese. A resolution to the conflict of funding the Loreto Master Plan diminished when funds in abundance from project reports became available. By that time, Fr. Gregory had been assigned to another station and I inherited the task of implementing our jointly sponsored Plan.

Phase 1 of the Plan fell into abeyance when real estate prices skyrocketed and local government calculatedly deterred purchase of lands by representatives of the christian minority. Phase 2 of the Plan might have met a similar fate if foreign aid, especially on the part of the United States, had not been responsible for electrification and agricultural development in the Punjab. No Pakistani bureaucrat objected to a miniscule funding for one isolated village in the Thal when his own position of authority favored friends on a grandiose scale with these same funds. I was a supplicant, and also an American citizen; the latter carried weight, the former meant ridicule.

A Peace Corps Volunteer made the first site plans and architectural drawings. The professional quality of his work convinced everyone of our determination to develop Loreto village in an orderly way. A branch office of the Bank of America in Lahore was approached for funding, and the manager became an interested friend.<sup>68</sup> He introduced me to several key funding bodies within the United States program for Aid to International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) and their department heads. At first, it seemed a presumptuous intrusion on my part to disturb men who were literally handling millions of dollars in development funds; the warmth and interest of their response showed otherwise. One contact led to another and before long I knew decision makers in every department of A.I.D. These men in turn acquainted me with the relations between their departments and the contractors executing programs in the field. This proved especially helpful in the four divisions of agriculture, electrification, education, and financing.

Familiarity with the demands of private aid organizations had prepared me for sponsoring projects to government agencies. Receipt of agricultural tools from CARE required a report on the use of the donated equipment. UNICEF supplies were obtained upon submission of quarterly reports, and relief organizations, both church and non-church affiliated,

subsidized projects for small scale ventures on the basis of written presentation and corresponding project data. The gestation period for individual agricultural projects, housing schemes, educational programs, and health measures, varied from a few months to several years. In most cases, correspondence was exchanged requiring modification of design, additional data of local needs, or a request to review costs. This preparation demanded concentration and refinement of ideas; mere description of need found no audience outside personal correspondence to friends. The professionals demanded professional work and I was obliged to comply with their standards.<sup>69</sup>

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By far and away, the one agricultural dilemma that every farmer feared in Loreto village, and the Plan sought to alleviate, was water-logging. Water-logging as a national calamity had been occasioned by a combination of geological conditions and a century of expanding canal irrigation in the Punjab. With a land elevation difference of a foot in a mile and thousands of cubic feet of water inundating the plains from canals, it was inevitable and unforeseen that the ground water table would rise to dangerous levels. When the ground

water table rose to within two feet or less of the surface soil it forced underlying salts to the surface and caused "salinity"; when the same water flooded the surface, it became known as water-logging. Both effects destroyed the land for agricultural purposes.

In the first days of colonization in the Thal, such a phenomena was unknown; the ground water table at 42 feet had the sweetness of fresh spring water. A decade later, the doomsayers predicted that the entire Punjab would become a lake unless radical measures were introduced. The response of the international community resulted in the Revelle study, a twenty-five year comprehensive scheme for agriculture and irrigation in the Punjab.<sup>70</sup> This report triggered the heavy financing of the World Bank and the U. S. government. Because Thal lands had few champions in the seats of power, little overt attention had been given to the problem in that area. Yet, hundreds of Thal acres contained a high content of salts, and water-logging buckled road foundations making them un-serviceable for miles. Despite the prognosis and doubtful concern of government, I studied and surveyed the extent of the problem in Loreto village and the surrounding area.

The results were disheartening. One third of the best village lands had succumbed to some degree of salinity; crop productivity for most of the land owners in the area had

decreased substantially, and some men had rented their lands to alleviate their immediate distress. At the observed rate of loss, less than five years would elapse before the entire village suffered a similar fate. No matter what the solution or remedies to be employed, the first step required educating the farmer.

Individual farmers well knew their plight; to make the entire community aware of the problem seemed a futile task. The individual farmer lived and labored, breathed and bargained within the confines of his fifteen acre plot. The benevolence of the community or a unified village effort in the face of natural exigencies seldom existed. To the peasant farmer, natural calamities appeared outside the range of human control; such events belonged to God's providence. Neutralizing this accepted local lore and seeking to educate the farmers required ingenuity rather than specific skills in language or knowledge of customs. It presupposed my personal familiarity with the people and their acceptance of my leadership. I was exuberantly confident on both counts.

The need for a total reorientation in agriculture was expounded at Mass on Sundays, by individual encounters with the farmers in their fields, and the always enjoyable pastime of visiting farmers in their homes. My own knowledge of agriculture took quantum leaps from reading government sponsored

studies, attendance at several seminars sponsored by A.I.D. officials, and written communique, as well as verbal confrontation with foreign advisers who were the architects of the soon to come "green revolution". The advice and guidance of foreign agricultural technicians extended to the selection of farmers for brief courses in new agricultural techniques, supply of statistical data from soil and water samples submitted to them, and actual instruction on site to the farmers via graphs, slides, and movies. This teaching program unearthed the suspicion that few farmers knew or cared about agriculture. The view found confirmation in the judgment of a visiting U.S.A.I.D. official. After spending a day in the fields with the farmers, he bluntly informed me: "Only one landowner in five is a farmer."

Christians in the Thal, unlike the hereditary landlords of the Arain lineage or people from Jullundar in East Punjab, had never owned land. They had cultivated for the Sikh or found employment as day laborers and had little appreciation for the soil's productivity except that its possession set a man apart from others in the community. The realization of this disturbing social phenomena had to simmer until I better understood the underlying mechanism and how to channel it. The information failed to dismay me because the few real farmers were inexorably acquiring the cultivation rights of their

less interested neighbors and increasing the total productivity of agriculture in the village. For them, I hammered out a program of agricultural improvement.

A cornerstone of the program required supplementary supply of water for irrigation. Canal irrigation by government allowed one cusec of water for 320 acres of land. It came closer to one cusec for 500 to 600 acres of land after evaporation, leakage on the water courses, and annual shutdown for canal repairs. In the U.S., one cusec for 100 acres is considered a norm, so even under optimum conditions the supply in the Thal was deficient.

The crucial factor for tube-well operation lay in power supply. Diesel operated tube-wells cost too much for fuel charges and could only be economically justified for high cash crops like citrus fruits or outright sale of water during periods of critical need. A diesel powered tube-well supplying water to raise food grains or fodder crops proved prohibitive in operating costs. Foreign engineers drilling tube-wells on government contract thirty-five miles south of Loreto educated me on the benefits of electricity. They also visited the village and supplied the technical data for a project report on tube-wells in Loreto. It presumed government source of electrical supply from power lines fourteen miles distant; a presumption of the first magnitude.

Commonwealth Associates, a U.S. based electrical engineering firm, had the contract for supervising power grid installations in the Punjab. Their main office in Lahore, some 250 miles from Loreto village, advised me as to procedures and key personnel instrumental for the electrification of the Thal. By a personally sponsored field survey of the village site, measuring the route for fourteen miles of power lines and poles from the nearest electrical sub-station, and itemizing the power requirements of a ten square mile area, I was able to influence favorable decisions on the highest levels of planning in the government. Without such personal and persistent advocacy, no electrification of the area would have been envisaged for a decade or more. This personal representation of local problems was precisely what concerned industrialists and wealthy landlords exercised, and my intercession for one voiceless area conformed to this unwritten practice. The institutional structures for a better representation and evaluation of needs in countless rural communities did not exist. The two notable attempts of a Village Aid Program in the first five-year plan, and Basic Democracies of the second plan, never replaced the time honored moghul custom of authority dispensing favors to interested and influential parties.

Even granted the source of electrical power, the cost of tube-wells and the installation of transmission power lines

was in excess of \$50,000; more than half the annual operating costs of the entire diocese. The effort and interest to be expended on this aspect of the Plan seemed like pie in the sky until a cost breakdown of the total village holdings revealed otherwise.

#### LORETO VILLAGE CHURCH



Estimated Real Estate ValueMoveable and Immoveable Property in LoretoProperty Valuation:

1000	acres	@ 2000 Rs. per acre	2,000,000 Rs.
600	acres	@ 1000 Rs. per acre	600,000
120	acres	@ 8000 Rs. per acre	<u>960,000</u>
Total value of land in Loreto village:			3,560,000 Rs

Moveable and Immoveable Property:

Church	60,000 Rs.
School	200,000
Convent	70,000
Priest's House	60,000
Storage	30,000
Dispensary	25,000
Boys' Boarding	130,000
Girls' Boarding	225,000
Staff Quarters	45,000
Village Housing	160,000
Roads, trees, playgrounds, etc.	30,000
Animals (oxen, cows, donkeys, sheep, goats, chickens)	325,000
Barns, plows, hand pumps, fodder machines, etc.	<u>30,000</u>
Total value of moveable and immoveable property in Loreto village:	1,390,000 Rs.

Total Real Estate value, moveable and immoveable property in Loreto village: 4,956,000 Rs.

or

At an exchange rate of \$1 U.S. to 4.76 Rs., the village holdings exceeded \$1,000,000.

The study used current market prices for land rather than the original land grant cost of 120 rupees per acre. It showed that a medium sized village is a million dollar investment, and the hereditary landlord possessing several villages is a millionaire. For this very reason, land prices in T.D.A. had inflated from nominal land grant costs to auction prices prohibitive except for the privileged rich. These auctions commandeered prices that would scarcely find favor for the best of Mississippi bottom lands. Government lured the first settlers into the Thal with land grants, then satisfied itself with maximized profits from land sales. No leader took cognizance of the increase in absentee landlords, the growing numbers of tenant farmers, and the mounting social problems consequent upon this land sale speculation. It took no great intelligence to realize that the grand idea of T.D.A. had long since been aborted; the area was a backwater for small farmers on the scene, tenant farmers employed by absentee landlords rich enough to buy land, and a horde of poor peasants.

Under the circumstances, I embarked upon a frenetic program to enlist influential government officials and foreign consultants for tube-well installation in the Thal. The landed aristocracy of the Punjab consistently employed a similar approach, and their efforts were immensely helped by close alliance with the civil service elite and military officer

caste via inter-marriage or otherwise. Government policy further slanted the issue in their favor by granting lands or permitting their acquisition on favorable terms for the civil service elite and military officers while on state service. Land settlement in the Punjab exhibited inbreeding on a rampant scale with all new colonization areas reserving large blocks of land for the upper echelon of civil service and military personnel.<sup>71</sup> Government installation of tube-wells followed a discriminatory pattern, and only by chance rather than from deliberate design did smaller farmers profit from this program. A single wealthy landlord could influence an almost immediate rectification of his water-logging problems, but the lack of voice on the part of thousands of small farmers doomed their expectations to the realm of fate. The paternal relationship of colonial rulers to their humblest charges had gone, and no institutional structure had taken its place.<sup>72</sup>

The one institution that might have facilitated change, the religion of Islam, bred a conservatism that affected an entrenchment of the status quo.<sup>73</sup> Islam as an institution in the society transcended religion and influenced law, customs, war, family life, politics, education; in sum, the totality of human existence. It fostered a virulent religious fanaticism that in one way or another inhibited all changes in the rural

structure. To a lesser degree, but still evident, the same was true in the major cities of the nation. It could scarcely be otherwise when the demand for a theocratic state sounded from every mosque at one time or another, and men professing to pray practiced the ritual in public offices, while travelling in crowded trains, at roadside bus stops, or wherever a man could find room to prostrate himself.

It was admirable to myself as a leader of another great faith, but the disparities between religious beliefs and rampant social injustices gave pause for reflection on Lenin's dictum of religion as an opiate. The christian minority also suffered from this excess of religious formalism and I often ridiculed overt superstition or counselled against pompous piety as a substitute for social concern. Again, though, this same dichotomy between professed belief and practice in the day to day activity of the people had scourged the nation from the day one. No spiritual leader of a Gandian stature had arisen to purify and channel the religious aspirations of the people, and no political leader had the necessary strength to confront the issue nationwide.

\* \* \* \* \*

Travel by day or night, on buses, in trains, by plane or Landrover, brought me into association with a myriad of government officials. An amazing lack of continuity and familiarity with conditions in the rural areas was shared by most of them. Part of the problem lay in the vast populations under the control of individual district officials, the primitive communications links between the government in the cities and the countryside, as well as the rapid turnover of capable individuals. The Commissioner of Bahawalpur seldom remained more than nine months in office, and the negative effects upon planned development in the division frustrated everyone. Even the more technically trained irrigation officials experienced this problem. In the Thal, I had occasion to write up a memorandum at the request of the irrigation engineer on the adverse operating costs of diesel powered tube-wells. He appreciated my advice and I helplessly watched as government implemented the scheme for diesel units. Shortly thereafter, another engineer sought my counsel to correct the error. Like the echo from a ringing bell, the lack of trained personnel with continuity of service in district areas kept being heard.

Short terms of service and residency in big city enclaves hampered the performance of foreign personnel as it did their Pakistani counterparts. Practices and procedures established early in the planned development of the nation became

entrenched assumptions for subsequent replacement personnel. Very few key foreign advisers had lengthy continuity of service or established authority to break with earlier development concepts. Despite the rhetoric contained in the first five-year plan emphasizing concern for the human factors so necessary to make development a success, a fundamental shift took place early in the planning process that made economics the key criteria. The former colonial rulers were usually well qualified in language and knowledge of the country. Their level of authority was for the most part in direct proportion to their understanding and experience of the people. It was the rare administrator or project director who was unable to converse with his engineer, the office clerk, or laborer on the job.<sup>74</sup> His exposure to the people and their exposure to him were mutually beneficial. The new approach completely subordinated this necessary interplay with the people and enshrined professional expertise. For the most part this was expressed in terms of technology and economics. The problems of the nation were conceptualized instead of being experienced and shared.<sup>75</sup>

The whole cultural life of the east is deeply sensate; the senses rule for the majority of the people. By doing a strictly professional labor divorced from the content of the culture, the foreigner was inadvertently encouraging those

forces least responsive or understanding of the masses, namely the military, large landlords, civil service elite, and the new industrialists. Colonialism was gone and the people no longer had off-bounds military cantonements in their midst staffed by foreign troops. Instead, the Army rulers contentedly encouraged the presence of foreign professionals to manipulate the development course of the nation when in reality there was almost a total block of relevant communication between these new colonials and the populace at large.

Foreign technicians in the field were held in high esteem by the populace. Their intensity and skill became a byword and discomfited their Pakistani counterparts. As one engineer observed: "At first, I was embarrassed knowing my salary was five times that of my counterpart. Then I realized I was working five times harder." It was with pride I introduced a middle aged U.S.A.I.D. agricultural technician to the farmers of Loreto village and knew he'd spend all day in the fields with them when a more youthful Pakistani counterpart would merely "salaam" and pass on. This humanitarian impulse to help on the part of foreign technicians was offset by their specific government assignments which invariably benefited the rich and powerful.

This state of affairs was perpetuated by the lack of any institution or mechanism in the society to permit liason with

the populace. Outside their official duties in the assigned national development schemes, the foreign community of advisers and consultants took pains to assist particular needy groups. Individual schools were subsidized, services freely donated to hospitals, funds raised, and immediate household employees well treated. These works were commendable, even if on an insignificant scale in relation to the overall development undertaken in the nation.

Such activities were discharged with the same spirit of humanitarian idealism which at one time or another moved the most obdurate foreign national. This same motivation reinforced much of the effort expended in the national development labors of the foreign community; it rarely bridged the gap of language barrier and social understanding. As a consequence, major development undertakings unless completely engineered and managed by foreigners in key positions fell prey to the dynamic social and political forces seeking to express themselves in the nation. These took place in the form of rivalries for administrative seats of power, or critical engineering posts, or prestige positions. When informed of a breakdown in a multi-million dollar power plant, the first words on the telephone by the Pakistan director of electrical power to the plant engineer were: "Who did it?" It was an inquiry of the deeper malaise in the body politic where men of

substantial authority were less concerned as to what was happening than who was involved.

Responses of this kind by indigenous personnel frustrated the foreign planners and their allies, the overseas contractors. The prime objective of both was to get the job done; failure was likened to a betrayal of western know-how. The scales had long since been tipped against them because the whole array of western development values perished for lack of preparedness in the society. Hospital personnel could let a badly burned man die because "he's from the villages", and countless other cases of the nation's indifference to its own larger ills could be multiplied. Human values that would eventually have penetrated the consciousness of the nation had never been the prime object of national planning. It was clearly evident to any sojourner in the city bazaar with its beggars, or sick souls on railway platforms, or undernourished peasants in the villages. No aspect of the Pakistan planning process proved hazier or more misunderstood than the specification of human values as a national goal. Exorbitant influxes of foreign aid impugned these goals from the start. Foreign aid brought out the worst features of the national character and promoted the monstrosity of avarice on a national scale. The Pakistani engineer, industrialist, or technician never discussed his work in terms of people helped,

assistance rendered, or improvement for the nation's poor. He measured human welfare, national progress, and personal accomplishment in the meanest of terms; money acquired by hook or by crook, and more often the latter. By misplacing emphasis on statistical figures and rapture with increased GNP, the planners ruptured rather than changed the society. Bangla Desh resulted from the avarice of exploitation, not from disloyalty to islam.

The ecclesiastical heirarchy of the Catholic Church pursued a policy not unlike that of resident foreigners working on national development programs.<sup>76</sup> Church leaders registered little awareness of social and political movements in the country. And this despite a long history of service to the people, a body of exceptionally dedicated missionary staff, and a faithful flock clinging to the under belly of society. Whereas Pope John XXIII had put his imprint on the twentieth century with the encyclical "Pacem in terris", Pakistani ecclesiastical leaders periodically gathered to discuss liturgical reforms or ward off government take-over of mission schools. To a man, the bishops impressed me by their simplicity and resonance of faith. Leading lives governed by a narrowly defined morality, they ruled with a caution indistinguishable from irresolution. It salvaged them; their constituency suffered.

The ruling classes' appreciation of human values is best exemplified in the primacy of foreign educational institutions in the field of education. These institutions dominated the scene. The wealthy and powerful had recourse to them, and government obliged by minimum allocation of resources for the education of the populace at large. The ruling classes catered to themselves, and the rest of the population counted as straw in the wind. The 1961 census reported 12% literacy in a population of 110 million for the world's sixth largest nation. Even this meager percentage figure was questionable. In the district where I resided, the criterion of literacy meant a man could read and write his own name.

\* \* \* \* \*

Phase 3 of the Loreto Master Plan called for an increase of student body and expansion of school facilities in Loreto village to change the statistic of illiteracy for the christian minority and their moslem neighbors. Excellence in education was the outstanding attribute accorded to foreign missionaries. In Loreto village this deserved praise had been earned by three highly qualified American Sisters. It wasn't at all evident in the first years that the village school with its crude mud walls and total enrollment not exceeding fifty

children for six grades would become a large educational complex. Part of this change in perspective was due to the advent of boarding schools within the confines of Loreto village.

Government lacked schools in many of the outer stations where tenant farmers lived. More often than not though, most illiterate peasant parents were indifferent or even hostile to education. Unless the mission assumed the responsibility for boarding children in Loreto village, scant chance existed that the christian minority in the outer villages would ever be educated. This emphasis on education for children outside Loreto coincided with a pattern of increased student enrollment in Loreto village itself. A population expansion of 11% to 15% a year had been taking place within the village since its foundation, and school operation took the lion's share of the station's budget allowance. Education with all its attendant costs of construction, employment and housing of staff, and innovative administrative policy, became a key facet of the Loreto Master Plan.<sup>77</sup>

From a small population with three people able to read and one to write, the village could claim an almost 95% literacy rate for everyone under 21 years of age in a population of two thousand by 1968. The source of financing all social projects like education was exogenous to the resources of the people.

The diocese supplied these funds from U.S. solicited origins or by project grants from organizations in western Europe. Like foreign aid to the nation at large, the diocesan funds had many times helped the people unable to help themselves. No clear comprehensive plan guided the expenditure of these funds for housing subsidies, excavating water courses, tube-well installation, medical costs, scholarships for higher education, and school buildings; an ad hoc dispersed growth taking place in fits and starts ruled the scene. The Loreto Master Plan was an attempt to avoid this random development in education.

The drastic change in school enrollment occasioned by the construction of boarding facilities to accommodate the children of tenant farmers in the numberless small villages and railway junctions of T.D.A., curtailed proposed diocesan investments in tube-wells. The phenomena of a few land owners diligently pursuing agriculture, and these few exercising cultivation rights over adjacent properties, implied their capability to finance tube-wells. I would continue to prevail upon government for electrification; the farmers could finance the tube-wells. Education preempted all other approaches to the Loreto Master Plan.

Several causes prescribed this choice. Evidence had mounted to show that the social landscape of the village was



LORETO VILLAGE SCHOOL



*BOYS' BOARDING - LORETO VILLAGE*



*GIRLS' BOARDING*

fast changing shape. The heirarchical structure of a village society where ownership of land and land returns determined the pecking order of social status was being undermined by the nation's need for technologically trained personnel. The vil- lage carpenter and iron monger traditionally lived on the edges of the village, and, like untouchables, seldom married outside their social class. The economics of their lives was regulated by work done for property owners, and it fell short of half the return of a poor farmer. With the introduction of large irrigation development schemes throughout the nation via the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, a need for such local artisans became paramount on government projects. With outside employ- ment, the village artisans could earn in two months what no village could scarcely provide in a year. Students with tech- nical high school education became more valuable to foreign contractors than locally trained engineers, and men with their college B.A. would seek this training from the limited facili- ties in the nation. Education in Loreto village sought to capitalize on technical and scientific career training.

Upgrading the school staff and expanding facilities called for a financial outlay opposed to the prosaic picture of a village in the desert. The president of an American tube-well contracting firm, H.T. Smith Inc.,<sup>78</sup> met the Sisters and became interested in their work. Shortly thereafter, he

despatched an architect to survey the existing school plant and interrogate the Sisters on their needs as outlined in the Loreto Master Plan. Within six months a total high school complex with superb science and laboratory equipment, library facilities, office space, and twelve new classrooms had been professionally prepared. Everything learned about teaching for ten years in the desert had been incorporated into the finished plans; height of classrooms, ventilation for extreme heat, exposure to sun for the winter cold, as well as colorfully painted rooms. This last feature contrasted sharply with the universal custom of whitewashing publicly used buildings in the nation. By experimenting with this simple device in several existing classrooms, the school took on the aura of a visit to a museum of art for the students; so barren of color is the desert. Having designed the new school complex, the engineering firm agreed to build half of it.

With this impetus to spur me on, I submitted the remainder of the school building plan to an international agency for funding. They obliged, and furthered our Loreto Master Plan by funding a community center for women. The marked separation of the sexes in Pakistan had been the concern of the American Sisters, and one of them, Sr. Catherine Raymond, early organized a small sewing class. It soon blossomed into a woman's community affair with fashion shows, child care



WOMEN'S  
COMMUNITY  
CENTER




instruction, and adult literacy. The new woman's community center recognized the importance of this budding village institution. Eventually it became central to the education of girls who either through lack of school interest or parental choice discontinued formal education. The woman's community center served them as a staging area while making the transition to a more active role in their families, preparation for marriage, and as adult members of the village society.

An exceptional rapport existed amongst the Americans of the mission staff stationed in Loreto village. We jointly discussed school policy, individual student scholarships, and plans for school building expansion. We developed an information program involving the village men so that they could understand the school policy changes most apt to directly affect their lives. To avert any crises in this matter, a series of meetings were held with the village men in attendance. The Sisters made known their ideas for scholarship choices, rules for admittance, hopes for expansion and educational goals. As a further venture into the future, the offer was made to permit a select body of five men from the village to oversee all financing of the school, consultation for the employment of additional staff, and control of administration as soon as an acceptable Pakistani candidate could be found. The last feature became a necessity, not because of

government intervention, but solely from the realization that education was displacing ownership of land as the status symbol of the village.

It might seem a commonplace to an outsider, the idea of local teaching personnel being elevated to the level of school administrators; it was endorsed with less than unanimity in the diocese. The employment of a highly qualified christian educator as school principal in Loreto village involved interviewing a number of candidates, and long journeys to persuade interested applicants. The experience was not unlike that encountered in the selection of a college president in the U. S. The decisive factor proved to be salary size, and this became possible with a grant from the I.O.S. (Investors Overseas Services) Foundation to supplement teacher salaries. The new principal and school administrator had qualifications shared by only one other Catholic christian in the Punjab. At present, he is the only Pakistani in the whole diocese with such a wide range of autonomy and authority in education, and his success to date has more than justified the experiment. The Pakistan government decreed in March 1972 the nationalization of all foreign or privately owned schools over the next two years. It can be assumed that during this transfer of authority and jurisdiction, Loreto village school will be the model for the diocesan administrators.



FACULTY QUARTERS



LORETO SCHOOL FACULTY ROOM

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As long as agriculture received my adequate interest which included tube-well installation, electrification, and government construction of a road, the farmers accepted the changes education involved. They knew that their lands were too small to absorb all the labor potential of the growing village and that many youths were unable or unwilling to work in the fields. Education of sons and daughters would increase their own social status and offered promise for additional income from outside employment. The quality of the school staff headed by three American teaching Sisters and the size of the school buildings satisfied their pride in the eyes of adjacent communities. In this setting of relative social progress, governing the village was a fairly easy occupation for myself. Several landlords of the village seeking to enhance their power and prestige questioned this state of equilibrium. Their claim against a foreigner as village mayor had much merit and justification; their obvious motives earned them no support from the majority of village residents. Government decided the issue.

The Colonization Officer of T.D.A. periodically approved local lumberdars, and in the case of Loreto village had been obliged to visit the site in order to satisfy contrary claims.


Before the assembled body of all village land holders, he asked who desired a new lomberdar. Only one man sought to replace the incumbent, and on the basis that no foreigner should rule locally. The complaint was valid and in accordance with my own mature thoughts on the subject. However, the Colonization Officer concurred with the decision of the majority to make no change. The reluctance of the farmers to make a change had as cause the disparate factions common to all villages, and they therefore refrained from offering an alternative candidate. Their omission and my lack of foresight in the matter permitted little room for maneuver.

Two weeks later, government selected as the new lomberdar a landlord of little particular appeal to the village. I had to assuage the frustration of the farmers and at the same time sustain the new mayor as the lawfully appointed authority. These efforts proved partially successful, but the inadequacy of the new mayor quickly became apparent to all. Periodic difficulties arose in the form of refusal by the people to pay taxes, land and water disputes of greater frequency, and a deterioration of community spirit.

To have accepted the authority of lomberdar in the beginning was a prerequisite for welding the village together. By retaining the position too long, I had created a situation inimical to the goal of village self-government. Government

itself shares the responsibility for this state of affairs. By falsely informing the people of the correctness of their choice of a foreigner, the Colonization Officer effectively suspended discussion of a replacement acceptable to the many. From the first days, I had inculcated an esprit and respect for local leadership, and yet the very difference of my leadership style made it difficult to choose a successor.

As minority members of the nation, christians would often try to hide their identity from fear of discrimination. The leadership given by the Church in Loreto village did much to remove these inhibitions. Whether in the port city of Karachi, or the Punjab capital of Lahore, former village peasants would proudly identify their home as "Loreto Chak 270 T.D.A."; the Province of the Punjab, the district of Muzaffargarh, or Leiah tehsil, had far less meaning for them. They spoke of their village with the same pride as city dwellers do in the more cosmopolitan centers of New York, London, or Moscow. With the failure of government to consolidate this fragile community spirit, my experiment in building a new village social order had been jeopardized. There was no fear of community collapse; just a loss of the dynamism to realize its full potential. No village in the Thal started with greater handicaps or achieved so much in the short span of fifteen years. As the tractor driver, Khurshid, said: "What we do here in a



LORETO VILLAGE 1961



LORETO VILLAGE 1969

year would take five years in other places."

No small part of the successful development of Loreto village was due to its very remoteness. Distance from religious superiors and indifference of local government officials permitted a wide latitude of action without interference. In Bahawalpur city, development in the social order was choked by religious mandate or government obstruction. In the Thal, six weeks would pass before my superiors expressed concern for a fait accompli, and government officials approved work of any kind in an otherwise stagnant project area. So much had been done in Loreto village over a short period of time that it stunned visitors and silenced critics. In the latter stage of village development, fellow priests refrained from visiting and contributed to my growing sense of alienation.

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The shape and change of government in Loreto presaged those of the nation, and before long the farmers jokingly referred to my descent from power as "like Ayub Khan". The changes in the national scene began with a series of student-worker strikes against the ruling regime. At first, they seemed like harmless riots, just as I misjudged as harmless the one or two landlords contesting my position as village

mayor. The mounting frequency and violence of national riots, however, soon beguiled the claim of Ayub's regime celebrating a "Decade of Development". To the surprise of the foreign community, President Ayub Khan suddenly resigned from office in March 1969, and the military once again proclaimed martial law.<sup>79</sup>

Ayub Khan was the personage internationally equated with leadership and national development in Pakistan. Hadn't President Kennedy sumptuously feted him on his state visit to Washington where he spoke to a joint session of Senate and Congress? Who could take his place? The cause for what appeared a drastic change in national leadership caused consternation in many foreign quarters. The Army had ruthlessly and expeditiously in the past uprooted forces far more threatening than student rioters and striking workers. After a few months, most observers concluded that the matter was an internal affair of the military as opposed to a major policy change.

If foreign personnel were now inclined to view the role of the military with less equanimity after the removal of Ayub Khan, their awakening concern was understandable. For a full decade, the economy of the nation had shown remarkable progress; industry both heavy and light significantly increased, manufacturing broadened its field of enterprise, exports

showed marked improvement, and agriculture was in the heady throes of the "green revolution". Political instability would endanger the whole structure. The foreign community of advisers, consultants, contracting engineers, and other foreign aid groups were beginning to question their past contribution and future scope of their work. In this they were justified.

A number of well executed projects were either not functioning or malfunctioning because of conditions contingent upon the lack of qualified Pakistani personnel and a corrupt administration.<sup>80</sup> What with the political system lacking the commanding figure of Ayub Khan, the enthusiasm for development had suffered. Most foreign advisers, consultants, contractors, and others could claim some continuity of exposure and experience with the nation to feel uneasy in the new political atmosphere. Some observers were more astute than others in their realization that the nation could not much longer pursue its present course. One such high ranking official told me in conversation that the data coming into his office raised the spectre of national breakdown a few years hence. His plaintive cry proved prophetic: "I don't want to be around here in 1972." The Army rulers willfully executed this prophecy.

Over the years, I had come to admire the Army, its

organizing abilities, its efficiency, and the quality of its members. After the 1965 war with India, the Army frequently and on an ever larger scale held maneuvers in the Thal. Their technologically sophisticated equipment presented a striking contrast to the bullock power of the peasants. U.S. built tanks, mobile field artillery, Mercedes-Benz heavy duty trucks, helicopters, and supersonic jets overhead impressed the people while contradicting the prevalent poverty of the society.<sup>81</sup>

The singular silence of every aid giving agency concerning the large allocation of national revenue to defense in Pakistan is a cause for wonder. In the very first five-year plan (1955-1960), before the Army took over government, the authors were explicit in their alarm at the proportion of resources allocated to defense:

"The magnitude of the resources absorbed by our defense programme is shown by the fact that while a sum of 3,700 million rupees is estimated to be available from domestic sources for financing the development programme in the public sector, defense will require 4,775 million rupees from the same sources. During 1955-58, expenditure on defense is expected to be only slightly less than the total net tax revenues of the Central Government.

In comparing the burden of defense expenditure in Pakistan with that in countries such as India, Australia, Ceylon, Thailand, and Turkey, we find that whatever standard adopted to compare their relative positions, whether it be the amount of expenditure per capita or ratio between defense expenditure and national income - the relative size of defense expenditure in Pakistan appears to be among the largest."<sup>82</sup>

In addition, there was the "classified" aid in arms by the U.S., estimated at \$2.4 billion between 1954 and 1965. A reduction in such aid did take place in 1965 following the war with India, at which time China replaced the United States as the main supplier of military equipment. The U.S. later resumed arms aid in diminished quantity. Figures are scarce or doctored as regards the annual military share of national revenue; but it is safe to say it averaged between 50%-60% for the twenty-five years of the nation's existence.<sup>83</sup> Of course, such a lion's share leaves out roads built by the civil sector for military use, or the import of petroleum products under the label "industry", or the myriad other ways for practicing deceptive accounting. No matter how appraised, the magnitude of national income earmarked for defense was all out of proportion to the existing poverty of the nation, and

furthered the delusion of omnipotence on the part of the nation's military leadership.<sup>84</sup>

No underdeveloped nation in the modern world, unless lavishly subsidized by foreign aid, could have embarked upon a development program of the size and cost incurred by Pakistan and at the same time maintain such a high rate of investment in arms. Foreign aid, directly in military matters and indirectly in development programs, contributed more than all else to cause harden the nation's military leaders toward their own subjects. Sequestered in their military cantonements, supplied with the most modern of equipment, and surrounded with the best of physical facilities, they were contemptuous of their own people and the architects of disaster. Their ascendancy to power, retention of rule, and descent from that pinnacle, parallels the investment of foreign aid in Pakistan. There is no more damning indictment of the nation's military leadership than the case of East Pakistan, and the community of foreign aid personnel are not blameless. From the beginning, the regional disparity between East and West Pakistan was pronounced. Yet, none of the formal planning models developed in preparation for the third five-year plan (1965-1970) were formulated as regional models.<sup>85</sup> The resulting cleavage of the two wings of the nation happened not by accident; it had been built into the planning process.<sup>86</sup>

While the nation swiftly heated to the flash point of civil war, brother priests upset my life. In less than a month's time, a series of incidental and aggravating clashes occurred. Backbiting gossip and an all too human disrespect rooted in envy strained our relationships. The lessons I had learned of development in the social order were neither acceptable nor transferable. A land grant for a sweeper's housing colony in Bahawalpur city had been approved by government and the priest executing the project showed me his landscaping efforts. I was appalled at the neglect of study for proper drainage, spatial layout, and prepared house designs. In consternation, I informed him: "You're moving a slum from one place to another. You should have a portfolio an inch thick before undertaking a project of this sort". He resented my advice, and his resentment recruited allies. I soon found myself more a stranger to men I'd lived with for fourteen years than people I'd never known. In the past, I had endured for the sake of the people being served and the opportunities to be exploited in their behalf. Now, I questioned my future role in the diocese. My success in development had estranged the diocesan community of priests, and their repudiation of my style was wracking me. A misfortune in the village of Fati-mapur settled the outcome.

A tractor-trailer filled with a number of village people

returning from a wedding party had overturned. Several persons had died and many others seriously injured. All the clergy of the diocese, including the bishop, first heard the news three days later when gathered in Bahawalpur to elect members for the bishop's council. My spontaneous request to be excused and visit the village met rebuff. I argued with the bishop that the meaning of our ministry turned on just such events, and we had an obligation as certain as the fealty with which the people honored him. After a fitful night's sleep, I excused myself from the next day's meeting, went to the village of Fatimapur, and returned with the formal request for passage back to the United States. Some of my fellow priests expressed regret at the decision; for the remainder, it elicited nominal indifference or silent acceptance; for a few, hostile delight. I left the Punjab and Pakistan in March 1970. Almost a year to the day, the Pakistan Army unleashed its maniacal fury to suppress East Pakistan. The rest is the story of Bangla Desh.

This tale of one man's experience East of the Suez ends here. The customs of the people, their dress, their habits and views on the world have been alluded to. Many fine books describe these matters in greater detail. The purpose of this study was to fulfill a thesis requirement, and in the process it has raised questions to the writer himself. What happened

to him during all those months and years in the Punjab with the village people of Loreto, Fatimapur, Bahawalpur, and countless other primitive peasant communities? There is a partial answer, poetic as it seems.

On the day of my departure, a fellow missionary handed me a sealed envelope. It contained a small ivory camel and a farewell letter with this message:

"Dear Rider,

I thought I'd make myself small and you could have me as a reminder. I symbolize a lot of things. To be broad, I signify the expanse of the desert with its tinkle of a camel bell or cry of a jackal or thundering nighttime silence. To be precise, I manifest Loreto and all the other places you've covered in the desert.

Deserts make men - they train well. You came as a youth, you return as a man. And now while you are yet young and have your health and a deep faith, go to your new world. Give it what you have given my sands so generously.

Let me symbolize the fact that you have made an oasis in the desert - you have left your mark as no other will do - no other could do - because there is only one village of Loreto and she has come of age."

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FINIS

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FOREIGN AID COMMITMENTS TO PAKISTAN<sup>a/</sup>

(Million Dollars)

<u>Donor</u> <u>Country/Agency</u>	<u>Second Plan</u>		<u>Third Plan</u> 1965/66-1968/69	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1. IBRD	\$ 120	6.1%	\$ 230	11.9%
2. IDA	207	10.5	143	7.4
3. IFC	10	0.5	12	0.6
A: Total Bank Group <sup>b/</sup>	\$ 337	17.1%	\$ 385	19.9%
4. United States <sup>c/</sup>	889	45.6	517	26.7
5. Germany	216	10.9	152	7.9
6. Japan	144	7.3	128	6.6
7. United Kingdom <sup>d/</sup>	124	6.3	84	4.3
8. Canada <sup>e/</sup>	82	4.1	147	7.6
9. Italy	5	0.2	78	4.0
10. France	25	1.3	54	2.8
11. Netherlands	12	0.6	10	0.5
12. Belgium	-	-	10	0.5
13. Sweden	-	-	13	0.7
14. Suppliers Credit	33	1.7	59	3.1
B: Total Consortium Countries/ Agencies (1-14) <sup>f/</sup>	\$1877	95.1%	\$1637	84.7%
15. Denmark	7	0.4	2	0.1
16. Australia/New Zealand	7	0.4	4	0.2
17. Switzerland	10	0.5	18	0.9
18. Turkey	-	-	4	0.2
19. Asian Development Bank	-	-	10	0.5
C: Total Other Non-Communist Countries	\$ 24	1.3%	\$ 38	1.9%
20. USSR	41	2.1	74	3.8
21. Yugoslavia	30	1.5	67	3.5
22. China	-	-	48	2.5
23. Czechoslovakia	-	-	52	2.7
24. Poland	-	-	17	0.9
D: Total Communist Bloc Countries	\$ 71	3.6%	\$ 258	13.4%
TOTAL ALL DONORS	\$1972	100.0%	\$1933	100.0%

Notes:

a/ Excludes PL-480 and contributions to the Indus Basin Development Fund. Estimated value of PL-480 Title I and II imports are:

Second Plan period: \$ 706.1 million. Third Plan  
(1965/66 - 1968/69) \$ 390.3 million.

Commitments to the Indus Basin Fund, including those made under the supplementary agreement of 1964, total \$ 1,210.4 million.

b/ IFC credits are not part of the Bank Group's consortium contribution.

c/ Includes Ex-Im Bank.

d/ Includes Export Refinance Corporation which is not part of the UK's consortium contribution.





e/ Includes Canadian Development Finance Corporation which is not part of Canada's consortium contribution.

f/ Includes commitments by consortium countries outside consortium.

Source: Second Plan: US/AID. Statistical Fact Book - Pakistan.  
Karachi. US/AID Pakistan, 1968.

Third Plan: US/AID - unpublished data.

# SELECTED ECONOMIC TRENDS



ESTIMATED COST OF 2 CUSEC FIBER GLASS  
FILTER TUBE-WELL WITH 320' DEPTH

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
1	Drilling	ft.	285	\$4.50	\$1280.00
2	Electric log	ea.		75.00	75.00
3	Housing casing	ft.	75	5.50	415.00
4	Tubewell casing	ft.	210	4.25	895.00
5	Slotting casing	ft.	180	1.00	180.00
6	Gravel shroud- ing	ft.	285	1.25	360.00
7	Developing and testing			300.00	300.00
8	Concrete base and slab			50.00	50.00
9	Pump, motor & controls			2700.00	2700.00
10	Installation			200.00	200.00
11	Pump house			75.00	75.00

Cost Per Unit: \$6530.00

Total Cost for Five (5) Units: \$32,650.00

ESTIMATED COST FOR ELECTRIFICATION

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Approximate Power Consumption Calculation

1. School, Boarding, Dispensary	60 KW
2. Village housing (350 X 0.3 per house)	105 KW
3. Cottage Industry (Mechanical work, Flour Mill, etc.)	50 KW
4. Church	30 KW
5. Agrucultural barn	40 KW
Total Village Consumption:	285 KW
Five (5) Tubewells @ 22 KW per unit	<u>110 KW</u>
Total Need of Electrical Power:	400 KW

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Cost of Electrification for above 400 KW lines:

11 KW lines (about 4 miles, Rs. 21,000 per mile or U.S. U.S. Dollars:	\$16,800.00
Six (6) 11/0.4 KV transformers with accessories:	7,200.00
Total Cost of Electrification	\$24,000.00

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Total Cost of Entire Project:

1. Five (5) tube-wells:	\$32,650.00
2. Two (2) auxiliary generators:	13,000.00
3. Electrification:	<u>24,000.00</u>
TOTAL:	<u>\$69,650.00</u>
Deduction of two (2) tubewell installations: (pipe and boring fees)	5,400.00
Total Cost of Proposed Project:	\$64,250.00

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WATER AND SOIL ANALYSIS RESULTS

WATER ANALYSIS:

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Total Salts	$\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$	$\text{NaHCO}_3$	$\text{NaCl}$	$\text{Na}_2\text{SO}_4$
900	nil	655	170	75
Allowable Maximum				
2000	nil	500	500	Desirable

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ASSUMED CROPPING PATTERNS WITH TUBE-WELL WATER SUPPLY

Intensity	Future Stage I	Future Stage II	
K:R	100%	120%	120%
	1:1.5	(canal irrigation)	(tubewell irrigation)

TOTAL ESTIMATED INCREASE OF CROP RETURNS  
WITH TUBE-WELL IRRIGATION

Present Gross Return Per Acre	Future Gross Return Per Acre (Conservative Estimate)
118.00 Rs.	440.00 Rs.

APPENDIX III  
SAMPLE PROJECT REPORT  
Pages 188 - 192

May 6, 1969

Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
Administrator,  
CAFOD,  
14 Howick Place,  
London S.W.1.

Dear Sir Hugh,

West Pakistan 69/5  
Vermin-Proof Grain Storage Bin

We submit, for CAFOD's kind consideration, the enclosed project to provide a rat and vermin proof grain storage Bin for the Loreto Village Co-operative, Loreto Village, District Muzaffargarh. The Bin will be of brick construction and is estimated to cost Pak. Rs. 27,500 (£2,165).

Father George Westwater O.P. who has visited us recently and who has presented this project under our advice and guidance is engaged in very active and successful work for the uplift of the people, physically and spiritually in the Diocese of Multan, W. Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,

  
John Hardy

b.c./CRS/New York - Herewith copy of Project Text.  
✓ Rev. George Westwater O.P. - Herewith copy of Project Text.

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**APPLICATION FOR GRANT****WEST PAKISTAN/69-5**

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**1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION APPLYING FOR GRANT:**

**Fr. George Westwater O.P.  
Residency: Loreto Village  
District Muzaffargarh  
West Pakistan**

**2. NATURE AND FUNCTION:**

**Missionary Society engaged in the socio-economic uplift of village people in the Diocese of Multan.**

**3. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION THROUGH WHICH APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED:**

**Catholic Relief Services - U.S.C.C.  
P.O. Box 7401  
Karachi 3, Pakistan**

**and**

**Catholic Relief Services - U.S.C.C.  
11, rue de Cornavin  
1201 Geneva, Switzerland**

**4. DATE, AMOUNT AND REFERENCE NUMBER OF LAST GRANT:**

**N.A.**

**5. AMOUNT REQUESTED IN STERLING AND LOCAL CURRENCY:**

**Rs. 25,000 (£ 2163.7.6)**

**6. PRECISE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PROJECT:**

**Loreto Village  
District Muzaffargarh  
(Thal Desert)  
West Pakistan**

**7. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION OF AREA IN WHICH PROJECT IS LOCATED:**

**Until fifteen years ago, the Thal Desert bordering the mighty Indus River was known for its austere unproductive landscapes, dominated by high sand dunes, scarcity of water, minimal vegetation, and extremes of climate. Today, two-thirds of the Thal**

Desert wears a new look. The desert backdrop is giving way to vast tracts of green fields, forest plantations, farm lands, new villages, and planned cities. It is the most rapidly expanding agricultural project in West Pakistan with its teeming millions of population.

The story of this radical transformation from a wasteland to a progressive region is one of enormous official and private enterprise. This effort to reclaim the wild desert stretching over 5,000,000 acres along the Indus River began in 1949 when Thal Development Authority (T.D.A.) was created. There has been no diminution of the original impetus now that agriculture has been firmly established; rather, there is now marked emphasis on progressive farming procedures.

In this regard, Loreto Village is an outstanding example. Since its inception under generous government land grant in the year 1954, Loreto Village can boast a development without a peer in all of T.D.A. From an initial settlement of less than a hundred men to a firm established complex of two thousand people, the village of Loreto stands as a representative community of a people with ancient traditions and centuries bred custom bursting into the twentieth century with its industrialized cities and competitive agricultural society.

The reason for being of Loreto Village is its 1800 acres of arable land irrigated by canals. With the exception of a hundred acre village site, comprising the residential and social life of the village with its homes, school, church, dispensary, streets, life is centered in the 114 fifteen acre plots of land owned by individual farmers. Crop produce centers around wheat (springtime harvest) and sugar cane (November harvest), with minimal cotton and secondary grains.

#### 8. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT AND IMPLEMENTATION:

To stabilize the economic life of the village, a co-operative bank was begun four years ago. However, due to lack of capital sufficient to meet the needs of the demand it has not been able to reach its full potential. This is especially true as regards storage facilities for wheat and advances for fertilizer at planting time.

The last wheat harvest was about 350 tons, and we hope to double that figure in a few years time with continued emphasis on new seeds and fertilizer. Sugar cane is contracted to a government mill eighteen miles away and offers no difficulty beyond the lack of a good road.

The necessity for proper wheat storage is evident in the fact that wheat sells for about 16 rupees per maund at harvest time and is sold at double that price in the off season of winter. As a consequence, the farmer actually sells his wheat at a loss during harvest time to pay for taxes, buy new farm implements, purchase clothing, etc., and buys back this same wheat in the winter months at double or more the cost. The only available answer to this chaotic marketing of wheat is the encouragement

of co-operatives.

The Loreto Village Co-operative began with an operating capital of 1200 rupees (about US\$250), and in the course of a single year was able to show a profit of better than 100% on the original investment; most of this profit was obtained from fertilizer and seed sales, both commodities require no lengthy storage facility because they are seasonal agricultural needs that are purchased almost immediately. However, practically all the advantages of the Co-operative are negated by the inability of the people to store wheat at harvest time in order to anticipate the normally escalating costs in the off season of winter.

For this reason, we have done the necessary research and obtained architectural plans for the construction of a rat-proof storage bin for minimum requirements of winter wheat needs when the prices usually escalate to the extreme disadvantage of the village people.

We envisage a storage bin of 100 ton capacity of brick construction, costing approximately Rs. 27,500. Of this cost, the people can immediately contribute the sum of Rs. 2,500. The investment would yield at 10% per annum storage fees the sum of about 3000 Rs. This sum would either be used for further storage bin construction or could be funnelled back into the Co-op as operating capital.

The program would thus be like the following:

WHEAT CONSUMPTION IN LORETO VILLAGE:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PER MONTH</u>	<u>3 MONTHS</u>
1 family (5 members)	200 lbs.	600 lbs.
540 co-op families	108,000 lbs.	324,000 lbs. or 162 (maximum) tons

COST OF 100 TONS OF WHEAT:

a) at harvest time (April)	50,000 Rs.
b) during winter (off season)	80,000 Rs.
Loss incurred by people during winter	30,000 Rs.

PROPOSED REMEDY:

Construction of 100 ton capacity storage bin for wheat	27,500 Rs.
Loreto Co-op contribution	2,500 Rs.
<b>BALANCE REQUESTED AS SUBSIDY:</b>	<b>25,000 Rs.</b>

The repayment for this subsidy would be effected by the 10% return for the storage fees of 100 tons of wheat per year (minus about 500 Rs. as charges for insecticides and handling costs). This repayment could then be poured back into the Loreto Co-op to further finance operating capital, increase the present purchase of seed and fertilizer supplies, expand the number of farm implements now being used by the Co-op

members, and supply expenses for additional training of the members at diverse government and private seminars in agriculture.

**9. ITEMISED COST OF PROJECT:**

Rs. 27,500 for a storage bin of 100 ton capacity of brick construction with concrete floor.

**10. SUPPORT PROMISED FROM OTHER SOURCES:**

Rs. 2,500 from local people

**11. SUPPORT REQUESTED FROM OTHER SOURCES:**

None for this project

**12. CONTINUATION OF PROJECT:**

The Co-operative society will be able to finance as an on-going paying proposition as long as needed by the farmers.


**13. PHASING OF PAYMENTS:**

As soon as possible

**14. REPORTING:**

As required by the funding agency

APPENDIX IV  
LORETO SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION COSTS  
Pages 193 - 199  
LORETO VILLAGE MANAGEMENT COSTS  
Page 200



COMPARATIVE STATEMENT

No.	NAME OF BUILDING	NEW TOTAL COST	OLD TOTAL COST
1.	Boys Hostel Loreto School	4.41.800	3.32.213
2.	Girls Hostel Loreto School	2.23.300	3.62.087
3.	Library Science Room Loreto	2.01.000	2.12.799
4.	Girls School Loreto	1.69.000	1.96.611
5.	Agricultural School Trainy Centre Loreto	3.31.200	6.40.705
		13.66.300	17.44.415
say		13.67.000	

BOYS HOSTEL - LORETO SCHOOL

S.No.	Particulars	Qty.	Rate	Unit	Amount
1.	Excavation in foundation	20000 cft.	6.00	% cft.	1200.00
2.	C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation	3900 cft.	300.00	" "	11700.00
3.	Brick Masonary foundation	13000 cft.	160.00	" "	20800.00
4.	Earth filling	14000 cft.	20.00	" "	2800.00
5.	4½" Brick bat soling	11400 sft.	40.00	" sft.	4560.00
6.	1½" C.C. Bed over soling	11400 sft.	40.00	" sft.	4560.00
7.	Water proofing on plinth	12000 sft.	20.00	" sft.	2400.00
8.	3" thick C.C. bed over water proofing	12000 sft.	80.00	" sft.	9600.00
9.	R.C.C. Lintels & beams	1600 cft.	425.00	" cft.	6800.00
10.	R.C.C. Slab 4" thick	19000 sft.	200.00	" sft.	38000.00
11.	R.C.C. Parapet wall	800 sft.	150.00	" sft.	1200.00
12.	R.C.C. Steps	25 Nos.	100.00	per step	2500.00
13.	4½" thick Brick masonry	1400 sft.	80.00	% sft.	1120.00
14.	9" " " "	4300 cft.	200.00	% cft.	8600.00
15.	13½" " " "	9500 cft.	200.00	" "	19000.00
16.	Brick masonry pillars	1000 cft.	225.00	" "	2250.00
17.	Internal plaster ½" thick	37000 sft.	35.00	" sft.	12950.00
18.	External plaster ¾" thick	12000 sft.	40.00	" sft.	4800.00
19.	Cement pointing	9800 sft.	25.00	" sft.	2450.00
20.	Deodar doors	1250 sft.	10.00	" sft.	12500.00
21.	Deodar window	1625 sft.	10.00	" sft.	16250.00
22.	Deodar ventilator	700 sft.	10.00	" sft.	7000.00
23.	Mosaic flooring	18000 sft.	250.00	" sft.	45000.00
24.	Mosaic Dado 5' hight	1000 sft.	250.00	" sft.	2500.00
25.	G.I Pipe Railing ¾" dia	1500 sft.	3.00	sft.	4500.00
26.	Water proofing on roof	8400 sft.	25.00	% sft.	2100.00
27.	C.C. Flooring	3000 sft.	80.00	" sft.	2400.00
28.	White wash on ceiling	12000 sft.	5.00	" sft.	600.00
29.	Water bound Distemper on walls	25000 sft.	8.00	" sft.	2000.00
30.	Colour wash to external walls	12000 sft.	10.00	" sft.	1200.00
31.	Steel cutting	25 ton	140.00	per ton	3500.00
32.	Cost of Steel	25 ton	1400.00	" "	<u>35000.00</u>
					291840.00



<u>S.No.</u>	<u>P a r t i c u l a r s</u>		<u>Amount</u>
			291840.00
33.	Cartage for material	10 %	
34.	Elec. & Drainage	20 %	
35.	Miscellaneous	15 %	
36.	For unseen items	<u>5 %</u>	
	Total:	50 %	145920.00
37.	Paintings & Murals		<u>4000.00</u>
			441760.00
		say	<u>441800.00</u> *****



GIRLS HOSTEL

S.No.	Particulars	Qty.	Rate	Unit	Amount
1.	Excavation in foundation	9700 cft.	6.00	% cft.	582.00
2.	C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation	1280 cft.	300.00	" "	3850.00
3.	B.B. Masonry in foundation	5400 cft.	160.00	" "	8640.00
4.	Brick Bets Packing	8800 sft.	40.00	" sft.	3520.00
5.	C.C. Flooring 1½" thick 1:3:6	8800 sft.	20.00	" sft.	1760.00
6.	Water proofing on plinth	9800 sft.	20.00	" "	1960.00
7.	3" thick C.C. 1:3:6 Flooring	9800 sft.	40.00	" "	3920.00
8.	R.C.C. Beams & Lintels	700 cft.	425.00	" cft.	2975.00
9.	R.C.C. Slab	9800 sft.	200.00	" sft.	19600.00
10.	Brick Masonry 4½" thick	530 sft.	80.00	" "	424.00
11.	" " 13½" thick	12400 cft.	200.00	" cft.	24800.00
12.	" " Pillers	300 cft.	225.00	" "	675.00
13.	Internal plaster	23600 sft.	35.00	" sft.	8260.00
14.	External plaster	12000 sft.	40.00	" "	4800.00
15.	Deodar doors	546 sft.	10.00	sft.	5460.00
16.	Deodar windows	800 sft.	10.00	"	8000.00
17.	Mosaic flooring	8800 sft.	250.00	% sft.	22000.00
18.	Mosaic dedo	620 sft.	250.00	" "	1550.00
19.	Water proofing on roof	9800 sft.	25.00	" "	2450.00
20.	C.C. Jali	200 sft.	300.00	" "	600.00
21.	White wash on ceilings	8500 sft.	5.00	" "	425.00
22.	Water bound Distemper on walls	15100 sft.	8.00	" "	1208.00
23.	Colour wash on external walls	12000 sft.	10.00	" "	1200.00
24.	M.S. Steel	13 ton	1400.00	perton	18200.00
					146849.00
25.	Cartage for materials	10 %			
26.	Ele. & Drainage	20 %			
27.	Miscellaneous	15 %			
28.	For unseen items	<u>5 %</u>			
		<b>Total:</b>	<b>50 %</b>		<b>73425.00</b>
29.	Paintings & Murals				<u>3000.00</u>
					<b>223274.00</b>
					say <b>223300.00</b>

SCIENCE - LIBRARY

S.No.	PARTICULARS	Qty.	Rate	Unit	Amount
1.	Excavation in foundation	10900 cft.	6.00	% cft.	654.00
2.	C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation	2500 cft.	300.00	" "	7500.00
3.	B.B. Masonry in foundation	5680 cft.	160.00	" "	9088.00
4.	Brick bats packing	6700 sft.	40.00	" sft.	2680.00
5.	C.C. Flooring 1½" thick	6700 sft.	20.00	" "	1340.00
6.	Water proofing on plinth	7900 sft.	20.00	" "	1580.00
7.	3" thick C.C. 1:3:6 Flooring	7900 sft.	40.00	" "	3160.00
8.	R.C.C. beams & lintels	500 cft.	425.00	" cft.	2125.00
9.	R.C.C. slab	7900 sft.	200.00	" sft.	15800.00
10.	R.C.C. Parapet	1000 sft.	150.00	" "	1500.00
11.	Brick masonry 4½" thick	170 sft.	80.00	" "	136.00
12.	" " 13½" thick	13500 cft.	200.00	" cft.	27000.00
13.	" " Pillers	210 cft.	225.00	" "	473.00
14.	Internal plaster	16800 sft.	35.00	" sft.	5880.00
15.	External plaster	10800 sft.	40.00	" "	4320.00
16.	Deodar doors	378.sft.	10.00	sft.	3780.00
17.	Deodar windows	528 sft.	10.00	"	5280.00
18.	Deodar ventilators	264 sft.	10.00	"	2640.00
19.	Mosaic flooring	6700 sft.	250.00	% sft.	16750.00
20.	Mosaic Dedo	720 sft.	250.00	" "	1800.00
21.	Water proofing on roof	7900 sft.	25.00	" "	1975.00
22.	Flower Bed	60 Rft.	15.00	Rft.	900.00
23.	White wash on ceiling	8000 sft.	5.00	% sft.	400.00
24.	Water bound Distemper on walls	8800 sft.	8.00	" "	704.00
25.	Colour wash on exterior	10800 sft.	10.00	" "	1080.00
26.	Steel M.S.	10 tons	1400.00	per ton	<u>14000.00</u>
27.	Cartage for material	10 %			132545.00
28.	Elef. & Drainage	20 %			
29.	Miscellaneous	15 %			
30.	Unseen itoms	<u>5 %</u>			
	Total	50 %			66273.00
31.	Paintings & Murals				<u>2000.00</u>
					200818.00
				say	201000.00




GIRLS SCHOOL


S.No.	Particulars	Qty.	Rate	Unit	Amount
1.	Excavation in foundation	8300 cft.	6.00	% cft.	258.00
2.	C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation	1050 cft.	300.00	" "	3150.00
3.	B.B. masonry in foundation	4700 cft.	160.00	" "	7520.00
4.	Brick Bats Packing	6450 sft.	40.00	" sft.	2580.00
5.	C.C. 1:3:6 Flooring 1½" thick	6450 sft.	20.00	" "	1290.00
6.	Water proofing on plinth	7450 sft.	20.00	" "	1490.00
7.	3" thick C.C. 1:3:6 Flooring	7450 sft.	40.00	" "	2980.00
8.	R.C.C. Beams & Lintels	510 cft.	425.00	" cft.	2168.00
9.	R.C.C. Slabs	7450 sft.	200.00	" sft.	14900.00
10.	Brick Masonry 4½" thick	200 sft.	80.00	" "	160.00
11.	" " 13½" thick	9900 cft.	200.00	" cft.	19800.00
12.	" " Pillers	160 cft.	225.00	" "	360.00
13.	Internal plaster	8700 sft.	35.00	" sft.	3045.00
14.	External plaster	15300 sft.	40.00	" "	6120.00
15.	Deodar doors	315 sft.	10.00	sft.	3150.00
16.	Deodar windows	464 sft.	10.00	"	4640.00
17.	Deodar ventilators	232 sft.	10.00	"	2320.00
18.	Mosaic flooring	6450 sft.	250.00	% sft.	16125.00
19.	Mosaic Dedo	540 sft.	250.00	" "	1350.00
20.	Water proofing on roof	7450 sft.	25.00	" "	1863.00
21.	White wash on ceilings	6450 sft.	5.00	" "	323.00
22.	Water bound Distemper on walls	2250 sft.	8.00	" "	180.00
23.	Colour wash to External walls	15300 sft.	10.00	" "	1530.00
24.	Steel	10 tons	1400.00	per ton	<u>14000.00</u>
					111302.00
25.	Cartage for Material	10 %			
26.	Eléc. & Drainage	20 %			
27.	Miscellaneous	15 %			
28.	For unseen items	<u>5 %</u>			
	Total	50 %			55651.00
29.	Paintings & Murals				<u>2000.00</u>
					168953.00
				say	<u>169000.00</u>
					*****




S.No.	Particulars	Qty.	Rate	Unit	Amount
1.	Excavation in foundation	10000 cft.	6.00	% cft.	600.00
2.	C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation	2500 cft.	300.00	" "	7500.00
3.	B.B. Masonry in foundation	5700 cft.	160.00	" "	9120.00
4.	4½" thick Brick bats packing	9000 sft.	40.00	" sft.	3600.00
5.	4½" thick C.C. flooring	9000 sft.	40.00	" "	3600.00
6.	R.C.C. Beams & Lintels	1600 cft.	425.00	" cft.	6800.00
7.	R.C.C. Slab	15000 sft.	200.00	" sft.	30000.00
8.	R.C.C. Steps	42.Nos.	100.00	No."	4200.00
9.	R.C.C. Paropet	2100 sft.	150.00	% sft.	3150.00
10.	4½" thick Brick Masonry	560 sft.	80.00	" "	448.00
11.	9" thick Brick Masonry	2700 cft.	200.00	" cft.	4800.00
12.	13½" thick Brick Masonry	11000 cft.	200.00	" "	17600.00
13.	Pillers " "	900 cft.	225.00	" "	2025.00
14.	Internal plaster	25000 sft.	35.00	" sft.	8750.00
15.	External plaster	21000 sft.	40.00	" "	8400.00
16.	Deodar doors	623 sft.	10.00	sft.	6230.00
17.	Deodar windows	864 sft.	10.00	"	8640.00
18.	Mosaic flooring	13500 sft.	250.00	% sft.	33750.00
19.	Mosaic dedo	1100 sft.	250.00	" "	2750.00
20.	Water proofing on roof	10400 sft.	25.00	" "	2600.00
21.	White wash on ceiling	14000 sft.	5.00	" "	700.00
22.	Water bound Distemper on walls	11000 sft.	8.00	" "	880.00
23.	Colour wash on external walls	21000 sft.	10.00	" "	2100.00
24.	M.S. Steel	19 tons	1400.00	perton	26600.00
25.	Cutting & Fabrication for Steel	19 tons	140.00	" "	<u>2660.00</u>
26.	Cartage for Materials	10 %			204483.00
27.	Elec. & Drainage	20 %			
28.	Miscellaneous	20 %			
29.	For unseen items	<u>10 %</u>			
	<b>Total</b>	<b>60 %</b>			<b>122690.00</b>
30.	Paintings & Murals				<u>4000.00</u>
					<b>331173.00</b>
				say	<b>331200.00</b>
					*****



### BOARDING SCHOOLS - LORETO VILLAGE



LORETO VILLAGE SCHOOL



## FOOTNOTES

- 1 Harza Engineering Co. International. 1963. An Appraisal of Resources and Potential Development. Lahore, West Pakistan: Government of Pakistan, p.17.
- 2 Thal Development Authority. 1954. A Handbook of Thal Development Authority 1949-1954. Jauharabad, West Pakistan: Public Relations Division T.D.A., p.8.
- 3 One such fort was at Munda. I slept there one evening in 1958 under the shadow of a high 18-foot mud wall, about five feet thick at the base and enclosing several acres of land. These walls have since been dismantled and the constituent element of mud used to build a number of shops, houses, and storage facilities for the busy agricultural commerce that has evolved in the recent past. This development was quickened by the construction of roads intersecting at what now is known as Munda Chowk (crossroads).
- 4 Thal Development Authority, op.cit., p.20.
- 5 It is interesting to note that as late as 1969 I personally saw these same maps in use by foreign consulting engineers to the Pakistan Government, and they expressed surprise at the changes I described since the maps had been drawn up half a century before.
- 6 Darling, Sir Malcolm, ILO Expert. 1954. Report On Labor Conditions in Agriculture. Lahore, West Pakistan: Government of Pakistan, p.36.
- 7 Callard, Keith. 1957. Pakistan, A Political Study. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.: p.18.
- 8 Thal Development Authority, op.cit., p.58.
- 9 Ibid., pp.20-25.
- 10 Waterston, Albert. 1963. Planning in Pakistan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.15.
- 11 Quoted in Waterston, ibid., p.20.
- 12 Papanek, G.F. 1967. Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.66.

- 13 Quoted in Waterston, op. cit., pp.20-21.
- 14 Ibid., p.33.
- 15 Thal Development Authority, op. cit., p.71.
- 16 Pakistan. 1957. The First Five-Year Plan 1955-1960.  
Planning Commission, Karachi: p.265.

## FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2

- 17 When I inquired of one doctor what medicines I should carry with me to help the people, he plucked the sides of his pants and said: "Carry malaria pills in one pocket, and anti-malaria pills in the other".

## FIGURE 3

- 18 In the winter of 1957-58, the head of an international relief agency told me that 54 wagons of relief supplies earmarked for the diocese had been "lost" in transit. There was no recourse for such hijackings, and every missionary could recite a litany of similar cases.
- 19 The New York Times. June 13, 1972.  
"In the yearly hell of a North India summer, blinding dust storms so thick that all traffic must stop are a welcome phenomena. For, while they last, the whirling brown clouds blot out the deadly sun".
- 20 One of the great hazards of the desert is freezing to death. In the winter, few people have adequate clothing for long exposure to the cold and often freeze to death on night field watches in temperatures proximate to, or slightly below, freezing.
- 21 The priest-worker movement involved priests who worked and labored in factories, on docks, in mines, and wherever a wage earner could be gainfully employed. The movement was identified with the Dominican Order of France, and suppression of the movement had reverberations for the Dominicans in America of which I was one.
- 22 During this period I read the then Senator Kennedy's Profiles in Courage, and was so moved I wrote him a letter of thanks for the inspiration his book afforded me. Little did I or anyone else anticipate the favored

position Pakistan would receive in U. S. foreign policy when he became President.

- 23 Unpublished paper of the writer detailing the political process of Loreto village, entitled: "The Rise and Fall of Mutab Khan", M.I.T. 1970.
- 24 When I questioned a lawyer who had been no great friend of the British about the high opinion he rendered for ICS personnel, he replied: "When an ICS officer walked into a court room, you stood back in awe and wonder". The selection ratio of candidates ran as high as one in ten thousand.
- 25 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1970. The Challenge of World Poverty. New York: Vintage Books, p.153.
- 26 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1969. Asian Drama. New York: Random House, Vol.I, p.319.
- 27 Waterston, A., op. cit., p.11.
- 28 Ibid., p.11.
- 29 General Marden, formerly military attache of the British Army to the independent state of Bahawalpur with headquarters at Ahmedpur East, Bahawalpur, West Pakistan.
- 30 A similar judgment was made to me in a lengthy conversation with Major General Nasir Ahmed Khan, a one time Chairman of T.D.A. He was consulted concerning the Army's role in the nation immediately preceding the take-over in 1958 by Ayub Khan. He was a close friend of the first Martial Law Administrator and strongly opposed the entrance of the Army into a commanding political role. In their conversations he questioned either his or the Field Marshal's ability to handle the nation's political problems; all that either of them had ever experienced was childhood life in remote villages and the lifelong regimentation of a military career. He told me that the Army had corrupted itself and would destroy the nation by continuing to rule. His observations proved prophetic.
- 31 Pakistan. 1956. The First Five-Year Plan (Draft) 1955-1960. Planning Commission, Karachi: p.20, #53.
- 32 Ford Foundation. 1965. Design for Pakistan. p.13.

- 33 Ibid., p.15.
- 34 Papanek, G. F., op. cit., p.6.
- 35 The Economist, London: April 13, 1968, p.47.  
"If Pakistan has reason for special gratitude to an outside body, it must be the World Bank in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. All the figures in these projects are near-astronomical. The Mangla Dam on the Jhelum has cost \$658 million...Tarbela Dam on the Indus \$830 million...financed by the Indus Basin Development Fund with resources \$1,200 million."
- 36 Myrdal, Gunnar, op. cit., pp.327,328.  
"But perhaps the most substantial gain from the greater confidence Ayub Khan brought to the conduct of its foreign relations was the agreement Pakistan reached with India in September, 1960 for ending their dispute over the distribution of the Indus basin waters. Admittedly, this was made possible only because the Western powers agreed to finance almost the whole cost of the scheme."
- 37 Falcon, W. P. and Papanek, G. F. 1971. Development Policy II: The Pakistan Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.4.
- 38 The first totally staffed, managed, organized, and executed project by all Pakistan personnel on the Indus Basin project was the link canal between the Taunsa Barrage and the Chenab River. Availability of heavy duty construction equipment on the site averaged 20% vs 80% for the same equipment when employed by Morris and Knudsen, the U. S. contractors at Mangla Dam. A World Bank official informed me that his reports would be critical of the project as executed by an all Pakistan staff.
- 39 Ali, Tariq. 1970. Pakistan-Military Rule of People's Power. New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., p.228.
- 40 Karpov, A. V. and Ross Nebolsine. 1961. Indus Valley: Key to West Pakistan's Future. Lahore, West Pakistan: Government of West Pakistan, p.14.
- 41 Summary of the 1st meeting of the Committee on Aid Utilization (SECRET), Government of Pakistan: Dacca, 19th September 1962.  
"5. The inability of many of our sponsoring agencies to prepare aid worthy projects was identified as one of the major reasons for slow

commitment of funds....

7. The Chairman stated that apart from the employment of consultants, the preparation of projects could be improved by utilizing the expert services available with the local missions of aid giving agencies".

42 Appendix I.

43 Ahmad Hussan, later to become Secretary for all Water and Power Development in West Pakistan. The same man approached me a year after the water supplement to Fatimapur village for assistance in an illegal money exchange.

44 Such fortuitous events never really resolved a problem; they merely made them public. Graft, bribery, and official corruption too often, all too often, intervened. In the present instance, the additional irrigation water had been allocated for the next planting season beginning on April 15th. The local canal overseer demanded a bribe of several hundred rupees for complying with the Deputy Chief Engineer's orders!

45 I met him again on two other occasions in the West wing. He invariably impressed me as the only man with an understanding and systematic approach to the problems of rural Pakistan.

46 The Reader's Digest, March 1961: "The Story of Loreto". Both the Reader's Digest and Time magazine were avidly read by the higher echelons of government and the nation was very sensitive to what they printed.

47 Misereor is a German Catholic Relief organization of social concern with yearly expenditures in multi-million dollar figures. They assist any worthwhile project, Catholic and non-Catholic. Their chief difficulty lay with their clergy clientele who had little training for project reporting.

48 The demise of Village-Aid programs as major features of the Five-Year Plans in both Pakistan and India are witness to this fact. Too much tried to be accomplished in too short a time.

49 Myrdal, Gunnar. op, cit., p.336.

- 50 The expression "Basic Democracy" came into disrepute with the people long before the downfall of Ayub Khan.
- 51 Myrdal, Gunnar. *op. cit.*, p.247:  
 "Jinnah and the Muslim League...concentrated on the one supreme, but negative, aim of drawing a firm boundary line against the Hindus. The following they won was interested not in better things for the masses but in communal vindication."
- 52 Thornburn, S. S. 1886. Musalman and Money-Lenders in the Punjab. London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, p.140.
- 53 Myrdal, Gunnar. Asian Drama. Vol.III, p.1748:  
 Pakistan 1960-61:
- |                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Modal age range of | Percent of children of    |
| Primary education: | modal age range enrolled: |
| 6 - 11             | 8% (both sexes)           |
- The New York Times. June 23, 1972: Under the title, "Pakistan Reform Appears Far Off: Budget Shows Scant Funds to Help Nation's Poor"  
 "...New outlays for education are largely limited to financing 1,000 scholarships for the children of peasants and other poor people...(but it) is reportedly costing \$3.2 million to build a new President's House in Islamabad".
- 54 Myrdal, Gunnar, *op. cit.*, Vol.I, p.331:  
 "The remarkable effectiveness of Pakistan's public relations with Westerners, especially Americans, has from the beginning and even more since the military take-over undoubtedly been attributed in part to the worldly outlook and modes of living of the Pakistani leaders".
- 55 Papanek, G. F. *op. cit.*, p.199.
- 56 The shakedown of the peasantry for a rupee contribution to the "Red Cross" by Colonization Officers and tehsildars, is only surpassed by the extortion perpetrated on truck drivers by the magistracy at every district crossroads.
- 57 I one time confronted the editor of the now defunct Pakistani Civil and Military Gazette with the observation that his editorial diatribes against the downtrodden christians intensified the opportunity for a demagogue to inflame passions in the slums. If the christisn slums

ever erupt, no priest, no bishop and no pope will be able to hold them back for the discrimination they have endured as "sweepers".

- 58 One newspaper reported a study by UNICEF which gave the city of Lahore 40 beggars for every thousand people.
- 59 S. Alamgir, now retired from civil service.
- 60 Pakistan, 1956. The First Five-Year Plan (Draft), op.cit., p.132, #113.
- 61 The Economist, London: March 6, 1965. Under the title, "Pakistan's Success Story":  
 "While India's planners have been rethinking their strategy in the face of a faltering economy, Pakistan is doing well. Pakistan gives bigger scope to private industry than almost any other developing country; and its planners are now actually raising their targets for the third plan which comes into force in July (1965). While they previously envisaged a rise of 30 percent in real national income over 5 years, they now hope for 37 percent or even more."
- 62 As quoted in Waterston, A., op. cit., p.130.
- 63 Very little of the professional literature written as an outgrowth of the Pakistan experience suggests a comfortable relationship between the foreign expert and his surrounding milieu.
- 64 The Ayub Government permitted and fostered the most violent of rhetoric in the nation's media which was government controlled.
- Brines, Russel. 1968. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. London: Pall Mall Press, p.284.
- 65 The cases of women who have their noses chopped off for apparent infidelity are legion. Yet, every city and town has its red light district freely patronized by men and with society's endorsement.
- 66 Brines, Russel. 1968, op. cit., p.433.
- 67 It is only just to briefly digress and make mention of the fine missionary men and women who contributed to this

development of Loreto village in the brief space of ten years. Fr. Terance Quinn, with his civil engineering degree did much to design and build and govern the village for five years. Fr. Timothy Carney processed and settled refugees from the water-logged area of Sialkot in upper Punjab. And, four American Sisters (Sparkill, New York) rotated every three years as school administrators and teachers, assumed responsibility for the village dispensary, introduced adult education, and started the nucleus of a woman's community center.

- 68 Mr. Donald Barbaree - Peace Corps Volunteer; later employed by Louis Khan. Mr. Dolf F. Stieber, later Manager of the large regional Bank of America in Singapore.
- 69 Appendix II and III and Figure 4.
- 70 The Pakistan Development Review: An Analysis of "Revelle Report". Vol.III, Summer 1963, Number 2: Ghulam Mohomnad & Christoph Beringer:  
 "We believe that the main hurdle to the implementation of the Revelle Plan is likely to be the difficult problem of administration, education and extension and not the cost of pumps and fertilizer which, on balance, have received most of the emphasis in the Report."
- 71 The much heralded policy of limited land holdings and the break-up of large tracts by the Ayub regime probably redistributed not more than 2 percent of all cultivated land. (The Economist, London: December 2, 1961: quoted in Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol.1, p.329.)
- 72 The futility of having recourse to government for help was universally shared by the peasantry.
- 73 Ahmad, Mushtaq. 1970. Government and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Space Publishers, pp.310, 347.
- 74 Practically the only language instruction books available in Pakistan for local dialects had been written by former colonial officers or foreign missionary educators. Newspapers often complained of Pakistan government officials who were unable to converse in the local languages.
- 75 The Development Advisory Service (DAS) publications of Harvard University are notable examples of this discrepancy.

- 76 Apthorpe, R. J. 1970. People, Planning and Development Process. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., p.142:  
 "Indeed the social scientists, administrators, missionaries etc., resident in Africa then had in common a very large range of behavioral characteristics". By extension, the same was true of Pakistan.
- 77 Appendix IV and V.
- 78 Harold T. Smith was known as "Tube-well" Smith because he had drilled more footage for wells than anyone else in the world. His progressively less costly contracts despite increases in materials was the result of his in-service training of Pakistani personnel in all departments to replace high cost foreigners.
- 79 The Economist. London: March 29, 1969; p.15:  
 "Though President Ayub did more for the Bengalis than his predecessors, he has united them against the center; and ten years of quiescence have brought East Pakistan, in the end, nearer to both secession and revolution than ten years of parliamentary disorder did."
- 80 Planning Department, Government of Pakistan: Discussion with World Bank Economic Mission - February 1-5, 1969; p.7, paragraph 5:  
 "Efficiency in respect of Project implementation and mangement practises of autonomous bodies needs to be improved."  
 -The Nation, April 14, 1969; p.455: Under article entitled: "Law and Order in Pakistan":  
 "...corruption is so severe that Ayub's son has progressed within five years from a monthly salary of about \$150 to possessions estimated at more than twenty million."
- 81 Estimated per capita income was about \$50 - \$60. Like all statistics for underdeveloped countries, it only emphasized the poverty of the people and is not a true economic measurement.
- 82 Pakistan. The First Five-Year Plan 1955-60. National Planning Board; Government of West Pakistan: p.154.
- 83 Pakistan. Basic Facts - 1969-1970. Government of Pakistan;

Ministry of Finance; p.108:

"The expenditure on defense was estimated at Rs. 12,384 million against the plan (1965-60) projection of Rs. 5,890 million. The shortfall of Rs.7,577 million in the revenue surplus was mainly accounted for by unanticipated defense expenditure."

-Even after the loss of East Pakistan this exorbitant outlay for defense continues. The New York Times, June 17, 1972:

"The Pakistan Government plans to spend more than 60 percent of federal revenues for defense outlays according to the budget."

-Questionable use of foreign aid for military purposes was reported in the New York Times, June 8, 1972 under the title: "U.S. Report Says Pakistan Spent Aid for Defenses":

"Washington--The General Accounting Office has reported to Congress that most of a grant of about \$10 million made to Pakistan last fall for humanitarian relief was diverted for the construction of military defenses on what was then the East Pakistani border with India."

84 Newsweek, December 6, 1971: Yaha Khan, Martial Law Administrator: "If she (Mrs. Gandhi) wants war,...then I will give it to her. If that woman thinks she is going to cow me, I refuse to take it."

85 MacEwan, Arthur. 1971. Development Alternatives in Pakistan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.196:  
"In spite of the concern with regional aspects of the plan, however, none of the formal planning models developed in the preparation of the Third Plan were formulated as regional models."

86 Ibid., p.147:  
"Much of the economic planning in Pakistan is carried out on an explicitly regional basis. The reduction of regional income disparity is put forth as a high priority planning goal, and the target is the complete elimination of disparity by 1985. The attainment of that goal will require the reversal of a trend. Although data are poor, it is generally agreed that disparity has increased significantly since the early 1950's. Whereas the West Pakistan real per capita income then exceeded that in the East by less than 20 percent, in 1964-65 the difference was at least 30 percent."

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