How Can We Tackle Persistent Poverty in Deprived Neighborhoods?
Lessons from the US and the UK

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Abstract

Since the late 1980s, there has been a broad consensus in the US and the UK that the persistent concentration of poverty in deprived neighborhoods results in negative area effects on local residents, including low aspirations and benefit dependency cultures. In order to transform the prospects of deprived neighborhoods, the governments in the two countries launched the most ambitious community revitalization programs. In the US, the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program (1993-2010) was started to transform the nation’s worst public housing and in the UK, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) program (1998-2008) was launched to tackle multiple deprivations in the poorest neighborhoods in England. This research attempts to provide useful insights into addressing the problems of deprived neighborhoods in the US and the UK, exploring the HOPE VI and NDC programs. In order to develop a conceptual framework that delineates the rationale for HOPE VI and NDC, the assumptions and theories around the problems of deprived neighborhoods are reviewed. It then analyses the evidence from existing research on HOPE VI and NDC including academic literature and policy documents to measure the outcomes. It also draws on information from interviews with academics and researchers to elicit their views on both programs. This research finds that on the basis of similar assumptions and theories to identify the causes of problems in deprived neighborhoods, the US and the UK governments took different approaches: ‘neighborhood transformation’ in HOPE VI and ‘neighborhood improvement’ in NDC. These different approaches were due to fundamental differences in social efforts designed to promote the basic physical and material well-being of people in need. However, it has been observed that the UK government has adopted the US market driven approach and community revitalization policies in the two countries are actually converging and share a common trajectory of change.

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Table of Contents

1. Contextual Background .................................................................................................................. 5

2. Assumptions and Theories around the Problems of Deprived Neighborhoods ................. 9

3. Persistent Poverty in Deprived Neighborhoods and Community Revitalization Programs in the US and the UK ............................................................................................................ 16
   3.1 The Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) Program in the US: The Transformation of Distressed Public Housing Estates............................................................. 16
   3.1.1 The Story of Poverty Deconcentration under HOPE VI......................................................... 18
   3.2 The New Deal for Communities (NDC) in the UK: Bridging the Gap between the Poorest Areas and the Rest of the Country..................................................................................... 23
   3.2.1 The Story of Targeting the Concentration of Multiple Deprivations under the NDC...................................................................................................................................................... 26

4. Discussion....................................................................................................................................... 32

5. Conclusion....................................................................................................................................... 36

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees..................................................................................................... 38
Appendix 2: Main Themes for Interviews......................................................................................... 39
Bibliography......................................................................................................................................... 40
1. Contextual Background

The problems of deprived neighborhoods in the US, the UK and a number of developed countries are often thought to be caused by deficiencies in individuals or groups, whether in skills, in networks, in moral cohesion, or in responsibility. People in poverty are repeatedly blamed for their own segregation and marginalization from mainstream society (Clark, 1965; Levitas, 2005; Lewis, 1969; Lister, 2004; Murray, 1990; O’Connor, 2001; Taylor, 2011; Wilson, 1987; 2012). Community revitalization initiatives have therefore focused on community capacity building and committed to skills development, technical support and training to help people in deprived neighborhoods manage their lives better and reconnect them to the mainstream. Under the rhetoric of ‘self-sufficiency’, local residents in such neighborhoods are encouraged to become active citizens who are able to take certain responsibilities and accountabilities for their actions rather than depend on the state. The state, in particular in the US and the UK, does not act as a welfare provider any more but as a facilitator and a partner to encourage citizens to develop skills and capacities for their own well-being. With the acceptance of neoliberal economic theories and policies, there has been both a direct and indirect gradual reduction of public expenditure on social housing and welfare and a consistent devolution of responsibility for social and other services from the government to the local level since the 1980s. Especially since the global financial crisis in 2008-09, residents in poor areas are expected to be more resilient and have the capability to cope successfully in the face of various risks associated with financial, social or emotional adversity (Batty and Cole, 2010; Davidson, 2008).

Since the late 1980s, there has also been a broad consensus that the concentration of poverty in deprived neighborhoods results in negative area effects on local residents, including low aspirations and a benefit dependency culture. Relying on the theories of social capital and social exclusion (mostly in the UK and other European countries), the creation of mixed-income communities (in the US) or greater social mix (in the UK and other European countries) has been pursued to transform the prospects of deprived neighborhoods. Whilst this idea has
continued to be under debate among academics (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Blasius et al., 2007; Chaskin and Joseph, 2015; Davidson, 2008; Galster, 2003; 2009; Galster et al., 2010; Joseph, 2006; 2013; Lees, 2008; Sampson, 2012b; Vale, 2015), policymakers in the US and the UK have largely accepted that neighborhoods effects exist. In order to restore or rebuild community values, the governments in the two countries have taken practical approaches that include initiatives to improve the physical image and sense of safety in deprived neighborhoods by improving their physical environment; and to diversify tenure within neighborhoods in order to break up large and stigmatized social (public) housing estates and create more mixed communities.

On the basis of these assumptions and theories, the largest and most ambitious community revitalization programs were launched in the US and the UK as a possible way of dealing with the problems in deprived neighborhoods. In the US, the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program (1993-2010) was started in order to transform the nation’s worst public housing, which had come to be regarded as one of the most visible failures of American social welfare policy (National Commission, 1992). The HOPE VI program was designed to provide funding for establishing positive incentives for residents’ self-sufficiency and comprehensive supportive services to empower residents in public housing to pull themselves out of poverty. It also promoted mixed-income development in order to create proper community values and avoid poverty concentration. Policymakers expected that supportive services for residents together with mixed-income development would provide better opportunities for residents and improve their economic circumstances (Cisneros, 2009; Popkin et al., 2009; Vale, 2013). In the UK, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) program (1998-2008) was launched to address social exclusion and tackle multiple deprivations in the poorest neighborhoods in England, with a strong emphasis on involving local residents in the regeneration process. The NDC program attempted to activate local residents in both socially and economically deprived neighborhoods to become active players in making the areas better places to live by providing additional resources. Housing tenure mix was also emphasized, not only to increase levels of home ownership in deprived neighborhoods, but also to achieve New
Labour’s social inclusion goals of sustainable communities (Kearns and Mason, 2007). Mixed
tenure was believed to bring greater social integration of diverse and advantaged/
disadvantaged groups and to tackle the problem of area stigmatization that developed in
relation to social housing estates.

Nearly two decades after the HOPE VI and NDC programs began, it is possible to assess how
much of what was conceptualized at a policy level has been accomplished in practice. This
research attempts to provide useful insights into addressing the problems of deprived
neighborhoods in the US and the UK, exploring the most prominent programs in the two
countries. Using the HOPE VI and the NDC programs, this research examines 1) how the
governments in the US and the UK conceptualized the problems in deprived neighborhoods;
and 2) how they developed their approaches to deliver the programs. On the basis of this
examination, this research tries to find answers to following questions: 1) have similar
assumptions and theories been applied in the two different national contexts? 2) what
similarities and differences have these two programs had in terms of delivering the programs as
a means to regenerate such neighborhoods? 3) what explains the different approaches of HOPE
VI and NDC? 4) what can be concluded about HOPE VI and NDC outcomes in improving the
circumstances of local residents in deprived neighborhoods? This research reviews the
assumptions and theories around the problems of deprived neighborhoods in order to develop
a conceptual framework that delineates the rationale for HOPE VI and NDC. It then analyzes the
evidence from existing research on HOPE VI and NDC including academic literature and policy
documents to measure the outcomes. It also draws on information from interviews with
academics and researchers to elicit their views on HOPE VI and NDC. Finally, a comparison is
made between HOPE VI and NDC from the analysis and policy implications for future
community revitalization are considered.

Although there has always been a strong interest in comparative research between the US and
the UK, there are very few studies that have set out to comparatively investigate the
conceptualization, policy approaches and practices of community revitalization in deprived
neighborhoods in a way that can capture learning in the two countries. This research will make
a unique international contribution to the debate on the future of community resilience in
deprieved neighborhoods by (1) comparing major community revitalization programs in the US
and the UK; and (2) contributing to the further transfer of learning between research and policy
communities in the two countries on policies and practice in community and neighborhood
revitalization.
2. Assumptions and Theories around the Problems of Deprived Neighborhoods

In the mid-1950s, despite the growth of the welfare state and the economy, poverty was still found in inner-city areas in both the US and the UK. In order to attack persistent poverty in such neighborhoods, the US government declared the ‘War on Poverty’ policy initiative in 1964. A range of comprehensive programs, including the Community Action Program, Head Start, Model Cities Program and Job Corps, were initiated for remedial education, job training, health and employment counseling and neighborhood improvement. The UK government also promoted special initiatives to deal with the problems in deprived neighborhoods in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The most well-known programs were the Urban Aid Programme (later recast as the Urban Programme) and Community Development Projects (CDP). The assumption behind these programs in both countries was that the causes of problems of such neighborhoods lay in the community itself. The causes were seen not only to be due to the poor quality of the physical environment but also the culture, which local residents shared and passed on through generations in deprived neighborhoods (Clark, 1965; Deacon, 2003; Gans, 1995; Lewis, 1969; O’Connor, 2001; Somerville, 2011; Taylor, 2011; Wilson, 2012). Although this idea of a ‘culture of poverty’ was more influential in the US, in the 1970s, a similar notion of a ‘cycle of deprivation’ also emerged in the UK (Lister, 2004). Local residents were considered to be dysfunctional, having a lack of work ethic, lack of obligation, lack of responsibility and assuming a dependency culture. Hence, the solutions were thought to be found within the community, providing social services to change residents’ behavior to be better citizens and parents. Strengthening the skills, competencies and abilities of residents in deprived neighborhoods was considered to be the best way to rescue them from the cycle of poverty or deprivation.

This ‘moral underclass discourse’, as Levitas (1998) argued, has never gone away and the poor continue to be criticized for their poverty, being excluded and not participating in mainstream activities. Lister pointed out, “While the precise language and labels have changed with time,
they are, in the UK, imbued with deeply sedimented ‘punitive and negative images of the poor’.

These images were transplanted and adapted to the ‘New World’ of North America where they continue to shape attitudes and policies towards ‘the poor’. They reinforce a belief in self-help and the American Dream, which constitutes poverty as failure” (2004, p.103-104). Vale (2000) suggested that this transplant happened in the early 17th century with the American adoption of the Elizabethan Poor Laws. The notion of an ‘underclass’ became predominant by its association with crime, violence and anti-social behavior in both the US and the UK in the 1980s and the early 1990s (Welshman, 2002; 2006). Charles Murray\(^1\), who has written a series of articles about the British underclass and has popularized the idea of an underclass in the UK, defined it “... I refer not to poor people, but to a subset of poor people who chronically live off mainstream society (directly through welfare or indirectly through crime) without participating in it” (1990, p.5). This division of the poor into the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ is deeply rooted in the two countries and also in many other countries. Policymakers in the US and the UK have embraced the neo-liberal arguments that state welfare encourages the development of the undeserving poor, frequently describing recipients as ‘welfare queens’. The 1990s in the US saw social and welfare policy changes including the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, often referred to as ‘welfare reform’. This Act of 1996 abolished a major cash transfer program, which had been introduced by the Roosevelt administration as part of the New Deal. A new welfare to work program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, was launched which required recipients’ work participation, and had a five-year lifetime limit. The primary purpose of the legislation was to end what was often described as the ‘culture of dependency’ created by the welfare system. This welfare reform in the US significantly influenced the New Labour government’s reforms to welfare to work policies in the UK and it was adopted in the New Deal programs, which emphasized training and education to get people back to work (Midgley, J. 2008).

\(^1\) Charles Murray identified the same trend in some of British towns and cities that had been seen in America: a rapid rise in the number of children born into homes with no resident father and where the principal source of income was welfare benefit.
William Wilson (1987; 1996), however, argued that persistent, concentrated poverty was not necessarily mainly caused by deficiencies in individuals or groups although he agreed with a pathological analysis of behavior of the underclass and used the term initially. He drew attention to the fact that highly concentrated poverty was positively related to joblessness that was the result of the dynamic aspects of social, economic and demographic changes, together with race and class divisions. In order to participate in mainstream activities, Wilson emphasized the changing of social and ethnic population composition in concentrated poverty areas, which would potentially increase both human and social capital of the residents in such areas. His argument, together with other neighborhood effects, have had a great influence on poverty deconcentration policies in the US and the UK and has become a key part of the rationale for the development of mixed communities (Chaskin and Joseph, 2015). Most neighborhood effects studies assume that neighborhood characteristics and individual behavior are correlated. From such studies, Bauder (2002) identified three mechanisms of the operation of neighborhood effects – 1) peer groups, 2) concentrated poverty and adult role-model, 3) physical infrastructure and institutional networks. According to the neighborhood effects studies, local peer networks and adults in poverty areas infect youngsters with negative behavior; pass their pathological behavior on to the youths who live in the same neighborhood; and dilapidated physical infrastructure of the areas destabilizes local communities. In order to reduce these social and economic problems, it was believed that residents in deprived neighborhoods needed to mix with other citizens in mainstream society.

The idea of mixed communities has been embraced not only as an alternative approach to highly concentrated poverty areas but also as a general social good (Tunstall and Lupton, 2010). The development of mixed communities has been pursued in order to create an integrated and egalitarian society in which people of all social classes and incomes share the same space, services and facilities. The advocates of mixed communities, drawing upon social capital theory, believe that low-income residents will benefit from area resources and social interactions, which can provide access to information, opportunity and the potential for social mobility (Chaskin and Joseph, 2015). Since the late 1980s, social capital has become an important
concept in relation to explaining the relationship between the quality of people’s social networks and a range of outcomes, including economic growth, health, crime and educational performance (Halpern, 2005). Social capital is described as ‘the sum of the resources that accrue to an individual or a group’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 119), as ‘productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends’ (Coleman, 1988, p.96) and as ‘features of social life that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 664-5). In general, the concept is seen as a productive asset that exists in the networks of relationships among actors (Joseph et al., 2007).

In the UK and other European countries, social capital is used to examine issues of social exclusion amongst deprived neighborhoods (Middleton et al., 2005). Residents in deprived neighborhoods become increasingly isolated and excluded from mainstream society and this lack of interaction with or participation in societal activities is identified as a key factor of neighborhood decline. Chaskin and Joseph (2015) argue that social exclusion discourse transcends the informal social relations and networks, the core idea of social capital, and pay attention to the broader social processes and mechanisms of marginality. Therefore, the social exclusion agenda often addresses the wider issues of social relations associated with political, economic and cultural institutions and promotes state-initiated responses in order to build an inclusive society. In terms of delivering a social exclusion agenda, however, the Labour government emphasized the role of community and voluntary organizations [the third sector] with its ‘third way’ politics and neoliberal policies. Gough (2002, p.70) called this ‘top-down mobilization of community’, which the Labour government pursued to meet important neoliberal aims of reducing the costs of the poor through state benefits and reproducing the poor as effective labor power.

The concept of social exclusion has three competing political discourses in the UK, which Levitas (2005) labeled as RED (a redistributionist discourse), MUD (a moral underclass discourse) and SID (a social integrationist discourse). The differences between these three discourses are ‘what the excluded are seen as lacking’ – money in RED, morals in MUD and work in SID. In tackling
social exclusion in deprived neighborhoods, the New Labour government reflected on all of these three discourses (Lister, 2004). Although Prime Minister Tony Blair criticized a long period of disparity between the demand for rights from the state and the duties of citizenship, the Labour government did not abandon its traditional social democratic commitment to redistribution and equality completely (Deacon, 2003). Its social policies constituted a new mix of redistribution, morality recovery, financial incentives and compulsion. A series of changes were made to income tax and social insurance contributions in order to strengthen financial work incentives for those with low earning power, including the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW), Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Working Tax Credit (WTC). Through the WTC, additional support was offered to families without children who were in work but on a low income for the first time in the UK (Brewer, 2007).

The ideas of social capital and social exclusion emphasize a different aspect of poverty and social inequality (Murie and Musterd, 2004; van Kempen, 2002). These two ideas go beyond a traditional discourse of poverty, focusing on relational issues of the poor - social participation, integration and power. In relation to the problems of deprived neighborhoods, social capital and social exclusion have been identified both as a cause and a consequence of poverty in the sense that people are cut off from the labor market, lose social contacts and live in certain stigmatized neighborhoods. Murie and Musterd (2004) challenged the reference to these spatial concentrations of deprived residents as part of the defining aspects of social exclusion [or as part of lacking social capital]. They raised questions about negative neighborhood effects on poor people living in areas of concentrated poverty, including, “Is there a concentration of disadvantaged households because the neighbourhood has an adverse impact on opportunities?” (2004, p. 1443). Cheshire also asked the similar question, “Do poor neighbourhoods make residents poorer, or do poor people simply live in poor neighbourhoods because living in affluent ones costs too much?” (2012, p.267). Chaskin and Joseph (2015, p.27) argue that most people living in poverty share similar aspirations to mainstream society and
therefore, the perspective that argues mixed communities would change the problems of deprived areas could be seen as both ‘paternalistic’ and ‘misguided’.

A large volume of evidence, mostly using qualitative methods, shows that, in general, areas with more mixed communities result in greater average resident satisfaction with their homes and neighborhoods, have better services, lower crime rates and better area reputation. However, there is limited evidence that the development of mixed communities actually creates broader social networks (Galster, 2007; Musterd and Anderson, 2005; Ostendorf et al., 2001; Tunstall and Lupton, 2010). Mixed communities are more likely to deliver shared spaces than to create broader social networks, as different groups tend not to actually mix. Chaskin and Joseph (2015) call this phenomenon ‘incorporated exclusion’, where mixed-income development reproduces marginality and alienation of public housing and low-income residents. Furthermore, the neighborhood effects on individual outcomes also seem mixed. Some studies in the US, such as Popkin et al. (2009) and Chetty and Hendren (2015), found that there were improvements in social wellbeing for residents and in the outcomes of the youngest who had been moved into neighborhoods with lower levels of poverty but the studies on Gautreaux and on the Moving to Opportunity program (Rosebaum, 1995; Ludwig et al., 2001) found little impact on adults’ economic outcomes. Similarly, studies on neighborhood effects in the UK and Europe did not consistently show positive patterns and the effects were limited (Galster, 2007; Musterd and Anderson, 2005; Tunstall and Lupton, 2010). It is still not certain what the causal mechanisms are of the neighborhood effects that produce a positive or negative impact on individuals’ outcomes and determine upward social mobility (Bauder, 2002; Cheshire, 2012; Jencks and Mayer, 1990; van Ham et al., 2012). As Joseph put it, “After nearly 20 years of poverty deconcentration and mixed-income efforts in the United States and Western Europe (and in other parts of the world, such as Australia), however, fundamental questions remain. The intentions and overall outcomes of efforts to create pathways to self-sufficiency and opportunity for those who have been socially and economically isolated in high-poverty, inner-city communities remain unclear” (2013, p.215).
The next section explores how these assumptions and theories around deprived neighborhoods are understood and deployed in urban policies in the US and the UK, using the HOPE VI and NDC programs.
3. Persistent Poverty in Deprived Neighborhoods and Community Revitalization Programs in the US and the UK

3.1 The Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) Program in The US: The Transformation of Distressed Public Housing Estates

“Begin with the basic concept that this is not about building housing, but about building communities. Don’t segregate by income, race, or ethnicity. Design these developments as inclusive, mixed-income neighborhoods that are the heart and soul of the community. Do it in partnership with the private sector. Build in opportunities for homeownership. Help the residents get stable, livable-wage jobs and help the children excel in school” (Cuomo, 1999, p. 3).

In the late 1980s, as William Wilson described in his book, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), the extreme poverty in inner city areas in the US was intolerable. The absolute number of poor people in metropolitan neighborhoods of high-poverty (census tracts with poverty rates of 40 percent or more) grew from 4.9 million in 1980 to 7.1 million in 1990 (Kingsley and Pettit, 2003). During this period (1979-1989) violent crime in inner city areas also grew by 33 percent on average (Katz, 2009). Public housing estates were the representatives of these high-poverty, high-crime neighborhoods. Besides Wilson, other studies, including Lemann (1992) and Kotlowitz (1992), also described the condition of poorly maintained public housing estates, which suffered from high levels of serious crime and violence and concentrations of poor families living on welfare. Residents in public housing estates were predominantly African-American women and children and were extremely poor (Sue et al., 2004). In 1991 the number of public housing households with incomes below 10 percent of local median income was 20 percent of the total public housing population (Katz, 2009). With the combination of intense poverty, physical deterioration and social disorder, public housing estates became ‘places of last resort’ for both residents and policymakers (Vale, 2013).

In order to study the matter of distressed public housing and propose a remedial plan, the US Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989.
The National Commission proposed a comprehensive plan that encompassed increased funding for both rehabilitation and replacement of physically unsustainable housing; mixed-income development to avoid or decrease the concentration of very low-income families; and support services and coordinated systems for delivering those services (National Commission, 1992). These recommendations of the Commission led to the 1992 enactment of the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD), the first iteration of the HOPE VI program. Congress also approved the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, which authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to administer grants for the physical revitalization of distressed projects, public housing authorities’ management improvements and support services to promote residents’ self-sufficiency. Eligible activities also included residents’ involvement in redevelopment planning, job training, tenant relocation costs, and neighborhood economic development. Later, in 1999, Congress passed authorizing legislation for HOPE VI within the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA). The QHWRA brought radical changes in eligibility and rent determination in order to reduce the concentration of very low income families in public housing (Smith, 1999; Vale, 2013). Vale pointed out, “With “work responsibility” linked to “quality housing” even in the name of legislation itself, after 2000 many housing authorities went so far as to make gainful employment a requirement for entry into any subsidized housing.... Paralleling the shift in public housing policy toward higher-income occupancy, other housing production programs also targeted the working poor rather than the poorest” (2013, p.27).

The HOPE VI program funding covered capital costs to reconstruct replacement units, Section 8 vouchers, improve public housing authorities’ management practices and community service programs. Local public housing authorities (PHAs) were allowed to propose plans covering up to 500 units with grant awards of up to $50 million (Katz, 2009). However, after 2004, funding for HOPE VI grants were greatly reduced as the Bush administration proposed eliminating funding for the program altogether, blaming the slow pace of implementation, flaws in program.

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2 The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 set aside up to 20% of the initial $300 million appropriation for community service programs and for supportive services.
design, questionable cost-effectiveness and the lack of administrative capacity on the part of HUD (Popkin et al., 2004; Zhang, 2004). However, despite the lack of support at federal level, there was still strong public and private sector investment in the mixed-income approaches of HOPE VI due to growing demand for affordable housing in urban areas (Joseph, 2006). In the lifetime of the HOPE VI program, HUD awarded 262 revitalization grants totaling $6.2 billion between FYs 1993-2010. In addition, the HOPE VI grants leveraged billions more in other public, private and philanthropic investments.

HOPE VI was succeeded by the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CNI) in 2010. CNI focuses on severely distressed public housing properties as well as HUD-assisted, private housing properties and entire neighborhoods.

### 3.1.1 The Story of Poverty Deconcentration under HOPE VI

The HOPE VI program focused on two principal areas for poverty deconcentration. One was physical revitalization (place-based) through relocating the residents and creating new mixed-income communities. The other was residents’ empowerment and self-sufficiency (people-based) through the community and social services. To deliver these objectives successfully, the management of public housing authorities needed modernizing as few of them had the organizational structure and trained personnel to complete real estate transitions of the complexity required under HOPE VI (Gentry, 2009). The public housing authorities were required to recruit the requisite talent, revamp their accounting systems, adopt less centralized operational models and learn the techniques of site management from private sector practices and partners. Gentry (2009) observed that HOPE VI brought the exposure of asset management and mixed-finance to the public housing authorities.

With the emergence of New Urbanism, the physical design and density of communities in public housing were recognized as significant parts of the problem. In order to create walkable neighborhoods of lower density, containing a wide range of housing types, open spaces and
adequate community facilities, advocates for redevelopment argued that smaller-scale replacement buildings were necessary. Their justification was that significant numbers of the units in the worst buildings were already out of service (Cisneros, 2009). In the Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994, one of the most serious problems of public housing was framed as the ‘concentration of very low-income families in dense, high-rise housing’ and therefore the solution was to demolish these high-rise concrete blocks and replace them with ‘economically integrated, well-designed, small-scale, affordable housing’. It was expected that old public housing communities [profoundly poor, unemployed, socially excluded members of society] would be replaced with entirely new, mixed-income communities [socially and economically active members of society] through the HOPE VI program (Goetz, 2013). Goetz argued that HOPE VI, which emerged within the Clinton administration, “could be viewed as an attempt to “end public housing as we know it”, a fitting companion piece to Clinton’s effort in the welfare policy arena” (2013, p.11). The ‘one-for-one’ replacement rule was lifted by Congress in 1995 and Section 8 rental assistance enabled those residents to move out of public housing. Section 8 rental assistance, considered a cost-effective, demand-side solution, was encouraged as a successful way of deconcentrating poverty and integration into mainstream society (Zhang, 2004). Under HOPE VI, about 75,410 households were relocated and over 98,700 public housing units were either demolished or were planned for demolition but only 87,800 units were built or would be rebuilt in their place within new mixed-income communities, as of fiscal year 2014.

With rental assistance, in theory, public housing tenants moved to better neighborhoods and would be able to come back after redevelopment had been completed. Even if they did not return, relying on neighborhood effects theory, it was believed that they would enjoy a range of individual benefits including safer environment, better school, increased economic opportunities through social capital and better quality public services. It was expected that,

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3 The relocated households, demolition and new construction unit numbers are the cumulative total of past actuals, current actuals and future planned units up to 2014 from the Quarterly project progress reports of HOPE VI revitalization grant program (1993 – 2011). The unit numbers under the Demolition-only grants are not included.
eventually, public housing tenants would be self-sufficient by moving up the socioeconomic ladder.

This belief appeared to hold true for voucher holders but less so for public housing relocatees (Buron et al., 2007). Buron et al., (2007) compared changes in outcomes for voucher holders with changes for residents who relocated to other public housing. They found that in terms of physical environment, mental health and children’s behavior, voucher holders had positive improvements after relocation whereas public housing residents had only small improvements or did not gain any improvement at all. Other studies also showed a similar tendency (Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; Popkin et al., 2004; 2009; Trudeau, 2006). Although voucher holders moved to neighborhoods that had lower poverty rates than those they had left behind⁴ (Kingsley et al., 2003), these new neighborhoods were still segregated and the poverty rates were higher than the average for their cities (Buron et al., 2002; Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; Popkin et al., 2002; Sink and Ceh, 2010). As the voucher holders often remained within communities with which they were familiar and in which they maintained social ties, they did not relocate far away from the public housing from which they had been displaced (Comey, 2007; Goetz, 2003; 2010).

In terms of individual economic outcomes and physical health conditions, contrary to expectation, HOPE VI relocation and Community Supportive Services (CSS) were unlikely to produce a positive impact on both voucher holders and residents who relocated to public housing (Buron et al., 2007; Goetz, 2010; Levy and Wolley, 2007; Popkin et al., 2009). Buron et al. (2007) found that 45 percent of voucher holders reported trouble paying their utility bills and providing adequate food for their family. These findings were supported by other evidence. Levy and Kaye (2004) discovered that the vast majority of working-age respondents (employed and not employed) were still living far below the 2003 poverty threshold; and through the HOPE VI Panel Study⁵, Levy and Wolley (2007) revealed that almost 50% of the working-age

⁴ Kingsley et al., (2003) found that HOPE VI residents who received vouchers moved from neighborhoods with an average poverty rate of 61 percent to neighborhoods with an average poverty rate of 27 percent.
respondents were not employed. A data analysis of CSS reports in 2014 shows that only a limited number of CSS participants are currently working.

A couple of reasons can be found to explain these research findings. First, the new neighborhoods chosen by most voucher holders were still deprived and racially segregated. Therefore, the expected neighborhood effects of creating social networks or social capital, which were potential for job opportunities, might not be generated. Second, relocation did not happen voluntarily, as the number of people who did not wish to move was very sizable (Goetz, 2010). The research results from Gibson (2007) and Kleit and Manzo (2006) showed that some families, who were ready and willing to move, benefited most from relocation. And third, even though the intention of HOPE VI for poverty deconcentration was to improve residents’ self-sufficiency through the CSS program, surprisingly, there were no established standards for CSS service packages or implementation practices (Levy and Wolley, 2007; Popkin et al., 2009). Because of this lack of guidelines for the CSS program, from the outset, the PHAs encountered great difficulties in putting together meaningful CSS programs (Zhang, 2004). As a consequence, the effectiveness of the CSS services for improving residents’ self-sufficiency was very limited (Levy and Wolley, 2007). A number of studies found that many residents still experienced a considerable number of barriers to finding a job including mental and physical health problems, low level of education, and lack of previous work experience and mobility. Popkin et al. argued, “without adequate services and support, there is a risk that these families [coping with multiple complex problems] could become literally homeless. If they fail to meet even the minimal requirements of traditional public housing, they could face eviction, a very real risk as housing authorities in the US begin to more strictly enforce lease requirements” (2009, p.494).

Few residents, indeed, came back to the new mixed-income developments as they had to pass a number of screening criteria, including employment and crime records checks before being accepted. Early research findings (National Housing Law Project, 2002) discovered that the

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6 The author analyzed HOPE VI CSS (Community and Social Service) reports of 219 sites in the period from 2013 Q4 to 2014 Q3. Less than 4% of HOPE VI developments have CSS participants who are currently employed.
returning rate was around 11 percent but by 2008 the rate had increased to 24 percent according to HUD figures (Vale, 2013). What happened to them after coming back to new, well designed mixed-income neighborhoods? In principle, the returnees should have benefitted most from the HOPE VI redevelopment. Goetz (2013) found that on average, the poverty rates of HOPE VI neighborhoods decreased from 44 percent (at the relocation stage of redevelopment) to about 36 percent, a reduction of more than 8 percentage points over the ten-year period; and the reduction in African American residents in HOPE VI neighborhoods (from 61 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 2000) was greater than the cities in which they were situated. There have been clear benefits in terms of physical environment and security but in terms of social impacts of the mixed-income setting on their lives, it seems that any expected benefits from social mix across different income levels have not materialized yet (Chaskin and Joseph, 2015; Joseph, 2010; Joseph and Chaskin, 2010; Jourdan et al., 2013). Although Jourdan et al. (2013) demonstrated that connections within the new mixed-income communities have grown over time, their sample size is too small to draw any general conclusion. Chaskin and Joseph (2015) conducted extensive fieldwork including interviews over six years in three mixed-income public housing redevelopments in Chicago and found that only 13 percent of the original residents came back. This was similar to the earlier research findings by the National Housing Law Project (2002). The residents who returned to the mixed-income developments certainly enjoy a better infrastructure and safer environment but they have found it difficult to integrate with other income groups in their community. Chaskin and Joseph (2015) stated, “many of those who did return to the redeveloped sites have in numerous ways been marginalized within these communities, subjected to routine surveillance and regulation and excluded from many of the benefits that integration was meant to provide” (2015, p.229).

These outcomes find common ground with those conclusions in other poverty deconcentration efforts through mixed communities, which showed limited evidence of creating social mix, as discussed in Section 2.

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7Jourdan et al. (2013) focused on the effects of the redevelopment on 12 families from Magnolia Gardens in Beaumont, Texas between 2007 and 2011. The data from the in-depth interviews was further supplemented by additional interviews with PHA staff, city employees and other project stakeholders as well as focus groups with new residents.
3.2 The New Deal For Communities (NDC) in the UK: Bridging the Gap between the Poorest Areas and the Rest of the Country

“Our goal is simple: it is to bridge the gap between the poorest neighborhoods and the rest of Britain. Bridging that gap will not be easy. It will require imagination, persistence and commitment. But I believe that it can be done. Indeed, if we are to bring Britain back together, it has to be done” (Blair, 1998, no page)

In the 1980s and the 1990s, the UK also experienced unprecedented levels of poverty and inequality in its post-war history as the result of the recessions in the early 1980s and the early 1990s (SEU, 1998; Hills et al., 2009). From 1979 to 1995, net incomes (after housing costs) of the richest tenth of the population grew by 68 percent, while those of the bottom tenth fell by 8 percent (Hills, 1998). The incomes of the very poorest were lower in real terms in 1994/5 than they had been in 1979 (Hills, 2004) and the gaps between affluent and poor wards had widened between 1981 and 1991 (SEU, 1998). Similar to the situation in the US, the poorest became more concentrated in small areas of multiple deprivation. The problems were understood from the cycle of deprivation theory: those residents who were generally better skilled and educated moved out, leaving behind increasing concentrations of deprivation including poor quality housing, badly maintained local environments, antisocial behavior, crime and drug and alcohol abuse. The situations also worsened with time. People living in deprived neighborhoods often had no qualifications and low level of skills; lived in housing that was unfit for human habitation; and suffered from violent crime and poor health. Nationally, council housing continued to dominate in the majority of poor neighborhoods but outside London, poor areas were likely to include more privately rented or even owner occupied homes (DETR, 1998b).

For the Labour government (1997-2010), especially under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the serious degeneration of community, a weakening sense of solidarity, was the origin of many of the problems in deprived neighborhoods (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; SEU, 1998). The activation of communities was, therefore, an important part of Labour’s approach to the revitalization of deprived neighborhoods. In order to enable disadvantaged communities to access resources
they could use to tackle problems for themselves, certain kinds of social networks, conceptualized as 'social capital', were believed to be a key factor. The social capital theory was the rationale for Labour’s social exclusion agenda, describing how vulnerable members of society were pushed out of the mainstream through the interaction of different factors of disadvantage (Dillon and Fanning, 2011).

One of the first decisions of the incoming Labour administration was to establish a Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in the Cabinet Office. The SEU identified three key ways to respond to the multi-faceted problems of deprived neighborhoods (SEU, 2001): first, effecting positive change in five key domains of employment, housing, education, crime and health; second, rebuilding of social capital; and third, encouraging 'joined-up' approaches, involving a wide range of public, private and voluntary bodies to co-ordinate services around the needs of each neighborhood. A new neighborhood renewal program, the New Deal for Communities (NDC), was introduced targeting 39 neighborhoods\(^8\) (under 10,000 residents each) of disadvantage in the major urban areas with the aim of reducing the disparities of opportunity between NDC neighborhoods and urban areas as a whole.

In each of the 39 neighborhoods, NDC partnerships were set up with local representatives to coordinate and manage delivery of the program at local level. The NDC partnerships had some freedom to decide how to allocate their budget and plan interventions across six domains of place- and people-based outcomes. With a strong emphasis on a bottom-up approach, this locally focused approach was expected to allow local communities greater influence over partnership strategy and would also encourage greater involvement by other public sector agencies including local authority housing and environmental departments, health authorities and the police (Lawless, 2012). In most cases, the NDC partnerships operated in the manner of independent companies, whose ultimate authority rested with a board composed of a

\(^8\) These 39 neighborhoods were located across England with 10 in London; 6 in the South East, South West and Eastern regions taken together; and the remaining 23 in the Midlands or Northern regions. Although the local authority areas eligible for NDC funding were selected using the 1998 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and a regional quota system, the selection of neighborhoods within the local authority districts was left to local discretion.
combination of local residents and representatives of the main service agencies. Staff numbers varied substantially from 10 to 50, which reflected fundamental differences in individual NDC partnerships’ approach to program and project management (CRESR, 2002). However, it was acknowledged that recruiting and retaining staff with appropriate levels of experience in the NDC areas was challenging and thus several NDC partnerships had to recruit interim staff or use external agencies to develop and deliver programs (ODPM, 2005a; CLG, 2010a). The NDC partnerships designed and implemented a spectrum of projects that best suited the needs of their area. By 2008, the 39 NDC partnerships spent a total of £1.71 bn on some 6,900 projects or interventions, aiming at reducing crime, improving education attainment, health and housing and physical environment.

All NDC areas were located in cities and within local authority areas which were disadvantaged in relation to their region as a whole. Approximately two thirds of NDC areas had mainly social housing and nearly one third had a mix of private and social housing. 62 percent of the NDC population was people of working age (males aged 16-64 and female 16-59) and almost 75 percent was White, 11 percent was Asian British and 10 percent was Black/Black British (Beatty et al., 2005). The NDC program was designed to improve place-based outcomes - community, housing and physical environment, and crime - as well as people-based outcomes - work and finance, education and skills, and health. This holistic approach was expected to enhance cross-outcome benefits and achieving gains in one outcome would help drive improvement in others (Batty and Cole, 2010). The NDC was distinctive from previous area-based funding schemes in its length (10 years), the scale of central funding (£50m per area), the establishment of community-led partnerships to design and deliver the programs and the existence of a ‘Year Zero’ for partnerships to consult and plan before spending any money.

With the growing skepticism due to the lack of evidence on the effectiveness of previous area-based initiatives as well as the emphasis on evidence-based policy (Romeo, 2009), the Labour government designated a consortium of 14 research organizations in order to evaluate the impact of the NDC program. This research consortium identified neighborhoods (control areas)
that had the same levels of deprivation, labor market conditions and population size as NDC areas but were not part of NDC or similar area-based initiatives. The research consortium conducted a household survey in both NDC and control areas from 2001 to 2008\(^9\) in order to monitor the effectiveness of NDC and published final evaluation reports in 2010. This research draws on evidence from those National Evaluation reports.

3.2.1 The Story of Targeting the Concentration of Multiple Deprivation under the NDC

The NDC program was started with a belief that improving the physical and socioeconomic conditions of a place would positively impact social capital and social cohesion, enhance economic vitality and increase the possibility of sustaining improvements (CLG, 2010a). It was a specific, geographically targeted program to tackle the problems of deprived, socially excluded areas, based on a ‘bottom-up’ approach, underpinned by partnership between key local players such as local authorities, community groups and the business community. NDC thus did not intend to totally transform the 39 deprived areas or completely resolve problems of the areas rather it was “an experiment in exploring what happens in small areas if regeneration funding is sustained over longer periods of time” (Lawless, 2012, p.315). Initially housing redevelopment through demolition\(^10\) was not even included in the remit of the program (Lupton and Fuller, 2009). As Lupton and Fuller note, “New Labour’s early response to place poverty seemed clearly to represent compensatory support for individuals and places that markets put at risk through ameliorative state-funded interventions” (2009, p.1016). Also, in the UK it had been

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\(^9\) A baseline was established in 2002 across all 39 areas using a household survey interview questionnaire addressing socio-demographic, status and attitudinal considerations across all six outcomes. It was based on a random sample survey and culminated in approximately 500 responses from all 39 NDC areas, 19,574 responses in all. The survey was repeated in 2004, 2006 and 2008.

\(^10\) According to round 1 bidding guidance suggestions for projects under NDC, the project suggestion for housing was refurbishment (DETR, 1998a).
acknowledged that the large-scale clearance programs carried out by local authorities were too expensive and socially unacceptable since the end of the 1960s.\footnote{The Housing Act 1969 marked a switch from a policy of slum clearance and replacement new housing to one of housing improvement.}

In the mid 2000s, the Labour government’s focus changed to ‘poverty deconcentration’ as the solution for deprived neighborhoods with a “more radical and intensive approach” (ODPM, 2005b, p.38). In January 2005, the ‘Mixed Communities Initiative (MCI)’, influenced by HOPE VI in the US, was announced as a new approach to tackling area deprivation in England. The MCI aimed at a fundamental long-term transformation through population mix, rather than modest improvements. It depended on market mechanisms and local private and public partnership rather than on strong state interventions, such as central state grants, strong direction on program activities and monitoring. Although the MCI did not replace the NDC and any other existing neighborhood renewal programs, the emphasis of neighborhood renewal shifted from the interests of existing residents towards the needs of the market (Lupton and Fuller, 2009).

Creation of successful, mixed communities\footnote{In the early 2000s, mixed communities were encouraged to have more balanced social housing letting policies (Kearans and Mason, 2007).} became crucial to the future of renewal areas and the evaluation of NDC in 2003 highlighted the significance of housing tenure mix (Lawless, 2003). The NDC partnerships focused on increasing levels of home ownership and also on providing improved residential environments in order to attract and retain homeowners (Kearns and Mason, 2007; Lupton and Fuller, 2009). In general, mixed communities practices in NDC redeveloped social housing estates at higher densities in order to build extra homes for sale and the profits on these sales subsidized new or refurbished social housing and community facilities (Lupton et al., 2013). But some NDC partnerships were closely integrated with strategies for economic growth in the city, changing the image of the area to attract business investment and meeting the housing demand for incoming professionals. Physical redevelopment involved demolition to remove unsafe properties, create more public spaces and build new housing for sale but the common concerns among the NDC partnerships were to
support the modernization of social housing, exterior improvements such as public spaces, gardens and fencing and improve security on individual properties. Between 1999/2000 and 2007/08, 13,012 homes were improved or built in the NDC areas.

In many respects, the 39 NDC areas saw a considerable positive change and narrowed the gaps with the rest of the country. There were more obvious signs of positive change in relation to place- rather than people-related outcomes. This might be due to the fact that some people-related outcomes, notably in health and education would take years to become apparent. Beatty and Cole (2009) pointed out that in the early stages of the program, many NDC partnerships often concentrated their efforts on physical environmental improvements and crime reduction, which would be evidently seen and noticed as regeneration efforts in order to achieve “quick wins” (p.151). Efforts subsequently moved more towards people-related interventions, such as health, education and skills, where the benefits would be gained over a longer term.

Between 2002 and 2008, the NDC partnerships brought improvements in crime reduction, education, health, worklessness, community and housing and the physical environment. The biggest improvements were for indicators of people’s feelings about their neighborhoods. However, the proportion of NDC residents who wanted to move out of the area remained stable at 39 percent between 2002 and 2008 and the NDC interventions did little to change patterns of mobility. According to Pearson and Lawless (2012), between 2002 and 2004, about 3,500 residents left the NDC areas and the main reason they did so was that they needed a larger property due to household changes or move closer to their place of work. The ‘leavers’ of the NDC areas had access to a better choice and quality of housing in areas with lower rates of crime and a better environment but ‘in-movers’ were not necessarily more deprived than stayers. In relation to residential mobility and NDC outcomes, Beatty and Cole (2009) argue that physical improvements could increase residents’ satisfaction with their neighborhoods but this would not necessarily encourage them to continue to stay in the area.
The NDC program was intended to make residents more self-sufficient by providing individuals skills to enhance personal trajectories. What changes were experienced by those who stayed in the NDC areas? There were large improvements in relation to educational attainment for teenagers (age 11 to 14) and the percentage of working age adults taking part in education or training increased in 29 NDC areas. The number of workless households decreased across all NDC areas by 3.7 percentage points. However, the indicator of ‘the proportion in receipt of means-tested benefits’ showed statistically significant negative change. This increase probably reflected changes in the benefit systems between 2002 and 2008 (CLG, 2010b). The Labour government had an ambition of eliminating child poverty over a generation as well as ending pensioner poverty. Benefits for non-working families with children rose substantially, both in real terms and relative to average earnings and low-income families received the maximum rate, whether they were out of work or in low-paid jobs (Hirsch and Miller, 2004). Among the stayers in the NDC areas, who made the most improvement and why? Those who made the greatest transitions were mostly women, aged between 25 and 49, White, not in employment and staying in the social rented sector. Lawless (2012) learnt from the household surveys in the NDC areas that more deprived individuals at the start of the program in 2002 were more likely to make progress by 2008. This outcome was to be explained with two reasons (CLG, 2010a; Lawless, 2012): first, they had more room for improvement and secondly, the NDC partnerships targeted interventions to the most disadvantaged residents and prioritized those individuals.

Comparing these changes in the NDC areas with those occurring in the comparator areas, the NDC areas achieved positive outcomes related to physical improvements, area satisfaction ratings and reductions in crime. Nevertheless, even though there was evidence of absolute improvement in many people-related outcomes across the NDC areas, very little of this improvement was significantly greater than that experienced in the comparator areas. This might be due to the fact that insufficient time had passed for the impacts of the NDC interventions to appear. But people-related interventions at neighborhood level had inevitable limitations, as the outcomes would be constrained by what happened outside those neighborhoods. In particular, problems of worklessness should be addressed at regional or
national level in relation to international economic climate, although it is possible to provide necessary job training at neighborhood level to meet demand in the economy. In the context of ‘community and social capital’ indicators, there were modest improvements in the NDC areas but these improvements were not greater than the comparator areas. In 2008, residents in the NDC areas remained less likely to “feel part of the community”, “think that people in the area were friendly”, and “look out for each other” and to “know most/many people in the area” than did their counterparts in the comparator areas. Moreover, there was not any significant relationship between resident involvement and outcome change across all outcomes at the area level (CLG, 2010d). Whilst there was evidence that participation in NDC activities was associated with positive outcome change for individual residents, it was less likely to support the assumption that residents’ participation would increase social capital for residents in deprived neighborhoods.

Given the level of resources and interventions, the community and social capital indicators were expected to show more marked improvement in the NDC areas. The key reason for this lack of change was due to the fact that only a limited number of residents (about a fifth of all NDC residents) were involved in NDC activities (CLG, 2010e; Grimsley et al., 2005; Lawless, 2012). It seems that factors associated with increased participation were likely to be linked with individual characteristics, household turnover rates and the extent to which residents trusted local agencies, not the actions of NDC partnerships. Lawless (2012) found that there was never a widespread willingness to participate in the formal processes of regeneration no matter how hard the NDC partnerships tried. He argued, “it was naïve to imagine that adopting relatively routine community involvement interventions would create an environment within which more residents would ‘engage’; even more implausible to think the limited intensity of such involvement would be associated with discernible change with regard to trust, engagement and social capital” (2012, p.319). However, some criticized the NDC approaches to community involvement for the lack of improvement in community and social capital. Dinham (2005) argued that the NDC approach was a “prescriptive and bureaucratic approach” that worked to circumscribe community participation. In reality, the narrative of neighborhood policy
emphasizing the importance of community involvement under the Labour government became more formalized and bureaucratized to fit in with central government agenda (Dillon and Fanning, 2011; Dinham, 2005). Another reason might be related to the challenges of finding and retaining experienced staff that were able to develop and deliver NDC programs effectively. The high turnover of staff would have made it difficult to develop meaningful trusting relationships between local agencies and residents. This lack of trust could be the reason for the low level of residents’ participation.

The next section makes a comparison between HOPE VI and NDC drawing from the analysis of the social and economic backgrounds, the outcomes and the impact of the two programs on residents in deprived neighborhoods.
4. Discussion

This research started with the big question, “how can we tackle persistent poverty in deprived neighborhoods?”. Here, the term ‘we’ refers to three main actors who are closely associated with the issue of poverty in our society – state, market and community. The intention of this research is to explore how perceptions towards the poor and their problems in deprived neighborhoods have changed, what interventions have been tried and how they have worked in the US and the UK, using the cases of HOPE VI and NDC. In this journey, this research looks into how each actor plays their role, shares their responsibilities and supports the others to tackle persistent poverty.

The US and the UK governments shared similar assumptions and theories to identify the causes of problems in deprived neighborhoods. First, for both governments, ‘community itself’ appeared to be one of the causes of the problems after they found concentrated poverty in inner-city areas in the mid-1950s. Whilst there was acknowledgement of the poor as victims of social and economic structural problems, the idea of deficiencies in individuals in deprived neighborhoods was more dominant in the two countries. Neoliberalism was the principal ideological rationalization for state restructuring and rescaling in the US and the UK. Both the Clinton and Blair administrations criticized the welfare dependency culture that existed in deprived neighborhoods and believed that the restoration of community would be an alternative to the state meeting welfare needs. They drew attention to the general themes of social and personal responsibility and the need for citizens to make sacrifices for the common good. The governments in the US and the UK emphasized self-sufficiency, in particular, economic self-sufficiency as a way of escaping persistent poverty in deprived neighborhoods. Secondly, the governments in the US and the UK held closely the idea of ‘neighborhood effects’ and connected the physical and socioeconomic conditions in deprived neighborhoods with immoral behavior of individuals. These negative neighborhood effects were understood to be a result of residents’ isolation and disconnection from mainstream society. Creating mixed
communities was regarded as an answer to reducing negative neighborhood effects and at the same time increasing social networks with socially and economically active citizens.

However, the governments in the US and the UK took different approaches to address the problems of deprived neighborhoods in the cases of HOPE VI and NDC. First, although both the HOPE VI and the NDC programs were initiated by central government, NDC was driven by stronger state interventions whilst HOPE VI was designed to depend more on market mechanisms. In HOPE VI, the sites were chosen where there were the greatest opportunities for leveraging private sector investment, not the most challenging cases. The public housing authorities under HOPE VI had to change the way they managed their properties to follow more private sector practices. The NDC partnerships also adopted some aspects of private sector practice such as working with local partners and running their business as independent companies but central government controlled and monitored their budget and performance closely. The NDC sites were the most deprived neighborhoods in England where the government’s intervention, including financial commitment, was inevitable to improve the condition of the areas. Also, the scale of the NDC interventions (10,000 residents each) was larger than almost all HOPE VI sites, closer to Choice Neighborhoods Initiatives in the US. The second difference in approach was that, in the US, the HOPE VI program embraced a ‘neighborhood transformation’ approach as a way of reversing decades of racial and socioeconomic segregation in public housing whilst in the UK, the NDC program took a ‘neighborhood improvement’ approach to ameliorate disadvantaged local conditions in deprived neighborhoods. The NDC partnerships put greater efforts into the improvement of existing socioeconomic and physical conditions within defined areas (Lawless, 2012). This differed from HOPE VI, which moved residents out of deprived neighborhoods and transformed them into completely new mixed income neighborhoods with lower density. In addition, the practices of mixed communities in NDC, in contrast to HOPE VI, generally involved higher densities to build more houses for sale. The profits on these sales were used to support social housing (Lupton and Fuller, 2009; Lupton et al., 2013).
In terms of outcomes, both programs contributed to positive improvements of physical environment, mental health, crime and education in deprived neighborhoods. However, it needs to be borne in mind that neither HOPE VI nor NDC was one program. Every project took a somewhat different approach according to the needs of individual areas and therefore outcomes were not all the same. The poverty rates of the HOPE VI neighborhoods decreased and the gaps between the 39 NDC areas and the rest of the country narrowed. Nevertheless, there was limited evidence that either HOPE VI or NDC made enhancements to social capital. Despite high expectations in HOPE VI that mixed-income development would provide opportunities for low-income residents to accumulate resources [capital] through social interaction, as yet, sharing the same space together with different income groups has not created broader social networks. Over time, it may be possible to see higher levels of relationship building that lead to benefits for low-income residents. Similarly, in the NDC areas, community involvement interventions did not necessarily increase residents’ participation or social capital. As critics argued, community involvement in NDC might be just rhetoric to achieve what the Labour government wanted and therefore community involvement was used not as an end but as a means. The experience of HOPE VI and NDC demonstrates that in order to achieve meaningful outcomes of mixed communities development, first of all, residents in deprived neighborhoods need to be provided with sufficient services and support. With this encouragement, individuals are able to increase social connections and improve their own lives as well as alleviate their community and many social problems through collective action. Secondly, as Small (2009) pointed out, it needs to be explored more ‘how’ and ‘why’ people make and sustain social ties and under what circumstances people know more of their neighbors, especially when they have diverse social backgrounds. And lastly, more investigation is necessary into better practices used to implement what is conceptualized in policy in the real world.

Have HOPE VI and NDC improved the circumstances of local residents in deprived neighborhoods? The socially and economically segregated public housing estates and their cities in the US certainly benefited from the HOPE VI intervention in terms of decreased poverty
rates, safer environment and better public services. As Turner stated, “the contribution of HOPE VI to the revitalization of long-distressed neighborhoods seems undeniable. And the neighborhood benefits appear to spill over, enhancing the cities’ social and fiscal health” (2009, p.169). But what about ‘people’ who used to live in public housing, especially the neediest who could not move to private rental housing nor come back to redeveloped neighborhoods? It seems that the most deprived residents, who needed help the most, were the losers, excluded again from the benefits from the HOPE VI intervention. Is it possible to say that this program was ‘successful’ when, although the physical image of neighborhoods and cities improved and the positive housing market brought middle-income people into the areas, only 10 percent of original residents could benefit from it? Do we have to accept that it was an inevitable choice to force the poorest members of our society out from their homes for the common good of others? We have already seen similar phenomena through slum clearance and urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s. Vale (2013) pointed out that HOPE VI shared common beliefs with slum clearance/urban renewal. Both programs pursued destroying and removing public housing to improve the city’s image and reduce crime; displacing the poor ‘for their own sakes’; providing public housing for deserving poor; and redevelopment was intended not to increase the public housing stock. The 39 NDC areas did not undergo as much transformation as the HOPE VI developments, as they were still poorer neighborhoods than the rest of England although the gaps between those areas and the rest of country reduced. The impacts of the NDC interventions on areas outside those neighborhoods were relatively modest compared to what HOPE VI contributed to their cities. However, the emphasis placed on improving places to address existing poverty in defined areas prioritized the most disadvantaged people and led to them having more positive changes than other groups. Needless to say, it was also found that some individuals moved from a positive position in 2002 to a negative one 6 years later and some did not change at all (CLG, 2010a). Making a transition from being socially and economically excluded to being self-sufficient is a complex and difficult task both for individuals and for regeneration agencies. The NDC program possibly gave the most disadvantaged people the opportunity to move to a better pathway in life, which would ultimately lead them to become active citizens.
5. Conclusion

The differences between HOPE VI and NDC reflect fundamental differences of social efforts in the US and the UK designed to promote the basic physical and material well-being of people in need. In the UK, housing has been a central right despite the fact that there has been privatization and residualization of public sector housing since the 1980s. There have been high levels of state intervention in housing and welfare policies in order to preserve a balance between social and private housing for vulnerable people. Whilst, on the contrary, housing in the US has been primarily a consumer good based on individual choice with minimum state involvement. More emphasis has been placed on the opportunities for the private sector to contribute to housing provision and redevelopment, through schemes of mainly property-led, business-driven regeneration in the belief that the resulting benefits would trickle down eventually to all. Also, the public housing problems in the US are compounded by a long history of racial segregation and discrimination (Levy et al., 2010). HOPE VI redevelopment efforts in the US have targeted troubled African-American or Hispanic communities in public housing and have put strong emphasis on transforming the areas in order to create a greater mix with higher income people. Whereas in the UK, the majority of tenants in social housing are White British (except London) and they share a stronger community spirit.

In the UK, nevertheless, the mixed communities approach adopted by the Labour government in its second term echoed similar ideas to HOPE VI. The mixed communities approaches tried to solve the problems of poor neighborhoods through transformation, relying heavily on private sector involvement and the housing market. Physical image, diverse housing type and tenure were emphasized to attract private investment, stimulate the housing market and attract potential homebuyers. Furthermore, Labour’s regeneration programs, which tried to close the gaps between the most deprived neighborhoods and the rest of society, have now been discontinued. The previous Coalition government (2010-2015) and the current Conservative government (2015-present) have shifted its responsibility away from the state to individuals,
neighborhoods and communities. It appears that community revitalization policies in the two countries are actually converging and share a common trajectory of change.
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Some of those listed were interviewed on more than one occasion.

- **USA**
  - Margery Austin Turner: Senior vice president for program planning and management, Urban Institute
  - Sue Popkin: Senior fellow and director of the neighborhoods and youth development initiative, Urban Institute
  - Corianne Payton Scally: Senior research associate, Urban Institute
  - Erika C. Poethig: Institute fellow and director of urban policy initiatives, Urban Institute
  - Jim Stockard: Lecturer, GSD, Harvard University
  - Alexander von Hoffman: Senior Research Fellow, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University
  - Jennifer Molinsky: Senior Research Associate, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University
  - James Carras: Adjunct Lecturer, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

- **UK**
  - Alan Murie: Emeritus Professor, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham
  - Paul Lawless: Former Director of NDC National Evaluation (2002-2007), Professor, Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University
  - David Robinson: Professor, Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University
  - Ann Power: Professor, London School of Economics
  - Bali Paddock: Housing Development Project Manager, Birmingham City Council
  - Peter Griffiths: Councillor, Birmingham City Council
  - John Creswell: Former Chief Executive, Kings Norton Three Estates New Deal for Communities, Birmingham
  - Lisa Storey: Community Development Worker, Our Place Kings Norton, Birmingham
Appendix 2: Main Themes for Interviews

- What evidence is there of its effectiveness in improving the circumstances of vulnerable people? In reality, is it possible that resilient neighborhoods can be created/developed from deprived communities?

- Is the HOPE VI/NDC programs genuinely different from previous efforts in the US and the UK?

- Have the HOPE VI/NDC programs produced better outcomes?

- Is it possible that residents of deprived communities become active actors/citizens that respond to adversity? If so, what/how much can we expect from them and how can it be achieved?
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43


46


