Are Gang Injunctions a Tool for Gentrification? The Case of the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction

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ABSTRACT
My research aims to understand the connections between police practices, court decisions, and gentrification, and focuses on the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction. The injunction encompasses both the Silver Lake and Echo Park community, but mostly is in the Echo Park neighborhood. Echo Park is a community in LA that has undergone significant demographic changes in the past ten years. Local organizers and residents repeatedly questioned the function of the injunction in an area where crime has been decreasing and the neighborhood is increasingly attracting young white professionals. Indeed, residents critiquing the injunction are also addressing the tension arising from gentrification and the displacement of low-income communities of color across Los Angeles, like many other cities in the U.S. Through both qualitative interviews and statistical analyses I investigate the motivations for pursuing the Glendale Corridor Injunction, the connection between the injunction and demographic changes, and the effects the injunction has for people on the ground. The research leads to a conclusion that while gang injunctions are not motivated primarily by gentrification, the fear of displacement and over policing communities of color is not mutually exclusive. Both gentrification and gang injunctions have negative impacts on community members' sense of belonging in their own community.

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For my grandmother Mary L. Rodriguez and mother Nellie Quevedo:
"Grandmother the alchemist
you spun gold out of this hard life
conjured beauty from the things left behind
found healing where it did not live
discovered the antidote in your own kitchen
broke a curse with your own two hands
you passed these instructions down to your daughter
who then passed it down to her daughter”.

For my immigrant father, Jorge Quevedo, whose shoulders I have the privilege of standing on.
Soy producto de la inmigración.

For mi familia and chosen family. Thank you for giving me love, life, and support.

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Introduction

The recent shootings of unarmed black men and women by police officers have brought national attention to police brutality. Organizers at the forefront of this movement are advocating for the humanity and dignity of black lives. Intimately connected to police brutality has been the critique of city planning and urban policy. The killing of Mike Brown in the summer of 2014 highlighted the role that planning policy has played in creating racially segregated neighborhoods and breeding racial hostility (Rothstein, 2014). In the wake of Ferguson, planning as a discipline has been forced to reckon with the broader ramifications of planning policies that support state violence against black communities and other communities of color.

Planning decisions have not only created racially segregated neighborhoods, but have also shaped police tactics for cracking down on crime. The “broken windows” theory of policing, based on a popular 1982 article in The Atlantic by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, has impacted the way police forces across the nation have addressed issues of crime in neighborhoods of color. Wilson and Kelling argued that urban residents assign a high-value to public order and that visual signs of disorder, such as broken windows, graffiti, or aggressive panhandlers, convey a sense of disorder and leads residents to be more fearful, discourages residents from using public spaces, breaks down community controls and contributes to increases in crime. Beginning in New York, broken windows policing strategies have created tough-on-crime, zero-tolerance polices that seek to regulate low-level offenses in order to prevent more violent crimes. As a result, low-income communities have been over-criminalized and young men of color have been systematically funneled into the criminal justice system.

These tough on crime policies have become headline stories in Los Angeles recently because of the use of civil gang injunctions. A gang injunction is a “civil court order that
prohibits a gang and its members from conducting certain specified activities within a defined geographic area known as a ‘safety zone’ (“Important Facts to Know About Gang Injunctions,” n.d.). Listed on the gang injunctions is a list of criminal and non-criminal activities that are prohibited within a safety zone. In Los Angeles, common restrictions include: “do not associate with other gang members, do not use gang hand signs and/or wear gang colors and attire, do not use, possess, sell or transport illegal drugs, do not drink or possess alcohol, do not own, use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapons, do not commit graffiti/vandalism and/or possess graffiti/vandalism tools, do not intimidate, threaten or harass people” (“Important Facts to Know About Gang Injunctions,” n.d.). A violation of this order is punishable by up to six months in jail or juvenile hall and/or a $1,000 fine (“Important Facts to Know About Gang Injunctions,” n.d.). Proponents of gang injunctions have argued that gang injunctions are put in place to reduce violent crimes. However, it has been contended by community members and local activists that gang injunctions tear families and communities apart, further marginalizes communities from accessing resources, and serves as an effective tool for displacement and gentrification.

The Los Angeles City Attorney (“City Attorney”) filed the first gang injunction in 1987 against the Play Boy Gangsta Crips gang in West LA. Since then, the City Attorney has filed 45 more injunctions throughout the city. Law Enforcement and the City Attorney’s office have applauded gang injunctions as a quick reliable fix to violent street gangs. The largest gang injunction targeted the Blythe Street gang in 1993 and cited nearly 500 alleged gang members (ACLU, 1997).

In 2013, the City Attorney filed the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction against 6 rival gangs in the area (Big Top Locos, Crazy, Diamond Street Locos, Echo Park Locos, Frogtown and Head Hunters). Grassroots organizations and residents opposed the injunction, arguing that
the City Attorney and the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) were overstepping their powers and creating an environment where “more young people are being stopped, frisked, harassed, and labeled as gang members” (“Activists and law enforcement square off over gang injunctions,” 2013). Opponents have voiced many concerns, for instance, pointing out that the injunction is 15 years too late as it is being implemented at a time when crime rates have reached historic lows. Local organizers and residents repeatedly questioned the function of the injunction in an area where crime has been decreasing and the neighborhood is increasingly attracting young white professionals.

Indeed, residents critiquing the injunction are also addressing the tension arising from gentrification and the displacement of low-income communities of color across Los Angeles, like many other cities in the U.S. A 2014 report by UCLA described Los Angeles as the most unaffordable city in the nation for renters, concluding that the median renter in LA pays 47 percent of their income in rent (Ray et al., 2014).

My research aims to understand the connections between police practices, court decisions, and gentrification, and focuses on the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction. The injunction encompasses both the Silver Lake and Echo Park community, but mostly is in the Echo Park neighborhood. Echo Park is a community in LA that has undergone significant demographic changes in the past ten years. Local activist groups such as the Youth Justice Coalition and S.T.A.Y (Standing Together Advocating For Our Youth) have pushed to revoke the gang injunction in the Glendale Corridor. The questions I seek to answer are:

1. What led the City Attorney to file a gang injunction in the Glendale Corridor?
2. How do recent neighborhood demographic changes relate to the gang injunction?
3. What does the gang injunction mean for people on the ground in terms of stops, arrests, and surveillance?

This paper is organized into 6 chapters: an outline of the methods used, a literature review on the subject matter, history of gang injunctions in Los Angeles, case study of the Echo Park and Silver Lake neighborhoods, an analysis of that case study, and conclusion.

Methodology

The methodology for this research included the gathering and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data. The goal of my research was to understand what led to the gang injunction and how it has impacted people on the ground. I used informational interviews to contextualize my research and gain an understanding of what led to the injunction and investigate if neighborhood change was a part of that decision. I conducted a total of 8 interviews of police officers, representatives in the City Attorney’s office, academics, community organizers, developers, and residents (see appendix for a list of interviewees). The interviews were approximately one hour long and some were conducted over the phone while others were conducted in person. Prior to each interview, I compiled a list of questions in order to guide the interview process, but did not rely solely on the list of questions.

To understand the neighborhood change in the area I looked at census data and analyzed trends over time. I define gentrification as “the process by which central urban neighborhoods that have undergone disinvestments and economic decline experience a reversal, reinvestment, and the in-migration of a relatively well-off middle- and upper middle-class population” (Smith, 1998:198). Changes in: educational attainment, race, median household size, median house value, median rent, median household income, household by household type, and tenure. The
literature review discusses the research on quantifying gentrification. Table 1 summarizes the census variables used and the data sets from which I extracted the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Census and ACS Variables for Measuring Gentrification

To further analyze if gentrification facilitated the creation of a gang injunction, I ran a logistic regression analysis to look at how tract characteristics predict the presence or absence of an injunction. Both census data and ARCGIS were used to gather information for the independent and dependent variables. The dependent variable for the logistic regression is the likelihood that a neighborhood would be sanctioned with a gang injunction. Using ArcGIS, I
mapped census tracts on gang injunctions to find which census tracts fell completely within a
gang injunction and those within a mile radius from each gang injunction. After mapping gang
injunctions and census tracts, I used census data (outlined in Table 1) as my independent
variables. My independent variables were socio-economic characteristics associated with
gentrification. All data was at the census tract level. Because the dependent variable is a discrete
variable, I ran a logistic regression to analyze the data. The following is the expected logistic
regression equation and null hypothesis:

\[ \text{GangInjunction} = \beta_1 (\text{ProportionWhite}) + \beta_2 (\text{ProportionBachelorsDegreeOrMore}) + \]
\[ \beta_3 (\text{MedianHouseholdIncome}) + \beta_4 (\text{MedianHousevalue}) + \beta_5 (\text{MedianGrossRent}) + \]
\[ \beta_6 (\text{ProportionNonFamilyHouseholds}) + \beta_7 (\text{AverageHouseholdSize}) + \]
\[ \beta_8 (\text{ProportionRenterUnits}) + \varepsilon \]

Null Hypothesis (H0): The model coefficients were observed through chance. The independent
variables do not have an effect on the likelihood that a neighborhood is sanctioned with a gang
injunction.

Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): The model coefficients differ significantly from zero; the
independent variables do have an effect on the likelihood that a neighborhood is sanctioned with
a gang injunction.

Given that many of the injunctions overlapped each other, it was important to avoid double
counting. Thus, only for tracts that have an injunction, I looked at the share of the land area
within the tract that is included in the injunction. I ran an OLS regression to analyze how various
demographic characteristics affect the area of a census tract covered by a gang injunction. My
hypothesis is that the more gentrified a tract is the larger the area a gang injunction occupies that
tract. The following equation captures the OLS regression:

\[ \text{AreaOfGangInjunction} = \beta_1 (\text{ProportionWhite}) + \beta_2 (\text{ProportionBachelorsDegreeOrMore}) + \]
\[ \beta_3(\text{MedianHouseholdIncome}) + \beta_4(\text{MedianHousevalue}) + \beta_5(\text{MedianGrossRent}) \]
\[ + \beta_6(\text{ProportionNonFamilyHouseholds}) + \beta_7(\text{AverageHouseholdSize}) \]
\[ + \beta_8(\text{ProportionRenterUnits}) + \epsilon \]

One of the difficulties in creating the statistical models above was that many of the gang injunctions overlapped and therefore a tract could be double counted. Thus, I created rules of aggregation and ran regressions based on the three rules of aggregation. The rules for aggregation are as follows and only apply for tracts with more than one gang injunction:

1. If there is one instance where the gang injunction overlaps a tract entirely, that data point is kept and is marked as an overlap. The overlap indicates that there is more than one gang injunction within the census tract.

2. If there is no data point for a tract that covers the entire census tract add the proportion of tract covered by an injunction for each data point and if and only if they add to 1, indicate the proportion as 1. Indicating the proportion as 1 means the entire census tract is covered by an injunction. If the proportions do not sum to 1 assume that the gang injunctions all lie on top of each other and take the maximum of area.

3. The third scenario takes the same rule as rule 2 but instead when the proportions do all add to 1, assume that 50 percent of the tract is covered by an injunctions.

LAPD stop and stop and frisk data from the “Arrest, Discipline, Use of Force, Field Data Capture, Audit Statistics, and New Directive Polices” for 2004 to 2009 were analyzed to further understand what the recent gang injunction means for people on the ground. As a result of a Consent Decree placed over the LAPD by the Department of Justice, the LAPD was required to report stop and frisk data along with race twice a year. The consent decree began in 2001 and formally ended in 2013, but only data from 2004 to 2009 were accessible online (Consent decree
overview). To analyze these data, I ran a fixed effects model to explain the number of stops and stops and frisks as a function of the presence of a gang injunction. I used a fixed effects model to account for the change over time. Under this model, I ran two regressions. The first regression looked at the function between the number of pedestrians and drivers stopped and frisked (dependent variable) and when an injunction is introduced in a reporting district (independent variable). Given that by 2004 many of the Reporting Districts had an injunction it was difficult to get a sizable before and after population. To address this challenge, I ran another regression, which looked at the number of pedestrians and drivers stopped and stopped and frisked (dependent variable) as a function of the number of injunctions within a Reporting District. Appendix B depicts the various multivariate equations expected for both models described above.

**Literature Review**

Shaped by the history of race in the United States, police practices have often been used explicitly to control communities of color (Bass, 2001). To ground the quantitative research in existing scholarship, this section discusses the literature-analyzing race and policing, with an emphasis on the broken windows theory of policing, together with research on the impacts of gang injunctions. I conclude this literature review with an overview of how gentrification has been quantified to provide a foundation for the variables I use in my logistic and multivariate regression on neighborhood characteristics and gang injunctions. Together, this literature review highlights the connection between race and policing, the history of the relationship between planning and police practices, and the ways that recent developments in police practice—such as gang injunctions—have been publicly received. Furthermore, this literature presents a framework
for how to analyze police practices within the context of gentrification and illustrates the gaps within the literature.

Race, Space, & Policing

Policing as a form of social control has a unique history and contemporary meaning in communities of color. Sandra Bass (2001) argues that de jure housing discrimination faced by the African American community has shaped the culture of policing in the U.S. Slave patrols were the first semi-formal organized policing force, and, after slavery, Black Codes operated as a legal tool to control newly freed slaves (Bass, 2001). The rise of Jim Crow after Reconstruction effectively created a police state in which the African American public was patrolled. Michelle Alexander further contends that the War on Drugs is a new form of racialized social control similar to Jim Crow that relies heavily on police practices to perpetuate racial hierarchies and exert social control over African Americans (Alexander, 2010).

Broken Windows Policing

More recent forms of police practices have evolved from planning and public policy theories of order and control, most notably broken windows theories of policing. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling presented the concept of broken windows policing in 1982 in an article for the Atlantic Monthly (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). Wilson and Kelling argue that crime and disorder are viewed by social psychologists, police officers, and the public at large as inherently connected. They argue, “social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken” (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). One broken window is enough to signal to the rest of the community that no one cares, and therefore ensures that more windows are broken. As a result, police forces became more aggressive with low-level crimes to prevent future high-level crimes.
Although Kelling and Wilson do not mention urban planning or Jane Jacobs, Ranasinghe (2011) argues that the origins of broken windows theory stems from Jane Jacobs articulation of disorder. For Ranasinghe (2011), Jacob’s articulation of civility and the consequences of its decline in the American city is what inform the concerns of both Wilson and Kelling in their creation of the broken windows theory.

New York City’s 1994 zero tolerance policy aggressively targeted petty crimes such as jaywalking, homeless individuals living on subways, subway fare evaders, loud teenagers, and drunks (Sridhar, 2006). Rudy Giuliani, mayor during this time period, attributed the downward trend in crime to the zero tolerance program (Thompson, 2015). After New York City adopted this approach to policing, it influenced police forces across the nation. Dissenting opinions rose as a result of broken windows policing.

Roberts (1999) in her case study of a gang-loitering ordinance in Chicago, argues that broken windows policing criminalizes black communities by “constructing ‘visibly lawless’ people at the heart of vague loitering laws” (790). Criminalizing black youth through gang-loitering ordinances justifies the lack of protection of their civil liberties. This criminalization further enhances current perceptions of crime that defines a propensity for criminality by race. Embedded in broken windows theories are perceptions of disorder, which are seen as influencing the likelihood of crime. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) argue that there is a strong positive correlation between our perceptions of disorder and the concentration of poverty and minority groups. When people of color and poor households are concentrated, an individual’s perceptions of disorder increase regardless of one’s racial background. This perception shapes the ways in which authority figures, such as the police, make their decisions. Because broken windows theories of policing explicitly target signs of disorder and because individuals perceive
communities of color as “disordered”, they therefore have more policing resources targeted at them.

As demonstrated in the previous section, policing has historically been used to confine and control communities of color. Stewart (1998) argues that gang injunctions, a new tough on crime policy influenced by the broken window theory, are an extension of black codes and are used as a way to regulate and control “undesirable” groups by “majority race groups.” Gang injunctions in effect perpetuate oppression through a less overt mechanism than black codes that stamps poor communities of color as inferior (Stewart, 1998).

Muñiz’s (2015) extensive work on gang injunctions in Los Angeles demonstrates how public policy and court decisions work to construct definitions of deviancy. Muñiz (2015) highlights how the LAPD, city prosecutors, and business owners struggled with who should be considered dangerous and how they should be controlled. This struggle over how to control dangerous groups in Los Angeles illustrates how gang injunctions have historically been used as a tool to control the movement of “deviant” youth of color (Muñiz, 2015). The first injunction in 1987 on the Playboy Gangsta Crips, despite race-neutral language, emphasized the “fear of black men and stereotypes about black families were central to the rationale of the injunction” (Muñiz, 2014: 216). As a result of the first injunction “what remains is the criminalization of racial groups and spaces under the guise of a routine ‘race-neutral’ policy protocol” (Muñiz, 2014: 216).

Methodologies for Researching the Effectiveness of Gang Injunctions

Out of the broken windows theory emerged a very significant tool to control communities of color. Civil gang injunctions have been used by police forces across the country. Scholars have used several methods to analyze the effects of gang injunctions. Jeffrey Grogger uses a
difference-in-difference estimate to determine if gang injunctions reduce reported violent crimes and if they cause spillover effects in Los Angeles (Grogger 2002). His research finds that within the first year after the injunctions were imposed violent crime decreased by 5-10 percent in the neighborhood with the injunction. Grogger analyzed neighborhood-level reported crime counts from four police departments in LA County, and compared reporting district level (RD-level) crime data on FBI Index Offenses from four LA-area enforcement agencies. Reporting Districts are small geographical areas and often mirror census tracts in LA County. Grogger grouped the neighborhoods he analyzed into three categories: target-area RDs, adjoining RDs to observe spillover effects, and neighboring RDs, those that touch adjoining RDs. One important issue in this analysis is the overall downward trend of crimes in all three areas (and in the United States overall) during the study’s time frame. To address how crime levels would have changed if injunctions were not imposed, Grogger uses a matching technique. He uses the neighboring RD’s as a control, with similar demographic characteristics to the target-area RDs. The second technique is a comparison area from RDs whose crime levels were similar to those in the target area during a period prior to the injunction. Grogger then applies a difference-in-differences approach to compare before and after crime data in target areas to the changes in comparison areas. Grogger concludes that violent crime decreased by 5-10 percent within the first year that a gang injunction is enacted.

By contrast, the ACLU of Southern California analyzed the effects of the Blythe Street Gang Injunction from 1991 to 1996 (ACLU 1997) and concluded that reported violent crime rose dramatically following the introduction of the gang injunction. The monthly data for reported violent crime by reporting district fluctuates, but overall demonstrates an upward trend. Data for the 19 reporting districts was obtained by a request under the California Public Records Act and
national crime data was obtained through the U.S. Department of Justice National Crime Justice Reference Services (NCJRS) and Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The report analyzes trends in crime for violent crimes, police call volume, and drug arrests before and for at least 18 months after the issuance of the Blythe Street gang injunction.

Gaoutetlee (1997) critiques the interpretation of the ACLU’s results. Gaoutetlee (1997) argues that the higher incidence of 911 calls after the injunction is actually a sign of success. Prior to the gang injunction, critics argue, community members were terrified of calling the police to report gang related activity. Gaoutetlee (1997) therefore suggests that the increase in calls related to violent crime demonstrates that the gang injunction was successful.

While debate continues over quantitative measures, Maxson (2005) has conducted a qualitative evaluation of the community impact of gang injunctions in San Bernardino California. Maxson surveyed residents in five neighborhoods of San Bernardino regarding their experiences and perceptions of crime, gang activity, and neighborhood quality. The study surveyed residents 18 months prior to the injunction and 6 months after the injunction. Questions focused on residents’ recent experiences with gang members were used to evaluate the immediate outcomes. Further questions on perceptions of their neighborhood were used to evaluate the intermediate and long-term outcomes of the injunction. Maxson concluded that immediately after the injunction there were positive short-term effects on the perception of safety among residents, there were no significant long-term changes. In the short-term, residents indicated less gang presence, gang intimidation, and fear of confrontation with gang members.

Current research regarding gang injunctions generally suggests that they are followed by a short-term reduction in violent crime. However, little evidence has examined the long-term effects of gang injunctions on violent crime. The methodology analyzing the effects of gang
injunctions indicates the need to pay close attention to issues of multicolinearity and the appropriate counterfactual. My research will analyze the effect that gang injunctions have on people living in these neighborhoods and their likelihood of being stopped and arrested.

Operationalizing Gentrification

In order to understand the relationship between gentrification and gang injunctions, a review of the literature on neighborhood change is necessary. Gentrification in urban planning has been a highly researched and contested topic. Conventional theories around gentrification attribute gentrification primarily to the change in middle-class preferences for city living and the rehabilitation of old low-income housing (Sassen, 1991). Neil Smith (1979) offers an economic alternative to gentrification through the rent gap theory. The rent gap theory suggests that when there is a great difference between a site’s current value and its potential value, this gap will attract investors and lead to gentrification. In contrast to Smith’s (1979) research on the economic factors that produce gentrification, David Ley (1986) focuses on the demand for gentrification and the role of the changing political economy of major cities together with the large social and cultural shifts in the 1960’s as creating a gentrifying class that preferred living in cities over suburbs.

Building on his earlier research, Ley later conducted an in depth research of six Canadian cities and argues that indicators of gentrification include: mean monthly rent, median household income, home value, household size, and college education (Ley 1993). Barton (2016) examines two strategies for quantifying gentrification. His first strategy is borrowed from Hammel and Wyly (1996) and uses the following variables: “proportion with college degrees, family income, home-ownership rates, proportion age 30 to 44, proportion white-non family households, proportion managerial and administrative workers, and proportion with some college increased
and how much the percent for poverty and black decreased” (Barton 2014, 98). Using a strategy outlined by Freeman (2005), Barton (2016) identifies gentrifiable tracts by “median income being less than median income for the city and contains a proportion of housing built within the past 20 years lower than the proportion found at the median for the city” (98). In addition tracts already gentrified had the same characteristics, but also had an increase in educational attainment and housing prices. Comparing both strategies demonstrated that identifying gentrified neighborhoods varied greatly. Under the Freeman assumptions, more neighborhoods are identified as gentrified than were identified when using the Hayley and Wyly strategy. Each strategy impacted the number and geographic distribution of gentrifiable tracts. While the findings are small they “have potentially important implications for research that assesses the influence of gentrification on other neighborhood outcomes such as residential displacement and crime” (Barton 2016: 108).

A review of some of the major works for measuring gentrification highlight the various ways academics have tried to capture neighborhood change. What is consistent in these strategies is the role income and educational attainment play in calculating gentrification. Based on the literature I used educational attainment, income, rent, and house value as indicators for gentrification. While the research in the literature does not point to the role of race in gentrification, based on the history of residential segregation in Los Angeles I also looked at changes in the white population as a signifier for gentrification.

Conclusion

Muñiz (2015) has laid the foundation for understanding gang injunctions in the context of gentrification and white supremacy through her analysis of gang injunctions as a tool for controlling the movement of those deemed “deviant.” However, a gap in the literature exists in
analyzing how police practices shift in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification. My work will build on her insights to further analyze the motivations for a new gang injunction in LA, the connection between this new gang injunction and gentrification, and the effects the injunction has on people living in the areas covered by it through a statistical analysis.

**History of Gang Injunctions**

**Legal History**

The purpose of a gang injunction is to impose restrictions on alleged gang members’ rights of association and rights of movements in order to curtail gang crime by enjoining gang members or a gang as a public nuisance. Organizations such as the ACLU have argued that gang injunctions infringe on First Amendment rights to freedom of association and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process (Crawford, 2009). The Supreme Court of California in *People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna* first upheld the legality of civil gang injunctions. The city of San Jose argued that the street gang Vario Sureno Treces created a public nuisance through their criminal behavior and ultimately infringed on the community’s right to “the comfortable enjoyment of life and property” (Harward, 2015). The city of San Jose cited the violent criminal activity of various gang members, the intimidation of local residents, and the occupation and use of public space for illegal activities as the basis for their argument. The Supreme Court of California upheld the injunction, finding that these acts were egregious enough to warrant the injunction (Harward, 2015). Some of the restrictions included prohibiting alleged members from associating with other members in public, and intimidating residents (Harward, 2015). *Acuna* created the procedure of naming gang members and suing them individually, however Howard (2015) argues since gangs change constantly and vary in size, a newer tradition was started to sue the gang as an entity in addition to individuals. Caldwell (2010) suggests that
under a gang-only injunction the police have broad discretion on which they see fit to serve. Once served with a gang-only injunction there is no “scheduled opportunity to challenge his or her inclusion in the injunction in court” (Caldwell, 2010). For most, their first opportunity to challenge the injunction is when they violate it and then are awarded legal counsel. But to avoid spending time in jail awaiting a court hearing, many work out a plea bargain and plead guilty and (Caldwell 2010).

In 2001 the California Court of Appeals in *People v. Englebrecht* upheld the legality of another injunction and concluded that restrictions forbidding the use of language, clothes, symbols, and gestures that were associated with the gang in question was constitutional (Myers, 2009). Myers (2009) notes that as in *Acuna* the Court of Appeals “held that the provisions did not burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental interest because gangs look to maintain control by fear and intimidation in their use of gang signs and symbols” (285).

Central to all gang injunctions are prohibited activities and a “safety zone”, which defines the boundaries for the injunction. The safety zone is the geographical area in which the gang injunction is applied (Harward, 2015). The size of the safety zone varies by injunction. Within each injunction there are a number of prohibited activities that are both criminal and non-criminal. Caldwell (2010) summarizes criminal activity to include: “possessing of drugs or weapons, selling drugs, vandalizing property and threatening witnesses” (246). The non-criminal activity includes: “waving at cars, walking down the street with someone else the police consider to be a gang member, appearing in public view in the presence of someone who possesses alcohol, carrying a marker, and riding in a vehicle with someone the police consider to be a gang
member”, and as in the case of People v. Englebrecht, wearing clothing associated with gang symbols.

History of Gang Injunctions in Los Angeles

Los Angeles has been the leader in paving the path for gang injunctions as a policing tool to regulate gang activity. The first gang injunction in the City of Los Angeles was in 1987 on the Playboy Gangsta Crips gang, which set the stage for future gang injunctions. The injunction prohibited illegal activities but also enjoined nuisance activities such as approaching cars, carrying markers, or blocking sidewalks (Crawford, 2009). As a result of the ACLU challenged the legality of the injunction, and the court decided to strike down certain provisions and only permit the restriction on already illegal activities (Crawford, 2009). Given these restrictions, the City Attorney of Los Angeles did not release another injunction for another 5 years.

The Acuna decision along with the creation of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act in 1988 (STEP) spurred momentum for creating tougher gang injunctions (Crawford, 2009). The STEP Act stated that the state was in crisis as a result of gang violence and created a list of substantive offenses. Harsher punishments for crimes that were committed for benefiting a gang were also imposed as a result of the STAP Act (Yoshino, 2008). The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act under Proposition 21 passed in 2000 further toughened the provisions in the STEP Act. Proposition 21 gave prosecutors substantial new powers to charge children as adults, required that all gang members register with law enforcement, created a “gang conspiracy” offense in the California penal code, and made gang related offenses eligible for death penalty (Caldwell, 2010). Both the Step Act and Proposition 21 created a punishment-driven climate in which the proliferation of civil gang injunctions flourished.
Since LA's first injunction in 1987, the City Attorney has issued a total of 46 gang injunctions enjoining 76 gangs. The City Attorney office's gang division describes gang injunctions as "crucial tools used to suppress gang activity" by using "prevention and intervention strategies" to address gang activity at its source since "communities cannot simply arrest their way out of gang activity" ("Office of Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer | Gang Division," n.d.). The most recent gang injunction was in 2013 known as the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction against 6 rival gangs in the area (Big Top Locos, Crazy, Diamond Street Locos,
Echo Park Locos, Frogtown and Head Hunters) and included a 3.8 square mile safety zone (Los Angeles City Attorney, 2013). Image 1 depicts the gang injunction and the two communities it is in as represented by the neighborhood council district.

The safety zone, as articulated by the City Attorney at that time Carmen Trutanich, serves as an “important tool in curbing the escalating criminal activity of these six rival gangs and bringing needed to peace to our neighborhoods” because “our residents have the right to enjoy all our public areas” (Los Angeles City Attorney 2013). The safety zone is in between the Los Angeles River, the 110 Harbor freeway, and two major boulevards and also includes the newly renovated Echo Park Lake. The injunction prohibits gang members from the named gangs from associating with each other in public, intimidating the public, carrying firearms or illegal weapons, trespassing, carrying graffiti or vandalism tools, possessing or selling drugs, and consuming or possessing alcohol in public. The gang injunction covers part of both the Silver Lake and Echo Park neighborhoods and is policed by the Rampart Division and North East Division respectively.

The passing of the injunction spurred much dissent in the neighborhood and was a headline in local news. Many community members and local activists argued that the injunction gives police more authority in dealing with gangs and as a result targets youth of color by increasing the stopping, frisking, and labeling youth of color as members of gangs (“Activists and law enforcement square off over gang injunctions,” 2013). Kruti Parekh an organizer for Youth Justice Coalition in a report for The Daily Breeze said, “This is the criminalization of young people. The people who have to deal with the injunctions have that many more stops, that many more frisks, that much more exposure to the terrorism brought by injunctions” (“Activists and law enforcement square off over gang injunctions,” 2013). The Youth Justice Coalition
(YJC), a prominent community organization aimed at addressing systems of oppression that seek to incarcerate communities of color in Los Angeles, has spent the past ten years pushing back against gang injunctions. YJC along with S.T.A.Y, a group of local Echo Park residents that formed as a reaction to the gang injunction, helped lead and organize community members against the Glendale Corridor Injunction.

Additionally, opponents of the gang injunction have argued that gang injunctions precipitate and perpetuate gentrification, often pointing to the low crime rates and recent development in the Echo Park area. The timing of the gang injunction was a major point of contention between community members, activists and officials. In an article by the Annenberg Media Center, Herman-Wurmfeld, a Silver Lake Neighborhood Council member at that time, said, “when you overlay the gang injunction with Glendale Boulevard/Carter redevelopment projects and see that it's nearly the same parameters, [you] realize that there’s tremendous money to be made by disenfranchising people and driving them from their homes” ("Proposed Gang Injunction Divides Silver Lake | Neon Tommy," n.d.). He later goes on to stay that, “the folks
that I'm listening to are the ones that are saying that this injunction is threatening my life and limb and security and property”.

The LA times published an article titled Does Echo Park Need a Gang Injunction? highlighting the timing of the gang injunction as it relates to crime. The article points to the gang injunction being implemented well past the “gang-emergency” in Echo Park. At the court hearing for the injunction, a resident of Echo Park, Victoria Arellano, said that since the announcement of the injunction she has organized meetings with the gangs, three of which have come to a truce. Arellano stated, “They called a peace. They said there won’t be any activity and we’re going to keep it that way” (“MAP: Judge allows next step in proposed Echo Park gang injunction (updated) | 89.3 KPCC,” n.d.). However, supporters of the injunction argue that the injunction is in place to “prevent the area’s relapse into chaos as imprisoned gang members complete their terms and return to their old neighborhood and, perhaps, their old ways” (“Does Echo Park need a gang injunction? - LA Times,” n.d.). Yet, opponents point to the low crime rates in the neighborhood to further shed light on the timing of the injunction. A report released by YJC, titled The Echo Park Gang Injunction, argues that the homicide rates for both divisions that encompass the injunction are at an all-time low. Image 3 highlights the significant decline in homicide rates for both divisions. In response Mike Feuer, the City Attorney that inherited the injunction contends, “The mere fact that crime in the neighborhood or Los Angeles is dropping misses the point that there is too much crime in Los Angeles” and further argues that, according to federal crime statistics, gang crimes account for almost half of crime in their respective “turfs” (“Activists and law enforcement square off over gang injunctions,” n.d.). For Mike Feuer the injunction has nothing to do with gentrification saying, “Nothing could be further from the truth. I haven’t even contemplated the gentrification of the community” (“Activists and law
enforcement square off over gang injunctions,” n.d.).

Despite many objections from local residents and community groups, the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction was passed in August of 2013 and was served by LAPD officers to gang members beginning in March 2014 (“LAPD begins serving Echo Park gang injunction papers | 89.3 KPCC,” n.d.). Since its introduction in 2013, the name of the injunction has changed to 6 Gang Injunction, however in this report I will continue to name the injunction as the Glendale Corridor Injunction to reflect the sentiments, arguments, and history of the injunction.
History of Echo Park and Silver Lake Neighborhoods

White Flight

In order to better understand the timing of the injunction in regards to recent demographic shifts in the area, it is important to understand the history of Echo Park and Silver Lake within the context of white flight in Los Angeles. The large outmigration of whites into suburbia between 1848 and 1920 was in part a “refusal of middle-class whites to live near immigrants and people of color” (Pulido, 2000: 25). As a million whites moved outside the city and spread “north to Hollywood, east to Pasadena, and west to Santa Monica and south to Long Beach” people of color were being pushed to the central part of the city including the downtown area and eastside (Pulido, 2000: 2005). The migration of white Angelinos to the suburbs and into the northern areas of Hollywood is highlighted by Phillips’ (2016) analysis of the roles of Jewish ethnoburbs in Los Angeles. The Hollywood Corridor, which comprises Echo Park, Silver Lake, Los Feliz, and Hollywood became what Phillips (2016) describes as an ethnoburb comprising the second largest Jewish population in LA County by 1930, about 20 percent of LA County’s Jewish population. According to Pulido (2000) the Depression and World War II further intensified outmigration assisted by discriminatory housing practices. Communities of color were systematically denied access to federally financed mortgages and suburban communities resulting in the overcrowding of communities of color in the “barrio” and “ghetto.” During this time, Mexican Americans moved into affordable homes in the Echo Park area, quickly becoming the majority (Hsuan, 2012). Mexican-American working-class families continued to move into Los Angeles’ original older neighborhoods as white middle-class families continued to move to the suburbs (“White Flight | KCET,” n.d.). While both the Silver Lake and Echo Park neighborhoods are in close proximity to each other and share much of the same history, they are
distinct in many ways. The next section will highlight their distinctions and chart the various demographic shifts that have occurred from 2000-2014.

Silver Lake Then & Now

Located five miles away from Downtown, Silver Lake has been known for the creative artistic class in Los Angeles. After the 1930’s when the film industry had moved to the Valley, Silver Lake became home to self-proclaimed Communists and a haven for the gay community. Silver Lake resident Harry Hay founded one of the first gay organizations in the U.S., the Mattachine Society, in 1950, and, from 1960-1980, due to the large influx of gay residents, Silver Lake became widely known for several gay bars, and was seen as a refuge for the gay community (Dryden, 2012). However, for many residents living in Silver Lake, the new influx of residents sparked a first wave of gentrification and hostility between working-class Latinos and gay residents, who by 1980s comprised of 20 percent of the community (Dryden, 2012). As a result of violent altercations and a firebomb that was thrown into a famous gay restaurant, the Frog Pond, the Sunset Junction Street Fair was created in 1980 to reconcile the tensions between both community groups (Dryden, 2012). The arising tensions in the 1980s underscore an often-overlooked aspect of the Silver Lake neighborhood, the de facto segregation that existed in the neighborhood between white residents and residents of color. A Los Angeles Times article in 1984 illustrates this division:

In recent years Silver Lake has developed into two distinct areas that have little in common: A more affluent area of professional, mostly Anglos and Asians, in a leafy, amphitheater-like setting surrounding the reservoir named for Herman Silver (a member of the city’s first Board of Water Commissioners), and older, more bustling working-class neighborhoods, mostly Latinos to the South along Sunset (Ramos, 1984).

Since the Los Angeles Times article was released, the Latino population and working class
families has fluctuated, but is no longer the majority. A closer look at census data illustrates the demographics changes from 2000 to 2014. The Latino and Asian population continuously declined from 2000 to 2014 while the black population remained the same. In 2000 Latinos represented 46 percent of the population and Asians 18 percent of the population, in 2009 it declined to 41 percent and 16 percent respectively (figure 3). In 2014 the Latino population represented 33 percent of the total population representing an 8-percentage point decrease from 2009 and 2014. In 2014 the Asian population declined by only 1 percentage point between 2000 and 2009 and represented 15 percent of the total population. From 2000 to 2009 the black population remained stable at 3 percent. On the other hand, the population of whites has increased from 2000 to 2014. In 2000 the white population was 31 percent and increased to 37 percent in 2009 and by 2014 had increased to 46 percent. The population with Bachelor’s degree or more increased by 15 percentage points from 2000 to 2014 where almost half of the population in Silver Lake had a Bachelor’s degree or higher in 2014. Income, median gross rent, and median house value have all significantly increased since 2000 (see appendix). In 2000 the median household income was $59,996 and increased by 10 percent to $65,984 by 2014. Median house value almost doubled since 2000 with a median value of $672,154 in 2014. Median rent in Silver Lake increased dramatically by 30 percent to a median rent of $1,252 in 2014. While median housing value increased, total owner occupied units remained consistent while nonfamily households and average household size decreased slightly. Owner occupied units in Silver Lake decreased by 3 percentage points from 2000 and 2014 and made a total of 32 percent in 2014. Family households in Silver Lake decreased from 48 percent in 2000 and to 44 percent in 2014 and the household size decreased from 2.5 to 2.3 persons.

The demographic changes demonstrate how Silver Lake has become less Latino, more
affluent, more educated, and a more expensive place to live. Forbes magazine in 2012 named Silver Lake the “Hippest Hipster” neighborhood where a “trendy community boasts some of the nation’s most lauded food trucks and farmers markets, a multicultural blend of residents with eclectic professions, and a booming arts scene” (Brennan, 2012). Nestled in the midst of these changes is the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction, which occupies the southern part of Silver Lake and is shared with the Echo Park neighborhood.

![Figure 2: Proportion of White, Asian, Black, and Latino residents in the Silver Lake Neighborhood Council area from 2000-2014](chart.png)

**Figure 2: Proportion of White, Asian, Black, and Latino residents in the Silver Lake Neighborhood Council area from 2000-2014**


**Echo Park Then & Now**

Similarly to Silver Lake, Echo Park also has a diverse history. Just northeast of downtown LA, Echo Park is “home to a bustling corridor that includes four freeways that are among the busiest in the United States” along with the Dodger Stadium in its backyard (Molina, 2014: 77). The area’s affordable rent attracted many creative groups in the area along with marginalized groups such as political leftists and the gay community. Molina (2014) argues that Echo Park has been home to activism before and after World War II despite white flight in the 1950s and further demonstrates a history of a “shared sense of struggle” between progressive whites and
working-class Latinos (78). Molina (2014) points to Alice McGrath, an Echo Park resident, who defended Latinos in the infamous Sleepy Lagoon Murder Trial in 1942, and a new wave of progressive whites that followed in 1950s when other whites moved out. However, for some Echo Park residents the history of Echo Park has been less amicable.

The battle for Chavez Ravine marks a major event in Echo Park history that illustrates the exclusion of Latinos, especially Mexican-Americans, in Echo Park and surrounding areas. Chavez Ravine is located in Elysian Park, a neighborhood within Echo Park. Once home to generations of poor working class Mexican-Americans, the community between 1952 and 1953 was razed through eminent domain to make room for public housing (Parlow, 2006). Many of the residents were forcefully removed from their homes other compensated and others not at all (Parlow, 2006). However, when a conservative mayor took office in 1953, the plan for affordable housing was abandoned and the Chavez Ravine was instead used for the development of the Dodger Stadium (Parlow, 2006).

The razing and development of the Chavez Ravine still haunts the memory of Echo Park residents and was brought up by residents and community activists in my interviews. The changes in Echo Park over the last 10 years evoke the feelings of exclusion and the pushing out of long-time residents that the Chavez Ravine redevelopment epitomized.

A review of demographic data between 2000 and 2014 shows how the Latino population and Asian population has declined while both the white and black population has increased (see figure 3). In 2000 whites made up 11 percent of the population and more than doubled in 2009 to 37 percent and then declined in 2014 to 20 percent. The total Asian population decreased by 3 percentage points from 2000 to 2009 and then increased by 2 percentage points in 2014. From 2000 to 2009 there was a sharper decrease in the Latino population that decreased from 65
percent in 2000 to 41 percent in 2009. From 2009 to 2014 the Latino population increased by 16 percentage points. The black population remained relatively stable only increasing by 1 percent from 2000 and 2009 and remaining the same in 2014 at 3 percent of the total population. The population with Bachelor’s degree or more increased by 6 percentage points from 2000 to 2014 where 24 percent of the population 25 years and over in the Greater Echo Park Neighborhood Council area had a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, Professional degree, or a Doctoral degree in 2014. Median house value and median gross rent have all significantly increased since 2000 while median household income increased less significantly (see appendix). In 2000 the median household income was $37,415 and increased by 8 percent to $40,255 by 2014. Median house value almost doubled since 2000 with a median value of $482,600 in 2014. Median rent in the Greater Echo Park Neighborhood Council District increased intensely by 37 percent to a median rent of $1,075 in 2014. While median housing value increased, total owner occupied units remained consistent while average household size decreased slightly and nonfamily households decreased more significantly. Owner occupied units in Echo Park decreased by 1 percentage point from 2000 and 2014 and made a total of 21 percent in 2014. Family households in Echo Park decreased from 66 percent in 2000 and to 55 percent in 2014 and the average household size decreased from 3 persons to 2.8 persons.

The demographic changes demonstrate how Echo Park has become less Latino, more affluent, more educated, and a more expensive place to live. Nestled within the rising gentrification in the neighborhood is the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction. For some residents, gentrification has pushed gang members outside their turfs of Echo Park and the recent injunction is put in place to target gang members that remain (Gerber, 2014).
Interview Findings

An analysis of the demographic changes in both Echo Park and Silver Lake provides insight into the growing demographic changes as articulated in the history section. To understand the connection between gentrification and the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction, my research aimed to understand what led the City Attorney to file a gang injunction in 2013. Interviews that I conducted with representatives at the City Attorney’s office, a gang unit officer for the Northeast Division, a Senior Lead Officer with the Northeast Division, and an academic expert in the field of gang injunctions reveals competing reasons for filing an injunction.

Representatives at both the City Attorney’s office and the Northeast Division cited an increase in violent and gang related crimes as the reasons for initiating an injunction. Individual crimes and an individual’s rap sheet were cited as substantial reasoning for needing an injunction. As opposed to looking at overall statistics of violent crimes in the area, particular focus is put on individual gang related crime. In addition, the Senior Lead Officer at the North East Division cited an increase in calls for service in the area as an indication of the growing
need for an injunction. Calls for service are used as a measure for understanding the community’s fear around violence and gang activity during the time of the injunction, and presently. However, an overall account for data collection and timing for collecting data is vague and unexplainable when spoken in context with the filing of an injunction.

One major theme in the interviews with representatives at the City Attorney’s office and the Northeast Division was the role gang injunctions play in the larger strategy to deal with gangs. The role of an injunction as explained by a gang unit officer is to saturate a particular area as a tool to prevent “gang members from hanging out within a specified area.” This tactic is used in areas where crime and gangs are highly visible and creating a nuisance or criminal gang activity. The role in determining a gang injunction is largely between a gang unit officer and the City Attorney. Various other actors play a role in gang injunctions through their support and will be further explained later in this paper. The City Attorney’s office is first approached by law enforcement to pursue an injunction and will sometimes deny an injunction if there is not enough criminal activity to pursue an injunction. If the City Attorney’s office determines that a gang injunction is appropriate, then an individual gang officer works in partnership with the City Attorney’s office to initiate the injunction. In preparation for an injunction, a gang unit officer needs to accumulate crime reports and violent arrest reports, however there is no specified time frame. The gang unit officer did mention that in particular the Echo Park gang “has been around for a long time.”

Calls for service is considered an important component for supporting the argument for an increase in crime, and for gauging the needs of the community which in effect puts law enforcement on alert for gang activity as a precursor to gang crime. However, calls for service are not collected and accounted for during the process. Both the Senior Lead Officer and gang
unit officer recall an increasing amount of calls for service during the time of filing for an injunction. As an example of calls received during the time of the gang injunction, the gang unit officer pointed to a call he received a couple of days before the interview where multiple residents called in a shooting where someone on a Saturday evening was shooting a shotgun in the air. Immediately after the injunction, calls for service had declined, but given recent shootings and homicides, calls have increased when the interview was conducted in January of 2016.

As previously mentioned, an accumulation of crime reports and gang related crime is needed in order to proceed with an injunction. An assigned gang unit officer is responsible for compiling this information for the City Attorney’s office in order to present it in court. The violent crimes that are accumulated span a couple of years but there is no time frame in which gang unit officers are accounting for these violent crimes. However, the City Attorney’s office noted that they are constantly reviewing more recent crimes and accounting for them in their cases.

Implicit in the discussions of crime is the intimidation of community members because of violence and fear experienced by many residents. Both the gang unit officer and the City Attorney’s office articulate this point. The intimidation narrative draws out specific perceptions of crime prevalent in three of the interviews conducted. As the gang unit officer discussed:

“Activists have come up and said it’s a violation of civil liberties, targeting youth of color, basic response. But I want to point (out) there is only one Echo Park injunction, and four Echo Park gang murders in the last five months and numerous assaults and robberies in Echo Park.”

For opponents and community activists, homicide rates are now the lowest they have been since the 1950s, which points to a reduction in crime, and for one developer crime in the area is
targeted to gang on gang violence. One question brought up by the academic expert and community activists is if crime was such a big issue then why the year before the injunction was Echo Park denied a Summer Night Lights program because there was not a high need in the area? The Summer Night Lights program “is part of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) comprehensive strategy, which is directed at strengthening community resiliency to the influence of gangs and gang violence” and keeps “recreation centers and parks open between the hours of 7 pm – 11 pm throughout the summer months” (City night lights). A representative for the City Attorney’s office aware of the opponents’ arguments mentioned that, “sometimes the opposition will say this [crime] is not a problem, but they need to see more extreme issues happening here.”

When analyzing the reasons for filing an injunction there is no clear narrative on what precipitates an injunction, how much nuisance is necessary to initiate an injunction, and a distinction between overall crime and gang crime is made in the argument for filing an injunction. The time frame for which gang related crime is reviewed prior to an injunction was unclear making it difficult to map out what was happening before the injunction was filed. It was also unclear how long before the injunction was initiated was the City Attorney’s office looking to file the injunction. Although it was mentioned that the injunction was started back in 2008 it is unclear what precipitated it then, and why it stopped. Crime was a term repeated in the interviews as the precursor to filing an injunction, however when it was mentioned that the overall crime rates have gone down in the area a point was made that gang related crime continues to exist. This distinction highlights the anecdotal justifications for initiating, filing, and proceeding with an injunction. Additionally, the reasoning for filing an injunction is not justified by data as evidenced by the emphasis of calls for service as a way to gauge the community’s
needs but no calls for service have been analyzed leading up to the injunction.

The lack of procedural transparency and data reveals the need to further examine the relationship between the timing and the passing of an injunction. An analysis of the interviews with the City Attorney’s office and gang unit division reveals that there is no set threshold or timing mechanism for determining when an injunction is initiated. Multiple actors make the decision on which gangs get enjoined through a convoluted series of actions and decisions from the City Attorney’s office and gang unit division. Multiple injunctions on different gangs can be and are processed at the same time by the City Attorney’s office. The process of filing an injunction takes approximately one year as evidence is gathered to support the injunction. A representative in the City Attorney’s office stated that he himself had begun the process for the filing of the Glendale Corridor injunction in 2008 but was removed from the case shortly after for an unknown reason. He also mentioned that during the recession, the office lost over 100 attorneys. Work on the injunctions slowed significantly while attorneys had to focus on more pressing issues. There is no list or order of gangs that are going to be enjoined. The procedure is police officers work with an attorney in the City Attorney’s office to do a review and see if there is sufficient evidence worth dedicating resources. Additionally, each injunction varies in size due to the location of criminal activity, as result of pin mapping crime on a large map, and what the court ultimately approves which can change from what the City Attorney’s office suggests.

On the other hand, community residents and local activists have pointed to various instances in the passing of the injunction that suggest to them that the injunction is more than just addressing gang crime. For some community residents and local activist, injunction is a tool for gentrification. One local activist mentioned that the press release of the gang injunction occurred the same day the Echo Park Renovation was opened, and revealed that the newly renovated park
was at the epicenter of the injunction. Another community activist mentioned that while he recognizes there is not a direct causation with gentrification, the timing of the injunction would suggest that there is a correlation saying “is it a coincidence that the injunction is named Glendale Corridor when the new renovation plan for the area is also [named] the Glendale Corridor?”

The sentiments expressed by community activists and residents are reflective of the major changes the Echo Park area has seen in the last 10-15 years. For one organizer, the changes are “scary actually” and “sad that we are getting pushed out by people with new bigger wallets.”

One community activist and resident mentioned that what is often missing in the discussion is that gentrification has real detrimental effects on the psyche when you “come from a low-income community and now your new neighbor can afford a huge house for themselves and quote un-quote clean it out. It is as if white people are cleaning up our community and we are dirty.”

While she has grown up in Echo Park all her life this resident recalls how when the neighborhood began to change her father, who owned a home, was approached by a fire code enforcer for the city who had informed her father that there were fire code violations. Since her father was in real estate he knew that there was no violation. Shortly after this encounter, an individual that wanted to pay cash for the property approached her father indicating that they would not have to worry about any code violations. This has happened twice to her family home.

The renovation of Echo Park Lake in 2013 further reflects for some residents the tension that exists between old and new residents and the feeling of being pushed out by new residents. One resident noted that now living closer to Echo Park Lake the amount of microagressions experienced by her and her partner is “unsettling” and she never experienced it when the neighborhood was experiencing the most violence. She also indicated that the youth she works
with also feel like the park is not for them, recalling one youth, when asked about her feelings of the renovation of Echo Park Lake, articulated that the park was not built for her. The resident also noted that “gentrifiers” can get high and drink alcohol and wine in the park while youth of color are getting arrested for having a lighter. The violence of gentrification spoken by this resident is in contrast to the violence articulated by those in power and the policing and monitoring of certain groups more than others. For non-community members, the violence most threatening to residents of the area is gang related crime, but for community member’s gentrification is seen as a more violent threat to their livelihood. Gentrification is not only a violent force, but creates an environment where certain bodies or policed more than others.

For another resident the closing of local businesses and the moving of friends to areas outside Los Angeles have been the telling sign of gentrification. One resident articulates that in the last 10 years “moms and pops could not afford to keep stores open” and that El Batey Market was the last local store to go. Many of her friends because of the unaffordability of Echo Park had to leave to Palmdale and Lancaster, which is about two hours outside the city. For this resident she does not mind the change but articulates that “people’s characters are so disrespectful” and feels like newcomers look at people like her as if she should not be here. She later stresses that young adults in the area are not given the opportunity to benefit from the new changes, as they do not get hired because they do not have “blonde hair and blue eyes.”

For one developer in the Echo Park area, the biggest resistance they faced was not crime, although they did experience some form of intimidation and property theft, but the community’s resistance to change and development as voiced in the community meetings they hosted. For the Senior Lead Officer at the Northeast Police Division she discussed how her job benefits from the recent beautification that happens when gangs are suppressed and there is no fear of being
engaged by gang members. Furthermore she mentions that the “hipsters” moving into the neighborhood try to outreach to beautify the community and bring services to the community. For the Senior Lead Officer Echo Park is seeing the “old and new world colliding” and that people in the community are making it a “racial thing”. The Senior Lead Officer has heard community members say “it’s not that I don’t like you white people, I just don’t want you here” later mentioning that the hipsters are “good about turning the other cheek. What the older residents in the community are feeling is “resentment” according to the Senior Lead Officer. However, when juxtaposed to other interview responses, gentrifiers are not passive and always pleasant to families that have lived in the area for many years. Furthermore the system of gentrification is not race neutral and the consequences of gentrification have detrimental emotional and psychological effects on people of color living in the area.

The awareness of the sentiments in the community was also articulated in interviews with the gang unit officer and the representatives from the City Attorney’s office especially around the issue of gentrification. The gang unit officer articulated “people in the community are saying that they are doing this [gang injunction] because of gentrification and that is unfair. I am not going to dispute that. [I will] just [say] location, location, location.” One representative at the City Attorney’s office also pointed to the same sentiment when he said, “real estate is what it is” and the other representative mentioned, “we [the City Attorney’s office] have done injunctions in areas where there are no curbs” referring to the gang injunction in Pacoima and the lack of paved curbs and sidewalks in the area.

The support or lack thereof for the gang injunction by both community members and the Neighborhood Council was also a point of discussion in the interviews. Despite the Neighborhood Council of Silver Lake and Echo Park voting against the injunction, one
representative in the City Attorney’s office argued that the City Attorney’s office acts on behalf of California and “no one has to support its legal standard” but they ultimately want support from the neighborhood council. However the Neighborhood Council’s input is given the same weight as other constituents, and, at the end of the day, the City Attorney’s office main duty is public safety. The role of gang injunctions as keeping the public safe was recognized despite one City Attorney’s office representative articulating that after an injunction “many gangsters will modify behaviors” and is “not so much in your face after that.”

Ultimately, what the set of interviews reveals is that there is no visible calculated effort to advance gentrification on the City Attorney’s and LAPD side, but instead gang injunctions are seen as a tool at their disposal that is taken for granted without considering productive alternatives. The overall presentation of gang injunctions is that inevitably every gang will be enjoined it is just a matter of time and resources. When that will happen, the community does not know. The lack of community knowledge highlights how the City Attorney does not recognize any significance in community opposition and is motivated primarily by satisfying the legal standard. The lack of transparency further advances the fear many community members feel in regards to gentrification and policing tactics that affect communities in various ways that are not purely economic. Many community members are viewing the gang injunction as a further encroachment on their right to remain in a neighborhood they call home, which is not a sentiment that should be taken lightly.

Along with the fear of gentrification, gang injunctions for some community members and activists create both real and perceived limitations on their rights to live in their communities freely without fear of retribution. Additionally, the recent gang injunction has enhanced the
criminalization of youth of color in the area, which is viewed by community members as a mechanism to push them out of their community.

During the interview process, the gang unit officer mentioned that their department did not receive any additional funding from gang injunctions and that no police strategies and enforcement change as a result of a gang injunction existing. Additionally, one representative in the City Attorney’s office mentioned that there are many myths in the community around the injunction and the process. One myth that is widely held is that there is a public record of who is on a gang injunction which can be seen by employers and limit people’s opportunities to get a job however this is not true.

Despite the many rumors surrounding the injunction the overall awareness of an injunction in the Glendale Corridor and the backlash that it received was what one interviewee said made this case unique. For year’s gang injunctions have been passed in communities without residents’ knowledge. One community activist that is named in the Boyle Heights injunction mentioned that in his community no one knew what the gang injunction was and recalled that it was “a mysterious entity and everyone had their own story and idea about it.” In the beginning there was a rumor that if you did not sign it then you were not put on the injunction, only later to find out that they were still on the injunction regardless of their signature. For him, being on the gang injunction has made him avoid interaction with police at all times. Although he knows that the injunction only applies in the safety zone, to him it matters everywhere because for him being on an injunction automatically means your words have no weight when in the presence of law enforcement. Being on a gang injunction has also impacted his ability to actively participate in civil disobedience, because he cannot take the chance of being arrested. The injunction became a significant hindrance for him and he realized it was something he wanted to hide. The
injunction had become an obstacle to organizing people from former gangs but does not want to put him and others at risk. He mentions, “I know I need to be off the gang injunction so I can go into my community in a way that I could not have before.”

Despite the awareness around this injunction and the backlash that ensued, community members struggled to find support and guidance around the injunction when it was first introduced. One community member in Echo Park whose family has been placed on the gang injunction mentioned that members in her family received an injunction in 2013 prior to the actual serving of injunction to members in 2014. When her family received the injunction she had no idea how to interpret it for her family members pointing that there was no number to call on the injunction for more information. There was a sudden fear in the association clause in which she felt that this put many fathers and sons at risk if the police identify you as an active member and then can arrest your son for associating with is father who is on the injunction mentioning. She mentions that, “a lot of fathers in Echo Park are not active gang members and they just want to spend time with their sons.” When she asked the police about the injunction she received conflicting answers, with some saying not to worry that the injunction since it is not in effect yet. Despite her family members no longer being active in a gang for many years, they were still placed on the injunction. She even mentioned that there was a discrepancy between who was named on the injunction and the pictures of gang members shown on the injunction. The pictures shown on the injunction were old photos from the 1990’s and were not of the person that was named on the injunction.

An attempt was made to fight off the injunction but in order to fight the injunction one person had to admit to being part of the gang in order to move forward, but no one was going to
admit to something that was not true. It is difficult and expensive to get a lawyer to help you fight off an injunction unless they are charged with a crime and assigned a public defender.

It was also expressed that the recent gang injunction has created an environment where teenagers are harassed and pulled over because they look suspicious and are given tickets for possessing lighters. Youth were being cited for minor reasons and when parents began putting in complaints for harassment “they [police] cooled down a bit.” For this community member these citations were a way to financially exploit lower income families because of the fines associated with tickets and demonstrate how “Police do not allow us to live why because the neighborhood is gentrifying.” She later comments that her children have been told by police officers that they hope their parents lose their house and move to another part of town.

The overall lack of clarity around injunctions creates fears and stressors that are both real and perceived, but affect the feelings of belonging in one’s own community nonetheless. Just as gentrification has detrimental effects on the psyche, the existence of an injunction affects both those listed on an injunction and those not. The general fear around increased policing caused by a gang injunction affects young people living in an area where there is an injunction. For young people not listed on the injunction, the gang injunction is viewed, as a marker of difference that seeks to push out community members deemed undesirable by police officers. An injunction creates both literal and imagined boundaries that impact the way one views themself in their own community. An injunction operates as a mechanism for exclusion that further creates divisions between community members and the police. Furthermore, the injunction is seen and experienced by those on the injunction or affected by the injunction as a way to target, harass, and push out those the police deem as undesirable in the area.

**Statistical Findings**
To further understand if certain neighborhood characteristics associated with gentrification increases the likelihood that an area is sanctioned with a gang injunction I conducted a logistic regression to compare the demographic characteristics of census tracts with an injunction to census tracts within a mile from the injunction, which is referred to as the buffer zone. Given that some of the gang injunctions overlapped I applied three scenarios of aggregation outlined in the methodology section to run three separate logistic regressions.

Scenario 1

The logistic output in Table 2 demonstrates that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > chi2 is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. However, the explanatory power of the model is low. The model only explains 6.37 percent of the variation in Y (likelihood a neighborhood gets an injunction). At the 95 percent confidence level non-family households, average household size, bachelor’s degree or more, and median household are statistically significant. Census tracts with larger shares of college educated residents; larger shares of non-family households, higher median incomes, and larger household sizes were less likely to be the subject of a gang injunction.

| Variable                          | Coefficient | SE       | P>|z| |
|----------------------------------|-------------|----------|-----|
| Proportion white population      | 1.645739    | 0.7790574| 0.293|
| Proportion non family household  | 0.132809    | 0.1219874| 0.028|
| Average household size           | 0.5857952   | 0.1047468| 0.003|
| Proportion bachelor's degree or more | 0.1428185  | 0.1392316| 0.046|
| Median household income          | 0.99999861  | 6.04E-06 | 0.021|
| Percent renter population        | 1.459312    | 0.6467171| 0.394|
| Median house value               | 0.99999998  | 4.19E-07 | 0.685|
| Median gross rent                | 0.9995191   | 3.14E-04 | 0.125|

Prob > chi2  Pseudo R2  Number of obs
Scenario 2

Similarly the logistic results in Table 3 demonstrates that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > chi2 is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. However, the explanatory power of my model is low. The model only explains 10.85 percent of the variation in Y. However in this scenario at the 95 percent confidence level average household size, proportion with bachelor’s degree or more, median house value, and median gross rent are statistically significant. Unlike Scenario 1, proportion of non-family households are not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, but are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level along with percent renter population. Census tracts with higher home values, higher rents, a greater proportion of residents with a bachelor’s degree and larger average household sizes were less likely to be the subject of a gang injunction.

Table 3: Coefficients from the Logistic Regression of Injunction on Neighborhood Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Injunction</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion white population</td>
<td>1.383326</td>
<td>0.784549</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion non family household</td>
<td>0.1601812</td>
<td>0.1706985</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>0.5969101</td>
<td>0.1259461</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion bachelor's degree or more</td>
<td>0.095799</td>
<td>0.1042256</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>0.9999906</td>
<td>6.59E-06</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter population</td>
<td>2.469216</td>
<td>1.226048</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median house value</td>
<td>1.000001</td>
<td>4.79E-07</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median gross rent</td>
<td>0.9989645</td>
<td>0.0003553</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudo Probe &gt; chi 2</th>
<th>R2</th>
<th>Number of obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.1085</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scenario 3
Much like the previous two scenarios, the logistics results for Scenario 3 in Table 4 demonstrate that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > chi2 is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. However, the explanatory power of my model is low. The model only explains 10.92 percent of the variation in Y. This scenario proved to have the least amount of statistically significant variables at the 95 percent confidence level. Like Scenario 1 and 2 average household size and proportion bachelor's degree or more was significant. Census tracts with higher rents, a greater proportion of residents with a bachelor’s degree and larger average household sizes were less likely to be the subject of a gang injunction.

| Variable                          | Odds Ratio | SE      | P>|z| |
|----------------------------------|------------|---------|------|
| Proportion white population      | 1.111911   | 0.4794115 | 0.806 |
| Proportion non family household  | 0.2966091  | 0.2380464 | 0.13  |
| Average household size           | 0.6099988  | 0.0972527 | 0.002 |
| Proportion bachelor's degree or more | 0.0969601 | 0.0838164 | 0.007 |
| Median household income          | 0.9999919  | 5.58E-06 | 0.147 |
| Percent renter population        | 1.760826   | 0.7075736 | 0.159 |
| Median house value               | 1          | 3.68E-07 | 0.971 |
| Median gross rent                | 0.991778   | 0.0002783 | 0.003 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prob &gt; chi 2</th>
<th>Pseudo R2</th>
<th>Number of obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1092</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion and Implications

The results imply that the relationship between neighborhood demographics and gang injunctions can be measured using existing data at the census tract level. The logistic regression under all three scenarios demonstrates that an increase in educational attainment and household income both decreases the likelihood that a tract has an injunction. The logistic regression
indicates those census tracts with less household income and a smaller population of individuals with a bachelor’s degree or more are more likely to have an injunction. The challenge is I am using static measures for gentrification, while gentrification is a measure of neighborhood change. The results are in a way consistent with a gentrification hypothesis in that those neighborhoods that are higher income and more educated are less likely to be subject to an injunction because they are already gentrified. However, a discrepancy exists between which variables are explainable under each scenario. The more observations included in the model the less explainable variable become as the odds ratio coefficient reaches 1. The discrepancies between unexplainable variables indicate the importance of how gang injunctions geographically relate to one another and further present potential issues of collinearity.

To address the issue of weighting tracts based on the proportion of a census tract with an injunction, I ran an OLS regression to measure the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and the proportion of a census tract covered by an injunction. The proportion of a tract covered by an injunction is important in understanding how much importance we assign to a particular tract. In this regression, importance is assigned based on how much a tract is covered by an injunction. Identical to the logistic regression, three different scenarios were applied in the OLS model.

Scenario 1

Under Scenario 1 the OLS output in Table 5 demonstrates that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > F is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. This results shows a relatively high R-squared value of .3020, indicating that the model’s independent variable explains 30.2 percent of the variation in a the proportion of a
census tract with an injunction. Variables that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level are median house value and at a 90 percent confidence level is median household income. However this model shows a negative correlation exists between proportion of a census tract with an injunction and neighborhood characteristics. Tracts with lower median home values and lower median incomes are more likely to be more fully covered by a gang injunction.

| Variable                  | Proportion of Census Tract with Injunction | Coefficient | Robust SE | P>|t| |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|------|
| Proportion white population| -0.0420151                                 | 0.1201162   | 0.727     |
| Proportion non family household | -0.0024112                                 | 0.1977545   | 0.99      |
| Average household size     | -0.0031493                                 | 0.0329733   | 0.924     |
| Proportion bachelor's degree or more | -0.4875345                                | 0.2543568   | 0.056     |
| Median household income    | 7.69E-07                                   | 1.83E-06    | 0.675     |
| Percent renter population  | 0.2609975                                  | 1.10E-01    | 0.018     |
| Median house value         | -1.73E-07                                  | 1.00E-07    | 0.085     |
| Median gross rent          | 0.0000407                                  | 8.31E-05    | 0.625     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Number of obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scenario 2

Similar to Scenario 1, the OLS output in Table 6 for Scenario 2 demonstrates that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > F is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. Scenario 2 also resulted in a high R-squared value of .2099, indicating that the model's independent variable explains 21 percent of the variation in the proportion of a census tract that is sanctioned with an injunction. Variables that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval are proportion of renter population and median house value. However, a positive correlation exists between proportion of a census tract with an injunction
and renter population while a negative correlation exists between proportion of a census tract with an injunction and median house value. A 1 percent increase in the proportion of a census tract with an injunction is associated with a 19 percent increase in renter population and less than 1 percent decrease in median house value. Unlike Scenario 1, median household income is not significant.

Table 6: Coefficients from the regression of Proportion of Census Tract with an Injunction on Neighborhood Characteristics

| Variable                      | Coefficient | Robust SE | P>|t| |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------|------|
| Proportion white population   | 0.0550245   | 0.1072278 | 0.608|
| Proportion non family household| -0.0930469  | 0.1769215 | 0.599|
| Average household size        | 0.0419938   | 0.030287  | 0.165|
| Proportion bachelor's degree or more | -0.176579 | 0.2210248 | 0.425|
| Median household income       | -2.90E-06   | 1.67E-06  | 0.083|
| Percent renter population     | 0.1646266   | 1.04E-01  | 0.115|
| Median house value            | -2.89E-07   | 9.18E-08  | 0.002|
| Median gross rent             | 0.0000686   | 7.45E-05  | 0.358|

Scenario 3

The OLS output in Scenario 3 shown in Table 7 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis given that our prob > F is very low (.0000). We can reject the null hypothesis and assume that there is a relationship between our independent variables and our dependent variable. The results show a high R-squared value of .37759, indicating that the model’s independent variable explains 38 percent of the variation in the proportion of a census tract that is sanctioned with an injunction. Variables that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval are renter population and median house value similar to Scenario 2. However, renter population is negatively associated with proportion of a census tract with an injunction. Further indicating that a 1 percent increase in the proportion of a census tract with an
injunction is associated with a 19 percent increase in renter population and less than 1 percent decrease in median house value.

| Variable                              | Proportion of Census Tract with Injunction | Coefficient | Robust SE | P>|t| |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----|
| Proportion white population           |                                          | 0.0550245   | 0.1072278 | 0.608 |
| Proportion non family household       |                                          | -0.0930469  | 0.1769215 | 0.599 |
| Average household size                |                                          | 0.0419938   | 0.0302087 | 0.165 |
| Proportion bachelor's degree or more  |                                          | -0.176579   | 0.2210248 | 0.425 |
| Median household income               |                                          | -2.90E-06   | 1.67E-06  | 0.083 |
| Percent renter population             |                                          | 0.1646266   | 1.04E-01  | 0.115 |
| Median house value                    |                                          | -2.89E-07   | 9.18E-08  | 0.002 |
| Median gross rent                     |                                          | 0.000686    | 7.45E-05  | 0.358 |
| Prob > F                              |                                          | 0.0000      | 0.2099    | 876  |

Discussion and Implications

The OLS regression displays a high degree of variation across all three scenarios where the correlation between the proportion of a census tract with an injunction and neighborhood characteristics is inconsistent. There is less variation between Scenarios 2 and 3 since they are less restrictive rules for calculating the proportion of a census tract covered by an injunction and thus accounts for more data points. However consistently across all three scenarios the proportion of a census tract with an injunction is negatively correlated with median house value. Similar to the data output in the logistic regression, an increase in demographic characteristics associated with gentrification is associated with a decrease in the size of a gang injunction in a census tract. Nonetheless, the regressions show that a relationship does exist between the proportion of a census tract covered by an injunction and census tract demographic characteristics. Like the logistic regression, the rules for aggregation have significant implications for the model.
Additionally, the data gathered from the interviews pointed to the negative effects that gang injunctions have on young people of color living in the area despite no articulated changes in policing practices after an injunction is passed. An analysis of the stop and frisk data available demonstrates a variation in the significance the presence of a gang injunction has on whether a driver or pedestrian of color is stopped and frisked. This analysis accounts for the timing of when an injunction is passed. Table 8 through 11 outlines the regression output for the fixed-effects model where year I fixed. When it comes to the explanatory power of the models for determining the relationship between drivers being stopped by race is very low in all models along with the inability to reject the null hypothesis. The inability to reject the null hypothesis indicates that there are other factors affecting stops and frisks and is not only explained by injunctions. This means that the variation observed in stops and frisks of drivers and pedestrians is not mostly explained by an injunction being present in a reporting district.

In addition, the relationship between a driver of color being stopped and frisked showed to not be significant at the 90 percent or 95 percent confidence level with the exception of black drivers. At the 98 percent confidence level, after an injunction is introduced the number of black drivers who are stopped decreases by 43 percent compared to before the introduction of the injunction. However, this could not be said for drivers that are Latino and Asian. When it came to the relationship between drivers stopped and race the explanatory powers also fluctuated but remained very low and the presence of an injunction did not prove to be significant in any of the scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injunction</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Stopped Drivers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1023772</td>
<td>-0.430727</td>
<td>0.0989856</td>
<td>-0.1026522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0928537</td>
<td>0.1801478</td>
<td>0.098265</td>
<td>0.2052378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Coefficients from the Regression of Drivers Stopped and Frisks on the Presence of an Injunction
Further analysis of pedestrian data illustrates similar trends. When it comes to the relationship between the changes in pedestrian stops and frisks when an injunction is introduced, they are not well explained by the model. For whites, Latinos, and Asians, the presence of a gang injunction is insignificant, in the case for stopped and frisked pedestrians that are black, the presence of an injunction in this scenario shows a 65 percent decrease in stops and a 62 percent decrease in frisks.

---

**Table 9: Coefficients from the Regression of Pedestrians Stopped and Frisked on the Presence of an Injunction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injunction</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>0.1267868</td>
<td>-0.3983774</td>
<td>0.2558394</td>
<td>0.2855249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.1577063</td>
<td>0.2170102</td>
<td>0.1812554</td>
<td>0.258518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10: Coefficients from the Regression of Drivers Stopped and Frisks on the Number of Injunctions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injunction</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>-0.1630497</td>
<td>-0.6547274</td>
<td>0.1375066</td>
<td>-0.078367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.1072477</td>
<td>0.245827</td>
<td>0.0964662</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Injunction Frisked Drivers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injunction</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>-0.1131567</td>
<td>-0.6190435</td>
<td>0.1397601</td>
<td>-0.1828187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.1073363</td>
<td>0.2441996</td>
<td>0.122632</td>
<td>0.2023423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The presence of an injunction is only significant for black pedestrians and drivers. However, the data indicates that stops and frisks decrease when there is an injunction. This could be because the model does not account for population size or where in the reporting district the stops occur. Given that gang injunctions are only applied in specific areas it is important to know whether where the stop occurred is in a part of the reporting district that is subject to a gang injunction, which the current data unfortunately does not provide. Additionally, it is also
important to know the relative population of people in each reporting district to better understand the relative rate of stops as compared with the raw number of stops.

The stop and frisk data made available by the consent decree agreed to between the Department of Justice and the LAPD is publicly accessible only from 2004 to 2009. By 2004, the majority of injunctions had already been passed, making it difficult to account for the timing of an injunction. By 2004 of the 18 Reporting Districts in LA, only 6 did not have an injunction. Of the 96 observations only 17 did not have an injunction at any given point in time from 2004 to 2009.

To account for the lack of data available, an analysis of the police stop and frisks as a function of the number of gang injunctions present in a reporting district was evaluated. However this model showed the same amount of variability and low explanatory power between stops and frisks and the number of injunctions present in a Reporting District. Much like the previous model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. With the existing data, there is not enough evidence to identify a significant relationship between stops and frisks and the presence of the number of injunctions in a Reporting District. Unlike the previous model, the independent variable, number of injunctions in a Reporting District, was not significant in any of the cases.

Discussion and Implications

The OLS model suggests that there are various other factors that affect the stops and frisks of people of color in areas with gang injunctions. An injunction alone is not the best model to explain these stops. This can be accounted for the fact that gang injunctions target only specific people in an area and are described in the interview from a gang unit officer and the City Attorney’s office as reserved for the most violent criminals and is used scarcely. The interviews also pointed to the role the gang injunction has played in targeting specific families in the
neighborhood and the role citations have played in incriminating youth of color. These specific interactions are not accounted for in the data available under the consent decree. Moreover, the data available for stops and frisks are only for Reporting Districts, it is impossible to narrow down the data to specific geographic areas, which is critical given that gang injunctions are geographic specific. This does not mean that gang injunction do not effect young people in and out of a safety zone, but points to the difficulty in using current data for understanding the relationship between gang injunctions, police interventions, and people of color in areas where an injunction is present.

**Conclusion**

Although the results of the logistic regression indicate a relationship between gang injunctions and neighborhood characteristics the inconsistent results across all three scenarios demonstrates that further investigation into the spatial relationships of the injunctions is needed. Further research should consider how to quantify and evaluate gang injunctions that overlap as to avoid over counting. However, the logistic output under Scenario 2 demonstrates that accounting for the overlap and assuming that gang injunctions lay on top of each other leaves room for more flexibility and the ability to capture more data points. Thus further research should account for how gang injunctions overlap and if the proportion of the tract occupied by a gang injunction matters to the analysis. In this case, creating rules for aggregation account for data points where gang injunctions occupy large portions of a census tract. Further articulations of this analysis should, if not using rules for aggregation, consider how to weight each data point. Weighing data points allows for census tracts where most of the tract is covered by an injunction to be weighted more than tracts with less of the tract covered by an injunction.
In addition, there are still potential threats to the validity of the statistical analysis given that crime is not accounted for in the model. Crime data at the census tract level for Los Angeles is not available. Future research could benefit from finding a method to obtain tract specific crime data. Without that crime data, one way to address the explanatory power of the model would be to cluster the data by matching a gang injunction to its respective buffer zone. If this were to be explored a new measure of the buffer zone would need to be evaluated since buffer zones are shared in this model when injunctions overlap.

Given that current data availability make it difficult to draw a correlation between the presence of a gang injunction and stops and frisks is it important to look at gang injunctions as part of a larger system of gang suppression tactics. More recent attention has been paid to the role gang databases play in incriminating youth of color. The Cal Gang Database is a statewide database of alleged gang members “accessible by over 6,000 law enforcement officers in at least 58 counties” (Real Search, 2012: 3). Most people that are added to the gang database are unaware and are added, “without having been arrested or accused of criminal activity and most [often] collected during routine police stops or stop and frisks” (Real Search, 2012: 4). According the gang unit officer, being added on the gang database is a result of self-admission, “dressing in a manner that says you are gang affiliated, or associating with other people in a gang” among other things. While it was pointed out in the interview that you can be on the gang unit database and not a gang injunction, community advocates have argued that a gang database is “routinely used to help identify who is served with a gang injunction” (Real Search, 2012: 4). In some regards, gang files are a precursor for documenting, branding, and incriminating young people of color as gang members. Future research should focus on the relationship of both gang
databases and gang files to understand how various police tactics affect policing practices on the ground.

While gang injunctions do not appear to be motivated primarily by gentrification, the fear of displacement and over policing communities of color as shown in the Glendale Corridor Gang Injunction is not mutually exclusive. Gang injunctions through the views of law enforcement and the City Attorney’s office are a tool to address gang related crime and target specific individuals. Gang injunctions have become institutionalized as a tool to address gang crime. Given gang injunctions legal standing they are not viewed by law enforcement or the City Attorney’s office as needing to incorporate the needs or wants of community members advocating for an alternative system. Nonetheless, residents and advocates against the injunction view the injunction as a tool for facilitating gentrification. Both gentrification and gang injunctions have negative impacts on a community member’s sense of belonging in their own community. Community members view gang injunctions and gentrification as external powerful forces threatening their ability to stay in a community they call home. These findings are important to understanding the connections between police practices and gentrification as both have significant impacts on an individual’s perceived and literal opportunities for staying in their respective communities.
Appendix A. List of Interviewees

Senior Lead Officer, Northeast Division, Los Angeles Police Department

Gang Unit Officer, Northeast Division, Los Angeles Police Department

Anti-Gang Section, Safe Neighborhoods And Gang Division, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office

Community Organizer, Youth Justice Coalition

Real Estate Developer, Los Angeles

STAY, Standing Together Advocating for Our Youth

Echo Park Community Member

Ana Muñiz, Los Angeles Gang Injunction Researcher, Author of *Police, Power, and the Production of Racial Boundaries*
Appendix B. Regression Equations

\[ \log \text{TotalStopDrivers}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{StopDriverBlack}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{StopDriverAsian}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{StopDriverHispanic}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalFriskedDrivers}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{FriskedDriverBlack}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{FriskedDriverHispanic}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{FriskedDriverAsian}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalStoppedPedestrians}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalStoppedPedestriansBlack}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalStoppedPedestriansHispanic}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalStoppedPedestrianAsian}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalPedestrianFrisked}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalPedestrianFriskedBlack}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalPedestrianFriskedHispanic}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
\[ \log \text{TotalPedestrianFriskedAsian}_{it} = \beta_{yx} \text{GangInjunction}_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \]
Appendix B. Additional Demographic Charts

Silver Lake

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2000</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>49%</td>
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<td>43%</td>
<td>48%</td>
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<td>Nonfamily Households</td>
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<td>57%</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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Echo Park

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<td>2009</td>
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<td>18%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Households</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonfamily Households</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>45%</td>
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Works Cited


Gerber, M. (2014). With Gentrification, Echo Park Gang members Move outside their Turf -


Los Angeles City Attorney. (2013). City Attorney Trutanich seeks injunction against six rival gangs [Press release].


