Transparency and the Effectiveness of Security Regimes: A Study of Concert of Europe Crisis Management and United Nations Peacekeeping

by

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Abstract

This dissertation examines how well two types of security regimes promote peace by providing transparency. The literatures on regimes, international institutions, and cooperation all suggest that regimes can increase transparency — what adversaries know about each other's intentions and capabilities — and that increased transparency can increase cooperation while reducing uncertainty, tension, and miscalculation. But these claims have received little attention. How much do security regimes increase transparency? What effect does transparency have? How effective are security regimes in promoting peace and how much does transparency contribute to their efforts?

I answer these questions by proposing and testing hypotheses about transparency and security regimes. From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation lies at the relatively uncharted intersection of two strands in international relations theory: theories about war and peace (security) and theories about international institutions (regimes). The former focus on why states go to war, and the latter focus on how institutions facilitate cooperation and produce joint gains.

My case studies for forum diplomacy are five crises confronted by the Concert of Europe. The Concert was the first multilateral crisis management forum in history and is often cited by analysts as an exemplar forum. My case studies for United Nations peacekeeping include UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNTAC, and UNTAG in Cyprus, on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel, in Cambodia, and in Namibia, respectively.

The ability of security regimes to provide useful, peace-promoting transparency is often modest at best. The conditions under which security regimes can produce significant results with transparency are circumscribed by a number of factors. When the intelligence gathering capabilities of the adversarial parties is high, regimes add little new information. When media coverage in the target area is poor, regimes can more easily add useful information. When adversaries' suspicions are very high, regime-provided information has difficulty penetrating; when suspicions are very low, it is irrelevant. By examining and specifying these and other conditions, this dissertation should help U.N. peacekeeping operations and other regimes more effectively provide transparency and wield information in the service of peace. If the conditions are right, security regimes can achieve significant peace-promoting results with transparency.
Biographical Note

Dan Lindley received his bachelor of arts degree in International Relations and French from Tufts University in 1983. He worked for Congressman Ratchford, the Center for Defense Information, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Brookings Institution before starting graduate school at MIT. He has published and spoken on the Cyprus problem, U.N. peacekeeping, internal conflict, collective security, the U.S. intervention in Panama, and SDI contracting.

He is currently an associate fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
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Dan Lindley
Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 11, 1997
Chapter 1:  
Introduction

For every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace.¹

This dissertation examines how well two types of security regimes promote peace by providing transparency. The literatures on regimes, international institutions, and cooperation all suggest that regimes can increase transparency—what adversaries know about each other’s intentions and capabilities—and that increased transparency can increase cooperation while reducing uncertainty, tension, and miscalculation. These claims have not been tested.

Security regimes are international institutions in which states cooperate to reduce the problem of war. How much do security regimes increase transparency? What effect does transparency have? How effective are security regimes at promoting peace and how much does transparency contribute to their efforts?

I answer these questions by proposing and testing hypotheses about transparency and security regimes. From a theoretical perspective, the answers to these questions fill gaps at the relatively uncharted intersection of two strands in international relations theory: theories about war and peace (security) and theories about international institutions (regimes).² The


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former focus on why states go to war, while the latter focus on how institutions facilitate cooperation and produce joint gains. Few hypotheses and little empirical research exist on security regimes. On a practical level, the answers to these questions about regimes and transparency will help leaders make wise choices about forums and U.N. peacekeeping operations in particular and about how to promote peace with security regimes and transparency in general.

The first type of regime I examine is forums. Forums bring diplomats together to confront problems. Multilateral meetings can be expected to increase transparency because they allow states to size each other up and exchange information more easily than when states are limited to bilateral exchanges.\(^3\) I study one forum in particular: the Concert of Europe, the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum in history. The Concert is often cited in policy recommendations as a prototype forum from which many lessons can be learned. As the first crisis management forum in history, its effects are relatively easy to compare to previous diplomatic practice. This I do by using the first partition of Poland in the late 1700s as a control case.

The second type of regime I examine is U.N. peacekeeping operations. I study two

\(^2\) (...continued)

operationalize, a problem that can be solved by defining security regimes more formally and requiring that a regime's "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures," be at least minimally institutionalized. This means that the rules, norms, and procedures must be on signed agreements. Hence, I define security regimes as international institutions designed to cooperatively reduce the problem of war. I am tempted to start from scratch and say that this is a study of international security institutions (or ISIs), but this has problems of its own because ISIs might also include alliances. To me, the term security regime connotes cooperative, liberal endeavors somewhat more than ISI does. Except to the extent that liberalism believes progress is possible and good, I care not for such loaded terms. When the definitional dust settles, I am looking at the Concert and the U.N. and I am exploring what cooperative endeavors to improve security can be realistically expected to achieve and how they can be improved.

\(^3\) For more on this point and case selection in general, please see the methodology chapter.
traditional peacekeeping operations, UNFICYP on Cyprus and UNDOF on the Golan Heights. These can be expected to increase transparency because they monitor buffer zones and verify areas of limited armaments. I also study two multifunctional operations, UNTAG in Namibia and UNTAC in Cambodia. These can also be expected to have increased transparency because they were mandated to monitor elections and verify the results. Little international relations theory has been brought to bear on the study of U.N. peacekeeping and the subject offers immediate policy relevance.

In examining these cases and testing my transparency hypotheses, I answer the following two sets of questions:

1. Have the Concert and U.N. provided transparency, and if so, did the transparency they provided cause peace? More specifically, can regimes increase what adversaries know about each other's capabilities and intentions (transparency)? And does this knowledge reduce tension and promote cooperation by substituting facts for unwarranted fears, reducing misperceptions, correcting miscalculation, and increasing the chances that if one side violates an agreement, it will be caught (the main hypothesized effects of transparency)?

2. How much does the provision of transparency help security regimes cause peace? More specifically, compared to deterrence, mediation, cajoling, establishment of norms, and other possible products of regimes (the competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations for the effects of regimes), how much does the provision of transparency contribute to the peace-promoting effectiveness of regimes?

These questions indicate that my main task is not to make comparisons between the Concert and U.N. peacekeeping operations. Instead, I am trying to figure out how two different types of security regimes provide transparency and what effect these efforts have.

In light of the practical and theoretical importance of security regimes, it is surprising and unfortunate that so few scholars work on the subject. States have been grappling with security regimes for at least 200 years. Every time a major war ends, the participants set up a security
regime to help prevent the 'next' war. The Napoleonic Wars were followed by the Concert of Europe; World War I by the League of Nations; and World War II by the United Nations.

Similarly, the end of the Cold War rekindled enthusiasm for the U.N. and sparked a number of new peacekeeping operations. Over time, the number of security regimes has also grown, ranging from the Open Skies agreement in Europe to the Organization of African Unity.

The last few years have seen a surge of debate and new policies focused on the U.N. and other security regimes. To replace NATO or supplement the U.N., a number of analysts proposed new security structures modeled after the Concert of Europe. Others proposed strengthening the United Nations and moving it closer toward being an ideal 'all against any aggressor' collective security system. President Bush spoke of a 'new world order,' the Clinton administration flirted with 'aggressive multilateralism,' and both concepts involved a reinvigorated U.N. Reflecting this enthusiasm, the U.N. saw a manyfold increase in the number and cost of its peacekeeping operations.

This wave of optimism about the U.N. and collective security and the U.N.'s subsequent troubles in Bosnia and Somalia provoked a backlash of criticism. Critics charged that peacekeeping is useless or counterproductive: that it only makes peace between those who want peace; that it only works between small countries; or that it prevents adversaries from negotiating an end to their dispute by removing the strongest incentive to compromise, the pain of continuing war. Others argued that security regimes are irrelevant: security regimes can not influence international politics because they are at the beck and call of the great-powers and are thus a reflection of their relative power and particular interests. And if security regimes lack the support of the great powers, then their activities are irrelevant because they are backed with
trivial amounts of military or economic clout.⁴

These debates highlight the fact that one simple question has not been well answered: Just what can security regimes do to promote peace? Gyraations from optimism to pessimism, unsettled debates, and policy failures are all indicative of insufficient scholarship on the specific tools that states and security regimes have at their disposal to cause peace. If the international


Proponents of stronger, more ideal, forms of collective security include: Gene M. Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations in Theory and Practice," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1994); Edward Luck, "Making Peace," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); Sir Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-Keeping to a Collective System?" in Adelphi Paper 265 (London, Great Britain: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991/1992) and Robert Wright, "Bold Old Vision: The Case for Collective Security," The New Republic (January 25, 1993). An ideal collective security system is an 'all against any aggressor' security regime. Weaker forms of collective security are still inward focusing and still try to regulate conflict among their members (and are thus distinguishable from alliances), but they relax parts of this definition: the need for universal membership (the 'all') and/or the need to respond to all aggression (the 'any'). Concerts are institutionalized great power discussion forums and they are the weakest form of collective security. They do not have universal memberships nor do they mandate any response to aggression other than talking about it.

relations literature had more systematic analysis about security regimes, the U.S.' recent U.N. policy debates might have been better grounded and the resulting policies might have been more effective.

By focusing on transparency, this thesis examines one specific way security regimes can promote peace. Decision makers need to know what peace-promoting tools are available and how well they can be expected to work. International relations scholars have failed our policy makers by not giving security regimes the attention they deserve. Robert Keohane, a proponent of international institutions, laments the lack of attention the field of international relations has paid to security regimes. The best scholarship that does exist has been skeptical. In the foremost articles in this forlorn field, Robert Jervis and Charles Lipson argue that security regimes are harder to implement and exert less influence than regimes in other issue areas (such as the environment and economics).  

Transparency is a product of security regimes and a tool for decision makers. But again,

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there are few studies of what transparency is, how to increase it, and what its effects are, even though many literatures discuss transparency or touch on topics related to transparency. Charles and Clifford Kupchan, Jervis, and Lipson have done the best work applying theories about transparency to security affairs. However, these authors underestimate the significance of transparency, bury it within discussion of other concepts, do not offer many causal propositions, and/or offer only cursory empirical support for their claims. John Lewis Gaddis has done excellent work on transparency, but his historical studies do not directly test or add to the stock of international relations theories and hypotheses.

I focus on transparency because transparency influences the likelihood of war or peace and it is an influence over which people and states can exert some control. Manipulable causes of war and peace are hard to come by and thus deserve special attention. Humans have engaged in war for thousands of years; common sense dictates that war is not a problem that is going to be

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6 For details, see the next chapter - the literature review.


8 A second reason to study transparency is that it is a product of security regimes. This reason, of interest to international relations theorists, is discussed in the 'international institutions' section of the literature review. That section also explains why, among all the things that can make a peacekeeping operation effective - deterrence, transparency, mediation, and cajoling, I am focusing on transparency. (It is much easier to figure out why the study of transparency applies to the Concert as it was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum in history.)
'solved' any time soon. Even worse, what we do know about war suggests that most of its causes are difficult to manipulate. Policy makers can not do much to abolish anarchy or change human nature. Many other factors that influence war and peace such as system polarity or economic and political development are stubborn as well. It is sad but true that war is overdetermined and that many of its causes can not be manipulated. Against this gloomy backdrop, one should be grateful for whatever can be done to reduce the likelihood of war. I am pleased that this study shows that the U.N. has, in some cases, some of the time, modestly promoted peace by providing transparency.\footnote{As mentioned in the previous footnote, many things may contribute to a peacekeeping operation's effectiveness including deterrence, transparency, mediation, and cajoling.} My enthusiasm for transparency derives from its manipulability, not from the strength of its effects. Modest tools and modest hopes are all that is available.

The next sections define transparency, summarize my methodology for testing theories about transparency, summarize my conclusions, and sketch out how my dissertation is structured.
Definition of Transparency

Transparency is a word that is often bandied about by security studies analysts, especially in the arms control literature. Yet it is rarely defined, much less analyzed. In current usage, the meaning of transparency is fuzzy enough so that it, verification, and confidence-building are often used synonymously. Verification and confidence-building usually do increase transparency but only the term transparency highlights the role of information. While I often discuss verification or confidence-building, I am focusing on transparency because I am focusing on information.

Transparency describes the availability of information about potential adversaries' capabilities and intentions. If information about potential adversaries is easy to obtain, then the world is said to be transparent. If information is hard to get, the world is minimally transparent (or opaque). An increase in transparency increases the amount and accuracy of information available to states (and other groups) about their potential adversaries' capabilities and intentions. Likewise, a decrease in transparency obscures and reduces this information. The more transparency there is, the better a state can assess the threats it faces. The less transparency there is, the harder it is for a state to assess threats.\(^\text{10}\)

Of course, to say that "the world" is transparent should not obscure the fact that there are

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\(^{10}\) The continuum from high to low transparency is the same as that from low opacity to high. To be painfully grammatical, if transparency is the amount and accuracy of information available, it can not really mean anything without a modifier, e.g. more transparency or less transparency. Modifiers are often ignored in common usage and when people say transparency they mean more transparency and when they say opacity they mean less transparency; opacity emphasizes lack of information while transparency emphasizes availability of information. In this study, I often drop the modifier at times as well because the context usually makes it clear when transparency means increased transparency (or when opacity means less transparency).
many sources of information for threat assessments. I discern five types of transparency, each corresponding to one of the five general ways states obtain information about their potential adversaries. For simplicity, these types conflate the mechanisms that produce transparency/information and the end product of transparency itself.

Type I, ambient transparency, is caused by scarcely manipulable characteristics of international politics such as extent of global media coverage, relative ease of travel, and amount of trade and telecommunications. An increase in any of these factors generally increases transparency. Type II, unilateral transparency, is caused by state’s independent and directed efforts to collect intelligence. These efforts include satellites, spies, and other such methods to gather and assess information. Type III, confrontational transparency, is caused when states communicate in order to coerce or deter. When states coerce or deter, they clarify their stakes in a given situation, clarify what actions they are willing to take to preserve their interest in those stakes, and clarify what capabilities (and allies) can be brought to bear to support those actions. A variant of Type III is coerced transparency and occurs when states are forced to open up, as Iraq was forced to do after the Gulf War. Type IV, proffered transparency occurs when states unilaterally share or offer information to others, typically in an effort to despiral a conflict (which

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11 My thanks to Jim Marquardt, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Bradley Thayer for helping me understand the complexities of transparency. I take full responsibility for any remaining errors or confusion. Note that my definition of transparency leads to types of transparency that may not accord with common conceptions of it. Perhaps the biggest stretches are Type II unilateral transparency (intelligence) and Type III confrontational transparency which, while they do increase knowledge about adversaries, are not typically thought of as a transparency-increasing measures. Like it or not though, all five Types fall out of my definition of transparency. In creating these types, I tried to err on the side of completeness by including anything that increased a state’s knowledge of its adversaries. Marquardt, Oudraat, and Thayer have all led me to believe that there are other useful ways to define or categorize transparency. My theory chapter and case studies discuss some of the subtleties of the different types of transparency and address questions such as: What happens when states bluff or lie? What happens when a state discovers that the situation is even worse than it originally thought? Transparency is not always benevolent, nor should states or regimes blindly adopt increasing transparency as an ‘always wise’ policy or goal.
contrasts with confrontational transparency where information is offered to coerce or deter).

Type V, *cooperative transparency*, is caused by states' cooperative efforts to increase transparency. Various cooperative mechanisms can be used to increase transparency, including discussion forums, buffer zones, verification provisions in treaties, shared intelligence, and so forth. These mechanisms vary according to their formality (what is explicitly required of or provided to the participants), so Type V transparency has two main variants, Type Va, *informal cooperative transparency* and Type Vb, *formal cooperative transparency*. To illustrate, discussion forums (such as the Concert) are less formal than border patrols which are in turn less formal than monitored buffer zones or on-site inspections. Arranging for an institution (or creating one) to provide transparency can do so anywhere along a wide spectrum of formality, depending on the extent to which the information it gathers, generates, and disseminates is strictly defined.  

This thesis is about security regimes so its focus is on cooperative transparency and its two variants. I argue that forums and other mechanisms that increase Type Va *informal*

\[\text{12} \text{ Along similar lines, one can propose two types of opacity. Type I, ambient opacity (again on the system level) is caused by the atomized state system, and differences in language, culture, political systems, etc. Type II, unilateral opacity is caused by deception and military secrecy.} \]

A primary cause of opacity is the simple fact that the world is divided into states. The world is complicated and obtaining information about an adversary often requires considerable resources. This is especially true in the realm of security affairs where states are frequently motivated to conceal their capabilities and intentions. Even in other dimensions of international relations, perfect information is hard to come by. States often do not communicate clearly, sometimes because of organizational, bureaucratic, and special interests, or muddy policies to begin with. Not only is the world divided into states, but the governments of states are divided into many entities, each entity composed of individuals. Some level of opacity is inherent whenever states or individuals interact.

\[\text{13} \text{ The difference between informal and formal transparency could also be described as the difference between passive and active transparency. Informal mechanisms such as discussion forums merely facilitate other types of transparency, notably Type III. Formal mechanisms such as inspections or border patrols identify or respond to a demand for specific types of information and then help provide that information.} \]

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cooperative transparency may succeed in helping states coerce or deter each other more efficiently and with less miscalculation. Forums may help states better figure out when to be deterred, when to cave in, or when they have pushed their advantages as far as possible. At best then, forums help states conduct realpolitik with less risk of war. In terms of my definitions and categories: Type Va informal cooperative transparency (forums) enables Type III confrontational transparency. In terms of my hypotheses, this type of transparency leads to less miscalculation and supports H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

On the other hand, peacekeeping and other mechanisms that increase Type Vb, formal cooperative transparency may, under certain conditions, have a more pro-active peace promoting effect. When peacekeepers monitor, investigate, and report on the sources of adversaries' suspicions and fears (such as shootings, military construction, and other antagonisms), then peacekeepers may reduce unwarranted fears and correct misperceptions. This can reduce tensions and prevent crises from occurring. This type of transparency offers support for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

In theory, the promise of peacekeepers can lead states to sign peace treaties in the first place. This is so because peacekeepers are able to verify the terms of peace treaties and thus reduce the chances of defection and cheating. However, the cases examined offer little support for this proposition.

Note that all Types of transparency require some sort of mechanism for transparency to actually be provided. These mechanisms range from the media and travelers to spies, diplomats, and satellites, to forums and peacekeepers.
Overview: Main Transparency Hypotheses, Case Selection, and Methodology\textsuperscript{14}

I hypothesize that security regimes increase transparency and that transparency promotes peace in three ways: by reducing fears of cheating on agreements (and thus promoting cooperation in the first place), by reducing unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions, and by reducing miscalculation based on false optimism about relative capabilities. These effects of transparency distill what most people are thinking of when they think of transparency:\textsuperscript{15} Thus, I start with four main transparency hypotheses:

H1: Regimes Provide Transparency;

H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation;

H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions; and

H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

\textsuperscript{14} All explained in greater detail in the theory and methodology chapter, along with the competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations.

\textsuperscript{15} Of course, it turns out that transparency is a bit more complicated. See in particular the methodology chapter's section on competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations, p. 104 as well as the conclusion.
These may be arrow-diagrammed as:

Chart 1-1: Arrow Diagram of Principal Transparency Hypotheses

Security regimes are the first independent variable. Transparency is both an independent and dependent variable. The ultimate dependent variable is peace. The following points summarize my hypotheses and specify the proposed causal relationships between security regimes, transparency, and peace:

**H1: REGIMES PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY:** Security regimes provide and increase transparency. Transparency does not just happen, it has to be provided. Information has to be moved from one place to another. This hypothesis makes clear that I am focusing on security regimes as providers of transparency. Regimes can increase transparency by facilitating communication between actors (discussion forums) or can provide information to actors that would otherwise be difficult

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16 One might say that the dependent variables are war and peace, and that the independent variables are transparency and opacity. However, it is simpler to say just peace and transparency.
or impossible to come by (monitoring and verifying peace accords). Peacekeeping missions that patrol borders report on incidents and provide information that can identify rogue provocateurs, quash rumors, and/or help prevent a small incident from spiraling out of control due to misinformation and miscalculation. They may also report on the disposition and movements of each side's forces within delimited buffer zones or areas of limitation.

H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation: Lack of transparency causes states to fear others will cheat on agreements. These fears of cheating diminish states' willingness to enter into or adhere to peace treaties, confidence-building measures, arms control, and other agreements. In contrast, increased transparency lessens fears of cheating. By lessening fears of cheating, increased transparency increases states' willingness to cooperate and sign peace treaties and other agreements. In addition, verification of continued compliance helps maintain cooperation.

Lack of transparency reduces states' ability to verify compliance with agreements. Unverifiable agreements are dangerous because if cheating occurs, the duped state may be imperilled by a surprise shift in military power. Increased transparency helps states verify compliance. This reduces the probability and consequences of cheating and increases the prospects for cooperation in the first place. Once an agreement is in place, cooperation could backslide unless continued compliance is assured.

When the provision of transparency enables states to maintain cooperation, avoid general backsliding in their relations, and not annul or reject existing agreements, this effect is expressed as a variant of H2 called H2: Transparency Maintains Cooperation.

H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-Case Assumptions: Lack of transparency causes unwarranted fears and necessitates the making of worst-case assumptions. Increased
transparency makes threat assessments more accurate and lessens unwarranted fears.

Faced with uncertainty in their threat assessments, states must often make worst-case assumptions to ensure their security. By definition, worst-case assumptions are likely to be wrong and, if wrong, they create unwarranted fears. Increased transparency allows states to replace worst-case assumptions with facts, and this will reduce unwarranted fears in most cases. This in turn reduces tensions and security spirals, reducing the likelihood of war and increasing the likelihood of cooperation.

When a regime increases transparency about its own functions and activities and this reduces fears about the operation and clarifies the purpose of the operation (reduces uncertainty), this dynamic is expressed as a variant of H3 called H3: **SELF-TRANSPARENCY REDUCES UNWARRANTED FEARS AND CLARIFIES PURPOSE.**

H4: **TRANSPARENCY REDUCES MISCALCULATION:** The absence of transparency causes or exacerbates optimistic miscalculation, a frequent cause of deterrence failure. Increased transparency reduces false optimism.

With less information to go on, it is easier for states to miscalculate. For example, states may think that offense is easier or victory more assured than they actually are and start a war (offensive optimistic miscalculation). Or states may think that defense is easier or that war is less likely than they actually are and they may fail to deter (defensive optimistic miscalculation). If states can not determine the payoffs associated with war, miscalculation is likely. As Geoffrey Blainey argues: "most wars were likely to end in the defeat of at least one nation which had
expected victory." Miscalculation can also occur in negotiations where difficulties in measuring relative power and can lead states to adopt overly ambitious or overly cautious positions.

CASE SELECTION

My principal cases are five crises confronted by the Concert of Europe and four United Nations peacekeeping operations. I study two traditional U.N. operations, UNFICYP on Cyprus and UNDOF on the Golan Heights, as well as two newer-type multifunctional, election monitoring operations, UNTAG in Namibia and UNTAC in Cambodia. To help measure the effectiveness of Concert diplomacy and help determine the effects of transparency, I also examine crisis management before the Concert during the first partition of Poland.

As mentioned before, I selected the Concert for study because it was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum in history and because it has received considerable acclaim and/or scrutiny from international relations theorists, historians, and other scholars. I selected the U.N.'s peacekeeping operations for study because they are the most prominent activity by a security regime in the world today. UNFICYP is a particularly rich case and one which I was able to explore in depth. I provide more detail on case selection and how the cases contain appropriate variance in the independent and dependent variables (variations in regime activity, in transparency, and in peace/tension/war) in the methodology chapter.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{ Causes of War, pp. 144-145.}\]
**Methodology**

This thesis explores security regimes' ability to provide transparency and into what are assumed to be the beneficial effects of transparency (H1-H4). My main objective is to test these four hypotheses against the null. In practical terms, the null is the information an adversary has before any intervention by the regime. Transparency is measured by examining whether the regime added information to an adversary's assessment during a negotiation, crisis, or incident and whether this information affected the course of these events. I want to know whether or not the regime generated information, provided information, or facilitated the exchange of information over and above what would have been the case in the absence of the regime.

I gather data by process tracing within cases. I measure data with congruence tests involving observation of fluctuation in the independent and dependent variables at many points within each case, in particular during crises and negotiations.\(^{18}\)

A principal task of my empirical research is to identify turning points in crises and negotiations and explain their outcomes. Turning points often exhibit variance in the independent and dependent variables. Transparency is about information and a good way to observe information 'in action' is to examine turning points in crises and negotiations and see if regime-provided information changed the course of events.

I add additional rigor in three ways. First, I use a control case, the first partition of Poland

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\(^{18}\) Congruence procedure type 2 according to Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science* (Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT, 1996), pp. 32-33. To recall, security regimes are the first independent variable. Transparency is the dependent variable of transparency but also the independent variable for the ultimate dependent variable of peace (Security regime $\rightarrow$ Transparency $\rightarrow$ Peace).
to examine crisis management before the Concert and thus help measure the effects of Concert diplomacy. Second, I evaluate the transparency hypotheses alongside competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations (methodology chapter, p. 104). And third, I make controlled comparisons across cases (although my cases differ in many respects, especially the Concert and the U.N., I apply the same template to each case. While common sense limits overdrawn comparisons between the Concert and the U.N. and between forums and peacekeeping, it would be equally unwise to ignore any reasonable insights provided by the comparison of two different ways security regimes can provide transparency).
Summary of Findings

I selected cases which I thought should have evinced stronger evidence for the provision and effects of transparency than they did. While one would hope for the cause of peace that transparency's effects would be pronounced, beneficent, and easily manipulable, none of these was clearly the case.

My research revealed a combination of mixed (from dramatic to negative) and modest results for transparency and security regimes. The silver lining is that this array of results inspired several new hypotheses about transparency and allowed me to identify a number of bounding conditions for the successful use of transparency.

I found that out of the first five crises confronted by the Concert, forum diplomacy reduced miscalculation in two cases, facilitated a deception campaign in one case, and clarified the existence of schisms within the Concert in two cases. The first two cases offer support for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation, while the third highlights the danger that the same mechanisms that can be used to provide information can also provide disinformation. As disinformation in a sense increases miscalculation, support for H4 is vitiated. The remaining two cases inspired a new hypothesis: H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Of my peacekeeping case studies, UNFICYP on Cyprus is the most detailed. Interviews with top U.N. officials, peacekeepers, government officials, and reviews of diplomatic and operational records revealed how difficult it is to increase transparency when suspicions are so high that new information provided by UNFICYP made little difference to each sides' threat
perceptions. This is a significant bounding condition for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. However, UNFICYP investigates over 1,000 incidents a year and generates a lot of information along the way. While the tactical use of transparency helps UNFICYP calm incidents, UNFICYP often uses the information it obtains not to increase transparency but get violators of the cease-fire in trouble (and in this way keep incidents from escalating). This effect led to H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis.

UNFICYP also illustrated two limits to the manipulability of transparency. First, peacekeepers' efforts to increase transparency are often impossible to disentangle from their efforts to cajole, mediate, and deter. As a peacekeeper shuttles back and forth across the buffer zone talking to each side and trying to calm an incident, the peacekeeper often engages in all these efforts simultaneously. Second, my UNFICYP case study uncovered episodes where great power pressure had to be brought to bear on the parties to make it possible for UNFICYP to conduct its inspections and do its job. In these instances, UNFICYP's ability to manipulate transparency was intertwined with great power politics.

The case study of UNDOF on the Golan Heights showed that despite seemingly elaborate verification measures, UNDOF doesn't generate much information that Syria and Israel don't already obtain from their intelligence services. In addition, the situation on the Golan is so calm that it suggests another bounding condition for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. There have to be fears for H3 to work. However, a number of analysts argue that each side's compliance with the areas of separation and limitation sends calming signals about their mutual respect for the status quo.
The effects of transparency were much more dramatic in the two multifunctional operations I studied. In Cambodia (UNTAC) and Namibia (UNTAG), the U.N. used information campaigns to calm unwarranted fears about the elections and pre-election violence in each country. For example, Radio UNTAC dispelled rumors that the pencils used to mark ballots had satellite links that would allow hostile parties to identify who had voted for whom (and then retaliate). These information campaigns also reduced fears among the citizenry about what the U.N. was doing in the country. This last effect is the basis of a corollary to H3, H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

While UNTAC and UNTAG's successes were greatly assisted by the operations' ability to provide transparency, the U.N.'s ability to provide transparency in turn rested on some specific conditions. In both of these poor countries, the existing media infrastructures were rudimentary and mostly served to broadcast blatantly biased views from the various political parties. This meant that the U.N. could more easily provide credible and useful information that calmed unwarranted fears (and promoted fair elections).

These findings contribute to theorists' and policy makers' understandings of what transparency is and how it works and of what security regimes can and can not do in the service of peace.
Structure of the Dissertation

In the next chapter, I review the scholarship on transparency and transparency-related subjects in the field of international relations. I also summarize the literatures which assess the peace-causing effectiveness of the Concert of Europe and the U.N.. In chapter three, I specify in greater detail my theory and methodology. Chapter four covers diplomacy and transparency before the Concert. In it, I examine the general conditions affecting crisis management in the 18th century such as speed of communications and the professionalism of diplomats. I also examine two 18th century crises/wars: the Seven Year's War in America and, in greater detail, the first partition of Poland. This gives me a baseline of comparison for analysis of the Concert's effects.

Chapter five contains the case studies of five crises confronted by the Concert. Chapter six covers the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Chapter seven contains my case study of traditional peacekeeping operation on the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Chapter eight examines the multifunctional U.N. missions in Namibia (UNTAG) and Cambodia (UNTAC). The conclusion summarizes my findings and explains the implications of my findings for policy makers and international relations theorists.

The first appendix adds more detail to two aspects of the Cyprus case: the Roccas Bastion construction and the killing of Stelios Panayi by the Turkish Forces in June, 1996. The second appendix assesses the overall effectiveness of most of the U.N.'s peacekeeping operations to date. This helps give the reader a greater sense of the array of U.N. operations. Finally, a bibliography and list of interviews is included.
Chapter 2:

The Literature on Transparency

"No Man Is an Island"

In this chapter, I assess the state of the literature on transparency. This chapter helps answer the questions: of what use is this study? In what ways does it add value to what is already known?

While the international cooperation, arms control, misperception, and international regimes literatures all offer valuable insights for the study of transparency, transparency remains poorly defined and under-analyzed. There is no detailed specification of what transparency is, no theory of how transparency works, and no in depth empirical analysis of how variations in transparency influence the likelihood of war or peace. I discuss these four literatures in turn, sketching out their arguments, showing how they have contributed to my thoughts on transparency, and explaining why there is still something left to be said about transparency. As I must also make judgements about the peace-causing effectiveness of the Concert and the U.N. in my case studies, I summarize the literatures on these regimes as well.

The Cooperation Literature

The literature on cooperation uses game theory and rational choice analysis to explore the
incentives states have to cooperate under anarchy. By so doing, this literature seeks to explain the conditions under which states enter into or defect from agreements and then to identify ways in which states can overcome barriers to cooperation. The absence of transparency (incomplete information) is one of those barriers.

Cooperation theorists argue that several factors favor cooperation including sufficient payoffs from doing so, smaller numbers of actors, a long shadow of the future, and the ability to identify and punish defectors. Conversely, barriers to cooperation include insufficient joint gains from cooperation (deadlock), large and unwieldy numbers of actors, the ability to defect with low costs, and insufficient capabilities to monitor compliance and punish defectors. Cooperation theorists argue that increased transparency helps overcome barriers to cooperation not just because it increases the ability to identify defectors but also because it helps states know what the payoffs are from cooperation (and defection) in the first place. This reduces fear and miscalculation.

1 A long shadow of the future means that there is a high probability that the actors will need to cooperate in the future. The higher the probability, the more a potential defector can anticipate having to pay for its defection for a long period of time. This helps cooperation because it raises the costs of defection. For example, Germany would not have to worry so much about taking Alsace-Lorraine from France if it did not ever have to deal with France again. On the other hand, if post-attack cooperation between France and Germany could produce gains, then Germany's attack would mean paying an opportunity cost the size of the foregone potential gain (depending of course on France's post-attack policy. Germany might have to pay the more direct and substantial cost of war.)

Jervis develops the argument about verification and identifying defectors in part of what is the best theoretical discussion of transparency in any literature:

Cooperation is made more likely not only by changes in payoffs but also by increases in the states' ability to recognize what others are doing - called "transparency" in the literature on regimes. Coupled with the ability to act on this information, transparency can produce a situation in which, in effect, the choices of CD and DC are effectively ruled out. Short periods of defection may occur; but if they can be detected and countered, the only real alternatives are CC and DD.3

In other words, Jervis is arguing that states can be led to cooperate not just by the straightforward task of making cooperation more lucrative (for example, the U.S.'s provision of billions of dollars in aid to Egypt and Israel certainly changed the payoffs associated with signing the Camp David accords) but also by increasing transparency. Once states are assured that compliance can be adequately monitored, they are more likely to make agreements. This is the argument of H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation.4

George Downs, David Rocke, and Randolph Siverson make the following deductive argument about unwarranted fears of defection or what I call H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

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3 From Jervis' contribution to the Oye volume Cooperation Under Anarchy, "From Balance to Concert," p. 73; the discussion of transparency spans pp. 73-76. "C" is Cooperate and "D" is Defect. "CD," for example, means one side opts to cooperate and the other to defect. This excerpt helps show how transparency works, and makes a fairly strong claim for the effects of transparency. Yet I do not think Jervis realizes the strength of his claim. It seems clear to me that transparency changes payoffs as well. If payoffs are expected values, then any change in the probability of detection of defection changes the payoffs associated with defection. I agree with Jervis that increases in the ability to verify an agreement increase the probability of concluding the agreement and sticking with it. However, I think it is because the payoffs have changed.

4 Lipson also implicitly supports H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation as well when he says that "Important joint gains are to be captured in many issues...The real problem is that they are often difficult to accomplish because information is poor, deception and cheating are possible, and most important, the basic rights of property and contract (and enforcement mechanisms for those rights) are simply absent at the international level. In other words, transparency and elimination of anarchy would help cooperation. In "Are Security Regimes Possible," p. 5. Lipson discusses transparency explicitly on p. 9, with reference to arms control.
Imperfect intelligence can inspire an arms race that would not take place in the presence of perfect information, and can permit one to continue when it is 'unjustified'... Imperfect intelligence expands the range of games that can lead to arms races by raising the possibility that one side will think the other side has defected even though this may not have occurred.\(^5\)

The cooperation literature also makes deductive arguments about miscalculation, the subject of H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. From a rational-choice perspective on cooperation, James Fearon argues that "the combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these" can lead to miscalculations of relative power and dangerous diplomatic signaling. This may lead to war.\(^6\) Although he does not frame it in terms of transparency, Fearon is highlighting important causes of minimal transparency: states' incentives to keep information private and their incentives to manipulate that information.\(^7\)

Finally and more generally, game theorists note that under conditions of incomplete information there may be multiple equilibria. This means that if actors do not have enough information (about the conditions in the outside world or about their own preferences), several possible actions may appear equally desirable. However, as actors do not know any better under conditions of incomplete information, some of the possible actions may not be wise. Thus, incomplete information may lead to miscalculation and therefore to tension or war.

Of all the literatures that touch on transparency, the cooperation literature is the most sophisticated and it provides some of the deductive underpinnings for my hypotheses. However,

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\(^7\) It is debatable whether or not deception is tantamount to opacity, but transparency certainly influences the degree to which states can succeed with a deception plan.
the sources of much of this literature's sophistication - rational choice analysis and game theory - are also the source of its biggest flaw: lack of empirical testing. Rational choice and game theory are useful deductive tools and the insights they produce are certainly testable. Yet Matthew Evangelista notes that "there have been relatively few attempts to evaluate competing theories (of cooperation theory) through empirical analysis of historical cases,"

This dissertation shows how the provision of transparency helps (or does not help) states and other adversaries reorder their preferences on the basis of new information promised or provided by the security regime. For example, the U.N. helped people vote in Cambodia and Namibia by reducing fears about its operation and by lessening fears of reprisals by their enemies (the Khmer Rouge, for example). In game theoretic terms, many people initially feared being caught if they defected (voting for any party which some other party might penalize them for voting for) while the U.N. assured them of their anonymity and the fact that they could not be caught for "defecting." On the other hand, the transparency that the U.N. provides on Cyprus does little to affect preferences because the levels of suspicion between the adversaries are too high to be influenced.

The Arms Control Literature

The arms control literature assesses and debates the ability of arms control to achieve

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three possible benefits: reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the damage caused if war does occur, and reducing expenditures on arms. As this study examines how transparency influences the likelihood of war, I am not directly interested in this literature's arguments about damage or cost.

Arms control agreements place limits on the quantities and/or types of weapons a state may deploy. For arms control to affect the probability of war, then arms builds/arms races, and/or differences between types of weapons must increase the likelihood of war. The arms control literature posits and debates two ways in which quantities or types of weapons can help lead to war. I will summarize the debates in the arms control literature about arms builds/arms races and types of weapons and then show how transparency is relevant to these debates.

First, arms control proponents argue that arms races create tension and thus increase the likelihood of war. Arms races are based on spiral dynamics which are themselves a result of the security dilemma. As mentioned, the security dilemma occurs when one state builds a weapon to increase its security and that same weapon decreases the security of other states. The spiral occurs when state $B$ responds to state $A$'s buildup with a buildup of its own and then, thanks to the security dilemma, the two countries become locked into a cycle of continuous balancing and counterbalancing. The source of tension seems straightforward: state $A$'s buildup means that it poses an increasing threat to state $B$ (necessarily so due to the security dilemma) and increased threats are sources of increased tension. If all these arguments are true, then arms control can make substantial contributions to international security by stopping arms builds and stopping

\footnote{This is true if the weapon has any offensive capability -- and almost all weapons do. The relationship between offensive and defensive weapons is discussed below.}
security dilemma-generated spirals in mid-gyration.\textsuperscript{10}

In response to this first argument, critics of arms control charge that arms races are symptoms, not causes, of tension.\textsuperscript{11} After all, why would state A build weapons in the first place? Why would state B care how many weapons state A had if there was not tension already? These criticisms contain boulders of truth, and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions would be less relevant if arms races were always symptoms and never causes of tension. But this is not true. Arms races are both symptoms and causes of tension. The arguments of arms control proponents and critics are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Arms buildups can result from existing tensions, or can exacerbate existing tensions, or can cause tensions - it is a furball of causal arrows.\textsuperscript{12}

The second arms-related source of conflict identified by arms control advocates are weapons deemed to make offensive military operations more likely to succeed. Weapons that


\textsuperscript{11} One could have the same arguments about arms control: are such agreements symptoms or causes of reduced tension? The answer again is: both. And even if the critics are right (and they are not) that controlling the quantities or types of weapons does not help cause peace, these arguments ignore the collateral benefits of the increases in transparency that accompany arms control agreements. It is certainly true that the SALT agreements did not do much to limit nuclear weapons (in fact they allowed for significant modernization), but SALT made threat assessment easier (thanks to verification), provided benchmarks for behavior and rules of the road, and made the arms race more predictable. Increased transparency is one of the principal benefits of arms control.


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favor the offense increase the incentive to start aggressive and preventive wars. This in turn
heightens crisis instability. Further, building offensive weapons causes more fear in other states
than building defensive weapons, so offensive weapons aggravate the security dilemma-rooted
spiral dynamics described above. If these arguments are true, then arms control agreements that
limit offensive weapons will lessen the probability of war by reducing the incentives to start one
and/or by ameliorating spirals caused by the security dilemma.¹³

Critics of arms control claim that it is very hard to differentiate offensive from defensive
weapons; most weapons can be used for either purpose. Tanks are offensive when they are
moving forward into enemy territory, defensive when they are not. A shield can provide defense
- or a secure base from which to launch attacks. Even the simplest, lowest technology weapon
can be offensive. Many Rwandans were killed with machetes. The critics add a justified note of
skepticism, but I believe that it is still possible to make agreements that alter the offense/defense
balance, and increase the odds of peace. Agreements that encourage mobile over fixed-site
missiles, that establish buffer zones, or that spur fortifications and fixed-site defenses all tend to
discourage the offense. Buffer zones and fortifications are hybrids between arms control and
confidence-building measures because, while not putting a cap on quantities or types of weapons,
they do physically influence the ability to use force.¹⁴

World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), and Andrew Mack, "Conclusion: The Future of Arms Control," in Ball and
Mack, The Future of Arms Control, as well as the previously cited Arms Control Association, Arms Control and National
Security, pp. 5-15 and Blacker and Duffy, International Arms Control, pp. 335-338.

¹⁴ See Marion William Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Studies, 1941, Vol. XVI, No. 1) and Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races:
Prerequisites and Results," in Art and Waltz, The Use of Force.
Transparency affects how states perceive arms buildups by others and the balance of power more generally. How many weapons are really being built? What are they capable of? Who would win if there was a war? It is often impossible to answer these questions with certainty, and some of this uncertainty may be transparency-related. Uncertainty is relevant to the assessment of the severity of the security dilemma and the assessment of the offense/defense balance. H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions springs in part from the security dilemma-driven spiral model which is at the core of many arms control proponents' arguments. If, as I argue in the theory chapter when I explain my hypotheses, spirals are usually aggravated if there is uncertainty about threat assessments, then spirals can be ameliorated by transparency. H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation is derived in part from analyses such as those by Blainey and Van Evera which show that uncertainty about the offense/defense balance leads to miscalculation.

Having explained how the arms control literature has contributed to my thesis, I will now explain what this study aims to contribute to the study and practice of arms control. With regard to scholarship, it is hard to read far into the arms control literature without finding mention of transparency -- so what is left to be said about transparency? A lot is left because transparency is often little more than a buzzword in the arms control literature.\(^\text{15}\) In most of the examples just

cited (in footnote 14), the meaning of the term and its beneficent effects are assumed or under-
specified. In other cases, the term is submerged in lists of proposed arms control measures or
their benefits.

To take one example, Zdzislaw Lachowski lists four "stabilizing measures for localized
constraint;" 3. "measures to reinforce confidence;" and 4. "measures for monitoring of
compliance and evaluation." Of these four, three and half really boil down to transparency.
The measures to reinforce confidence include hot lines and observation measures. The measures
of constraint include such provisions as demilitarized zones and deactivation of weapons,
provisions which only become meaningful if monitored. Indeed, the monitoring of these
provisions is probably as much of a cause of peace as their influence on military factors such as
the offense-defense balance. Finally, the measures for monitoring compliance and measures of
transparency obviously boil down to transparency. This example shows that the provision of
transparency is at the heart of several disparate arms control activities ranging from verification
to confidence-building.

On the practical side, arms control and confidence-building agreements mean little if they
can not be verified. Many peace agreements also require verification. These agreements are not

15(...continued)
Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989). Although it is not directly targeting the arms control literature, Ann
includes discussion of arms control and transparency.

16 Lachowski, "Conventional arms control and security cooperation in Europe," in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford,
mean to criticize Lachowski, there is value to parsing these out as he does. I am simply pointing out the role of
transparency in underpinning most of these activities.
even likely to be signed without provisions to increase transparency and will likely founder if transparency declines.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, studies that show how to increase transparency and how well the various methods to increase transparency work (and under what conditions) will provide guidance to leaders who confront arms control and related security issues.

This study which gives transparency the benefit of the doubt by selecting for study regimes which ought to provide meaningful levels of transparency (easy cases) comes up with modest findings about the importance of transparency. Regime provided transparency means little when states and other adversaries suspect each other too much to believe the regime's information, when they suspect each other too little for the information to lessen tensions, or when they already know so much about each other that new information means little. The latter is often likely to be true among great powers who have many means of learning about each other. This is born out by Jim Marquardt who examines the effects of transparency in great power arms control agreements (harder cases) finds even less benefit to the transparency provided by these agreements.\textsuperscript{18}

The Literature on Misperception

Transparency is about the amount and accuracy of information decision makers have available when they make decisions. Minimal transparency, for example, explains one reason

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] The Cold War debates about Soviet compliance underscore this point.
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] Marquardt, APSA, August 1997.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
why decision makers must sometimes act with incomplete information. The literature on misperception is about the various influences that directly or actively distort information: cognitive biases, organizational dynamics, and even politics itself. This means that studies of transparency and various sources of misperception share a common theme: a focus on the quality of information. This common theme means that the literature on misperception offers many insights for this thesis.

The primary focus of the international relations literature on misperception is on assessing the influence of cognitive biases on the decisions of leaders. Cognitive theorists contend that the accuracy of incoming information is often distorted by the cognitive biases of decision-makers. For example, Jervis puts forth the two hypotheses that "there is an overall tendency for decision makers to see other states as more hostile than they are" and that "actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplines, and coordinated than it is." If leaders misread signals from their adversaries, they may cause or aggravate a crisis - even if they intend to reduce tensions. The misperception literature is filled with examples of how cognitive biases helped cause or aggravate World War I, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Falklands War, the 1973 Middle East War, and other wars and crises.

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A secondary focus of the misperception literature is organizational dynamics. Organization theory explains two main things: why and how organizations act in their own self-interest and why and how organizations develop routinized behavior and standard operating procedures. In organizational terms, self-interest manifests itself in drives for size, wealth, and autonomy. Self-interest explains why organizations may monopolize information, spread self-serving falsehoods (thus contributing to other's misperception), or prefer to believe some types of information more than others. For example, it comes as no surprise to organization theorists that the Defense Intelligence Agency comes up with more alarming threat assessments than other U.S. intelligence services; higher threats should lead to larger Pentagon budgets. Routinized behavior explains why organizations may not be able to quickly or successfully adapt to changed circumstances and new information. These insights about self-interest and routinized behavior apply to individuals as well.

The literature on surprise attacks is noteworthy because it compares several sources of misperception: opacity, cognitive psychology, organizational imperatives, and international and domestic political influences. It asks whether surprise attacks are more likely because of faulty

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22 This is not really misperception, but the effects are similar.


24 The effects of the first three (opacity, cognitive biases, and organizational imperatives) should be clear by now, so I will explain the effects of politics on decision-makers and the extent to which politics can be considered a source of misperception. International and domestic political influences include electoral and party politics, alliance politics, trade politics, and so forth. Domestic politics may create strategic vulnerability if, for example, a leader risks war by being tougher than a situation requires in order to boost its standing in the polls. Alliances can create vulnerability if they cause chain-ganging (or other forms of resource diversion such as fogging the agenda-setting process or causing maldeployment of forces). Political influences explain how utility calculations come to be at variance with the national interest (risking national security to help re-election, for example).

(continued...)

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information processing and assessment at the level of the individual or organization or state, or because of a lack of information available to decision-makers in the first place. Patrick Morgan summarizes an excellent edited volume on surprise attacks with two somewhat conflicting observations, the first suggesting a relatively large role for opacity:

Detecting a strategic surprise attack in advance remains at bottom, a problem of having too little information. As Klaus Knorr has pointed out, "Threat perception is a matter of 'estimates' that would not be needed if all the pertinent information were unambiguously at hand. One estimates when one does not know."\(^{25}\)

On the other hand, he notes that detection does not solve the vulnerability problem. While information about attacks is always likely to be somewhat ambiguous, there is often enough information to be able to predict an attack or at least heighten suspicions. Something else besides incomplete information is needed to explain vulnerability. Morgan writes that the following "central proposition" of the cognitive literature (with respect to surprise) receives "strong support."

The primary source of vulnerability to strategic surprise is the defender's adherence to an incorrect set of views that treats being attacked as highly unlikely

\(^{24}\)(...continued)

I showed how organization theory explains how organizational dynamics and imperatives shape utility calculations and how this in turn affects what information organizations want to hear and what information they are likely to disseminate. Political influences work the same way. Opacity and cognitive bias are more "pure" sources of misperception than politics or organizational dynamics because they do not really affect utility calculations, just information (even though the two are closely related). True misperception means that actors have distorted or incomplete information and this causes actors not to be able to act effectively on pre-existing utility calculations. Half-breed sources of misperception such as organizational dynamics and politics affect utility calculations and this in turn affects information and perception. What all sources of misperceptions have in common is that they help explain why leaders make choices that are suboptimal with respect to advancing the national interest. Theories that explain suboptimal choices may be more accurately classified as 'pathology theories,' but they are grouped here under misperception because of this theses' focus on information.

or impossible, thereby causing a misreading of the available signals.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, of the four factors that create strategic vulnerability (limited information, cognitive biases, organizational imperatives, and international and domestic political influences), Morgan argues in the second passage that it is generally not a lack of adequate information (or opacity) that creates vulnerability. Instead, the primary source of danger is created by other sources of misperception which cause misreading of available information.

Morgan's summary analysis of the surprise attack literature highlights both the limits of and opportunities for transparency. The importance of sources of misperception other than opacity suggests that even perfect transparency would only have modest effects on leaders' abilities to correctly assess adversaries.\textsuperscript{27} That said, this is not as strong a caveat as it may at first appear and there are three reasons why transparency remains a worthy topic of study.

First of all, the sources of misperception are often inter-related. Uncertainty plays a large role in creating unwarranted fears (and resultant spirals) and lack of transparency is a major source of uncertainty. The degree of intra-government opacity may significantly affect the extent of the danger(s) posed by organizational dynamics.

Second, much works remains to be done comparing the relative influence of the several sources of misperception. For example, two primary arguments in the misperception literature

\textsuperscript{26} Morgan, "Opportunity for Strategic Surprise," pp. 215-216.

conflict. If Jervis is right in "Hypotheses on Misperception" when he argues that "there is an overall tendency for decision makers to see other states as more hostile than they are" and that "actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is," then one would not expect the kind of complacent oversights (due to cognitive and organizational standard operating procedures, among other things) documented in the surprise attack literature. Jervisian dynamics should lead to higher alert levels but organizational dynamics seem to lead to lower alert levels. Under what conditions does each source of misperception prevail and what can be done about it? I am not conducting a comparison of the various sources of misperception, but by undertaking the first thorough study of transparency, I am doing my part to help future scholars make such a comparison. This hints at the third reason to study transparency: of any of the four influences on perception that Morgan lists, transparency is by far the least examined.

Fourth, finally, and most important, of the four influences on perception and the quality of information, transparency is probably the most manipulable. Awareness of cognitive biases can reduce their influence, but their source - human nature - is immutable. Similarly, organization theory argues that organizations pursue the self-interested goals of size, wealth, and autonomy. Awareness of organizational dynamics can improve a decision-maker's policy analysis, but the goals of organizations seem also immutable. The same can be said for the influence of politics.

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28 p. 475.

29 Which in turn may reduce crisis stability or make the consequences of accidents more dangerous.
On the other hand, states can identify issues where if they knew more, fears, tensions, and miscalculation would be reduced. Once these issues are identified, states can undertake unilateral or cooperative efforts to increase transparency in these areas. The caveat here is that, while transparency may be manipulable, only status quo states are likely to be interested in cooperative agreements to increase it.

My case studies of Cambodia and Namibia showed that the U.N. could reduce misperceptions with the information it provided. On the other hand, the parties on Cyprus harbor such deep suspicions that they often do not believe the U.N. when it has calming information.

The Literature on Regimes and International Institutions

Most of the writing on regimes is within the subfield of international political economy. This literature offers two basic arguments about regimes and information. First, if information is hard to get, then the high cost of information creates a demand for a regime to lower those costs. Second, regimes can reduce uncertainty by providing information.30 The first of these arguments is similar to H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation, and the second is similar to H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. One goal of my research is to identify how and under what conditions international institutions influence outcomes in international politics.

However, the research program on cooperation has much in common with the work on

international institutions, and some of it offers more specific and fine-grained insights on the role
of information in international politics in general and in security affairs more specifically. As I
discussed these insights above, I will turn to a different issue raised by the regimes and
international institutions literature.

The regimes literature asks questions of fundamental importance for this study: "do
regimes matter?" And more subtly, how and under what conditions do regimes matter? These
questions are at the heart of the debates between realists and liberal institutionalists. Liberals
believe that institutions can alter states' interests and influence their behavior. Realist critics
charge that regimes are merely symptoms or byproducts of their members' interests and relative
power. In essence, these are debates over whether regimes are independent or dependent
variables in international politics.32

According to Haggard and Simmons in 1987, regimes could be shown to matter if process
tracing showed that decision makers "were actually concerned with reputation, reducing
transactions costs, the need for transparency, and so forth, when facing decisions about regime
creation and compliance...An even stronger claim [could be made if such analysis showed that
regimes] can alter actor's interests and preferences." They also note that "Surprisingly little work

31 Indeed, Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons include the cooperation literature in their assessment of the
504-506. In both these literatures, however support for hypotheses on information is either deductive or largely
anecdotal.

32 The clearest examples of this debate are: Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions,"
International Security, Vol. 19., No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of
(Summer 1995).
of this kind has been done." Keohane and Lisa Martin indicate that this was still true in 1995 when their *International Security* article in defense of institutions contained few empirical cites in general, and no cites to reinforce their claim that the informational role of institutions should be important. They note that the "logic of institutionalist theory, with its focus on the informational role of institutions, appears solid." 

By exploring and showing how and under what conditions security regimes produce transparency and lessen the odds of war, this study provides evidence of regimes influencing outcomes and thus acting as independent variables. There are basically two parts to my argument: that security regimes can provide transparency (H1) and that this product of regimes influences states' behavior (H2, H3, and H4). Even if I show that variations in transparency influence behavior, the questions that the regimes literature highlights for this study is the first half of the equation: to what extent is transparency really a product? Couldn't it too be a symptom of its powerful members' power and interests? I argue that transparency is a product of

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33 Haggard and Simmons, "International Regimes," p. 514.

34 Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," pp. 46-51. In addition, two of their three security-related cites offer questionable support for the significance of institutions: First, Lisa Martin's *Coercive Cooperation*, a study of issue-linkage, seems to offer as much support for realism as for liberal institutionalism. Her cases show that institutions facilitate arm twisting and horse-trading, coercive/realist and mutually beneficial/liberal forms of issue linkage, respectively. Whether issue linkage is a primarily realist or liberal phenomena (i.e. whether they temper anarchy and power politics) seems indeterminate. However, reality is more important than this debate and Martin's work is more a victory in describing reality than for bolstering any particular theoretical framework. Second, Duffield's "International Regimes" argues that institutional factors explain the high degree of stability in NATO's force levels through most of the Cold War, but he measures stability with a variable of little significance: the numbers of brigades and divisions. This beancounting exercise ignores other variables such as investments in high technology weapons, readiness, and force multipliers that proved their worth (at least against the Iraqis) during the Gulf war. Ivo H. Daalder notes that this "analytical shortcoming" raises questions about the "overall validity of Duffield's theoretical argument," in his review of *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) that appeared in the *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 1071.

35 See the arrow diagram on p. 28.
security regimes. However, my U.N. case studies show that the U.N. often does not involve itself in peacekeeping without great and regionally great power consent and/or involvement.

The primary reason that transparency is likely to be a product of security regimes is because it is cheap. The more resources a regime requires to take on a task, the more that task is likely to serve its most powerful members' interests. If it takes fewer resources for a regime to provide a good, the good may or may not still serve great power interests, but the point is that it does not necessarily have to. The cheaper the good, the more able the regime is to provide it relatively free of great power interests or initiative.

To illustrate these points, the U.N.'s peace enforcement operations in Korea and the Gulf were led by the U.S. and could not have been undertaken without U.S. capabilities and leadership. It is inevitable that these operations served U.S. interests for the obvious reason that the U.S. would not have paid such high prices and taken such big risks if its interests had not been at stake. Although undertaken under U.N. auspices - and somewhat facilitated because of this - these U.N. operations were very much products of U.S. power. These last comments are not criticisms, but observations about the way regimes work. At the other end of the costs scale are good offices missions taken on by the U.N. Secretary General (UNSG). These missions are cheap and can be undertaken at the UNSG's discretion (although the importance of leverage implies that the UNSG would be wise to obtain great power backing ahead of time).

The costs of peacekeeping operations vary but they generally fall somewhere in between peace enforcement and good offices missions. Peacekeeping operations depend on modest deterrence, increased transparency, mediation, and cajoling for their effectiveness. I am focusing on transparency because it is fairly cheap, and is more likely to be a product of the regime than
deterrence. The more a peacekeeping operation deters, the more force it is likely to need and the more it is likely to depend on the resources of the great powers. On the other hand, increased transparency (in the form of monitored buffer zones, impartial incident reporting, and so on) is relatively cheap and can be provided by the U.N. with relative independence from the great powers. Of course, great power support is always helpful to the U.N. and they could (and sometimes do) assist transparency-increasing efforts with satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and other expensive intelligence gathering assets.

I am not arguing that transparency is the only product of security regimes. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, these regimes, and the U.N. in particular, undertake many tasks ranging from peace enforcement, peacekeeping, mediation, and good offices missions. These tasks in turn depend on a variety of factors for their effectiveness. Enforcement missions depend on large uses of force. Peacekeeping operations depend on smaller amounts of force, as well as elements of deterrence, leverage, provision of transparency, mediation, and cajoling. Good offices missions depend on leverage, mediation, and cajoling.

In sum, the theoretical importance of studying transparency is derived from the regimes and institutions literature which asks if regimes matter, and if they can influence events and are

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36 Mediation and cajoling fall somewhere in between transparency and deterrence on the cost scale. Mediation can be cheap, but it also often depends on leverage (as does cajoling, and sometimes even the provision of transparency). Leverage is power and power is usually expensive. In the end though, it would be unwise to view power, deterrence, mediation, cajoling, and transparency too discretely. They often depend on each other or reinforce each other. For example, in order for UNFICYP to get permission to inspect the Roccas Bastion construction (see p. 252) and thus increase transparency, it had to cajole the "TRNC" as well as engage the support of the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.S. and British governments.

A question that deserves more study is the role of transparency in mediation and the role of mediation in transparency. I begin to explore the role of transparency in mediation by testing H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation (see the UNDOF case, in particular). But mediation itself may increase transparency because it helps two or more sides exchange views and bargaining positions.
independent variables in the international system.

The Literature on the Principal Case Studies

On the Concert of Europe as a Peace-promoting International Institution

In recent years, there has been a virtual tidal wave of optimism by historians and political scientists about the effectiveness of Concert of Europe and the general peacefulness of the Concert period. These optimists credit the Concert of Europe with solving crises with relative ease, with promoting moderation between the great powers, and for being largely responsible for the long period of great power peace ranging (depending on the author) anywhere from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the Crimean War and even all the way to World War I. Again depending on the author, a number of factors are said to be responsible for this period of peace: war weariness, shared moderation, skilled diplomacy, ideological homogeneity, the persistence of bonds built during the long Napoleonic wars, and the effectiveness of the Concert as a security regime.

Of all these factors that may have caused peace, only those that depend on institutional benefits matter much to policy makers. Only institutional benefits (such as transparency) are easy to reproduce. The other factors (war weariness, etc.) are difficult to manipulate, undesirable to manipulate, or are idiosyncratic. Thus, most policy relevant arguments derivable from the
Concert period must necessarily depend on its value as an international institution or regime.\textsuperscript{37}

As a regime, the Concert is claimed to have codified and promoted peace-causing norms and procedures, facilitated diplomacy, and increased transparency. My focus is transparency, but the research and process-tracing needed to chart the possible effects of transparency gives me a good (but less formal) basis for judging how well the Concert promoted peace with norms and other mechanisms. The case study shows that the great powers did seem gripped by a centripetal force or norm that led them to meet in Concert to confront their common problems. Beyond that though, the number of war scares, \textit{faits accomplis}, and general level of hardball politics weaken the case that Concert norms were influential.


Robert Jervis's two pieces on the Concert came out in 1982 and 1986. Paul Schroeder's oft-cited "The 19th Century International System" also came out in 1986.\textsuperscript{38} With the terrain prepared, the

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\textsuperscript{38} In order of citation: Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System;" Lauren, "Crisis Prevention;" Jervis, "Security Regimes;" and Jervis, "From Balance to Concert;" Schroeder, "The 19th Century

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end of the Cold War sparked a wave of Concert optimism. The decline of the Soviet Union (and the subsequent reasonably friendly relations with Russia) made NATO and other Cold War security structures seem less relevant. Seeing an opportunity and a need to create new structures, a number of analysts looked back to the early 19th century Concert of Europe as a model or source of ideas. In short order, at least a dozen calls for Concert-based and Concert-like structures appeared in prominent journals.  

Finally, in 1994, Paul Schroeder published his magnum opus, *Transformation of European Politics*, in which he argues that the Concert 'transformed,' 'even revolutionized' European politics. The ascendant position of the optimists was clear when almost an entire issue of *International History Review* was devoted to critically assessing *Transformation* and Schroeder emerged almost unscathed.  

As mentioned, when the optimists make bold claims that the Concert was a 'revolution' or 'transformation' in international politics, they are making some of the strongest claims made by any scholars about the influence of any regime in any issue area. Realist and moderate accounts of the Concert do exist, but it is clear that the optimists' claims need to be questioned. As the

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38 (...continued)

International System." Jervis' work is quite balanced, but parts of it are regularly cited by optimists.

39 See footnote 4.


As only Scott came close to questioning the peaceful premises of Schroeder's arguments, Schroeder begins his response with "Before receiving these essays, I had thought of opening my reply with the remark that my critics had apparently come to bury Schroeder, not to praise him. But I cannot say this even as a joke," p. 745.
surge in optimism is a recent development, only an up-to-date study can directly address their claims and examine them against the historical record.

I argue that the premises of the optimists are wrong; the Concert period was not that peaceful and on a number of occasions war was only narrowly avoided. In the face of all the factors listed above that may have helped resolve the Concert's crises (war weariness, etc.), placing too high a value on the Concert as a regime seems mistaken. Finally, crisis management under the Concert produced similar outcomes to crisis management in the late 18th century. On the positive side, the Concert did more good than harm and it helped reduce miscalculation in two instances (while helping increase miscalculation in another).

The Effectiveness of United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations

The large literature on the U.N.'s track record with peacekeeping has developed a rough consensus supporting two main hypotheses.42 First, that peacekeeping operations "don't get off


the ground without great power support" and second, that "they do not fare well on the ground without local consent." A corollary to the second hypothesis is that peacekeepers must remain impartial and only use force only in self-defense. A tertiary hypothesis suggests that peacekeeping operations with clear mandates tend to be more successful.

These propositions are wise and well-supported, yet the literature on peacekeeping operations suffers from two problems. First, the literature on peacekeeping is largely a 'theory-free zone' that rarely adds to or benefits from international relations theory. International relations theorists have made little use of the peacekeeping literature to propose or test international relations theory. Early Cold War scholars and more recent analysts including Betts,

\[\ldots\text{continued}\]


Indeed, my case studies show that great power influence in starting a peacekeeping operation is often so great that the promise of transparency provided by the mission is a relatively insignificant factor in bringing the parties to peace. This observation weakens H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation.

A Cold War corollary to the first hypothesis was that great powers, especially the two superpowers, could not serve as peacekeepers. Had one superpower tried to do so, the other would have become suspicious and vetoed the mission in the Security Council.

Joffe, and the Kupchans have applied international relations theory to the much broader topic of collective security, but little theoretical attention has been focused on peacekeeping operations, the most significant day-to-day security-related activity of the U.N.\textsuperscript{46} There is a small literature on security regime theory but here the best work has focused on the Concert of Europe and peacekeeping is thus again ignored.\textsuperscript{47}

The second problem is that there are few academic studies on how peacekeeping operations work on a day-to-day operational level. The number of these sorts of studies is growing slowly.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Of course, the U.N. has been a frequent object of study, in particular during the 1950s and 1960s before the prolonged gridlock of Cold War U.N. politics took the edge off of interest in the subject. In the 1950s, the journal *International Organization* was almost exclusively devoted to analysis and reportage about the U.N.. Few of these older studies have stood the test of time. Two examples of those that have are: Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (March 1955) and, Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined."


\textsuperscript{47} See the literature review section on regimes and international institutions, p. 55, as well as the introduction. Jervis' "Security Regimes" is the foremost article on the subject.


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By testing transparency theory, this dissertation addresses these problems by applying transparency theory to operational-level analysis (especially in the UNFICYP and UNDOF cases). The thesis also adds a deeper level of understanding to the question of why some peacekeeping operations succeed and others do not. The hypotheses about great power support and local consent listed in the beginning of this section address sources of success and failure at a fundamental level. But these hypotheses are quite general and only take us so far. Once support and consent are achieved, then what? What else makes peacekeeping operations work? How much does the provision of transparency contribute to a peacekeeping operation's effectiveness?

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The most important operational-level study that has yet to be done is "what happens when consent is lost or begins to erode?" Dobbie's article addresses this issue, but much more empirical work needs to be done. How has the U.N. dealt in the past with the numerous times its forces have been challenged or the situation on the ground begins to turn sour? By studying crises during peacekeeping operations and how they are resolved, my study addresses this issue, but not as fully as it deserves.
Chapter 3:

Theory, Cases, and Methodology

People often study history less for what they might learn than for what they want to prove.¹

Introduction

The function of methodology is to help political scientists accurately and persuasively extract lessons from history. Extracting lessons involves finding patterns in history and generalizing from these patterns.² This chapter explains how I conducted my search for these lessons.

This chapter explains my case selection, my hypotheses, and my methodology for testing my hypotheses -- in particular detailing my predictions (or observable implications) about what behavior should be evinced in the case studies in order to confirm the hypotheses. I first explain my main transparency hypotheses and their corollaries. Then I discuss the predictions. These are followed by my competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations. The chapter

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¹ Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 13.

² Methodology increases accuracy and persuasiveness in several ways. First, methodology makes hypotheses (causal propositions or arguments) explicit. Clear arguments are honest arguments. Second, hypotheses focus attention on specific themes in history and on specific events or factors in history that bear on the validity of the argument presented. Explicit hypotheses, along with their predictions, help indicate what evidence to look for and what evidence is relevant. Third, methodologies provide criteria for judging whether or not the evidence gathered supports the argument. For example, in the comparative case study method, one asks the same questions about the theory of each selected case. If the answers in each case are different, this sheds doubt on the theory. Finally, by helping ensure that the evidence is relevant to and supportive of the arguments presented, methodology helps catch those who push their arguments beyond what is supported by the evidence.
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of transparency and transparency theory.

Case Selection

My principal cases are drawn from the crises confronted by the Concert of Europe and the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. I had four criteria for case selection:

1. The cases had to be regimes whose goal was to reduce the problem of war.
2. The provision of transparency had to be a likely factor in the regime's efforts to reduce the problem of war.\(^3\)
3. The cases also had to contain appropriate variance in the independent and dependent variables (variations in regime activity, in transparency, and in peace/tension/war).
4. The cases had to be important as measured by historical significance and policy relevance.

I will first discuss my cases with respect to these criteria. Then I will use these criteria to explain why I am not studying a number of other security regimes including the League of Nations and various arms control and confidence-building measures.

The Concert was formed in 1814-1815 to help preserve Europe's hard-won peace. It was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum in history and has received considerable praise as a prototype forum from scholars and analysts (first and fourth selection criteria). Prior to the Concert, states were limited to bilateral contacts and common sense dictates that bilateral diplomacy is a potential barrier to diplomatic agreements involving three or more powers. In situations involving three or more states, bilateral diplomacy will tend to slow communications and pose coordination problems. In contrast, multilateral diplomacy (forums) should reduce

\(^3\) I need not worry about finding 'hard cases;' any assessment of the effectiveness of security regimes in international politics necessarily involves hard cases.
these problems. Forums allow states to meet together simultaneously and this should increase transparency because states should be able to more rapidly exchange information about their intentions, capabilities, alliances, and resolve. This in turn should allow the powers to resolve crises more quickly and with less tension than in the 18th Century (second criterion).

I examine the series of crises the Concert confronted during the period analysts agree it was most effective: from 1814 to the mid-1830s. Crises are an ideal time to observe variance in the peace/tension/war variable. Almost by definition, the outcome of a crisis may be either peace or war and turning points in crises are where I look for the impact of the provision of transparency (third criterion). Also, the Concert's effects should be relatively easy to discern compared to modern forums where the information flow is much harder to trace because of the number of other forums and diplomatic channels, telecommunications, and so forth.

To more fully understand how much of a diplomatic evolution the Concert represented, I examine a similar crisis handled by the same countries as close in time as possible to the start of the Concert in 1814 - the first partition of Poland of 1772 (thereby employing the method of difference). I also review the general state of diplomacy and transparency during the 18th

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4 Of course, when the number of participants gets too high, collective action problems set in and overall efficiency may be reduced. This problem was explicitly recognized by the Concert's great powers who, for example, set out by themselves to decide the major issues at the Congress of Vienna before presenting the outcome to the panoply of lesser states and principalities that were attending. See a memorandum from Castlereagh concerning necessary preparations for the Concert of Vienna, September 1814, in C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna: 1814-1815 (London, Great Britain: Bell & Sons, 1934), Appendix II, pp. 151-152.

As to why a forum might produce efficiencies in the flow of information, consider that if there are five states, there have to be ten separate meetings for each to meet each other only once (#1 with #2, then with #3, etc.). That said, forum diplomacy does not mean that all diplomacy is conducted in the same room, far from it. Much Concert diplomacy was conducted in cliques, or bilaterally behind closed doors. However, the fact that plenipotentiaries from all relevant powers were in the same town to discuss the same issue offered efficiencies that were not available to foreign policy decision-makers limited to sitting in their respective capitals sending and waiting for missives. Nowhere were these efficiencies more evident than in the formation of the 'secret alliance' of Austria, France, and Britain against Russia during the Poland/Saxony crisis when the alliance was formed and then revealed to Russia in two days.
century.

Turning to the U.N., it is the most prominent present-day security regime and its charter makes clear that its goal is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping operations are the most obvious embodiment of the U.N.'s mission (first and fourth criteria). I study several of the U.N.'s peace operations, two cases of traditional peacekeeping and two multifunctional operations. Traditional mission operate with consent, between states, and along clear boundaries. The two I study are the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Multifunctional missions operate within states and involve aspects of civilian governance and the sponsoring of elections. The two multifunctional missions I study are the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

My most in-depth case study is UNFICYP which I visited for about a month. I also visited UNDOF on both sides of the Golan Heights. I trade depth for breadth in my analyses of the U.N.'s multifunctional in Namibia, and Cambodia. These four case studies allow me to make arguments about the provision and effects of transparency under different conditions. For example, I use (UNDOF) to focus on H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation because the promise of UNDOF played a role in the cease-fire negotiations between Israel and Syria (unlike

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5 As the government of Cyprus would hasten to point out, UNFICYP is legally an intrastate operation today because the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" has only been recognized by Turkey. Operationally however, UNFICYP is essentially an interstate mission.

6 On Cyprus (and in New York), I conducted interviews of U.N., UNFICYP, Cyprus government, Turkish Cypriot authorities in the Northern part of Cyprus (the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and U.S. embassy officials. I went on buffer zone tours, took notes on official records, inspected headquarters and sector command posts and saw them in action, and talked with people wherever I could throughout Cyprus. The thoroughness of my research into UNFICYP allows me to process-trace a number of incidents in considerable detail and boosts the reliability of my findings.
UNFICYP, which was imposed on Cyprus). I develop two transparency themes in my case studies of UNTAC and UNTAG. First is the notion of self-transparency. Neither of these missions would have been successful had they not been able to explain what they were doing (especially supervising and fostering elections) to their target countries. Second, they used novel forms (for peacekeeping operations) of conveying information, everything from puppet shows to radio stations. This information was used in part to dispel rumors (H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions) and to promote self-transparency. Based on these cases, I have proposed a variant of H3 called H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

All the U.N. operations selected should depend in some part on the provision of transparency because all of these operations involve verifying compliance with peace agreements, and/or investigating and reporting on possibly hostile incidents along borders and within countries (second criterion). The incidents confronted by peacekeeping operations provide the same sort of data as the Concert's crises: instances where the variables of tension and transparency vary (third criterion).

In some sense, I am intentionally selecting the dependent variable inasmuch as I have selected regimes expected to rely on transparency at least to some degree for their effectiveness. The Concert and U.N. peacekeeping operations are "easy cases." This is less troublesome than it appears. First, one can debate whether any test of security regimes' effectiveness can be an easy test. Second, there exists sufficiently little research on transparency and on security regimes that my primary task is to see if the hypotheses explain anything at all. It turns out that with the cases selected I am able to make a number of claims about the effectiveness, limits of, and conditions
for transparency. Finally, the main danger of selecting on the dependent variable is that one will appear to have supported a theory with evidence that almost necessarily had to support the theory in the first place. However, I have only come up with modest claims for transparency. This is finding is stronger and somewhat surprising precisely because I picked "easy cases." Modest findings with easy cases helped me establish bounding conditions for the effectiveness of transparency.

The Concert's crises and U.N. peacekeeping operations (UNFICYP in particular) are more data-rich than they may at first appear. The Concert's crises often lasted months or years and usually involved many smaller crises or episodes. UNFICYP confronts hundreds or even over a thousand incidents per year. Thus, each of my cases presents a number of subcases. By process-tracing a number of these subcases, incidents, and episodes, I effectively increase the number of data points in this study and thus subject transparency theory to more thorough testing. In sum, my Concert and U.N. cases studies are of regimes that aim to promote peace and do so in part by increasing transparency. Their value as cases is strengthened by the number of subcases they present.

To explain in greater detail how these cases meet the fourth criteria of scholarly and historical importance, Jervis calls the Concert "the best example of a security regime." When historians call the Concert a 'transformation' or 'revolution' in European diplomacy, they are making some of the strongest claims for any regime in any issue area. In part because of these claims, the Concert is also a source of a significant number of post-Cold War policy

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7 Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 178. Overall, however, Jervis is a Concert moderate.
recommendations that called for concert-based or concert-like security forums (see Chapter 1, footnote 4). Add in the fact that the Concert was the first peacetime crisis management forum in history, and it becomes almost necessary to include the Concert in a study of security regimes and transparency. For its part, U.N. peacekeeping is the most prominent activity of any security regime in the world today, and it is also the subject of the most extensive and most heated policy debates involving any existing security regime.

By examining the Concert and U.N., I am also addressing the policy-relevant aspects of current debates about the broader subject of collective security. Several of the calls for concerts treated the Concert (and concerts in general) as forms of limited collective security. The U.N. is also a form of limited collective security. Looking at its Charter, the U.N. is closer than the Concert to an ideal 'all against any aggressor' collective security system. But looking at its actions, the U.N.'s most prominent security-related activity is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping certainly is not 'all against any aggressor' collective security, but each peacekeeping operation results from a decision by the U.N. Security Council to try to stop war and make peace - albeit with limited means. John Mearsheimer calls concerts and peacekeeping the 'fallback positions' of collective security advocates. But ideal collective security is not likely any time soon, so

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8 See Chapter 1, footnote 4. Kupchan and Kupchan’s "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe" is the most explicit and well argued along this line, but see also: Bennett and Lepgold, "Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict" and Flynn and Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security."

9 See Chapter 1, footnote 4 for more on the distinction between a concert and a collective security system. I am about to explain in this chapter why I am not studying the League of Nations. Basically, I am studying transparency and security regimes and not collective security. I mention collective security because my study does bear on the issue and one might as well collect all the insights possible from one's work.

10 John J. Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
concerts and peacekeeping are not just fallback positions, they are the principal 'live' options related to collective security. In order to engage the most realistic aspects of debates about collective security, we need to know how concerts and peacekeeping can cause peace and how well they have done so.

EXCLUDED CASES

Why have I excluded a number of other security regimes from this study? Excluded regimes include the League of Nations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the associated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Open Skies Treaty of 1992, the Vienna confidence and security building measures, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the various strategic arms control treaties (SALT/ABM/START), and other arms control and confidence-building agreements. These regimes are all worthy of study and the world needs more scholarly and theoretically informed study of regimes and arms control. However, I have only so much time and space and, as explained in the next several paragraphs, these regimes do not meet my case-selection criteria as convincingly as the Concert and U.N..

I exclude the League of Nations for a number of reasons. Although the League was designed to be a grand forum which was supposed to democratize international politics, it never came close to fulfilling this role. Its membership never included all the great powers. Moreover, its role as a forum would be hard to study because its influence would be diminished or lost in all the noise of other forums and more elaborate diplomacy that had emerged by or in the early 20th
century: conferences at the Hague, arms control agreements, trade accords, the Geneva
Conventions, and so forth. The League participated in some monitoring and U.N.-like activities
and in these respects the League was a precursor organization to the U.N. However, if the
League was a precursor to the U.N., why not cut to the chase and study the real thing?

I excluded other arms control agreements for similar reasons. For example, it would be
difficult to assess the influence of the SALT agreements on U.S.-Soviet relations because so
many things influenced these relations. Some compliance disputes might present case-studies
similar to the crises and incidents described above. I'd like to do a study on transparency and the
Standing Consultative Commission (which dealt with compliance disputes) and see what lessons
it offers for resolving compliance disputes in other agreements. However, even if the SCC did
increase transparency, it would be hard to assess its impact on peace/tension/war between the
superpowers. To determine its impact, one would have to weigh the competing claims of hawks
who do not like arms control and manipulated compliance disputes to try to cast the Soviets in
the worst possible light and the claims of doves who support arms control and who are likely to
gloss over compliance problems and attribute more benefits to arms control than it deserves. As
topics for this thesis, other arms control and confidence-building measures suffer from these
same problems.11

One regime which may well deserve inclusion in this study is the IAEA. I believe that

11 For example, the Open Skies agreement in Europe sounds like a wonderful way of increasing transparency. But
how much more transparency does Europe need? What don't they know about each other? Moreover, how much is the
whatever tiny increment of transparency that is being provided actually affecting international relations in Europe?
Perhaps the transparency provided by Open Skies will increase in value if tensions rise. If tensions rise, it is more likely
that violations of the agreement (such as preventing agreed-upon flights) will help signal and confirm the decline in
relations.
the IAEA is a particularly important regime because it deals with nuclear proliferation. Its functions certainly include increasing transparency because it monitors nuclear facilities and materials. However, to determine the influence of its transparency-increasing aspects would likely require looking at records and conducting a number of interviews of government officials and scholars in places that would be hard for me to visit or gain access to for the foreseeable future. Also, a number of states that are potential proliferators (or who already have nuclear weapons) are not members of the IAEA and are not subject to its inspections.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, it may be that the book version of this study will survey the IAEA, the SCC, Open Skies proposals, arms control verification, the impact of satellites, and/or other prominent sources of transparency. My argument in this section is that the Concert and U.N. are the best cases for a study on transparency. They provide the largest bite on the issue because of their importance and their data-richness.
The Hypotheses

As I outlined in the introduction, the causal chain I am investigating is:

security regimes$\rightarrow$transparency$\rightarrow$peace

The first independent variable is security regimes. Transparency is both an independent and dependent variable. The ultimate dependent variable is peace. Here are my four hypotheses about this causal chain, with longer explanations to follow:

H1: Regimes Provide Transparency

- Security regimes provide transparency.

  Transparency does not just happen; mechanisms are needed to provide transparency. Regimes can supply the mechanisms (forums, buffer zones, etc.) that fall under the rubric of cooperative transparency described above in the definition of transparency.$^{13}$

H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation

- Minimal transparency causes fears of cheating on agreements. Thus, increased transparency lessens fears of cheating and promotes cooperation.

  Fears of cheating diminish states' willingness to enter into or stick with peace treaties, confidence-building measures, arms control, and other agreements. Thus, by lessening fears of cheating,

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$^{13}$ To quote: "Type V, cooperative transparency, is caused by states' cooperative efforts to increase transparency. Various mechanisms can be used to increase transparency, and these mechanisms vary according to their formality (what is explicitly required of or provided to the participants), so Type V transparency has two variants, Type Va, less formal cooperative transparency and Type Vb, more formal cooperative transparency. For example, discussion forums (such as the Concert) are more informal than border patrols which are in turn more informal than monitored buffer zones or required sharing of intelligence."

A more elaborate list of possible transparency-increasing mechanisms is given on page 94 of this chapter where the predictions for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency are explained.
increased transparency increases states' willingness to cooperate and enter into these sorts of agreements. When the provision of transparency enables states to maintain cooperation and avoid backsliding in their relations, this falls under H2*: Transparency Maintains Cooperation.

H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions

- *Minimal transparency causes unwarranted fears and necessitates the making of worst-case assumptions in threat assessments. Thus, increased transparency lessens unwarranted fears and makes threat assessments more accurate.*

Minimal transparency, a cause of uncertainty in threat assessment, exacerbates the security dilemma. This increases the likelihood of security spirals, which worsen tensions and may lead to conflict. Minimal transparency also limits the availability of information that could reduce biased views of the potential adversary. Cognitive, organizational, and political dynamics are some of the sources of such bias. If a security regime increases transparency about its own operations, reducing fears and uncertainty about the purpose or effectiveness of its activities, this is called: H3*: Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

H4: Transparency Reduces Optimistic Miscalculation

- *Minimal transparency increases uncertainty in threat assessments. This makes calculations of coercive/deterrent power less accurate and increases the probability of deterrence failure through offensive or defensive optimistic miscalculation. Thus, increased transparency lessens miscalculation.*

Miscalculation is a significant source of deterrence failure and war. Incomplete information is a source of miscalculation.

I will now explain the theoretical and real-world underpinnings of these hypotheses.

*Explanation of H1: Regimes Provide Transparency*

This hypothesis is mechanistic but necessary. While my definition of transparency makes clear that security regimes are not the only providers of transparency, this hypothesis specifies the
agent (security regimes) under study. It correctly suggests that I am examining whether or not security regimes can increase transparency, not just the effects of increased transparency. This hypothesis is also necessary on a more fundamental level because transparency does not just happen. Transparency is about information, specifically how much is known about a potential adversary's capabilities and intentions. An agent or mechanism of some sort is always required to generate information, provide information, and/or facilitate the flow of information between the states or parties involved.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Explanation of H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation}

Why does it matter if states fear cooperation? It matters if it makes them fearful to sign peace accords and end a war. It matters if it makes them fearful to sign confidence-building or arms control agreements that could lessen the probability of war, lessen the potential damage of war, or lessen the costs of preparing for war. This section offers deductive and theoretical argumentation about how and to what extent states' incentives to cooperate can be manipulated with transparency.

Realists identify two factors that hinder cooperation (mutually beneficial agreements and actions) between states: relative gains concerns, and fears that the other state(s) would cheat on the prospective agreement.\textsuperscript{15} Increased transparency can reduce fears of cheating much more

\textsuperscript{14} Even ambient transparency (see the definition of transparency in the introduction) needs agents - the press, international business, tourists, and so forth.


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than it can reduce relative gains concerns.

In anarchy, states are always concerned about relative gains because the relative power of a state is the most basic determinant its security. A stronger state is more secure and a weaker state is more vulnerable. More subtly, shifts in relative power drive the security dilemma - a term security studies scholars often use to capture relative gains concerns. The dilemma is that what State A does to improve its security almost necessarily\(^{16}\) diminishes the security of State B. The security dilemma describes a source of tension that is inexorable and can not be wished away. Transparency cannot solve the security dilemma. Transparency can only reduce the extent to which: incomplete information exacerbates the security dilemma. This is the subject of the next hypothesis, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

The reason that the security dilemma affects cooperation is that even mutually beneficial cooperation is likely to shift the relative of between states. For example, it unreasonable to assume that free trade agreements will allow each participating state to benefit in exactly the same proportion as all the others and thus maintain relative power. It is also unlikely that an arms control agreement, no matter how well negotiated, will affect each side equally. Thus cooperation entails almost inherent risks and these risks are rooted in the security dilemma. The security dilemma explains why relative gains concerns are a barrier to cooperation and why they

\(^{16}\) How necessarily depends on the extent to which offensive and defensive weapons can be distinguished and whether purely defensive measures or weapons even exist at all. A purely defensive weapon would not pose any increased danger to others, but even a shield can help one attack more safely. See the section in the literature review on arms control, p. 43.
are a barrier that is hard to manipulate.

The second barrier to cooperation, fears of cheating, is also about relative gains concerns because most cheating involves secret increases in capabilities. However, fears of cheating are different from the relative gains concerns described above because fears of cheating are more manipulable. Increased transparency can reduce fears of cheating.

Transparency reduces fears of cheating by increasing the ability to detect cheating. For example, the verification provisions of the U.S. - Soviet Union nuclear arms control agreements made it harder to build and deploy specified types or quantities of weapons. Satellites were allowed unfettered observance of silos and other facilities, telemetry signals from rocket tests were to be broadcast without encryption to facilitate intelligence gathering, and some agreements even allowed on-site monitoring.\textsuperscript{17} If cheating is detected, the state endangered by the cheating can take appropriate countermeasures. At best, increased transparency prevents cheating by deterring cheating. At worst, increased transparency reduces the likelihood of cheating by raising its cost and necessitating more elaborate and expensive deception ruses. Either way, increased transparency benefits status quo powers and reduces fears of cheating.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} It took awhile for the superpowers to become aware of the benefits of transparency and the arms control opportunities afforded by satellites. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when photo-satellite reconnaissance was in its infancy, the Soviets declared such surveillance illegal (and rejected Open Skies proposals as well). But the Soviets changed their satellite policy around 1963 for three reasons: the U.S.' new reconnaissance capabilities presented them with a \textit{fait accompli}, they came to see the value of reconnaissance for threat assessment, and they saw its value for stabilizing the arms race. See Gaddis, Long Peace, pp. 203-205. Gaddis also speculates that the Soviets realized that their "policy of secrecy regarding military capabilities had backfired: the result had been an American proclivity for 'worst-case analysis' that had produced military buildups larger than otherwise would have been the case," p. 205. Of course, however transparency and security dilemma-aware the superpowers became, they continued throughout the Cold War to engage in arms racing and to fear windows of opportunity.

\textsuperscript{18} As Barry R. Posen argues, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which measures designed to increase transparency serve revisionist states. For example, he suggests that intrusive inspections could help attack planning by revealing the lay of the land, secret defensive positions, and so forth. Posen also notes that the benefits of increased information might (continued...)
Fears of cheating are particularly high in the security arena. Compared to economic cooperation, there is a "special peril" of defection in security affairs. If a state violates an arms control agreement and builds more or newer weapons than allowed, or if a state moves offensive forces into a demilitarized buffer zone, that state may give itself enough of an advantage to win a war against the 'duped' state. These sorts of first-strike or offensive advantages may present a window of opportunity that will then tempt the defecting state to initiate a war. This was the fear of those in the 1980s who thought the Soviets could rapidly break out of the ABM Treaty by upgrading their air defenses into ballistic missile defenses. Note here that minimal transparency has effects that may go beyond increasing fears of cheating and it may actually tempt states to start a war in the first place. The dangers of defection in security affairs make verification and transparency all the more important.

Critics of arms control in the 1980s also used imagined, potential, and some real verification problems as reasons to scuttle existing treaties and not enter into new ones. In the face of such critiques, reassurance about compliance was necessary to continue with arms control negotiations and to continue abiding by those agreements that were already in place.

Transparency's role in reassurance and continued cooperation is the basis of H2: Transparency

18 (...continued)

be lost if one side was affected by domestic or alliance politics. See "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 228. I agree that all these problems may exist with transparency (as my discussions of the misperception literature and of the limits of transparency show, transparency can cut in all sorts of directions. One can imagine many reasons why status quo states might be asleep at the wheel, but it is also true that revisionists are often full of optimistic miscalculation.). However, all other things being equal, I argue that increased transparency should be of at least some marginal value to status quo powers if only because it raises the costs of deception. An interesting question for future research is: does increased transparency cause drowsiness or does increased information increase the chance of alertness when danger increases?

Maintains Cooperation.

This discussion shows that minimal transparency creates a combination of temptation and fear that may prevent cooperation between states even when they have interests in common. The silver lining is that there are remedies for minimal transparency and that states may be willing to accept peace treaties, confidence-building measures, arms control and other such agreements if compliance can be verified. Verification boils down to increasing transparency.

Explanation of H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose

States have much to fear in international politics and war and loss in war are two things states fear the most. The previous section outlined how the security dilemma causes fears: when state A builds a tank, state B's security is diminished. State B must then fear for its security. But in addition to fear based on facts and real shifts in relative power, international politics is full of uncertainty and uncertainty exacerbates fears. State B may not know how many tanks state A really built or what state A intends to do with them. An incident along a border may signal the intentional launching of a full-scale war or it may be a minor provocation by a rogue actor. Obviously, it can be hard to assess a potential adversary's capabilities and intentions without accurate information. By definition, minimal transparency is one source of uncertainty.

Uncertainty exacerbates security dilemma-based fears for two reasons, one based on realist theory and one based on cognitive theory. To first discuss realist theory, if states lack adequate information about their potential adversaries' capabilities and intentions, they must often make worst-case assumptions about these adversaries in order to adequately insure for their
defense. As worst-case assumptions are also likely to be untrue (by definition), the arms races and tension these assumptions cause are thus also unnecessary and avoidable, at least in principle.

These effects are illustrated by the Cold War bomber and other 'gaps,' State B's capabilities may not be adequately assessed by State A, State A will then be forced to overestimate the threat, and this will lead State A to overreact. Opacity also affects estimates of intentions. If there is incomplete information, State A can only guess where the weapons are targeted or against which threat they were purchased. It can not know if the weapons were purchased as a result of bureaucratic or organizational imperatives. To avoid leaving itself unprepared, State A will likely assume that the weapons are a reflection of hostile intent and that it is the target. The same may be true if a rogue creates a border incident. To provide adequate insurance for itself, State A may be forced to assume that a full-scale war has begun. Indeed, this dynamic helped start the Seven Year's War in America.20

Several authors have studied these effects of opacity. George Rathjens writes that "Action-reaction phenomenon, stimulated in most cases by uncertainty about an adversary's intentions and capabilities, characterizes the dynamics of the arms race."21 Uncertainty aggravates the dynamics of the spiral model, a model which Jervis argues helps explain the outbreak of WWI (and a number of other cases).22 John Lewis Gaddis contends that the

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20 See my discussion of this war in chapter 4.


22 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chapter 3.
reconnaissance revolution (especially satellites) "may rival in importance the 'nuclear revolution' that preceded it" in explaining why the Cold War was a long peace and he argues that the reconnaissance revolution "rarely gets the attention it deserves." He notes that improved reconnaissance lessened fears of surprise attack, but it is also clear that satellites helped prevent recurrence of the bomber and missile gap 'panics.'

Similarly, Robert Jervis uses cognitive theories to explain why states have unwarranted fears. Uncertainty and incomplete information are likely to exacerbate these fears. Jervis puts forth two hypotheses: 1. "there is an overall tendency for decision makers to see other states as more hostile than they are" and 2. that "actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is." Jervis' hypotheses are mutually reinforcing and tend to exaggerate whatever fears the security dilemma has already created. Even though there is ample evidence to show that leaders and states sometimes ignore available information (see next section on miscalculation), the misperceptions and fears described by Jervis' hypotheses are likely to be heightened when there is not enough information to accurately assess the potential adversary's intentions (or capabilities) in the first place.

Transparency will not eliminate all unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions. In the 1980s under the Reagan administration, there was much more transparency than in the 1950s and early 1960s, but that did not prevent a number of relatively low-grade gaps and windows of

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vulnerability. Given that administration's reluctance to change or question their now known to be inaccurate worst-case analyses about the strength and capabilities of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, only an improbably drastic increase in transparency (multiple Soviet invitations for thorough on-site inspections of anything the U.S. wanted) would have led to more accurate threat assessments. In addition, this example suggests that it would be much harder and more expensive for an outside organization to increase transparency between the superpowers than it would be for an organization to increase transparency between poorer states with less well developed intelligence capabilities. It is easier for an outside organization to increase transparency and "add value" in the latter case.

In sum, increased transparency makes threat assessments more accurate. By replacing worst-case assumptions with facts, unwarranted fears are reduced. This in turn calms tensions and security spirals, thus reducing the likelihood of war and increasing the likelihood of cooperation.

With respect to H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose, my research showed that states or parties involved with a peacekeeping operation may harbor fears about the operation, be uncertain about why it is there, and suspect the operation of working for or bias towards the other side. In Cambodia and Namibia, the U.N. operations were successful in confronting and reducing these sorts of fears as well as explaining and clarifying their purpose and functions with their media and publicity operations. Hence, I propose the inductively arrived at variant of H3 called H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose. When H3' is at work, the organization increases transparency about itself.
Explanation of H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation

Anarchy is the taproot cause of optimistic miscalculation. Opacity and the other sources of misperception mentioned above only add to the harmful effects of anarchy. Anarchy increases uncertainty about power and intentions in general. Without an enforcer to deter aggression, deterrence devolves to individual states, coalitions, and alliances. The number of actors, and their different motivations and constraints, mean that balancing may be neither swift, nor certain. Sometimes states bandwagon and sometimes aggression is not redressed (such as Bismarck's). Sometimes balancers are tardy or send mixed signals (U.S. entry into the World Wars) or balancing coalitions can shift (Napoleonic Wars). Compared to a hierarchical system, anarchy weakens deterrence because it makes punishment less certain. Vagaries about punishment can lead to miscalculation by a revisionist power who thinks victory is easier than it actually is. The uncertainty associated with anarchy may also lead to instances where a status quo power mistakenly believes that threats are lower than they are.

Optimistic miscalculation takes two forms. First, non-status quo or revisionist powers may believe their target for conquest is less powerful than it really is. Offensive optimistic miscalculation causes deterrence to fail because the revisionist power does not know enough about its victim's capabilities or willpower to be deterred. For example, Germany's hope that Britain wouldn't enter the coming war made it more belligerent than it otherwise would have been in the crisis leading up to WW I. Had Britain been clearer about its commitments, or had Germany had better information, the crisis may not have led to war. Second, a status quo power may hope it lives in a safe neighborhood when it does not. Defensive optimistic miscalculation
causes deterrence to fail because the status quo power does not know enough about its
adversaries capabilities or ambitions to deter. Britain's Ten-Year Rule during the 1920s and early
1930s and later policies of appeasement are examples.\footnote{On optimistic miscalculation of the first type, see Blainey, \textit{Causes of War}.} Another example is India's optimistic
assessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities prior to the unexpectedly devastating Chinese
attack of October 1962.\footnote{Yaacov Vertzerberg, "India's Strategic Posture and the Border War Defeat of 1962: A Case Study in Miscalculation." \textit{The Journal of Strategic Studies}, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1982).}

Optimistic miscalculation is a major cause of war and low transparency helps cause
miscalculation. The principal theme of Blainey's \textit{The Causes of War} is that war is caused when
nations disagree about their relative bargaining power or strength. He argues that most wars are
started by those who expect to win them, continuing on that: "most wars were likely to end in the
defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory."\footnote{Causes of War, pp. 144-145.} He adds that: "Any factor which
increases the likelihood that nations will agree on their relative power is a potential cause of
peace."\footnote{Blainey, \textit{Causes of War} pp. 145, 293-295, quote p. 294.} If Blainey is correct, then anything that limits or distorts information about states'
relative power is a cause of war. By definition, transparency affects this information. Van Evera argues that "The control of national misperception is the central peace problem for the future." Of the factors he argues cause misperception: psychology, organizational imperatives, deception, and opacity, Van Evera appears to rank opacity third in explanatory power behind organizational imperatives and deception and second in manipulability behind organizational imperatives.\textsuperscript{29} Opacity may well rank below some other causes of misperception and miscalculation. But we do not really know because there are so few studies of transparency, much less comparative studies of the various sources of misperception. What we do know is that misperception is a serious problem.

That said, miscalculation is not necessarily always a life or death, war or peace issue. Less severe versions of offensive and defensive optimistic miscalculation can affect tensions more generally, as well as lesser crises, negotiations, and other tests of will. For example, offensive miscalculation occurs if states adopt harder-line negotiating strategies than are justified by their actual bargaining power. Conversely, defensive miscalculation occurs if states adopt softer negotiating strategies than are justified by their actual bargaining power.

How can miscalculation be identified? Blainey identifies examples of miscalculation when he sees a state that lost a war that it thought it could win. This criteria is incomplete because it does not help identify when states calculate correctly. Blainey's methodology is

\textsuperscript{29} This is my reading of Van Evera, \textit{Causes of War. Volume I}, pp. 25-29, quote p. 33. The extent to which organization theory can be repealed is debatable as the theory seems to reflect essential characteristics of human nature itself: drives for wealth and autonomy, a tendency to stick to routines, and so forth.

See also the discussion of the surprise attack literature in the introduction for more on the importance of misperception and the relative weight of transparency in causing misperception.
similar to studies of deterrence that identify deterrence failures when war occurs. These studies do tell us that deterrence failed, and they may tell us why, but they have a much tougher time explaining why or when deterrence succeeds.\textsuperscript{30} This thesis faces a similar problem: identifying when transparency helps correct miscalculation.

I define miscalculation as planning or taking action based on faulty information or assumptions. This means that miscalculation in a crisis, as well as at other times such as during negotiations, can be identified when a state changes its policies based on new information that corrects what is then revealed to be previous miscalculations.

I use process tracing of crises to find instances when states corrected miscalculation and to determine if transparency helped bring the correction about. Crises are periods when peace is being tested and relations are sliding toward war. The study of crises helps analysts identify the factor(s) that contribute to stabilizing the situation and causing peace. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing point out that: "a crisis distills many of the elements that make up the essence of politics in the international system. It is a 'moment of truth' when the latent product of all these central elements [power configurations, interests, images, and alignments] become manifest in decision and action."\textsuperscript{31} Thus, as mentioned before, a major focus in the case studies is to find turning points in crises and see if transparency played a role.

\textsuperscript{30} It is extremely hard to identify instances of deterrence success because peace may be due to a multitude of causes other than deterrence. Of course, war may be due to something other than deterrence failure, such as miscalculation, organizational routines, and so forth. That said, if it is true that most states prefer peace to war most of the time, then it is more accurate to say that war is caused by deterrence failure than to say that peace is caused by deterrence success. Basically, it is easier to tell why something (war) did occur than why it did not. And if one tries to flip the problem and ask why peace occurs, this is a tough problem too because of the number of possible explanations.

Methodology for Testing the Hypotheses

Having presented my transparency hypotheses, I now explain how I will test them. My principal technique is the comparative case study method. To summarize the steps involved in using this method:  

1. Identify a problem or questions to be examined.
2. Identify theories that bear on the problem.
3. Deduce testable hypotheses from the theories.
4. Infer predictions about what behavior the hypotheses should lead one to expect in each of the cases.
5. Determine to what extent the predicted behavior(s) is evinced in the cases. This is done by asking questions such as 'is the behavior of prediction X in evidence here?' of each of the cases.
6. Draw conclusions about the phenomena to be explained, based on the explanatory and predictive power of the theories.

In this and previous chapters, I have already walked through steps one through three. The principal task that remains for this chapter is to specify my predictions (step four). After presenting the predictions, I review my competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations and their predictions. I conclude this chapter with some thoughts about the limitations of transparency theory. Steps five and six are left to the case studies and conclusion.

The Predictions

Predictions specify what behaviors should be evinced in the case studies if the hypotheses are true. Predictions tell us what to look for in the case studies and answer the question 'how do we know transparency and its effects when we see them?' This also means that predictions can help falsify or weaken a theory. If the predicted behavior is not evinced, or if the opposite behavior occurs, then the theory's explanatory power is weakened. For the study of subjects which do not lend themselves to quantification, determining how well the predictions fare in case studies is as close as one can get to measurement of variables.

The most basic predictions are those that reformulate the hypotheses as predictions. As I have four main hypotheses, I have four main predictions. My first main prediction is that security regimes will use mechanisms that should do something to increase transparency (P1, based on H1). This includes serving as a forum, acting as liaison, and monitoring a buffer zone. Second, the promise of increased transparency by security regimes will help persuade potential adversaries to make peace (P2 based on H2). Finally, the cases will show that the provision of transparency reduces unwarranted fears, worst-case assumptions, and miscalculation (P3 and P4, based on H3 and H4).

Based on these central predictions, the main questions I investigate in each case are:

1. Is a transparency-increasing mechanism used in the case(s)? [A yes supports H1: regimes provide transparency]
2. Is the promise of verification/monitoring/transparency important to adversaries when making peace? [A yes supports H2: transparency promotes cooperation]
3. After the mechanism is used, do threat assessments become more benign and are
tensions and fears reduced? [A yes supports H3: transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions]

4. Are plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation? [A yes supports H4: transparency reduces miscalculation]

If security regimes --> transparency --> peace, then the answer to question one must be yes and there must be a yes to some combination of questions two, three, and four. Each main prediction for each hypothesis involves numerous supporting sub-predictions. The following sections explain the predictions and sub-predictions.

Predictions for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency

Security regimes can not just magically provide transparency, they must use some sort of mechanism to generate, provide, or facilitate the exchange of information. If no mechanism is used to increase transparency, we can be sure a security regime is not increasing transparency. Security regimes could use a variety of mechanisms, alone or in combination, to provide transparency. If they do, we should expect to observe their use in the cases (main prediction P1):

- conferences
- summits
- liaisoning
- observation missions
- inspection missions
- demarcation lines
- buffer zones
- demilitarized zones
- restricted activity zones
- incident reports
- information and anti-propaganda campaigns
• radio, television, print, and other media
• organized sharing of intelligence
• organized sharing of information

The way these mechanisms should (deductively, anyway) increase transparency is more obvious in some cases than others. An observation mission that is required to provide reports to each side (a.k.a. a traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation) provides transparency in a much more straightforward way than a summit or conference (a.k.a. the Concert). When U.N. peacekeepers investigate an incident along a border and furnish a report on the incident to both sides, they actively increase transparency. A forum, on the other hand, only facilitates the exchange of information.

Observable implications extend beyond identification of the mechanism. If the security regime provides new information or facilitates the exchange of information, then the actors to whom or between whom the information is distributed should also be identifiable. Further, the content of the information provided or exchanged should be identifiable and describable. For example, the information might be about the numbers and disposition of forces in buffer zones and limited force areas, might determine the exact location of a border, might verify chains of command within countries to help identify rogues, might outline the various different interpretations of an incident and show which versions are supported by the facts gathered during the post-incident investigation, and so forth. Finally, the information provided should show up in the statements and assessments of the actors involved.

If the content of the information is hard to identify, then post-hoc assessments by the actors involved and by historians and analysts assume greater importance. These assessments can be used to fill in the blanks and answer questions that would help indicate whether or not the
regime provided information. What did the actors involved believe would be accomplished when they used the mechanism? What did they believe happened when the mechanism was used? What did they learn and how did it affect their behavior? Actors should recount history using the information the regime provided and this history should describe the role of the information provided (for H1 and some combination of the other hypotheses to be confirmed).

*Predictions for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and for H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation*

The cooperation hypothesis posits that minimal transparency leads states to fear that present or future adversaries will cheat or are cheating on agreements and that increased transparency reduces this fear. The condition necessary for this hypothesis to operate or be relevant is that the states must be seeking cooperation but that they do not trust each other enough to so - much like a prisoners' dilemma. If the cooperation hypothesis is true, the following behavior will be evinced in the cases.

States will insist on adequate verification before signing a peace, cease-fire, or other tension reducing agreement and this insistence will be evinced in speeches, negotiations, policy statements, debates, and so forth (main prediction P2). This insistence will be based on fears that the other party(s) will cheat.

States may ask a security regime to help verify the agreement or a security regime may offer to help verify the agreement. However the security regime becomes involved in verification, states' willingness to sign the agreement will increase after the security regime
becomes involved.\textsuperscript{33} Progress toward an agreement will be speeded up.

If the promise (or delivery) of increased transparency or verification is withdrawn, then states will shy away or withdraw from the agreement (inverse of main prediction P2). Leaders and skeptics will cite unverifiability as a reason to withdraw or back away from the agreement. These arguments by leaders and skeptics are likely to be accompanied by accusations of (future) cheating. The credibility and political significance of claims of unverifiability will be increased if doves or supporters of the agreement make them.\textsuperscript{34}

Much of the last paragraph applies to H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation. If transparency and verification is no longer assured, states will threaten to back out of agreements or will actually do so. They will cite verification problems and cheating as the reasons for backing out. On the other hand, if the regime increases transparency in response to mounting concerns about verifiability and cheating and this helps maintain adherence to the agreement(s) in question, then this chain of events will lend support to H2'. When this happens, states will first complain about cheating and the apparent uselessness of the agreement in question. The regime will then step up its verification activities and the information gathered and disseminated in the process should be identifiable. Finally, the state who was complaining should show signs of being assuaged; the number of complaints should drop and intentions to stick with the agreement should be reaffirmed.

\textsuperscript{33} Note that verification will involve one or more of the mechanisms listed above (or some other mechanism).

\textsuperscript{34} Hawks are more likely to believe accusations of cheating and are more likely to use unverifiability and accusations of cheating as pretexts to stir up tension. This means that if doves and supporters raise issues about transparency, the issue of cheating is most credible.
Predictions for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and for H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose

This hypothesis is about how transparency lessens unwarranted fears and tensions and corrects worst-case assumptions (main prediction P3). If this hypothesis is true, then the following behavior will be evinced in the cases: If a states' threat assessments are based on worst-case assumptions, these threat assessments will become more benign as transparency increases (transparency is assumed to increase when a mechanism listed above under H1 is used and the predictions about mechanisms are evinced). This prediction is based on the almost always true (by definition of worst-case assumption) statement that if a state has made worst-case assumptions, then more information about the adversary will make its threat assessments more benign. The same is true for unwarranted fears.

A worst-case assumption or unwarranted fear is marked by two things, both of which must be true for these assumptions and fears to be reliably identified. First, whether or not a threat assessment is worst-case or unwarranted is indicated by the tone of the threat assessment by leaders and others that suggest grave and increasing danger from an adversary, the inevitable threat of war, an implacably hostile enemy, and so forth. This tone, while not automatically incorrect, suggests that nothing could be worse. Hard, uncontestable facts will be scanty or

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35 Obviously, this does not mean that dire threat assessments are always wrong.

36 Unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions are very similar. Both are bases for threat assessment, but the former emphasizes gut-reactions, instinct, psychological biases and mechanisms while the latter emphasizes a more analytical approach to threat assessment. Those making worst-case assumptions often know what they do not know, but those with unwarranted fears either do not know what they do not know or do not care what the truth is because their biases are guiding them. One problem with transparency is that facts may not be enough to overcome biases. For more discussion of this problem, see the section in the literature review on psychological theories and surprise attack.

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lacking in these assumption-based assessments.\textsuperscript{37} Second, whether or not a threat assessment is based on assumptions or is otherwise unwarranted is indicated by insider revelations or post-hoc analysis that the assessments were indeed based on assertions, guesses, extrapolations, and so forth.\textsuperscript{38}

A more benign threat assessment is one that attributes less offensive capability and less harmful intentions to the adversary. Revised threat assessments will be seen in the writings and statements of leaders, government agencies, experts, and the press. To be most supportive of the theory, these revised assessments should be based on new facts and information provided or facilitated by the security regime (using one of the mechanisms listed above). Further, the more benign threat assessments should reduce fear and tension and should spur cooperation. These benefits may be manifested in several ways including: more benign and/or cooperative rhetoric by actors, making peace, undertaking confidence-building measures, exchanging diplomats or envoys, increasing trade, increasing tourism (and so forth), and less threatening military postures involving reduced forward deployments, less belligerent exercises, slackening of hair-trigger readiness (and so forth). If specific fears and worst-case assumptions were holding up progress in negotiations or other efforts, then an increase in transparency should speed up these negotiations.

Many of these predictions also apply to H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted

\textsuperscript{37} Of course, actors may make up what appear to be hard facts at the time. When this is the case, the post-hoc assessments will be particularly valuable in determining the extent of the worst-casing. The extent that these worst-case assumptions are wrong may also become apparent in the cases once the security regime provides falsifying information.

\textsuperscript{38} For more analysis on the subject of over-estimation and how to recognize it, see Jane Kellett Cramer's dissertation on National Security Panics.
Fears and Clarifies Purpose. To support H3', if the target states or parties harbor fears about the operation or who it benefits, these suspicions will be evinced in the same way as the fearful threat assessments described above. When the regime generates and/or disseminates identifiable information (and through identifiable mechanisms) to address these fears, the fears should then be assuaged in the same way as the threat assessments were described above as becoming more benign.

If the target states or parties are uncertain about an operation, they will evince skepticism and be reluctant to cooperate. Once the regime addresses these concerns with identifiable information (and through identifiable mechanisms), then the states or parties should evince increased willingness to cooperate with the peace treaty and/or election.

*Predictions for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation*

This hypothesis posits that minimal transparency can lead to deterrence failure by making it easier for states to offensively or defensively miscalculate. Increased transparency reduces miscalculation. If a state attacks when it should not have, that's *offensive miscalculation*. If a state fails to adequately defend or deter, that's *defensive miscalculation*. Milder forms of these miscalculations occur when states are more bellicose or more appeasing than their relative power and interests would imply. Miscalculation is due to faulty threat assessment (and/or faulty self-assessment). Thus, information provided by an security regimes may prevent miscalculation and war.

The most obvious sign of miscalculation is a change in plan or attitude upon receipt of
more information about others' (or one's own) capabilities and intentions. This is main prediction P4.

States who have offensively optimistically miscalculated and who are on the verge of aggression will change their plans and desist once they learn those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. The readiness of forces will then be relaxed, forces will be pulled back from borders, alerts will be canceled, assurances will be offered to adversaries who caught wind of the aggressive plans, and so forth. For these actions to best support transparency theory, these changes will occur due to information provided by the regime and actors will explain these changes with reference to this new information.

States who have defensively optimistically miscalculated and who are more vulnerable than they thought will change their plans accordingly once they learn those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. Assuming that balance of threat theory is generally correct, most states will ramp up their efforts to internally or externally balance. If the new information suggests that there is no hope for the threatened state, then the state is more likely to bandwagon. If states (prepare to) to bandwagon, then they will concede to the demands of the revisionist and/or join it in carrying out its plans. If states (prepare to) balance, then the readiness of forces will be increased, alert levels will rise, deterrent statements will be issued (i.e. 'there will be costs if..'). Over the longer term, balancing may takes the form of alliances, increased procurement, and larger force levels. Again, these changes should occur due to information provided by the regime and actors will explain these changes with reference to this new information.

H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation requires many nuances and caveats because it works differently depending on the states involved. The effects of H4 are dependent on the
interactions between and status quo powers and revisionists, between two status quo powers, or between two revisionists (or even more numbers of states...). The outcomes are also dependent upon the relative strength of these states, the perceived relative strength, and the post-increased transparency perceived relative strength of these states. The predictions required by all these various interactions would be tedious to spell out and can be deduced from the previous predictions. That said, the basic, first order outcomes of these various interactions are predicted in the next section: "Transparency and Its Limits, Part II" and in "Table 3.2: Effects of Opacity and Transparency," pp. 113 and 117, respectively.

H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions overlaps somewhat with H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. This is because unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions are forms of miscalculation. However, the unwarranted fear/worst-case assumption hypothesis emphasizes how miscalculation increases tensions while the miscalculation hypothesis is primarily about deterrence failure. Miscalculation can also be evinced in negotiation: and crises. For example, a state could adopt a position that was not based on the facts, it could push an issue too far and be pushed back, and so forth.

Some predictions involve both tension and miscalculation and are thus relevant to both hypotheses. Which hypothesis (or both) is supported if the following predicted actions and behaviors are evinced is a judgement call based on the circumstances of the case. Predictions common to both H3 and H4 are:

If a security regime increases transparency, it should help standardize or make common

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39 For example, this table indicates what happens when a revisionist power overestimates a status quo power's capabilities (and all other permutations of types of power and types of estimation as well).
the information upon which states and other actors base their policies. Examples of how this may reduce both tensions and miscalculation include: helping resolve disputed borders, reducing misinterpretation of incidents, and identifying rogue actors as rogues - allowing their home states to disclaim and stop their activities and ease tension with their adversaries.\footnote{This is a short list of examples for illustrative purposes. The cases studies go into more detail.} As always, the specific mechanism used by the security regime to provide the information should be readily identifiable, as should be the content of the information and the actors to whom it is distributed. Another symptom of the regime having increased transparency is that the crisis or issue in question should be more quickly resolved after the regime provides the necessary information (about the incident or rogue, etc).

\textit{Disconfirming Predictions}

How can these hypotheses be disproved or weakened? What would the cases have to show to call into question the validity of these theories about transparency? Some disconfirming predictions have been alluded to above. For example, if a state asked or expected a security regime to increase transparency and nothing was done, this would indict the ability of the regime to provide transparency. If the security regime tried to use a mechanism to increase transparency and it failed outright in this attempt or the mechanism provided an underwhelming amount of information, then these results would cast doubt on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. Doubts would arise about H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation if a security regime promised
increased transparency in an attempt to spur negotiations and the offer was instead spurned. Disconfirming evidence would also include instances when increased transparency discouraged cooperation.41

With respect to H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation, these could be weakened if it was obvious that transparency was increased (mechanisms used, actors and information identified) and fears, tensions, and worst-case assumptions were not reduced or if obvious miscalculations were not prevented. Some of the predictions above indicated that increased transparency would spur peace, confidence-building measure, or other negotiations, end crises, and otherwise expedite efforts to promote peace. Thus, these hypotheses would be weakened if there was no sign that efforts to promote peace were expedited by clear efforts to increase transparency. The symptoms of these various sorts of disconfirming evidence can be deduced by inverting the predictions from the previous sections.42

Competing and Complementary Hypotheses and Explanations

This section explains my competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations.

This thesis examines security regimes' ability to provide transparency and into what are

41 For more on when transparency is or is not likely to promote peace, see the following sections on the limitations of transparency.

42 For example the paragraph in the section on predictions for H3 beginning with "A more benign threat assessment..." would be inverted as follows: "A less benign threat assessment is one that attributes more offensive capability and harmful intentions..."
commonly assumed to be the beneficial effects of transparency -- promoting cooperation and reducing fears and miscalculation (the main hypotheses: H1-H4).

However, my research revealed the need to offer competing and complementary hypotheses and explanations. Regimes efforts to provide transparency and transparency's effects are more complicated that what is commonly assumed. For example, the peacekeepers on Cyprus often investigate and gather information about incidents, something which might help UNFICYP increase transparency. In many cases though this information was used to make the offending side back down, not to increase transparency. Likewise, when the Concert met, it often clarified the existence of deadlock, tension, or conflict. This sounds more ominous but such clarification can help reduce miscalculation.

In both instances, the same mechanisms that were expected to increase transparency (gathering information, convening the forum) produced results that were not anticipated by my original hypotheses (H2-H4: promoting cooperation, and reducing unwarranted fears, misperceptions, and miscalculation). Hence, I add two more hypotheses in this section: H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis and H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Competing and complementary explanations arise in part because peacekeeping involves a stew of activities of which providing transparency is only one. In Cyprus and elsewhere, peacekeepers deter, coerce, cajole, or mediate, as well as increase transparency. Concert powers also engaged in these activities with one another. Peacekeeping missions are also usually influenced by the interventions of outside powers (in contrast, the Concert powers were the great powers). Adding to the stew, these powers can represent significant intervening variables.
These activities and influences offer competing and complementary explanations for the effects of security regimes. They must be noted and made explicit to avoid giving the impression that the only thing peacekeepers or forums do or should do is provide transparency and to avoid implying that peacekeeping missions operate in a power vacuum. More subtly, if the provision of transparency is tangled up with these other activities and influences, then the manipulability of transparency is called into question.

Defining the terms deter, coerce, cajole, and mediate shows that they often overlap with each other and can overlap with the provision of transparency as well. Quoting from the American Heritage Dictionary, to deter is "to prevent or discourage from acting, as by means of fear or doubt." To coerce is "to force to act or think in a certain way by use of pressure, threats, or intimidation; compel." To cajole is "to urge with gentle and repeated appeals, teasing, or flattery; wheedle." To mediate is "to resolve or settle (differences) by working with all the conflicting parties" or "to effect or convey as an intermediate agent or mechanism."

Deterrence and coercion are generally forceful means of persuasion. Peacekeeping operations rarely use violent force, but they may deter by interposing their forces. Moreover, H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis suggests that peacekeeping operations can use information to coerce transgressors. Cajoling is a form of persuasion, but it lacks threats of force and rests more on moral or subjective appeals than on factual appeals. That said, there is likely a grey area or continuum between H5 and cajoling. Mediation may well involve increasing transparency, especially if the there is an active mediator who facilitates or

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even regulates the exchange of information between two sides. My UNDOF case study explores this possibility. Mediation may also involve H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict. When mediation works on Cyprus, it is as often because the process allows the two sides on the line to vent their arguments as it is because a truly mediated solution is arrived at.

To keep the focus of this thesis on transparency and information, I offer these activities and influences (deterrence, great power intervention, etc) as competing and complementary explanations for the effects of security regimes, not as hypotheses. In my case studies, I will make note of these explanations when called for on a common sense basis (which is often).

I will now explain how H5 and H6 work, what effects they describe, under what conditions they are likely to operate, and offer predictions for them.

\textit{H5: The Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis}

This hypothesis describes what happens when a security regime is able to gather information about the capabilities, intentions, and/or actions of a party in a conflict and use that information to persuade that party to cease and desist from whatever they are doing that threatens the peace. Information is generated and used to promote peace by the regime, but the information is not used to increase transparency, but it instead becomes part of the regime's efforts to coerce or cajole the revisionist or violator.

Simply put, the regime gathers enough information about the source of the trouble to say: I've got the goods on you, cut it out. The earlier title for this hypothesis was the "in-your-face-with-the-facts hypothesis." An example from Cyprus would be if there were allegations of
slingshotting between the sides. If a peacekeeper conducted an investigation, found out that only one side had participated, told that side what he learned, and this put a stop to the incident, this would be H5 at work.

H5 applies primarily to peacekeeping operations. For this hypothesis to operate, the regime has to have some leverage over the violator. The leverage might be the threat of public exposure of the transgression. Or it might be that the regime is capable of going up the command chain and getting the violator in trouble. A mission that operates with the consent of the parties can get violators in trouble because violators are presumably breaking agreements that the government has signed on to at the highest level. H5 has coercive elements, but because it usually can only work when consent exists, the coercion occurs at the local level.

Many of the predictions for H5 are similar to predictions for earlier hypotheses. The regime has to conduct an investigation or gather information. Thus, some sort of mechanism must be seen at work for this to be so: an observer in an observation post, a peacekeeper on patrol, or a peacekeeper talking to both sides and inspecting the area around where a violation may have occurred. The information gathered should be identifiable, as should be the party(ies) to whom the information was presented. Finally, the party(ies)'s violations should cease when confronted by the peacekeepers and their information.

H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict

This hypothesis is the antithesis of the benign hypothesis H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. H6 describes what happens when transparency
reveals that relations are (or should be) as bad or worse than one or both sides thought. It can describe what happens when side A learns that side B is more committed to goals antithetical to side A's interests than side A at first thought. It can describe what happens when each side comes to learn that there is no room to come to a mutually beneficial agreement (when there is no win-set). Or it can describe what happens when one side learns that the other really does harbor evil intentions and/or is adding capabilities to match. I induced H6 in the course of my Concert of Europe research, but it can apply to other regimes as well.

If H6 is at work, that does not necessarily mean that the security regime failed or that transparency did not promote peace. Timely discovery of a revisionist can lead to successful balancing by status quo powers. Airing of differences can prevent miscalculation. Indeed, there are instances in the case studies of H6 leading to H4; the two are related. For more on this, see the discussion of H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation above, as well as "Transparency and Its Limits, Part II" and "Table 3.2: Effects of Opacity and Transparency," pp. 113 and 117, respectively.

H6 is important because it suggests that transparency is not a pure good. Sometimes it may be better for peace for states to live with ambiguity and uncertainty. If peace negotiations would only serve to highlight differences and lead to blaming and finger-pointing, maybe it would be better to stick with a cease-fire and wait until cooler heads prevailed.

The predictions for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict are similar to those for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. Again, a transparency-increasing mechanism would have to be used and the information generated or exchanged should be identifiable (see predictions for H1, p. 94). The effects of this
information should be the opposite of those for H3. Benign threat assessments should be replaced by more malevolent threat assessments, or any doubts about the existence of deadlock, tension, or conflict should be removed. For more on how to identify and characterize threat assessments, please see the predictions for H3 (p. 98).

When these two hypotheses are added to great power influence and to the various additional activities and effects of security regimes, the arrow diagram from the introduction (reproduced as chart 3-1) becomes a bit more complicated as shown in chart 3-2. The focus of my theoretical inquiry is on my main hypotheses (chart 3-1) as these are what most people assume are the effects of transparency. However, reality is not so simple, so I also propose and/or discuss all the causal arrows in chart 3-2.
Chart 3-1, Arrow Diagram of Main Hypotheses:

Security Regimes  →  H1: Provide Transparency  →  Promote Peace

H2: Reduce Fears of Cheating and Promote/Maintain Cooperation
H3: Reduce Unwarranted Fears; Reduce Worst-Case Assumptions
H4: Reduce Miscalculation

Chart 3-2, Arrow Diagram of All Hypotheses, with Great Power Influence and Other Regime Activities Added:

Great Power Influence (PKOs only)

Addn'l Regime Activities and Explanations for Outcomes: Deterrence, Coercion, Cajoling, Mediation, Norm-setting

Security Regimes  →  H1: Provide Transparency  →  Promote Peace

H2: Reduce Fears of Cheating and Promote/Maintain Cooperation
H3: Reduce Unwarranted Fears; Reduce Worst-Case Assumptions
H4: Reduce Miscalculation
H5: Investigate; Gather Information
H5: Violators Cease and Desist

H6: Clarify Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict
Increase or Perpetuate Conflict, Justify Fears

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Transparency and Its Limits, Part I: The Importance of Anarchy

Transparency is about the amount and accuracy of information between adversaries. Thus, transparency can only be related to those causes of war which have something to do with information. Information influences three causes of tension and war: fears that adversaries will cheat on agreements because of inadequate verification (thus scuttling agreements or preventing cooperation in the first place); unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions that occur when threat assessments are made under conditions of incomplete information; and optimistic miscalculation which occurs when revisionist states believe that the offense or victory is easier than it actually or when status quo states believe that the defense is more dominant or peace more prevalent than it actually is. My three main hypotheses, therefore, are about how transparency affects these three causes of tension of war.

However, I am not claiming that minimal transparency or lack of information are necessarily the fundamental causes of fears of cheating, fears of adversaries, or even miscalculation. Anarchy is most often the taproot of these causes of tension and war. Realism offers several propositions (explained in the next paragraph) about how anarchy causes fear and uncertainty. My hypotheses on opacity and the causes of war are variants of these realist hypotheses. I hypothesize that minimal transparency (opacity) only exacerbates the some of the deleterious effects of anarchy while increases in transparency only mitigate these effects.

Why does anarchy hinder cooperation, cause fears, and lead to miscalculation? Anarchy

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44 For a clear, but perhaps overly conflict-predicting summary of realism's assumptions, see Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 9-14.
is the absence of political authority or order. Under anarchy, there is no superstate with police power to enforce agreements. Realists focus on the problems posed by anarchy and they argue that the lack of meaningful enforcement in the international system is the primary reason to fear that states will cheat on agreements.\textsuperscript{45} Opacity only makes it even easier to cheat. Similarly, realists posit that the security dilemma is a central cause of tension under anarchy. Opacity does not cause states to fear each other's capabilities, the security dilemma does. Opacity only heightens these fears because when states do not know what a potential adversary is up to, they often must assume the worst. Finally, the dangers inherent in miscalculation derive from anarchy. While many things may cause miscalculation - minimal transparency, personality, culture, civil-military relations, organizational imperatives, and/or deception, one would scarcely have to worry about measuring relative power of states (or war at all) if the international system were not anarchic. Anarchy, in turn, is a major source of opacity because anarchy often causes states to hide their true intentions and capabilities. Thus, anarchy is a principal source of miscalculation.

\textit{Transparency and Its Limits, Part II: Different Effects on Status Quo and Revisionist Powers}

This section further explains some of the factors and conditions that influence or limit what effect an increase in transparency is likely to have. I have already noted two limitations of

\textsuperscript{45} Of course, relations between individual states, the regimes they belong to (such as the European Community or NAFTA), and the particular issue area under consideration all influence the ability to cheat, the impact of defection, and the likelihood of punishment.
transparency. First, anarchy is the fundamental cause of fear and miscalculation. Transparency can only ameliorate fear and miscalculation to the extent that opacity exacerbates the effects of anarchy.\textsuperscript{46} Second, opacity is but one source of misperception and miscalculation. Reducing opacity can not be expected to reduce cognitive biases, organizational dynamics, or political pressures. As the surprise attack literature shows, these sources of misperception can sometimes swamp the ability of increased transparency to improve perception.

A third limitation needs further explanation. Transparency affects status quo and revisionist powers differently. Transparency is of most benefit to status quo powers that want to cooperate, but face trust and verification hurdles. Further, under some circumstances, increased transparency may encourage a revisionist and increase the likelihood of war. These points are discussed in detail in the next two sections.

\textbf{TRANSPARENCY'S DIFFERENT EFFECTS ON STATUS QUO AND REVISIONIST POWERS}

Transparency is not a pure good. Transparency has three dangers. First, dependence on the transparency provided by an security regime may create complacency among status quo powers and they may let down their guard, hurting both deterrence and their ability to prevail if attacked. However, this problem is easily remedied. Caution dictates that security regimes should be a supplement to, and not a substitute for, states' own intelligence capabilities. It is hard

\textsuperscript{46} However, this caveat should not be taken too far because it implies something that is obviously false: that all states are doomed to hostile relations with all other states. But tensions fluctuate and some nations are more friendly or hostile than others. Anything that moves relations from hostile to friendly in a sense mitigates the effects of anarchy. It is possible that efforts to increase transparency do not just minimize opacity but help improve relations on other levels as well.
to think of any examples where a security regime made a state dangerously complacent.

Second, the mechanisms used to provide transparency (conferences, buffer zones, organized sharing of intelligence, and other means listed above) could also be used as part of a deception plan by a revisionist. This danger is a variation on the first, because it too depends on complacency. However, increased transparency also makes deception campaigns more expensive to mount and harder to get away with. A status quo power fearing deception should prefer a world with more transparency to one with less.

The third danger is that transparency may encourage a revisionist to attack if new information confirms that the revisionist was sufficiently powerful to win if it started a war. Increased transparency may also help the revisionist plan the war and opening attack (another form of encouragement). This danger should not be overstated. Presumably, the same increase in transparency could help status quo powers identify a rising revisionist and signal them to begin balancing or to prepare for an attack. This happened when NPT (and IAEA) helped identify North Korea's nuclear program and when North Korea's threat to withdraw from the regime helped galvanize the world's response. Another such signal was sent to Israel when Egypt kicked out the UN peacekeeping mission between them just prior to the 1967 War.

The following table details the effects of opacity and transparency on both status quo and revisionist powers.\textsuperscript{47} This table specifies how, when, and under what conditions a security regime can reduce the probability of war. There are a few things to note. Accurate threat assessments result from transparency; over and underestimation result from opacity. Security

\textsuperscript{47} Although I have said it before, opacity is not the only cause of miscalculation and transparency is not the only cure for miscalculation.
regimes are of most value to status quo powers. Transparency can help prevent inadvertent arms races and tensions between these states (box 1), or spur them to undertake balancing efforts (box 6).

Transparency also reduces optimistic miscalculation. The worst boxes for deterrence failure through optimistic miscalculation are 5, 8, and 11. Box 5 is defensive optimistic miscalculation and boxes 8 and 11 are offensive optimistic miscalculation.

Overestimation is bad against a fellow status quo power (box 1), but helps balancing when facing a non-status quo or revisionist power (box 4). Some might argue that worst-case analyses (overestimation) have little downside risk and can provide a valuable hedge (in essence arguing that the benefits of box 4 outweigh the costs of box 1). But transparency is best because accurate estimates (box 6) also result in balancing against a revisionist power (so same as box 4) while simultaneously preventing defensive optimistic miscalculation (box 5) and unnecessary spirals (box 1).

Whether or not transparency encourages or discourages aggression is indeterminate in box 9 (and to a far lesser extent in box 12) because the effect depends on what the revisionist learns about its relative strength. However, increased transparency also helps status quo powers assess the balance of power. This helps them balance against revisionists when necessary (box 6) so that, in the net, transparency will tend to help deterrence. All other things being equal, you can not get box 9 without getting box 6; the same increase in transparency that helps a revisionist decide upon and plan an attack should help the status quo power detect and defend against the attack.

One last nuance: it is possible that any estimate of a revisionist's capabilities and
intentions that produced sufficient awe and fear could produce bandwagoning or caving in, rather than increased efforts to deter. For example, this could happen if an underestimation was corrected by an increase in transparency and the status quo power then thought the situation was hopeless. While I am a fan of balance of threat theory, it only leads me to believe that states will chose balancing over bandwagoning most of the time, not all the time.

Table 3-1: Effects of Opacity and Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This Power Does This</th>
<th>Resulting in</th>
<th>1. Minor effects on chance of war; may spur unnecessary balancing, tension</th>
<th>2. Minor effects on chance of war; deterrence is weak</th>
<th>3. Minor effects on chance of war; deterrence is appropriate</th>
<th>4. Reduces chance of war; spurs balancing and helps deterrence or spurs bandwagoning</th>
<th>5. Increases chance of war; reduces balancing; weakens deterrence</th>
<th>6. Reduces chance of war; spurs balancing and helps deterrence or spurs bandwagoning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SQ Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Reduces chance of war; deterrence strengthened temporarily; likely to spur arms build-up</td>
<td>8. Increases chance of war; opens optimistic window of opportunity</td>
<td>9. Indeterminate. Increases chance of war if NSQ power confirms that it is stronger; reduces chance of war if NSQ power discovers it is weaker.</td>
<td>10. Reduces chance of war; deterrence strengthened temporarily; likely to spur arms build-up</td>
<td>11. Increases chance of war; opens optimistic window of opportunity</td>
<td>12. Increases chance of war; reduces effects of Box 10. War is likely because even if both sides find they remain deterred, an arms race will start or continue until this is no longer so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSQ Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Minor effects on chance of war; may spur unnecessary balancing, tension</td>
<td>2. Minor effects on chance of war; deterrence is weak</td>
<td>3. Minor effects on chance of war; deterrence is appropriate</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SQ = status quo, NSQ = non status quo (revisionist)

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48 This table could apply as well to other sources of perception/misperception.

49 But same transparency will also increase the status quo powers' ability to identify the revisionist. In other words, box 6 occurs at the same time as box 9.

50 Which it always was by definition of this box (NSQ vs. NSQ).
WHAT GOOD IS TRANSPARENCY?

If transparency is most helpful to status quo powers, then what good is it? The answer is that status quo powers are not immune from the security dilemma, security spirals, miscalculation, or unwarranted fears and the tensions they cause. Transparency can reduce these effects, thus lowering the likelihood of war. Moreover, fluctuation in tensions create a large grey area in between the status quo and war. As tensions rise and fall, states face choices about peace and war, cooperation and defection. In some cases, states making these choices face prisoners' dilemma-like situations. States may want to reduce tensions and preserve the status quo, but they may not be sure how to achieve these goals. The more doubts exist about whether the other side is sincere about cooperating or can be trusted to follow through with an agreement, the less likely cooperation becomes. Transparency can help overcome problems with trust and verification.

Transparency is relevant whenever states face prisoners' dilemmas.51 A major reason that defection is the prisoners' dominant strategy is that neither can be sure what the other will choose.52 In game-theoretic terms, the payoffs for cooperation are high, but uncertainty makes defection the dominant strategy. In international relations, there is often uncertainty about others' intentions and capabilities. Increased transparency can reduce this uncertainty, helping states to choose cooperation (CC) over defection (DD).

Transparency certainly will not stop a determined aggressor from aggressing. However,

51 Thanks to Rachel Bronson for encouraging me to make this point clearly. See also my review of the cooperation literature.

52 The payoff structure is the most fundamental reason.
as my discussion of the Seven Year's War in America highlights, many wars are caused by miscalculation and/or fear, not determined aggressors.\textsuperscript{53} States may want peace but do not know enough about each other or can not trust each other enough to achieve it. Under these circumstances, increased transparency can help cause peace.

\textsuperscript{53} See the next chapter for more on the Seven Years War. See Van Evera, draft and Blainey, \textit{Causes of War} for more instances of miscalculation and war (including aspects WWI, the Korean War, WWII, the Crimean War...)

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Chapter 4:

Diplomacy and Crisis Management

Before the Concert

Introduction

This chapter examines diplomacy and crisis management in the 18th century. The 18th century was a time of minimal transparency: small diplomatic corps and state bureaucracies, slow travel, and no peacetime forums for conducting diplomacy. Only by having a sense of how well crises were managed at a time of minimal transparency can we tell what effect the Concert of Europe - and subsequent forums - have had on causing peace.

This chapter has three parts. The first part examines the general conditions under which diplomacy was conducted during the 18th century. I argue that such factors as the diminutive size of the diplomatic corps and the slow speed of their communications made this a period of minimal transparency. The second part examines the outbreak of the Seven Year's War in America to illustrate how minimal transparency can help cause war. The French and British misperceived each other's goals in the Americas. They did not have common maps and did not know they were being mislead by rogues on their own sides. Opacity was high not just between the two countries, but also within their own administrative structures. Similar problems with
maps and rogues come up repeatedly during the peacekeeping case studies.

Third and finally, I conduct a mini-case study of the crisis surrounding the first partition of Poland in 1772. This case serves as a control case for analysis of the Concert's crises. Using the method of difference, inclusion of this case highlights the effects (if any) of the Concert's new practice of multilateral diplomacy.\(^1\) This is because the first partition of Poland is as close as possible to a Concert episode in time, participating actors, and severity, and overall character. During the first partition of Poland, as in many Concert episodes, a crisis arose on the periphery of Europe and the resulting tensions among the great powers threatened general war. These similarities should serve to highlight what was new about diplomacy following the Napoleonic Wars. States could now avail themselves of a forum for peacetime multilateral crisis-management, a forum now named the Concert of Europe.\(^2\)

According to the transparency hypotheses, the new practice of Concert diplomacy should have increased transparency, tempering the severity of the crises, reducing miscalculation, and leading to quicker conflict resolution. However, these effects occur in underwhelming proportion and I find it difficult to ascribe major benefits to Concert diplomacy.

General Observations about Diplomacy in the 18th Century


\(^2\) For more information on the origins and evolution of the term 'Concert of Europe,' see footnote 1 of Chapter Five. Bottom line: the term did not enter common usage until the second half of the 1800s, in particular in the late 1870's after (yet another) crisis involving the Eastern question. During the years most scholars believe the Concert was at its peak (1815 to 1820-30, or so), the word concert was used mostly as a verb, i.e. to concert one's powers.
The foundations for modern, bureaucratized diplomacy were laid in the 18th century. The reason I am focusing on diplomacy is that diplomacy is one of the most basic ways of increasing transparency. Diplomacy was one of the first mechanisms states turned to to learn more about their adversaries. Joseph Strayer notes that states in the 1600s began to handle "outside threats [with an] emphasis on acquiring information. Permanent embassies were established; secret agents and spies were hired; knowledgeable merchants and travelers were questioned."  

Inis Claude wrote that there are four prerequisites for the development of international organizations: 1. the world must be divided into a number of independent nation states; 2. there must be substantial contact between them; 3. the states must be aware of the problems generated by their interactions; and 4. the states must recognize a need for creation of institutions to regulate their behavior. These preconditions are simple and basic, so much so that they are prerequisites for diplomacy as well. The following observations are organized around these four points to show how states moved toward fulfilling these basic prerequisites for diplomacy during the 18th century.

The peace of Westphalia in 1648 is oft noted for marking the end of dynastic or religious kingdoms and empires and the beginning of the modern independent nation state. Old habits die

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3 Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 96. He goes on to discuss the shortcomings of these early efforts, some of which are discussed below and many of which were not very well addressed until the 18th century.

hard and relations between the Hapsburg and Bourbon Houses still defined the balance of power through the end of the 17th century. It was not until the 18th century that the large European states really began to shed their dynastic and personal character in favor of more modern bureaucratized states.

Claude's condition #1 (a number of independent states) came close to being satisfied in the 18th century as the number of states grew and their capacity to wield power and conduct diplomacy became greater, more elaborate, and more professional. With the rise of Russia, Prussia, and Britain, great powers began to proliferate. However, they only slowly gathered the basic attributes we now take for granted: professional armies, professional diplomatic corps, bureaucratized taxation systems, and other mechanisms for concentrating and using power. To focus on diplomacy, diplomats were not systematically recruited and paid to serve their state prior to the 18th century. Instead, the few diplomats that were posted abroad were often paid by the host government (!). In 1695, Russia had no permanent representatives abroad. By 1721, it had 21 missions abroad, although by 1800 this number had declined to 14. In 1702, there were four representatives from abroad in Russia, and eleven by 1719.\(^5\) France had five officials in its foreign ministry in 1661, but the ministry grew during the 1700s to include cartographic, financial, cryptographic, correspondence, legal, and archival departments.\(^6\) French also become the universal language of diplomacy in the 18th century. Almost all treaties of peace after


Utrecht in 1713 were written in French and French was even used in intragovernment communications by Austria and Prussia. At the same time, precursors to foreign policy training schools took form in France and Prussia.

In the mid-18th century, despatches traveled at a maximum of 100 kilometers per day. It took about three weeks for news to from London to Venice. Nonetheless, European roads grew swiftly in number and quality during the 18th century. Further, when the stagecoach appeared, it hastened communications and enabled meaningful diplomatic discussion to be conducted by despatch. With permanent diplomats and sufficiently speedy communications, continuous diplomacy became possible. This meant that, in the hands of a capable diplomatic corps, an organized and continuous flow of information about other states could be relayed back to the home state. In turn, the state could respond with instructions that were less likely to have been overtaken by events.

By highlighting the increasingly sophisticated and involved level of diplomatic contacts between states, this section suggests emerging fulfillment of Claude's condition #2 (contact between states). Despite these developments, diplomacy in the 17th and early 18th centuries was still frequently hampered by difficulties with procedure and protocol. At times, states resorted to round tables, round treaties, and rooms with many doors (so delegations could enter simultaneously) in order to reduce problems with precedence, order, and rank. Delegates at peace conferences often communicated by passing notes through mediators. As the 18th century wore on, the stress on formality eased. Instead, it was tensions between the great powers that

vitiated the peace conferences of the mid-1700s. According to Richard Langhorne, mutual
suspicions led to disappointing results at the Congresses of Soissons (1728-1729), Aix-la-
Chapelle (1745), and the Congress of Breda (1746). However, problems with formalities tended
to recur (as they still do). At the 1813 Congress of Prague, Napoleon caused "deadlock to
develop on the question of whether to proceed by discussions leading to agreed minutes, or to
communicate entirely in writing through a mediator."8

One reason that procedure and protocol loomed so large is that states could not agree that
war (or any other issue) was a big enough problem to deserve serious concerted attention. The
18th century saw the peak of raison d'etat international politics where war was used as an
instrument for state gain. However, while war was often conducted deliberately, there were also
elements of restraint and formality. In contrast with the "marauding," "pillaging" and
undisciplined armies of the Thirty Years War, armies and war in the 18th century were less
destructive.9 War was also conducted for 'raison de self.'10 Nobles throughout Europe
constituted essentially a military caste who needed war for their advancement and prestige. As a
result, warfare was a "function, if not an actual necessity, of the structure of European society."11
For whatever raison, if war was more of an opportunity than a problem during this period, then

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8 Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," Studies in History and Politics, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (1981/1982), pp. 73-75. These sorts of issues persist to this day, especially between states with strained relations
such as North and South Korea. In late September 1995, mainland China refused a summit in Washington in part
because their leaders would not receive a full 21-gun salute and other diplomatic honors.

9 Holsti, Peace and War, p. 102; see also Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century. pp. 174-78.

10 The difference between raison d'etat and raison de self is blurry in cases where the leaders are the state. That
was of course the contention of Louis XIV when he said "L'etat, c'est moi" (I am the state).

states were a long way from fulfilling Claude's conditions #3 and #4 (awareness of common problems that need common, institutional solutions). After all, why would states form an international organization to try to control the problem of war if war was not a problem?

Despite these various barriers to diplomacy and cooperation, some precursors to concert practices fell into place during the 18th century. As mentioned, there were peace conferences following several of the many wars of the time. The practice of mediation also became widespread. Holsti lists six of many instances of mediation from the Peace of Nystadt in 1721 to the ending the war of Bavarian Succession in 1779. But he also notes that between 1713 and 1814 there were "no cases on record where formal mediation actually prevented a war." There were no peacetime crisis-management conferences either. Instead, mediation was most often a device for states to save face after "issues had already been resolved on the battlefield." During much of the 18th century, war was not enough of a problem for states to act in concert to try to prevent it. Even if they had been so motivated, states were only beginning to have the institutional capacity and physical infrastructure to conduct concert diplomacy.13

12 Holsti, Peace and War, pp. 111-112.

Seven Years War in America

What are the effects of minimal transparency? This section on the Seven Years war helps answer this question. My hypotheses and predictions suggest that transparency should help cause peace in a number of ways including: giving states common information upon which to make decisions, identifying rogues, allowing states to clearly communicate their intentions, preventing spirals based on misperception, and preventing deterrence failure based on miscalculation. On the other hand, under minimal transparency, one would predict that none of these good things would happen, that the problems transparency mitigates would go unchecked, and that opacity would help cause war.

The outbreak of the Seven Years War between Britain and France in America during the 1750s highlights the dangers of opacity in several ways: Britain and France did not know how to interpret accurately what the other was doing; they did not even have an objective and common measure of what the other was doing because their maps were different; and their central governments could not monitor what their own underlings and representatives were doing. All these opacity-related problems contributed to the start of the war.

In the mid-1700s, the growth of the British colony in Eastern North America made tension, if not conflict, inevitable with its smaller French neighbors to the West. But opacity was a significant permissive condition that allowed the specific catalysts of the war to work their charms. Britain and France were wise enough to attempt to dampen their incipient conflicts throughout the Western Hemisphere. They established a joint Delimitation Commission in 1750 to settle land claims where their colonies bumped up against one another. But the Commission
had limited powers and could not even resolve what should have been objective differences between British and French maps.\textsuperscript{14}

The 'map problem' became dangerous in 1753 when France began to fortify the Ohio territory, land that was claimed by both powers. The British responded with an eviction notice and a counter-fortification. The French then forcibly ousted the British from their new fort. The resulting skirmishes led to casualties on both sides, but at this point, neither side wanted war. Opacity caused the crisis to escalate into a war. First, each side thought itself to be supporting the status quo, so each side perceived its own actions to be aimed at deterrence while viewing the other's moves as compellent. Neither understood the other's intentions and ultimate goals. Second, rogue hawks influenced policy at several key junctures. Their claims were hard to verify and their influence went unchecked by their central governments in part because so few channels of communications existed and because communications were so slow. For example, Governor Shirley of Massachusetts contributed to Britain's overly pessimistic assessment of French motives by falsely reporting to London that the French had begun to settle in Massachusetts (!). After a series of skirmishes and a small naval engagement, Britain declared war on France in May 1756.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] As we shall see, these are the same problems that often plague U.N. missions: lack of great power support and lack of respect from the participants themselves. Missions that seem simple and desirable often fall short without the commitment of these actors. Even more to the point, the U.N. missions in Cyprus and the Golan Heights still suffer from disputes about the exact borders of their cease-fire lines, buffer zones, and other delimited areas because the initial maps for these operations were carelessly drawn. In both cases, large scale maps were marked with large pens or crayons. The swath of these lines on the map covered many meters on the ground, paving the way for continued disputes and making it harder for the U.N. to provide transparency. See my discussion of the base truth in Chapter 6, pp. 234 and 299.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] This account is drawn directly from Richard Smoke, \textit{Controlling Escalation} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), Chapter 8.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

(continued...)
The First Partition of Poland

I examine the first partition of Poland in order to better measure the contribution of multilateral Concert diplomacy to crisis management. The early 19th century Concert was the first multilateral peacetime crisis management forum in history. States were able to meet together, simultaneously, and hash things out. One would expect this apparently major evolution in diplomatic practice to produce different outcomes from the bilateral and sequential diplomacy of the 18th century (as measured in this case by examination of the first partition of Poland).  

My hypotheses and predictions suggest that Concert diplomacy would increase transparency and that this increase would allow the Concert to resolve crises more quickly and with less tension and miscalculation.

However, it turns out that it is hard to tell the difference between the outcomes produced under the Concert and during the partition. In both cases, as tensions increased and states sought to avoid general war, states shifted alliances or struck bargains that divvied up territory. While these efforts diffused the crises, crisis management took months and years and involved serious war scares. The similarities in outcomes between the partition and the Concert make it impossible to make strong claims for the peace-causing effectiveness of the Concert.

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15(...continued)
The 'small' naval engagement mentioned could have been a disaster for the French. In early 1755, they sent 3000 troops on eighteen ships to reinforce their American colony. The British set out to seize or sink them, something which they could have easily done. However, due to fog, they were only able to capture two. (A case of opacity prolonging peace...?)

16 An example of sequential diplomacy would be if Russia sent an emissary to Austria, got a response, then sent an emissary to Prussia, and so forth. Sequential diplomacy stands in contrast to multilateral diplomacy in which diplomats meet together (hence, simultaneously).
The Story

The first partition of Poland highlights three themes of relevance to this study. First, bilateral diplomacy involves a variety of mechanisms including: communiques, secret letters, envoys, and meetings. This shows some of ways states can communicate in the absence of a forum. Second, these mechanisms allowed states to come to what was a complex multi-state deal to partition Poland. Through bilateral, sequential diplomacy states were able to achieve what I call a near-multilateral solution. If bilateral diplomacy can produce near-multilateral solutions, this undercuts the strength of calls for more multilateral forums and suggests the need for more study on the subject of when forums are and are not likely to help states achieve diplomatic solutions. Third, this episode involved war scares (but the actual wars did not involve

17 This footnote explains how great power relations evolved prior to the first partition of Poland. Two major European wars created the alliances, treaties, and tensions that were the strategic backdrop for this episode. In 1740, King Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia, invaded neighboring Silesia, doubling the size of Prussia and launching the War of Austrian Succession. Silesia was part of the Austrian/Hapsburg Empire, an empire whose integrity had been guaranteed by all the European powers under the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. However, instead of coming to Austria’s aid, Frederick’s invasion sparked a great power feeding frenzy. Spain, Bourbon France, Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia attacked various Austrian holdings. Despite losses in Belgium, Italy, Silesia, and elsewhere, help from Britain led to a generous settlement for Austria in the 1748 peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. For the most part, the status quo ante was restored. Prussia was allowed to keep Silesia.

Shortly before the 1756 outbreak of the Seven Year’s War in Europe, the second major war, great power alignments suddenly shifted. Fearing the continued rise of Prussian power, Austria courted France into an alliance. Austria promised to support France in another bid to conquer Belgium in exchange for French support of its efforts to regain Silesia and weaken Prussia. This provoked Britain into an alliance with Prussia in order to better protect Hanover and the low countries (which in turn solidified the Franco-Austrian alliance). Russia continued to be aligned with Austria.

Fearing an attack in 1757 by the emerging offensive coalition against Prussia, Frederick declared: “If Austria is pregnant with war, I shall offer the service of midwife” (Dorn, p. 314). And on August 29, 1756, Prussia launched a preventive attack Southward into Saxony, starting the Seven Year’s War in Europe. Before long, the combination of France, Austria, and Russia almost proved overwhelming. Prussia was saved by a combination of military prowess and coalition disunity, including the late defection of Russia. In early 1763, the Peace of Paris and Treaty of Hubertusberg were signed, essentially restoring the status quo in Europe and codifying Prussia’s sovereignty over Silesia and helping solidify its stature as a great power.
the main European great powers), fait accomplis, various manipulations of alliances, and finally a deal that preserved European great power peace at the expense of a lesser power (Poland). This third point speaks to the general tone of the crisis as well as to how it was resolved. This is the behavior benchmark for comparison to the Concert period.

In April of 1764, almost a year after the Peace of Paris ended the Seven Years War, Russia and Prussia signed a mutual defense pact to make no peace or truces without each other's consent and to come to each other's aid in case of war with either troops or cash. The pact also endorsed installation of a Russian puppet at the head of the Polish government. Russia and Prussia agreed to suppress unwanted political change if Poland's politics ever became "unjust" or "dangerous" to its neighbors.¹⁸ In 1768, the Confederates of Bar (Poland) rebelled against the Polish King. Russia sent in the troops.

This may not have had much consequence, were it not for the fact that in 1768 the Ottoman Empire shared a border with Poland. For several years, Russia had been fomenting plots against Turkish rule, especially in Greece, Crete, and Montenegro. This aggravated the ages old rivalry between Russia and Turkey. In addition, France had been trying to heighten Turkish antipathy toward Russia as part of an overall plan to so entangle Russia that France would become free to avenge its losses in the Seven Years War against Britain. If Russia was at war or embroiled in the East, the theory went, it could not aid Britain in the West. France's ambassador to Turkey, Comte Charles Gravier de Vergennes, had been given three million livres to stir up tension by corrupting and otherwise influencing the Turks. In the end, Vergennes

returned the money to France. There was enough real tension between Turkey and Russia to cause a war without it.

In response to the Russian incursion into Poland, Turkey demanded that Russian troops leave Poland. They did not and Prussia feared war. War came when Russian troops pursued some Confederates across the Turkish border and burned the town of Balta. Following Turkish practice of international law, the Turks formally declared war on October 6, 1768 by arresting the Russian ambassador and holding him in the Castle of the Seven Towers.

Frederick was quick to grasp that war between Turkey and Russia could allow Prussia to acquire some of Poland or push for other advantages. Frederick had long been an acquisitive revisionist. Remember that, in 1740, during his first year as King at the age of twenty-eight, Frederick started the War of Austrian Succession and seized Silesia from Austria. He had made plans to build roads in territories he had yet to obtain. And during the present crisis, Frederick hoped to secure some of Prussian Poland in return for his services as an ally. He hoped for a partition of Poland when he offered mediation to Russia on November 9. While nothing came of this suggestion, it was the first of many attempts and ideas put forward by Prussia to partition Poland. On November 14, Czarina Catherine of Russia wrote to Frederick, "I hold myself secure that Your Majesty will remain faithful to our alliance" [of April 1764]. Prussia reaffirmed its intention to uphold the pact, and hinted again that some price would be attached to that support. However, even though Frederick wanted a piece of Poland, he did not want to get involved in a

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20 In those days it was common practice to compensate allies, so talk of gains and partition should not be surprising. For that matter, World War II saw plenty of horse-trading about post-war gains.
Russo-Turkish war there. Fortunately for him, Russia's impressive and quick military victories over Turkey in 1769 muted this concern.

In the meantime, Austria became fearful that France's plan to divert Russia might succeed. If France fought Britain, Austria's role would be to restrain Prussia - an unwelcome prospect. Austria and Prussia had some common cause in wanting to keep a lid on the Turko-Russian war. Prussia did not want its alliance with Russia to draw it into a war with Turkey in Poland and Austria did not want to be dragged into a war with Prussia by its ties with France. Austria made the first move to warm up its ties with Prussia by sending a representative to visit Frederick. In November 1768, Austria renounced its claims to Silesia and both countries agreed that future expansion by either France or Russia should be discouraged.

Austria had more complex motives than just moderation and conciliation. On December 3, the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz sent a memorandum to his government speculating about a partition of Poland or recovery of Silesia, made possible with Turkish help. Austria built up its troops along the Polish and Turkish borders, hoping to prevent the war from spilling over. It installed markers (Austrian eagles) along parts of borders that were unclear. 'Eagled' into to its own territory any lands that were in dispute or of unclear ownership. 'Eagling' may have increased transparency (remember the task of the Delimitation Commission), but may also have increased tensions. By confirming a shift in the status quo, it may offer support for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

With enough 'eagling,' Austria ended up occupying the Polish counties of Zips in February 1769. This offered *de facto* protection for those Bar Confederates located in Zips. In May 1770, Austria began to suggest to Prussia its ideas for further partition of Poland.
However, in Spring and Summer 1769, Russia began to rack up a series of military victories. Russia occupied Bessarabia and the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia on the Austrian frontier. By mid-1770, Russia had begun to conquer the Crimea, stirred up a revolt in southern Greece (Morea), and, after sailing from the Baltic, had sunk the Turkish fleet (with British help) at Chesme in the Mediterranean.

Russian victories caused apprehension in nearby great powers. Amidst uncertainty and rising tensions, Austria and Prussia exchanged secret letters of neutrality to help keep the peace between them. Austria and Prussia wanted the August 1769 agreement to be secret because they wanted to keep their respective alliances with Russia and France. But the secret was hard to keep and Prussia's not-so-secret meeting with Austria made Russia nervous. Russia and Prussia renewed their treaty of alliance in October and extended it until 1780. Prussia benefitted from the treaty, not just because it helped manage relations with Russia, but because good relations with Russia also made Austria more conciliatory. Prussia was manipulating the tensions between Russia and Austria.

This episode of secret meetings and shifting and renewed alliances is similar in some respects to the Poland/Saxony crisis of the Concert period in which a secret alliance was formed and then quickly revealed for political effect. Sometimes it is in the interest of states to increase transparency, perhaps when they want to manipulate other states with information (as in the case of Prussia here) or when they want to reveal a change in power to their advantage (as in the Poland/Saxony crisis). Neither of these related effects are captured by my hypotheses, but they
certainly deserve further study.  

In Winter 1769-1770, Prussia suggested that Austria offer mediation to the Turks and promised to support that mediation in its discussions with Russia. Prussia also urged Turkey to enlist Austria as a mediator. In September 1770, Prussia and Austria began to discuss what terms Russia might accept to end its war with Turkey and declared to each other a desire to live in peace. Coincidentally (?), during these discussions, a letter from Turkey arrived asking for mediation from the two countries. Prussia raised the possibility of general European war in its attempt to persuade Russia to accept mediation, but Russia had been too successful to start compromising. However, it was not long before sufficient progress had been made in the war (along with the onset of the war-slowing Winter), to lead Russia to express a desire for peace to Prussia in late December 1770. On January 20, 1771, Russia proposed some conciliatory terms, including independence for Moldavia and Wallachia. While the various countries were talking, Austria continued to push its Eagles further into Poland and Prussia had begun to occupy parts of the country as well.

Austria did not take up Prussia's suggestion to become a mediator. Instead, they asked Prussia not to help Russia if Austria attacked Russia outside of Poland (presumably along the Danube). Austria also wanted to use Turkey as a lever to help force concessions from Russia, so Austria proposed an alliance with Turkey and promised that Austria would prefer war to the total defeat of Turkey. Through late Winter and Spring 1771, Prussia pressed Russia to accept a

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21 Most of the effects of increased transparency implied by my different types of transparency (unilateral, confrontational, etc.) are not captured by my hypotheses. This is because I am focusing on how security regimes can increase transparency. My typology of the different ways transparency can be increased in under my definition of transparency on p. 23.
partition of Poland. Domestic politics, an epidemic, fear of peasant revolt, and continued unrest in Poland increasingly led Russia to see partition as a viable choice to end the stresses of war.

On July 1 1771, Crimea fell to Russia and on July 6, Turkey took up Austria's offer of alliance. Although Frederick had reason to believe that Austria actually would not be willing to fight for its new ally, he renewed his push for partition of Poland with Russia. Russia viewed the Austro-Turkish treaty with greater alarm.\(^{22}\) This helped lead Russia to accept a Prussian plan for partition in January of 1772, and they essentially confronted Austria with this *fait accompli*. Austria resisted the plan for several months, but eventually gave in as Russia and Prussia cut it in for ever-larger shares of Poland. The powers convened two abortive peace congresses trying to sort out the details of the partition and finally settle the Russo-Turkish War.

Here, the turning point in the crisis was shifts in power both on the ground (Russia's victories) and in alliances (Turkey with Austria). Neither shift required a security regime to make it effects known.

In the end, Poland lost one-third of its territory and one-half of its population. Prussia achieved its goal of partitioning Poland and avoiding being dragged into war. Austria received the largest share of Poland, and the Russians withdrew their threatening forces from the Danubian Principalities and returned the territory to Turkey (but gave itself the role of protector of those lands). Russia received the smallest share of the partition, but also freed itself from the possibility that the Europeans powers would be drawn into its war with Turkey. Thus unfettered,

\(^{22}\) There is significant divergence on this point in the histories I read. Schroeder writes that the Austro-Turkish alliance was a feint by Austria but claims that Prussia nonetheless feared general war following the agreement; Sorel and Gershoy argue that Prussia knew that it was a feint soon after the signing, and Sorel cites a memo to that effect on pp. 161-162.
Russia continued to pursue some of its war aims (which is why the peace-congresses broke down). In 1774, Turkey was forced to accept the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji in which Russia gained the independence of Crimea from Turkish rule and became its protector, gained freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and control over most of its North coast. Turkey pledged "constantly to protect the Christian religion and its churches' in general, [and] to 'place no impediment in the way of the free practice of the Christian religion'" in Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece, and Georgia. Based on this treaty, Russia later claimed a right to "interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire." This treaty and its interpretation helped cause later crises between Russia and Turkey, including the Crimean War.

Conclusions

The deal to partition Poland was quite complicated and was essentially a multilateral outcome - even though it resulted from a series of bilateral negotiations and maneuvers. Throughout most of this crisis/war, the great powers wheeled and dealted until the multi-power final partition agreement took shape. Rough and tumble great power politics led to peace at the expense of a minor power. The great powers never sat down together until the end-game, but by then, there was little left to decide. They had worked it out through sequential bilateral diplomacy.

Could multilateral forum (Concert) diplomacy have changed the outcome? A plausible

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counterfactual argument could be made that multilateral diplomacy could have reduced tensions between Russia and Austria and hastened - but not changed - the eventual outcome. Austria and Prussia also went to considerable lengths trying to manipulate each other (and others) to achieve their desired results when in fact they (as well as Russia) had shared and overlapping interests. Multilateral diplomacy could well have revealed those interests sooner and reduced the need for what seems to have been an inefficient level of manipulation. However, Russia's victories and then domestic weakness explain some of the changes in Austrian, Prussian, and Turkish policies during this episode. Multilateral diplomacy would have had little effect on these factors. In the end, all one can conclusively say is that sequential diplomacy was sufficient to produce a near-multilateral outcome and that multilateral diplomacy was not necessary to do so.

If one took the actors involved in the first partition of Poland and increased the levels of war-weariness and fear of revolution and war and also added multilateral diplomacy (traits of the early Concert period), this episode would be virtually indistinguishable from diplomacy under the Concert of Europe, forty years hence. In laying the foundation for his argument that diplomacy was transformed between the 18th and early 19th centuries, Paul Schroeder claims that the first partition of Poland:

in turn says something profound about the eighteenth-century system. Like late nineteenth-century imperialism outside Europe, its rules made co-operative system-conforming conduct indistinguishable from naked aggression, at least from the point of view of the victims. Three great powers, perceiving their shared interest in the maintenance of general peace, discovered the best way to do so: to aggrandize themselves at the expense of a helpless third party.... The 'crime' of the first Polish partition rose directly from the rules and needs of standard eighteenth-
century politics.24

The next chapter will make the case that diplomacy was not transformed. Compared to the first partition of Poland, crisis management and great power behavior is not that much different during the Concert period. This is somewhat surprising because multilateral diplomacy intuitively and deductively seems like it would represent a major transformation for the better. And the major reason multilateral diplomacy would promote peaceful relations would be because it would increase transparency and hasten diplomatic solutions.

However, the next chapter shows that the Concert period was not markedly more peaceful than the late 1700s. Although the great powers avoided general war during the early Concert period, it was a close call. At several points tensions were quite high and states feared general war. Further, the great powers' motivations and actions of the nineteenth century were not all that different from those of the eighteenth. Schroeder's characterization of 'late nineteenth-century imperialism outside Europe' also describes a good proportion of early nineteenth-century behavior within Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars, the European great powers were more fearful of war and revolution, but they were still aggressive to each other and often resolved their disputes by being 'expedient' with smaller states. To reach agreement in Vienna, Poland and Saxony were carved up. In two cases, Naples and Spain, Concert diplomacy helped great powers squash rebellions in their lesser neighbors. In the Greek rebellion, the Concert helped prevent Russia from intervening...so that Turkey could do the job. Finally, Belgium's independence was only sorted out after much divisive great power coercion and intervention. All in all, the first

24 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 19.
partition of Poland seems like a pilot program for the Concert's early episodes.

In solving the problems described in the last paragraph, the Concert powers did indeed meet together. In two of five instances, this seemed to have helped them reduce miscalculation. In another instance this mildly helped them perpetrate a deception scheme on Alexander. In another two instances, Concert diplomacy appeared to have little effect. Despite use of the forum (H1: Regimes Provide Transparency), only modest support is offered for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation and no support is offered for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.
Chapter 5:

The Concert of Europe

Introduction

This chapter investigates how much the early 19th century's new practice of multilateral crisis-management - called the Concert of Europe - helped states manage crises. If my hypotheses are true, Concert diplomacy should have resolved crises with relative alacrity. Compared to the 18th century when states only met bilaterally, multilateral forum diplomacy should greatly increase transparency. Information should be exchanged at a much greater rate, reducing fears among status quo powers and clarifying the intentions and capabilities of all powers.

I examine the first five crises the Concert confronted. According to most scholars of the

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1 The term 'Concert of Europe' did not enter common usage until the second half of the 1800s, in particular in the late 1870's after another crisis involving the Eastern question. During the years most scholars believe the Concert was at its peak, the word concert was used mostly as a verb, i.e. to concert one's powers. In the early period of the Concert, statesmen used words and expressions such as "confederacy," "great alliance," and "Areopagus." This shows that the great powers were conscious of their status and common interests. However, I believe that the use of the term Concert of Europe, a term projected onto actors who used it rarely if it all, reifies the association of great powers and suggests more harmony than actually existed. The shifting alliances, threats to national interests, intrigues, and fears of war described in this chapter do not seem possible in a Concert, with its implication of harmonious and cooperative governance. That said, I use the term, so I am as guilty as the next scholar. The term has become so common that it would seem contrived not to use it. The origins and use of the term Concert of Europe are discussed in Carsten Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-1914 (London, Great Britain: Longman, 1970), pp. 3-5 and passim. Pitt used the term as a noun in his 1805 Memorandum. See Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 11.
Concert, it was most effective and coherent during its earliest years: 1814/15 to 1821/22. I argue that, even at its peak, the Concert was not that effective then either. There were many crises and war scares and they took months and years to resolve. While war was averted, it was still not a very peaceful period and was nothing to be nostalgic about. In addition, the case studies of the Concert's crises do a poor job confirming the predictions about transparency. Given the number of factors which could have dampened these crises and prevented them from boiling over into war - ideological homogeneity and war weariness to name two, it is hard to ascribe much peacemaking effect to Concert diplomacy or to transparency. This conclusion is bolstered by the numerous similarities between Concert episodes and the first partition of Poland.

Intuitively, the Concert of Europe appears to be an ideal case for finding transparency at work. The Concert was a multilateral forum, so it provided a highly plausible mechanism for

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2 Some scholars argue that the Concert lasted until World War I, but even they agree that it had lost most of its effectiveness by then. Most scholars argue that it was over by the Crimean war, and a good number of these argue that the Concert met its demise in the early to mid 1820s. I side with the early-demise arguments, although the practice of multilateral peacetime diplomacy started by the Concert obviously lived on.


Those arguing it ended with the Crimean War include Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972) and Elrod, "Concert of Europe," p. 159.

Finally, scholars arguing that World War I marked the end of the Concert include K. J. Holsti, "Governance with government: polyarchy in nineteenth-century European International Politics" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 30-51; and Langhorne, "Development of International Conferences," p. 61; and Lauren, "Crisis Prevention," p. 36. Schroeder progressively extended his estimates to the end of the century, to WWI, or beyond in "The 19th-Century International System," (1986) and Transformation of European Politics (1994). Note that Langhorne seems to have contracted his assessment. Craig and George also have a hard time choosing between Crimean and WWI for the date of the Concert's demise in Force and Statecraft, pp. x, 30-33.
gathering and exchanging information and thus increasing transparency. Compared to when states were limited to bilateral diplomacy, multilateral forums should greatly hasten states' ability to establish negotiating positions, tender and consider proposals, and establish or shift coalitions. All these things should make what each state knows about others' capabilities and intentions more accurate. As argued in the theory section, more accurate threat assessments tend to reduce unwarranted fears, worst-case assumptions, optimistic miscalculation, and may also reduce fears of cheating. These are my hypotheses and it seems logical to expect that the Concert would confirm them. My results are more modest than expected.

I test the hypotheses by examining the cases to see if they evince the predicted behavior. I argued in the theory chapter that a key place for examining behavior and checking on the predictions is at turning points in crises. In these turning points, I will look for answers to the following sorts of questions: What explains why the crisis escalated or was diffused? What explains changes in states' behavior? How much of a role does transparency play in answering these questions? Seeing how well the predictions are confirmed will indicate what role transparency is playing.

Some confirmation of the predictions will occur if in fact the Concert helped states resolve their crises more peacefully, and with less tension and miscalculation, than the great powers experienced during the first partition of Poland. On a more fine-grained level, the predictions will be confirmed if, for example, actors' threat assessments become more benign during the crises and because of new information whose exchange was arguably facilitated by

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3 To reduce fears of cheating may be expecting too much from a discussion forum.
Concert diplomacy. Confirmations will also occur if misperceptions are corrected, if states' divergent interpretations of incidents or border locations evince more common ground, or if coalitions or bargaining positions shift. All of these changes must be based on new, more accurate information facilitated by the Concert.

A note on case selection. I examine the five most significant crises the Concert confronted in its early years: the crisis over Poland and Saxony in 1814/15, the rebellions in Naples and Spain in the early 1820s, the revolt in Greece also in the early 1820s, and the establishment of Belgian independence and neutrality in the early 1830s. As mentioned, these crises occurred when scholars agree that the Concert was most effective and coherent. Every major Congress and Conference of the period was convened to deal with one or more of these crises (except the one at Aix-la-Chapelle which is covered in the legal framework section that precedes the case-studies). 4

Selecting on crises ignores problems that may have been prevented altogether by Concert norms or other influences. Even though most scholars focus on the Concert's crises when discussing the Concert, some point out instances of dogs that don't bark. 5 I acknowledge this defect in my case selection while offering the following mitigating points. If Concert norms were strong enough to prevent many crises, why were nonetheless five or so major crises in the first fifteen years of the Concert, several of which involved serious war scares? Why, by my

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4 Congresses were attended by heads of state, while conferences were attended by foreign ministers. This is only a rough distinction; the meetings at Troppau and Laibach are usually described as Congresses even though they were attended by combinations of heads of state and lesser representatives. See Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 213-214.

5 Elrod, "Concert of Europe," p. 168 and Paul Schroeder, personal correspondence.
reading, did the management of these crises often involve considerable hardball politics and
evince few norms?

Many other factors could have rivaled Concert norms in their ability to prevent crises
including war weariness, ideological bonds, common fear of revolution, friendships built during
the Napoleonic wars, clarified power relationships as a result of the Napoleonic, and deterrence.
Given all the factors favoring tranquility, then it is perhaps remarkable that there were so many
crises and war scares in the Concert period. Those who argue that many dogs didn't bark also
have to explain the cacophony from the dog pound.

On a related note, many of these factors, including shared norms, might also increase
transparency. However, none of these possible peace-promoting influences, save for deterrence,
is as replicable today as the Concert's role as a crisis management forum.

To set the stage for the case studies of individual crises, this chapter begins by sketching
the origins and legal framework of the Concert. Then I examine the crises just listed above. The
conclusion has two main parts. The first explains my findings about transparency and the second
explains the implications of these findings for the literature and policy debates that focus on the
Concert.
The Formation and Legal Framework of the Concert

This section explains the origins of the Concert of Europe and thus allows examination of the whether the promise of increased transparency helped motivate states to form the Concert (H2). I argue that the Concert had its roots in the wartime alliance against Napoleon and that the Concert owes much of its existence to the momentum of that alliance and continued fear of a resurgent France. The Concert powers also feared revolution more generally and banded together to allay these concerns as well. While balance of threat theory explains most of the Concert's origins,\(^6\) H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation receives mild support because Britain's Foreign Minister Viscount Castlereagh, the prime architect of the Concert, expressed the hope in 1814 that the Concert-to-be would increase transparency.

The Concert of Europe took form through a series of military, political, and ideological treaties. The first of these, the Treaty of Chaumont, was signed by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia just prior to Napoleon's first defeat and abdication in March 1814. The allies agreed to continue the war against France, each maintaining 150,000 troops in the field for service against the "common Enemy"\(^7\) [France], and "most important, united them for twenty years in jointly maintaining peace."\(^8\) In May 1814, the First Treaty of Paris was signed by the allies and the

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\(^6\) Balance of threat theory posits that states ally with each other to secure themselves from threats and that threats are combinations of the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. For more, see Walt, *Origins of Alliances*.

\(^7\) Frederick H. Hartmann, ed., *Basic Documents of International Relations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1951), pp. 1-4. Quotes are from the text of the agreement, p. 3.

\(^8\) Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 501. The Treaty was signed on March 9, 1814 and backdated to March 1.
newly restored Bourbon government of France. This treaty returned France to its 1792 borders, exiled Napoleon to Elba, but did not extract any other concessions or reparations from France.

In September 1814, the Congress of Vienna met to chart Europe’s future. The Congress was a diplomatic fest of the highest order and included representatives from all the great powers and most of the lesser European states and principalities. Amidst an atmosphere of pomp and intrigue, the real work of the Congress was accomplished behind closed doors by the four victorious great powers, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Napoleon’s sweeping wars left many territorial issues unsettled. The Congress’ final act of June 1815 - a lengthy, formal, and detailed document - covered over one hundred territorial, governance, legal, and other issues. By so doing, it prescribed much of Europe’s borders and political order for at least a generation. While the Congress is widely recognized as the birthplace of the Concert of Europe, it continued to evolve over the course of several more treaties.

The alliance against France took a clearer turn toward broader Concert-like peace-maintaining purposes after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo when the Allies signed the Second Treaty of Paris, on November 20, 1815. While singling out the dangers of Bonapartism, the allies also expressed more general fears about revolution:

And as the same revolutionary principles which upheld the last criminal usurpation, might again, under other forms, convulse France, and thereby endanger the repose of other States; under these circumstances the High Contracting Parties...engage...to concert themselves...for the safety of their

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9 However, the idea gestated during the Napoleonic Wars, most concretely in William Pitt's Memorandum of 1805 in which he spoke of a European concert to restore and maintain peace in Europe. Pitt, a British Prime Minister, is widely recognized as having a strong influence on Castlereagh. See in particular Temperley and Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy, pp. 9-21 which includes a copy of the memorandum.
respective states, and for the general tranquillity of Europe.\textsuperscript{10}

Further, the Allies pledged to "renew their Meetings at fixed periods...for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe."\textsuperscript{11} The Concert of Europe thereby received "formal recognition" and its role as a discussion forum was codified.\textsuperscript{12} The Quadruple Alliance was expanded to include France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1818.\textsuperscript{13}

As early as 1814, the main founder of the Concert, Castlereagh, had an intuitive feel for how such a forum might increase transparency and how transparency might promote peace. Unfamiliar as he was with the social science lexicon of the late 20th century, Castlereagh did not say "transparency," but he talked about it. Castlereagh thought that if the great powers could continue to meet as a body, then:

many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and causes of irritation anticipated and met, by bringing the respective parties in unrestricted communications common to them all, and embracing in confidential and united discussion all the great points in which they were severally interested.\textsuperscript{14}

This statement mildly confirms H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation in that

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\textsuperscript{10} Webster, \textit{Foreign Policy of Castlereagh}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{11} Hartmann, \textit{Basic Documents}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{13} Simultaneously however, the Allies secretly renewed their Quadruple Alliance.
\textsuperscript{14} The quote is from the Earl of Ripon, who accompanied Castlereagh to Europe in 1814, in Webster, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh}, Vol. 2, p. 56.
\end{flushleft}
Castlereagh seems to believe that the promise of transparency helps adversaries make peace. Moreover, Castlereagh's statement also indicates an implicit understanding that transparency would reduce fears, tensions, and miscalculation (H3 and H4).

The Treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia on September 26, 1815, was the most ideological of the various treaties of the period. It also presaged the difficulties Britain would have with other Concert members. The "Three Contracting Monarchs" agreed to "take no other rule for their guidance" than the precepts of Christianity - "Justice, Charity, and Peace" and to give each other aid and assistance "on all occasions and in all places."15 All other European governments subsequently adhered to this treaty, except Turkey, the Papal States, and Great Britain. Recognizing that the British Parliament would never accept the terms of the Holy Alliance, the British Foreign Minister Castlereagh proposed that Britain unofficially subscribe to the Treaty. The Cabinet rejected this proposal, on the grounds that it was inconsistent with Britain's constitutional principles.16 Most states did not take the Holy Alliance seriously and signed on mostly to please Tsar Alexander.

This series of treaties provided the formal basis for the Concert of Europe (and thus show why the Concert may be considered a security regime). The treaties also show that, from the outset, liberal revolution was seen as a cause of the Napoleonic wars and that Britain's liberal-for-the-times ideology had begun to distance her from the more conservative powers.

15 Hartmann, Basic Documents, pp. 6-8. The language of this Treaty is wonderfully flowery, friendly, and religious.


The reader should know that very few besides Russia's Tzar Alexander took the Holy Alliance seriously. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, p. 59.
This pattern foreshadowed ensuing developments. Under restored Bourbon leadership, the liberal threat from France receded. But the conservative continental powers began to feel threatened by liberal revolutions in general. In response, they came to envision the Concert as an instrument to suppress revolutions. And suppress they did, starting in 1820. As a more liberal, and more distant, state, Britain was less threatened by these revolutions. Britain also espoused to a modest degree the principle of non-intervention. Thus, Britain opposed the conservative, interventionist turn of the Concert and ended up suspending discussions within the Concert. How did these events come about?

Conservative interventionist principles and British opposition to them began to take tangible form at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, September-November, 1818. At this Congress, Tsar Alexander proposed an Alliance Solidaire in which

...all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a common league guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things in thrones as well as territories, all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first power that offended either by her ambitions or by her revolutionary transgressions.

Castlereagh vigorously objected to this notion of a collective security system designed to interfere in the domestic politics of its members and it never got off the ground. Castlereagh's objections were based on practicality, the principle of non-interference, his view that the previous Treaties were designed only to counter potential revolutions in France alone, and his

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17 The Congress did take the significant steps of admitting France into the Concert of Europe, agreeing to withdraw the occupying armies, and settling France's indemnities.

18 Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, p. 148, quoting Castlereagh.

government's increasing suspicion of entangling alliances with the "military despots of the
Continent. It"\textsuperscript{2} Despite also rejecting Alexander's Alliance Solidaire proposal, Metternich, the
foreign minister of Austria, resisted Castlereagh's narrow interpretation of the Concert's Treaties
(see above, esp. the Second Treaty of Paris). According to Carsten Holbraad,

Metternich was anxious to extend the sphere of the Concert to the field of social
relations. The revolutionary movements not only presented an indirect threat to
the security of states and the peace of Europe; by undermining the social order,
they also endangered the future of civilization.\textsuperscript{21}

The debate over the Alliance Solidaire shows the importance of ideology to the various
conceptions the founders had of the Concert's purpose. But to truly decide the course of the
Concert in the face of revolution, it would take a revolution. And in 1820 there were two, one in
Spain (January) and the other in Naples (July). In response, and over the protests of Britain, Tsar
Alexander succeeded in gathering a conference of the great powers in Troppau in October, 1820.
The resulting protocol, signed only by Austria, Russia, and Prussia\textsuperscript{22} was clear:

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of
interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a
menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the

World (London, Great Britain: G. Bell and Sons, 1925), p. 7. There was significant domestic resistance to even the

See also a lengthy memo that Castlereagh delivered to the Congress in Webster, Congress of Vienna, pp. 187-93 as well
as Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 226-29, 248 and C.J. Bartlett, Castlereagh (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,

\textsuperscript{21} Concert of Europe, p. 29. Holbraad is using the kind of language found in Metternich's memoirs.

For more on Metternich's desire to transform the Concert into an instrument to suppress liberal revolutions see also
Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, pp. 4-5; Bartlett, Castlereagh, 161; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of

\textsuperscript{22} Although France did not sign, it still agreed with what the Eastern powers proposed. Webster, Foreign Policy of
Alliance...The Allied Powers...will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed.\textsuperscript{23}

The Troppau Protocol was rejected by the British Government in no uncertain terms.\textsuperscript{24} This created "an open and public breach with the Alliance."\textsuperscript{25} Despite these objections, Austria intervened in Italy to restore the Neapolitan king in early 1821.

This pattern repeated itself as the Concert confronted the Spanish rebellion. In October, 1822, at the Congress of Verona, the Eastern powers and a newly conservative France proposed intervening to put down the still festering revolution. With Canning now directing British foreign policy, the Britain's opposition was stronger than before.\textsuperscript{26} British objections were to no avail and France successfully suppressed the revolution in 1823. In the end, according to Temperley, Metternich thought the breach with England "was very fatal to the Congress system. Its essence was that Europe should present an entirely united front to cow the revolutionaries in all parts of Europe."\textsuperscript{27}

With this sketch of the formation, legal framework, and initial jockeying of the Concert in hand, it is time to progress to the case studies.


\textsuperscript{24} Webster, \textit{Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822}, pp. 298-306, esp. p. 304. However, Castlereagh personally supported Austria in its desire to intervene in Naples.

\textsuperscript{25} Webster, \textit{Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822}, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{26} Temperley, \textit{Foreign Policy of Canning}, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{27} Temperley, \textit{Foreign Policy of Canning}, p. 73. To be fair to Britain and history, Britain repeatedly participated in subsequent conferences and congresses, especially when threats to its interests or the general peace loomed large.
The Operation of the Concert of Europe: Case Studies

The case studies evince three transparency-related themes. First, even though the powers could all meet together, they still used many of the same diplomatic tools they did during the first partition of Poland, including secret letters, bilateral meetings, and formation of separate alliances. This shows in general terms that the availability of Concert diplomacy may not necessarily lead to an increase transparency. States are often highly motivated to be furtive and guard their secrets. This casts some doubt on the ability of the Concert to increase transparency (H1).

Second, it often took many months and years to resolve crises during the Concert period. Recall that the immediate events of the first partition of Poland took lasted over three years. This shows that Concert diplomacy did not necessarily hasten crisis resolution. Hastened crisis resolution is a sub-prediction or indicator that increased transparency may be at work, so its absence also casts doubt on my hypotheses, especially H1, H3 (reduced fears), and H4 (reduced miscalculation).

Third, as during the first partition of Poland, the Concert’s crises also involved war scares, fait accomplis, various manipulations of alliances, and often led to deals that preserved European great power peace at the expense of a lesser power. This third point indicates that the Concert period was not more peaceful than the preceding period, something which ought to be true if transparency is increased and its hypothesized effects are significant. After all, if it is not true

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28 Transparency issues aside, facilitating the exchange of secret letters, bilateral meetings, and the formation of separate alliances are contributions of Concert diplomacy.
that the security regime in some way promoted peace (SECURITY REGIME → P), then it is unlikely that the security regime increased transparency and this in turn promoted peace (SECURITY REGIME → T → P).

Poland and Saxony, late 1814 - early 1815

The most difficult and dangerous problem that arose during the Congress of Vienna involved the ultimate governance of the Kingdom of Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw (Poland). By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, treaties had already been signed (Teplitz, Kalisch, and Reichenbach) between Austria, Prussia, and Russia to peacefully partition Saxony, Poland, and other territories when the war was over. Russia, the dominant power in the region, wanted Poland and had 200,000 troops stationed there at war’s end. But some of Poland had been part of Prussia, so to placate Prussia, Russia backed giving it long-coveted Saxony in exchange.

This plan raised fears in both England and Austria. If Russia obtained Poland, Russian power would be projected deep into central Europe. Central Europe would then no longer be strong enough to serve as a counterweight to either French or Russian expansion. For Austria in particular, Prussian expansion into Saxony would boost its influence throughout greater Germany and give Prussia a much longer border with Austria.

Russia’s plan, backed by military force in place, amounted to a fait accompli.29 At the Congress in September 1814, England’s representative Viscount Castlereagh began to present

29 Transformation of European Politics, p. 524.
arguments against the plan to Tsar Alexander. Castlereagh sought a "just equilibrium" in
Europe and for him this meant a strong central Europe.\textsuperscript{30} Alexander held firm and Castlereagh
began efforts to unite Austria and Prussia against Russia. He wanted it made clear to Russia that
the rest of Europe would not grant legitimacy to Russia's virtual annexation of Poland. Prussia
would not join this effort until its claims to Saxony received conditional support from Austria's
representative, Metternich. Even after Prussia obtained this support, continued bickering
between Austria and Prussia almost broke up their nascent coalition. In the face of mounting
resistance, Alexander became increasingly strident. This was part of an October 22 meeting
between Alexander and France's representative Talleyrand:

\begin{quote}
Alexander: "I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw. Let them
drive me out if they can! I have given Saxony to Prussia; and Austria consents."
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Talleyrand: "I do not know that. I should find it difficult to believe, it is so
decidedly against her own interests. But can the consent of Austria give to Prussia
what belongs to the King of Saxony?"
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Alexander: "If the King of Saxony refuses to abdicate, he shall be led to Russia;
where he will die." The Tsar continued: "You are always speaking to me of
principles. Your public law is nothing to me: I don't understand all that. What do
you think are all your parchments and treaties to me?" Talleyrand wrote: "I had
reminded him of the treaty by which the allies had agreed that the duchy of
Warsaw should be shared by the three courts.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

This is the sort of discussion that shows H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension,
or Conflict in action. Talleyrand and Alexander are clarifying their differences, making claims

\textsuperscript{30} Webster, \textit{Congress of Vienna}, p. 118.

about relative power on the ground, and giving some indications of how they view the stakes involved in this crisis. In this case, the crisis almost led to war. But it also led to the secret alliance described below. Thus, to some extent, H6 can be seen leading to H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

According to Edward Vose Gulick, "war talk had become widespread at the congress from October on." The French representative Blacas expected that "Europe would remain in a feverish state, which sooner or later must end in war." By November 11, tensions had risen to the point where Castlereagh wrote home:

Unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of public conduct, the peace which we have so dearly purchased will be of short duration.32

It may be possible that bringing so many diplomats together in close quarters might allow talk of war to spread faster than if diplomacy was limited to bilateral means. In this way, H6 could lead to more miscalculation, not less as suggested above. This is an area for further study.

Despite the talk of war, it was clear that Russia would not budge and eventually (by next May) Russia received the lion's share of Poland. The prospect of Russia's inevitable success in Poland frightened Prussia's Hardenberg, as the agreed-upon support from Austria and Britain for his claims to Saxony were conditional on a less lopsided outcome in Poland. Further, a satiated

32 in Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 223.

33 A November 11 letter from Castlereagh in Vienna to Liverpool quoted in Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 123. On December 5, Castlereagh wrote again:

Upon the existing state of affairs, extremely entangled in themselves, my opinion is, that it may unexpectedly assume a better aspect, but that it may equally lead to a total stagnation, and that, it may, as Europe is more extensively armed than at any former period, suddenly end in war.

Castlereagh to Liverpool from Vienna, in Webster, British Diplomacy, pp. 251-52.
Russia might be less inclined to support Prussia's position. Having lost its way on Poland, Austria dug in its heels on Saxony and tensions rose between Austria and Prussia. Castlereagh proposed to Prussia that it accept a limited part of Saxony and receive compensation elsewhere. This outcome was unacceptable to Prussia, and Hardenberg and other Prussian representatives began to talk of war. Prussia also readied its armies and fortified Dresden. On December 30, Hardenberg stated that annexation of the whole of Saxony was necessary for Prussia's reconstruction and that refusal of other terms to recognize that was "tantamount to a declaration of war." Castlereagh termed this "a most alarming and unheard-of menace."\(^{34}\)

These rising tensions made Austria and Britain accept Talleyrand's December 23 offer of alliance with France. On January 3, 1815 the three powers signed a secret treaty in which each promised to supply 150,000 troops in case of attack. The treaty strengthened the backbones of Metternich and Castlereagh in their continued discussions with Hardenberg, and Hardenberg began to yield. Within one day, news of the secret alliance appears to have reached Alexander who then withdrew Russian support of Prussia's all-or-nothing position and urged a compromise partition of Saxony.\(^{35}\) Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, was then without allies and was forced to accept a compromise in which it received two-fifths of Saxony and portions of the Rhineland. The formation and quick leak of the 'secret' alliance was the turning point.

This turning point supports H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. Plans were

\(^{34}\) in Webster *British Diplomacy*, pp. 277-278.

\(^{35}\) Castlereagh met with Alexander on January 4, just one day after the treaty was signed (by my reading of Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, p. 135). At this meeting, Alexander asked him if the rumors of the treaty were true and Castlereagh answered in a way that "could have left him little doubt."
changed based on new information whose provision was facilitated by the regime, reducing miscalculation (which would have been the case if Russia and Prussia had persisted with their demands in the face of ever more determined opposition). The regime also made it easier to form the secret alliance in the first place.

For its part, Saxony was forced to accept the outcome in terms as stark as those facing Prussia. Britain and France agreed upon their coercive position towards the King of Saxony: "We [Britain] say that we will support the King of Prussia, our Ally, in Saxony until suitable concessions are made to him. France says that she will cease to support her Ally, the King of Saxony, if he refuses to make good the cessions agreed upon."36

ASSessment

TRANSPARENCY ASSESSMENT To assess the role of transparency in this crisis, one must look at how the problems that created the crisis were resolved. Two problems were dealt with during this crisis, Russia’s annexation of Poland and Prussia’s claims to compensation. Russia succeeded and Prussia’s claims were clipped back. In both cases, - albeit with some risk, power relationships were made clear and then were no longer contested. States changed their behavior when they learned more about their adversary’s commitment or power, or of new alliances. This involved a combination of H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

36 Castlereagh to Liverpool from Vienna, January 11, 1815, in Webster, British Diplomacy, p. 284, italics in original.
The most crucial turning point(s) were the events leading up to Prussia's diplomatic retreat. Concert diplomacy facilitated the making of the secret alliance and Concert diplomacy also let news of the alliance reach Alexander efficiently (see footnote 35). Thus, Concert diplomacy enabled the efforts that ended up clarifying intentions and capabilities. When Prussia's then backed down, its hot-headed optimism was revealed to be something of a miscalculation. In sum, H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict, and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation receive some support.

There are several similarities between this case and the partition of Poland: the great powers squabbled over spoils and successfully ended up carving up smaller powers and thereby fending off larger conflict. These rough similarities between the causes of the crises and ways in which they were resolved suggest that Concert diplomacy may not have been necessary to resolve the Poland-Saxony crisis and that bilateral diplomacy may have been sufficient. On the other hand, the pace at which diplomats were able to respond to increases in the threat of war with clearer and firmer alignments and policies suggests a more positive contribution of the Concert. The path was rocky, but it is reasonable to assume that the probability of war would have been higher if the Concert states had not been able to meet in congress. In the terms used by this thesis, the forum facilitated Type III, confrontational transparency and this in turn offers support to H1 and H4. 


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GENERAL ASSESSMENT  Turning to a more general assessment of this crisis, Schroeder optimistically argues that in this case "balance of power tactics were tried and failed." Yet he also says that Russia prevailed "hands down" with its *fait accompli* due to its "big battalions," and that power helped "force" concessions from Prussia.\textsuperscript{38} Schroeder writes that Russia forced concessions to save the alliance,\textsuperscript{39} but that boils down to saving the alliance from Russia's own belligerent policy. Russia reduced the costs of its *fait accompli* by transferring those costs onto Prussia (by making Prussia accept less than it sought and less than it had been promised).

Some credit for the peaceful outcome of this episode is in fact due to the shared moderation of the Concert states. Kissinger and Schroeder agree that no state truly wanted war. That said, moderation certainly does not explain Russia's *fait accompli* and accompanying stubbornness. Moderation may explain why the *fait accompli* was let stand by the other states, but even this argument is weak. Russia's dominant and *in situ* power and its commitment to gaining Poland seem much more convincing ingredients in explaining why Russia succeeded, even in Schroeder's account. The other powers simply could not do much to force Russia out. They were moderated by reality. Russia held all the cards: capabilities x intentions x credibility = a winning combination.

Moderation may also explain why Prussia allowed itself to be coerced or why Russia helped coerce Prussia. But here again a realist explanation seems more persuasive. Beyond the

\textsuperscript{37}(...continued)  
*Policy of Castlereagh*, vol. 1, pp. 122, 327-387.

\textsuperscript{38} *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 537-38.

\textsuperscript{39} *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 558.
simple observation that moderation certainly does not describe Prussia’s attitude, one can not accurately tell the story of the coercion of Prussia without reference to the much greater relative power of Russia over Prussia and to the fact that the stakes involved a choice between avoiding war or helping Prussia.

Overall, this crisis and its resolution is a story of tough power politics combined with lesser elements of moderation, legitimacy, and compensation. Concert diplomacy helped clarify stakes and alignments. The role of transparency was to facilitate power politics, not moderate it.

The Rebellions in Naples and Spain

When a military-led revolution broke out in Spain in January of 1820, the only great power concerned at first was Russia. For years, Russia had been advancing the idea that the alliance should evolve into an anti-revolutionary league\(^{40}\) and Russia soon called for a great power congress to confront the Spanish revolt. Russia’s call languished until another revolt broke out in Naples in July. Naples adopted the same liberal constitution as that taken up by the Spanish revolutionaries. Austria wanted to intervene in Naples to restore conservative order in

\(^{40}\) At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, September-November, 1818, Tsar Alexander proposed an Alliance Solidaire in which

...all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a common league guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things in thrones as well as territories, all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first power that offended either by her ambitions or by her revolutionary transgressions.

In Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, vol. 2, p. 148, quoting Castlereagh. Castlereagh opposed and defeated the Tsar’s idea with strong arguments that the alliance was not designed to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and was only designed to confront attempts at universal dominion. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle also agreed to withdraw the occupying armies from France, formally invited France into the congress/conference system, and secretly renewed the Quadruple Alliance against France, just in case.
its Italian satellite. France began to call for a congress as well. As at Aix, Britain opposed any allied steps towards a general policy of suppressing revolutions and it opposed a congress. On the other hand, Britain (and particularly Castlereagh) was willing to grant Austria the right to intervene on the grounds of self-defense. Prussia had little influence on these debates.

What were the interests for each country? Russia, under the eccentric and moody Tsar Alexander, saw itself as the leader of a new Europe. It would be a Europe unified under Christian, somewhat liberal principles. Russia wanted to intervene in Spain and then Naples because it feared military revolts and did not want to legitimize constitutions imposed at gunpoint. Somewhat paradoxically, Russia also wanted the interventions to serve progressive constitutional ends. France was initially unconcerned about the Spanish uprising because of its own domestic turmoil, because it was itself mildly liberal at the time, and because it did not perceive any significant threats arising from the revolt. However, when the Austrians proposed intervening in Naples, it raised the perennial issue of the French and Austrian competition for influence in Italy. In response, France sought a great-power conference in order to restrain and gain leverage over Austria. In October 1821, the French government took a reactionary turn and began to feel more threatened by the ongoing turmoil in Spain.

The revolutions posed the least threat to Great Britain because it was more liberal and more geographically isolated than the other powers. Nonetheless, Britain had interests in Spain where it had recently fought Napoleon and especially in Portugal which it was bound by treaty to defend and where it had long-term ties. Britain wanted to prevent the other powers from gaining influence on the peninsula. In May 1820, Castlereagh issued his well-known circular spelling out Britain’s policy on non-intervention and more general views on the purposes of the alliance:
...The present state of Spain no doubt seriously extends the political
Agitation in Europe, but it must be admitted that there is no portion of Europe of
equal magnitude, in which such a Revolution could have happened, less likely to
menace other States with that direct and imminent danger which has always been
regarded, at least in this Country, as alone constituting the Case which would
justify external interference...the notion of revising, limiting or regulating the
course of such Experiments [governance based on "the Representative Principle"],
either by foreign Council or by foreign force, would be as dangerous to avow as it
would be impossible to execute...In this Alliance...nothing is more likely to impair
or even destroy its real utility, than any attempt to push its duties and obligations
beyond the Sphere which its original Conception and understood principles will
warrant: - It was a union for the Reconquest and liberation of a great portion of
the Continent of Europe from the Military Dominion of France...It never was
however intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or for the
Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.41

Some of these principles and the manner of their presentation were geared for British domestic
and parliamentary consumption. Castlereagh in fact supported an Austrian intervention - but
only if it did so on the basis of self-defense and only if it kept the alliance out of it.

Austria was caught between British and Russian policies. Britain was Austria’s closest
ally and together they formed a bulwark against Russian influence. Britain privately supported a
conservative restoration, but not allied action to do so. Russia wanted concerted allied action,
but to install regimes more liberal than Austria - the most conservative of the powers - preferred.
But Austria needed Russia’s backing. Without it, Austria feared the sending a large force into
Southern Italy and leaving Russia greater freedom of action in Northern Europe. And as Webster
noted: [Metternich] "would do nothing until he heard from the Tsar. One word of
encouragement from the North and all Italy and Germany would rise. Men must be clearly

41 Excerpts taken from a reprint of the circular in Temperley and Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign
Policy, pp. 47-63.
shewn that Russia was backing Austria, not the revolution."\textsuperscript{42}

According to Metternich, Austria was on the horns of dilemma: "Austria considers everything with reference to the \textit{substance}...Russia wants above all the \textit{form}; Britain wants the \textit{substance} without the \textit{form}...It will be our task to combine the \textit{impossibilities} of Britain with the \textit{modes} of Russia."\textsuperscript{43} Ideally, Austria had to get Russia’s blessing without causing a break with Britain.

In the end, Russia’s support was more important and Metternich risked a rupture with Britain. In late 1820, a congress was held at Troppau, with Russia, Austria, and Prussia represented by plenipotentiaries and France and Britain by observers. The three Eastern powers issued the Troppau Protocol on November 19 which stated in part:

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance...The Allied Powers...will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed...\textsuperscript{44}

Lord Charles Stewart, the British representative, returned from a visit to Vienna to find himself presented with the Protocol already signed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. He protested this fait accompli. Britain and France refused to sign. This shows how a document which was intended to express and consolidate norms instead ended up highlighting rifts in the Concert. This episode offers some support for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Foreign Policy of Castlereagh}, vol. 2, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{43} Quoted in Kissinger, \textit{World Restored}, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{44} Cresson, \textit{Holy Alliance}, p. 99. "European Alliance" refers to the Holy Alliance.
When states break out or defect from agreements (or in this case, refuse to sign) it sends a signal of malign intent and/or divergent interests.\textsuperscript{45}

Nonetheless, Austria's plans were blessed by the Troppau Protocol and Austria sent troops to crush the Naples revolt in early 1821. In theory, this joint blessing may have reduced miscalculation (combining H1 and H4). However, it does not seem like much miscalculation was really in the air.

As the Austrian troops were en route, another revolt sprang up in Piedmont. By this time, a mutiny in St. Petersburg and the counsels of Metternich had combined to make the Tsar drop his liberal-leaning ideas and become more reactionary. Ninety thousand Russian troops were called up as a reserve to the Austrians and to deter the French from intervening. In short order, the Austrians prevailed in both Naples and Piedmont.

With regard to the revolt in Spain, Britain again wanted to avoid making it an issue for the Concert powers. Britain wanted to keep France out and avoid further damage to its relations with Austria. Russia offered to lead an 'international army' to quash the Spanish rebellion by sending its troops across Europe and into Spain. This was a scary prospect for the other powers, especially Austria, and preventing Russian intervention was one reason that Metternich so quickly supported action by France. France at first wanted to keep the matter out of alliance hands as well, but ended up supporting a Congress at Verona which convened starting in October 1822. In order to assuage the British - who again only sent an observer - Metternich persuaded the four conservative powers to send simultaneous notes to Spain in an attempt to peacefully

\textsuperscript{45} For more on this, see the discussion of the Tripwire/Defection Signaling Hypothesis on p. 379.
change the liberal Spanish government. But France refused to send its note, and with the backing of the three Eastern powers, France invaded Spain and restored Ferdinand VII in April 1823. Canning, Castlereagh's successor, obtained French assurances that the invasion would be temporary and that Portugal's independence would be respected.

Again, this joint blessing may have reduced miscalculation (combining H1 and H4). In this case though, Britain's interests were more explicitly taken into account. It is therefore possible that H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation receive a bit more support. However, the next paragraph indicates that the diplomacy surrounding these revolutions did more to fracture the Concert than take Britain's interests into account. Indeed, the Concert's coherence suffered precisely because of Britain's objections to the interventions and the way these objections were handled.

The revolutions showed that "common action was no longer possible...because the insular and the Continental conceptions of danger had become incompatible."\textsuperscript{46} When Britain rejected the Troppau Protocol, it started a "doctrinal controversy and propaganda war [that] would last for decades [and produced] the first open break between Britain and the Holy Alliance."\textsuperscript{47} Canning wrote of Verona: "The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy...and so things are getting back

\textsuperscript{46} Kissinger, \textit{World Restored}, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{47} Schroeder, \textit{Transformation of European Politics}, p. 611.
to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all." According to
Temperley, Metternich thought the breach with England "was very fatal to the Congress
system." Although peacetime conferences and congresses became a routine part of international
relations, a number of scholars including Robert Jervis and Richard Rosecrance trace the decline
of the Concert back to this period.

ASSESSMENT

Concert diplomacy helped clarify the great powers' intentions and a mild counterfactual
argument can be made that, because of this, some miscalculation was averted. The first potential
conflict that may have been prevented was a clash between France and Austria over Italy.
Discussions, the Troppau declaration, and Russia's backing of Austria all made the remote
possibility of Franco-Austro conflict even more remote. Second, however unlikely, Russia's
scheme to march a Russian army through Europe was fraught with danger and possible
miscalculation. Concerted diplomacy helped dissuade Tsar Alexander from following through

a seemingly authoritative book, but lacking footnotes.

49 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827, p. 73.

50 Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 178; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, pp. 272-273; and Rosecrance, action and
Reaction in World Politics. For the general information presented in this section, see Roy Bridge, "Allied Diplomacy in
(London, Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1979); Roger Bullen, "The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-
European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Schroeder,
Transformation of European Politics, pp. 606-614, 621-623; Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, chapters 1, 3, 4; and
Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, pp. 228-347.
with his plan. It appears that H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation is supported to the extent that a Franco-Austrian war was averted by Concert diplomacy and to the extent that Russia's plans were changed based on new information whose provision was facilitated by the regime.

However, it is not clear that Concert diplomacy added much to what regular diplomacy could have achieved. Remember that in the Poland-Saxony crisis, a secret alliance was formed on January 3, 1815 and Castlereagh tacitly told Alexander about it the next day. This was a very rapid change of events and a very specific transmission of information that were clearly facilitated by Concert/forum diplomacy. Here though, the value added of Concert diplomacy is much more difficult to discern. I can not identify moments where crisis resolution was greatly speeded-up or where specific information really changed the course of events. In the end, the most threatened powers intervened against the threats and the least threatened power sat out. Thus, despite initial appearances, H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation does not receive convincing support.

It may even be that transparency helped worsen relations in the case of the rebellions. Each time an intervener got permission to intervene by fellow conservative powers, it isolated or angered Britain. By seeking joint blessing, interveners reduced their ability to fudge or finesse the issue with Britain. Thus, Concert diplomacy ironically ended up clarifying that tensions had increased between Britain and the continent and showing that the Concert had lost a good bit of its unity and coherence. This offers some support for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict. However, it would be hard to blame the Concert for adding much to the tensions when the outcome was really determined by the positions and interests of each state as
they confronted the two rebellions.

The Revolt in Greece

In early 1821, Christians in Greece and in the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rebelled against their Muslim Turkish rulers. By March 1821, over one-third of the forty thousand Turks in Morea (Southern Greece) had been killed. This quickly led to Turkish counter-atrocities, including the killing of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople on the door of his cathedral on Easter Sunday (April), 1821. Had this been a liberal revolution somewhere else, it might have been simple just letting the Sultan suppress the revolution, perhaps with the help of conservative Concert members. But Russia's views toward the revolt were far more complicated. Russia had traditionally viewed itself as the protector of the Orthodox faith and was motivated to intervene to protect its fellow faithful. Many of Alexander's advisors sided with the Greeks and counseled accordingly. Alexander's most influential advisor on the area, Capo d'Istria, was a Greek noble. In addition to Russia's religious kinship with the Greeks, Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been competing for influence and control throughout the Balkans and in the Caucasus for years. Russia had long sought control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles and each new chink in the Ottoman's rusting armor presented opportunity and temptation to Russia.

Austria was the European (non-Turkish) power most threatened by the possibility of Russian intervention. Not only was Austria Europe's the most reactionary state and thus harbored a deep fear of revolution, but the Balkan turmoil was right on its doorstep. Austria
favored a weakened but whole Ottoman Empire to a Russia strengthened by conquest combined with land grabs of Ottoman leftovers by the other powers. Austria favored a quick suppression of the revolt by the Turks. Britain shared Austria's attitude with regard to relative Russian and Ottoman strength. If Russia fought Turkey, "she would gobble up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next."51 Unlike Austria, however, Britain also sought to maintain free trade and access to its colonies throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Although some in France wanted Russia to intervene, breaking up the 1815 order and opening up the possibility of France's recovery of the Rhineland, cooler heads prevailed. France ultimately favored restraining Russia and foregoing the risks of turmoil and the benefits of possible expansion. Due to their shared Christian heritage and philhellenic leanings, a significant portion of European public opinion supported a Russian intervention.

In July 1821 Russia issued an ultimatum to the Turks insisting that they protect the rights of Christians and broke relations with the Turks. War between Russia and Turkey seemed imminent. Metternich set out to convince the Tsar not to intervene. As British interests were now threatened, Castlereagh rejoined European diplomacy and added his voice to Metternich's. With Metternich in the lead, they appealed to the Tsar's pro-Concert and anti-revolutionary feelings. They reminded him of his pledges not to act unilaterally. They gave the Tsar credit for creating the European Alliance and urged him not to wreck it. At the same time, they also tried to convince Alexander that the rebels were not Christian victims in need of being saved by the Muslim Turks. Instead, they painted the rebels as ordinary but dangerous liberal revolutionaries,

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51 Canning, quoted in Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, p. 52.
worthy of being crushed by Turkey. Metternich arranged for numerous diplomatic and police reports to descend on Alexander from around Europe attesting to the spread of revolutionary sentiment and the dangers of revolution.

Here Concert diplomacy and other diplomatic means are being deployed for what is essentially a deception plan. This undercuts H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. H1 is further undercut because the role of Concert diplomacy itself should be downplayed. Here's why. The 1822 Congress of Verona took place during the Greek revolt. Alexander had hoped that he could dominate the Congress with the subject of the revolt. He was foiled and the Greek Revolt took a back seat to the situation in Spain (see above) at the Congress. While not completely off the table, "it was a matter of common courtesy not to mention Turkish difficulties at Verona."\textsuperscript{52}

By mid-1822, Alexander had been persuaded not to go to war, however morally satisfying or lucrative it may have been. He acted to save the alliance, his Holy Alliance. This is the turning point in the crisis, but the discussion in the previous and forthcoming paragraphs cast doubt on the value of Concert diplomacy in doing anything other than facilitating the deception that helped stop Alexander.

Schroeder calls Alexander's decision a "triumph of diplomacy over the use of force" and the "easiest and simplest" counter-realist example of a state that has "foregone concrete material advantages for the sake of moral principle."\textsuperscript{53} In the words of Alexander:

\textsuperscript{52} Nichols, \textit{European Pentarchy}, p. 254 (quoting Gentz, the Austrian publicist).

\textsuperscript{53} \\textit{Transformation of European Politics}, p. 621.
I could have permitted myself to be swept along by the enthusiasm for the Greeks, but I have never forgotten the impure origin of the rebellion of the danger of my intervention for my allies. Egotism is no longer the basis of policy. The principles of our truly Holy Alliance are pure.\textsuperscript{54}

There is no doubt that Alexander at this point embodied elements of visionary idealism and that his behavior offers some support for an optimistic interpretation of the Concert.

But while Schroeder emphasizes Alexander’s autonomy in choosing to avoid war, Kissinger makes the Tsar out to be Metternich’s dupe. If Alexander was an idealist, he was also swimming amid self-interested statesmen whose only purpose in talking about principle was to restrain a Russia who might otherwise act against their national interests.

Here, the mechanism that is supposed to increase transparency (Concert/concerted diplomacy) is actually being used to pull the wool over Alexander's eyes. This seems, in terms of my hypotheses, tantamount to increasing miscalculation and therefore provides disconfirming evidence for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. The information provided or facilitated by the regime in some sense fostered miscalculation. Duping Alexander may well have served the cause of great power peace, but peace certainly was not promoted by increasing transparency.

After Alexander decided not to intervene, the pro-Greek Capo d’Istria resigned and testified to Austria’s pernicious influence by commenting that ”'with friends like Austria, Russia did not need enemies.”\textsuperscript{55} Metternich cared little for Russia or principle and held Alexander’s pliability in contempt:

\textsuperscript{54} Quoted in Kissinger, \textit{A World Restored}, p. 308.

\textsuperscript{55} paraphrased by Schroeder in \textit{Transformation of European Politics}, p. 621.
After having robbed the world of a few months of peace, the Emperor Alexander takes his head in his hands and presents himself before me with the request that I explain its content to him....[He] wants to find his way in a labyrinth and asks his old Ariadne for yarn.\textsuperscript{56}

On the question of whether or not Alexander was an idealist or a dupe, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. In the words of Matthew Anderson, Alexander was willing to have his hands tied.\textsuperscript{57}

By 1825, however, Alexander was getting frustrated with his allies. The allies had only supported lukewarm and ineffective measures to end the continuing turmoil. He felt he had not received the "reciprocity of services which he had a right to expect," especially in light of Russia's backing of the respective Austrian and French interventions in Naples and Spain.\textsuperscript{58} The continued fighting in Greece also led the Turks to request Egyptian assistance and in February a large Egyptian army landed in the Morea. In December, Alexander died and was replaced by Nicholas I - a Tsar with much less commitment to the Concert. Meanwhile, the Russians had been spreading word that the Egyptians planned to depopulate and transplant (ethnic cleansing?) the Moreans and colonize Greece with Africans. The European consensus against intervention began to slip especially as France came to support a generalized European intervention. In sum, a variety of factors made Russian intervention increasingly likely.

As Metternich's influence over Russian policy ebbed, the burden of restraining Russia

\textsuperscript{56} Quoted in Kissinger, \textit{A World Restored}, p. 304. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, 3 \textit{ed.}, computer ed., Ariadne was "the daughter of Minos and Pasiphaë who gave Theseus the thread with which he found his way out of the Minotaur's labyrinth."

\textsuperscript{57} "Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-1841," in Sked, ed., \textit{Europe's Balance of Power}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{58} Temperley quoting Alexander in \textit{Foreign Policy of Canning}, p. 339.
fell on Britain. And as war seemed more likely, the only technique left to Britain was to join Russia to restrain it. By cooperating with Russia, Canning also hoped to further his goal of destroying the Congress system. On April 4, 1826, Russia and Britain signed the St. Petersburg Protocol which called for mediation between the Turks and the Greeks with the aim of giving full autonomy to the Greeks. This "diplomatic fiasco" tied Britain to "a vague, indefinitely expansible Russian programme which the Turks were sure to reject and the Greeks had already spurned but also...expressly authorized Russia to pursue its aims [Greek autonomy] with or without Britain and without limits as to time or means." Not only had Britain failed to constrain anything, but continental statesmen were "dismayed at seeing an Anglo-Russian solution in the Near East imposed on them over their heads."^59

With Austria ever more isolated, France adopted the goals of the St. Petersburg Protocol by signing the Treaty of London with Britain and Russia in July of 1827. The Treaty had a secret clause in which, if the Turks did not agree to an armistice in Greece, the three powers would impose one by a united naval effort. In October 1827, the allied fleet sunk a Turco-Egyptian fleet in the Bay of Navarino, killing 4000 men. With full-scale war between Turkey and Russia imminent, Britain and Austria rejected a French suggestion that Russia be allowed to occupy the Danubian principalities in order to coerce Turkey. Instead, they occupied Morea themselves and told Russia to go no further. Russia decided to fight the Turks anyway and declared war in April 1828.^60

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^60 The sources consulted for the general history in this section include Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *The Concert of Europe*:  (continued...)

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ASSESSMENT

The main turning point in this crisis was when Alexander was convinced and duped not to intervene. This episode provides a cautionary tale about the how mechanisms which are supposed to increase transparency may be used to manipulate the truth. It is certainly true that anything that either transfers or generates information can also transfer or generate false information. If the efforts of security regimes to increase transparency often have malign effects, then considerable doubt would be cast on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation (as well as on H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H3: Transparency Reduces Un warranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions to lesser extents).

None of my research suggests that malign effects of transparency are frequent or that security regimes in general frequently do more harm than good. Still, the questions that need answering are when, how often, and under what conditions do mechanisms that increase transparency make deception easier? 61

The example of the Greek crisis alone is not sufficient to fully answer these questions, but Alexander’s dupability suggests a key variable upon which deception depends. Not surprisingly, the degree to which transparency may help or hinder deception likely depends to a large extent on

60 (...continued)

61 The sections on the limitations of transparency theory in the methodology chapter discuss these questions in the abstract.
the vigilance of states and their leaders.\textsuperscript{62} This reinforces the findings of the surprise attack branch of the misperception literature which shows that states often have blinders on (see literature review section on misperception, p. 49.)

This variable is intuitively sound, and Metternich did use Concert diplomacy (and norms, to the extent they existed in Alexander's head) to manipulate Alexander. However, it is questionable whether Concert diplomacy significantly helped the deception because Alexander could well have been deceived in any era. In one corner we have Alexander, an eccentric and manipulable fellow. In the other corner, we have Metternich, a skillful and wily diplomat aided by like-minded allies. Given this matchup, it is hard to believe that more or less use of Concert diplomacy or more or less transparency would have made much of a difference.

Another reason to discount the role of Concert diplomacy in this episode is that much of the diplomacy was bilateral (such as the meeting between Metternich and Castlereagh in Hanover in November 1821 where they concocted to send similar messages to Russia)\textsuperscript{63} or largely unilateral (most of Metternich's disinformation campaign). This means that to the extent that policy recommendations based on the Concert are based on this incident, they are: 1. not really based that much on Concert diplomacy and 2. based a lot on Alexander's personality.

\textit{Independence of Belgium}

\footnote{It obviously involves a number of factors such as the 'spoofability' of transparency-increasing technology, of a peacekeeping operation, or of any other mechanism (see predictions about mechanisms for a more complete list).}

\footnote{Temperley, \textit{Foreign Policy of Canning}, p. 323.}
For hundreds of years, the area of the Netherlands/Belgium/Luxemburg had been a source of tension and a flashpoint for European wars. For the thirty years prior to its 1830 revolt, Belgium had been something of a European football. During the Napoleonic wars, Belgium had been part of France. The 1815 Vienna settlement attached Belgium to the Dutch Netherlands in order to create a stronger buffer against France. But, in August of 1830, the Belgians began to rebel against Dutch rule. At the end of September, the Dutch had appealed to all the great powers save France for military help in suppressing the revolt. Russia and Prussia, the conservative Eastern Powers, were most favorable to intervention. In October, the Belgians declared their independence and on November 4, all five great powers met in London to discuss the problem.

Remembering Napoleon and aware of France's perennial appetite for Belgium, Europe feared French intervention (and this was why the Dutch did not request French help). France in turn feared the consequences of a British or Prussian intervention. Russia mobilized intervention forces, but would not act unilaterally and was soon hamstrung by more proximate problems when Poland against it rebelled against it in November 1830. With everyone fearing intervention more than rebellion, the conference agreed in fairly short order to allow Belgium's separation. By late January 1831, the great powers had issued several joint Protocols specifying Belgium's new borders, guaranteeing its independence (primarily from the French), and providing for freedom of navigation on rivers.

Unfortunately, the conference left Luxemburg occupied by Belgian troops and this caused a crisis by Summer 1831. On August 2, the Dutch attacked Belgium, and Belgium appealed to France for help. France quickly entered Belgium and convinced Holland to bring its troops
home. France then reversed a promise to withdraw its own troops and left its forces in Belgium pending a full settlement between Belgium and Holland and resolution of France’s concerns over fortresses on the Belgian border with France. Britain became alarmed at the French occupation and feared private negotiations between France and Belgium. In mid-August, Palmerston, the new British Foreign Minister, wrote, "It is a question of war or peace." Grey, the British Prime Minister wrote:

The French must not remain in Belgium on any pretext whatever. To insist on the demolition of fortresses before leaving would be inconsistent with policy and justice, as they have a sufficient assurance that they will be dismantled. Public opinion in England is already excited, and any appearance of bad faith on the part of France would kindle a flame which would make war inevitable. 64

France’s King Louis-Philippe, a generally pacific leader, waffled in responding to British concerns. Palmerston wrote again "One thing is certain, the French must go out of Belgium, or we shall have a general war, and war in a few days." Prussia began to threaten to move into the Rhine Provinces and Russia’s hands were soon to be untied because the Polish revolt was almost fully extinguished. Britain took the diplomatic lead and (with the support of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian ambassadors to France) had by September 9 convinced the French to leave Belgium.

This was a turning point. The others powers were able to clarify and underscore their desire to have France leave. This supports H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H4:


65 Omond, "Belgium," p. 145.
Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. Support is tempered by the fact that much of the diplomacy seemed to take place, not at the London conference, but in Paris.

Even though the French occupation had been dealt with, matters between Belgium and Holland were left unresolved. On October 15, the ongoing London conference came up with another plan for settling the situation. Among its numerous provisions, the Twenty-four Articles called for Luxemburg to be partitioned between Belgium and Holland. By January 1832, the Articles had been presented to Belgium and Holland, accepted by the former and rejected by the latter, and had been ratified by Britain and France. Expressing a wide range of frustrations, the Eastern powers delayed ratification until late Spring.

By October 1832, the Dutch King still rejected the Articles and was hindering shipping on the Scheldt river. The great powers concurred that the time had come to step up pressure on the Dutch. The Eastern powers wanted to apply economic pressure on Holland, but the British and French thought that these measures were insufficient and would delay things more than resolve them. Palmerston and the French chargé d'affaires agreed that the "non-fulfillment [of a treaty] exposes the Peace of Europe to constant and increasing peril."66 Again this suggests that breaking of treaties can have a signaling function and thus increase transparency. This idea is further developed on page 379.

On October 22, the British and French agreed to joint sea and land operations to get the Dutch out of Antwerp, free-up shipping, and restore other territories in the low countries to their allotted Belgian or Dutch owners. Russia left the conference, Austria and Prussia protested, but

French troops re-entered Belgium on November 15 while the British blockaded the Scheldt.67 According to Schroeder, this affront to the Eastern powers "caused suspension of the conference and created a war scare more serious than any earlier one."68 Metternich tried to coordinate a response by the conservative Eastern powers, but these efforts failed.

In the face of Franco-British actions, the Dutch quickly withdrew from Antwerp and the French pulled out their troops. But the blockade persisted until May 1833. The Belgian situation was not fully resolved until, after nearly a decade of diplomacy, coercion, and 70 great power protocols, a treaty was finally signed by Holland and Belgium on April 19, 1839.69

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67 This again shows the double edged sword of Concert diplomacy. Yes, actions with the potential for miscalculation are discussed and maybe miscalculation is averted. On the other hand, Concert diplomacy often does not seem to further agreement about actions. Instead, it seems to make clear how angry states are (as with Britain during the rebellions). This seems to cast doubt on the Kupchan’s claim that looser institutions are more resilient (in "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe"). Finally, when agreement is produced, it is often through coercion or deception.

68 Transformation of European Politics, p. 690. According to Omond, who in describes the diplomatic maneuverings of this episode in somewhat less bellicose terms than Schroeder does, has this to say about the possibility of war at this time, with France prepared to move unilaterally against Antwerp: One Prussian Corps was at Aix-la-Chapelle, and another was posted in reserve on the Rhine. The doors of the Temple of Janus were creaking ominously, and might fly open at any moment. The danger of an explosion was increased by the temper of the Belgians; for it was quite possible that, if the two Western Powers did not act immediately, they might break loose and attack the Dutch. If so, Prussia would rush in to the help of Holland and, should she be victorious, would take from France Alsace and Lorraine...all of which she tried to obtain during the Congress of Vienna. If Prussia was defeated, France would endeavor to annex the Rhine Provinces and ...Luxemburg. Austria and the other States of the Germanic Confederation would be drawn into the struggle. Russia would intervene....Great Britain, unless she deserted France, would find herself at war with more than one Continental Power; and soon not only Europe, but half the world, would be at war. (pp. 153-154).

By this logic, when the British and French acted against the East’s wishes so quickly in October, they helped prevent war.

69 General sources consulted for this section include: Albrecht-Carrie, Concert of Europe, pp. 60-98; Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History of Europe, pp. 31-36; Omond, "Belgium; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp. 670-691; Temperley and Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy, pp. 88-100; Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841, Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question, vol. 1 (London, Great Britain: G. Bell & Sons, 1951), pp. 89-176.
ASSessment

Transparency Assessment There were two turning points in this crisis. The first was getting France to leave Belgium on September 9, 1831. This result was certainly aided by concerted diplomacy, but not necessarily by forum diplomacy. Much of the diplomacy that ended up convincing France to leave took place in Paris, and not in London where the conference was being held. This undercuts some of the support that would otherwise be generated for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency.

The second turning point was when Britain and France joined forces to coerce the Dutch on October 22, 1832. Here, it appears that Britain and France knew of the impending dangers of war and, calculating correctly, took joint action to prevent it (see footnote 68, above). To calculate the danger of war correctly, the French and British had to know of Belgium's intentions to break loose and of Prussian intentions to support the Dutch in case the French intervention crossed onto Dutch territory. Letters between the French envoy to the London Conference (and French Foreign Minister) Prince Talleyrand and a French Foreign Ministry official, the Duc de Broglie, reveal that the French and British exchanged key information about their own intentions and capabilities, and on the dangers of Prussian intervention, both in London and in Paris. Further, the Prussians had made their intentions clear in direct communications with French government representatives in Paris.70

Here, the conference at London (or at least the diplomacy that took place in London)

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appears to have been helpful, but perhaps not necessarily crucial, in clarifying the situation. This supports H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. However, the most important clarifier in this episode was the fact of joint British and French action, not the diplomacy surrounding it. This action deterred Prussia, coerced the Dutch, and obviated Belgian action.

All told, this adds up to only lukewarm support for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. To a limited extent, plans were changed based on new information whose provision was facilitated by the regime. It is possible that more research in the memoirs and correspondence would reveal and attribute greater importance to communications that took place at the London Conference. However, it seems more likely to me that the London Conference at best only reinforced communications that were taking place throughout Europe during this episode. While the London Conference did serve to ratify or otherwise bless various joint great power decisions (and it clarified the situation when the Eastern Powers walked out), it is unclear to what extent ratifying decisions constitutes crisis-management.

That Prussia was deterred supports H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict because the divergences among the Concert powers was made clear. H6 also received support when the Eastern Powers walked out of the London Conference. Open rifts and clear violations of rules and norms all help clarify stakes and interests and thus increase transparency.

General Assessment On a more general note, the multilateral diplomacy surrounding Belgium’s independence is often heralded by Concert optimists. Lauren lauds the "famous establishment of
neutral Belgium in 1831." Schröder writes that "One must conclude, therefore, that in no earlier century, under no other international system than that of Vienna, could the Belgian crisis have been solved peacefully...It took something more than normal politics." I disagree. This crisis involved serious stakes, serious coercion, and serious war scares including troop movements and combat.

That said, it is plausible to imagine that war might have resulted had the powers been forced to undertake the time-consuming bilateral dance that characterized the partition of Poland in the 18th century. Even though the big picture is that the crisis lasted for years, some key aspects of it were resolved with relative alacrity (a secondary prediction that hints at the possibility that transparency was increased). One looks in particular at the speed with which the French were persuaded to leave Belgium in the Summer of 1831, a major turning point. This crisis combined normal politics, brutally normal politics with the multilateral diplomacy of the Concert. In other words, the Concert enabled Type III, confrontational transparency. It was only in this way that miscalculation was somewhat reduced (H4).

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72 Transformation of European Politics, p. 676.
Conclusions

Findings

Multilateral forum diplomacy reduced miscalculation clearly in the Poland-Saxony case, moderately in the Belgian case, and mildly facilitated deception in the Greek case. H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation therefore receive modest and mixed support. At crucial turning points in the Poland-Saxony and Belgian crises, diplomacy moved fast and war was averted in part due to forum diplomacy which allowed states to communicate their intentions more quickly (thus increasing transparency). In the absence of the Concert, states may have edged closer to war but for the reasons just mentioned, war would likely have been averted in any way. This is because in the Poland-Saxony case, the balance of power would have certainly led to Prussian concessions eventually. In the Belgian case, much of the diplomacy took place away from the forum. The London conference helped resolve the problem of the French occupation of Belgium, but it may not have been necessary for resolving the problem.

Turning to Metternich's deception of Alexander, this would likely have occurred in the absence of forum diplomacy. However, the deception and cajoling of Alexander was facilitated by the ability to conjure up the Concert norms of non-unilateral action and suppression of revolutionaries (the twist being that this time they were to be crushed by non-Concert member Turkey).73 This is one of the clearest instances of Concert norms in action, and they were

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73 This was the same norm the British twice rejected during the rebellions in Naples and Spain. Their lack of
wielded to get Russia to behave in line with Austrian and British interests. One might point to other examples of these norms in action such as the Troppau protocol before Austria's intervention in Naples. However, this isn't a very good example as Austria simply got blessed to do what it wanted to do anyway. In sum, the Greek case evinces no support for transparency. Instead, the Concert and its norms were manipulated in a successful effort to deceive and cajole Alexander.

There is little sign that Concert diplomacy reduced unwarranted fears, so H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions is not supported. On the other hand, H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict received modest support in Poland/Saxony, Spain/Naples, and Belgian cases. In these incidents, H6's operation may have served to very mildly reduce miscalculation. However, these conflicts and rifts would have occurred with or without the Concert.

To expand on my findings about H1 and H4, the Concert was created as a multilateral forum and was used as a multilateral forum. However, this does not confirm H1: Regimes Provide Transparency as strongly as it may appear. Based on the results of other predictions and comparison with the first partition of Poland, it is not clear transparency was actually increased much by the use of the forum. Also noteworthy is the extent to which the forum was supplemented (or vice-versa) by bilateral contacts, coalition-building in the background, and so forth. The relationships between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and between private and public diplomacy deserve further research.

\[...continued\]

sincerity supports the case that norms were tools for realpolitik in this case rather than deeply held beliefs that helped promote peace because they were shared by the major powers.
With respect to H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation, the only clear case that supports the hypothesis is the Poland/Saxony crisis when the secret agreement was quickly forged and made known. The Belgian Independence case offers weaker support for H4. In both these cases, the Concert facilitated what I term Type III Confrontational Transparency: the exchange of information in the process of efforts to coerce or deter. Thus, even when Concert diplomacy helped keep the peace, it was only because it facilitated hardball politics. This is not a bad thing and it may have modestly and in one and a half cases helped prevent great power war.\textsuperscript{74} Perhaps one can not expect much more from a forum.

What does the first partition of Poland teach us about the Concert? The gravity and outcome of the crises during the Concert's most effective period are very similar to the first partition of Poland. In all cases, great power hegemonic war was averted and the resolution of crises often took as long or longer under the Concert than it did before. It is possible that Concert norms prevented crises altogether and that my focus on crises leads me to underestimate the Concert's true effectiveness as an security regime. I discount this argument for reasons explained in the section on case selection in the introduction of this chapter. There I argued that many non-regime factors including war weariness, ideological bonds, common fear of revolution, and deterrence may have also dampened crises. Moreover, resolution of the crises I did examine evinces little evidence of norms. A focus on crises is also justifiable because crises remain the best place to study whether and how the regime increases transparency.

In sum, transparency theory does not do as well as expected when tested with the Concert,

\textsuperscript{74} It is also possible to imagine that concert diplomacy could have been a big help in resolving the misperceptions that helped start the Seven Years' War (discussed in the previous chapter).
a surprising finding given the deductive logic in favor of multilateral forum diplomacy and given the recent optimistic wave of scholarship about the Concert's effectiveness (and policy
recommendations based on these assessments). Tables 5-1 and 5-2 summarize my findings about the Concert:

**Table 5-1: How the Main Predictions Fared in Each Case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Master prediction: More peaceful than Partition of Poland?</th>
<th>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in case(s)?</th>
<th>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/transparency important to adversaries when making peace?</th>
<th>P3: Threat assessments become more benign, tensions and fears reduced?</th>
<th>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland and Saxony</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellions in Naples and Spain</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (schisms were evinced)</td>
<td>No 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolt in Greece</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (could even have been more miscalculation, if one who is deceived can be said to miscalculate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (schisms were evinced)</td>
<td>Yes, a bit 78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 Defined as less risk of European great power war and less hardball politics.

76 One can not expect much from this hypothesis when looking at the Concert. Even though Castlereagh implicitly hoped that the Concert would increase transparency (p. 150), this hypothesis is about reducing fears of cheating on agreements and thus encouraging cooperation. By definition, Concerts are among the most informal regimes. They are not tasked to verify agreements and the agreements that are involved in their founding scarcely need verification.

77 No state changed its position in response to learning something new so it can not be said that the Concert helped states reduce miscalculation.

78 The main thing that clarified things was the joint Franco-British military action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Predictions</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Comments about findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in case(s)? [A yes supports H1: regimes provide transparency]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>States conducted multilateral forum diplomacy. However, based on the results of other predictions and comparison with the first partition of Poland, it is not clear transparency was actually increased much by the use of the forum. Also, forum diplomacy was considerably supplemented by other means, especially in the Greek and Belgian cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/transparency important to adversaries when making peace? [A yes supports H2: transparency promotes cooperation]</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>But it is unreasonable to expect a forum to verify or monitor a peace settlement. That said, Castlereagh did hope the Concert would increase transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Threat assessments become more benign, tensions and fears reduced? [A yes supports H3: transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions]</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>States usually learned what they should fear and that their fears were justified. There were war scares, but not war panics. In the Spain/Naples and Belgian case, the extent to which the Concert was losing coherence was clarified. H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict is supported. However, these conflicts would have occurred with or without the Concert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation? [A yes supports H4: transparency reduces miscalculation]</td>
<td>Mixed, but overall somewhat positive.</td>
<td>Clearly in Poland/Saxony, less so in Belgian Independence, not in the Italy/Spain rebellions. Increased miscalculation (deception) in the Greek case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implications

There are five related sets of implications that can be drawn from the above findings. The first is that those historians, political scientists, and pundits who emphasize the Concert's achievements -- people I call Concert optimists -- are overestimating the Concert's pacifying effects. Second, this weakens historical support for the plethora of policy recommendations based on optimistic analyses of the Concert. Third, this also weakens support for IR theorists who bolster their theories about security regimes/institutions with their (again optimistic) analyses about the Concert. Fourth and fifth, even a more pessimistic interpretation of the Concert's effectiveness yields policy recommendations (fourth) and implications for international relations theory (fifth). The following sections analyze these implications in turn, with additional implications left for the concluding chapter.

The sections in literature review chapter on regimes and on the Concert presented the lineage and general claims of the concert optimists. The optimists dominate recent historical research on the Concert, and policy recommendations based on an optimistic interpretation of the Concert have also gone unchallenged.79

In order to critique the optimists, this section will present their claims in greater detail, contrast these claims with those of realists, and assess the competing claims in the light of my

79 Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions" misses the mark because he attacks collective security, not concerts or the Concert.

The policy prescriptions were footnoted in the introduction. Three of the most often cited historical works by these Concert optimists are Elrod, "Concert of Europe," Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," and Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System." Jervis' "From Balance to Concert," and "Security Regimes" are also frequently mentioned.
According to Concert optimists, the Concert operated according to several principal norms. States behaved with moderation,\(^{80}\) they compensated each other when territorial and other adjustments became necessary, they consulted each other and did not act unilaterally, and they kept the general equilibrium in mind when judging the consequences of their actions. As a result, these scholars give the Concert credit for numerous peace-enhancing accomplishments: creation of buffer states, isolating regional conflicts, specifying spheres of influence, suppression of revolutions by multilateral action, and the general practice of multilateral conflict resolution.\(^{81}\) According to Schroeder, this amounted to a sweeping transformation of diplomacy and international relations:

> Only in one arena in 1789-1815 can one speak unequivocally of progress, breakthrough, even revolution: in international politics. Here there was unmistakable structural change. A competitive balance-of-power struggle gave way to an international system of political equilibrium based on benign shared hegemony [Britain and Russia] and the mutual recognition of rights underpinned by law.\(^{82}\)

This quote supports my previous statement that claims made for the Concert are among the strongest to be found for any regime in any issue area.

Realists, in contrast, would characterize the world in harsher terms and would expect to find in the Concert period a higher risk of war, more fait accomplis and unilateral actions, self-

\(^{80}\) Just to be clear, optimists emphasize norm-based moderation. They give less shrift to moderation caused by deterrence, or unplanned balances of power.

\(^{81}\) See previous footnote.

\(^{82}\) Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 580.
interest viewed in more narrow and zero-sum terms, and more use of force.

Note that neither view ignores the importance of power or pursuit of self-interest. But optimists (and liberals more generally) usually view the world in less harsh terms and they believe that what brutality exists can be tempered by institutions, regimes, and other forms of cooperation. To liberals, cooperation is a relatively useful tool to use in pursuit of self-interest. Realists usually portray international politics as more brutal and are less sanguine about moderating that brutality. To realists, cooperation is less useful and frequently engenders risks.\textsuperscript{83}

Note too that discussions of power or self-interest by actors do not automatically confirm realism.\textsuperscript{84} Instead, it is the style, the manner, the \textit{modus operandi}, the means and meanness of behavior that distinguishes one paradigm from another. One should not be too stark about the difference between liberalism and realism; they are caricatured here only to help clarify their differences. As shown in the wide range of international relations theory and in history, there is in fact a continuum between realism and liberalism. Schroeder correctly points out that "intrigues, subterranean rivalries, and competition for influence" are found in "every dog show or


\textsuperscript{84} Here, Paul Schroeder is correct to criticize formalizations of realism that claim a monopoly on self-interested behavior and behavior that takes power into account. Such formalizations are indeed tautological as they describe almost all behaviors. Most of the time, states pursue self-interest and take material factors into account. Thus, pursuit of self-interest alone explains little and does not help define the difference between liberalism and realism. Instead, one must describe and differentiate between liberal and realist behaviors and their respective views of self-interest. People who advocate a stronger U.N., for example, often make self-interested arguments. Are they realists? No. The problem is defining their beliefs in such a way so as to distinguish them from realism.

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bridge tournament. To find out where one is on the continuum, one has to make judgment calls about the severity of the stakes and ruthlessness of the diplomacy involved in any given incident.

The following table contrasts optimist and realist views of state behavior:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optimist/Liberal View</th>
<th>Realpolitik/Realist View</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderation. Force is a minor factor. Low levels of fear.</td>
<td>More brutality and fear; evidenced by threats to use force, use of force, and war scares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital interests infrequently at risk</td>
<td>Vital interests more frequently at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Unilateral action, faits accomplis secret alliances, duplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation for territorial adjustments</td>
<td>Gains at others' expense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned equilibrium, systemic thinking, enlightened self-interest, planned balances of power</td>
<td>Zero-sum view of world, gains at others' expense, concerns over relative gains, unplanned balances of power (balance of threat)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This exercise puts into sharp relief the differences between the perspectives and helps one read the history of the Concert better able to discern the behaviors predicted by each view. Did enlightened statesmen plan a balance of power that would optimize deterrence and minimize tensions or did they struggle in narrow self-interest until a balance emerged? Did they behave with moderation according to the rule of law and other norms or did they behave more

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unilaterally, ruthlessly, manipulatively, and brutally?

My interpretation of state behavior during the Concert period falls much more in line with the realist view than with the liberal view. I am not arguing that the realist view is entirely correct; Concert statesmen were both moderate and hardline. But I want to demonstrate that the realist side deserves more attention than it has recently received. The history of the Concert as I read it is full of faits accomplis, threats to use force, use of force, secret agreements, and general hardball diplomacy.

Why is it important to determine which interpretation is correct? Whether or not the Concert optimists are correct affects debates about international relations theory as well as policy recommendations based on the Concert. With respect to theory, scholars wonder: 'do regimes matter, do they influence state behavior?' As noted in the introduction and literature review, the Concert plays a large role in the few analyses of security regimes and most of these analyses attribute modest to large effectiveness to the Concert.

On a more specific level, analyses of the Concert have also been used to bolster

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86 Various interpretations of the Concert range along the continuum from optimism to realism. Examples of what I consider to be moderate interpretations of the Concert include Jervis' "From Balance to Concert," and "Security Regimes" and Lipson, "Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?" Overtly realist historical works include Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe; Kissinger, A World Restored; and to some extent Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh.

Gulick's Europe's Classical Balance of Power is sometimes interpreted as a making a realist argument, but I do not think that is true. His use of the term balance of power probably leads some astray. Gulick argues that states put the balance of power ahead of state interest (p. 304). To him, the balance of power was planned, which to me means he is making an optimistic or liberal argument in that states are taking others' interests into account in an almost cooperative or enlightened fashion. However, I would argue that most of the evidence provided by Gulick, Schroeder, and other historians actually supports a realist argument. In any case, I try whenever possible to cite a diverse range of historians in making my arguments.
sophisticated arguments about the benefits of looser regimes over more formal ones.\textsuperscript{87} I argue that the Concert did more good than harm, but that the good was minimal. The Concert can not be used to support strong arguments about the influence of regimes. Further, my research suggests that formal regimes are likely to be more effective than informal ones. I will develop this argument following my case studies of U.N. peacekeeping.

Turning to policy, the optimists make recommendations that would affect the future of NATO, the U.N. and U.S. and international security. Whatever the deductive appeal of a great-power discussion forum or of a mechanism for a great-power condominium, these recommendations lose some of their shine if the actual Concert was less peace-causing than the optimists assert.

Policy recommendations for a new concert are also largely unnecessary. The more one believes that the Concert represented a revolution in diplomatic affairs, then the more one must be grateful for the state of modern diplomacy. Today, communications are rapid, the press is almost omnipresent, summits are plentiful, and many fora exist for states to exchange views on all sorts of issues.

For yesterday's Concert, there is today's United Nations and its Security Council, the G-7, the O.S.C.E., the Contact Group, the E.U. and on and on. A security-only variant of the G-7 of the seven strongest powers might be of some use (the S-7?) and certainly could not hurt. Regional variants might be of more use. But overall, there is little to be gained in recommending variations of Concert diplomacy in today's world, especially in Europe. Multilateral diplomacy

\textsuperscript{87} Most notably, Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe."
is already happening everyday.
Final Notes on the Concert

Fortunately, the shifting alliances, threats to national interests, intrigues, and fears of war during the Concert period were matched by multilateral and sometimes cooperative diplomacy and a generally pervasive willingness to avoid war when push came to shove. However, the moderate great powers of the Concert period did not mind pushing when opportunities arose. At its best, the Concert was a forum for basically status quo powers to discuss and clarify their positions. Hence, the modest support for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation and H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Despite some modestly close calls, great power wars were avoided. It seems highly probable that without extensive and lengthy diplomacy, some of these crises would have resulted in general war. The Concert worked. But that just means that diplomacy worked and its not clear that multilateral diplomacy was necessary to make it work. After all, the first partition of Poland also involved extensive and lengthy diplomacy. Further, a good part of the discussing and clarifying focused on forming temporary deterrent, compellent, or restraining alignments and then bringing their weight to bear. This what I termed 'type III coercive/deterrent transparency\(^{88}\) and it boils down to normal hardball politics - minus some miscalculation. So what are people really recommending when they recommend concert-based security arrangements? In the late 20th century, not much.

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\(^{88}\) See definition of transparency, p. 23.
Chapter 6:

The United Nations Force in Cyprus

Negotiating on Cyprus is "like being a doctor - you can't be too depressed if the patient is very sick or not responding to treatment. You must keep at it." ¹

"We try, we try...nothing happens."²

"The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart.
We must imagine Sisyphus happy"³

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and finds that UNFICYP does increase transparency between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides of the divided island and by so doing helps keep the peace. That said, increasing transparency is but one of the many things UNFICYP does to maintain and promote peace. On Cyprus, peacekeeping involves deterrence, cajoling, shouting, and crowd control, as well as such transparency-increasing activities as incident investigation, inspections, and mediation. UNFICYP effectively helps keep small incidents small between the Cypriot sides and the

¹ Gustave Feissel, Chief of Mission and Deputy Special Representative, UNFICYP, May 8, 1996.

² John Lister, Second Secretary, Political Affairs, U.S. embassy, Cyprus, 6/4/96.

provision of transparency plays a necessary but not sufficient role in this success. However, UNFICYP and the U.N. in general have only a modest effect on the overall state of relations between mainland Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey have strong historical, ethnic, military, and economic ties with their respective Cypriot sides and have, along with the great powers, the most influence on the prospects for war or peace on Cyprus.

To be more specific about the role of transparency, UNFICYP has three categories of activities: traditional peacekeeping, crowd control, and humanitarian activities. The next few paragraphs summarize how UNFICYP's effectiveness in each of these categories depend in varying degrees on the provision of transparency.

UNFICYP's first activity is coping with violations of the 1974 cease-fire in and along the buffer zone between the two sides. This is what most people think of when they think of peacekeeping on Cyprus and this is what consumes the most of UNFICYP's time and energy. In a typical year, UNFICYP confronts about 1000 violations or incidents. These incidents include provocations and antagonisms, overmanning of positions, military construction and improvement of positions, overflights and maritime violations, shootings and weapons violations, and moves forward into the buffer zone.

UNFICYP is often successful in calming these incidents and its success is based on a variety of activities and effects ranging from deterrence to cajoling to increasing transparency. Deterrence, cajoling, and mediation crucial to UNFICYP -- often more and sometimes less than transparency. These functions are often used in combination with transparency. Thus, the provision of transparency is an important and necessary, but not sufficient, tool in UNFICYP's peacekeeping toolbox.
I estimate (very roughly) that increasing transparency accounts for about fifteen percent of UNFICYP's success in dealing with cease-fire violations. The bulk of this chapter details how UNFICYP confronts cease-fire violations. H1: Regimes Provide Transparency receives modest support and the effect of the transparency provided supports H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. Little miscalculation is evinced, so H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation is not supported. H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis receives considerable support.

UNFICYP's second activity is controlling demonstrations and trying to prevent demonstrators from entering the buffer zone. Demonstrations are sometimes violent, resulting in injuries, deaths, and increased tension on Cyprus. Transparency generally plays very little role in coping with demonstrations. However during the most violent demonstration of the Summer of 1996, UNFICYP actively reduced rumors and this activity supports H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation.

UNFICYP's third area of responsibility is humanitarian affairs, the most prominent of which is helping sponsor and coordinate bicultural activities. Bicultural activities are meant to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriots together, build confidence, and show each community the human face of the other. Such activities may help lay the foundation for a more durable peace on Cyprus, including a political solution which would reunify the island. Strictly speaking, bicultural activities do not involve transparency as they do not directly affect state's

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4 The conclusion explains how I arrived at this estimate. See in particular Table 6-3 which breaks down the transparency estimates by category and subcategory of activity (p. 338).
(or political entity's) assessment of each other's capabilities and intentions. However, they are supposed to de-demonize individual's assessments of people from the other side. By de-demonizing, bicomunal activities can be seen as an attempt at a societal-level form of H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

Over and above UNFICYP's activities, the buffer zone in and of itself helps increase transparency. It is a marker of the status quo, of compliance with the 1974 cease-fire. Although it is almost routinely violated in minor incidents, its overall integrity is nonetheless a symbol of each side's continued respect of the status quo. If war broke out on Cyprus, the buffer zone (and U.N. monitoring of the buffer zone) might help determine who started the war.

The buffer zone also has non-transparency functions. It keeps the two sides physically distant. This reduces their ability to provoke each other. The zone allows the U.N. to maintain a patrol track between the two sides and increases its ability to interpose itself when necessary. That said, the zone also helps UNFICYP increase transparency because it helps them find out who did what to whom when (gather information) and to liaise between the sides (transmit information). The significance of the buffer zone's transparency functions are hard to measure or even estimate.

CHAP TER STR UCTURE To set the stage for assessing UNFICYP's current operations, I begin this chapter by giving some historical background of the Cyprus problem. I then explain the strategic situation on Cyprus and give an overview of UNFICYP's activities. Here I describe in particular the status quo, the buffer zone, and UNFICYP's liaison system with the opposing forces. These elements are crucial to UNFICYP's efforts to keep the peace and provide transparency.

The bulk of the chapter is devoted to evaluating the role of transparency in UNFICYP's
three sets of activities described above: peacekeeping, crowd control, and humanitarian activities. In eight subsections that proceed in the following order, I cover the various violations of the cease-fire and status quo that UNFICYP routinely confronts as part of its day-to-day peacekeeping responsibilities. These violations include 1) antagonisms, p. 243; 2) overmanning of positions, p. 248; 3) military construction and improvement of positions, p. 251; 4) overflights and maritime violations, p. 273; 5) shootings and weapons violations, p. 275; and 6) moves forward into the buffer zone, p. 297. I then assess UNFICYP's other two functions: 7) crowd control during demonstrations, p. 308; and 8) humanitarian activities, including bicomunal activities, p. 319. This last subsection also includes a discussion of a major source of misperception and myths on Cyprus: the press and schools. The chapter's conclusion assembles my findings about transparency from the eight subsections just listed and it offers policy implications. This chapter's structure is outlined in detail in the Table of Contents.

By covering this range of subjects, this chapter illustrates the routine, extraordinary, and long-term responsibilities, achievements, and limitations of UNFICYP. This scope of analysis helps assessment of the role and relative importance of the provision of transparency to the effectiveness of UNFICYP. In the course of this chapter, I report on many of the major recent challenges faced by UNFICYP, including shooting deaths in the buffer zone, the major construction undertaken by the Turkish side in the Roccas Bastion (along the buffer zone in Nicosia) in 1994, and the violent demonstrations of August 1996. There are more details on some of these events in Appendix I.

**Methodological Notes** Before starting in with the historical background, I offer here a few methodological notes to explain how I came to focus so heavily on this case and how the
incidents and crises described in each subsection were picked for analysis. The main reason I focus so heavily on Cyprus is simply that I was able to gather a large amount of data on UNFICYP. I interviewed everyone from the Force Commander and Chief of Mission to soldiers on the line, I had several line tours, and I had access to any record I requested. I took notes on these records in educational locations ranging from a sector headquarters operations center to the offices of UNFICYP's operations staff. Over more than a month, I was also able to interview and talk with politicians and others on each side.

From my initial research and briefings, I knew the range of UNFICYP's responsibilities (e.g. the eight subsections above). I made it a point in my interviews and in the records I requested to try to make sure I understood as well as possible each of these eight activities. When I thought I was up to speed on one sort of incident, I'd request records on another. Some records presented a cross-section of activities (weekly logs, etc). Exceptional research opportunities presented themselves on two occasions. The first was when the Chief of Mission offered me UNFICYP's complete records on the Roccas Bastion construction. The second was when I arrived at UNFICYP headquarters for another day of note-taking and it turned out to be only a few hours after Stelios Panayi had been shot in the buffer zone. UNFICYP let me sit in their crisis center and observe them in action. I am very grateful to UNFICYP, and especially Force Commander General Vartiainen, for the unprecedented cooperation and support they offered me.

In writing up each subsection, I describe a representative sample of the routine aspects of these activities. I also try to assess any extraordinary events that fall into each of the categories. For example, many non-lethal shots are fired in and along the buffer zone. These are routine.
An extraordinary shooting and weapons incident is one where someone gets killed. In each subsection, I try to give a sense of the relative proportion of the ordinary to the extraordinary. However, the extraordinary justly receive disproportionate attention because these events pose higher threats to the peace. What little statistical evidence I have on the amount and severity of each type of incident is presented in the conclusion.

As always, I focus on turning points in negotiations, crises, and incidents as the best way to keep an eye out for transparency and its effects in action. In each subsection and for each incident and crisis, I try to answer the following key questions about my hypotheses and predictions: What caused the turning point and did transparency have anything to do with it? Was cooperation promoted, were fears and tensions reduced, was miscalculation averted? And did information provided by UNFICYP have something to do with it?

Background to the Cyprus Problem

Surrounded by Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Greece, Cyprus is the only major island (9250 square kilometers) in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its strategic position made it a crossroads for an impressive list of powers going to or coming from the Middle East. The Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and British have all controlled Cyprus at various times.5 Despite these

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numerous conquests, the majority of Cypriots have been Greek-speaking, Greek Orthodox for many hundreds of years. Cyprus was the birthplace of Aphrodite and the first place in the Roman Empire to be governed by a Christian.

\(^2\) (...continued)

Map 6-1, Cyprus and Its Neighbors

Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Area

6 From Maier, Cyprus, p. 14.
In 1878, Russia defeated Turkey in war. At the time Cyprus was under Ottoman/Turkish domination. Turkey leased Cyprus to Britain in exchange for help against further Russian expansion. When Turkey joined the Central Powers in World War I, Britain annexed Cyprus. Greek Cypriot demands for enosis - union with Greece - grew during the 1950s and led to an increasingly violent rebellion in 1955. Enosis and the Greek Cypriot IRA-like terror/rebel group EOKA threatened the Muslim Turkish minority. In so doing, they also endangered Turkey's strategic interests. Not only were the Turkish Cypriots physically threatened by EOKA, but were the enosis movement to succeed, they would then either have to become Greek citizens or be forced to go to Turkey. And were Cyprus to become a Greek island, Turkey would have been completely surrounded by Greek islands throughout the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Soon, the Turkish Cypriots created their own group, TMT, which pushed for partition of Cyprus. EOKA's primary target was the British, but EOKA and TMT fought each other as well as moderates and alleged sympathizers within their own communities. The British sought help from the Turkish Cypriots against EOKA, a divide-to-rule move that did not exactly plant the seeds for future harmony between the Cypriot communities.

After several years of violence, Cyprus was granted independence in 1960 by agreement of the Guarantor Powers - Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Constitution of 1960 forbade both partition and union with outside powers and it had numerous specific provisions to create a bicomunal government: the president was to be a Greek Cypriot, the vice-president a Turkish

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Cypriot (each with a number of veto rights -- the vice president could veto any bill relating to foreign affairs and defense, for example). The ministers, representatives, and civil service were allocated on a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio (bills on specified subjects like taxes and electoral laws needed to pass with separate majorities from each group's representatives). The Turkish Cypriots were allocated 40% of the 2000 man-strong military to be. At the time, the population of Cyprus was about 80% Greek Cypriot (GC) and 18% Turkish Cypriot (TC).

In the end, the Greeks did not get enosis but did get a constitution imposed on them that gave the TCs disproportionate rights. The constitution also set the stage for massive implementation problems. By giving both communities veto rights at the executive and legislative levels, the constitution protected minority rights by specifying how the TCs could block majority rule and produce gridlock.\footnote{This raises the following questions: To what extent is there always a tradeoff between protection of minority rights and efficient government? How is this tradeoff best minimized? It would certainly seem that the tradeoffs are likely to be at their worst when constitutions are designed to unite ethnic groups riven with strife under one government. The histories of Cyprus' drive for independence, of its problems with its constitution, of its ethnic problems more generally, and of UNFICYP's peacekeeping activities before the Cyprus was divided in 1974 would likely offer many lessons to those interested in the causes of ethnic conflict and the prospects of ameliorating the problem.} Sharp disputes arose about filling the civil service quotas. Meanwhile, the GCs proceeded to undermine the provisions for a bicommmunal army by creating their own irregular forces, largely made up of former EOKA members. The TMT did not take long to revive either.

Three years of gridlock, dispute, and fairly low-level violence ensued. On November 31, 1963 President (and Archbishop) Mouskos Makarios III put forward 13 proposals to amend the 1960 constitution. The proposals would have eliminated the veto provisions, the separate majorities legislative provisions, and reduced the allotment of TCs in the government down to
their actual proportion of the population. Many of the provisions would indeed have made the
government work more efficiently, but they also gutted much of the protections afforded the TCs.
The Turkish government swiftly rejected the proposals and any remaining chance for their
consideration was snuffed out by a sharp increase in intercommunal violence. Three weeks after
the proposals were floated, two TC civilians and one GC policeman were killed in Nicosia.
There appears to be no agreed-upon version of who did what to whom first in this incident. The
killings sparked a wave of violence and led to fears of intervention by Turkey and/or Greece.
Such an intervention might have led to war between the two NATO members.

In response, an unworkable short-term peacekeeping force of troops from Britain, Greece,
and Turkey, under British command was quickly established pending an international conference
a few weeks later. In January 1964, the British proposed a NATO peacekeeping force, but the
government of Cyprus was so opposed that the issue finally ended up at the U.N. The violence
continued and in March the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of a U.N.
peacekeeping mission mandated to:

"to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the
maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."^9


Note that because the peacekeeping force was essentially imposed on Cyprus, the promise of increased
transparency did little to help the sides cooperate to achieve peace and H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation is not
supported. Of course, the sides were not trying to cooperate and as I argued in my methodology chapter (p. 118),
transparency is most useful to states/sides that are not revisionists and that want to seek peace, but do not trust each other
enough to do so.
This rather open-ended mandate remains to this day.\textsuperscript{10} 

The First Years of UNFICYP: 1964 - 1974

By the end of April 1964, UNFICYP had close to 6400 soldiers deployed - just about the most it would ever have. Between 1964 and 1967, the Greek Cypriots and Greeks had roughly 33,450 men under arms on Cyprus while the Turkish side had 13,450.\textsuperscript{11} UNFICYP deployed along the Green Line\textsuperscript{12} dividing Nicosia, in towns where trouble was expected, and throughout


In the aftermath of U.N. operations in Somalia and Bosnia where mission creep contributed to mission disaster, it has become conventional wisdom to recommend that all U.N. operations have clear (and often limited) mandates. UNFICYP's vague mandate helped it change with the circumstances in 1974 and has allowed it to take on a range of political and humanitarian responsibilities that distinguish UNFICYP from its neighboring traditional peacekeeping operation, UNDOF, in the Golan Heights.

My hypotheses about transparency suggest that it is generally good to be transparently clear and precise and the hypotheses thus support such maxims as 'good fences make good neighbors' and 'clear agreements are better than ambiguous ones.' However, UNFICYP's success with its mandate indicates that ambiguity can sometimes be more of a tool than a trap. The question then arises: under what conditions does ambiguity do more good than harm? Common sense and game theory would answer that ambiguity in a treaty probably expands win-sets and therefore makes it easier to come to agreement (each side is more likely to think it has gotten a decent deal if the treaty terms are ambiguous). On the other hand, ambiguity raises the danger of disputes about implementation.

\textsuperscript{11} The April 1964 UNFICYP total was 6369 with 2719 from the United Kingdom, 1087 from Canada, 1000 from Finland, 889 from Sweden, 636 from Ireland, and 38 from Austria, the latter including 28 civilian police. UNFICYP reached its peak strength of 6411 in June 1964 and had declined to 4737 by December 1967. The number of people under arms is the average of the estimates presented by Stegenga in United Nations Force in Cyprus, pp. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{12} A line dividing Cyprus' capital Nicosia into separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot areas. It was created by the British during their initial, abortive peacekeeping efforts in late 1963-early 1964.
Cyprus more generally. Such a dispersed deployment was necessary because in even in the mid-1960s, the Greek and Turkish communities continued to be spread across the island. In the early 1960s, the communities were still widely (and fairly peacefully) interspersed. The violence of 1963-1964 then led most of the TCs to concentrate themselves into purely Turkish villages or enclaves, but these were still widely spread throughout Cyprus.\(^{13}\) See Map 7-2, Ethnic Demographic Changes on Cyprus, p. 221.

As has become standard procedure in peacekeeping operations, UNFICYP could only use force in self-defense and thus had only limited means available to try to stem conflict and promote peace. In cases of imminent or actual conflict, UNFICYP troops often tried to interpose themselves, hoping to deter or halt conflict. They also hoped to deter violence by patrolling and by being able to observe and give accurate accountings of incidents. Such accounts aimed to deter violence by not letting the aggressor escape in a fog of mutual recriminations. This effect is the basis of H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis.

When deterrence failed, and it often did because UNFICYP could only stop each side from fighting when it had their consent to do so, UNFICYP had to do its best to interpose itself and/or negotiate cease-fires. UNFICYP was often successful at mediating cease-fires, even though many did not last too long. Most of UNFICYP's various efforts to promote peace were aided by its liaison system that linked UNFICYP to political and military representatives of the two sides from the highest levels down to the troops on the ground. Sometimes UNFICYP tried

\(^{13}\) For more on the demographics, see J. Jeffrey Hoover, "The Society and its Environment," in Bunge, pp. 60-65; Patrick, *Political Geography*, esp. pp. 8-13, 340-348. Intermarriage was common during Ottoman rule, but declined until the 20th century (Hoover, p. 70). UNFICYP's spokesman, Waldemar Rokoszewski, now says he can count the number of intermarriages with his fingers and notes the contrast with Yugoslavia where there were many such marriages before its troubles. Interview, June 6 1996.
to clarify the local cease-fire lines with paint and large rocks. Obviously, a buffer zone is better at separating antagonists than these rudimentary efforts. A buffer zone also clarifies the situation on the ground more clearly and better reduces miscalculation (H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation).

There seems to be a general consensus that through its early years, UNFICYP was modestly successful at ameliorating but not stopping intercommunal violence.\textsuperscript{14} A good bit of UNFICYP's limited effectiveness in its early years was due to the provision of transparency. The following text from Fetherston offers support for both H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose:

Breaches of the ceasefire were dealt with through a liaison system...[the system also made] sure that information about any planned activities by UNFICYP (troop movements or removal of fortifications for example) was received by both sides will in advance. The liaison system was meant to reduce tensions by providing both sides with reliable information and in this sense facilitate communication between the antagonists (such liaison systems are employed in all UN peacekeeping operations).\textsuperscript{15}

Today, the liaison system is still very important, but the post-1974 buffer zone helps clarify


\textsuperscript{15} Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping, pp. 51-52.
things as well.

In addition to sporadic violence, Cyprus faced two major crises from 1964-1974. In August 1964, the Greek Cypriot National Guard launched a 2000-soldier attack against various Turkish positions around Kokkina on Northwest coast. This led to over 90 sorties by fighter-bombers from the Turkish mainland which in turn led to a threat by Makarios to attack every Turkish village on Cyprus if Turkey did not desist. Even though Greece began to concentrate troops in Thrace during the crisis, it did not want war with Turkey. Greece withheld support for Makarios’ belligerent threat. Lacking backing and fearing a Turkish invasion, Makarios agreed to a U.N. Security Council appeal for a cease-fire and fears of a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus abated. Turkey also agreed to the cease-fire, after having been warned against invasion in the strongest terms by the U.S. Ten Turkish Cypriots and fifty-five Greek Cypriots were killed, the latter mostly due to the air attacks.

In November 1967, the National Guard attacked two Turkish enclaves in Southern Cyprus, losing one soldier, killing twenty-six Turkish Cypriots, and leaving others wounded. Cypriot-born Greek General George 'Digenis' Grivas, a former EOKA leader and commander of the National Guard, had planned the attack and the provocations leading up to it.\textsuperscript{16} Several U.N. soldiers had been forcibly disarmed; their radios and some U.N. buildings destroyed. Locally, UNFICYP arranged a cease-fire at Ayios Theodhoros and refuted exaggerated rumors about atrocities. Rumor reduction is transparency in action and this incident would seem to support H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, except that I do not

\textsuperscript{16} Many (Southern) Cypriot towns have streets named after Grivas.
know what effect the defusing of the rumors had. It may have helped a bit locally, but as the next paragraph suggests, the outcome of the 1967 crisis appears not to have been affected by anything done at the local level.

Turkey mobilized to invade Cyprus and attack Greece. Heavy weather prevented the invasion, giving a break for diplomatic efforts. The U.S. sent Cyrus Vance shuttling between Greece and Turkey in search of a cease-fire agreement. Peace was maintained but Turkey succeeded in getting Athens to recall Grivas back to Greece, along with 10,000 of the 11,000 Greek soldiers on Cyprus. Both crises demonstrated Turkey's strategic superiority over Cyprus and Greece, underscored the U.S.' influence and the necessity for the U.S. to use its influence to keep the peace in a crunch, and highlighted UNFICYP's inability to keep or restore peace in the face of deliberate, large scale violence.17

The 1974 Turkish Invasion: Setting the Stage for UNFICYP's Current Operation

Turkey finally did invade Cyprus in 1974, partitioning it through force into a Turkish/Turkish Cypriot area in the North (comprising thirty-seven percent of the island), with the bulk of Cyprus still left for the Greek Cypriots. The partition changed UNFICYP's modus operandi. Instead of trying to keep the peace throughout the interspersed or enslaved

communities of Cyprus, UNFICYP now endeavored to maintain the peace and the status quo by protecting the integrity of the new buffer zone. The buffer zone separates the two sides and is the area that existed (three percent of Cyprus) between the two opposing cease-fire lines at the end of the Turkish invasion in 1974.

I will now describe the events leading up to the invasion and better set the stage for analyzing post-1974 peacekeeping, the primary focus of this chapter.¹⁸

Extremist pro-enosis groups began to form again in 1969 and they waged a terror campaign against President Makarios' government. To them, Makarios appeared to have gone soft over the years because he had increasingly given up on enosis. Grivas came back to Cyprus in 1971, unified the groups into EOKA-B, and increased the level of violence. The primary conflict during the late 1960s and early 1970s was between Greek Cypriots. A right-wing military coup occurred in Greece in November 1973. In June and early July 1974, Makarios finally decided to take harsh measures against EOKA-B, proposing to remove sympathizers from the National Guard and sending the mainland Greek military officers of the National Guard back home.¹⁹

In response and with almost certain Greek backing, the National Guard overthrew Makarios on July 15, seizing the radio station and then the presidential palace and seat of his

¹⁸ An analysis of how UNFICYP moderated (or failed to at times) the violence during the pre-partition era of interspersed and enclaved communities would yield valuable lessons for peacekeeping in ethnic conflicts, one of the most pressing and frustrating tasks for the U.N. today. Some of what this analysis would reveal is hinted at in the history above. A good place to start would be Harbottle’s Impartial Soldier, which has detailed descriptions of several incidents during the 1960s.

¹⁹ Grivas died in January 1974. However, the person who emerged as the Cypriot leader of the coup was Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA leader and a true believer in enosis.
archdiocese. Makarios fled to Britain, but the coup succeeded. Fearing that enosis was right around the corner, Turkey sought a joint intervention with co-guarantor Britain. Britain refused. On July 20, Turkey invaded Cyprus from the North around Kyrenia and pushed South towards Nicosia until a cease-fire took hold two days later. This cease-fire, one of many, held for a day and then Turkish forces began to push slowly South again, while broadening their Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor to the East and West. At the time, the U.S. was sending mixed signals and much of the world harbored some sympathy for the Turkish position. Greece did not lift a finger to help Cyprus; it was so outmanned by the more proximate Turks that it couldn't. Further, the governments in both Greece and Turkey soon fell. Sympathy for the Turks ended on August 14 when, after another round of peace talks had broken down, the now 40,000 strong Turkish forces unleashed a large offensive extending their lines to include the thirty-seven percent of Cyprus currently known as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." On August 16, a final cease-fire was declared, the lines began to gel, and peace has not been made to this day.

It is estimated that 6000 Greek Cypriots and 1500 Turkish Cypriots died in the fighting. A total of 6000 prisoners of war were taken from both sides. Some 214,000 Greek Cypriots and 42,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced or made refugees during the fighting. UNFICYP helped provide humanitarian relief to the one third to one half of the island who were refugees, in part by helping over 8000 Turkish Cypriots move to the North. In the end, the island was segregated into two nearly ethnically pure areas, finishing off with partition the ethnic cleansing essentially

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20 The "Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus" was the name of the Northern area starting in 1975. In 1983, the North declared itself to be the independent state of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." The latter has only been recognized by Turkey.
advocated by pro-enosis extremists since the 1950s. The following inserted maps indicate the transformation over time of Cyprus into ethnically segregated communities.  

Map 6-2, Ethnic Demographic Changes on Cyprus


Following the final cease-fire, inter and intra-communal violence died down fairly rapidly to the relatively low level typical today, 23 years later. From the cease-fire of 1974 to May 1996, six Greek Cypriot and three Turkish soldiers had been killed in or along the buffer zone, a casualty rate far below that of the 1950s through 1974. Violence spiked up in the Summer of 1996. Between June and October of 1996, a GCNG soldier, a TF soldier, and three GC civilians were killed in and along the buffer zone.

Peacekeeping in Cyprus in the 1990s

This section has three principal subsections. The first summarizes the strategic situation on Cyprus. This helps the reader understand the situation on Cyprus in general, but also puts UNFICYP's size into perspective and is suggestive of its limits. The second subsection gives an overview of how UNFICYP operationalizes its mandate to maintain the status quo and preserve the integrity of the buffer zone. It also gives a bird's eye view of the routine operations of UNFICYP. The third and longest subsection details UNFICYP's routine operations. In eight sub-sub sections, I cover UNFICYP's responses to specific problems including antagonism violations, overmanning of observation posts, maritime and overflight violations, shootings and

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23 Figure does not include one National Guard soldier who shot himself in 1989 after shooting at a Turkish Forces soldier. I also do not know the figure for civilian deaths. Of the three Turkish fatalities, one Turkish Cypriot was accidentally killed by a U.N. soldier in 1975 and one was killed by Cypriot police after he had taken hostages and killed a National Guard soldier (one of the GC 7) who had gone to investigate. From Chief Clerk, Operations Branch (UNFICYP), Memorandum to the Chief Operations Officer, "OPFOR Deaths Within the BZ" June 6, 1996 (The memo attached an "Immediate Message" from HQ UNFICYP to the four Sectors on May 28, 1988 giving the details of the hostage takings and shootings of that morning) and Spokesman's Office, "Greek Cypriot Press Review," June 6, 1996. For more on these shootings and the topic in general, see the section below on Shootings.
weapons incidents, moves forward into the buffer zone, and demonstrations and crowd control. Also discussed are UNFICYP's humanitarian efforts and the role of the press and schools in exacerbating the Cyprus problem. These sections also analyze some of the more severe recent problems or crises on Cyprus including the construction at Roccas Bastion and several of the buffer zone killings during the Summer of 1996.

This is the heart of this chapter, which is in turn the empirical heart of this dissertation. I attempt to describe all of UNFICYP's major activities, assess the overall effectiveness of these activities, and assess the role and relative importance of transparency to UNFICYP's effectiveness.

_The Current Strategic Situation on Cyprus_

Today, UNFICYP numbers 1197 peacekeepers and civilian police. A battalion of 388 soldiers from Great Britain and Northern Ireland patrol UNFICYP's Sector 2 in and around Nicosia (the most troublesome area) while 390 Argentineans patrol Sector 1 from outside of Nicosia West to Kokkina and 311 Australians cover Sector 4 (yes, 4) from outside of Nicosia East to just South of Famagusta.\textsuperscript{24} There are smaller contingents from Hungary (39), Ireland (30), Australia (20), Ireland (15), Canada (2), and Finland (2). Forty internationally recruited and 318 locally recruited civilians staff UNFICYP. The peacekeeping force is down from a little over 2000 in 1992/1993 when it was reduced and restructured in response to a financial crunch and

\textsuperscript{24} The Argentineans and British get along fine. And so, in general (outside of occasional bar fights), do the Cypriots and their former colonial keepers, the British. Sector 3 was eliminated when UNFICYP was cut back in the early 1990s.
weakened political faith in the mission. As part of the restructuring, the Greek and Cypriot
governments offered to pay for part of UNFICYP's budget. For the period July 1996 through
June 1997, the government of Cyprus will pay a third of UNFICYP's $45 million budget while
the Greeks will contributed $6.5 million. Thanks to the Greek and Cypriot governments, the rest
of the U.N.'s members get UNFICYP at roughly half price.\textsuperscript{25} Unfortunately, though, this
payment scheme reduce UNFICYP's impartiality in the eyes of the Turkish side. This in turn
reduces trust in the operation and limits UNFICYP's ability to increase transparency.\textsuperscript{26}

UNFICYP's chief responsibility on Cyprus is to supervise the cease-fire and thus foster
the conditions helpful for negotiating a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{27} The principal way UNFICYP
maintains the cease-fire is by preserving the military status quo within and along the buffer zone.
This may sound like a non-sequitur, but a successfully maintained the status quo cuts off a prime
source of spiraling tension. UNFICYP endeavors to prevent military construction in or near the
buffer zone, to stop soldiers or unauthorized civilians from entering the buffer zone, to stop the
sides from antagonizing each other across the buffer zone, and to investigate whatever incidents
occur in or near the buffer zone. By seeking to minimize antagonism along the buffer zone,
UNFICYP seeks not only to maintain a cease-fire in the technical sense of no bullets flying, but


\textsuperscript{26} Interview, Aytug Plumer, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, "TRNC," June 5, 1996. The large number of Turkish troops in the North also reduces the Turkish side's reliance on and respect for UNFICYP.

\textsuperscript{27} The question of whether or not UNFICYP deprives Cyprus of the 'hurting stalemate' that might be propitious for negotiations is touched on in various of the following sections. My bottom line is that the chance of war would go up significantly without UNFICYP. Thus, I do not advocate removing UNFICYP to promote peace because that is tantamount to promoting war to promote peace.
also to keep tensions low and thus defuse threats to the cease-fire at the lowest possible level.

To maintain surveillance of the buffer zone, the U.N. staffs 22 permanent observations posts (OPs) along the buffer zone and uses another 120 OPs less frequently. Routine patrols within the buffer zone are conducted from 19 patrol bases. Patrols are also sent out to investigate whenever one of the sides complains about the other's construction, overmanning, or harassment - all frequent occurrences. All these activities are integral to UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency (H1). The buffer zone is 180 kilometers long, comprises 3% of Cyprus' area, varies in width from 5 meters (in Nicosia) to seven kilometers, and contains some of the Cyprus' most fertile agricultural land.28

Today, there are roughly 130,000 (18%) TCs on Cyprus out of a total population of 750,000.29 The overall GNP of Cyprus is about eight billion dollars, with a GNP per capita of

28 United Nations, S/1996/411, pp. 1-3, United Nations, Blue Helmets, 2 ed., pp. 306-307, and interview/briefing, Lt. Colonel Nick Parker, Chief Operations Officer, UNFICYP, May 9, 1996. The Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus went from describing the minimum width of the buffer zone as 20 meters in the June 15, 1995, S/1995/488 report (p. 3) to describing it as a "few" meters in the next report on December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020 (p. 1). Parker stated the figure of 5 meters. Having noticed the change in the Reports since my return, I do not know why the buffer zone apparently became narrower. Perhaps it was due to successful moves forward by one or both OPFORs or perhaps UNFICYP is coming to terms with and tacitly recognizing the constriction at Four Minute Walk. See the section on moves forward starting on page 297 for details.

29 Population figures on Cyprus, especially for northern Cyprus, are often contested. The Greek Cypriots claim that as many as 100,000 Turkish mainland civilians have settled in the north since 1974 (when there were 116,000 Turkish Cypriots out of 641,000 total Cypriots). The Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that only 15,000 Turkish mainlanders have settled on Cyprus. In their first census since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot authorities recently found that the "TRNC"s population was 198,215. However, the birthplaces for this population have not been disclosed. In a final complication, it is widely recognized that many Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus, but again nobody knows or will say how many. There are over 600,000 Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. For information on this census, see Celestine Bohlen, "Fresh Tension for Cyprus: Counting the Newcomers," New York Times, January 23, 1997, p. A10.

This issue is a major hurdle for any peace agreement (over and above those that are the focus of this paper) because it raises the following questions: Who is a Turkish Cypriot? Anybody born on Cyprus? What of those living there long enough to have children? What will happen if Turkish mainlanders come to outnumber Turkish Cypriots? If there is a federal settlement, who will get voting rights? With what population statistics will calculations for proportional representation or federal contracts or federal social aid be based (if these are relevant features of the new constitution)? Will a settlement involve deportation of tens of thousands of Turkish settlers?
$10,000. The GNP per capita of the Greek Cypriots is $12,500, while that of the Turkish Cypriots is around $4,000. Almost all the TCs live in the Northern 37% of the island in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Over 30,000 troops from Turkey join 4000 Turkish Cypriot soldiers on Cyprus and there are 26,000 TC reservists.

There are two infantry battalions and 1300 officers and NCOs from Greece on Cyprus. These Greek officers control the 10,000 strong GC National Guard and the GC 88,000 reservists. In November 1993, Greece and Cyprus strengthened their military cooperation by signing a joint defense agreement. Under the new defense dogma, Greece's defense line now includes Cyprus, defense planning and acquisition between the two is supposed to be better coordinated, and the two hold more joint exercises.

The large number of troops from Turkey means that about 25% of the people living in the "TRNC" are soldiers and the U.N. calls the "TRNC" "one of the most densely militarized areas in the world." The Turkish military is larger and more capable than the Greek military, and Cyprus is much closer to Turkey than Greece. The Turkish forces on Cyprus are better trained and disciplined than the Cypriot National Guard forces. The bottom line is that the Turkish Forces enjoy clear superiority on Cyprus and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future.30


31 The notion that Greece could bail Cyprus out is hard to sustain. The distances clearly favor Turkey (see the map of the area above. In addition, it probably would not take much of a mobilization on Turkey's part around Thrace and elsewhere to make Greece think about more proximate problems. The real danger of the defense dogma, alluded to in the next paragraph, is that the Greek Cypriots might come to believe it will work and then make a serious miscalculation. A (perceived) closer balance could lead to more provocations along the buffer zone and so forth. As the motorcycle demonstrations and the two related civilian killings in the buffer zone during the summer of 1996 make clear, there is (continued...)
Table 6-1: Basic Components of Military Strength

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>10,000+2,300 Greek mainland soldiers and officers (with 30,000 TF and 4,000 TCSF on the North)</td>
<td>$354 Million (4.5% GDP)</td>
<td>$7.9 Billion</td>
<td>748 Thousand (18% Turkish Cypriot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>168,300</td>
<td>$5.1 Billion (5.2% GDP)</td>
<td>$99 Billion</td>
<td>10.5 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>639,000</td>
<td>$6.0 Billion (3.6% GDP)</td>
<td>$167 Billion</td>
<td>62.3 Million (20% Kurds)</td>
</tr>
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UNFICYP's Chief Operations Officer estimates that the Turkish forces could overrun the rest of Cyprus in three days. This decisive imbalance, and their view that the 1974 invasion was nothing but benign salvation, leads the Turkish side to claim that their forces are the real peacekeepers on Cyprus. Some senior UNFICYP officials agree with the some of this argument, recognizing that war and peace on Cyprus is more dependent on Turkey than anyone or anything else. They also worry that instability may increase if Cyprus' present military buildup comes closer to equalizing the local military balance.

Finally, there are approximately 5000 British soldiers on Cyprus aside from those serving with the U.N.. They occupy two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) with an area of 99 square miles

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31(...continued)

already a lot of foolish bravado on Cyprus. For more analysis along these lines, see Dan Lindley, "UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment" (MIT, Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, May 1997).


33 This estimate was confirmed in discussions with U.S. Embassy staff and other military experts.

34 Interviews with UNFICYP spokesman Rokoszewski and with Ayttug Plumer, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, "TRNC," June 5, 1996 as well as other conversations at UNFICYP.
and several other smaller facilities, all granted to Britain in the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of Cyprus of 1960. The two SBAs contain air force bases, and these were used to support British/U.S./Allied/U.N. forces during the Gulf War.\footnote{Purcell, \textit{Cyprus}, pp. 33-34. Purcell notes (in 1969) that the Akrotiri SBA is the largest British airfield outside of Britain. The SBAs are also rumored to contain intelligence gathering facilities, some of which may be U.S. controlled.}
Map 6.3, Cyprus and UNFICYP in December 1995

UNFICYP's Routine Operations

UNFICYP takes justifiable pride in being able to keep small incidents small. In the course of a year, the U.N. operation confronts and documents many hundreds of antagonism (probably the most common), overmanning, construction, and other often relatively minor incidents. As dealing with these sorts of incidents is UNFICYP's primary focus, it is important to give due attention to these routine activities and not be overly distracted by the relatively infrequent but more severe crises which tend to get more press. This is all the more true to the very real extent that many small incidents have the potential to escalate into more severe ones. While the argument is necessarily counterfactual, it is clear that some of the many incidents described below of stone-throwing, construction, and so forth could have escalated into severe near-war crises or war without UNFICYP's intervention. As will be shown, UNFICYP also plays a key role in calming some of the more severe incidents as well.

Most incidents that UNFICYP confronts take place in or along the buffer zone and are considered violations of one sort or another. Violations are classified into five types of major (or letter) violations and five minor (or spirit) violations. The five major violations are: 1. moves forward into the buffer zone; 2. weapons discharges and explosions within 1000 meters of the buffer zone; 3. military overflights; 4. military construction and improvements made within 400 meters of the buffer zone (or over, depending on UNFICYP's judgement); and 5. other changes to

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37 Spokesman Rokoszewski remembered a figure of 1400 incidents in a year, a couple of years ago. Interview, May 6, 1996. Many more incidents do not even make it into the logsheets, mostly because they are dealt with quickly by soldiers on the line who then do not bother to report them. A subsequent section covers local agreements, agreements made between local UNFICYP and one of the OPFORs which are then sometimes not reported up UNFICYP's chain of command.
the status quo in or along the buffer zone. The five minor violations are: 1. exercises or
deployments within 1000 meters of the buffer zone; 2. photographs in the buffer zone; 3. civilian
overflights; 4. infractions of the maritime security line;38 and 5. antagonisms such as stone
throwing, slingshotting, insults, etc.39

Although some people I spoke with claimed that both sides were equally responsible for
violations, my judgement is that more people argued more convincingly that the Turkish forces
(both TCs and mainland) cause somewhat more trouble than the Greeks. However, it is also true
that many incidents on both sides are caused by bored soldiers or even by accident. According to
one sector commander, "ninety-nine percent of problems are small minded and petty."40

This means that peacekeeping on Cyprus has a lot in common with babysitting and that
many problems could be solved by greater discipline within each side's ranks and by greater
distance between them. Babysitting is an appropriate analogy because UNFICYP spends a lot of
time scolding the opposing forces (OPFORs) -- getting them to desist from antagonizing each
other and to conform to simple rules for maintaining the status quo. The good behavior lasts for
what almost inevitably turns out to be a limited period of time.41

However, the babysitting analogy does not mean that keeping small things small is trivial.

38 An extension of the cease-fire line into the Mediterranean.

39 Interview/briefing, Lt. Colonel Parker, Chief Operations Officer, May 9, 1996.

40 Interview, Major Walsh, Battery Commander Sector 2 (Kingston), UNFICYP, May 24, 1996.

41 It is hard to think of an international relations theory that encompasses babysitting; perhaps one should be
invented. If so, it would have to incorporate cajoling, yelling, internationally recognized gestures, tests of wills,
personalities, fear of embarrassment, fear of discipline, and so forth. It would also have to incorporate a good degree of
rebellion and helplessness; UNFICYP does not always succeed, it certainly is not always heeded, and its powers are quite
circumscribed.
On Cyprus those being tended have guns, powerful friends, and have disliked each other for years. Most people I talked to believe that the chance of war would be somewhat higher or certain without UNFICYP. Further, even behavior which seems childish to outsiders is not necessarily benign or accidental. Both sides are "masters of provocation," and several UNFICYP officials suggested or speculated that the authorization or planning for those incidents which are deliberate can occur as high up as the battalion or regimental level of the OPFORS. Thus, the babysitting analogy understates the seriousness of situation but often accurately describes the behavior of the OPFORs and the necessarily 'parental' responses of the U.N.

Before explaining in detail the routine operations of UNFICYP, I will describe how UNFICYP knows the status quo when it sees it, the operation's liaison system, and also give an overview of the types of incidents a UNFICYP subsector confronted over about a month and a half. These three items give a bird's eye view of UNFICYP: indicating how UNFICYP defines the problems it deals with, describing one of the principal ways it deals with these problems, and presenting what one sub-sector commander thought were the 'top ten' problems he dealt with in his first month on duty.

The status quo and the liaison system are crucial to the provision and effectiveness of transparency. As described above, maintenance of the status quo along the cease-fire lines is the most important task related to maintaining the cease-fire itself. Both sides, and UNFICYP, must

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42 Interview, Spokesman Rokoszewski, May 6, 1996.

43 I speculate below that some of killings of the Summer of 1996 were deliberately planned by the Turkish side to have a political impact. While I cannot prove it, this would indicate that the killings were planned or approved at the highest political levels. See the section on shootings and killings, p. 275.

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share the same views about the status quo or disputes will arise.\footnote{The sections on construction (p. 251) and moves forward (p. 297) describe disputes about the status quo. These problems are far from abstract.} When UNFICYP succeeds in helping the sides share the same view about the status quo, it is increasing transparency and reducing the likelihood of miscalculation (H4). When UNFICYP can calm unwarranted fears about possible changes in the status quo, it is increasing transparency (H3). However, when UNFICYP succeeds in preventing or reversing an actual change in the status quo, it is often engaged in deterring, cajoling, or enforcing as well (often in ways that support H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis).

The liaison system's importance to transparency is more self-evident. It is the primary means UNFICYP uses to communicate with each side. On an operational and military level, UNFICYP's liaison system is the main way each side's military can communicate with each other, albeit indirectly via UNFICYP. Thus, the liaison system is crucial for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency to work.

**THE STATUS QUO**

As just mentioned above, the main way that UNFICYP preserves the cease-fire is to maintain the status quo in and along the buffer zone. The status quo is thus absolutely central to UNFICYP's operation. What is the status quo? How did it come about? And how can UNFICYP recognize changes in the status quo if they occur?

The status quo is key to UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency. The status quo is the
'base truth' and if UNFICYP can maintain get the OPFORs to accept a single base truth about the cease-fire lines and the buffer zone, much tension and miscalculation can be averted. By definition, increases in transparency move decision-makers and states closer to the truth. Thus, transparency can play a decisive role in resolving disputes involving differing interpretations about the status quo, or base truth. The clearer the base truth, the easier it is to increase transparency, or avoid disputes in the first place. Before proceeding further with points about transparency, I want to back up and explain the status quo:

[The] cease-fire came into effect at 1800 hours on 16 August 1974. Immediately afterwards, UNFICYP inspected the areas of confrontation and recorded the deployment of the military forces on both sides. Lines drawn between the forward defended localities became respectively the National Guard and Turkish Forces cease-fire lines. In the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement, the military status quo, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, became the standard by which it was judged whether any changes constituted violations of the cease-fire. The military status quo was subsequently clarified further and adjusted in numerous local agreements between units of UNFICYP and of the sides concerned. Most of those agreements were eventually consolidated in a simple set of rules which UNFICYP communicated to the military forces on both sides in early 1989.

It is an essential feature of the cease-fire that neither side can exercise authority or jurisdiction or make any military moves beyond its own forward military lines. In the area between the lines, which is known as the U.N. buffer zone, UNFICYP maintains the status quo ... without prejudice to an eventual political settlement concerning the disposition of the area.45

In practical terms, the status quo means not only the location of the cease-fire lines but every militarily significant feature along the buffer zone. This includes such details as the number of sandbags, the number of soldiers, the number of firing holes, and the quality of the concrete blocks in every OP and position along the buffer zone. The section on construction (p.

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251) goes into to more depth on these points.

Keeping track of all these details -- the base truth -- is a daunting task and the knowledge must be passed on to each successive rotation of troops.\(^{46}\) Numerous soldiers I talked to said that they learned the ropes in their sectors in about a week or week and a half. UNFICYP employs a number of techniques to make sure that the OPFORs do not encroach into the buffer zone with new buildings (a combination construction/move-forward' violation) or make improvements to existing positions. Alone or in various combinations, there are often sketches, photos, written records, computerized records, and file folders of various positions, areas, and buildings along the buffer zone. A number of the buildings, barbed wires, etc. in and along the buffer zone are marked with little signs by the U.N. indicating what it is and who 'owns' it.\(^{47}\)

Despite these efforts, there are numerous problems involved in keeping track of the status quo. Many of the violations discussed below in some way reflect a dispute (real, imagined, or manipulatively concocted) about whether or not a construction actually improves a military position or whether an activity really crosses the cease-fire line. It would be extremely helpful to UNFICYP and the maintenance of peace if there was a comprehensive and centralized photo or video data-base of the buffer zone, but this does not exist. In fact, both sides are extremely sensitive about photos being taken of and in the buffer zone and 'no photographs allowed' signs dot the cease-fire line in Nicosia.\(^{48}\) In disputes with each side about the status quo, UNFICYP

\(^{46}\) Which happens as frequently as every six months in the case of the British contingents.

\(^{47}\) For example: "U.N. barbed wire; not CFL."

\(^{48}\) During one of my line tours in central Nicosia, the TFs called a U.N. sub-sector headquarters (Maple House) wondering about the guy with the backpack (me) and asking whether I was taking photos (although I was walking around (continue/...
can not even use the photos it does have due to the suspicions of the OPFORs that the U.N. is really spying for the other side. If it has them, UNFICYP must instead use its sketches to try to make a case that one side or the other really did add something to one of its positions.

Another problem is that when the cease-fire lines were drawn, it was done on a large scale map (1:400,000) with a thick pencil. This invited numerous and continuing disputes about the actual location of the cease-fire lines because the swath of the pencil covered about 300 meters!\(^49\) The exact same problem occurred when the maps were drawn between Israel and Syria when the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was created.

In sum, the base truth was not well established from the start. And problems with the base truth persist. Even though UNFICYP generally succeeds at maintaining the integrity of the buffer zone and confronting incidents, some of the problems it faces are due to or exacerbated by the difficulties of establishing the base truth. These are problems in the provision of transparency and cast some doubt on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency). These problems are evinced and discussed in most detail in the section on moves forward (p. 297), as well as that on construction (p. 251). Again though, UNFICYP generally succeeds in its investigations and usually establishes the facts necessary to help tame many incidents.\(^50\)

\(^48\)(...continued) with a pad of paper taking notes, I was not taking photos and the backpack was never opened). UNFICYP soldiers are instructed to take the film from anyone seen photographing the buffer zone and if the request is resisted, they are supposed to call the Cyprus Police (CYPOL) to deal with the offender

\(^49\) Interview with General Vartiainen, Force Commander. See also Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, p. 65.

\(^50\) Indeed, its success in doing so is the basis of a powerful new hypothesis, H5: the information-based cease and desist, proposed at the end of the antagonism violations section.
**THE LIAISON SYSTEM**

The liaison system is crucial to UNFICYP's operation and to the transparency that UNFICYP provides. UNFICYP depends on it for coping with problems and it is the primary vehicle each side uses to t the U.N. to deal with complaints about the other. The liaison system also allows the OPFORs to indirectly communicate with each other. In these ways, UNFICYP can provide transparency (H1).

The basic standard operating procedure (SOP) for dealing with violations and incidents involves discussions with the OPFORs in an attempt to calm things down, to find out the truth about what happened, and/or to cajole, persuade, or coerce proper behavior. These discussions can take place at UNFICYP's initiative if they discover a problem or at the behest of the OPFORs if they report an actual, suspected, or fabricated violation to UNFICYP. If an OPFOR initiates a complaint, the SOP is to talk first with the complaining side and then to the other side. As U.N. soldiers and officers shuttle between OPFOR OPs or make phone calls to each side, they are acting as intermediaries and truth seekers on a local level. As will be seen below, both of these activities can increase transparency.

UNFICYP's liaison system follows two mantras: 1. deal with the problem at the lowest possible level and 2. be "firm, fair, and friendly." At the beginning of each rotation, officers down to Captain-level are formally introduced to their OPFOR counterparts and soldiers below that rank are encouraged to get to know their counterparts as fast and as well as possible.

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51 I say mantra because I heard the same thing repeated many times. For example, interviews with Colonel Ian Talbot, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP, May 9, 1996 and Lt. Colonel Andrew Snowdon, Commanding Officer Sector 2, May 10, 1996.
According to the commander of Sector 2, these relationships are fundamental to the success of the peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{52} If a problem can not be worked out at the lowest level, then the problem gets bumped up UNFICYP's chain of command (in extreme cases, sometimes all the way to the U.N. in New York and to the embassies of involved states. This escalation is shown in the discussion of the Roccas Bastion construction, starting on p. 252). UNFICYP has direct lines to much of each OPFOR's command structure, extending at least down to the sub-sector level. The highest levels of UNFICYP (Chief of Staff, Force Commander, and Chief of Mission) meet their counterparts at least once a month.\textsuperscript{53} Following mantra number 1, the lower levels meet or talk more often.

To help handle negotiations and as a service to new rotations, UNFICYP maintains character profiles on OPFOR officers. They include name, nationality, rank, estimated age, weight, as well as personality, likes and dislikes, negotiating style, strengths and weaknesses, and so forth. Notes include such things as "very clever," "very efficient and professional," "he's the boss man - we all listen respectfully," "unhelpful, uncooperative, unable to make a decision. Therefore not worth dealing with," "as incorrigible as ever," and that meetings with a certain officer usually involve alcohol: "be warned."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} Lt. Colonel Snowdon, May 10, 1996. I talked to him and one of his company commanders later, on the penultimate day of their rotation, and they talked with alternating affection, sadness, anger, and frustration as they described their goodbyes with various of their counterparts. They even exchanged goodbye gifts with some of them. This helps demonstrate the importance of the influence of personalities on the effectiveness of the liaison system.

\textsuperscript{53} Chief of Staff Talbot notes that (at least for him) this is an improvement over his predecessors. He further recommends meetings on a regular basis so as not to meet only when there is a crisis. I'm not sure how far and wide this bit of wisdom has been promulgated. Interview, May 9, 1996.

\textsuperscript{54} From "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," Sector 2, West, Kingston.
While flow charts and SOPs exist to govern the liaison system, in reality these rules can not be (and are not) followed too strictly. Strict adherence could allow the OPFORs to play games with UNFICYP, perhaps buying time while they sought advantage or created a fait accompli. UNFICYP "must be able to jump out of the formal system if necessary to keep them on their toes." Moreover, certain incidents may require a sharp escalation to higher levels of authority and problems can be bumped up to headquarters level in a matter of minutes.55

Details on what happens in meetings sparked by specific incidents follow in subsequent sections. There are also routine meetings between UNFICYP and the OPFORs. To illustrate, here's what happened at a May 1996 meeting between an UNFICYP Captain and a TF Lieutenant. The meeting was requested by the TF's to discuss an upcoming trench refurbishment near the buffer zone. The meeting's tone was friendly and unusually cooperative. Even in these routine meetings, transparency plays a role.

- After UNFICYP was told of the refurbishment plan, UNFICYP requested that the meeting be moved to the trench area. The meeting then moved to the 100 meter long, 1.5 meter deep trench, whose sides and roof were collapsing. The TFs said that the refurbishment would take place over two weeks, starting in four days, and would involve numerous soldiers and some bulldozing.
- UNFICYP noted that the construction was sensitive and required careful monitoring.
- The TFs responded that UNFICYP was not permitted to cross the buffer zone and that they had already broken the rules by moving the meeting.56
- UNFICYP then asked for a guarantee that there would be no improvements in the trench, other than the refurbishment.

55 Interview, Chief of Staff Talbot, May 9, 1996 as well as discussions with the Chief Operations Officer, Lt. Colonel Parker.

56 In reality, UNFICYP should have freedom of movement throughout the island. While movement is free in the South, it is restricted in the "TRNC" and this is a matter frequently protested in the UNSG's reports. The original status of forces agreement, proposed by the UNSG U Thant and accepted by the Government of Cyprus in 1964 allowed for full freedom of movement throughout the island. Following the 1974 invasion, Turkish Cypriot authorities agreed to allow the U.N. to freely visit Greek Cypriots living in the North but even these limited promises were never completely fulfilled. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, pp. 211-20 and 266-67 and UNSG S/1996/411, p. 6.
- The TFs agreed to an inspection when it was done and perhaps to inspections every few days during the construction.
- UNFICYP then complained about littering of the buffer zone by the TFs.
- UNFICYP then notifies the TFs of an impending three day NG exercise near the cease-fire line, of an upcoming UNFICYP escort of civilians into the buffer zone to check on the lights around the Nicosia prison, and of an NG cleanup effort to take place at one of their OPs.
- The TFs asked for more information on the NG exercise if it became available.

Note several instances of transparency in action. The TFs and UNFICYP notified each other in advance of potentially tension-increasing activities (of construction, the exercise, and other activities in and near the buffer zone). UNFICYP also took action to get inspections to preserve the status quo along the buffer zone. Gathering information is a prerequisite to the provision of transparency.

Thus, H1: Regimes Provide Transparency is supported and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions receives some support, although it is hard to tell exactly how much calming effect the provision of transparency had. One can make the counter-factual and deductive argument that without this sort of routine advance notification, life along the buffer zone would be filled with all sorts of (or even more) tension causing faits-accomplis. Indeed, these sorts of faits accomplis are what the OPFORs frequently do to each other anyway and these create the incidents that UNFICYP then has to resolve. The section on construction in particular describes a number of these sorts of incidents.

INCIDENT OVERVIEW: SECTOR 2, WEST

To give an overview of life along the buffer zone, I present in this section a summary of the most notable incidents that occurred between December 5, 1995 and January 27, 1996 in
Sector 2, West (Kingston). If an incident is closed, the U.N. is happy with the outcome or can not do anything more about the situation. If an incident is continuing or ongoing, then the U.N. is still trying to work out the issue. Ongoing incidents are monitored by the operations branch in UNFICYP's HQ. Here is the summary:

* Two prisoners escaped from the Nicosia prison (near the buffer zone) and were recaptured within 45 minutes. Incident closed.
* A National Guard observation post (NG OP) built a low wall which was removed after a U.N. verbal protest. Incident closed.
* Since Autumn 1995, an NG OP has been shining a spotlight toward a Turkish Forces (TF) OP, said to be in retaliation for TF stone throwing. Incident continuing. An annex to the brief noted five spotlight shinings in November, one in December, and two in January.
* An NG OP which is supposed to be unmanned is often manned. The TFs are sensitive to this violation due to the proximity of the NG OP to a TF OP and they frequently call the U.N. to report the problem. The Battery Commander (a Major) in charge of Sector 2 West is in ongoing discussions with his counterparts. Incident continuing.
* The TFs tried to improve three firing ports in their force commander's berm. The improvements were removed after UNFICYP met with the TF commanding officer. Incident closed.
* An NG OP sentry sanger was enlarged but was replaced with the original after a local U.N. protest. Incident closed.
* A routine U.N. patrol [probably two soldiers] to the Wayne's Keep cemetery was intercepted in the cemetery by a 25-soldier strong TF quick reaction force. After a forceful discussion, the local U.N. commander got the TFs to agree to maintain the SQ. In a local agreement, the U.N. retained the right to patrol up Grammar School Hill without giving notice but nonetheless agreed out of courtesy to give the TFs a fifteen minute warning before patrolling the area. Incident

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57 The following is from the "Main Incident Brief," dated 1/29/96, in a file folder called "Protest General," located in the headquarters of Sector 2, West (Kingston). Sector 2, West consists of one company of British soldiers and stretches West roughly from the Western part of old Nicosia to just beyond the old and now defunct Nicosia airport. This was the only record of this type I saw and I include it here because it represents the company commander's selection of the most important events he confronted during the time indicated. Most of the other records I saw were arranged by type of problem, so this is the best shot I can offer at presenting a representative sample of the most important but still routine events. These incidents occurred during the first month and a half of the company's rotation - usually a time marked by the testing of the new soldiers by both OPFORS. However, the brief noted that many of the predicted hot spots were quiet.

58 These are agreements made by local commanders with their OPFOR counterparts having to do with rights of patrol, or other issues. These agreements are sometimes not reported up the chain of command or to the next rotation of soldiers. There is more on local agreements as well as contested patrolling rights in subsequent sections, especially moves forward (p. 297). Wayne's Keep cemetery is a sensitive area near Sector 2, West's headquarters at Kingston.
closed.
* A number of hunting incidents and hunter intrusions into the buffer zone have occurred over the past eight weeks. Incident closed.
* A wall dubbed the 'Great Wall of Bengal' was built by the TFs near Mamhari to help the "TRNC" protect itself from motorcycle riding anti-Turk demonstrators from the South.\(^{59}\) After prolonged negotiations, the U.N. got the TFs to reduce the wall's height to two feet. One reason the TFs lowered their wall was that the U.N. offered to build a barbed wire fence to help manage the problem. Incident closed.

These incidents begin to paint a picture of the various sorts of violations confronted by UNFICYP and of the discussions the U.N. undertakes to resolve them. To the extent that the OPFORs can trust UNFICYP to maintain the status quo in and along the buffer zone, this increases transparency by making threat assessments along the buffer zone more certain and more accurate. On the other hand, these incidents also hint at the extent to which transparency is not involved in resolving incidents and the extent to which incidents can be hard to resolve at all. Verbal protests and forceful discussions in themselves may not have much to do with transparency, although they often have a lot to do with maintaining the status quo.

Operational Nuts and Bolts: Dealing with Violations and other Activities

I will now proceed to walk through the types of major and minor violations listed above (p. 230). I will discuss the violations in this order in separate subsections: antagonism, overmanning, construction, overflight and maritime, shooting and weapon, and moves forward/patrol tracks/local agreements. I will also discuss demonstrations and crowd control,

\(^{59}\) Motorcycle riding demonstrators aiming to cross the buffer zone and enter the "TRNC" pose the toughest challenge to U.N. crowd control efforts. There is a subsequent subsection on demonstrations.
humanitarian activities, and the role of the press and schools in exacerbating the Cyprus problem. The press and schools promote extreme nationalism and their myth-making decreases transparency on Cyprus. Most of these subsections show instances of transparency in action and all of them taken together (see conclusions) help indicate the relative importance of increasing transparency to UNFICYP's mission.

ANTAGONISM VIOLATIONS

Antagonisms are among the most common violations and consist of stone-throwing, insult-hurling, slingshotting, gesturing, and so forth between the two sides. Several fairly typical incidents are summarized in the Immediate Reports that the UNFICYP soldiers are supposed to prepare each time they deal with an incident:60

- 12/26/95
  - A UNFICYP OP reports that an NG soldier is using a sling shot against a Turkish OP.
  - When the NG soldier is told to stop, he fires a shot at the UN OP.
  - A UNFICYP Troop sergeant is deployed to the area. The UNFICYP operations officer protests strongly to an NG sergeant who apologized and promised to deal with the NG soldier.

- 2/5/96
  - A stone was thrown from an NG position, hitting a TF soldier on the neck in his OP.

60 The dated IMREPs are from IMREP folder, Sector 2, West, Kingston. All these IMREPSs were sent from Sector 2 West to Sector 2 headquarters.

Many incidents never even make it to paper. One U.N. soldier told me that when he first arrived, he would report incidents all the time. Now, he said [with particular reference to overmanning of OPs] that he just shouts at the OPFORs in violation and they "bugger off," albeit after annoying the other side. Further, he said he might not even try to remedy the violation if the other side can not see it. If UNFICYP routinely got caught doing this, it would erode faith in the operation. However, the practice helps conserve one's cajoling/coercive capital for incidents which do increase tension between the OPFORs. A related, but opposite, leverage-increasing tactic mentioned by a fairly senior officer is to fix a problem on side A and not tell side B about the problem or the fix. Then, if the side B becomes stubborn about fixing one of their violations, one can then tell the held-in-reserve story of the fix on side A to help get side B off the dime.
- The TFs request to speak to an UNFICYP non-commissioned officer (NCO).
- UNFICYP speaks to both sides; the UNFICYP operations officer speaks to the NG battalion HQ which promises to deal with the accused soldier.
- Incident closed.

* 2/6/96
- The TFs complain of a light shining from an NG OP.
- UNFICYP sends a patrol to the NG OP and tells them to stop
- Incident continuing.

* 2/7/96
- The NG protests the TFs use of a spotlight.
- The UNFICYP operations officer protested to the TFs who then promised to discipline the soldier.
- Incident closed.

* 2/21/96
- An NG OP phones UNFICYP at 10:15 to protest TFs use of sling shot.
- UNFICYP sends a patrol and the situation is quiet.
- The TF soldier says there is no problem.
- The NG OP says the problem started at 9:30 and that now the situation is quiet.
- UNFICYP will continue to monitor the situation; tells NG that if UNFICYP had been told earlier, a patrol could have been sent earlier.
- Incident closed.

Two more incidents were recounted to me in greater length by Bombardier Elwyn Jones, who likened his job to that of a detective (as a detective, Jones personifies H1: Regimes Provide Transparency). The first occurred at 'Silver Bunker' when an NG OP reported at 9:20 am that a TF soldier had entered the BZ, moved to within 100 meters, and began to shout abusively and point his weapon threateningly. Jones went to the area 100 meters away, then went 150 and 175 meters away. There were tall walls, barbed wire, etc. in the area and Jones thought that the TF could not have made it into the buffer zone in that area unless he was a good climber or had a

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61 Interview and line tour, May 10, 1996, Sector 2, East, Maple House (central Nicosia). Jones consulted a personal notebook during our talk.

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ladder or a climbing harness. So Jones went to the NG line sergeant and said that there was no way the TF soldier could have been there. Jones was then accused of being a liar, but Jones said he would not escort the NGs into the buffer zone to prove his theory. Then the NGs began to say maybe this, maybe that and their story began to crumble. Jones wrapped up by visiting the TF side anyway and they stated that they were in their OP the whole time.

In a second case, Jones was called out at 7:30 am to speak to a NG officer who claimed that two TFs directly opposite his OP had begun throwing stones and smashed a window in the NG OP. He further claimed that the TFs had planted stones around their own OP to claim that the NG had returned 'stonefire.' Jones got to the NG OP at 8:31 thinking the situation would be clear cut, but the broken window was thick and had a wire mesh several inches in front of it. There were also no stones around the OP. Jones started counting pebbles and asking where the stones were. The NG responded that the stones were all around. Jones then started throwing pebbles at the mesh and when they just ping off, he asked again where the stones are. An NG soldier responded by going away and bringing back a stone -- but there is no way that stone could have fallen that far away if it had hit the window. Jones thought that maybe the NG broke the window from the inside and were trying to pin it on the TFs to avoid punishment. On the other hand, there were stones on the TF side, so maybe the NGs threw stones and the TFs threw pebbles. Jones ended up talking to both sides, telling each not to retaliate in these sorts of instances but to instead call the U.N.

These incidents offer a number of lessons, all of which will be reinforced by subsequent sections. First, each side frequently calls on UNFICYP to try to resolve problems it has with the other side. Second, UNFICYP often - but not always - succeeds in resolving these problems.
Points one and two underscore UNFICYP's utility. Third, those who did not agree with my peacekeeping as babysitting analogy should at least be on the fence by now.

Fourth, the last two tales from Bombardier Jones (especially the first one) triggered the creation of H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis. This occurs when a regime (a.k.a. Jones) conducts a fact-finding exercise (on the verge of being H1: Regimes Provide Transparency in action), throws facts in the face of the would-be perpetrator of an incident, and gets them to back down when the facts against them are sufficiently obvious and embarrassing. H5 is not really about transparency because it is not increasing the amount and availability of information about adversaries. However, it is an information-related hypothesis because it depends for its effectiveness on the same information gathering mechanisms UNFICYP uses to provide transparency — patrolling, monitoring, and investigations.

I mentioned above (especially in the context of the Seven Years War, p. 129) that increased transparency could work within governments to allow them to identify and constrain rogues. H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis is related to this point because the regime confronts the rogue (or higher authorities) directly with the facts. The information undercuts the lies they are trying to perpetrate (the lies are typically deployed to support hostile or antagonistic actions).\(^\text{62}\)

Fifth, Jones' liaising with the TFs in these incidents could provide some support for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, but it is hard to

\(\text{62 Had the joint Delimitation Commission stuck around long enough to tell Governor Shirley of Massachusetts that the French were not in fact colonizing Massachusetts, this would have been an example of H5: the cease and desist hypothesis at work. This might have helped delay or prevent the Seven Years War.}\)
measure the effects of this liaisoning. Although, a good argument can be made that UNFICYP's presence and actions keep a lid on many antagonism incidents, H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation is not supported because of the relatively small role of transparency in preventing these incidents from escalating.

Sixth, the ability of UNFICYP to maintain the status quo along the buffer zone does increase transparency on an overall level. This is because UNFICYP gives each side has reasonable confidence that the other is respecting the status quo and the buffer zone. However, specific problems along the buffer zone are often solved not with transparency but by conducting enough of an investigation to get someone in trouble (H5).

This last point, about the ability of UNFICYP to get violators in trouble, highlights one of my most important observations and conclusions about U.N. peacekeeping. The ability to get someone in trouble is the operational definition of consent to a peacekeeping operation. With consent, there is always someone of higher rank than the troublemaker who can get the troublemaker in trouble and make amends. Thus, the operational definition of consent and H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis are intimately related.

Ideally, consent means that there will be no trouble along the cease-fire line or buffer zone maintained by the peacekeeping operation. This is the case for UNDOF. For more

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63 In addition, it is probable that there are antagonism incidents in which discussion with both sides is necessary to figure out what happened and calm the situation. H3 would receive stronger support in these cases, but I have no documentation or examples of this happening. However, this happened in several of the construction and weapons incidents discussed below and this supports the plausibility of the argument that this sort of investigation and liaisoning occurs in antagonism incidents as well.

64 In the words of an UNFICYP soldier: "s**t rolls downhill." He said that the U.N. can start this process in order to snuff out incidents.
incident-filled operations like UNFICYP, consent means that if someone tries to stir up trouble, they will ultimately face punishment if they are caught. This is so because troublemakers are going against a policy the government at the highest levels has agreed to. Consent means that, in the end, a damper can be put on potentially aggravating incidents. On the other hand, lack of consent greatly diminishes the possibility of punishment (the troublemaker may even be rewarded),\textsuperscript{65} the damper is removed, and the odds of escalation are greatly increased. As peacekeeping operations usually have little true military or economic leverage of their own, consent is crucial to their success.

What is difficult for UNFICYP is that both sides intentionally provoke each other. UNFICYP, luck, and a desire to avoid war when push comes to shove have kept Cyprus from war since 1974. Unfortunately, there has been lots of pushing. Peacekeeping on Cyprus takes place almost at the limits of consent. Were the situation much hotter, and the pushing more forceful, UNFICYP would have to turn to peace enforcement to be effective. At present, UNFICYP can deter through monitoring, presence, and mild diplomatic coordination. It is not capable of peace enforcement or deterrence through force.

OVERMANNING

\textsuperscript{65} Of course, reality is not quite so clear-cut. Even if UNFICYP does have the consent of both sides, there may still be social or professional rewards or incentives for soldiers at some levels who instigate incidents and get away with it, for those who get one over on the U.N. or who get the OPFOR into a tizzy. Even if his actions are not officially condoned, the successful troublemaker may enhance his reputation among his comrades, relieve some boredom, or show some initiative to his senior officers. My hunch is that much of the outcome depends on the personalities of the soldiers and officers involved. As I mentioned before, some UNFICYP officials suspect that some incidents are instigated as high as the regimental level.
Most Greek and Turkish OPs along the buffer zone are only supposed to be manned by only one or two soldiers. A few OPs are considerably bigger. As the name suggests, overmanning occurs when there are more soldiers in an OP than specified. The majority of overmanning incidents involve a few extra soldiers just relaxing at a comrade's OP, chatting, napping, drinking a beer, or playing cards. The serious side of overmanning is that it antagonizes the other side and fosters unprofessionalism - the latter leading to unruly behavior and more serious incidents.\textsuperscript{66} Walking along the buffer zone in Nicosia frequently reveals Greek Cypriot overmanning of a casual nature (hanging out, etc.). The TF positions along the buffer zone are much harder to see, even from the TF side.

Despite the fact that overmanning is sometimes dealt with verbally on the spot by U.N. patrols and is then not reported (or is ignored and not reported),\textsuperscript{67} overmanning is one of the most frequent violations dealt with by the U.N.. Overmanning violations make up a good percentage of the immediate reports sent in by U.N. soldiers after an incident\textsuperscript{68} and are a frequent topic in meetings between the U.N. and the OPFORs. Here are some examples:

* 5/13/96, "The TF complained that the NG were oman NG OPs [xxx]\textsuperscript{69} and [xxx]. The UN patrol that investigated this objection could not find any evidence to prove it."

* 5/14/96, "TF OP [xx] was oman by 15 sldr[s] [soldiers]. The sldrs at NG OP [xx] and TF OP [xx] traded insults until the UN QRF [quick reaction force] arrived and calmed the situation

\textsuperscript{66} To underscore this point, UNFICYP calls one NG OP "OP Disco" because it is known for loud music and drunkenness.

\textsuperscript{67} See footnote 60 above.

\textsuperscript{68} which are then combined to make up each sector's Situation Reports, SITREPs.

\textsuperscript{69} [xxx] and like designations indicate that the exact name of the OP or other position is being withheld at UNFICYP's request.
down. The QRF were also able to achieve a return to the status quo. There was a possible incidence of weapon cocking by an NG sentry during the period of antagonism although further enquiries failed to prove this. This incident will be dealt with at a meeting with the commanding officer [of this Turkish battalion in two days].

* 3/5/96
- NG OP overmanned by 1 man.
- TF retaliated by putting two extra soldiers on their OP and saying they will continue to overman if the NG continues to overman.
- UN patrol told both to return to normal and they did. Will continue to observe.
- Incident closed.

* 3/7/96
- TF OP overmanned by 4 men.
- They say an officer told them to overman by 4.
- UN patrol told them to return to normal. Will man UN OP [xx] to observe situation.
- Incident closed.

* 5/16/94
- Memo from UN Liaison Officer to NG Liaison Officer, forwarded to Chief Operations Officer, re: daily meeting with NG UN Liaison Officer. Says NG are re-occupying a position in response to press reports of infiltration by 3 Albanians from North to South. NG says position not part of Unmanning agreement, that the position has been unmanned for awhile, and that they have the prerogative to re-man it. The Chief Operations Officer made a note to categorize this situation as overmanning in the situation report.

These incidents again show the sides calling upon the U.N. to help resolve problems with the other as well as the U.N. discovering problems and resolving them in the course of patrolling. The episode involving insults and possible weapons cocking highlights the dangers of proximity and illustrates the wisdom of confidence-building measures that would pull forces back and/or to unman positions.

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70 Both of these examples are from the "Sector 2 Daily Sitrep," Sitrep No. 163, 13 May to 14 May, 1996.

71 The last two examples are from IMREP folder, Sector 2, West.

72 This example is from the folder NG CFL 1203.
With respect to transparency, the first incident in this section shows UNFICYP responding to suspicions which they found and reported to be unfounded (mild support for the H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears). However, as the facts of the case are fairly easy to establish in most overmanning incidents, transparency plays a lesser role in overmanning that it does in antagonism incidents. That said, when a U.N. patrol says 'you're overmanned' and the violator backs down, that's H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis at work.

CONSTRUCTION, INCLUDING THE ROCCAS BASTION INCIDENT

Part of UNFICYP's mission to preserve the status quo includes assuring that construction along the buffer zone adds no military advantage to either side. Each side's construction is limited to maintenance of current military positions. New positions should not be built and old ones should not be improved. As described above, when repairs are made, each brick should be replaced with the same sort of brick, regular concrete should not be replaced by reinforced concrete, and so forth.

Relative to most other types of incidents, transparency is particularly important in construction incidents because it can be hard to tell if improvements are actually being made or not. Furthermore, fears are readily inflamed because construction itself is often so visible and hard to hide. Only UNFICYP is in a position to investigate and determine the nature of constructions.

This section details the 1995 construction of a playground in the Roccas Bastion and then
presents several more typical instances of construction. The Roccas Bastion episode was a fight to provide transparency (H1) in the hopes that so doing would reduce fears and tensions (H3). Built by the "TRNC," the playground overlooks Cyprus' main telecommunications building and contains long, concrete underground tunnels. The tunnels raised a furor in the South and the U.N. fought an intense diplomatic battle to win the right to inspect them and assure that they were and are not being used for military purposes.

Even in construction incidents, UNFICYP's role and the role of transparency should not be overstated. Both sides engage in large amounts of military construction that is outside of UNFICYP's jurisdiction or ability to inspect. The Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus often express concern and disapproval about construction and military buildups on Cyprus, but that is the extent of the U.N.'s role in the bulk of military construction and procurement.

"TRNC" CONSTRUCTION AT ROCCAS BASTION

Nicosia is divided almost exactly in half by the buffer zone. Its old city is surrounded by a circle of 20-30 foot high, 500 year old Venetian walls and these fortifications contain eleven bastions - protrusions that extend out from the otherwise round walls about 100 meters and that are about 200 meters wide (see the diagram below to get a better sense of these dimensions). The Roccas Bastion is one of these bastions. Cyprus and the "TRNC" each control five bastions, and the U.N. controls the eleventh (Flatro). Roccas Bastion

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73 The majority of this section is based on many pages of detailed notes taken over the course of several days from UNFICYP's Roccas Bastion file. The file contained cables from and to UNFICYP, inspection reports, notes on meetings, press releases, diagrams, and so forth. The file contained no photos. My rules of engagement were that I could not use any names, addresses, or direct quotes and my notes contain none of these items. I brought up the Roccas Bastion construction in most of my interviews; it was an incident of sufficient gravity that almost everybody remembered it and had something to say. I also visited the Roccas Bastion on several occasions. Please see Appendix I for more details on the diplomatic record and process-tracing of events on a near-daily basis (p. 449).
was supposed to be demilitarized under a December 1963 agreement and was also covered by the 1989 unmanning agreement.

The Roccas Bastion is one the most sensitive areas in the city for several reasons. It overlooks the main building and node of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) and is one of the few places "TRNC" citizens can glimpse life on the other side. The bastion is one of the closest points of civilian contact on the island\(^4\) and from it Turkish Cypriots can throw stones and hurl insults at the Greek Cypriots (and vice-versa). The Greek Cypriots usually pass by the Roccas Bastion on their way to demonstrate against the Turkish occupation at the very nearby Ledra Palace, so the Roccas Bastion is also frequently used for counter-demonstrations by the Turkish Cypriots.\(^5\) Finally, there is a historical legacy of troubling military construction in Roccas Bastion. In 1965, part of Roccas Bastion collapsed, revealing a 50 foot long tunnel. This sharply increased tensions and raised suspicions in the press about other Turkish tunnels in Nicosia. According to the U.N., the tunnel afforded an "excellent firing position" for the Turkish Cypriots. After considerable negotiation, UNFICYP sealed off the tunnel and rendered it unfit for military use.\(^6\)

\(^4\) Outside of the mixed village of Pyla.

\(^5\) The Ledra Palace was a grand hotel and is now used by the U.N. as a barracks. The Ledra Palace Checkpoint is where those who are able and willing can pass from North to South and vice-versa. It is a favorite spot for demonstrations as well as bicomunal events.

Demonstrations are covered in a subsequent section.

\(^6\) Evidently, UNFICYP has subsequently relinquished the level of control it once had over the bastion. See Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, pp. 254, citing *Report of the Secretary General*, S/6228, March 11, 1965. Col. Talbot said that the Turks actually tunneled out of Roccas Bastion in 1963-1964. Interview, May 9, 1996. He also said that the 1995 Roccas Bastion construction showed what a long-term game was being played by the Turkish side - a theme he brought up several times.
In June 1995, the Turkish Cypriots began construction of a playground in the Roccas Bastion and this construction involved two large underground tunnels. These tunnels again sharply raised both suspicions and tensions. UNFICYP, the U.N., and British and American diplomats waged an intense campaign to get permission for inspections of the tunnels by UNFICYP from the Turkish side. This campaign was ultimately successful and the subsequent and periodic inspections that followed did modestly help calm, but certainly did not eliminate, Greek Cypriot suspicions.

The story of the Roccas Bastion construction is one of the most significant and illustrative with respect to the transparency hypotheses. Not only was the incident among the most diplomatically sensitive and involved in years, it shows the U.N. using diplomatic leverage and finesse to get permission to use a transparency-increasing mechanism (inspections). This supports H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. It also shows that the provision of transparency did in fact reduce the mostly unwarranted and somewhat hysterical fears of the Greek Cypriots down to the level of resentment and milder suspicion. At least as far as the military implications of the construction goes, this event offers modest support to H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

The event also shows two bounding conditions for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. First, H3 can not work if the two sides mistrust each other so much that calming information is simply ignored or not believed.

Second, the whole battle for inspections also revealed a good deal of obstinacy and even malevolence on the part of the Turkish side. While the inspections revealed that the tunnels appeared to have little real military utility, the episode indicates malicious intent on the part of
the Turks. This supports H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict. The U.N.'s difficulties signaled the Turkish side's obstinacy and secretiveness. H3 can not be supported when in fact bad news comes over the line.

A full description and time line of the events surrounding the Roccas Bastion incident is covered in Appendix I. A synoptic version is given here.

On June 10, 1995, the Turkish side informed UNFICYP at the Company level that work would begin next week on a playground in Roccas Bastion. Keeping things at the sector level, UNFICYP communicated these plans the next day to the Greek Cypriot National Guard 211 battalion. On the 12th, the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister informed UNFICYP's Chief of Mission that repairs would take place and that a playground would be built in Roccas Bastion. The minister also noted that Roccas Bastion was not part of the buffer zone but that it was part of the "TRNC". The U.N. Senior Advisor said that the construction was unlikely to be of concern and that civilianization of the area was a worthy purpose. All sides agreed that the area was covered by the 1989 unmanning agreement. An internal memo written after the meeting noted that the U.N. should inform the National Guard, in order to lessen the chances of Greek Cypriot overreaction to the construction. The National Guard was informed at the headquarters level on the 19th.

Two related points support H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. First, through the liaison system at several levels, UNFICYP learned of the construction of the Roccas Bastion. They then communicated what they had learned to the Greek Cypriot side in a timely manner. Second, the internal memo shows that UNFICYP clearly recognizes its transparency-providing role and that this role can calm fears. When it works, this supports H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted
Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

Despite UNIFICYP's efforts, an uproar started on the Greek Cypriot side when excavation began on the 20th. The National Guard Chief of Staff wrote UNIFICYP charging that talk of a playground was certain to be a ruse to disguise military construction and asking that the U.N. correct the situation. UNIFICYP's Spokesman said that there were 10-15 stories a day in the Greek Cypriot press about the construction as it took place.\(^{77}\) The Greek Cypriots were filled with suspicion about the construction. Such fear is the necessary first step for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions to work. (Later, UNIFICYP's inspections will show these fears to be an overreaction.)

Quickly responding to these concerns, UNIFICYP requests inspections at the military level on the 21st, but are referred to "TRNC" political authorities. Because the Roccas Bastion is above ground level and is hard to see into, UNIFICYP began helicopter overflights. Here, UNIFICYP is gathering information but it is not sharing it. Thus, it is implementing the mechanisms necessary for the provision of transparency (H1), but not actually increasing transparency.

A diplomatic furball began as the U.S. and U.K. issued demarches to the Turkish Cypriot authorities supporting UNIFICYP's requests to inspect the construction. Later, appeals are sent directly to Turkey and other countries including France join in the requests for inspections. The Turkish side repeated that the construction is for recreational purposes and that the Greek side is just whipping up a furor to divert attention from their own constructions and buildups. They say

\(^{77}\) Interview, Spokesman Rokoszewski, May 13, 1996.
they do not want to be seen caving into to Greek pressure. The Turks also played games with UNFICYP's efforts to monitor the construction; they burned down an observation post UNFICYP had built for the purpose and they built berms to try to obstruct UNFICYP's view.

Into early July, UNFICYP continued to try to gain inspections from the Turks while also attempting to calm Greek Cypriot fears and make them postpone threatened unspecified actions. UNFICYP also tried to get the issue raised at the highest levels at the U.N. in New York. UNFICYP's Chief of Mission did not think the issue could be resolved without diplomatic efforts by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. On July 7, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote the President of the Security Council asking that the Roccas Bastion construction be brought to the attention of the Security Council. The letter, S/1995/561, said that the construction is a "disturbing development" and that the "extensive digging of trenches some 3 metres wide and 2 metres deep...has raised doubts about its real purpose." Some of the construction at the bastion also occurred at night. The Security Council briefly considered the issue on the 10th and a letter dated July 11 (S/1995/562) extended the Council's full support to UNFICYP's effort to get inspections.

On July 12, a Turkish representative in Washington D.C. told the U.S. State Department that UNFICYP's Chief of Mission could visit the Roccas Bastion the next day. The Chief of Mission visited the next day and also received permission for a UNFICYP technical team to inspect the construction on the 14th.

After the inspection, the UNFICYP team reached these conclusions: the Roccas Bastion construction could be for a recreation area but the nature, scale, and manner of the construction
created a number of doubts about this purpose.\textsuperscript{78} For example, the construction was very elaborate given the simple and small number of facilities planned. It was also elaborate given the claims of limited funding - and that the Turkish Cypriots also claimed that they had not yet received funding for the above-ground portion of the area. The team wondered why the Southwest trench was very large compared to the small pipes it held and why its design contradicted its drainage function. They continued to question the need for night work, the need for a berm near the U.N. observation post, and the need for wooden planks to be placed vertically near the berm. The team noted that the construction could be used for military purposes, even though the construction was not to military specification or even militarily logical. They also wrote that the construction was covered by the 1989 unmanned agreement, but that only the Southern trench was a certain violation of the cease-fire. As such, UNFICYP could only request a return to the status quo ante with respect to the Southern trench [which they did].

The inspections were a victory for UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency (H1). However, the victory was made possible in part by as much coercion and leverage as UNFICYP could muster to its side: the U.N. Secretary-General and the embassies of powerful countries. Again, this shows that transparency provided by security regimes is often not a pure product of regimes. In this case, power and coercion needed to be applied to the Turkish side before UNFICYP was allowed to conduct the inspections.

During the initial inspection, the UNFICYP team received permission for subsequent daily inspections. A few days later though, the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister reneged,

\textsuperscript{78} For details, see the appendix.
saying he would not permit regular inspections before UNFICYP declared publicly that the
construction was not military in nature. The foreign and defense minister did not want to
respond to the heated Greek Cypriot press on the issue and he said that UNFICYP could get
access by helping to stop the campaign in the press. UNFICYP's Senior Advisor told the foreign
and defense minister that he could not make such a declaration until the Security Council hears
from the Secretary-General and he urged the minister to make it possible for the Secretary-
General to report that regular inspections would be forthcoming.

The Senior Advisor later told the minister that serious questions that remained about the
construction and that answers to these questions would require regular low-key visits. He added
that if regular visits were assured, then the Roccas Bastion issue could be removed from the
Security Council's docket. The foreign and defense minister then repeated his argument about
the need for a public declaration from UNFICYP prior to regular inspections. The minister also
said that regular inspections behind the cease-fire line were difficult for the Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to accept and that his side did not want to set a bad precedent. The Senior Advisor
responded that it was up to the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to prove that the construction was
benign and that quick action could help with regard to the Secretary-General report to the
Security Council. On July 18, in a meeting with the Chief of Mission, the "TRNC" foreign and
defense minister finally agreed to regular inspections during the construction and periodic
inspections thereafter.

Again, this shows UNFICYP successfully marshaling as much leverage as it can within
the U.N. system. Analysts often make claims that one of the few real arrows in the U.N.'s quiver
is the ability to shine a spotlight on problems in attempts to fix them. This example is a case in
point. Even here though, several embassies were also applying leverage. Their efforts were part of the spotlight, but also independently influential.

Following the initial inspections, the Chief of Mission met with the Greek Cypriot President and later with a Greek official to explain that, while the construction was somewhat inexplicable, the materials used were below military specifications and that the design of the construction conformed to no military logic. The Chief of Mission told the President that UNFICYP was arranging visits in order to keep the construction that way. This did not seem to do much to allay the Greek Cypriot's fears. A few days later a Greek Cypriot ambassador brought in a Turkish mainland newspaper (Hurriyet, July 20) article with its accompanying photographs about Turkish fortifications and tunnels and said that the article was about the Roccas Bastion.

The ambassador charged that article said that the trenches contained military command posts, military bunkers and quarters, openings through which to see the Greek Cypriots, communications, and so forth. The ambassador said that the construction and blocked UNFICYP inspection were a blatant violation of Security Council resolution 1000 and the 1989 unmanning agreement and said that the construction facilitated attack, endangered the peace, and was a provocation. The Ambassador also noted that he communicated the same message to the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council.

The Greek side would be justified in their fears, except that the U.N. shortly determined that neither the photographs nor the article's text were about the Roccas Bastion (!). The Chief of Mission cabled this news to headquarters so that they could better handle protests about the article from Cypriot representatives in New York.

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So far, despite UNFICYP's inspections and meetings with the Greek Cypriot President and others there is not much support for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. Communicating the results of the inspections (H1) should have allayed at least some of the Greek Cypriots' fears. However, as the Hurriyet story demonstrates, the Greek Cypriot side was still filled with hysteria about the construction.

The most obvious and striking provision of transparency by the U.N. occurred on July 25 when the Secretary-General wrote the President of the Security Council (S/1995/618) to report on the findings of the technical inspection of the July 14. The Secretary-General wrote that "UNFICYP is of the view that the construction on Roccas Bastion to date, including the material used, does not indicate work carried out to normal military specifications, or to any evident military logic. At the same time, the construction appears unnecessarily elaborate and costly for its stated purpose." He noted the very sensitive location of Roccas Bastion and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities had promised unhindered regular and periodic access to the bastion and that "these arrangements will enable UNFICYP to satisfy itself that the new infrastructure being built on Roccas Bastion continues to be used exclusively for civilian purposes." The Secretary-General attached the following diagram of the Roccas Bastion:
CONSTRUCTION ON ROCCAS BASTION
SITUATION AS AT 19 JULY 95

Diagram 6-1, The Roccas Bastion Construction

S/1995/618
English
Page 3

Annex

KEY

- Turkish Cypriot Observation Post
- Turkish Cypriot Unmanned
- Trenches (3m deep and 2m wide) with concrete floors and sandstone walls.
- Trees
- Filled in trench
- Fencing posts running along bastion walls
- Pipes running from filled in trench for water, sewage/drainage, electricity and telephones. As yet unconnected.
- Pre-existing military trench (approx.1m wide and 1.5m deep and 10-12m long)

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79 annex to S/1995/618, p. 3.
This is H1: Regimes Provide Transparency in action. UNFICYP generated information and provided it to the world. Only UNFICYP could have gotten permission to conduct the inspections and the Secretary-General was able to shine a spotlight on the situation in his letter to the Security Council. That said, the information provided does allow for a certain amount of fear on the Greek Cypriot side. Nobody ever said transparency would only generate good news.

Indeed, it turned out that the Greek Cypriot government was disappointed with the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council because it was, in their opinion, too factual with little or no condemnation and it only noted the construction's cost and extravagance. That said, the Greek Cypriot President decided that there would be no countermeasures, even though he was still upset about the construction. In a meeting with UNFICYP's Force Commander, the head of the Greek Cypriot National Guard said that he did not believe UNFICYP's assessment about the non-military nature of the trenches, that the 1989 unmanning agreement had been violated, and that therefore the National Guard had the right to countermeasures. He further said that, despite other Greek Cypriot Government claims to the contrary, the situation on Roccas Bastion blocked progress on furthering the unmanning agreement and undermined all political relations on Cyprus.

This highlights some potentially significant questions and problems with efforts to increase transparency: what if the target of the new information does not believe it? What if the target does not want the truth but instead wants a biased interpretation? How can efforts to increase transparency be made most credible? Could UNFICYP have used photographs or videos to bolster their case with the Greek Cypriots? Photographs seem so obviously useful, but the use of photographs along the buffer zone is too sensitive for both sides and the Turks would
probably not have allowed UNFICYP into the construction had UNFICYP been carrying photographic equipment.

Over the next several months of construction, UNFICYP continued its regular visits and its reports never varied from its initial findings. On November 11, the Roccas Bastion playground was opened at 15:30. October 15 is the anniversary of the "TRNC"s founding and is a holiday. Five thousand people attended the opening which became violent. Lots of stones were thrown from the Roccas Bastion,\(^\text{80}\) causing damage to Greek Cypriot cars and property. The opening caused a sharp increase in tension. UNFICYP's Force Commander, General Vartiainen, said that the "opening day was a catastrophe." However, he also said that the Roccas Bastion playground had become a source of understanding: "now each side can see each other and can see that they are humans, not beasts as taught in school."\(^\text{81}\)

It is clear that UNFICYP succeeded in providing transparency, so H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. But it is much less clear that H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions was confirmed. The story so far indicates that the Greek Cypriot President was only mildly calmed by the inspections (no countermeasures), but that the Greek Cypriot military remained deeply suspicious. Greek Cypriot foreign ministry officials attributed some calming effect to the inspections.

\(^{80}\) The records I read for this date said that stones were thrown to and from the bastion. But General Vartiainen said that most of the stones were thrown by Turkish Cypriots, from the bastion. Also, the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus, S/1995/1020, for the period June 16 to December 10 1995, p. 3 also only mentions violence by Turkish Cypriot civilians on opening day.

\(^{81}\) Interview 5/7/96 with General Vartiainen. Note how he believes (implicitly) that bicomunal contacts in a sense increase transparency and reduce misperceptions. According to General Vartiainen, familiarity breeds a more humane view.
A detailed view was provided by Dr. Leonides Pantelides, a political officer in the Foreign Ministry's Cyprus Problem Division. He believed it was due to great pressure from the Greek Cypriots on the U.N. and from the U.N. on the Turks that the U.N. was allowed the inspections a week. It was crucial that the Greek Cypriots kept pressuring the U.N. not to believe that the Roccas Bastion was a playground. Also, the U.N. did not want to be shown that it was ineffective or could be taken for a ride. Dr. Pantelides believed that the inspections helped resolve the crisis. That said, the Greek Cypriots still do not feel that it is park and that the deep digging and concrete indicate a possible future military use. He specified that his argument is not that the U.N. is not right when it says that there are no weapons there, but that the Turks misled the U.N. when they said it was not constructed up to military specifications. Dr. Pantelides views show some very modest support for H3. He confirms that the inspections did help resolve some of the acute aspects of the crisis and in general he places considerable value in UNFICYP and its inspections. However, he also does not believe everything UNFICYP says about the military utility of the Roccas Bastion construction. Some suspicion, though, is entirely justified by the facts.

The Turkish Cypriot authorities have quite opposite views on the Roccas Bastion construction. According to Mr. Aytug Plumer, an under-secretary at the "TRNC" ministry of foreign affairs and defense, the Greek Cypriots made a big fuss about the construction of the playground to the Security Council and others. Plumer noted that UNFICYP had clearly reported that the construction was not military in its reports and that these reports show that the big fuss

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82 Interview, 5/16/96.
was a big lie.83

Turning to U.S. embassy officials, John Koenig, First Secretary for Political Affairs, said that the U.S., U.K., and UNFICYP worked in close consultation for several weeks on the issue (as they often do, he added) and that much of the emphasis early in the crisis was about getting permission for UNFICYP to inspect the construction. He said that the U.S. acted to get information from the Turks on what they were up to, that the U.S. would share additional information it had with the U.N. (or information it received from UNFICYP with the Greeks), that the U.S. acted to reinforce pressure to get full cooperation, inspections, and transparency from the Turks, and that the U.S. interest in the matter reassured all sides. He also said that the U.N. "was the pivot for all this" and that the U.N.'s actions also helped reassure each side. Even after the construction was over, Koenig remembered that the problem continued with men of military age throwing rocks and shouting insults from the bastion. In the end, Koenig was still not entirely satisfied with the situation: the way the Turks handled it was designed to raise doubts and Greek Cypriots still think it is a military construction.

In sum, transparency was provided (supporting H1), but transparency's effects were modest. UNFICYP expended considerable effort and a crisis of greater proportion was averted. Despite that, suspicions remain, the suspicions are somewhat justified, so H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions receives only minor support. To the extent UNFICYP's inspections and the U.N.'s reports revealed malevolence on the part of the Turks, H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict is supported.

83 Interview, 6/5/96.
On the upside, the inspections and generally successful outcome helped preserve the 1989 unmanning agreement, a very wise confidence-building measure which the U.N. is trying to expand to other areas. The Roccas Bastion construction endangered this agreement and increased transparency at least kept what little cooperation has been achieved from backsliding. And even if the inspections do not help the unmanning agreement get extended, the outcome at least did not endanger the prospects for its extension. Thus, H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation is modestly supported.

For additional details on the diplomatic history, on the results of the inspections, on various official's reactions and for my own assessment of the degree to which suspicions are justified, please see Appendix I on the Roccas Bastion construction. The appendix shows in greater detail how UNFICYP and the U.N. struggled to get inspections and the different means they used to try to monitor the construction (H1). It adds to the story of how the U.S. and other players were brought in to help resolve the issue. And it shows that UNFICYP regulated how much it told the Greek Cypriot and when it told them. It never lied, but it also wisely did not tell them everything as soon as it learned it.

Other, more typical construction incidents. UNFICYP deals frequently with construction incidents, all of which are less severe than the Roccas Bastion episode. The following are examples of somewhat more typical construction stories. Beyond these, there are even more mundane incidents that involve, for example, an UNFICYP patrol that notices new sandbags (or something else new) or when one of the OPFORs reports some construction. When necessary, UNFICYP sends out a patrol out to deal with the problem and usually succeeds in resolving it. This section recounts five construction incidents and then assesses them.
1. On December 27 1995, an UNFICYP captain met his Turkish counterpart to protest that the Turkish Forces (TFs) had exchanged concrete blocks for sandbags at three locations. The TF counterpart said it was done to improve the general area near a memorial. The UNFICYP captain responded that even if the aim was not to improve the defenses, that's the fact, so the blocks must be replaced. The TF officer said that they used to have a position near the memorial, and now it was gone. The captain insisted that they were not allowed to improve positions. The TF officer then said he needed his commander's permission to remove the blocks. The captain invited him to report this meeting to his commander, and if the commander was not happy, then both of their commanders could meet. The TF officer asserted that sandbags deteriorate quickly. The UNFICYP captain responded by noting that at other positions the sandbags looked in very good condition. His counterpart then asked if it would be possible to remove the top layer of blocks and leave the bottom. The captain again insisted that the original condition must be restored. The meeting ended with the Turkish counterpart promising to tell his commander about the conversation.\(^{84}\) It is not clear if or how this incident was resolved.

2. On May 9, 1996, after unruly behavior by the National Guard, the TFs added 39 sandbags and a machine gun to one of their OPs. UNFICYP went to the Turks, and said 'Ok, now you have our attention and we will go and talk to the National Guard.' UNFICYP talked to the National Guard and the TFs removed their additions.\(^{85}\)

3. In May 1996, the National Guard had replaced some barrels in one of their positions

\(^{84}\) From "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," Sector 2, West, Kingston.

\(^{85}\) Interview, Lt. Col. Snowdon, May 10, 1996.
with the same number of similar barrels - exactly the way maintenance is supposed to be performed, according to an UNFICYP officer. The TFs came to UNFICYP with two photographs that they asserted showed that the position had changed. After hours of meetings, the TFs eventually agreed that the first photo indicated no change in the National Guard position. However, they argued that the second photo incriminated the Greeks. UNFICYP insisted that the second photo was actually taken at a location 100 meters down the line, but the TFs maintained their stance even after walking to this location with UNFICYP officers and after being shown UNFICYP sketches of the various positions. The situation was closed when the principal UNFICYP officer in charge wrote a letter to the TFs attesting that the status quo had not been changed.\textsuperscript{86} This incident supports H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis.

4. In early 1996, the TFs were refurbishing a bunker position. But the National Guard claimed it was an improvement so on February 2 they responded by building a sanger on top of a nearby building. This prompted the TFs to call a meeting with UNFICYP. Here, The NG’s uncertainty about the TF’s construction causes a security spiral. Transparency could help resolve these fears of cheating and despirit the situation.

While the TF soldiers were waiting for the meeting, the NG soldiers cocked their weapons and called in a quick reaction force (QRF). The QRF pointed their weapons at the TFs (but the weapons lacked magazines) and this lasted for five minutes. When the UNFICYP

\textsuperscript{86} From "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," Sector 2, West, Kingston, and from interviews. The UNFICYP officer who told me of this story said that, although the Greeks knew that something was up, he decided not to tell them to gain leverage with them in future incidents.
captain and TF major met they discussed the National Guard construction, the captain said UNFICYP was happy that the TF construction was not an improvement, and he said that the NG undertook their construction in the belief that the TFs were improving their position. The captain further said that the National Guard had been told that the TF construction was not an improvement and that the matter was under investigation. The TF major indicated that he would be meeting his commanders that day and would probably be ordered to react to the National Guard construction. He added that the TFs would lodge an official complaint about the weapons cocking. The meeting report concluded that the TFs were aware that it would take some time to deal with the National Guard and that the meeting had clarified the situation between UNFICYP and the TFs.

By February 9, however, the TFs' patience had evidently run out and they built a new wall near their position in response to the NG sanger. The Greeks, who still thought the original TF construction was an improvement, offered to take down their sanger if the TFs rebuilt their original construction with the original or exact same bricks. On February 10, an UNFICYP major met with his TF counterpart to protest the TF wall. The TF officer argued that the wall was built in response to the NG sanger. The UNFICYP major suggested that both sides should take their constructions down simultaneously. The TF officer said no, the NG built theirs first, so the TFs would only deconstruct their improvement two hours after the Greeks did. The major then noted that the NG built their sanger because they thought the TF's had made their bunker wall stronger. The TF officer responded that the UNFICYP had inspected the bunker and was satisfied that the status quo was maintained. The TF officer invited the major to the bunker to make a personal inspection so that he could tell the National Guard that he had inspected it.
himself. The meeting moved to the TF position and the UNFICYP major agreed that the dimensions had not changed, even though the type of building blocks were different.

In the end, UNFICYP did succeed in getting the OPFORs to take down their new constructions. An UNFICYP Lt. Colonel had to stand in the buffer zone close enough to the Turkish to talk to them, while talking on the phone to the National Guard, helping each side simultaneously and step for step deconstruct their improvements.\footnote{\textit{From "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," Sector 2, West, Kingston and various interviews.}}

This incident clearly supports a combination of H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation because the verifying presence (H1) of the Lt. Colonel in the buffer zone was necessary to get the OPFORs to de-spiral and take down their constructions. On the other hand, the initial fears that led to the spiral (the TF's alleged bunker improvement) were never allayed. The UNFICYP captain was satisfied that the TFs were not altering the status quo, but the UNFICYP major noted that the blocks were different. In any case, it was not UNFICYP's findings about the original bunker that diffused the situation, it was the Lt. Colonel's verifying presence. Hence, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions is not supported.

5. In another early 1996 incident, the TFs replaced sandbags with a wall outside of an OP. The Greeks complained to UNFICYP, UNFICYP spoke to the TFs, and the TFs said the wall had been there for years. But it was clear to the U.N. that the wall had been put up overnight. So the TFs then said that they'd get rid of the wall. That night, the UNFICYP OP saw what they thought was the wall being taken down, but later analysis revealed that the TFs had
just covered the wall with sandbags. The National Guard could only see the sandbags and were happy, so that brought the matter to a close.\textsuperscript{88} There are similar stories about Greeks 'getting away' with construction.

\textbf{Assessment} To assess these incidents, there are several lessons to be learned or reinforced. First, it is hard to imagine incidents like these being resolved without an intermediary like a peacekeeping force. Both sides are too apt to lie about their actions or the other side's actions and both sides are also quick to engage in escalatory tit-for-tat behavior. Thus, it is hard to believe a Greek/Turkish equivalent of a Standing Consultative Commission\textsuperscript{89} for the buffer zone could resolve these sorts of problems effectively. A third party is needed to mediate, cajole, deter, and provide transparency (H1).

The story (#4) beginning February 2 showed UNFICYP playing a crucial role in getting the OPFORs to de-spiral. Each side needed to be assured that the other was fulfilling its side of the bargain and neither would have taken down its construction without these assurances. This is a clear confirmation of a combination of H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation/Prevents Backsliding. I interpret getting an agreement from both sides to reciprocally restore the status quo ante as an example of H2 whereas what the agreement accomplished (preserving the status quo) exemplifies H2'. In addition, the Lt. Colonel's presence in the buffer zone, talking to both sides as they deconstruct is H1: Regimes Provide Transparency in action. This story shows these hypotheses (H1, H2', and H2) working

\textsuperscript{88} From interviews.

\textsuperscript{89} The SCC was the joint U.S.-Soviet body that resolved arms control disputes between the two countries.
on a very tactical level in what might be called local or tactical despiraling.

Second, while the Roccas Bastion episode showed UNFICYP going to the mat to try to reach closure over a problem, there are limits to UNFICYP's political capital and when it is willing to spend it. The first and fifth construction stories in particular show that some problems are not pursued with total vigor or candor. In the fifth, the Greek side was calmed despite the fact that UNFICYP shied away from full disclosure or enforcement. This reinforces a point made above that pursuit of increased transparency is a goal that requires some nuance or subtlety in application. A worthwhile debate or subject for research would be the topic of whether it helps or detracts from the overall mission to be a stickler over every transgression. Does it conserve political capital to let some things slide or does it erode credibility? In the end, total compliance or enforcement is probably not to be expected in the real world.

Third, the May 1996 story about the bogus photographs is a modest example of H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis. The Turks persisted with their story for some time, despite being shown the facts about the real subjects of their photographs. However, they did eventually cave in. This story again shows how helpful it would be if UNFICYP had its own database of photographs and could use them without raising the suspicions of the OPFORs.

Finally, many of these stories highlight the fact that UNFICYP must know what the status quo is in the first place to be able to confront and resolve violations of the status quo. This use of or need for information is more often fundamental to UNFICYP's success than its ability to use information to increase transparency.

OVERFLIGHT AND MARITIME VIOLATIONS

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A relatively minor but constant source of frustration for UNFICYP is overflight and maritime violations. Lacking any capacity to act at sea or in the air, UNFICYP can do but record each side's protests and lodge those of its own. In the six months ending in early June, 1994 (the last time the Secretary-General reported specific figures, there were four, two, and one overflights of the buffer zone by TF, NG, and Cyprus police aircraft, respectively. There were twenty-nine, five, and seven violations close to the buffer zone by these aircraft respectively. There were eleven overflights by civilian aircraft from the North and seven from the South. Finally, civilian and military aircraft from other countries added another 18 overflights. UNFICYP protested all overflights of the buffer zone. The Government of Cyprus considers that it owns all the airspace of Cyprus and it protests whenever aircraft from the Turkish air force enter Cyprus airspace. Indeed, any Turkish forces anywhere on the island are considered illegal by the Government.

The Secretary-General correctly notes that overflights have the potential to raise tension. Low and loud overflights by Turkish air force F-16s over Nicosia on June 21, 1996 created the banner headline in the Cyprus Mail: "Turkish war planes fly over Nicosia: Anger and fear in capital as Turkish jets violate Cyprus air space." The same story noted that four Greek fighters flew over Cyprus earlier that week. The buzzing of Nicosia was serious enough to make the International Herald Tribune, courtesy of Reuters, and the overflight was strongly protested by

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90 UNFICYP owns two small observation helicopters and no boats or ships.

the U.N.\textsuperscript{92} While these incidents follow the pattern of antagonism on Cyprus, an increasingly plausible danger exists that a plane will eventually be shot down, creating a serious crisis.\textsuperscript{93}

It is also a violation when boats from either side cross over the maritime security line - a seaward extension of the cease-fire line. Here it appears that Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats have been responsible for the vast majority of the violations ever since the line was established in 1985. These violations can become more serious. In his June 1995 report, the Secretary-General noted two instances where Turkish Cypriot patrol boats seized Greek Cypriot fishing vessels and their crews that had violated the line. The people and boats were returned after intervention by UNFICYP.

To a limited extent, the maritime security line can be seen as a transparency-increasing device. Like the buffer zone, it delineates each sides's area and reduces the probability of miscalculation. In principal, the Turkish side helped reduce miscalculation by placing buoys along its side of the line.\textsuperscript{94} In practice, violations continue apace and UNFICYP can not do much about them.

\textbf{SHOOTING INCIDENTS}


\textsuperscript{93} The Secretary-General reported in December 1995 that the TFs were receiving shoulder-launched air defense missiles. The NGs already have these in the form of SA-7s. They have large systems as well. See \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus}, S/1995/1020, p. 4 and International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{The Military Balance, 1993-1994}, (London, Great Britain: Oxford University Press for the IISS, October 1993), p. 77.

This section covers shooting violations, ranging from killings within buffer zone to discharges of weapons near the buffer zone and the cocking and pointing of weapons by the OPFORs at each other or at UNFICYP soldiers. I start by covering two shooting deaths in some detail, the April 8, 1993 shooting of National Guard private Athanasios Kleovoulou and the June 3, 1996 shooting of National Guard private Stelios Panayi, both in the buffer zone.

The killings and other weapons incidents highlight UNFICYP's fact-finding role. UNFICYP is the only body authorized to conduct the investigations in the buffer zone and thus plays a key role in determining what actually happened in these most serious of incidents. Even though UNFICYP's power is an artifact of the existence of the buffer zone, UNFICYP is uniquely positioned to increase transparency by acting as investigators, conducting physical examinations, interviewing people on both sides, and so forth.

Both killings also show just how easily events could get out of hand on Cyprus. Immediately following the June 3 killing, for example, both OPFORs quickly built up their forces. What if UNFICYP had not been there? What if the TF warning shots had been fired at NG soldiers coming to pick up the body, rather the UNFICYP soldiers? The details and further arguments are provided below.

This section offers support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. It also supports two arguments about the calming effect of transparency.

First, it turns out that repeated lax discipline on the part of NG soldiers significantly contributes to why they enter the buffer zone (and then get killed). In part due to UNFICYP's investigations, the Greek Cypriots have eventually come to understand this and this has helped lead to calmer reactions to the killings on their part. Thus, this first argument supports H4:
Transparency Reduces Miscalculation, as well as the related H5: information-based cease and desist hypothesis. It does so because UNFICYP's investigations helped the Greek Cypriot government and citizens understand *themselves* better.

Second, the killings seem to indicate deliberate and unnecessary lethal brutality on the part of the Turkish Forces. There is no reason to kill someone who entered the buffer zone to trade or sell brandy or hats. Indeed, I believe that the facts about several of the killings this summer attribute could well support a more worst-case analysis of Turkish intent than I have seen even in the English-translated Greek Cypriot press.  

If I am right, this shows that increased transparency can lead to very warranted fears and worst-case assumptions. This incident reverses the causal arrow of H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions so that increased transparency *increases* unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions. As mentioned in the theory chapter's section on caveats about transparency, the reversal of the causal arrow is most likely to occur when one side is a revisionist, does not want to cooperate, or otherwise does not seek peace. When this is true, increased transparency is likely to help reveal these elements of malign intent.

THE APRIL 8, 1993 SHOOTING OF KLEOVLOULOU. According to UNFICYP's records, on April 8, 1993 at 18:25, an off-duty unarmed NG soldier in full camouflage ran across the buffer zone toward a TF OP. An NG sentry yelled for him to stop but was ignored. Two shots were fired, between two and seven seconds apart according to various sources. Two UNFICYP soldiers from a nearby

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95 For example, two of the killings coincided with political initiatives to try to resolve the Cyprus problem. More details and analysis along these lines are in Appendix 1.
U.N. OP heard the shots and arrived in the area in five minutes, with two more arriving soon thereafter. Kleovoulou was on the ground, one meter from the Turkish cease-fire line, with wounds to the chest and back and an irregular pulse which lasted for ten minutes. The UNFICYP soldiers were unable to revive him. By 18:40, UNFICYP had called in the military police and a doctor. The doctor arrived at 19:00 and estimated the time of death at between 18:40 and 18:45. An NG general arrived at 19:05. Photographs were taken of the scene around 19:45. The body was handed over to the NG shortly before 20:00 (only UNFICYP is allowed in the buffer zone).

The TF soldier who shot Kleovoulou said that he saw two people in camouflage approaching, that he shouted warnings in Turkish and English, that he shot one warning shot, and then when one of the approaching soldiers began to climb the barrels near his OP, he shot the soldier at a range of four or five meters. Then the second soldier ran back to the Greek lines screaming. UNFICYP found several probable anomalies in this story. The shooting was more likely from a range of nine to eleven meters; it was unlikely Kleovoulou was climbing the barrels; he probably entered the buffer zone alone; and the warning shot was probably fired after Kleovoulou was shot because Kleovoulou was shot in the chest.\textsuperscript{96} This begins to indicate that UNFICYP can be quite detective-like in gathering information, thus partially demonstrating its ability to provide transparency (H1).

A plastic bag was found by UNFICYP thirty centimeters from Kleovoulou's feet.

\textsuperscript{96} As I will describe below, when soldiers along the buffer zone fire off a round accidentally, they then often fire off a few more rounds to cover up the accident by making it seem that they were involved in a shootout with the OPFOR. If this knowledge or practice is as commonplace as I think it is, then the TF soldier would not have to have been thinking quite as quickly as it first appears.
containing two bottles of brandy and a Zippo lighter. UNFICYP hypothesized that Kleovoulou crossed the buffer zone to trade the brandy with the TFs. This theory is supported not just by the brandy but also by the confidence revealed by running across the buffer zone in daylight; some deal had probably been arranged. Kleovoulou had tried at least once before to contact the TFs. UNFICYP records note that UNFICYP, with the help of NG soldiers, had to stop Kleovoulou from entering the buffer zone on March 23, 1993 (two weeks prior to April 8). Following the fatal shooting, the Greek Cypriot authorities refused to release the toxicology report on Kleovoulou.

An early UNFICYP report hypothesized that perhaps the TFs had changed personnel at their OP, so that Kleovoulou was not in fact running toward someone he knew and was instead shot by a 'stranger' doing his duty. Another hypothesis for the shooting was that the arrival of a TF officer may have forced the TF soldier to choose between shooting Kleovoulou and harsh discipline. The exact reason why Kleovoulou was shot may never be publicly known, but despite the risks, trading and even friendship across the lines is not uncommon. Whatever hypothesis for the shooting one accepts, it is clear that Kleovoulou was not supposed to enter the buffer zone and was thus behaving unprofessionally when he did so. It is also clear that whatever reason the TFs had for shooting Kleovoulou, the story they concocted for UNFICYP did not ring true.

The shooting sparked a number of reactions. First, by 23:17, forty Greek Cypriots were

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The preceding was from an AustCivPol folder, "Investigation Report re: Death of Athanassios Kleovoulou," dated 5/6/93. With regard to Turkish discipline, I heard from a number of Greek Cypriots and UNFICYP soldiers (not officers) that Turkish officers are allowed to kill a certain number of their soldiers each year for offenses as minor as sleeping on duty. This may well be apocryphal, but high level UNFICYP personnel did confirm that Turkish discipline is strict.
demonstrating at the South Ledra Checkpoint. Second, the killing increased tensions along both cease-fire lines, marked by shouting, stone throwing, and general ill discipline. Additional Greek Cypriot demonstrations occurred. Third, on April 11, three days later a major gunfire occurred near Dherinia. Approximately 50 small arms rounds were exchanged and a Turkish Cypriot Security Forces OP was hit three times.\(^98\) Fourth, the Government of Cyprus, while protesting the shooting, indirectly indicated that Kleovoulou made a fatal mistake. After it was clear that Kleovoulou was out to trade brandy in the buffer zone, the Government printed up information sheets and posters for its soldiers with faces of the six (including Kleovoulou) National Guard soldiers that had been shot in the buffer zone since 1974. Three of these six had been involved in exchanges of some sort with the TFs. In these sheets and posters, the Government strongly warned against going into the buffer zone. Finally, UNFICYP tried to use the shooting to get the 1989 unmanning agreement extended. This was immediately rejected by a Cyprus Government spokesman, who repeated President Clerides' proposal that if there was to be any new unmanning agreement, both sides should pull their troops behind the respective mountain ranges on each side - the Troodos on the South and the Kyrenia to the North.\(^99\)

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\(^98\) See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/25912, June 9, 1993, p. 5 and a June 4 1994 fax from UNFICYP's Chief Operations Officer to all UNFICYP action and info addressees telling them what happened after the last shooting and to increase their vigilance, review contingency plans, keep all liaison channels open, keep reserves available and review leaves, and to deal with all situations in the buffer zone quickly and firmly.

This incident clearly shows how problems can chain-gang and escalate. However, it is not clear what stopped the shootout and I would like to learn how UNFICYP dealt with the shootout.

\(^99\) From a translation of the NG poster (and press reports - the list of Greek Cypriots soldiers killed is widespread) and from a June 6 interview with UNFICYP Spokesman Rokoszewski. Rokoszewski also said that President Clerides would not agree to furthering the unmanning agreement because his military would not [the Greek air military is in charge of the National Guard]. But, two days after another killing, he held out hopes that UNFICYP might still persuade the two sides to agree to not carry ammunition or to keep it on their belts [they already do this to some extent]. It is my opinion that President Clerides is using an unrealistic (or to be charitable, a very long term) proposal to block an (continued...)
While I will discuss lessons learned from this and the next shooting incident in greater
detail below, there are three immediate lessons that bear on the analysis below. First, this
shooting provoked fairly severe protests and a dangerous shootout. The reaction to the next
shooting was more mild. Second, UNFICYP's investigation helped make clear the extent of
Kleovoulou's misbehavior and thus helped shape the Greek Cypriot government's warnings to its
soldiers. While Kleovoulou certainly did not deserve to be killed, there is a certain air of taking
responsibility for one's own side's lack of professionalism in these government warnings. Points
one and two combine to indicate that UNFICYP's investigations helped the Greek Cypriots learn
about themselves. Thus, UNFICYP helped the Greek Cypriots understand, identify, and confront
roguish behavior in their own ranks, a type of internal transparency discussed in especially in the
theory chapter.

Third, UNFICYP's investigation did not arrive at definitive conclusions about what
motivated the TFs to kill Kleovoulou. But the investigations did find numerous holes in their
initial accounting of the incident.\textsuperscript{100}

\textbf{THE JUNE 3, 1996 KILLING OF PANAYI.} The second killing examined here is the shooting of National
Guard private Stelios Panayi on June 3, 1996.\textsuperscript{101} This was the first of five killings in and along

\textsuperscript{99}(...)continued\textsuperscript{100} I do not know, who, if anyone, was told about the TF's story and UNFICYP's conclusions about it.

\textsuperscript{101} The sources for this section include the "Temporary Hot Spot File," for the incident which included a number of
UNFICYP situation reports, cables, memorandums, faxes, incident logs, and so forth, other such documents, several
conversations and interviews, and personal experience. I arrived and was allowed into the UNFICYP headquarters'
(continued...)
the buffer zone in the summer of 1996; three Greek Cypriot civilians and one Turkish soldier were killed in subsequent incidents.\(^{102}\) This killing shows how quickly rumors can spread, but it also shows UNFICYP's limited ability to combat them when it also is awaiting accurate information.

Here's what happened on June 3. At roughly 6:15am in an area just West of central Nicosia, an UNFICYP soldier heard shouting between a NG OP and a TF OP.\(^{103}\) Seeing a TF soldier walking towards the buffer zone, the UNFICYP soldier ordered him back to his OP. The TF soldier, carrying his rifle, is again observed walking into the buffer zone and going down into reedbeds where he can no longer be seen by either UNFICYP or NG soldiers.

At 6:30, the UNFICYP soldier heard a single shot while he was calling his supervisor. A TF soldier was then seen running back towards Turkish lines. Obviously, at some time prior to this, Panayi, unarmed and off-duty, had himself gone into the buffer zone. Proceeding toward the scene of the shooting at 6:35, the UNFICYP soldier was told by an NG soldier at his OP that an NG soldier had been shot. The UNFICYP soldier tried to approach but was ordered to halt by TF forces who pointed their weapons at him. By 6:40 the UNFICYP soldier had returned to his OP to report the incident and call an ambulance. When a U.N. captain and another soldier reached the scene, the three UNFICYP personnel tried to approach but were again told to halt. As they

\(^{101}\)(...continued)

operations center several hours after the shooting, stayed there all day, and resumed my note-taking and conversations in the Operations branch over the next several days. Specific footnotes are given where possible and desirable.

\(^{102}\) The killing of the two Greek Cypriots is covered in the section on demonstrations.

\(^{103}\) Unconfirmed reports from the Cyprus Police (CYPOL) indicated that during the last week that there were a series of conversations in the area between the OFPORS about trading of caps and that there was friendly shouting that morning about the possibility of a meeting. The shouting is confirmed in UNFICYP's records.
continued forward, a warning shot was fired and they backed off. They tried to move forward
two more times, but each time backed off after warning shots were fired. The captain's efforts to
negotiate with the TF were unsuccessful. At 6:47, the Turkish regiment in the area was
requested by UNFICYP's duty watchkeeper to stop the TF firing. At 6:51, UNFICYP
headquarters was informed.

Between 7:05 and 7:10, UNFICYP soldiers escorted a civilian ambulance forward to the
closest NG OP. The soldiers had to recover Panayi themselves as the TFs did not allow the
ambulance men forward. Two of the three UNFICYP soldiers who tried found a faint pulse on
Panayi but he was pronounced dead at the hospital. One UNFICYP source indicates that the
ambulance men believed Panayi was dead when he was brought to them. An NG cap with the
name of another NG soldier was found near Panayi and another cap was found in his pocket.

In the meantime, both sides were rapidly building up and arming their forces in the
immediate area. Up to ninety TF soldiers had arrived by the time the body was removed.
Machines guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers were brought in by one or both sides. Both sides
built down their forces rapidly as well. UNFICYP's chief operations officer noted that the
situation was calm at 8:45.104

At 7:20, local TFs claimed that they had shouted warnings at the NG soldier and had fired
a warning shot before firing again as Panayi turned away to return to his position. The TFs also
claimed that the warning shots fired toward the UNFICYP soldiers were to give the TFs time to

104 This helps demonstrate, albeit counterfactually, the utility of UNFICYP and the buffer zone. What would have
happened if the NG had moved forward to recover Panayi? As both sides were building up, what would have happened if
the warning shots were fired at the NG instead of UNFICYP? Scary thoughts.
take photographs of the area before the scene was disturbed. At 11:35, the TFs claimed that the NG soldier had been observing their positions and that warning shots were fired in the air, in the ground, and then finally at Panayi. This story of multiple warning shots was repeated on Nicosia Bayrak Radio in Turkish at 17:30 (GMT).

As the morning progressed, the crisis/command staff was formed at UNFICYP's headquarters, U.N. forces were put on alert in anticipation the story becoming public knowledge, and Greek Cypriot and U.N. doctors were trying to figure out what caused the four wounds (by 11:36, it was found to be six) in Panayi's body. A Greek Cypriot pathologist was sent to the U.N.'s sector headquarters to be escorted to the crime scene, but when the TFs were told of his impending arrival at 10:29, the TFs denied him permission to enter the buffer zone. UNFICYP told the TFs they were being informed about the pathologist, not being asked for permission. At 10:33, the TF regiment asked that a Turkish Cypriot pathologist also be present at the crime scene and at 11:10 an agreement was made whereby the pathologists from the two sides would enter together.

The autopsy took place between 14:30 and 16:00, with UNFICYP personnel attending. The results arrived at UNFICYP headquarters at 16:15 and indicated that one 7.62mm round entered Panayi. The bullet fragmented upon hitting his spine, and the fragments caused severe internal trauma, left several exit wounds, and then entered his right arm.

At 11:08, a TV news flash broke the news of the killing to the Greek Cypriots (and anybody else who tuned in). Before noon, Cyprus President Clerides made a statement for the television expressing sympathy to Panayi's parents and calling the shooting "cold blooded murder. The parents were shown crying at the hospital. By 12:12, the Cyprus News Agency was
reporting that Panayi was talking to a Turkish soldier when he was shot by another soldier from a TF OP. At 13:35, Greek Cypriot authorities reported to UNFICYP that Panayi was not from an National Guard OP in the area, that his duty area was unknown, and that it was possible that he had been shot by more than one weapon. At 15:00, an NG liaison officer told UNFICYP that Panayi had been shot three times in the chest, that the NG feels he was shot not from an OP, but from the a trench in the buffer zone. They said this supported the theory that there was an ambush that included a second TF soldier in the buffer zone. This story resurfaced on June 6 when the Government of Cyprus spokesman spoke of reports indicating that Panayi had been shot from within the buffer zone and that a second TF soldier had been hiding in the bushes waiting for Panayi.\(^{105}\) This particular conspiratorial interpretation was later debunked in the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (see excerpt below).

The debunking of this conspiratorial interpretation of Panayi's shooting offers good support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, but poor support for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. Support is poor for H3 because even UNFICYP's interpretation allows for a scathing indictment of the Turkish side. They killed someone for no justifiable reason. Further, even with this particular conspiracy debunked, it is likely (in my personal view, for reasons spelled out in appendix I) that Panayi was killed for political reasons. However, it is not a bad thing if increased transparency reveals malevolence (as my caveats section in the methodology chapter makes clear).

As the Cypriot press geared up for the story and rumors became mixed with facts,

\(^{105}\) Jean Christou, "Was soldier lured to his death by Turks?" *Cyprus Mail*, June 7, 1996, p. 3.
UNFICYP was itself trying figure out exactly what happened - how many shots were fired, where the body was found, where the shots came from, how many soldiers from each side were in the buffer zone, why Panayi entered the buffer zone, and so forth. As seen in the last paragraph, many of rumors cast the TFs in the worst possible light. In UNFICYP's operations center,\textsuperscript{106} officers sorted through incoming reports that contained conflicting answers to many of these questions. Lt. Colonel Parker, the Chief Operations Officer, also began to establish a history of incidents in the area, in part to prepare a forthcoming briefing and in part to help try to push the unmanned agreement. UNFICYP's Spokesman Rokoszewski could not address many of the rumors because UNFICYP had yet to complete its own investigation.

This shows that the provision of transparency (H1) depends on the availability of correct information in the first place. Had UNFICYP had 'complete information' from the start, many rumors could have been dispelled (H3). Instead, it had to wait for its investigations to yield results.

Lacking complete information, Rokoszewski repeated, "like a tape recorder," that UNFICYP confirmed that there had been a shooting in the buffer zone, that a soldier from each of the OPFORs had been seen in the buffer zone, that a National Guard soldier had been shot and killed, that UNFICYP was investigating the incident and was in liaison with each side, and that the matter will be further taken up with the Force Commander, the Turkish Forces, and the

\textsuperscript{106} In a crisis, the briefing and conference room at UNFICYP's headquarters is turned into its expanded operations center. It is a rudimentary but workable affair. Five tables are arranged in a circle around the chief operations officer's table. The tables typically have two posts each, a couple for the operations branch, one for the chief CivPol officer, the chief humanitarian officer, the head of UNFICYP's two helicopters, and so forth. Each post has a radio and a telephone. Near the front of the room, there is a television and a VCR and an older generation computer to keep the log. There are maps on the walls. For those concerned about waste at the U.N., this sparse setup is not the place to look.
National Guard. In response to mounting criticism of UNFICYP for not getting the still-alive Panayi out of the buffer zone quicker, Rokoszewski added further that UNFICYP soldiers had been delayed by warning shots that were not just shot in a bang, bang, bang burst, but were shot each time UNFICYP soldiers tried to approach.

Here is a case where increased transparency does not do much to help relations between adversaries but it does do something to maintain UNFICYP's effectiveness and reputation. UNFICYP had to dispel rumors to defend itself.\textsuperscript{107} This is an example of H3: Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

UNFICYP's Force Commander met with the commander of the TFs at 15:15 to protest the incident - both the killing and the warning shots - and urge that soldiers along the buffer zone carry unloaded weapons and that areas where soldiers are in close proximity be unmanned. The commander of the TFs expressed sadness about the death, but said that the soldiers were acting according to standard operating procedures that he had implemented. However, he also said that shooting was not the only option that could have been taken. The Force Commander followed up with a letter of protest on June 5. And on June 7, the TF commander counter-protested with a letter claiming that the whole incident took place on "TRNC" territory. He tried to support his claims with photographs and a map, but analysis revealed that these were inaccurate or misleading.\textsuperscript{108} The "TRNC" political authorities were quick to say that the incident was

\textsuperscript{107} There are more instances of this sort in the later analyses of UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAG in Namibia.

\textsuperscript{108} I was with UNFICYP's operations staff as they dissected the letter and photographs looking for errors or cover-up stories. As mentioned, they found several blatant examples. UNFICYP protested the TF's story at the highest levels, especially the claims that the shooting was not in the buffer zone. However, I do not know to what extent the errors in the letter were used as part of UNFICYP's argument. I do know that the Greek Cypriots were never told of this letter and its
unfortunate, and to blame Panayi for failing to heed warning shots and for crossing into "TRNC" territory.\(^{109}\)

Both the National Guard and Government of Cyprus vigorously protested the killing. By early in the afternoon of June 3, Constant Feissel, the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General on Cyprus had been called to the Foreign Ministry to receive strong demarches from Cyprus. All of Cyprus' missions abroad were instructed to lodge demarches with their host governments and international organizations.\(^{110}\) The Force Commander met with the commander of the National Guard on June 4 to hear his protests exchange views about what happened.

UNFICYP came out with its report on the incident on June 10 in the *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. The report reads:

12. The third incident took place on 3 June 1996.\(^{111}\) An unarmed National Guard soldier was shot and killed inside the United Nations buffer zone in central Nicosia. The investigation has revealed that the lethal round was fired by a Turkish Cypriot soldier whom UNFICYP had observed entering the buffer zone with his rifle slung across his back. Shortly thereafter a single shot was heard and the Turkish Cypriot soldier was seen running back in a crouched position to the Turkish cease-fire line holding his rifle in his right hand. UNFICYP soldiers were prevented from reaching the National Guard soldier by Turkish Cypriot soldiers who fired shots in the direction of the UNFICYP soldiers

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\(^{108}\)(...continued) errors. Again, sometimes it is best not to be too transparent. UNFICYP did not need to reveal this to make its protests, nor did the Greek Cypriots need to know to follow their policies.

\(^{109}\) Statement by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash on June 3, Nicosia BRTK Television Network, 16:30 GMT in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report*, FBIS-WEU-96-108, June 4, 1996 and interview with Aytug Plumer, under-secretary, ministry foreign affairs and defense, "TRNC."


\(^{111}\) This refers to the previous paragraph which reported increased shooting incidents near the cease-fire lines, including one case of tracer rounds fired by TFs at an UNFICYP helicopter and another case in which two shots were fired by TFs in the vicinity of a UNFICYP patrol. (p. 3)
each time the latter tried to move forward. UNFICYP strongly protested to the
Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus the unauthorized entry of an armed
Turkish Cypriot soldier into the buffer zone, the shooting incident and the hostile
action, including live fire against UNFICYP. UNFICYP is pursuing with the
Turkish forces in Cyprus and with the Turkish Cypriot authorities the question of
appropriate action and has requested that UNFICYP police investigating the
killing be able to interview the Turkish Cypriot soldier involved in the incident.
The military authorities on both sides have been urged once again to respect the
United Nations buffer zone and ensure its integrity.

This version raised a furor with the Greek Cypriots and they successfully lobbied for a
corrigendum that read: "Paragraph 12. The fifth sentence should read: UNFICYP soldiers were
prevented for some 25 minutes from reaching the National Guard soldier by Turkish Cypriot
soldiers who fired shots in the direction of the UNFICYP soldiers each time the latter tried to
move forward."\textsuperscript{112}

The U.N.'s role as official historian 'of record' is highlighted in this episode. Many of the
actors involved look to it to tell the final or definitive truth about what happens on Cyprus, and
thus this episode highlights the fact that UNFICYP is in a good position to increase transparency
(H1). However, this episode also shows UNFICYP and the U.N. using other, non-transparency
tools to help influence events on Cyprus. As with the Rocca Bastion construction, UNFICYP
often turns to moral suasion and shining the spotlight on wrongdoing to correct or deter
misbehavior by the OPFORs (elements of H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and
Desist Hypothesis). These tools sometimes work, and sometimes do not.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112} Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period 11 December 1995 to

\textsuperscript{113} The Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus are often written to highlight
one or a few ongoing problems and the subjects highlighted seem to be rotated every so often. For example, one report
will note an increase in construction or overflight incidents while the next will note problems with negligent discharges
(continued...)

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At UNFICYP headquarters, the Force Commander General Vartiainen regretted this delay and expressed to his officers that UNFICYP should be more "hard core," that being deterred by three warning shots was a mistake, and that armored personnel carriers might be used in future similar situations. Shortly thereafter, the Chief Operations Officer ordered one of UNFICYP's MOWAG APCs to headquarters to see how they might be employed.

When all was said and done, not much was done. No demonstrations or additional shootings followed the incident. President Clerides again rejected modest but workable confidence-building measures in favor of his sweeping de-militarization, behind the mountains proposal (see above). The mood in the Greek Cypriot press and in the streets combined a sullen 'Turks will be Turks' attitude with a recognition that the Panayi had made a fatal mistake. The Cyprus Mail editorialized: "It may seem insensitive, but in the final analysis, the guardsman died because he disobeyed army orders. This in no way excuses his callous murder by the forces of another country illegally in occupation..." The papers and government authorities spoke of the

\[...continued\]
along the buffer zone. Sometimes, the incidence of these problems will decrease. Sometimes, UNFICYP will highlight the problem again in a year or three.

\[113\] At first, there was dismay and anger at UNFICYP that Panayi's life might have been saved if UNFICYP had gotten to him sooner. However, this sentiment changed after it became clear to the Greek Cypriots repeated warning shots prevented UNFICYP from reaching him. The Cyprus Mail wrote "No UNFICYP officer in his right mind would risk walking into the buffer zone after warning shots were fired," Murder on the Green Line," June 5, 1996, p. 9. That said, General Vartiainen is of course correct to do everything possible to maintain control over the buffer zone.

\[114\] Unfortunately, UNFICYP has only six MOWAGs. All are old, they are very poorly designed (no internal communications between the driver and commander, very poor shooting ports, and the machine gun is extremely hard to control), and when I was there, five were not operational. It would take a significant effort of time and money to bring these vehicles up to speed. A better idea would be to replace them altogether, but this is even more unlikely. In contrast, UNDOF (which responds to far fewer serious incidents) has a fairly large fleet of good quality, working-order APCs for its rapid reaction teams.

poor training of Greek Cypriot soldiers. The *Cyprus Weekly* wrote:

President Clerides’ anger must also be directed at the National Guard command, however, for its failure to ensure the strict discipline demanded by the circumstances. The incidents of National Guardsman being shot on straying into the Green Line is only the tip of the iceberg. Many more do so, either to fraternise with Turkish Cypriot or Turkish mainland troops, or even worse, to engage in petty smuggling, without any consequences. This state of affairs only tends to underline the lack of discipline on the part of young conscripts, and the failure of their officers, particularly at command level, to ensure that strict orders are obeyed. The National Guard Commander and his staff, as well as the lower level officers, bear a heavy responsibility...\textsuperscript{117}

This rather tepid and self-indicting response contrasts with the protests and shootout after Kleovoulou’s death. Hopefully, these killings will help lead to more self-control by the Greek Cypriot soldiers. If this happens, UNFICYP’s investigations into what actually happened in these buffer zone killings will have helped reduce this form of miscalculation by the NG soldiers. I am not optimistic that the killings will yield a silver lining. First, the motorcycle demonstrations later in the summer of 1996 were unnecessarily provocative and the Government of Cyprus should never have even let the idea get off the ground. They led to led to two civilian deaths in the buffer zone (see below). I do not think the Greek Cypriots (or the TFs) will learn for long to stop provocations in and along the buffer zone. Second, if the Greek Cypriots wanted to put the killings to constructive use, they would have taken up UNFICYP’s (and British and U.S.) offers to implement further confidence-building measures along the buffer zone. Instead, the Greek Cypriots spurned these offers and it appears that Panayi and others will have died in vain.

\textsuperscript{117} “Need for tougher discipline,” *The Cyprus Weekly*. June 7-13, 1996, p. 4.
The killing of Panayi, Kleovoulou, and transparency. The killings of Panayi and Kleovoulou reveal the following lessons and conclusions. First, in both cases, UNFICYP's investigations helped establish the delinquency of the NG soldiers and thus helped provoke introspection on the part of the Greek Cypriots and their government (H1+H5). This dampened miscalculation to the extent it deprived the GCs of reasons to (even further) escalate these incidents (H4). Second, while UNFICYP in neither case firmly established why the TFs killed these men, both investigations revealed inaccuracies or holes in the TFs stories about the shootings. This could support H5, but killings by TFs continued unabated in the summer of 1996 (albeit with some provocation, at least during the motorcycle demonstration. There was no provocation or reason for killing the snail gatherer). Third, as the sole authority in the buffer zone, only UNFICYP could have carried out these investigations (H1).

Finally, this means that with respect to transparency, the information UNFICYP did provide helped the Greek Cypriots understand themselves better. Some calming effect occurred to the extent the Greek Cypriots blamed themselves and their soldiers' lack of discipline for the shooting (especially in the case of Panayi). This may have also prevented some degree of escalation based on false premises (miscalculation). However, beyond helping the Greek Cypriots better understand their own behavior, increased transparency offered no basis for more benign threat assessments, calmed fears, or any of the other more straightforward hypothesized benign effects of transparency. Indeed, these killings reveal TFs willing to kill for no justifiable reason. UNFICYP investigations support this conclusion because their findings about

118 This argument is necessarily somewhat counterfactual.
exchanging brandy and caps certainly undercut TF claims that the NG soldiers had any malign intent (such as carrying a bomb, etc.) when they entered the buffer zone.

Thus, H1: Regimes Provide Transparency is supported, but H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions are not. H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation receives some support, although the limited calming effects that UNFICYP's investigations did cause came from increased self-understanding on the part of the Greek Cypriots. In the introduction and theory chapters, identification of rogues or other 'errors' on one's own side was folded into H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. However, these calming effects also have many elements in common with H5: information-based cease and desist hypothesis. This is because UNFICYP's investigations helped the Greek Cypriots face up to the somewhat unpleasant truth about their soldiers' activities.

H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict is supported to the extent that UNFICYP showed that the NG soldiers had no hostile intent in entering the buffer zone. This means that the TFs used unnecessary deadly force. However, the same evidence shows that Kleovoulou and Panayi entered the buffer zone for frivolous reasons.

LESSER SHOOTING AND WEAPONS INCIDENTS.

The vast majority of shooting incidents are non-lethal and are far less serious than the two described above. The most dangerous non-fatal shootings are (apparently) deliberate shots that cause strike marks on an OPFOR position. There were three or four of these types of
shooting incidents in the Nicosia area during the first five months of 1996.\textsuperscript{119} Accidental shootings are considerably more frequent. The June 15, 1995 \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus} said this: "The firing of weapons was reported on numerous occasions. A significant number of these cases was attributable to undisciplined weapons discharges by members of the National Guard."\textsuperscript{120}

Some shooting incidents are fictional. The June 7, 1994 \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus} said that "during the early part of the reporting period, the Turkish Cypriot press repeatedly published reports of shooting incidents along the buffer zone. On numerous occasions, upon investigation UNFICYP determined that the allegations in question were unfounded and so informed the authorities on both sides."\textsuperscript{121} As this report only mentions unfounded allegations in the beginning of the reporting period, and as subsequent reports do not mention them at all, it seems probable that UNFICYP's actions helped end this misbehavior. If so, this supports H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis. In addition, it is likely that H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions is supported as well because the Turkish side was obviously making a big deal of these incidents.

The final type of weapons incident are those involving the loading, cocking, and pointing of rifles by the OPFORs at each other or by the OPFORs at UNFICYP soldiers. According to the

\textsuperscript{119} Lt. Col. Snowdon, May 10.

\textsuperscript{120} S/1995/488, p. 3, downloaded version.

\textsuperscript{121} p. 5.
Force Commander, General Vartiainen, the OPFORs load and cock at each other at least once a week in the Nicosia area (where the density and proximity of OPFORs are highest). Often loading and cocking is the highest rung on the escalatory ladder of insults, finger and other gestures ("international signs," said the General), throwing of bottles and stones, and slingshotting. The OPFORs sometimes point their weapons at UNFICYP soldiers as well. Many of the soldiers I spoke to said that loading and cocking was the scariest thing that happened to them during their tours on Cyprus.123

UNFICYP protests shooting (and loading/cocking/pointing) incidents whenever it can determine who fired the shots. However, it may be hard to tell what exactly happened in a shooting incident. Many shootings happen at night, exacerbating the difficulty of finding out where the shot came from. In these instances, doubt is cast on UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency. Most shootings are accidents or negligent discharges and soldiers of course try to deny that they happened or cover them up. As mentioned above, a frequent technique of soldiers to disguise an accident is to fire off a couple of rounds after the accident to make it appear as if a more serious shootout occurred.124

To discuss specific incidents, in one case on February 11, 1996, a shot was heard near a TF post. UNFICYP sent out a patrol and questioned the TFs. The TFs said that there had been a

\[122\] Interview, May 7, 1996. Colonel Talbot, the Chief of Staff, thought that loading and cocking incidents occurred somewhat less frequently. Interview, May 8, 1996.

\[123\] Many of them also said they would prefer more lively assignments in Bosnia or even occasionally Northern Ireland. I spoke mainly with British soldiers along the line because of our common language and because I spent most of my time in Nicosia, the zone assigned to the British peacekeepers.

\[124\] Interviews with Lt. Col. Parker, Lt. Col. Snowdon, and Bombardier Cowie, May 9, 10, and 24 respectively.
negligent discharge and that the incident was being dealt with by an officer. This closed the incident. On the 23rd, three shots were heard by a UNFICYP OP. UNFICYP asked the TF if they had heard anything and they said no. However, the NG insisted that there had been shots. The incident was closed when further investigation did not uncover any more evidence.125

In another case, an UNFICYP OP heard two shots and about thirty seconds later there was another burst of four. UNFICYP sent out an armed patrol of two soldiers in a jeep. The TFs denied everything. UNFICYP got a TF captain to come to the scene. They talked and eventually the TFs made up a story of having to fire the shots because they spotted someone in the buffer zone. The NGs said the shots took out street lamps and hit an NG OP. UNFICYP calmed each side that night, just by talking and going back and forth (about 600 meters) between the sides over the course of about an hour and a half. The next morning, UNFICYP visited the NG OP and there was no damage. In the meantime, the TFs had held an internal inquiry (because, according to Cowie, they do not take it lightly when a soldier fires for no reason) and said the shots were fired by a new lad who made a mistake.126

This sub-section shows that UNFICYP often - but certainly not always - gets to the bottom of and reports to both sides on real and made-up non-lethal shooting incidents. Thus, some support is given to H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. In the case of fictional incidents in particular, UNFICYP's investigations helped curtail this behavior and end the false reports in the Turkish press. This episode supports H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-

125 IMREP folder, Sector 2, West, Kingston.

126 Interview with Bombardier Cowie, May 24, 1996.
case Assumptions and H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis. However, other types of non-lethal shooting incidents continue apace, so despite short-term or tactical successes, UNFICYP's efforts do not successfully reduce the frequency of these incidents over the long-term. Of course, almost all problems recur on Cyprus. I believe that this is an argument in favor of UNFICYP's continued presence, and that the recurrence of problems is more an indictment of the OPFORs than of UNFICYP.

Interestingly, Cowie's story of calming the OPFORs would support H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, except the calming appears to be based more on cajoling or presence than on full knowledge of the facts. Further, except for the presumably reduced tensions associated ending the fictional incidents, it is not clear how much UNFICYP's actions reduce any fears or miscalculations associated with non-lethal shootings (outside of being able to put a stop with their presence situations which could easily escalate). I have no direct evidence on transparency and this issue, and what I do know is not enough to support reasonable speculation.

A final comment is that UNFICYP and the U.N. try to use shooting and weapons incidents to spur the unmanned agreement and other confidence-building measures. The calming, incident reducing potential of carrying unloaded weapons or of pulling back from the cease-fire lines and leaving OPs unmanned is both significant and obvious. Despite the dangers of accident and unintended escalation, the OPFORs consistently reject these overtures.
Maintaining the status quo is one of UNFICYP's main tasks, and each side's confidence in UNFICYP's ability to do this is a principal benefit of UNFICYP's existence (see above, p. 233). For UNFICYP to effectively maintain the status quo, its authority in the buffer zone must be clear and unquestioned. In practice, UNFICYP usually has clear and unquestioned authority in the buffer zone.\textsuperscript{127} This means that UNFICYP usually enjoys complete freedom of movement in the buffer zone, that it prevents entry into or construction in the buffer zone, and that it corrects violations when they occur. There are notable and blatant exceptions such as the warning shots fired at the UNFICYP soldiers who tried to approach Panayi (see above, p. 283).

This section explains some of the more routine and more subtle ways UNFICYP's authority in the buffer zone is challenged. Sometimes UNFICYP loses control over its patrol tracks and, once lost, this control is difficult to regain. Control can be lost if one of the OPFORs moves forward and the UNFICYP commander on the scene is not able to dislodge them and then ends up making a local agreement with the OPFOR. These agreements essentially legitimize the new status quo. Local agreements are very difficult for UNFICYP to deal with because, as the name implies, they are made by local commanders who often do not notify their superiors or successor rotations about them.

According to one of UNFICYP's folders on moves forward, local agreements are due to a "lack of understanding and weakness of UNFICYP at [the] local level" over time. And it is "clear that local agreements and understandings have far reaching effects when changes are made

\textsuperscript{127} Although the Turkish side with their superior numbers and insistence that they are the real peacekeepers are somewhat arrogant and dismissive about UNFICYP. While the Greek \textit{sic.} is supportive of and helps pay for UNFICYP, they also insist that UNFICYP's control over the buffer zone is only a temporary condition. Their argument stems from their claim that the Government of Cyprus has sovereign control over the whole island.
to activities within the buffer zone without clearance from HQ UNFICYP." UNFICYP's spokesman echoed these concerns, saying that local agreements are "hell in this mission." ¹²⁸

This section relates to transparency in three ways. First, in the macro sense, UNFICYP can only assure each side that the status quo in the buffer zone is being maintained if this is in fact true. If each side begins to suspect that the other is routinely getting one over on UNFICYP, then the effectiveness of the mission is jeopardized. While this section certainly deals with one of UNFICYP's more embarrassing problems, it should not be forgotten that UNFICYP generally is effective in maintaining control over the buffer zone.

Second, one can view local agreements that are not communicated to superiors or successor rotations as actions committed by 'rogues' within UNFICYP. These agreements hinder UNFICYP's ability to send consistent messages and to coordinate itself; they diminish UNFICYP's internal transparency.

Third, when one side gets away with a move forward, this action is often accompanied by arguments about where the cease-fire line really is and protestations that the move forward was actually legitimate. UNFICYP should be able to win these arguments hands down, but when it does not, it is often because of ambiguities about the 'base truth' of where the cease-fire lines really are, the extent of construction along the cease-fire lines, and so forth. As mentioned many times before, UNFICYP has no comprehensive database of photographs or videos of the whole

buffer zone. And when the cease-fire lines where drawn, they were drawn ambiguously.¹²⁹

As increasing transparency usually amounts to moving sides away from misperception and towards the truth, these ambiguities about the base truth reduce UNFICYP's ability to increase transparency (H1). UNFICYP can not rebut an OPFOR's claims about the cease-fire lines without an agreed-upon set of facts. One of the obvious policy prescriptions that follows from this is that peacekeeping missions whose mandate includes monitoring should create a comprehensive database and record of the status quo and have both sides sign it. This should be provided for in the initial status of forces agreement when both sides are most likely to accept photography or other such intrusions.

While the problem of local agreements is a largely self-concealing phenomenon, the subject came up in several of my interviews. Local agreements and disputes about patrol tracks and the delineation of the cease-fire lines were also covered in a couple of folders I took notes on. I will now recount several incidents in which authority in the buffer zone was contested. Note how there are often disagreements about things which should be a matter of clear record. In addition, UNFICYP is frequently engaged in cajoling, persuasion, and negotiation in these episodes. Not all of these ended with a loss for UNFICYP; sometimes the agreements arrived at seem fair and appropriate.

**BOURHAN TAN** There is a road named Bourhan Tan that runs along the buffer zone near central Nicosia. It is a sensitive and important part of UNFICYP's patrol route within the buffer zone because without it, there would be no patrol route in that area. Effectively, that would mean that

¹²⁹ See above, p. 236, as well as discussion of the Delimitation Commission, including footnote 14, p. 129.
there would be no buffer zone in the area, the TFs and the NG would be even closer, and tensions would rise. Unfortunately, the TCSF cease-fire line runs along the North edge of Bourhan Tan and both UNFICYP and the TFs use the road for their patrols.

In November 1984, a memo was written by the Sector 4 (now Sector 2) HQ at Wolseley Barracks to the commander of the TF's Wolf regiment about "ongoing incidents" at Bourhan Tan and an area called 4 Minute Walk (which I'll come to soon). These incidents continued and a July 1987 memo from Sector 4 to UNFICYP HQ recounted several incidents over the past year in which TFs pushed UNFICYP peacekeepers or pointed and cocked their weapons at them. Previous TF correspondence noted that UNFICYP had freedom of movement in the area. The agreement that was made to resolve this problem (or at least minimize tensions) was that the TFs would patrol the North side of Bourhan Tan, while UNFICYP patrolled the South side.\footnote{This section is based on the folder "Move Forward of TFCFL Nicosia," 20/002-1303, 5/24/89.}

WAYNE'S KEEP In January 1995, UNFICYP's Sector 2 commander met with his TF counterpart to discuss a dispute about UNFICYP's right to patrol in the Wayne's Keep cemetery. According to the meeting notes, the U.N. said that it had conducted armed patrols in the past in Wayne's Keep, that the disagreement is not about the cease-fire line but the patrol area, that patrols should continue, that the SOPs for visits and the process of informal notification works well, and that UNFICYP could reduce the frequency of patrols in the area if things calmed down there. The TF's responded by saying that at no time in the last 18 months had the U.N. patrolled the cemeteries, that if the U.N. patrolled the area, the TFs would too, and that the matter should be discussed at the Chief of Staff level. The notes said the meeting ended amicably with agreement.
that the issue could not be resolved at the sector level.

A few days later, UNFICYP's Chief Operations Officer met with his TF counterpart, walked through the area, then exchanged views. The TF position had not changed. They argued that there had been no former patrols, that no patrol track existed in the area, that there were always problems with new contingents who did not know they were not supposed to patrol there, that the U.N. did not need to patrol in Wayne's Keep because they could see into it from the road, and that, as the cemetery was a holy place, only TF officers were permitted into Wayne's Keep, even though the cease-fire line ran along the South of the cemetery [toward the Greek Cypriot side]. The TFs said that the U.N. could patrol the area, if it informed the local TF authorities ahead of time, but they also said that if the U.N. conducted patrols, they would too.

UNFICYP's counter was that the problem was caused by the TFs trying to stop patrols which had been conducted on a daily basis by the last two regiments. UNFICYP was amazed that the TF were disputing a July 1994 agreement that allowed the patrols and that records on file indicate a first mention of such patrols as early as 1978 and again in 1988. To UNFICYP, it appeared that the TFs tried to take advantage of each new rotation in Sector 2.\textsuperscript{131} UNFICYP argued that the TF cease-fire line was along the trench line to the North of the cemetery and that there was a big difference between having a right to patrol an area whenever it wished and needing to notify before patrols. That said, UNFICYP offered to inform the TFs at a local level in advance of each patrol and that it would decrease the number of patrols if the situation

\textsuperscript{131} Rotations occur every six months for the British forces who patrol Sector 2. Obviously, if either side extracts even a small concession from UNFICYP with each new rotation, then UNFICYP would stand to lose considerable ground over time.
remained calm.\textsuperscript{132}

Major Walsh, the Sector 2 West battery commander told me that the issue was 'resolved' with each side agreeing to disagree. He said that UNFICYP conducts unarmed patrols in the cemetery out of respect and that technically UNFICYP should notify the TFs about patrols in Wayne's Keep, but that it does not most of the time. As a rule, UNFICYP tries hard to conduct its operations transparently, but here the goal of transparency conflicts with UNFICYP's operational independence and authority in the buffer zone. That said, notification increases during times of tension. More generally, he had been told by HQ UNFICYP not to lose the cemetery and that playing games with the cemetery was playing with big bucks.\textsuperscript{133}

4 Minute Walk The 4 Minute Walk is so named because there is a part of the buffer zone patrol track in central Nicosia which is too skinny for patrol jeeps to pass (the Leoforos Kykkou). While the vehicles detour this spot (but I believe the detour is still in the buffer zone), the peacekeepers go straight through on foot and rejoin the vehicle in...four minutes. This walking area was contested in the mid-1980s and is now essentially a no-man's land.

In November 1975, an agreement was made between UNFICYP and the TF that UNFICYP had the right to patrol in the 4 Minute Walk area, but also that UNFICYP had made a unilateral offer to stop patrolling (UNFICYP did patrol the area after 1975).\textsuperscript{134} The agreement also accepted TF patrols in the area. In May 1983, the commander of Sector 4 agreed (apparently

\textsuperscript{132} From "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," Sector 2, West Kingston.

\textsuperscript{133} Interview, May 25, 1996.

\textsuperscript{134} According to a letter from the Chief of Staff of UNFICYP to the Chief of Staff of the TFs, May 12, 1984 in the file "Move Forward of TFCFL Nicosia," 20/002-1303, 5/24/89.
with the TFs) that patrols in the 4 Minute Walk area were not necessary as UNFICYP could inspect the zone from either end of the Walk. However, the Sector 4 commander also insisted that UNFICYP retained the right of patrol. By April 1984, UNFICYP had not patrolled in the 4 Minute Walk zone for six months. On April 13, the TFs drew a chalk line where they believed the cease-fire line was and then they moved troops up to that line. UNFICYP lodged verbal protests, but a UNFICYP lieutenant ended up getting pushed by the TFs. In response, UNFICYP moved in a jeep. This prompted both sides to neutralize the area.

In a follow up meeting on April 20 between UNFICYP and TF majors and captains, the sides fail to agree on a longer term solution. The TFs say that in five hours they will block the 4 Minute Walk and prevent observation again. They can not assure this action wouldn't be taken before the UNFICYP Sector 4 and TF Wolf Regiment commanders have a chance to meet. UNFICYP tries all day to arrange this meeting and in the meantime deploys two Lynx vehicles and a reserve section to the area. The two commanders eventually met and records of the meeting indicate that the Wolf Regiment commander denied the validity of the 1975 agreement, that he wanted to deny UNFICYP's right to observe the area and the buildings South (towards the Greek Cypriot side) of the Walk. However, the TF commander also agreed that no action would be taken until it was discussed at higher levels and that UNFICYP could conduct a one-time inspection. The Sector 4 commander reported that he thought this was all part of a long-term TF plan to deny access to the area. He also thought it appropriate for the UNFICYP Chief of Staff to take up the issue. Note how much of the discussion centers on UNFICYP's right to inspect this area. The outcomes in this and similar disputes affect UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency (H1).
On May 12, 1984, UNFICYP's Chief of Staff wrote to the TF Chief of Staff noting the 1975 agreements, suggesting that UNFICYP continue inspections in the buildings South of the Walk, reaffirming the right to Patrol the Walk - but also offering not to patrol the Walk, and offering a limited right of patrol to the TFs in the Walk. There was no indication in the files on how this immediate offer panned out, but on October 8, the Sector 4 commander met with the Wolf regiment commander asking for permission to inspect the Walk area. Access was denied and the UNFICYP wrote the TCSF commander on October 10 to express his disappointment that the Sector 4 commander was not allowed to inspect. The TCSF brigadier general responded on October 15 denying that there was ever an agreement in 1975 and that he was "amazed to hear of disappointment" about the refused request.\textsuperscript{135}

According to Bombardier Jones who regularly patrolled the area in central Nicosia surrounding the 4 Minute Walk, the Walk is now a no-man's land and is only occasionally contested (stones thrown at the Bombardier, for example). The Chief Operations Officer, Lt. Colonel Parker, said that different maps revealed three different cease-fire lines in the 4 Minute Walk area. He noted more generally that he had a huge files on unresolved cease-fire line interpretations. Parker said that if the cease-fire line problems could be resolved, this would calm both sides and generate lots of peace.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{135} This discussion is based on the file "Move Forward of TFCFL Nicosia," 20/002-1303, 5/24/89. Please note that although this section recounts disputes with the TFs and incidents involving TF moves forward, this emphasis is mostly due to the folders I saw about this issue. This emphasis does not mean that there are no such disputes involving the NG.

\textsuperscript{136} Interviews with Bombardier Jones and Lt Colonel Parker, May 10, 1996 and May 9, 1996 respectively.
ASSESSMENT  These incidents, highlighted by Parker's last comments, hit transparency themes on the head. First, without saying the word transparency, Parker nonetheless believes that increased transparency could do a lot to calm tensions (H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions). However, his comments and these incidents also reveal shortfalls in UNFICYP's ability to increase or provide transparency. Thus, doubt appears to be cast on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency.

But I would argue the opposite is true. Regrettable as they are, these incidents are exceptions. UNFICYP usually does a good job maintaining the integrity of the buffer zone, and this creates strong implicit support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation/Prevents Backsliding, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation, and H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis.\textsuperscript{137} I believe that the occasional failures described in this section contrast with and therefore actually serve to demonstrate UNFICYP's day to day effectiveness. To see the validity of this argument, one has only to imagine a much more porous or even non-existent buffer zone. The number of incidents would drastically increase and so would the probability of miscalculation.

A counterpoint to these arguments that the maintaining the integrity of the buffer zone promotes peace is that the buffer zone is also a symbol of invasion, wrongful division, and ethnic strife, especially for the Greek Cypriot side. In this light, the buffer zone causes tension and offers support for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict. However, I

\textsuperscript{137} This argument in support of these hypotheses could apply in other sections, but this section on moves forward is most directly related to UNFICYP's control of the buffer zone.
strongly believe the buffer zone's benefits outweigh the costs.

Government of Cyprus officials I talked to believe UNFICYP successfully maintains control of the buffer zone, preserves the status quo, and keeps small things small. Dr. Pantelides, a political officer in the Cyprus Problem Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called UNFICYP "extremely successful." Ms. Petrides, also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that UNFICYP helped keep the Turkish side from gaining ground in the buffer zone. On the "TRNC" side, Mr. Plumer, an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense was much less supportive. Even though he said that UNFICYP's job had gotten easier since the creation of the buffer zone in 1974, he thought that the TFs were doing the real peacekeeping on Cyprus and that UNFICYP was not big enough to do its job adequately. He also noted with displeasure the U.N.'s reluctance to recognize the "TRNC" and said that UNFICYP was 70% paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Thus, he argued that UNFICYP's benefits appear to accrue more to the Greek than Turkish side.

Second, disputes about the location of the cease-fire lines recall the same difficulties encountered by the British, French, and their Delimitation Commission in America in the 1700s (see above, p. 129). The British and French could not agree on the boundaries of their respective colonies, the Delimitation Commission was powerful enough to figure out the boundaries on its own, and these difficulties contributed to the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in America. The difference between Cyprus and 200+ years ago is that these difficulties should be easier to

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138 Interviews, May 16 and 15, 1996, respectively.

139 Interview, June 5, 1996. The correct figure is 50%.
resolve in the 20th century. To repeat, when consensual peacekeeping operations are established, borders should be clearly defined and agreed on by all sides.

Third, it is surprising and dismaying that the 'base truth' is so elusive or subject to dispute. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, this makes it hard to increase transparency. Why should there be any question that there was a 1994 agreement that UNFICYP could patrol Wayne's Keep and that it had indeed patrolled there subsequently? What kind of games are being played when such apparently obvious facts are disputed? These sorts of incidents suggest that UNFICYP should strengthen its ability to establish the base truth and better use the information-based cease and desist strategy (H5). Ideas for doing so are covered in this chapter's conclusions.

DEMONSTRATIONS AND CROWD CONTROL

Another major problem confronted by UNFICYP are demonstrations. With one potentially notable exception, this problem and the ways in which UNFICYP tries to deal with it have relatively little to do with transparency. During the particularly violent demonstrations of the summer of 1996 (two Greek Cypriots dead and numerous casualties), UNFICYP actively defused rumors in near real time. This supports H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and possibly H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. Even though there is little evidence about transparency during other demonstrations, judging the relative importance of transparency to UNFICYP's mission requires describing all the mission's major functions and responsibilities.

This section describes typical demonstrations and what UNFICYP is supposed to do
about them. It then describes the events of the summer of 1996.

Most demonstrations are usually held by Greek Cypriots to protest the Turkish invasion and occupation. The demonstrators create havoc for UNFICYP as they frequently try to cross into the buffer zone. They also throw rocks, bottles, and occasional molotov cocktails across the buffer zone at Turkish Cypriots or other targets of opportunity, including UNFICYP personnel. UNFICYP's responsibility during the demonstrations is, as usual, to protect the integrity of the buffer zone. The Cyprus police (CYPOL) are supposed to help control the demonstrators and protect UNFICYP (and thus also help protect the buffer zone). In ideal circumstances, CYPOL forms the first line of crowd control, UNCIVPOL personnel then talk to any that get by, and unarmed UNFICYP troops and their barbed wire form the third line.

The Greek Cypriot demonstrators typically consist of school groups, women's organizations such as "Women March Home," relatives of supposedly "missing persons,"\textsuperscript{140} or motorcycle clubs. The number of demonstrators can vary from several tens to several hundreds to the low thousands. Colonel Parker, the Chief Operations Officer, said that between 30-40% of the demonstrators really feel strongly about the Cyprus problem (or whatever more specific issue they are protesting) while the remaining 60-70% are best viewed as professional

\textsuperscript{140} There are approximately 1500-1600 Greek Cypriots and 500-800 Turkish Cypriots unaccounted for since the 1974 invasion. Since 1984, the U.N. has run an autonomous (i.e. not a U.N. organ) Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) which is supposed to coordinate the activities of the two sides to ascertain the whereabouts of these persons. The Greek Cypriots in particular play up the missing persons problem even though it is widely recognized by those without vested interests that most if not all of the missing are dead. To some extent, the U.N. is fostering continued mythmaking and propaganda by its continued participation in the CMP. To its credit, the U.N. has signaled its displeasure with the CMP's lack of progress and has grumbled about ending the committee. Of the missing, there are currently 1493 Greek Cypriot and 500 Turkish Cypriot cases officially before the CMP. See Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020 and June 7, 1996, S/1996/411, pp. 10 and 7-8 respectively.
demonstrators. For example, Colonel Talbot noted one protester who one week claimed she wanted to return to her home in Morphou and then in a protest the next week wanted to return home to Kyrenia. For their part, the Turkish Cypriots organize what are usually counter-demonstrations that occur during or following the Greek Cypriot demonstrations. The Turkish Cypriot demonstrations tend to be more controlled and orchestrated. However, according to spokesman Rokoszewski, demonstrations on both sides are often triggered by politicians.

UNFICYP learns about demonstrations from a variety of sources. The motorcycle demonstrators publicize their plans well in advance, often trying to gather up supporters. Prior to the big summer of 1996 protest, the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation (CMF) wrote UNFICYP twice asking for permission to cross the buffer zone on their way to Kyrenia. UNFICYP never responded (understandably). Other groups sometimes inform UNFICYP ahead of time or UNFICYP learns of demonstrations through the newspapers and other open sources. CYPOL is supposed to notify UNFICYP of upcoming demonstrations, although CYPOL’s level of cooperation in this and in other ways (see below) is spotty at best. Finally and occasionally, UNFICYP is taken by surprise by demonstrations.

The Turkish Cypriots often learn of demonstrations through liaison with UNFICYP. According to Colonel Talbot, UNFICYP tells the Turkish side what they are going to do about the upcoming demonstration and this helps build trust. He said it was very important for him to

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141 Interview, May 14, 1996.
142 Interview, May 9, 1996.
143 Interview June 6, 1996.
say 'I'm doing this' about the demonstration and ask about their (Turkish) concerns and respond to them. He believed the trust this engendered may help disengagement over the long-term.\textsuperscript{144}

UNFICYP's information gathering and Colonel Talbot's remarks support H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation may also be supported if the Turks end up being calmed by the advance knowledge UNFICYP provides and are then not surprised by the upcoming demonstrations. I have no evidence on this point. H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose is also supported by Talbot's and other's advance meetings with each side. In the end though, transparency does not seem very relevant to most demonstrations. However, there is some evidence that the provision of transparency in near-real time during the August 1996 demonstrations helped keep the violence from getting even worse.

The demonstrations vary in their level of hostility and danger. AKEL (the Greek Cypriot communist party) demonstrations are "unfailingly peaceful."\textsuperscript{145} On the other hand, even schoolchildren can be quite aggressive. In October of 1993, 5000 schoolchildren left their schools to protest at the Ledra Palace, violated the buffer zone and injured five members of UNFICYP.\textsuperscript{146} Two years later,

...for several successive days in second week of November 1995, Greek Cypriot schoolchildren, marshaled by adults, including teachers, violently protested the detention by Turkish Cypriot authorities of a member of the National Guard who had crossed the buffer zone. Fifteen members of UNFICYP sustained

\textsuperscript{144} Interview, May 9, 1996. This interview occurred before the deadly demonstrations later in the summer.

\textsuperscript{145} At least according to CYPOL, in a note in the UNFICYP "Demonstrations Folder," #401, 4/003, 9/27/95.

minor injuries during these demonstrations. The U.N., both in Nicosia and in New York, made strong representations to the Government of Cyprus; thereafter, in particular on 15 November 1995, the Cyprus Police took effective action to control the demonstrators and improved advance liaison with UNFICYP.147

These demonstrations raise several points. First, CYPOL often promises increased cooperation but the *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus* often remark on the fleeting nature of these promises. Second, note again the role of teachers and schools in fostering nationalism, even violent nationalism. Third, over the years, UNFICYP has learned that the more it tries to be confrontational with protesters (with riot gear, a generally forceful presence, and so forth), the more violence it actually spurs. Some of this is craft knowledge in the British units based on their experiences in Northern Ireland. One tactic of UNFICYP is to keep troops and vehicles in covert locations unless really needed during a demonstration. Whatever force UNFICYP deploys however, it is not hard for it to be outnumbered by protesters (UNFICYP can only muster about 1000+ troops across all of Cyprus for these events). A final limitation on UNFICYP's crowd control efforts is that it can ill afford to be seen clubbing schoolchildren (or others, barring unavoidable self-defense), no matter how violent the schoolchildren or others become.148

147 *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020, pp. 2-3. November 15 was the opening of the Roccas Bastion playground on the Turkish side and the reader may remember that the Turkish authorities did little to prevent Turkish civilians from throwing stones from the bastion toward the Greek side. According to Lt. Colonel Parker, UNFICYP's Chief Operations Officer, the ambassadors of several troop contributing countries threatened to withdraw from UNFICYP, protesting that their soldiers were not in Cyprus to get hurt by schoolchildren. Interview, May 14, 1996.

148 Interviews with Colonel Talbot and Lt. Colonel Snowdon, May 9 and May 10, 1996, respectively. For *Reports* that note problems with CYPOL's cooperation in restraining protesters or that note CYPOL promises of cooperation, see for example November 30, 1988, S/20310, p. 5 in which CYPOL assured it would do whatever was necessary to prevent demonstrators from entering the buffer zone and then the next report on May 31, 1989, S/20663, p. 5 in which the U.N. notes that despite these promises, about 2000 women broke into the buffer zone with about 54 who made it to Turkish (continued...)
Motorcycle protests are the most violent and troublesome for UNFICYP to confront. With belligerence, speed, walkie-talkies, and portable phones, these demonstrators can often run around and outwit UNFICYP troops. These demonstrations stress UNFICYP’s command and control abilities, often highlight failures in this area, and prompt UNFICYP to try to remedy whatever deficiencies are identified. In July of 1993, a large number of motorcyclists repeatedly entered the buffer zone in a number of places, throwing rocks and molotov cocktails at the Turkish and UNFICYP forces and injuring twelve UNFICYP members and damaging nine UNFICYP vehicles. The protestors were so well organized that they pulled down UNFICYP’s barriers with chains attached to vehicles. After strong protests, the Government of Cyprus expressed "regret and assured UNFICYP that it would take appropriate measures so that such incidents did not recur." UNFICYP thanked the Turkish Forces for their restraint, noting that

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148 (...)continued
side being arrested and then released. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, November 22, 1993, S/26777, p. 18 which states: "I share the view of the Force Commander that neither the Security Council nor the troop-contributing Governments should be expected to accept that violations of the buffer zone or attacks on UNFICYP personnel are not prevented by the Cyprus Police."

One demonstration folder I looked at (#401, 4/003) indicated that the Chief Operations Officer wrote to the Senior Advisor (10/18/95) noting CYPOL’s complicity in letting schoolchildren through to the South Ledra Checkpoint and suggesting that a protest letter be sent not to CYPOL but to the Ministry of Education. In another folder on the 8/6/95 Cyprus Motorcycle Organization rally, a 8/9/95 Sector 1 report noted that CYPOL obstructed U.N. personnel and did not cooperate, that it did not stop demonstrators, that it did not arrest anyone, and that CYPOL helped the demonstrators remove U.N. obstacles.

To be fair, this same folder showed that on 8/18/95, the Chief of Mission wrote New York and indicated that CYPOL had made good preparations, including 1000 police and riot police and that they had used tear gas. This message noted that the demonstrators were particularly mobile around Sector 1 and that UNFICYP could not keep up. It also mentioned UNFICYP equipment deficiencies that hindered command and control.

149 Lt. Colonel Parker, the Chief Operations Officer during my visit, was particularly happy with his progress in this area.

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there otherwise could have been "serious consequences."\textsuperscript{150}

By 1996, the Government of Cyprus had again forgotten about these promises and the Turkish Forces and authorities had lost their restraint. Announced in January 1996, a planned motorcycle demonstration for August of 1996 led to the deaths of two Greek Cypriots and numerous injuries. Starting on August 2, a group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists set out from Berlin (to symbolize the fact that Nicosia is still a divided city) on their way to Cyprus. They planned to cross from the South and go to Kyrenia in the North (and had twice asked UNFICYP's permission to do so). The U.N. said that it was obvious in advance that the plan to cross the buffer zone

...was bound to cause the utmost provocation. During the period leading up to the demonstration, the media on both sides publicized a large number of increasingly acerbic statements by the demonstration's organizers and by Greek Cypriot political leaders, as well as counter statements by the Turkish Cypriot side.\textsuperscript{151}

By the morning of August 11, the motorcyclists were set to go from the South to the North. In the meantime, the U.N. Secretary-General and several embassies had become worried about the impending demonstration. Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that he:

expressed his concern at reports that a Greek Cypriot motorcycle association is planning to violate the ceasefire lines as well as the UN buffer zone in Cyprus on Sunday 11 August...[he] hopes that the organisers of this event will avoid a course of action that could only harm efforts to resolve the longstanding Cyprus problem.\textsuperscript{152}


At the very last minute, President Clerides met with the president of the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation, and the ride to Kyrenia was called off. However, hundreds of motorcyclists (out of a claimed 7000 Cypriots and Europeans who had joined the ride) and others ignored the tardy cancellation and proceeded to punch through U.N. lines around Dherinia (a frequent hot-spot) and into the buffer zone. The Turkish side was well prepared for the widely publicized rally and many Turkish Cypriot civilians were ready to meet the motorcyclists with clubs. Members of the Turkish mainland militant right-wing group the Grey Wolves had also been imported to help confront the Greek Cypriot demonstration. In the ensuing violence, a Greek Cypriot, Tasos Isaac was clubbed to death, and 50 or more other Greek Cypriots, about 12 Turkish Cypriots, and 12 UNFICYP personnel were injured.

On August 14, Issac was buried and at his funeral, this "symbol of freedom"'s "heroic death" was eulogized as a "source of inspiration" by the Primate of the Church of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{153} A demonstration followed the funeral. Several hundred Greek Cypriots charged the cease-fire lines and entered the buffer zone. As the protestors threw stones, Solomos Solomos, a cousin of Isaac, began to climb a flagpole to take down a Turkish Cypriot flag. He was killed and four others were wounded (including two UNFICYP personnel) when Turkish Forces opened fire and shot 25-50 rounds into the crowd.\textsuperscript{154}

UNFICYP lodged strong protests, and Feissel, the Chief of Mission, said that the


"shooting was totally unwarranted and inexcusable. The U.N. was controlling the crowd and in a position to get them out." UNFICYP personnel were chasing Solomos when he climbed the flagpole.\textsuperscript{155} Turkey's foreign minister, Tansu Ciller, responded "We break the hands that reach out in disrespect of the flag. We won't allow any violation of border lines. We won't allow any attacks on the flag."\textsuperscript{156} A flurry of diplomatic activity by the U.N., the U.S., Britain, and the European Union followed these killings, but these were (so far) unproductive. Security Council Resolution 1092, December 23, 1996, stated that the UNSC:

2. Deplores the violent incidents of 11 and 14 August, 8 September and 15 October 1996, which resulted in the tragic deaths of three Greek Cypriot civilians and UNFICYP personnel, in particular the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side, as well as the largely passive role played by the Cypriot police in response to civilian demonstrations...

These demonstrations and killings highlight Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cold-blooded and lethal brutality, a tragic, somewhat out of touch Greek Cypriot mind-set, and the limits of UNFICYP's effectiveness. Turkish brutality speaks for itself, especially in the second killing.\textsuperscript{157}

With regard to the Greek side, it is incredible to think that the motorcycle ride to Kyrenia could have been pulled off peacefully. Why did the Government of Cyprus encourage it? It is incredible that the Government of Cyprus did not wake up to the ride's dangers until just minutes before the motorcyclists were to set off. The rally had been planned months in advance, and UNFICYP had already begun its preparations when I was there in early May. Perhaps the Greek

\textsuperscript{155} Elizabeth Neuffer, "Turkish troops kill protester as strife worsens on Cyprus" \textit{Boston Globe}, August 15, 1996, p. A1. The \textit{Boston Globe} covers Cyprus more thoroughly than either the \textit{Washington Post} or the \textit{New York Times}.


\textsuperscript{157} As well as the October 15 killing in which a middle-aged man gathering snails was killed.
Cypriots and the Government of Cyprus feel so strongly about their cause that it is worth paying a blood price. They had better, because encouraging and almost allowing 7000 motorcyclists to break through the buffer zone into the North is as close as one can come to making a conscious decision to pay in lives to make a political point.  

**Assessment**  It is clearly difficult for UNFICYP to contend with large crowds. UNFICYP is frequently well outnumbered, and it can not resort to any level of force to help control these crowds. As spokesman Rokoszewski said after the abortive motorcycle demonstration, "with these limited resources, the protestors just entangle you." UNFICYP would need a much larger force, and/or the cooperation of CYPOL to deal effectively with large protests. However, it does successfully cope with numerous smaller protests each year.

Transparency played a role in preventing the violence from getting even worse during the August 1996 demonstrations. According to UNFICYP's journal, *The Blue Berets*:

UNFICYP played a unique role in defusing tension between the two parties. During the height of the crisis, rumours and disinformation were rampant on both sides which could easily have triggered military clashes. UNFICYP's liaison officers attached to the police and military headquarters were instrumental in keeping both sides informed of developments and in quickly clarifying any

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158 Of course, just what is that political point? That the Greek Cypriots hate the people they claim they want to reunify with? That Cyprus, the real and not pseudo state, has an ineffective police force? That Cyprus, the real and not pseudo state, lets hooligans carry out their foreign policy?

Greek Cypriot policies, actions, and rhetoric are frequently so inflamed that they do their cause no service. When Turkish brutality is clear, the Greek Cypriots should do what they can to publicize it, not do things that detract from any sympathy they deserve. And where the Greek Cypriots have made mistakes, they should own up to them, thus gaining respect and increasing the ability to reach a lasting settlement. In my view, Greek Cypriots are hurting their cause when they practice extreme nationalism in ways ranging from fault free history (from schools to the tourist OP at Lideras street) to hooliganism in the buffer zone.

159 Elizabeth Neuffer, "Greek, Turkish foes clash on Cyprus" *Boston Globe*, August 11, 1996, p. A2.
misperceptions.\textsuperscript{160}

In tactical terms, UNFICYP appears to have increased transparency and put both H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation into action. On a larger scale though, each side maintains dramatically different interpretations of the August demonstrations. For example, the dead Greek Cypriots are hailed as superpatriot heroes by their side.\textsuperscript{161}

Despite UNFICYP's success with near-real time transparency during these exceptionally violent demonstrations, transparency generally does not play a large role in demonstrations. The facts of the case in each demonstration are fairly clear, as are each side's interpretation of them. There is not much for the U.N. to investigate and the U.N. has done about all it can to publicize the facts and issue condemnations. Demonstrations, violent or not, just inflame and deepen passions and there is little UNFICYP can do about that. Indeed, it would be sad if the Greek Cypriots did not protest about an issue they feel strongly about. However, the strength of these passions is not fully demonstrated when the demonstrators are manipulated schoolchildren or overzealous and violent nationalists on motorcycles.

The limits of H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis are shown in UNFICYP's repeated scoldings of CYPOL. No amount of criticism from the U.N. provokes anything more than the most temporary improvement in cooperation. In the end, it is clear that the Government of Cyprus encourages demonstrations and actions by demonstrators up to and

\textsuperscript{160} Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1996, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{161} For more analysis of these demonstrations, see Lindley, "UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution."
even beyond the limits of plausible deniability. As one high level UNFICYP official noted, the
demonstrations are a hot air balloon, but the government must keep them going.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Part of UNFICYP's mandate is to help Cyprus "return to normal conditions" and it is
under this directive that UNFICYP has come to engage in a number of humanitarian activities on
the island. These efforts range from facilitating farming in the buffer zone, helping administer
villages in the buffer zone (notably the mixed village of Pyla), and helping both sides coordinate
the linked electrical, water, and sewer systems to sponsoring bicomunal concerts and other
events. The mandate is described on p. 212.

Bicomunal events, infrastructure coordination, and other contacts are explicitly
designed to increase transparency. According to UNFICYP:

Bicomunal contacts can contribute significantly to facilitating an overall
settlement. It is obvious that the encouragement of tolerance, trust and
reconciliation between the two communities through increased contact and
improved communication is an essential part of the peace process...

If one is willing to broaden the definition of transparency to include how information affects

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162 The mandate is described on p. 212.

163 Note that other parties such as interested embassies (especially the U.S.), artists, businesses, and others also
sponsor and promote bicomunal events. However, these usually require coordination with UNFICYP for obvious
reasons.

quote continues: "and I strongly urge both communities, and especially the Turkish Cypriot authorities, to lift and prevent
all obstacles to such contacts."
threat assessments made by groups about other groups (here dubbed societal-level transparency), then statements like this are redolent of H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation, and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. In addition, if UNFICYP succeeds in reducing tensions based on myths about the other side's history and intentions, it is likely reducing miscalculation as well (H4).

Unfortunately, it is hard to tell if H1, H2, H3, and H4 are really confirmed or supported by bicomunal activities because it is hard to discern any changes in behavior or attitude associated with these events. The Turkish side rarely sponsors them and often obstructs them. Whatever effects they may have are likely to take place over a very long time. This does not make bicomunal events irrelevant or unworthy of pursuit; they have a lot of intuitive appeal. It just means that from my vantage point as a social scientist, I have a difficult time measuring the impact of bicomunal contacts.\(^{165}\)

This is frustrating because most of this chapter deals with how UNFICYP maintains cooperation, reduces fears, and reduces miscalculation on a fairly tactical level. One area where UNFICYP may be influencing 'high politics' is in its humanitarian and bicomunal efforts. According to General Vartiainen, UNFICYP adds little to each side's ability to assess the

\(^{165}\) This raises the fascinating and largely unanswered question of whether things in the same vein as bicomunal events -- student exchanges, professional exchanges/epistemic communities, trade, shared radio/television/internet communications, and so forth -- can influence the course of international relations. I believe such activities played an important part in ending the Cold War, but I cannot prove it. I further believe that it is generally wiser to give closed societies a 'loving death embrace' than to isolate them. I believe, again without proof, that contacts are more likely than a hard line to produce change from within. I would not embrace actively malignant closed societies. Terrorists and true rogues deserve isolation and subversion. One of the few analyses of the effects of exchanges is Matthew Evangelista, "Transnational Relations and Security Policy," in *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995) in which he argues that the transnational arms control community helped influence Soviet/Russian security policy.
strategic, warmaking capabilities of the other. However, UNFICYP may well be influencing mass public and political level threat assessments. As these assessments are currently polluted by one-sided histories, devil-imaging, and white-washing, UNFICYP may well be influencing the intentions side of threat assessment with its humanitarian efforts (H3 and H4).

Measurement difficulties aside, humanitarian activities are an increasingly important part of UNFICYP's repertoire and are a necessary part of any detailed description of UNFICYP's role on Cyprus. There is substantial coordination between the North and the South on a number of practical issues. For example, there is only one electrical grid on Cyprus and this obviously requires coordination between North and South. The South has three power plants and it supplies free electricity to the North, which has two plants. According Chief Humanitarian Officer Tereso, this situation at first cut appears to support the South's political agenda because the South's provision of electricity shows that the North is dependent on the South (even though the North can generate some of its own power). On the other hand, he noted, were the South to cut off supplies, it would reinforce the idea that there are really two separate political entities on the island. However, for a six-month period in late 1994 and early 1995, electricity from the South was indeed partially cut off. According to UNFICYP, this was "owing apparently to technical difficulties," but these difficulties caused widespread blackouts "which have seriously affected all aspects of private and commercial life on the Turkish Cypriot side." These blackouts

166 Interview, May 7, 1996.

167 According to both the Chief Humanitarian Officer, Lt. Colonel Jorge Tereso (Argentina) and spokesman Rokoszewski in interviews May 14 and June 6, 1996 respectively.

168 Again, according to Chief Humanitarian Officer Tereso, May 14, 1996.
occurred just prior to and were largely alleviated by the opening of the second Turkish Cypriot
power plant in March 1995.¹⁶⁹

This episode may cast some doubt on H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H3:
Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions because the
interdependence that was supposed to create the contacts that were supposed to spur cooperation
and reduce fears was the same interdependence that created problems between the North and the
South. As transparency may exacerbate conflict in some cases (H6: Transparency Clarifies
Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict), so may interdependence. The key question is when does it help
or hurt and under what conditions does it do so.

Water, sewage, and phone lines also flow across the buffer zone. For example, the
Morphou area in the North provides about 4000 cubic meters of water a day to South Nicosia.
To coordinate these various connections, representatives from each side meet almost every day in
the intercommunal meeting rooms in the Ledra Palace.¹⁷⁰ The Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) is
designed to coordinate utilities and road and other construction between the two halves of
Nicosia. Work on the NMP spurs contact between the two mayors, their subordinates, and other
officials.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Quote from Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, December 12, 1994,

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Lt. Colonel Parker, May 9, 1996. The Ledra Palace, a former hotel, is now in the buffer zone, is
occupied by the U.N., and is principally used as a dorm for some of UNFICYP's Sector 2 soldiers.

¹⁷¹ The NMP was discussed above in the section on the Roccas Bastion construction (esp. pp. 455, 457). It is worth
noting that UNFICYP is not the only U.N. entity carrying the water on Cyprus. The U.N. Development Program and the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees also help with the NMP and other humanitarian tasks.
Moving away from such day-to-day, practical cooperation, other bicomunal activities range from joint art exhibits, blood drives, concerts, and open houses at the Ledra Palace, to meetings of youth organizations. On October 22, 1995 for example, 5000 children and parents met at the Ledra Palace for an open house and this was followed eight days later by a "bicomunal friendship concert" with over 1000 in attendance. Both communities were roughly evenly represented in these events. In April of 1996, about 8000 people participated in bicomunal events. I attended a bicomunal concert in June 1996. The attendance was at least several hundred and were I not aware that it was a bicomunal event, I would not have been able to figure it out. There were no visible signs of either tension or 'let's meet our neighbor' activities.

As mentioned above, the U.N. often criticizes the Turkish side for obstructing bicomunal activities (see continuation of quote in footnote 164). While 75% of proposed bicomunal events are approved by both sides, 99% of the remaining 25% are refused by the North. Further, the North makes lists of and signs off on each individual it allows to participate. The demonstrations of the Summer of 1996 led the Turks to cut off most bicomunal activities. According to Tereso, the "people are so eager to get together," but "politicians try to control policies against the other" community. Tereso's counterpart in the North, Asim Altiok, Director/Representative of the Consular


and Minority Affairs Department of the "TRNC," complained that the Greek side often uses bicomunal events for propaganda, describing Turkish Cypriots who participate as coming from the 'occupied area.' Because of this, he thought that the bicomunal activities did not do much to help solve the Cyprus problem. Although the "TRNC" in theory supports bicomunal activities, their constant drive to be recognized and their resentment at being called an illegitimate government directed by an occupying power may explain the "TRNC"s rationale for blocking some of the events. Asked if he or the "TRNC" had ever proposed or initiated any bicomunal events, Altıok thumbed through a folder and said no.\(^{175}\)

Turning to the other side, Dr. Pantelides of the Government of Cyprus complained about "TRNC" obstructions and said that at one event (to celebrate when the U.N. received the Nobel prize), one half of the 150 Turkish Cypriots in attendance were plainclothesmen and the other half were plants (compared to 1500 Greek Cypriots in attendance). Ms. Petrides also complained about Turkish obstructions and their insistence about being recognized, but she thought that contacts helped prepare the ground for a fair and viable solution.\(^{176}\)

These official responses to bicomunal activities offer mild disconfirming evidence for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. This is probably because everything on Cyprus is a political football. As such, bicomunal activities may not calm tensions or dispel false conceptions but instead may sometimes be events at which each side tries to score points. That said, the real effects of

\(^{175}\) Interview June 4, 1996.

\(^{176}\) Interviews May 16 and 15, 1996, respectively.
bicommunal events are supposed to occur at the person to person level. This suggests that these official statements may be missing the point. It may also be true that the more recent (summer 1997) diplomatic push for a Cyprus solution may lead government officials to sing the praises of bicommunal activities.

MINORITY COMMUNITIES ON CYPRUS A final aspect of UNFICYP’s humanitarian mission is to look after the humanitarian concerns of the 486 Greek Cypriots and 187 Maronites living in the North and the 343 Turkish Cypriots living in the South (as of December 1996).\textsuperscript{177} UNFICYP visits the Turkish Cypriots in the South periodically, comments in the \textit{Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus} that these Cypriots are "not subjected to a restrictive regime," but that they also do not "enjoy a fully normal life" due to "capricious discrimination or police harassment."\textsuperscript{178} In one particularly egregious example, UNFICYP investigated five incidents in which it was alleged that 22 Turkish Cypriots were "taken into police custody...beaten and forcibly sent across the buffer zone into the northern part of the island." The investigations "concluded that prima facie there was adequate material to support the plausibility of the allegations." The Greek Cypriot government responded that "in the light of the evidence submitted by UNFICYP, the allegations could not be conclusively substantiated." The


Government of Cyprus later undertook its own inquiry into police misconduct.\(^{179}\)

At first, this story of the ignored investigations shows the limits of H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis. However, UNFICYP does seem to have spurred CYPOL's later internal investigation.

The problems of the Turkish Cypriots in the South pale in comparison with that of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the North. These communities are subjected to "very severe restrictions, which curtailed the exercise of many basic freedoms and had the effect of ensuring that, inexorably with the passage of time, those communities would cease to exist in the northern part of the island."\(^{180}\) In late 1992, there were 544 Greek Cypriots and 250 Maronites in the North. In late 1995, there were 492 Greek Cypriots and 234 Maronites in the North.\(^{181}\) The Greek Cypriots are concentrated in the Karpas peninsula and their average age is was 66 in 1994.\(^{182}\) The Maronites live around Kormakiti. "TRNC" policy toward these minorities amounts to non-violent ethnic cleansing.

In 1995, UNFICYP conducted a thorough humanitarian review of policies each side had towards its respective minorities. The results were summarized in the *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020, pp. 5-8, and I have already discussed the situation of the Turkish Cypriots in the South. UNFICYP


\(^{181}\) *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 1, 1992, S/24917 and December 12, 1994, S/1994/1407, pp. 7-8 and 5, respectively.

appeared to pull no punches when it indicated that abuses in the North include these policies and actions:

* Greek Cypriots in the North cannot bequeath property to anyone who does not already live in the North and in this way the Turkish Cypriot authorities are able to appropriate increasing amounts of Greek Cypriot property.

* There are no secondary schools for Greek Cypriots or Maronites in the North and Greek Cypriot schoolchildren who attend secondary schools in the South lose their right to reside in the North and basically lose their right to return home once they reach the ages of 16 for males and 18 for females.

* Turkish Cypriot authorities frequently vet and delay Greek Cypriot schoolbooks going from the South to the North.\(^{183}\)

* Greek Cypriots in Karpas do not usually have access to private telephones and must usually make private phone calls from police stations.

* The Greek Cypriots and Maronites do not enjoy freedom of movement in the North.

* UNFICYP's movement around the North is restricted, even when helping deliver Red Cross and other humanitarian aid.

The U.N. routinely focuses on one or more of these problems in each of its bi-annual Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus. Yet little progress has been made in solving or reducing the problems of the minorities in the North (there has been an increase in the number and scope of bicommmunal events). This casts doubt or helps show the limits of H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis. The quantity and clarity of the U.N.'s claims about "TRNC" behavior should have embarrassed the Turkish side into stopping their non-violent ethnic cleansing. Considering that it took a full-court press by the U.N. and

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\(^{183}\) In 1992, the Turkish Cypriot authorities withheld 35 out of 89 schoolbooks sent to the North. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, December 1, 1992, s/24917, p. 7. Altıok, the "TRNC" minister in charge of minorities, said that the Turkish Cypriot authorities were just checking for anti-Turkish propaganda. He said that they do not teach their students that the Greeks are the enemies. He also claimed that the Greek Cypriots and Maronites had freedom of movement in the North. Interview, June 5, 1996.
others to get inspections of the Roccas Bastion construction, perhaps it should not be surprising that the "TRNC" is willing to ignore the complaints about an even more serious matter in the Reports. The more important the policy is to the "TRNC," the more likely it is to ignore U.N. pronouncements. The U.N. ability to publicize problems and exert moral pressure are its ultimate sanction unless it works with its members to exert stiffer penalties.

**Assessment**  Cyprus is clearly a place where societal-level transparency between the two sides could do some good. Nationalistic chauvinism abounds in the press, schools, government, and elsewhere (see next section for more on this). Myth-filled, one-sided history is promulgated without enough skepticism or question. Any solution will be hard to come by so long as each side believes that it is completely right and just and that the other is completely wrong and threateningly evil. Bicommunal activities are likely a step in the right direction toward de-demonizing each side's views, even though it is hard to judge the effectiveness of these efforts. Other steps such as joint North-South history commissions are discussed later.

**The Press and Schools on Cyprus**  The aim of increasing transparency is to substitute facts for rumors, untruths, and misperceptions. Any story about transparency would be incomplete without some analysis of the principal sources of rumors, untruths, misperceptions on Cyprus. This section assesses two of these sources: the press and the schools. The press and the schools often hinder mutual understanding and so create societal-level opacity.

According to UNFICYP's spokesman Rokoszewski, there are eight or nine daily, two afternoon, and ten weekly newspapers on the Greek side, along with six television and thirty-
seven radio stations. There are six daily and one weekly papers in the North, along with one television and one radio station. Until recently, radio and television broadcasts on both sides were government controlled but the Greek Cypriots began to allow private radio stations in 1990. Most of the newspapers on both sides are affiliated with, controlled by, or otherwise supportive of a single political party. Feissel, the Chief of Mission, noted that because the newspapers are connected to political parties, everyone has a point of view "so they go off the deep end, this way and that."\(^{184}\)

The media market is saturated on Cyprus, especially with respect to print journalism. Imagine having over 25 newspapers for a medium size U.S. city (the population of Cyprus North and South is about that of Indianapolis, suburbs not included). Rokoszewski said that "in an overloaded market, the journalists are hunting for anything," and this helps explain why seemingly small incidents on Cyprus often get blown way out of proportion.\(^{185}\)

An even more significant problem is chauvinism in the press. The press helps perpetuate one-sided and biased views of the Cyprus problem. General Vartiainen, UNFICYP's Force Commander, said that the press in the South was "very militant and aggressive," that it took "every opportunity to hit the North," that he had "told them he doesn't like the way they do their job," that "what they know [about each other] is what is in the newspapers and that is bullshit,"


\(^{185}\) An example is the construction at Roccas Bastion. The press (and everyone else) leapt at this story.
and that without such a press, Cyprus "could have citizen's opinion like in Germany."\textsuperscript{186}

The schools are another significant source of one-sided story telling and bias. According to Mr. Feissel, it was "education that made things bad" on Cyprus. General Vartiainen said that the schools teach the children to view the other side as "beasts."\textsuperscript{187}

During their colonial period, the British divided the schools into separate Greek and Turkish systems and then left the two communities to run the schools as they saw fit. The most important function of the schools became the inculcation of national ideals and the strengthening of ethnic identity... The schools polarized Cypriots in at least two ways. The segregated school systems of the colonial and postindependence period socialized students into Greek and Turkish ethnicity, teaching mainland speech, culture, folklore, and nationalist myths. The texts used in these schools also included ethnic propaganda, often highly chauvinistic, with each community emphasizing its superiority over the other.\textsuperscript{188}

Today, the schools have serious educational programs but the nationalist function continues. Most of the schoolbooks for Cypriots come from Greece or Turkey, especially those having to do with history. Booklets are given to Greek Cypriot primary schoolers with very distorted interpretations of the Turkish invasion. The degree of nationalism and chauvinism was extremely high following the 1974 invasion. This tapered off a slight bit in the late eighties and early nineties, but the new Greek Cypriot Minister of Education is a fan of "Greece, Orthodoxy, and the Nation" and promotes these ideas in the schools.

\textsuperscript{186} He followed up this point by saying he was "optimistic that [the bullshit] is not the opinion of the people."

\textsuperscript{187} Interviews, May 8 and May 7, 1996, respectively.

The schools also play a role in encouraging demonstrations, at least in the South. I spoke to many people who said that the schools rarely or barely punish students who participate in demonstrations and that word of upcoming demonstrations passes quickly and freely through the schools. Apparently, the schools in the South go right up to the line of barely plausible deniability in promoting and sanctioning demonstrations. According to one person I spoke with at length, it is the teachers even more than the texts who are responsible for encouraging nationalism and chauvinism.  

The end result (again, at least in the South where I had much more opportunity for casual conversation with Cypriots) is often a somewhat schizophrenic or dissonant view of the Turkish side. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots often claim that the Turkish Cypriots are their brother Cypriots. After all, they want to re-unify with them. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots often despise the Turkish Cypriots for what they did in 1974 or scorn them as backward or culturally inferior. One man I spoke to claimed to love his fellow Turkish Cypriots, but also claimed that the Greek Cypriots were genetically superior.

It is hard to expect lasting peace in a situation where, as pithily summed up by General Vartiainen, "the Greeks don't remember what happened before 1974 and the Turks can't forget it." The biased, myth-filled views of history, not to mention outright hate-mongering, are an obvious impediment to a common understanding of history. Such a common understanding would involve Greek understanding of and apologies for the threats posed to the Turkish Cypriot

189 Myria Vassiliadou, PhD Candidate, Intercollege, Cyprus.

190 Interview, May 7, 1996.
community from the 1960s until 1974. Likewise, the Turkish side would have to own up to their 
disproportionately large and violent invasion and land-grab (see historical background above).

In the meantime, as one passes the Ledra Palace checkpoints from one side of the island 
to the other, one sees a big sign on the Greek side bemoaning the Turkish invasion and 
sarcastically encouraging visitors to the North to "Enjoy yourself in this land of racial purity and 
true apartheid. Enjoy the sight of our desecrated churches. Enjoy what remains of our looted 
heritage and homes." In the North, there are poster boards with photographs and slogans 
thanking the Turkish "peacekeepers" and noting that there have been no massacres or mass 
graves since 1974. The Greek Cypriots have similar photographs of slaughter, destruction, and 
refugee camps at the 'tourist' observation post they maintain where Lidras Street stops at the 
buffer zone in Nicosia. The photos on the two sides are nearly mirror images of each other. It is 
all very sad.

UNFICYP, and some of the Western embassies, are making efforts to de-demonize each 
side's view of the other. These efforts consist of promoting bicommunal activities as well as 
other humanitarian efforts and they were described in the previous section on humanitarian 
activities. These initiatives can be seen as efforts to increase transparency on a cultural and 
societal level.
Conclusion

This section begins with a short summary of my findings. Then I present a number of tables which parse apart and also summarize these findings. Finally, the policy implications of these findings that are specific to Cyprus are discussed. The more general theoretical and policy implications are described in the dissertation's conclusion.

Findings

UNFICYP has three main functions and they depend in varying degrees on transparency for their effectiveness. First, I estimate that UNFICYP's considerable success in patrolling the buffer zone and keeping small incidents small depends on transparency for about fifteen percent of its effectiveness. Further, UNFICYP's efforts to increase transparency along the buffer zone are often entwined with its efforts to cajole, deter, mediate, and get violators in trouble.

Second, UNFICYP also performs a good deal of crowd control. With rare exceptions, transparency plays little role in crowd control.

Third, UNFICYP sponsors and facilitates many bicomunal activities that bring Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together. As these are designed to build confidence and reduce unwarranted fears by substituting face-to-face experiences for devil-imaging, these depend almost entirely on what I call societal-level transparency for their effectiveness. Unfortunately, it is very hard to determine what effects these activities have had.
With respect to each side's overall assessment of the other's capabilities and intentions, UNFICYP adds very little. Each side knows what forces the other has and neither side trusts the other. However, this does not rule out possible miscalculation, especially as the Greek/Greek Cypriots continue their buildup of advanced weapons.\textsuperscript{191} The buffer zone offers some transparency as it symbolizes each side's continued respect for the status quo. Overall, the transparency that UNFICYP offers is more tactical than strategic. It helps control events along the buffer zone more than it shapes each side's overall threat assessments.

Table 6-2 presents my findings about UNFICYP's overall effectiveness and the role transparency plays in UNFICYP's effectiveness. Table 6-3 presents very rough quantitative estimates of the role that transparency plays in UNFICYP's effectiveness. Table 6-4 then indicates to what extent the main predictions were confirmed by these findings. Tables 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4 break down their assessments by individual UNFICYP incident, violation, or activity in the order presented in the chapter. Table 6-5 aggregates Table 6-4 to present overall findings about the predictions.

\textsuperscript{191} A possibility mentioned by a high ranking UNFICYP official. See my report \textit{UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment} for an argument on why Turkey will be the dominant power on Cyprus for the foreseeable future.
Table 6-2: Assessing UNFICYP and the Role of Transparency in each Type of Incident, Violation, or Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident, Violation, or Activity</th>
<th>Assessment of UNFICYP's Role</th>
<th>Assessment of the Role and Relative Importance of Transparency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP Overall</td>
<td>UNFICYP effectively keeps a wide range of small incidents small. UNFICYP also calms more severe incidents such as killings. Without UNFICYP, the chance of war on Cyprus would increase significantly. However, there are many causes of tension and possible war on Cyprus that are beyond UNFICYP's control or influence.</td>
<td>The provision of transparency is a crucial part of what UNFICYP does to help keep the peace. However, deterrence, cajoling, and mediation are also crucial to UNFICYP -- often more and sometimes less than transparency. These functions are often used in combination with transparency. Thus, the provision of transparency is an important and necessary, but not sufficient, tool in UNFICYP's peacekeeping toolbox. It is possible, but hard to prove, that UNFICYP's general presence on the island helps deter aggression by increasing the probability that the aggressor would be identified. This might be termed the provision of 'macro-transparency.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP's Liaison System (p. 237)</td>
<td>It is UNFICYP's system and it is necessary for UNFICYP to communicate to each side. It also helps each side communicate with each other.</td>
<td>The liaison system is necessary for the provision of transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonism (p. 243)</td>
<td>UNFICYP is frequently - but not always - successful in calming these potentially escalatory incidents. It does so by investigating, cajoling, and deterrence through increased patrolling/presence.</td>
<td>UNFICYP often has to investigate these incidents (H1), but resolving them depends more on cajoling and other efforts than it does on increasing transparency, at least as originally conceived. In many cases though, the effectiveness of the cajoling depends on the facts dug up in the investigations. These facts are thrust in the face of the perpetrators and this helps get them to desist. This effect is the basis of H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis. Here, UNFICYP often plays a key role in straightening out the truth. When liaisoning with both sides is involved, H3 receives some support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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192 To help the reader recall what H1 and so forth refer to:

H1: Regimes Provide Transparency
H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation
H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation/Prevents Backsliding
H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions
H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation
H5: information-based cease and desist hypothesis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overmanning (p. 248)</td>
<td>UNFICYP is usually - but not always - successful in calming these frequent but not too severe incidents. It does so by investigating, cajoling, and deterring through increased patrolling/presence.</td>
<td>UNFICYP often has to investigate these incidents (H1), but resolving them depends more on cajoling and other efforts than it does on increasing transparency. It is harder for violators to lie about overmanning than it is to lie about antagonisms (the extra soldiers are either there or not). Thus, even though these violations have a lot in common with antagonisms, these incidents also do not offer as much support for H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (p. 251)</td>
<td>UNFICYP is frequently - but not always - successful at resolving these incidents. However, if UNFICYP had and could use better records (such as a photographic database of the buffer zone area), it could do an even better job.</td>
<td>In coping with construction incidents, UNFICYP often benefits from its unique ability to conduct investigations in the buffer zone (H1). Without such investigations, it is hard to determine what materials are being used, the extent of the construction, and so forth. The Roccas Bastion incident showed UNFICYP struggling to increase transparency and the inspections did in fact mildly calm the situation (H1, H3). The inspections also helped maintain cooperation in the form of the unrunning agreement (H2'). Other construction incidents offer support for H2' on a tactical level because UNFICYP helped despiral tit-for-tat constructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overflight and Maritime (p. 273)</td>
<td>Other than protests, UNFICYP can do little about these incidents. UNFICYP's protests appear to have little influence over these incidents.</td>
<td>Transparency plays little role in these incidents. UNFICYP could conceivably help demarcate or even patrol the maritime security line (I do not know how well the Turkish buoys do the job), but UNFICYP has little to no resources with which to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting and Weapon (p. 275)</td>
<td>UNFICYP's control of and presence in the buffer zone is a crucial factor in keeping these severe incidents from escalating.</td>
<td>UNFICYP's investigations usually play an important role in figuring out what happened in lethal shooting incidents (H1, almost). The information that UNFICYP generates in these incidents has not so much increased transparency (not benignly anyway), but it has helped the Greek Cypriots understand their own conduct (a combination of H4 and H5). UNFICYP has a decent but not excellent record in determining what happened in other types of shooting incidents. When UNFICYP is successful (H1), H3 and/or H5 receive more direct support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moves Forward/patrol tracks/local agreements (p. 297)</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNIFICYP is usually successful in maintaining control over and authority in the buffer zone. This control is central to its ability to maintain the status quo. The incidents recounted in this section show some glaring problems UNIFICYP has experienced in this area, but these problems should not obscure the fact that UNIFICYP patrols the buffer zone every day and has effectively done so for 23 years.</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNIFICYP's problems discussed in this section show that the 'base truth' is sometimes elusive (see p. 234). Without a base truth, it is by definition hard to increase transparency. It is hard to believe that there are disputes about the exact location of the cease-fire lines, the history of patrol routes and patrol activity, and other seemingly basic elements of the status quo. That said, UNIFICYP's general success in the buffer zone supports H1, H2', H3, and H4.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demonstrations and Crowd Control (p. 308)</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNIFICYP does a reasonably good job controlling most demonstrations. It has a more difficult time with very large demonstrations and motorcycle demonstrations. However, encouragement from schools and the Government of Cyprus for protests, and the passivity of the Cyprus police make UNIFICYP's job harder.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Except for one significant instance, transparency plays little role in handling demonstrations. Further, the U.N. and UNIFICYP repeatedly note the factors making demonstrations violent or difficult to control and these public complaints do little to alter behavior. This undercuts or shows the limits of H5.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Activities (p. 319)</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNIFICYP plays a key role in sponsoring and coordinating a wide array of humanitarian activities. There is clear value in the practical measures such as delivering supplies and performing other services for the Cyprus’ minorities, or helping coordinate Cyprus’ utility grids. Other activities such as bicommmunal events have great intuitive appeal, but their effects are hard to evaluate.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Anything that brings the two communities into contact could and probably does increase transparency. H1, H2, and H3 are probably supported by UNIFICYP’s humanitarian activities. However, it is hard to find concrete evidence of the utility of these activities. They do not resolve crises and their effects are only likely to take hold over a long time.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6-3:
Rough Estimates of the Role of Transparency in each Type of Incident, Violation, or Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity or Problem confronted by UNFICYP (first six are cease-fire violations)</th>
<th>Frequency of Activity or Problem (from Report)</th>
<th>Adjusted Frequency (percent)</th>
<th>Estimated Contribution of Transparency to UNFICYP's Efforts with Respect to each Activity or Problem</th>
<th>Overall Significance (Adj. Freq x Contribution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antagonisms</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25, if inc H5; 10- w/o</td>
<td>7.5 / 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overmanning</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15, if inc H5; 10- w/o</td>
<td>2.25 / 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overflight and Maritime</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of positions (Construction)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shootings (and Weapon incidents)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encroachments (Moves Forward)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25, if inc H5; 10- w/o</td>
<td>5 / 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicommmunal activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80+ (if one accepts notion of societal-level transparency)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall effect of buffer zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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193 n/a means not reported, as explained above.

194 My estimates. This fills in the categories of violations and also adjusts the frequency for those that were reported. Based on my research, I believe the reported statistics under-report antagonism and harassment incidents (because UNFICYP soldiers on the line can often defuse them quickly and informally and thus often do not bother to report them).

195 My estimates. "yy if inc H5; xx- w/o" means that UNFICYP's efforts to diffuse this type of incident depend yy percent on transparency if H5; the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis is included, and xx percent on transparency if H5 is not included. I separate H5 out because H5 is not one of the four main transparency hypotheses and making someone cease and desist is not what is normally thought of as an effect of transparency. However, including H5 helps indicate UNFICYP's overall dependence on the information it can generate and wield.

196 Adjusted frequency x estimated role = indication of transparency's overall significance to UNFICYP. As with previous column, the first number is with H5 and the second is without it.
The next few paragraphs explain how I arrived at these estimates. In a typical year, UNFICYP confronts about 1000 incidents. The only statistics that I have found that attempt to break these down by type of incident are for the first ten months of 1990. During this time, UNFICYP recorded 820 incidents. Twenty-five percent of the incidents were shootings, another twenty percent were encroachments into the buffer zone, and another twenty percent were strengthening of positions near the cease-fire line. The remaining thirty-five percent was not explained in the Report.\footnote{According to the Report of the Secretariat Review Team on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, S/21982, December 7, 1990, paragraph 13.} Table 6-3 uses those statistics as a springboard for making rough estimates of transparency's role in UNFICYP's efforts to keep the peace.

Thus, by my admittedly very rough estimates, UNFICYP's efforts to confront cease-fire violations (traditional peacekeeping) depend about 14.5% on transparency for their effectiveness. When one takes UNFICYP's overall reliance on information into account (conducting investigations in order to get people in trouble and other aspects of H5), the number rises to almost 25%. UNFICYP's efforts to maintain order during demonstrations depend a negligible amount on transparency: 5%. Almost the entire thrust of bicomunal activities is to increase what I term societal-level, so I peg that figure at 80%. Finally, I guesstimate that the buffer zone in and of itself helps keep the peace. A lot of this effect is due to physical distance and the damper that puts on the OPFORs' ability to harass each other. However, I estimate that 30% of the buffer zone peace-promoting effect lies in its ability to help each side know what the other is up to and to reassure each side that the other is roughly content with the status quo.
Table 6-4: How the Main Predictions Fared, Overall and by Incident, Violation, or Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prediction*</th>
<th>Overall, and with respect to each Problem or Activity, Does UNFICYP help promote peace? ¹⁹⁸</th>
<th>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in incident, violation, or activity?</th>
<th>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/ transparency important to adversaries when making peace?</th>
<th>P3: Threat assessments become more benign, tensions and fears reduced?</th>
<th>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP Overall</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (most often in the form of investigating, reporting, and liaisoning)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Somewhat (more tactically than strategically, politically, or societally)</td>
<td>Somewhat (more on a tactical or inadvertent escalation level than strategically)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>A bit</td>
<td>Not really</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-manning</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>A bit</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (in form of H²)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overflight and Maritime</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting and Weapon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>Moderate (H5 as well)</td>
<td>Moderate (H5 as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moves Forward/patrol tracks/local agreements</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (in form of H²')</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations and Crowd Control</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Activities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (by encouraging N/S contact)</td>
<td>No (n/a)</td>
<td>Yes (presumably; but effects are hard to measure)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 6-2 walked through each problem and activity to summarize UNFICYP's overall contribution, this table walk through each problem and activity to summarize how the predictions fared in each sub-section of the chapter. This table provides the basis for the next table which takes a bird's eye view of all the all the subsections and summarizes how the predictions fared overall.

¹⁹⁸ If this is not true, then security regime --> transparency --> peace stands almost no chance of being true.
Table 6-5: How the Predictions Fared Overall, with Comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Predictions</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Comments about findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in case(s)? [A yes supports H1: regimes provide transparency]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>A vast number of incidents involve investigating, reporting, and liaisoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/transparency important to adversaries when making peace? [A yes supports H2: transparency promotes cooperation]</td>
<td>No, but Yes in form of H2.</td>
<td>UNFICYP was imposed on Cyprus, so P2 is not confirmed (because it is irrelevant). However, H2: Transparency Maintains Cooperation/Prevents Backsliding was proposed based on evidence in this chapter. Without the transparency provided by UNFICYP, it seems reasonable to believe that relations between the two sides would be even worse. Hence, H2 is supported. See especially the Roccas Bastion incident in particular and maintenance of the integrity of the buffer zone in general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Threat assessments become more benign, tensions and fears reduced? [A yes supports H3: transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions]</td>
<td>Mixed, but overall somewhat positive.</td>
<td>Yes, in some specific incidents (especially construction). Bicomunal events and other such cooperation may also support H3, but evidence for P3 is hard to come by. Also a Yes with respect to maintenance of the buffer zone. Both sides can basically be assured that the integrity of the buffer zone is not meaningfully threatened. However, the role of transparency in calming other incidents seems modest, minimal, or non-existent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation? [A yes supports H4: transparency reduces miscalculation]</td>
<td>Mixed, but overall negative.</td>
<td>Although UNFICYP calms many incidents and prevents inadvertent escalation, the role of transparency seems modest, minimal, or usually non-existent. Only a clear Yes to the extent that maintenance of the buffer zone prevents miscalculation. Note though that identification of rogues and one's own mistakes, initially part of H4, are now part of H5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hypothesis/Prediction: P5: Rogues identified and provocations averted based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation and preventing increased tension? [A yes supports H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This new hypothesis was created with evidence that arose in the antagonism section and it continued to be strongly supported in the overmanning, construction, shooting, and moves forward sections. H5 depends for its success on the same investigations and monitoring that UNFICYP must do for H1. Indeed, UNFICYP most clearly successful use of information gathered or maintained is H5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the data just summarized, my research in this chapter supports the following conclusions:

1. UNIFCYP effectively helps keep the peace on Cyprus.

2. To keep the peace, UNIFCYP relies on deterrence, leverage, cajoling, mediation, and the provision of transparency.

3. The provision of transparency is a necessary but not sufficient component of UNIFCYP's peacekeeping efforts. Transparency is especially important with respect to the maintenance of the overall integrity of the buffer zone. Both sides know that the buffer zone’s integrity is basically well protected and this has a general calming effect (H2: Transparency Maintains Cooperation/Prevents Backsliding).\(^{199}\) Of course, the buffer zone is also a focal point for tension, but these tensions would only be worse without a buffer zone. Other than this, transparency plays a significant role in some incidents, and a modest or irrelevant role in others.

Transparency is most likely to play a role when there is uncertainty about what is going on. This is most frequent in construction incidents, and is also frequent with respect to the particulars of lethal weapons incidents. Transparency can play a role in antagonism and other incidents. However the information gathered by UNIFCYP when it investigates these incidents is more often used to make the OPFORs cease and desist than it is to provide transparency. Thus, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation receive incident-dependent support, but H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis receives stronger and more sweeping support.

\(^{199}\) For more details on this argument, see especially the sections on the status quo, the liaison system, and moves forward on pp. 233, 237, and 297, respectively.
4. The same activities that UNFICYP uses to increase transparency -- investigations, monitoring, liaisoning -- also provide the information that allows UNFICYP to tell the OPFORs to cease and desist as effectively as it does. The role of information in UNFICYP's activities is more wide-ranging than I thought when I began the project. On the other hand, the role of the provision of transparency is somewhat less important than I thought it would be. This is surprising given the amount of investigating, monitoring, and liaisoning that UNFICYP performs.

5. UNFICYP is effective at keeping small incidents small and this helps keeps the peace by reducing tension and preventing inadvertent escalation. However, this does not help solve the Cyprus problem directly. One area where transparency could help solve the Cyprus problem is by reducing the extent to which one-sided histories are embraced by each side. I believe it is a major impediment to peace that neither side can agree on who did what to whom and why. Thus, they can not recognize the strengths in the other's arguments and the weaknesses in their own. They are not singing from the same fact sheet and this is a situation crying out for more transparency. The bicomunal events and other humanitarian activities a likely a step in the right direction (even though it is hard to measure their effects). However more should be done.

6. UNFICYP does not help each side make threat assessments about the other's strategic or overall warmaking capabilities. Each side knows very well what is going on with respect to the other's capabilities. The recent crisis over the Government of Cyprus' decision to buy anti-aircraft missiles from Russia underscores this point. On an island where small things often become big issues very quickly, changes in capabilities do not go unnoticed for long. Thus, when UNFICYP clarifies issues about capabilities, they are typically addressing such smaller
scale issues as construction along the buffer zone or overmanning of an OP.

Most of UNFICYP's demonstrated ability to calm the intentions side of threat assessments are also on this small, tactical scale. But on a macro-political level, threat assessments on Cyprus are influenced by devil-images of the other side and white-washed images of one's own side. This is a fundamental source of tension and could lead to serious miscalculation as well. UNFICYP does address this intentions side of threat assessment with the bicultural activities and infrastructure coordination that it helps sponsor. See especially the sections on humanitarian activities and the press and schools for more on these points (starting on pages 319, 328, respectively). However, as I mentioned in these sections, it is hard to measure UNFICYP's effectiveness in these areas.

These last two paragraphs help underscore the domains in which UNFICYP promotes and maintains cooperation (H2), reduces unwarranted fears (H3), and reduces miscalculation (H4).

Policy Implications

These implications are drawn from the above findings as well as from the chapter more generally.

1. UNFICYP should recognize more explicitly that one way it helps keep the peace is by increasing transparency. As I said in the introduction, this would be an underwhelming first recommendation were it not for the fact that in a number of my interviews, when I said I was researching whether and how peacekeeping operations increase transparency between adversaries, the person being interviewed assumed I meant that I was investigating whether or
not the operation itself was transparent to others. Whether and how peacekeeping operations increase(d) transparency between adversaries appeared not to cross many practitioner's minds until I explained my topic further. To the extent this observation is true, it means that practitioners are not evaluating their operation's successes or failures along transparency lines as consciously as they should be and that they likely are not doing all they could do to increase transparency.

2. One of the biggest transparency-related problems that UNFICYP faces is that the base truth about the status quo, the cease-fire lines, and the buffer zone is sometimes elusive. Ambiguities about where the cease-fire lines are and who built what when and with what materials not only lead to disputes between the OPFORs and between the OPFORs and UNFICYP, but they also make it harder for UNFICYP to resolve these disputes. Resolving disputes by reducing ambiguities and establishing the base truth is increasing transparency.

Some ideas that might be considered to help establish the base truth and reduce disputes about that which should be almost beyond dispute include:

- local agreements should be against the rules unless signed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and OPFOR counterpart. This would raise their prominence and essentially de-localize them, increase their legitimacy, and make them harder to deny or back out of.

- all agreements related to the location of the cease-fire lines and UNFICYP's authority in the buffer zone should be filed publicly.

- summaries of UNFICYP's patrol activity could be made public and available to each side (with some specifics left out to reduce predictability in UNFICYP's operations).

- UNFICYP could set up a commission that would work with the OPFORs to identify and resolve different interpretations of the cease-fire lines.

- video and photographic records could help establish the location of patrol tracks and that those videos and photographs that do exist could be used to greater effect.
UNFICYP might try to delineate the cease-fire lines more clearly with rocks, barrels, wires, and so forth. They could also note the GPS indicated positions of these markers on the markers themselves and publish what they did in an open record. These measures might deter the OPFORs from trying to move the markers.

A general prescription that follows from this is that all peacekeeping missions whose mandate includes monitoring should create a comprehensive database and record of the status quo and have both sides sign it. This should be provided for in the initial status of forces agreement when both sides are most likely to accept photography or other such intrusions.

There are weaknesses to many of these ideas. UNFICYP lacks the resources to do much construction along the buffer zone or perhaps even to take sufficient photos or videos. The OPFORs are deeply suspicious of photographs and videos and fear intelligence gathering. One could imagine solutions to these and other problems. For example, representatives from each side could accompany the UNFICYP photo/videographers down the buffer zone and what was being recorded could be shown in real time to all. Each side could have a pause button which could shut down recording if the camera strayed at too wide an angle.

The biggest weaknesses inherent in many of these (and many other worthy) ideas are that the OPFORs would have to 1. cooperate for some of these measures, measures which 2. are designed to reduce the number of incidents. It is very hard to get the OPFORs to cooperate and they do not seem inclined to reduce tensions either. The U.N. and UNFICYP have been pushing a number of confidence-building measures for years and the OPFORs always come up with reasons not to accept them. These points highlight what I argued in my theory chapter. Transparency can help sides cooperate, but they have to be wanting to cooperate in the first place for transparency to be of much use.

3. Other problems or incidents go unresolved or are inadequately addressed because of limits to
UNFICYP's ability to investigate and gather facts. Other than a vastly increased force, some technological fixes that could help UNFICYP are:

- Audio triangulators could help UNFICYP figure out where shots came from, how many were fired, and so forth. These have been proposed for and may be in use in U.S. inner cities.

- Remote video/sensor monitoring could leverage UNFICYP's stressed resources.

- UNFICYP's night vision capability could be augmented and upgraded.

These and other imaginable fixes face the same resource and political hurdles discussed above.\(^{200}\) However, if UNFICYP will be around for years to come, these sorts of things would make good investments. One thing this chapter clearly suggests: UNFICYP is effective, it does much more good than harm, and it should stick around as long as is needed.

4. On the level of political and societal transparency, much more could be done if the two sides are willing. I believe that there are three goals to this level of transparency. The first is to commonize each sides' interpretation of history. This would lay the factual basis for mutual understanding and apologies in all directions. The second would be for those on each side to simply view each other as humans (and "not beasts" as General Vartiainen said). A third goal is somewhat more cynical. The "TRNC" pays a large economic price by not cooperating. Increased transparency would show the Turkish side just how high a price they are paying by not being unified with the South. This kind of transparency probably helped end the Cold War; it might

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\(^{200}\) General Vartiainen mentioned that there was no funding for video cameras and that UNFICYP had once unsuccessfully tried to get radars to help monitor big flat areas. He also thought that this sort of sophisticated monitoring was not really necessary as both sides are quick to alert UNFICYP about the other's transgressions. This is a good point but it does not take into account the non-trivial amount of incidents which are closed by UNFICYP due to lack of information and the degree to which each side lies about the other and itself. Interview, May 7, 1996.
work on Cyprus by putting more pressure on the "TRNC" to negotiate. 201

General measures likely suffice to further the latter two goals of helping each side view each other as humans and publicizing the advantages of life in the South. Examples of such general measures are the current range of bicomunal events and the joint infrastructure activities. These measures provide specific benefits such as jazz concerts and water, but their transparency benefits are more diffuse and hard to measure. That said, they are intuitively appealing and more is probably better.

More focused measures must be designed to lead each side to a common history. I offer two ideas for establishing a common history. The first is to set up a joint history commission of primarily Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars and have them write what would become a definitive primarily political history of Cyprus. They could be helped by a team of U.N. and outside experts. The commission might do well to include mainland Greek and Turkish, and perhaps British scholars as well, although the Cypriots would remain in charge. The U.N. and outside experts would be most useful at the start in setting up the agenda and figuring out exactly what topics should be covered in which order. Once a detailed outline for the study had been drawn up, each side could write its own history, following the outline as closely as possible.

201 Although political solutions to the Cyprus problem are not the central focus of this chapter, the U.N. frequently casts greater blame on the Turkish side for blocking negotiations. The Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, May 30 1994, S/1994/629, page 17 notes that "For the Present, the Security Council find itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side. While it can be understood that the Turkish Cypriot community has sometimes felt that its unhappy experience in the years before 1974 justified its unhonorable approach on key aspects of the proposed bizonal and bicomunal federation, I find it difficult to understand why similar reluctance should have affected the Turkish Cypriot leadership's approach to a set of eminently reasonable and fair proposals [confidence-building measures] that would bring substantial and tangible benefits to its community without in any way compromising its security or its basic political positions." This report, which is much longer and more detailed than usual, goes on to say that the confidence-building measures alone would raise the Turkish Cypriot GDP by 20%.
When the resulting tomes were compared, it would reveal in detail the differences between the sides and where more research needed to be done. At this point, the hard work of ironing out the differences would really begin. Here again the U.N. and outside experts could be of assistance, but only up to a point. The project would lose some of its legitimacy and its purpose would be vitiated if the Cypriots were forced to accept one interpretation over another. That said, the outside experts could help separate fact from assertion, help conduct more research, help establish what the facts really were, and hopefully minimize the extent to which interpretations were necessary.

The second idea would be to set up a truth commission of primarily outside experts to write the history. This would have the advantage of overcoming what could well be gridlock if the project were left in the hands of Cypriots. However, if the conditions are there for gridlock in the first place, then it is also likely that the results of the truth commission's study would be disputed. Perhaps the joint history commission and the truth commission could operate simultaneously. They could submit their works together and begin the ironing out process described above. In general though, the truth commission is a distant second best idea.

Of course there are objections to these projects as well. Perhaps they would just crystallize differences. Perhaps the cooperation needed to resolve differences in interpretation is of such magnitude that the projects (especially the joint history commission) could only be completed if the Cyprus problem was close to being resolved in the first place. Mr. Feissel, the Chief of Mission when I was there, objected to the idea of a truth commission, especially in reference to the missing persons. He said "what is truth anyway? ... 1500 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots are dead, and most of the 1500 were soldiers ... Nothing can really be
justified. How do you solve this thing? By dragging out the past? You shouldn't divide the fault 60:40 or 70:30. Instead, the two sides should cry together.\textsuperscript{202}

I agree that the two sides should cry together. They have caused each other much pain. However, how do you get each side to accept that fact? At present, both sides are too filled with one-sided, biased history to do so. The blame for the pain is divided 100:0 and 0:100. The prospect of joint crying seems further away than the prospect of ironing out differences in historical interpretation. Cyprus is a tragic island and there is a lot to cry about. I believe establishing a common history would help exorcize the tragedy and promote peace.

\textsuperscript{202} Interview, May 8, 1996.
Chapter 7: UNDOF, Traditional Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights

This case study of UNDOF allows me to probe the effects of transparency when the U.N. is involved in negotiations about and then administers fairly elaborate confidence-building measures. These confidence-building measures are the Areas of Separation and Limitation (AOS/AOLs) on the Golan Heights that divide the Israelis and Syrians. Israeli and Syrian forces are physically separated by the AOS and their numbers and types of weapons are circumscribed in the AOLs. Adherence to these limits is verified by UNDOF.

This chapter answers two sets of questions: First, was UNDOF put into place because verification was needed to help seal the cease-fire agreement? This question bears on H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. Second, what does UNDOF monitor and verify and how well does it do so? What incidents does UNDOF confront and how does it deal with them? These questions bear on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation (as well as H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis). Answering these questions will shed light on transparency and security regimes, but will also help assess the oft-heard claim

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1 Thanks to the gracious hospitality of UNDOF, UNTSO, and their host countries, I was able to spend about ten days in Syria and Israel visiting U.N. offices in Jerusalem, Damascus, and Tiberias as well as Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani in the Golan Heights, and positions 10, 71, 16, 60, 52, and 55 (in North - South order). These positions (and the driving to get to them) cover the entire length of the AOS, except for the heights of Mt. Hermon. See map 7-2, p. 370. I saw Quneitra as well.
that UNDOF is a model peacekeeping operation.²

HOW PEACE ON THE GOLAN MAKES THE MEASUREMENT OF TRANSPARENCY DIFFICULT UNDOF is very successful if success can be measured by the tranquility of the Golan Heights since 1974 when UNDOF was established. However, it is this very success that makes it difficult to measure UNDOF's effectiveness. Since it was established, there have been very few serious incidents in UNDOF's area of responsibility (AOR). Several UNDOF soldiers were killed by mines in the 1970s, a U.N. aircraft was downed by an anti-aircraft missile over Syria in 1974, killing nine, two shepherds were killed in 1975, a number of livestock have been killed at different times (by mines and the Israeli Defense Forces), and there have been shooting incidents between Syrian authorities and smugglers.³ Basically, things have been quiet for the last twenty-two years.

According to many people I interviewed, incidents with shepherds or their flock coming too close to the Israeli lines constitute ninety-nine percent of the incidents that UNDOF faces. The Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force are normally very thin, are very repetitive from one six month period to the next, and usually offer very little news or new information. The November 1995 Report said that "During the period under review, the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained without incident and the

² See for example, UNDOF's The Golan Journal, No. 65, March-April 1996, p. 4 and James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, pp. 333-334. I also heard this claim many times in my interviews. Just for the record, Syria objects to the term peacekeeping because they view the Golan Heights as their land. As the Syrians do not want to admit to having lost any land, UNDOF is an observer force overseeing a cease-fire, not a peacekeeping force overseeing a peace agreement. Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, pp. 131-132. This is one of the most instructive books on peacekeeping that I have seen.

area of operation of UNDOF remained calm.\textsuperscript{4}

As argued in the theory chapter, one of the best ways to see transparency in action is to examine how crises evolve and to see if information provided or generated by the security regime played a part in the crises' turning points. The calm on the Golan Heights deprives me of crisis-based measurement points and makes it hard to evaluate UNDOF's effectiveness. There are virtually no crises on the Golan. Compared to other chapters, this means that assessment of the role of transparency on the Golan must depend to a greater degree on analysts' post-hoc assessments and on deductive and counterfactual argumentation.

Of course, the absence of crises could mean that UNDOF is exceptionally effective in promoting peace. UNDOF's effectiveness could be due to three possible things, alone or in combination. First, it could be due to UNDOF's monitoring of the Areas of Separation and Limitation and the transparency thus provided. Second, it could be due to the physical distance created by these buffer zones — a combination of transparency and tilting the offense/defense balance towards the defense. Or, third, it could be due to UNDOF's ability to deter Syria and Israel. The third is largely absurd and the role of the first two factors is explored later. The first two factors contribute a bit to peace on the Golan. However, I, along with most analysts, credit the bulk of the calm to the cooperation and peaceful disposition of Syria and Israel.

UNDOF is a mission that enjoys a very high level of consent and this consent explains most of its effectiveness. From the start, this means that transparency does not play a large role

\textsuperscript{4} S/1995/952, November 17, 1995, p. 1, emphasis added. Other reports are not quite so unequivocal, but almost all stand in marked contrast with those of UNFICYP, quoted often above.
in UNDOF's effectiveness.5 That said, several analysts argue (and it is certainly reasonable to assume) that tensions would be higher if the two sides lacked outside monitoring of their disengagement and if Syrian and Israeli forces ended up abutting each other. Furthermore, UNDOF was demonstrably helpful in the cease-fire negotiations. Having discussed how peace and calm make assessing UNDOF's effectiveness difficult, I will now describe how UNDOF came into being, what it does, and answer the questions I posed above.

Assessing the Role of UNDOF and Transparency in the Syria - Israel Disengagement Agreements

In the Spring of 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger negotiated a disengagement between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, bringing an end to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.6 The settlement included the creation of UNDOF. UNDOF was supposed to monitor the phased disengagement of forces and withdrawal from the lines of confrontation, observe the cease-fire, and conduct inspections throughout the AOS and AOLs to

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5 Consent means that the highest levels of the respective governments have signed on to UNDOF and also do not want war with the other side. To learn if and how UNDOF influences these decision makers, one would have to interview President Assad of Syria and his most respected generals and similar actors on the Israeli side. I was not able to do this. My attempts at establishing contacts on the Israeli side were thwarted by their presidential election (Netanyahu was elected when I was there) and I did not try on the Syrian side for other reasons. It is possible that UNDOF has a large role in maintaining consent and peace and that the transparency UNDOF provides in turn plays an influential role in its effectiveness. The problem is that it is exceptionally hard to evaluate UNDOF's effectiveness and most outside accounts of its effectiveness credit consent for the success, without taking the next step and figuring out exactly upon what that consent rests. Perhaps UNDOF is increasing transparency, calming tensions, and reducing miscalculation. We'll never know until the highest level authorities and officers and soldiers on the line on each side are interviewed about these issues.

6 Technically, there had been a cease-fire in the Golan since October 25, 1973. The intensity of the fighting calmed markedly but there were still a number of artillery duels in the months that followed.
make sure the terms of the cease-fire and disengagement were being respected.\(^7\)

This means that UNDOF's creation could offer significant confirmation for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. If either side, or better both sides, needed an UNDOF to be assured of compliance with the cease-fire before they would be willing to sign it, then H2 would be supported. However, from what I can tell, H2 and the other transparency hypotheses only receive modest confirmation in this case. UNDOF's creation was important in helping bring about a cease-fire, but not primarily because of the transparency it could and would provide. Instead, UNDOF helped Israel and Syria accept compromises that would otherwise be too distasteful to swallow. They could give up land to UNDOF that they could not give up to each other. In addition, each side negotiated, made concessions, and reached agreement because the agreement was in their self-interest and because of U.S. pressure. I will now provide the evidence that makes this argument about the role and relative importance of H2.

On October 25, a U.N. force was created to help bring peace to the Sinai front of the October War.\(^8\) This provided something of a model for calming the situation on the Golan Heights, where Syria and Israel were still in conflict. In addition, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had been observing a buffer zone in the Golan since the 1967 war. From the start then, the idea for a U.N. force on the Golan may have been in the air. However, it appears that Syria's first proposal for a disengagement on January 20, 1974 did not

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mention the U.N. or a buffer zone. On the other hand, when the Israelis tendered a counteroffer on February 27, their idea was modeled on the Egypt-Israel accord and included a U.N.-monitored AOS and AOLs.

At this point, both sides had proposed forward lines that the other was not prepared to accept. Indeed, Kissinger thought that the distance between the two proposals was so great that he did not communicate all the details of each plan to each side for fear that the agitation this would provoke might be enough to break off the negotiations. Even though Israel made some concessions on its original position by March 29, Kissinger continued to filter the information given to each side: "My usual report to all interested parties -- a procedure designed to minimize the dangers of suspicions fed by rumors -- would be pretty skimpy this time."

In principle, it is clear that Kissinger believed these reports' effectiveness in calming rumors (implicitly, of course) were premised on H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and to some degree H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. As Kissinger said in discussing the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement: "In mediation I almost invariably transmitted any proposal about which either side felt strongly, thus reassuring the parties that their viewpoint would receive a fair hearing." However, in reality, Kissinger knows it is sometimes best not to blindly increase transparency and tell all. For example, Kissinger

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revealed "no" aspects of Israel's original February 27 plan to Syria.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Kissinger, the Syrians had embraced a U.N. buffer zone and AOLs by April 13.\textsuperscript{13} But mutual embrace of these U.N. confidence-building measures did not break the deadlock. Exacerbated by the fact that each side was governed by relatively weak leaders or coalitions who could barely withstand the image of giving into the other side, there were serious and difficult disputes that hindered the disengagement agreement. The two sides debated the disposition of a hotly contested town in the Golan called Quneitra, Palestinian terrorism, and prisoner of war issues. In general:

From Kissinger's point of view, the negotiations took the form of an endless series of haggles, and central to every exchange was the question of the Golan. Each village and field, every ridge line and watercourse, was contested step by step; such was the significance of this watershed between the two nations.\textsuperscript{14}

There were also disputes about what type of U.N. force would be put into place. The Syrians wanted a small unarmed observer group that would not stand out amidst the 20,000 or Syrian civilians that would return to the Golan. These civilians would likely think Syria gained more (or lost less) in the negotiations if the observer group was small. A small group would appear less threatening to the sovereignty Syria claimed on the Golan. On the other hand, Israel

\textsuperscript{12} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, p. 814 (first quote); pp. 965-966 (second quote), emphasis in original. I noted this finesse and nuance in manipulating information at several points in the UNFICYP chapter when UNFICYP personnel withheld telling everything to the OPFORs.

\textsuperscript{13} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, p. 1044. It is possible my time line is not accurate. None of the accounts cited in this chapter explicitly examine the role of UNDOF in the negotiations. For example, UNDOF could have appeared earlier in Syria's proposals and simply not been mentioned by Kissinger or the other scholars.

\textsuperscript{14} Mackinlay, \textit{The Peacekeepers}, pp. 126-127. Mackinlay notes that even when the two sides went to Geneva to cut the final cease-fire deal, they would not sit at the same table or partake in ritual handshakes and photographs. This is reminiscent of the protocol difficulties remarked on in chapter 4.
wanted as large a force as possible and proposed an armed force of up to 3000 U.N. troops. At a minimum, Israel was hoping to reify to the extent possible any gains it kept on the Golan. However, Aronson says that the Israelis wanted a large U.N. force so that it could actually help deter Syria and so that it could do its monitoring effectively.

If Aronson's interpretation is correct, then the second half of Israel's argument about the need for effective monitoring is transparency-related and it supports H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation (at least from the Israeli perspective) and reflects hope that this transparency will reduce fears and/or miscalculation (H3 and/or H4). Monitoring may also deter the Syrians from trying anything in the first place.

However, by May 31, 1974 these various disputes had been sufficiently resolved for a cease-fire and disengagement agreement to be signed. I'll explain the features of the agreement when I describe UNDOF's composition and mandate, but for now I want to continue assessing the role of UNDOF and the promise of transparency in reaching these agreements.

In most of the cited accounts, there is surprisingly scant indication of why each side wanted UNDOF or what benefits they really thought it would bring. Reich offers the most

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16 Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East, p. 242. Aronson also says that the Israelis wanted between 3000-5000 U.N. troops.

17 While at first blush, this alone may be some indication of UNDOF's importance, there is little conclusive evidence about any factor that may have influenced the course of negotiations. We do not really know what caused turning points or what caused each side to compromise. We may never know. Could the leader of either side really be expected to say: 'The U.S. twisted my arm enough and I cried uncle' or 'the U.N.'s is going to protect me, so I'll sign.' I doubt it.
detail on UNDOF's strategic and transparency-related significance (see also Aronson's interpretation above). He says that Israel's generals and strategic planners thought the new lines of defense were as good as the previous, pre-1973 War lines and that the buffer zone and AOLs "would act as additional inhibiting factors (albeit minor ones) to the outbreak of hostilities." In addition, Reich says that the disengagement agreements, which established UNDOF and specified the exact mechanics of disengagement:

significantly diminished the prospects for war by reducing the tension resulting from the unstable postwar troop movements, while setting in motion a possible movement toward further negotiations for a settlement...The general feeling was that the consummation of the two technical agreements improved the prospects for a broader settlement involving the political concepts and attitudes of the parties involved.¹⁸

It certainly seems likely that UNDOF's establishment helped each side make peace and that the provision of transparency played a role. If UNDOF helped reduce tension during what would have otherwise been unmonitored troop movements, this certainly supports H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. The promise of these benefits would in turn support H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation.¹⁹

¹⁸ Quest for Peace, pp. 267-268.

¹⁹ Lt. General Siilasvuoh (Finland), Chairman of the U.N. Military Working Group that determined the technical aspects of UNDOF's deployment, seems to disagree with even conditional support for this interpretation. However, I discount his view because he is measuring UNDOF against the yardstick of a final peace agreement, not against the successful disengagement agreement. His statement that follows even reveals that both sides did in fact rely on UNDOF's ability to verify, even if it was verifying what in his view was nitpicking. He says: "In everything on could see the deep distrust between the parties and the illusion that security would increase if only the limitations were defined in great detail and UNDOF had the task of verifying them. It was hard for me to understand such endless distrust and I could hardly bear the continual hair-splitting. A detailed scheme of limitations would not resolve the situation on the Golan or ensure the success of UNDOF. Only increasing trust between Israel and Syria would calm the tension, while UNDOF would succeed only if the parties had the political will, based on mutual interests, to maintain the peace," In the (continued...)
COMPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS

While my transparency hypotheses appear to receive some support, three other factors also contributed to the eventual success of the negotiations and thus vitiate the support for the transparency hypotheses. First, it is clear that the U.S. used significant leverage to make these negotiations succeed. Kissinger put a large amount of personal and U.S. prestige on the line with his exhaustive shuttle diplomacy. In addition, the U.S. combined carrots and sticks by threatening to reassess its relationship with Israel if it did not make reasonable compromises, while hoping to curry compromise by waiving $1 billion out of $2.2 billion that Israel owed the U.S. for arms purchases. President Nixon was prepared to make even larger adjustments in aid to help get both sides to make concessions.\(^2\) Saadia Touval describes several other ways that Kissinger and Nixon applied pressure on the two sides including threats of public embarrassment if Israel blocked an accord and subsequent loss of the U.S. public's support as well as U.S. threats to suspend the negotiations after having promised Quneitra to Syria (thus giving Syria real reason to want to continue the negotiations and make concessions).\(^3\)

Second, the disengagement agreement had benefits for both sides, independent of

\(^1\) (...continued)

_Service of Peace_, p. 265. Considering that Siilasvuo considered it a "miracle" that the Syrians even showed up to negotiate in Geneva (p. 265), nitpicking and UNDOF verification appear to have been helpful in achieving the possible -- a disengagement. Both nitpicking and verification increase transparency. In the end, I believe Siilasvuo's words bolster my interpretation of events and the limited support these events give to the transparency hypotheses.


UNDOF's inclusion in the agreement. The agreement pushed Israel back from the 1973 war's Saassa salient, only twenty-five miles from Damascus. Syria also gained back some of the land it had lost in 1967, especially Quneitra. For Syria, regaining Quneitra appears to have been a key bargaining position. According to one scholar, the turning point in the disengagement negotiation was when Israel agreed to cede Quneitra and let it become part of the Syrian administered U.N. demilitarized zone (this happened on May 16, with Syria accepting on May 18). This concession also allowed Syria to paint the agreement as a success and a step towards further concessions. For Israel, the agreement put an end to a costly war while it still retained very good positions in the Golan. Finally, the U.S. made various security guarantees to each side that reduced the risks of the agreement. This included supporting Israel's right to retaliate for any terrorism staged from Syrian territory against Israel and U.S. promises to Syria that Israel would place no heavy weapons on the hills surrounding Quneitra.

Third, UNDOF's most important role in the negotiations may be of a more cynical nature than the strategic and transparency-related arguments described above. UNDOF's areas of responsibility were adjusted several times in the course of negotiations and I argue that both sides were able to make territorial concessions to UNDOF which they could not make to each other. They could allow UNDOF to control/patrol land (i.e. have the land become part of the AOS or AOLs) that they could not give to the other side. Kissinger makes this point at several

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22 Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East, p. 242. See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1079-1089.

23 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1079-1110 and Reich, Quest for Peace, pp. 266-267.

junctures. On page 1047 of *Years of Upheaval*, Kissinger says:

Having let [his aid] Shihabi agree to a UN buffer zone, Asad now informed me it was unnecessary to have zones of limited armaments as well -- to which Shihabi had also agreed. But it was inconceivable that Israel would tolerate having the main force of the Syrian army follow it into territories evacuated as a result of the agreement. I was thus faced with two conditions certain to blow up the negotiations: If Israel maintained its view about the location of the line of separation, the negotiation would collapse in Damascus. If Asad insisted on his second thought about zones of limited armaments, the shuttle would come to a halt in Jerusalem.

In the end, Israel did agree to move the line of separation, but it could only do so because Syria agreed to have AOLs. UNDOF's AOS and AOLs meant that Syrian troops would not follow Israel's withdrawal and occupy all the territory Israel gave up. UNDOF's impending existence seems to have facilitated compromise.\(^{25}\) While this is not smoking-gun evidence that each side made compromises to UNDOF that they could not to each other, there is clear evidence that this effect worked in these negotiations. The whole point of Kissinger's use of the "United States Proposal" was that each side could seem to be agreeing with the U.S., and not with each other.\(^ {26}\) In addition, the reason Kissinger had to engage in shuttle diplomacy in the first place is because the two sides refused to talk face-to-face. The negotiation itself necessitated a third party.\(^ {27}\)

\(^{25}\) In political science terms, UNDOF provided a figleaf that enlarged each side's win-set while reducing apparent losses. A pretty neat trick when there is haggling over each meter -- an apparent zero-sum game if there ever was one.

\(^{26}\) In *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1079-1099. The obviousness of the purpose this proposal is shown by Kissinger putting the term in quotes to help indicate that it is being used as a figleaf term to help the negotiations. A "United States Proposal" was also used in the Sinai negotiations.

\(^{27}\) One area for further transparency research is the role of third party mediators. In contrast with the Concert which was a passive forum, third party mediators can be seen as 'active forums' which make sure information is exchanged. While not a one-man security regime, Kissinger and his shuttle diplomacy can be viewed as an active forum whose effectiveness was due in part to the provision of transparency.
As I just said above, the Quneitra issue was central in the disengagement negotiations and resolving it was the main turning point. Discussion of UNDOF's role was an integral part of the Quneitra negotiations that preceded the turning point. For example, on May 2, Israel's Moshe Dayan formulated a proposal in which "the Israeli line of separation be pulled West a bit (by broadening the UN buffer zone) so that the eastern part of Quneitra could be given to Syria." On May 14, Assad counter-proposed "to divide the hills west of Quneitra between Israel (on the Western slopes) and Syria (on the Eastern slopes), with the ridge under UN control." These proposals underscore the importance of the U.N.'s lines and the placement of the buffer zone in the negotiations over Quneitra.

The evidence about this third point shows that when each side considered compromises in the Golan and in particular around Quneitra, they considered UNDOF's future lines and zones of control. Further, it is clear that contrivances were necessary to help each side compromise and even negotiate. Thus, I argue that UNDOF's AOS and AOL lines facilitated compromise because, when they were manipulated, each side could appear to be making way for something other than its enemy's border. This does not mean that the positions of the lines were not taken seriously, just that having UNDOF lines to negotiate over made moving the lines seem like less of a zero-sum game.

In conclusion, there is some evidence that the strategic and transparency benefits of UNDOF's creation encouraged the successful disengagement negotiations. This supports H2:

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28 Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East, p. 242.

29 First quote, Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1057; second, p. 1075, emphasis in the original. See also p. 1090.
Transparency Promotes Cooperation in particular. However, the negotiations were also successful because of U.S. leverage and because the agreements were mutually beneficial. The strategic and transparency benefits may have helped make the agreements mutually beneficial; these factors are not mutually exclusive. Finally, there is clear evidence that the promise of UNDOF and the existence of the AOS and AOLs helped the two sides negotiate by allowing for compromises and adjustments they could not make without the AOS and AOLs. Thus, while H2, as well as H1, H3, and H4, all receive some support in the story of UNDOF’s creation, this support is considerably tempered by the existence of powerful complementary explanations for the outcome.

*UNDOF's Mandate and Operations*

UNDOF's creation and mandate was an integral part of the May 31, 1974 separation of forces agreement and protocol between Israel and Syria. UNDOF's strength was set at 1250 troops, a compromise size, and its name, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, also combined elements of Israeli and Syrian demands (see above).\(^{30}\) UNDOF was tasked to maintain and observe the cease-fire and to supervise and inspect the AOS and AOLs. The exact details of the disengagement and specific limitations in the AOLs were worked out by the U.N. Military Working Group and signed on June 5 in Geneva.

\(^{30}\) UNDOF was supplemented by 90 observers from UNTSO. While I go into some of the details of the operational and organizational relationship between UNDOF and UNTSO, the reader can refer to the subsequent cites in this chapter for more information on this rather baroque arrangement.
No Syrian or Israeli armed forces were allowed in the 80 kilometer long and 15 km to 300m wide AOS (buffer zone). However, Syrian civilians were permitted to return to towns and land in the AOS and AOLs, and Syrian police were allowed to help provide law and order in this Syrian administered area. Three layers of AOLs were established on each side. In the AOLs closest to the AOS, two brigades' worth of armed forces were allowed on each side, with specific limits set on tank (75), short range 122mm or less artillery (36), and 6000 total troops. In the middle AOLs, 162 artillery pieces were allowed with a maximum range of 20 kilometers, 450 tanks were allowed, and there were no limits on personnel. Finally, from the AOS to the outer AOL, no surface to air missiles were allowed.\(^3\) Map 7-1 below depicts the AOS/AOLs and summarizes this agreement.

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Map 7-1, The AOS and AOLs of the Disengagement Agreement on the Golan Heights

From Mackinlay, Peacekeepers, p. 129
From June 14 to June 27, 1974, UNDOF monitored and verified the phased withdrawal that took the forces on each side down to the specified levels in the AOS and AOLs. The disengagement was successful and peaceful. Siilasvuo notes no problems, save for a mine accident that killed four Austrian peacekeepers.33

After overseeing the initial disengagement, UNDOF then turned to delineating the AOS and AOLs. This is part of what I call establishing the base truth, and its general importance is summed up in the phrase 'good fences makes good neighbors.' More concretely and as seen in the last chapter, uncertainty about the base truth can lead to disputes and hinders the ability of a peacekeeping operation to provide transparency (pp. 234, 299). UNDOF had some difficulties measuring and marking the lines for the AOS, in part because there were no map experts among the U.N.'s military observers (Siilasvuo hoped that, in the future, professional surveyors could do the job). Fortunately, the ambiguities only led to minor disputes -- even though some of these disputes are ongoing. This contrasts with Cyprus, where the exact same difficulties led to various more severe incidents and continued disputes in and along the buffer zone.34 Even


Unfortunately, according to Mackinlay, there is no official record of how UNDOF contributed on the ground to the success of the disengagement and Siilasvuo's account -- the next most likely source -- says little about the operation as well (as do the others). One can imagine that this was a time when UNDOF's ability to provide transparency could have been quite important to calming tensions and preventing miscalculation (H3 and H4). The calm success of the disengagement could indicate UNDOF's success or show that it was unnecessary.

34 Currently, UNDOF is trying to fix these problems with what are called 'pinpointing operations' in conjunction with UN Military Observers (UNMOs) from UNTSO. They are re-measuring the lines and trying to put the numbered barrels that mark these lines precisely where they should be. The barrels are often moved or removed by locals. This is not too serious because UNDOF photographs the locations of the barrels.

(continued...)
though the Golan Heights is calmer, cease-fire lines created in the summer of 1974 appear to be of poor vintage. They lack clarity and, despite aging for many years, their initial bitterness lingers.

**Monitoring and Verification**

To monitor the AOS and verify the absence of troops within it (the heart of H1: Regimes Provide Transparency), UNDOF staffs some 30 permanent positions and 17 other observation posts. These armed observer forces are supplemented by unarmed UNTSO observers who permanently staff 11 OPs along the AOS lines.\(^{35}\) UNDOF forces also conduct foot and vehicular patrols in the AOS. Map 7-2 shows how these forces are deployed, as well as some of the patrol

\(^{34}\)...continued

A good accounting of the story of the lines is in Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 137. However, for base truth buffs, I will summarize the story and add details [in brackets]. Mackinlay notes that the Military Working Group (MWG) in Geneva had only been able to negotiate the boundary lines down to 100 meters [at best, most likely] and that every terrain feature on the Golan was bitterly fought over in the war and in Geneva. To finalize the exact locations and lines agreed on in the negotiation, the MWG worked with 4\(^{1}\) 1:100,000 maps and thick [pencils]. The lines subtended several hundred [at least 300] meters [to this point the similarities with UNFICYP's 1974 map problems are astounding, p. 236]. The four maps were from different series or editions, so they did not align well [and their inaccuracies made them inadequate for field use]. Later, [on 6/9/74], the Israelis provided [1:50,000] maps with their own version of the AOS lines marked. [These were perused and signed by non-specialized UNDOF staff], but rejected by the Syrians. [On 7/20/74, an American DMATL 1:50,000 map was provided and this was agreed to by the Syrians. It is now the official UNDOF map and is regarded by the Israelis as accurate. That said, the Israeli defense forces do not recognize the UNDOF map and vice-versa and this has led to a number of compromises over the years.]

My information is primarily from UNDOF's SOPs, dated January 1994, January 1995 copy, p. 3-10. Also, interviews with UNDOF personnel on May 22, 1996, a briefing by UNTSO Captain Richard Deschambault (Canada), Military Public Information Officer (MPIO), May 20, 1996, and a briefing by UNTSO Captain Sander Luijten, (Netherlands), May 20, 1996.

\(^{35}\) United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 76-78; United Truce Supervision Organization, "UNTSO," (a brochure). UNDOF now numbers a bit over 1000, with Austrian, Polish, and as well as Canadian forces providing the bulk of the forces. Japan contributes 45 soldiers, which for them marks a significant foray into peacekeeping. UNTSO observers number around 80-90. These are all officers, and because each of the eleven UNTSO OPs is supposed to be staffed by two officers from different countries, the force is made up of 20+ nationalities (mostly Europeans, though). UNDOF costed $36 million in 1996.
routes. The triangles are UNTSO OPs and the circles are UNDOF positions.

36 United Nations, Blue Helmets, 3 ed., p. 79.
Map 7-2, UNDOF and UNTSO Positions

UNDOF deployment as of November 1995

[Map showing UNDOF deployment in November 1995]
To verify the AOLs, UNDOF, using UNTSO observers, conducts biweekly inspections of at least 500 Syrian and Israeli positions. The U.N. observers are accompanied by liaison officers from whichever side they are inspecting. According to UNDOF's SOPs, inspectors are not supposed to physically count the troops at each base in the first 10 kilometer AOL. Instead, they are supposed to ask for a head-count from the local commander. In the first and second 10 kilometer zones, tanks are supposed to be counted by the inspectors, and they are supposed to distinguish between combat tanks, fixed tanks, and support tanks. APCs are ignored. Artillery pieces are counted, and these are to be distinguished by range or caliber. MLRS systems count as one artillery piece. In all zones, surface to air missiles are automatic violations to be reported. Inspectors are not allowed to be intrusive during inspections.  

After inspections, UNDOF reports the results to both sides. To the violators, it gives fairly specific information: the exact type and number of the offending weapon(s)/personnel and their location down to 1000 yards. The other side receives more general information about the category of the violation (although UNDOF can apparently threaten to release more specific information if the violator does not comply with the agreed limits). As one can tell from the dry Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, even if reports of violations are made public, the identity of the side that was the violator is never released. This shaded reporting system is wise and recalls my already numerous points about how transparency can not be pursued blindly or without nuance.

To the very large degree that the agreed-upon limits are generally observed and

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37 UNDOF SOPs, p. 3-37.
inspections go on unhindered, the AOS and AOLs should greatly increase transparency. However, there are five problems with the inspection system, the first three of which are built into the SOPs for the inspections.

First, the inspectors have to trust the troop figures that the local commanders give them. Second, hidden weapons are very hard to count. Third, I heard from several sources that the Israelis in particular take advantage of the biweekly inspection schedule to move weapons up for exercises and then move them back to avoid the inspections. Fourth, both sides routinely deny the inspectors some freedom of movement in the AOLs and access to areas that should be inspected (the intelligence gathering stations, in particular). This difficulty is just as routinely reported in the Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. In denying access, the physical limits of H1: Regimes Provide Transparency are evident. Ironically though, the two sides are protecting their own intelligence gathering facilities. Fifth, both sides commit 'permanent violations,' which again include the early warning and surveillance posts.

There are several problems with the monitoring/OP system as well. Although UNDOF's buffer zone is shorter than UNFICYP's (80 vs. 180 kilometers), there are still not enough troops or technology to provide round-the-clock, all weather, very high confidence monitoring. Several things bear this out. According to UNDOF's Force Commander, Major-General Johannes C. Kosters, the night vision equipment is inadequate. In his 1989 book, Mackinlay wrote that there was no night vision equipment at all. Even if they were better equipped, the OPs are not

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38 Interview, May 21, 1996. Major R. H. Chase (U.S. Marines), said that the AN/PVS-5/7s which were available have limited depth perception. Draft document and conversation, May 30, 1996.
sufficiently staffed to provide complete surveillance. This is in particular true of the two officers in the UNTSO OPs who can scarcely be expected (and they are not) to maintain a constant watch. I've heard that at night and/or in the fog, smugglers often come quite close to UNDOF/UNTSO OPs (as they must because of the OPs' locations and/or the locations of mine fields). However, Mackinlay also wrote of 'reports' that neither side wants to see the surveillance equipment of UNDOF updated. This would seem to downgrade the stock they place in UNDOF's provision of transparency.³⁹

These problems are not as severe as appearances suggest. First, both sides generally keep so far below the agreed limits that there is virtually no question about compliance. Typical personnel counts are about 2000, where 6000 are permitted. Equipment is generally at 40-60% of allowed levels.⁴⁰ Second, one would predict that if either side thought the other was committing a violation, then they would report it to UNDOF and request a special inspection. However, this almost never happens. According Major-General Kosters, in the one and a half years he had led UNDOF, there had not been a single request for a special inspection and this was because both sides trusted that UNDOF was doing its work. "They never argue our verification."⁴¹

³⁹ The Peacekeepers, pp. 141 and 151.

⁴⁰ Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996.

⁴¹ Interview, May 21, 1996. I had a tough time evoking any stories at any level of UNDOF or UNTSO about problems on the Golan serious enough for either side to call on UNDOF to go fix or investigate things (quite a contrast with Cyprus where UNFICYP is called on to fix things on a daily basis). Still, at lower levels of authority, some stories emerged about one side or the other needing to call on UNDOF to help solve a problem. One UNDOF company commander thought that perhaps one or two times a month one side would complain about some suspected military problem on the other side. For example, on the night before this interview, the Golan Israel Defense Force Liaison Officer (GILO) reported about 20 mysterious searchlights to UNDOF. UNDOF sent out a ready reaction patrol. The (continued...)

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Had any of the above-mentioned problems caused serious disputes, UNDOF's ability to provide transparency (H1) would be clearly called into question. As it stands based on the unchallenged acceptance of UNDOF's inspection reports, it appears that, that UNDOF can and does provide some level of transparency and that H1 receives some support. On the other hand, unchallenged acceptance of UNDOF's inspection reports could mean that the inspections do not matter very much. H3 and H4 do not seem to be much in play, so again it is hard to tell what is really going on. Authoritative interviews of military and government officials on both sides would be required to answer this question.

On the positive side, the facts that personnel and equipment levels are always below allowed limits and that the OPFORs never refute or question the inspection reports and verification indicate that levels of tension are fairly low on the Golan Heights.42 This low level of tension makes research into transparency's effects difficult. One needs at least some level of tension for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions to be in play (see predictions section, p. 98).

In sum, after a number of reasons why doubt is cast on H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, these problems turn out not to substantially affect UNDOF's operations. It is possible that H1, and thus transparency itself, may not be all that important to UNDOF.

41(...continued)
problem turned out to be the headlights on a farmer's tractor. And so it goes on the Golan. Note though, that these examples are on the local or field level. They are not examples of either side calling the AOL inspections into question.

42 To further underscore the lack of tension on the Golan, while the Israelis conduct real exercises on the Golan, one UNTSO official said that Syrian exercises consist of forty men, one rifle, and half a bullet. I heard other tales of woe about the state of Syrian forces on the Golan. Syria sends its best troops to Lebanon and also harbors significant fears of Turkey. It was suggested to me that one reason that the Golan is so peaceful is that Syria is able to harass Israel in Lebanon.
VIOLATIONS

There are a number of categories of possible violations that UNDOF confronts, including military entry into the AOS, overflights, firing into or across the AOS, military construction in the AOS, and civilian crossings of the wrong A and B lines (the A line is the Israeli side of the AOS; the B line is the Syrian side). Military entry into the AOS does occur from time to time, but these incidents are of little consequence. The same is true of overflights. For example, sometimes Syrian vehicles take shortcuts through the AOS. Unlike on Cyprus, there is usually a practical (or lazy) reason for these violations and they are not trying to annoy UNDOF or Israel. (Israel commits less of these violations because a mildly electrified touch-sensitive, alert-sending 'technical fence' runs the length of their side of the buffer zone (actually, the fence is a short distance in from the A line, often as close as 200-300 meters, but also sometimes kilometers away).  

According to a briefing by UNTSO Lt. Colonel Ray Martin, the head of Observer Group Golan - Tiberias, there had not been a major violation in 22 years. He attributed this to a clear mandate, to a system that was "very transparent" in that everyone knows where everything is, to the cooperation of both sides, and to UNDOF's deterrent effect. He made an analogy (which he later became fond of) that UNDOF was like a police car on a highway. If people see the police car, they will slow down. When asked if the U.N. had made peace work on the Golan, he said it

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43 Israeli patrols generally arrive within five minutes after the fence is touched.
was a chicken and egg problem: "Who can tell?"\textsuperscript{44}

This brings us to sheep. By far the largest problem UNDOF faces, at least in numerical terms, is sheep and shepherd violations. Shepherds become violators if they go beyond the grazing line, which runs between the Israeli A line and the Israeli technical fence. They are often motivated to do so, because this forbidden zone often contains good grazing land. Sheep are incidentally not violations, but as shepherds often follow their sheep, errant sheep are often good indicators of soon to be errant humans. I received various indications of the extent of the shepherd violations. At least two people said they constituted ninety-nine percent of all violations (the other one percent are unidentified civilians, sometimes defectors, according to one of these sources). Another source indicated that there were 100-130 sheep/shepherd violations a week. And at the UNTSO morning briefing I went to in Tiberias (May 30, 1996), the briefer said that there had been six civilian and twenty-one shepherd violations in the last day.

UNDOF's response to these violators is to send out a patrol and persuade the shepherds to return to their side of the line. UNDOF's patrols use various placards with appropriate messages in appropriate languages to help them with this and other such tasks. These incidents are reported to UNDOF, but are typically not reported to the U.N. in New York.

These incidents can be serious, especially for the sheep and shepherds involved. Often,

\textsuperscript{44} This illustrates that successful peacekeeping is a stew of ingredients from consent to transparency to deterrence. What kind of tickets can the U.N. police write? The answer is seen in the Cyprus chapter: local application of H5: the information-based cease and desist hypothesis as well as what might be called strategic use of H5, combined with coercion: publicizing problems and coordinating with embassies. Of course, UNDOF writes few tickets on the Golan.

In this May 30, 1996 briefing/interview, Martin also noted that things could change very quickly on the Golan Heights. During Israel's Grapes of Wrath Operation in Lebanon (only twenty kilometers from the Golan), some Syrian military forces crossed the B line and within ninety seconds, two Israeli F-16s came flying along the A line.
the areas they move into are heavily mined. Sometimes the shepherds move the mines onto UNDOF patrol paths. Sometimes, in the words of UNDOF soldiers, the sheep or shepherds become purple clouds. In other cases, Israeli soldiers will shoot warning shots to shoo away the approaching sheep and shepherds. Sheep are shot outright on a fairly regular basis as well. Israeli soldiers on the Golan are typically sent there after having served in Lebanon. They are wary of possible terrorists which can appear in any guise. When UNDOF sends out a ready reaction patrol to reign in shepherds, it is more of a humanitarian than peacekeeping gesture.45

OTHER’S ASSESSMENTS OF UNDOF’S ROLE AND THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY

I have indicated at several points above how hard it is to measure UNDOF's peace-promoting effects, including the role of transparency. Ironically, this is in part because the situation on the Golan is so peaceful. As this operational analysis has not yielded decisive results, I will now review others' assessments of UNDOF's role to see what evidence is revealed.

If UNDOF is supposed to provide transparency, it must be able to add value to each side's own threat assessments. Thus, a central question for this analysis is how much transparency UNDOF can add to what each side already knows or can learn. Mackinlay argues that in 1974, UNDOF's monitoring ability may have been "as effective as that of the Syrian and Israeli armies." This situation has changed as both sides rebuilt and improved their intelligence-

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45 The source for these last paragraphs is briefing, Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996; interview, Captain Ken-Ichi Kawazu, Japan, Deputy MPIO, May 20, 1996; interview, Lt. Colonel Mats Torping, Sweden, Chief, Observer Group Golan, May 21, 1996, and other interviews. See also Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p. 144. Most people say sheep, but they may also be referring to other animals in the shepherds' flocks as well.
gathering capabilities, while those of UNDOF remained largely stagnant. Mackinlay says that this means that neither side relies much on UNDOF monitoring, except to the extent that it serves as a backup.\footnote{On the argument that UNDOF serves as intelligence backup, the Deputy Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Colonel Jaako Oksanen, Sweden, made something of a counterpoint by suggesting that, because each side knows pretty much what the numbers are (especially on their own sides, of course), UNDOF’s inspections can be seen as tests of UNDOF. Interview, May 28, 1996. Keep in mind that UNDOF only reports specifics to the inspected side.} However, he adds that the two sides can communicate through UNDOF if there are problems in the AOS and AOLs (however, as shown above, this does not happen much). Mackinlay and UNDOF’s Force Commander (and several other UNDOF and UNTSO officers in interviews) agree that, even though both sides have adequate intelligence, the Israelis have a much better picture of what goes on on the Golan than the Syrians.\footnote{Mackinlay, \textit{The Peacekeepers}, p. 151. Interview, Major-General Kosters, May 21, 1996. Mackinlay says that the Syrians and Israelis both have huge surveillance towers on the Golan. From what I could tell, they are not so equivalent. The Israeli observation stations are much more prominent and there are at least two huge stations atop Mt. Hermon, as well as several others on top of hills throughout the Golan. Mackinlay also noted that it is a "popular joke among the UN troops that with these [surveillance] devices the Syrians and Israelis can not only pick out individual soldiers in the AOS but read the nametags on their shirts," p. 150. A similar story I heard was about a poor U.N. soldier enjoying a magazine in his OP who was photographed in action with an Israeli telescopic camera. The picture was sent to his unit and he had to go home due to embarrassment.} This discussion suggests that, in terms of strategic threat assessment, there is little that UNDOF can add to each sides’ unilateral capabilities -- what I called Type II, \textit{unilateral transparency} in the introduction.

Turning to more general assessments of UNDOF’s effectiveness, many of which are transparency-related, one high ranking UNDOF officer said that "UNDOF clarifies all real or supposed violations (H3), but we don’t have many serious violations here." He added that both sides are aware that serious violations would threaten the peace process.\footnote{Interview, May 21, 1996.} Colonel Torping, whose experience with UNDOF spans eleven years, said that Syria and Israel "want a guarantee
that the other side won't take unexpected steps and they know that neither side has tried anything for 20 years," (+H3, +H4). He also said that the U.N. has been doing its job in a good way, but that it was more important that both sides want peace and trust the U.N.\footnote{Interview, May 21, 1996.} Major-General Kosters cautioned not to make too much of the confidence-building effects of UNDOF; the chance of conflict is very low and UNDOF's force is only "barbed wire and nothing more," (-H3)\footnote{Interview, May 21, 1996.} Zenon Carnapas, UNTSO's Senior Advisor, said that with UNDOF/UNTSO the two sides get an objective opinion about each side respecting the Geneva agreement (+H3). He thought that if UNTSO were withdrawn it might serve as a political trigger (+H4, +H6).\footnote{Interview, May 27, 1996.}

Alan James says that the inspections "are a means of helping to keep anxiety at a somewhat lower level than it would otherwise reach and as such are of value," (+H3).\footnote{James, \textit{Peacekeeping in International Politics}, p. 332.} Finally, while much of what Mackinlay argues has already been laid out, he also says that UNDOF's liaison system provides a "limited but important diplomatic link between the Syrians and the Israelis" (+H1) and that UNDOF "will certainly cry the alarm to the whole world if either opponent force attempts to maneuver to regain the Golan," (+H4, +H6).\footnote{Mackinlay, \textit{The Peacekeepers}, pp. 150 and 152.}

The last two points in each paragraph (by Carnapas and Mackinlay) suggest a new transparency-related hypothesis, the tripwire hypothesis. This hypothesis describes the effect
when a revisionist attacks at or around a peacekeeping operation (or asks it to withdraw before an attack), thus helping warn the world about the aggression and/or focus attention on the aggression. The status quo power could be similarly warned. The tripwire hypothesis needs testing, but one case, that of the U.N. Emergency Force I, offers some tentative support. When Egypt asked UNEF I to leave the Sinai/Gaza armistice line with Israel in 1967, it helped signal impending conflict and helped identify the aggressor.54 This also shows that loss of consent may have a silver lining. Depending on the timing of the balancing it helps kindle, a peacekeeping operation's last gasp may help deter aggression or conduct a just war.

A softer form of the tripwire hypothesis might occur when states break out or defect from agreements. Such a defection might indicate malign intent or at least signal divergent interests. This type of signaling is similar to H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict. Further research into what might be called the Tripwire/Defection Signaling Hypothesis is indicated.


Conclusion

FINDINGS

This analysis of UNDOF reaches the following findings in response to the two sets of questions posed at the beginning of the chapter:

1. "Was UNDOF put into place because verification was needed to help seal the cease-fire agreement?" The answer to this question is: yes, but others factors, especially when combined, were more important. That said, UNDOF’s overall role in reaching the agreement was significant and larger than its transparency role alone.

The promise of transparency in and after the disengagement appears to have been a modest factor in helping Syria and Israel reach the cease-fire and disengagement accords. This supports H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. However, UNDOF played another role in the negotiations, and this role seems even more important than the provision of transparency. Each side was able to make de facto concessions (adjustments in the cease-fire lines and resultant AOS and AOLs) by tweaking the areas that would come under UNDOF’s area of responsibility. In this way, the concessions would not appear to be being made to the adversary they were not even willing to sit down with. Two other factors were important in reaching these accords. First, the agreements were in both sides’ self interest. Second, the U.S. exerted considerable leverage, especially on Israel.

2. "What does UNDOF monitor and verify and how well does it do so? What incidents does UNDOF confront and how does it deal with them?" The answers to these questions are that
UNDOF has very specific transparency-related duties, that its ability to provide transparency is somewhat limited by the various problems mentioned above, but these problems do not affect UNDOF's operation. UNDOF confronts very few security-related incidents. However, it effectively helps shepherd the shepherds and their flocks.

It appears that UNDOF's level of verification and monitoring is adequate to the task. UNDOF's force levels, technologies, and procedures are all somewhat flawed, but it does not matter because they are not challenged. Neither side significantly violates the AOS and AOLs. Perfection or even excellence in providing transparency is not necessary. At first it appears that H1: Regimes Provide Transparency receives modest support. However, UNDOF inspections and reports add almost nothing to what each side already knows about each other. Thus, while UNDOF employs several relatively sophisticated mechanisms that should increase transparency, these are almost doomed to have small effects, if any, due to the intelligence capabilities of the countries it operates between.

Without authoritative interviews, it is hard to tell whether H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions or H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation are even in play. There are few tension increasing or miscalculation causing incidents along the AOS. In contrast to UNFICYP, which uses transparency tactically at times, UNDOF faces so few incidents that it is simply not given much opportunity to use transparency (or mediation, cajoling, and deterrence) along their lines.

Despite these points, a number of UNDOF personnel and other analysts argue, with caveats, that UNDOF's presence and provision of transparency help calm tensions. One can also argue deductively and counterfactually that tensions might well increase without UNDOF. The
forces would abut, the signal sent by UNDOF's presence that each side accepts the status quo would be gone, and each side might feel more compelled to build up forces and constructions in the Golan. These arguments are mostly assertions, but they are reasonable assertions and they are made by people with some authority, experience, and/or credibility. Thus, there is some reason to believe that H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation are modestly supported. While some proportion of these benefits are simply due to the physical distances provided by the AOS and AOLs,\(^{55}\) some is due to the active transparency-increasing efforts of UNDOF.

### Table 7-1: How the Predictions Fared Overall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Predictions</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Comments about findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in case(s)? [A yes supports H1: regimes provide transparency]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UNDOF has a very clear mandate to monitor and verify, even though there are some flaws in its ability to be thorough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/opacity important to adversaries when making peace? [A yes supports H2: transparency promotes cooperation]</td>
<td>Modestly</td>
<td>A small factor compared to others. However, the fact that a U.N. buffer zone would be part of the peace (as opposed to the monitoring of the zone) was considerably more important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation? [A yes supports H4: transparency reduces miscalculation]</td>
<td>Quite Modestly</td>
<td>Regime provides little concrete information that adds to threat assessments in a way that affects miscalculation, esp. for Israelis.</td>
</tr>
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\(^{55}\) An argument can be made that physical distance, especially if well monitored, can offer some assurance to each side that the other side was not building up for an attack. Or if one side was planning an attack and did not want to signal it by breaking the limits, then the AOS and AOLs would serve to complicate the attack. Seen this way, physical distance offers stability in part because of transparency (both H3 and H4) and in part because it helps shift the offense/defense balance towards the defense.

The case of Cyprus demonstrates that physical proximity allows the OPFORs a number of ways to harass each other that would not be available if the buffer zone was wider (slingshotting, stone throwing, verbal insults, etc.). The 2 ½ mile wide buffer zone in Korea certainly does not prevent all antagonisms and more severe incidents. However, it is more than reasonable to assume that the situation would be far worse if the buffer zone was similar to that on Cyprus.
I believe that UNDOF does some good, and certainly does more good than harm. If it only provides modest security benefits -- and even proponents do not claim more -- it is also very cheap compared to war. Thus, UNDOF provides good (less) bang for the buck.

The AOS and AOLs are good confidence-building measures and someone has to monitor them. Impartial, modest, fairly undemanding, "alert but inert" monitoring is all that the circumstances require. UNDOF and the U.N. are very well equipped to conduct this kind of monitoring. A heavier, better-equipped U.S. monitoring force has been discussed to help monitor a more demanding final peace settlement. But until this idea moves further along, UNDOF is doing all that the situation requires and permits.

There are few policy recommendations that spring from this analysis. Neither side wants better or airtight performance from UNDOF/UNTSO. There is no sign that tensions or incidents demand more either. The main recommendation that results is to stay the course.

UNDOF shows that the U.N. can do a very good job conducting light monitoring. If there are other areas where consent for such a mission is high, and such a mission would contribute even a little to consolidate the peace, UNDOF-like missions are well worth the money. And if consent exists for more stringent verification, then it would not be difficult to fix the problems mentioned above with better technology, and more thorough and intrusive procedures.

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56 Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p.152.
Chapter 8: UNTAG and UNTAC, Transparency in Election-Monitoring

This chapter explores the role of transparency in two non-traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia sought to resolve conflicts in part by holding and monitoring elections. For the purposes of this study, these operations are notable because they involved active information/education media campaigns to promote the operations' missions and to defuse rumors and fears. The operations' media campaigns inspired the corollary to H3, H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose. Many in Cambodia and Namibia did not know what the U.N. was up to and local populations harbored suspicions of these operations. In each country, the U.N. was the target of hostile propaganda that further deepened distrust or fear of the U.N. The U.N.'s use of the media educated the citizenry, clarified the operations' purposes, and largely overcame the unwarranted fears.

The U.N.'s media campaigns are also suggestive of the potential and limits of pro-active information campaigns to reduce ethnic conflict. The U.N. has demonstrated that it can use information to control damaging rumors, unwarranted fears, and even violence. However, these efforts are only likely to be of value when target countries are poor and have such underdeveloped media infrastructures that the U.N.'s (or other's) use of the media can make a clearly discernable impact.
UNTAC in Cambodia

This section begins with some background on the situation in Cambodia which led to UNTAC's creation. This allows me to examine the extent to which the promise of UNTAC, and specifically the promise of increased transparency provided by UNTAC (H2), helped bring about the Paris Peace Accords of 1991. I then delve into UNTAC's operations on the ground. Although many aspects of UNTAC's activities did not involve much transparency, a number of analysts concur that UNTAC's use of the media to promote its message and reduce fears and rumors was particularly successful and effective. Hence, I conclude by focusing on this area of UNTAC's operations.

UNTAC was created in 1991 after decades of murderous turmoil in Cambodia. Cambodia was a French colony for 90 years until its independence in 1954. The French-installed Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970 by the U.S.-backed General Lon Nol. This was but one way in which Cambodia was ravaged by the Vietnam war. The Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot quickly began an insurgency against Lon Nol that succeeded in toppling him in 1975. During their short rule, the Khmer Rouge killed at least one-million Cambodians (one in eight), targeting the educated elites in particular. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978, in part to put an end to border skirmishes with the China-backed Khmer Rouge. With Soviet support, Vietnam installed its own puppet party under Heng Samrin and Hun Sen. A counter-coalition of rebel factions involving Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge and backed by China and the U.S. then formed against the new but internationally unrecognized government in Phnom Penh.
The civil war continued along for years until April 1989 when Vietnam announced its troops would leave the country. This coincided with a number of developments that led all the major outside powers to rethink their commitments to their various clients. The end of the Cold War made strange bedfellows less necessary. For example, the U.S. could stop helping China support the Khmer Rouge against the Soviet-backed, Vietnam-installed Hun Sen government. This was in turn because the Soviets pulled away from Vietnam and began to warm up ties with China (and of course with the U.S.) as the Cold War ended. Finally, within Cambodia, the civil war had "reached something of a 'mutually hurting stalemate.'"\(^1\)

**PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND H2: TRANSPARENCY PROMOTES COOPERATION**

Earlier peace conferences sponsored by Indonesia in 1988 and February 1989 brought all the Cambodian factions together but had otherwise failed. However, Vietnam's announced withdrawal prompted the French and Indonesians to rededicate themselves to the peace process and the first Paris Conference was held in July 1989. The negotiations bogged down over power-sharing arrangements during the interim period before elections. Hun Sen rejected power-sharing in general and sharing with the Khmer Rouge in particular.

The idea that broke the deadlock was to transfer most political power in Cambodia to the U.N. during the interim period. A weak Supreme National Council (SNC) made up of members from each of the factions would hold or symbolize national unity and sovereignty, but real

administrative power would lie with what become UNTAC. Under the accords, the SiNC granted the U.N. all powers necessary to assure the peace agreement’s implementation. More specifically, the U.N. was mandated to:

"organize and conduct free and fair elections; coordinate the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; coordinate a major programme of economic and financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction; supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, the cease-fire, the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian factions, and the demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the military forces of the factions; coordinate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees; and foster an environment of peace and stability in which all Cambodians could enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."²

One reason that this idea worked and the U.N. was given such an unprecedented degree of authority was that the "parties could not trust each other enough to rule together [so the U.N. had to] take over the administration of Cambodia during the period between a political settlement and the installment of freely, democratically elected leaders."³ This appears to offer general confirmation of H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. Further, two specific areas of the U.N.’s mandate required significant monitoring and verification by the U.N. for them to work: the elections and the cease-fire and other limits on forces and arms. While I have yet to find smoking-gun evidence (such as statements of leaders) that the promise of transparency provided by the U.N. helped them come to agreement, it is reasonable to assume that the promise of transparency played some role in helping bring the leaders of the factions to sign the Paris

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Accords in October of 1991. Hence, H2 receives some support.

However, there are two other factors that also help explain why the accord was reached and which therefore undercut support for H2. First, even if the promise of transparency played a role in getting the factions to accept the peace accord, it is also probable that the promise of the U.N.'s physical presence played an even larger role. A physical presence and symbol of the outside world's involvement was likely anticipated by the factions as a deterrent to their adversaries' aggression. Physical deterrence likely outweighs transparency in calming fears of adversaries. That said, deterrence and transparency are not mutually exclusive. One lesson from the Cyprus chapter is that it is often hard to separate physical presence and some coercive capability from the ability to provide transparency. H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis is in part based on this inseparability.

Second and perhaps more important, most of the content of the what became the peace accords was worked out by the U.N. Permanent Five and other outside players, including Australia, Indonesia, and Japan. The draft framework reached by these players was then sold to or forced on the Cambodian factions. The degree of coercion required to obtain the factions' acceptance varies by account, but there is no doubt outside powers drafted most of the agreement and that coercion and pressure applied to the factions was at least significant. Of particular importance appears to be a secret agreement between Vietnam and China to pressure their clients

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4 According to Findlay: "To a great extent the Accords were pressed on a mostly reluctant Cambodian political elite by an international community eager to be rid of the Cambodian problem," in Cambodia, p. 16. According to James A. Schear, the Peace Accords were "fragile instrument, a product of intense pressure applied upon the parties by external powers operating in a climate of cooperation that did not yet exist inside Cambodia," in "Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace," in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press), p. 139.
(Hun Sen and the coalition that included Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, respectively) into compliance.\(^5\) This agreement was in turn made possible by the power/political shifts occurring as the Cold War ended and because China wanted to repair its image after Tiananmen. Power politics, not transparency, played the greatest role in getting the factions to accept the draft framework for peace.

As we shall soon see, the U.N. efforts in Cambodian arms control proved to be a failure, while the elections turned out to be very successful. The factions resisted demilitarization and cantonment, and there was little the U.N. could do to overcome this resistance. This failure was obvious to all and transparency played no role. On the other hand, U.N.-provided transparency played a large role in the elections. The elections support H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

Although the factions accepted the draft framework in September of 1990, it took months of wrangling over still more demobilization and election issues until the final Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991. During the negotiations, the civil war again raged until being tempered by a cease-fire in May of 1991.\(^6\)

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THE U.N. ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC)

The U.N. sent an Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in November 1991 to pave the way for UNTAC's March 1992 deployment. UNAMIC's primary mission was to maintain the cease-fire until the arrival of UNTAC. It was also supposed to begin de-mining the country (a mission which quickly expanded when the size of the mine problem became apparent).

To maintain the cease-fire, the plan for UNAMIC "called for a team of 50 military liaison officers who would, in a good-offices role, aim to facilitate communications between the military headquarters of the four Cambodian factions by, for example, passing messages between the factions and arranging meetings between them." UNAMIC was also supposed with the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG), a forum established by the Paris Accords to bring together military representatives of the Cambodian factions.

One could not ask for a clearer plan to increase transparency. However, the evidence I have casts considerable doubt on UNAMIC's performance as a liaison. UNAMIC's overall effectiveness in maintaining the cease-fire was poor. The entire Cambodian settlement was on the verge of unraveling by the time UNTAC began its tardy deployment four months later in March of 1992 (by the end of April, 3,600 UNTAC troops and personnel had arrived out of a planned full strength of 22,000). UNTAC was not fully operational until September 1992. UNTAC's late arrival and slow start combined with UNAMICs small size to create a crisis in

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6(...continued)
gopher://gopher.state.gov).

Cambodians' faith that the U.N. could keep the peace and fulfill its ambitious mandate.

Focusing more specifically on UNAMIC and transparency, one indication of UNAMIC's inability to serve as liaison was Sihanouk's criticism that UNTAC's absence during the early phases of the peace left the factions without a neutral mediator to deal with political and military tensions. This was said despite UNAMIC's presence. Even more specifically, the Khmer Rouge repeatedly violated the cease-fire and boycotted a meeting of the MMWG during UNAMIC's tenure. UNAMIC personnel also had trouble communicating with the Cambodians due to language difficulties. Communication is certainly a prerequisite for providing transparency.

UNTAC: MANDATE, ACTIVITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY

To recap, in military affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:

1. Monitor the cease-fire and disengagement of forces.
2. Monitor withdrawal of foreign forces (Vietnamese forces) from Cambodia.
3. Facilitate and monitor the demobilization and disarming of seventy percent of each factions' forces.
4. Facilitate and monitor the cantonment of the remaining thirty percent of each factions' forces.
5. Conduct mine clearance.

In civil affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:

1. Promote human rights with an education campaign, monitoring, investigations, and supervision of local law enforcement.
2. Organize and conduct free and fair elections, including civic education and election monitoring.
3. Control most major aspects of civil administration (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public

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8 Findlay, Cambodia, pp. 24-26.

9 The following is drawn largely from Scheer, "Riding the Tiger," pp. 146-149.
security, and information) and supervise those other aspects of governance that could influence the elections.

4. Repatriate approximately 360,000 refugees.

5. Restore and rehabilitate aspects of Cambodia's infrastructure in areas including housing, transport, utilities, education, and so forth.

6. Conduct an information program to support UNTAC's activities and educate Cambodians about the Peace Accords and the UNTAC's missions.

I will review each of these two major areas, military and civil, and assess the role of transparency played in UNTAC's performance.

UNTAC'S MILITARY COMPONENT Transparency could have contributed significantly to UNTAC's military missions. From the cease-fire to cantonment, UNTAC's monitoring and verification could have given each side the assurance that others were indeed adhering to the accords (H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions). Unfortunately, obstructionist policies primarily by the Khmer Rouge (but also by Hun Sen's party, the State of Cambodia or SOC) torpedoed most of UNTAC's military mandate and made efforts to increase transparency in this area irrelevant. Regime-provided transparency can not work when adversaries do not want to cooperate in the first place.

UNTAC's military mission fell apart in several ways. First of all, fighting continued throughout UNTAC's tenure, albeit usually at a lower level than before. No one needed UNTAC to tell them that fighting and violence continued.

Second, UNTAC had no real power to enforce or even effectively coerce demobilization, disarming, and cantonnement. As Schear points out, UNTAC was between a rock and a hard place. UNTAC would look bad if it tried to coerce the parties because UNTAC's relative weakness and inability to resort to force meant that it would inevitably fail. On the other hand, voluntary
compliance was likely to fail as well because the Khmer Rouge resisted the military aspects of UNTAC's mandate almost from the start.\textsuperscript{10} Seeing the writing on the wall, UNTAC was forced to make cantonment voluntary and partial. By November 1992, UNTAC had completely suspended its efforts to disarm, demobilize, and canton the factions.\textsuperscript{11}

From the perspective of transparency, there was little to verify. Again, the factions did not need the U.N. to tell them the agreements had been violated. It is possible that the very existence of the agreements and their subsequent dissolution could have hardened suspicions between the parties. H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict might be confirmed to the extent that everyones' breaking the accords signified to all everyones' discontent with the status quo. However, given the turbulent and violent history in Cambodia, this signal probably did not add up to much.

Third, there were a number of ways in which UNTAC's specific efforts to increase transparency failed. For example, the Khmer Rouge simply did not believe potentially calming reports from UNTAC's Strategic Investigation Teams that monitored the presence of foreign forces and cease-fire violations. UNTAC found almost no evidence of Vietnamese or Vietnam-controlled forces in country, but the Khmer Rouge disputed these findings and even disagreed with the definition of foreign forces. The Khmer Rouge also never provided to UNTAC the required information on the manpower and materiel of its forces. For its part, the SOC sent a number of its forces to be cantoned, but these were among the poorest of its soldiers (if they were

\textsuperscript{10} Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 154.

soldiers at all) and many of these soldiers left the cantons on agricultural leave.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, even here, there was little calming news for the UN to spread.

Fourth, UNTAC made serious efforts to start demining Cambodia. It trained 2300 Cambodians and disposed of 37,000 out of six to ten million mines. Admirable as this may have been, transparency has little to do with demining.\textsuperscript{13}

In sum, where UNTAC could have increased transparency in the military mission, non-compliance meant that there was little to verify or monitor. And what was well monitored and reported by UNTAC -- the absence of foreign forces -- was disbelieved by the Khmer Rouge.

\textbf{UNTAC's Civil Components}

UNTAC's civil mandate was complex, had mixed results, and its various aspects depended in varying degrees on transparency for their success. I will run though the various tasks of UNTAC's civil mandate outlined above, assessing UNTAC's effectiveness and the role of transparency in whatever was achieved. I will then focus in more depth on the information/education aspects of UNTAC's activities. Information/education played an important role in several aspects of UNTAC's civil mandate, in human rights and in especially in preparing Cambodians for the election.

\textsuperscript{12} Some 50,000 troops were cantoned and as many weapons were turned over to the U.N. Most of these were from the SOC. However, Heininger notes that many of the weapons were not operable and the troops were of such poor quality that the SOC actually improved its army by getting rid of them. \textit{Peacekeeping in Transition}, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{13} The preceding section was based on Berdal and Leifer, "Cambodia," pp. 36-43; Findlay, \textit{Cambodia}, pp. 36-51, 72; Scheur, "Riding the Tiger," p. 156-158; United Nations, \textit{Blue Helmets}, 3 ed., pp. 476-477.
Refugee repatriation worked well with slightly more than the estimated 360,000 refugees returning to Cambodia. This success appears to have had less to do with transparency than with the facts that the refugees wanted to return, that Thailand (where most refugees were) wanted them out, that the factions cooperated with their return, and that the U.N. offered the refugees cash, jobs, food, and/or land to return. Repatriation was assisted by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees which helped logistically and because the Khmer Rouge were much more willing to cooperate with the UNHCR than with UNTAC. In addition, Cambodia's factions all saw the refugees as returning members or as potential new members. However illogical, none perceived enough of a relative gains problem to spur them to threaten the returning Cambodians. There was not a single deliberately disruptive incident in the whole endeavor.\(^\text{14}\)

Despite all these interest/incentive-based reasons for the success of repatriation, transparency played a role in UNTAC's success. According to Heiniger, "Making certain that all factions were apprised of developments in the repatriation process, which entailed endless dialogue and negotiation, helped allay their suspicions and gain their cooperation."\(^\text{15}\) Thus, UNTAC's repatriation efforts offer some support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation or H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation also receive support.

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

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\(^{14}\) Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 52-54; Heiniger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 48-54; and Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 163.

\(^{15}\) Heiniger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 54.
planned and the results had little to do with transparency. Although the international community ended up pledging $880 million for Cambodia's reconstruction, well over the $593 million planned, disbursement of funds was slow. Logistical and political difficulties plagued planned projects. Long-term, large scale projects were difficult to start, much less complete, during UNTAC's short tenure. Much of the aid ended up being focused on the Phnom Penh area simply because it was easier to get things done there. This helped the SOC which was dominant in that region and angered the rural Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge tried to block some rehabilitation projects, even though considerable funds would have been spent in areas it controlled if it had been more hospitable to the U.N.'s presence in the first place. On the positive side, jobs were created and the basis was laid for further reconstruction of war torn Cambodia.16

CIVIL CONTROL UNTAC's mandate for civil control and supervision was comprehensive and could have involved a large degree of transparency. Adequate supervision of the five main branches of government (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information, as well as any other branch that could affect the elections) required monitoring and gathering large amounts of information as Cambodians conducted their day-to-day governance. UNTAC attached teams to all major sectors of government and maintained a separate investigations division. The purpose of such massive oversight was to maintain a neutral political environment during the pre-election interim period. According to its mandate, UNTAC should have been in a good position to gather information, correct abuses, introduce transparency in government, and reassure all factions as to the fairness of the interim government. In theory, UNTAC's civil control mandate should have

led to strong support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

As it turned out, UNTAC faced numerous difficulties in civil control, many of which affected its ability to provide transparency and calm the factions. First, the parties varied in their cooperation with UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge, as usual, resisted UNTAC's efforts. The smaller factions, including Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC, had very little structure to monitor at all. So most of UNTAC's monitoring fell on the SOC in Phnom Penh. The SOC viewed this disproportionate attention as discriminatory and it became less than completely cooperative. UNTAC's greatest failure in this respect was its inability to reign in the SOC's security forces and secret police. Their continued activity was one of the biggest threats to the neutral political environment UNTAC was trying to create.17

Second, even the SOC often did not govern in ways that could be effectively monitored. According to Scheer, power often resided with army officers, provincial governors, local officials, relatives of bureaucrats, and so forth. Further, many decisions were made informally and without written record.

Finally, UNTAC was simply overwhelmed by this very sophisticated task. UNTAC was slow to assert its authority and never caught up. The quality of its personnel varied and was sometimes poor.

All of these factors meant that UNTAC did not do very well at civil control, had difficulty

17 Findlay, Cambodia, p. 60.
monitoring government functions, and therefore could not provide much transparency.\textsuperscript{18}

On the upside, analysts agree that without UNTAC attempts at civil control, the situation would have been worse. Even more abuses, violence, and political harassment would have occurred. Some analysts suggest that UNTAC planted a seed for further maturation of Cambodia's political institutions.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS} UNTAC had limited success with its mandate to promote and protect of human rights. Human rights abuses continued throughout UNTAC's tenure, though of course no where near the level of Pol Pot's murderous regime. UNTAC's small human rights staff noted or documented a number of abuses, but could take no real corrective action against violators such as arrests or firing them from their posts. UNTAC had to rely on the SOC to police the violators it had identified, so enforcement was rare. Further, UNTAC often had to work with violators in other areas of its operations, so antagonizing these officials (or others) on the basis of human rights violations jeopardized other aspects of the mandate. While UNTAC tried to train judges and lawyers,\textsuperscript{20} it did not have the resources to conduct a more sweeping overhaul of Cambodia's judicial system. Asia Watch harshly criticized UNTAC for

\textsuperscript{18} One analyst notes that UNTAC did introduce "a fair amount of transparency into Cambodia's institutions." Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 159. This reference to transparency uses the terms slightly differently than as used in this thesis. The use here might be termed 'transparency of process' and its effects are reducing corruption, and improving accountability and efficiency. This can be related to reducing fears, helping verification, and so forth, but I do not think that is Schear's principal meaning. H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose involves transparency of process, but it also involves active efforts to make one's purposes known — not a part of Schear's use of the term. H3' is explored in some depth in the upcoming section on information/education.


\textsuperscript{20} Most lawyers and judges and others with any sort of higher education and training were killed by Pol Pot's regime, leaving Cambodia ill-prepared to govern itself.

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failing to take concrete actions to defend human rights and punish abusers.

On the positive side, all four major factions including the Khmer Rouge signed onto major international human rights agreements. UNTAC helped gain the release of several hundred political prisoners. UNTAC undertook a large-scale, country-wide human rights education campaign. Using radio, television, video, puppets, singers, local artists, and other tools, UNTAC raised awareness in Cambodia about human rights. About 150,000 Cambodians joined human rights groups. Cambodia also gained what Doyle called the freest press in Southeast Asia and the citizens enjoyed what was for them unprecedented freedom of movement and association. Hopefully, UNTAC's efforts to teach Cambodians about human rights will make it somewhat harder for Cambodia's governments in the future to abuse their citizens as much as they have done in the past.21

Although information and education played a crucial role in what success UNTAC did enjoy in promoting human rights, transparency appears not to have played much of a part.

Elections Organizing and conducting free and fair elections was the centerpiece of UNTAC's mandate and also the area where it enjoyed its most prominent success. It was also an area that depended to a large degree on the provision of transparency. I will discuss UNTAC's effectiveness with the elections in this section and leave most of the discussion of transparency for the next section on information and education.

Ninety-six percent all eligible voters were registered before the May 23-28 1993 elections. A remarkable ninety percent of Cambodia's eligible voters then voted. Despite

considerable violence and intimidation prior to the election, Cambodia was surprising peaceful during the actual voting. Since March 1, there had been 200 deaths, 338 injuries, and 144 abductions attributed to politically motivated pre-election violence and the majority of this was attributed to the Khmer Rouge. But the Khmer Rouge, for reasons still unknown, did not violently interrupt the elections and the polling period was one of the "least violent in Cambodia for years."

UNTAC operated some 1400 fixed polling stations and 200 mobile stations, which were well-monitored. Most stations were fairly well guarded by U.N. peacekeepers and the collected ballots were more heavily guarded.

Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC won the election with 45.47 percent of the vote. Hun Sen's SOC party, called the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won 38.23 percent. The Buddhist party got 3.81 percent of the vote and seventeen other parties split the remaining 12.56 percent. As a result, FUNCINPEC won fifty eight seats in the new Constituent Assembly, while the CPP won fifty-one. There was some post-election bickering about vote-counting and so forth. Control of the executive was disputed. In the end, Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun Sen shared the executive and became co-prime ministers, although the former was 'first' prime minister and the latter was 'second' prime minister.

Looking at longer-term benefits, the election calmed the civil war, lessened the power of the Khmer Rouge, and brought, at least temporarily, a multiparty system into a traditionally one-

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22 Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 83.
party-rulled state.23

INFORMATION/EDUCATION AND TRANSPARENCY

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC had a number of diverse tasks and is widely recognized by analysts as being extremely successful in its support role. The Information/Education Division's role was critical after years of Cambodian isolation and inadequate education in general. Cambodians knew little of the outside world, or of how the elections and campaigning of democracy were supposed to work. UNTAC was a novelty and many Cambodians did not know why it was there.

Among the Information/Education Division's tasks were educating Cambodian journalists on establishing a free press, helping candidates get out their messages, and educating Cambodians about what UNTAC was doing and how elections worked.24 To accomplish these tasks, UNTAC produced videos, posters, leaflets, flyers, banners, billboards, advertisements. It published guidelines and directives and ran discussion groups. UNTAC brought the candidates together for round-table discussions and gave them access to its television/video, radio, and other facilities to help them spread their messages. UNTAC ever ended up running its own radio station, Radio UNTAC, a first for a U.N. operations.

At its peak, Radio UNTAC broadcast 15 hours a day and was the most popular station in


24 The UNTAC also conducted education activities in support of its human rights efforts as well. Please see the human rights section above.
the country. To give some sense of the scale and penetration of UNTAC's information efforts, Japanese NGOs and parties contributed over 300,000 hand-held radio for distribution throughout Cambodia. Crowds would gather in marketplaces to listen to U.N. broadcasts. Relay stations were installed by UNTAC so that its broadcasts would reach the whole country. In-country facilities were unable to do so, and before installation of the relays, UNTAC had to rely on borrowed transmitter time from VOA to broadcast throughout Cambodia. UNTAC's estimates for its radio station's audience ranged from almost the entire population to even more than the population (by including listeners in neighboring countries).

Before Radio UNTAC and other UNTAC efforts, all the media in Cambodia was controlled by the political parties and factions. Some newspapers were published out of Phnom Penh, but fifty two percent of the men and seventy eight percent of the women in Cambodia were illiterate.\(^{25}\) The SOC had a fairly wide ranging but sporadically broadcasting radio and television network. FUNCINPEC's station could only be heard around Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge ran a hidden shortwave station that also could only be heard sporadically.

This paucity of other media outlets, their technical backwardness, and their limited credibility made it relatively easy for UNTAC to dominate the news flow. These are important preconditions for similar information efforts. The bottom line is that the value added of the new information has to be high. To illustrate, the U.N. could not make much of a dent in the U.S.' news flow. But in Namibia and Cambodia, the U.N. became quite influential. Another condition under which the U.N. (or any other information producer) might become influential is when there

\(^{25}\) Findlay, Cambodia, pp. 82-83.
is a media monopoly, as in the Serbia. The importance of all this to transparency is obvious: one's message has to be credible and influential for it to make a difference. A security regime whose message is implausible and has no impact can not provide transparency.

The main message and function of the Information/Education campaign was to convince Cambodians that their ballots were indeed secret. Many feared retaliation if they did not vote for one party or another. In response, UNTAC instructed Cambodians about the mechanics of elections and the procedures for insuring ballot secrecy. In doing so, UNTAC made its own system transparent, but also reduced fears. Sometimes fears were wildly unfounded. Some feared that the pencils for marking ballots contained radio beacons that linked up to satellites and would reveal who had voted for whom. Others feared secret electronic eyes in the polling places. These and other concerns were expressed by Cambodians in letters to the station and in frank discussions on talk shows. UNTAC officials could then respond appropriately with necessary information. The success of UNTAC in reducing rumors and unfounded fears offers strong support to H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

A second function of UNTAC and especially Radio UNTAC was to help all the parties get out their messages. Radio UNTAC gave free air time weekly to all the political parties. In a transparency-related assist to the parties, it also gave a right of response to parties that felt particularly aggrieved by misstatements or lies in other's broadcasts. These efforts helped defeat the SOC's media near-monopoly. This in turn helped to antagonize the SOC.

Sometimes, Radio UNTAC combated fears generated by pre-election violence and rumors of election-time violence. Other times, though, news of violence encouraged more fear.
When the Khmer Rouge captured the symbolic town of Siem Reap near Angkor Wat three weeks before the election, Radio UNTAC sent a reporter and broadcasts from the town helped convince Cambodians not to be intimidated and to continue with plans for the elections. On the other hand, when the Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnamese targets in Phnom Penh, news of these attacks reported by Radio UNTAC greatly increased fears in Cambodia. Radio UNTAC's continued broadcasts then played a role in taming the very fears that its broadcasts (the truth, though) helped create.

When the voting began on May 23, Radio UNTAC reporters were stationed around the country. There were widespread fears of Khmer Rouge attacks on polling places, and many hesitated to vote, fearing for their safety. Radio UNTAC reports that voting was being conducted safely (again, the truth) throughout the country is widely credited with helping bring many Cambodians to the polls. The physical presence of some 16,000 peacekeepers also helped calm these fears.

With respect to violence and rumors of violence, Radio UNTAC mostly lessened unwarranted fears and this supports H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions. However, sometimes it also confirmed real fears. This in turn supports H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Another function of the Information/Education Division and Radio UNTAC was to combat hostile propaganda and rumors about UNTAC and the U.N., many of which were about ballot secrecy and other election issues. The SOC and Khmer Rouge often propagandized against UNTAC and the U.N. One of the main messages of the SOC was that UNTAC could not protect the Cambodians and that only the SOC could do so. The SOC also tried to confuse

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Cambodians about what role UNTAC had Cambodia. For example, the SOC claimed to be able to register people to vote, even though this was UNTAC's sole responsibility. UNTAC successfully combated this sort of propaganda and this supports H3: Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

Similarly, the SOC tried to confiscate people's voter registration cards in an attempt to intimidate non-supporters. UNTAC used its media resources to convince the people that this was against electoral law and the SOC's efforts blew up in its face. This example supports H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis.

One thing that appears to be craft knowledge to many who deal with media issues in the U.N. is that it is often unwise to combat propaganda with tit-for-tat counterpropaganda. Doing so often degenerates into a war of words and adds credibility to the hostile propaganda. Instead, the strategy is to stick to one's own message, repeat it a lot, and subtly change the focus as needed to combat whatever rumors are the most pernicious. Another similar kernel is that whatever intelligence U.N. operations gather (and it is often not much and not enough) is often gathered the press/information components of the operation.

Radio UNTAC also played a transparency-related role after the elections and help protect the election results from attacks launched by the political parties. The following quote illustrates this as well as some of the previous points:

On 31 May 1993, Chea Sim, President of the CPP who controlled the Interior Ministry (and its 40,000 police force) demanded that Radio UNTAC should stop broadcasting the results. Radio UNTAC was accused of misleading and confusing the public. UNTAC rejected the allegations. UNTAC's stand was broadcast over Radio UNTAC that day: 

"The decision to make the progressive results of the counting available to the media, and through the media to the people of Cambodia and of the World, flows
from UNTAC's commitment to the principle of openness and transparency in the administration and conduct of the election. In addition, it reflects the fact that since progressive results are made available to all registered political parties (whose agents have the right to be present at the counting and to observe every aspect of that process), they are in effect already in the public domain.\textsuperscript{26}

The SOC had expected to win the election and became bitter as the results came in. Had the SOC gotten away with its anti-election message, the election might have gone down the tubes in a flurry of recriminations and disagreements about the election's fairness. Again, Radio UNTAC told the truth, dispelled rumors and lies, and thereby helped consolidate the election results. This supports H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose and also H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.\textsuperscript{27}


Also very helpful were interviews with the following U.N. officials at the U.N. in New York over the period April 12-28, 1996: Joao Lins de Albuquerque, Media Division, Department of Public Information; Henry Breed, Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, Department of Public Information; Fred Eckhard, Senior Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Kevin Kennedy, Chief, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; Steve Whitehouse, Video Section, Department of Public Information; Lena Yacoumopoulou, Film/Video Archives, Department of Public Information. During this visit to New York, I also interviewed Dr. Michael Doyle, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy at the Academy.
Conclusion: Cambodia and Transparency

In the Summer of 1997, Hun Sen staged a coup and took over Cambodia's government. Whatever the future holds, Cambodia took a step forward with UNTAC's help. One can hope that having tasted a multi-party election, a free press, and progress in human rights, Cambodians won't let their country take too many steps back. One can also hope that the memories of these advances will help them take more steps forward when the time comes. These hopes can only be realized if Cambodians care how and by whom they are governed.\textsuperscript{28}

UNTAC had some failings and inadequacies, but the core of its mandate – the holding of free elections – was a success. In achieving this success, transparency was not a sufficient tool, but it was certainly a necessary tool. UNTAC's experience offers clear and unambiguous support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose.

The promise of transparency was very mildly helpful in getting the parties to agree to the Paris Accords. Power politics and historical circumstances were far more important. Hence, H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation receives very modest support.

The Cambodian factions resisted many of the military aspects of the Paris Accords. There was little for UNTAC to monitor and verify. And when it reported what it did successfully

\textsuperscript{28} John Brown, PhD candidate at MIT and a reporter for the Phnom Penh Post and Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists argue that Cambodians don't care very much how they are governed or who governs them and that even after their elections, the political culture of Cambodians is such that democracy is a very distant prospect.
verify, the departure and subsequent absence of Vietnamese forces, UNTAC was not believed by the Khmer Rouge. Hence, support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions is weakened, but only very mildly because this failure is the factions' fault.

UNTAC's repatriation efforts depended to some degree on reducing returnees' unwarranted fears about their safety. Thus, the success of these efforts offers some support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions.

UNTAC failed at civil control. This effort could have depended to a large degree on transparency for its success, but like the military aspects of UNTAC's mandate, resistance by the factions torpedoed UNTAC before transparency could play a role.

While information and education played a large role in UNTAC's human rights campaign, transparency was not much of an issue. Further, UNTAC had difficulty in this area because of its very limited capabilities for coercion and enforcement.

UNTAC's greatest success was the election. Transparency played a large role in this success. Through information/education, with Radio UNTAC in particular, UNTAC defused many rumors, calmed many fears, clarified UNTAC's role, stopped interference with electoral procedures, and helped end disputes about the election's results. Without information/education and transparency, the elections might have gone down the drain. H1: Regimes Provide Transparency, H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions, and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose all receive very strong support. H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis receives some
support.

UNTAC's experience suggests some conditions under which an security regime can promote peace with transparency. Transparency is about information. Making information provided by the U.N. (or others) count is easiest to do in areas where information is otherwise hard to come by or the current sources are obviously biased and/or are under monopoly control. This is more likely to be the case where poverty, underdevelopment, and/or dictators reign.
UNTAG in Namibia

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the first non-traditional peacekeeping operation to begin as the Cold War ended. This section on UNTAG reinforces many of the themes from the better documented efforts of UNTAC in Cambodia. The U.N. media efforts again clarified the operation's purpose and defused rumors and fears that would have otherwise threatened the successful execution of the mandate. After discussing the conditions which led to UNTAG's deployment (to see if H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation receives support), I will then assess UNTAG's mandate, operations, and the extent to which its considerable success relied on transparency.

The efforts of UNTAG helped free Namibia from South African rule, marking the end of one of the world's longest processes of decolonization. From 1884-1914, Namibia was a German colony, then known as South-West Africa. Under the League of Nations' mandate system, South-West Africa was turned over to South Africa following World War I. When World War II ended and the League of Nations dissolved into the U.N., South Africa refused the U.N.'s requests to place South-West Africa under trusteeship -- direct administration by the U.N. In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly voted to end South Africa's mandate, but this changed little under on the ground. Formed in 1960, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) resorted to violence in 1966 in its attempts to gain independence for the country. SWAPO became a full-fledged a guerilla rebel group and operated out of Zambia and then Angola when the latter became independent in 1975. SWAPO's reliance on Angolan bases swept it into Cold War
politics as superpower support for various Angolan factions made Angola one of the central battlegrounds for influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Conflict between SWAPO and South Africa smoldered on for years. The U.N. General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people in 1976.

South Africa offered a plan for Namibian independence in 1975 that would have preserved apartheid. In response, the West (the U.S., France, Britain, Canada, and West Germany) formed a Contact Group to try to help manage a peaceful transition to independence, one that would avoid apartheid, civil war, and Soviet influence. By 1978, the Contact Group had come up with a plan to grant Namibia independence. A key element in Namibia's move to self-determination and self-governance was to be free elections assisted by the U.N. and a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in particular. This was all specified in U.N. resolution 435. It took a decade, though, before South Africa decided to leave Namibia and UNTAG could be activated.

The most important thing that convinced South Africa it was time to leave Namibia was that Cuban troops also finally agreed to leave Angola.29 Their departure meant that Namibia was less necessary to the South Africans as a buffer zone. South Africa had always insisted that the

29 This in turn reflected shifting relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and between the Soviets and Cuba. Cuba's departure from Angola relied on part on transparency provided by the U.N. According to Virginia Page Fortna, "South Africa was capable of verifying the Cuban withdrawal with its own technology, but charges of Cuban noncompliance would carry little weight coming from South Africa alone. South Africa was uncomfortable about the UN's impartiality but trusted UN monitors to report what they saw. Angola and Cuba wanted verification of their compliance with the peace plan to be indisputable to ensure they were not blamed for any attempt by South Africa to back away from the plan." See "The United Nations Angola Verification Mission I," in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p. 379.

This passage offers support for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation and shows various parties using transparency instrumentally, albeit still in the service of peace.
Cubans withdraw before they would grant independence to Namibia. In addition to Cuban withdrawal, the international political climate had begun to shift and the U.S. and Soviets began to cooperate to bring peace and independence to Namibia. U.S. mediation by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker was particularly effective. Domestic politics in South Africa had become more liberal and South Africa was increasingly unwilling to bear the cost of conflict in Namibia. In Crocker's words, "the right alignment--the proper constellation--of local, regional, and international events" necessary to create peace in Namibia (and Angola) had come about.30

Thus, of the various factors and turning points that led to the deployment of UNTAG, none had much to do with transparency (except indirectly in Angola. See footnote 29). This is underscored by the fact that the basic plans for UNTAG had been sitting on the shelf for years. The promise of transparency (monitoring, etc) had been on offer for a decade, but had been ignored. As a result, H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation receives no support.31

UNTAG's Mandate, Operations, and Transparency

UNTAG's mandate had two main elements. As with UNTAC, each depended to some degree on transparency for its effectiveness. The most important component of the mandate was


to create the conditions for and then hold free and fair elections. Supporting this civil component was a military and police whose success was a necessary precondition for the elections. The mandate of the military and police component was to supervise the cease-fire and verify the withdrawal of South African forces. In addition, SWAPO forces were to be cantoned and the remaining South African controlled South West African Police (SWAPOL) were to be monitored by UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL).

UNTAG started formal operations on April 1, 1989 and lasted until March 1990. It began to deploy its forces in April of 300 military monitors, 2550 troops (one battalion from Kenya, Malaysia, and Finland), 1500 civilian police, a number of logistics and other units, and various support and political personnel. UNTAG numbered about 8000 when the elections began.

Military Component SWAPO launched a major incursion on April 1, the day the cease-fire began.\(^{32}\) Even though a deal to end the incursion was reached in little over a week (and SWAPO was getting beaten by the South Africans), SWAPO's actions delayed UNTAG, cost UNTAG some credibility, and "revived the mistrust and division which had begun to be assuaged during the seven months of de facto cease-fire."\(^{33}\)

Several of UNTAG's early radio programs (and parts of other information efforts) were devoted to covering the events of early April and subsequent monitoring of the cease-fire. Fortunately, after early April, there was good news to report and UNTAG's information efforts worked to help calm fears. More on these efforts is offered below in the section on the civilian

\(^{32}\) UNTAG was just beginning to deploy and could do nothing to stop the 1500-strong incursion. The U.N. agreed to let South Africa, whose forces had been confined to base, repel the SWAPO forces.

component.

Except for the SWAPO incursion, UNTAG enjoyed nearly complete cooperation and consent from the parties. This was the major reason for UNTAG's success. There was very little pre-election violence. UNTAG's information efforts help spread what became calming news.

**CIVILIAN COMPONENT** The civilian component was supposed to educate Namibians about democracy and elections. According to the U.N.:

UNTAG personnel found that the Namibian people were, in many cases, perplexed about what was happening and what UNTAG actually was. As a result of many years of colonialism and apartheid, Namibia had a public information system which was geared to maintain this situation, with deeply partisan newspapers and a public broadcasting system prone to disinformation. UNTAG had to neutralize these processes and to provide Namibians with relevant and objective information.

The effort was led by UNTAG's information service which used radio, television, all kinds of visual materials, and print, as well as the traditional word of mouth. ... Information proved to be one of the key elements in UNTAG's operation; by the end, more than 200 radio broadcasts... 32 television programmes, and more than 590,000 separate information items had been produced.34

The situation was ripe for UNTAG to reduce fears and substitute facts for rumors (H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose). However, at first, many Namibians did not believe the U.N. was impartial. Professionalism, repetition of key themes, and avoidance of overt controversy helped bring Namibians around and calm their suspicions.

The main topics and themes were: repatriation, voter registration, the code of conduct for the

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elections, explaining the role of UNCIVPOL units, and explaining the disarming and removal of South African units. In other words, H1: Regimes Provide Transparency could not occur before trust was established with the Namibians.

Namibians harbored a number of specific fears, and the U.N. worked to reduce them. For example, many refugees were fearful of returning. In response, the U.N. told stories of successful repatriation. Others feared the return of South African forces. In response, the U.N. reported on the agreements South Africa had signed, on the departure of tanks (etc.), and on the attention being paid the problem by the international community. Other fears were that there would be no jobs when the U.N. left (these jobs were also very helpful in winning over the hearts, minds, and wallets, of Namibians). In response, the U.N. featured all the U.N. agencies who would remain to help after UNTAG left: the UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFP, and UNESCO, among others.

How this worked can be seen by looking at the transcripts for the radio programs. Unlike in Cambodia, the U.N. did not run its own station but had to use the state radio facilities. The broadcasts were only five minutes long, but their reputation and audience grew. Also unlike Radio UNTAC's operation, nothing in Namibia was ever live. Here are excerpts from a radio program that dealt with fears of returnees:

Yacoumopoulou (host): Today, more on the situation of the returnees. Returnees are naturally concerned about their future in Namibia...Jeff Crisp, Information Officer for UNHCR, has recently returned from a visit to the reception centers - with this report.

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35 I am extremely grateful for the help of Lena Yacoumopoulou for allowing me to review these transcripts and for talking with me at length about the U.N.'s operations in Namibia and elsewhere. Almost everyone I talked to at the U.N. was helpful, but she went beyond the call of duty. According to Fred Eckhard, then in the DPKO and now the Secretary-General's spokesperson, Yacoumopoulou single-handedly produced the radio programs in Namibia.
Crisp: Now of course UNHCR's primary responsibility is to ensure that refugees can come back to their homeland in conditions of safety...it's quite certain at the moment that there will be severe problems for some of the returnees in finding shelter...employment...medical care...So there is a growing effort amongst the UN agencies ... to see how [these problems] can be tackled.

... Yacoumopoulou: Another element that Jeff Crisp feels has been exaggerated in the press is that returnees are overwhelmed with fear.

Crisp: Of course there's a degree of caution amongst people and it's totally understandable that if you've been out of your country for 10 or 12 years, you're not really sure where you're going back to...what reception you are going to get...It is quite understandable that people should be cautious and perhaps even a little bit apprehensive. But I wouldn't say there was any genuine atmosphere of fear in the reception centres.

Yacoumopoulou: On the whole, though, Jeff Crisp reports that the mood in the reception centres in the north is one of excitement and liveliness.

Crisp: As soon as they jump off the buses, they are looking around to see people they may not have seen for several years. Often there's spontaneous singing...and various forms of jubilation...36

This is H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions in action, as well as some H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose. The U.N. is being honest about the fears, but also reporting that things are not as bad as rumored in the local press and that the U.N. is working hard to fix whatever problems remain.

There were many similar broadcasts involving the election process, presence and monitoring of South African forces, and so forth. UNTAG's media, liaison and outreach efforts were extremely effective, and they were effective in good part because they increased transparency and thereby reduced rumors and fears.

Ninety-six percent of eligible voters voted between November 7-11 1989 with a scant 1.4 percent of the ballots were rejected. SWAPO received 57% of the vote and the U.N. declared the


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elections free and fair on the 14th. The new Constituent Assembly quickly set about the task of writing a constitution. Thanks primarily to the overall cooperation and consent of relevant local, regional, and international actors, Namibia's conflict was over. This cooperation and consent was key, but the U.N.'s efforts to increase transparency helped create the conditions necessary for a free and fair election.\(^{37}\)

**CONCLUSION: UNTAG AND TRANSPARENCY**

Like UNTAC, UNTAG came into being largely because of political changes at a variety of levels, not because of the transparency that could be promised with UNTAG's deployment. Thus, H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation is not supported. Unlike UNTAC, UNTAG's military component faced largely consensual adversaries (after an initial debacle). Thus, the information division could report mostly good and calming news about the durability of the cease-fire and departure of foreign troops. This helped reduce fears and H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions receives some support. UNTAG supplied information also calmed fears in other areas of UNTAG's mandate such as repatriation of refugees. Like UNTAC, information was at its most visible when used to promote free and fair elections. Some of the information increased transparency and again reduced fears, both about potential problems with the elections and adversaries and about UNTAG and its purpose. H3 and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose are both

supported.

The same conditions that helped UNTAC's successes with information and transparency also helped UNTAG. The country had a poor media infrastructure and the media that did exist lacked credibility. This made it relatively easy for the U.N. to provide credible, authoritative, transparency-increasing information.
Conclusion

As there are conclusions at the end of each section on UNTAC and UNTAG, I will try to avoid being repetitive. This table summarizes my findings in this chapter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Predictions</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Comments about findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Transparency-increasing mechanism used in case(s)? [A yes supports H1: regimes provide transparency]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>A wide range of mechanisms ranging from radio, banners, and town meetings to theater groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Promise of verification/monitoring/transparency important to adversaries when making peace? [A yes supports H2: transparency promotes cooperation]</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, even though transparency was crucial to free and fair elections, which were in turn crucial to peace, UNTAC and UNTAG's deployments were made possible by changes in regional and global political circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Threat assessments become more benign, tensions and fears reduced? [A yes supports H3: transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions]</td>
<td>Yes, Strongly</td>
<td>Probably the clearest demonstration of transparency in action in this thesis came in this chapter as the U.N. conducted active information campaigns that calmed fears about its activities and fears about possible troubles elsewhere. H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears anc Clarifies Purpose is strongly supported as well (indeed, it was this chapter that led me to propose it).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Plans changed based on new information provided or facilitated by the regime, thus averting miscalculation? [A yes supports H4: transparency reduces miscalculation]</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>It is hard to see miscalculation here, although some of the SOCs tactics in Cambodia backfired due to UNTAC's successful counter-information campaign (this is more relevant to H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis, though).</td>
</tr>
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The U.N.'s information efforts in each of these missions were part education, part sales pitch, and part cajoling. But they also increased transparency and increased transparency was clearly very helpful in making each of these missions as successful as it was. Without the U.N. to defuse rumors, it seems likely that violence in each case would have been created or spiraled higher by unchecked misinformation.

The policy recommendations resulting from this chapter are discussed shortly in the
conclusion. They include increased use of U.N. radio and other media to help stem conflict in cases where the U.N. and its members are unwilling to send peacekeepers.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This conclusion begins by summarizing each chapter's 'lessons learned' about transparency.\(^1\) Then I evaluate how my hypotheses fared in light of these lessons and the evidence presented in the chapters. Next, I discuss caveats and areas for further research. Finally, I offer the implications of these findings for international relations theorists and policy makers.

Lessons about Transparency by Chapter

CHAPTER 4: DIPLOMACY AND TRANSPARENCY BEFORE THE CONCERT

Chapter four had four transparency-related purposes. First, it described what a world with minimal transparency looks like: few and often corrupt diplomats, few and very slow means of gathering and sending information, and no multilateral forums or other regimes and institutions to facilitate diplomacy and increase transparency.

Second, the story of the Seven Years War in America illustrated how these factors (minimal transparency) could contribute to the outbreak of war. The story of uncertain borders and the Delimitation Commission's efforts to fix them was particularly relevant as similar

\(^1\) For other lessons and observations, especially about the operational aspects of peacekeeping, please see the relevant chapters.

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problems with disputed cease-fire lines now cause sometimes major headaches for UNFICYP and low-grade pain for UNDOF.

Third, the story of the first partition of Poland shows that even in the pre-Concert period, a time of relatively minimal transparency, states using bilateral diplomacy were able to cobble together the fairly complex deal to partition Poland. Because the deal involved a number of states, this means that bilateral diplomacy can yield essentially multilateral results. States were able to establish bargaining positions and adjust them in ways similar to the way they did under the Concert. While the Seven Years War highlights, indeed almost caricatures, the dangers of minimal transparency, the first partition of Poland only a few years later shows that states can avoid miscalculation using bilateral, non-Concert diplomacy. That said, it is clear that dealing with foreign policy on the American frontier is harder than in central Europe in the 1700s. One reason this was so is transparency-related: reliable information was easier to come by and quicker to transmit in Europe.

Fourth, the general tone of states' behavior during the first partition of Poland serves as a benchmark to help measure the pacifying effects of Concert diplomacy. During the first partition of Poland, the great powers wheeled and dealed, feared great power war in central Europe, and avoided this war in part by carving up a smaller power.

CHAPTER 5: THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

This chapter offered the following lessons about transparency. First, Castlereagh, the prime architect of the Concert, expressed some hope that Concert diplomacy would increase
transparency and thereby reduce tensions. This offers some support for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation.

Second, the mechanism of the forum (a.k.a. Concert diplomacy) was often used and this lends some support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. However, the effects of multilateral diplomacy were modest and did not provide strong support for any of the other transparency hypotheses. This suggests that meeting together did not add much transparency or that transparency has modest effects. Another aspect of multilateral diplomacy related to H1 is that states often supplemented Concert diplomacy with meetings in other locations, with bilateral contacts, side-meetings, and so forth. These may be valuable supplements to or byproducts of forums, and they may serve to increase transparency. But they may also serve to generate private information.

Third, states engaged in hardball diplomacy during the Concerts' crises. Behavior during the Concert period was quite similar to that observed during the first partition of Poland.

Fourth, the Concert helped states conduct hardball diplomacy and in two instances this offered support for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation (Poland/Saxony and Belgium). Concert diplomacy enables Type III confrontational transparency.

Fifth, in another instance, Concert diplomacy helped states conduct a deception campaign (Greek revolt). This weakens support for H4 and also confirms the deductive caveat from the

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2 Of course, this is to be expected unless widespread pacific norms or other influences exerted strong influences. I argue, that although the states did avail themselves of Concert diplomacy and that this was a significant change in diplomatic style, behavior was not so different from that during the first partition of Poland. And then when one adds in the numerous other factors which may have tended states toward peace: war weariness, bonds formed during the Napoleonic Wars, common fear of revolution, etc., this further weakens arguments that suggest that Concert-promoted norms caused a lot of peace.
theory chapter that mechanisms that can be used to increase transparency may also be used to deceive. Transmission of information can sometimes become transmission of disinformation.

Sixth, there is little evidence that Concert diplomacy reduced fears (H3). Instead, states often learned that their fears were justified or made their objections to others' policies more clearly known. This supports H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Seventh, when H6 is at work, miscalculation may be reduced (H4). As shown in the Poland/Saxony and Belgium episodes, states' bargaining positions and tactics may become more realistic or focused once stakes are clarified.

CHAPTER 6: UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)

This chapter shifted the focus from great power forums to U.N. peacekeeping, a quite different beast offering a number of new lessons about transparency. First, transparency had little to do with the initial deployment of UNFICYP, so H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation is not supported. UNFICYP's continued deployment and the Greek/Greek Cypriot's financial support for UNFICYP have less to do with transparency than they do with the GC's efforts to keep the international spotlight on the Cyprus problem and hopes of adding marginally to deterrence of the Turks. H2': Transparency Maintains Cooperation is only supported in the tactical sense that UNFICYP's success in keeping small problems small prevents incidents from escalating and helps reduce tensions on Cyprus.

Second, UNFICYP uses a number of transparency-increasing mechanisms ranging from
liaison systems to the buffer zone to public reports of its observations. This offers some support for H1: Regimes Provide Transparency. However, the effects of the transparency provided are modest. UNFICYP often uses these mechanisms for purposes other than the provision of transparency (as in using the liaison system to get a cease-fire violator in trouble). Further, UNFICYP sometimes finds it useful not to fully disclose the information it has. Manipulated information and half-truths sometimes help promote peace.

Third, the provision of transparency does help UNFICYP do its job and my rough estimate is that transparency may account for about 15% of UNFICYP's considerable effectiveness in peacekeeping.

The transparency that is provided tends to reduce fears (H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions) much more than reduce miscalculation (H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation). The reasons for this are discussed below.

Fourth, transparency on Cyprus is rarely a pure product and this is true in two senses. Transparency is often combined with cajoling, deterrence, mediation and other such efforts, all of which together describe peacekeeping along the buffer zone. I have come to view peacekeeping as a stew of different ingredients that are hard to separate from one another. Further, the Roccas Bastion episode showed that transparency sometimes can not be provided without great power and U.N. Security Council intervention and leverage. These points suggest that transparency may not be quite as manipulable as initially thought.

The liaison system and the buffer zone highlight the point that transparency is not a pure product. Both increase transparency, and both are crucial to the U.N.'s day-to-day effectiveness.
However, the liaison system is also used to cajole, deter, and mediate. The buffer zone creates physical distance between the OPFORs and this lessens the number of incidents UNFICYP faces (as evidenced by the fact that close physical proximity helps explain the high number of incidents around Nicosia). Finally, the buffer zone reifies the division on Cyprus and thus is a symbol of tension that offers support for H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict.

Fifth, one problem with the buffer zone is transparency related: there are disputes over what I call the 'base truth,' or the most basic elements of an agreed upon status quo. In this case, the base truth involves the exact location of the cease-fire lines and nobody's records on Cyprus are good enough to conclusively establish where the lines are. This invites all sorts of bickering between the sides and with UNFICYP. More serious incidents occur when one side tries to move forward into land that UNFICYP can not conclusively and unambiguously refute their claims. As transparency should help get adversaries to play from the same song book, and differing interpretations invite miscalculations (as shown in the Seven Years War), the inadequately established base truth hinders UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency and reduce miscalculation (H4). It also hinders UNFICYP's ability to put H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis into play.

Sixth, UNFICYP is often quite effective at investigating incidents and gathering information. However, this does not always mean transparency is or will be provided. Instead, it often means UNFICYP knows enough to credibly identify the violator, assign blame, and get the violator to back down. This use of information is frequent on Cyprus and offers strong support to H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis.
Understanding how H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis works in turn helps understand what I call the operational definition of consent in a peacekeeping operation. Simply put, consent exists when the peacekeeping operation can get a violator in trouble. When the peacekeeping operation can go up the perpetrator's chain of command and find someone who will discipline the perp, then consent exists. To do this, the peacekeepers must know enough about what happened to make a persuasive case (and the liaison system must function at all levels of command).

Seventh, several incidents in this chapter revealed UNFICYP withholding or manipulating information. In almost every case, this was the right, tension-reducing thing to do. This shows that transparency is not something to pursue blindly. Complete openness can have costs while some cunning manipulation of information can be helpful.

Eighth, the importance of transparency varied depending on the type of incident UNFICYP faced. Some incidents create more unwarranted suspicions than others and thus are better 'targets' for UNFICYP's ability to increase transparency. For example, construction creates more suspicion than slingshooting. Being slingshotted is clear. But whether someone is maintaining a position (allowed) or improving it (not allowed) is far less clear. In many cases, only UNFICYP is capable of investigating and determining the difference (which supports H1).

Ninth, the counterpoint to the previous point is that suspicions are rampant on Cyprus. No matter what UNFICYP determines or says, the two sides still will not trust each other very much. The Roccas Bastion incident demonstrated this. Greek suspicions were mildly calmed, 

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3 Although there are numerous incidents of each side reporting fictional incidents to the U.N.
but that is all. (To some extent as well, Greek suspicions were justified, confirming H6: Transparency Clarifies Deadlock, Tension, or Conflict).

This confirms an important caveat about transparency mentioned in the theory chapter: the sides have to want to cooperate or at least have tensions and suspicions low enough so that they will believe whatever calming information comes their way.

Tenth, UNFICYP contributes little to nothing to each side's strategic or high-level military/political threat assessments. However, UNFICYP's Chief of Mission plays an important role in the U.N. Secretary-General's good offices mission and this helps facilitate communications between the two sides on Cyprus. The bitter state of relations, combined somewhat ironically with the low probability of war since 1974, helps explain why so little support for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation was evinced in this chapter. Everyone pretty much knows the score. This state of relations also explains why H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions applies more to the tactical, incident by incident level, rather than a higher political level. Of course, keeping small incidents small helps maintain the cease-fire and prevent worsening of relations. But UNFICYP's ability to put H3 into play does little to directly promote a peaceful solution per se.

Eleventh and finally, the discussion of bicomunal activities introduced what I call societal-level transparency. This is when the people of two communities harbor unwarranted distrust for each other and when (it is hoped) increased contact between the two will reduce this distrust.

Some call these sorts of activities conflict resolution or confidence-building measures.
And some would argue that the term societal-level transparency unhelpfully dilutes the meaning of transparency. I argue that the term societal-level transparency helps understand more precisely how some practices of conflict resolution and confidence-building are supposed to work their charms.

CHAPTER 7: UNDOF, TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Even though life on the Golan Heights is quite uneventful for UNDOF, the operation still offers a number of insights. First, the promise of transparency meant little to each side's willingness to accept U.N. forces on the Golan. H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation receives correspondingly little (but not no) support. Superpower leverage and involvement was the biggest factor that led to the U.N. monitoring of the cease-fire.

Second, even though H2 receives little support, the buffer zone created by UNDOF's deployment helped each side make territorial compromises. They could give up territory to the zone that they would not be willing to concede to each other.

Third, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy involved the management and selective communication of information. Israel and Syria might have deadlocked had they known how far apart their respective positions were at certain points. While it is possible to imagine this sort of diplomacy backfiring, it worked well in this case and this suggests again that there are times when transparency is not a goal to be pursued blindly and without reservation. As pointed out in the UNFICYP case, sometimes incomplete information is better than complete information.

One way to view Kissinger's diplomacy is as an 'active forum' where the information
between states is transmitted and edited by an outside actor (not ignoring the role of leverage, of course). Kissinger's diplomacy facilitated and added value to the flow of information. It is unlikely that this sort of diplomacy (whether by Kissinger, other diplomats, or a regime) would be of much use in relations between great powers. They are less likely to accept mediation by others.

Fourth, UNDOF's day to day operations on the Golan do not increase transparency very much, despite elaborate monitoring and verification in the Areas of Separation and Limitation. Both sides, especially the Israelis, know what they need to know about the other side's forces. Information from UNDOF adds little value. While the monitoring and verification mechanisms employed by UNDOF would seem to be able to increase transparency considerably, in fact they do not.

Fifth, the distances and limitations created by the AOS/AOLs may alter the offense/defense balance somewhat in favor of the defense and this may reduce miscalculation. Keeping in mind point four though, this means it is not transparency provided by UNDOF that is reducing miscalculation. Little support is offered for H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation in this operation. Transparency aside, this point underscores UNDOF's overall peacekeeping utility.

Sixth, a related point is that there are virtually no tension-raising incidents on the Golan and the sides never dispute UNDOF's observations. These tranquil conditions make it extremely hard for UNDOF's activities to put H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions into play.
Seventh, the last two points suggest some important preconditions for regime-provided transparency to be effective. The sides have to have incomplete information and/or harbor unwarranted fears for regime-provided transparency to have the effects captured in H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions or H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

Eighth, even if there were gaps in each side's threat assessments, it is not clear that the two sides have allowed UNDOF to be thorough enough to fill in these gaps. Thus, another precondition is that the sides have to allow the regime to increase transparency.

Ninth, despite all these caveats, analysts tend to concur that UNDOF's presence promotes peace. Although the peace-promoting effects traceable to transparency may be less than all the AOS/AOLs and monitoring imply, physical distance and the U.N.'s/international community's presence likely add some marginal increment towards peace.

CHAPTER 8: UNTAC AND UNTAG, TRANSPARENCY IN ELECTION-MONITORING

This chapter contained the strongest evidence of any for the effects of regime provided transparency. Among its lessons are: First, there was (again) little support for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. The creation and deployments of UNTAC and UNTAG were much more dependent on changes in the political environment affecting the conflicts in Cambodia and Namibia. More specifically, the peace agreements that the U.N. operations consolidated and implemented were dependent on improved relations between the great and greater powers that
were previously manipulating events in each country.

Second, H1: Regimes Provide Transparency is strongly supported in these missions. The mechanisms used are clearly identifiable (everything from puppets to radio) and the information conveyed (and to whom) are equally clear.

Third, these multifunctional missions most notable transparency-related successes were among their most notable successes, period. Through the use of media and information campaigns, they calmed fears about the mission's purposes, and often calmed fears about the situation in each country, as well as educated citizens about elections. UNTAC and UNTAG's information efforts greatly increased transparency and provide strong support for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions and H3': Self-Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Clarifies Purpose. While the elections were centerpieces in each country's efforts to make peace, I do not mean to imply that each operation was a complete success. UNTAC in particular had notable failures during its tenure, and the peace agreement has unraveled since.4

Fourth, there is little evidence in this chapter that supports H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation. This may be due to lack of evidence, but the clearest bit I have is that some of the SOC's more egregious efforts to corrupt Cambodia's elections were detected, revealed, and reversed by UNTAC. However, even this seems to support H5: the Investigation/information-based Cease and Desist Hypothesis more than H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation.

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4 As pointed out in the case study though, this does not mean that UNTAC's efforts all came to naught. Some long-term contributions include helping isolate the Khmer Rouge, improving human rights, and perhaps giving Cambodians models of political behavior that may again be useful sometime in the future.
Fifth, this chapter suggests more preconditions for the relevance of regime-provided transparency. Before the U.N.'s arrival in each country, the existing media were extremely biased, had limited coverage, and were based on relatively outmoded technologies. These factors made it relatively easy for the U.N. to increase transparency. The information the U.N. operations provided added value by being credible, by covering wide areas, and by using a full spectrum of 'technologies' from radio relays to town meetings and puppet shows.
Table 9-1 summarizes these findings with regard to the main hypotheses while 9-2 covers all Hypotheses and Corollaries:

### Table 9-1 Findings about the Main Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>H1: Regimes Provide Transparency</th>
<th>H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation</th>
<th>H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions</th>
<th>H4: Transparency Reduces Miscalculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concert of Europe</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC/UNTAG</td>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>Not really</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9-2 Findings about All Hypotheses and Corollaries

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concert of Europe</td>
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<td>A little</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Perhaps</td>
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<td>Very little</td>
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<td>Very little</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC/UNTAG</td>
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<td>A lot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
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</table>
Some General and Cross-case Conclusions about Transparency

The clearest overall finding is that I tossed a softball at transparency theory and it only hit a single. I selected cases which I thought should have evinced stronger evidence for the provision and effects of transparency than they did. While one would hope for the cause of peace that transparency's effects would be pronounced, beneficent, and easily manipulable, none of these was clearly the case.

The Concert helped avert miscalculation in two instances, while facilitating deception in another. The effects of regime-provided transparency were dramatic in the cases of UNTAC and UNTAG. UNFICYP and UNDOF showed more modest results.

There is a silver lining to finding mixed (from dramatic to negative) and modest results using favorable cases. By extrapolating or generalizing from the lessons-by-chapter listed above, this study is able to provide a number of bounding conditions for the effective provision of transparency. I first list the bounding conditions that were derived from and apply especially to peacekeeping operations and then I list those derived from the Concert cases. From peacekeeping:

- If transparency is to reduce fears, there have to be unwarranted fears for the regime to address.

- These fears and suspicions (and tensions more generally) can not be so great that nothing the regime does can reduce them.

Combined with the last point, this creates a fairly narrow band of relations where transparency can help. As I argued in the theory chapter: transparency helps those who basically want to get along, but need a little help to do so.

- If regime-provided transparency is to add new information (which it must to reduce fears and miscalculation), the states or parties have to start with incomplete or inaccurate
information so that the regime can fill in the gaps or make corrections. This suggests that regimes will be of comparatively little value to developed countries which can independently avail themselves of a number of mechanisms to gather information.

- It is easier for the regime to add new information if the information flow in the target country is limited and lacks credibility. This suggests that un/underdeveloped countries are better candidates for the U.N.'s efforts than more developed areas. This is because the former's media infrastructures are likely to be relatively poor and their political discourse lacking in nuance and debate. One notable exception to this rule is the moderately developed Serbia. Much is made of the Milosevic's media near-monopoly and how he manipulated his citizens into ethnic conflict by repeated and unchecked lies and distortions about ethnic relations in the crumbling Yugoslavia.

- A peacekeeping operation is unlikely to be deployed in the first place if great and locally great powers do not support installing the operation in the target country. The variable of great power support affects the manipulability of peacekeeping overall, so it necessarily affects the manipulability of transparency provided by the peacekeeping operation.

- A peacekeeping operation also cannot provide transparency if the parties do not consent to this function. This is true in two ways. First, consent from the parties involved is needed for most peacekeeping operations to deploy (although the last point suggests that consent is often induced by outside powers). Thus, the parties involved have to agree to whatever information gathering mechanisms the peacekeeping operation will use. Second, if consent does not exist, this means transparency will be irrelevant. A peacekeeping operation deployed without consent is most likely to be a Chapter 7 enforcement operation authorized to use force. Transparency is of little use if bullets are flying and the parties in conflict want to fight.

These are some bounding conditions for forums and transparency:

- States have to use the forum for it to be useful. However, if states stop using a forum, this can signal malign intent or divergent interests.

- If transparency is to meaningfully reduce miscalculation, someone has to be on the verge of going to war. This is more likely to be the case for a crisis management forum than for a peacekeeping operation. Crisis management forums are convened because war is in the air. Peacekeeping operations aren't normally put in place until there is a peace to consolidate.

- A forum is most useful when states have few other means of communication. Given the numbers of forums and other means of communication available in the late twentieth
century, this condition is rare.

I will now offer some general observations about each of the main hypotheses and attempt to answer some questions about transparency that arose during the study. For some of the reasons just described, it is harder for regimes to increase or provide transparency (H1) than one may think. Transparency is not that manipulable. H1: Regimes Provide Transparency is a hypothesis, not an assumption. First of all, the range of circumstances under which a regime can usefully provide transparency is fairly circumscribed. Second, even if a regime can provide transparency, it may be mixed up with so many other activities (deterrence, cajoling, and mediation; the stew of peacekeeping) that its effects are hard to discern and its manipulability less than clear. Third, the ability of a regime to provide transparency may also depend on great power leverage and support, further calling into question the extent to which transparency is a manipulable product of regimes. Fourth, even if a regime can generate information and provide transparency, it often turns out that it is helpful to withhold or manipulate information to promote peace.

H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation was the least supported hypothesis in this study. The promise of transparency made relatively little difference to states when they decided to make peace and form or accept a regime. There were many factors that led to the creation of the Concert. Transparency meant something to Castlereagh, but a number of other factors ranging from the momentum of war-time relations, war weariness, to ideological homogeneity all played a role. The situation was clearer in the peacekeeping operations where the biggest factor leading to the deployment of an operation was changes in the power exerted on the local actors. In some
cases, this meant that the local actors lost their patrons and in other instances it meant that the superpowers decided to use the U.N. to help them put an end to a conflict. Sometimes these factors worked together. Of course, H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation is not doomed. There are probably cases, perhaps many cases, which would offer support for H2.

More evidence was evinced for H3: Transparency Reduces Unwarranted Fears and Worst-case Assumptions in peacekeeping operations than during the Concert's episodes. Why are peacekeeping operations better at addressing unwarranted fears and tensions than at averting miscalculation? I believe this is true because peacekeeping operations are generally deployed with the consent of the parties and because macro-political forces and changes that significantly influenced the targeted adversaries helped make the conditions ripe for peace. Thus, peacekeeping operations often deploy when the probability of war is relatively low or is relatively controllable by the actors who helped move the conditions towards ripe in the first place. The purpose of the peacekeeping operation under these circumstances is to reduce tensions and consolidate the peace.

In contrast, why is it that crisis management forums facilitate hardball diplomacy, reduce miscalculation a bit (H4), and also clarify the existence of deadlock or conflict (H6)? I believe these things are true almost by definition of crisis management forum. Without a crisis, states would not be meeting and there would not be conflict between them. When they meet under these circumstances, diplomacy boils down to hard bargaining. When lucky, this bargaining may reduce miscalculation. When less lucky, deadlock may degenerate into conflict.

It is possible that forums may in some cases reduce unwarranted fears (H3), but I did not
find evidence for this. And again, by definition of crisis management forum, states are likely to find that their fears are warranted (so H6 is more likely than H3).

None of this means that crisis management forums are likely to do more harm than good. Crisis management forums, especially great power forums, also fare well in rough expected utility calculations against peacekeeping, even though the effects of transparency in peacekeeping operations are sometimes more pronounced. If a crisis management forum contributes a little to preventing a great power war, this may compare favorably to a peacekeeping operation doing somewhat more to prevent a small power war.
Caveats and Limitations

Before launching into implications and policy recommendations based on these findings, I want to offer some caveats about this study and suggest areas for further research. First of all, there remains much work to be done on transparency. My conclusions are suggestive; they seem plausible based on the available evidence. Many insights would likely be gleaned from studying the effects of transparency in additional peacekeeping operations and especially in the regimes I did not cover -- various arms control arrangements, the League of Nations, and so forth. Second, it would also be worth studying the effects of non-regime based transparency. Transparency provided by states' collection of intelligence or by the spread of global media seem interesting subjects, albeit ones for which hard data would be difficult to gather.

Third, analysis of Kissinger's diplomacy in the UNDOF chapter suggests that the transparency effects of mediation and mediators (some regime-based, some not), as well as summit meetings should be examined. Fourth, Kissinger's diplomacy and UNFICYP's experiences withholding and manipulating information indicate that the question of when incomplete information and ambiguity promote cooperation and peace deserves more empirical analysis. Fifth, the relationship between the intended or formal products of forums (multilateral diplomacy, reaching formal treaties) and the unintended or side-effects of forums (side-agreements, discussions in the halls, etc) is worth study. Sixth, the Tripwire/Defection Signaling Hypothesis (p. 379) needs exploration. Finally, the issue of when and under what conditions transparency-increasing mechanisms increase vulnerability to deception deserves further consideration.
One limitation of this study, like all studies of modern diplomacy, is that one can rarely be sure that one has gathered sufficiently definitive evidence about negotiations, threat assessments, and averted miscalculation. This sort of information is often closely held or revealed with self-interested biases. Diplomatic data often does not surface for many years, if it ever comes to light at all. In a perfect world, I would like more evidence on the following types of issues: on the negotiations that led to UNTAC and UNTAG’s deployments; on what Israeli and Syrian military and government officials really think UNDOF and the AOS/AOLs contribute; and on the extent to which the buffer zone/transparency/UNFICYP have prevented miscalculation on Cyprus. While miscalculation is relatively easy to spot, averted miscalculation is comparatively tough to track down because it is a self-concealing phenomenon. What politician likes to admit or reveal his/her mistakes when they do not have to? Again, the passage of time is helpful in revealing this phenomenon.

Implications for Theorists and Recommendations for Policy Makers

My findings about the Concert and transparency have five implications. First, academics who look to the Concert as "the best example of a security regime," are either looking at the wrong regime or are not saying too much for security regimes. Second, policy recommendations based on an optimistic view of the Concert are on shaky historical footing.

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5 Additional implications and recommendations can be found at the end of some of the case studies, especially the Concert and UNFICYP chapters.

Third, policy recommendations based on the Concert are also largely irrelevant as well, at least between the great powers. There are a plethora of Concert-like forums in today's world (the U.N. Security Council, the G-7, the O.S.C.E., the E.U., etc.) and consultations between the leaders of great powers in a crisis are quickly achieved and, in late 20th century practice, are almost automatic.

Fourth, expectations about what forums can achieve should be modest. Forums simply bring leaders together, making it easier to engage in Type III confrontational transparency (defined on p. 23). Forums may lend themselves to unilateral and proffered transparency (spying and sharing) as well. Forums do not actively defuse crises or actively help states overcome fears of cooperation the way more formal ways (such as peacekeeping operations) of increasing transparency do.

Fifth, despite my general skepticism, Concert-like forums or periodic summits may well be useful when states lack the means to communicate on a regular basis, or at all. This is a rare condition today, but when communication is minimal (as between the Koreas), organized summits or forums may be all the more desirable and may be the only way to get adversaries to communicate. In testimony before the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. Army General Gary Luck, commander of both U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea said: "They (North Korea) refuse to meet us at Panmunjom on armistice-related issues, and they refuse to talk to us on the telephone when we've called to protest armistice violations." He went on to

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7 Remember that part of my skepticism about the Concert was based on comparisons with 18th century diplomacy, a time when there was a fair level of bilateral diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy did not seem to offer many benefits over bilateral diplomacy, at least in the case of the Concert. Obviously, states that barely or do not communicate are not even availing themselves of much bilateral diplomacy.
argue that "the lack of communication is dangerous because it would inhibit efforts to defuse a border situation."  

My findings about the U.N. and transparency result in three policy recommendations. First, policy makers and U.N. officials should recognize the value of increasing transparency to the success of their peacekeeping operations, reducing tension and defusing crises in numerous instances. A tool will only be correctly used if its effects are well studied and its potential is appreciated. This would be an underwhelming first recommendation were it not for the fact that in a number of my interviews, when I said I was researching whether and how peacekeeping operations increase transparency, the person being interviewed assumed I meant that I was investigating whether or not the operation itself was transparent to others. Whether and how peacekeeping operations increase(d) transparency between adversaries appeared not to cross many practitioner's minds until I explained my topic further.

Second, if peacekeepers become more aware of their transparency-increasing role, this could lead them to a number of new roles and missions. For example, peacekeepers could go beyond often passive border patrols and post-hoc incident reports and try to increase transparency proactively. They could monitor each sides' policies and statements and try to supplement these with relevant facts to help get the adversaries operating with more common and accurate information. Peacekeepers could set up truth squads and seek to quash or defuse myths and rumors before they get out of hand. To do this, doctrines, procedures, and capabilities would have to be provided to the in-house information and media departments organic to most

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8 Bill Gertz, "U.S. Commander in Korea sees North Near Disintegration," *The Washington Times*, March 16, 1996, p. 7. The first quote is a direct quoted from Luck; the second is Gertz's paraphrase of Luck.
peacekeeping operations. The U.N. could also experiment with mini-peacekeeping operations that seek only to increase transparency in cases where a full scale peacekeeping operation is not possible or desirable. A U.N. news radio located near a troubled area might do some good if helped quash rumors and deflate myths held by each side. In general, one of a peacekeeper's jobs is to talk to both sides. This means that they should become experts on the conflict their mission is trying to defuse. Peacekeeping operations sometimes do not have enough in-house expertise or information gathering capability to adequately help them separate myth from fact and provide tension-reducing information.9

Third, this research, combined with the diagnosis that hate-mongering is a major cause of ethnic conflict, suggests that information and anti-propaganda campaigns might be an effective tool to use to prevent or stop ethnic conflict. My research shows that the U.N.'s information campaigns in Cambodia and Namibia substituted facts for rumors and helped defuse tensions within their respective countries. The U.N.'s radio station in Cambodia became the most popular in the country and 'competed' with stations run by the rival political parties. Research on ethnic conflict indicates that many of these wars are started by ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs who are often quick to grab control of the media (like revolutionaries) and use hate-mongering to

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9 A recent example fleshes out this recommendation. The head of the troubled U.N. mission in Angola recently said he did not understand why the two sides were fighting. Some of the fighters admitted the same. If no one knows why the conflict persists, this fact should be broadcast far and wide. Of course, the head of the mission should still try as hard as possible to understand the conflict. Otherwise, he/she wo not be able to separate truth from myth and will be an ineffective mediator or problem-solver. If U.N. peacekeeping operations come to have the information and media capabilities I recommend, then it is absolutely essential for them to understand what is going on on the ground. For the Angolan case, see Thomas L. Friedman, "African Madness," New York Times, January 31, 1996, p. A17; for the U.N.'s difficulties in intelligence gathering in general, see Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994); for details on how the U.N. can successfully gather information and direct media campaigns to address specific problems and defuse tensions, see my case study of the U.N. mission in Cambodia, especially discussion of Radio UNTAC.
come to power and/or cause harm to others.10 These two observations provide the logic for the recommendation that the U.N. and other actors should launch information and anti-propaganda campaigns to try to defang the hate-mongers whose propaganda manipulates ethnic histories and politics and thus fuels so many of the deadly conflicts we see today.

Note that these three sets of recommendations are likely to be more applicable to smaller and less well-developed states. The active provision of transparency - such as that achieved in peacekeeping operations - will be most helpful to states whose own unilateral abilities to gather intelligence are limited. Similarly, information and anti-propaganda campaigns are more workable and are more likely to succeed in countries with relatively undeveloped media infrastructures.

The ability of security regimes to provide useful, peace-promoting transparency is often modest at best. The conditions under which security regimes can produce significant results with transparency are circumscribed by a number of factors. The good news is that once these factors are understood, the good results from UNTAC and UNTAG can be more readily duplicated and improved upon. The same circumstances that make situations ripe for the useful provision of transparency may also provide fertile ground for more ambitious transparency-related projects. These include information and anti-propaganda campaigns that aim to dampen ethnic tensions by breaking media monopolies and providing alternate sources of news and information.

Appendix I: Additional Notes on Cyprus

This appendix adds more details and analysis to the stories from the UNFICYP chapter about the Roccas Bastion construction and the killing of Panayi.

* Roccas Bastion Time line, History, and Additional Analysis

* 6/10/95
- the Turkish side informed UNFICYP at the Company level that work would begin next week on a playground in Roccas Bastion.

* 6/11/95
- UNFICYP Sector 2 communicated these plans to the National Guard 211 battalion.

* 6/12/95
- the UNFICYP Chief of Mission met with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister and was informed that repairs would take place and that a playground would be built in Roccas Bastion. The minister also noted that Roccas Bastion was not part of the buffer zone but that it was part of the "TRNC". The U.N. Senior Advisor said that the construction was unlikely to be of concern and that civilianization of the area was a worthy purpose. All sides agreed that the area was covered by the 1989 unmanning agreement. Finally, the report noted that the U.N. should inform the National Guard, in order to lessen the chances of Greek Cypriot overreaction to the construction.

* 6/19/95
- a UNFICYP liaison officer informed the National Guard headquarters about the impending construction during a routine meeting.

* 6/20/95
- excavation starts on Roccas Bastion.

* 6/21/95
- the National Guard Chief of Staff wrote the UNFICYP Chief of Staff expressing concern over the construction, noting that the playground story is certain to be a ruse to disguise military construction, and noting that the U.N. needs to correct the situation.

- The U.N. Senior Advisor received a call from the Mayor of Nicosia. The Mayor complained that UNFICYP did not inform the National Guard, to which the Senior Advisor responded that they were informed over a week ago at the headquarters and sector levels and that the U.N. had received a letter of protest. The Mayor then said that the National Guard were accusing him of complicity in the construction, that they were trying to spread blame for it, that they were working with the press because of their opposition to bicommmunal relations, and that the National Guard had been told of the Mayor's complicity by the U.N. The Mayor also proposed a press conference in order to refute the National Guard's allegations. In response, the Senior Advisor
again said that the National Guard was informed and that UNFICYP had said nothing to the National Guard about any involvement of the Mayor in the construction. The Senior Advisor also discouraged the Mayor from holding the press conference.

- UNFICYP, at a military level, requests permission to inspect the construction and are referred to "TRNC" civilian authorities. The Chief of Mission also requests permission for inspections from the "TRNC."

[UNFICYP Spokesman Rokoszewski told me that there were 10-15 stories a day in the Greek Cypriot press about the construction as it took place. Interview May 13, 1996]

* 6/22/95
- at the liaison officer level, UNFICYP repeated the requests for inspections and is again referred to civilian authorities.

- due to limited visibility of the Roccas Bastion (it is 20-30 feet above ground level), UNFICYP began monitoring the construction by helicopter. The flight reveals trenches under construction.

* 6/23/95
- another low level helicopter flight leads to the first sketches of the construction.

- UNFICYP repeated the request for inspections and mentions that it would violate the unmanning agreement if inspections were not permitted.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters (New York) and notes his concern that this could be a big problem if they can not determine soon if the construction is really a playground. He says that the Turkish Cypriots must soon agree to an inspection.

* 6/27/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters noting that the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister believes that the issue, as usual, is overblown by the Greek Cypriots to skew attention from the unimplemented confidence-building measures agreement and the Greek Cypriot/Greek joint defense plans. The "TRNC" minister also said that the Greek Cypriots were giving naval bases to the Greeks, putting planes in Syria to surround Turkey, and procuring 900km missiles to hit Ankara - all real [still according to the minister] and not overblown dangers. Finally, the minister noted similar Greek Cypriot construction in an unmanned area on 6/2 (and elsewhere) where the U.N. had not provided inspection assurances. The Chief of Mission responded to the minister by insisting on the right of inspection.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to say that the embassies of China, France, and Russia have been briefed (the U.S. and U.K. were briefed yesterday). The U.S. and U.K. had issued démarches to the Turkish Cypriots and may do the same to the Turkey. France may
follow. China and Russia are not on board (or off). The Chief of Mission urged patience to the Cyprus government, pending results from the démarches.

- the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister issued a press release claiming that the Roccas Bastion construction is for recreational purposes only. He said that the underground infrastructure was needed to protect the historical and natural fabric of the area and that the deep trenches were needed in order to connect sewers into the otherwise higher ground of Roccas Bastion. He also said that the Greek Cypriots were trying to divert attention from their own large-scale militarization efforts, as well as trying to prevent implementation of the confidence-building package.

* 6/28/95  
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters noting that the uproar from the Greek side could have been averted had the Turkish Cypriots allowed inspections promptly and kept things at a low level. He also pointed out that when the Turkish Cypriots informed the U.N. on 6/12, that acknowledged a UNFICYP interest in the area. He said he asked the Turkish Cypriots if they would trust the Greek Cypriots if the situation was reversed. Finally, he said that when Greek Cypriots digging goes into the buffer zone, UNFICYP fills it in if it can not get the Greek Cypriots to do so themselves.

* 6/30/95  
- by this time, UNFICYP had raised the height of their observation post neighboring the Roccas Bastion to get a better view. In response the Turkish Cypriots built a berm to partially re-obstruct its view.

* 7/2/95  
- the newly heightened observation post burns down.¹

* 7/3/95  
- work begins on a replacement observation post.

* 7/6/95  
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters reporting that he made no progress in his meeting with the "TRNC" president and Turkish Ambassador, even though he had threatened to inform the U.N. Security Council about the issue. The Chief of Mission wrote that he thought that the work in the Roccas Bastion was being run by the Turkish Forces. Continuing the report, the Chief of Mission said that, in a 7/5/95 meeting, he persuaded the Cypriot President to

¹ The records do not cast blame for this. However, a high-ranking UNFICYP officer I talked to all but blamed the Turkish side. He would not answer the question directly but implied I'd be a dupe if I did not think they did it. He also said that someone had attempted to torch the observation post shortly before the successful arson, that the OP was only periodically manned, and that after the first arson attempt failed, it was a mistake not to switch to 24 hour staffing.
postpone threatened unspecified action about the construction - at least until after a meeting of the National Council on 7/10. [The National Council is where the President meets with the leaders of the principal political parties in the South] The Chief of Mission also met again with the U.S. and U.K. ambassadors who noted that their governments had already intervened and that they will also press the Greek Cypriot President. The Chief of Mission said that he felt that the issue would not be resolved without additional pressure being applied and that the credibility of UNFICYP was at issue. Finally, the Chief of Mission sent along a draft communiqué which he thought might be issued by the Security Council, if the latter put the subject sufficiently high on its agenda.

* 7/7/95
- the U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wrote the President of the Security Council asking that the Roccas Bastion construction be brought to the attention of the Security Council. The letter, S/1995/561, says that the construction is a "disturbing development" and that the "extensive digging of trenches some 3 metres wide and 2 metres deep...has raised doubts about its real purpose." The letter notes that the area is covered by the unmanning agreement, that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities have refused requests for inspections and briefings, and that the Government of Cyprus may take countermeasures.2
- the Cypriot ambassador to the U.N. wrote the President of the Security Council regretting that U.N. inspections have not been allowed and asking that the fortifications being built be demolished.
- The Chief of Staff wrote a memo3 trying to anticipate UNFICYP reactions to possible Greek Cypriot demonstrations protesting the construction as well as to possible National Guard countermeasures. He suggested that the police on both sides be notified and that, in particular, the "TRNC" authorities should prevent civilian access to the Roccas Bastion during demonstrations.

* 7/8/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters reporting that he got briefed on the park by the Mayor of North Nicosia, together with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister and two others. He noted that the Mayor said he did not know of the construction until 10 days ago and that the briefing seemed hastily prepared and thus not persuasive. The Chief of Mission asked for another meeting ASAP and mentions possible U.N. Security Council involvement. The foreign and defense minister said that there would be no cooperation if the Greek Cypriots continued to press the issue.

* 7/10/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters updating (as of 13:00) it on the construction and including a sketch. He adds that the National Council met and demanded restoration of the status

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2 The letter is a public U.N. document.

3 It was unclear whether the date of this memo was 7/6/95 or 7/7/95.
quo ante and respect for the unmanning agreement. They also threatened unspecified countermeasures if these demands were not met. However, a deputy minister assured the UNFICYP in private that no action would be taken until the U.N. Security Council reviewed the situation.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to report on a 16:00 meeting with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister. The minister said that he wished to be cooperative, but that he did not want to be seen as caving in to Greek Cypriot pressure. He assured the U.N. that they would have access to the Roccas Bastion by the end of the week. The Senior Advisor responded that the U.N. itself was deeply concerned about the project and the fundamental need to uphold the 1989 unmanning agreement. He noted involvement by the U.N. headquarters and asked for an inspection the next day (7/11). The foreign and defense minister then asked about the National Council meeting and the Senior Advisor said that there would be no action until deliberation by the U.N. Security Council. As the foreign and defense minister still can not promise access to Roccas Bastion until the end of the week, the Senior Advisor asked for the work to be halted. The foreign and defense minister declined, noting that that would imply that something suspicious had been going on. In conclusion, the communique noted that it was still not clear when the U.N. Security Council would discuss the Roccas Bastion but that some access was now accepted by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots.

- the U.N. headquarters cabled UNFICYP (at 22:24) reporting that the Security Council had briefly deliberated. In the meeting, the U.K., supported by Argentina, argued that the Security Council should send a letter supporting the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General to resolve the issue and that, to this end, the Security Council should circulate a draft letter. The U.N. headquarters also noted that the U.K. was consulting with U.N. Security Council members about asking the Secretary-General to inform it of the results of inspections, once they occur.

* 7/11/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters with an updated sketch of the construction, based on helicopters flights on 6/23, 6/24, 6/26, 6/29, 7/1, 7/2, 7/4 (2x), 7/8, 7/9, and 7/11.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters thanking it for the 7/10 cable and reporting that UNFICYP had received a draft Security Council letter from the U.K. High Commissioner. The Chief of Mission then offered some advice on how to phrase some parts of the letter because he noted that the Greek Cypriots want to refer to the Turkish, not Turkish Cypriot, authorities while the Turks wanted it the other way around. He also reported that the French ambassador said that Paris supported the U.K. letter and that France will issue a démarche to Turkey. He noted that a similar policy was being adopted by the U.S. In more general terms, the Chief of Mission reported support from and frequent communications with the local U.S., U.K., and French embassies, but virtually neither from China or Russia.

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4 These countries supply two of the three main UNFICYP contingents, the third being Austrian.
The Chief of Mission also wrote that the Senior Advisor called a Greek Cypriot minister to urge restraint prior to Security Council action. The Chief of Mission was appreciative of Greek Cypriot restraint to date. He then mentioned that the inspection of Rocca Bastion would take place within days, but that assessment, not inspection was the real goal.

* 7/12/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to report that no invitation for an inspection had yet been issued, but that there had been no Greek Cypriot threats either. He also said that, at an event last night, the "TRNC" president had told him that the whole issue would be over once the Greek Cypriots started to build counter-trenches. He reported that the U.S. embassy in Cyprus said that the U.S. State Department in Washington had been told by a Turkish representative that the UNFICYP Chief of Mission could visit the Rocca Bastion on 7/13. The Chief of Mission noted that this was an unusual procedure and that he had no confirming evidence about the offer. He further reported work on the Rocca Bastion had taken place late into last night and that the trenches along the South and Southwest ramparts [not the main ones] had been filled in.

- the U.N. headquarters cabled the Chief of Mission sending along a copy of a letter the Security Council President sent to Secretary-General dated 7/11 (S/1995/562). The letter extended the Security Council's full support to the UNFICYP effort to inspect the trenches, recalling relevant provisions of the 1989 unmanning agreement and Security Council Resolution 1000 of 6/23/95,5 and asking the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council about the results of any inspections of the Rocca Bastion.

* 7/13/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters reporting that he had met with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister and had visited the Rocca Bastion. The construction appeared the same as had been observed by the helicopter. The Chief of Mission said that the foreign and defense minister had given permission for a technical team to inspect the next day.

* 7/15/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to report on the results of the 7/14 two hour long technical inspection by a team of eight from UNFICYP. The team included the Sector 2 commander, several engineers, and several officers from the operations branch. They reported that each trench was 100m long, 3m deep and 2m wide with walls of sandstone blocks supported by reinforced concrete pillars every 8m. Plans for the roof were that it would be made of reinforced concrete 15cm thick, then covered with earth. There were two 2m x 2m rooms in the North-South trench which will be toilets with their pipes above the floor. In the East-West trench, there were five smaller room for storage, a generator, and a gardener's restroom and shower. [see the U.N. sketch below] They noted that the engineers did not allow for seepage along the Southwest wall because they walled and filled in the trench and did not put in any

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5 Which contains nothing specific about Rocca Bastion.
gravel. When the team asked why there was no Northwest trench, the answer was that the Turkish Cypriots had run out of money. When the team asked about why the Turkish Cypriots worked at night, they answered that the contract had a penalty clause of $100/day for late work (The team noted in the report that the cost of the extra work probably exceeded the penalty). Finally, the team noted that they had received permission for daily inspections.

The team came to following conclusions: the Roccas Bastion construction could be for a recreation area but that the nature, scale, and manner of the construction created a number of doubts about this purpose. For example, the construction was very elaborate given the simple and small number of facilities planned. It was also elaborate given the claims of limited funding - and that the Turkish Cypriots also claimed that they had not yet received funding for the above-ground portion of the area. The team wondered why the Southwest trench was very large compared to the small pipes it held and why its design contradicted its drainage function. They continued to question the need for night work, the need for a berm near the U.N. observation post, and the need for wooden planks to be placed vertically near the berm. The team noted that the construction could be used for military purposes, even though the construction was not to military specification or even militarily logical. They also wrote that the construction was covered by the 1989 unmanning agreement, but that only the Southern trench was a certain violation of the cease-fire. As such, UNFICYP could only request a return to the status quo ante with respect to the Southern trench [which they did].

* 7/17/95
- the U.N. headquarters cabled the Chief of Mission to say that they shared his views, that they support a return to the status quo ante on the Southern trench, and that they agree that periodic inspections will be needed in order to calm the Greek Cypriots. They also said that they would like to receive sufficient assurances from the Turkish Cypriots about the issue in order to close the case with the Security Council that Wednesday night [7/19].
- in the Senior Advisor's notes on the Chief of Mission's meeting with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister, he writes that the Chief of Mission asked for regular inspections but that the foreign and defense minister said no, not until there was no pressure. The Chief of Mission responded by saying that he would have to report this result to New York and that in the meantime the helicopter inspections would continue. The Senior Advisor also reported on a conversation the Chief of Mission had with the Greek Cypriot President on Saturday [7/15] urging and receiving assurances that the Greek Cypriots would make no public declarations on the subject. The Greek Cypriot President said he was not happy with the situation on the ground as briefed by the Chief of Mission, but the Chief of Mission noted that the President seemed calm and appreciative of UNFICYP's methods.

- in notes written on 7/19, the Senior Advisor reported on his 7/17 meeting with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) officer responsible for Nicosia. In the meeting, the Senior Advisor asked if an construction in the Roccas Bastion was part of the 1985 Nicosia Master Plan
(NMP). By so doing the Senior Advisor was checking to see if both sides had in fact agreed to this construction, in some form or another. The UNDP officer called back saying that there was nothing in the NMP about this construction other than general suggestions for restoring the Venetian Walls.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters reporting that the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister would not permit regular inspections before UNFICYP declared publicly that the construction was not military in nature. The foreign and defense minister did not want to respond to the heated Greek Cypriot press on the issue and he said that UNFICYP could get access by helping to stop the campaign in the press. The Senior Advisor told the foreign and defense minister that he could not make such a declaration until the Security Council hears from the Secretary-General and he urged the minister to make it possible for the Secretary-General to report that regular inspections would be forthcoming - a point made all the more poignant by the Secretary-General's impending arrival in Ankara. The foreign and defense minister then repeated his request that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council that the work was not for military purposes, but then said that that was not a prerequisite for regular visits. The Senior Advisor responded that a hint of a prerequisite would lead to dismay and anger. At that point the conversation went in circles. Finally, the Senior Advisor noted that the commander of the Turkish regiment in the Roccas Bastion area had been officially requested by UNFICYP to restore the status quo ante in the bastion.

* 7/18/95
- the Senior Advisor cabled U.N. headquarters reporting on another meeting with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister. The Senior Advisor told the minister that the Secretary-General was likely to report soon - perhaps the next day - to the Security Council and that he would likely mention the serious questions that remain about the construction [see the UNFICYP team's report, above]. He added that answers to these questions require regular low-key visits and that if regular visits were assured, then the Roccas Bastion issue could be removed from the Security Council's docket. The foreign and defense minister then repeated his argument about the need for a public declaration from UNFICYP prior to regular inspections. The minister also said that regular inspections behind the cease-fire line were difficult for the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to accept and that his side did not want to set a bad precedent. The Senior Advisor responded that it was up to the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to prove that the construction was benign and that quick action could help with regard to the Secretary-General report to the Security Council.

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6 The NMP was designed to coordinate construction between the two halves of Nicosia, reducing the chances of building redundant highways and so forth, and planning ahead for the day the two halves might be reunited. In fact, the two sides of Cyprus coordinate on a number of vital issues: sewer, electricity, and phones - a subject discussed at greater length below in the section on humanitarian activities. The UNDP helped formulate the NMP.

7 In some cases (like this one), the Senior Advisor cables New York under the Chief of Mission's name when the latter is absent.
* 7/19/95
- a note for the file by the Senior Advisor on the Nicosia Master Plan and Roccas Bastion indicated that several projects such as theaters and landscaping had been planned for the bastions but that no specific plan had been made for the Roccas Bastion. On the other hand, figure 6 of an appended document to the NMP designated Roccas Bastion as a proposed playground. In the end, the Senior Advisor noted that the NMP did not support the foreign and defense minister's claims that the full excavations and construction had already been agreed to. The Senior Advisor also commented on the claim by the Deputy to the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia that underground parking was allowed in the Roccas Bastion. According to the NMP, such parking was discussed for five of the bastions and Roccas Bastion was not one of them. Finally, the Senior Advisor noted that during regular meetings with the UNDP about the NMP over recent years, no mention had been made of construction on the Roccas Bastion and that no mention had been made to the Chief of Mission on 6/12.

- the Senior Advisor also reported in detail on a 7/18 conversation between the Chief of Mission (CM) and the foreign and defense minister (FDM), and two of the minister's aides.
  
  CM: said that he hoped for a quick solution and said that the problem would remain and that people would get more and more suspicious if UNIFICYP could not visit and verify that it remained a playground and if the Secretary-General could not repeat these findings to a larger audience.

  FDM: said that visits were permissible so long as the Secretary-General reports exonerated the construction and were not an indictment.

  CM: responded that the visits would be low key and should be done by two UNIFICYP personnel. The inspections should be frequent during the construction and periodic after its completion. After all, the Chief of Mission said, you have insisted that the construction is Donald Duck and we should be able to visit to make sure it stays Donald Duck.

  FDM: asked about the contents of the report.

  CM: said that UNIFICYP needed to visit to make sure it remained a park.

  FDM: said that if doubts remain, the Greek Cypriots will continue to raise a hullabaloo and this risks cooperation.

  FDM's aide: says that visits will be assured so that negative consequences can be averted.

  CM: specifies that the visits should be frequent now and periodic later, that they will be low key and will be conducted by two UNIFICYP personnel.

  FDM: says the visits will happen.

  CM: says the visits should be daily during the construction work.

  FDM: says OK, and turns back to discussing the report saying that he does not want suspicions in the Greek Cypriots press. He notes that the visits should remove any questions and

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8 Apparently, the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister had made some declaration about the Roccas Bastion construction being covered by the NMP on 7/7/95 and this was one reason that UNIFICYP began investigating the NMP. Perhaps my notes on an item dated 7/6 (see above) actually referred to a 7/7 meeting and perhaps the NMP was discussed in this meeting but either did not get mentioned in the notes or I did not write that fact into my notes. In any case, my 7/19 notes mention the 7/7 declaration by the foreign and defense minister.
will thus cooperate.
CM: says he can report that things are under control, that there is no evidence of military construction, and that inspection visits had been promised. He offers that the exact terms and frequency of the visits need not be mentioned in the report.
FDM's aide: repeats request not to put the meaning of frequent and regular visits in the report.
CM: says that, at this point, the report will say that the Roccas Bastion construction is not military.
FDM: says that an OK report is necessary for OK visits.
CM: assures that the Security Council will be grateful about cooperation over the visits.
CM: turns to the issue of the South trench and notes the request to the Turkish regiment in the area to deal with that trench. He says that this issue need not be mentioned in the report if it can be dealt with locally.
FDM: says that the issue is between the sector commanders, but also promises that the status quo ante would be restored.

- the Senior Advisor added a note to the file about a follow up call to another Turkish official. The Senior Advisor reported that the official knew about the South trench request and the upcoming visits and that appropriate orders were already being given.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to report on his conversation with the "TRNC" foreign and defense minister. He repeated the main points that regular and periodic access had been promised, that the visits would be low-key by two UNFICYP personnel, and that specific details about the arrangements should not be mentioned in the Secretary-General report to the Security Council. The Chief of Mission said that the response on the more militarily useful South trench was positive and that the foreign and defense minister did not want that trench mentioned in the report. However, the Chief of Mission did want it in the report because it reflected positively on the Turkish side and on the U.N.'s ability to restore the status quo ante. The Chief of Mission also said that the helicopter inspections would continue when there were no inspections.

The Chief of Mission also reported on a 7/15 meeting with the Cyprus President in which he explained that, while the construction was somewhat inexplicable, the materials used were below military specifications and that the design of the construction conformed to no military logic. The Chief of Mission told the President that UNFICYP was arranging visits in order to keep the construction that way. [the Chief of Mission did not mention the South trench, but that was before the issue had been resolved] The Chief of Mission urged the President to keep this information to himself so as not to hinder the U.N.'s efforts. The Chief of Mission also reported that he had met with another [person I assume to be a] Greek official to give the exact same information. The official said the he will also convey this information to the Cyprus President, including the part about keeping it confidential.

Along with these reports, the Chief of Mission included a draft letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The letter explained why the Roccas Bastion issue was sensitive
and included the technical details from the inspection mentioned above. The draft letter said that the UNFICYP view is that the construction could be for a park and that it did not conform to military specifications or logic. That said, the letter also mentioned that they still can not explain why the construction is so extravagant, especially with respect to the trenches. The Chief of Mission then said that the 7/15 visit by UNFICYP technical experts saw the work on the South trench, that it was lengthened and that concrete walls had been added, and that the Turkish side had promised to restore the status quo ante.

* 7/21/95
- the Spokesman wrote a note for the file reporting that the Greek Cypriot ambassador brought in a Turkish mainland newspaper (Hurriyet) article with its accompanying photographs dated 7/20 about Turkish fortifications and tunnels and said that the article was about the Roccas Bastion. The Spokesman also included a Greek Cypriot summary of the article which said that the trenches contain military command posts, military bunkers and quarters, openings through which to see the Greek Cypriots, communications, and so forth. The Ambassador said that the construction and blocked UNFICYP inspection were a blatant violation of Security Council resolution 1000 and the 1989 unmanning agreement and said that the construction facilitated attack, endangered the peace, and was a provocation. The Ambassador also noted that he communicated the same message to the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council.

- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to inform it that the Greek Cypriot government had contacted the P5 ambassadors and UNFICYP about the Turkish newspaper article and had lodged protests. He noted after reviewing the article that the photographs were not of the Roccas Bastion and that the description was also not about the Roccas Bastion. The Chief of Mission thought it was important for New York to know of this in order to handle similar protests about the article from Cypriot representatives in New York.

* 7/25/96
- the Secretary-General wrote the President of the Security Council (S/1995/618) to report on the findings of the technical inspection on 7/14. In addition to the details described above, the Secretary-General noted that the Turkish Cypriot authorities stated that at historical sites infrastructure and other facilities are required to be built underground, that the trenches would

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9 This turned out to be a blatant misreading of the article. See next paragraph and footnote. This shows both an extreme level of unwarranted fears as well as the fact that these fears are persisting to this point in the crisis. It is not clear the extent to which the results of the recent inspections had percolated through the Greek Cypriot government or community. Based on UNFICYP's discussions with the Greek Cypriot President, the fact that the U.N. Secretary-General was still working on a draft of his statement to the Security Council, the requests by UNFICYP for confidentiality at this point in the proceedings, and the fact that regular inspections had yet to be assured, it is not clear if it is reasonable to assume or expect that unwarranted fears should have been calmed by now.

10 In a 5/13/96 interview, the Spokesman added that the real Hurriyet article actually argued that all of those military facilities were not necessary for Roccas Bastion because the Turks have those facilities elsewhere.
serve as passageways and would also aid repair of the water, sewage, electrical, and phone pipes and lines. The Secretary-General then wrote that "UNFICYP is of the view that the construction on Roccas Bastion to date, including the material used, does not indicate work carried out to normal military specifications, or to any evident military logic. At the same time, the construction appears unnecessarily elaborate and costly for its stated purpose." He noted the very sensitive location of Roccas Bastion and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities had promised unhindered regular and periodic access to the bastion and that "these arrangements will enable UNFICYP to satisfy itself that the new infrastructure being built on Roccas Bastion continues to be used exclusively for civilian purposes." He finally reported that the pre-existing military trench on the Southern end of the bastion had concrete walls installed and had been lengthened, but that the Turkish Cypriot authorities had undertaken to restore the status quo ante. The Secretary-General attached the following diagram of the Roccas Bastion:\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^{11}\) For the record, this is the exact same diagram as those in the files. Nothing is being hidden.
CONSTRUCTION ON ROCCAS BASTION
SITUATION AS AT 19 JULY 95

Diagram Appendix 1-1, The Roccas Bastion Construction

12 annex to S/1995/618, p. 3.
* 7/31/95
- In a note for the file, the Senior Advisor reported that he reconfirmed with a foreign and defense ministry official the terms for visits and specified that inspectors could use spikes to poke into the ground as part of their verification routine.

* 8/2/95
- the Chief of Mission cabled U.N. headquarters to report that the Greek Cypriot government was disappointed with the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council because it was, in their opinion, too factual with little or no condemnation and only noted the construction's cost and extravagance. The Greek Cypriot government hoped that an Security Council response to the letter would be forthcoming. The Chief of Mission included a draft for such a response - still factual, but noting that the response would help calm the Greek Cypriots. The draft response noted the Greek Cypriots' concern, underscored the importance of the inspections, and noted that the status quo ante would be restored at the South trench. The Chief of Mission then reported that the UNFICYP Force Commander had met with the head of the National Guard and that the Greek Cypriot President had decided that there would be no countermeasures, even though he was still upset about the construction. The head of the National Guard said that he did not believe UNFICYP's assessment about the non-military nature of the trenches, that the 1989 unmanned agreement had been violated, and that therefore the National Guard had the right to countermeasures. He further said that, despite other Greek Cypriot Government claims to the contrary, the situation on Roccas Bastion blocked progress on furthering the unmanned agreement and undermined all political relations on Cyprus.

- an UNFICYP Roccas Bastion inspection report noted that the inspection team had not been allowed to use probing rods despite the promises from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. They also said that the berm near the U.N. OP had been removed.

* 8/3/95
- a note for the file from the Senior Advisor indicated that the Chief of Mission had spoken with New York and that headquarters was skeptical about the prospects of a Security Council response to the Secretary-General's letter. But New York seemed persuaded by the Chief of Mission that such a letter would help prod the Turkish Cypriots about further inspections, so that headquarters would try to prompt the Security Council about response. The Senior Advisor also noted that the Chief of Mission had called the British High Commissioner and U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, trying to prompt them about an Security Council response.

* 8/4/95
- the Senior Advisor wrote a note for the file about his 8/3 conversation with New York in which

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13 The unmanned agreement currently covers only a very limited amount of the buffer zone and one of UNFICYP's top priorities is expanding the unmanned area.
he learned that the Security Council thought that a response to the Secretary-General's letter was not necessary and thus would not be forthcoming. He also wrote that the matter about the probes was not resolved and was under discussion.

* 8/5/95
- an Roccas Bastion inspection report noted that a pit on the Southwest wall was still not filled in, that there were no blast doors near the entrances, and that the bricks were so poorly laid that they could probably be pushed over.\(^{14}\) Roofs were put on the trenches and the Turkish Cypriot authorities gave copies of the antiquities laws to the inspection team.

* 8/12/95
- an Roccas Bastion inspection report noted that the inspection failed in three ways: probes were still not allowed, requested architect's plans were not forthcoming, and that they were still not able to meet with the architect. However, the inspection team noted that the construction seemed increasingly benign.

* 8/14/95
- New York cables the Chief of Mission noting the benign results of the inspections and then informing the Chief of Mission that the matter of Roccas Bastion is closed for the Security Council and that the issue would not be re-opened barring major new developments. Headquarters told the Chief of Mission to consider this when dealing with the Turkish Cypriots.

* 9/11/95
- Phase I of the construction was completed, including sinks, toilets, fire exits, and sewers.

* 9/16/95
- the tunnels are complete except for the generators and construction begins on the playground equipment.

* 9/30/95 - 11/6/95
- the cafeteria is built.

* 10/7/95
- an inspection report indicates that seven trash barrels between the cafeteria and the fence were removed immediately after UNFICYP so asked. The barrels were too similar in appearance to an OP.\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\) Most inspection reports also repeated previous information about dimensions, number of toilets, generators, and so forth. I did not take notes on what seemed repetitive.

\(^{15}\) OPs all around Nicosia are often constructed using oil barrels, often filled with concrete. Further, the top of a long stretch of the Venetian wall leading towards the Roccas Bastion is covered with a line of barrels. They're ugly, but they (continued...)
* 10/20/95
- an inspection report notes that they detected a strong sewer smell and that the sewer was not working well.

* 10/23/95
- an inspection report noted that there were water leaks and that the cafeteria was flooded.

* 10/26/95
- the "TRNC" prime minister visits the Roccas Bastion.

* 10/31/95
- A letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the U.N. Secretary-General protests that the Roccas Bastion construction is of military utility and violates the 1989 unmanning agreement and Security Council Resolution 1000.

* 11/10/95
- an inspection report noted that there is no evidence of military use of the Roccas Bastion.

* 11/15/95
- the Roccas Bastion playground was opened at 15:30. October 15 is the anniversary of the "TRNC"'s founding and is a holiday. 5000 people attended the opening. There was lots of stone throwing from the Roccas Bastion, with lots of damage to Greek Cypriot cars and property. The opening caused a sharp increase in tension.

* 11/17/95
- an inspection report noted that UNFICYP will soon turn to monthly inspections of the construction.

* 11/24/95
- an inspection report noted that there were no changes in the Roccas Bastion.

* 12/1/95
- an inspection report noted that there were no changes in the Roccas Bastion.

* 12/5/95

15(...continued)
would provide defensive cover in case of renewed fighting.

16 The records I read for this date said that stones were thrown to and from the bastion. But General Vartiainen, below, said that most of the stones were thrown by Turkish Cypriots, from the bastion. Also, the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus, S/1995/1020, for the period June 16 to December 10 1995, p. 3 also only mentions violence by Turkish Cypriot civilians on opening day.
- a Sector 2 summary of the Roccas Bastion construction incident recapped much of the above and added the following. The construction was a near fait accompli, with very short notice and no details on scope. The construction was very poor if it was for the purpose of protecting troops from artillery or mortar fire, that there was not enough ventilation to use weapons from inside the facility, and that it was too close to the line to be a plausible field headquarters. Thus, the report concluded, even though it was a bizarre example of spending by the relatively poor Turkish Cypriots, there seemed little military utility to the construction. That said, regular inspections were still needed. Finally, the report recommended that the road on the Greek Cypriots side be closed by the Cyprus police during demonstrations.

ASSESSING THE CONSTRUCTION AT THE ROCCAS BASTION

This section has two main parts. First, it fills in gaps in the U.N. record to add background and give impressions of the incident from several of the players involved: the Cyprus government officials, "TRNC" authorities, U.S. embassy staff, and UNFICYP personnel. Details are added to the synoptic account given in the main chapter text. Second, it offers my judgements about who was telling the truth at various points and what general lessons can be learned.

According to UNFICYP's Force Commander, General Vartiainen, the way the playground was constructed was very provocative. In part this was because the construction was so elaborate and obvious. Two Greek Cypriot OPs on the CYTA building and a nearby hotel were able to see heavy equipment such as backhoes and bulldozers dig big trenches with pipelines and sewers. To try to figure out what was going on, UNFICYP monitored Roccas Bastion from helicopters and raised an old OP high enough to see in. UNFICYP also had to twist arms to get on-site inspections.

General Vartiainen noted that the contractor for the construction accompanied UNFICYP on one of the inspections. The Force Commander continued to meet (as usual) with his National Guard counterpart during the construction. In these meetings, the Force Commander told the National Guard what UNFICYP was seeing and they tried to do some joint military analyses of the construction. Nonetheless, the National Guard counterpart always insisted that the construction's purpose was military.

General Vartiainen said that the "opening day was a catastrophe," with hundreds of Turkish Cypriots throwing stones from Roccas Bastion. Fortunately, the Cyprus police had blocked off the streets in the immediate area (thanks to UNFICYP's advice). The stone throwing continued for awhile until UNFICYP made strong representations. To help prevent continued eruptions like this, UNFICYP succeeded in getting a plainclothes policeman stationed full time

17 According to Mr. Feissel, as the inspections continued and became routine, the Greek Cypriots know that UNFICYP keeps inspecting the Roccas Bastion, but they are not told the information from each and every inspection. This is a good thing because UNFICYP must retain some flexibility and it shows again that transparency must often be provided with wisdom, not just simply provided.
in the playground.18 The General said that not one stone had been thrown for months. He concluded on an optimistic note, suggesting that the Roccas Bastion playground had become a source of understanding: "now each side can see each other and can see that they are humans, not beasts as taught in school."19

Government officials on both sides still hew to the basic lines described above. Ms. Thalia Petrides, the Director for European Affairs in the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the construction was a very sensitive issue, that the papers criticized the U.N. for being slow to respond, but that, in the end, UNFICYP's inspections definitely helped.20 Dr. Leonides Pantelides, a political officer in the Ministry's Cyprus Problem Division, deals with the U.N. and the various embassies on a regular basis and had more detailed comments. The following are his views.

According to Dr. Pantelides, even though the Greek Cypriots believe the status quo is wrong, illegal, and reifies the Turkish occupation, it is nonetheless beneficial for the U.N. to effectively manage the buffer zone and keep small incidents small. A basic criteria for the U.N.'s mission is to preserve the status quo, preventing upgrading along the buffer zone and preventing incursions into it. This is why the Greek Cypriots were so noisy about the Roccas Bastion and tried to pressure the U.N. to monitor the situation ASAP. Dr. Pantelides said that everyone learned about the Roccas Bastion construction at the same time and that it was on the evening news. Due to the scale and type of construction, the Greek Cypriots were concerned about dual use [military/civilian] of the bastion. They were also concerned that it would facilitate counter-demonstrations and that, symbolically, it brought the Turks much closer.

Continuing with Dr. Pantelides' views, he believed it was due to great pressure from the Greek Cypriots on the U.N. and from the U.N. on the Turks that the U.N. was allowed two inspections a week. It was crucial that the Greek Cypriots kept pressuring the U.N. not to believe that the Roccas Bastion was a playground. Also, the U.N. did not want to be shown that it was ineffective or could be taken for a ride. Dr. Pantelides believed that the inspections helped resolve the crisis. That said, the Greek Cypriots still do not feel that it is park and that the deep digging and concrete indicate a possible future military use. He specified that his argument is not that the U.N. is not right when it says that there are no weapons there, but that the Turks misled

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18 Following the construction and subsequent tension, UNFICYP periodically stationed some soldiers at the base of the bastion. These soldiers were endangered by the rocks from above. According to Colonel Snowdon, Commander of UNFICYP's Sector 2 (central Nicosia), several rounds of gunfire in early December also spurred the stationing of the UNFICYP soldiers and the Turkish Cypriot plainclothesman. On December 6, 1996 two shots were fired from the CYTA building and two shots were fired back from the South of the Roccas Bastion. The next night, three shots were fired in each direction. Snowdon said that it was at this point that the soldiers and policeman were deployed. He was grateful that each side thought that the UNFICYP troops were sent out to monitor the other.

19 The previous two paragraphs report on a 5/7/96 interview with General Vartiainen. Note how he believes (implicitly) that bicomunal contacts in a sense increase transparency and reduce misperceptions. According to General Vartiainen, familiarity breeds a more humane view.

20 Interview, May 16, 1996.
the U.N. when they said it was not constructed up to military specifications.\footnote{Interview, 5/16/96.}

Not surprisingly, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have quite opposite views on the Roccas Bastion construction. According to Mr. Aytug Plumer, an under-secretary at the "TRNC" ministry of foreign affairs and defense, the Greek Cypriots made a big fuss about the construction of the playground to the Security Council and others. However, Plumer noted that UNFICYP had clearly reported that the construction was not military in its reports. These reports, Plumer argued, show that the big fuss was a big lie. The Greek Cypriots played up Roccas Bastion to cover up their own military activities because they were doing their own construction prior to the incident and building positions that were violations of previous agreements.\footnote{Interview, 6/5/96.}

Turning to U.S. embassy officials, I was surprised in my two interviews how much they supported UNFICYP -- especially the U.N.'s good offices and negotiating efforts (the U.N.'s set of ideas and the confidence-building measures in particular). Despite what they said were large U.S. interests in Cyprus, I got little sense that the U.S. acted independently of the U.N. with respect to the Cyprus problem. Instead, the U.S. generally acts within and is supportive of the diplomatic framework set by the U.N.. That said, both officials were cognizant of the U.S.' overall influence. John Koenig, First Secretary for Political Affairs, said that the U.N. can not act alone on a Cyprus settlement without dynamic support of U.N. Security Council members. On the other hand, he said that he could not imagine the U.S. going it alone in Cyprus and that in the end, the U.S. and the U.N. needed each other. He noted that the U.S. had some influence with Turkey - but not as much as some think -- because of its good relations with the Turkish military and because the U.S. was a big country and P5 member. John Lister, Second Secretary said that the U.S. sees itself in a support role, that it would not take the lead in front of the U.N.. Lister repeated Koenig's claim that diplomatic initiatives on Cyprus are all taken in the context of the U.N.'s good offices mission. He said that the U.N. has a unique relationship with the parties involved based on its resolutions and previous negotiations.

With regard to the Roccas Bastion, Koenig said that the U.S., U.K., and UNFICYP worked in close consultation for several weeks on the issue (as they often do, he added) and that much of the emphasis early in the crisis was about getting permission for UNFICYP to inspect the construction. He said that the U.S. acted to get information from the Turks on what they were up to, that the U.S. would share additional information it had with the U.N. (or information it received from UNFICYP with the Greeks), that the U.S. acted to reinforce pressure to get full cooperation, inspections, and transparency from the Turks, and that the U.S. interest in the matter reassured all sides. He also said that the U.N. "was the pivot for all this" and that the U.N.'s actions also helped reassure each side. Even after the construction was over, Koenig remembered that the problem continued with men of military age throwing rocks and shouting insults from the bastion. In the end, Koenig was still not entirely satisfied with the situation: the way the Turks handled it was designed to raise doubts and Greek Cypriots still think it is a military construction. He did not know if the U.S. had its own conclusions about the

\footnote{Interview, 5/16/96.}
\footnote{Interview, 6/5/96.}
construction.

Finally, I visited the Roccas Bastion on two (of three) of my visits to the "TRNC". Both times I tried to visit the tunnels and bathrooms and both times I was not allowed in. Each time, I bought a soda in the cafeteria - a kiosk really - and stood around drinking it, relaxing, looking at the Greek side, and noting the paltry playground equipment (a few see-saws, etc.). There were very few people in the park and the plainclothes monitor armed with a walky-talky was in plain view. The first time, after drinking my soda, I meandered over to the men's bathroom and it was locked. I gestured to the monitor who said it was for the military only. Perhaps he did not know any other English. The second time, after my soda, I tried to meander to the men's and a different monitor waved me away before I had gotten 20 feet from the kiosk. He said that there was a problem and had no further explanation even though my subsequent gestures made my needs clear. In any case, the above-ground doors (like a stand-alone shed or closet) leading to steps to the underground tunnels and bathrooms are clearly marked as women's (North side) and men's (South side) bathrooms. The doors also look like they are constructed of heavy-duty metal and they have a small window that looks like a peephole on an armored car. UNFICYP took an active interest in my experiences.

WHO'S RIGHT AND WHAT ARE THE LESSONS? What can be concluded from all this? What really happened and whose arguments are the most plausible? First, even though UNFICYP had good intentions in encouraging Turkish 'civilianization' of the Roccas Bastion, it was initially blindsided or misled about the extent of the construction (see 6/12/95). The two sides have too much at stake and too much of a one-sided agenda for the U.N. to let down its guard and accept OPFOR claims at face value.

Second, I believe that the U.N. is telling the truth in its assessment that the construction is not up to military specifications. The Sector 2 summary is detailed and specific about the weaknesses of the construction. I spoke to the commander of Sector 2, Lt. Col. Snowdon, on several occasions and he is a serious fellow who does not mince words. In addition, UNFICYP's inspection reports instill confidence because they were repetitively consistent and never wavered in their assessments about the flaws in the design and construction, even when reported by different inspectors.23

Third, it is certainly true that a foxhole built with a hand shovel is a military construction of a sort.24 But even if the Roccas Bastion trenches do have some military utility -- and, like any construction, they do -- it is still hard to figure out why a force that could take the island in a matter of days would build highly exposed and very obvious trenches. Trenches have more utility in defensive than offensive operations and the angles of these trenches do not appear optimized for firing out of the Roccas Bastion. They are set back from and are not parallel to the edges of the Roccas Bastion (see diagram above -- they are at 45 degree angles to the walls, the

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23 As mentioned, I did not summarize or even take notes on most of the inspection reports I saw. It was unnecessary because they almost always said the same thing. I did try to report or take notes on any differences I spotted.

24 A point made by Colonel Parker on 5/19/96.
hardest possible angle for which it is possible to imagine military utility). While I am not a military expert, if UNFICYP's assessment of the trenches' concrete and other weaknesses are correct (and I just argued why they are), it would probably not be difficult for the Greek side to cave in the trenches with mortars and/or shoot any remaining forces that made their way out. While the trench is on high ground, several buildings on the Greek side look down or across at it.  

Fourth, the Greek Cypriots are justified in being angry at the construction. It does have some level of military utility and the area is covered by agreements that are supposed to prevent just this sort of provocation. And the Turks were very provocative in the way they built it. Why were they so provocative? Why do it that way? Those familiar with Bismarck or the security dilemma know that being provocative is very often the worst tactic for accomplishing a political/military goal. Unless provocation is the goal. It is hard to believe that a playground was the primary goal. I've seen the playground and it is sparse and depressing with only a few swings and other playground paraphernalia. In my judgement, it is clear that far, far more money and effort was spent below ground than above ground. Perhaps some bureaucratic errors explain this misallocation of resources. Certainly the Turkish Cypriot authorities were inept at trying to put a good spin or concoct a reasonable explanation about the construction. But, the "TRNC" is a poor country and hopefully would not botch a non-trivial public works project up that much.

Fifth, the Turkish side made a reasonable, but slightly overdrawn point about construction on the Greek side. The Greek Cypriots are building fortifications and trenches along the buffer zone. The June 15, 1995 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/1995/488) notes "an extensive programme" by the National Guard to strengthen or add to its positions along the cease-fire line opposite all sectors of the buffer zone. It also notes that "some excavations encroached on the buffer zone and these were filled in after representations by UNFICYP." The June 7, 1996 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/1996/411) indicated that UNFICYP protested 150 National Guard constructions along the buffer zone as violations of the spirit of the cease-fire. However, these spirit violations do not violate the unmanning agreement (which, unfortunately, only covers a few small areas of the buffer zone around Nicosia). In addition, they are mostly in the countryside, they are not being built with 'extra furtiveness,' and they are not in one of the most sensitive areas along the entire buffer zone: the Roccas Bastion in Nicosia. The Secretary-General's June 1995 report also reported maintenance and minor improvements of Turkish Forces' positions along the buffer zone, but these appear to be on a much smaller scale than those of the Greek Cypriots. In my judgement, there is some degree of hypocrisy in the Greek's complaints about the Turkish construction at Roccas Bastion but there is also a substantial measure of conscious and unnecessary provocation in that construction as well.

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25 Indeed, much fighting was done from the tops of tall buildings in Nicosia during the 1974 war; many are still pocked with bullet holes.

26 The quotes are from the downloaded version of the June 1995 report, p. 3, at: gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_06/488. The figure of 150 is from page 2 of the June 1996 report.
Sixth, even with some worthy facts on their side, the Greek Cypriots still could not stop themselves from getting over-excited and embarrassing themselves by blatantly misinterpreting the Hurriyet article (see 7/21/96). This would not be remarkable except that this sort of thing happens time and again on both sides. Both sides have some reasonable points about the Cyprus problem, but they undermine themselves and hurt their credibility through one-sided exaggeration, lies, and propaganda.

Seventh, whatever the tensions raised by this construction, and despite delays and obfuscation by the Turkish side and despite over-reaction by the Greek side, UNFICYP conflict-confronting and reducing efforts basically succeeded. UNFICYP worked the issue diligently, liaising actively and at many levels with the opposing sides as well as with the most influential countries on the island. Greek disappointment with the speed at which UNFICYP achieved the inspections is somewhat misplaced, given the fact that UNFICYP needed permission to get the inspections and this permission was not forthcoming. I hope the above sequence of events makes this clear.

Eighth, even though it is supportive of UNFICYP's efforts, the last point suggests some cautionary notes. To get the inspections, UNFICYP used its trump card: the threat of embarrassment at the highest U.N. level: the Report of the Secretary-General. There is not much more that they can do without really active and involved support from the great powers (and to some extent, they were involved here). Thus, this episode helps demarcate the limits of UNFICYP's intrinsic influence. If larger, more severe incidents are to be resolved, the great powers and especially the U.S. will have to spend real resources - money, time, and prestige - to do it. And, barring a major change in the status quo, what will be required to actually make peace on the island? The Roccas Bastion episode - quite minor from an outsiders' point of view - sheds some light on the answer. A lot of leverage will be required.28

\[27\] I have repeated mentioned the leverage they added in this case. But it is worth noting that basically only embassy-level support was involved. It is not like the 1967 crisis when Cyrus Vance shuttled around trying to fix the problem.

\[28\] This question is addressed in much more detail at the end of this chapter.
Additional Analysis of Panayi's Killing

For all that is known about the shooting of Panayi, I believe several questions remain. Panayi's death may well have been timed to have political effects. The shooting occurred the day that Sir David Hannay, Britain's new special representative on Cyprus, arrived on Cyprus for his first round of talks and three days before Denktash was supposed to meet with Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Ankara. There is a pattern to this sort of behavior. The Greco-Turkish crisis over the Imia/Kardak islands in early 1996 flared up just before U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke was due in Cyprus. The trip was canceled and instead of marking the beginning of the U.S.'s 1996 "big push" on Cyprus, it marked the end. The day Hannay returned to Cyprus again (October 13, 1996), the TFs killed 58 year old Petros Kakoullis who had crossed onto the Turkish side while snail-fishing.

There are other reasons the killing of Panayi may have been a set-up. Beyond the timing of the killing, it is certainly odd that, after talking about trading caps for days, Panayi gets killed by the same soldier he apparently had been talking to. And if it was not the same soldier who met Panayi, then he was probably at least was lured out into the buffer zone by the same soldier whose voice he recognized. If this is the case, then it is even more likely that a set-up occurred because if somebody else met Panayi, then that indicates that this somebody else was deliberately chosen to meet Panayi and kill him.

Is it possible that it was not a set-up? Yes, and for the same reasons that may have explained why Kleovoulou was shot. Perhaps the TF soldier who met Panayi suddenly noticed he was being watched by an officer. It may also be possible that the shooting in some way boosted the TF soldier's career or social standing. Whatever the reason, none justifies Panayi's death.

If the killing of Panayi was politically motivated, what was the motive, what did the TFs/Turkish side think they would gain? There are two possible motives. First, the TFs/Turkish side may have wanted to throw a wrench into the whatever diplomatic initiative or momentum Hannay's visit may have created. The reason that this might be the case is that the TFs/Turkish side may believe that the current situation, de facto partition, is superior to almost any outcome conceivable in recent negotiations. The possible threats in a negotiated outcome include giving up some territory or eventually losing control of their side to the economically superior and more

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29 To be perfectly clear, none of the following is based in any way on my discussions with UNIFICYP soldiers or officers. I arrived at UNIFICYP's headquarters just hours after the June 3 killing, was able to sit in their command center and watch the story unfold, and talked with many UNIFICYP personnel about the killing in subsequent days. While I am able to report first hand how UNIFICYP dealt with the situation, I did not hear a single word of speculation along these lines from anyone in UNIFICYP nor did I read anything along these lines in any UNIFICYP documents. In addition, I read all I could in the English language Greek Cypriot press about the incident and there was no speculation along these lines there. What I do know from my experience at UNIFICYP is that the efforts to explain the story by the Turkish Cypriot side were more detailed and inaccurate than is commonly known and that I know of nothing to indicate that UNIFICYP changed or falsified its side of the story.

populated Greek side. Second, a constant theme of Turkish Cypriot authorities is their goal for the "TRNC" to be recognized. Maybe Panayi was killed to increase the degree to which this goal and the Cyprus problem more generally would be taken seriously by the international community - even at the risk of the Turkish side appearing malevolent. Maybe they think they have to be malevolent in order to be taken seriously.

My view is that in the current negotiating climate, the Turkish side has to be at least seen as not closing off the goal of reunification under a federal system (this has shifted a bit during the negotiations of the Summer of 1997. The EU accession has given Turkey an opening to be much more blunt about partition and unification of the "TRNC" with Turkey.). This is the canonical solution to the Cyprus problem because it is promoted seemingly without question or doubt by the Greeks, the U.N., the British, and the U.S. The Turks probably have to mumble about federalism just to sit at the table and avoid further international condemnation and isolation. But the Turkish side's insistence on recognition, coupled with the dangers of being swallowed up by the Greeks in a federal system, may mean that the Turks think they are best off talking the federal game, while occasionally killing people to try to prevent it. This helps the Turks maintain de facto partition, which I argue they view as superior to federalism, with recognition superior to both.
Appendix II: An Overall Assessment of
20 Peacekeeping Operations

This appendix summarizes some of the peacekeeping literature in order to form a consensus-based assessment of the effectiveness of twenty peacekeeping operations. I survey how a number of different authors judged a variety of peacekeeping operations and report the results. This is a rough and at times arbitrary exercise. Yet, even this effort is a contribution because there has been little stock-taking of the large literature on peacekeeping.

The reason for this appendix's existence is that I am not able to do Cyprus-like or even mini-case studies of most peacekeeping operations. It is nonetheless important for this study to get a sense of how effective these operations are. I am trying to figure out if peacekeeping operations cause peace, and if transparency helps them do so. This appendix helps address the first question. According to this assessment, peacekeeping operations promote peace sixty-percent of the time. More generally, my case studies address the tip of the peacekeeping iceberg (a fairly representative tip, I would add) and this exercise helps indicate what the rest of the iceberg looks like.

The two primary sources for this exercise were William Durch's edited volume, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* which contains twenty case studies of U.N. peacekeeping operations from 1945-1992 and Alan James' slightly earlier survey, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, which covers seventeen of these twenty missions. Durch's book provides the baseline set of cases because of the breadth of its well-structured and dispassionate case studies. This means that case selection is tilted toward more traditional peacekeeping operations and that this analysis is not quite up to date. This is a first-cut effort that deserves further work, but I believe that it is nonetheless is revealing.

By my reading of Durch's twenty cases, two did a good job in accomplishing their mandates or contributing to peace, ten were fair, two straddled fair and poor, and six failed. Of the seventeen missions in James, one was good, eleven were fair, one straddled fair and poor, two were poor, and one failed. These two books have many attributes, but the one that made them most useful for this exercise is their breadth. Other sources quoted or consulted were Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., and Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation.*

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See also Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 61, 79-81, 90, and passim; Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, pp. 480-85, 537; 553, 58, and passim; Rikhye, *Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. For additional cites, see the peacekeeping operations section of the literature review on p. 63).
assessments of their assessments appear in Table Appendix 2-1.

To explain the coding in Table Appendix 2-1, I'll start with caveats. This analysis serves as only a rough approximation of the effects of each mission. Author's assessments are often more nuanced than I can possibly give them credit for in this table.

That said, to make this project as transparent as possible and to increase replicability, I will explain the qualitative judgements made below. First, I summarize each individual author's judgement as Good/Fair/Mixed/Poor/Fail in the middle column and offer a quote in the right column to support my summary. I then tally the results and express them collectively as [Success] or [Failure] and put this indication below the others in the middle column.

These qualitative summary assessments cover a wide range of outcomes. For example, UNOMAP was judged to be a success because it did a fair job accomplishing a minor mandate (providing a figleaf for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan). UNIIMOG was also a success and it may have kept the Iran-Iraq war from flaring up anew -- a major accomplishment if true. UNEF I was a success because it helped keep the peace for a number of years, even though the mission ended when war broke out between Egypt and Israel. UNEF I promoted peace; it did not solve the problem of war for all time. Failures cover a similarly wide range of outcomes. Simply put, successes are those missions which do more good than harm; failures do more harm than good or were irrelevant.

Finally, I often found it hard to give more than a fair rating to many peacekeeping operations, even if the collective judgment of analysts was more enthusiastic. This is because a rating of good to excellent should imply, at least to me, that the peacekeeping operation was a decisive, necessary, and sufficient cause of peace. Peacekeeping operations can help make and keep peace, but rarely that much.

The Bottom Line: A Sixty Percent Success Rate

In assessing 20 peacekeeping operations, the following table reveals a consensus that 12 were a success (60%) and 6 failed (30%). A further 2 (10%) deserved a judgment of mixed. This is a pretty good batting average, especially considering that these peacekeeping operations were/are confronting issues of war and peace.
### Table Appendix 2-1: Assessments of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Summary Comments, by Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, UNSCOB, 1947-1951; &quot;Investigate outside support for guerillas in Greece.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair/// Poor/// Fair [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;...did achieve its goals&quot;...but mostly due to &quot;changes in the political and military environment.&quot; Provided lessons for future operations. (Durch 81-82)//Used by West to point finger at communist states and groups. Communists thought mission was illegal. (James 88-91)//Four other factors helped cause peace but &quot;the UN peace-observation operations were a major factor.&quot; (Wainhouse 238) ///</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO, 1948-present; &quot;Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail/// Good/// Fair [Mixed]</td>
<td>&quot;UNTSO unequivocally failed.&quot; Had no consent and was dwarfed and made redundant by UNIFIL, UNDOF, MFO. A training ground for UN observers. (Durch 98-101)//&quot;UNTSO did an enormously valuable job between 1949 and 1967,&quot; investigating and defusing incidents and mediating cease-fires. (James 154-157)//With &quot;limitations, UNTSO... performed indispensable functions.&quot; (Wainhouse 272)//BH=no conclusion///</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Emergency Force, UNEF I, 1956-1967; &quot;Separate Egyptian &amp; Israeli forces in Sinai.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair/// Fair/// Fair/// Fair [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;...helped to keep the peace...for more than a decade,&quot; until it lost Egypt’s consent &amp; was withdrawn at their request. (Durch 104, 127-128)//Helped resolve Suez crisis, maintained truce, but did not make peace. Played a &quot;valuable minor role.&quot; (James 217-220)//&quot;Maintained peace&quot; for more than 10 years until consent was lost. (BH 78)&quot;did achieve some success for an extended period.&quot; (Diehl 46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II, 1973-1979, see above</td>
<td>Fair/// Fair/// Good [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;...performed its tasks successfully&quot; until 1979 Camp David Peace Accords led Soviets to prevent continuance of mission. (Durch 131)//Had initial stabilizing effect, which, thanks to the U.N.'s &quot;impartial and non-threatening activity,&quot; likely continued to prevent parties from stumbling back to war. (James 319, 325)//&quot;Parties wanted UNEF II to continue, but was prevented by opposition from Soviets, Arab states, and PLO. (BH 97-98) &quot;facilitated unprecedented progress toward conflict resolution.&quot; (Diehl 49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Disengagement Observer Force, UNDOF, 1974-present; &quot;Monitor separation of Syrian &amp; Israeli forces on Golan Heights.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair/// Fair/// Fair [Success]</td>
<td>Mandate achieved with &quot;unequivocal success,&quot; but &quot;political stalemate continues.&quot; (Durch 152) ///&quot;...it has been able to get on with its job with considerable success,&quot; but only because neither side wants war. (James 328-334)//&quot;has&quot;continued to perform its functions effectively with the co-operation of the parties.&quot; (BH 110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon, UNOGIL, 1958; &quot;Monitor infiltration of arms &amp; troops into Lebanon from Syria.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail///Fair///Poor/// [Failure]</td>
<td>&quot;...unsatisfactory.&quot; &quot;...not capable of fulfilling its mandate.&quot; Gave U.S. a cover to leave Lebanon. (Durch 163, 175-177)///Had &quot;three stabilizing and resolving&quot; effects: postponing and limiting U.S. intervention and allowing the U.S. to leave more gracefully. (James 288-289)//&quot;Did not and could not fully stop infiltration (Wainhouse 384)//&quot;BH=no conclusion///</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, 1978-present; &quot;Establish buffer zone between Israel &amp; Lebanon.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail///Fair///Poor///Fail /// [Failure]</td>
<td>&quot;...failure.&quot; &quot;...dismal.&quot; But was deployed without consent in midst of hostile states, sub-states, and terrorists. Provided some humanitarian aid. (Durch 181, 197-200)///Despite being unable to stabilize its area of operations early on, and continued problems thereafter, UNIFIL was a buffer between Israel and Syria and between Israel and her adversaries in Lebanon. (James 340-350)//&quot;Prevented from implementing the mandate,&quot; but has had some beneficial effects. (BH 152)&quot;perhaps no other peacekeeping mission that has failed so consistently to limit the armed conflict.&quot; (Diehl 58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Yemen Observation Mission, UNYOM, 1963-1964; &quot;Monitor infiltration into Yemen via Saudi border.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail///Fair///Fail///Mixed /// [Failure]</td>
<td>&quot;UNYOM floundered for 14 months under very adverse conditions and was withdrawn.&quot; (Durch 206)//&quot;The disengagement and withdrawal pact was quickly broken and UNYOM had &quot;no discernible impact on...the civil war in Yemen.&quot; (James 302-306)//Parties failed to &quot;fulfill their disengagement agreement.&quot; (Wainhouse 433)//&quot;failure of the parties to implement the disengagement agreement&quot; but UNYOM accomplished much more than could have been expected of it.&quot; (BH 196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP, 1964-present; &quot;Maintain order; from 1974 monitor buffer zone.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair///Fair///Fair///Mixed /// [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;...has performed its assigned functions well in a difficult and volatile environment,&quot; including armed clashes. Political conflict remains &quot;intractable.&quot; (Durch 219, 233-235)//&quot;UNFICYP can be seen as playing a very valuable stabilizing role.&quot; (224-236)//&quot;continues effectively to carry out its task of conflict control.&quot; (BH 306)//&quot;The record of UNFICYP is mixed.&quot; (Diehl 55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, UNIIMOG, 1988-1991; &quot;Monitor cease-fire in Iran-Iraq war.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair-Good///Fair-Good///Fair-Good /// [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;UN observers more than likely kept the war from flaring up anew in the face of mutual provocations.&quot; (Durch 253-254)//&quot;Without UNIIMOG, it is highly likely that the cease-fire would have frequently broken down.&quot; (James 170-174)Without UNIIMOG, &quot;hostilities could have broken out once more.&quot; (BH 333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, UNIKOM, 1991-present; &quot;Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair///N/A /// [Success]</td>
<td>&quot;...is doing the job,&quot; but the job is made easier because Iraq was soundly defeated in a Chapter VII authorized war in 1991. (Durch 267-269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP, 1949-present; &quot;Monitor cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair-Poor///</td>
<td>Helped implement peace accord after 1948 war; war recurred in 1971; mission is now next to irrelevant. (Durch 273-283) /// Initially played a &quot;worthwhile role&quot; but &quot;current peacekeeping value is virtually nil.&quot; (James 158-163) /// &quot;Fairly successful&quot; (in its time) (Wainhouse 371) /// [reverse of Wainhouse; not much on early part] But now basically irrelevant. (BH 170-171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Temporary Executive Authority/ U.N. Security Force, UNTEA/UNSF, 1962-1963; &quot;Keep order and administer W. New Guinea pending transfer to Indonesia&quot; [from Dutch].</td>
<td>Good///</td>
<td>&quot;...one of the more ambitious and successful peacekeeping operations&quot; of the U.N. in its first 20 years. (Durch 285) /// Due to cooperative parties, was a &quot;useful tool&quot; that &quot;greatly eased the transfer of power to post-colonial local rule. (James 190-196) /// Transferred authority with a &quot;minimum of violence.&quot; (Wainhouse 420) /// &quot;Proved the capacity of the United Nations to undertake a variety of functions.&quot; (BH 276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, UNGOMAP, 1988-1990; &quot;Monitor Soviet Pullout from Afghanistan.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair///</td>
<td>Mission was successful but redundant. Oversaw and gave legitimacy to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (which would have happened anyway). (Durch 308-311) /// &quot;...gave significant help in extricating the Soviets from their embarrassing deployment.&quot; (James 242-246) /// Soviets withdrew, but U.N. had difficulty monitoring incidents along Afghanistan/Pakistan border and few refugees were repatriated. (BH 318-321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Operation in the Congo, ONUC, 1960-1964; &quot;Render military assistance, restore civil order.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair-Poor///</td>
<td>&quot;...held the Congo together, but at a high cost.&quot; &quot;...lacked every element necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission&quot; great power support, consent, a clear mandate, enough funding and force support. Hurt U.N. funding and peacekeeping for a decade. (Durch 315, 345-349) /// Prevented &quot;undesirable&quot; parties from trying to settle conflict, but did not calm or resolve international difficulties and spurred ongoing suspicions of U.N. peacekeeping operations. (James 292-299) /// Shows difficulty of combining coercive use of force/no consent with efforts to mediate. (Wainhouse, 411-13) &quot;Most of ONUC's objectives had been fulfilled.&quot; (BH 258) /// &quot;mixed bag of conclusions.&quot; (Diehl 53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Transition Assistance Group, UNTAG, 1989-1990; &quot;Supervise transition of Namibia from South African rule to independence.&quot;</td>
<td>Good///</td>
<td>&quot;One of a few examples of highly successful peaceful solutions to conflict.&quot; (Durch 372-373) /// &quot;...a peaceful transfer of power could hardly have been envisaged without an involved peacekeeping operation.&quot; (James 266-268) /// &quot;UNTAG showed how much the United Nations can achieve.&quot; (BH 385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM I, 1989-1991; &quot;Monitor Cuban pullout from Angola.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair///</td>
<td>&quot;UNAVEM I had a limited job to do, but it did it well.&quot; (Durch 385) /// &quot;...first year has gone smoothly.&quot; (James 256) /// &quot;Success.&quot; (BH 340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II, 1991-present; &quot;Monitor general cease-fire and creation of new joint army.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail///</td>
<td>Oversaw a 1992 election whose results were rejected by candidate Savimbi. War then resumed. &quot;...the once-promising Angolan peace process is [was then] a tragic failure.&quot; (Durch 401-403)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO, 1991-present, &quot;Conduct referendum on independence from Morocco.&quot;</td>
<td>Fail///</td>
<td>&quot;As of fall 1992 it appeared that MINURSO would fail to implement its mandate.&quot; (Durch 429-431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observer Group in Central America, ONUCA, 1989-1992; &quot;Monitor compliance with Esquipulas II agreement; demobilize Nicaraguan contres.&quot;</td>
<td>Fair///</td>
<td>Better at confidence-building than ensuring demobilization and disarmament, &quot;ONUCA showed how impartial international entities can give crucial material support to a regional settlement.&quot; (Durch 456-458)//An &quot;as yet unfinished matter.&quot; (James 67) ONUCA &quot;has played a key part in a peace process.&quot; (BH 389)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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*New York*

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Lubbers, Ruud, former Prime Minister, Netherlands, at the Rockefeller Foundation; 4/16

Doyle, Dr. Michael, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy at the Academy; 4/19

Eckhard, Fred, Senior Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/19

Kimball, Eliza, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/19

Annabi, Hedi, Director, Africa Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/22

Breed, Henry, Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/23

Carlson, Stan, Chief, Situation Center, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/23

Verheul, Adriaan, Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/23

Yacoumopoulou, Lena, Film/Video Archives, Department of Public Information; 4/23 -24

de Albuquerque, Joao Lins, Media Division, Department of Public Information; 4/24

Gomez, Joao Carlos, Media Division, Department of Public Information; 4/24

Kennedy, Kevin, Chief, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; 4/24

Whitehouse, Steve, Video Section, Department of Public Information; 4/24

Kawakami, Takahisa, Principal Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/25

Schottler, Frederick, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; 4/25

El-Amir, Ayman, Chief, Radio Section, Department of Public Information; 4/26
Titov, Dmitry, Principal Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4/26

_Cyprus_

The following interviews took place on Cyprus between May 6 and June 6, 1996. Except for the government, embassy, and other sources clearly indicated, most interviews took place with UNFICYP personnel in UNFICYP headquarters and other UNFICYP facilities. I had numerous casual conversations with many of these sources and other UNFICYP personnel.

Rokoszewski, Waldemar, Spokesman, UNFICYP; 5/6, 6/6

Vartiainen, ATP Ahti, Brigadier General, Force Commander, UNFICYP; 5/7

Talbot, Ian, Colonel, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP; 5/8

Feissel, Gustave, Chief of Mission UNFICYP, Deputy SRSG; 5/?

Parker, Nick, Lt. Colonel, Chief Operations Officer, UNFICYP; 5/9, 5/14

Snowdon, Andrew, Lt. Colonel, Commanding Officer, Sector Two; British Contingent, UNFICYP; 5/10

Barnard, Andrew, Major, Battery Commander, UNFICYP; 5/10

Skinner, Lieutenant, UNFICYP; 5/10

Jones, Elwyn, Bombardier, UNFICYP; 5/10

Tereso, Jorges, Lt. Colonel, Chief Humanitarian Officer, UNFICYP; 5/14

Petrides, Thalia, Director, European Affairs, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 5/15

Theophanous, Andreas, Dr., Director, Center for Research and Development, Intercollege; 5/15

Pantelides, Leonides, Dr., Political Officer, Cyprus Problem Division, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 5/16

Cowie, Raymond, Bombardier, UNFICYP; 5/24

Walsh, Major, Battery Commander, UNFICYP; 5/24-25

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Fetter, David, Military Attache, U.S. Embassy, Cyprus; 6/4
Koenig, John, First Secretary, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Cyprus; 6/4
Lister, John, Mr., Second Secretary, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Cyprus; 6/4
Plumer, Aytyug, Under-Secretary; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, "TRNC;" 6/5
Altıok, Asım, Director/Representative, Consular and Minority Affairs Dept., "TRNC;" 6/5
Schmitz, Peter, Senior Advisor, UNFICYP; 6/6

Syria

The following interviews took place with UNDOF personnel in Syria at UNDOF headquarters and various positions on the Golan Heights from May 20 to May 22, 1996.

Luijten, Sander, Captain; 5/20
Seng, Jeffrey, Major; 5/20
Kawazu, Ken-Ichi, Captain, Deputy Military Public Information Officer; 5/20
Deschambault, Richard, Captain/Major, Military Public Information Officer; 5/20
Kosters, Johannes, Major-General, Force Commander; 5/21
Mixuliszyn, Romuald, Major, Doctor and Chief Medical Officer; 5/21
Holder, Lt. Colonel, Chief Military Personnel Officer; 5/21
Thaller, Stefan, Lt. Colonel, Chief Operations Officer; 5/21
Moidl, Werner, Captain, Operations Duty Officer; 5/21
Torping, Mats, Lt. Colonel, Chief, Observer Group Golan; 5/21
Binas, Lech, Lt. Colonel, Chief Liaison and Protocol Officer; 5/21
Yackich, Antonio, Lt. Colonel; 5/21
Perez-Berbain, Francisco, Major; 5/21

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(non-attribution), Polbatt Commander; 5/22

Gruber, Captain, Commander, 3rd Company, Ausbatt; 5/22

Klinger, Sergeant; 5/22

Israel

These interviews with U.N. personnel from UNDOF, UNTSO, and UNIFIL took place in Israel at U.N. facilities in the locations indicated from May 27 to May 31, 1996.

Carnapas, Zenon, Senior Advisor, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/27

Knight, Bob, Major, Deputy Chief of Operations Officer, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

Kapetanovic, Lt. Commander, Senior Operations Officer, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

Oksanen, Jaakko, Colonel, Deputy Chief of Staff, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

Kupolati, R. M., Major-General, Chief of Staff, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

Hossinger, Helmut, Lt. Colonel, Chief Military Personnel Officer, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

French, Anthony, Mr., Senior Legal Advisor, UNTSO, Jerusalem; 5/28

Bernard, Manfred, Captain, UNTSO/OGG-T, Tiberias; 5/30

Martin, Ray, Lt. Colonel, UNTSO/OGG-T, Tiberias; 5/30

Kuppens, Tom, Captain, UNTSO/OGG-T, Tiberias; 5/30

Chase, Bob, Major, UNTSO/OGG-T, Tiberias; 5/30

Pack, Major, Duty Officer, UNIFIL, Nahariya; 5/31

Lindvall, Mikael, Press and Information Officer, UNIFIL, Nahariya; 5/31