Russian Nationalism, 1856-1995: Content, Empowerment, and Impact on Russian Foreign Policy

by

Mary Astrid Segovia Tuminez

A.M., Regional Studies: Soviet Union
Harvard University, 1988

B.A., Russian Language and Literature, International Relations
Brigham Young University, 1986

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Signature of Author:______

Department of Political Science
May 31, 1996

Certified by:__________________________

Donald L. M. Blackmer
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by:__________________________

Barry R. Posen
Professor of Political Science
Chairman, Committee for Graduate Studies

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to answer the question, "under what conditions does a malevolent brand of nationalism become empowered and have an impact on foreign policy?" By empowerment I mean that nationalist ideas are propagated in diverse and effective fora, resonate deeply with the articulate public, and garner institutional support. I explore three cases when nationalist ideology was prominent in Russian politics, and contrast cases of aggressive nationalism in 1856-1878 and 1905-1914 with the prominence of a relatively benign nationalism in 1991-1995. I show that, in the first two cases, virulent nationalism influenced state decisions to go to war. But in the post-Soviet period, from 1991-1995, malevolent nationalism has not been empowered and has, therefore, not been a determining factor in Russian foreign policy.

I show that national humiliation, caused by a military fiasco or other instances of international defeat, is the necessary precondition that triggers the articulation of aggressive nationalist ideas in Russia. National humiliation, however, is insufficient to cause the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. I formulate and test hypotheses on four controlling variables to explain why extreme nationalism rises to the top of political discourse and exerts an impact on Russian international behavior. These variables are internal instability, domestic incentive structures, social communication, and threats and opportunities in the international system. My findings rank internal instability and threats and opportunities in the international system as most significant among the variables that lead to the empowerment of virulent nationalism.

Thesis Supervisor: Donald L. M. Blackmer

Title: Professor of Political Science
For Papang, in memory
Acknowledgments

In Lasse Hallstrom's film, "My Life as a Dog," Ingemar, the young hero and one of my favorite screen characters, mulls over events in his boyhood that have been truly formative, painful, and unforgettable. While wrapped under blankets and ensconced in a garden hut in the midst of a Scandinavian winter, he notes that one "must always have perspective." Things can be bad, but think of Laika, the dog, whom the Soviets sent into space with no food or water for sustenance . . . So with that observation, Ingemar grows up. "My Life as a Dog" could well be the subtitle of the last four years I have spent working on this thesis while also carrying on a job. There have been seemingly countless late nights and tedious weekends of researching, writing, and revising, and many moments when I suffered loss of perspective. Now I have the satisfaction of contemplating the end of a major project of my life to date and, like Ingemar, I, too, have grown up.

I have many friends and colleagues to thank for bringing me to the end of the doctoral road. My greatest intellectual debt is to my thesis supervisor, Donald L. M. Blackmer, who, with interminable patience and a sharp eye for weaknesses and contradictions in my draft chapters, gave me the guidance I needed to hone my analysis. Don has also been a great friend, and has gone many extra miles to support and encourage my work, including giving me the opportunity, at least twice, to drown my Ph.D. sorrows in his pond in lovely Vermont. I also want to thank Stephen Van Evera for his example of incisive thinking, clear writing, and commitment to issues that are relevant to the "real world." Steve never hesitated to let me know when my draft chapters were giving him a "headache." Suffering from guilt pangs for being the source of someone's migraines, I became highly motivated to improve my writing. I owe Stephen M. Meyer, my third thesis adviser, much of the excellent training I received as a graduate student at M.I.T., and thank him for his comments and suggestions on improving my thesis.

No professional home in the last four years could have been more hospitable to me than Carnegie Corporation of New York. I used to believe that Moscow winters were unmercifully dreary, but not any more, for it was on a cold, dark, and slushy winter day in Moscow in 1990 that I met Dr. David A. Hamburg, president of Carnegie. Since I began working for David in 1992, he has consistently encouraged and (gently) prodded me to finish my thesis, and always affirmed his belief in the importance of my efforts. I recall recently announcing to him my pregnancy, and his genuine response of delight and congratulations. Then came his next question, "how's your thesis?" That was a very useful reminder.

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Brian Taylor gave me valuable comments on my thesis, rendered occasional research assistance (a sign of true friendship!), and was co-witness of some of my Moscow adventures, including the shelling of the Russian “White House” in October 1993. I also thank Mark Kramer for commenting on various chapters, and for encouraging my weight gain program during pregnancy, while I was frantically finishing thesis revisions. Graham T. Allison and Fiona Hill at Harvard both took time from their busy schedules to read my theory chapter and give me important feedback. Vicky Dorfman from Harvard showed me the true magic of e-mail, when I could ask her a research question in the morning and get a response moments later. I also thank Robin Varghese at Columbia University, who gave me research support.

I wish to acknowledge the U.S. Institute of Peace for giving me a Peace Scholar award, which allowed me to do field work in Moscow. Similarly, a dissertation fellowship from the Social Science Research Council financed several weeks of interviewing and archival work in Russia. I want to thank as well those Russians who generously gave me their time for interviews, and the personnel who facilitated my work at the State Archives of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Military-Historical Archives, and the Manuscript Division of the Russian State Library.

I also wish to acknowledge Gary L. Browning, my undergraduate mentor at Brigham Young University, who encouraged me to pursue scholarship and who set an example of commitment to excellence and service. Finally, I want to thank my sisters and brothers for their support, and my seventeen incredible nieces and nephews, who always help me find perspective. I acknowledge my mother, who was known to be out in the Philippine ricefields, harvesting, while several months pregnant (and now her daughter has completed a thesis while seven months pregnant!); I could not have completed this project without the tenacity I inherited from her. I want to thank my father, who knew the secret of enjoying hours of tropical breezes amidst mango and coconut trees (something I have to learn now that my thesis is done); his memory is always vibrant in my life. My husband, Jeffrey S. Tolkin, who knows me best and is my most constant friend, will now need to recover from the shock of having a wife who is no longer writing a thesis. I thank Jeffrey for inspiring me always to do well, for sharing many adventures around the world, and for loving me unconditionally.
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Chapter One

"Russian Nationalism: Content, Empowerment, and Impact on Foreign Policy"

For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God, and the Lord hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself, above all the nations that are upon the earth.

Deuteronomy 14:2

A spectre haunts Europe...

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1848

Having developed with considerable slowness—up until recent times and relative to national movements in other [former Soviet] republics—Russian nationalism is now entering a phase of expansion and realization of its gigantic potential.

Valerii Solovei, 1992

I. Introduction

A. Questions

The spectre of Russian nationalism haunts much of western coverage of Russian domestic politics and foreign policy. In particular, the jolt created by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party's electoral victory in the Duma elections of December 1993 has led observers to emphasize nationalism as a driving force in post-Soviet Russian politics.¹ Others, alluding to Weimar Germany's experience, warn that the rise of nationalist ideology in Russia could lead to the renewal of authoritarianism at

home and aggression abroad. While many of these predictions are exaggerated, there are aspects of Russian rhetoric and behavior which lend credence to worrisome predictions regarding nationalism's impact. Examples are Russian intervention in the former Soviet republics, Moscow's massive use of force in Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's pronouncement that Moscow was ready to use force to protect its citizens abroad, a Duma Bill requiring all foreign visitors to Russia to certify that they are AIDS-free, and the popularization of vehemently anti-Western sentiments.

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Widespread concern about nationalism's malevolent effects, especially on a state's international behavior, is not new, and in fact, prevails in much of the literature on nationalism in general, and Russian nationalism, in particular. But arguments regarding the manifestly harmful effects of nationalism beg a more fundamental question: under what conditions does an aggressive variant of nationalism become empowered and have an impact on a state's foreign policy? This is the central question that my thesis asks. I break this question down into smaller queries: What is the content of competing variants of Russian nationalism at different points in time? Which of these variants are more benign, and which are more malevolent? What triggers the articulation of aggressive nationalism? Who are its key proponents, and what interests motivate them? What domestic political conditions, norms and structures, and what


factors in the international system, help or hinder extreme nationalists in propagating their ideas and gaining popular and institutional support? What is the impact of nationalism on Russian foreign policy? I ask these questions across three periods when nationalism became dominant in Russian political discourse: 1856-1878, 1905-1914, and 1991-1995. In examining cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I am concerned about continuities and discontinuities between past cases of aggressive Russian nationalism and the more recent resurgence of what I would argue is a relatively benign form of Russian nationalism.

A central premise of this thesis is that in the last century and a half, nationalism has not consistently been a dominant ideology of the Russian state. I have, however, identified three discrete periods when there was an "outbreak" of Russian nationalism. In two of these periods, constituting my first and second case studies (1856-1878 and 1905-1914), the empowerment of an aggressive variant of nationalism occurred in Russia. By "empowerment" I mean that, during a discernible period, aggressive nationalist ideas are propagated in diverse and effective fora; resonate strongly with the politically articulate segments of the population; and garner enough institutional support to influence state behavior in favor of expansionist, hegemonic, or imperialistic war on behalf of the putative "nation." By "aggressive" I mean that the content of nationalist ideology 1) emphasizes ethnic criteria for defining membership in the nation; and, more important, 2) exaggerates the uniqueness, superiority, and great power status of the

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5In referring to foreign policy, I limit myself to official Russian decisionmaking to go to war or otherwise engage in offensive military action in conjunction with nationalist prescriptions.
nation, while emphasizing the inferior and/or sinister qualities of other groups; and 3) articulates an externally-oriented, messianic, and imperialistic national mission.

My two cases from 1856-1914 focus on aggressive nationalism whose initial proponents are mostly—though not exclusively—unofficial elites, seeking to pressure the ruling regime to adopt their nationalist vision and its attendant policy implications. Key official decisionmakers initially reject and oppose the ideas put forward by extreme nationalists but, ultimately, these ideas take a prominent position in Russian political discourse, mobilize the public for political action, coopt key players in the official regime, and have an impact favoring decisions to go to war.

The third case that I examine involves the resurgence of Russian nationalist ideas in the post-Soviet period from 1991-1995. Again, many of the initial proponents of extreme variants of nationalism come from outside the ruling regime. While it is premature to argue that one kind of Russian nationalism has been fully empowered in Russian politics, I will show that in 1991-1995, the most dominant nationalist ideology has been relatively benign. Extreme nationalism that advocates ethnic exclusivity, chauvinism, and aggressive expansionist mobilization on behalf of the nation has not been empowered in Russia. Although these ideas are present in post-Soviet discourse, they have not gained the support necessary to push Russia toward war with other states, neither have they shifted Russian behavior toward reckless aggression. Their impact, instead, has been chiefly to modify the early, pro-western orientation of Russian

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6 This thesis, to a large part, addresses what one scholar calls "nationalist pressure groups." See John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 11.
foreign policy in 1989-92 toward greater assertiveness in defining and defending Russian interests,\(^7\) even if it means invoking some tension with neighbors and with western states, especially the United States. What explains the relative failure of virulent Russian nationalism in the post-Soviet period?

This thesis argues that there are two sets of variables which explain the empowerment of aggressive Russian nationalism. I argue that the necessary precondition or triggering mechanism that activates malevolent nationalism is national humiliation arising from external military defeat or other developments that undermine Russian honor and pride; what undergirds "honor and pride" is mainly the state's imperial (especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries) and great power status in the international system. National humiliation is a key variable in states like Russia, where centuries of history and socialization have created and reinforced the myth of national power and greatness relative to the international system.

National humiliation has objective as well as psychological or attitudinal components. Its objective components may be measured by such factors as military defeat, diplomatic debacles, the waning of economic and military power, territorial losses, and the disintegration of political authority. Its attitudinal elements, on the other hand, may include expressions by elites and the politically articulate public of feelings of demoralization, wounded pride, shame, unjust treatment by internal and external

\(^7\)Prominent purveyors of virulent nationalist ideology, like Zhirinovsky, would define these interests in ways that imply sinister outcomes for Russian policy, but key policymakers have largely rejected these definitions. I would argue that official Russian rhetoric, although colored by nationalism, stays primarily within the bounds of what is reasonable for a country of Russia's size and with its former superpower status.
enemies, and diminishing faith in the state. National humiliation especially affects elites, who react by purveying malevolent nationalist ideas that reassert Russian greatness and uniqueness, highlight the perfidy of outsiders, and affirm Russia's right to use force to defend its kin and other interests abroad. The role of national humiliation as a significant factor in the rise of aggressive nationalism has been repeatedly and strongly argued by scholars in the case of Weimar Germany and the empowerment of Nazi ideology. The basic argument is that the crushing defeat of Germany in World War I, followed by the imposition of the punitive and onerous Treaty of Versailles, caused severe national humiliation and led to the delegitimation of the democratizing Weimar Republic almost from the very beginning; Weimar, in other words, was seen as the "illegitimate child of defeat." See Louis Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 157. Although some scholars debate how materially punitive the Treaty of Versailles was, they agree on the treaty's destructive psychological impact. The vast majority of Germans rejected the treaty, and resentful elite detractors of Weimar effectively used the war defeat and humiliating peace to argue that the new government was illegitimate and incapable of defending the nation's interests. One scholar notes, for example, that by "keeping the wounds of defeat and national humiliation open, [reparation payments imposed by Versailles] made it virtually impossible to end the virulent nationalist agitation against the republic at any time during its existence... In many German minds their economic sufferings became directly linked with the foreign oppression imposed upon the nation." See E.J. Feuchtwanger, *From Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-33* (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), p. 316. Although one cannot argue that national humiliation was the central cause of the collapse of Weimar and the rise of Nazism, it did create a context in which Hitler's promises of deliverance (i.e., overthrowing Versailles) and of a racially pure and strong nation with an assertive foreign policy became very attractive and resonant. See L. Snyder, *Roots*, pp. 157-87; Feuchtwanger, *From Weimar*, pp. 316-25; Fritz Stern, *Dreams and Delusions* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), pp. 147-91; Mary Fullbrook, *Germany, 1918-1990. The Divided Nation* (London: Fontana Press, 1991), pp. 44-89; A.J. Nicholls, *Weimar and the Rise of Hitler*, 2nd ed. (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 42-48; Gordon A. Craig, *Germany 1866-1945* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 391-433; Warren Morris, *The Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982), pp. 73-88; Woodruff Smith, *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 196-230; and Richard Bessel, *Germany After the First World War* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 254-84.
merely by invoking nationalist symbols but, more importantly, by fomenting hatred against outsiders and forging societal unity by reference to external enemies. Hence, the rise of malevolent nationalism under conditions of national humiliation.⁹

But humiliation is insufficient to empower virulent nationalism. Although some elites may propagate aggressive nationalism, their ideas do not necessarily have to dominate political discourse, gain adherents among the politically relevant segments of the population, or have an impact on foreign policymaking. One must, therefore, look for controlling variables that determine whether or not aggressive nationalist ideas will ultimately be widely propagated, supported, and have an impact favoring decisions to go to war.

My research underlines four sets of controlling variables that help explain the empowerment of extreme nationalism after it has been triggered by national humiliation. These controlling variables determine the depth and extent to which nationalist ideas will resonate with elites and the articulate public. The deeper and broader this resonance, the greater the resulting public mobilization and pressure on official decisionmakers to adopt malevolent nationalism as rhetoric and, subsequently, as a basis for policymaking. One controlling factor is the level of internal instability, measured by the number and degree of challenges to cohesive state authority, the extent of delegitimation of fundamental ideas on which state organization rests, and the level of popular perception of the state's incapacity to maintain the national welfare.

⁹This point echoes Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1 (Spring 1995):72-85.
Severe internal instability intensifies public loss of confidence in the state, as already triggered by national humiliation. It motivates the politically articulate population to support malevolent nationalism, which not only articulates popular discontent with a weak and ineffective state, but also identifies the nation's enemies and prescribes ways to prevail over them. The fragmentation of elites at top levels of policymaking is particularly important because it can intensify internal instability, and create policy vacuums that proponents of aggressive nationalism can exploit to promote their views and provide answers to questions that are of great concern to society. Division at the top ultimately reinforces public perception of an inept state regime, while simultaneously increasing the political legitimacy of unofficial nationalist extremists.

A second controlling variable is the character of the domestic incentive structure. Specifically, elites advance the extremist nationalist agenda because there are political and economic incentives for them to do so.\textsuperscript{10} The greater these incentives, the more intense the resulting nationalist propaganda, and the higher the chances for the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. Timing matters as well; my research shows that not all elites universally support aggressive nationalism at the same time. In fact, the domestic incentive structure in Russia sometimes makes it more advantageous for some elites to combat aggressive nationalism at first, but they are gradually coopted into the nationalist camp as the latter gains greater momentum and legitimacy in

society.

Third, effective social communication also helps the empowerment of malevolent nationalist ideology. Social communication has technological components that determine how much and how easily information can be transmitted (e.g., language, mass education, literacy, mass media), and social components that determine how effectively information will be assimilated by its target audience (e.g., shared symbols, experiences, and historical memories). Social communication determines the extent to which nationalist ideas can reach, convert, and mobilize the population and, therefore, exert pressure on the ruling regime. A situation that will work to the advantage of malevolent nationalism might include numerous opportunities for effective social communication of extremist nationalist ideas, coupled with weak and/or incompetent institutions of debate and criticism and a historically-driven lack of strong, alternative ideologies.¹¹

Fourth, threats and opportunities in the international system are another set of variables that facilitate the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. Opportunities that seem likely to increase the chances for success of an aggressive nationalist agenda, while diminishing the costs of such an agenda, motivate embattled political leaders to support malevolent nationalism as a means to bolster their legitimacy without assuming unacceptable risks. Such opportunities may include weak neighbors, support from external allies, and the weakness of international sanctions against nationalist aggression. But even if tremendous risks are involved, state decisionmakers may still

¹¹Alternative ideologies would include benign variants of nationalism.
support extreme nationalist ideas if they perceive few other effective options for dealing with threats to vital state interests and national honor. In the wake of severe national humiliation, in particular, state leaders become extremely sensitive to combatting public perceptions of official weakness and ineptitude, and can ill afford to ignore external threats—whether perceived or real.

A standard apartment building in New York City provides an apt metaphor for the explanation I have just outlined. To enter the main door leading to the building’s foyer, a person must use one set of keys. To enter a specific apartment, however, a second and different set of keys must be used. In my thesis, the variable of national humiliation is the first and necessary key that leads to the "foyer" of malevolent nationalism. The different apartments represent different outcomes, including the defeat, demise, or empowerment of the ideology. Only the availability of the correct second set of "keys" or, in this instance, my controlling variables, creates conditions sufficient for the outcome of extreme nationalist empowerment.

To summarize, the chief propositions of this thesis are:

1) In states and societies steeped in great power myths and traditions, national humiliation is a sufficient variable to trigger the articulation and propagation of malevolent nationalist ideas, especially by elites. National humiliation is not sufficient, however, to propel the full political empowerment of malevolent nationalism.

2) Four other variables are necessary (but none, alone, is sufficient) for the political empowerment of malevolent nationalism. These are severe internal instability, high domestic incentives for proponents of aggressive nationalist ideas, a great
degree of effective social communication, and high threats in the international system coupled with perceived opportunities that mitigate the costs of nationalist aggression. In the Russian case, internal instability and international threats seem particularly pivotal for official regime decisions to adopt malevolent nationalism as rhetoric and as a basis for foreign policymaking.

3) The political empowerment of nationalism, ultimately, is both a "top-down" and "bottom-up" phenomenon. Elites may be the first to articulate malevolent nationalist ideas, but the larger and articulate public must believe in these ideas, mobilize for action, and generate pressure from below to make these ideas a powerful factor in state decisionmaking and behavior.

Below is a diagram of my explanatory framework; section III elaborates further on this framework and on the hypotheses that guide this inquiry.

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES               DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Necessary Precondition              Impact
NATIONAL HUMILIATION ———> RISE OF MALEVOLENT NATIONALIST IDEAS

Controlling Variables               Impact
INT. INSTABILITY
DOM. INCENTIVES
SOC. COMMUNICATION
INTL. THREATS/OPPORTUNITIES

POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT OF VIRULENT NATIONALISM
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B. Definition of Terms

Nationalism is a concept that scholars have yet to define consensually.\textsuperscript{12} I define nationalism as a political ideology\textsuperscript{13} which holds 1) that there exists a nation with identifiable members; 2) that the nation is distinct or special compared to other national units; and 3) that the individual and state's highest loyalty must be to the nation's well-being and mission.\textsuperscript{14} Although intellectual and political elites are the prime actors who

\textsuperscript{12}For example, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm define nationalism as a "political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent," while Hans Kohn defines it as a "state of mind" in which the individual's supreme loyalty is to her nation-state. Echoing Kohn, Lia Greenfeld asserts that nationalism is a "particular perspective or a style of thought" based on the idea of the "nation": it "locates the source of individual identity within a 'people,' which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity." Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1; Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1944) p. 10; and Lia Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 3. These meanings highlight some aspects of nationalism while obscuring others. The Gellner/Hobsbawm definition, for example, omits the nationalism of groups who would claim their own state but deny the same right to other nationalities, and the nationalism of groups who willingly tolerate the existence of a small diaspora outside their borders. See Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," p. 6, fn. 4. Greenfeld's emphasis on nationalism as a type of identity obscures the critical political aspects of this phenomenon. It says nothing on when and why nationalist ideas that arise in the cultural realm achieve political power—i.e., under what circumstances does nationalism become an effective motivation for political action?

\textsuperscript{13}An "ideology" is a set of ideas, beliefs and concepts (invented, factual or normative) that purport to explain or justify a specific social order. If that order does not exist, the ideology "may constitute a believed strategy for its attainment." I derive this definition in part from Eric Carlton, War and Ideology (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 18-21.

\textsuperscript{14}My definition includes both state-based and stateless nationalisms; it draws from Breuilly, Paul Brass, Anthony Smith, and others who emphasize the political aspects of nationalism. Breuilly, for example, defines nationalism as "political
generate and propagate nationalist ideas, these ideas do not become politically powerful without some level of mass following. At the very least, nationalist elites must be able to attract adherents among the politically articulate segments of society or those whose opinions matter to the ruling regime.

Nationalism's content and intensity can change over time and under different political and social circumstances, but in all cases the idea that the nation should be the locus of individual and collective loyalty is central. Moreover, some elements of nationalism in areas with long histories and old cultures may be difficult to manipulate movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments." A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three assertions: 1) there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; 2) the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; and 3) the nation must be as independent as possible; at minimum, it must attain political sovereignty. Smith echoes similar themes in enumerating core nationalist beliefs that 1) humanity is naturally divided into nations; 2) each nation has its own peculiar character; 3) the source of all political power is the nation; and 4) loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. See Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p.3; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), chaps. 1-3; and Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1983), p.21. See also Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. New Realities and Old Myths (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 4 and pp. 17-20 for other definitions emphasizing the political aspect of nationalism. The political aspect of nationalism is also apparent in the Gellner/Hobsbawm definition cited earlier.

because such elements are transmitted from one generation to the next and become embedded in collective tradition and memory.\textsuperscript{16} The presence of collective traditions and memories creates (or constructs) public consciousness that is more susceptible to particular nationalist ideas than others, and can increase the likelihood that these ideas will have an impact on social attitudes and actions.\textsuperscript{17}

I define nation as a concept that connotes a community of people who share a kinship based on culture, race, language, ethnicity, religion, or citizenship, and are the professed repository of legitimate political authority. My definition reflects the argument of scholars who do not treat nations as "real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities."\textsuperscript{18} I concur with the view that the interesting question is not,


\textsuperscript{18}See Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," \textit{Contention} 4 (Fall 1994):3-19; Verder, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" pp. 37-46, and Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," pp. 222-24. See also Greenfeld, \textit{Nationalism}, and Kohn, \textit{Ideas of Nationalism}, on the issue of the "people" as the repository of political power. A more common definition of nation is a "group of people who believe that they are ancestrally related." See Walker Connor, \textit{Ethnonationalism} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. xi and 75 and Robert J Kaiser, \textit{The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6. This definition excludes the nationalism of multiethnic states—e.g., the United States and Switzerland—whose peoples may not subscribe to the idea of common ancestry but nonetheless believe they constitute a nation. For an emphasis on language as the key characteristic of a nation, see Munro Chadwick, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe and the
"what is a nation?" but: "How is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against states more or less resonant or effective? What makes the nation-evoking and nation-invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?"  

My definition does not imply that there is never a real entity behind the concept of nation, or that the concept itself can vary endlessly in one setting and remain resonant. Rather, a convergence of factors may crystallize a particular conceptualization of a "nation" at different points in time and, at each point of crystallization, the nation may temporarily become a real entity, mobilized to act in prescribed ways. The main criteria for defining the concept of nation may also vary, but such variations tend to stay within parameters consistent with a particular cultural and historical setting; those who define the nation outside these parameters will likely have more difficulty finding

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20Ronald Suny argues, along these lines, that "nationality as well as nationalism, . . . is the product of real historical conjunctures in which ethnic communities, activist intelligentsia, and political imperatives have worked together to create a new level of national coherence, consolidation, and consciousness." See his "State, Civil Society, and Ethnic Cultural Consolidation in the USSR--Roots of the National Question," in Gail Lapidus, et al, eds., *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.24.
followers.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, the idea that a nation or "people" is the source of legitimate political authority does not imply that nationalism always rises in tandem with effective mass democracy. For example, unrepresentative and small groups of elites may successfully claim that they are acting on behalf of the nation, even while violating the needs, preferences, and rights of the mass population.\textsuperscript{22}

Nationalism is a highly normative ideology with powerful legitimating effects and, therefore, can have great impact on the interests and fate of ruling state elites.\textsuperscript{23} It is normative because it defines who is "in" and "out" of the nation, and advocates particular courses of action for the well-being of the nation. It has legitimating effects because it anchors political power in the "nation," and only those ruling elites can be legitimate who can successfully claim to represent the nation and defend its interests. It is an axiom that every dominating system, especially the state, must establish and cultivate belief in its legitimacy using material, coercive, affectual, ideological or other

\textsuperscript{21}For an emphasis on powerful, pre-existing shared cultural myths, traditions, symbols, and emotive memories from which specific articulations of nationalist ideology are drawn, see Anthony D. Smith, \textit{The Ethnic Origins of Nations} (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 18. Emphasis on the ethnic origins of nations does not rule out the fact that states may employ coercive and other means to create one nation out of different ethnic groups, or to redefine fundamentally the contours of a nation. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's creation of the modern Turkish nation attests to this.

\textsuperscript{22}One can argue that this was the case with Stalin's use of Russian nationalism in the 1930s and early 1940s. Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) basically claimed to know and do what was best for the Russian nation, even while engaging in mass oppression and murder.

\textsuperscript{23}Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'" pp.38-44.
means; in the modern context, nationalism has become an extremely powerful instrument that state elites can wield to legitimate their domestic rule. The state has no monopoly over nationalism, however, and unofficial groups can make competing claims to be the true articulators and defenders of the nation's interest and mission, and may seek the right to exercise state power, change the directions of state policy, or create their own state. Whatever their claims, these groups can potentially undermine the legitimacy of any existing state. They can argue, for example, that the state's territorial boundaries should be changed because they do not fit those of the nation. They can assert that state leaders do not adequately defend the nation's interests or faithfully execute its mission and should, therefore, be replaced unless they change their policies. Or, they can pressure the state to pursue aggressive and expansionist actions on the grounds that these will benefit the nation.

I focus on nationalism as a political ideology because I am interested primarily in

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25 Arguments on state power as the ultimate goal of nationalists are found in Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, passim; Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, passim; and James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 54-57. Any "nationalism" that does not aspire for political power should more aptly be called "national consciousness" or a prelude to nationalism.
its political empowerment and impact on a state's foreign policy. As noted, political empowerment means that proponents of a specific variant of nationalism are able to: 1) propagate their ideas in diverse and effective fora; 2) make their ideas resonate with the politically articulate segments of the population; and 3) gain sufficient institutional support to have their ideas exert impact on the state's foreign policy. By "institutional" support, I mean primarily support from high-ranking elites in formal, organized structures of decisionmaking. As for the impact of nationalism, I am interested primarily in whether or not proponents of aggressive nationalism consistently advocate war and militant expansionism as means to resolve foreign policy tensions and defend the nation's interests, and what impact these arguments have on actual policymaking.

My thesis will accomplish two tasks. The first is descriptive and involves a survey of the content of benign and malevolent variants of Russian nationalism in 1856-1878, 1905-1914, and 1991-1995. I then present evidence of the empowerment or non-empowerment of an aggressive type of nationalism, and describe its impact on Russian foreign policy. My second task is explanatory, and involves formulating and

26Nationalist ideology becomes important in the realm of social action chiefly when its proponents are mobilized and use nationalism to gain, increase, exercise, and/or manipulate state power.

testing hypotheses that might account for the empowerment or weakness of the aggressive nationalist ideas I have described and any outcomes they helped produce. This thesis does not articulate a grand theory of nationalism, but generates and tests hypotheses on the empowerment and impact of malevolent nationalism in Russia. My hypotheses draw on insights from general theories of nationalism, specific literature on the character and sources of Russian nationalism, and the history of the rise and empowerment of extreme nationalism elsewhere, especially in Weimar Germany. My thesis also adds to the larger literature on ideas and their impact on state behavior, particularly the literature that examines the combined role of domestic and international variables in explaining the impact of ideas on state behavior.\(^2^8\)

C. Literature on Nationalism and the Russian Case

In the five decades since Hans Kohn, the reputed "father of nationalism" published *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944), scholars from diverse fields have generated a tremendous amount of literature on the subject.\(^2^9\) A survey of this literature reveals that 1) hardly any theoretical scholars focus in-depth on the distinct as well as


comparative aspects of the political empowerment of nationalism in Russia. Instead, they concentrate on nationalism's emergence and empowerment in Europe and, subsequently, in countries in the developing or colonial world; and 2) most scholars focus on nationalism as a unitary instrument that elites use to consolidate state-building or nation-building, or to acquire independence and a formal state structure. This general theoretical literature neglects critical features of the Russian case.

First, the general literature does not account for the existence of competing _______________________

A theoretical work that devotes one chapter to Russian nationalism is Greenfeld, *Nationalism*. This book, however, does not address the political processes and factors which make nationalism a salient frame of reference in Russian policymaking. Instead, it describes the content of Russian nationalist thought as articulated in eighteenth century poetry, plays, and other literary works, and then employs a framework based on the psychological phenomenon of elite *ressentiment* (i.e., feelings of unmitigated inferiority and hatred toward the West) to explain why the content of Russian nationalism is ethnic, collectivist, and authoritarian. Unlike this work, my thesis explicitly describes and explains the political development and impact of nationalism in three cases in Russia from 1856-1995. I do, however, find Greenfeld’s concept of *ressentiment* useful in explaining why national humiliation elicits malevolent reaction from Russian elites.


variants of nationalism within one state (which is true of Russia in all three cases I examine), and why nationalism with an aggressive content becomes more politically salient than others. In Russia, during different periods, at least two (if not more) variants of nationalism compete for political dominance. At the most general level, the state may sponsor or approve one brand of nationalism, while shunning other variants that officials deem harmful to state interests. Second, many scholars correctly assume that the central goal of nationalism is to cement the nation-state, an entity in which the political, economic, territorial, and affective borders of "nation" and "state" coincide. But, in the Russian case, I would argue that a truly integrated "nation-state" was never, and has not yet been, created. Nationalism that effectively bonded state and society within relatively clear territorial boundaries, as in western Europe, has been weak in Russia. Indeed, official Russian elites have tended to support a popular brand of nationalism only when they were compelled to do so to stave off critical challenges to their legitimacy and to maintain their hold on power. Nationalism tended to contradict the long-term interests of Russia as a multinational, imperial state; therefore, the state never consistently or fully harnessed it as a unifying or mobilizing ideology.

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33This dynamic persisted even during the Soviet period, when "dissident" (unofficial) and "establishment" (official) variants of Russian nationalism coexisted. Stephen Carter, for example, writes, "[the] lines of demarcation between the various types of Russian nationalism are blurred and they overlap in several places, but the two major streams of thought are fairly clear. On the one hand, Slavophile or vozrozhdenets [renewal] nationalism is genuinely religious, liberal, anti-colonial and anti-Communist. On the other hand, the fascist or chauvinist Great Russianism is anti-Semitic, authoritarian and imperialist in tone." Stephen Carter, Russian Nationalism. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 152-72.

34On the uses of nationalism to further the interests of the state, see Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 116-17.
post-Soviet period, it remains to be seen whether or not Russian elites will succeed in using nationalism to consolidate a genuine Russian nation-state.35

My thesis helps fill current gaps in the literature by emphasizing the heterogeneous, rather than unitary, character of Russian nationalism. I describe two or more variants of nationalism in each period I study, and show, in two cases, how an aggressive brand of nationalist ideology that state officials initially reject eventually gains political empowerment and exerts an impact on foreign policy. I also show how Russia's failure to become a "nation-state" was a factor contributing to the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. In my first two case studies, I show that because state leaders failed to articulate, and rally support for, an alternative and more benign nationalist ideology that could bind state and society together, politically-conscious segments of the population who felt disconnected or alienated from the state became more susceptible to unofficial nationalist propaganda, despite its malevolent content. Further, because the Russian "self" was a divided, multiethnic entity, state elites had great difficulty in effectively forging national unity by reference to an artificial russified nation; under conditions of stress and crisis, they opted to forge unity by supporting nationalism which emphasized the evils of the "other" or outsiders to the

35An article which sparked my thinking on this issue is Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma," Comparative Studies of Society and History 4 (1961/62):253-64. My thanks to Brian D. Taylor for calling my attention to this piece. Another article notes that although the Russian people constituted the predominant group in the Russian empire and the Soviet state, the "political unit housing [the Russian] people was not a nation-state." See Michael Urban, "The Politics of Identity in Russia's Postcommunist Transition: The Nation Against Itself," Slavic Review 53 (Fall 1994):740.
nation. By comparing historical cases of malevolent nationalism with the current case of more benign Russian nationalism, my thesis also yields insights on factors that might help or hinder the dominance of virulent nationalism in Russia in the long-term.

D. Literature on Russian Nationalism

The bulk of literature on Russian nationalism is largely descriptive rather than theoretical or explanatory. Most authors survey the range of Russian nationalist thought before, during, and after the Soviet period, and account for the sources of, and influences on, such thought. These authors disagree, however, on two questions. First is the content of Russian nationalism intrinsically and perpetually malevolent and, therefore, liable to degenerate into fascism, or does it vary on a spectrum that is benign on one end and malevolent on the other? Can nationalism, in fact, be a progressive


38One analyst concludes that a "hard line" and a "soft line," reminiscent of the Cold War analytical paradigm, characterizes western approaches to Russian nationalism. Hardliners argue that Russian nationalism is a "malignant and monolithic force that is unrefrangible and tends inexorably toward extreme forms of racism and authoritarianism." Softliners, in contrast, claim that Russian nationalism exists in many varieties, including liberal, humanistic, intolerant, authoritarian, racist and fascist forms—and that outsiders should cooperate with, and support, moderate nationalists who share many western values. See David G. Rowley, "Russian Nationalism and the Cold War," American Historical Review 99 (February 1994), pp. 169-70. For support of the "hard line," see Yanov, Russian New Right; Alexander Yanov, The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000 (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and Andrei Sinyavsky, "Russian Nationalism," Massachusetts Review 31 (Winter 1990), p. 493. For a contrasting
force in Russian politics? My thesis, by describing benign and aggressive variants of Russian nationalism in three different periods covering a span of a century and a half, reinforces the perspective that the "menu" of nationalism in Russia does not contain uniformly malevolent options.

Students of Russian nationalism diverge on a second question: Are the negative effects of Russian nationalism—e.g., militarism, expansionism, and imperialism—determined or contingent? Some scholars imply that such effects are continuous and determined; for example, during the Soviet period, they argue that Soviet internationalism and aggression was but Russian national imperialism in a different perspective, see John B. Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries (Belmont, MA: Nordland Publishing Company, 1976) and John B. Dunlop, The Contemporary Faces of Russian Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); Carter, Russian Nationalism; Nicolai N. Petro, "The Project of the Century: A Case Study of Russian Nationalist Dissent," Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (Autumn-Winter 1987), pp. 250-51; and Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (NY: Harper Collins, 1993). Despite the latter's sensational title, Laqueur actually concludes that the extreme right, fascist-oriented type of nationalism is unlikely to gain power in Russia in the long-term.

guise. They identify nationalism as an element of continuity that produced aggressive behavior during both the tsarist and Soviet periods. A major problem with this view is that its proponents fail to provide a causal dynamic for the empowerment and subsequent malevolent impact of Russian nationalism. They take for granted that extremist ideas automatically lead to aggressive actions. My thesis, by examining variables that help or hinder the empowerment of virulent Russian nationalism shows that although nationalism can lead to malevolent outcomes, such outcomes are not determined but contingent on domestic and international variables.

II. Nationalism: Insights from, and Limitations of, Specific Explanations

A. Primordialism Versus Constructivism

A major debate in writings on nationalism asks whether nations are primordial or

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40Adam Ulam and Richard Pipes, for example, argue that Russian nationalism or a broadly defined Russian national culture is a prime cause of Russian and Soviet expansionism. Ulam, for example, notes that Russian nationalism and panslavism have been subsumed into communism and are reflected in Soviet expansionist behavior. See Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough, (NY: Simon and Schuster), 1984, pp. 1-40, 169-77; and the following by Adam Ulam: "Russian Nationalism," pp.3-18, in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), Expansion and Coexistence, (NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974), and "Nationalism, Panslavism, and Communism," pp. 39-67, in Ivo Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). Ulam does note, however, that the marriage of Russian nationalism and communism is not forever. With the splinter in international communism caused by China and Yugoslavia, he hints that nationalism may split from communism and cause the latter's demise.
constructed/modern entities. The first viewpoint claims that nations have always existed "as a human constant"; indeed, nations are perennial entities because people who share a culture always have an intrinsic awareness of their collective identity. This identity evokes loyalty and other strong sentiments which undergird group material and political interests and claims, and which provide impetus for group actions such as warfare on behalf of the nation. In contrast, the second viewpoint asserts that far from being a natural or necessary element in the fabric of society and history, the nation is a purely modern phenomenon, a product of strictly modern developments like capitalism, bureaucracy and secular utilitarianism. It is really a quite contingent phenomenon, with roots in neither human nature nor history, even if today it has become ubiquitous.

The nation, from the latter perspective, is not a perennial but a constructed entity; and

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41 Constructivist arguments are found in Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Anderson, Imagined Communities; and Suny, Revenge of the Past. Discussions of primordialism are found in Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Wrath of Ages," Foreign Affairs 72 (November/December 1993):142-49; Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity"; John Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Smith, Theories of Nationalism.

42 Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 2-3, 6-8, and 32, and Cruise O'Brien, "Wrath of Ages," pp. 142-49. Primordialists use evidence from social psychology to argue that nations are primordial because people adhere closely to their in-groups and distrust outsiders even when groups are arbitrarily formed under laboratory conditions. People judge their group members less harshly than outsiders; tend to perceive more intracategory than extracategory similarity; and are more willing to make sacrifices on behalf of (randomly selected) in-group members than outsiders. See David M. Messick, "Nationalism as Ethnocentrism: A Social Psychological View," A summary prepared for the Workshop on Nationalism and International Conflict, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 6-7 December 1988, 8 pp. This social psychological evidence proves, however, ONLY that groupness is primordial, NOT that nations are.

the ideology that it engenders—i.e., nationalism—is contingent on factors such as industrialization, secularization, and elite competition for wealth and political power.\footnote{Elite manipulation of nationalism to preserve or increase their parochial interests is discussed in Breuilly, Nationalism and the State; Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism; and J. Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State."}

The primordialist view of nationalism appears weak in the Russian case. First, nationalist consciousness appeared in Russia only in the eighteenth century, and nationalism itself emerged as a significant political force only a century later.\footnote{I use the term "national consciousness" as Hans Rogger defines it—i.e., "a striving for common identity, character, and culture by the articulate members of a given community." Rogger, National Consciousness, p. 3; see also pp. 1-7 and Liah Greenfeld, "The Formation of the Russian National Identity: The Role of Status Insecurity and Ressentiment," Comparative Study of Society and History (July 1990), pp. 552-70 for a description of developments that made possible the birth of national consciousness in eighteenth-century Russia.} Prior to the eighteenth century and in the medieval period, localism, clan, religion, and other categories superseded nation or ethnicity as the basis of group cohesion, identity and loyalty.\footnote{Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism and Edward Keenan, "Royal Russian Behavior, Style, and Self-Image," in Allworth, ed., Ethnic Russia in the USSR, pp. 3-16. Keenan argues that in medieval Russia, ethnicity as a category did not even exist. The court was cosmopolitan in membership, tradition, custom, and dress, and the primary loyalty of nobles was to their clan and not their nuclear families or ethnic groups.} In the nineteenth century, nationalist ideas were generated and propagated mostly by a small group of cultural elites, and coincided with such aspects of modernization as increased education, mobility, urbanization, and the rise of a leisure
class. Second, although Russian nationalism has centuries-old themes which resonate deeply among articulate members of the population and, in different periods, prove effective at public mobilization, this does not mean that nationalism is primordial. Rather, these themes represent salient points in the dynamic construction of the Russian nation, and correspond with ideas emphasized by nation-creating elites during a relatively recent period in Russian history: the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Third, although themes of Russian nationalism show some continuity, the nation itself as a concept has shifted in Russian history. As this thesis shows, for example, a predominant Russian definition of the nation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was pan-Slav—i.e., Slavic-speaking and Orthodox peoples were incorporated into the primary group with which Russians identified themselves. Contrast this with the predominantly Soviet definition of the Russian nation during the communist era. Although ethnic Russians had their own ethno-territorial unit during the Soviet period (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or RSFSR), many Russians were nonetheless accustomed to thinking of the entire Soviet Union as their national territory and of themselves as members of a Soviet national entity. In the post-Soviet period, the

47 It was not until the nineteenth century that nationalism, based on the idea of the existence of a "nation" that is the repository of political power, became a force in Russian politics. One of the first signs of the "nation" asserting itself against the traditional Russian monarchy was the Decembrist revolt of 1825. This event manifested the growing rift between Russia's monarchy and the articulate elements of society or the "nation." See Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914*, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, c. 1987), pp. 50-63; Kaiser, *Geography of Nationalism*, pp. 33-82; Rogger, *National Consciousness*, passim; and Pipes, *Formation of the Soviet Union*, pp. 6-9.

\textbf{B. Nationalism and Modernity}

Many scholars emphasize modernity as the cause of nationalism. They argue that social and economic factors such as industrialization, mass education, secularization, modern communication (e.g., the rise of print capitalism), and state-building explain the rise of nations and nationalism.\footnote{Gellner's modernization theory is particularly salient. It argues that the rise of industrial society—with its attendant need for perpetual growth and a flexible, mobile division of labor—stimulated mass education, the spread of literacy, and subsequent cultural homogeneity. This homogeneity made nations and nationalism possible. Without industrialization and its demands, neither nations nor nationalism would exist. Gellner summarizes thus: ". . .nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state." Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, p. 48.} This explanatory model yields insights on the emergence of nationalism in western European countries, but does not account for the development of nationalism as a political force in non-industrialized, weakly modernized, or largely peasant societies. In Russia, in particular, it would be difficult to argue that industrialization caused the rise of nationalism. In the late 1850s, for example, shortly after the Crimean War, when nationalism began to manifest itself
as a distinctly political set of ideas, Russia was only a weakly industrialized and mainly traditional society. In fact, unlike many western European countries, Russia still clung to the institution of serfdom and relinquished it only at the beginning of the next decade.\textsuperscript{50}

One might use the modernity thesis, especially Gellner and Tilly's versions, to explain official Russian nationalism or russification in Russia, which was motivated by the state's need to facilitate the modern requirements of government and administration, particularly in the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{51} But causality in this instance would not follow Gellner and Tilly's models. Official Russian nationalism did not result from a homogenized culture created by an industrialized society or a "modern" state.\textsuperscript{52} Rather, 

\textsuperscript{50} Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 101-150. There was significant industrial development in Russia from 1800-1861, but the motor of industrialization accelerated only after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. One scholar who tracked quantitative indicators in Russian industry and labor in the nineteenth century concludes that in 1860 Russia "was industrially extremely backward, with serfdom providing a major obstacle to further development; that few sectors showed any modern growth; and that despite an obvious increase in economic activity, the main period of industrialization came considerably later." See M.E. Falkus, The Industrialization of Russia 1700-1914 (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., c. 1972), p.43.


\textsuperscript{52} Tilly lists as characteristics of the modern state: centralized administrative power, capacities to mobilize otherwise civilian populations and industries for interstate war, and existence in a world of comparable states. Part of the process of modern state-building was the imposition of national languages, national education, and national military service. Over time, life homogenized within states and heterogenized between them; nationalism subsequently came to life as a by-product of state-building. This
it ensued from an authoritarian state's attempt to maintain power over a *multinational* and *multicultural* empire that was largely rural, weakly industrialized, administratively decentralized, and far from nationally educated. Although the Russian situation was not unique, the problem of multinationality was of a much greater magnitude in the Russian empire than, say, in France, Germany, or Spain. Moreover, whereas western European states gradually made their peace with people's claims for political participation (thereby acknowledging the central premise of the "nation" as the repository of political power and making nationalism a truly effective mechanism for binding state and society), the Russian imperial state never made similarly successful and durable concessions to society's political claims.\(^{53}\)

Arguments that emphasize modernity also fail to explain why *specific types* of nationalism—benign or malevolent—become politically empowered. In contrast, my thesis addresses specifically this issue. In Russia, for example, I contrast two instances of an aggressive type of nationalism becoming politically salient and one case where malevolent nationalism had only marginal political impact. What explains this variance? Modern processes such as mass education and communication do not fully explain these outcomes. Rather, they show why a *hospitable context* existed for

propagandizing all kinds of nationalist ideas, but such a context does not guarantee the political empowerment of a benign or aggressive type of nationalism. In my thesis, I acknowledge the facilitating role of modern processes (e.g., mass education) for nationalist propaganda but, more important, I identify the mix of variables that propel malevolent nationalism to the center of the political stage.

C. Elite Ressentiment and Parochial Interests

Instrumental explanations emphasize that nationalism is the creation of elites who need an ideology to help them acquire, defend, and augment their parochial interests, both material and psychological. Pursuing this line of analysis, Liah Greenfeld asserts that malevolent Russian nationalism is the product of elite ressentiment or a "psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings."  

Ressentiment stems from crises of identity among elites who, because of their shifting environment and exposure to comparative elites from other societies, become dissatisfied with their status and wish to change it but cannot do so. Nationalism, for these elites, becomes an adaptive response to "status inconsistency; they use it to advance such interests as status-seeking, status aggrandizement, and status preservation." 

54Greenfeld, Nationalism, pp. 15-16. Greenfeld argues that two conditions create ressentiment: 1) a belief on the part of the subject that it is fundamentally equal with its object of envy, and 2) an actual inequality between subject and object of such dimensions that the presupposed equality becomes practically impossible to fulfill.

Greenfeld's elucidation of elite ressentiment contributes to understanding why much of Russian nationalist thought since the eighteenth century is "ethnic, collectivist, and authoritarian." By underlining Russian intellectual elites' focus on the West as their object of envy, for example, Greenfeld helps to clarify why dominant strands of Russian nationalism are infused with anti-westernism, claims of uniqueness and special qualities (compared to the West), and an apocalyptic sense of mission. But explaining the content of Russian nationalism is not tantamount to explaining its empowerment. Greenfeld cites the writings of elite Russian cultural figures to show the impact of ressentiment on nationalist thought, but she does not account for variables that move nationalism from the psychological and cultural realms to the political arena. Further, the concept of ressentiment, which emphasizes envy, hate and hurt pride, highlights a psychological and sociological pathology among elites, while obscuring more rational motivations that drive the purveyors of nationalism, and the domestic political and international factors that help them succeed. It also fails to differentiate among types of elites and their varied interests that are served by nationalist ideas. In post-Soviet Russia, for example, ressentiment-driven "ethnic, collectivist, and authoritarian" nationalism may benefit some elites, but arguably not westernized groups whose parochial interests include freedom to travel and interact with western colleagues. Westernizing elites may well choose liberal and relatively benign variants of nationalism to advance their agenda.

Yet another shortcoming of the ressentiment explanation is that it assumes that

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all chauvinist nationalist rhetoric and behavior derive from feelings of inferiority. This
denies the existence of genuine feelings of superiority which also motivates Russian
nationalists and color their attitudes.\textsuperscript{57} Although I agree in general that resentment-
driven status aggrandizement and preservation are important goals of elites, my thesis
examines more closely the material, political, and other elements of the domestic
incentive structure which make it particularly beneficial for some elites to support
malevolent nationalism. I also provide, overall, an account of how aggressive
nationalism acquires political power and what its political impact is.

Others who advance an instrumental explanation of nationalism emphasize:
1) the role of coalition politics and logrolling, or 2) the degree of collaboration or
opposition between nationalist elites and state authorities. Coalition logrolling refers to
the process of elite interest groups trading favors and then forming a coalition that
captures the state and hijacks state policy in favor of nationalism, expansionism, or
imperialism.\textsuperscript{58} This explanation is difficult to apply to the empowerment of aggressive
Russian nationalism, especially in autocratic Russia in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Tsarist authority in these years—particularly over ideology and
foreign policy—remained supreme, if not always effective, and cohesive and distinct
interest groups or agencies engaged in "logrolling" hardly existed. Nationalist coalitions

\textsuperscript{57}This is true, for example, of Russian nationalists' attitudes toward people from
Central Asia or the Caucasus.

\textsuperscript{58}J. Snyder, \textit{Myths of Empire}, pp. 19-17; Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of
and Nuclear War}, vol. 2 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 265; and Brass,
\textit{Ethnicity and Nationalism}, pp. 1-14.
themselves were rarely cohesive and never enduring, as I will show in my case studies. When proponents of aggressive nationalism did manage to "hijack" state policy, it was largely because of factors unrelated to logrolling among interest groups.\(^{59}\)

Unlike coalition politics, the degree of opposition or collaboration between state authorities and nationalist elites seems a more useful variable to apply in cases of nationalist empowerment in imperial and post-Soviet Russia, especially because nationalism begins as an unofficial ideology frowned upon by most ruling officials. Because my three case studies involve periods of political transition in Russia—when the ruling regime is fragmented and policies are fluid—it makes sense to examine the impact of variable state policies on the rise of malevolent nationalism. What is the degree of state opposition to aggressive nationalism, and how effective and consistent is it? Do assistance and collaboration by some state officials offset the impact of more punitive policies against aggressive nationalism? What is the impact of policies of liberalization and democratization on the advancement of extreme nationalism?

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\(^{59}\)Jack Snyder's research shows that coalition politics and logrolling operate in both liberal and authoritarian contexts, as long as relatively cohesive agencies or interest groups exist. In Russia, particularly in the nineteenth century, such groups were missing in the political system (although one could identify broadly "conservative" or "liberal" groups). This factor distinguishes the process of nation-building in Russia from such countries as France, Germany, and Japan. Even during moments of liberalization and political reform from 1861-1914, factions and groups in Russia tended to have such diffuse interests and fluid memberships that the framework of coalition politics is of limited utility in explaining the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. See Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People. Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), pp. 88-128 and 491-582; J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire*; Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, pp. 293-98; and Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment. Government and Duma 1907-1914* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
III. Russian Nationalism: Content, Empowerment and Impact (A Framework of Inquiry)

A. Nationalism, National Humiliation, and State Legitimation

My thesis begins with the premise that there has always been, and continues to be, a dilemma between nationalism and the state in Russia. This dilemma emerged in the nineteenth century, and was rooted in the fundamental conflict between the idea of nationalism, and the foundations of the Russian state. First, the state, territorially and ethnically, was a multinational empire whose peoples were vastly different in culture and were never homogenized into a nation—unlike the French and Germans, for example.\(^{60}\) Because it was averse to the risk of splitting the empire along ethnic and linguistic lines, the Russian government did not seriously attempt to implement national cultural homogenization until the late nineteenth century.\(^{61}\) Second, the autocratic nature of the


\(^{61}\) The Russian imperial state developed in the fifteenth century, before a Russian "nation" existed. Subjects of the state did not have to be Russian ethnically or linguistically to be "Russian"; instead, they simply had to be a citizen of the state or Orthodox in religion. It was only in the 1880s, under the reign of Alexander III, that the state embarked on a systematic and aggressive policy of cultural and linguistic russification. Nationalities within the Russian empire severely resisted this policy, causing the empire to hover on the brink of disintegration by 1917-1920. See Thaden, Russification in the Baltics; Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed., p. 394; Seton-Watson, Russian Empire 1801-1917, p. 485; Boris I. Kotchoubey, "The Russian or the Soviet Mentality: Which One will be Integrated into Europe?" Mind and Human Interaction 3, no. 2 (January 1992), pp. 47-48; and Carrere D'Encausse, Decline of an Empire, pp. 13-18. The dilemma of nationalism and the imperial state remained during
Russian state contradicted nationalism's central premise of the "people" (not the tsar) as the ultimate repository of political power and the arbiter of political legitimacy. Because the tsarist state appropriated nearly all political power to itself and made the preservation of autocracy its highest goal, a gap arose between it and the society it purported to rule. Hans Rogger notes, for example, that in the nineteenth century, Russian nationalism could only with difficulty, if at all, view the tsarist state as the embodiment of the national purpose, as the necessary instrument and expression of national goals and values, while the state, for its part, looked upon every autonomous expression of nationalism with fear and suspicion.

Third, the process of modernization, which many scholars link with nationalism, came very late to Russia and remained weak well into the twentieth century. As a result, Russia's population proved backward in education, economic power, and political

the Soviet period; the Soviet government could not overly emphasize ethnic Russian nationalism because it would contradict other ethnically-based nationalisms within the Soviet Union and risk rebellion against the center. On the weakness of official nationalism in the Soviet Union, see Kellas, Politics of Nationalism, pp. 148-50.


63 Rogger, "Nationalism and the State," p. 253. See also A.N. Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlim i nastrojashchem (St. Petersburg: knigo-izd. "Kolos," 1913), pp. 81-85, for the Russian state's strong repressive actions against some of the earliest nationalist movements in Russia in the early 1800s.

power—compared to most of western Europe. Further, when the state implemented policies of modernization, its primary goals were always to enhance its own power and control rather than give society a voice in politics.\textsuperscript{65} In this context, nationalism—both official and unofficial varieties—could not function as a glue binding state and society, but only deepened the chasm between the two. Official nationalism, embodied in russification, was shunned by many in Russia's multinational society and became a divisive instrument of internal oppression. On the other hand unofficial nationalism—suspected and often punished by the state—became the rallying cry of a small but politically active sector of Russian society, whose members struggled to propagate their ideas, delegitimize the ruling regime, and pressure state leaders to act in ways conforming to their vision of the identity and mission of the Russian nation.

A major consequence of the dilemma of nationalism in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia was that genuine cohesion never developed between the Russian state and nation. This created a persistent crisis of state legitimacy, as the state struggled against challenges to its authority from society or the population that

\textsuperscript{65}One historian notes that since the Crimean War in 1853-1856 and throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, the greatest issue in Russian domestic politics was how to introduce political participation and representation. In fact, during the relatively reformist reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), at least four major proposals on this issue were drafted—but none implemented. Minister of the Interior D. A. Valuev, for example, recognized the gravity of the issue when he wrote to Russia's Head of the Gendarmerie in 1862: "One thought evidently has possessed all minds. It has taken on various forms and adopted for itself various names . . . but in essence the idea is always the same. It consists in this—that in all European countries the various estates are allowed a certain degree of participation in the work of legislation or of general administration of the state; and that if this is so everywhere, it must also come to that here." See Leonard Schapiro, \textit{Rationalism and Nationalism} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), pp.114-28.
sought a voice in politics. This crisis became particularly severe during periods following a military defeat or other occasions when the state suffered national humiliation in its international relations, when Russian weakness became starkly clear, and state credibility and authority before the society it ruled was compromised. During these periods—as in 1856 (after the Crimean War), 1905 (after the Russo-Japanese war), and 1989 (after the Soviet Union's Cold War defeat)—nationalism rose to the top of the Russian political discourse. Questions of nationalism became paramount as the articulate public asked: Who are we? How is Russia different from other nations? What is our role and mission, and are we fulfilling them? Official and unofficial elites offered competing answers to these questions and, partly because official elites suffered from low levels of legitimacy, unofficial sources of answers to these questions gained new prominence. Among these sources were purveyors of malevolent nationalism, whose ideas were both stimulated and reinforced by Russian encounters with national humiliation.

B. Content of Nationalism: Benign or Malevolent?

In each of my case studies, I begin by describing the content of variants of Russian nationalism. In my descriptions, I seek to capture the benign or malevolent implications of various ideas for international behavior. I formulate below several

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66 Ulam notes the state of "continuous internal crisis" in Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which, he says, were interrupted only by brief periods of intense nationalism—as in 1877-78 (during the Russo-Turkish war) and in 1914 (during World War I). See Ulam, "Nationalism, Panslavism, and Communism," p. 46.
measures by which I gauge benign or aggressive content, focusing on three aspects of nationalist thought (based on my definition of nationalism): 1) criteria for membership in the nation; 2) definition of the self- and other-image; and 3) statement of the national mission.

1) Membership in the Nation

Nationalism claims that a nation exists whose members are identifiable. If ethnic, rather than civic, criteria determine membership in the nation, then nationalism will likely have malevolent implications for foreign policy. Ethnic nationalism depends on a common language, religion, or ancestry, and includes pan-ideologies such as panslavism. Civic nationalism, in contrast, classifies as members of the nation everyone residing within specific territorial boundaries, regardless of their ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic background.\(^67\) Ethnic nationalism can push states toward the goal of unification; specifically, states whose dominant ethnic group is scattered territorially might seek to rescue the irredenta or unify all members of the ethnic group in one national state. This may occur peacefully, but it is more often the case that violent methods are used to rescue and unify irredenta. Post-communist Serbian aggression and "ethnic cleansing" against Muslim populations in the former Yugoslavia starkly illustrate such violence. Besides aggressive action to unify the irredenta, ethnic nationalism also threatens disenfranchisement, persecution, or forced assimilation of

\(^{67}\)Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, pp. 1-12.
minorities or outsider groups who reside within the borders of a state. External allies or kin of these persecuted groups might come to the aid of their beleaguered relatives and violence could escalate.

Although ethnic nationalism tends to have more dangerous implications than its civic counterpart, it is not the case that ethnic nationalism always leads to malevolent outcomes. In fact, the probability of such outcomes may decrease if ethnic nationalism co-exists with a liberal-constitutional political framework. Within that framework, membership in the nation may still depend on ethnic categories, but authorities will respect the political and cultural rights of minorities or other groups that do not constitute the dominant nationality; spread economic benefits as equitably as possible among ethnic groups; and direct the national mission toward internal stability and development rather than outward expansion and aggression. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, need not always be benign, especially if it prescribes coercive assimilation of groups that want to preserve their distinct national cultures and ethnic traditions.

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69See Michael Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 87-99. In this thesis, I describe neoslavism in 1905-1914 as an example of a relatively benign combination of ethnic nationalism and liberal politics. A similar example may be Quebecois nationalism, which is linguistically-based but liberal-constitutional in its political framework.
2) **Self-Image and Other-Image**

Nationalism asserts that a purported nation is distinct and special compared to other groups. The greater the claims of uniqueness in a nation's self-image, the more dangerous nationalism is likely to be. Its proponents might engage in chauvinistic mythmaking that glorifies the nation while denigrating outsiders.\(^{71}\) Chauvinism can also lead to a repetition of past aggression that has not been recognized as a wrongdoing. Finally, it can justify malicious behavior against outsiders on the grounds that the national group is so "special" that it possesses greater rights and privileges than others.\(^{72}\)

Nationalist ideology that exaggerates uniqueness in the nation's self-image might also exalt war and the military as instruments for asserting those rights and privileges to which the nation is entitled. When war and the military are exalted, nationalism will have malevolent implications for international behavior. It is thus important to ask: who are the nation's military heroes and how prominent are they in the national culture? Do

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\(^{70}\)Intellectuals who write and interpret the nation's history play a key role in the formation of the national self-image and other-image. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 136.

\(^{71}\)In India, for example, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party has selectively used stories of ancient atrocities committed by Muslim rulers in India to illustrate the hostility and vileness of Muslims, and to justify violence against the latter. See Amartya Sen, "The Threats to Secular India," *New York Review of Books*, 8 April 1993, pp. 26-32.

\(^{72}\)On these points and others dealing with the kinds of national self- and other-images conducive to war and aggression, see Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 26-31.
people believe that the nation's greatness lies chiefly in its military strength and prowess? Is there a belief that war and conquest strengthen the nation, and is there a vigilant effort to inculcate military values in society? 73

3) National Purpose

Nationalism preaches that the individual and the state's highest loyalty must be to the nation's well-being and mission. But how do nationalists define the national mission? The national mission can be benign—i.e., defensive towards outsiders and focused on improving collective welfare, maintaining the territorial status quo, and strengthening internal cohesion and stability. But, it could also be hegemonic, imperialistic, and messianic, in which case nationalism is likely to have malevolent implications for foreign policy. Its proponents might argue for expansive and aggressive policies, and deny other collectivities those rights which it reserves for itself. 74

Undoubtedly, objective realities including the existence of disputed territories, the

73 Militarism and jingoism were important aspects of aggressive German nationalism between the two world wars of this century. In fact, some German nationalists preached that war nurtured the best qualities of the German people, ennobled the nation, and led to national rejuvenation. See L. Snyder, German Nationalism, chap. 2; Gary D. Stark, Entrepreneurs of Ideology (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), chap. 5; and Craig, Germany 1866-1945, pp. 491-92.

74 For example, Nazi Germany pursued its right to Lebensraum or living space at the cost of invading and swallowing up other states' territory. Similarly, Russian pan-slavism in the nineteenth century argued for self-determination for Slavs under Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman rule, but denied the same rights to Poles under Russian imperial rule. In other cases, a messianic national purpose may spur states to go to war to fulfill such "noble" goals as spreading a true religion or promoting civilization in "dark" parts of the world.
dispersal of ethnic groups, and the weakness of neighbors can mitigate or aggravate messianic or imperialistic tendencies embedded in nationalist ideas.

C. Hypotheses on the Empowerment of Nationalism

Under what conditions does a specifically aggressive variant of nationalism become empowered? When do channels open for extreme nationalist ideas to influence state priorities and foreign policy behavior? 75 I formulate below some hypotheses that guide my inquiry to answer these questions in the Russian context. Many, but not all, of these hypotheses refer to the historical account of Weimar Germany after World War I, and the subsequent collapse of the regime and the rise of Hitler and national socialism. The experience of Weimar Germany is an appropriate point of comparison with Russia for two reasons. First, Weimar rule was a transitional period, marked by Germany's most serious attempt yet to change from an imperial, autocratic, and militarized regime to a republican model. The experiment failed and ended with the triumph of an extremely malevolent form of nationalism, contributing to the second world war of this century. In Russia, the outbreak of extreme nationalism in

75 Nationalist ideas can be empowered even if their proponents are not officially in power. The salience and power of ideas do not necessarily depend on the fate of their individual purveyors. German and Russian fascism before World War II illustrate the empowerment of one nationalism and the failure of another. German fascism became sufficiently empowered and decisively influenced Germany's domestic and external policies. Russian fascism, however, achieved no real success. Russian fascists, like their German counterparts, had compelling ideas, strong leaders, and the right oratory and showmanship. However, they lacked other conditions for success: they were an organization in diaspora and had no permanent geographical base; they were dependent financially and otherwise on foreign governments; and they faced formidable opposition from the Bolshevik government within Russia. See John J. Stephan, The Russian Fascists. Tragedy and Farce in Exile 1925-45 (NY: Harper and Row, 1978).
all three cases I study is similarly preceded by a period of transition and relative political liberalization, and in at least two of them, extreme nationalism contributed to the outbreak of war. Second, many scholars and policy analysts tend to make facile comparisons between post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany, and predict that the former will follow the latter's path. This assertion needs to be substantiated and, although my thesis does not fully compare the experience of Weimar and post-Soviet Russia, it at least begins to substantiate the extent of applicability of the Weimar analogy to post-Soviet Russia.

1) Necessary Precondition: National Humiliation as a Trigger for Malevolent Nationalism

In his work on the ethnic origins of nations, Anthony Smith argues that although nationalism is not primordial, neither is it purely a product of elite invention and manipulation; indeed, successful nationalist ideologies tend to draw on myths, symbols, traditions, memories, and values that are familiar to a specific group of people. In ascertaining why a malevolent brand of nationalism becomes empowered, it is important to examine the pre-existing myths and values, if any, that it taps among potential believers. In the case of German national socialism, for example, proponents of this highly malevolent ideology appealed to the wounded feelings of Germans who had been socialized in the myth that their state and nation was always, and should rightly be, a great power. Germany's defeat in World War I and the imposition of a 

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76 Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations and Theories of Nationalism, passim; see also Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories," pp. 72-85.
harsh peace at Versailles stimulated backlash from elite groups (among them, intellectuals, politicians, the military, and religious leaders) who began to preach that their nation had been humiliated and "stabbed in the back" by internal and foreign enemies. These groups reacted to Germany's national humiliation by advancing extreme nationalism. Their ideas fell on fertile ground because "virtually all sections of opinion" agreed on "the restoration of Germany's great power position" as a prime goal of domestic and foreign policy.\(^\text{77}\)

If pre-existing notions of great power status are strong, as in Germany, feelings of national humiliation are likely to be intense after a military fiasco or other forms of international defeat. Elites, in particular, because they are the bearers of culture, the beneficiaries of a vibrant state, and the representatives of national health and well-being, may react to national humiliation by propagating extreme nationalist ideas to raise collective morale, to aggrandize themselves at a time of severe stress, and to

\(^{77}\)Feuchtwanger, *From Weimar to Hitler*, pp. 318-19. Fritz Stern further describes the situation leading up to the fall of Weimar and the rise of Hitler: "[The Germans] had suffered a defeat which had left them enraged and humiliated, an inflation which had expropriated the middle classes and which could be blamed on the vengeful victors of Versailles and from which, it was alleged, a few Jews and other greedy entrepreneurs profited...[In] 1932 Karl Jaspers wrote that what was real was 'the consciousness of danger and of loss.' By the early 1930s, the intellectuals' feeling, long nurtured, that bourgeois society was, and deserved to be, doomed, coincided with a people's realization that a political and economic system had broken down. In that kind of wilderness, the promise of deliverance—however empty of all practicality—proved tempting and beguiling. . . . For most the appeal to German nationalism and the sense of renewed power and purpose reawakened old hopes. Germans were once again a nation to be reckoned with. Hitler seemed to assuage the wounded pride, the past humiliations, and his promise to end the 'fulfillment' policy of Weimar, i.e., the fulfilling of the provisions of Versailles, impressed Germans. There was relief as well that political uncertainty was a thing of the past. People felt 'swept up' by a new wave of hope and expectation. . . . In short, the enthusiasm many Germans felt for the fuhrer and for national renewal was often genuine..." Stern, *Dreams and Delusions*, pp. 151, 171-72.
seek to recapture any lost privileges or positions of prestige and power. Intellectual elites, especially, may be first to articulate aggressive nationalism because, unlike their counterparts in the ruling regime, most intellectuals do not represent official positions and, therefore, have greater liberty to purvey ideas that official leaders themselves might approach cautiously. In the last century and a half of Russian history, there have been at least three great instances of national humiliation: the Crimean War defeat in 1856, the defeat to Japan in 1905, and the Cold War defeat and demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In each of these cases, I will assess the extent to which elites responded to national humiliation with exaggerated assertions of national greatness, betrayal by outsiders, and national renewal by military or other violent means.

National humiliation will affect not only elites, but all politically articulate segments of society who tend to see a humiliated regime as a delegitimized regime that is unworthy to rule. In particular, if members of a group or population is socialized in great power myths about themselves—including in their education, popular culture, and traditions—then this population would be highly vulnerable to the propaganda of peddlers of malevolent nationalism who advocate forceful means to restore the nation's greatness.

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78 On the fundamental clash between German great power identity, on one hand, and elite feelings of being "buffeted" after World War I, on the other, see Stern, Dreams and Delusion, p. 153; W. Smith, Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, pp. 195-200; and Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, pp. 42-47. Intellectuals, who consider themselves bearers of the national culture, play a prominent role in promoting extreme nationalism to enhance their own status and cultivate and strengthen national pride in the wake of national humiliation. See for example, Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, pp. 478-80, on the role of professors in purveying malevolent German nationalism and Greenfeld, Nationalism, pp. 191-274.
2) Controlling Variable: Level of Internal Instability

Although there was a period of stability in Weimar Germany in the late 1920s many years of the Weimar Republic were fraught with internal crises, including assassinations of political figures, the Great Depression in the late 1920s (which created as many as six million unemployed citizens), the rise of anti-Weimar paramilitary groups, a putsch by the army and other acts of military insubordination, arson of government property, crises in the cabinet, and so on. Several historians note that by the early 1930s, Weimar Germany was in "near civil war" conditions.\(^7^9\) Indeed, at that time, Germany suffered from blatant and numerous challenges to state authority, the discreditation of ideas on which the Weimar regime was founded, and increasing public protest regarding the government's incapacity to rule. Under these circumstances, the promises of extreme nationalists to restore order, albeit by authoritarian and violent means, became very attractive to large sectors of society.

Severe and prolonged internal instability could lead to the delegitimation\(^8^0\) of the state, as was the case with Weimar Germany. The leaders of Weimar failed to exploit nationalism as an instrument for combatting delegitimization, but their opponents took full advantage of this ideology to wrest the mantle of legitimacy completely from the ruling regime. This experience implies that when delegitimation occurs, elites may find

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\(^7^9\) Fullbrook, Germany, pp. 67 and 44-48; Stern, Dreams and Delusions, p. 157; Feuchtwanger, From Weimar, p. 317; Bessel, Germany After, pp. 283-84; and Craig, Germany 1866-1945, pp. 424-33.

\(^8^0\) Delegitimation entails the discreditation and, in extreme cases, breakdown, of the state's basic organizing ideas and principles (e.g., monarchy, parliamentarism, socialism or capitalism), key institutions, and official rulers.
aggressive nationalism an effective basis for reestablishing public trust and rallying public support. As highlighted in my introduction, the nature of nationalism as an ideology endows it with important legitimating effects. Therefore, the more shaky the legitimacy of ruling elites and the greater their insecurity, the more likely they may be to propagate and support extreme nationalism. They may seek to project certitude, cohesion, and strength in their rhetoric to make up for uncertainty, weakness, and incompetence in their actions. Indeed, because nationalism is an ideology that has proven highly effective—at least in the last two centuries—for promoting or restoring cohesion, order, and legitimacy to the state, it has become the ideology of choice for many elites seeking legitimacy and power in contexts of transition and instability.⁸¹

The fragmentation of elites at top levels of state decisionmaking is a particularly important component of internal instability. If official elites are fragmented and unable to articulate clear opinions or decide policies on highly emotional issues or problems that society links tightly with national welfare, survival, honor, and prestige, then outsiders, including extreme nationalists, have a chance to play a greater role than might

⁸¹This was the case with Napoleon's France, Bismarck's Germany, Hitler's Germany, and in new states that were formed through decolonization after World War II. Nationalism has become the chief principle of legitimization or main principle of political organization for the modern state. By successfully transferring sovereignty from traditional sources such as God or monarch to the "people" or nation, henceforth all state leaders who wish to be seen as legitimate must claim to represent the nation and be loyal to its interests and mission. See Tilly, Formation of National States, passim; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, passim; Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, pp. 65-82, 125-65 and 250-78; James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 26-34 and 145-52.
otherwise be the case in setting options for state behavior.\textsuperscript{62} Fragmentation at the top also creates confusion about state priorities, and could lead to ineffective policies that further undermine state authority and help the aggressive nationalist cause. For example, official attempts to punish extremist nationalists at one time may be offset by state tolerance and assistance to aggressive nationalists at other times. Moreover, political entrepreneurs within the state bureaucracy may also propagate and aid aggressive nationalism contrary to official policy if they know that their superiors would not take effective action to punish them.\textsuperscript{63} Official blunders that result from the fragmentation of political elites can also increase popular perceptions of the state's illegitimacy while enhancing the political capital of nationalist extremists who do not wear the official mantle of the state.

The nature of the state over which they rule may also affect political elites' willingness to articulate and defend aggressive nationalism. If the state is multiethnic and multinational, the ruling regime may not want to provoke and inflame internal tensions by emphasizing aggressive and ethnically exclusive nationalism.\textsuperscript{64} However, if

\textsuperscript{62}The fragmentation of political elites and the incoherence of state policy can open "windows" through which highly motivated nationalists can advance their ideas and seek to influence the directions of foreign policy. See Kellas, \textit{Politics of Nationalism}, pp. 81, 85. This dynamic has also been documented in American foreign policy; see Ernest May, \textit{American Imperialism, A Speculative Essay} (NY: Atheneum, 1968).

\textsuperscript{63}This is true, for example, of some proponents of Russian panslav nationalism in 1856-1878, who exploited division within the tsarist family to advance their nationalist propaganda. Although the tsar did not support panslavism, some members of his family did, and they became informal patrons of an ideology that the state officially rejected.

\textsuperscript{64}The examples of India and the former Yugoslavia illustrate that multiethnicity or multinationality is not a sufficient variable to prevent elites from purveying ethnically
internal instability is so severe and the regime's legitimacy and longevity are in the balance, state officials may see aggressive nationalism as a last resort for marshaling public support and thereby preventing state collapse. They may emphasize the nation's uniqueness and superiority and their own role as the nation's guardians; blame outside groups for the nation's ills; begin preparations for a military campaign; and even initiate aggression against alleged saboteurs of the nation's welfare.  

3) **Controlling Variable: Domestic Incentive Structure**

Elites whose interests are served by aggressive nationalist ideas are likely to focus their energies and organizational skills on propagating such ideas and seeking to have these ideas implemented in state policy. But what domestic incentive structures make it particularly profitable for elites to purvey malevolent nationalism, as opposed to other ideologies that may also serve their parochial interests?

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exclusive or chauvinistic nationalism. However, there are other examples, mainly of federative arrangements in multiethnic states such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada, which support the formulation of this hypothesis. In the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan is one state where the regime has muffled ethnic Kazakh nationalism to avoid tension with ethnic Russians, who make up roughly forty percent of the population.

a)  Political Participation and Mass Politics

Scholars have documented the intensification of nationalism under conditions of mass political participation.\(^{66}\) But in the context of national humiliation and internal instability, not only is nationalism likely to intensify, but it is also likely to take extremist forms. This is chiefly because competing political elites may find it convenient to accuse one another of failure to defend the national interest, and may try to outdo each other’s nationalist rhetoric as they vie for public support (especially if elections take place), seek to capture the mantle of true defenders of the nation, and otherwise fight for their political lives. These dynamics may be particularly intense if political competition occurs in a context of weak institutions and fluid norms and procedures, where individual contenders for political power are not subject to strict scrutiny or accountability for the ideas they propagate, as has occurred in Wilhelmine Germany, Weimar Germany, Britain in the 1950s, post-communist Yugoslavia, and post-colonial India.\(^{67}\)

b)  System of Material Rewards

If the material welfare and career ambitions of individuals and institutions depend


\(^{67}\)J. Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," pp. 16-17 and J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp. 66-111. This is also a central theme in Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* and V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95):130-66. In Weimar Germany, as early as 1920, parliamentary democracy and elections during a time of severe internal crisis provided a structural incentive for extreme nationalists to purvey their ideas and deliver a serious electoral blow to the fragile political coalition of Weimar. See Morris, *Weimar Republic*, pp. 81-83.
on external aggression or expansion, then these actors are likely to support malevolent nationalist ideas which sanction and advocate aggressive behavior. In Weimar Germany, for example, such institutions as the Colonial Society and the army, whose privileges and clout were sharply diminished by the Treaty of Versailles, became some of the first and most vociferous proponents of extreme nationalism. Heavy industrialists and representatives of big business, whose interests suffered due to demilitarization and economic depression, also supported ideas of national autarky and lebensraum or national expansion.  

Some institutions, by virtue of their function, have more to benefit than others from malevolent nationalism. Foremost is the army, whose missions of war preparation and war fighting are served well by chauvinistic and hegemonic ideas which promote national morale and strong armed forces. Military elites may thus propagate these ideas to cultivate public support and loyalty, to facilitate the state’s extraction of resources for military needs, and to increase the military’s share of government

88 Members of the Colonial Society argued that Versailles was unfair because it eliminated Germany's colonial possessions. When members of the Society realized that the Weimar government was not going to make the restoration of German colonies a central priority, they began to explore cooperation with the Nazi party. Versailles also emasculated the German army and roused intense resentment among generals and other officers who, early on, tried to delegitimize Weimar and actively sought a nationalist alternative. See W. Smith, Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, pp. 211-16 and Craig, Germany 1866-1945, pp. 426-28.

allocations. But militaries need not uniformly favor malevolent nationalism; organizational norms of professionalism may induce military elites to desist from the types of military adventurism and recklessness promoted by extreme nationalists. 90

4) Controlling Variable: Effective Social Communication

The empowerment of aggressive nationalism depends to a large extent on the resonance of nationalist ideas among the politically articulate segments of the population. The greater the resonance of these ideas, the greater the pressure that proponents of extreme nationalism can generate to pressure the state to adopt their ideas. Extreme nationalist ideas will resonate with the population if their proponents can employ effective social communication. Effective social communication depends, first, on technological advantages that are available to proponents of malevolent nationalism; these include mass literacy, mass mass education, and mass press. The greater these advantages, the more likely that aggressive nationalism will be propagated widely to win the "hearts and minds" of society and become empowered. Second, technological advantages could work to the fullest advantage for proponents of extreme nationalism if coupled with manipulation of the right symbols and collective memory, weak and/or incompetent evaluative units 91, and a historically-driven lack of strong, alternative


91I borrow the term "evaluative units" from Stephen Van Evera. These units refer to individuals, groups, and institutions which assess the validity of nationalist ideas and
ideologies.\textsuperscript{92}  

Freedom of expression and an educated population are likely to facilitate the dissemination of all types of nationalist ideas. But if these factors operate in a context of weak and incompetent evaluative units and a lack of strong, alternative ideologies, malevolent nationalists will have the advantage of being able to propagate their ideas without having to subject their claims to serious scrutiny and criticism. If strong evaluative units do exist, they can hinder the empowerment of malevolent nationalism by combatting myths and ideas that encourage chauvinism, aggression, or imperialism.\textsuperscript{93} Evaluative units also work best against aggressive nationalism if mass consumers of information are relatively sophisticated in weighing arguments and evidence, and if they engage significantly in ongoing policy debates. Finally, a debate their implications. These include scholars, universities, civilian associations, and mass media.

\textsuperscript{92}On the importance of symbols and collective traditions and memories in the construction of nations, see Deutsch, \textit{Nationalism and Social Communication}, pp. 86-105.

\textsuperscript{93}In Weimar Germany, many writers, historians, professors, religious leaders, and other opinionmakers spread myths that absolved Germany of responsibility for World War I, while demonizing Germany's internal and external enemies. Explanations of Germany's defeat in the war were not debated openly or extensively. Further, many intellectuals remained silent when they could have clarified the historical record or defended the Weimar Republic from the onslaught of malicious attacks against it. Organizations that preached the idea of \textit{lebensraum} before 1914 also continued to flourish in the Weimar Republic, and professors at universities succeeded in making a "science" of the idea of \textit{lebensraum}. See Bessel, \textit{Germany After the First World War}, pp. 273-83; W. Smith, \textit{Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism}, pp. 204-225; Craig, \textit{Germany 1866-1945}, pp. 479-82; and Fullbrook, \textit{Germany}, pp. 40-41. A counterexample of strong evaluative units successfully combatting malevolent ideas--in this instance, anti-semitism--was France during and after the so-called Dreyfus affair of 1894-1899. See Barbara Tuchman, \textit{The Proud Tower} (NY: Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 178-263.
historically-driven lack of strong, alternative ideologies could help the empowerment of aggressive nationalism by severely restricting the menu of ideas that might successfully counter or replace malevolent nationalist ideology.  

5) Controlling Variable: Threats and Opportunities in the International System

Nationalism is an ideology that emphasizes the distinctive qualities of a putative nation in relation to other groups and the world at large. Because it focuses on the characteristics, welfare, and needs of an "in-group," nationalism cultivates sensitivity to threats that might arise from "out-groups," or non-members of the nation. In an anarchic international system, external threats can play a significant role in intensifying nationalism, especially aggressive nationalism. If perceptions of threats to vital interests and national honor are high and if society perceives that the state's reactions to these threats have been inadequate and deleterious to the nation's interests, then pressure will build for decisionmakers to opt for aggressive nationalist mobilization. While most external threats are defined in military or economic terms, great powers are also sensitive to threats to their international honor and prestige. This is most likely to be the case in the aftermath of national humiliation, when elites and the public undergo

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94 A corollary to this proposition on the absence of strong alternative ideologies is the presence of ideas that have been disseminated, accepted, and legitimized over time and which could easily be manipulated to form the basis in whole or in part of extreme nationalist propaganda movements. This was the case with anti-semitism in Germany, whose seeds were planted almost half a century before becoming a pillar of the Nazi political program in the 1930s. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

cognitive dissonance between national myths and beliefs of greatness, on one hand, and a harsh reality imposed by outsiders, on the other. In Weimar Germany, for example, coercive measures imposed by the allied powers such as wresting territory from German control, and French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, substantiated conservative political groups' propaganda about "threats" to the German nation and people, and the need to counter those threats with aggressive nationalism. While nationalists can sometimes conjure outside perils to benefit their ideology, objective factors such as geography, demography, history, and relative economic and military power can increase or decrease the credibility of their propaganda.

Threats in the international system become even more important when they lead to crises. Crises push policymakers and institutions to their limits and can threaten the downfall of policymakers and the breakdown of institutions. They do this by revealing

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97 For example, if a state is situated next to friendly neighbors and borders between them are legitimate and militarily defensible, nationalist elites will find it more difficult to inflate security threats. However, if a state and its neighbors have had clashes in the past, share unstable borders on territory that may be up for grabs, and perceive each other inimically, malevolent nationalist propaganda becomes more credible. In fact, war could result if nationalism assumes the dynamics of a "security dilemma"—i.e., one party's nationalism begins to threaten others, who then respond by heightening their own nationalism. A spiral of action and reaction may ensure, leading to armed confrontation. See Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 27-47 and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics no. 2 (1978):167-213.

98 A study which shows that the severity of crises makes the international system more salient as a factor in state decisions to use force is Patrick James and John R. Oneal, "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June 1991):307-332.
starkly the discrepancies and contradictions between underlying social forces and demands, on one hand, and existing institutions and policies of state, on the other. When this happens, ruling regimes can become very vulnerable to assertions and accusations by proponents of aggressive nationalism that the state is neglecting the national interest and welfare, and that its ruling representatives should, therefore, be removed or replaced. Members of the ruling regime may thus find it expedient to defend their reputation by purveying extreme nationalist ideas themselves, especially if such ideas have been propagandized widely by others and already resonate broadly with society. 99 My thesis illustrates this dynamic in Russia. In two of my case studies, the interests of extreme nationalists and state leaders in preserving Russian great power status coincide, but the state initially shuns the ideas and reckless tactics of nationalist extremists. However, in times of international crises and severe state deligitimation, the ruling regime yields to pressure to adopt the rhetoric of aggressive nationalism and is subsequently compelled to follow through with corresponding action.

The influence of threats and crises on empowering malevolent nationalism can be mitigated if the international system offers resources other than self-help to allow a state to defend against security threats and resolve crises. 100 It can be further mitigated


100 In neorealist theory, states rely almost exclusively on self-help to deal with external threats. But liberal theory provides an alternative: current technology,
if significant material incentives and normative arguments are available to counter the
prescription that aggressive nationalist mobilization and military action or conquest of
territories are the best responses to external threats. If resources other than self-help
are minimal and/or ineffective, and norms and incentives against conquest and national
imperialism are weak, then state leaders are likely to be highly vulnerable to the
temptation to exploit, and yield to, aggressive nationalism, when the state faces
external threats and crises.

Finally, relatively "cheap" opportunities in the international system for pursuing
potentially aggressive nationalist policies—e.g., unification of the diaspora, military action
on behalf of members of the nation who live outside state boundaries, and territorial
expansion—are also critical to the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. Such
opportunities might include weak neighbors, material and political support from allies,
the lack or weakness of international sanctions against aggressive behavior, and the
prevalence of conquest as a norm that pays in the international system.101 These
opportunities can strengthen, legitimize, and facilitate the claims of extreme nationalists,
and help persuade the state to support such claims.

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international economic linkages, and the multiplicity and increasing impact of
international and transnational institutions show that states increasingly depend on one
another and on international norms to preserve their national welfare. See chapters by
Kenneth Waltz in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1986) and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and

101See Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 65-83. For an argument on
conquest as a norm that pays, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest,"
D. Impact of Nationalism on Foreign Policy

In my first two case studies, I examine the impact that proponents of malevolent nationalist ideas have on state decisions to go to war or favor force and aggression in foreign policy. I focus particularly on periods of high external threat or crises, and determine if extreme nationalists uniformly argue and lobby for war or other military action as the best option for defending the interests of the Russian nation. I describe the tactics and channels that nationalist proponents use to exert pressure on government decisionmaking, and assess how effective these are in modifying state policy in favor of aggressive priorities defined in nationalist terms. In the post-Soviet case, I examine critical Russian policies in the "near abroad" and in the former Yugoslavia to illustrate how the aggressive, neoimperialist propaganda of malevolent nationalists has had a weak impact on the international behavior of the state.

IV. Methodology

A. Research Methods

For the descriptive part of this thesis, I use content analysis of primary and secondary materials to describe nationalist ideas and determine whether they are benign or malevolent. I also employ "process-tracing" of government decisions in times of crisis to determine what impact proponents of aggressive nationalism have on the directions of foreign policy. For my case study of 1856-1878, I look at Russian decisionmaking leading up to the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878 and examine the
impact of panslav proponents on the decision to go to war. For 1905-1914, I trace the government's decision to enter World War I in 1914 and assess the influence of revived panslavism on this decision. Finally, for 1989-1995, I examine Russian policy in the "near abroad" and the former Yugoslavia, and describe the weak and limited impact of malevolent nationalism on shaping Russian intervention and policy in these regions. Although Russia has exploited opportunities to enhance its own power, its behavior does not amount to the empowerment of malevolent nationalism.

For the explanatory part of my thesis, I employ "structured focused comparison"\textsuperscript{102} of three cases dealing with a similar category of events—i.e., the rise of nationalism in Russia. My analysis is "focused" because it deals only with selective aspects of the case studies involved: I examine a limited set of variables (elaborated above) that apply across cases of nationalism from 1856-1995. My analysis is also "structured" because I explore the same set of hypotheses or questions for each of my three case studies, and try to identify regularities and irregularities among them.

I do not compare cases of aggressive nationalism across countries, but compare cases across time in Russia.\textsuperscript{103} Although this is not the standard way that comparative case studies are done, I will argue, as James Rosenau does, that developing explanations based on a single country creates the advantage of combining in one's


\textsuperscript{103}I do, however, use insights from studies of nationalism in countries such as Germany, Europe, India, and others to guide my formulation of hypotheses and my research in general.
framework of inquiry both in-depth (idiographic) knowledge of a country’s history and culture, on one hand, and more general (nomothetic) knowledge of variables and processes that apply across a set of similar countries. I have chosen this methodology because it allows me to exploit my skills and training in both Russian/Soviet area studies and political science.

I chose my three case studies based on criteria of comparability. First, the cases vary in the dependent variable being examined. In two cases, national humiliation triggers the propagation of malevolent nationalist ideas, which the state initially rejects but whose foreign policy component it eventually adopts and tries to implement. Aggressive nationalism in these cases contains recurrent themes that are directly relevant to foreign policy: Russia's great power status and the need to preserve it; the unreliability and perfidy of the West and Russia's need to defend its interests against western incursion; and Russia's messianic mission to defend the interests of members of the nation who live outside the borders of the state. In my third case, national humiliation also triggers malevolent nationalist propaganda, but there is no resulting empowerment of an extremist nationalist agenda. What explains these varying outcomes?

Second, the three periods I examine (1856-1878, 1905-1914, and 1991-1995) involve delegitimation of the state in its authoritarian incarnation, and domestic transition

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104 See James N. Rosenau, "Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of the USSR," in Charles Hermann, et al, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 53-74. Rosenau adds that single-country studies can be comparative if they involve contrasting outcomes, which is true of this thesis.
toward some form of participatory politics. Granted, reforms toward political participation are not exactly the same in quantity and quality for each period. However, in each case, the government creates room domestically for various actors and ideas to penetrate the state's foreign policy discourse.\textsuperscript{105} Third, the latter period in each case study involves a time of deep Russian sensitivity to the international system. In my first two cases, serious international threats and crises arose to challenge Russian national prestige and great power status, which had earlier been damaged by precedents of national humiliation. At the same time, opportunities in the international system reinforced among Russian policymakers the view that they could adopt and implement aggressive nationalist ideas at minimum or acceptable costs, while simultaneously bolstering their legitimacy at home. This helped push decisions to go to war. To what extent do these international factors operate similarly in post-Soviet Russia?

**B. Data Requirements**

To describe the content of variants of nationalism for my three case studies, I do content analysis of both primary and secondary sources that cover the speeches and writings\textsuperscript{106} of key nationalist thinkers. How do these thinkers define criteria for

\textsuperscript{105}I had originally intended to include as a case study the rise of nationalism under Stalin, 1918-1946. However, my initial research convinced me that this case would not be truly comparative with my other cases because it involves the cynical manipulation of nationalism by a dictator under conditions of strictly authoritarian politics. Therefore, many of the variables that are important in my other cases--e.g., internal instability, domestic incentive structures, and propaganda advantages would hardly apply.

\textsuperscript{106}This includes mainly books, and journal and newspaper articles.
membership in the nation? How do they characterize Russia's self- and other-image? What is their statement of the national mission? Before the political empowerment of nationalism in the nineteenth century, what is the content of Russian national consciousness—i.e., the durable themes of Russian nationalist thought as it evolved in the eighteenth century and earlier?  

Given the recent increased access to archival sources in the former Soviet Union, I also do archival research on the content of nationalism for 1856-1870 and 1905-1914. The archives I use include the Manuscript Division of the Russian State Library, the Russian State Military-Historical Archives, and the State Archives of the Russian Federation. For my last case study, 1991-1995, I use materials from interviews with elite nationalist and other political leaders in Moscow in 1993-1995. This material supplements published sources and is important for my last case study of post-Soviet reality. The post-Soviet period is relatively "new" to scholars and analysts, 

\[107\] I am not doing a history of the intellectual and cultural roots of Russian nationalism; therefore, I rely mostly on secondary material to describe the themes of pre-nineteenth century Russian national consciousness. I find two works particularly useful: Greenfeld, Nationalism and Rogger, Russian National Consciousness.

\[108\] I worked in the Russian archives for approximately two months. I certainly could have done more archival research in a greater number of archives, but given logistical realities (travel and costs, lags between requests for material and actual receipt of materials, xeroxing difficulties, etc.), I limited myself to the three archives mentioned here. I also targeted my research to personal documents (letters, essays, and correspondence of central figures in the history of nineteenth-century Russian nationalism), and sought clues regarding the tactics elites employed to empower their ideas in Russian politics, and the incentives that moved them to do so.

\[109\] Among those I have interviewed are Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennadii Zyuganov, Aleksandr Rutskoi, Aleksandr Sterligov, Gen. Viktor Filatov, Boris Fyodorov, Aleksei Arbatov, Vladimir Lukin, Stanislav Govorukhin, Dmitrii Rogozin, and many other prominent political figures in Russia.
and it is here where the need to collect and analyze original material is greatest.

I use mostly secondary historical material, supplemented by archival research for 1856-1914, interviews for 1991-1995, and other original sources, to analyze the factors that explain the empowerment of aggressive nationalism in Russia. I rely on the work of western and Russian historians, diplomatic documents, original records of elite rhetoric and correspondence, and statistical figures (e.g., literacy rates in Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). My thesis covers a period stretching almost a century and a half, and it would be unrealistic for me to use only original materials for my research; hence, my reliance on the work of historians, especially for my first two case studies.

V. **What Comes Next**

What follows are three case studies and a concluding chapter. Chapter Two describes the content of Russian slavophilism and panславism in 1856-1878. I show how many Russian elites began to propagandize aggressive nationalist ideas—specifically, messianic Russian panslavism—in the wake of Russia's national humiliation in the Crimean War in 1856. I then examine the causes of empowerment of panslav nationalism, and describe its impact on foreign policy, particularly on Russian decisionmaking leading to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

Chapter Three describes the content of three variants of nationalism in 1905-1914: neoslavism, rightist nationalism, and great power nationalism. Of these, the most aggressive is great power nationalism (which incorporates traditional panslavism). I examine the aftermath of Russia's national humiliation in the Russo-Japanese War of
1905, and show how humiliation triggered the articulation of extreme nationalist ideas among Russian elites. I then explain the empowerment of great power nationalist ideas and trace their impact on Russia’s decision to enter World War I. Chapter Four is a case study of post-Soviet Russian nationalism. I describe the persistence of nationalist ideas during the communist period and note the rise of nationalism as a viable alternative to communist ideology in the Gorbachev period, from 1985-1991. I then describe Russia’s national humiliation at the end of the Cold War, and the extreme nationalist response to it. I also outline five competing strands of Russian nationalist ideology in 1991-1995, chronicle the weakness of the most aggressive variant of nationalism, and then make a case for why extreme nationalism has not been empowered in post-Soviet Russia. Finally, I assess the weak impact of extreme nationalism on critical Russian policies on the Russian diaspora in the “near abroad,” on conflicts in the former Soviet republics (Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan), and on the war in former Yugoslavia.

My conclusion recapitulates the results of my research on triggering and controlling variables that explain the empowerment, or weakness, of aggressive Russian nationalism. I outline the rise of the myth of Russian greatness and great power identity over centuries, and use this myth to explain why instances of national humiliation elicit aggressive nationalist reaction in Russia. I also highlight similarities and differences between those cases when aggressive nationalism became empowered in 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, and when it has not become as influential in Russian politics and foreign policy in 1991-1995. For example, I compare the problem of “persecuted brother Slavs” in the nineteenth century and the problem of “Russians
abroad" in the post-Soviet period, and offer some reasons why the variables that compelled Russia to go to war on behalf of Slavs in 1877-1878 and 1914 are unlikely to spur Moscow to use violence on behalf of Russians in the "near abroad." I also outline changes that will have to occur in my controlling variables if aggressive nationalism were eventually to become empowered in Russia after 1995. Finally, I outline some policy options that outsiders, especially western states and international organizations, might take to prevent the empowerment of malevolent nationalism in post-Soviet Russia.
"Russian Panslavism: Struggle and Triumph, 1856-1878"

Russia never had anything in common with the rest of Europe . . . [its] history demands a different thought and formula than the thought and formula . . . of the Christian West.¹

Aleksandr Pushkin, 1830

Man does not live by bread alone, and nations do not live and define themselves in history merely by their material welfare. We must be concerned not only with the daily lives of the Balkan Slavs, and we must protect them not only from the Turks but also from western encroachments on their land and from [western] spiritual seduction and deprivation. The trials of our brothers by faith and ancestry,. . . trials that Russia has been called to remove, are not only physical but also moral . . .

Ivan Aksakov, 1877

Russia is the propeller and commander of our entire Slavic family: let us go forward all as one in the spirit of our people, under the guidance of our historically-affirmed tribal elder, [Russia].

Ludovit Stur, 1850s

I. Introduction

Russian panslavism is an aggressive variant of nationalism that developed in the nineteenth century,² became politically empowered in 1875-78, and reemerged in Russian political discourse in the years preceding World War I. It emphasized the idea

¹This quote and all others below, if footnoted from Russian and French sources, are translations by the author.

²Panslav ideas had appeared, however, before the middle of the nineteenth century. The earliest panslavs highlighted cultural and linguistic similarities between Russians and other Slav peoples who, in the late eighteenth century, comprised minorities in the Austrian, Turkish, and Prussian empires. In the 1850s to 1870s, panslavism evolved from a culturally-oriented set of ideas to a more concrete political ideology that "confirmed the superiority of Slavs over other nations and Russia's calling as a hegemon in the Slavic world." See Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1967), p. 793; see also Frank J. Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia. Karazin to Danilevsky 1800-1870 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1962), pp. 11-72.
that Russians were bound by ethnicity, religion, and/or language to neighboring Slav peoples, including Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, and even Greeks. Together, these peoples, under the leadership of a hegemonic Russia, were to form a powerful national and political entity that would surpass the western world in its power, brilliance, and accomplishments. The ideas of panslavism, although extremely popular at specific points in time, never created a sustained mass movement nor enjoyed enduring official support in tsarist Russia. In 1875-1878, however, these ideas gained support from members of Russia's highest policymaking circles and from Russian society as a whole. In 1875-76, for example, panslav propaganda roused thousands of ordinary Russians and military personnel to volunteer, without official sanction, in the Serbian army and help fight a Serbian war of liberation against Turkey. The widespread popularity of panslavism during these years ultimately influenced the tsarist government's decision to go to war against Turkey in 1877 to free Slav "brothers" suffering from imperial Ottoman rule. As many as two hundred thousand Russians gave up their lives in the bloodshed that followed.3

Russian panslavism meets the criteria I outlined in Chapter 1. One of what constitutes aggressive or malevolent nationalism. It favored (albeit not exclusively) ethnic and cultural criteria for membership in the nation, and implied the need to unite all members of the nation—i.e., Slavs—under Russia. It also preached a chauvinistic and imperialistic self-image that positioned Slavs above other nations, justified Russian hegemony over other Slavs, and maligned outsiders, especially the "West." The

panslav self- and other-image automatically pitted Russia and its Slav allies against western states and other enemies, and encouraged aggressive action toward outsiders whom panslavs portrayed as obstacles to the fulfillment of Slavic historical destiny and national potential. The panslav national mission was also aggressive: it aimed to unite all Slavs in one political entity under Russian leadership, thereby putting Russia in direct conflict with other nineteenth-century imperial rulers, particularly Austria-Hungary and Turkey, both of which ruled over large numbers of Slav subjects in their respective empires.

In this chapter, I will implement the framework of inquiry elaborated in Chapter One to explain why panslavism, a malevolent brand of nationalism, became politically empowered in Russia. Empowerment means that panslav ideas were propagated in diverse and effective fora, resonated deeply and widely with the articulate public, and ultimately gained support from, and influenced the decisions of, policymakers in key Russian institutions including, in this case, the tsar and his circle, the foreign ministry, and the war ministry.

The literature on Russian panslavism, written primarily by historians, offers some explanations for the rise and impact of this ideology, but these explanations are incomplete and do not stem from explicitly stated, systematic, and testable propositions. One argument, articulated by the historian Hans Kohn and others, focuses on the role of Russia’s small educated class in the nineteenth century. Kohn notes that these intellectuals, coming “face-to-face” with Russian backwardness relative to European states, sought and propagated an ideology that asserted Russia’s unique identity (in comparison with Europe), spiritual greatness, and immense material and political
potential. Hence, they developed and propagated Russian panslav ideas. This explanation echoes the concept of ressentiment, which I described in the previous chapter. Elites experience ressentiment when they compare themselves with outsiders, determine that their relative status is inferior, and conclude that they are unable to catch up with their rivals. They promote aggressive nationalism to correct the dissonance they feel between their actual status and what they think it should be. Ressentiment helps to explain the chauvinistic and imperialistic content of panslavism and why educated elites were motivated to propagate it, but does not explain why political elites in the highest echelons of power eventually supported this ideology. As Kohn himself notes, many members of the tsarist court and government in the nineteenth century were not initially drawn to ideas of panslav solidarity; they tended to be Europeanized and were interested in modernization and closer contacts with Europe. In this chapter, I examine multiple variables to show not only why educated and intellectual elites articulated panslavism, but also to explain why panslav ideas eventually rose to the top of Russian political discourse and had an impact on decisionmaking in foreign policy.

Another argument focuses on the international system. First, scholars note that the Crimean War in 1853-1856 caused many Russian elites to feel that the western powers, particularly Austria, were unreliable allies, and that Russia faced an “unreasoning European hatred” towards it. Russia needed to find true allies, and the only credible candidates were the Slavs. Second, Russian intellectual and political

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elites who supported panslavism did so because they were imitating the successful
nineteenth century unification of Germany (under Bismarck) and Italy. Indeed, Russian
panslavs pointed to the racial-linguistic basis of both German and Italian unifications as
an example for Slavs to emulate. Panslavs argued that only when Russia was able to
unify the numerous Slav peoples of Europe under its wing could it hope to generate
strength on a par with the other European powers. This argument became even more
compelling when coupled with problems of internal instability triggered by such events
as the Polish uprising of 1863 in Russia. The threat that Russia might disintegrate
when other powers were consolidating themselves on a national basis created a strong
rationale in support of panslav nationalism.\(^5\) This explanation renders insights on how
domestic and international factors might combine to increase the attraction and
credibility of an aggressive nationalist ideology. I incorporate this type of explanation in
my chapter, but I offer an explanatory framework that states more explicitly what I
believe to be the impact of sets of domestic and international variables on empowering
aggressive nationalism. I also offer a conclusion that underlines the pivotal role of
international variables, particularly threats, crises, and opportunities, in the
empowerment of panslavism in Russia.

In this chapter, I show that national humiliation, arising primarily from Russia’s

\(^5\)Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 103-79; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 199-
239; Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign
Policy in Russia 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1987), pp. 60-62; and A. N. Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom i nastoiashchem (St.
Russians and Poles created ideological and political problems for panslavism. I will
write more on this issue in the section below on the content of Russian panslavism.
defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, stimulated intellectual elites (who had political sympathizers) to articulate aggressive panslav ideas. But national humiliation was insufficient to propel panslavism to the top of the Russian political agenda, especially in foreign policy. I argue that four controlling variables contributed directly to the political empowerment of panslav ideas after they had been articulated as a response to national humiliation. First, severe and prolonged internal instability discredited Russia's autocratic government and created pressure for political elites to pay attention to panslav demands from below. Internal instability stemmed from the rise of the concept of the people or narod as the source of political legitimacy (as opposed to divinely foreordained monarchy); the fragmentation of state elites at the top echelons of power, which resulted in ineffectual policies to stem the tide of panslavism; and the difficulties of domestic reform and the beginnings of terrorism in Russia. Second, although the domestic incentive structure offered few political rewards for proponents of panslavism, it did present potential material and other parochial rewards for some individuals and groups who, as a result, promoted panslav ideas. Third, effective social communication, stemming from advances in mass education and mass press, the loosening of censorship, the incompetence of evaluative units that might combat panslav propaganda, and the lack of strong, alternative ideologies, also facilitated the empowerment of panslavism.

Fourth, threats and opportunities in the international system contributed to the political triumph of panslavism. Panslavism offered solutions to threats against Russian national interests, particularly the need to reassure Russia's strategic access to the Black Sea straits and ensure Russian influence over other Slav nationalities. These
interests were critical in the context of a crumbling Ottoman Empire and an unreliable system of alliances and agreements among the great European powers. Further, the rise of indigenous nationalism among Slavs in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires—and the failure of traditional great power diplomacy to resolve crises associated with Slav rebellion against oppressive rulers—made arguments for panslav mobilization and solidarity highly compelling. Finally, the lack of a united position among European powers to oppose Russian aggression on behalf of the Slav peoples created an opportunity for Russia to pursue panslav action, at minimal or low cost to itself.

Section II below gives a brief history of panslavism and describes slavophilism, its relatively benign nationalist philosophical precursor. In Section III, I describe Russian national humiliation after the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the aggressive nationalist reaction that arose in response to it. Next, I describe the content of panslavism as the most dominant expression of malevolent nationalism in Russia in 1856-1878, and chronicle manifestations of its political empowerment, especially in 1875-1878. In Section IV, I test hypotheses on the impact of four controlling variables to explain the empowerment of panslavism: internal instability, the domestic incentive structure, social communication, and threats and opportunities in the international system. Section V describes the impact of panslavism and its proponents on state decisions leading to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Finally, my conclusion summarizes the role of national humiliation and my four controlling variables in explaining the rise of aggressive panslavism and its impact on Russian foreign policy in 1856-1878.
II. Panslavism: Historical and Philosophical Background

A. History of Panslavism

Russian panslavism is only one expression of panslav ideology, and notably the most expansive, aggressive, and hegemonic. It preached Russia's holy calling as the liberator of all Slavs and the rightful leader of a united Slav federation to be created from the subjects of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires.\(^6\) Preachers of this ideology were primarily Russians. With few exceptions, non-Russian panslavs advocated more liberal and non-chauvinistic versions of panslavism, including 1) Jan Kollar's cultural panslavism based on literary and intellectual reciprocity among the Slavs; 2) Frantisek Palacky's austroslavism, which advocated territorial integrity for Austria-Hungary so long as Slavs could enjoy the same rights as the empire's dominant German and Hungarian nationalities; 3) democratic panslavism, preached by the Society of United Slavs and the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in early nineteenth century Russia, which favored an egalitarian Slav federation among Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, and other Slavs; and 4) Karel Kramar's neoslavism, prominent in 1908-1910, which preached democracy, equality, justice, and religious freedom for all Slavs, and reconciliation between Russia and Poland.\(^7\)

\(^6\)Russian panslavism is a type of "hegemony nationalism," or a motivation for action by a national group that believes it can derive advantage from consolidating smaller units into larger and more dynamic entities. See Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of Nationalism (NY: Paragon, 1990), p. 241.

\(^7\)A non-Russian who supported Russian hegemonic panslavism was the Slovak, Ludovit Stur, who died in 1856. A publicist and politician, Stur became famous as a panslav theorist only posthumously in Russia. Panslav professors in St. Petersburg and
In Russia itself, the hegemonic version of panSlavism emerged and matured in 1856-1870. However, Russian interest in the Slavs of the Ottoman empire dated back to the reigns of Peter the Great (1682-1725) and Catherine the Great (1762-96). These monarchs took an interest in Orthodox Slavs outside Russia primarily for geopolitical reasons, viewing the Slavs as an asset to Russia in its dynastic competition with nearby empires. Many ordinary Russians also gained firsthand acquaintance with their Slav neighbors during the course of Russia’s wars with Turkey in the eighteenth and early


nineteenth centuries. In 1774, after winning a war with Turkey, Russia gained the legal status of protector of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte (the governing center of the Ottoman empire) and the right to build a church in Constantinople. Thereafter, Russia's right and, in the opinion of some, even divine calling, to protect the southern Slavs became a persistent idea or myth in Russia. But early imperial and popular interest in the southern Slavs notwithstanding, panslavism did not become a coherent political ideology until later in the nineteenth century.

In 1812-1813, incipient panslav sympathies in Russia became apparent as the press celebrated Slav successes in a Balkan League war against Turkey. Slavic cultural societies solicited money and medicine to aid the southern Slavs, and held Slavonic banquets in Moscow and St. Petersburg, in which participants sang patriotic songs and gave fiery speeches favoring the Slav struggle for liberation. The tsarist government, not wishing to offend the ruling Habsburgs of Austria, who had their own share of restive Slav subjects, eventually curtailed public manifestations of support in Russia for the Slavs.⁹

Although there was a political element in Russian popular support for the Slavs in 1812-1813, for most of the first half of the nineteenth century (1801-1855), panslavism developed mainly as an academic and cultural program to increase knowledge and understanding between Russia and its Slav neighbors.¹⁰ Russians went to Slav lands to

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¹⁰There were some activists who did lobby for political panslavism in the early 1800s. Foremost were V. N. Karazin, who lobbied the foreign ministry to assist the Slavs in 1804-1807; V. B. Bronevskii, a naval officer who wrote two books arguing that Russia
study, and Slav students, especially Bulgarians, received scholarships to study in Russia. Slavic studies chairs were established at Moscow University, and newspapers and journals began to publish articles on the Slavs, their lands, and their cultures. Further, official institutions, such as the ministry of foreign affairs and war ministry, sponsored historical, military-strategic, and other studies of the Balkan Slavs and Russia's wars with Turkey. These efforts helped spread knowledge of the Slavs in Russia, but panslavism did not gain a firm foothold in official circles. The tsarist government, especially under Nicholas I (1821-1855), deemed panslavism a subversive ideology; because it preached the liberation of small nations from tyrannical rulers, the tsar feared that it would undermine the legitimacy of all of Europe's imperial regimes, including Russia. Indeed, Nicholas I correctly assessed the danger of panslavism. Many of the earliest panslav societies in Russia did reject autocratic rule, favored the abolition of serfdom, and advocated autonomy for all Slav national units, including Poles, in the Russian empire.

should use its military power to free the Slavs and lead a Slav federation to fight any European coalition that might form against Russia; and M. P. Pogodin, a prominent professor who wrote a series of panslav memoranda to Minister of Education S. Uvarov in 1839-1842. See Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation; hereafter, GARF), f. 1750, op. 1, d. 32; Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, pp. 76-80, 84; and Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 12-13.

11Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 12-59 and Dostoian, Russkaia obshchestvennaia mysli, pp. 186-208.

12Panslav ideas also influenced members of the Decembrist uprising of 1825, which marked the first indelible sign of rupture between Russian gentry society (the stronghold of monarchical support) and tsarist authority. See Dostoian, Russkaia obshchestvennaia mysli, pp. 222-53.
Slavophilism: Precursor to Panslavism

Slavophilism was a set of relatively benign nationalist ideas that gained prominence among a coterie of intellectuals in the 1830s and 1840s. The slavophiles, as proponents of these ideas were known, never created a political program or movement, but articulated ideas that panslavs echoed. The most prominent slavophile thinkers were: Ivan Kireevskii (1806-56); Aleksei Khomiakov (1804-60); Konstantin Aksakov (1817-60); and Yuri Samarin (1819-76). These gentlemen came from Russia's conservative upper and petty nobility; all were educated, though they were not

\[\text{Slavophilism manifested the influence of romanticism in Russian philosophical circles in the 1820s to 1840s. Much of Russian romanticism came from Germany, where many young Russians studied and traveled. The government of Nicholas I deemed it safer to send Russian youth to a respectably despotic Germany than a chronically revolutionary France, where they might be infected by dangerous ideas. Two aspects of romantic thought became salient among Russian intellectuals: 1) the doctrine that "every human being, country, race, and institution has its own unique, individual, inner purpose which is itself an 'organic' element in the wider purpose of all that exists, and that by becoming conscious of that purpose it is, by this very fact, participating in the march towards light and freedom"; and 2) the idea that the West was in decline because of its rationalism, materialism, skepticism, and abandonment of traditional spiritual values; as a result, Russia (or Germany, in the case of German romanticism), because of its youthfulness as a nation, its raw and barbaric energy, and its lack of education (its "purity") had the greatest potential for glorious accomplishment and leadership in the future. See Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (NY: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 119-20.}\]

thoroughly Europeanized like the majority of the upper Russian aristocracy. The
slavophiles shared an affinity for Moscow and the countryside, where their family
estates were located. They saw Moscow as more thoroughly "Russian" compared to
the "European" St. Petersburg. Moscow represented old Russia, old noble families,
mysticism, conservatism, the capital of religious life, and the bastion of resistance
against rationalist, revolutionary, and liberal thought. In contrast, St. Petersburg was
the new, westernized Russia of Peter the Great, a modern city without a past, the cradle
of raznochintsy or newcomers to the noble class, and the center of dangerous liberal
and socialist thought. Many slavophiles were also veterans of the literary and
philosophical salons that proliferated in Russia in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{15}

Slavophilism emerged primarily in response to a strand of Russian thought
known as westernism. Westernism (a label coined by the slavophiles to denote the
national apostasy of their ideological opponents) originated from Petr Chaadaev's
(1794-1856) \textit{Lettre philosophique ecrite a une dame}, published in 1836 in the Russian

\textsuperscript{15}Philosophical and literary circles emerged in Russia in the wake of gentry liberation
from compulsory service to the tsar in 1762. One of the most prominent was the
"Society of Wisdom Lovers," which nurtured such future slavophiles as I. Kireevskii and
A. I. Koshelev. The Wisdom-Lovers reacted against eighteenth-century rationalism,
searched for a truly "divine" philosophy, and looked to German romanticism for new
truths. They subscribed to romantic nationalism, and believed that Russia should have
a distinctive and organic national culture and mission. The Society disbanded in 1825,
shortly after the tsarist government crushed the Decembrist revolt, but members
continued to publish their ideas in Moskovskii vestnik, edited by the panslav Pogodin.
See Walicki, \textit{History of Russian Thought}, pp. 74-77; Fadner, \textit{Seventy Years of Pan-
Slavism}, p. 185; and P. N. Sakulin, \textit{Iz istorii russkogo idealizma. Kniaz' V. F. Odoevskii,
journal Teleskop (Telescope). In this letter, Chaadaev stressed that Russia was an isolated, rootless entity. It belonged to neither East nor West, and had no historical continuity. Russia was isolated from the rest of the world because it chose Orthodoxy rather than the universal Church of Europe, Catholicism. For Russia to progress, it must repeat the entire European path of development from the beginning. In short, Chaadaev criticized Russia's past and attacked the notion of superiority of the Orthodox church and the traditional Russian folk (narod). He summed up:

We, Russians, like illegitimate children, come to this world without patrimony, without any links with people who lived on the earth before us; ... This is a natural result of a culture based wholly on borrowing and imitation. There is among us no inward development, no natural progress; ... We grow, but we do not mature; we advance, but obliquely, that is in a direction which does not lead to the goal. ... Isolated in the world, we have given nothing to the world, we have taken nothing from the world; we have not added a single idea to the mass of human ideas; we have contributed nothing to the progress of the human spirit. And we have disfigured everything we have touched of that progress.  

The slavophiles agreed with Chaadaev that Russia was fundamentally different from the West—even isolated from it. However, this isolation was not Russia's bane but its blessing. Because Russia did not have the legacy of western development, it maintained its wholeness as an organic entity, its harmonious model of social development, and its true Christian faith. It remained loyal to sobornost' (communality),

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16Chaadaev was a Russian noble who served in the tsarist army and sympathized with the anti-tsarist Decembrist movement in the 1820s. He did not join the movement, but opted to leave the army in 1821. In 1823-1826, he lived abroad, confirmed his sympathy for Roman Catholicism and, in 1828-1831, wrote eight philosophical letters elaborating his world view.

the organizing principle of the Russian peasant commune, based on brotherhood, general accord, and harmonious coexistence. Russia was an "organic" entity, suffused with the feeling of unity and free from the internal strife caused by race and class in the West. The West was too rationalistic, juridical, atomistic, decadent, and violent. In the individualistic West, people did not live in harmony and faith; their social contracts reflected soullessness and selfish calculations that dominated in a "technico-logical" civilization. Slavophiles portrayed Russia as fundamentally peaceful and the West, aggressive. In the words of K. Aksakov:

All European states are formed through conquest. Enmity is their fundamental principle. Government came there as an armed enemy and established itself by force among the conquered peoples. . . . The Russian state, on the contrary, was founded not by conquest, but by a voluntary invitation of the government. . . . Thus in the foundation of the Western state: violence, slavery, and hostility. In the foundation of the Russian state: free will, liberty, and peace. [Emphasis in original.]

To slavophiles, the Orthodox religion was another pillar of Russian greatness. Russia was the cradle of Orthodoxy, the only church that preserved collective or supraindividual Christian consciousness in its purity. All other churches, including Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, were tainted by the virus of rationalism. In Aleksei Khomiakov's assessment, Catholicism had replaced sobornost' with utilitarian

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19K. Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, p. 8. Slavophile aversion to the West came early when, as young men, Petr and Ivan Kireevskii and Aleksei Khomiakov traveled to Europe and expressed severe displeasure and disgust about the West in their notes and letters. See Riasanovksy, Russia and the West, pp. 60-156; Walicki, History of Russian Thought, pp. 93-99; and Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 120-21.
calculations and blind submission to authority (i.e., the pope). Protestantism, on the other hand, was a splintered faith and the "religion of lonely individuals lost in an atomized society." Religion and faith, indeed, occupied a central place in slavophile thought, and slavophiles like Khomiakov postulated that Orthodoxy could save Europe by bringing about the transformation of European intellectual life. Russia did not need to conquer the West militarily because its spiritual faith was sufficient to bring the errant West back to the true Christian fold.

A critical area of slavophile interest was Russian internal politics. This, arguably, was the greatest distinction between them and panslavs, because the latter's prescriptions dealt more with Russian great power foreign policy than internal reform. Slavophiles generally supported autocracy because they believed it was founded on mutual trust between the sovereign and his subjects. They believed it was the most appropriate system for Russia, whose citizens, unlike westerners, did not seek freedom to participate in politics, but freedom from politics; this meant the right to live according to unwritten rules of faith and tradition, and pursue full self-realization in a social sphere in which the monarch did not intervene. Moral convictions, rather than western-style legal guarantees or representative institutions, were the best insurance for fair and harmonious relations between monarch and people. At the same time, slavophiles acknowledged the difficult internal social conditions under which Russians lived. They highlighted Russia's social ills, deplored government censorship, and advocated the abolition of serfdom. Many of them became active participants in Russian politics under

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Alexander II (1856-1881), when the government finally eliminated serfdom and implemented other sorely needed internal reforms. The slavophiles were inward-looking to a great degree, and believed that reform at home was a priority over foreign messianic ventures on behalf of Russia's Slavic brethren.  

To summarize, classical slavophilism focused on the internal spiritual life of Russians, emphasized religion over race or politics as the basis of Slav commonality, claimed that Russia was inherently unique and superior to the West, and advocated internal change rather than imperial or hegemonic politics abroad as Russia's highest priority. Although the slavophile self-image contained chauvinistic elements, slavophilism as a set of nationalist ideas remained benign because its proponents engaged in honest self-criticism and recommended actions that focused on improvements inside Russian state and society. As a matter of course, slavophiles did not propose aggressive action on behalf of oppressed Slavs in other empires, nor were they enamored with the idea of a panslav federation led by Russia.

By 1860, most of the slavophile leaders were dead, including Khomiakov, the Kireevskii brothers and Konstantin Aksakov. Their co-thinkers and sympathizers who remained--particularly Yurii Samarin, Ivan Aksakov, and others--shifted emphasis from philosophy and religion to politics and race. Taking an openly panslav approach, they

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21In Khomiakov's opinion, serfdom was the greatest social and moral evil in Russia. See Lavrin, Russia, Slavdom, pp. 86-100. See also Richard Wortman, "Koshelev, Samarin, and Cherkassky and the Fate of Liberal Slavophilism," Slavic Review 2 (June 1962), p. 261; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 183-84, 220-22, 236-37; and O. Smal, "The Crimean War and Slavophiles," pp. 122-31, in J. G. Purves and D. A. West, eds., War and Society in the Nineteenth Century Russian Empire (Toronto, Canada: New Review Books, 1972).
advocated Russian support for rebellious Slavs in Europe and the Ottoman empire. They argued that Russian foreign policy should emphasize assistance to the Slavs in their struggle for freedom. They also maintained that all Slav nationalities must submit to Russian leadership and rule. They did not favor equal relations between Russians and other Slavs, and censured Poles and Czechs who wanted to pursue independent agendas that would undermine Russian hegemony. Especially after the Polish uprising in Russia in 1863, it became evident that slavophilism had yielded to Russo-centric pan-slavism—a chauvinist, expansionist, and hegemonic ideology.  

III. National Humiliation and Aggressive Nationalist Reaction

A. The Crimean War and Its Aftermath

There is no need in this chapter to expound in detail the causes of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Briefly, the war was a culmination of a long series of events surrounding the "eastern question," or the future of the declining Ottoman empire. Both Russia and Britain desired to prevent each other from gaining control of Turkey because such control could give one side undue advantage in their ongoing imperial competition. In 1844, after Tsar Nicholas I visited Britain, Russia believed it had an agreement with Britain to preserve the status quo in case a crisis arose in the Ottoman empire. If the status quo could not be maintained, then Russia and Britain would divide the crumbling empire between them. Russia also believed it had Austrian and Prussian support in this

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22 Walicki, History of Russian Thought, pp. 92, 111-14; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 19-38; and Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Pan-slavism, p. 29.
arrangement.

In 1850, a dispute broke out in the Holy Land between Orthodox and Christians over certain rights to some of the most sacred shrines of Christendom. In February 1853, Russia issued Turkey an ultimatum to settle the dispute in favor of the Orthodox and to recognize openly the rights of Orthodox subjects within the empire. The Porte yielded on the first point, but not on the second. A series of other actions of dismal diplomacy followed, and hostilities broke out between Turkey and Russia in October 1853. Britain and France joined the war on behalf of the Porte in March 1854, while Austria exerted strong diplomatic pressures on behalf of the allies against Russia.

During the Crimean War, Russia found itself fighting alone against a formidable European coalition. Although the war was fought in part in the Caucasus and the Danubian principalities, its main front was the Crimean peninsula. In particular, the allies sought to capture the Russian naval base at Sevastopol. For almost a year, Russian soldiers fought heroically to defend Sevastopol against the allies' unrelenting bombardment with superior weapons. Russian heroism notwithstanding, Sevastopol fell in September 1855. The war officially terminated in March 1856, when an international congress met and signed the Treaty of Paris.23

Russia's ignominious defeat at the hands of France and England delegitimized

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the idea of Russian solidarity and cooperation with the Great Powers of Europe which, up to then, was the basis of tsarist foreign policy. Nicholas I firmly believed that only such a policy could avert the threat of general anarchy and revolution. But, as the war clearly demonstrated, the other Great Powers did not reciprocate tsarist Russia’s approach. Russia’s defeat in the war was calamitous, and caused severe national humiliation. First, the war exposed Russian military backwardness and unpreparedness, particularly in military technology, human resources, transportation and other logistical support, and financing. D. A. Miliutin, Russian defense minister, wrote in 1856 that “despite the fully intensified production of our military factories, there was no possibility whatsoever for us to supply the entire army within a short time with similarly modern weapons as those in the hands of the opposing [British and French] armies.”24 The Russian army fought with obsolete muskets, while the allies used modern rifles; Russia had 35,000 men in the Crimea at the start of the war, while the allies had 60,000; Russian soldiers were inadequately clothed or sheltered, causing thousands to die of cold, exhaustion, typhus and other epidemics; and many Russian officers were ignorant and corrupt and unprepared to conduct a successful military campaign.25


25N. E. Dubrovin, Istoriia Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopola (St. Petersburg: tip. Tovarishchestva "Obshchestvennaia pol’za," 1900), p. xv; John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (NC: Duke University Press, 1979), p. 558; Berkov, Krymskaia kampaniia, pp. 85-87; S. K. Bushuev, Krymskaia voina (Moscow: izd. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1940), pp. 123-24; and Riasanovsky, History of Russia, pp. 338-39. Russian military backwardness had roots in prevailing socio-economic conditions. In 1855-1859, 50 million of Russia’s 60 million population were peasants; of these, 23 million were
Second, national humiliation stemmed also from Russian losses in the war, ultimate defeat, and subsequent conditions imposed by the victors. As many as 340,000 Russians died in the last two years of the war alone—a figure that equaled the number of Russian fatalities in all wars in the entire second half of the eighteenth century. The defense of Sevastopol itself claimed over 100,000 lives. In addition, the war almost brought Russian external trade to a halt, and military expenditures created a huge deficit that brought Russia to the verge of bankruptcy. The Treaty of Paris, although moderate in not imposing any foreign occupation of Russian territory, nonetheless was a "disaster for Russian interests and a defeat for the major policies adopted in Eastern affairs during the century."26 Russia ceded to Turkey the mouth of the Danube and part of Bessarabia, accepted neutralization of the Black Sea (i.e., Russia suffered humiliation because it was prohibited from maintaining a navy or building coastal fortifications on its own territory), lost its legal position since 1774 as protector of the Porte's Orthodox subjects, and accepted international control over the Danubian principalities and over navigation on the Danube. In essence, Russia bowed to French and British influence in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire and to French, British, and Austrian influence over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia. An anonymous note, heavily marked in the margins by Tsar Alexander II and foreign

serfs on noble estates or state lands. Russia also had only 650 miles of rail, built mostly by Americans using American capital. See W. E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia, rev. ed. (NY: Collier Books, 1962), chap. 1 and Riasanovsky, History of Russia, pp. 346-47.

minister K. Nesselrode in 1856, noted that the Paris Treaty meant “the diminution of Russian possessions and Russian prestige as a Great Power . . . [Russia] has emerged from the struggle belittled in the eyes of public opinion and weakened in its political capability.”

Third, Russia was humiliated by the betrayal that it felt at the hands of its fellow European powers, especially Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia. Although the last two did not officially join the alliance against Russia, they nonetheless openly showed signs of preparation to join the allies, particularly as Russia’s position in the war worsened. There was also a pervasive feeling in Russia that France and Britain actually fueled Russo-Turkish hostilities even while feigning to work on regulating the conflict in its early stage. Finally, Russian national humiliation stemmed from the sense that the Crimean War and Russia’s defeat exposed helplessness, decay, and rottenness (bespomoshchnost’, gnilost’) inside Russia itself. Liberal critics of tsarism called the war “degrading,” and many reacted to Russia’s dismal performance with disillusionment and anger. The articulate public felt that the nation (narod), despite its sacrifices of money and blood in the war, had been betrayed by its own government. The fall of Sevastopol, in particular, elicited public shame, shock, and outrage. In the words of two eyewitnesses:

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The news of the fall of Sevastopol made me weep. If I were in good health I would have joined the militia, without wishing victory for Russia, but with a desire to die for it. My soul was sick at this time. Here all honorable people, no matter what their opinions, hung their heads. . . . The people crowded into bars by the hundreds, in the city they moaned and crossed themselves in horror. The shock was terrible . . . as all had trusted the [official] printed statements about the impregnability of Sevastopol.29

Society's diminished trust and faith in the government became manifest in peasant uprisings and other actions expressing the desperation of Russia's serfs; louder and more strident opposition to the war from the articulate public, including intellectuals, journalists, educators, bureaucrats, and members of the nobility; and demands for internal political and social reform in Russia. Subversive political tracts and verses circulated, which mocked Russian officialdom, condemned "stupid, ignorant officials," and called on the people to rise against oppressive internal conditions in Russia.30 Clearly, national humiliation stemming from the war and its aftermath exposed the frayed and tattered fabric of relations between Russian state and society.

National humiliation stimulated an aggressive nationalist reaction from Russian intellectuals and opinionmakers. Government elites themselves largely desisied from extreme nationalism because they, more than the articulate public, knew the extent of damage the war had caused, worried about internal disorder in the state, and realized that state interests after the war required retrenchment rather than aggressive

29Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 552; see also pp. 550-59; Chikhachev, Velikie derzhavy, pp. 10-11; and M. A. Rakhmatullin, "Voiny Rossii v Krymskoj kampanii," Voprosy istorii 8 (1972), pp. 117-18.

30Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, pp. 536-49; Bestuzhev, Krymskaia voina, pp. 166-67; and Bushuev, Krymskaia voina, pp. 125-42.
nationalist posturing.\textsuperscript{31}

Public reaction to national humiliation included, first, reassertions of Russian greatness in the face of defeat. The public accorded returning military personnel a hero's welcome, replete with fiery speeches and patriotic entertainment. Commentators characterized the defenders of Sevastopol as Herculean, mythic warriors (bogatyry), whose actions embodied the “life-giving” forces of the people or narod. Many ignored Russia’s dismal military performance and instead extolled the greatness and moral superiority of the Russian army and navy, whose actions, allegedly, so impressed the European powers that they were compelled to impose moderate conditions on Russia in the Treaty of Paris. Yet others underlined Russian defeat as temporary, and insisted that present misfortunes would awaken Russia’s “sleeping forces” and lead it to “purification and exaltation.” Slavophiles, panslavs, and westernizers joined in the chorus asserting the people or nation as the key to Russian resurrection; only by heeding the voice of the people would the regime regain its moral authority and restore Russia to greatness.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31}Tsar Alexander II (Nicholas I died in 1855), for example, wrote to his friend Prince Bariatinskii in May 1857: “I must direct your attention again to the absolute need to diminish, at any cost, our expenses and even restrain our military operations for a year or two. The last three years of the [Crimean] war have had such a deplorable effect on our finances and it is of utmost urgency that we think of wise savings in order to get out of our current difficult situation, whose end may well be a crisis with consequences that we cannot foresee—and God help us!” [Emphasis in original. Translation from French by the author.] See Alfred J. Rieber, The Politics of Autocracy. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii 1857-1864 (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1966), p. 105.

\textsuperscript{32}Rakhmatullin, “Voiny Rossii,” pp. 117-18; Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, pp. 555-57; Bestuzhev, Krymskaia voina, pp. 150, 170-71; Bushuev, Krymskaia voina, pp. 132-33; and Berkov, Krymskaia kampaniiia, pp. 86-91.
Second, national humiliation generated tremendous anti-western rhetoric. Publicists highlighted the perfidy of the European powers and western "instinctive hatred" for Russia. Third, slavophile ideas became radicalized and transformed into an anti-western, hegemonic panslav ideology. In the aftermath of the Crimean war, opinionmakers like the Aksakov brothers and Pogodin expressed extremist views against the West and in favor of an aggressive Russian foreign policy to form a panslav federation with thirty million Slavs in Europe and the Balkans. Russia was surrounded by traitorous nations; to defend itself, Russia must gain the sympathy of its Slav kindred by championing their revolts and going to war on their behalf, if necessary. In Pogodin's opinion, war was inevitable and Russia must have a "permanent Slavic policy."

Chauvinism also featured prominently in the ascendant panslav rhetoric, which condemned Poles and western Slavs who were "contaminated" by the West because they did not accept Russian superiority and leadership, and who failed to grasp that, as the preserver of the true Slavonic way of life, Mother Russia's security superseded the rights of all other Slav peoples.

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33At the start of the Crimean War, the slavophile Khomiakov expressed sentiments indicative of a shift to aggressive nationalism. He praised the government's decision because it reflected official recognition of Russia's duty toward the Christian Slavs of Turkey. He characterized the war as a condemnation of immoral western policy that suppressed the strivings of another people. He also portrayed the war as the beginning of the ultimate triumph of slavdom and the Orthodox cause, and the spread of moral law to guide the future of mankind. He proclaimed that "human blood is precious, war is horrible—but the designs of Providence are inscrutable, and a task must be fulfilled whatever its rigors. Wave, flag! Sound, trumpet of battle! Nations! Forward to battle! God orders mankind to march on!" Quoted in Kohn, Panslavism, p. 132.

34Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 195, 211-14, 222-33; Chikhachev, Velike derzhavy, p. 9; and Bestuzhev, Krymskaia voina, p. 167.
B. Content of Panslavism

Much of the early fiery articulation of aggressive panslavism thus came as a reaction to Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War. Chief proponents of panslavism in the nineteenth century were Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), a publicist, professor of Russian history and contemporary of the slavophiles; Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), panslavism’s most ardent political agitator; Nikolai Danilevskii (1822-1885), a botanist, ichthyologist, and philosopher; Rostislav Fadeev, a major-general in the Russian army; Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887), an early liberal who turned into a reactionary publicist; V. I. Lamanskii (1833-1914), a scholar in Slavic studies; Nikolai Ignatev (1832-1908), diplomat and Russian ambassador to Constantinople; Mikhail Chemiaev, a Russian general who led the Serb army against Turkey in 1876, and others. I summarize below the key ideas that these men and their supporters shared. 35

1) Membership in the Nation

To panslavs, the key criteria for membership in the nation were ethnic, cultural, and political: race, religion, language, and submission to Russian authority and

35 These ideas represent the most salient elements of panslavism, although panslavs occasionally disagreed on the finer points of their ideology and how best to realize their goals. My list of panslavs here is also not comprehensive, but includes those who were most visible in activity and influential in theory. Danilevskii was not known initially for his panslavism; he was a member of the Petrashevtsy Circle, whose members the tsar executed or jailed in 1849 for their “subversive” socialist ideas. Katkov was a westernizer before becoming a panslav and great power propagandist. There were other panslav sympathizers such as the writer Fedor Dostoevskii, but I do not include him among the politically-motivated panslavs because of his dominant Christian mysticism and aesthetic philosophy. On Dostoevskii’s panslavism, see Hans Kohn, “Dostoevsky and Danilevsky. Nationalist Messianism,” pp. 500-515, in Simmons, ed., Continuity and Change.
leadership. In an 1838 letter to the tsarevich Alexander (the future Alexander II), for example, Pogodin referred to

... our brothers and cousins, the Slavs, who are scattered over the whole of Europe from Constantinople to Venice, from Morea to the Baltic and the North Sea, the Slavs in whose veins the same blood flows as in ours, who speak the same language as we do, and who therefore, according to the law of nature, sympathize with us, the Slavs who in spite of geographic and political separation form by origin and language one spiritual entity with us.36

Panslavs spread the myth (debunked by later historians) of common geographic and linguistic origin for all Slavs, and argued that Russia was a remnant of a once unified Slav people. They also lobbied, at the 1867 Slav congress in Russia for instance, for Russian to be made the official Slavic language. Some panslavs esteemed language over religion as a basis for unity, but the subsequent evolution of panslav ideas and actions (e.g., rejection of Slavic Poles and acceptance of Orthodox Greeks) indicated that religion and loyalty to Russia were the foremost criteria for membership in the nation.37

Although there were multiple criteria for membership in the Slav nation, panslav writings indicate that acceptance of Russia's hegemonic role and authority was decisive. Thus, Russian panslavs rallied at different times behind different Slav groups,

36Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, p. 87; see also M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-politicheskie pis'ma i zapiski 1853-1856 (Moscow: V. M. Frish', 1874), pp. 1-14.

37Some Russian panslavs did concede at the 1867 congress that non-Russian Slavs may incorporate into Russian parts of their own languages. See Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 142-43; N. P. Barsov, Slavianskii vopros i ego otnoshenie k Rossii (Vilnius: tip. A. Syrkina, 1867), pp. 5-11; and Luciani, La societe des slaves, pp. 9-29.
depending on who adhered most closely to Russian interests and preferences.\(^{38}\) For example, they included in the Slav nation the Greeks—who were not Slavic by race, but Orthodox in religion and an ally of Russia—but not the Poles—who were Slavic in race but Catholic in religion, and were also the Russian empire’s most mutinous and ungovernable subjects. Indeed, Russia had a big headache in Poland. Until 1918, Poland and Finland were the only two subject nations of the Russian empire to ever demand separation from the Russian state. Panslavs harshly and uniformly condemned Poland as a state that had betrayed and lost its Slavic essence. They portrayed Poles as traitors who would catholicize Russia and whom Rome had fed with “mother’s milk of hate” for Russia and Orthodoxy. Panslav vilification of Poland intensified especially after the Polish uprising of 1863, when some declared Poland “an adopted son of the West, . . . which took Latinism into its flesh, blood, and spirit; severed itself from the Slav brotherhood; and became the vanguard army of the latinized West against the Orthodox Slavic world.” M. Katkov portrayed Russia and Poland as two nations engaged in a fatal struggle; one will live and the other will die.\(^{39}\)


2) Self-Image and Other-Image

Claims of uniqueness and superiority thoroughly suffused the self-image of Russian panslavs. They asserted that Slavs were unique and superior because they were peaceful, liberal, tolerant, democratic and never guilty of the forceful conquest of other nations. If religious or political intolerance existed in Russia, it was chiefly caused by westernized clergy and elites, and by such imported western institutions as censorship or bureaucracy. Moreover, intolerance in Russia was minor compared to similar problems in the West. Russia epitomized the strength and superiority of slavdom. It was rich physically and spiritually; it encompassed all soils and climates, and had plenty of natural resources. In Pogodin's words:

[We] have mountains of gold and silver, which have become almost extinct in Europe; we have bread to feed all of Europe in a year of famine; we have forests to rebuild Russia if, heaven forbid, it is burnt to the ground; . . . But the physical assets of Russia are nothing compared with its spiritual strengths. These include intelligence, daring, understanding, patience, and the military features of the Russian nation. All these assets form one gigantic tool, set most purposefully and successfully in the hands of one man—the Russian tsar—who, at any moment, can put this instrument into action by a single motion, give it direction, and set the appropriate speed. . . . I ask, who can compare with us? Whom will we not force into submission? Is not the political fate of Europe in our hands, and the fate of the whole world, if we will only decide one way or the other?40

Because Russia was strong and whole—indeed, it was the only free nation among the Slavs and the "truest repository of the Slavic ideal"—it was slavdom's legitimate leader, protector, and ruler.41

40Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, p. 88.

41Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 103 and 82-84, 97-103. Pogodin asked in a secret memorandum to Uvarov, Minister of Education: "Which of the Slav tribes occupies the first rank today? Which offers the best prospects for future greatness by virtue of its present state and history? . . . My heart trembles with joy. Oh,
Nikolai Danilevskii, pan Slavism's most systematic theorist, published a book in 1869 called *Russia and Europe*. In it, he devised a pseudo-scientific theory to justify the Slav nation's special position above other civilizations. He argued that every civilization constituted a distinct "historical-cultural type" which, like botanical organisms, undergoes a long period of development according to species-defined laws of nature, blooms momentarily, then dies. Some nations did not constitute civilizations but were only "ethnographic material," whose purpose was to be absorbed by, or become an adjunct to, the main players on the historical stage. Western civilization was an impressive "historical-cultural" type that developed in the political and cultural spheres, but was rotting and soon to die. The Slav type, in contrast, was young and ascendant, and its full development entailed the unprecedented synthesis of political, cultural, socio-economic, and military achievements in one civilization.  

Two other aspects of the pan Slav self-image dealt with notions of the state and the role of war in national development. Unlike their slavophile predecessors who supported the state because it was a necessary evil, Russian panslavs characterized the state positively as a *sine qua non* of national progress and development. Indeed, Russia, my dear fatherland! Is it not you?" See Pypin, *Panslavizm v proshlom*, pp. 88-89; see also Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism*, pp. 26-27 and 319-38; and Kohn, *Panslavism*, pp. 123-28 and 159-63.

without the state, an economically and militarily united slavdom would be impossible. A strong, centralized, and autocratic Russian state, specifically, was the best solution for the chaos and disunity that plagued slavdom; Russia could fulfill its highest potential as the leader of all Slavs by shunning western parliamentarism and unruly democracy. As I. Aksakov argued:

The Slav races have aspirations that are completely democratic, in the real sense of the word and not in the theoretical revolutionary sense so popular in Europe. . . . The ideal, which is more or less common to all Slav races, is local self-government, without any political bearing, sustained and crowned by a superior and central authority which is completely frank and free in the governmental sphere. . . . The people . . . do not seek to govern the state, but they definitely desire a government which can inspire confidence in them through its energy, force, and impartial and national character. The reason why the Russian people support the tsar is because the tsar . . . does not belong to any party or any social category. He is above and beyond everything, the first man of the country and, for the people, the personification of the nation. Supreme authority in Russia is not . . . a juridical and abstract issue as it is in constitutional states; what the Russian people want is an authority endowed with a human heart, a vital being, whose spirit and soul are authorized to supplement the formalism of bureaucracy and the dead letter of the law. [Emphasis in original.]^43

Although panslavs supported the autocratic state, they also argued that it must implement reform to eliminate such corrupt western influences as censorship, bureaucracy, and nihilism.

Panslavs characterized Russian state imperialism as generally benign. Russia absorbed other groups not by violent conquest, but by advancing these groups' interests and thereby obeying higher laws toward the establishment of the ultimate civilization of

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^43Panslav views on ideal government echoed the slavophile notion of an idealized peasant commune, where there was true freedom in the local sphere and the government itself was unencumbered by people's representatives in the sphere of high politics. See I. Aksakov's letter to the Bulgarian king (in French) in Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 403-404.
all time. They argued that the state, unlike individuals, was not subject to moral laws. States were secular and temporary entities, whose priority was to meet their greatest potential, whereas individuals were eternal beings who must abide by divine laws as they prepared to face God's judgment. The inapplicability of moral law to the state implied that the state was justified in defending panSlav interests, even if it meant harsh and aggressive policies toward Poland, Europe, and other enemies of Slavdom. As Danilevskii argued, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, . . . the Benthamite principle of utilitarianism, or the commonsensical understanding of what is in one's advantage—this is the law of foreign policy, the law of all interstate relations. There is no place here for the law of love or sacrifice."

Panslavs generally saw conflict and war as endemic in the struggle between Russia and its enemies, and between civilizations. They saw war between Russia and Europe, and between Russia and Turkey, as inevitable. Armed conflicts would bring about the liberation of Slavs and the creation of a united Slavdom led by Russia. Recalling the rhetoric of radicalized Slavophiles on the eve of the Crimean War in 1853, panslavs argued that war could have salutary effects on the nation: it would forge panSlav solidarity and cleanse Slavs of their subservience to western ideas and institutions. Danilevskii claimed that although war was evil, there was "something far worse than war, something for which war can also serve as a cure, for 'man shall not

44Russkaia politicheskaia mysli', p. 64; see also V. K. Tereshchenko, M. P. Pogodin v obshchestvenno-ideinoi bor'be 30-50kh godov XIX stoletiiia. Avtoreferat dissertatsii (Moscow: Gos. universitet im. Lomonosova, 1975), p. 26; Walicki, History of Russian Thought, pp. 292-94; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 305-338; and Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, p. 345.
live by bread alone." I. Aksakov, similarly, stressed that if war was so terrible, Prussia should have emerged tired and weak from its war with Austria in 1866. Instead, war infused Prussia with "living water, [and it] became younger, rejuvenated, and healthier from activity." In three years, Prussia fought another war with France and again emerged "greater in strength and glory, renewed, transformed . . ." By avoiding war, Russia would be turning away from greatness and risked becoming a secondary state like Holland or Belgium.\footnote{Danilevskii, \textit{Rossiia i Evropa}, pp. 474-75; Sochinenija I. S. Aksakova, pp. 576-77; 761; Petrovich, \textit{Emergence of Russian Panslavism}, pp. 257-58, 267-71, 281-82; Hunczak, "Pan-Slavism or Pan-Russianism," pp. 101-102; and Smal, "Crimean War and Slavophiles," pp. 123-26.}

In depicting outsiders, panslavs emphasized Europe's intrinsic inferiority and enmity for Russia and all Slav. They insisted that European civilization was not a universal civilization, and condemned Russian westernizers who deformed the true Slav spirit by importing western ideas and institutions. They described the West as a chaotic, atomized, and divided entity, whereas Russia was an organic entity still ruled by order and authority. The West hated Russia because it was waning in vitality, whereas Russia was still to attain full bloom.\footnote{Stephen Lukashevich, \textit{Ivan Aksakov 1823-1886. A Study in Russian Thought and Politics} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 123 and Smal, "Crimean War and Slavophiles," p. 126. These perceptions of the West became especially salient after the 1848 revolutions in Europe. These disturbances, according to panslavs, symbolized Europe's decay and strengthened their case for preserving a conservative order in Russia.} I. Aksakov claimed that western instinctive hatred for Russia stemmed from the deep "antagonism of two opposing spiritual and cultural systems, and the envy of a decrepit world towards the new."
Similarly, Pogodin denigrated Austria as a "whitened sepulchre, an old tree that [was] rotting inside," and would be uprooted from its roots by "one blow of the wind." His colleague, P. Shevyrev, added that the West carried "a terrible and contagious disease" which endangered the "true governmental and social health of Russia." The natural and inevitable conflict between Russia and Europe was the sole means for resolving the "eastern question" in Russian foreign policy, and Russia was divinely ordained to win this struggle and create a Slavic union to succeed western civilization.

The panslav other-image also targeted Poland (and, on occasion, Jews and other foreigners in Russia) as enemies of Russia and the Slav nation. While Russia was the bearer of Christ, Poland was Judas—corrupted by the western kiss. Without ever mentioning the horrors that Russia had inflicted on Poles from the time of Catherine the Great onward, panslavs condemned Poles for their disloyalty to Russia and slavdom. In completely sanctimonious tones, white-washing Russia's own behavior toward Poland, one panslav argued:

History has proven that the Poles are not capable of defending their statehood.

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47 Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, p. 5; see also Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, p. 90 and Kohn, Panslavism, p. 114. Panslav slander of the West sometimes reached hysterical proportions. When Danilevskii, for example, discovered vinicultural lice during one of his botanical expeditions, he asked Alexander II to ban foreign grapes from Russia because they were a sign of insidious western influence. In another incident, a Russian woman asked Pogodin to comment on western clothing, and the latter wrote that "western clothing was the beginning of foreign influence on Russia. By discarding it, we might begin to liberate ourselves from deadly foreign influences . . ." See Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv (Russian State Military Archive; henceforth, RGVIA), f. 213 (Khrulev), op. 1, d. 44, p. 21 and Macmaster, Danilevsky, pp. 146-74.

48 Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 337-38; Russkaia politcheskaia mysli', p. 19; MacMaster, Danilevsky, pp. 119-31; and Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 114, 123-29.
They have never tried to protect their motherland, which no one has attempted to take from them. Instead, they have always tried to seize foreign lands and, as the most faithful servants of Rome, catholicize them. This provoked revolts everywhere and brought Poland to the edge of death. [Poland obstructed the Slav unification process and was a] criminal before the entire Slav world.\(^{49}\)

Panslavs accused Poles, who were numerous and prosperous in the western region of the empire, as guilty of stealing Russian land, catholicizing a million Russians and, together with their Jewish co-conspirators, consuming the bread of Russian welfare.\(^{50}\)

3) National Mission

Panslavs defined the national mission in a manner consistent with their views on membership in the nation and their self- and other-image. The national mission had short- and long-term components, with the former being more prominent than the latter in panslav writings and actions. In the short-term, the national mission was to strengthen the Russian state and propagandize panslav ideas. Next, Russia should fulfill its divinely foreordained task of liberating the Slavs from Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule, and establishing with them a Slav federation. Danilevskii, for example, stressed that the national mission was not to defend such universal ideals as Christianity or traditional social bonds. Instead, it was to create a powerful state, an organism whose expansion would be limited only by the natural laws of evolution. He

\(^{49}\)Durnovo, Russkaia panslavistskaia politika, p. 29.

\(^{50}\)Barsov, Slavianskii vopros i ego otnoshenie, pp. 17-25 and Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 123-28. Baltic Germans were also targets of panslav vilification, as exemplified in Samarin’s journal, Okrany Rossiî (Russian Borderlands). In a letter to the journal in 1868, A. Kruzenshtern, an ethnic German, complained, “We [Germans] are all faithful subjects [of Russia] and not the scoundrels which you have conveniently portrayed.” See RGVIA, f. 678, op. 1, d. 628.
declared that slavdom ought to be, "after God, the supreme ideal of every Slav"; it should be "higher than freedom, . . . science, . . . education, . . . [and] all worldly goods."\(^{51}\)

Although Russia's national task of liberating the Slavs was divinely ordained, panslavs did not seek prophetic instruction regarding the fulfillment of this task. Instead, panslavs in the military and foreign ministry, such as Fadeev and Ignatev, worked out detailed geopolitical schemes toward the fruition of panslav dreams. Their schemes evaded altruism as a goal and emphasized panslavism as a means to expand Russian territory, increase Russian state power, and attain Russian supremacy in Europe. Further, when the Russian general Mikhail Cherniaev unofficially went to lead the Serbian army against Turkey in 1876, I. Aksakov heralded the event not as a step toward Serbian liberation, but as a move favoring Russian interests. "What is most important," he noted, was "that the chief of the Serbs is a Russian, a representative of the Russian idea and the Russian viewpoint on the Slav question . . . [It] is clear that Cherniaev . . . will augment the honor and grace of the Russian name among the Slavs."\(^{52}\)

The long-term mission of panslavism was to realize an evangelical vision of a

\(^{51}\)Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, p. 113.

\(^{52}\)Sochinenia I. S. Aksakova, p. 21. Panslavs believed that in the context of a crumbling Ottoman empire, Russia should assist the emergence of friendly states based on the Christian nations that were then "subject to the sultan's sceptre." See GARF, f. 730, op. 1, d. 538, p. 40. See also Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, p. 87; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 17 and 344-49; Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 260-61; Barsov, Slavianskii vopros, p. 16; and Rostislav Fadeev, Mnenie o vostochnom voprosе (St. Petersburg: tip. departamenta Udalova, 1870).
great Slav civilization leading and filling the whole earth. This civilization would move Europe's borders to their natural limits (naturally, allowing Russia to expand) and plant genuine Christian enlightenment in all the "wild and barren places of Asia." The Slav state would create a universal empire based on a universal order, and it would mean the fulfillment of the Slav role to "consummate, to crown the development of humanity, . . . to harmonize ancient and modern civilizations, to reconcile heart with reason, to establish real justice and peace . . ." This mission was so grand that if it failed, Danilevskii lamented that the "world would only be a miserable chain of accidents and not the reflection of supreme reason, right, and goodness."\(^53\)

C. Empowerment of Panslavism, 1856-1878

The height of panslav empowerment came in 1875-1878, culminating in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Before this, in 1856-1866, panslav proponents had fluctuating levels of success in promoting their political agenda. They received little or no official support, and at times encountered direct opposition from censors and other government officials. Many tsarist officials were of non-Slavic ethnic origin, were highly cosmopolitan, and favored a defensive foreign policy in the wake of Russian defeat in the Crimean War. They also resisted the types of social reforms that panslavs advocated, such as the removal of censorship; hence, they tended to be lukewarm, if

\(^{53}\) Barsov, Slavianskii vopros, pp. 4-12; Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, p. 89; and Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 118 and 159.
not hostile, to the panslav agenda.\textsuperscript{54}

The lack of official support for panslavism in the first decade following the Crimean War did not detract the most dedicated panslavs from their cause. In 1867, they organized a panslav congress in Moscow (under the guise of an ethnographic exhibition), which marked a triumphal moment in the development of panslavism. Momentum, however, soon dissipated because non-Russian delegates at the congress rejected the political program of Russian hegemony proposed by their Russian colleagues. Russian panslav agitation diminished in 1868-1874, and then returned in full force in 1875-1878. The three key indicators of panslav empowerment were 1) propagation of ideas in diverse and effective fora, 2) resonance of those ideas with the articulate public, and 3) institutional support.

1) Propagation of Ideas

From the late 1830s to the 1860s, panslav proponents consistently tried to publish papers and journals to inform the Russian public about their Slav kindred outside Russia, with the intent of cultivating sympathy for Slavic national liberation movements. Some of the earliest panslav publications did not have long lives, however, and ceased publication due to lack of funds or because they ran afoul of government censors.\textsuperscript{55} These were Moskvitianin (1841-1856), Moskovskii sbornik (1846-1847),


\textsuperscript{55}I. Aksakov tells of his problems with censorship in a letter to Pogodin in November 1858 in Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka (Russian State Library; hereafter, RGB), Manuscript Division, f. Pogodin/II, k. 1, ed. 36. See also M. S. Anderson, \textit{The
Russkaia beseda (1859), Den' (1861-1865), Moskva (1867), and Moskvich (1867-1868). These publications had relatively small audiences; Moskvitianin, for example, which lasted the longest of the early panslav publications (16 years), barely had 200 subscribers in 1846, compared to 3,000 for its westernizing counterpart, Otechestvennye zapiski. Besides setbacks in publishing, early panslav propaganda suffered from the occasional arrest of some of its avid promoters, including Samarim and I. Aksakov, who were arrested in 1848 and then released after brief detentions.

In the late 1860s, panslavs continued to publish newspapers, but still faced government opposition. Officials banned I. Aksakov's last two panslav publications, Moskva and Moskvich, in 1869. At the same time, other publicists, sympathetic to the panslav agenda and with arguably greater agility in dealing with officials, continued to publish. One was Katkov, whose Russkii vestnik (late 1850s), Moskovskie vedomosti (1863-1887), and Russkie vedomosti (1856-1887) carried articles propagandizing the fate of the Balkan Slavs and rousing Russian panslav nationalism. Moskovskie vedomosti was highly successful, with 12,000 subscribers in the 1860s. Besides

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Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 104-128.

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newspapers, panslavs also propagated their ideas in memoranda to government officials, and in books. Of particular importance were Danilevskii's *Russia and Europe* (1869) and Fadeev's *Opinion on the Eastern Question*; the latter was a guide on practical strategy and tactics for implementing a panslav geopolitical program. Although these books did not receive massive public attention, they were taken seriously in some circles and Danilevskii's treatise was translated into many Slavic and European languages.58

Another forum for the propagation of panslav ideas was Slav congresses. Of note was the 1867 Slav congress in St. Petersburg, which turned the Slav question into a headline item for nearly all publications in Russia, and sparked a major public debate on Russia's role and responsibilities toward its persecuted Slav relatives. Before the congress started, panslav and non-panslav publications heavily advertised the upcoming events, the biographies of non-Russian participants, and such issues as Slavic political and cultural unity and the fate of Slavs under Ottoman and Austrian rule. In addition, V. Lamanskii, a professor and member of the Slavic Committee, translated and disseminated widely for the first time in Russia the work of the deceased Slovak panslav, Ludovit Stur. Stur, who died in 1856, preached that a political union with Russia was the only means by which his fellow Slavs could throw off the yoke of the

58Danilevskii's book did not receive uniform support from all panslavs. The St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee, for example, refused to give him money to publish his book because the author had fallen out of favor with Committee officials. A member of the Committee, O. Miller, criticized the book for neglecting Russian internal reform, without which, in Miller's opinion, a panslav dream was impossible. See Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism*, pp. 340-41 and Thaden, *Russia Since 1801*, pp. 266-67.
foreigner and realize their full national potential within an independent state. The 1867 congress moved the panslav idea from "the realm of the book into life," as Russians witnessed a microcosmic image in the flesh of a united Slavdom whose potential membership could include 60 million Russians and at least 17 million oppressed western Slavs. Another Slav congress followed the next year in Prague, although Russians, led by professor Lamanskii, played only a secondary role in organizing this congress and determining its substantive content.

2) Resonance with the Articulate Public

Although the propagation of panslav ideas proceeded with ups and downs, these ideas did resonate over time among the articulate public. This resonance manifested itself in civic activism on behalf of, and public manifestation of support for, panslavism. In 1857, slavophiles and panslavs formed the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee. Approved by Tsar Alexander II in 1858, the Committee's overt *raison d'être* was to render assistance to Russia's Slav brothers, particularly the Bulgarians, in educational and religious matters. Although its avowed purpose was apolitical, the Committee reported directly to the foreign ministry's Asiatic department and used the department as

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60 Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety*, pp. 43-44, 56, 156-260. The congress in Prague was primarily a forum for non-Russian Slavs, who expressed their yearning for equal status with other nations of Europe, including Russia. See Stanley Buchholz Kimball, "The Prague 'Slav Congress' of 1868," *Journal of Central European Affairs* 22 (1962), pp. 179-80.
its liaison with Slav lands. Committee membership also included the most prominent
panslavs, who soon began to use the organization for blatantly political purposes.\textsuperscript{61}

After the 1867 Slav congress, branches of the Slavic Benevolent Committee were
organized in St. Petersburg in 1868, Kiev in 1869, and Odessa in 1870, and a Ladies
Section of the Moscow Committee was organized in 1870. The Moscow and St.
Petersburg branches became the most politically active of these organizations.\textsuperscript{62}

The 1867 panslav congress in Russia, organized by members of the Moscow
Slavic Committee, stimulated great resonance for panslav ideas. Although the initial
and formal occasion was a Slavic ethnographic exhibition, the congress became largely
a political event. In 1863-1867, while planning for the exhibition was in progress, the
Slavic Committee found itself in difficult straits, with its budget down to an all-time low of
R436 (rubles). It did not even have sufficient means to advertise the exhibition, and
members had to solicit outside sponsorship. Hard work paid off, and in May 1867,
Russian panslavs welcomed 62 Slav delegates, the majority of whom were Czechs, to
the Slav congress.

Official Russia did not initially welcome the idea of a Slav congress, but the

\textsuperscript{61}For a comprehensive account, based on archival materials, of the activities of the
Moscow Slavic Committee and its branches see Nikitin, \textit{Slavianskie komitety}, pp. 39-40;
see also pp. 82-90 for an account of the friendly relations between the Moscow
Committee and the Asiatic department. Although the majority of Committee members
were slavophile scholars of modest means, such ambitious and politicized personalities
as Pogodin, I. Aksakov, Katkov, Danilevskii, Ignatev, and Fadeev were also members.
See \textit{Slavianskii sbornik. Slavianskii vopros i russkoe obshchestvo v 1867-1878 godakh}

\textsuperscript{62}An attempt to open a branch in Voronezh failed because of insufficient public
government changed its mind upon witnessing the warm and energetic public response to the event. Thousands of Russians welcomed the Slav delegates at the train station, and approximately 30,000 ordinary citizens attended the Slavic ethnographic exhibition itself. The government extended its hospitality to Russia's Slav guests by hosting for them an official reception with the tsar and empress; in attendance were such illustrious figures as Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, foreign minister A. M. Gorchakov, and head of the Asiatic department, Stremoukhov. The Russian minister of education, D. A. Tolstoi, also hosted a luncheon for the Slav delegation. In what he called "unofficial" comments, Tolstoi expressed sympathy for his Slav guests, underlined the strength of ties between Russia and slavdom, and mentioned the grand future of the Slav tribe.\(^{63}\) During the congress itself, participants discussed prospects for Slavic political and linguistic unity, but disagreed on many points. In addition, Pogodin's denunciation of Poland roused a call for reconciliation from the non-Russian Slavs. In the end, the Slav delegates left without forging a strong base of cooperation with their Russian colleagues, and fearing that Russian hegemony would ultimately destroy their dream of independence and equality.\(^{64}\)

The publicity generated by the Slav congress of 1867 resonated widely in Russia and catalyzed the formation of branches of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee in St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Odessa. The St. Petersburg branch had 63 new members in


1868 and recruited 324 more in 1869 and 228 in 1870. The payment of dues to the Moscow Committee also gained momentum, with the Committee's budget increasing from R436 in 1867 to R9000 by 1868, just one year after the congress, and reaching a high of R12,000 in 1870.65

The diminished resonance of panslavism in Russia in 1871-1874 was a deceptive prelude to the explosion of panslav enthusiasm and activity in 1875-1878. The journal Zaria, which published Danilevskii's Russia and Europe in 1869, correctly predicted in 1871 that the "political idea of all-Slavdom [was] an idea of the future, a future that [was] clearly near and decisively irresistible."66 That future came indeed, beginning in September 1875 when the Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina staged a revolt against their Turkish overlords. Other uprisings soon followed, in Bulgaria and Serbia, and Serbia finally went to war against Turkey in July 1876.67 These crises in the Balkans helped propel the political empowerment of Russian panslavism.

The Russian setting in 1875 was such that, regardless of setbacks to the promotion of their ideas since 1856, panslavs had been able to propagate their ideas over almost two decades in numerous fora, including journals, newspapers, books, the

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65This enthusiasm waned in the early 1870s, with only one third of the Moscow Committee's 704 members continuing to pay their dues by 1874. As a result, the organization's budget fell to R500 in 1875. See Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 43-56, 156-260 and Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 151-52 and 193.

66Zaria, no. 7 (1871), p. 66 and Slavianskii sbornik, p. 9.

67I will write more about these uprisings in the section below on the international system. For the history and dynamics of these crises, see B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (London: Archon Books, 1962); Anderson, Eastern Question; and David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Panslavism 1875-1878 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967).
Slav congresses of 1867 in Russia and 1868 in Prague, and the civic and religious activities of the Slavic Benevolent Committees. While the rise of panslavism was not a straight or steep incline upward, years of effort did create a base of knowledge about, and sympathy for, the Slavs, among Russian elites and the larger public. Panslavs appealed to this base of knowledge and sympathy when crises broke out among the Balkan Slavs in 1875-1877. They relentlessly urged the Russian population and government not to desert the heroic Slavs in their struggle. I. Aksakov urged that it was "Russia's historical calling, moral right, and duty" to "free the Slav peoples from their material and spiritual yoke and give them the gift of independent spiritual and . . . political life under the shade of the powerful wings of the Russian eagle." Russia ought to be ashamed for leaving its brothers "in faith and ancestry" to cope on their own against the Muslim yoke. He asked, "are we not Christians, are we not Orthodox, are we not Russians, Slavs?"

During the crises of 1875-1876, Russian nobles, intellectuals from the Slavic Benevolent Committees, Orthodox clergy, and the larger Russian public displayed a unified outpouring of support for the Balkan Slavs. The Slavic Committees solicited material and financial donations on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Bulgaria, and

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68 Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 6 and 226. This refrain echoed over and over in panslav rhetoric over the course of decades, and the echo was particularly powerful in the 1870s in such publications as Cherniaev's Russkii mir, Katkov's papers, Dostoevskii's Diary of a Writer (1875-1878), and even liberal publications like Novoe vremia, which pledged to awaken society and change the government's mind to help the Balkan Slavs remove the Turks from Europe. See Slavianskii sbornik, p. 9; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, p. 327; and Thaden, Russia Since 1801, p. 266. For a sampling of the civic, educational, and religious activities of the Slavic Committees from 1858-1872, see GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 72.
Montenegro, and responded to requests from ordinary Russian citizens who wanted to volunteer in the Serbian army. From the eruption of the Herzegovina uprising in September 1875 to October 1876, the Slavic Committees collected R1.5 million for the Slavs, with donations increasing as panslav propaganda intensified. Russian Orthodox clergy also gave comfort to Orthodox Slavs in Herzegovina and urged them to keep their faith.\(^{69}\)

In 1876, an estimated 5000\(^{70}\) Russians volunteered to fight in the Serbian army against Turkey. Many of them were common people, including peasants, workers, low-ranked bureaucrats, and non-commissioned officers from big cities as well as the provinces. These people willingly sacrificed and shared their material and financial resources to help the struggling Serbs, and were first to go to the front when Russia formally declared war on Turkey in 1877. Reports from the tsarist secret police (the Third Section) confirmed the sincere sympathy of ordinary Russians for the Slav struggle in the Balkans. This sympathy was consistent with archival materials from the late 1850s and late 1860s, which showed Russian civic activism for the purposes of educational and material assistance to Bulgarians and other Slavs. During Russia’s war with Turkey in 1877-1878, draft evasion was low and morale high among the mass of

\(^{69}\)In the first ten months of solicitation, the Moscow Committee received only R151,458 in donations. The next four months after that, donations increased to more than R590,000. The St. Petersburg Committee collected R800,000 in the same period. Other sources estimate that donations might have even been as high as R3 million. Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 226-27 and Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 186-87. On financial and religious assistance to the Slavs, see GARF, f. 1099 (Filippov, T. I.), op. 1, d. 987-993 and RGVIA, f. 261 (Monteverde), op. 1, d. 15.

\(^{70}\)A Serb source puts this number at only 2,718. See Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, p. 187, fn. 1.
peasant recruits in the army, many of whom interpreted the war as a "quasi-holy struggle, almost a crusade, to rescue fellow Christians from the heathen Turk."\textsuperscript{71}

Finally, among cultural elites, the resonance of panslavism was evident as prominent writers like Dostoevskii and Fedor Tiutchev staunchly supported the panslav cause. Dostoevskii's periodical, \textit{Diary of A Writer}, incessantly propagandized panslav messianism from 1875-1878. Other luminaries in the world of Russian arts and sciences, including the writer I. Turgenev, sculptor M. Antokolskii, painter I. Repin, and scientist D. Mendeleev, joined Dostoevskii and Tiutchev in lobbying official support for the Slavs in 1875-1877.\textsuperscript{72}

3) Institutional Support

From the 1830s to the 1860s, some Russian government officials and members of the imperial court and upper nobility showed sympathy for panslav ideas, although these ideas did not become the centerpiece of official policy. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, Pogodin had access to high officials, including Uvarov, minister of education, to whom Pogodin addressed a series of panslav memoranda. Uvarov

\textsuperscript{71}Fuller, \textit{Strategy and Power}, p. 325. Peasant soldiers indeed displayed incredible heroism, sometimes covering 100 versts or over sixty miles on foot to reach their mobilization depots. They also endured hardships often imposed by the blunders of their very own commanders. See L. I. Narocznitskaia, \textit{Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie na Balkanakh 1875-1878} (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp. 24-28 and 40-41; Nikitin, \textit{Slavianskie komitety}, p. 320; O. A. Yakovlev, \textit{Russko-turetskaia voina 1877-1878 gg. i russkoe obshchestvo}. \textit{Avtoreferat dissertatsii} (Leningrad: Gos. univ. im. A. A. Zhdanova, 1980), p. 10; RGVIA f. 261 (Monteverde), op. 1, d. 18 and GARF f. 1750, op. 1, d. 82.

\textsuperscript{72}Narocznitskaia, \textit{Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie}, pp. 37-38.
subsequently spearheaded a panslav-oriented search for Russians to supervise Slavonic studies at Russian universities, shifting from earlier approaches of Slav reciprocity, which entailed the participation of non-Russian Slavic scholars to lead Slavonic studies in Russia. A. N. Bakhmetev, superintendent of the Moscow school district and first president of the Moscow Slavic Committee, also supported panslavism. Heads of the Asiatic department of the foreign ministry, responsible for Russian relations with the Ottoman empire, were themselves friendly with panslavs, gave moral and financial support to panslav publications, and acted as a conduit for communications between the Slavic Committees and Slavs outside Russia. In 1859, E. Kovalevskii, chief of the Asiatic Department, supported and encouraged the publication of I. Aksakov's Parus. N. Ignatev, chief of the Asiatic Department in 1861-1864, also became one of the most ardent supporters of panslavism. During Alexander II's reign, the empress and Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich, brother to the tsar, regularly read I. Aksakov's Russkaia beseda; members of the Orthodox hierarchy lobbied for greater government resources to be used to strengthen ties among Slavs in and outside Russia; and Alexander II's close friend and adviser, Prince Bariatinskii, urged the tsar to pursue a policy that would put Russia at the head of all Slavic movements for

73 Some of Kovalevskii's colleagues opposed his overt panslav sympathies, leading Aksakov to complain about their attitude in a letter to Countess Antonina Bludova, lady-in-waiting to the empress. See RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 65, k. 8, ed. 1; Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 104-128; and Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 1-124, 293-94. Accounts of members of the upper nobility and officials supporting panslav publications are found in Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 151-52; Barsukov, Pis'ma M. P. Pogodina, pp. 72-82, 90; RGB, Manuscript Division, f. Cherkasskiii/III, k. 4, ed. 1; and Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 136-37.
independence. As previously noted, the tsar and high-level officials also welcomed Slav delegates to the 1867 Slav congress in St. Petersburg, thus endowing the pan-Slav agenda with official approval. These manifestations of official support for pan-Slavism, although meager and sporadic for many years, became manifestly stronger in 1875-1878.

In 1875-1878, top decisionmakers representing the court, military, and foreign ministry showed open support for the pan-Slav agenda. At the court, the empress, her ladies-in-waiting, and tsarevich Alexander sympathized with pan-Slavism, and financed pan-Slav activities. Most prominent among pan-Slav sympathizers in the empress's entourage were Countess Bludova, a close friend of Pogodin and I. Aksakov, and A. F. Tiutcheva, daughter of the pan-Slav poet Tiutchev and wife of Aksakov. The tsar, not impervious to familial and public pressure, legitimized pan-Slav ideas when, during the crises of 1875-1877, he referred to the besieged Slavs as our "brothers in faith and

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74RGB, Manuscript Division, f. Cherkasskii/III, k. 4, ed. 1; RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 120, ed. 21; GARF, f. 730, op. 1, d. 496; and Rieber, Politics of Autocracy, pp. 88-90.

75The list of members of the Ladies Section of the Moscow Slavic Committee indicates the prominence of women who belonged to upper noble families, boasted the best addresses in Moscow, and had close links to the court. Their last names were those typical of great Russian nobility: Golitsyna, Bariatinskaia, Morozova, Obolenskaia, Narshkina, Trubetskaia, Cherkasskaia, and Shcherbatova. See GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 6. Financial assistance from the court for pan-Slav activities included the empress' donations to the Slavic Committees on behalf of education for Bulgarians in Russia. As Ignatiev noted while he was Russian ambassador to Constantinople, although Russia needed to be more active in charity, education, and commerce in order to promote pro-Russian views among Slavs in the Ottoman empire. at least the "school issue" was "covered to a certain degree, thanks to the magnanimity of her Majesty, the empress, and members of the imperial family." See Ignatiev's note to Tsar Alexander II (in French) in GARF, f. 430, op. 1, d. 538; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 40-42; and Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 149 and 216.
ancestry," praised Russian volunteers who were helping to fight Serbia's war, and threatened that if guarantees were not met for the Slavs, then "God help us fulfill our calling." In the military, active and retired officers and military educators,—including Fadeev, Cherniaev, Ignatev, and Pogodin—lobbied strongly for the panslav cause. They had supporters from among military members of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Slavic Committees, including Admiral A. V. Freigang, Colonel M. F. Mirkovich from the general staff, General S. A. Khrulev, Lieutenant-Gen. N. I. Kruzenshtern, and others. Although not all military men in the Slavic Committees were rabid panslavs, and defense minister Miliutin himself did not subscribe to panslavism, it was nonetheless evident that panslavism had made inroads in high echelons of the military hierarchy. In the foreign ministry, zealous panslavs like Ignatev, ambassador to Constantinople in 1864-1878, and Russian consuls in the Slav lands, openly espoused the panslav cause to the extent of contradicting the more cautious official instructions issued by foreign minister Gorchakov. Institutional support for panslavism was significant enough in 1875-1877 that, as I will show in Section V below, it had a major impact on Russia's decision to go to war against Turkey in 1877.

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76Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, p. 238.

77Nikitin, Slaviianskie komitety, pp. 47-50 and 60-62; "Khrulev, S. A.," TsGVIA SSSR, Putevoditel' vol. 2 (1979), p. 570; and GARF, f. 730, op. 1, d. 15-48. One historian identifies an Admiral Shiskov in the Russian military as the first nineteenth-century forerunner of panslavism, whose influence on panslav ideology was even more important than that of the slavophiles. See Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 20.:

78Narochnitskaia, Rossiia i natsional-no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, pp. 37-38.
IV. Hypotheses on the Empowerment of Aggressive Nationalism

Why did aggressive Russian panslavism eventually attain political empowerment in Russia after decades of uneven development? What variables moved panslav ideas to the top of the Russian political discourse, positioning them to have a major impact on Russian foreign policy?

A. Internal Instability

I have hypothesized that severe and prolonged internal instability can delegitimate ruling elites and make them more susceptible to pressure to adopt malevolent nationalism in order to restore their legitimacy as rulers and their credibility as defenders of the national interest. Internal instability was a common feature of the Russian landscape in 1856-1878. Although some years proved more stable than others, the autocracy's hold on political power over these years became feeblcer while popular ability to participate in politics—with or without official sanction—became stronger. As a result, the wielders of power in Russia were compelled to pay attention to widespread public enthusiasm and support for the panslav cause in 1875-1878, and act in favor of such a cause.

There were three main sources of instability in Russia in the period here under consideration: 1) the emergence and development of the concept of the people (narod) as political participants and the source of political legitimacy, 2) the severe fragmentation of official elites at high levels, and 3) the difficulties of domestic reform and the beginnings of terror in Russia.
1) People and Nation (Narod) in Russian Politics

After the Crimean War ended in 1856, the concept that political legitimacy rested with the people or narod gained widespread publicity in Russia. Many preached and believed the idea that the autocrat could no longer ignore the voice and needs of the people if his rule was to be accepted as legitimate. This phenomenon of " politicization of society" or the rise of socio-political mass consciousness and movement (obshchestvennoe dvizhenie) became increasingly prominent in the 1860s and 1870s. And although mass democracy or political participation did not replace Russian autocratic politics by the late 1870s, there were nonetheless strong signals of diluted monarchical power and of serious challenges to autocracy. Political journalism flourished to replace the "traditional voicelessness of Russian society"; the government finally abolished serfdom in 1861 as a response to suffering, frustration, and unrest among Russian peasant masses; and the state instituted organs of local government (zemstvos) in Russian districts and provinces, covering 34 out of 70 provinces by 1875. Members of the zemstvos were elected by gentry, townspeople, and peasants, thus breaking the aristocracy's previous monopoly on access to authority.78 Along with these changes came the rise of radical populism. Universities became fertile breeding ground for populists who exalted the common people, over autocracy, as the source of political authority. During the "mad summer" of 1874, in particular, thousands of populists from the big cities (many of them students) donned Russian garb and launched a "movement

to the people." They descended on peasants in thirty-seven provinces to teach them about politics, their rights as citizens, and even revolution. The Russian police, overreacting to this largely peaceful event, arrested 770 participants.80

2) **Fragmentation of Elites**

Deep division among elites in the Russian government on policy toward panslavism at home and the "eastern question" abroad facilitated the rise and impact of panslav ideas. As one scholar has hypothesized, discord among government leaders and their inability to articulate a clear stance on issues—particularly those of great importance to society—could allow non-traditional actors to take the lead, or at least a greater role than normal, on crises regarding these issues. Fragmentation among political elites also led to weak and unsustained policies in combatting panslavism. Division among Russia's ruling figures and the ambiguity of policymaking in Russia stemmed from the nature of autocracy itself. Although in theory the autocrat was supposed to be omnipotent, such omnipotence was a chimera. In reality, the tsar depended on his advisers and ministers for policy proposals and on the large Russian bureaucracy for policy implementation. Ministers, representing different branches of government and subscribing to divergent opinions, competed intensively for the tsar's ear and favor. Members of the royal family with "vastly differing political views [also]

sought to sway their most illustrious relative."\(^{81}\) Under these conditions, panslav proponents, while unable to convince all in government of their ideas, were able to make headway into state institutions and decisionmaking.

Before 1875, panslav ideas had already made headway in the Russian state apparatus. In the 1850s, Bulgarians in Moscow used Pogodin and others to lobby the education minister, the foreign minister, the head of the Asiatic department, and members of the royal family to support Bulgarians studying in Moscow. Many of these Bulgarians returned home and became active in the Slav national liberation movement. In the 1830s through the 1870s, Russian officials censored and closed down panslav publications, but at other times also supported some of these publications financially and otherwise.\(^{82}\)

Division within the court and royal family led to measures that favored panslav activities in Russia and swayed the tsar's opinion in favor of panslavism. Alexander II's wife, "ailing, devout, and suffering" after the death of her eldest son and in light of her husband's philandering with the 18-year old Princess Ekaterina Dolgorukaia, was easily swayed toward the panslav cause by her confessor and ladies-in-waiting. One of the latter, Countess Bludova, an "intelligent and sly" woman and "sworn enemy" of western European culture, was a close and long-term friend and supporter of Pogodin; she dreamt of the Slavs one day ruling all of Europe and spreading Orthodoxy throughout the world. She was known to have interceded with the court on behalf of panslav

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causes and influenced not only the tsarina but also the tsar. As for the tsarevich Alexander, he was always eager to read panslav materials and wrote in 1877 that he favored a "final resolution"—i.e., war with Turkey—to the "eastern question" and supported I. Aksakov's stand on the issue.\textsuperscript{83}

Another crucial division within the Russian government, leading to ineffective policies for combatting panslavism, was between Gorchakov and Ignatev. Gorchakov had been foreign minister since 1855 and was a mild and conciliatory man who subscribed to the "balance of power" school in Russian foreign policy: he believed that consultation and conferences among the Great Powers was the best way to pursue Russia's national interest in the "eastern question." Although he shared the panslav goal of undoing the disadvantageous and humiliating conditions imposed on Russia by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, particularly the demilitarization of Russia's southern coastline, he wanted to attain this goal through negotiation and consensus with the Great Powers of Europe. Gorchakov's official policy, however, carried dual and contradictory elements. He wanted to cooperate with the Great Powers in regulating the Balkan situation, but also rejected European intervention to suppress national movements in the Balkans and encouraged the Balkan Slavs to continue to view Russia.

\textsuperscript{83}In 1862, the tsar declared his opposition to panslavism by declaring that it was "extremely dangerous for Russia and for the monarchical principle. . . . The union of all Slavs under one head is a utopia unlikely ever to become a reality." See Mosse, Alexander II and Modernization of Russia, pp. 125-26; see also Aleksandr II. Ego lichnost, intimnaia zhizn' i pravlenie (Moscow: Galaktika, 1991), pp. 12-27; Slavianskii sbornik, pp. 163-66; Rossiiskie samoderzhtsy 1801-1917, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), p. 195; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 150-51, 328; Nikolai Barsukov, Zhizn' i trudy M. P. Pogodina (St. Petersburg: tip. M. M. Stasulevicha, 1888), vol. 11, pp. 239-41 and vol. 13, pp. 80-81; and the tsarevich's notes to his tutor in RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 230, k. 4405, ed. 7-9.
as their protector. Gorchakov also favored strengthening Russian ties with Christian Slavs in Turkey and Austria-Hungary, but wanted to avoid entanglements that might set a new European coalition against Russia.⁸⁴

In contrast, Ignatev, who was Gorchakov's subordinate, consistently favored a clear and assertive Russian foreign policy unrestrained by Great Power agreements. He did not favor a reckless approach to Great Power relations, but lobbied Russia's ruling figures to take every opportunity to improve Russia's relative position among Slavs under Turkish rule. He argued that whatever space Russia failed to occupy would be usurped by the western powers. He lobbied intensively for Russian assistance to Serbia, in particular, noting that Serbia was the "pivotal point of the liberation movement" in the Balkans.⁸⁵ Those who supported Gorchakov's line included the tsar; defense minister Miliutin, who argued that Russia was not militarily ready for the type of foreign adventurism that panslavs favored; finance minister Reutern, who thought Russia's priority was to modernize its economy; and the Russian ambassadors to London (P. A. Shuvalov) and Vienna (E. P. Novikov). The tsar, though generally in support of Gorchakov, never firmly decreed that Russia should sustain Gorchakov's line in foreign policy. He also gave Ignatev room to maneuver by allowing the latter to report

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⁸⁵See Ignatev's notes (mostly in French) to defense minister D. A. Miliutin, Gorchakov, and others from 1862-1870 in RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 169, k. 36, ed. 47; f. 169, k. 64, ed. 39; f. 169, k. 66, ed. 38; GARF, f. 730, op. 1, d. 483 and 531; Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 296-97; and Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, Russia in the East 1876-1880 (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 4-7.
directly to him when Ignatev was chief of the Asiatic department, and in 1864 rewarded Ignatev with an ambassadorial appointment to Constantinople.\footnote{Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 182; Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 63-65; and S. K. Bushuev, A. M. Gorchakov (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye otnoshenia, 1961), p. 75. Part of the reason Alexander II may have been favorably predisposed toward Ignatev was because Ignatev came with high recommendations from Prince Bariatinskii, one of the tsar’s closest friends since childhood. See Rieber, Politics of Autocracy, pp. 77-78.}

The government's indecisive stance on panslavism created a window of opportunity for panslavs to push forward their agenda during the Balkan crises of 1875-1878. Unable to articulate and implement a clear policy, the government blinked on activities of the Russian Slavic Committees to assist the Balkan Slav insurrections in 1875-1876. These activities included sending agents, arms, and money to the Slav rebels; soliciting donations and volunteers to aid the Slavs; and assisting Gen. Cherniaev in his illegal flight (using a fake passport) from Russia to lead the Serbian army in 1876. Further, in the absence of unequivocal directives, panslavs from the foreign ministry contravened official policy by encouraging Serbia to support the Herzegovina uprising against Turkey in 1875, thereby enlarging the war and increasing the chances that Russia would be drawn in on behalf of its Serbian ally.\footnote{MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan Policies,” pp. 229-33. Previously, in 1866-1868, Russian officials had rendered short-term (and half-hearted) military support to the formation of an anti-Turkish Balkan league. Ignatev, on his own initiative, had also encouraged two small uprisings in Bulgaria and was never reprimanded by his superiors in Russia. See Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 163-66. Other Slavic Committee activities in 1875-1878 included the creation in Paris of an International Committee to Aid the [Slav] Rebels, supervised by G. Veselitskii-Bozhidarovich, a Russian of Herzegovinian origins. Veselitskii gave “eyewitness” lectures to the nobility in Russia to solicit their help for the Slav cause, while Countess Bludova helped him set up meetings at court. P. A. Monteverde, correspondent for Russkii mir in the Slav lands, lobbied the foreign ministry to aid the Slav uprisings. These efforts led to an increase in official}
who were against panslavism found themselves swept by the rising tide. Miliutin, for example, recorded in his diary in July 1876:

I discovered today, in deep secrecy, that the state chancellor [Gorchakov] agreed to look through his fingers at the transport of arms to the Serbs and Bulgarians. The Sovereign [tsar] also permitted the minister of finance to give corresponding secret instructions to our customs officials.\textsuperscript{88}

The fragmentation of elites at the highest levels of policymaking and the resulting vacillation on policy toward the Balkan Slav crises in 1875-1877 allowed panslavics to propagate their ideas and lobby for their preferences effectively. A few months before the tsar declared war on Turkey, he was vacationing in Livadia and met with his closest advisers. His son, the tsarevich, wrote about his frustrations regarding his father's indecisiveness and noted how, "even here, from where all orders and decisions originate, there are days when nobody knows or understands anything." Thankfully, the tsarevich continued, Ignatev came to impose some order and clarity on the situation. Ignatev thus had a major opportunity, in close quarters, to lobby the tsar to support the panslav cause.\textsuperscript{89} In the end, panslav agitation persuaded Russian officials to declare

assignations for the Slavic Committees, which were subsequently spent on arms and other assistance to the Slav rebels. See Nikitin, \textit{Slavianskie komitety}, pp. 271-92 and RGVIA, f. 261 (Monteverde), op. 1, d. 15.


\textsuperscript{89}The tsarevich noted that Ignatev was so effective that he convinced the tsar to declare war against Turkey even though he and others remained unclear about the exact reasons for the war. At this time, the aged Gorchakov had become too incapacitated to assert a strong voice in foreign policymaking or thwart Ignatev's influence. See RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 230, k. 4405, ed. 7-9 and C. and B, Jelavich, \textit{Russia in the East}, pp. 4-7.
war against Turkey in April 1877. Shortly thereafter, the government put all Slavic Committee activities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially the work of panslav agents in Turkic lands and in Serbia. The government and panslav organizations became, at least temporarily, allies working for the same goals. One historian notes that:

The government, because of its murky program and unsuccessful diplomatic game, lost its authority over the mass population, for whom the calls to help [Slav] brothers had become clearer and closer. They heard this call from everywhere. All the newspapers wrote about it. And the authority of the Slavic Committees, which were implementing the popular call, naturally grew. As a result, not only did the activities of the Slavic Committees (which the police deemed dangerous!) proceed without obstruction, but governmental organs and official figures even moved them forward. Generals assisted in recruiting volunteers [for the Slav war against Turkey], the military donated cloth for uniforms, the railroads transported volunteers for free or with a major discount, and so on.90

3) Internal Reform and the Beginnings of Terror

A third and final source of internal instability which weakened the state regime in Russia and made it vulnerable to panslav pressure was the difficulties of internal reform and the beginnings of terror. After the Crimean War, and especially in 1861-1866, Alexander II implemented reforms which had the unfortunate effect of raising people's expectations from a regime that could not deliver what the people wanted. Reforms included the abolition of serfdom in 1861; the institution of local self-government organs (zemstvos) in 1864; legal reforms, including trial by jury; economic modernization; and military reform, including the introduction of conscription. Many among the traditionally

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90 Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 7-8 and 329.
privileged did not welcome these reforms, while those who were supposed to benefit from them continued to feel deeply dissatisfied. The emancipation of peasants in 1861, for example, did not result in any dramatic improvements in the lives of peasants, neither did it create a large landless free peasantry that might augment the industrial labor force or otherwise help Russia in its need to advance industrially.91

The reforms that Alexander II instituted did not lead to a much-needed social consensus between state and society after the Crimean War, yet the government was unwilling to grant more concessions for fear of losing its authority entirely. From below, radical populists and revolutionaries decided to launch terror as their new campaign. They issued demands for maximal change in Russian internal politics and justified violence as a means to bring about change. The worst of terrorism was to come in 1894-1917, but two unsuccessful assassination attempts were made on the tsar in 1866-1867; a third attempt did kill the monarch in 1881. The government responded to these challenges to its authority by increasing censorship, limiting the influence of local zemstvos and the liberal and radical press, and increasing education on Russian religious and national ideas. These measures did not strengthen the authority of the state, however. As Miliutin wrote, describing the years 1866-1875:

[During those years] of stagnation and reaction, all the strictures of the police not only failed to suppress sedition but, instead, created masses of the discontented, many of whom became new recruits of evil-minded people. . . . It proved . . . that the unfinished reforms and the absence of a comprehensive plan led to a sense

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of full chaos in all parts of the government.\textsuperscript{92}

With the autocratic government besieged from many quarters—and its incompetence and vulnerability exposed—it turned a tolerant eye to the panslavs who were, in fundamental ways, supportive of autocracy. The tsar, for example, felt by the late 1860s that panslav proponents, unlike radicals in Russian society, could at least be counted among the “loyal” segments of the population and should not be treated so harshly by government officials.\textsuperscript{93} By 1875-1878, a weakened and delegitimized tsarist government found it extremely difficult to ignore panslav public opinion and pressure, and had few means at its disposal to hope to combat panslavism effectively.

\section*{B. Domestic Incentive Structure}

If domestic incentive structures encourage elites to purvey and support aggressive nationalism, they are likely to do so and thereby assist the political empowerment of such nationalism. Domestic incentives include political rewards, particularly under conditions of mass politics, when competing political actors may find it

\textsuperscript{92}Rossiiske samoderzhtsy, p. 198 see also pp. 194-97; McCauley and Waldron, Emergence of Modern Russian State, pp. 149-61; Aleksandr II. Ego lichnost, pp. 20-21; Thaden, Russia Since 1801, pp. 234-51; and Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, The Russian Autocracy in Crisis 1878-1882, trans. Gary M. Hamburg (FL: Academic International Press, 1979), p. 48. On the subsequent development of terrorism in Russia, see Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill. Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

\textsuperscript{93}This was the tsar’s response to Miliutin and Prime Minister P. Valuev who, in 1866, wanted to remove Katkov from his editorship of Moskovskie vedomosti because they objected to his panslav nationalism. Valuev remarked that the tsar’s attitude revealed the “weakness of the government, and essentially my retreat.” See Dnevnik P. A. Valueva, vol. 2 (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1961), p. 133.
useful to intensify their nationalism as they vie for public support and seek to increase their legitimacy as leaders of the nation. Beyond political rewards, domestic incentive structures could also offer material and careerist rewards to proponents of aggressive nationalist ideology. Finally, psychological satisfaction might also motivate true believers in, and ideologues of, virulent nationalism.

Were proponents of panslavism in 1856-1878 motivated by political, material, and psychological incentives? My research suggests that, because mass politics was not a strong feature of Russian politics in the period covered in this case study, political incentives did not feature prominently among the motivations of panslavs. However, there is evidence, first, that psychological incentives motivated panslavs who were true believers, particularly I. Aksakov and Danilevskii.

Evidence indicates that a psychological drive for heroism and the satisfaction of strong convictions motivated I. Aksakov. Aksakov fought in the Crimean War and then became a most ardent and loyal proponent of panslavism for the rest of his life. While in college, he wrote to his family, "I am full of resolute will and yearning for labor—labor that is difficult, great, and beneficial." Panslav agitation and its accompanying risks and grandiosity fit perfectly with the labor Aksakov desired. He devoted himself passionately to promoting panslavism, regardless of the obstacles, and responded with fiery and defiant notes to officials who criticized his work. His many clashes with Russian authorities in the course of his panslav activism led his long-time senior colleague Pogodin to remark that Aksakov was "wont to throw [himself] against the knife
... with his eyes open!"\(^{94}\)

Danilevskii, like Aksakov, was also motivated by sincere belief and a desire for heroic and utopian solutions to big questions in Russian national life. A botanist and ichthyologist by training, Danilevskii most likely had his first contact with panславism through the Russian Geographical Society’s ethnographers’ section, which sponsored many of his fishing and botanical expeditions, and which included among its membership some prominent panслав professors. Unlike Aksakov, however, Danilevskii expressed his desire for heroism and grandiosity through theorizing rather than activism. His panслав theories embodied an attempt to devise a utopian and absolute solution to the problem of Russian backwardness relative to the West, and how Russia might sustain its Great Power status. One historian has argued that ressentiment or hatred and envy of the West may have motivated Danilevskii.\(^{95}\) His absolutist style of thinking in *Russia and Europe* was also consistent with his radical socialism in the 1860s, for which he was arrested and exiled for four years. It was perhaps the desire to avoid another unpleasant clash with authority that led him to maintain a relatively low political profile as a panслав.

Pogodin, like Aksakov and Danilevskii, seemed to have been motivated by

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\(^{94}\)See Sem’ia Aksakovykh (St. Petersburg: tip. M. Akinfiieva i L. Leonteva, 1904), p. 43 and Petrovich, *Emergence of Russian Panславism*, p. 127; see also RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 369, k. 415, ed. 19.

\(^{95}\)This biographer notes that Danilevskii hated the West and was ashamed of his westernized past as a believer in Fourier and radical socialism. Because he could not express his hatred and anger through open aggression, he opted instead for chauvinist, totalitarian theorizing on Russia’s relations with the rest of the world. See MacMaster, *Danilevsky*, pp. 15-116, 131-45.
genuine belief in panslavism. However, evidence indicates that he also had careerist motives. In particular, he tempered his panslavism in order to obtain favor from high officials, whose largesse was a key instrument for political and material advancement under the tsarist system. Pogodin was a dedicated and consistent proponent of panslavism from his youth to the end of his life. Inspired as a young man by the historian Nikolai Karamzin's ideas on Russian distinctiveness and greatness, Pogodin as early as the 1830s traveled to the Slav lands and saw Russia's destiny in the forging of a Slavic union that would be the world's most powerful political entity. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War temporarily doused his panslav enthusiasm96, but he soon resumed his panslav activity in 1857 in the Moscow Slavic Committee and in memoranda and articles addressed to high government officials.

My reading of materials on Pogodin's life indicates that Pogodin also used panslavism to appeal to powerful political figures in Russia, and thereby have a chance to gain entry into the world of power and privilege that was denied to him at birth.97 It is interesting, for example, that Pogodin consistently preached panSlav ideas as a means to revivify Russian greatness abroad, but he was careful not to malign gravely the Russian autocratic regime and its policies at home. His biography portrays him as a

96After the Crimean defeat, Pogodin remarked that he was a "disappointed panSlavist" who no longer sought the creation of a panSlav federation, but only access for all Slavs, wherever they lived, to the same rights as other peoples of Europe. See Pogodin, Istoriiko-politicheskie pis'ma, p. 4.

97Pogodin was born to a serf family in the village of Nikol'skoe Galkino. One biographer records that his father spent most of his life ingratiating himself to the rich and erudite. This trait influenced the young Pogodin, who himself sought all his life to raise his position in society and become equal with the nobility. See Tereshchenko, M. P. Pogodin, pp. 15-26.
person eager to use his ideas to gain attention and recognition from the ruling regime, one who lobbied his associates to help him gain a high governmental position, and an intellectual who was jealous of those who had access to the tsar. Pogodin was always writing notes or memoranda to the tsars and various ministers, even though his message sometimes never reached its targeted audience. When he did gain access to such people as minister of education Uvarov, he was overjoyed. On meeting the minister, he exclaimed: "What can I say about my conversations in the office of the Minister of Education? They gave me this year such gladness as I have not felt in a long time. The minister's attention to my ideas . . . is something that will never be erased from my memory." When Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich commissioned Pogodin to do a short assignment in 1851, Pogodin responded: "The request of your royal highness made me as happy as I could possibly be . . . " Pogodin was careful not to let his panslav beliefs cross the line that official Russia tolerated because he wanted to remain in official favor, and he always reaffirmed autocracy even while criticizing Russian foreign policy.  

My reading of several sources indicates that other panslavs propagandized panslavism to benefit their personal honor, career, and material welfare. Sometimes these panslavs broke official rules but, like Pogodin, they sought not to alienate tsarist authority completely and cast their activity as efforts to increase Russian international power and prestige. Ignatev, for example, appeared to have a strong instrumental  

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approach to panslav nationalism. As a diplomat, he was well-known for his great penchant for lying and an unmitigated desire for self-advancement. Thus, one could not take for granted his sincerity when expressing panslav beliefs. Moreover, in the age of competitive imperial expansionism, it was natural for a diplomat like Ignatev to seize on an ideology that favored Russian expansion, and whose successful implementation would assure him of glory in Russian history.

Ignatev came from a highly placed noble family, with a father who served as governor-general of St. Petersburg and became president of the Imperial Council of Ministers. He built his initial reputation in Russian diplomacy by gaining territorial advantages for Russia in China in 1860, and by helping undo the Treaty of Paris' restrictions on the movement of Russian vessels in the Black Sea straits in 1870-1871. During his tenure as ambassador to the Ottoman empire, he continued to pursue his already proven preference for aggressive power projection in Russian policy abroad. In his notes to Alexander II, he emphasized Russian geopolitical interests and competition with the British and Austro-Hungarian empires over panslav ideals. His approach to panslavism was tinged with cynicism, as evident in a note to Gorchakov in 1876, in which he suggested that Russia's priority was to find "intelligent people" in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, whom "we can use as we wish." Russia should extend financial assistance to Serbia because "in the East, money is the surest vehicle for influence," and Russia ought to focus on creating on the ruins of the Ottoman empire a foundation strong enough to resist any future pressure from the West. Further, Ignatev's diplomacy in 1864-1872 in the controversial creation of a Bulgarian exarchate—a church hierarchy separate from the hierarchy of the Orthodox church in Greece—showed that he was less
concerned about the formation of a Slavic federation led by Russia than in positioning Russia favorably for the impending fall of the Ottoman empire. And in 1881, when the official doctrine of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Official [Russian] Nationality" reigned and general enthusiasm for panslavism had waned, Ignatev wrote deferential and ingratiating notes to Konstantin Pobedonostsev, adviser to the new tsar, emphasizing his devotion to the dominant official ideology. Basically, Ignatev was lobbying for acceptance by Pobedonostsev and others who wielded power in the new Russian administration.\textsuperscript{99}

Parochial interests also motivated the panslavism of Aleksandr S. Ionin (1837-1900), Russia's official representative in Montenegro. Ionin actively supported the Herzegovina uprising against Turkey in 1875 and Montenegro's participation in the war against Turkey in 1876. He particularly favored Russian help to Montenegro rather than the other Slav lands because Nikolai, prince of Montenegro (1841-1921), had promised to make him prime minister when Montenegro became independent. In 1875-1878, Ionin wilfully flouted policies favored by the Slavic Committees in order to protect his own political ambitions. He disregarded Serbia and other Slav lands in favor of Montenegro and, in contravention of Committee instructions, channeled all financial donations from Russia—including those earmarked for Herzegovina—to Montenegro

because he hoped to its prime minister.\textsuperscript{100} In addition to Ionin, there were Russian merchants who, while not becoming avid panslavs, gave financial support to Aksakov's Moskva in the late 1860s and donated money for a Serb school in Constantinople; some also became members of the Slavic Benevolent Committees. These merchants were not convinced by arguments that a triumphal panslav policy would advance their economic interests by opening Slav markets in the Balkans. Rather, they liked panslav writings that promoted protective tariffs, particularly against Germany, and they also relished receiving honorary awards from the Slavic Benevolent Committees.\textsuperscript{101}

Although the Russian military institution as a whole and defense minister Miliutin in particular were not enamored by panslavism,\textsuperscript{102} there were military personnel who propagated panslav ideas because they served their personal and material interests. Many panslavs from the military were active proponents of Russian expansionism. They had served in expansionist campaigns in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and were not pleased with Tsar Alexander II's retrenchment policy after the Crimean debacle. They were dismayed by the diminished power of field generals in Russian

\textsuperscript{100}See the May 1876 letter of N. A. Kireev, Slavic Committee agent in the Balkans, in Slavianskii sbornik, pp. 105-110.

\textsuperscript{101}Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 67-81.

\textsuperscript{102}Some military leaders, like Gen. M. I. Dragomirov, were highly concerned in the 1870s about preparing Russian soldiers for the requirements of modern warfare. But the option of using panslavism or other types of nationalism to increase cohesion and national loyalty in the army was difficult because of illiteracy. In 1874, only 20% of army recruits were literate and the overall percentage of literacy in the military did not exceed 13%. See GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 495, part I, pp. 34, 38; Narochintskaia, Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, pp. 21-29; and P. Spilberg, "'Nation in Arms' in Russian Military Thought," in Purves and West, eds., War and Society, pp. 165-66.
foreign policy, and sought to restore a more prominent role for themselves. Finally, many of them had fought in the Crimean War, which ended in humiliating defeat, and wanted another chance for a military victory in the Balkans. Among these military men were Gen. Cherniaev, known for his conquest of Central Asia; Lt.-Gen. S. A. Khrulev, a Crimean war hero and veteran of Russian campaigns in Central Asia; Fadeev, who served in the Caucasus; and Rachinskii, who fought in the Crimea and became a founding member of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee. Khrulev himself showed keen interest in the potential commercial benefits of Russian expansion in the Balkans. 103

Generals Cherniaev and Fadeev illustrate the motivations of military men who used panslavism for parochial ends. Cherniaev came from a military family that had served the tsar for centuries. He earned the sobriquet, "Lion of Tashkent" for leading the conquest of Tashkent in 1865. He was a key player in Russian expansion in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and had a record of self-glorification and paranoia. The zenith of his career was his appointment as military-governor of Central Asia, from which he was later removed due to his contemptuous disregard for the wishes of civilian leaders, including the governor of Orenburg. From 1867-1875, while Cherniaev was in semi-retirement, he actively opposed defense minister Miliutin's policy of retraction and military reform. He joined a group of conservative politicians and officers who wanted to

103 Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 129-35, 142-43; Mosse, Alexander II and Modernization of Russia, p. 124; David MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent. The Career of Gen. M. G. Cherniaev (GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. xvi-115; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 61-62; Khrulev's correspondence with Ignatev and other notes and articles in RGVIA, f. 213 (Khrulev), op. 1, d. 1, 4, and 6-14; and GARF, f. 730, op. 1, d. 317.
reverse Miliutin's reforms and restore the predominance of the gentry and field generals in the military. Cherniaev used his periodical, Russkiii mir, to publicize his views in support of an activist, panslav policy. When the Herzegovina revolt against Turkey broke out in 1875, he hoped that Miliutin's liberal reforms would end, and his services would be required in a panslav war against Turkey.  

Fadeev, like Cherniaev, built his career on Russian expansionism. He was retired from active military service in 1870 because of his outspoken opposition to Miliutin's reforms. Contrary to the official foreign policy of Gorchakov and Alexander II, he advocated a Russo-French alliance against an emerging German threat. Fadeev promoted panslavism and expansionism to gain the attention of Russian officials, particularly the heir to the throne, Alexander III. When Fadeev's career came under threat, he wrote notes to the tsarevich (knowing of the latter's sympathy for panslavism),

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104 One scholar calls Cherniaev a representative of a “failed class”—i.e., a military nobleman in an era of rising capitalism, and an expansionist at a time of Russian retrenchment. Cherniaev liked to brag that Central Asia was conquered primarily at his own initiative, and that his removal from power was unfair persecution at the hands of an “ungrateful government and conspiring bureaucrats.” He denigrated Miliutin as an “armchair general,” and along with older officers, resisted innovations that threatened the patriarchal order in the army—e.g., the abolition of corporal punishment and the introduction of conscription, which gave non-nobles access to military education. Cherniaev attempted civilian investments but lost most of his assets by 1872. He then assumed a repentant attitude to see if Russian officials might take him back into military service, but his ruse failed. In 1876, he made his final attempt to regain military glory and honor by going to Serbia, against the tsar's wishes, to lead the Serbian army against Turkey. See MacKenzie, Lion of Tashkent, pp. xvi-115. In a shorter piece, David MacKenzie notes that Cherniaev was motivated also by genuine belief in Russia's mission to unite the Slavs, but offers no evidence other than Cherniaev's own declarations. It thus seems more credible that the primary incentives for Cherniaev's panslavism were a desire for adventure and longing for lost military glory. See David MacKenzie, “Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876),” Journal of Modern History 36 (September 1964):279-97.
and noted that any action taken against him would hurt Russia's image among the Slavs, who liked him immensely. He also asserted that he was being punished unjustly for patriotic views which were supported by those higher than him in the hierarchy. From 1870-1875, Fadeev continued to lobby the heir to the throne with notes on restoring Russian military power and strengthening Russia's geostrategic position in the East. He also worked with Cherniaev on Russkii mir, but parted ways with the latter over their rivalry on leading the Bulgarian movement against Turkey in 1876. Aksakov, then president of the Moscow Slavic Committee, supported Cherniaev over Fadeev and the latter, in defiance of the Slavic Committees, decided to act on his own to acquire arms for Bulgaria.  

Many panslavs belonged to the Russian gentry, and it is thus appropriate to address the interests of the gentry as a class. The period corresponding with the rise of panslavism (1856-1878) was a period of decline for the gentry. The emancipation of serfs in 1861 accelerated the decline of the landowning nobility and diminished the political power of landowners vis-a-vis peasants. Other changes such as legal reform, industrialization, urbanization, the rise of a bourgeois middle class, the decline of the patriarchal and autocratic order, and the decline of religion—in short, modernization—further threatened the privileged position of the traditional gentry and landowning class. While the gentry's social and economic position declined, that of the middle class and professional groups improved. Thus, for example, in the second half of the nineteenth

\[105\] Fadeev was unable to transport these arms to Bulgaria and caused problems for the Slavic Committees. See V. A. Cherkasskii's letter to I. Aksakov in Slavianskii sbornik, pp. 161-62; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 338-40; GARF, f. 677, op. 1, d. 1023, 1936, 355, and 476; and Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 338-42.
century, Russia witnessed the unprecedented rise of such wealthy merchant and middle
class patrons of the arts as S. Mamontov, Savva Morozov, and P. Tretiakov. Special
treatment of gentry students also ended, and gentry representation in education
decreased overall. In 1855 students in universities were 65.3% nobility and gentry,
23.9% raznochintsy (people of mixed background below the gentry), and 1% peasants.
By 1875 gentry representation was to 43.1%, clergy 35.2%, and other classes 21.7%.\textsuperscript{106}

Social and economic changes in the 1860s and 1870s did indeed make the
gentry feel insecure, and many of them turned to panslavism because its proponents
emphasized the maintenance of a conservative, autocratic political order in Russia and
deplored changes that would further dilute gentry privileges in the military, government,
and bureaucracy. Although panslavs advocated some social reforms—e.g., easing of
censorship and the abolition of serfdom—they insisted on a strong state to arbitrate
social relations and maintain stability. They also promoted the idea of Russian
expansion, and whenever Russia expanded, it was the gentry who gained new positions
of power along with economic benefits. Many (but not all) panslavs, as defenders of
gentry interests, expressed their hatred for the middle class and the raznochintsy.

Danilevskii, for example, asserted that the middle class personified greed and violence,

\textsuperscript{106}For narratives and statistics on Russian urbanization, industrialization, and
domestic reforms that eroded the privileged position of the gentry, see Thaden, Russia
Since 1801, pp. 201-202; Riasanovsky, History of Russia, pp. 368-84, 422-24; Bendix,
Kings or People, p. 522; Shchetinina, "Universitety i obshchestvennoe dvizhenie," p.
166; and V. P. Leikina-Svirksaia, "Formirovanie raznochinskoi intelligentsii v 40-kh
and their striving for representative institutions was an evil Russia must overcome.\textsuperscript{107}

Others like Fadeev claimed that the gentry was Russia's best hope for bridging the gap between government and society. The gentry and monarchy should reunite because a strong Russian society depended on the solidarity of the noble class and a return to order, duty, and an emphasis on Russian roots.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{C. Effective Social Communication}

The greater the extent to which proponents of aggressive nationalism can engage in effective social communication, the more likely that their ideas will become politically empowered. In Russia, from 1856-1878, panslavs enjoyed a great degree of effective social communication. This was due to their effective manipulation of symbols; the advantages of mass press and mass education, coupled with weak and incompetent evaluative units for debating and criticizing panslavism; and the absence of strong, alternative ideologies.

\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Russkaia politicheskaia mysli}, p. 20. Katkov echoed Danilevskii's fears and himself emphasized conservative politics at home and panslavism abroad after witnessing the Polish uprising of 1863. He turned to the wealthy and conservative upper gentry for support in opposing legal and local government reforms in the 1860s. See RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 120, k. 21, kniga 3. Not all panslavs, however, defended gentry interests. I. Aksakov, for one, while deploring middle class strivings for representative institutions, also condemned the nobility for losing touch with the people. See Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov, pp. 118-41, 125-27, 182-83; Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, pp. 403-404; and Barsukov, Zhizn' i trudy M. P. Pogodina, vol. 10, pp. 518-19.

Panslav use of symbols helped their ideas resonate with the articulate public. The most effective of these symbols were the Orthodox church and the millenial triumph of "slavdom." Panslav rhetoric was steeped in church imagery and vocabulary, including the idea of a "holy calling" for Russia and of an "apostasy" that needed to be corrected through the cultural, spiritual, and political reunification of all Slavs. Panslavs worked with Orthodox clergy to highlight holy figures in Slavic history such as Cyril and Methodius, creators of the cyrillic alphabet and God's "own apostles to the Slavs." By linking themselves with the church as a symbol, panslavs infused their cause with divine meaning, touching on the salvation of individuals and Russia itself. This symbolism bolstered the legitimacy of panslav ideas among a Christian populace that had deep and vibrant religious roots and traditions. Police records in 1875-1878 show that many of Russia's common citizens subscribed to a spirit of self-sacrifice on behalf of their suffering Slav brethren in the Balkans, whom they equated with suffering Christian martyrs and saints.

The imminent millenial triumph of "slavdom" was another powerful symbolic device that panslavs used. It heralded the idea that Slavs, under Russian leadership, would vanquish all enemies and form a glorious entity that would bring true civilization and enlightenment to humankind. This triumphalist imagery resonated with Russians

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110 RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 231/razd. II, k. 1, ed. 43; Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 85-87; Sochineniiia I. S. Aksakova, p. 13; and Geyer, Russian Imperialism, p. 71, fn. 14.
who felt themselves betrayed and persecuted by western nations, particularly since Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. "Slavdom" was a symbolic concept because Slavs actually did not belong to one geographic, linguistic, or even racial unit. But many Russians—especially peasants, non-nobles, and the lower nobility—shared one dominant life experience with other Slavs: oppression by authoritarian and despotic governments. Thus, the symbol of "slavdom" likely resonated with Russians who empathized with the suffering of Slav "brethren" abroad, and believed that liberation and salvation were both possible and imminent. This may explain the tremendous public response of donating time, treasure, and even lives to the panslav cause in 1875-1878.

Another factor that facilitated social communication of panslav ideas was the rise of mass press and improvements in mass education from 1840 to the 1860s, coupled with the weakness and incompetence of evaluative units and the lack of strong, alternative ideologies. Previous tsars in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had attempted some liberalization of censorship and broadening of educational opportunities in Russia, but dramatic change in these areas occurred only in the second half of the nineteenth century, giving birth to the phenomenon of public opinion. In the 1860s in particular, the "intelligentsia" matured as a social category in Russia. The intelligentsia consisted of educated gentry and raznochintsy (who had as much education as the nobility)—all of whom shared a concern about Russia's evolving social structures and principles. The intelligentsia did not subscribe to a monolithic outlook,

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but included liberals, moderates, and reactionaries. As a group, however, they were responsible for the rise of public opinion because they propagated, analyzed, and criticized social and political issues in Russia.\textsuperscript{112}

In the 1840s, educational reform in Russia increased popular access to education. In 1840-1848, university enrollment increased by more than fifty percent, while enrollment in secondary schools rose at an even faster rate. Although I have been unable to find exact figures for the years 1856-1878, it is worth noting that university enrollment from 1860-1914 increased ninefold from 4,641 to 35,965. The number of elementary school students also rose from 400,000 in 1856 to approximately 2.2 million by 1885 (a 450% increase). By 1880, there were 1.6 million students in Russian schools compared to only 800,000 in 1865. Literacy rates in such areas as Moscow gubernia, encompassing Moscow and surrounding areas, climbed from 7.5% in 1869 to 17.6% in 1881. In Moscow itself, literacy was almost 50% in the early 1880s and was 64.4% in St. Petersburg. Although Russia's overall literacy rate was only 10% in the early 1880s, the situation was vastly better in the big cities, where public opinion was loud and political activism rampant.\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{113} I. M. Bogdanov, Gramotnost' i obrazovanie v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii i v SSSR (Moscow: izd. Statistika, 1964), pp. 20-29; Bendix, Kings or People, p. 541; McCauley
Along with advances in mass education and literacy came the proliferation of philosophical and literary circles in private homes and universities. The number of Russian periodicals or "thick" journals also increased from 10-20 in the 1820s to 130 by 1851; of these, 106 were founded only since 1836. The reading public's dramatic growth was further evident in the volume of mail in Russia; mail increased by only three million items in 1825-1840, and by fifteen million more in 1840-1845. Finally, from 1845-1848, more than two million foreign publications were imported into Russia.¹¹⁴

Advances in mass education and mass press increased the number of literate and politically articulate people in Russia. But under the repressive regime of Nicholas I (1825-1855), the press and academic publications were subjected to heavy censorship, and Russian intellectuals were prohibited from engaging in political commentary. Discussions were limited to philosophy and literature, and many intellectuals developed the talent of using Aesopian language to express political ideas that were otherwise deemed officially subversive.¹¹⁵

Reforms under Alexander II in the 1860s provided the long-awaited opening for Russia's articulate population to express their views plainly on political and social issues. After the emancipation of serfs in 1861, the government allowed the Russian press for the first time to cover state politics, foreign policy, and social life. Thick

and Waldron, Emergence of Modern Russian State, pp. 37-39; and Thaden, Russia Since 1801, p. 244.

¹¹⁴Billington, Icon and the Axe, pp. 378-79.

journals and newspapers began publishing articles on politics and economics, and public opinion on these topics became a prominent part of Russian intellectual discourse. From 1855-1875, Russian periodicals increased fourfold in number, and circulation for the most popular ones ranged from 6,000 to over 20,000 by 1877. The 1860s witnessed the birth of a civic voice in Russian politics; as the Russian newspaper Obshchee delo reported, the rise of public opinion made Russian society feel for once within itself "the presence of an independent, moral strength."\(^{116}\)

Advances in mass education and mass press, however, did not automatically entail the emergence of strong and competent evaluative units that might debate and criticize aggressive nationalist ideas such as panslavism. The government imposed strict limitations on school curricula and discouraged critical thought. Moreover, the open discussion of political and social issues in Russia was a new phenomenon that had not yet fully matured. These developments worked in favor of panslav propaganda. In 1875-1877, in particular, the press had nearly unlimited room for publicizing the plight of the southern Slavs and criticizing the government in failing to support the Slavic struggle against Turkey. With minor variation, publications representing variant political persuasions affirmed common sympathy for the suffering of the Balkan Slavs. In 1875-1878, public events also helped generate pressure for the Russian government to launch action on behalf of the Slavs. I. Aksakov, in his speeches, made absolutist statements depicting the fight between Slavs and Turkey as one between good and evil.

\(^{116}\)MacKenzie, Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, p. 41, fn. 58; see also L. I. Robniakova, Bor'ba iuzhnykh slavian za svobodu i russkaia periodicheskaia pechat' (Leningrad: Nauka, 1986), pp. 83-84, 102; and Narochnitskaia, Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, pp. 41, 44.
He argued that Russia must get involved in the "terrible, bloody, last war of Slavdom with Islam. For the Slavs, this is a fight for life or death..." He further underlined the apocalyptic nature of the Slav struggle by asking Russian society to pray for the victims of the Slav uprisings who were undergoing torment "for the sin of Orthodoxy, for the sin of sharing one faith and one thought with us."\textsuperscript{117}

There were no sustained, and few competent, challenges to panslav assertions and arguments, and panslavs operated in a fortunate setting where they could express views to incite emotional public response without being subjected to rigorous scrutiny or vigorous debate. This was true not only in 1875-1878, but also in earlier years of panslav propaganda. Further, panslavism’s incitement of action to expand Russian prestige and influence as a Great Power was an idea deeply embedded in imperial Russian history. Strong, alternative ideologies favoring Russian retrenchment, or arguments regarding the perils of imperial policy, were largely absent or distinctly subordinated in Russian discourse in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{117}Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{118}Some liberal publications (e.g., Nash sovremennik, Delo, Russkoe slovo, and Otechestvennye zapiski) did criticize panslav ideas. They sympathized with the Slavs, but highlighted universal rights as the solution to Russia’s eastern question. They also minimized Russia’s role as protector of the Slavs, and linked the Slavic question with internal Russian reform—i.e., if Russia were to fight for the rights of minorities in empires abroad, it must first deliver those same rights to its own subjects. See Robniakova, Bor’ba iuzhnykh slavian, pp. 99, 110-11, 195-96. Criticism of panslavism also came from philosophers including Alexander Herzen (who wrote from London) and Vladimir Solovev, who condemned Danilevskii’s ideas thus: “When one ascribes to any nation a monopoly of absolute truth, then nationality becomes an idol, the worshipping of which... leads first to a moral, then a material catastrophe. ... For a true and farsighted patriotism, the most essential... question is not the question of Russia’s might but that of Russia’s sins.” See Kohn, Panslavism, p. 178; see also Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism, pp. 317-18; Pypin, Panslavizm v proshlom, pp. 89-92; Berlin, Russian
D. Threats and Opportunities in the International System

If serious threats exist to vital interests and national honor, and if collective international measures fail to resolve these threats, then political elites will likely opt for aggressive nationalist mobilization. Moreover, international opportunities, which convince policymakers that the costs of an aggressive nationalist policy are relatively low, can also increase the likelihood that malevolent nationalism will become politically empowered.

In Russia in 1856-1878, a critical issue of national interest was the "eastern question." First, the ideology of pan-Slavism contained foreign policy prescriptions on this issue which, for the most part, coincided with the government's own goals; thus, although tsarist official policy for years did not adopt pan-Slavism, it actually had some "common language" with pan-Slavs. When severe crises arose in the Balkans, as was the case in 1875-1877, and attempts to find international solutions to the crises failed, the tsarist government launched a war against Turkey that took on the character of a pan-Slav program. Second, the weakening of the Ottoman empire, the rise of indigenous nationalism and strivings for independence among the Slav nations, and the absence of a united front among the European powers to combat Russian pan-Slav aggression, also created opportunities which enhanced the credibility and attractiveness of pan-Slav prescriptions.

The Crimean War in 1853-1856 dealt a heavy blow to the idea that Russia could rely on traditional Great Power politics to preserve its interests, particularly in the

Balkans and Black Sea straits.¹¹⁹ Not only did France and Britain ally with Turkey against Russia but, worse, Austria—on whom Russia counted the most—deceived Russia with overt “neutrality” while in reality supporting the British-French coalition. After the Crimean War, a top priority of Russian foreign policy was to abrogate the most humiliating provisions of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, particularly the restoration of navigation rights for Russian military vessels in the Black Sea straits and the recovery of Russia's position—cultivated since the eighteenth century—as protector and patron of Christian Slavs in the Ottoman empire. The tsarist government and panslavs converged on these goals, but differed on tactics and strategies for attaining them.

In 1870-1871, while Prussia and France were busily at war with each other, Russia unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Paris' provisions on the Black Sea straits. Prussia supported this action, while Britain protested. In March 1871, the Great Powers convened a meeting in London and decided to let the Russian declaration stand. Russia thus was free again to build arsenals and maintain a fleet on the Black Sea.¹²⁰ This development satisfied one of Russia's vital foreign policy goals, but the problem remained on how to restore Russian influence and leadership among Slavs in the Balkans. This pillar of Russian national interest became an advantage for the panslav

¹¹⁹The straits were important not only for the defense of Russia's southern borders, but also for larger military-strategic goals of imperial power projection. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the straits were gaining prominence as well as a transportation route for Russia's grain export. See Meininger, Ignatev and the Establishment of Bulgarian Exarchate, pp. 1-2 and Thaden, Russia Since 1801, p. 257.

¹²⁰For the text of Gorchakov's renunciation of the Treaty of Paris, see Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami 1856-1917 (Moscow: Gos. izd. politicheskoi literatury, 1956), pp. 103-107. See also B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, pp. 156-57.
cause. After all it was the panslavs who, right after the Crimean War, argued vigorously that Russia had no reliable friends among the western powers, that its best allies were the Slavs, and that Russian foreign policy should nurture a panslav alliance, with Russia at its head.\textsuperscript{121} In the interest of maintaining some influence among the Balkan Slavs, especially after the Crimean War, the Russian government allowed and assisted such panslav activities as the establishment of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee in 1857, the holding of the panslav congress in Russia in 1867, and the formation of other Slavic Committees in 1868-1870. Russia could not count on Great Power alliances or diplomacy to help improve its stature among the Balkan Slavs; not only were the western Great Powers reluctant to see Russian influence expand, but in the late 1860s and early 1870s, Austria-Hungary was competing intensively with Russia for influence in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{122}

A series of crises in the 1860s, and especially in 1875-1877, coupled with failed attempts at international solutions, greatly propelled panslavism forward in Russian

\textsuperscript{121}One proof touted by panslavs of Slav loyalty to Russia was Bulgaria's secret plan, which was never implemented, to assist Russia during the Crimean War. The journal Russkaia beseda declared in 1856: "In those days when all of Europe resounded with cries of frenzied enmity against us, when everyone breathed evil on us, the sole voice of empathy which we heard came from our brothers by blood, the Slavs, and our brothers by faith, the Greeks; and it was not only a voice we heard, but we saw action and acts of love, bravely defying death for their brethren's sake." See Robniakova, Bor'ba iuzhnykh slavian, p. 43, fn. 49.

\textsuperscript{122}Austria had lost its hegemony in Italy and been effectively expelled from Germany. To lessen its internal problems, the Habsburg monarchy, by 1867, came to terms with its most active and powerful minority, the Magyars, and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was born. In the late 1860s, Austria-Hungary was surrounded by unified national states and, in the words of one historian, had "left only one direction in which [it] could hope to make conquests—southeast toward the Balkans." See B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, pp. 152-54.
politics. First, in 1867, Greek nationalism led to a Cretan revolt against Turkey. This crisis gave Russian panslavs an opportunity to publicize the prospect of an impending war in the Balkans and argue that Russia needed to prepare to help its Orthodox and Slav brothers. Second, in the same year, after the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was created, the newly independent Magyars began a round of abuse against their Slav (mostly Czech) subjects. This led Czech leaders and national liberation activists to turn to Russia, having lost hope that they could gain autonomy and rights within the Austro-Hungarian empire. These events lent an air of urgency and vitality to the panslav congress in Russia in 1867 and inspired an unprecedented outpouring of Russian financial support to the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, thereby helping advance the panslav cause.123

Third, in 1875, increasing taxation, intolerable agrarian conditions, and oppressive Turkish rule led to a revolt of Christian peasants against their Muslim landlords in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The initial Turkish attempt to quell the revolt failed, and a grave crisis ensued. Other Slavs from Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire empathized with the Herzegovinian struggle and began to collect assistance for the insurgents. In Bulgaria, a small uprising occurred in April and May 1876, to which the Turks responded brutally. Turkish paramilitary units destroyed up to 60 villages and massacred between 15-30,000 villagers and peasants. The governments of Serbia and Montenegro were at this time hesitant to get involved in the Slav revolts, but

123Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, p. 44; Vysny, Neoslavism and the Czechs, pp. 9-10; Kohn, Panslavism, pp. 149-51; B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, pp. 258-61; and Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 159-66.
overwhelming public opinion in both countries pushed their leaders to act. The press in Serbia, in particular, incited such passions for war that Serbia's rulers feared they would lose their lives or throne, or both, if they failed to act. In June 1875, Serbia declared war on Turkey and its army began military operations under the leadership of Mikhail Cherniaev, the Russian panslav general.\textsuperscript{124}

The Great Powers, including Russia, attempted to resolve the Balkan crisis in 1875-1877, but failed. The Austrian government in December 1875 sent a note to the six signatories of the Treaty of Paris, outlining proposals for reform in Ottoman governance of its Christian subjects. The Andrassy Note, as these proposals were known, called for religious freedom and equality before the law for Christians, fairer taxation practices, agricultural reform, and the creation of a Muslim-Christian commission to implement these measures. The Great Powers and Turkey accepted these proposals, but the Slav rebels rejected them. Shortly before Serbia and Montenegro's entry into the war with Turkey, in May 1876, the Three Emperors' League (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) made another attempt to resolve the Balkan crisis by formulating the Berlin Memorandum, which reiterated the Andrassy note's provisions and suggested a two-month armistice between Turkey and the Slavs. Italy and France

\textsuperscript{124}Prince Milan of Serbia, who was not a panslav, initially favored a resolution of the Herzegovina crisis through a decision by the Great Powers. But he was powerless to resist the wave of domestic pressure in Serbia for war against Turkey. The Serbian press agitated for action against Turkey, and even spread false reports that Russia had abandoned its Great Power alliance with Austria and was prepared to side with Slav insurgents in a general war against Turkey. See MacKenzie, \textit{Serbs and Russian Panslavism}, pp. 30-60; Anderson, \textit{Eastern Question}, pp. 174-79, 184-85; Thaden, \textit{Russia Since 1801}, pp. 268-69; and B. Jelavich, \textit{St. Petersburg and Moscow}, pp. 175-80.
supported this memorandum, but Britain rejected it. Turkey interpreted Britain's action as a sign that Britain would support the Porte's intransigent stance in dealing with its discontented Slav subjects.\textsuperscript{125}

The Serbian army did not fare well against Turkey and, by October 1876, found itself on the verge of collapse. Russia was compelled at this point to demand an armistice to avoid an outcome that would be utterly humiliating for itself, as self-declared protector of the Slavs, and for Serbia. At the same time, as Russian diplomatic notes show, official tsarist diplomacy still preferred a European solution, not war, to the Balkan crisis.\textsuperscript{126} If such a solution could not be found, Russian officials knew they must consider other actions or lose international honor and their credibility among the Slavs.

As the Balkan war turned into a desperate situation for the Serbs, panslav propaganda increased in Russia and war fever began to spread, engulfing officials from the war ministry and foreign ministry (including those who initially preferred a cautious approach). In November, after Russia had issued its ultimatum to Turkey for an armistice, the tsar ordered partial mobilization of the Russian army in response to


\textsuperscript{126}Gorchakov wrote a note to Bismarck in October 1876, emphasizing Russo-Prussian cooperation on the Balkan crisis because the issue at stake was a “European” one. A. G. Jomini, chief adviser to Gorchakov, also underlined in 1876 that Russian greatness and security were “perfectly in order.” What was necessary was “the development of [Russia’s] internal life, her productive resources, her prosperity, her culture, her commerce, her industry—all things which require peace. Her foreign policy should thus be purely preventative and defensive.” See GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 517 and B. Jelavich, \textit{St. Petersburg and Moscow}, p. 173.
Turkish recalcitrance and to internal pressure generated by panslavs. Even at this late stage, when war seemed all but inevitable, tsarist diplomats made yet one more attempt to find a peaceful resolution. The Russian government convened a conference of the Great Powers in Constantinople in December 1876, with a plan for the Great Powers to ask Turkey to grant autonomy to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. At this point, Russia had given up its maximalist claims on behalf of Serbia. When the conference opened, however, the Turks delivered a surprise by announcing that they had granted a constitution to their subjects; the conference, therefore, was superfluous because the new constitution contained all necessary reforms for the Balkan Slavs. A last attempt at an international solution transpired in January 1877. Russia sent Ignatiev as an envoy to the capitals of the Great Powers and, in March 1877, the London Protocol was signed. This document asked Turkey to conduct reform in the near-term to appease its Christian population and provide for their welfare. Turkey rejected the Protocol as interference in its internal affairs.\(^{127}\) Thus ended the last effort at Great Power diplomacy and, in April 1877, with a panslav rally in full force in Russia, the tsar declared war on Turkey. Soon, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Rumania joined forces with Russia, and the Russo-Turkish war "assumed aspects of an Orthodox war against Islam and a Slav war of national liberation against the Porte."\(^{128}\)

\(^{127}\)Narochnitskaia, Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, pp. 50-55; Bushuev, A. M. Gorchakov, pp. 103-104; and MacKenzie, "Russia's Balkan Policies," pp. 231-39. The tsar's speech announcing the conference of Great Powers in order to avoid the shedding of Russian blood is in S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II. Ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1903), pp. 335-36.

\(^{128}\)MacKenzie, "Russia's Balkan Policies," p. 239.
Opportunities in the international system also helped advance the panslav cause. First, it was clear in 1876-1877 that the Great European Powers were not going to form a coalition to fight Russia on behalf of Turkey, as they did during the Crimean War in 1853. Second, the Ottoman empire was weakened to the point that Russia could feel confident about prevailing in a Russo-Turkish war. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire was undergoing its twilight years in military, intellectual, cultural, and administrative terms. British and French intervention in the Crimean War failed to strengthen the Turkish empire for the long-term and gave it only temporary breathing space. Turkey's imperial weakness, coupled with severe socio-economic gaps between the empire's Muslim rulers and Christian peasants, led to a third development that worked favorably for panslavism: the rise of indigenous national liberation movements among the Orthodox and Slav subjects of the Porte. These movements advanced faster in some states than others, but by 1866-1876, they had strong followings in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece, and Bulgaria. Russia, as the most powerful Orthodox Slav state in Europe, with a long tradition dating back to the eighteenth century of sympathizing with, and intervening for, the Christian subjects of the Porte, naturally became the favored and much sought-after patron of the Slavs. A tradition of russophillism among Bulgars and Serbs added further impetus to potential cohesion between Russians and discontented Slavs.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{129}Some highlights of Russian intervention on behalf of Slavs and Orthodox subjects of the Porte were: 1) a war against Turkey in 1768-1774, which allowed Russia to gain access to the Black Sea for its trade vessels; 2) Russian assistance to a Serbian uprising against Turkey, and another Russo-Turkish war in 1806-1813; Serbia gained internal autonomy as a result; 3) Russian assistance to the Greek national revolution in the 1820s; 4) a Russo-Turkish war in 1828-29, which helped Greece gain some
The crises of 1875-1878, which advanced panslavism in Russia, were rooted in indigenous Slav nationalism. In an earlier time, in the 1860s, Slav nationalism also helped the Russian panslav program. In Serbia, for example, the ruling prince from 1860-1868, Michael Obrenovic (and his father before him), worked to remove the Porte's remaining rights in Serbia and to expand Serb territory. Serbia—encouraged by support from the Russian panslav Ignatev, by the continuing weakness of Turkey, and by Austria's defeat to Prussia in 1866, began to organize a Balkan union against Turkey in 1866-1868; it signed treaties with Montenegro, with Bulgarian revolutionaries, Greece, and Rumania. The murder of Michael Obrenovic in 1868, however, caused the fragile Balkan coalition to splinter prematurely. While it is doubtful that the coalition could have fought Turkey successfully, its mere existence constituted an opportunity, favorable to panslavism, which Russia took when, in 1867-1868, defense minister Miliutin sent Russian officers to help train the Serbian army.\textsuperscript{130}

V. Panslavism and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78

Panslavism did not by itself cause the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, but it influenced decisively the Russian government's decision to go to war. As original

\textsuperscript{130}Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 164-67 and Slavianskii sbornik, p. 8.
documents from the war show, the government decided to launch military action largely in response to the pressing "voice of the people" which, in 1875-1878, was rife with panslav content and emotion.\textsuperscript{131} There were three ways that panslavs influenced the decision to go to war. First, panslav proponents—through their propaganda in the press and other civic activities—incited such public passion for war that Alexander II's government was compelled to respond to it or face even greater domestic delegitimation. Second, by mobilizing the Russian populace to get involved in the Slavs' battles against Turkey in 1875-1877, panslavs coopted the role of official policymakers and committed Russian prestige and authority to intervention in the Balkans. This role of \textit{de facto} policymakers became possible because the tsarist government itself, as discussed above, did not have a unified and unequivocal policy on the Balkan crises and tolerated unofficial panslav actions. The existence of a public commitment to the Slavs created the risk that Russia's government would look impotent internationally if it did not go to war. Finally, individual panslavs who occupied official positions in Russia or in the Balkans took advantage of resources and opportunities to make sure that war happened.

A. Panslav Incitement for War

Panslavs uniformly advocated war as a policy option once they understood the severity of the crisis between Balkan Slavs and their Turkish rulers. Panslav reaction was initially slow in 1875, but intensified dramatically in 1876-1877. The most

prominent panslavs zealously argued in speeches and articles that war was the only
honorable and viable option for Russian foreign policy. I. Aksakov, for example, argued
that war was the chief solution to the Balkan crisis. He reminded Russia of its
humiliation in the Crimean War and accused the Russian government of "deceiving the
enslaved" who were counting on Russian help. He also capitalized on spilt Russian
blood (Russian volunteers died while fighting in the Serbian army in 1876) and urged
Russia to go to battle against Turkey, the "enemy of Christ." In a speech to the Moscow
Slavic Benevolent Committee in March 1877, Aksakov pronounced:

The entire responsibility rests with us and with us alone. It is no use to cast
blame on others, to be angry at Turkey or Europe. Turkey cannot so easily and
simply cease to be, no matter how much we might desire this. Turkey is doomed
to fall, but it is right in fighting for survival. Western Europe is also right in fighting
for its interests—though they may be narrow and egoistic—but they are Europe's
own interests. We are the only ones who are wrong because we deny and
destroy our very vital interests.\(^\text{132}\)

Katkov, in Moskovskie vedomosti, initially advocated autonomy for Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1875; but by 1876 he, too, began to issue calls for war. He condemned
the foreign ministry's stance favoring international diplomacy, and used his paper to
encourage the Serbs to go to war against Turkey. He also urged Rumania to join
Serbia's war and, in covering the war for the Russian press, deliberately minimized
Turkish victories while hiding the failures of Cherniaev and the Serbian army. He
worked with Aksakov to manipulate press reports in order to "harrass" St. Petersburg
policymakers and high society into intervening in the Balkans. When Alexander II finally
ordered partial mobilization of the Russian army in 1877, Katkov openly rejoiced and

\(^{132}\text{Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, p. 248; see also pp. 213-63.}\)
suggested that Russia should conquer and occupy Constantinople. Like Katkov, Fadeev used his paper, Russkii mir, to incite the Serbs to battle against Turkey, exaggerate Serbian prospects for victory, urge Russia to go its own way and abandon cooperation with an international alliance, lie about Cherniaev's battles and Russian heroism in Serbia, and hide Serbian reverses in the war against Turkey.\footnote{Nevedenskii, Katkov i ego vremia, pp. 362-68; MacKenzie, Serbs and Russian Panslavism, pp. 56-57; MacKenzie, Lion of Tashkent, pp. 118-50; Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety, pp. 272-73; and RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 120, n. 21, kniga 3-ii (letters to Katkov; see especially Aksakov's letter of 27 March 1877).}

More panslav agitation in favor of war came from the cultural intelligentsia, whose voice was authoritative among the reading public. Tiutchev, Turgenev, and Dostoevskii, for example, expressed support for Russian volunteers who were fighting in Serbia and emphasized that war on behalf of Russia's Christian brothers was a moral action. In Tiutchev's words, regardless of the outcome of war, Russia's "moral victory was certain. The work that we are taking upon ourselves is the holy work of Christendom. The reasons for war are pure and moral. If western European politicians cannot understand this, then objective history will make it clear."

The Moscow Slavic Committee presented the Serbs, "in the name of the Russian people," a banner with Dmitrii Donskoii and his troops depicted on it. Donskoii fought and vanquished the Mongols in 1380, and the gift of this banner to the Serbs signaled that war in the Balkans was as noble as Russia's struggle against the Mongol hordes.\footnote{P. Apostol'skii, Nравстvennye osnovy nastoiashchei voiny (Moscow: tip. universitetskaia, 1877), p. 16; see also P. N. Kadiin, Gridushchee zavershenie voinoiu 1914 g. Istoricheskogo prizyiania Rossii v roli osvoboditel'nitsei i glavy slavianskogo mira (Kharkov: tip. Mirnyi trud, 1914), p. 1; and Robniakova, Bor'ba iuzhnykh slavian, pp. 227-28.}
Finally, panslav coverage of horrors in the Balkans, including eyewitness accounts, was extremely effective in rallying the public for war. One account by a Russian agent emphasized the barbaric treatment of Slavs by Turks, including unfair imprisonment and the murder of all Slavs capable of bearing arms. It went on to recount an encounter with peasants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had been homeless for weeks and were starving. An old man, barely conscious, approached the Russian agent and exclaimed, "Ah, it is the Russian tsar who sent you to help us." The account concluded that the "thought of mercy from the Russian tsar, or brotherly help from the Russian people [was] the sole hope that the Slavs [had] not relinquished in their difficult situation."\textsuperscript{135}

Panslav propaganda was so effective that publications which initially shunned war as an option soon began to criticize government diplomacy; this included \textit{Golos}, a paper subsidized by the foreign ministry. Responses to Slavic Committee calls for donations and assistance to the Balkan Slavs increased, and even children, who played a game called the "Eastern Question," all wanted to be the warrior Cherniaev!\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{B. Creating a Public Commitment for War}

By engaging in public activities to assist the Balkan Slavs in 1875-1877, panslavs acted as unofficial policymakers and committed Russian prestige and authority at home and abroad to intervention in the Balkans. Panslavs articulated altruistic motives for

\textsuperscript{135}RGVIA, f. 261, op. 1, d. 15 and Narochnitskaia, \textit{Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie}, p. 29.

their efforts, but their chief intent was always to push the government to follow where their public activism led. As I. Aksakov argued, panslav agitation and public activities were useful only to the extent that they could stimulate the government to act.¹³⁷ Voluntary assistance to Serbia in 1876—including military and medical personnel—was intended to deepen and widen the eastern crisis. Russian panslavs solicited support for the Serbs and Montenegrins in the hope that other Slavs would join in the war against Turkey. They also sent agents to Bulgaria to help organize and arm an uprising there. Most important, Cherniaev’s unofficial mission to Serbia stimulated intense military fervor in Russia. Archival documents reveal deep sentiment among ordinary people who were extremely eager to provide their services to the Serbian army under Cherniaev. These included peasants, soldiers, musicians, hunters, doctors, nurses and many others. One apologized for his poverty and the fact that he could offer only moral, not financial, support; and a sixteen-year old boy, swearing that at age thirteen he made a trip of 950 versts alone, begged the Moscow Slavic Committee to finance his trip to Serbia so he could fight.¹³⁸

The public response to panslav solicitation of donations and assistance to the Balkans revealed that a powerful force had been released in Russian society. One can assume that sympathy for the Slavs’ plight grew only stronger as Russians began dying


¹³⁸Cherniaev received as many as 300 letters of support a day. Poor Russian villages also literally collected kopecks to be sent to the Slavs. Ten villages in one oblast’, for example, sent a total of R110 to the Moscow Slavic Committee. See Slavianskii sbornik, pp. 10-12 and 105-120; MacKenzie, Serbs and Russian Panslavism, p. 135; and GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 83, d. 107, d. 378, and d. 420.
in the Serbo-Turkish war in 1876. The tsarist government, fearful of the consequences of such unprecedented public activism, tried feebly to stem the tide of popular response to panslav agitation. It prohibited the official retirement of army officers who wanted to fight with Cherniaev in Serbia, and instructed the police to let volunteers for the Balkan war come into Moscow only by day so that few would see them since most people would be at work. Before long, however, the government yielded to public clamor and stopped trying to prevent soldiers and officers from joining Cherniaev; it even paid for the return of some volunteers to Russia when the need arose. The military also allowed doctors to volunteer in Serbia and return to their state jobs later, and no officials objected when railroad authorities granted free passage for volunteers and supplies to Serbia. This change in governmental action reflected the fact that high officials wanted to avoid the image of an inactive and paralyzed government at a time when the people or narod themselves were making enormous sacrifices to defend Russian honor and prestige.

\[139\] A list of fatalities among Russian volunteers is found in GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 125, pp. 2-22. For more documentary detail on panslav activity among workers, peasants, church folks, merchants, and other sectors of the population, see Narochnitskii, Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia bor'ba, pp. 62, 78-79, 84 and Izmail M. Grigoriev, Uchastie narodov srednego Povolzh'ia v natsional'no-osvoboditel'nOI bor'be izhnykh slavian v period vostochnogo kriiza 1875-1878 gg. Avtoreferat dissertatsii (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskii gos. pedagogicheskii institut im. Kuibysheva, 1978), pp. 10-12.

\[140\] One document records that up to 5000 people came over two days to bid farewell to 25 officers who were leaving to join Cherniaev. See RGVIA, f. 261, op. 1, d. 48; Narochnitskii, Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia bor'ba, pp. 15-16; Domontovich, Obzor russko-turetskoi voyny, p. 3; GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 83; GARF, f. 1750, op. 1, d. 321, pp. 6-7; and Geyer, Russian Imperialism, p. 72.
C. Individual "Diplomacy" for War

Individual panSlavs contributed to the Russian government decision to go to war by exploiting opportunities to lobby Russian officials and by fueling the fires of war on the ground in the Balkans. Ignatev, for example, immediately urged the Russian government to send 200,000 troops to help Serbia when the Serbo-Turkish war broke out. He also kept Serbia informed of Turkish troop positions, even though this contradicted the policy favored by the tsar, Gorchakov, and Miliutin. Before the war, Ignatev also informed the Serbian military representative in Russia that Russia's official public urging for Serbia to avoid war did not reflect the tsar's "secret desire"; just as soon as Serbia declared war, Russia would be right behind it. 141 But Ignatev's decisive moment of influence was probably his visit with the tsar while the latter was resting in Livadia in October 1876. The tsar convened a meeting of his closest advisers, and Ignatev was invited despite Gorchakov's protest. According to the tsarevich, Ignatev "opened everyone's eyes" and the tsar, ending a long period of indecision, resolved to go to war while at the same time expressing his desire for a quick denouement. 142

Another individual who helped push Russia to war was Cherniaev. Although


142 RGB, Manuscript Division, f. 230, k. 4405, ed. 709. Although the tsar did not immediately declare war after Livadia, he did ask finance minister Reutern to find the means for an upcoming war. Reutern responded with a note that war would jeopardize Russian reforms and economic stabilization. The note irritated Alexander II, who refused to discuss it with his other ministers. Instead, he blamed Reutern for wanting to "humiliate" Russia and swore that neither he nor the heir to the throne would allow such a thing. See Rossiiskie samoderzhtsy, p. 207.
Cherniaev did not lobby the government directly, he nonetheless intensified the momentum for war by his activity in 1875-1876. In 1875 he used the pages of Russkii mir to publicize the Slav uprisings and urge the Russian government to intervene. Then, in 1876, he encouraged Serbia to go to war by claiming (falsely) that the Russian government supported his leadership of the Serbian army, and that he was in correspondence with an aide to the tsarevich. When Serbia suffered heavy losses in the war, Cherniaev brazenly refused to think of retreat or negotiation. He cautioned prince Milan of Serbia that ending the war was an act that Russia and the Slavs would never forgive.¹⁴³

Cherniaev's role as commander of the Serb army raised Serbian expectations of Russian help and put Russian prestige on the line. Indeed, when the Serbian army was on the verge of defeat in late 1876, the Serbs became deeply disappointed with the delay in Russian official intervention on their behalf, and their enthusiasm for their Russian "ally" plummeted. This appearance of complete weakness and the attendant loss of prestige in Europe was unacceptable to the Russian government, and some officials who were at first cautious began to advocate war as a policy option. For example, defense minister Miliutin at first feared the formation of another European coalition against Russia. But when agreements were reached with Britain and Austria-Hungary precluding such a development, he urged Alexander II that the time had come for Russia to prove itself as a Great Power and raise itself from the Crimean defeat of

Members of the royal family also contributed to the Russian decision to go to war. The empress and tsarevich, whose sympathy for pan-Slavism has been discussed, favored war against Turkey to preserve Russian prestige. Together with some of the grand dukes who were swept up in the tide of pan-Slav nationalism, they urged the tsar to take more decisive steps on behalf of the Balkan Slavs. The empress became actively involved with Russian quasi-official support for the Balkan Slavs; she supported the Society for the Care of Sick and Wounded Fighters (later, the Russian Red Cross) and subsequently became its head. Other Russian officials in the Balkans, including the Russian representative to Montenegro and the consul to Serbia, also conveyed to Serbs and Montenegrins unauthorized promises of Russian support. Such promises fed the war in the Balkans, obstructed the possibility of early resolution, and helped create a situation that made war an attractive and compelling option for Russia in 1877.

VI. Conclusion

The case study in this chapter leads to several conclusions on the political empowerment of Russian pan-Slavism, an aggressive brand of nationalism, in 1856-

\[144\text{MacKenzie, } \text{Lion of Tashkent}, \text{ pp. 118-50; C. and B. Jelavich, } \text{Russia in the East}, \text{ pp. 14-15; A. G. Jomini's notes in GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 451; and A. Pidhainy, "Miliutin as War Minister: Reforms and Foreign Policy," in Purves and West, eds., } \text{War and Society}, \text{ pp. 147-48.}\]

\[145\text{RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 1, d. 1284, pp. 35-39; Geyer, } \text{Russian Imperialism}, \text{ p. 73; and Narochnitskii, } \text{Rossiia i natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia bor'ba}, \text{ p. 10.}\]

\[146\text{Nikitin, } \text{Slavianskie komitety}, \text{ pp. 295-96.}\]
1878. First, it is clear that national humiliation, stemming from Russian defeat in the Crimean War in 1853-1856, did trigger the articulation by Russian publicists, political commentators, and intellectuals of aggressive panslav ideology. In the early stage of the emergence of panslavism, the majority of Russian political elites—particularly the tsar and his ministers—were not enamored of this ideology. They gauged accurately and wisely that Russia was in no position to espouse and implement a nationalist program that prescribed militant action on behalf of scattered and persecuted members of the Slav nation abroad. They preferred stability and peace for the sake of the Russian state’s longevity in the wake of a disastrous war. Thus, they emphasized reform at home, retrenchment in foreign policy, and peaceful relations with the other Great Powers of Europe. Articulators of panslav ideas, on the other hand, were more concerned about bruised Russian national pride and sought to salve that pride by promoting ideas that reaffirmed Russia’s predestination to greatness (in this case, as leader of the Slavs and future beacon of world civilization) and Russia’s exalted position among friends and kindred (the Slavs).

Second, national humiliation was insufficient to raise panslavism to the top of the Russian political discourse and make it a powerful influence on Russian international behavior. The four controlling variables I have examined in this chapter—internal instability, domestic incentives, social communication, and threats and opportunities in the international system—all contributed to propel panslavism to the fore of Russian politics. Severe and prolonged internal instability delegitimized the tsarist government and made officials vulnerable to the societal pressure that panslavism generated, especially in 1875-1878. Political incentives based on mass politics were not critical in
motivating elites to promote aggressive panslav ideas and lobby for their implementation; however, material and other parochial interests (e.g., personal career advancement) did spur some individuals and groups to support panslavism. The political empowerment of panslavism would also have been impossible without effective social communication. Such communication allowed ideas to penetrate large sectors of society and mobilize people into action. The account I have related here shows that panslav proponents were able to mobilize the larger public in support of their ideas because, over many years, they were able to manipulate powerful symbols that resonated deeply with Russian society. They also took advantage of advances in mass press and education to disseminate their ideas, and their propaganda encountered minimal opposition because of the weakness of evaluative units and the lack of strong, alternative ideologies in tsarist Russia.

Most important, as this case study shows, was the impact of the international system on the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. In particular, international crises and threats of further humiliation, loss of prestige, and loss of credibility convinced Russian policymakers to act in ways that supported panslavism, even though they had refrained from adopting this ideology for many years. I would make the case that if crises had not happened among the Balkan Slavs in 1875-1877, and if international attempts to resolve these crises had succeeded, then panslav ideas and policies would not have achieved the prominence and impact that they did in Russia.

Two other related points emerge from this case study. One is the emotional power of nationalist ideology. Panslavism in 1875-1878 mobilized the Russian public in unprecedented ways, and exerted a remarkable influence on all sectors of the
population. During these years, elites who initially promoted panславism—whether due
to sincere belief, more parochial purposes, or instrumental ends in European
geopolitical competition—did not fully orchestrate or control the effects of nationalist
emotions in Russian society. Officials, who were only half-hearted sympathizers of
panслав ideas, were compelled, against virtually all rational calculations, to declare war
against Turkey on behalf of “Orthodox and Slav” brethren in 1877.\textsuperscript{147} Second, the
emotional power of panславism was most likely rooted in its emphasis on Russian
“greatness,” a theme that had been current in Russian nationalist thought since the
eighteenth century, and was associated with Russia’s many wars with Turkey.
Panslavсs appealed to Russian belief in the myth of national greatness (based primarily
on exploits in war and imperial expansion)\textsuperscript{148} and to the unacceptability of international
humiliation to mobilize political elites and society into action. A note from
Pobedonostsev to the tsarevich Alexander captured the effectiveness of this appeal:
without war, it “would be impossible to clarify the position which rightfully belongs to
Russia,” for other states were “ready to drop [us] at that very minute [when] they feel our
weakness.”\textsuperscript{149}

The empowerment of panславism in the 1870s did not last for long. The

\textsuperscript{147}Geyer explains at length that Russia’s financial woes, weak industrial
development, need for military modernization, shaky credit worthiness on foreign
markets, and other problems of domestic instability dictated in rational terms that Russia

\textsuperscript{148}I will discuss this issue in greater detail in Chapter Five, my concluding chapter.

\textsuperscript{149}K. P. Pobedonostsev, \textit{Pis’ma k Aleksandru III} (Moscow: “Novaia Moskva,” 1925),
pp. 55-58.
government soon realized the dangers of overt societal intervention in foreign policy and took measures to limit the influence of panslavism. After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, his son Alexander III launched a reign of reaction, when the articulation and propagation of ideas were again controlled heavily by the state. I will discuss these issues in the case study following this chapter, and chronicle the return of panslav ideas and the empowerment of great power nationalism in Russia in the early twentieth century.
Chapter Three

"Great Power Nationalism and the Last Gasp of a Dying Order, 1905-1914"

Dear Sirs,—the Slavic question is first and foremost a national question. Interest in the Slavs is interest in nationalism and, thus, interest in our Russian national consciousness. In this context, the growth of Russian interest in the Slavs means the rebirth of Russian national feeling and the rise of Russian patriotism—the decline of which has [led us toward] . . . mental vacillation and the pursuit of cosmopolitan dreams. We see the new emergence of interest toward the Slavs as a sign of the imminent and complete victory of Russian national roots over all those teachings which have splintered our lives and contradicted the very soul and history of the Russian nation.

P. A. Kulakovskii, 1909

It is high time to recognize that there is only one path toward a Great Russia: we must direct all our energies to that area which is genuinely open to the active influence of Russian culture. That area is the entire Black Sea basin, or all the European and Asian countries bordering on the Black Sea.

P. V. Struve, 1908

Slavs of all countries, unite!

A. F. Rittikh, 1908

Everywhere is betrayal and cowardice and lies.

Tsar Nicholas II, 1917

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed the empowerment of panslavism in Russia in 1856-1878, which culminated in Russia’s entry into war with Turkey on behalf of "brother Slavs" in 1877-1878. Russia defeated Turkey in the Russo-Turkish War, but military victory failed to realize the dream of a powerful Slav federation under the imperial wings of the Russian eagle. Instead, the other great European powers—unwilling to sanction Russian dominance in the Balkans—convened the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and whittled away at Russian and Slavic war gains. The conclusion of the war also ended Russia’s brief official sponsorship of panslavism. The government

1This quote and others below, if footnoted from Russian sources, are original translations by the author.
closed down the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, curtailed the activities of the St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Odessa Committees, and exiled panslav leader Ivan Aksakov and banned him from publishing from 1878-1880.²

In 1881, the terrorist campaign of the People's Will (Narodnaia volia) succeeded in its third attempt to assassinate Tsar Alexander II. Swearing to end "revolutionary anarchy" in the country, the new tsar, Alexander III, launched a policy of reaction which temporarily halted the crisis of autocracy in Russia and restored a semblance of stability in the state. The new tsar and his government also revived the official principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality,³ which emphasized national consolidation via russification over adventurous policies on behalf of "Slav" or "Orthodox brothers" abroad.

In 1894, Alexander III died and his son, twenty-six year old Nicholas II, took the reins of Russian government. The young tsar, weak-willed and reluctant to govern,⁴


³These "sacred" principles, first declared by Minister of Education S. Uvarov in 1833, constituted official government ideology during the reign of Nicholas I in 1825-1855. Uvarov characterized "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality" as "the principles which form the distinctive character of Russia, and which belong only to Russia . . . and without which [Russia] cannot prosper, gain in strength, live." See Nicholas V. Riasanovksy, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia 1825-1855 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 73-75. Autocracy meant subjection to the tsar, whose authority was supposed to be unlimited and commissioned by God. Orthodoxy meant adherence to the dogma of the state-supported church, and Nationality connoted belief in the superiority of Russian land, culture, language, and thought, and the russification of non-Russian subjects of the empire.

⁴Nicholas II's personality was well suited for a family man—a loving husband and doting father—but no⁴ for a leader of an enormous empire on the verge of imploding.
was buffeted by internal instability for most of his reign, until he finally abdicated the throne in 1917. Internal instability in Russia stemmed in large part from the autocracy's unwillingness and inability to understand or satisfy the growing demands of the population: Russia's educated and urbanized sector wanted greater political participation; peasants clamored for more land; workers struggled for better working conditions; and the landowning nobility insisted on protection of their traditional status and privileges. Peasant disturbances, workers' strikes, and terrorist acts became commonplace, reflecting an ever widening gap between the highest ruling echelons of the state, on one hand, and the mass population, on the other.⁵

The year 1905 was a watershed for Nicholas II and the institution of Russian autocracy. In January, "Bloody Sunday" occurred, when government troops killed 130 peaceful demonstrators (and bystanders) as they marched to petition the tsar for, among other things, constitutional reform. Three months later, Russia suffered a major defeat in the battle of Tsushima Strait, heralding St. Petersburg's ignominious surrender to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war. These events and others intensified

The Russian throne was a burden to the young tsar who, in his scrupulously kept diaries, wrote daily about the weather, family gatherings, outings, and receptions, but made no substantive or profound assessments of the political events and challenges of his time. See Rossiiskie samoderzhcstva 1801-1917, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 323-24.

internal and external pressure\(^6\) on the Russian government to undertake domestic reform and thereby avoid revolution. In October 1905, the tsar issued the October Manifesto, which granted civil liberties to all Russians, announced the creation of a Duma with genuine legislative powers to pass or reject all proposed laws (for the first time in Russian history!), and promised the institution of a new order—a constitutional monarchy—in Russia.\(^7\) One historian notes that the Manifesto "set the stage for the open struggle of political concepts and institutions in Russia," particularly issues arising from conflicting principles of the old autocratic order and new ideas of popular sovereignty and political participation.\(^8\)

In the context of national humiliation, occasioned by Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, and internal distress, caused by serious challenges to the autocratic order, nationalism became prominent again in Russian political discourse. There were at least three variants of nationalism propagated in Russia in 1905-1914: neoslavism, rightist nationalism, and great power nationalism (with a strong panslav orientation). Of these, great power nationalism became the most dominant. It emphasized ethnic Russian criteria for defining membership in the nation, preached a hegemonic and imperialist self-image, and defined a three-fold national mission, which had aggressive implications for Russian international behavior: 1) to strengthen and preserve the Russian state, in

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\(^6\)After "Bloody Sunday," for example, French financial circles, to whom Russia was indebted, issued a warning that no more loans would be forthcoming in the absence of Russian domestic political reform. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 9.


\(^8\)Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 17.
an imperial and semi-liberal form; 2) to shift the focus of Russian foreign policy from the Far East to its historical home—Europe and the Balkans; and 3) to restore Russia’s political prestige and Great Power\(^9\) status by assisting Slavs in Turkey and Austria-Hungary in their struggle against their imperial rulers, and by seeking control of the Black Sea straits. Proponents of great power nationalism came largely from the ranks of the moderate liberal opposition to autocracy, specifically, Octobrists, some Kadets (Constitutional Democrats), Moderate Rights, Nationalists, and Progressists from the third and fourth Dumas. Although nearly all political groups in Russia favored the restoration of Russian Great Power status after the defeat with Japan in 1905, great power nationalists tended to be the most vocal and vehement supporters of aggressive and decisive actions toward this end. Eventually, and especially in 1914, members of the tsar’s own cabinet supported great power nationalism and used it to argue for Russian defense of Serbia on the eve of World War I.

In 1905-1914, great power nationalism became empowered in Russia. Its proponents were able to propagate their ideas in diverse and effective fora, create resonance with the articulate public, and elicit support from leaders in the foreign ministry, Duma, war ministry and the tsar’s circle. In 1914, great power nationalism, especially with its panslav orientation, unmistakably influenced Russian foreign policy: its proponents had succeeded in creating a "climate of opinion wherein war against Germany and Austria-Hungary [on behalf of brother Slavs] appeared an acceptable and

\(^9\)I capitalize “Great Power” when referring to the status of the great European states or when referring to these states themselves (i.e., Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia).
indeed necessary instrument of policy.  

In this chapter, I will argue that national humiliation in 1905, stemming from St. Petersburg's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war and from internal developments which racked imperial stability and authority, created the initial impetus for elites to articulate great power nationalist ideas. These ideas reasserted Russian greatness in the face of humiliation and reaffirmed the importance of Russian power projection, particularly in the Near East. Although official policy after the defeat of 1905 was to retrench from international activism and focus on problems at home, many among Russian political elites and the articulate public were nevertheless reluctant to see Russia retreat completely. They insisted that, as a Great Power, Russia must make its influence felt in the Balkans, where it had historical, centuries-old interests, duties, and ties. Russia should not forever remain in a humiliated state; a measure of internal reform and an active foreign policy should eventually restore stability and rejuvenate state power.

Historians of late imperial Russia have identified nationalism and panslavism as domestic factors that had an impact on Russian foreign policy in the early twentieth century. Some explain this outcome by arguing that, to maintain its legitimacy or control over society, the ruling regime in Russia had to take nationalism into account in decisionmaking. Others assert that the rise of "civil society" or a politically articulate public that sought to dilute the power of autocracy over foreign policy was the chief reason for the success of nationalism. Yet others underline the breakdown of Russia's "united government" (a functioning, semi-constitutional monarchy) in 1907-1914 as the

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prime reason for the empowerment of nationalism. My own research presents arguments connected to, and supportive of, these views. However, I present a more comprehensive framework that argues the impact of domestic and international variables on the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. I also show a two-stage process that involved, first, the impact of national humiliation in 1905 in stimulating aggressive great power nationalism among elites and the articulate public; second, I test hypotheses on four sets of variables that actually caused the political empowerment of nationalism.

This chapter argues, that prolonged and severe internal instability—with political, social, and economic elements—plagued the Russian state and discredited the principle of autocracy in Russia, leading many elite supporters of autocratic power, and eventually, members of the autocratic regime itself, to resort to great power nationalism to preserve their political legitimacy. These political elites sought to bolster their claims to be rightful defenders of the Russian nation by taking on the mantle of assertive nationalism, first in words and, subsequently, in actions. Politically, instability arose from the fragmentation of ruling elites and the ensuing erosion of state authority and leadership on issues that were of great concern to the articulate public, particularly the

restoration of domestic stability and international Great Power status. Socially and economically, disturbances included strikes by discontented workers, peasant uprisings, mass demonstrations for reform, political assassinations, and violent actions by Russian revolutionaries.

Second, the domestic incentive structure in Russia offered political rewards for purveyors of great power nationalism, and also presented potential material returns for landowning elites who saw aggressive nationalism as an instrument for bolstering their economic status and material privileges in the face of industrialization and agricultural competition from Germany. To advance their parochial interests, these elites propagated aggressive Russian nationalism and its anti-German prescriptions for Russian policy in the Balkans. Third, effective social communication stemming from nationalist manipulation of symbols and use of the mass press and other public opinion fora, coupled with incompetent evaluative units and weak alternative ideologies, facilitated as well the empowerment of great power nationalist ideas. Russia’s legislative body, the Duma, provided a particularly effective new forum for communicating and advancing aggressive nationalism.

Fourth, and most important, threats and opportunities in the international system decisively contributed to the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. Renewed crises in Slav lands under Habsburg or Ottoman rule; the absence of effective international arrangements for resolving these crises; and a series of Russian foreign policy humiliations in the Balkans increased the attractiveness and credibility of aggressive nationalist ideas and nationalist mobilization as means to address threats to Russian security and prestige. By 1914, many in Russia had come to believe the nationalist
tenet that Russian security as a Great Power could not be restored unless St. Petersburg once again executed its role as protector of Slavs in the Balkans and opened the Black Sea straits to Russian commercial and military navigation. At the same time, the intensification of nationalism among the Balkan Slavs, the weakening of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires which ruled over Slav territories, and the consolidation of Russia's new alliance with France and Britain created opportunities that favored great power nationalist directions in foreign policy, especially in 1912-1914. These opportunities prodded the tsarist government to take an activist stance in the Near East, at minimal or acceptable cost to itself, and thereby hope to strengthen Russian prestige abroad and authority at home.

In Section II below, I provide background material on key political developments in Russia from 1878-1905, and highlight factors that contributed to the decline of panSlav nationalism. In Section III, I describe Russia's national humiliation in 1905 and the revival of aggressive nationalist ideas in response to such humiliation. I then outline the content of three variants of nationalism which were current in 1905-1914: neoslavism, rightist nationalism, and great power nationalism. Next, I present evidence of the empowerment of great power nationalism in terms of broad propagation, resonance with the articulate public, and institutional support. In Section IV, I test hypotheses related to four controlling variables that led to the empowerment of aggressive nationalism: level of internal instability, the domestic incentive structure, effective social communication, and international threats and opportunities. Section V traces the impact of aggressive nationalism on Russia's decision to enter World War I in 1914. Section VI summarizes my findings on why great power nationalism became
empowered, however briefly, in Russian politics in 1905-1914. I also note how this
nationalism ultimately failed to bind Russian state and society in a lasting manner and
was but a momentary spark that coincided with the last gasp of a dying autocratic order
in Russia.

II. **Background: Decline of Aggressive Panslav Nationalism, 1878-1905**

The Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878 was a pinnacle in the political
empowerment of malevolent nationalism—specifically, its panslav variant—in Russian
politics. For almost three decades thereafter, panslavism receded to the periphery of
Russian political life. Several factors, both domestic and international, contributed to
this outcome.

A. **Domestic Politics: Reaction Under Alexander III, 1881-1894 and
Nicholas II, 1894-1905**

A major reason for the decline of panslavism was the policy of reaction taken by
Alexander III from 1881-1894. This policy aimed to reassert the autocratic
government’s control over Russian domestic and foreign policy initiatives and
decisionmaking which, under the previous tsar, became diluted with influences from
unofficial actors and ideas. Among these unofficial sources of influence that the new
regime rejected were panslavism and its proponents. Although Alexander III showed
some sympathy for panslavism before he became tsar, he realized thereafter that the
Balkan national liberation movements which preceded the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-
1878, and the 1881 assassination of his father, were frightening harbingers of what
could be fatal dangers to the Russian autocratic order itself. National liberation movements could infect the nationality subjects of the Russian empire and threaten state integrity, while political assassinations and other such disturbances could bring closer the demise of the Russian state by revolution. Therefore, after acceding to the throne, Alexander III made his priorities the suppression of mass politics, terrorism, and revolution domestically, and, internationally, the avoidance of foreign entanglements and the renewal and strengthening of Russian ties with fellow imperial monarchies in Germany and Austria-Hungary. These priorities directly contravened those factors which had favored the rise of panslavism in 1856-1878, including mass voluntarism, the input of the articulate public to option formulation in Russian foreign policy, and Russian institutional support for national liberation movements among Slavs abroad.

Alexander III's policy of reaction led to the near-complete cessation of liberal reforms in Russia. Reactionary officials blamed reforms under the previous regime for undermining state authority, cohesion, and order, and leading to the chaos, confusion, and terror which culminated in the tsar's bloody assassination in 1881. Through the "Temporary Regulations," issued in 1881, Alexander III gave broad new powers to government officials to control individuals and groups who might, in any way,

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13There was a very brief period right after Alexander III's accession to power when the tsar allowed liberal and conservative circles to struggle for control of the government. However, by late 1881, it was clear that conservative and reactionary forces had triumphed. On this point and others elucidating the triumph of reaction from 1878-1882, see Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, The Russian Autocracy in Crisis 1878-1882, trans. Gary M. Hamburg (FL: Academic International Press, 1979).
threaten public order and imperial authority. These powers included summary search, arrest, imprisonment, exile, and trial of persons suspected of subversive activities. Alexander III also launched "counterreforms," including censorship of the liberal and radical press; abolition of university autonomy and the rights of students to form organizations;\(^{14}\) and severe curtailment of the powers and autonomy of zemstvos or local organs of government which were created under Tsar Alexander II.\(^{15}\) As a result of these measures, political space for voicing public opinion and exercising civic participation became severely constricted, and most unofficial activities that had earlier helped the empowerment of panslavism came to a halt.

A second domestic factor that contributed to the decline of panslavism was the

\(^{14}\)The reactionary approach to university education was evident in an 1887 note to Alexander III from one of his most influential advisers, V. P. Meshcherskii. The latter advised the tsar to "clean out" all the students of St. Petersburg University and allow only the worthy ones to re-register. Such a measure, Meshcherskii argued, would improve student life, rid the university of dangerous ideas, and strengthen the moral foundations of young people. See Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation; hereafter, GARF), f. 677, op. 1, d. 588.

\(^{15}\)Zaionchkovsky, Russian Autocracy in Crisis, pp. 90-91; Riasanovsky, History of Russia, 391-94; James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe. An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (NY: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 449; and a letter from Prince V. A. Dolgorukov to Minister of Internal Affairs D. A. Tolstoy in 1883, arguing that the zemstvos were dangerously gaining too much autonomy and might soon leave the orbit of government control, in Russkaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka (Russian State Library or the former Lenin Library; hereafter, RGB), Manuscript Division, f. 120, k. 18, ed. 48. The zemstvos were established in 1864 in 34 provinces in central and southern European Russia. As part of Alexander II's reforms, they were given authority in education, sanitation, agronomy, medical care, road-building, and local judicial administration. They lost many of their powers under Alexander III. See Alexander V. Zenkovsky, Stolypin: Russia's Last Great Reformer (NJ: Kingston Press, Inc., 1986), pp. 84-86. Richard Pipes argues that Alexander III's "Temporary Regulations" "codified and systematized . . . repressive legislation" and established "all the elements of the police state . . . in imperial Russia by the 1880s," in Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1974), pp. 305-312.
introduction of state-sponsored nationalism. Under the tutelage of Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Alexander III reintroduced the triumvirate principles of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality" as the foundation of the Russian state. The principle of "Nationality" emphasized Russian Great Power status and Russian chauvinism. Operationally, it entailed policies to preserve internal control and cohesion within the empire, and cultural russification and discriminatory measures against non-Russians.

16Pobedonostsev was the reactionary tutor to tsarevich Alexander III and was Procurator of the Holy Synod or lay head of the Russian Orthodox church from 1880-1905. He was also chief adviser to both Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II. He believed in the state as the representation of truth and the national will, and argued that all instruments— including the office of the autocrat, the press, the law and judicial system, education, family life, and the Orthodox church—must be put in the service of the state. He condemned western rationalism and constitutionalism, and argued that Russia must pursue its own path of "organic" development based on the immutable laws of the land and history. The Russian nation can be strong if it maintained strong central authorit

17Before Alexander III and Nicholas II, voluntary and administrative rather than cultural russification were the norms in the Russian empire. Voluntary russification referred to the unplanned assimilation of particular groups (e.g., Ukrainians, Tatars, Chuvashes, Belorussians, and others) who naturally adopted Russian language, customs, and culture as a result of serving in the Russian army or bureaucracy, living in Russian areas, or marrying Russians. Administrative russification referred to the state's goal of unifying the borderlands with the center through the "gradual introduction of Russian institutions and laws and extension of the use of Russian in the local bureaucracy and as a subject of instruction in the schools." Cultural russification, which dominated at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, aimed not only at political and administrative unification of the Russian borderlands with the center, but also at more coercive linguistic, religious, and cultural assimilation of non-Russians. It was no longer sufficient for subjects of the empire to be loyal to the tsars; they must also accept and internalize Russian language, values, and culture. See Edward C. Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland 1855-1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 8-9; Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism (PA: Dufcur Editions, 1961), pp. 30-31; and Seymour Becker,
and non-Orthodox subjects of the tsar. Authorities implemented these policies to cultivate a loyal russified population while punishing those who refused to assimilate into Russian culture or cooperate with Russian imperial authority. As part of aggressive russification, the state expanded the Orthodox church's role in education to inculcate the youth with truly "Russian" values.\textsuperscript{18} With the advent of state-sponsored Nationality and strict monitoring by authorities of adherence to this ideology, official and unofficial sympathizers of panslavism lost the maneuvering space they had earlier enjoyed under Alexander II. They could no longer openly preach "panslav" identity and values, neither could they agitate for state sponsorship of Slav causes beyond Russian imperial shores.

Third, Alexander III's coming to power entailed the entry of a cadre of new elites into the highest levels of power in Russia. Key figures among these elites had little or no sympathy for panslavism and, therefore, panslav ideology waned in influence among official circles. New and influential ministers and advisers to the tsar were unenthused about panslavism primarily because, like the tsar, they saw external entanglements on behalf of "oppressed Slavs" as extremely destabilizing for the internal order of Russian autocracy. Among the key new figures in court were Pobedonostsev, whose views have already been described; foreign minister Nikolai Giers, a cautious career diplomat who favored traditional Great Power diplomacy over support for national revolutionary struggles because, in his words, Russian internal consolidation needed the "avoidance

\textsuperscript{18}Riasanovsky, History of Russia, pp. 394-95.
of all useless and ill-conceived complications” in foreign policy;¹⁹ and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Obruchev, who disliked panславism and its anti-German policy prescriptions.²⁰ The rabid panслав, Nikolai Ignatev, who failed to assess with any accuracy the degree of western opposition that Russia would face at the Congress of Berlin, was condemned by public opinion and many in Russian official circles after Russia and its Slavic allies lost most of the gains which Ignatev himself had secured in the Treaty of San Stefano, signed by Turkey and Russia at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war in 1878. Alexander III, recognizing Ignatev’s energy and other abilities, appointed him Minister of Internal Affairs in 1881, but Ignatev proved inept in handling internal matters in the empire and was abruptly dismissed from his ministerial post in 1882. Thereafter, he lost practically all influence in public and official circles, though he continued some of his civic activity in the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee.²¹ Thus, in the 1880s and 1890s, influential panславs were not part of the tsar’s circle of ministers and advisers; those who were closest to the center of power were concerned about Russian internal stabilization and not the fate of Slavs or other panслав ideas and policies. Dire Russian military and financial weakness by 1878 also reinforced the


necessity for official policy to avoid panslav entanglements in Alexander III's Russia.\textsuperscript{22}

A fourth domestic factor that contributed to the decline of panslavism was the splintering of the panslav movement itself. Disagreements had already been manifest among panslav leaders before and during the Russo-Turkish war. These disagreements continued into the postwar period,\textsuperscript{23} and any panslav activism that did continue occurred in the absence of strong political groups or coalitions. With the government's permission, for example, I. Aksakov resumed writing panslav tracts in 1880, but worked primarily as an individual.\textsuperscript{24} Some erstwhile panslavs supported the new, official nationalism of Alexander III, while others, such as Rostislav Fadeev, continued to lobby the tsar to pursue Russian control of the Black Sea straits, but to do so in the name of Russian national interests and not for panslav ideals. Those who

\textsuperscript{22}War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin, for example, commented in 1878 that Russia had to yield to the conditions imposed by the Great Powers in Berlin because it could not fight another war--this time with Turkey, Britain, and Austria-Hungary. He noted, "[our] military forces were so dissipated by war, so weakened, that we could not have hoped for any probability of success [in a new war]." D. A. Miliutin, \textit{Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1875}, vol. 3 (Moscow: tip. Zhurnala "Pogranichnik," 1950), p. 68. Indeed, Russia's finances were in a catastrophic state in 1878, when its national debt stood at 4.9 billion rubles. Russia did not recover from this situation until the 1880s. See T. H. Von Laue, \textit{Serge Witte and the Industrialization of Russia} (NY: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 17-18 and William C. Fuller, Jr., \textit{Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914} (NY: Free Press, 1992), pp. 338-41.

\textsuperscript{23}See, for example, the disagreement between Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov over Russian foreign policy toward Bulgaria in S. Nevedenskii, \textit{Katkov i ego vremia} (St. Petersburg: tip. A. S. Suvorina, 1888), p. 374.

\textsuperscript{24}In Aksakov's articles in the newspaper \textit{Rus'}, which he edited until his death in 1886, he deplored Russia's losses at the Congress of Berlin, lamented the Russian government's internal focus under Alexander III, and insisted that Russia must fulfill its historical calling toward the Slavs. See Lukashevich, \textit{Aksakov}, pp. 141-70 and \textit{Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova. Slavianskii vopros 1860-1886} (Moscow: tip. M. G. Volchaninova, 1886), pp. 298-769.
remained in the St. Petersburg Slavic Committee in the 1880s and 1890s restricted their activities to politically insignificant cultural and educational assistance to the Serbs and Bulgars. Altogether, then, the fierce dedication and organized efforts of panslavs during specific periods in 1856-1878 were absent for the rest of the nineteenth century.

In the first half of Nicholas II's reign (1894-1905), panslavism continued to be weak for much the same domestic reasons as during Alexander III's reign. Reactionary policies continued to be dominant, particularly while Pobedonostsev remained in court. Pobedonostsev convinced Nicholas II that Russia must preserve autocratic absolutism at any cost, and that any concession to demands of mass politics, parliamentarism, or constitutionalism would be a betrayal of the tsar's sacred duties. Official Nationality continued to be enshrined as the authorized variant of nationalism and the most influential members of government continued to focus on internal development and stabilization.

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27The St. Petersburg Slavic Committee conducted some activities in the late 1890s including an evening to honor the panslav general, Mikhail Cherniaeiv, and a competition for the best history of the Balkan uprisings and the Russo-Turkish war of 1875-1878. These activities and their sponsors, however, had no measurable political impact in Russia. See GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 1052, pp. 1-2 and GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 1051, pp. 2-3, 25-39 and 163-67.
B. Russian Foreign Relations, 1878-1905

At least three developments in Russian foreign relations contributed to the decline of pan-Slavism. Foremost was the souring of relations between Russia and its Slav allies after the Russo-Turkish war in 1878. The war initially ended with the Treaty of San Stefano, characterized as the "fullest practical expression ever given in Russian foreign policy to the pan-Slav ideal." San Stefano created an enlarged autonomous Bulgarian state tributary to the Turkish sultan, tripled Montenegro's territory, granted formal independence to Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, outlined reforms in Turkish rule of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stipulated a huge war indemnity for Turkey to pay (primarily in territorial concessions to Russia). These were substantial gains for the pan-Slav agenda, but the western Great Powers canceled most of these gains in Berlin. The Congress of Berlin and its aftermath led to disappointment among the Slavs in Russian ability and willingness to defend their interests. Slavic nationalist resentments simmered against Russia and the other European powers, who ignored the input and interests of Slav nations in Berlin. After Berlin, Russian influence among the Slavs

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29For example, Bulgaria was not represented in Berlin even though 22 of the 54 articles discussed at the Congress concerned Bulgaria. Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania were also not admitted to the Congress, and the Serbs were particularly disappointed because Russia minimized their territorial gains in favor of Bulgaria. A representative from Bosnia-Herzegovina went to Berlin, but was completely ignored by the Great Power delegates, who consigned Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austrian occupation. It seemed clear to the Balkan Slavs that Russia was going to act chiefly in its interest, at the cost of discriminating against some Slavs and sacrificing pan-Slav "solidarity" achieved in 1875-1878. Russian foreign minister Giers informed the Serbian representative in St. Petersburg in 1878 that Russian interests came first, then Bulgaria's, then Serbia's. On the souring of relations between Russia and the Slavs, see Alexander Joseph Michaels, Neoslavism and Its Attempt at Russo-Polish
remained mainly in Bulgaria, whose interests St. Petersburg did defend at the Congress. But by 1886, even Bulgaria slipped out of the Russian orbit. A pro-Austrian ruler came to the throne and most Bulgarian elites opted for distance from Russia, whose heavyhanded policies they had come to detest.\(^{30}\)

A second development detrimental to the pan-Slav cause was the renewal of the Holy Alliance of three empires—Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—in 1881. Partly as a result of this alliance, Vienna and St. Petersburg agreed on a modus vivendi that lasted until 1903 on dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence and respecting the status quo in the region. Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence included Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia's encompassed Bulgaria and Rumania. The other Great Powers themselves cooperated on maintenance of the Balkan status quo, thereby avoiding a repetition of regional crises that helped empower pan-Slavism in Russia in 1875-1878. While the Balkans were relatively quiescent, imperialist competition heated up in the Far East from the 1890s to the early twentieth century. Russia, like other imperial powers, shifted its expansive and aggressive designs to the Far East and, from the early 1890s until Russia's defeat in the Russo-

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Japanese war in 1905, St. Petersburg's foreign policy focused on commercial and other imperial opportunities in China, Manchuria, Korea and, indirectly, Japan.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, St. Petersburg's economic policies in favor of industrial development and economic expansion also drew attention away from the Balkans and pan-Slavism. During the tenure of Finance Minister Serge Witte from 1892-1903, in particular, Russia pursued an aggressive policy of tariff protection, monetary stability and financial reform, heavy taxation, and vigorous encouragement of foreign investment, especially from France and Belgium. The Russian economy grew at an average rate of 8% annually and, by 1900, Russia had overtaken the other powers (except the United States) in railway construction.\textsuperscript{32} The Balkans did not occupy a central place in Russia's foreign relations during this period of intensive economic development. Russian trade with with the Balkan Slavs was negligible, no Russian banks operated in the Slav lands, and


\textsuperscript{32}The bulk of external financing for Russia's economic boom of the late 1880s to 1900 came from France and Belgium. By 1900, out of 269 foreign companies in Russia (all founded since 1888), 162 were Belgian, 54 French, 30 German, and 19 British. See Hugh Seton-Watson, \textit{Decline of Imperial Russia 1855-1914} (London: Methuen, 1952), pp. 109-120 and M. E. Falkus, \textit{The Industrialization of Russia 1700-1914} (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1972), pp. 51-74. In the early 1890s, Russian foreign policy sought rapprochement with France and a Russo-French military convention was signed in 1893.
Russia did not construct any railroads linking it directly with its erstwhile Slav allies.33

III. Revival of Russian Nationalist Ideas, 1905-1914

A. The Setting: Experimental Constitutional Politics, 1905-1914

The tsar’s Manifesto of October 1905 marked a fundamental departure from traditional autocratic politics in Russia. The creation of a Duma that, for the first time in Russian history, had genuine legislative powers, paved the way for incipient real politics to occur—i.e., different groups could organize in coalitions, propagate diverse political ideas, and participate in competitive elections. From 1906-1917, there were altogether four Dumas in Russia.34 The first two Dumas were dominated by radical constitutionalists, peasants, and revolutionaries who were implacably hostile to the tsarist system. Both Dumas were dissolved by the tsar; the first Duma worked only from April-July 1906 and the second from February-June 1907. In 1907, under the tenure of Prime Minister Arkadii Stolypin,35 a new electoral law was instituted. Known as

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35On the life and activities of Stolypin, see Alfred Levin, "Peter Arkadevich Stolypin: A Political Appraisal," Journal of Modern History 37 (December 1965):445-63 and
the System of 3 June 1907, this law manipulated eligibility requirements for voting, restructured Russia's electoral districts, and changed other rules to ensure that the majority of elected members of the Third Duma would consist of elements loyal to the government. Stolypin's ploy worked: the Third Duma had an absolute majority consisting of Octobrists, Moderate Rights, and Nationalists, illustrating how Russia's engineered electoral rules favored "the propertied and titled; . . . Russians and Orthodox over other nationalities and faiths; . . . and the more `trustworthy' elements—the conservative and reactionary . . . ." The Octobrists, who represented the majority liberal wing in the Duma, were not radical constitutionalists, but liberal reformers who also supported the continuation of tsarist rule in Russia.36

During 1906-1914, political parties and coalitions in Russia's fledgling parliamentary system tended to be mercurial, and loyalties to political party positions shifted constantly. In this fluid political context, different actors and groups offered competing ideas of Russian political, economic, and ideological orientation. These


ideas coincided roughly with a spectrum that covered the extreme left, centrists, and the right and extreme right.

The extreme left included Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, many of whom were heirs of the terrorist organization, People's Will. The extreme left's agenda included the propagation of revolutionary ideas, the complete overthrow of the tsarist regime, and the introduction of a socialist order in Russia. The right and extreme right or pravye, as they were called, encompassed "parties, leagues, unions or circles which professed a dedication to the historical principles of Autocracy, Nationality, and Orthodoxy and whose members seemed inspired by the fervent wish to return to the status quo ante of a less contentious, less frustrating period of Russian history in which every political impulse had come from above." The pravye subscribed to Russian chauvinism and advocated coercive cultural russification. Both the extreme left and the extreme right were hostile to the development of genuine representative government, and used the Duma chiefly to propagate their own self-serving views and to discredit unwelcome government policies.

At the center of the political spectrum were the Octobrists, Kadets, Moderate

37Lenin and the Bolsheviks were a splinter from the Social Democrats. For information on the left spectrum and their role in Duma politics, see Levin, Second Duma, pp. 35-50 and Gosudarstvennaia duma v Rossii v dokumentakh i materialakh (Introduction by F. I. Kalinychev) (Moscow: Gos. izd. iuridicheskoi literatury, 1957).


39Many of the Kadets, including their nominal leader, Pavel Miliukov, were maximalist in their demands for a constitutional regime and their utter rejection of the tsarist monarchy. However, they fit in the centrist category because they did not advocate violence to implement their political agenda. On Kadet maximalism, see Mklakov, First
Rights, Nationalists and others. The Octobrists and Kadets favored a constitutional political order in Russia and sought to bind the tsarist regime to its promises of civil rights and freedoms in the October 1905 Manifesto. Unlike the Kadets, however, who sought a complete dissolution of the monarchy, the Octobrists were members of the loyal opposition and were ready to cooperate with the tsarist government led by Stolypin. The Moderate Rights and Nationalists (the latter was a party formed in 1909 by members of the Moderate Rights), like the Octobrists, were allies of the government. Many of them were landowning gentry from Russia's western borderlands, who wanted to use the Duma to strengthen the monarchy and preserve what they saw as the precarious privileges of native Russians (who were competing against Jews and Poles) in the hinterlands.  

B. National Humiliation and Aggressive Nationalist Reaction

In 1905, Russia suffered severe national humiliation which stimulated the articulation of aggressive nationalist ideas. The single greatest cause of Russian humiliation was Russia's defeat in the war with Japan in 1904-1905. The war began in February 1904 when Japan, after judging that its negotiations with Russia over spheres of influence in Manchuria and Korea would not yield preferred outcomes, attacked an

State Duma, pp. 1-5 and Levin, Third Duma, pp. 26-34.


41For background on the causes of the war see Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy.
unsuspecting Russian fleet at Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula. Although St. Petersburg had been building up its military forces in the Far East, it was far from prepared to resist the Japanese onslaught. It found itself in the midst of a disastrous war, in which the “Russian colossus suffered defeat after defeat from the Japanese pygmy” or the “yellow monkeys” (the latter was a common appellation for the Japanese in Russian cartoons and schoolchildren’s rhymes). The Japanese military besieged and captured Port Arthur, pushed the Russian army north into Manchuria, and ultimately destroyed the Russian navy in the Far East. A particularly humiliating moment for Russia came in May 1905, when the Japanese annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet, which included antique vessels (“self-sinkers”) and newer ships which had never properly completed their trials and whose crews were not fully trained to work together. The fleet had traveled for months to get to the Far East, and was sunk in the straits of Tsushima in only two days!\(^42\)

Russian humiliation stemming from the Russo-Japanese war had psychological, material and territorial, and socio-political components. Russia’s defeat marked the first time that an Asian country routed a major European power in war, causing a psychological shock to Russian society. Many among the articulate public expressed feelings of shame about Russia’s disgraceful conduct of the war. As one eyewitness

Impatience, feelings of resentment, indignation—these grew everywhere and became stronger. With each new defeat, with each new retreat to "previously prepared positions" in "accordance with prior plans," indignation grew more intense and there took shape a mood of protest. There was no malicious joy. Oh no! There was a feeling of burning shame and undeserved injury.\(^{43}\)

The psychological wound caused by Russian defeat was so deep that in the decade after 1905, the words "Tsushima" and "Mukhdan" were to become "terse evocations in public opinion of the state's inability to fulfill even the most basic functions."\(^{44}\) Time and again, critics of tsarist authority would use these words to excoriate the tsar and his cabinet on occasions when they failed adequately to defend Russian prestige and interests, especially during various crises in the Balkans from 1908-1914.\(^{45}\)

Russia's material and territorial losses from the war became clear after Russia and Japan signed a peace treaty in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on August 23, 1905. Commenting on the treaty's provisions, A. P. Izvolskii, who was to become Russian foreign minister in April 1906, declared that the conditions of peace... bore very lightly on Russia; the Japanese renounced all demands of a nature that would affect the vital interests or the dignity of the


\(^{44}\)McDonald, *United Government*, p. 74.

\(^{45}\)Critics of the 1908-1909 Russian diplomatic failure to stop Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, called this incident a "diplomatic Tsushima." In Russia's Third Duma, opponents of radical constitutionalism also referred to Russia's defeat with Japan to attack such "unpatriotic" groups as the Kadets and socialists who fomented sedition at home and thereby helped the Japanese enemy. See P. Miliukov, *Balkanskii krizis i politika A. P. Izvolskago* (St. Petersburg: tip "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1910), p. 133 and Ben-Cion Pinchuk, *The Octobrists in the Third Duma 1907-1912* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 171.
Russian empire; Russia paid no war indemnity; retained her fleet and lost not an inch of her national territory . . . [save] the southern part of the island of Saghalien.46

But notwithstanding this brave public posture, and despite the fact that the Treaty of Portsmouth included conditions that were less harsh than Japan's original demands, Russia did suffer significant territorial and economic losses. St. Petersburg lost its forward positions in Korea and China and had to recognize Japanese dominance in Korea; relinquished its leasing rights to the Kwantung Peninsula and yielded trading ports and the naval base at Port Arthur; surrendered southern Sakhalin and all Russian government property on the territory, and lost control over raw materials on the island; granted Japan the rights to fish in Russian territorial waters in the Far East; and gave the southern Manchurian railroad to Japan. Russia's material losses, not counting territory, amounted to about 100 million gold rubles.47

The socio-political aspect of national humiliation stemmed from intensified public perception of the incompetence of tsarist authorities, which contributed to the near-total collapse of order inside Russia. Successive military defeats in the Russo-Japanese war revealed glaring deficiencies and faults among the Russian higher command and the army itself, and illuminated huge gaps between policies taken at home and strategic realities in the theatre of war. The articulate public interpreted Russian defeats as incontestible proof of the government's disgraceful incompetence, and many held the


tsarist regime accountable for the catastrophe in the Far East. Society became increasingly irate and frustrated at the government's conscription of volunteers and its inattention to public opinion and concerns. Never at any point did the war elicit great public enthusiasm or support; many felt that Russia itself was not in peril and few understood the state's interests in such far-flung territories as Manchuria.48

Russian defeats in 1904-1905 radicalized the moderate liberal opposition to tsarism and inflamed the revolutionary fever inside Russia, which had already been developing in the early 1900s.49 In October 1904, the Union of Liberation, which grew from the moderate zemstvo movement, called for the first time for constitutional rule in Russia. Zemstvo leaders also held a congress in November 1904 in St. Petersburg and issued an eleven-point resolution, marking a "momentous occasion for the reform movement." The resolution openly challenged the tsarist government by calling for broader civil rights, an end to arbitrary arrests, democratization and the expansion of local self-government, and the convening of an elected national assembly. Merchant


49*Raging worker and peasant discontent, roused by the state's failure to alleviate the misery of the masses, had already expressed itself in strikes and uprisings before 1905. In 1902, peasant riots had erupted in several Russian provinces, involving the burning of noble estates and looting of livestock and equipment. In 1900-1904, numerous strikes occurred annually, ranging from a low of 68 to a high of 550 in 1903. In 1903, a strike among oil workers in Baku spread to several other major cities and illustrated the potentially paralyzing impact of mass actions on the Russian economy. See Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 4-7 and Martov, et al, eds., Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, vol. 2, pp. 224-25.
groups, the Moscow City council (gorodskaya Duma), and other public organizations echoed the call for civil rights and rule of law. Representatives of the revolutionary opposition, specifically, the Social Revolutionaries and their sympathizers from national minority groups in the Russian empire, met in Paris and called for the overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of representative government. The massacre of “Bloody Sunday” in January 1905 prompted bitter comments about how “our brave soldiers could shoot a defenseless crowd with greater accuracy and zeal than they could the Japanese.”

Shortly thereafter, the empire became riven with protests, agrarian disturbances, workers’ strikes, and terrorist acts. The defeat in Tsushima in May was followed by numerous zemstvo congresses in Moscow, causing great consternation to Russian authorities who found themselves contending with the rising decibel of popular clamor against tsarism and autocracy. Discipline in the military showed severe strain when sailors in the Black Sea fleet rose in mutiny, commandeering the vessel “Potemkin” and fleeing with it to Rumania. A prominent figure in the ministry of foreign affairs recorded in his diary that

... internal confusion has created Herculean proportions of anarchy, and the government’s prestige has plummeted lower than at any other time in Russian history. ... [After Tsushima], disorder and chaos reigned as never before. Nobody knew or understood what went on inside the tsar’s head. ... Prince Lamzdorf said that the sovereign is showing signs of mystical delusion: he believes that matters may be bad now, but they will soon settle down. What can one say to this? Nothing! The Russian people [narod] will perish, if it does not soon take matters into its own hands.  


51 Ibid., pp. 105, 107.
In September 1905, a general strike brought large swathes of the economy to a halt and prompted the tsar's signing of the October Manifesto. This measure temporarily assuaged public demands and halted the country's decline into revolutionary chaos.\(^\text{52}\)

Russian national humiliation in 1905 was deep and widespread, and elicited an aggressive nationalist reaction from opinionmakers, especially from the Union of October 17 (the Octobrists), an organization which represented that wing of the liberal movement that had a "traditional, intimate connection with tsarism."\(^\text{53}\) The Union did not have a unifying ideology, but had chapters across the empire and was particularly influential among the liberal landowning gentry and the capitalist entrepreneurial class. These were people with a stake in Russian stability, who saw themselves as carriers of Russian national pride, and who were shaken by Russia's defeat in the Japanese war and by the revolutionary danger at home. They supported government reform for the sake of peace and the restoration of Russian national pride and prestige. After 1905, many Octobrists preached a nationalism that supported the restoration of Russian imperial might and greatness. In presenting the group's program in 1906, Octobrist leader A. Guchkov noted that:


\(^{53}\)Pinchuk, *Octobrists*, p. 10.
We cannot relate ourselves negatively to what was created by old Russia. We thought that the greatness of Russia, her glorious name, which had been disgraced in Manchuria, had to be restored, renewed, and carried over to the new Russia. We thought that the monarchical principle, which played such a tremendous role in Russia, had also to be carried over to the new Russia. The doctrinalism of the extremist parties, their alienation from the entire historical life of Russia, repelled us from them.\textsuperscript{54}

The Octobrists were not alone in their support for Russian hegemonic and imperial nationalism. Moderate nationalists and some members of the radical constitutionalist Kadet party also expressed solidarity with Russian great power mentality. Further, state elites representing the military, the diplomatic corps, and the tsar himself sought to rise from the Japanese humiliation by preaching that Russia's "historic mission and interests" as a great power in Europe remained, that Russia still had "sacred obligations" to defend Orthodox peoples and "fellow tribesmen" in the Near East, and that it could fulfill these obligations not by relying on international agreements "but solely by means of the struggle and the presence of well-armed forces." In the meantime, because Russia was militarily weak, it must temporarily retrench from expansionism, rebuild its internal capacities and, in foreign minister Izvolskii's words, be prepared to act when complications arise in Europe "or else... be in the position of a half-forgotten Asian power."\textsuperscript{55}

The phenomenon of ressentiment, explained in Chapter One of this thesis, was

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid., p. 14.

slightly evident in the aggressive nationalist reaction of Russian elites to their country's national humiliation. Although elites did not try to salve their hurt pride by widely demonizing foreigners and outsiders with whom they compared their own relative status as members of a humiliated nation, they did display an exaggerated sense of superiority and denial in their nationalistic rhetoric. Instead of plainly acknowledging Russian defeat in Japan, for example, some passionately argued that Russia could have won the war if only St. Petersburg had not prematurely decided to end hostilities. In fact, St. Petersburg ended hostilities just as morale was sinking in the Japanese army and the war was turning in Russia's favor! General Aleksei Kuropatkin, commander of the Russian army in Manchuria, urged that Russia prepare for a new war that will be fought "not only with the army, but with the whole of a patriotic nation." In assessing Russia's defeat in Japan, he declared that:

> Our great nation has issued renewed and strengthened from still heavier trials, and let us not doubt now but that Russia, summoned by the Tsar to a new life, will quickly recover from the temporary blows which she has sustained, and will not fall from her high place among the other nations of the world.\(^{56}\)

In a similar vein, others denied that Russia's Great Power status had diminished due to the Japanese defeat. In 1905, for example, one publicist protested against an Englishman's assertion that Russian power and prestige had been shaken "from the Bosphorus to the Pacific Ocean, from the Polar circle to the Himalayas . . . and beyond the Himalayas, in India." Just as British colonial defeat in the hands of "some shepherds" in the Boer War did not mean the end of Britain as a Great Power, neither

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did Russian defeat in the hands of the Japanese spell the demise of Russian might and prestige. As long as Russia was a geographically large country, it will always have prestige and be counted among the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{57}

C. Nationalist Revival: Three Variants

Russian national humiliation stimulated great power nationalist reaction; in addition, two other distinct strands of nationalist ideology were discernible in 1905-1914: neoslavism and rightist nationalism. By 1914, great power nationalism, incorporating panslavism, clearly resonated the most with society and had an impact on Russian policymaking. I describe below the content of these three competing variants of nationalism, particularly with regards to 1) criteria for membership in the nation; 2) definition of the self- and other-image; and 3) conceptualization of the national mission. I also highlight the benign or malevolent implications of these ideas for Russian international behavior.

1) Neoslavism\textsuperscript{58}

Neoslavism originated among Czech and Slovak subjects of the Habsburg

\textsuperscript{57}V. Doroshevic\textsuperscript{h}, \textit{Vostok i voina} (Moscow: tip. I. D. Sytina, 1905), pp. 181-95.

\textsuperscript{58}Some scholars use the term neoslavism to refer to the revival of more traditional panslavism in the early twentieth century in Russia. Because there are stark differences between neoslavism and panslavism, I do not conflate these two terms and use them in my thesis to refer to two distinct schools of nationalist thought. At different points in time and in an inconsistent manner, neoslav proponents in Russia included Kadet Miliukov, Octobrist Guchkov, Kadet P. B. Struve, and liberal Nationalists D. A. Vergun, and V. A. Bobrinskii. See Michaels, \textit{Neoslavism}, p. 58.
empire and became salient in Russia in 1908-1910.\textsuperscript{59} Outside Russia, neoslavism engendered a political movement which, under the leadership of the russophile Czech, Karel Kramar, aimed to bring about the unity and predominance of Slav peoples, particularly within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Neoslavs deemed this goal realizable only with assistance from Russia.

In Russia, neoslavs used race and nationality as the prime criteria for membership in the nation and, unlike their panslav predecessors in the late nineteenth century, did not accord religion a determining role for national identity. In fact, neoslavs fully accepted Catholic Poles, Czechs, and Croats as equals with Orthodox Serbs, Russians, and other Slavs.\textsuperscript{60} Neoslav criteria for membership in the nation puts neoslavism in the camp of ethnic nationalism; however, any malevolent implications of using ethnic to define insiders and outsiders to the nation were muted by the neoslavs' non-chauvinist, "live-and-let-live" self-image and non-imperial, status-quo- oriented definition of the national mission.

The self- and other-image of neoslavs emphasized equality among all Slav peoples and shunned hegemony by any group, particularly the Russians. Neoslavs in Russia declared that the "time of exclusive russophilism had passed"; that the dream of Russian hegemony among the Slavs was unrealizable because Russia "lagged too far [from the position] of a European hegemon"; and that Russians should not assume a

\textsuperscript{59} For the rise of neoslavism in 1905-1908, see Paul Vysny, \textit{Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, 1898-1914} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 55-90.

\textsuperscript{60} Michaels, \textit{Neoslavism}, pp. 1-4.
"big brother" role over other Slavs. The issues of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" among all Slavs were so central to neoslavism that one of its erstwhile supporters, P. Miliukov, even advocated independence for Poland and Russo-Polish rapprochement. Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, at one point a sympathizer of neoslavism, further declared that:

In the name of the feeling of national honor and love of country, we must be full of respect for the Poles and for every other nationality. We must make the Poles citizens of our great empire and grant them the same rights as Russian citizens, the right to be taught and administered in one's own language, the right of local self-government and freedom of religion.

Equal treatment, then, should not be reserved only for Poles, but for all nationalities within the Russian empire. Neoslavs were also concerned about Russia's internal political, economic, and psychological backwardness, and advocated liberal-constitutional principles as a means of modernizing Russia and overcoming its backwardness. As far as outsiders, neoslavs perceived Germany as the chief danger to Slavic aspirations and the European balance of power. Polish neoslavs, for example, who were once vehemently anti-Russian, accepted Russo-Polish rapprochement as the only effective means for Poland to counter the German threat.

\[\text{61P. Pertsov', Panrussizm ili panslavizm? (Moscow: tip. A. I. Mamontova, 1913), pp. 2-3, 6-7, 66.}\]


\[\text{63A neoslav commentator noted that in Russia, one can strongly sense "backwardness, grayness, [and] provincialism." See Pertsov', Panrussizm, p. 25 and Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 91-101.}\]

\[\text{64Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, pp. 84-86 and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 222-23.}\]
To Russian neoslavs, the national mission\textsuperscript{65} included fostering Slavic cultural union and political solidarity in European politics; supporting Slavic aspirations for cultural and political autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian empire and in Russia; defending Russian national interests, particularly in the Balkans; and maintaining the European balance of power by forging a Slav alliance against a rising German power. Neoslavs did not preach the necessity of creating one Slavic state led by Russia, neither did they show a strong preference for using force to carry out the national mission. Domestically, neoslavs defined the national mission as the creation of a constitutional-liberal political order in Russia and the institution of equal relations among nationalities in the empire. In their view, such changes would modernize Russia and increase its power internationally.\textsuperscript{66} The non-expansionist and inwardly-oriented character of the neoslav national mission made this ideology fairly benign for Russian international relations.

\textsuperscript{65}The original Czech neoslavs formulated the Slavic national mission as "the promotion of greater understanding among the Slav nationalities" and the elimination of existing inter-Slav conflicts within and outside the Habsburg empire. Slav unity and understanding would help Austro-Hungarian Slavs assert more effectively their political rights vis-a-vis the predominant German and Magyar nationalities in the Habsburg empire. The Czechs and their neoslav compatriots hoped to transform Austria-Hungary into a genuine federation with equal rights for all nationalities, and to shift the Dual Monarchy's foreign policy from closeness with Germany to a new rapprochement with Russia. Vysny, \textit{Neo-Slavism and the Czechs}, p. 248.

2) Rightist Nationalism

Purveyors of rightist nationalism belonged mainly to the Union of the Russian People (URP), Russia's most politically successful rightist organization, which claimed to speak for all "true Russians" and which, at the height of its prominence in 1907-1907, boasted over 1,000 branches and a membership of between 200-300,000. Led by Aleksandr I. Dubrovin, a physician and staunch supporter of monarcy, and V. M. Purishkevich, a landowner, government official, and member of the Russian Duma, URP supporters included a melange of the lower class, the aristocracy, Orthodox clergy, and a few academics and intellectuals. They defined membership in the nation chiefly in ethnic terms—i.e., ethnic Russians were the bona fide members of the nation. "True Russians," moreover, were those whose loyalty was unavering for "tsar, faith and fatherland," or "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality."  

Rightist nationalists portrayed the Russian self-image in terms of a united people living harmoniously within the sacred order of autocracy; traditionally, the benevolent Russian tsar and his people always lived in mutual affection and trust and in mutual compliance to specific duties and obligations. This internal peace and harmony  

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67 The term "rightist" refers generally to political groups that supported Russia's floundering autocracy in the early twentieth century, including the Russian Monarchist Party, the Union of Russian Men (Sioiz russkikh liudei), the Union of Russian People (Sioiz russkogo naroda), the Russian Assembly (Russkoe sobranie), the Russian Borderlands Society, and the Council of United Nobility (Sovet ob"edinnenykh dvorianskich obshchestv). In this thesis, my use of "rightist" refers more exclusively to the extreme end of the pro-autocracy spectrum, especially as represented by the Union of Russian People.  

disintegrated only when Peter the Great introduced western ideas and western ways that corrupted Russia's pure traditions and destroyed the harmony between tsar and people. Russia was also the preserver and defender of the true Orthodox faith, suffering more for Christ than any other people. Further, Russia was a benign ruler over other peoples because it allowed non-Russians in the empire to keep their national features (narodnost').

As to their perception of non-Russians, rightist nationalists subscribed to views that were blatantly anti-western, rabidly anti-semitic and unabashedly chauvinistic. They blamed internal enemies for turmoil and chaos in Russia, particularly revolutionaries, radical constitutionalists (i.e., the Kadets, whom Dubrovin labeled as "bearers of moral leprosy"), and Jews. Among these enemies, rightists hated Jews the most and accused them of conspiratorial designs against Russians and the Russian state. "Jews" encompassed not only concrete people but countless, faceless, unseen "others" who were undermining Russian welfare. One member of the URP even described Russia as a battleground between good and evil, with "evil" being personified by westernized constitutionalists who wanted to undermine autocracy. Lurking behind these constitutionalists were Jewish money (zhidovskie den'gi) and Jews who had no loyalty to Russia and who desired to enslave the Russian people and the world. Rightist animosity toward Jews developed in tandem with the embrace of forceful methods for dealing with the Jewish "problem." The URP and its armed wing, the Black Hundred, conducted anti-semitic pogroms, sponsored the assassination of prominent Jewish figures, and promoted widespread demagogic rhetoric that fueled and justified other
violent actions against Jews.  

Rightist nationalists also castigated other non-Russians in the empire, including Poles, Finns, Muslims, and Armenians, who resisted Russian dominance and who, in the rightists' opinion, were egregiously ungrateful for the numerous benefits they had received from Russian rule. Rightists advocated "Russia for the Russians," and believed that Russians deserved more rights than other nationalities in the empire because they were responsible for creating the state in the first place. They believed that Russia must wage a national struggle against non-Russian traitors, particularly "Pole-papists" on Russian soil. They prescribed russification and Orthodox missionary work as cures for eliminating anti-Russian tendencies and particularist aspirations among ethnic minorities within the empire.  

Rightist nationalists' conception of the national mission had relatively benign implications for Russian foreign relations. Their primary preoccupation was to preserve the territorial indivisibility of the Russian empire, restore internal stability, defend the


70 Durnovo, Russkaia panslavistskaia politika, pp. 13, 38, and 59-62 and Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 67-68. Some rightists, like N. N. Durnovo, had reservations, however, about the coercive nature of russification in areas like Georgia and Moldova and urged that Russians learn first the language of these people in order to russify them more effectively.
autocratic government, and revive Russian village traditions and religious values. They would do all this by launching a popular crusade on behalf of tsarism and creating an organization that would foster and nurture patriotic feelings throughout Russia. Rightists condemned urbanization, modernization and economic reform, and were uncompromisingly isolationist in foreign policy. They rejected ideas of panslav solidarity and saw Russian intervention on behalf of Slavs in empires abroad as a self-immolating policy for Russia. N. N. Durnovo argued, for example, that Russia should support only the Orthodox peoples of the Near East and discard the "chimerical idea of panslavism" because there will never be fraternal love between the Russian Orthodox and Pole-papist, or the Catholic Croat and Orthodox Serb. Russia must also beware of opportunists and traitors like the Bulgarians, who have proven that panslavism would only "gobble the [Russian] national treasure [and] splatter Russian blood," while those whom Russia protected would never deign utter a word in Russia's defense. The general isolationism of rightists led to such policies as URP opposition to raising the Russian military budget, especially for the navy.\textsuperscript{71}

3) Great Power Nationalism

The tenets of great power nationalism have been best expressed in two sources. One is the writings of P. B. Struve, a leading Kadet and prominent publicist, especially two articles that Struve published in the journal, Russkaia mys' (Russian Thought),

\textsuperscript{71}V. Ivanovich, Rossiskie partii, soiuzy i ligi (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 110-17; Durnovo, Russkaia panslavistskaia politika, pp. 63-69, 116-18 and 126-27; Levin, Third Duma, pp. 141-48; Laqueur, Black Hundred, p. 26 and Rawson, Russian Rightists, p. 59.
which he edited from 1907-1917. The other was the writings of traditional pan-slavs, published in Slavianskie izvestiia (Slavic News), the organ of the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee, and elsewhere. The rudimentary political parties that supported great power nationalism disagreed on many issues, particularly concerning domestic political organization and principles. However, in foreign policy, a majority shared the consensus that Russia needed to fortify its Great Power standing, extend its imperial reach, and augment its influence over historical Slav allies in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. Great power nationalists took an old idea, pan-slavism, to justify an expansionist and imperialist foreign policy which, after Russia's defeat in the Far East, targeted the Balkans as its most realistic geopolitical arena.

Struve and his sympathizers subscribed to liberal imperialism or national


73 The St. Petersburg Slavic Committee published the weekly Slavianskie izvestiia in 1883-1891. In 1892-1902, the journal was re-titled Slavianskoe obozrenie and, in 1902-1904, was renamed yet again Izvestiia Sankt Peterburgskogo slavianskogo blagotvoritel'noho komiteta. In 1903-1916, the journal reverted to its original title and was not published in 1911. I culled this information from the card catalog of the Russian State Library, Moscow, Russia and from Russkaia periodicheskaia pechat' 1702-1894 (Moscow: Gos. izd. politicheskoi literatury, 1959), pp. 696, 722.

74 Struve himself was an active politician only until 1908, at which time he retired to Sosnovka near St. Petersburg and made teaching his main preoccupation. However, he continued to write on political issues in Russia. Pipes, Struye, Liberal on Right, p. 180; Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, p. 457 and Frank, Struye, pp. 72-75.
liberalism—i.e., the institution of constitutional-liberal politics in Russia coupled with an imperialist foreign policy to bolster Russian state power. Struve defined the nation in both civic and ethnic terms, including cultural, linguistic, and territorial criteria. The nation included Russians, other Slavs, and national minorities living within the Russian empire. Although Struve favored closer ties among all Slavs, he was more directly concerned with Russian state power rather than the creation of a Slavic Federation or any other Slavic political unit.

In his formulation of the nation's self- and other-image, Struve emphasized the idea of velikaia Rossiia or an imperial, Great Russia. The nation was inextricably connected with the state; indeed, the nation was the state's most powerful ally because, together, they fulfilled man's ineradicable religious need to belong to a body larger and more permanent than himself. Every state had its "own supreme law of existence" and, in Russia's case, that law required Russians to aspire to "free and organic hegemony," "assimilatory growth," and the general pursuit of power. Struve believed that autocracy had to be preserved, albeit in a reformed version, because it was the most beneficial type of government for Russia; any belief that the masses themselves would change Russian politics in a positive direction was naive and mistaken. State stability

75"Great Russia" was the title of Struve's best-known nationalist treatise. He took this title from a speech of prime minister Stolypin, which declared that revolutionaries wanted "great upheavals" but "we [non-revolutionaries] want a Great Russia." See Frank, Struve, pp. 72-75. See also P. B. Struve, "Velikaia Rossiia," Russkaia mys' 29, no. 1 (1908):143-57 and an abbreviated translation of this article in "A Great Russia," Russian Review 11 (1913):11-30.

76Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, p. 90 and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 220.
required a strong political hierarchy that could pursue external power because without external power, Russia could not survive. The laws of history demanded that weak states, particularly those unable to project power outside their borders, must become victims of their neighbors' appetite for expansion. Thus, for example, in the name of state power and to the dismay of his radical liberal colleagues, Struve in 1904 urged Russian students to cheer for the tsarist army in its war with Japan.\textsuperscript{77}

Struve criticized the West, but favored the adoption of such western features as moderate liberal politics, developmental capitalism, and individual initiative.\textsuperscript{78} He identified Germany and Austria as threats to Russian and Slavic aspirations, but acknowledged the possibility of coexistence with them. He advocated non-violent assimilation of non-Russian nationalities within the empire, but acknowledged that the territories of Finland and Poland were unlikely ever to be assimilated. Therefore, Russia should allow Finns and Poles to use their own language in school, in the courts, and in the zemstvos, but should not give them political independence because they were "indivisibly connected with the Russian empire."\textsuperscript{79} While Struve entertained notions of liberal treatment for the culture of Poles and Finns, he took a more chauvinistic stance toward Ukrainians and Jews in the empire.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{77}Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 125-27; Frank, Struve, pp. 41-42 and 75-77; and Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 456-57.

\textsuperscript{78}Frank, Struve, pp. 211-12.

\textsuperscript{79}P. Struve, "Politika vnutrenniaia i politika vneshniaia," Russkaia mys', no. 2 (1910): 143 and Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{80}Frank, Struve, pp. 96-98 and 220-23.
Struve's definition of the national mission had aggressive implications for Russian foreign policy. He emphasized increasing the might and power of the state through imperial and expansionist actions and, unlike those who believed that Russia should shun foreign adventurism to focus on internal order, he believed that imperialism would strengthen cohesion within Russia itself. Russia was to accomplish its national mission, first, by liberalizing, but not eliminating, the autocratic order at home. Some measure of reform was needed because state welfare and might derived not just from raw military power but, more important, from collaboration between state and society. Toward this end, Russia should undertake such policies as improved treatment of its Polish population; this would increase Russian prestige and credibility among Slavs in Austria-Hungary, who questioned Russian Slavic sympathies because of St. Petersburg's harsh treatment of its Polish subjects. Russia must reconcile with Poland and grant Poles and other nationalities civil rights to foster unity among all the peoples who comprised the Russian state organism. The Russian government also ought to increase the educational level of the masses, protect Russian culture, and emphasize Russian as the linguistic basis of an all-Russian imperial culture.  

Second, Russia must shift its foreign policy focus from the Far East to Europe and the Balkans, and establish cultural, economic, and military hegemony in the latter. As Struve argued in 1908,

Our Far Eastern policy was the logical culmination of the whole foreign policy of Alexander III, when reactionary Russia, from lack of true statesmanship turned

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away from the Near East. The main fallacy of the foreign policy which led us to Tsushima and Portsmouth was that it transferred its center of gravity to a region inaccessible to the real influence of Russian culture. . . . Now it is time to recognize that for the creation of a Great Russia there is only one road: to direct all our forces to the area which is genuinely open to the influence of Russian culture. That area is the whole Black Sea basin: that is, all the European and Asian countries bordering on the Black Sea. 82

Finally, Russia must prevent German and Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans by forging Slavic unity and alliance, though the Slavs need not necessarily form a single state or political unit, as nineteenth-century panslavs advocated.

Proponents of panslavism 83 supported most of Struve’s great power nationalist ideas. A key difference was that panslavs emphasized Orthodoxy as a criterion for membership in the Slavic nation. Thus, they maligned Poles and other Catholics as traitors to the Slav cause, and on occasion even asserted that Poles were not members of the Slav race at all. For instance, the semi-official government newspaper Rossiia argued in 1908 that

except for their language, [Poles] have nothing in common with the other Slavs . . . They are Slav-speaking foreigners . . . In the interests of Slavdom the Poles must remain at the mercy of Russia, and anything that Russia does with them in her own interests will be advantageous to [all] Slavdom. 84

The panslav self- and other-image echoed Struve’s ideas. They portrayed

82 Avrekh, Stolypin i tret’ia Duma, p. 31 and Pipes, Struve: Liberal on Right, pp. 88-92.

83 Some of the most prominent panslavs in the early 1900s were Gen. A. A. Kireev, a publicist and courtier with strong ties to the tsarist family and whose brother died in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78; P. A. Kulakovskii, professor of Slavic studies, editor of the journal Okrainsi Rossii (Russian Borderlands), and member of the St. Petersburg Slavic Committee, and Gen. A. F. Rittikh, also a member of the St. Petersburg Committee.

84 Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, p. 79.
Russia as a hegemonic state and a Great Power with natural rights to expand territorially and exert "moral, economic, and political influence" abroad. Many panslavs did not insist on the creation of a Slavic Federation under Russian rule, but advocated Russian leadership in preserving the Orthodox religion and liberating Slavs who remained under Habsburg or Turkish rule. They also argued for the primacy of the Russian language within the Russian empire and among all Slavs. In comparing Slavdom with the West, they underlined Russian and Slavic spirituality and organic cohesion as qualities superior to western egotism, materialism, and chaotic pluralism. Finally, they defined the national mission as preserving the unity and Great Power status of the Russian empire; protecting the rights and privileges of Russians living in the empire's hinterlands; and fulfilling Russia's destiny and calling to liberate the Balkan Slavs and bring to fruition the "natural" state of Slav solidarity. Panslavs acknowledged that their kin in the Balkans, once liberated, may not want to be ruled by Russia, but might prefer a federation of their own. This outcome was acceptable because, if Russia assisted the birth of such a federation, the Slavs would look to it "with a grateful memory" and be ready to advance Russian Great Power interests in return.

85 Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 21-22 and A. F. Rittikh, "Ob'edinennoe slavianstvo" (St. Petersburg: tip. V. D. Smirnova, 1908), pp. 14-25. For more on the self- and other-image of Russian panslavs and the revival of ideas of such nineteenth century panslavs as N. Danilevskii, L. Stur, and V. Lamanskii, see L. Lobov, "Slavianstvo kak mir budushchego," Slavianskie izvestiia, no. 6 (1909):733-41. Panslavs were also critical of neoslavism; see, e.g., "Razcharovanie v neoslavianakh," Slavianskie izvestiia, no. 6 (1909), pp. 835-36.

86 Rittikh, Ob'edinennoe slavianstvo, pp. 17-25; Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 21-22; and the preamble to Okrany Rossi as described in Joseph L. Wieczynski, ed. The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History (Florida:
D. **Empowerment of Great Power Nationalism, 1905-1914**

Great power Russian nationalism became prominent from 1905-1914 and influenced Russian decisionmaking on the eve of World War I. Its adherents preached that 1) the Russian state, in an imperial and semi-liberal form, must be strengthened and its indivisibility preserved; 2) Russian foreign policy should shift its focus from the Far East to its historical home in Europe and the Balkans; and 3) Russia should reestablish its political prestige and Great Power status by assisting Slavs in Turkey and Austria-Hungary in their political struggles and by seeking control of the Black Sea straits.87 These ideas gained salience in a relatively uneven process in 1905-1914, with high points occurring in 1908-1910 and 1912-1914, culminating in decisionmakers' use of great power nationalism to argue for and justify Russian entry into war in 1914.

Supporters of great power nationalism were able to propagate their ideas in academic and cultural circles, and in political fora such as the press and Duma in 1905-1914. Their ideas also resonated broadly with the articulate public and ultimately garnered support from state institutions and decisionmakers.

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*Academic International Press, 1977), vol. 18, p. 150. In 1914, shortly before World War I, some panslavs returned to near-exact nineteenth century assertions about Russia's role as leader of the Slav world against the Romano-Germanic world; Russia's right to rule Constantinople; and Russia's calling to create and lead a Slavic Federation. See, for example, P. Kadihin, *Griadushchee zavershenie voinoi 1914 g. istoricheskogo prizvanija Rossi v roli osvoboditel'nitsy i glavy slavianskogo mira* (Kharkov: tip. Mirnyi trud, 1914), pp. 4-27.*

87*Foreign policy goals were paramount in great power nationalism. As one historian has noted, these goals, particularly "strengthening the empire and [Russian] integrity and indivisibility" enjoyed support among a cross-section of groups that otherwise disagreed on many issues of domestic politics. See Avrekh, *Stolypin i tret'ia Duma*, pp. 33-34.*
Great power nationalist ideas, particularly those advocating the merits of a panslav policy in the Near East, were propagated in 1905-1914 in history textbooks, Russian thick journals and newspapers, commemorative books and albums on the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78,88 Slavic conferences and congresses, meetings of political parties, Duma debates, and street demonstrations. Before 1908, discussions of panslavism itself occurred primarily in cultural and academic settings, and panslav gatherings for political purposes were kept secret.89 However, in 1908-1914, the deepening resonance of great power nationalist ideas became evident as panslavism migrated from academic and cultural circles into the openly political arena. St. Petersburg, for example, hosted "Slavic Week" in May 1908, in preparation for the Slav congress in Prague in the summer of 1908. Czech delegates to "Slavic Week"

88 See, for example, such officially-sanctioned books for youth and family reading as Sem'ia Aksakovych (St. Petersburg: tip. M. Akinfieva i I. Leonteva, 1904) and E. N. Tikhomirova, Za svobodu brat'ev-slavian (Moscow: tip. K. L. Men'shova, 1911). The former praised the Aksakov family's Russian roots and values, their Russian pride vis-avis western Europe, and Ivan Aksakov's unwavering loyalty and devotion to Russian panslavism and the well-being of the Russian motherland. The book admonished its young readers to emulate the example of Ivan and his slavophile brother Konstantin. The second book extolled Russia's selfless heroism in fighting to liberate "Slavs, who are our brothers by blood and faith" in 1877. In 1902, for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russo-Turkish war, commemorative albums with panslav content were also published. See, for example, Dyadatsiatipatile lie velikoi osvoboditel'noi voiny 1877-1902 (Moscow: tip. t-va I. D. Sytina, 1902) and Voina za osvobozhdenie slavian 1877-1878 (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tip., 1902). Proceeds from sales of the first album went toward support for Slav students studying in Moscow. Ludovit Stur's famous panslav treatise was also republished in Russia in 1909 (Slavianstvo i mir budushchego [St. Petersburg, 1909]). Other panslav writings were Zabolotskii, Vozrozhdenie idei slianskoi vzaimnosti and parts of the 1912 "Russian thinkers" (ruskie mysliteli) series of the publishing house, Put'. See Pertsov, Panrussizm, p. 58.

89 Thus, for example, a November 1904 congress of Slav nationalities in Paris, at which Russian delegates participated, was kept secret. See Michaels, Neoslavism, p. 39.
exchanged political views openly with members of the tsarist government and Duma. Other Slav congresses subsequently transpired, with Russian support and participation, in St. Petersburg in 1909 and Sofia in 1910.

The resonance of Russian great power nationalism was further manifested in mass demonstrations, press coverage, and civic activism. In 1913, for example, nearly 40,000 people participated in a demonstration to rally Russian support for Slavic nations who were engaged in war against their Ottoman rulers. As for press coverage, numerous publications—particularly those representing the liberal wing of Russian politics—purveyed great power nationalism and panslavism. Although these publications were not uniformly long-lived or consistently popular among large sectors of the Russian reading public, a few always managed to maintain a core base of public support. One of them, Novoe vremia, was particularly successful in maintaining official support and public patronage until 1917. Besides Novoe vremia, other publications that purveyed great power nationalism were Struve's Poliarnaja zvezda (closed in 1906), Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik (closed in 1910), Russkaia mysl' (especially in 1908-1914), P. A. Kulakovskii's Okrainy Rossi (1906-1912), the Octobrist organ Slovo (1905-1909), the Progressists' paper, Utro Rossi (1909-1916), Slavianskii mir (1908-1911)

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80 Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 96-100; V. Miakotin, "Nabroski sovremennosti," Russkoe bogatstvo, no. 11 (1908):198-99 and 208; Michaels, Neoslavism, chap. 3; and Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, pp. 64-65, 77, and 91.

and Slavianskie izvestiiia (1903-1916). As for civic activism, organizations arose that, to one extent or other, actively supported panslav ideas and goals; these included the Galicia-Russia Society, the Society for Slav Culture in Moscow, the Society for Slav Scholarship in St. Petersburg, the Society for Slav Mutualy, the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee, and discussion groups including a circle led by Struve and financed by wealthy Muscovite merchants.

A third indicator of the empowerment of great power ideas was institutional support. The Duma was particularly important. Although not all deputies were great power nationalists, the Duma nonetheless became the institutional center of support for nationalism and panslavism. In the first Duma in 1906, academician M. M. Kovalevskii

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92 Slovo, Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik, and Okrainy Rossii closed down due to uneven public support, while Poliarnaja zvezda ran afoul of censorship in its short life. Russkaia mysli' was a very successful slavophile journal in the 1880s (with a peak circulation rate of 13-14,000). In 1907-1909, its subscribers numbered only 2,522. Struve edited the journal in 1910 and enlivened its content by opening new sections called "Russia and Foreign Lands" and "History of Russian Literature and Culture." See Bibliografiiia periodicheskikh izdaniRossii, vol. 3 (Leningrad: Ministerstvo kul'tury RSFSR, 1960), p.p. 241 and 517; Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, pp. 169-70; Russkaia periodicheskaiapechat' 1895-oktiabr' 1917 (Moscow: Gos. izd. politicheskoi literature, 1957), p. 61; Frank, Struve, pp. 40-75; and Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 96-100 and 114-16.

93 V. A. Bobrinskii of the Nationalist party and his colleague A. I. Savenko led the Galicia-Russia Society, whose goal was to protect the rights of Slavs living in Galicia, a region under Austrian control. In 1913, the Society had approximately 250-300 members in St. Petersburg. The Society for Slav Culture and the Society for Slav Scholarship were founded by Miliukov, Struve, and Maklakov from the Kadets; N. N. Lvov, M. A. Stakhovich, M. M. Fedorov, and D. N. Shipov from the Progressists in the Third Duma; and Guchkov, N. A. Khomiakov, and Kapustin from the Octobrists. These organizations' goal was to enhance inter-Slav cultural, literary, and scholarly exchanges so that Slavs could appreciate better the richness of their common traditions. Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 224-25; Edelman, Gentry Politics, pp. 191-96; and Miakotin, "Nabroski sovremennosti," p. 202.
suggested that the legislature should declare its sympathy for the small Slav nations and encourage greater inter-Slav cooperation. He argued that Russian democracy entailed the duty of protecting all Slav nationalities who themselves had aspirations for freedom. From 1906 onwards, Kadet, Octobrist, and Moderate Right newspapers and journals also emphasized the primacy of Russian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea straits. Further, many deputies were active members and supporters of organizations that favored closer ties between Russians and Slavs in Europe. These deputies participated at panslav meetings and congresses. The Russian delegation to the Prague Congress in 1908, for example, was led by V. A. Bobrinskii (Nationalist), V. A. Maklakov (Kadet) and N. N. Lvov (Progressist). In the 1910 congress in Sofia, most of the Russian delegates came from the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee and from the Duma; among them were P. A. Kulakovskii, D. Bergun, Bobrinskii, G. V. Komarov, and A. Guchkov.94

During “Slavic Week” in St. Petersburg in May 1908, the Duma also accorded a warm reception to visiting Czech delegates and allowed them to observe a Duma debate in order to witness how the new political order functioned in Russia. Members of the tsarist cabinet—including Prime Minister Stolypin, Finance Minister V. N. Kokovtsev, and Education Minister A. N. Schwartz—also hosted the Czechs and attended a reception in their honor. During the reception, Stolypin expressed sympathy for Slavic

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solidarity and panslav sentiments.\textsuperscript{95}

Representatives of the foreign ministry and military also supported Russian great power ideas and political activism among Slavs. Both foreign ministers Izvolskii (1906-1910) and S. D. Sazonov (1910-1916) pursued activist policies in the Balkans and Black Sea basin. Sazonov, in particular, was swayed by panslav public opinion; in 1914, he argued that Russia had to act decisively on behalf of its Serbian ally or lose all credibility at home and abroad. Besides the foreign ministers, Russian ambassadors to Sofia and Belgrade also backed panslavism and encouraged Serbs and others to count on Russian assistance in their struggle against their imperial rulers. In the military, there were officers who favored a resurgence of Russian power in the Balkans; they participated in full dress uniform at the 40,000-strong demonstration in St. Petersburg in 1913 in support of the Balkan Slav war against Turkey. War Minister Sukhomlinov in 1914 also added his voice to those in the Russian government who argued that Russia must not desert its historic Slav ally, Serbia, in the brewing crisis before World War I.\textsuperscript{96}

\section{IV. Hypotheses on the Empowerment of Great Power Nationalism}

\section*{A. Internal Instability}

Aggressive nationalism is likely to be empowered under conditions of severe and

\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Gosudarstvennaia duma, stenograficheskie otchety, sessiia 1}, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 108 and Vysny, \textit{Neo-Slavism and the Czechs}, pp. 77-78.

\textsuperscript{96}\textit{Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War}, pp. 114-16 and McDonald, \textit{United Government}, pp. 197 and 204-205.
prolonged internal instability, which delegitimate state authority and lead elites to resort to extreme nationalism to regain public legitimacy and trust. Internal instability in Russia had political and social causes, and both helped advance the empowerment of aggressive nationalism.

1) Political Instability

The first and major source of internal instability was the rise of the concept of popular sovereignty (i.e., that political legitimacy stemmed from the "people" or "nation" [narod] rather than the autocrat's sacred right to govern). This concept challenged the legitimacy of autocracy, which had been eroding since Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, and aggravated the rift between the autocratic regime and the society it purported to rule. This rift had been evident, for example, in the implacable nature of the opposition to tsarism in the first and second Dumas and in the conversion of some members of the landed nobility—the conservative mainstay of tsarist support—to

97 Until 1905, the Russian state stood formally on the principle of unlimited autocracy—i.e., the tsar was divinely ordained to be the chief and absolute ruler of Russia. Although the principle of unlimited autocracy was officially revoked only in 1905, its legitimacy had been eroding for decades. A watershed was Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, which stimulated Alexander II's domestic reform efforts to salvage the legitimacy of the autocratic order. These reforms succeeded only partially and Alexander II's successor, Alexander III, shunned reform in favor of reactionary measures. He was temporarily successful but, by the time his son Nicholas II acceded to the throne, assaults on autocracy became so severe that the tsar was compelled to acquiesce to the beginnings of a constitutional monarchy in 1905. For a review of domestic crises leading to the revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto, see Charques, Twilight of Imperial Russia, pp. 59-139.
The rift between Russian state and society resulted in large part from Nicholas II's inability to fathom the meaning and gravity of changes transpiring in his country. He considered the throne a burden, yet never relinquished the mystical and fervent belief that he, as autocrat, was ordained to be Russia's ruler, that autocracy was best for Russia's welfare, and that the simple "folk" (prostoi narod) would always remain devoted to their tsar. In 1906, Nicholas set the tone for others in government and the bureaucracy by acting as if no major change had occurred in Russian politics despite the 1905 October Manifesto. He surrounded himself with conservative-reactionary advisers who reinforced his misperceptions and biases about how Russia should be governed. In addition, in the last years of his reign he succumbed to the reactionary influence of his wife and the depraved peasant, Grigori Rasputin, who pursued his own personal and lascivious interests while convincing the empress that he could heal her hemophiliac son, tsarevich Aleksei.

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98 In 1907-1910 many of the landed nobility returned to their traditional loyalty to the state and their ranks in the third Duma (i.e., the Moderate Rights/Nationalists) pursued largely cooperative relations with the government under Stolypin. See Haimson, "Conclusion," in Haimson, ed., Politics of Rural Russia, pp. 65-75.

99 Rossiiskie samoderzhtsy, pp. 310-16, 320-37 and 351-53; Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, pp. 23-27 and 30-31; McDonald, United Government, p. 188. In 1911, Stolypin confronted the tsar with information gathered by the Chief of Gendarmes, which warned about Rasputin's suspicious character and negative impact on the respectability of the throne. Nicholas II responded that Stolypin's information on Rasputin might well be true but, he continued, "I ask you never again to speak to me about Rasputin; after all, there is nothing I can do." See Rossiiskie samoderzhtsy, p. 357. On Rasputin's impact on the downfall of the monarchy, see the memoirs of M. V. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin. An Empire's Collapse, trans. Catherine Zvegintzoff (Florida: Academic International Press, 1973).
The rift between tsar and society widened in the last years before World War I, particularly after the 1911 assassination of Stolypin who, as prime minister, had sought assiduously to find a modus vivendi with public opinion and changing political attitudes in Russia. After Stolypin, the tsar selected advisers who staunchly reinforced the sovereign's general unresponsiveness to political demands from below. The widening gap between state and society helped increase the credibility of great power nationalists who claimed to speak on behalf of the people or narod in ways that the tsar and his cabinet did not.

A second source of instability was the divided nature of state authority and the severe fragmentation of political elites after 1905, which clouded the lines of official decisionmaking and created opportunities for outsiders to move Russian foreign policy discourse and action toward aggressive great power directions. The divided nature of state power was rooted in part in the Fundamental Laws of 1906, which decreed the Council of Ministers, led by the prime minister, as the official center of Russian executive power. The Laws, however, deprived the Council of jurisdiction over the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, or over the tsarist Court and such issues as succession to the throne, the imperial domains and the Russian church. In all of these, the tsar officially retained his authority. But in practice, Nicholas II did not exercise his

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100These advisers included Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, editor of Grazhdanin and Minister of Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo. On the views and activities of Durnovo, see Dominic Lieven, Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 207-230. One historian notes that Nicholas and his closest entourage were incompetent, and that the tsar was so divorced from realities at home that his response to domestic problems was often to take longer vacations. See Roiger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation, pp. 20-29.
powers actively or adroitly and, in the sphere of foreign policy, passively handed most of
the initiative to prime minister Stolypin and foreign ministers Izvolskii and Sazonov in
1906-1911.\textsuperscript{101} The Fundamental Laws also granted the Duma budgetary powers, but
not over 40\% of the state budget that went into the army, navy, state loans, and imperial
Court. The tsar sanctioned other provisions that curtailed the power of the Duma,
including a revision of the role of the State Council. The State Council, half of whose
members were elected and half appointed by the tsar, originally had a strictly advisory
function; but the tsar transformed it into an upper legislative house with the same
powers as the Duma and gave it authority to annul Duma decisions! The Fundamental
Laws further stipulated that government ministers were to report directly only to the tsar,
but the Duma, through its power of interpellation, could also summon ministers for
questioning.\textsuperscript{102}

The preceding description indicates that the new Russian "constitutional order"
inaugurated in 1906 was weak and rife with confusion of authority and functions.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101}This despite the fact that the office of prime minister did not formally include
authority in foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{102}The State Council was a conservative body that favored retention of the monarchic
system in Russia. Its elected members included 56 high-propertied deputies from the
provincial zemstvos, 18 from the gentry, 12 from commerce and industry, 6 from the
clergy, 6 from the Academy of Sciences and the universities, and 2 from the Finnish
Diet. Besides granting the Council powers identical to those of the Duma, the tsar
further diluted Duma authority by granting himself power to announce Duma sessions,
disband the Duma as long as dates for new elections and a new session were
announced, veto Duma legislation and, in case of emergency and when the Duma was
not in session, issue decrees that would have the status of laws. Riasanovsky, History
of Russia, pp. 408-409 and Lieven, Russia's Rulers, pp. 27-83.

\textsuperscript{103}Hosking notes that Russia was undergoing transition from autocracy to
constitutionalism at a time of "deep social conflict." During such a transition, disputes
Many who opposed the tsar felt that the latter had violated the spirit of the October Manifesto, especially because of the strictures he imposed on the Duma. The instability of state structures worsened when the tsar dissolved the first two Dumas, even while his own Council of Ministers was in disarray, with three prime ministers succeeding each other in the course of just one year.\textsuperscript{104} After Prime Minister Stolypin revamped the electoral laws in June 1907, the third Duma yielded a majority that was more conservative than its predecessors and more willing to work with the government. But though the third and fourth Dumas from 1907-1914 functioned under some semblance of stability, the underlying problems of amorphous state power and fragmented ruling elites were never truly resolved.

In 1911-1914, shortly before and then after Stolypin's death, the "growing fracture in the highest official spheres" of Russian policymaking worsened. The Stolypin government's alliance with centrists in the Duma failed; the State Council vetoed every Duma legislation which contained even a hint of liberalism, thereby burying all hopes for reform legislation; the Kadet, Octobrist, and Nationalist parties splintered; the Council of Ministers was mired in dissensions over policy issues; Nicholas II treated Stolypin's successor, V. N. Kokovtsev, with distance and disdain;\textsuperscript{105} and animosity between the

\textsuperscript{104}Serge Witte was prime minister for six months, I. L. Goremykin for three and, finally, in July 1906, P. A. Stolypin became prime minister. Stolypin was to stay in this post until 1911.

\textsuperscript{105}The tsar dismissed Kokovtsev in January 1914 and replaced him with the geriatric I. L. Goremykin (who had been prime minister for a few months in 1906). Many saw Goremykin's appointment as "the placing of a figurehead at the helm of a moribund
Duma and government intensified. The fourth Duma in 1912 was more antigovernmental than its predecessor, with numerous and less manageable political blocs replacing the working majority that had cooperated with Stolypin in the third Duma. By 1913, the Octobrists had split into three factions; many Kadets had turned from Miliukov's leadership and sought a coalition with the Progressists; and even the Nationalists began to take an opposition stance vis-a-vis the tsarist government. Octobrist M. V. Rodzianko captured the deep nature of the rift at the highest levels of state when he wrote to the emperor in December 1913,

Each minister has his own opinion. For the most part, the cabinet is divided into two parties. The State Council forms a third, the Duma a fourth, and of your own opinion the country remains ignorant. This cannot go on, your Majesty, this is not government, it is anarchy.

Amorphous, divided, and unstable state power helped advance the empowerment of great power nationalism and its aggressive panslav prescriptions. First, United Government." Foreign minister Sazonov described Goremykin as "an old man who had long since lost not only the ability to be interested in any matter except for his personal tranquility and well-being, but simply even to reckon with the surrounding reality." S. D. Sazonov, Vospominaniia (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991), p. 94.

In 1914, for example, some members of the Council of Ministers campaigned for an end to Duma deputies' freedom of speech at the rostrum and immunity from prosecution. Edelman, Gentry Politics, pp. 196-98.

Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 182-214 (for a general exposition on the failure of Stolypin's 3 June system); Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 407-457 (on internal party dissension and the eventual splintering of the Octobrist, Kadet, and Moderate Right/Nationalist groups); and McDonald, United Government, pp. 177-86 (on division in the Council of Ministers and the stronger anti-government stance of the fourth Duma). See also V. S. Diakin, Russkaia burzhuaziia i tsarizm v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914-1917 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1967).

Quoted in Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 213.
a path was opened for panslavs not only to to raise a clamor, but even to pursue unauthorized policies, in response to public sentiments in favor of restoring Russian Great Power status in the Near East. Second, division, competition and strife among state bodies made ideological consensus nearly impossible in Russia from 1907-1914, except on the basis of great power nationalism, whose prescriptions connoted a more stable and powerful Russian state.

In 1908-1914, affairs in the Near East had become salient in Russian political discourse, yet individuals and institutions responsible for foreign policymaking (i.e., the court and foreign ministry) failed to provide a clear, decisive, and coherent approach. Foreign policy became an open game for competing actors and ideas, and great power nationalists and panslavs saw and took an opportunity to promote their ideas. The court, Council of Ministers, and foreign ministry implemented divided and contradictory policies, thereby allowing great power nationalists from the Duma and elsewhere to push panслав prescriptions to the foreground of policymaking.

From 1906-1910, the biggest foreign policy debates in Russia tackled Russian relations with Turkey, Austria-Hungary (and, indirectly, Germany), and the Balkan countries. At the beginning of Izvolskii’s appointment as foreign minister, official Russian policy on these issues pursued dual and contradictory goals. On one hand, Russian officials wanted to remain friendly with Turkey and Austria so that Russia could have a peredyshka or breathing space from foreign policy complications and focus on

\[10^9\text{During Nicholas II's reign (1894-1917), Russia had eight foreign ministers, most of whom were inexperienced and untalented. See B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow. Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy 1814-1974 (IN: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 225.}\]
reconstruction at home; on the other hand, official policy also wanted to restore Russian international prestige by giving some support to the Balkan Slavs in their struggle against Turkish rule and Austro-German hegemony. Those who supported official policy included the tsar, Izvolskii, deputy foreign minister Charykov, and deputies in the Duma's rightist nationalist camp. In opposition were Octobrists, some Kadets, and Moderate Rights in the Duma, and their co-thinkers in the tsarist cabinet, who favored an explicitly anti-Austrian and anti-German line in defense of Russia's "unequivocal task to unite the Balkan Slavs."\textsuperscript{110}

The confused nature of official government policy and division between pro- and anti-Austrian camps among Russian political elites were at the root of the crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-1909. I will discuss this crisis in more detail in the "International System" section below, but I will explicate now the role that divided state policy played in causing and aggravating the crisis, and contributing to the empowerment of an assertive nationalist and panslav agenda. Izvolskii, in pursuit of official Russian foreign policy goals, concluded a secret deal with Austrian foreign minister Alois Aehrenthal in 1908. Briefly, the deal was that Russia would not object to Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina if Austria would help St. Petersburg attain free passage through the Black Sea straits.\textsuperscript{111} Izvolskii did not inform Stolypin or the Duma about his deal with Aehrenthal, but secured support and approval from the tsar


\textsuperscript{111}A full summary of the origins of this crisis is in McDonald, United Government, pp. 127-51.
and deputy foreign minister Charykov. In September 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, disclosed Izvolskii’s affirmation of Russian support for this act, and denied Austrian acquiescence for any *quid pro quo* involving the straits. A domestic crisis ensued in Russia, with Stolypin becoming highly irate over Izvolskii’s secret *démarche*; great power nationalists in the Duma condemned Izvolskii and voiced their outrage over Austria’s annexation of territory that had a large Slavic population.

When decisive state authority was needed to resolve the burgeoning crisis in Russia over Bosnia, the tsar (who retained supreme authority on foreign policy) chose to act passively. He denied his own complicity in the Izvolskii-Aehrenthal deal and refused to support fully either Stolypin or Izvolskii as tension heightened between the two.\textsuperscript{112} The absence of an authoritative voice for the state helped the cause of nationalists and panslavs who loudly condemned Russian indecision and weakness. A huge outcry ensued in the Duma and liberal press, and domestic pressure rapidly accumulated in support of an aggrieved Serbia, which was threatening war against Austria-Hungary for annexing a territory populated by numerous Serbs. By March 1909, however, both Russia and Serbia backed down from their belligerent position after Germany issued an ultimatum that they must accept Austria’s annexation of Bosnia or face the joint forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{113}

Divided state policy and the 1908-1909 stimulated immense publicity for great power sentiments and policy. The press found an opportunity to dramatize the plight of


\textsuperscript{113}B. Jelavich, *St. Petersburg and Moscow*, pp. 264-70.
unfortunate "brother Slavs" in the Balkans and to malign the government for its neglect of these brethren.\textsuperscript{114} Panslav and anti-Austrian voices in the opposition press also took liberties to misrepresent Russia's official position by claiming that St. Petersburg would aid Serbia against Austria-Hungary. These claims fueled Serbian belligerence against Austria, and although Russia eventually failed to deliver on Serbian expectations, Serb nationalists nonetheless gained greater confidence in pursuing their political agenda because they realized that the Great Powers would give them serious attention.\textsuperscript{115} This confidence proved critical in 1914, when Serbian terrorists sparked a crisis that pulled Russia into a "panslav" mode of action. Finally, divided state policy and the crisis of 1908-1909 prompted the expression of aggressive nationalism by top officials who were not generally proponents of a panslav policy. Stolypin, for example, slighted by Izvolskii's disregard of his authority, joined in the panslav tirade against the latter. Izvolskii also lost his job as a consequence of the domestic turmoil caused by his failed diplomacy, underlining the idea that government officials could not disregard great power nationalism and panslav opinion without eroding their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{116}

Fragmented state elites and divided state policy again helped advance great

\textsuperscript{114}Riasanovsky, History of Russia, pp. 402-403 and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 232-33.


power nationalism in 1910-1914. After Russia's humiliation in the crisis of 1908-1909, official foreign policy encouraged an alliance among the Balkan Slavs, while simultaneously avoiding war with the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{117} As in 1907, Russian diplomacy pursued contradictory goals because a Balkan alliance could only be hostile to Turkey and could, therefore, draw Russia into a confrontation with the Turks. The absence of strong leadership after Stolypin's death in 1911 further aggravated the situation; Kokovtsev, the new prime minister, was a gray bureaucrat who was dispossessed of Stolypin's energy, credibility, and vision.

Under Kokovtsev, the Council of Ministers was riven with conflict, particularly between Kokovtsev's supporters and those of war minister V. A. Sukhomlinov. Kokovtsev and Sukhomlinov quarreled over many issues, including Russian policy in the Balkans. Sukhomlinov, along with agriculture minister A. V. Krivoshein,\textsuperscript{118} were among the "war party" in the Council who sought an aggressive policy in defense of Russia's Balkan allies and interests. In 1912, when the Balkan alliance fought Turkey, for example, Sukhomlinov flouted Kokovtsev's authority by ordering partial mobilization of Russian troops on the Austrian border. Nicholas II himself disregarded formal decisionmaking procedures, ignored Kokovtsev's authority, and sanctioned Sukhomlinov's actions. Kokovtsev recorded feelings of "isolation" and "full


\textsuperscript{118}Krivoshein argued that Russia should defend its vital interests in the Balkans and go to war if necessary. His differences with Kokovtsev led him to spearhead an effort to unseat the prime minister in 1913. McDonald, \textit{United Government}, pp. 184-85, 197, and 204-205.
helplessness" in the face of division within the Council and lack of support from the tsar. This division in state policy and the lack of a clear locus of authority undermined Kokovtsev's cautious approach in the Balkans and favored those who desired aggressive nationalist actions.\(^{119}\)

The lack of clear goals and authority in foreign policy opened the way for great power nationalists to pursue their agenda in defiance of official instructions. Two figures were particularly notorious: N. G. Hartwig, Russian representative in Belgrade and a frustrated aspirant for the post of foreign minister, and his counterpart in Sofia, A. Nekliudov. Both exceeded their official instructions on encouraging a Balkan alliance in 1911-1912. With great zeal, they urged Serbia and Bulgaria not to take official Russian caution seriously because the Russian masses would support the Slavs in any war against Turkey.\(^ {120}\) Hartwig and Nekliudov enjoyed the sympathy of powerful figures at home including the empress, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich,\(^ {121}\) and Prince G. N.

\(^{119}\) McDonald, *United Government*, pp. 177-87.

\(^{120}\) Hartwig was a well-known slavophile and once led the foreign ministry's Asiatic department. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 impressed him deeply as a young adult and he advocated Russian help for "brother Slavs" throughout his career. As Russia's ambassador to Serbia, he engaged constantly in anti-Austrian agitation. His actions and those of Nekliudov recall the excesses of Nikolai Ignatev, the notorious panslav diplomat in my 1856-1878 case study. Thaden, *Russia and Balkan Alliance*, pp. 58-98; Taylor, *Struggle for Mastery*, p. 484; and Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 26-27.

\(^{121}\) Nikolai Nikolaevich was a close relative of the tsar and led the St. Petersburg military district. His wife and sister-in-law were daughters of the Montenegro king, and both influenced the Grand Duke to assume panslav sympathies. The Grand Duke allegedly influenced the tsar to support panslav activism by 1912. See Rossiiskie samoderzhtsyi, p. 341; Lieven, *Russia and Origins of First World War*, chap. 4; and McDonald, *United Government*, pp. 183-84.
Trubetskoi. The latter was head of the Asiatic department in the foreign ministry and was formerly a publicist for the panslav-oriented Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik. The diplomacy of Hartwig and Nekliudov helped create the Balkan alliance which declared war on Turkey in 1912 and, in the process, roused aggressive panslav emotions once more in Russia. Indignation in the press and Duma over government intransigence in protecting Slav interests again became very pronounced. Panslav initiatives and events also flourished: Octobrist leader Guchkov set up field hospitals staffed by Russian volunteers to assist Balkan Slavs who were fighting against Turkey; the St. Peterburg Slavic Committee collected donations for the Slavs; the Slav Philanthropic Society, the Kadet National Club, and other groups held meetings with Duma members to discuss Russian policy in the Balkans; and Duma political parties hosted panslav banquets to condemn official Russian foreign policy and voice their support for the Slav war against Turkey.\textsuperscript{122}

Deep division among political elites from 1905-1914 made the search for a new basis of consensus extremely urgent if the state were to continue functioning. In the early 1900s, the tsarist government first sought support from the right wing of the Russian political spectrum, including the proto-fascist Union of Russian People (URP). But this partnership was short-lived because the URP’s mass base turned out to be narrower and less reliable than the regime had presumed and, by the third Duma in

\textsuperscript{122}Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich sent a sympathetic telegram to one of these banquets; another banquet sent a telegram to Kokovtsev to condemn the weakness of Russian policy in the Balkans. Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossi, pp. 336-54; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 233-37; Thaden, Russia and Balkan Alliance, p. 112; McDonald, United Government, pp. 182 and 188-89.
1907, the extreme right was no longer a crucial source of government support.\textsuperscript{123} Instead, the tsarist government under Stolypin counted on support from the new Duma majority of Octobrists, right-wing Kadets, and Moderate Rights/Nationalists who were reformist but loyal to the government, and many of whom were great power nationalists.

The majority bloc that cooperated with Stolypin in the third Duma was neither homogeneous nor consistently cohesive. But after the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis of 1908-1909, many among the centrist groups developed a consensus on great power nationalism and panslav activism. This consensus emerged from a common desire among forces relatively loyal to the tsar to form a "united government" and avoid further internal strife that weakened the country and prevented it from achieving foreign policy victories.\textsuperscript{124} Stolypin himself encouraged nationalism and Russian chauvinism at different points to rally support for the government. From 1908-1912, this nationalism influenced domestic politics as the Duma and government adopted and implemented

\textsuperscript{123} Right-wing groups supported the monarchy, but tsarist support for these groups, especially the URP, never amounted to a full-fledged partnership. Stolypin himself was wary of the tsar's support for extremists like the URP, and his government subsidized other, more moderate right groups. For example, moderate nationalists led by P. N. Balashev received financing for over a year from Stolypin's government for their local activities. See Avrekh, \textit{Stolypin i tret'ia Duma}, pp. 414-15; Levin, \textit{Third Duma}, p. 148; G. Yurskii, \textit{Pravye v tretei Gosudarstvennoi Dume} (Kharkov: izd. Tsentral'nogo predvybornogo komiteta ob "edinennykh russkih liudei, 1912), pp. 91-125; Rogger, "Formation of the Russian Right," pp. 66-94; and Laqueur, \textit{Black Hundred}, pp. 23-24 and 27.

\textsuperscript{124} See Avrekh, \textit{Stolypin i tret'ia Duma}, pp. 38-43 and 413, on the rise of antisemitism among Struve and his fellow-thinkers in the Kadet camp as they sought political consensus with groups to their right on the political spectrum.
laws that discriminated against Jews, Poles, Finns, and other non-Russian groups.\textsuperscript{125} Sadly, the majority that formed a "united government" in Russia during the third Duma proved untenable; Octobrists who supported a reformed monarchy lost faith in the regime, especially when official complicity became evident in Stolypin’s assassination and when the court began to ignore the Duma almost completely and behave in flagrant violation of the promises of the October Manifesto after 1911.\textsuperscript{126} Although the idea of "united government" eroded, the popularity of great power activism in the Balkans nonetheless remained predominated through the end of the third Duma. In the fourth Duma, elected in 1912, the Progressists, who were followers of Struve, became the most prominent group. They subscribed to great power nationalism and panslav sympathies, and played an important role throughout the last years of the tsarist regime.

\textsuperscript{125}These included 1) the Kholm bill, which removed the Kholm territory from Poland and transferred it to Russia because many residents on the territory were Russian; 2) the Finland bill, which removed much of Finland’s autonomy and made Russian empire laws supreme on Finnish territory; 3) the western zemstvo bill, which changed the suffrage to ensure a Russian (as opposed to Polish) majority in the zemstvos of nine provinces; and other bills which discriminated against Jews, Muslims, and other minorities. See Tret’ia gosudarstvennaia Duma. Materiały dlja otsenki ee deiatel’nosti (St. Petersburg: Trud, 1912), pp. 139-50 and 372-77; Yurskii, Prawye v tretei gosudarstvennoi Dume, pp. 1-5 and 91-120; and Zenkovsky, Stolypin, pp. 15-27. Kadet leader Miliukov and his followers opposed Russian chauvinism, but they were overpowered by other Kadets who subscribed to Struve’s great power nationalism and those who saw Miliukov’s egalitarian position on the nationality issue as a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. See, for example, Miketov, Chto sdelalo narodnoe predstavitel’stvo tret’ego sozyva, pp. 133-69.

\textsuperscript{126}The Duma majority which supported the government splintered over disagreements on domestic policies, including Great Russian chauvinism; cohesiveness also weakened as Stolypin’s own political favor with the tsar waned in 1911. The individual parties themselves had leadership and other internal disputes which created new configurations of party lines and new groupings. See Avrekh, Stolypin i tret’ia Duma, pp. 407-456; Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, p. 93; Tret’ia gosudarstvennaia Duma, pp. 135-37 and 359-71 and Pinchuk, Octobrists, pp. 161-68 and 182-83.
2) Social Crisis

Internal instability in Russia in 1905-1914 also had social causes, including terrorism, strikes, and other disturbances. There had been two earlier waves of terrorism in Russia in 1878-1881 and 1901-1905, which victimized such prominent figures as Tsar Alexander II, two ministers of internal affairs (D. S. Sipiagin in 1902 and V. K. Plehve in 1904), one minister of education, and Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich. Terrorists from the organization, People's Will, were largely responsible for the first wave of terror, while Socialist Revolutionaries accounted for the second.

In 1905, terrorist acts claimed the lives of at least 3611 bureaucrats of all ranks in the Russian empire. In 1906-1907, revolutionary terrorism killed approximately 4500 state officials, including governors, army generals, members of the gendarmerie, and ordinary police in the villages. Prime minister Stolypin himself suffered a terrorist attack while in his country residence in 1906; he survived, but thirty of his visitors did not. Civilian fatalities from terrorism in 1905-1907 numbered approximately 2180. In January 1908-May 1910, terrorist acts killed 732 bureaucrats and 3051 civilians. A major reason for the decrease in the number of official victims may have been the government's harsh response to terrorism; in 1906-1909, the government executed 2825 accused terrorists and in a few months alone in 1907 court-marshaled and executed over 1000. Terrorism cost not only many lives but also huge economic losses due to numerous politically motivated thefts and expropriations throughout the
empire.\textsuperscript{127} Terrorism created great insecurity in people's daily lives; its effects were particularly vicious in peripheral areas, and regular citizens found minimal solace in government assistance because the state's efforts to end terror had no durable success.\textsuperscript{128}

Economic strikes, which were politically and/or economically motivated, also marred the landscape of Russian autocracy from 1905-1907. Strikes were at their most acute during the "revolutionary year of 1905" and waned slightly in 1906-1907. They reached their lowest level in 1910, when fewer than fifty thousand workers participated in about two thousand strikes. But with Russian industrial expansion from 1911-1914, these numbers rose again and by 1914, a new strike wave in Russia, mostly politically-driven, reached crisis proportions reminiscent of 1905.\textsuperscript{129}

The disturbances of 1914, including strikes and street demonstrations, resulted in large part from a horrendous incident that discredited the government and recalled

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\textsuperscript{128}Geifman, "Ubiil" p. 26. It became particularly difficult to trust the government's competence to fight terrorism when it could not even protect its own ranks. For example, there was evidence of police connivance in the assassination of Stolypin, who was not only prime minister but also Minister of Internal Affairs when he was killed in September 1911! Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 147-48.
\textsuperscript{129}Levin, Second Duma, pp. 366-67. According to Levin, there were 6164 strikes in 1906, 2545 of which were economically motivated. In 1907, strikes totaled 3573, 973 of which were mainly for economic reasons. There were about 700,000 workers on strike in Russia in 1912; 900,000 in 1913; and over 1.5 million in the first seven months of 1914. Charques, Twilight of Imperial Russia, pp. 111-39, 200 and Edelman, Gentry Politics, pp. 199-200.
\end{flushright}
1905's "Bloody Sunday." In April 1912, police opened fire on thousands of peacefully demonstrating workers at the Lena goldfields in Siberia, killing 147. Reflecting popular anger and near-collapse of faith in the government, the Duma called for a complete investigation of the incident and asked the government to outline measures it planned to take to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Government explanations did not satisfy Duma deputies, who were left with "the distinct feeling that the government was not in control . . ." In 1914, the police again brutally suppressed a meeting of workers convened to support strikers in the Baku oil fields. In response to these police actions, in July 1914, a "strike as massive and explosive as any that had erupted among the workers in 1905" swept St. Petersburg. Nearly all factories and commercial establishments in the working class districts of the city drew to a halt, and workers clashed violently with Cossack detachments and police. It was in this setting that the Russian government confronted the Serbian crisis of July 1914. In the context of a highly delegitimized autocracy being challenged by society, authoritative voices in the government opted to support aggressive great power nationalism on behalf of the Slavs, for fear that doing otherwise might destroy any hope for the state to recover its legitimacy among a restive population.\(^{130}\)

\[\text{B. Domestic Incentive Structure}\]

Aggressive nationalism is likely to be empowered if conditions of mass politics, 

\(^{130}\)Pinchuk, Octobrists, pp. 182-83; see also Charques, Twilight of Imperial Russia, p. 192; Seton-Watson, Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 291; McDonald, United Government, p. 207; and Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1907," Slavic Review (December 1964):627-640.
combined with national humiliation, spur elites to try to outdo each other's nationalistic rhetoric as they compete for popular support. Further, the greater the material incentives for elites and institutions (particularly the military) to purvey extreme nationalism, the more likely they are to do so and thus facilitate the political empowerment of aggressive nationalist ideas.

In 1905-1914, the majority of great power nationalists in Russia belonged to the moderate-liberal (e.g., right-wing Kadets and Octobrists) and moderate-conservative (e.g., Moderate Rights and Nationalists) wings of Russian politics. These groups' political organizations tended to be erratic, and membership in them constantly fluctuated.\textsuperscript{131} However, a core of support for great power nationalism always existed, even if these groups did not always agree on the modalities and speed of Russian power projection abroad. Some Kadets and Progressists, for example, while favoring a strong foreign policy in the Near East, also supported intervention by the community of Great Powers (not national or Slavic mobilization) as a response to crises stimulated by Slav rebellions against the Ottoman empire in 1911-1913. Others, including Octobrists, Nationalists, and some Progressists, more often took maximalist positions, arguing that tsarism was strong enough to defend Russian historical interests and execute Russia's role as "primordial protector of brothers by blood and faith in the Balkans."\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131}As one historian writes, in reference to the Third Duma from 1907-1912, "the [political] groups and factions altered with kaleidoscopic abruptness as members passed from one to another and new agglomerations emerged as fractions and groups merged with each other." Levin, *Third Duma*, p. 112.

Although competition in Russian mass electoral politics in the early twentieth
century focused mostly on domestic political issues, there is evidence that political elites
also viewed foreign policy as an important arena of struggle for legitimacy. Nearly all
parties after 1905 made claims to speak on behalf of the "people" or "nation" (narod) to
legitimate their vision of Russian foreign policy; indeed, the concept of narod dominated
politics as much as autocracy, revolution, or constitution.\textsuperscript{133} The largest contingent of
panslav supporters, for example, who sought to distinguish themselves from
conservative rightist groups which shunned activism in Russian foreign policy, insisted
that, unlike rightist nationalists, their mandate came from the nation or narod and
included not just lip service to Russian Great Power status but immediate, decisive, and
forceful actions to raise Russian prestige and worthiness in the international arena.\textsuperscript{134}
Liberal figures like Miliukov and his Kadet followers, whose liberalism was deeply
entrenched in western thought and "in almost every respect discordant with Russian
experience and tradition," thereby rendering them vulnerable to charges of being
unpatriotic, on many occasions also supported aggressive great power foreign policy
because it represented "national consensus" and was in Russia's national interest.\textsuperscript{135}
Yet others, such as wealthy merchants among the Progressists, who were developing
their political voice and power for the first time in Russian national politics, also used

\textsuperscript{133} Hosking, \textit{Russian Constitutional Experiment}, pp. 241-42 and 245.


militant great power nationalism to establish their credentials as speakers "not for the
government, but for the Russian people." Perhaps the most prominent figure from this
group was P. P. Riabushinskii, a supporter of Struve and representative of the "self-
affirming merchant class" (samoutverzhdaushchegosia kupechestva). In 1912,
Riabushinskii declared that it was time for the "Russian merchant to occupy the leading
position among Russia's estates, carry with pride the mark of a merchant, and cease to
hanker after the mark of the dying nobility." He and his circle fought against the
monarchy and other forces that had deeply compromised Russia's Great Power status;
they argued that Russia's future lay in a "great mission of Slav unification" and in a
"healthy militarism" that would restore Russian power and identity in protecting Slavs
from their German oppressors.136

Elites were motivated to support aggressive great power nationalism not only in
the competition for legitimacy among political parties, but also in the struggle to
strengthen legislative decisionmaking power vis-a-vis tsarist power in Russia's inchoate
political system. Miliukov, for example, used a strident pan-slav tone during the
annexation crisis of 1908-1909. Because the incident betrayed how little consideration
the monarchy accorded to the Duma and public opinion, Miliukov sought to delegitimize

136 See Diakin, Russkaia burzhuziia i tsarism v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny, pp. 33-34; V. P. Riabushinskii, ed., Velikaia Rossiia: Sbornik stat'ei po voennym i
obshchestvennym voprosam, Book 2 (Moscow: tip. Riabushkina, 1911), p. 5; James L.
West, "The Riabushinsky Circle: Burzhuziia and Obshchestvennost' in Late Imperial
Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, NJ:
Riabushinskikh," in Materialy po istorii SSSR, vol. 6 (Moscow: izd. Akademii Nauk
the Russian government by condemning its weakness in foreign policy and urging war against Austria-Hungary if necessary.137 There were other cases when liberals in the Duma, dismayed by the tsar's recalcitrance against the development of a true constitutional regime in Russia, used aggressive nationalism to challenge the authority of the tsar, to denigrate the foreign ministry for not adequately defending the nation's interests in the Balkans, to advocate reforms in foreign policymaking, and to argue that the Duma and the "people" in general had a central role to play in foreign policy.

Throughout the third Duma from 1907-1912, Octobrists and Kadets consistently tried to make Russian foreign policy accountable to the Duma. When foreign minister Izvolskii made his first statement to the Duma in 1907, Miliukov declared that the government needed "to lean upon public opinion [as represented in the Duma] in its coming diplomatic measures" to "compensate for [Russian] temporary material weakness."

Later, in 1908, Guchkov warned the foreign ministry that

the worth of all your diplomatic demarches depends on how much the people's consciousness, the people's will stands behind them. And when ... you have recourse to ultimata, ... it is to us [the Duma] that you will come for your war credits; you will need our blood and that of our brothers and sons, you will come for money and manpower ... 138

137Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, pp. 237-39 and Michaels, Neoslavism, p. 39

138See Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 424-25 and Tret'ia gosudarstvennaia duma, pp. 282-90. Guchkov was personally very interested in military and naval affairs and used his leadership of the Duma's defense committee to advance his personal authority on these issues. Another use of panslavism to attack the government came in 1908-1909, when the panslav-oriented Novoe vremia condemned the government's accomodation of Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The paper declared that the foreign ministry was no longer capable of meeting the demands made on Russian diplomacy in the modern age. Russian foreign policy, led by the tsar and his ministers, had become anachronistic for the "new Russia, with [its] representative system and ... strong Slav consciousness." On army and navy issues, the Duma was empowered to
Izvolskii's successor, Sazonov, was not highly responsive to public opinion at the beginning of his tenure and rarely made presentations to the Duma. In 1912-1913, however, he became increasingly sensitive to the vociferous comments and criticism in the pan-Slav press and Duma regarding Russia's indecisive stance toward Serbia, leader of the Balkan alliance that had declared war on Turkey in September 1912. Although Sazonov was not eager for Russia to go to war in the Balkans, he nonetheless expressed sympathy for the "Slavic cause" and, by 1914, argued for Russia to go to war on behalf of Serbia. He claimed that the Russian people would never forgive the tsar if he allowed Russia to be humiliated once more (as in 1909) in the Balkans.\(^{139}\) Other official figures including Nicholas II, Stolypin, Naval Minister Grigorovich and other leaders were cognizant of, or sensitive to, pan-Slav public opinion and sought not to alienate or aggravate its proponents.\(^{140}\)

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\(^{140}\)Nicholas II, for example, asked the publisher of *Novoe vremia* in 1909 to assist Russian foreign policy and help prevent a war for which Russia was not prepared by terminating publication of anti-German articles in *Novoe vremia*. Other government leaders undertook similar non-coercive measures to ask public opinion leaders to quell their pan-Slav war agitation in 1908-1909. See Bestuzhev, *Bor'ba v Rossi* , pp. 283-84 and 290; see also Fiona Hill, "Domestic Anxiety and International Humiliation. Russian National Interest, Public Opinion, and the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1908-1909," xerox ms., pp. 6-10, and McDonald, *United Government*, p. 196 on Grigorovich's arguments in 1913 for a more aggressive posture in the Black Sea as a response to the
There is evidence that material incentives also motivated groups who felt that their tangible interests would be served by aggressive great power nationalism. One was the landowning class, which felt increasingly dispossessed by government policies that, in their opinion, favored industry at the expense of agricultural Russia and served the interests of “Jews and Germans.” Many landowners, set in their feudal mindset, were outraged by overwhelming German competition in grain and other markets abroad, as well as inside the Russian empire and in traditional Russian zones of interest such as Persia. They developed extreme anti-German feelings, and feared Germany’s potential control of the Black Sea straits and ability to cut off Russian exports. Thus, they supported militant nationalism, particularly Russian policy that countered German and Austro-Hungarian power in the Balkans.¹⁴¹

Liberal, wealthy businessmen who supported Struve’s great power nationalism and panslav-oriented publications and activities may have also done so to benefit their trade interests. Led by Riabushinskii, these businessmen stressed "strong authority, social reform, legality, and a vigorous foreign policy."¹⁴² With Struve as their mentor, they argued that Russian foreign policy should concentrate on the Balkans because Russia enjoyed cultural influence in, and easy access to, the area. This stance was compatible with their interests in the protection of Russian trade through the Black Sea straits; after all, approximately one half of Russian exports depended for transit on the


¹⁴²Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, p. 180.
goodwill of potentially unfriendly powers in the straits.\textsuperscript{143}

The parochial and material interests of the military would also have been well-served by great power nationalism. Aggressive nationalism could justify larger military budgets as well as mobilize the mass population for future wars that required national support. Indeed, there were soldiers and retired officers who were preoccupied with great power nationalism and who, in particular, actively supported panslav organizations such as the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Committee and the Society of Russian Borderlands. However, the military command never exploited militant nationalism to argue for increased budgetary allocations. Although the army had suffered budget cuts through the 1880s and had not recovered by the early twentieth century, military leaders did not exaggerate threats from German or Austro-Hungarian power that required a forceful or immediate Russian military response. Many in the military behaved in a controlled and professional manner by gauging accurately the weakness of the army and favoring a largely defensive Russian foreign policy over nationalist adventurism. Systematic propagation of panslav or other aggressive nationalist ideas did not take place in the army or navy; neither did commanders push for a strategy of forward action in the Balkans. An exception was war minister Sukhomlinov who, in 1912 and 1914, urged military mobilization on behalf of the Balkan Slavs. Material interests, however, did not drive his behavior; rather, he argued that it was time to “believe more in the

\textsuperscript{143}Pipes, Struve. Liberal on Right, p. 174-82. The Russian merchants' fear of enemy control of the straits materialized during World War I, when Turkey closed off the straits and, as a consequence, allied forces had great difficulty supplying Russia with arms and munitions for its army and raw materials for its economic production. Edward C. Thaden, Russia Since 1801 (NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 410.
Russian people and their age-old love for the homeland, which was greater than any accidental preparedness or unpreparedness for war." Sukhomlinov, who had correctly argued in the crisis of 1908-1909 that the Russian army was unprepared to go to war against Austria and Germany, believed in 1912 and 1914 that a similar course of action would not only unacceptably damage the prestige of the army but also put Russia at a hopeless military disadvantage vis-a-vis an impending and inevitable German rapid mobilization.  

C. Effective Social Communication

Aggressive nationalism is likely to be empowered if its purveyors can take advantage of opportunities for effective social communication. Several factors contribute to effective social communication, especially elite manipulation of symbols, mass press, mass education, and public associations, on one hand, and the weakness of evaluative units and lack of strong alternative ideologies, on the other. Great power nationalists used symbols effectively to make their ideas resonate among the educated.

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144V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo. Vospominaniiia 1903-1914 (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), vol. 2, p. 128. Even if military commanders had wanted to instigate aggressive nationalist education in the military, their chances for success would have been impeded by the low levels of literacy among peasant recruits who made up the bulk of the army. In 1902, for example, the army was 80% peasant and had a dismal literacy rate. Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, pp. 80-84 and 209-210; Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 96-116; Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 338-50 and 377-84; and Fuller, Civil-Military Relations in Imperial Russia, pp. 205-207. Examples of military publications supporting panslavism are Rittikh, Ob'edinennoe slavianstvo and Voina za osvobozhdienie slavian.

145Geyer, Russian Imperialism, pp. 281, 312-13. Sukhomlinov's behavior was more consistent with general Russian military professionalism than with rabid nationalism.
and politically articulate sector of the Russian public. One symbol was the Darwinian image of struggle between great and small powers, with the former swallowing up the latter. Great power nationalists and panslavs emphasized this image to argue the importance of building and projecting Russian power abroad, especially in the Balkans, where Russia had a historical record of influence. Stolypin echoed this image when he declared to the Duma in 1907 that “nations [narody] that forget about their national tasks will perish. They will be transformed into dung and fertilizer, which other, stronger peoples will use to grow, expand, and gain even greater strength . . .”\textsuperscript{146} Imagery such as this roused emotional and political support from the articulate public, especially in light of their deep humiliation at Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. Apparent Russian military weakness, coupled with immense disturbances at home and the threat of revolution, generated insecurity regarding the very survival of the Russian state. This insecurity propelled great power nationalists like Struve and his co-thinkers to emphasize cooperation with the government to rebuild internal strength and to promote external policies that would restore the prestige of "Great Russia."\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146}Durnovo, Russkaia panslavistskaia politika, pp. 61-62; Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 125-27; and Charques, Twilight of Imperial Russia, pp. 182-85.

\textsuperscript{147}After the October Manifesto in 1905, Kadet leader Miliukov declared that the Kadet course of action was to remain as before—i.e., an uncompromising stance vis-a-vis the government and an unrelenting demand for a constitutional regime. Struve, on the other hand, broke with the party's official position and confirmed that the introduction of a constitutional order in Russia, no matter how imperfect, had already begun with the Manifesto. He urged the Kadets to adopt open methods of political struggle within officially-sanctioned limits and to cooperate with the government on the basis of moderate reform. Struve was extremely concerned about the dangers of revolution, political maximalism, and the passion of the masses. He believed that "tradition and the historical legacy" were a "necessary condition of true freedom; in contrast, any arbitrary 'revolutionism,' any violent and radical destruction of the societal order, any release of
Another symbol that great power nationalists used was Russia as the "Third Rome" and heir of Orthodox Byzantium. This religious symbol underlined Russia's divine calling that required selfless sacrifice, particularly in defending the Orthodox and Slav peoples of the Balkans. By "saving" the "long-suffering Slavs and opening . . . for them the path to a new life," Russia would save its own foundation as a church-state. By fulfilling its spiritual calling, Russia would show also that its mission was loftier than the materialism of the West.\textsuperscript{148} This symbolism was attractive to educated Russians who worried about Russia's spiritual needs and rebelled against rising rationalism and positivism among the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{149} Finally, nationalists also referred to mythic wars which defined Russia's position as a historical Great Power. One of these was the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. The use of war as a symbol of Russian state identity, power, and triumphalism appealed to those who sought a path toward Russia's rebirth.

demagogic passions can lead only to despotism and slavery." Frank, Struve, pp. 27-50, 75-77 and 213-14; Zabolotskii, Vozrozhdenie idei slavianskoj vzaimnosti, pp. 7-9; and Avrekh, Stolypin i tretia Duma, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{148}On the "Third Rome" symbol and Russia's spiritual salvation, see Kadilin, Griadushchee zavershenie voinoju, esp. pp. 2-23 and Voina za osvobozhdenie slavian, pp. 1-5.

\textsuperscript{149}The most ardent idealist, anti-materialist, and religious collection of writings from 1905-1914 was Vekhi (Landmarks), published in 1909; its authors included Struve, N. A. Berdiaev, S. N. Bulgakov, S. Frank and A. S. Izgoev. Vekhi garnered substantial attention, went through five printings in its first six months (3000 in the first and 5000 in the last), and stirred raging debates between Russian idealists and positivists. Although it did not affect the course of Russian politics in a major way, it stimulated from 1909-1911 the rise of religious philosophical meetings and circles among the intelligentsia. It helped resurrect ideas of Christian faith and mission that were compatible with great power and panslav themes. See Frank, Struve, pp. 81-94; Laqueur, Black Hundred, pp. 53, 290; and Walicki, History of Russian Thought, p. 106.
from the ashes of humiliation and internal turmoil.\textsuperscript{150}

Mass press and mass education also helped facilitate the communication of great power nationalism and panslav ideas. Although Nicholas II initially suppressed and censored the mass press, especially when opinions expressed infringed on foreign policy issues, he nonetheless yielded to domestic pressure and made concessions that allowed greater expression of public opinion in Russia beginning in 1905.\textsuperscript{151} The Russian press became freer than ever before in Russia in 1905-1914, giving voice to practically every type of political opinion. The number of Russian dailies multiplied from 125 in 1900 to 856 in 1913. Along with the mass press came advances in mass education, which continued a trend begun in Russia in the late nineteenth century. In 1897, the census estimated Russia's educated elite to number approximately 726,000 out of a population of 129 million.\textsuperscript{152} Among these elite were the "active intelligentsia," numbering about 50,000 in the early twentieth century and playing a powerful role in "[setting] the tone and [defining] the content of social debate in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia," especially after 1905. Further, literacy, the number of

\textsuperscript{150}Russia's alleged four greatest wars which defined the state's historical role as a Great Power were: the 1612 land war, Peter the Great's war against Sweden, the 1812 war against Napoleon's France, and the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war. The last was a "gigantic and heroic effort to resolve the eastern question and Russia's historical fate." See I. V. Preobrazhenskii, Za brat'ev slavian. Po povodu 25-letiia sviashchennoi voiny 1877-1878 (St. Petersburg: izd. P. P. Soikina, 1903), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{152}Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 2-3.
institutions of primary and secondary learning, and the number of students in
elementary schools all increased between 1897-1914.\textsuperscript{153}

In the mass press, great power nationalism and panslavism were propagated by
publications including \textit{Novoe vremia}, \textit{Russkaia myśl'}, \textit{Russkie vedomosti}, \textit{Moskovskii
ezhenedel'nik}, \textit{Moskovskie vedomosti}, \textit{Golos Moskvy}, \textit{Slovo}, \textit{Okrainy Rossi}, \textit{Utro
Rossii}, \textit{Russkaia molva}, and others. \textit{Novoe vremia} was the most influential of these,
with a circulation of 150,000 in 1911-1914. Its editorials emphasized great power
policy, patriotism, sacrifice for the state and nation, and moral satisfaction through
national prestige. It preached that Russian glory depended on ethnic Russian
chauvinism within the empire and support for the Slav cause outside. Nicholas II
allegedly read the paper daily, and many in the military called it their favorite
publication.\textsuperscript{154} Money from the new and politicized bourgeoisie also underwrote the
panslav-oriented press. For example, when \textit{Slovo} folded up in 1909 and \textit{Moskovskii

\textsuperscript{153}For Russian literacy rates from 1897-1920, see I. M. Bogdanov, \textit{Gramotnost' i
and 65-82. See also Lieven, \textit{Russia and Origins of First World War}, pp. 15 and 119 and
Christopher Read, \textit{Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia 1900-1912
(London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 6-7. Pupils in Russian primary schools increased from
over four million in 1899 to 6,629,978 in 1911; see I. Z. Kaganovich, \textit{Ocherk razvitiia
statistiki shkol'nogo obrazovaniia v SSSR} (Moscow: Gos. statisticheskoie izd., 1957).
For a perspective on the impact of daily newspapers on public opinion in Russia in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Louise McReynolds, "V. M.
Doroshevich: The Newspaper Journalist and the Development of Public Opinion in Civil

\textsuperscript{154}Lieven, \textit{Russia and Origins of First World War}, pp. 96-100 and 129-32; Avrekh,
\textit{Stolypin i tret'ia Duma}, p. 457; and Durnovo, \textit{Russkaia panslavistskaia politika}, p. 112.
From 1912-1917 \textit{Novoe vremia} was edited by the "Association of A. S. Suvorin,"
which also published other panslav literature. See Wieczynski, \textit{Modern Encyclopedia}, pp.
109-110.
ezhenedel'nik in 1910, the merchant P. P. Riabushinskii and his business associates supported their successor papers, Utro Rossiia in Moscow and Russkaia molva in St. Petersburg. They also supported such publications as the 1911 Velikaia Rossiia (Great Russia) volume, which was a treatise of moderate liberalism at home and great power nationalism in Russian policy abroad.\(^{155}\)

Public associations such as panslav committees did not play as prominent a role as they did in my case study of 1856-1878 in the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. However, the activities and publications of such groups as the St. Petersburg Slavic Committee and the Society of Russian Borderlands did help spread the tenets of, and nurture supporters for, great power nationalism. Instead, in 1905-1914, the Duma, whose debates received wide coverage and whose proceedings were open to the public, acted as a substitute for public associations in promoting great power nationalism. Taking advantage of their immunity from prosecution for whatever they said on the rostrum and using their power of interpellation, great power nationalists and panslavs in the Duma often issued fiery rhetoric favoring decisive actions to restore Russian power in the Balkans.

Kadet M. P. Fedorov, for example, openly declared in a 1910 Duma session that Russian foreign policy must be Slavic in orientation and its goal should be "the

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\(^{155}\) Velikaia Rossiia unabashedly appealed to militarism and imperialism; its contributors included Struve, S. A. Kotliarevskii (a professor and contributor to Russkie vedomosti), S. N. Yanospolskii (a contributor to Rech' and Russkaia mysli) and Prince G. N. Trubetskoi. See Riabushinskii, Velikaia Rossiia; Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 459-65; Pipes, Struve: Liberal on Right, pp. 180-86; and V. I. Bobykin, Ocherki istorii vneshnei politiki Rossi (Moscow: Gos. uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izd. Min. Prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1960), p. 105.
restoration of Slav power in the Balkans and Slav unification with one another and with Russia. Further, the Duma summoned foreign ministers for interpellation and publicly maligned them for their ineffective defense of Russia's national interest in the Balkans. The most salient example was the Duma's interpellation of Izvolskii in 1908 to demand an explanation of Russian "consent" to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shortly thereafter, Octobrist Guchkov declared "deep sympathy for our kindred Slavic peoples and states" and hoped that "the government will make the necessary efforts to defend the just interests of these peoples and states" and thereby "preserve the national dignity of Russia [and] of the State Duma."

As for evaluative units, an ample number of actors and institutions did examine and critique great power nationalism and panSlavism in the early twentieth century. Among these were conservative and socialist-oriented publications including Grazhdanin, Russkoe znamia, Zemshchina and Russkoe bogatstvo and their

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156. Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossi, pp. 337-38 and 338-48 for a view of different panSlav foreign policy tactics favored by various Duma groupings. See also Seton-Watson, Decline of Imperial Russia, pp. 317-18 and Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, p. 74.

157. Tret'ia gosudarstvennaia Duma, p. 293 and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 230. During the 1908 crisis, the Duma also ordered an investigation against police forces for hindering a panSlav lecture and public debate. Deputies accused the Ministry of Internal Affairs of committing an "anti-national" act and exacerbating Russian humiliation. They asserted that the government had neglected the national interest, and papers such as the Kadet Rech' and Slovo condemned the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the name of "public opinion." See Miakotin, Nabroski sovremennosti, pp. 200-204 and P. Lavrov, "Aneksiiia Bosnii i Gertsegoviny i otoshenie k nei slaviansstva," Vestnik Evropy, no. 3 (March 1909), pp. 27-52. In 1912, Duma deputies also condemned foreign minister Sazonov for failing to ensure a greater international role for Russia in the war between the Balkan alliance and Turkey. See M. V. Rodzianko, Krushenie imperii (Valley Cottage, NY: Multilingual Typesetting, 1986), pp. 80-81.
supporters in the government, Duma, and civic organizations. Critics of great power nationalism argued that Russia should avoid adventurism in the Balkans because it would draw limited energies away from more pressing problems at home. Some asserted that panslav demands for the protection of Slav rights abroad were unrealistic and hypocritical because the civil rights of Slavs and other minorities were constantly violated within Russia itself. Others accused panslavs of falsely claiming to speak for "society" when their positions did not accurately represent the views of the Russian masses. They criticized claims that a "progressive" foreign policy on behalf of persecuted Slavs would help solve domestic problems by increasing Russian internal cohesion; as the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war showed, such a policy did not necessarily go hand-in-hand with progressive measures at home.\(^{158}\) Finally, prominent individuals such as Baron R. Rosen in the foreign ministry in 1912 (former Russian ambassador to the U.S.) and Minister of Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo wrote long memoranda to the tsar highlighting the potential dangers of panslav and anti-German policies. Rosen insisted that Russia's mission was not in Europe but in the development of Siberia, and that the idea of a Russian panslav mission was likely to create an unnecessary and dangerous conflict with Austria-Hungary, whose dominance in the western Balkans did not contradict Russian national interests.\(^{159}\)

\(^{158}\)The extreme right in the Duma was skeptical that panslavism could even be progressive at all. They argued that panslavism was only an excuse for Russia to seize power abroad and introduce Russian dominion in the Balkans. See Miakotin, "Nabroski sovremennosti," pp. 204-213; Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, p. 350; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 229; and Pipes, Struve, Liberal on Right, p. 92.

\(^{159}\)Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, p. 90 and McDonald, United Government, pp. 199-201.
Criticism of great power nationalism, however, was not always competent and the mushrooming of public opinion and free speech after 1905 was not necessarily followed by sophisticated levels of discussion.¹⁶⁰ For example, many responses to Struve's ideas and arguments on "Great Russia" were *ad hominem* attacks that debated neither the logic nor validity of Struve's assertions. Despite criticism, the attractiveness of great power nationalism continued, partly because of the absence of strong, alternative ideologies. Rightist nationalists, for example, while arguing against great power nationalism, offered no real alternative foundations for Russian foreign policy; they had defined domestic issues, particularly the preservation of the monarchy as their domain and did not devote much time or attention to foreign policy. As for neoslav proponents, their program of liberal and equal relations among all Slavs offended historical Russian sensitivity about Russia's position as leader and defender of smaller Slav peoples. Great power nationalism remained the most attractive nationalist ideology because it was intimately tied to "memories of Russia's role as liberator of the Slavs in the nineteenth century, and particularly in the war against Turkey in the 1870s." Political elites who, on one occasion or other, supported great power nationalism, belonged to that generation that still recalled the unfairness of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Russia and its Slavic allies were denied the benefits they had rightly won in war.¹⁶¹

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¹⁶¹McDonald, *United Government*, pp. 137 and 147.
D. International System

The international system played an important role in the empowerment of great power nationalism in 1905-1914. In particular, one international crisis or other involving the Balkan Slavs usually preceded each major outpouring of nationalist sentiment in Russia in 1908-1909, 1912-1913, and 1914. It was also an international crisis in 1914 that catapulted great power nationalism and panslav sentiment to the top of the Russian foreign policy agenda.

I have hypothesized that the international system helps the empowerment of aggressive nationalism in two ways. First, if grave threats to the national interest exist and if effective international mechanisms for resolving these threats are missing, then aggressive nationalism will likely be empowered. Second, such empowerment becomes likely also if international opportunities exist for the state to pursue an extreme nationalist agenda without incurring prohibitive costs in the process.

1) International Threats

After its foreign policy fiasco in the Far East, Russia shifted its attention to the Balkans, where it had specific historical/sentimental, strategic, and economic interests. The historical and sentimental element of Russian interests involved Russia's role for over two hundred years as ally of the Slavic and Orthodox peoples of Turkey and Austria-Hungary, the somewhat mystical notion of Russia's "mission" to defend kindred Slavs and the Orthodox religion, and most important, the idea that the Near East was Russia's rightful sphere of interest as a Great Power. Strategically, Russia was interested in restoring free passage for its vessels through the Black Sea straits. As the
last war with Japan illustrated, such passage was crucial for Russia to be able to project its naval power abroad. In a larger sense, control of the straits was also important to guarantee Russian security from seaborne attacks along the Black Sea coast. In the economic sphere, Russia primarily sought to protect the passage of its grain exports through the straits and had little direct commercial interest in the Balkan countries themselves. But the straits were important because up to 50% of Russian export passed through them, including 90% of Russia's grain export. Revenues from the latter were critical to interest payments on Russia's foreign loans and, in 1911, Russia suffered losses when Turkey closed the straits while fighting a war with Italy over Tripoli. The straits were also important for transporting industrial equipment to the Ukraine, which was in the midst of intensive industrial development in the early twentieth century.

Although Russia had economic interests in the Balkans, these were modest in scale and St. Petersburg never quite successfully competed with the other Great Powers for economic clout in the region. By 1914, only 6-7% of Turkey's imports and 4% of its exports were channeled through Russian firms, and Russia's share of shipping to and from the Ottoman empire never exceeded 10% in tonnage or value. As a reflection of these modest statistics, foreign policy discussions in the Duma, the press, 

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162 Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, p. 200; Sazonov, Vospominaniiia, pp. 57-58; and Alfred J. Rieber, "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay," in Ragsdale, ed., Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, p. 325.

163 Bobykin, Ocherki istorii, pp. 109-119 and Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 484 and 504. Another estimate of Russian economic activity claims that only 37% of Russia's exports passed through the straits, including 75% of its grain. See Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 43-46.
and in memoirs of Russian officials tended to downplay the economic factor in Russian interests in the Near East; instead, leaders and opinionmakers primarily invoked Russia's "sacred obligations" and "historic responsibilities" and the primacy of restoring Russia's Great Power status in the region. The issue of regaining Great Power status and prestige overshadowed or subsumed other goals of Russian foreign policy; it overshadowed economics and encompassed the strategic goals of controlling the Black Sea straits and preventing the rise of rival powers in the Balkans. It subsumed as well ideas of panslav racial or religious solidarity, which were used chiefly to legitimize claims of Russian hegemony in the Balkans. Russia, of course, was not alone in cleaving to "Great Power" ideas. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, power politics and imperial competition were prevalent norms that guided relations between Russia and other leading European powers.

The gravest threat to Russia's national interest, defined in terms of Great Power status and prestige, especially in the Balkans, was rising "German power" in the early

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164 Geyer, Russian Imperialism, pp. 344-45; B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, p. 275; Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, p. 484. The primacy of Great Power status over race or religion was evident in Russia even before the twentieth century. Despite claims of panslav solidarity, for example, Russia did not hesitate to choose different Slav allies at different times, depending on who could best serve Russian Great Power purposes. In 1875-1878, for example, Russia shifted its attention from Serbia to Bulgaria when the former proved to be militarily weak in its war with Turkey. Then, in the 1890s, when Bulgaria became a non-compliant ally, Russia broke away and refocused its attention on Serbia. In 1912, when an independent Bulgaria threatened to conquer Constantinople, Sazonov proposed that 5,000 Russian troops go to Constantinople to defend Russian interests should Bulgaria take the city. See Thaden, Russia and Balkan Alliance, p. 132; Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 492-93; Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, p. 179 and 200; and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 229.

165 Bobykin, Ocherki istorii, p. 115.
1900s. "German power" meant the joint influence and clout of Germany and Austria-Hungary; in Russian eyes, the latter had effectively become a satellite to the former and, therefore, the influence they exercised in the Balkans was one and the same. Germany had penetrated the Ottoman empire militarily and economically and supported Austrian expansion in the area (as was the case with Austria's annexation of Bosnia).\textsuperscript{166} While German power was growing, Turkey's ability to resist it was weakening. The Turkish government had become highly unstable (it fell twice in 1908 and 1911), and no longer seemed capable of fending off external threats. In 1911, after the government fell as a result of war with Italy over Tripoli, the new regime of Said Pasha declared that Turkey could no longer be neutral and must reach an understanding with one or a group of the Great Powers to help protect its vital interests. Russia responded by seeking a Russo-Turkish agreement that might open the straits to Russian vessels, but Turkey rejected the proposal; Russian efforts to facilitate the formation of a Slavic confederation including Turkey also failed to bear fruit.\textsuperscript{167} Thus, Russia found itself handicapped in its traditional sphere of influence at the same time that German influence was growing in the region.

The threat arising from German power facilitated the rise of aggressive nationalism in Russia especially when this threat was linked to crises in the Balkans in 1908-1914. Russia's inability to defend its national interest effectively and the failure of


\textsuperscript{167}Thaden, \textit{Russia and Balkan Alliance}, pp. 47, 56-57, and 83 and Rossos, \textit{Russia and the Balkans}, pp. 8-33.
attempts to resolve various crises through international agreement triggered explosions of pan-slav sentiment and great power nationalism which, by 1914, persuaded a delegitimized government in St. Petersburg that its survival at home depended on yielding to aggressive nationalism in its policy abroad. The first of these crises was the 1908-1909 Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The crisis began when Austria announced in January 1908 that it would construct a railway across the Austrian-occupied sanjak of Novibazar, thereby linking Austrian territory with Turkey and consolidating Austrian hegemony in European Turkey. This announcement stirred the ire of the Russian press and Duma against the incursion of Austrian (and, by implication, German) power "into an area of unique interest to Russia as the Slavic Great Power." Before Austria could implement its railway plan, a Young Turk revolution toppled the Turkish government in July 1908 and caused disturbances throughout the Balkans. The Austrian government, anxious about Balkan instability and fearful of losing its comparative advantage in Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent a note to Russia declaring that Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted "territories which we have possessed for thirty years, into which we entered by virtue of an international mandate, and which we have conquered by force of arms." If circumstances required, Austria would annex the occupied provinces, and did so in September 1903.


169 Quoted in McDonald, United Government, p. 129. See also Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, pp. 202-203 for Austrian motivations leading to the annexation.
Prior to the annexation, Russian foreign minister Izvolskii believed he had an agreement with his Austrian counterpart that Russia would not object to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina if Austria assisted Russia in attaining free passage for its vessels in the straits. Once Austria had the upper hand in Bosnia, however, Vienna quickly denied any obligations toward Russia. Izvolskii, caught in an extremely difficult situation, sought a more palatable outcome by urging an international conference to resolve the problem. He reiterated Russia's original position that Bosnia's status was governed by the Congress of Berlin and any change therein required a meeting of Berlin Congress signatories. Izvolskii traveled to many of the European Great Powers' capitals to seek support for an international conference, but had no success.\(^{170}\) He also found little support at home for an international conference which Novoe vremia declared would only "bring humiliation to Russia" unless Russia could threaten war in the event of failed international action. Russian cynicism about an international agreement on Bosnia was warranted. Not only did the annexation violate a previous major international agreement (the Berlin Congress), but Austria dug up other international documents, unfamiliar to either Izvolskii or the tsar, to prove that the annexation had an international legal basis.\(^{171}\)

Austria's announced railway project and subsequent annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered the propagation, validation, and radicalization of great power nationalist opinion in Russia. Opinionmakers accused the tsarist cabinet of carrying out


\(^{171}\) Bestuzhev, *Bor'ba v Rossii*, pp. 225 and 249-50.
another "diplomatic Tsushima" and "another Mukhden," thereby piling humiliation on the state. A major debate ensued in the press about Russian foreign policy, and many argued for forceful measures, noting that Russia, as a Slav state, had a duty to prevent violence against "fellow tribesmen" in the Balkans. Papers and journals highlighted Austria-Hungary's oppression of Slavs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, warned that Bosnia's fate could befall other Slav nations, and condemned those in government who sought to make a deal with Austria at the expense of the non-Russian Slavs. In addition to the explosion of critical opinion in the press, pan-Slav organizations and meetings arose in the wake of the crisis. Among these were the Society for Slavic Culture, the Society for Slavic Scholarship, and the Society for Slavic Mutuality. Slavic meetings were also convened, including the May 1908 "Slavic Week" in St. Petersburg, the summer 1908 Slav congress in Prague, the April 1909 St. Petersburg conference of Slav organizations, another Slavic meeting in St. Petersburg in May 1909, and a Slav congress in Sofia in 1910. Members of the Russian government sanctioned these organizations and meetings, and Duma leaders participated actively in many pan-Slav events.

The 1908-1909 crisis also crystallized the opinion in Russia that Austria was

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173Michaels, Neoslavism, pp. 43-62 and 68-70 and Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossi, pp. 188-96.
determined to humiliate or absorb the Balkan Slavs; that Germany was prepared to grant carte blanche to Austria on this policy; and that Russian vacillation on these issues could only lead the country to greater humiliation and losses. Nationalists argued that, like Germany and Austria—and even Bulgaria, which exploited the crisis in 1908 to declare its independence from Turkish suzerainty—, Russia should concentrate on its own national interest and pursue a more assertive policy in the Balkans. It should have faith in the strength of the narod or people to support a policy that would revive Russian international honor and prestige. As Octobrist Guchkov argued in Golos Moskvy,

Yes, we are going through new humiliations but let Russia's enemies not hasten to celebrate their victory. . . . It is not the flabby indolence of official Russia, but the indignant patriotism of the whole Russian people, its readiness to lay down its life for its friends, that foreign, and indeed our own diplomats must reckon with. Taking our stand on this disregarded spiritual strength of the Russian people, we may boldly cry in our enemies' faces: 'Russia has not yet fallen, she will rise again!'

The Bosnia crisis forged unity among the majority of the Russian political spectrum; many believed that Russian passivity before Austria-Hungary constituted a shame (pozor), that Russia's Great Power status and aspirations had been put seriously at risk, that the Balkan states had been insulted, and that Russia should demand compensation for its aggrieved ally, Serbia. The crisis and Russia's humiliation cemented great power nationalism in Russia and hurt the agenda of the liberal neoslavs and the conservatives who advocated a defensive foreign policy. By the time of the

\[174\] Golos Moskvy, 17 March 1909, as quoted in Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 232-33. Some, including the moderate Miliukov and his Kadet followers, became disposed toward war as an option in dealing with Russia's rival powers in the Balkans. See Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, pp. 225 and 265-66.
April and May 1909 Slav meetings in St. Petersburg, the neoslav agenda (i.e., equality among all Slavs, rapprochement between Russia and Poland, and Russian solidarity with Slavs in Austria-Hungary) had clearly become secondary to the preservation of Great Russian/imperial power status in the Balkans and the pursuit of a Russo-Serbian common defense against Austria and Germany.\(^{175}\) The radicalization of the nationalist agenda in Russia spelt the termination of the Balkan status quo policy which both Russia and Austria-Hungary had observed since the 1890s; the full impact of this change was to become evident in the crisis of 1914 and the world war that followed.

The second set of international threats and crises that helped empower aggressive nationalism dealt with the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. In the context of Russia's humiliation in 1908-1909, continued Russian internal weakness, and increased competition from rival imperial powers,\(^{176}\) Russian foreign policy in 1910-1912 sought to maintain international prestige and influence by encouraging the formation of a Balkan alliance directed against Turkey. Although official Russian policy originally sought to

\(^{175}\) A major reason for the demise of neoslavism in Russia was the dismay caused by Czech support for Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The Czech neoslavs welcomed the incorporation of additional Slavic provinces into the Habsburg empire because it meant added strength to the already formidable 20 million Slav population of Austria-Hungary (out of a total of 45 million people). See Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, pp. 2 and 142-44; Lavrov, "Anneksiia Bosnii i Gertsegoviny," pp. 496-507; and Miakotin, "Nabroski sovremennosti," p. 200. On the general radicalization of panslavism in Russia due to the crisis of 1908-1909, see Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 22-37; Michaels, Neoslavism, pp. 99-116; Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 283-88; B. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, pp. 264-70; and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 24-26.

\(^{176}\) By 1911, for example, Turkey was considering plans for naval expansion in the Black Sea, Italy had invaded Tripoli, and France had made territorial gains in Morocco. See Thaden, Russia and Balkan Alliance, pp. 9-11.
avoid an alliance that would destroy Turkey, it had become clear that the Balkan Slavs were already moving in that direction and St. Petersburg chose to play a role in the process rather than watch it passively from the sidelines.\textsuperscript{177} The alliance that formed in 1912 included Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. Although Russia urged these states to proceed cautiously, they refused to submit to the Russian official agenda and declared war on Turkey against Russia's express wishes.\textsuperscript{178} War began in October 1912 and, to Russia's surprise, ended with a relatively quick and unequivocal Balkan victory.\textsuperscript{179} Inside Russia, the war stimulated considerable public enthusiasm and support; the press expressed support for the south Slavs' war against Turkey, many made donations to the Russian Red Cross to assist the Slavs, and others sent telegrams of solidarity to the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek kings. In the Duma, leading figures attacked those from the extreme right, who argued that Russia was better off avoiding entanglements with Slavs in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{177}The alliance was directed not only at Turkey but, potentially, also against Austria-Hungary. Thaden, \textit{Russia and Balkan Alliance}, pp. 83-90 and B. Jelavich, \textit{Russia's Balkan Entanglements}, pp. 229-30.

\textsuperscript{178}To express its irritation over the behavior of the Balkan states, Russia cut off military and financial aid to Montenegro but did not punish its more important Slav allies, Serbia and Bulgaria. Thaden, \textit{Russia and Balkan Alliance}, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{179}This victory was marred when the Balkan victors could not agree on the division of territorial gains among themselves. As a result, the second Balkan war broke out in June 1913—this time between Bulgaria, on one hand, and Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey on the other. Bulgaria suffered a resounding defeat and had to yield much of the territory it had gained in the first Balkan war; Serbia and Greece, in the meantime, gained much of Macedonian territory and each gained an extra million and a half subjects. See B. Jelavich, \textit{St. Petersburg and Moscow}, pp. 270-71 and Taylor, \textit{Struggle for Mastery}, pp. 497-98.

In December 1912 Turkey signed an armistice with its Balkan opponents, which had practically forced it out of Europe and were then poised to make considerable territorial gains. The Great Powers, however, blocked these gains. At a conference in London, Austria and Italy insisted that the new state of Albania be created out of territory which Serbia had been assigned in the Balkan alliance. Further, in April 1913, when Montenegro refused to vacate Scutari (an area which was supposed to be part of the new Albanian state), an international naval demonstration and landing force was sent to coerce Montenegro into changing its mind. The Russian government did not have much choice but to acquiesce with the Great Powers' decisions.\textsuperscript{181}

Russia's inability to defend the success of its Balkan proteges roused great indignation in the Russian press and Duma. Forceful arguments arose against the injustice of the international solution hammered by the Great Powers in London which, many felt, betrayed Russian interests and deprived the Slavs of their rightful gains. \textit{Novoe vremia} called the Albanian issue a "terrible blow to Slavdom," an "ignominious retreat," and a "diplomatic Mukhden." \textit{Utro Rossii}, the Progressist organ, called the event another encouragement for Austrian power because it had scored one more "bloodless victory over Russian diplomacy." \textit{Utro Rossii} also attacked the "German element" in Russian diplomacy, which was "standing at the moment in our path to the hearts of south Slavdom, [and] paralyzing our political will and our national energy." As for Scutari, public ire expressed itself in crowds breaking into the Austrian embassy in St. Petersburg; in a panslav demonstration attended by some 40,000 people; and in

Slav banquets at which participants condemned the Russian government's betrayal of Slavdom. One representative of the military declared that Russian official behavior exhibited "an insulting lack of faith in the strength of the Russian people and the Russian army." Foreign minister Sazonov suffered the brunt of many attacks, including insinuations of high treason in Russian diplomacy. In the highest echelons of power, officials acutely felt the pressure from public opinion, and the tsar approved Sukhomlinov's request in 1913 for a partial mobilization of troops in military districts bordering Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{182}

Another crisis in 1913 highlighted the German threat to Russian Great Power interest and fueled support for aggressive Russian nationalism. The crisis began in November, when Germany stationed General Liman von Sanders to be in charge of the Turkish army and take command at Constantinople.\textsuperscript{183} Having learned from bitter experience about the domestic consequences of Russian passivity on Balkan issues, foreign minister Sazonov reacted strongly this time to German incursion into a highly sensitive area of Russian foreign policy. He communicated Russian concerns to Berlin, and sought French and British support for joint actions to let the Turkish government know of the Triple Entente's (i.e., the alliance of Russia, France, and Britain) concern

\textsuperscript{182}Hosking, \textit{Russian Constitutional Experiment}, pp. 235-36; Sazonov, \textit{Vospominanija}, p. 87; McDonald, "A lever without a fulcrum," pp. 299-302; and McDonald, \textit{United Government}, pp. 185-86.

\textsuperscript{183}The Turks themselves had requested a German military mission to help them reorganize their armed forces after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Germany was eager to meet this request because it wanted to restore the prestige of its armaments after the Greeks and Serbs had routed the German-trained Turkish armies with French equipment in the first Balkan war. See Taylor, \textit{Search for Mastery}, p. 508 and B. Jelavich, \textit{Russia's Balkan Entanglements}, p. 235.
regarding the Liman affair. Sazonov's emotive appeal baffled his French and British colleagues because a British admiral had just been assigned to head a naval training squadron in Turkey, in much the same capacity as Liman von Sander's Turkish army appointment. But, as recorded in his memoirs, Sazonov explained that Germany's action made Russia feel "if not exactly under direct threat from a neighboring empire, . . . nonetheless under threat from the possibility that . . . the last remnants of Turkish control over the straits will be swept away," thereby benefitting German power. The crisis dissipated when, in January 1914, Germany found a face-saving solution by promoting Liman to the higher rank of honorary field-marshal, thereby eliminating his role as active commander of the Turkish army.  

Although the Liman von Sanders crisis was shortlived, it precipitated an important change in Russian views of foreign policy options. The crisis sparked new accusations in the press about the failure of Russian diplomacy and the futility of delusions that Germany could be Russia's friend. It motivated Sazonov to favor a more assertive stance in the Balkans and, in fact, he initiated a plan in Russia for forceful action if the Liman affair was not resolved satisfactorily. After the crisis, Naval Minister Grigorovich approached Sazonov and prime minister Kokovtsev for support in enlarging Russia's Black Sea fleet in response to anticipated growth in the Turkish Black Sea squadron. Grigorovich mentioned international and domestic policy considerations for his request, especially his fear of the domestic consequences of a "moral impression of our fleet's defeat, inflicted upon us, it would seem, by a long shattered Turkey." This

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position indicated a shift in Russian foreign policy to greater assertiveness compared, for example, to the caution of the Stolypin era. The international reaction of Britain and France to the Liman affair also convinced Russian policymakers to consolidate the Triple Entente as never before because Russia clearly could not implement a victorious and assertive Balkan policy without Entente support.185

Finally, the empowerment of great power nationalism on the eve of World War I was facilitated by another international crisis.186 Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, was assassinated by extremist Serbian patriots in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. The Austrian government subsequently issued a crushing ultimatum to Serbia. As in 1908-1909 and 1912-1913, there was no genuine chance for Russia to resolve the crisis through an international agreement. Not only did the dynamics of the crisis move too fast for real negotiations among the Great Powers, but the international alliance system in Europe at the time was itself set up to discourage compromise.187


186After the second Balkan war in 1913 which led to Bulgaria's military collapse and the break-up of the Balkan alliance, Bulgaria left the Russian sphere of influence. Many in Russia then elevated Serbia to the position of Russia's sole reliable ally in the Near East. Serbia's new importance to Russian foreign policy would have a significant impact on Russian decisionmaking in the crisis of July 1914. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, pp. 234-35.

187On one hand, a powerful Germany stood behind Austria-Hungary and was committed to go to war in defense of the latter's interests. On the other hand, France stood behind Russia and Great Britain behind France. These two opposing alliances were set up to function almost automatically once a member of one side launched hostilities against any member of the other side. In July 1914 Russia made an attempt to negotiate a way out of the crisis and avoid war, but failed. Austria itself miscalculated
Austria did not even bother to answer Sazonov's request for negotiations, and Nicholas II's own entreaty to Wilhelm II of Germany not to "go too far for the sake of our old friendship" failed to change the dynamics of the crisis. Unlike 1908-1909 and 1912-1913, however, Russian policymakers, though well aware of their state's weakness, were no longer willing to play a passive role and experience another humiliation in the Balkans as they did earlier. Instead, they openly contemplated the option of assertive self-mobilization that great power nationalists had advocated for years: Russia could face the crisis head-on because the strength of its people or nation (narod) would sustain it in fulfilling Russia's historic mission in the Balkans.189

2) Opportunities in the International System

Developments in the international system that were not of Russia's making created opportunities favorable to panslav arguments and great power nationalist policies. Officials of a weakened Russian state exploited these opportunities in the hopes of preventing the further erosion of Russian prestige abroad and bolstering state authority at home. Two developments were particularly important in creating "opportunities" for Russia to pursue aggressive nationalism without incurring unacceptable costs to itself: a) the intensification of nationalism among Slav and other minorities in the Balkans and the parallel weakening of the Ottoman and Habsburg

that Russia, as in 1909, could be bullied into doing nothing when its interests in the Balkans were threatened. See Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 445-48.

188Bobykin, Ocherki istorii, pp. 155-56.

189McDonald, United Government, p. 197.
empires, and b) the consolidation of the Triple Entente, which gave Russia the confidence it needed to consider an assertive pro-Serbian foreign policy in July 1914.

The intensification of nationalism among Slavs and other minorities in the Balkans was a process long in the making. Serbian nationalism, for example, was already prominent in the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{190} By 1900, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece had obtained independent or autonomous status from the Porte, although all of them still had diasporas living under foreign rule. Serbia and Bulgaria were also increasing in power; their populations were becoming more cohesive, better educated, and economically competitive. At the same time, Serbian and Bulgarian leaders were becoming more effective in using nationalist rhetoric to mobilize their populations. In Austria-Hungary, nationalism among Czechs and Slovaks was also intensifying, especially after universal suffrage became law in the Austrian half of the Habsburg empire in 1907 and a Slav majority came to the Vienna Reichstat. Despite this gain, Czechs and Slovaks continued to suffer from German and Magyar policies, especially linguistic and economic discrimination. Thus, they looked outward for potential assistance in their struggle for independence, and turned their eyes toward Russia. Russophile leaders, though not always a durable element of the Balkan political landscape, were prominent in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{190}I discuss this issue in my previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{191}This included the Young Czechs, led by Karel Kramar, in Austria and the Karadjordjevic dynasty which came to power in Serbia in 1903. On the rise of Balkan nationalism, see B. Jelavich, St. Petersbourg and Moscow, pp. 258-65; Thaden, Russia and Balkan Alliance, pp. 58-98; Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, pp. 1-54; and Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 224.
The intensification of Balkan nationalism in the early twentieth century threatened the state structure and territorial integrity of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, both of which were undergoing internal decay. Turkey, in particular, was increasingly losing control of its subject Christian populations; by implementing repressive policies of centralization of power and Ottomanization of its Slav and Orthodox subjects, the Turkish government fueled nationalist resentment among its subject populations. As the "sick man of Europe," Turkey was clearly in its last years of being a European power, and the other Great Powers on the continent were jockeying for the most advantageous position in anticipation of Turkey's fall.\textsuperscript{192} The combination of rising Slav nationalism and the weakening of Turkey and Austria-Hungary had several consequences for the empowerment of aggressive nationalism in Russia.

First, indigenous Slav nationalism fed Russia's renewed aspirations to turn to the Balkans as the proving ground for Russian Great Power projection after 1905. Responding in part to calls from the Slav nations, deputies in the newly-formed Duma in 1906 expressed sympathy for Slav strivings against their rulers and urged Russia to protect the Slavic nationalities and foster greater cooperation between them.\textsuperscript{193}


\textsuperscript{193}Vysny, \textit{Neo-Slavism and the Czechs}, p. 55. and pp. 56-89.
nationalism among the Balkan Slavs was the primary motor for the formation of the Balkan alliance of 1912. Serbia, in particular, vigorously sought the alliance as a vehicle for pursuing its territorial ambitions against the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and to repay Austria-Hungary for past actions against Serbia, including the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It conducted secret negotiations with Bulgaria in 1911, while seeking Russian support to help overcome Serbo-Bulgarian differences. Russia had only a minimal role in the drafting of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty that was signed in March 1912, and an even less important role in subsequent treaties signed between Bulgaria and Greece, and Montenegro and Bulgaria. Notwithstanding their secondary role in the Balkan alliance, Sazonov and his colleagues deemed it crucial to be involved in the Balkan negotiations because, at the very least, their presence might help deter developments detrimental to Russian interests. Moreover, as “protector” of the Slavs, Russia would damage its international prestige by abstaining from the formation of a key Balkan alliance. Third, extremist Serbian nationalism and not Russian design led to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the crisis that ensued in July 1914. Austria's complete intransigence on giving Russia and its Serbian ally any face-saving way out of the crisis contributed to a situation that once again favored aggressive

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194 Serbia intensely pursued its own self-interest in negotiating the Balkan alliance. It invented, for example, a "Macedo-Slav" nationality in Macedonia to convince Bulgaria to grant it the northern strip of Macedonia. Serbia also claimed Turkish territory on the Adriatic Sea that was not inhabited by Serbs but by Albanians. Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 16-17 and Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 485-86.

nationalist arguments in Russia.\textsuperscript{196}

Besides the rise of Balkan nationalism and the weakening of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, another opportunity that favored aggressive nationalism in Russia was the consolidation of the Triple Entente. Russia sought to consolidate this alliance as never before in the wake of the Liman von Sanders affair in 1913, which convinced Russian policymakers that a committed Entente was indispensable for any Russian implementation of Great Power policy.\textsuperscript{197} At the time of the July 1914 crisis, Russia sought, and gained, assurance that France would aid Russia if attacked by Germany or by Austria-Hungary with German help. The French government confirmed its "unconditional support" to Sazonov verbally and in written form by July 27, 1914. At the same time, Russia also received supportive communications from Great Britain.\textsuperscript{198} This situation contrasted sharply with 1908-1909 or 1912-1913, when Russia was too weak to fight a war over its Balkan interests and could not count on assistance from its

\textsuperscript{196}Austria's ultimatum delivered to Belgrade in late July 1914 asked for a formal abandonment by the Serbian government of south Slav irredentist claims and the dismantlement of the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), a Serbian nationalist society that had been operating in Serbia and Bosnia before 1914. Serbia responded with a conciliatory note, which Austria promptly rejected. See Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 305, 308.

\textsuperscript{197}Taylor, Search for Mastery, p. 509.

\textsuperscript{198}Bobykin, Ocherki istorii, pp. 155-56; McDonald, United Government, p. 204 and Fuller, Strategy and Power, p. 488. Russia shifted its alliance from Germany to France in the 1890s and early twentieth century primarily because it feared German power and expansion. From its earliest days, the Russo-French alliance had presumed war against Germany, and French funds had helped build railways on Russia's western frontier for precisely this purpose. Rogger, Russia in Age of Modernisation, pp. 168-72 and Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 24-27.
international allies (though Russia certainly asked). Consolidation of the Entente by 1914 clearly constituted an "opportunity" for Russia to consider aggressive nationalist options without fear of having to face potentially dire consequences alone.

V. Panslavism and Russia's Entry into the First World War

Historian Dominic Lieven notes that the crisis of July 1914, which precipitated World War I, undoubtedly humiliated Russia because the Central Powers communicated Germanic racial superiority toward the Slavs and implicitly denied the "Russian people's own dignity and . . . their equality with the other races of Europe." As a result of Russian humiliation, aggressive nationalist ideas and panslav agitation became resurgent in Russian political discourse. This resurgence, however, did not cause the war of 1914; other military, strategic, and European political variables mattered more as causes of the war, but great power nationalism did influence Russian policymaking in the 1914 crisis.

First, proponents of aggressive nationalism constantly advocated an assertive Russian policy in the Balkans—up to and including war—because Russia had a vital national interest in the area and a historic mission to be leader of the Slavs. Thus, they had helped over the years to condition Russian policymakers and the public to support

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199 Britain and France both indicated that they would not support Russia if it went to war over Balkan complications in 1908-1909 and 1912-1913. See Bestuzhev, Borba v Rossii, pp. 281-82; Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 418-23; and Thaden, Russia and Balkan Alliance, pp. 112-13.

200 Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, p. 37.

the choice of war in 1914. Second, during the July 1914 crisis itself, supporters of aggressive nationalism gained the upper hand in government deliberations and argued for decisive action in defense of Russian and Slavic honor and prestige. Sazonov, who had become highly sensitive to public criticism since the crisis of 1908-1909, and tsar Nicholas II, who had come to believe the myth that the people or narod would give unequivocal support to their ruler in a war effort, both believed in July 1914 that mobilization for war was imperative to defend Russia's Great Power authority and bolster its internal social and political cohesion.202

From 1908-1914, supporters of great power nationalism in Russia constantly advocated forceful actions in the Balkans. In 1908-1909, for example, Prince G. N. Trubetskoi argued that Russia must show the Balkan Slavs that it could defend their interests even if it meant war; otherwise, Russia's Slav allies would constantly be targeted for territorial division and humiliation, and Russia itself would be unable to stop German domination in the Balkans and might lose Constantinople, whose fate was of "vast historical and strategic importance to Russia."203 Great power nationalists and panslavs in the Duma also acknowledged in 1909 that Russia was too weak to fight Austria and Germany, but encouraged the Serbs to continue preparing for a future war

202McDonald, United Government, pp. 206-207 and Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 446-47.

203Trubetskoi was known for his lengthy pieces on international relations and Russian foreign policy in 1906-1912. A well-known slavophile descended from old Russian nobility (the Trubetskoi and Lopukhins), he subscribed to Struve's liberal imperialism and panslav nationalism. He and his brother co-edited Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik, which supported panslav ideas, and they also participated in the activities of the Struve and Riabushinskii circles. Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 91-101 and Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, pp. 225 and 265-66.
under more propitious circumstances, when Austria will be made to "pay dearly for Russia's humiliation."  

During and after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, proponents and sympathizers of aggressive nationalism in Russia stoked anti-German sentiment among the public and agitated for war on behalf of Russia's Slav allies. In a Duma debate in 1913, for example, V. A. Bobrinskii identified Germany as the culprit behind Austrian maneuvers to deny Serbia its territorial gains from war. He argued that it was impossible to preserve peace while Austria persecuted peoples of Slavic culture and Orthodox religion, and he and others insisted that the Balkan alliance would not have splintered after its victory against Turkey had Russia only shown more commitment to its Slav allies. The Octobrists Guchkov and Rodzianko also incited Nicholas II to go to war in 1913 to protect Russian interests in the straits. They argued that "the straits must be ours [and that a] war will be joyfully welcomed [in Russia] and will raise the government's prestige." Guchkov himself in 1912 encouraged the Serbs to launch a war against Turkey.

In the foreign ministry and in the military, aggressive nationalists used the events of 1912-1913 to insist that Russia must assert its cultural and political role in Europe, the playing field of the Great Powers. Publicist A. A. Kireev expressed this sentiment, which Sazonov echoed in a speech to the Duma in April 1912. Sazonov agreed with

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204 See Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii, p. 289.


206 Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, p. 129.
Kireev that increased possessions in Asia could not substitute for Russia's role as a Great Power in Europe. Only by asserting its influence in the Balkans could Russia preserve its prestige; otherwise, it risked becoming "a tolerated but inferior outrunner of Western culture." In the military, the events of 1912-1913 spurred pan-slav sympathizers in the officers' corps to express their loathing for Austria and their dismay at Russia's military weakness since 1905. Officers participated in public demonstrations to express support for the Slavs. For example, the garrison commander of the Peter and Paul fortress and his entire staff attended a memorial in April 1913 for the allied dead in the Balkan war against Turkey. Retired generals and active officers also joined in public demonstrations against official Russian passivity in the Balkans, and advocated a reassertion of Russian power to force Austria to back down from its demands.\(^\text{207}\)

In 1914, actions and argumentation by proponents of aggressive nationalism fueled passions for war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Six months before the war Novoe vremia and the Russo-Galician Society in St. Petersburg baited Austria by highlighting Austrian abuse of Slavs in Ruthenia and by engaging in other anti-Austrian activities. Not only were these activities hypocritical given Russia's abuse of its own Slav citizens, but they were also potentially damaging to Russian economic interests,\(^\text{208}\) and only intensified Austria's animosity toward Russia.

\(^{207}\)Ibid., pp. 90-91 and 116.

\(^{208}\)In 1913, 43% of Russia's exports went to Germany, while Russia took 47% of German exports. Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 132-34 and Edelman, Gentry Politics, pp. 144, 191-96.
Although there were cautious voices among Russian leaders and Duma opinionmakers in the few months preceding World War I, those who urged decisive action had the most dominant voice during the crisis itself. Meetings in the Council of Ministers and between the tsar and Council on July 24 and 25, 1914 were particularly important. The key voices at these meetings belonged to agriculture minister Krivoshein, war minister Sukhomlinov, navy minister Grigorovich, and foreign minister Sazonov. Krivoshein held to his vision of the strength and loyalty of the people or narod in support of Russia's historic mission among the Slavs. In remarks that made a "profound impression" on the cabinet, Krivoshein warned that the greatest threat to Russia was in not acting to defend its national interest and Great Power stature. He argued that while war was undesirable because of its potential domestic consequences, "public and parliamentary opinion would fail to understand why, at this critical moment involving Russia's vital interests, the Imperial Government was reluctant to act boldly." 

Sazonov supported Krivoshein's viewpoint and declared that further concessions

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209 P. N. Durnovo wrote a lengthy memorandum to the tsar in early 1914 urging reconciliation with Germany to protect Russian interests in the straits and to prevent conflict that could lead to revolution in Russia. Former finance minister Witte shared Durnovo's opinion, but they did not prevail on Nicholas II. Others like the Nationalist leader Savenko and Kadet leader Miliukov also urged caution a few weeks before war broke out, but Miliukov changed his position at the Duma session of July 26, when everyone but the Social Democrats agreed on national unity and support for the government in the imminent struggle to free Europe and Slavdom from German domination. See McDonald, United Government, pp. 199-201; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 240; Edelman, Gentry Politics, p. 195; and Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 78-79, 89-90, and 123-25.

210 McDonald, United Government, pp. 197 and 204-205.
from Russia, as in 1908-1909 and 1912-1913, would only feed German aggression. He declared that the "moment had come when Russia, faced with the annihilation of Serbia, would lose all her authority if she did not declare herself the defender of a Slavonic nation threatened by powerful neighbors. . . . If Russia failed to fulfill her historic mission she would be considered a decadent State and would henceforth have to take second place among the powers." Sukhomlinov and Grigorovich fueled the impetus for war by certifying Russian military readiness for such a contingency and by calling for general mobilization. These ministers believed that war with Germany was unavoidable and Russia, therefore, could not afford to delay its military preparations.

By 1914, leaders of the foreign ministry, naval and war ministries, the Council of Ministers, and the Duma had become sympathetic to one extent or other to aggressive nationalist arguments. By late July 1914, they converged on a basic inversion of past thinking on Russian foreign policy which, under Stolypin, emphasized the avoidance of international conflict and adventurism to nurture reforms at home and prevent a revolutionary upheaval. People like Krivoshein and his co-thinkers argued that Russia had largely been rebuilt; that domestic governance no longer hinged on caution but assertiveness in foreign policy; and that Russia must abandon its supine diplomatic stance since 1908. Sazonov declared that another Russian capitulation to Berlin's demands would constitute an act "for which Russia would never forgive the Sovereign,

211McDonald, United Government, p. 204.

and which would cover the good name of the Russian people in shame."213 In one historian's words,

[The] traditional formula connecting war and revolution had been completely inverted by the summer of 1914. Not only was there no spokesman for restraint in the council [of ministers], but because of the empire's pitiful diplomatic career since 1908, statesmen felt a threat from the prospect of society's response to inaction. . . . To capitulate yet again [in the July 1914 crisis] could [further] damage the state's own authority at home while casting into doubt its international claims to Great Power status.214

In July 1914 the disposition toward war was more prevalent than ever before among Russian policymakers. This did not imply, however, that leaders of the state eagerly wanted war there and then. Many were cognizant of Russian internal weakness and expressed misgivings about the potential consequences of war. These misgivings expressed themselves in efforts to avoid war in July. Even after Austria declared war on Serbia and Russia itself had ordered partial mobilization, Nicholas II still took pains to inform Wilhelm II that St. Petersburg did not plan offensive action against Germany and delayed the order for general mobilization until the very last minute.215 Ultimately, the dynamics of crisis left Russia no choice but to go to war.

On the eve of World War I, panslavism became Russia's rallying cry. Novoe vremia decried the "onslaught of the Germanic tribes against the Slavs" and called for "unity, strength of spirit, and a firm stance against the foe" in the war "for the very foundations of our fatherland." Struve wrote that war was "called upon to complete the

213 McDonald, United Government, pp. 205-207; Sazonov, Vospominaniia, p. 247; and Lieven, Russia and Origins of First World War, pp. 139-43.

214 McDonald, United Government, pp. 205-206.

external expansion of the Russian empire, realizing her imperial tasks and Slav
mission." Sazonov spoke to the Duma about Russia's duty to the Serbs who were of
common history, descent, and faith. And the tsar himself, in declaring Russia's entry
into the war, noted that Russia had never been indifferent to the fate of its Slav
brethren.  

VI. Conclusion

The empowerment of aggressive great power nationalism in Russia in 1905-1914
coincided with the last gasp of a dying tsarist state. In 1914, great power nationalist
ideas triumphed over a realistic assessment of Russia's geopolitical position and
internal strength to sustain a war effort, and contributed to a revolution that, in 1917,
swept away the autocratic order and the reign of the tsars. The power and influence of
aggressive nationalism were the result of several factors. First, severe and prolonged
internal instability delegitimized the Russian ruling elite and generated pressure for the
tsar, his ministers, and others to pay attention to, and even support, aggressive
nationalism and panslavism as a means to bolster their political legitimacy. Second,
and related to the first, incipient conditions of mass politics and the rise of the concept of
"popular sovereignty" created political incentives for elites to purvey and support great
power ideas, which resonated deeply among the articulate public, especially those who
were dismayed by incidents of humiliation in Russian foreign policy and sought ways to

216Novoe vremia, 20 July 1914; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 240;
Pipes, Struve. Liberal on Right, p. 209; and Hans Kohn, Panslavism. Its History and
restore Russian international honor and prestige. The domestic incentive structure, however, did not have a uniform impact in motivating all political elites to support aggressive nationalism at the same time. The tsar and his ruling circle, for example, had greater incentive just after the Far Eastern defeat in 1905 to shun all foreign adventurism and, therefore, initially supported the rightist nationalism of groups that favored the preservation of the monarchy and eschewed panslav policies and other expansionist nationalist prescriptions. Over time, however, the growing resonance of great power nationalism and panslav feelings compelled Russia's severely delegitimized ruling elites to seek political survival by recourse to the aggressive nationalism that they had treated with caution and reserve. There is evidence as well that material incentives motivated some groups, including Russia's landowning class and wealthy merchants, to support great power and panslav prescriptions.

Third, effective social communication also facilitated the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. Specifically, aggressive nationalist manipulation of symbols, the mixed competence of Russian evaluative units, mass press and education, and the absence of strong alternative ideologies all combined to ease the propagation of great power and panslav ideas. Fourth, international crises and opportunities which lent credence to aggressive nationalist arguments were, arguably, most critical in empowering great power nationalism. The Russian government would not have resorted to great power nationalist ideas had international developments not made it

\footnote{217}Carter, Russian Nationalism, pp. 29-32.

\footnote{218}I say "mixed" because in 1905-1914, there were actually some very cogent and competent criticism of the ideas of great power and panslav nationalists.
expedient and potentially profitable to do so. To illustrate, during 1910-1912, when no major international crisis occurred in the Balkans, mass support for aggressive nationalism (and, consequently, pressure on the tsarist regime to act forcefully in the Balkans) also waned. During these years, at least three panslav publications ceased publication for lack of a receptive audience. These were Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik, Okrainy Rossii, and Slavianskie izvestiia.\textsuperscript{219} In contrast, international crises, which strengthened the credibility of great power nationalism in 1908-1909, 1912-1913, and 1914, incited fervor in Russia in support of aggressive nationalist action in the Balkans. International opportunities, including the weakness of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, indigenous Slav nationalism which sought help from Russia, and French and British support in 1914, were also decisive in Russian decisions to implement forceful nationalist policies.

The empowerment of aggressive nationalism in 1905-1914 did not constitute an enduring victory for a nationalism that would truly bind Russian state and society. Although great power nationalism proved a potent ideological instrument for furthering Russian imperial aims, reality soon revealed its weakness in forging nation-state cohesion. As V. Miakotin wrote in Russkoe bogatstvo in 1908, Russia was living through a time when "our immense country, up to its very last corner, is caught in convulsions of despair and suffocating under the unprecedented weight of arbitrariness and violence"; yet, great power nationalists and panslavists dared to fantasize that "not only can we live under these circumstances, but we can even experience a `national

\textsuperscript{219}Avrekh, Stolypin i tret'ia Duma, pp. 410-11 and Pipes, Struve. Liberal on Right, p. 180.
Indeed, great power nationalists in Russia suffered from severe delusions. By 1917, Russia would be engulfed in a revolution, revealing an insuperable divide between state and society, and heralding the end of the old order and the beginning of what would be seventy years of travail under Soviet communism.

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Chapter Four


In the past, the mere mention of [the great Russians'] name used to destroy the walls of impregnable fortresses. Now they are defeated by Lilliputians. . . . We have lost our identity; "Russians"--this word has become an empty sound without any meaning.

Aleksandr Kazintsev, 1992

We don't have the strength for the peripheries either economically or morally. We don't have the strength for sustaining an empire--and it is just as well. Let this burden fall from our shoulders: it is crushing us, sapping our energy, and hastening our demise.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 1990

Russia must become a great power because it is good for her, and good for the world.

Natalia Narochnitskaia, 1993

. . . despite its diversity, stratification, and internal contradictions, the Russian nationalist movement will determine to a large extent the renaissance of the Russian nation and Russian statehood, and stability in the country.

V. Muntian, 1990

I. Introduction

Nationalism, articulated in different variants, has become the most prominent ideological force in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It resonates broadly and deeply among many segments of Russian society, and colors the rhetoric of nearly all elites in the Russian political spectrum.¹ But while many observers are quick to highlight the role of nationalism and, particularly, its malevolent implications for Russian behavior, none has presented a coherent framework to show how malevolent nationalism has been or will be politically empowered in Russia. In this chapter, I argue

that, although malevolent nationalism has been widely propagated in the late Gorbachev years (1989-1991) and thereafter (1991-1995), it has not become politically empowered. Extreme nationalism has proven to be a source of constant, yet ultimately ineffective, pressure on core official Russian foreign policymaking institutions and decisionmakers. By ineffective, I mean that malevolent nationalism has not become a rallying cause for the majority of the articulate public; neither have extreme nationalist tenets become a blueprint for state foreign policy behavior.

As in previous case studies in this thesis, national humiliation has been the necessary precondition for the rise of aggressive nationalism in the post-Soviet period. This humiliation stemmed from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a state whose self-image was steeped in "great power" (even "superpower") myths. In Section III below, I chronicle the extent and depth of national humiliation associated with the last years of the Soviet Union and following its demise in 1991. No other imperial state has disintegrated so rapidly, with attendant military, territorial, economic, and social losses. Consistent with my hypothesis on national humiliation, these losses roused aggressive nationalist reactions from elite opinionmakers and other politically active sectors of Russian society. These reactions plagued the initially liberal, westernizing government of Boris Yeltsin and caused it to modify its rhetoric in a more assertive nationalist direction, particularly in foreign affairs. Beginning in late 1992 and 1993, the Yeltsin government has employed greater nationalism in its rhetoric and even some of its actions. But this shift does not constitute the "political empowerment" of malevolent nationalism. Indeed, although extreme nationalism has been propagated widely and has resonated with a portion of the Russian public, it has neither mobilized a critical
mass of the population, nor garnered sufficient institutional support to cause Russia to
go to war with its neighbors on behalf of the nation, or to pursue other recklessly
aggressive policies—despite what some analysts might imply about manifestations of
nationalist-inspired, Russian neo-imperialism.²

In this chapter, I describe five competing strands of nationalism in post-Soviet
Russia, ranging on a spectrum that is relatively benign on one end and malevolent on
the other: westernizing democracy, nativism, cosmopolitan statism, ethnocentric
statism, and national patriotism. Of these, cosmopolitan statism has so far been most
dominant. It 1) defines membership in terms of ethnicity and language (i.e., Russians
and Russian speakers), but also grants rights to non-Russians on Russian territory; 2)
emphasizes a strong and unitary Russian state with great power status in the
international system; and 3) advocates a hegemonic approach toward states in the

October 1993, p. A23; Yuri N. Afanasev, "Russian Reform is Dead," Foreign Affairs 73
(March/April 1994), pp. 21-27; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership,"
Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994):67-82; and Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, 'Back in
the USSR,' Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics
and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia, Strengthening Democratic
Institutions Project, Harvard University, 1994. The only war that the Russian
government has launched since 1991 is the war against Chechnya. Because
Chechnya, in international legal terms, is an internal issue, I do not address it in detail in
this thesis. I would note, however, that this war illustrates the weakness of malevolent
nationalism. First, Yeltsin's use of nationalist rhetoric to mobilize Russians against
Chechens failed. Second, the war hurt large numbers of ethnic Russians—both civilian
and military—and elicited intense public condemnation of the government's
"authoritarianism." Third, mass public opinion against the war led to actions of protest,
including a "no-confidence" vote in the Duma against the government, condemnation in
the press of abuses committed by the Russian military, and legal and political actions by
civic groups to defend human rights in Chechnya. See Kronid Liubarskii, "Pust'
Gosduma zaplatit mne rubl'," Novoe vremia, no. 37 (1995):19-20; Interview with Anatoly
Shabad (member of Russian Duma, human rights activist, and critic of the war in
Chechnya), New York, 6 February 1995; and Zhurnalista i voina, Russian American
former Soviet space or the "near abroad" and a more independent, though not necessarily hostile, foreign policy stance vis-a-vis the West, especially the United States. Cosmopolitan statism strongly prescribes an assertive Russian foreign policy, but does not advocate warfare or use of force on grounds of national chauvinism or an expansionist national mission. Rather, it employs a rhetoric of national greatness to mitigate perceptual damage to the Russian self-image caused by national humiliation, while keeping Russian foreign policy actions largely within the confines of predictable or normal great power hegemonic behavior. While it is not the most benign form of Russian nationalist ideology, cosmopolitan statism's most resonant components represent a fairly moderate position, given the context of a deeply humiliated Russian nation and state.³

National patriotism, along with ethnocentric statism, constitute malevolent nationalism, which has not been empowered in post-Soviet Russia. To explain this outcome, I will show that, from 1991-1995, only one controlling variable, the degree of effective social communication, has acted largely (though not entirely) in favor of extreme nationalism: a relatively free press and media, freedom of association, manipulation of resonant symbols, weak evaluative units, and a lack of strong, alternative ideologies have facilitated the transmission and propagation of extreme nationalism. Other variables have not operated as auspiciously. First, despite dire predictions to the contrary and despite the war in Chechnya, internal Russian stability has largely held from 1991-1995. This has undermined the credibility of aggressive

³In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will highlight a few arguments on why a moderate version of statist nationalism could potentially contribute to the long-term evolution of a stable, confident and non-aggressive post-Soviet Russian state.
nationalist critics of the state and their extreme proposals for dealing with Russia's "enemies" and the nation's "crises." Second, the domestic incentive structure in Russia has neither strongly encouraged nor highly rewarded malevolent nationalism; in both the political and economic spheres, extreme nationalist propaganda has not been extremely effective for extracting desired rewards. Third, the international system has been mostly benign to the interests of the post-Soviet Russian state. Although there has been instability on Russia's borders, there have been no immediate, overwhelming, or intractable threats to Russian security, nor have there been insurmountable crises that have pushed leaders toward extreme nationalist mobilization. Despite the plummeting of Russian state and military power, the international community has also largely cooperated to help preserve significant Russian international prestige. Finally, there has been little, if any, opportunity for Moscow to pursue a highly aggressive nationalist agenda without potentially having to pay high costs in its international relations.

What follows are five sections. Section II chronicles the persistence of Russian nationalist ideas throughout the communist period, despite official attempts to suppress them, and emphasizes the rise of nationalism as an alternative ideology to communism in the last years of Gorbachev in 1989-1991. Section III describes the depth and extent of Russian national humiliation in the late Soviet and post-Soviet years, and notes linkages between expressed feelings of humiliation and extreme nationalist reaction. In the context of national humiliation, all major political actors in Russia have sought to gain legitimacy by clothing themselves in one version or other of nationalism; in this section, I describe five contending variants of nationalism in the post-Soviet period, and
characterize their benign or malevolent implications for Russian international behavior. Section IV provides evidence of the political weakness of extremist nationalism in Russia, despite the depth of humiliation that the country has experienced. In Section V, I test some hypotheses to explain this outcome, focusing on four controlling variables: 1) level of internal instability, 2) nature of domestic incentive structures, 3) degree of effective social communication, and 4) threats and opportunities in the international system. In Section VI, I briefly examine Russian foreign policy on three issues—"Russians abroad," conflicts in the former Soviet space, and the war in former Yugoslavia, and show that Russian behavior in these areas amount to opportunism and a predictable and relatively moderate hegemony rather than the implementation of a malevolent nationalist plan of action. I recap my findings in the concluding section.

II. Background: Russian Nationalism and Communist Politics

A. From Lenin to Brezhnev4: The Persistence of Nationalism

Three points are paramount in the relationship between Russian nationalism and communism during approximately the first six decades of the Soviet Union. First, communist ideology was fundamentally antithetical to nationalism in general and Russian nationalism in particular. Second, the inherent antagonism between  

communism and nationalism did not spell the demise of Russian nationalist ideas; in fact, these ideas persisted throughout the communist years. Third, evidence of the persistence of nationalist ideas shows that these ideas were not monolithic; nativist, statist, and national patriotic variants of nationalism were all propagated, but none succeeded in supplanting the official predominance of communist ideology.

The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 swept into power an ideology that, at its core, was antithetical to nationalism in general, and Russian nationalism in particular. First, communist thought emphasized internationalism and class ideology as the central and guiding principles of the post-tsarist state. Although Lenin and Stalin, for example, accepted nations as real and objective entities, they also preached adamantly that the preservation and development of national languages and cultures were but a necessary, temporary, and instrumental phase toward the time when all peoples would ultimately join the "universal culture, revolution, and communism . . . " Second, early Bolshevik thinking and policy on the nationalities issue deemphasized and maligned Russian nationalism, which Lenin defined as the nationalism of the "oppressor nation" and an impediment to the realization of a socialist state that would transcend national differences. By the time of the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, for example, the Bolshevik government had defined the "nationality" question in terms of

. . . neat opposition between "Great Russians" and "non-Great Russians" [non-ethnic Russians]. The Great Russians belonged to an advanced, formerly dominant nation possessed of a secure tradition of national statehood and frequently guilty of ethnic arrogance and insensitivity known as "great power chauvinism." All the other nationalities . . . were victims of tsarist-imposed statelessness, backwardness and "culturelessness" . . . , which made it difficult

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for them to take advantage of new revolutionary opportunities and sometimes tempted them to engage in “local nationalism.”

For the eventual triumph of socialism, Lenin emphasized the need for measures to eliminate Russian chauvinist nationalism and cultivate Russian “internationalism;” ethnic Russians were to be made to accept not only the “formal equality of nations, but also . . . the kind of inequality at the expense of the big oppressor nation that would compensate for the de facto inequality that exists in life.” Thus, under Lenin, a true federal plan was drawn up, emphasizing equal rights for Russians and non-Russians, including the right of self-determination. Bolshevik leaders gave non-Russian groups opportunities to promote their indigenous cultures and languages, and created political administrative units rooted in ethnic particularism.

Official communist ideological and political antagonism toward nationalism did not end the propagation of Russian nationalist ideas or the implementation of

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nationalist-flavored policies. From Lenin to Brezhnev, Soviet communism and Russian nationalism seemed always to coexist, albeit in rather uneasy terms. This uneasy coexistence was evident in two ways: 1) the state at times revived or coopted elements of Russian nationalism to further its own ends, while also waving the banner of communism; and 2) the state at other times tried to suppress Russian nationalism, but elements of it survived underground and resurfaced at later times.

At least two examples of the state coopting or reviving Russian nationalist ideas to further its own ends are worth noting. One was during the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921-1924 when, due to the realization that the bulk of Russian peasants and workers were not ready for the rapid socialist transformation of economic life, Lenin and his colleagues implemented a program to encourage small-scale commodity production—a practice they had previously condemned. NEP was intended to prevent state collapse after the terrible years of revolution, civil war, and war communism. The historian Robert C. Tucker notes that NEP involved the uneasy coexistence of a Soviet culture, on one hand, and a

scarcely Sovietized Russian culture that lived on from the pre-1917 past as well as in the small-scale rural and urban private enterprise that flourished ... It was a Russia of churches, the village mir [commune], the patriarchal peasant family, old values, old pastimes, old outlooks along with widespread illiteracy, muddy roads, and ... “the Seventeenth century, ... Holy Russia, ... icons and cockroaches.”

Emigre Russian intellectuals, observing NEP from the outside, believed that it “was the beginning of the end of Russian Communism as a revolutionary culture-transforming

movement, its incipient deradicalization, and Russia's imminent return to national foundations.\textsuperscript{10}

The state again coopted and revived Russian nationalism during Stalin's rule, particularly in the 1930s through the end of World War II. In this period, Russian nationalism coexisted with the excesses of Stalinist communism. On one hand, Stalin's policies of forced collectivization, industrialization and mass purges, coupled with the institutionalization of the cultural straitjacket of "socialist realism," were nation-destroying policies that decimated both Russian and non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union for the greater purpose of moving the state closer to communism.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, Stalin, more than any other Soviet leader, subscribed to Russian nationalism, adopted Russian chauvinist policies, and used Russian nationalist ideas to mobilize the population during World War II. In the early 1930s, Stalin's campaign for "socialism in one country" already marked his russocentrism and gave credit to Lenin's earlier charge that he was among those who erred on the side of "Great Russian chauvinism." In his speech announcing "socialism in one country," Stalin attacked Leon Trotsky and others whose internationalist beliefs belied their "lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the [Russian] peasant movement . . . and proletariat in

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11}The famine which resulted from collectivization killed an estimated five million, while yet millions of others died in Stalin's deportations, executions, and concentration camps. See Tucker, "Stalinism As Revolution From Above," pp. 82-83, 88, and 92. On socialist realism as a policy intended to create a uniform socialist truth in literature and the arts, see Edward J. Brown, \textit{Russian Literature Since the Revolution} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 15-16.
Russia."

By the late 1930s, official policies included national glorification of the Russian past, cultural and linguistic russification of the non-Russian nationalities, anti-Semitism, and elements of xenophobia. Stalin declared Russia as the most sovereign and most revolutionary of the Soviet nations; when the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) adopted a republican version of the Soviet constitution in 1937, for example, a Pravda editorial rhapsodized:

Russian culture enriches the culture of other peoples. The Russian language has become the language of world revolution. Lenin wrote in Russian. Stalin writes in Russian. Russian culture has become international, for it is the most advanced, the most humane. Leninism is its offspring, the Stalin Constitution its expression.  

Stalin’s regime ended Soviet revolutionary historiography and approved new textbooks that extolled "progressive" aspects, virtues, and accomplishments of the tsarist past. Russian tsarist imperialism became "benign" because it brought progress and civilization to backward peoples, and Russian imperial rule over other nations was depicted as a lesser evil compared to domination by more despotic powers such as Persia, Turkey, or even Poland. The state also built monuments to Russian heroes, resurrected Russian folklore—albeit with characters resembling Lenin and Stalin featuring prominently in some folkloric songs—, and elevated Russia to "hero-nation" status and "first among equals" in the Soviet Union. In addition, the centralization of political power in Moscow intensified, and Russians were sent to replace ethnic leaders

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in non-Russian republics who had been purged for their "bourgeois nationalism" and "nationalist-terrorist" activity. ¹⁴

Stalin's Russian nationalist revival reached its apogee during the Second World War, when he invoked images of an imperiled "Mother Russia" to urge and inspire Russians to fight against Nazi aggression. During the war years, the state emphasized symbols of the Orthodox Church over those of the Communist Party; glorified Russian military heroes and named military academies after them; and popularized traditional Russian military insignia. At the end of what later came to be known as the Great Patriotic War or the Fatherland War, Stalin made his famous toast to the Russian nation--"the leading nation of the USSR," "the guide for the whole Union," "intelligent, persevering, and patient." ¹⁵

The uneasy coexistence of Soviet communism and Russian nationalism continued under Stalin's successors. Nikita Khrushchev pursued policies that emphasized Soviet patriotism while seeking to muffle the most visible expressions of a

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strong Russian national ideology and cultural hegemony. In his famous denunciation of Stalin at the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress and in other fora, Khrushchev condemned Stalin's crimes against the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations, the excessive centralization of power, and policies of russification and Russian domination. He reemphasized non-Russian cultural rights and traditions, restored national histories, and sought to dilute the political power of the Russian ethnic group through "indigenization," or the appointment of indigenous cadres at every level of the communist hierarchy in the 1950s. Khrushchev also authorized the closing and/or razing of approximately 10,000 Russian Orthodox churches from 1959-64. He emphasized internationalism in his rhetoric and announced at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 that economic and cultural progress in the Soviet Union had created the "rapprochement" of nations. He declared further that the Leninist national policy of 1922 had been fulfilled: "the development of the nations and egalitarianism had created the conditions necessary to transcend prejudice and strong nationalist feelings" in the Soviet Union.

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17 Khrushchev elaborated that "fusion" (sliianie) or a true merging of peoples in one communist entity was the ultimate goal. But this was a long way off; therefore, he advocated the near term, less-ambitious idea of sblizhenie or drawing together of the distinct nations of the Soviet Union into the "Soviet people" (sovetskiy narod), a united entity based on brotherly tolerance under the direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. See Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire, pp. 13-46; Darrell P. Hammer, "Alternative Visions of the Russian Future: Religious and Nationalist Alternatives," Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (Autumn/Winter 1987), pp. 266-68; and Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev," in Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1990), pp. 7-8.
The official suppression of Russian nationalism continued under Leonid Brezhnev, but Russian nationalist ideas continued to be propagated in various fora. Nationalist groups operated clandestinely (in samizdat, or underground publications) or, in some cases, took calculated risks in declaring their ideas publicly. In the 1960s, for example, two unofficial voluntary organizations with nationalist leanings became active in underground Soviet political life. These were the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON) and the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPlit). The VSKhSON published in samizdat a rough blueprint for post-Soviet society, based on a Russian Orthodox theocratic state. On a more open front, some writers emphasized nationalist ideas in unprecedented publications in Molodaia gvardiia, the organ of the Komsomol or Soviet youth organization. Other nationalist writing flourished in Veche, a samizdat journal devoted to discussions and debates among Russian nationalist thinkers.16

In the early 1970s, two other documents, associated with Russia's most prominent writer of the time, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, reflected a resurgence of nationalist thought. These were the samizdat publication, From Under the Rubble, and Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Soviet Leaders. These publications deplored the social, demographic, environmental, political, and spiritual ills of Soviet-ruled Russia, and recommended possible solutions. Also in the 1970s, a literary group called the derevenskichi or village writers flourished; their work, dubbed by one critic as "some of the best writing of the twentieth century," emphasized Russian village life, nature, the

peasantry, reconciliation and social peace, and ethical and religious values.¹⁹

To sum up, the historical record indicates that Russian nationalist ideas always coexisted with communism—more successfully when the state sponsored these ideas, and less so when official policy was to suppress them. From Lenin to Brezhnev, articulators of Russian nationalism did not subscribe to a monolithic nationalist ideology, but propagated different types of nationalist ideas. One was nativism, which emphasized the traditions of rural and Orthodox Russia; this seemed dominant in the NEP period, in the derevneshchiki tradition, and in the works of writers like Solzhenitsyn. For the most part, however, nativism remained in the “underground” of Soviet political life and many of its adherents used it as a form of protest against communism and the Soviet government. Another nationalist strand was statism, prevalent under Stalin, and emphasizing power and greatness as the most essential attributes of a Russian-dominated state. Statism was also evident in some of the nationalist ideas that the Brezhnev regime officially tolerated; as long as proponents of these ideas supported a strong Soviet state and accepted the Soviet incarnation of the former Russian empire, they managed to avoid official opprobrium and punishment.²⁰

¹⁹Brown, Russian Literature, pp. 292-312. The derevneshchiki movement began in the 1950s, and its most prominent representatives included Fedor Abramov, Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Shukshin, Vasilii Belov, and Sergei Zalygin. Rasputin and Belov have since become two of the more active promoters of nationalism in post-Soviet Russia.

²⁰“National Bolsheviks” is the term often used to refer to adherents of Russian nationalism who simultaneously supported Marxism-Leninism and communism as ideologies that saved and preserved the great Russian imperial state. In the Gorbachev years, these people rallied for the preservation of communism as the sole hope of keeping the Soviet state from disintegrating. See Laqueur, Black Hundred, pp. 65-66 and John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 128-29.
Although it never supplanted communist ideology, statist nationalism seems to have enjoyed the greatest legitimacy and broadest room for expression throughout the Soviet period. Yet a third type of Russian nationalism was national patriotism, with its chauvinistic, anti-semitic, xenophobic and imperialistic content. National patriotism was present during Stalin's rule and also in some of the underground nationalist literature of the Brezhnev era but, like nativism, this brand of nationalism was never consistently prominent nor officially powerful during the communist period.

Adherents of different strands of Russian nationalism managed to propagate their ideas during the communist era, but elites and the broader public never had consistent opportunities to debate or discuss nationalism openly or widely because of the ideological restrictions of the Soviet system. This changed drastically after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, and launched his program of glasnost' (openness) and perestroika (restructuring).

Statism was popular among Russian nationalists because it accorded the Russian ethnic group a privileged place in the Soviet state. Moscow was the center of power, and the highest echelons of the Communist Party, the military officers corps, and other Union institutions were dominated by Russians. The officers corps, for example, was approximately 61% Russian in the late 1980s. These arrangements justified the absence of separate Russian republican institutions. See Michael Rywkin, “The Russia-Wide Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR): Privileged or Underprivileged?” in Allworth, ed., Ethnic Russia in the USSR, pp. 184-86 and Brian D. Taylor, “Red Army Blues: The Future of Military Power in the Former Soviet Union,” Breakthroughs no. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 3.

Dunlop, Contemporary Faces and Laqueur, Black Hundred, passim.

B. The Gorbachev Period

Russian nationalism traversed a rough and uneven path in the first six decades of communist rule. One version of it, focused on Russian greatness and flavored with chauvinism, reached an apex under Stalin; but neither this nor other variants of nationalism ever again enjoyed the same status despite alleged sympathy and support in high places in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika created a new opening for nationalist ideas and their proponents, especially in 1989-1991. Nationalist proponents took advantage of political liberalization under Gorbachev not only to propagate their ideas, but also to compete for political power in Russian elections. Some of the most active nationalists in the first years of glasnost were those concerned with preserving Russia's historical and cultural monuments, protecting the environment (e.g., the fate of Russia's northern rivers), solving social problems (e.g., alcoholism and high mortality rates), and revealing the truth about the Stalinist past. But other nationalists pursued a more malevolent agenda, based on anti-semitic convictions and chauvinistic sentiments. Among them was Pamiat, an organization which attracted much western attention in the last years of the Soviet


Union.  

Four developments in the Gorbachev period illustrated the incipient political power, viability, and attractiveness of Russian nationalism as an alternative to Soviet communism. First, glasnost' stimulated a revival of nationalist ideas. Previously unavailable works of nineteenth century conservative nationalist thinkers including Nikolai Karamzin, Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolai Danilevskii, and Dmitrii Ilovaiskii were republished in Moscow. Russian intellectuals and publicists wrote a barrage of patriotic articles in the popular media and in Russian "thick" journals, criticizing the entire Soviet system, the legacies of Marxism-Leninism, and even perestroika. In Novyi mir, for example, numerous articles from 1987-1989 countered Marxist tenets, denounced the "anti-people" and "anti-Russian" policies of communism and Bolshevism, and advocated greater Russian national self-awareness and other ideas for a future non-violent, Russian national revival.

Second, concessions by the state to nationalist demands and aspirations, first in

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26 See Stephen Carter, Russian Nationalism Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 103-118. Pamiat', by 1993, had fragmented into several groups and has become a peripheral actor in Russian politics.


the non-Russian republics and later in Russia itself, helped to legitimate nationalist ideas. Contravening previous communist policy, for example, Gorbachev allowed thousands of Orthodox churches to reopen, announced his own baptism, and blessed his wife's participation in the millenial celebration of Russia's conversion to Orthodoxy. Gorbachev also granted (or failed to oppose) demands for Russia to have its own republican institutions within the Soviet Union, including a Russian Academy of Sciences, a Russian Communist Party, and even a Russian foreign ministry. Official accommodation of, and indecision toward, centrifugal nationalisms and revived national identity in Russia and other former Soviet republics revealed the weakness of "Soviet" identity and loosened the already weak moorings of the Soviet state away from multiethnic federation toward more nationally-constituted states. Gorbachev's government revealed a deep incapacity to exploit Russian nationalist ideology to strengthen the state it ruled. For example, hardly any official attention was paid to arguments for developing a civic nationalism that might arrest the process of Soviet collapse and prevent future problems for ethnic minorities.

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29Intellectuals—among them the writers Rasputin and Belov—led the crusade for Russia to have its own institutions. At one session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, Belov noted that the lack of Russian institutions incited russophobia because it led other republics to equate Russia with the Soviet center. Rasputin followed with a statement that Russia should even consider seceding from the Soviet Union if its demands for separate institutions were not met. See Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Videt' real'nuiu opasnost'," Moskovskie novosti, 23 July 1989; Sergei Grigoriants, "Imperiia ili soiuz," Russkaia mysl', 4 September 1987; and the Central Committee position paper on nationalities in "'A Strong Center and Strong Republics': The CPSU's Draft 'Platform' on Nationalities Policy," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 1 Sept. 1989, pp. 1-4.

30See, for example, Valerii Tishkov, "Narody i gosudarstvo," Kommunist 1 (January 1989):49-59.
Third, the creation of specific political institutions and processes openly encouraged full participation by Russian nationalists and added to the rising political viability of nationalism in the Soviet context. Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1989 and to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in 1990 were particularly important. Although most members of the nationalist bloc lost in both elections, they nonetheless gained political experience and public exposure necessary for future political battles. A few nationalists did win seats in the Soviet and Russian Federation parliaments, and from 1990-93 many of them joined forces with communists in organizations like Союз and the National Salvation Front to form an active and outspoken opposition to their western-oriented, liberal democratic colleagues. More critically, elections in 1989, 1990, and 1991 gave Boris Yeltsin, ousted Politburo member, a chance to run for political office—first to the Russian Supreme Soviet and subsequently as Russian president—on a platform of populism and social justice ("land to the peasants"), Russian sovereignty from the Soviet Union ("all peoples of the USSR must have de facto economic, political, and cultural independence"), and some form of democratic government. Until the fall of 1989, Yeltsin had not exploited the nationalist themes of Russian humiliation, pride, and sovereignty. But elections turned him into a patriot and, in May 1990, he declared that the "issue of primary importance is the spiritual, national, and economic rebirth of Russia, which has been for long decades an

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31Electoral defeats catalyzed the creation of formal organizations with a nationalist/communist political platform. One of these was the United Workers Front, organized after the 1989 elections. The results of the 1990 elections also showed the potential political power of nationalism: among candidates of the nationalist bloc, those who emphasized nationalist ideas over communist loyalties generally did better than those who emphasized vice-versa. See John B. Dunlop, "Moscow Voters Reject Conservative Coalition," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 20 April 1990, pp. 15-17.
appendage of the center and which, in many respects, has lost it independence.”

Yeltsin coopted symbols used by his nationalist opponents, including the Russian commercial tricolor flag; at his inauguration as Russian president, he invited the head of the Orthodox church to speak and played Glinka’s “A Life of the Tsar” as the national anthem. Yeltsin’s rise to political power after being ignominiously expelled from the Communist Party hierarchy showed how effectively nationalism had come to challenge the dominance of communism in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union.32

Fourth, during the perestroika period, individuals and groups identified, to some extent or other, with conservative, authoritarian, chauvinist, and imperialist strands of nationalist thought became the loudest voices for nationalism, although their impact on actual policy did not coincide with the decibel of their propaganda. These groups actively promoted ideas and slogans on a strong, hegemonic Russian nation, the preservation of the Soviet empire, discipline and order, and defense of Russian national interests from assaults by westerners and internal traitors such as Jews and other non-Russians. They identified themselves as true defenders of Russia, in contrast to "democrats" who had surrendered Russia's welfare to the West, emphasized deceptive "all-human values" over Russian distinctiveness, and created chaos in Russia's social and economic life. A few Russian liberals in the USSR Supreme Soviet attempted in early 1990 to discredit the authority of conservative and even extremist nationalists to

speak "in the name of the Russian people [and] Russia," but this effort failed.33 Further, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 seemed to prove the correctness of those nationalists who had argued that liberal-democratic notions of the Russian nation and its mission would destroy the state and Russia's historical great power status in the international system.

III. National Humiliation and the Nationalist Response

A. Depth and Extent of Russian National Humiliation

Russian nationalism, especially its extremist variants, can be explained, first and foremost, as a reaction to Russia's national humiliation in the last years of the Soviet state and in the aftermath of its collapse. National humiliation occurred in a society which, under seventy years of communist rule, was steeped in ideas and myths of national greatness and great power status. The Soviet Union, after all, had become an industrialized and formidable military power under the Bolsheviks, with an internal and external empire including former constituents of the tsarist empire, Eastern Europe, and client states in many parts of the developing world. In the context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's alter ego was the United States; both were nuclear superpowers competing for influence in a bipolar world that they dominated.

The chronicle of Russian national humiliation is stark. Beginning in 1989-1991, the great power image crumbled when glasnost' provided opportunities for intellectuals

33"Deklaratsiia dvizheniiia 'Grazhdanskoe deistvie'," Ogonek, no. 8 (February 1990), p. 5.
to document and reveal "that seventy years of communist overlordship had left [Russia] in abject poverty and spiritual and intellectual confusion . . .\" Scholarly inquiries underlined that since 1917, Russians had steadily lost ground per capita to other nationalities in higher education, in housing and social infrastructure, in agricultural investment, and in overall economic development. The Russian republic also subsidized consumer goods for other Soviet republics, and lost billions in rubles of revenue in the process. Policies of "bleeding the Russian heartland," some concluded, had caused a catastrophic decline in the Russian population, making Russia the only Soviet republic, besides Latvia and Estonia, "to have suffered a decrease in the percentage of the titular nationality." One study showed that in 1979-1987 alone, Russia's rural population declined by four million, reflecting the dying out of the equivalent of two to three thousand villages annually. The Russian demographic situation was so dire that observers predicted that the Russian population could decrease by half in just two generations.\(^{35}\)

By the end of 1991, Russia's national humiliation reached new depths. First, the Soviet Union's defeat in the decades-old superpower Cold War with the United States became starkly clear. Second, the Soviet state disintegrated, with concomitant territorial, political, economic, and social losses for Russia. What was formerly a successor entity to the centuries-old Russian empire, encompassing thirteen million square miles and a population of over 260 million people by the end of the 1980s, suddenly crumbled, without a shot being fired, on December 31, 1991. Although in


preceding years Soviet power had already been on the wane—with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany and the loss of Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the withdrawal from Soviet client states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the signing of arms control treaties that entailed the destruction of significant parts of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the dismantling of Soviet conventional force superiority in Europe—the complete disintegration of the state nevertheless shocked many ethnic Russian and other russified elites. For the first time in over 300 years, Russia was detached from its imperial conquests and lost such traditional “Russian” lands as the Crimea, Belarus, and eastern Ukraine. Indeed, Russia had shrunk to a size smaller than it was when Peter the Great died in 1725.36

Territorial losses did not mean only a reduction of Russia’s geographic stature, but also a loss of natural resources including rich agricultural lands in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, cotton from Uzbekistan, oil and gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and fabulous resorts on the Black Sea coast in Georgia, to name but a few. Key transportation and communication routes by sea and rail also disappeared practically overnight. In addition, territorial disintegration created approximately 30 million displaced persons, 25 million of whom were Russians who suddenly found themselves at risk of expulsion or becoming second class citizens in alien states.37 There were as well military-strategic losses involving the breakup of the gargantuan Soviet army into


37 Calculations for these figures are documented in Carrere d’Encausse, End of the Soviet Empire, pp. 224-25.
new national units, the loss of defense enterprises, bases, and other military installations outside Russia proper, the division of nuclear and conventional weapons with other former Soviet republics, and the shrinking of economic power to less than half that of the Soviet Union, with the attendant dearth of resources to maintain what had been one of the world's most formidable military machines.\textsuperscript{38}

The process of national humiliation continued into the first three years of Russia's independent existence, when the new country experienced challenges to its territorial integrity from such internal regions as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia and, most seriously, Chechnya. Although Moscow succeeded in thwarting these challenges, its war in Chechnya and subsequent Chechen terrorist attacks have caused deep humiliation as they revealed to the world the Russian army's ineptness and state officials' repeated mishandling of the crisis and implicit complicity with the Chechen "outlaws" in the first place. Besides Chechnya, other sources of intensified humiliation arose from such social phenomena as soaring violent crime rates, open impoverishment of those segments of the population that failed to adjust to new economic realities, and widespread social malaise and depression. Internationally, Russian prestige also suffered. Some opinionmakers in Russia felt that their state had been left out of major diplomatic initiatives such as the drawing of a Middle East peace agreement, while others emphasized that Russia yielded to the West all that it wanted without receiving appropriate compensation. Russia also suffered the ignominy of yielding to western

pressures to cancel agreements such as a nuclear reactor deal with India, a long-standing Soviet and Russian ally.\(^{39}\)

B. National Humiliation and Extreme Nationalist Reaction

Public consciousness of the humiliation of the Russian state and people emerged in Russian political discourse in the late Soviet period and intensified after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In referring to the demise of the Soviet state, for example, representatives of practically all major strands of political belief have used a vocabulary connoting wounded feelings, a sense of injustice, and sentiments of betrayal and victimization, particularly by the "West." Representatives of liberal, conservative, moderate, and radical political opinion in Russia have commonly used the words "humiliated," "wounded," "destroyed," "dying," "raped," "genocide," "catastrophe," "bloodied," "losers," "beggars," "ashamed," "non-humans," "mutants," "hapless," "semi-colonial," "hated," "poor and paltry," "insulted," and "despised" to refer to the fate of their great state, the former Soviet Union, and to describe the condition of the Russian

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people and western characterizations of the Russian nation. This graphic language of humiliation appeared in the late 1980s and has remained in elite pronouncements in the mass media, journals, public speeches, and other fora. Elites have often followed many of these references to humiliation with assertive expressions such as "Great Russia," "great power," "glory," "strong," "salvation, rich," "mighty," "noble," "spiritual and blameless," "warrior," "correct, righteous people," "genetically great," and "worthy of respect" to refer to their hopes for Russia's future and to describe the true qualities of the Russian nation.

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40The Russian words used, in different variations, are unizhenie, umalenie, razrushenie, iznasilovali, chuystvo ulazvinoosti, vymiranie, bezpravie, nishchaia i nachtozhnaia zhizn', polukolonial'noe, neceloveki, nashu krov' ne tseniat, genotsid, mutant chelovechestva, stesniat'sia, and so on.

41In one instance, a national patriotic article poignantly described the humiliation associated with TV coverage of the deaths and dislocation of Russians in the Russian-Moldovan conflict in Transdniest. The author wrote that, after showing the corpses of 300 Russians who were killed, the program brazenly shifted to a commercial for Vidal Sassoon shampoo! He concluded that the message to Russians was "we will annihilate you all, and the world would not even blink." See S. Kara-Murza, "Unichtozhenie Rossii," Nash sovremmenik no. 1 (1993), p. 136; see also Interviews with Stanislav Govorukhin, Moscow, 29 September 1995; Gennadii Seliznev (leading member of the Communist Party and former editor of Pravda), Moscow, 29 September 1995; Stanislav Kuniaev (editor of Nash sovremennik), Moscow, 14 October 1993; Gen. Viktor Filatov (former editor of Voeno-istoricheskii zhurnal), Moscow, 15 October 1993; Gen. Aleksandr Sterligov (former KGB general), Moscow, 15 October 1993; Alla Latynina (liberal critic), Moscow, 31 May 1994; Dmitrii Rogozin (leader of Congress of Russian Communities), Moscow, 11 October 1993; Vladimir Lukin (former Russian ambassador to the United States and chair of Duma Foreign Affairs Committee), Moscow, 3 June 1994; Galina Starovoitova, New York, 16 November 1992; Aleksandr Rutskoii, Moscow, 8 June 1994; and remarks by members of the Russian Duma at an Aspen Institute forum, Madrid, Spain, 30 May-4 June 1995, author's notes. See also Vladimir Beliaev, "Rossiia kak ob'ekt agressii," Literaturnaia Rossii, 5 March 1993, p. 4; "Natsional'no- osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie otvechaet na voprosy 'Chto delat'? i Kto vinovat?';" Russkoe delo no. 1 (1993), p. 1; Petr Vykhodtsev, "Genotsid russkogo naroda. Unichtozhenie Rossii," Molodaia gvardiia no. 2 (1993):177-97; Fatei Shipunov, 'Put' spaseniia Rossii,' Molodaia gvardiia no. 1 (1993):206-225; Stanislav Govorukhin, Velikaia kriminal'naia revoliutsiia (Moscow: Izd. Andreevskii flag, 1993), pp. 122-23; Aleksandr Kazintsev,
Strong expressions of humiliation have come from elites who used to occupy positions of privilege and power in the Soviet Union, and who suddenly found themselves floundering in a sea of uncertainty after 1991. The rules of economic, social, and political power in their society have changed in ways that disadvantaged them. Many of these elites have become assertive, if not extreme, nationalists. Former KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov, who leads the Russian National Assembly, for example, has pithily remarked that he, a former “general with great connections,” could not buy regular medication for his granddaughter. Another national patriot, working for the journal Nash sovremennik, has observed how offensive it was for one of his friends to be unable to pay for a needed operation.42

Elite reaction to national humiliation has included gradations of assertive nationalism, not just extremist positions. For example, moderate figures who originally subscribed to liberal nativist ideas emphasizing religion and rural values have shifted to


42Interviews with Sterligov, Moscow, 15 October 1993 and Aleksandr Kazintsev, Moscow, 13 October 1993. Natalia Narochnitskaia, one of the first intellectuals to articulate strong nationalist views is the daughter of one of the most distinguished and recognized historians in Soviet times. Dmitrii Rogozin told me that he came from a privileged family whose father was a general in the Soviet General Staff. Govorukhin, whose language is steeped in national humiliation, has complained about the death of his career as a filmmaker in the new post-Soviet Russia. Interview with Govorukhin, Moscow, 29 September 1995.
positions centered on the primacy of a strong and hegemonic Russian state and an
oppositionist attitude towards the West.\footnote{One example is Viktor Aksyonchits, former head of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement who, in the December 1995 Duma elections, allied with the anti-western Govorukhin Bloc.} Others, like Yeltsin and former foreign minister Kozyrev, have changed their rhetoric from westernizing democracy to cosmopolitan statism. Yet other prominent individuals who could not be readily
classified as nationalists in 1990-1991 have since joined one or other grouping in the
nationalist movement: Oleg Rumiantsev, who drafted a liberal Russian constitution and has become a member of the Govorukhin bloc; Nikolai Travkin, former leader of the Democratic Russia movement, who at one point became active in former Russian vice-
president Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party for Free Russia; Sergei Stankevich, an early partner of western-style democratization projects who has become a spokesman for a strong Russia that pursues its own national interests, with or without western approbation; Vladimir Lukin, a highly visible westernizer who has become a major spokesman for cosmopolitan statism in the Russian Duma; and Valery Zorkin, former chief of the Constitutional Court and a sympathizer of western-style democracy, who has in recent years associated his name with extreme nationalists.\footnote{As assistant director of the Harvard Project on Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Moscow from 1990-92, I personally knew Rumiantsev, Stankevich, Lukin, and Zorkin, and observed their nationalist metamorphosis. See also "Russia and the West. Nag, Nag." \textit{Economist}, 8 April 1995, pp. 44-45.}

The articulate Russian public has also echoed feelings of national humiliation,
accompanied by strong nationalist assertions. These feelings have been expressed in letters to newspapers, responses to polls, regional publications, and mass
demonstrations. For example, letters to some of the most vitriolic nationalist papers decry the treatment of war veterans who risked their lives for Russia and have come to doubt the value of their previously sacred war medals. These letters argue that Russian society, since the demise of the Soviet Union, has become one of "monstrous lawlessness and outrage upon the memory of those who died" for the motherland (chudovishchnoe bezzakonie i nadrugatelstvo nad pamiatiu pogibshykh). Russian society has become focused on the "dollar" and lost its "human face," Russian brains have become a cheap commodity for western buyers, and "democracy" has pushed mothers to murder their children and kill themselves. In placards at demonstrations and in vandals' slogans, it is common to find expressions of outrage at western entities and western treatment of Russia. Polls have also shown nostalgia for the old days of Soviet superpower status, consternation about the humiliating and deplorable treatment of Russians and their cultural symbols in the "near abroad," drastic disillusionment with ideas and people from the West, a belief that the West deliberately caused many of Russia's woes, and a deep desire to restore respect for Russian national history, culture, and values. Further, regional publications have printed articles excoriating those responsible for the breakup of the Soviet Union, calling them "occupants" and "moral degenerates" who have committed crimes against the "great Russian state and Russian people," and have naively succumbed to the false "altruism of international financial capital" and the dubious munificence of the "Judeo-masonic American order."\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45}In a poll conducted by VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion), 66% in 1995 (as opposed to 50% in 1992) positively assessed the Soviet Union; 71% opposed the idealization of the western way of life; and 81% condemned the denigration of Russian national tradition and patriotic history (e.g., the deemphasis of Russian victory in World War II). A majority of respondents also indicated nostalgia
The linkage between national humiliation and assertive and extremist variants of nationalism is clear, and may be explained—at least on the elite level—by the concept of ressentiment. As stated in Chapter One of this thesis, ressentiment refers to a psychological state among elites who feel that their deserved needs, interests, and status are unmet, and could not be met. They use extreme nationalism as an adaptive mechanism in their quest for "status aggrandizement and status preservation."

Ressentiment provokes feelings of hatred, anger, and jealousy against those groups with whom status-dissatisfied elites compare themselves. In the Russian case, this is evident in extreme nationalist comments about Russian superiority and corresponding western inferiority, scorn and hatred for the West, emphasis on western perfidy, and disdain for western assistance. Some of the most rabid nationalists in Russia are


46Liah Greenfeld, “The Viability of the Concept of Nation-State,” A paper presented to the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh, August 1992, p. 3. See also comments by Mikhail Lapshin, head of the Agrarian Party, on being “humiliated” when attending meetings in the West, in Prism (electronic version), 20 October 1995, part 2. Letters to the newspaper Den’ scoff at US humanitarian aid and crassly refer to members of the U.S. peace corps in Russia as "snout-faced mugs" (mordovoroty) who will likely become informers for the CIA. See “Pis’ma v gazetu Den’,” p. 3.
those who have traveled to the United States and have returned with deep resentment against the nation to which they compare their own. In the words of one national patriot:

I hate America. . . . I have traveled all over the United States . . . and spent two months there. At first I was amazed and surprised by everything. Then I began to figure things out, I began to think, and realized that this society was very unpleasant—despite all its wealth and interesting features. . . . American propaganda and the mass media are horrible. I watched American television and had to laugh. If television were the expression of the essence of the American people, then that essence is horrible and shameful. And now when our own television is becoming more and more American, I begin to hate America even more. I think American TV is an example of totalitarian thinking. It shows a civilized country in a state of primitive barbarism . . . Whenever we [Russians] ended our isolation towards America, we have only exposed ourselves to the worst part of it. This is a tragedy.47

C. Contending Variants of Russian Nationalism

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russian politicians faced the central task of rebuilding the state within newly-defined boundaries. Because the task of state-building had to be done under conditions of severe and extensive national humiliation, no significant political force in Russia could survive without donning some nationalist mantle or other. As I have argued in Chapter One of this thesis, nationalism is an ideology with powerful legitimating effects; by anchoring political power in the "nation" (a malleable concept), nationalism confers legitimacy on those elites who succeed in claiming to represent the nation's interests and projecting a credible commitment to defending and fulfilling the national mission. In Russia, where the state must be rebuilt, official and unofficial elites have found themselves competing for the legitimacy conferred by nationalism. Because of the existing precondition of national humiliation,

47Interview with Kuniaev, Moscow, 14 October 1995. Govorukhin echoed these same sentiments in Interview with Govorukhin, Moscow, 29 September 1995.
all politics in Russia have essentially become nationalist politics. As I have noted, even those politicians who were not nationalists in 1989-1991 have come to adopt one variant or other of nationalist ideology.\textsuperscript{48}

I describe below a typology of nationalist ideas that have been, and continue to be, propagated in Russia in the late- and, particularly, the post-Soviet contexts, and which includes all major political orientations and groupings in Russia since 1991. For the purposes of this thesis, I highlight the benign and malevolent implications of different nationalist ideas for Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{49} My typology seeks to capture key tenets on membership in the nation, self- and other-image, and the national mission. This categorization reflects overlapping ideological lines among Russian nationalists but also tries to highlight key differences from one strand of thought to another. Proponents of each variant of nationalism have not necessarily stayed stationary in one category, and their early rhetoric may not always coincide with later actions. Nationalists have also made tactical changes in their rhetoric and affiliations as required by political exigencies.

\textsuperscript{48}The use of nationalism as a legitimating instrument in politics is common to all elites engaged in state-building in the former Soviet Union. In Uzbekistan, for example, president Islam Karimov has replaced Karl Marx's statue at the central square in the capital of Tashkent by a statue of Tamerlane, conqueror and ruler of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus in the fourteenth century. Although Tamerlane was not even Uzbek, Uzbek elites have claimed him as a symbol to help develop "national pride and love of the motherland" among the youth and all citizens of Uzbekistan. See "Move Over, Marx," \textit{Transition}, 9 February 1996, p. 3.

and those with seemingly contradictory convictions have sometimes come together in political coalitions. Where appropriate, I note linkages between the ideas below and their precursors in Russian nationalist thought in the nineteenth century and in the Soviet period.

1) Westernizing Democracy

Yeltsin and Kozyrev represent best the earliest articulators of the "westernizing democratic" strand of Russian nationalism. This strand was officially important in 1991-1992, but has since weakened considerably. Westernizing democrats define the nation primarily in civic terms—i.e., Russia includes all citizens within Russia's territorial boundaries (hence, Yeltsin's frequent use of the multiethnic россий as opposed to the ethnic term, русский). Because definition of membership in the nation is civic, westernizers also advocate liberal and flexible policies of autonomy for non-Russians within the Russian Federation. Civic definition of the nation does not, however, preclude recognition of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers outside Russia, especially in the former Soviet republics or "near abroad." Russians abroad are considered rightful affiliates of the nation, and the nation must defend their interests—not through force, but through negotiations and the use of international legal norms and

50Other representatives are former presidential adviser Galina Starovoitova, political scientist Lilia Shevtsova, Sakharov's widow Elena Bonner, and Kozyrev's former senior colleagues from the Russian foreign ministry.

51Valerii Tishkov, "Smertel'nyi gambit' natsional'noi politiki," Nezavisimaia gazeta 7 February 1992, p. 5. This line of thought echoes Yeltsin's 1990 injunction to the former Soviet republics to "take all the sovereignty they could swallow." See Morrison, Boris Yeltsin, p. 184. This liberal line came undone in Chechnya, where Moscow used excessive force to quell a secessionist drive within Russia.
Westernizing democrats reject Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet system, which they identify as the cause of many of Russia’s problems. Their self-image centers on Russia as a non-imperial power whose immense potentials can be realized through democracy, market reform, and integration and participation in the international community. Integration in the international, “civilized” community is of such high priority that in 1991-92, Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and others pledged active participation in UN peacekeeping and hinted at facilitating Eastern European incorporation into such western organizations as the European Community and even NATO! Kozyrev declared in 1991 that Russian failure to integrate into “the democratic community of states . . . would amount to a betrayal of the nation and Russia’s final slide toward the category of third-rate states.”

Westernizers reject categorical assertions of Russian uniqueness, and view Russia within a larger, interdependent community that adheres to universal values and standards. They reject claims to restore the Russian or Soviet empire, and see Russia as a non-coercive leader and integrationist among the former constituents of the Soviet Union. Although westernizing democrats see the West overall as their model and chief partner, they also recognize instances when western interests may not

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52See Kozyrev’s interview in Kuranty, 16 April 1993, p. 6 and Boris Yeltsin, "Russia is Strong in Intellect, Resources, and Culture," Rossiiske vesti, 21 April 1993, pp. 1-2. Two years later, however, Kozyrev pronounced a harder line, claiming that Moscow reserved the right to use all means, including armed force, to defend the interests of Russian speakers in the former Soviet republics. See Yegor V. Bykovsky, “New Russian Hawk,” Moscow News (English ed.), 21-27 April 1995, p. 2.

coincide with those of Russia.\textsuperscript{54}

The national mission of westernizing democrats, consistent with their self- and other-image, implies generally benign actions toward the outside world. This includes preserving Russia's territorial status quo, protecting Russian citizens within and outside Russia by recourse to international norms, modernizing the economy through market reforms, achieving an internationally-sanctioned role as peacekeeper in the former Soviet Union, and attaining full integration into key international institutions. Russia is to be a strong and powerful state, but one that rejects its imperialist past. Westernizing democrats have also expressed support for promoting a state-supported healthy, non-chauvinistic brand of patriotism that would aid Russia's progress toward a stable democratic state.\textsuperscript{55}


2) **Nativism**

Chief representatives of this strand of nationalism are the historian and humanist, Dmitrii Likhachev, and the writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.\(^{56}\) Nativists define the Russian nation as an ancient ethnic, linguistic, and territorial entity encompassing Great Russians (Russia proper), Little Russians (Ukraine), and White Russians (Belarus). They would prefer the reunification of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan in one “Russian” nation and state, but they do not advocate unification by violent means. Hence, they are willing to limit Russia to the current boundaries of the Russian Federation.\(^{57}\) The disavowal of violence makes nativism relatively benign for Russian relations with newly-independent states near its borders and with non-Russian groups inside Russia.

Following the legacy of their nineteenth-century liberal Slavophile forebears, nativists promote a Russian self-image rooted in the morality of the Christian Orthodox faith, an abiding belief in social justice and “constrained autocracy,”\(^{58}\) and a deep appreciation of Russia’s cultural inheritance and Russian nature. Its proponents reject

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\(^{56}\) Other proponents of nativism are Alla Latynina, scholar Sergei Averintsev, and the writers Sergei Zalygin and Vladimir Soloukhin. The writers Valentin Rasputin and Vasilii Belov, and the mathematician Igor’ Shafarevich also belong to this group, although some of their rhetoric has been occasionally extremist.


\(^{58}\) Constrained autocracy refers to an alternative strand of Russian political culture that accepts rule by a prince or autocrat, so long as that rule ensures “domestic tranquility and good government” that is accountable to the popular will and to the values of the Church. If the autocrat fails in his duty, the people deserve the right to “establish a new governmental compact.” See Petro, *Rebirth of Russian Democracy*, p. 31 and pp. 28–59.
Marxism-Leninism as an alien ideology imposed on Russia, and condemn Soviet tyranny as a product of that ideology rather than an expression of the "Russian character." They see a return to idealized native peasant values, such as sobornost’ or communalism, and Russian Orthodoxy as the key to Russian renewal. Both in the pre- and post-Gorbachev eras, they have sharply criticized Soviet policies that caused the destruction of Russian religion, nature and culture, and have sought steps for restoration and preservation. Some nativists see monarchy as the system of government best suited for Russia, but this idea is considerably weak. Others advocate enlightened authoritarian rule. Leading nativists, however, see democratic roots in Russia’s own culture and history and emphasize that Russia need not blindly copy the western model because of its weaknesses and other features that are unsuitable for the Russian context.

The nativist self-image is inclusive of other peoples and cultures. Likhachev and Solzhenitsyn, for example, advocate the flourishing of languages and cultures of all national groups in the Russian Federation. Likhachev is also known for his voluminous works emphasizing the greatness of ancient Russia, and the ability of bearers of Russian culture to produce works of tremendously distinctive aesthetic value which

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60 Solzhenitsyn, Pis’mo vozhdiam, chap. 7 and Igor’ Shafarevich, “Rossiia i mirovai katastrofa,” Nash sovremennik 1 (1993):100-129. An excellent book on liberal slavophile-oriented Russian nationalism (the author does not call it nativism as I do) is Petro, Rebirth of Russian Democracy.
have enriched the world. At the same time, Russian culture has itself been remarkably open to enrichment by outside influences.\textsuperscript{61} Although nativism is generally inclusive, some of its adherents are averse to foreign—especially, western—ideas and styles. A few voices betray anti-semitism while others, juxtaposing Russia with the West, claim innate Russian superiority. Although the West is doing better than Russia by some indicators, Russia will eventually flourish and surpass it in moral and spiritual development.\textsuperscript{62} Some nativists also depict the Russian nation as a persecuted group, both during the Soviet regime, when Stalin annihilated so many Russians in his purges and in war, and in the post-Soviet period, when millions of Russians suddenly found themselves stranded in "foreign countries."\textsuperscript{63}

Russia's mission in nativist thought is primarily defensive and inward-looking and, therefore, largely benign. It reflects the chief aspiration of "dissident" nativists and derevenshchiki in the Soviet period: to restore and defend the physical and spiritual well-being of the land and people. This means, inter alia, arresting the degradation of the environment, lowering Russian mortality rates, increasing the Russian birth rate, giving land to the peasants, reeducating the youth in moral and spiritual values, preserving Russia's cultural and historical legacies, rebuilding a strong state (without


\textsuperscript{62}These ideas on Russia and the West echo 19th century slavophilism. See Walicki, A History of Russian Thought, pp. 92-114.

\textsuperscript{63}V. Kozlov, "Russkii vopros: istoriia, sovremennost', budushchee," Vesti gorodov iuga Rossii, Krasnodarskie izvestiia [joint issue], 27 February 1993, p. 17 and Igor' Shafarevich, Russofobia (Munich: Rossiiskoe natsional'noe ob'edinenie, 1989).
imperial coercion) that would institute basic political freedoms at home, protecting the
human rights of Russians in the former Soviet Union, and fending off western economic,
political, or cultural exploitation. On the sensitive issue of defending the rights of
Russians in the "near abroad," some nativists promote a maximal program of
incorporating heavily Russian-populated regions into Russia if this was the will of the
majority as expressed in popular referenda. At minimum, they advocate national-
cultural autonomy for Russians living in the former Soviet republics.\textsuperscript{64} Nativists see the
revival of Russian national consciousness as a healthy phenomenon and a prerequisite
to Russia's fulfillment of its many potentials as a nation.\textsuperscript{65}


\textsuperscript{65}Latynina argues, for example, that "national consciousness is . . . creative. . . . I have hope in Russia's future because I don't see its [prerevolutionary] past in shades of black." Arsenii Gulyga further asserts, "There is nothing to be feared from the growth of the Russian . . . national consciousness. . . . Only nations with a developed sense of self-esteem can be friends with other nations. Faceless mobs are capable only of oppressing each other." See Alla Latynina, "Kolokol'nyi zvon--ne molitva," \textit{Novyi mir}, no. 8 (1988), 232-44; "Kliuch k chemu?" \textit{Literaturnaia gazeta}, no. 15, 1989; Arsenii Gulyga, "O russkoi dushe," \textit{Moskovskie novosti}, no. 22, 1988, p. 3; and Sergei Alekseev, "Vybor Rossii...V chem zhe on?" \textit{Nezavisimaja gazeta}, 13 November 1993, pp. 1, 3. On the positive role of nationalism in a country's development, see Leonard Doob, \textit{Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 263.
3) Cosmopolitan Nationalism

Cosmopolitan statism echoes ideas familiar to imperial, great power nationalism under the tsars, nationalism under Stalin, and National Bolshevism under communist rule; it also overlaps substantively with ethnocentric statism. It defines as members of the nation ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, others assimilated into Russian culture and "devoted" to the Russian motherland, and Slavic components of the Russian and Soviet empires. Territorially, cosmopolitan (and ethnocentric) statists do not accept a Russia limited to the present Russian Federation, but want to include at least Ukraine and Belarus and, at most, all the "historical" borders of the old Soviet Union and the preceding tsarist empire. The most prominent articulators of cosmopolitan statism are Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the U.S. and head of the Russian Duma's Committee on International Affairs; Gennadii Zyuganov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF); Boris Fyodorov, former Russian minister of finance; Sergei Stankevich, adviser to Yeltsin; newly-appointed foreign minister, Evgenii Primakov; minister of defense Pavel Grachev; former chair of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, Evgenii Ambartsumov; publicist

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66Statists seem unable to perceive a Russia that is bereft of Ukraine, for example. Interviews with Boris Fyodorov, Berlin, Germany, 24 August 1994 and Rogozin, Moscow, 11 October 1993; "Khasbulatov on CIS Reintegration," RFE/RL News Briefs, 14 September 1993; and an interview with Aleksandr Lebed in "General i ego armiia," Novoe vremia, no. 37 (1995):19-20. Arkadii Volsky has also stated that the "Soviet people" are genetically the same; therefore they naturally belong in an imperial union. See RFE/RL Post-Soviet/East European Report, 6 October 1992, p. 5.

67Zyuganov has been more of an extremist ethnocentric statist in the past and even served on the editorial board of the anti-semitic Den', but has since touted a more sophisticated, moderate line. See "Endangered Species," Economist, 6 May 1995, pp. 51-52.
Andranik Migranian; and minister without portfolio, Nikolai Travkin.

Cosmopolitan statists portray a Russian self-image infused with "great power" history and ideas. They emphasize that Russia is only temporarily demoralized, but will inevitably regain its natural position as a world power and as a "cement" uniting the numerous peoples of the former Russian and Soviet empires. Adherence to the "great power" idea—involving a strong and disciplined state, a hegemonic role in the former Soviet region, and prestige in the larger international community—is the strongest thread binding adherents to statism. This idea is rooted in a relatively moderate definition of the concept of “Eurasia,” which posits that Russia is a unique entity positioned between East and West. This unique position allowed Russia to create an empire partly through conquest and partly through its natural attraction as a "superethnos" to other ethnoses. It is thus a "nation of nations" that can potentially gather again its former units in a closely integrated structure.

Cosmopolitan statists’ striving for hegemony vis-a-vis their neighbors is evident in the call for a Russian "Monroe Doctrine" in the former Soviet Union. They argue that Russia should be the guarantor of political and military stability in the area, and should continue to have a military presence in the newly independent FSU states. Unless Russia takes charge, there is an unacceptable threat that international bodies like

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68 The original Eurasianists included the linguist N. S. Trubetskoi; the geographer, P. N. Savitskii; the legal scholars V. N. Il'in and N. N. Alekseev; the historians M. M. Shakhmatov and G. V. Vernadskii; and the philosophers G. V. Florovskii and L. P. Karsavin. Their ideas are elaborated in P. N. Savitskii, Iskhod k vostoku (Exodus to the East) (Sofia: Rossiisko-Bulgarskoe knigoizd., 1921).

69 I describe a more aggressive definition of Eurasia in the section on national patriotism.
NATO or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly, CSCE and now OSCE) will intervene in the region and in Russia's internal affairs.\textsuperscript{70} All statistis deplore the disintegration of the former Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{71} but they disagree on how former Soviet great power status may be restored. Cosmopolitan statistis argue that Russian great power renaissance should happen along essentially democratic and market-oriented lines, but "transitory" authoritarian rule may be necessary in the interim.\textsuperscript{72} This group rejects the communist past and seeks to reconcile democracy with strong patriotism. Its members also believe Russia should maintain its multi-ethnic character and pursue cooperative relations with the West, while renouncing naive ideas of full-fledged partnership or alliance with the United States and other western powers. Russia must go its own way in spheres where it has unique,


\textsuperscript{71} Many statistis, for example, are deserters from the Democratic Russia movement (an alliance which initially included nativists and westernizing democrats) who disagreed strongly with the movement's support for the independence of the former Soviet republics.

\textsuperscript{72} In Stankevich's words, "... at all times, in all countries, intensive reform efforts ... were implemented only by leaders who were somewhat authoritarian. ... Never and nowhere has a transition of society to a qualitatively new state been accomplished during ... a flourishing parliamentary democracy." See "Soviet Chaos Stymies Aid, Reform in Moscow," Washington Post, 7 October 1991, p. A1; see also Stankevich's comments at a Foreign Ministry Conference in February 1992 in "A Transformed Russia in a New World Order," International Affairs (Moscow), nos. 4-5 (April-May 1992):81-103 and Fyodorov, Patriotizm i demokratija.
historical and traditional ties and interests, such as in Serbia or in developing countries like India, where the Soviet Union nurtured relations for years. Moscow should cultivate friends wherever they may be found, as long as these relations serve Russian national interests and do not cause serious conflict between Russia and the international community. In line with this thinking, Lukin, just after he was appointed ambassador to Washington, immediately highlighted the need for Russia to diminish its intensive focus on the West.\textsuperscript{73}

Russia's national mission is primarily to return to great power status; this is Russia's destiny and its "genetic code." Russia must defend the interests of Russians and Russian speakers in the former Soviet Union, using legal norms and force when necessary. Besides protecting Russians "abroad," cosmopolitan statists argue that it is the national mission to maintain Russia's territorial integrity; exercise regional hegemony and integrate the former Soviet republics by voluntary means; create a unifying idea that would consolidate support for the state and revive discipline, authority, and order in the economy, the army, and society; and reject the kind of foreign policy that favors western goals while hurting Russian national interests. Although cosmopolitan statist ideas connote worrisome Russian external behavior, these ideas largely conform to normal great power behavior.\textsuperscript{74} Although they espouse a highly assertive national mission for Russia, cosmopolitan statists are careful not to advocate


\textsuperscript{74}The use of force to protect citizens abroad, for example, was used by the United States when it invaded Panama during Ronald Reagan's presidency.
behavior that would make Russia an international pariah. Moreover, some of them downplay altogether the external component of Russia's mission and argue that Russia must focus its energies on internal stability and welfare. The best foreign policy is one that does not seek haphazard "integration" with former Soviet republics, but one that allows Russia the stable space it needs to solve its domestic problems. Only an internally robust Russia could become a force that would attract its neighbors in an integrative relationship.\footnote{Stankevich, "Razdelit' sfery vliiania," p. 19; "Civic Union Discusses Foreign Policy Concept," RFE/RL News Briefs, 18-22 January 1993, p. 3; Interview with Rogozin, Moscow, 11 October 1993; "Committee Chairman on Russian National Interests," RFE/RL News Briefs, 8-12 February 1993, p. 5; "Communist Party: From Monolith to Open House," Moscow Times, 30 September 1995, pp. 1-2; and V. I. Krivokhizha, "Rossiia v novoi strukture mezhdunarodnych otnoshenii," Polis 3 (1995):9-22.}

4) Ethnocentric Statism

Prominent proponents of ethnocentric statism include former vice-president Rutskoi, retired Lt.-Gen. Aleksandr Lebed from the Congress of Russian Communities, and, occasionally, Zyuganov and Grachev. Ethnocentric statist's criteria for membership in the nation and their self- and other-image overlap with those of their cosmopolitan counterparts. A major difference, however, is that ethnocentric statists argue that Russia should become a great power with a more ethnically defined Russian base. To consolidate that base, Russia must protect the rights of millions of kinsmen in the "near abroad" and seek urgently to reconstitute the borders of the old Soviet empire.\footnote{As early as 1992, Rutskoi was advocating a reassessment of Russian borders. He has subsequently noted that if the U.S. constitution prosecutes those who would destroy}
contributions of communism to Russia and have sought to create a hybrid ideology of
"Holy Russian Communism." As for democracy, ethnocentric statists show deep
ambivalence or outright hostility, equating Russian democratization with conspiracies to
destroy the state. As one sympathizer has argued:

In time of grave sociopolitical or economic crisis, parliamentary debates and
conciliatory commissions are suicidal for any society. . . . The slogan of
democracy at any price is not so very harmless. It . . . is backed by all those who
for years have wanted to destroy Russia and now want a Russia floundering in
endless factional bickering, . . . a Russia incapable of any positive, constructive
effort for the good of the nation. . . . The entire history of Russia, its existence as
a sociopolitical system is incontrovertible proof that as a polity, Russia has
always been held together by a strong system of state power. [emphasis in
original]77

Others assert that even if Russia were to become a democratic state, it would likely
remain imperial because all great states tend to be imperial powers; witness the United
States. The key question is not whether or not Russia should be an empire, but how far
its imperial reach should go and what means it should employ; indeed, Russia could be
an empire and still act within acceptable international norms. As far as relations with
the West, ethnocentric statists are more confrontational than their cosmopolitan
colleagues. They see the West as Russia's foe, and some, like Yuri Skokov, former
chair of the Russian National Security Council, have advocated "the necessity to

77Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "Russia Today and Tomorrow," International Affairs no. 2
(February 1993), pp. 29-30.
confront the United States" on a number of issues.\textsuperscript{78}

Ethnocentric statists share their cosmopolitan colleagues' definition of Russia's national mission. They are, however, more prone to favor aggressive measures than the cosmopolitan group. Ethnocentric statists show little, if any, aversion to violence as a means of fulfilling the national mission. Lebed, for example, in touting Chilean general Pinochet as an example of a great leader, glibly notes that Pinoch\textsuperscript{et} killed only 3,500 people but restored his country's economy and allowed his people to live in a "civilized, flourishing country." Rutskoi, too, while verbally denouncing violence, has simultaneously expressed his fascination with theories on violent crowd behavior and his belief that the majority always follows whoever is stronger. Further, his leading role in the bloodshed in Moscow in October 1993 has proven his willingness to incite violent action.\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{79}For Lebed's comment, see "Russia Betrayed? Voices of the Opposition." In my interview with Rutskoi, he spoke at length about his admiration for Gustave Le Bon, the French philosopher who wrote on the psychology of the crowd and violent collective action. He also said the Nazis had a "great philosophy" but they corrupted it in practice. See Interview with Rutskoi, Moscow, 8 June 1994 and Gustave Le Bon, \textit{The World in Revolt}, trans. Bernard Miall (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1921).
5) National Patriotism

National patriotism is the most extreme variant of nationalism in Russia and continues a line going back to the Black Hundred movement in early twentieth century Russia and the diaspora Russian fascist movement from 1925-1945. Many of its proponents propagate ideas colored by chauvinism, anti-semitism, and a propensity for violent solutions to problems of the nation. National patriots include some of Russia's most vocal and notorious nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Aleksandr Barkashov, Aleksandr Prokhanov, former editor of the newspaper Den' (now called Zavtra); Dmitrii Vasiliev, head of Pamiat'; Gen. Aleksandr Sterligov, leader of the Russian National Assembly and former KGB general; Stanislav Terekhov of the unofficial Russian Officers' Union; Viktor Anpilov, leader of the Russian Communist Workers Party; the fascist Gen. Albert Makashov; the filmmaker Sergei Govorukhin; and editors of such publications as Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik. National

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80 The Black Hundred was the armed wing of the Union of Russian People, formed in 1905 as a response to liberal and revolutionary challenges to tsarist autocracy. The Black Hundred were militant, anti-semitic, demagogic and xenophobic. See Laqueur, Black Hundred, pp. 290-92 and John J. Stephan, The Russian Fascists. Tragedy and Farce in Exile 1925-45 (NY: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 1-18.

81 Some observers refer conveniently to national patriots as members of the "red-brown" coalition—i.e., supporters of nationalism and communism, whose predecessors are the National Bosheviks. This appellation is too simplistic. Some of today's national patriots were and continue to be critics of communism. Govorukhin exemplifies this best. His films, "Tak zhit' nel'zia" ("We Cannot Live This Way") and "Rossiia, kotoruiu my poteriali" ("Our Lost Russia"), played a significant role in expressing and strengthening popular disdain for the communist system in the early days of glasnost'. There are also national patriots with mixed credentials, who were once active nativists and/or leaders in the early democratic movement. I would mention Viktor Aksyuchits, head of the Russian Christian Democratic Party, who left the Communist Party in 1978, was a member of Democratic Russia and a nativist who has leaned toward extremism. Another is Sergei Baburin, formerly of Democratic Russia and the Kadets (Constitutional-Democratic Party) and head of the Unity faction in the former Russian...
patriots define the nation primarily in ethnic and racial terms, though some pay verbal
homage to civic and more inclusive definitions of the nation. They insist that Russia is
the territorial equivalent of the former Soviet Union, and should be led by one ethnic
group—the Russians. They support the use of force to restore the former
Russian/Soviet empire and to defend the interests of ethnic Russians outside the
Russian Federation, and equate Russia's loss of territory to a fulfillment of the dreams
of such historical foes as Carl XII of Sweden, Napoleon, Palmerston (Crimean War),
and Hitler.

Supreme Soviet, who has also associated with the national patriotic camp. See 100
Documents of the Russian Christian-Democratic Union in "Rossiiskoe Khristianskoe

Among the national patriots I have interviewed, only Gen. Filatov made no attempt
to hide his racist views. Others (Sterligov, Kuniaev, Zhirinovsky) initially claimed that
the Russian nation was not exclusively ethnic but, in the course of our conversation, it
became evident that they used ethnicity, blood, and language as key criteria for
membership and, particularly, leadership in the nation, and would disenfranchise many
Russian citizens, especially Jews, if given the opportunity. When pressed about how
they might determine if someone's blood was purely Russian, both Generals Sterligov
and Filatov insisted that they would "know." See Interviews with Filatov, Moscow, 15
October 1993; Sterligov, Moscow, 15 October 1993; Kuniaev, Moscow, 14 October
1993; and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Moscow, 14 October 1993.

The newspaper of the Union of Russian Writers, Literaturnaia Rossiia, declares:
"where are the boundaries of that country for which Russian citizens shed their blood,
and the blood of their enemies? This is a serious question, for if these boundaries no
longer exist, then there is no Russia. Peace at any price is not peace, but
capitulation..." In a similar vein, Baburin has said, "Russia is the former Soviet Union.
... It is politicians, not the people, who want national states." See Vladimir Beliaev,
"Rossiia kak ob'ekt agressii novogo tipa. Sud'bonsnoe vremia," Literaturnaia Rossiia,
5 March 1993, p. 4; and Marina Shakina, "The Discreet Charm of a Russian
Some national patriots reject Marxism-Leninism, but a greater number subscribe to the "single stream" view of history—i.e., the Soviet Union was fully legitimate because it was simply a continuation of the great Russian state. Great power is a supreme value to national patriots, as it is to statists; however, the former are more intense in their vitriolic chauvinism and violent proclivities. They see the Russian self-image as that of a great, imperial power, preach chauvinism, and argue that Russia is unlike any other empire because it was not artificially, but organically, created. Russian imperialism is benign because Russian rule is benevolent compared to rule by others, like the Mongols or Chinese. Russia also flourishes only under a strong, centralized, and authoritarian state, and Russians must make the requirements of the state their highest priority. Because of these beliefs, national patriots openly reject the western democratic model and see themselves in irreconcilable opposition to the post-Soviet Russian government. They characterize Russian democrats—from Gorbachev to Yeltsin—as traitorous, criminal, anti-national, "totalitarian-comprador," and even "cannibalistic."\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84}Many national patriots gloss over the history of the Stalin era. They are less interested in a full exposure and understanding of the past than in blaming recent and current leaders like Gorbachev and Yeltsin for destroying the great Russian state. See "Russkai\a partii\a' v KPSS prosushchestvovala do nachala perestroiki," \textit{Den'}, 28 February-6 March 1993, p. 3; "Natsional'n\o-osvoboditel'n\oe dvizhenie otvechaet," p. 1; and Wendy Slater, "Russian Communists Seek Salvation in Nationalist Alliance," RFE/RL Research Report, 26 March 1993, pp. 8-13.

\textsuperscript{85}On chauvinism, Gen. Filatov has declared, "We [Russians] have always helped other peoples. Who were the Chechens 100 years ago? They were mountain people who knew nothing except horses! Who were the Kazakhs? Just people chasing sheep and camels. But we have turned them into civilized nations!" Filatov also insists that the years of authoritarian Stalinist rule, 1937-53, were golden years when Russians were able truly to live by Russian rules. Interview with Filatov, Moscow, 15 October 1993. On epithets hurled at democrats, see Chesheva, "Kto nashi deputaty," p. 1;
Many ideas that dominate the national patriotic self-image echo an extremist and even superstitious conceptualization of Eurasia.\textsuperscript{66} The basic concept of Eurasianism portrays Russia as a unique, organic, and self-sufficient geographic and cultural entity, with "natural," imperial borders. It embodies both East and West, but resembles the former more in terms of communal values, spirituality, and striving for social justice. It has a historical, divine, and inevitable calling to be a great power, and any attempts to hinder the fulfillment of this calling are bound to fail. Russia must keep its unique, God-given identity and resist any attempts at Europeanization or westernization, especially in the political sphere, because these would bring only ills and shame, such as what happened in the aftermath of the Bolshevik, western-inspired revolution of 1917.\textsuperscript{67} But national patriotic Eurasianists go beyond these basic arguments. For example, in three issues of the journal \textit{Elementy} (subtitled "Eurasian Worldview"), one can find articles

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condemning the evil of globalism, extolling extreme rightists in Europe, justifying Soviet expansionism, pointing out such western "conspiracies" as the Trilateral Commission and other western evils, expounding the ideology of fascists, touting the supremacy of geopolitics above all other approaches to international relations, praising Stalin's brilliant geopolitical moves for the Soviet Union, condemning Gorbachev for destroying the Soviet "heartland" state, and heralding the virtues of strong will, action, and militarism.\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Elementy} also uses symbols that unmistakably recall the Nazi swastika; altogether, the journal's combination of symbols and prose seem designed to develop siege mentality, xenophobia, racism, and militarism among its readers.

The military features prominently in the national patriots' self-image. They consider a strong military the key to Russian greatness in the past and future. The armed forces are the "savior of the Fatherland" in its critical moments and, as Aleksandr Prokhanov declares, the Soviet army "connected the past and the present, the old and the young, and guaranteed [Russia's] stability and sovereignty." It is the sacred duty of the state to provide the needs of the army and restore the Russian military to its former strength and glory. Moreover, where national interests are at stake, the state should not hesitate to use armed force.\textsuperscript{89} National patriots would like to see Russian youth


\textsuperscript{89}Prokhanov has preached that war is better than peace because people become weak and demoralized when all is in order. War reinvigorates the nation and tightens discipline in the army. He has declared that Russians need not be sentimental about violence and bloodshed because they have shed blood throughout their history. They should take American general Norman Schwarzkopf as a model because he did not
culcated with military-patriotic values or the "warrior spirit," and they identify the military as an invaluable resource for resuscitating heroic vitalism needed for the rebirth of the nation.\textsuperscript{90}

Some national patriots emphasize an image of victimization and see Russia as the victim of other former Soviet republics that prospered at Russia's expense. They blame a "Zionist conspiracy" or "Jews hiding behind Russian surnames" for Bolshevik abuses and the destruction of the Russian state and the environment. They blame current Russian "democrats" for implementing genocide against their own people and for selling Russian resources wholesale and at a discount to criminals, particularly from the West. They see their compatriots in the "near abroad" subjected to humiliation and persecution while the western world stands idly by. They see the West and its leaders flinch when giving the command for carpet bombing of Iraq. Referring to Afghanistan, Prokhanov called the struggle a fight for "space equilibrium"; this is reminiscent of the Nazi wars for "lebensraum" or living space. See Michael Shuster, Interviews with Aleksandr Prokhanov and Col. Viktor Alksnis, National Public Radio, October 1992, xeroxed transcripts.; "Afganistan: ispytanie ognem," Literaturnaia gazeta, 29 April 1987, p. 6; Sergei Khovanskii, "Afghanistan: The Bleeding Wound," Detente, no. 6 (Spring 1986), pp. 2-4; "Rezoliutsiia fronta natsional'nogo spaseniiia," p. 4; and Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, "Prokhanov Warns of Collapse of Soviet Empire." RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 9 February 1990, pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{90}Gen. Makashov has suggested that military experience should be mandatory for future Russian leaders. Karem Rash, a propagandist for the military, has also favored military intervention in politics because soldiers are overall better human beings than civilians and they "don't wear a thread of foreign-made clothes." Finally, the theme song of the National Salvation Front, a coalition of national patriots, is "Holy War (Sviashchennaia voina)," a World War II anthem. See Valery Vyzhutovich, "Kommunisty i patrioty, shag vpered!" Izvestiia, 26 October 1992, p. 2; Stephen Foye, "Military Hardliner Condemns 'New Thinking' in Security Policy," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 13 July 1990, pp. 4-6; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 3 August 1990, pp. 8-11. In line with the idealization of military power, some national patriotic publications have featured ideas and leaders of Nazi Germany. See, for example, "Ideologiiia," Elementy no. 1 (1992):49-56.
as having deliberately orchestrated the downfall of the Soviet Union and the
emasculaton of the Russian state. The West, and especially the United States, always
will be a threat to Russian culture and statehood, an exploiter of Russia's natural
resources, a spiritually hollow and inegalitarian society, promoter of an anti-Christian
universal world order and a country of "civilized barbarism," the relentless antagonist of
a blameless Russia.  

Russia's mission, according to national patriots, is to restore the great Russian
imperial state under Russian leadership (preferably, for some, a monarchy) and do so
with minimal, if any, concern for the opinion and norms of Russia's neighbors and the
rest of the international community. Loyal members of the nation should advocate
protection for Russians abroad; overthrow the western-oriented, "slavish" government of
Boris Yeltsin; block arms control agreements that weaken Russia; restore Russian
military power and prestige; correct negative social trends in the Russian family and
society; seek a "third path" toward economic prosperity, neither capitalist nor

94National patriots never seem to identify Russian causes for Russian problems, but
always see outsiders, especially Jews, as the culprits. Nikolai Lysenko, leader of the
National Republican Party of Russia, accuses Jews of bringing catastrophe to Russia
and surviving at the expense of the Russian nation. In a similar vein, when asked about
the nuclear arms race, Prokhanov declares, "...my people are not guilty. Guilty are the
black imperialist forces [led by the United States]." See "Nasha tsel'—sozdanie velikoi
imperi," Nash sovremennik no. 9 (1992):122-30; Interviews with Filatov, Moscow, 15
October 1993, Kuniaev, Moscow, 14 October 1993, and Govorukhin, Moscow, 29
September 1995; Stephen Shenfield, "Making Sense of Prokhanov," Detente, no. 5
"Unichtozhenie Rossii," pp. 130-40; Vykhodtsev, "Genotsid russkogo naroda, pp. 177-
97; Walter Laqueur, "Foreign Policy Concepts of the Right," New Times no. 38
(1992):12-14; S. V. Kurginyan, et al, Postperestroika (Moscow: Izd. politicheskoi
literatury, 1990); I. S. Kulikova, et al, Fenomen Zhirinovskogo (Moscow: Kontrolling,
1992); "Chto s souzom?" Den' no. 3 (83), 1993, p. 7; Aleksandr Barkashov, "Era
Rossii," Den', no. 20 (48), 1992, p. 5 and no. 21 (49), 1992, p. 5; and V. Usghkuunik,
Parniatka russkomu cheloveku (Moscow: Russkii natsional'nyi sobor, 1993).
communist; and establish authority, law and order in domestic politics. For some, Russia's mission has a Stalinist and fascist flavor. Mikhail Antonov, leader of the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland, suggests a full-fledged attack on the "rootless and cosmopolitan" intelligentsia (i.e., Jews). Others call for purging cities like St. Petersburg of all non-Russians, dismissing leaders who are not Russian by nationality, and supporting armed action against non-Russians, lately the Chechens, who threaten the integrity of the Russian state. They also believe that sympathizers of minorities, including those who have fought for Chechen human rights, are traitors and should be punished by the state.  

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A summary of the the major contours of contending variants of Russian nationalism is in the table below:

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENDING STRANDS OF NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA</th>
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**WESTERNIZING DEMOCRACY**

- *civic: all residents within the territory of Russia are members of the nation*
- *ethnic and linguistic Russians outside Russia are rightful affiliates of nation*
- *territorially, Russia is the Russian Federation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership in Nation</th>
<th>Self- and Other- Image</th>
<th>National Mission</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>communism is not integral to Russian character</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russia is great power, but non-imperial</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russia part of larger international community</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>outside world, especially West, is Russian partner</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>preserve territorial status quo</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>modernize economy</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>protect Russians in &quot;near abroad&quot; using international norms and by establishing harmonious relations with neighbors</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>attain full integration in international institutions</em></td>
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**NATIVISM**

- *ethnic: members of nation share ethnic, territorial, and linguistic features; included are Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians) and White Russians (Belorussians)*
- *territorially, Russia should include at minimum Russian Fed., Belarus, E. Ukraine, and N. Kazakhstan*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership in Nation</th>
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<th>National Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>communism is alien to Russian character; Soviet rule victimized Russian nation</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Russian true values are sobornost</em> (communalism), Orthodox Christianity, culture and nature*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russia has contributed to other cultures and vice-versa</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Russia spiritually superior to West</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>democracy compatible with Russia but must be nativized</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>preserve environment</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>halt demographic catastrophe among Russians</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>make Orthodoxy strong influence in nation</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>educate youth in moral and spiritual values and in healthy patriotism</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>preserve Russian culture</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>build strong state that is able to fend off unwelcome incursions and exploitation by outsiders</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>defend rights of Russians living abroad by nonviolent means</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| COSMO. STATISM | *civic and ethnic: members of nation include ethnic Russians, native Russian speakers and others assimilated into Russian culture; ethnocentric camp emphasize ethnic criterion more than the cosmopolitan camp | *divided opinion on communism; some believe Soviet Union legitimate because it preserved empire and great power status | *return Russia to great power status
*defend interests of Russians abroad using international norms and force, if necessary
*maintain territorial integrity of Russian Fed.
*exercise hegemonic role in FSU and lead regional integration
*unify state, society, army and revive discipline via patriotism
*reject foreign policy that caters to western interests to detriment of Russian natl. interest |
| ETHNO. STATISM | *same as above, though argue Russian state should have more explicitly ethnic Russian base | *favor authoritarian govt.
*West is foe that cannot be trusted and seeks Russia's downfall | *same as above; force is a preferred option for fulfilling national mission |
**NATIONAL PATRIOTISM**

- *ethnic*: members of nation are ethnic Russians; pure Russians exist; outsiders, esp. Jews, not worthy to be members of nation; Russians should rule Russia
- territorially, Russia is equivalent to FSU

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<tr>
<td><em>majority believe Soviet rule legitimate because it preserved empire and great power status</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russia a unique nation and superior to others</em></td>
<td><em>Russia a unique nation and superior to others</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russian imperialism is benign</em></td>
<td><em>Russian imperialism is benign</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>strong, centralized, authoritarian rule best for Russia</em></td>
<td><em>strong, centralized, authoritarian rule best for Russia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Russian ''democrats'' are traitors and slaves of West; most of them are Jews</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>militarism, heroism, decisive actions are supreme values</em></td>
<td><em>militarism, heroism, decisive actions are supreme values</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>West is anti-Christian foe that orchestrated Russia's downfall</em></td>
<td><em>West is anti-Christian foe that orchestrated Russia's downfall</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- *restore Russian imperial state under Russian leadership* |
- *maintain Russian territorial integrity, using force as necessary* |
- *restore discipline in country, arrest negative demographic trends* |
- *protect Russians abroad using coercive means if necessary; end subsidized trade to all neighbors* |
- *cease catering to western states* |
- *block arms control agreements, restore Russian military might, educate youth in military and heroic values* |
- *seek Russian unique path of development, no need to seek integration with intl. community* |

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**IV. Weakness of Malevolent Nationalism**

The most virulent nationalist ideas—particularly national patriotism and ethnocentric statism—have been propagated widely in diverse fora in Soviet and Russian politics and have resonated with some elites and members of the larger Russian public from 1989-1995. Yet these have failed to mobilize the majority of Russia's politically articulate public and, as a result, the most extreme nationalists have remained on the periphery of Russian political power. Key institutions—including the executive, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Orthodox church, 

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and the Russian Duma have not adopted malevolent nationalism as a guiding ideology; instead, most of these institutions, the elites that lead them, and the majority of the Russian public have favored moderate statist nationalism. I describe below some indicators of the weakness of extreme nationalism.

A. Propagation of Ideas in Diverse and Effective Fora

Of the three indicators of political empowerment—propagation of ideas in diverse and effective fora, strong resonance of these ideas with the articulate public, and institutional impact—only the first has been true for extreme nationalism. Russian national patriots and the most virulent of ethnocentric statists have propagated their views as widely as possible since 1989. By 1993, it seemed, for example, that the national patriotic media—including such publications as the newspapers Den', Sovetskaia Rossiia, Rabochaia tribuna, Pravda, Literaturnaja Rossiia; the journals Molodaia gvardiia, Nash Sovremennik, and Elementy; and the television show "600 sekund"—were truly flourishing and would only increase in popularity. They had become highly effective and had created in Russian society "an atmosphere of chauvinism, the emergence of an explosive combination of feelings."94 But the accelerated pace of

94Yurii Afanasev, et al, God posle avgusta: gorech' i vybor (Moscow: Literatura i politika, 1992), p. 121. The national patriotic show of Aleksandr Nevzorov, "600 Seconds," was extremely popular on Russian television in the early 1990s. Authorities tried to close down the show because of its extremism, but failed because of mass protests on Nevzorov's behalf. After October 1993, the show was effectively cancelled, but Nevzorov returned to Russian television soon thereafter. In 1993, subscriptions to national patriotic papers like Den' were increasing. In 1992, Den' had approximately 20,000 subscribers; by August 1993, this number was up to to 57,000. See Phone interview with Den' editorial offices, Moscow, 3 and 11 August 1992 and "The Russian Media After Glasnost," RFE/RL Post-Soviet/East European Report, 20 October 1992, pp. 1, 6.
extreme nationalist propaganda abated in 1993, especially after the violent clash between Yeltsin's executive government and leaders of the Supreme Soviet, many of whom had begun to associate themselves with national patriots (especially Supreme Soviet chair Ruslan Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, and alternative Minister of Defense-designate Vladislav Achalov).

October 1993 dealt a setback to national patriotic propaganda because in its immediate aftermath, national patriotic leaders were arrested and jailed, while newspapers sympathetic to their views suffered sanctions; the government closed down Den' and Sovetskaia Rossiia, and ordered Pravda to change its editorial staff. Propagators of national patriotism in the mass media did recover subsequently from the shock of October 1993. Den' republished under a new name, Zavtra, and Sovetskaia Rossiia won a court case against the government. These publications have enjoyed a respectable level of circulation in Russia, but their subscribers, as of late 1995, were heavily outnumbered by those for more moderate and liberal newspapers. Moskovskii komsomolets, for example, which ranked third in popularity in Russia, had a critically uncompromising stand against national patriotic ideas. Market and political pressures in Russia have also curtailed the breadth and effectiveness of extreme nationalist propaganda on television, which remains the most powerful medium in Russia.

95The most recent subscription figures for Zavtra is 100,000 and 250,000 for Sovetskaia Rossiia. Compare these with figures for pro-government newspapers (likely to take a cosmopolitan statist line) or liberal and moderate publications: Argumenty i fakty (3 million), Moskovskii komsomolets (1 million), Komsomol'skaia pravda (1.2 million), Izvestiia (600,000), Rossiiskaia gazeta (495,000), Moscow News (175,000), Kommersant-Daily (100,000) and Segodnia (100,000). These figures illustrate the limited power of malevolent nationalist propaganda in the Russian press. See Laura Belin, "Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," Transition 1 (6 October, 1995), pp. 59-63, 88.
Although national patriots like Nevzorov have continued to broadcast, for example, on the most powerful channel, ORT (which reaches 200 million), his program has been the exception rather than the rule. Other programs like Solzhenitsyn's weekly 15-minute show, which had taken an extremist and harshly anti-western tone in 1995, was canceled due to low ratings. Thus, although malevolent nationalist ideas have been propagated in diverse fora, these fora have increasingly become narrower and not highly effective in reaching the broadest audience possible.

B. Resonance with the Politically Articulate Public

The resonance of national patriotism has been low and uneven among the politically articulate Russian public. Evidence for this includes attendance at mass demonstrations, electoral results, and responses to poll questions on the extreme nationalist agenda. In 1990-1993, there was some public enthusiasm for mass demonstrations in support of national patriotism. Attendance at national patriotic rallies in Moscow, for example, grew from approximately a few hundreds in 1991 to tens of thousands by late 1992 and early 1993. But these demonstrations have lost

96 Belin, “Wrestling Political and Financial Repression,” pp. 59-63, 88 and Interview with Aleksei Pushkov (deputy director of ORT channel), Moscow, 28 September, 1995. There is no national patriotic equivalent of powerful independent mass media outlets like the television channel NTV, which reaches 100 million viewers and promotes a healthy dose of westernizing, liberal political material. See, for example, tapes of “Dom,” a 1995 NTV Russian soap opera that features positive messages on privatization, democratization, and other aspects of post-Soviet transition. (Tapes are in author’s possession.)

97 In 1990-92, I lived in Moscow for almost two years and witnessed the sparse attendance at several “red-brown” demonstrations in the city. By February 1993, a demonstration organized by the extremist National Salvation Front and the Russian Communist Party to celebrate Defenders of the Fatherland Day drew 20-40,000 people.
momentum in 1994-1995, and mass participation in the few rallies that have taken place since 1993 has not been very high. The unofficial, alternative national patriotic rally to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in May 1995 did draw as many as 30,000 people, but this was most likely due to the resonance of the fiftieth anniversary itself rather than a sign of the renewed strength or more permanent appeal of extreme nationalism. Other national patriotic rallies have drawn few participants: a May 1, 1994 rally attracted 10,000 and another later in the same month drew 5,000. In August 1995, only 1,000 people showed up at the extreme nationalists’ commemoration of the failed coup against Gorbachev in 1991.  

On the electoral front, extremism has also been weakly resonant. The most vehemently nationalistic blocs fared poorly in the 1989 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the 1991 elections to the Russian Supreme Soviet, and the 1993 elections to the Russian Duma. Some, like Baburin’s Russian National Union, did not even manage to collect the requisite number of signatures to qualify for elections in 1993. In 1995, another group, the Union of Patriots, led by prominent national patriots Gen. Storilgov and Gen. Achalov, suffered an early death by failing to collect 200,000 signatures to put their party on the ballot—this after they conceded having paid for the signatures they collected! The only representatives of malevolent nationalism who have done well in elections have been Zhirinovsky and his colleagues in the Liberal Democratic Party

Another demonstration for May Day (May 1, 1993) drew as many as 100,000 participants. See Slater, "Russian Communists Seek Salvation," p. 13.

(LDP); they received almost a quarter of party votes in 1993. But it has been unclear if
the LDP's victory was due to the resonance of its program of expansive national
imperialism; the victory was more likely due to the forceful and entertaining persona of
Zhirinovsky, along with public protest against the painful effects of the Gaidar
government's economic reform program. Results of the 1995 vote for the Duma affirm
these perspectives; in elections that international observers certified as fair and honest,
the party garnered only 11% of party list votes (less than half of what it won in 1993),
and lost at least thirteen seats in the new Duma; it also won only a dismal one seat in
single-mandate voting. Substantive documentation further shows that falsified votes in
1993 helped the LDP gain great advantage in the elections.99

Other extremist groups like Pamiat', the National Salvation Front, the National
Republican Party of Russia, Fatherland (Otechestvo), Rogozin's Union of Russian
Rebirth (Soiuz vozrozhdeniia Rossii), and Rutskoi's People's Party for Free Russia have
been politically marginalized. Rutskoi, in an attempt at a political comeback in 1995,
launched his Derzhava or Great Power movement, promising not only to restore the
Soviet Union but also to clean up all crime and corruption and hinting at revenge against
the "criminal and illegal" regime of Boris Yeltsin. But Derzhava received less than 3% of

99"Electoral Commission Announces 'Final Preliminary' Results," OMRI Daily Digest,
1996, p. 59; "Union of Patriots Declares Solidarity with Derzhava," OMRI Special
Report: Russian Election Survey, 3 November 1995; "Thirteen Parties Qualify for
Mitrofanov (leading member of LDP), Madrid, Spain, 2 June 1995; and "Nationalist’s Big
Without falsification, one study concludes that the LDP would have come in second
place in the 1993 elections and would have won only 36 instead of 59 mandates by
party list. See A. A. Sobianin and V. G. Sukhvol'skii, Demokratia, ogranichennai
fal’sifikatsiami (Moscow: Proektnaiia gruppia po pravam cheloveka), pp. 77-99.
party votes and failed to be represented in the Russian Duma. The national patriotic
groups, Govorukhin Bloc and Communists-Labor Russia, also suffered a similar fate,
receiving only 1.4% and 4.5% of party votes, respectively. Regional electoral setbacks
for extreme nationalists have also occurred; in the May 1995 regional elections in
Kolomna, a communist and former cosmonaut, German Titov, easily beat two national
patriotic opponents, including a member of Zhirinovsky’s party. As one LDP leader
commented, the results of elections in Kolomna in 1995 were like a “cold shower” to his
party.100

While the electoral star of extremist nationalism fades, that of moderate statism
continues to rise. Zyuganov and his Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(CPRF), for example, performed well in the 1993 elections and did even better in 1995.
Once a leader in the extremist National Salvation Front, Zyuganov has been careful to
revise his image as a socially progressive statist nationalist. In the December 1995
elections, the CPRF won 21% of party list votes and a large percentage of single-
member constituency votes, thereby increasing its Duma seats from 45 to 158 or

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100 M. McFaul and N. Petrov, eds., Politicheskii almanakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow:
Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, 1995), p. 111; Evgenii Krasnikov, “Outsiders Playing in
Kremlin’s Hands,” Moscow News, no. 87, 1995 in Politica Weekly Press Summary
Declares Solidarity,” OMRI Daily Digest, 3 November 1995; “A Man to Watch in Russia,”
Economist, 7 October 1995, pp. 33-34; OMRI Daily Digest Special Supplement:
potrebnost’?” p. 11; “Soiuz Vozrozhdeniiia Rossii. Istoricheskaia spravka,” xeroxed ms.;
“Russkie obshchiny gotovy vziat’ vlast’ v strane,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22-28 April
1995, p. 3; “Oppozitsiia v Rossii: likvidatory ili otzovistyi?” Segodnia, 16 November 1993,
p. 2; Wendy Slater, “Russian National Salvation Front ‘On the Offensive’,” RFE/RL
July 1994, p. 43; and “Moscow Region Votes for a Communist,” Moscow News (English
roughly one-third of the entire legislature. This victory has put Zyuganov in the leading position to challenge Yeltsin in Russia's June 1996 presidential elections. The communist success may be attributed in large part to their program's clever combination of enlightened social welfare policies (thus addressing Russian social and economic discontent) and statist Russian nationalism. An examination of CPRF ideology shows emphasis on Russian/Soviet "folkloric" heroes like Ilya Muromets (epic hero), Yuri Gagarin (first man in space), Marshal Georgii Zhukov (World War II hero), and Aleksei Stakhanov (legendary worker). The CPRF has highlighted "greatness" in Russian history, egalitarianism in Russian communal life, Russian traditions and Orthodoxy, and the achievements of the Soviet regime. Zyuganov, while emphasizing Russia's great power status, has also eschewed violent confrontation and has a record to prove it.  

In public opinion data, there has been minimal support for the extremist nationalist program, especially its zealous and violence-oriented claims to restore immediately the former empire, subjugate or destroy non-Russians, create an authoritarian regime, or use force to defend the interests of Russians abroad. In an authoritative joint western-Russian poll in August 1995, for example, only 12% expressed support for a military regime and over 83% rejected the use of force to protect Russians living in the former Soviet Union. Racist ideas have also been unpopular, with very few Russians expressing support for the existence of a "pure Russian nation." Further, many Russians have avoided nationalist hysteria and strongly

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101 In October 1993, Zyuganov was on the record for advocating a peaceful resolution to the standoff between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. See Interview with Zyuganov, October 1994; Tsipko and Ozerney, "New Communist Patriotic Ideology," and "Electoral Commission Announces 'Final Preliminary' Results."
condemned Moscow's abuses against Chechens in the war in Chechnya; in fact, up to one million people signed an anti-war petition led by Nizhnyi-Novgorod governor Boris Nemtsov. This makes the narrow group of national patriotic supporters of the war, including Zhirinovsky, seem disconnected from the bulk of Russia's articulate public.  

C. Institutional Support

Among key institutions in Russian politics, only the leadership of the former Russian Supreme Soviet, a section of the Russian Duma, and small, fringe groups in the military and in the Russian Orthodox Church have expressed sympathy or support for extreme nationalism, thereby making this ideology a weak factor in Russian institutional policymaking. National-patriotic leaders like Sterligov, Makashov, and Prokhanov have not come to the center of political power, and their occasional sympathizers like Rutskoi, Khasbulatov, and Zorkin of the Constitutional Court have also been marginalized from the core of Russian decisionmaking. In the executive branch, leaders have purveyed primarily a statist nationalist line. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, one of the most visible representatives of executive power, has openly rejected policies reflecting national patriotic paranoia and chauvinism. For example, by negotiating openly with the Chechens in the Budennovsk hostage crisis of June 1995, Chernomyrdin showed respect for, and dignity in, the Chechens, whom national patriots had portrayed to be sub-human. It is problematic, however, that Yeltsin himself has

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used a highly strident tone against the Chechens and labeled them wholesale as "bandits" and "terrorists." This stance bodes ill for continued moderate nationalism among Russia's leaders, and I will discuss this issue further in my concluding chapter. 103

Most leaders of the Russian Duma since 1993 have not pursued a malevolent nationalist line, although there have been prominent national patriots in their midst, including Zhirinovsky, Govorukhin, Baburin, Lysenko and others. But extremist ideas have not dominated the Duma's agenda and the Duma's record from 1993-1995 shows a strong statist nationalist orientation instead. The Duma has also sought to develop genuine parliamentary politics that eschewed violent confrontation with the executive, thereby rejecting the radical methods of extremist nationalists. 104 As for the foreign ministry, Kozyrev never supported the extreme nationalist agenda, and the rhetoric of his successor in early 1996 indicates a firm commitment to statist and Russia's great power role in the "near abroad," while also supporting Yeltsin's ongoing declared commitment to generally cooperative relations with the West. In the military, defense minister Pavel Grachev has sometimes espoused an ethnocentric statist line, emphasizing, for example, that he would "not allow the honor and dignity of Russians to


be insulted on the territory of any state." But Grachev has not preached racism or unadulterated militarism, as his institutionally discredited national patriotic colleagues like Achalov, Alksnis, and Terekhov have done. As for the Orthodox Church, a few individual priests have preached extreme nationalism, but the church institution as a whole has not endorsed this ideology.105

V. Hypotheses on Malevolent Nationalism in Post-Soviet Russia

I have shown that Russia's national humiliation in the post-Soviet period has been deep and extensive; that, as a result of such humiliation, elites have reacted by purveying extreme nationalism; and that malevolent nationalism has failed to become politically empowered in Russia. What explains this outcome?

105See Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," RFE/RL Research Report, 21 August 1992, pp. 5-12. Achalov heads the unofficial Russian Officers Assembly. On the rise of statism in the foreign ministry under Kozyrev, see Tuminez, "Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy" and "Commission to Investigate Foreign Ministry," RFE/RL News Briefs, 30 August-3 September 1993, p. 2. The church could be a prime source of institutional support for national patriots, but the patriarch, Aleksii, is not a rabid nationalist. Moreover, perhaps the most outspoken extremist from the church hierarchy, Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg, died in 1995. Other problems including internal schism, religious competition from abroad, past links with the KGB, and a populace that is not as religiously inclined as the church might like hamper prospects for the church to become an effective purveyor of extreme nationalism. A 1995 survey of almost 3,000 respondents from thirteen regions showed only 3.8% claiming that religion played a fundamental role in their lives and 50.3% claiming that it played an insignificant or practically zero role in their lives. See Marian Leighton, "From KGB to MFA: Primakov Becomes Russian Foreign Minister," Post-Soviet Prospects, vol. IV, no. 2 (February 1996), 4 pp.; VTsIOM Survey Results, 11 August 1995, xeroxed copies; and Oksana Antic, "Patriarch Aleksii II: A Political Portrait," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 8 November 1991, pp. 16-18.
A. Level of Internal Instability

Malevolent nationalism is likely to be empowered if severe and prolonged internal instability delegitimates state authority, undermines officials' claims to lead and defend the nation, and creates pressure for state elites to use extreme nationalism to restore their legitimacy and regain public trust. In post-Soviet Russia, instability stems from economic hardship, crime, refugee flows, fragmentation of ruling elites, and chronic mass protests. Although disturbances involving these phenomena have occurred in Russia from 1991-1995, they have not yet been so consistently severe or prolonged as to fully undermine state authority and push most elites to resort to extreme nationalist propaganda that blames external enemies for the nation's ills and recommends coercive steps to restore state stability and lost glory. Moreover, a few indicators in 1994-1995 show that Russia may even be on the path toward economic recovery and a reasonable amount of political stability. The diluted nature of internal instability in Russia has caused only a mild delegitimation of Russian state elites, and explains in part why these elites have not resorted to extreme nationalist demagogy or succumbed to pressure to yield to aggressive nationalist policies. Under conditions of moderate instability, Russia's multiethnic composition has also served as a mitigating influence on any inclination by state elites to support malevolent nationalism.\(^{106}\)

The economic and social aspects of internal instability in Russia are well-known. Although some of these problems began in the late Soviet period, they intensified after

\(^{106}\)In Chapter One, I have hypothesized that deep and prolonged internal instability could nullify any mitigating effects that the multiethnic nature of a state might exert on elite temptations to support extreme nationalism. If instability is moderate, elites are more likely to refrain from preaching nationalist ideologies that could cause interethnic conflict within the state and thereby threaten state implosion.
the launching of price liberalization and other market reforms in January 1992.

Russians have come face-to-face with severe economic insecurities that were practically absent during the days of Soviet cradle-to-grave welfare; these included the ravaging effects of inflation (many lost their life's savings overnight), unpredictable monetary reform, unemployment, enterprise shutdowns, chronic non-payment of wages by the government and state enterprises, and sharp and highly visible economic inequality among new sectors of "haves" and "have-nots." By the end of 1995, statistics showed much that was bleak on the Russian economic horizon. From late 1990 to 1995, nominal prices increased 279,942% while real income fell 39%. The working poor was increasing in numbers, with approximately 30% of the population estimated to be living below the poverty line as of the first half of 1995. The richest ten percent of Russians in 1994-1995 received almost a quarter of all income while the bottom ten percent received only three percent. While the richest ten percent earned only 5.4 times the bottom ten percent in 1992, this ratio increased to 14 times by 1995! Official unemployment rose from 367,500 in October 1992 to 1 million in August 1993 to two million in 1995, and independent experts estimated that as many as 8-10 million might be actually unemployed, or roughly eight percent of the labor force. In some areas, unemployment could be as high as 30%. To protest their economic hardship, Russian laborers have resorted to strikes; in the first quarter of 1995, there were more strikes in Russia than in all of 1994.107

Dire economic statistics, however, portray only one side of the economic situation in Russia. Other data, statistical and otherwise, indicate developments that explain why economic hardship has not utterly destabilized life in Russia or discredited the ruling regime. First, macroeconomic reform, for all its negative side effects, has drastically reined in inflation which, in 1992-1993, ran at approximately 1200% annually. In October 1994, inflation was down to 15.8% a month, decreasing further to 4.7% in October 1995 and projected to be in low single digits in 1996. Further, the government’s privatization program has made a difference in the new Russian economy; one study comparing 266 state and privatized enterprises in 8 sectors in 13 regions showed that privatized Russian entities had higher production volumes, greater labor productivity, and a better record at paying debts and salaries. Successes like these and others because of privatization led the Economist to conclude in 1995 that:

Russia now has markets to send signals. The basic institutions of a market economy have appeared with astonishing speed. It is easy to forget that most forms of private business were still illegal until the end of Mr. Gorbachev’s presidency of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia now has 2,500 licensed commercial banks, 600 investment funds and 40m shareholders. The liberalisation of most prices in January 1992 and the privatisation of 15,779 medium-sized and large enterprises in a period of just 18 months have helped to form a private sector which in 1994 produced 62% of officially recorded GDP. Proportionately, Russia’s state-owned sector is now smaller than Italy’s.108

In the industrial sphere, many enterprises have suffered due to their linkage with the largely moribund military-industrial complex. But notwithstanding, Russian industrial output increased for the first time since the beginning of economic reform in May 1995. The six top former Soviet defense-dependent cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinburg, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Moscow oblast, and Perm) have also, surprisingly, managed to arrest economic free-fall, created dynamic regional economies, and generated new employment for their citizens. The problem of inter-enterprise debt, which used to plague the entire Russian economy, has more recently become limited to the most unprofitable sectors. In other hopeful developments, Russia enjoyed a trade surplus of 17% in 1995, and foreign investment in the economy, although still minimal, has increased 25% in the first half of 1995 compared to the same period in 1994. These figures prompted the western-dominated OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to forecast that in 1996 the Russian economy may well stabilize and could grow as much as ten percent.

Second, in evaluating why economic hardship has not led to more unstable outcomes in Russia, it is important to examine social factors. How have people coped with economic difficulties? What evolving attitudes have helped society overcome the

December 1995.

effects of social and other travails? Although real incomes have been falling in Russia, many have coped by working longer and at more jobs. One survey shows, for example, that the average number of hours people spent "moonlighting" was 20 hours a week and the maximum was 120! In another survey, forty percent of respondents claimed to have made adjustments to changes in their economic life that made a return to the egalitarian past highly unlikely. There is also evidence that the entrepreneurial spirit and capitalist skills have taken root among many Russians, and many still believe that the "decisiveness and skill of reform leaders" and "Russian patience and endurance" will save Russia.\textsuperscript{110} Further, many among the younger generation have prospered under Russia's new economic conditions and have assisted their older relatives adjust to new realities. In one recent comparison of two generations in two families, the younger members, who planned to shun extreme nationalists and vote for westernizing democrats in the December 1995 Duma elections, commented:

Life is better than three years ago . . . There is more money and more optimism for the future. . . [For] us, like many of our friends, our lives have improved, and we've learned a lot about how to manage this new economy. . . . You have to rely on yourself in the first place, and not wait for the state . . . We still have the chance to construct our own lives as we want to live them.\textsuperscript{111}

Crime in Russia has been another source of internal instability. Many Russians define crime as the greatest threat in their lives, and have been alarmed by statistics on the near doubling of the crime rate from 1985-92, with a total number of 2,799,600


reported criminal cases in 1993. Many crimes in Russia have been increasingly violent, and in 1992-93, there was a 195% increase in attacks using explosives and a 250% increase in firearm offenses. There were only 16 bombings reported in 1993, as opposed to 116 in the first six months of 1994 alone. Five hundred contract killings occurred in Moscow in 1994, and thousands are murdered in the country yearly; although the overall crime rate in Russia showed signs of leveling off by early 1995, murders continued "to climb precipitously." High-profile murders have been particularly alarming, with several dozen Russian bankers, for example, killed in mafia-style killings in 1995. Criminal gangs have proliferated, and one report estimates that 150 of these gangs controlled approximately 40,000 private and state companies, including most of the country's 1800 commercial banks. Public consternation on crime has been so intense that one opinion poll in Moscow showed 50% of common Muscovites and entrepreneurs identifying the "mafia and corrupted officials" as the true wielders of power in the capital.112 Added to crime as a source of instability in 1991-1995 was Russia's growing refugee problem, which available Russian social services were inadequate to address. Russia has become home to an estimated two million refugees, Russian and non-Russian, who have fled from other former Soviet republics because of

discrimination, ethnic conflict, and economic hardship.\textsuperscript{113}

Popular frustration with Russia's social problems has been manifested in public opinion surveys that show nostalgia for a "strong personality with an iron hand" who would restore order and discipline in the country. Expressions of desire for measures to address Russia's social problems, especially crime, have not, however, translated into support for xenophobic conspiracy theories or for radical measures recommended by extreme nationalists. Very few in Russia have been willing to support or undertake violent or radical actions to solve their problems, or to restore Soviet authoritarianism. Popular patience is not inexhaustible, however, and crime--if not adequately addressed--could still derail chances for stability in Russia and could help extreme nationalists in the future. As for refugees, the problem has been largely controlled (though not resolved), with forecasts of millions of ethnic Russians flooding into Russia not turning into reality. Although numerous refugees did pour into the country in 1991-1993, the flow has slowed down and many ethnic Russians in the "near abroad" have been daunted by the difficulty of finding a home and employment in Russia. Thus, after an initial exodus, larger numbers have preferred to stay where they were, believing that their chances to have a decent life were just as good in Russia as in states like Ukraine, Kazakhstan or the Baltics.\textsuperscript{114}


Yet one more source of internal instability has been the fragmentation of state elites, which has led to the erosion of cohesive state authority. The irreconcilable opposition of the former Supreme Soviet to Yeltsin's government in 1993, for example, created a profound crisis of state, with the executive and legislative branches temporarily forming two separate governments in October 1993. Violence and use of the armed forces by the executive power ended this impasse, with Yeltsin's political life lengthened, while that of his detractors essentially terminated.\textsuperscript{115} Although Yeltsin's apparent "victory" in October 1993 dealt a hard blow to challengers to state authority--particularly those in the extreme nationalist camp--it did not prevent the collapse of his own democratic-liberal coalition, neither did it help public confidence in Yeltsin personally, and in his government collectively. Fragmentation has also been apparent in regional challenges to Moscow's authority, with threats of secession or assertions of "sovereignty" coming from Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia and others in 1991-1992. Indeed, some have worried that centrifugal tendencies within Russia could create the same disintegration as befell the Soviet state. The fragmentation of elites, along with official blunders such as Moscow's declaration and early prosecution of the war in Chechnya, have caused public confidence in state authority to plummet in late 1994 and early 1995. By April 1995, Yeltsin's approval rating was down to single digits.

\textsuperscript{115} Vse o chernom oktiabre," Komsomol'skaia pravda, 4 October 1993, special ed.
In polls, people expressed disgust and distrust in the ruling regime in Moscow and in politicians in general.116

Internal instability arising from the fragmentation of ruling elites and other challenges to state cohesion and authority, although serious, has remained manageable. Central state authority, strengthened by the constitution adopted by popular vote in 1993, has remained in the hands of executive power under Yeltsin.117 The violence of October 1993, although unwelcome in Russia’s democratic evolution, seems to have dealt a decisive blow to the most blatant challengers to state authority and paradoxically helped create a relatively stable relationship between the new Russian legislature and the presidency. The Russian Duma, replacing the Supreme Soviet in December 1993, has articulated disagreements with the government but maintained relations with the executive in ways that have met the requirements of civic discourse and procedure, and bypassed violence. As for the executive, it is noteworthy that one of the first steps Yeltsin took toward the new Duma was to offer a civic accord that most factions signed in 1994. Yeltsin’s government has also made other adjustments to maintain some level of political legitimacy and combat the most serious criticisms directed at it by public opinion, in general, and extreme nationalists, in


117In the event of Yeltsin’s demise, the constitution approved in April 1993 provides for the temporary transfer of power to the prime minister and for elections shortly thereafter.
particular. Yeltsin removed Gaidar as prime minister after he had clearly become the object of wrath of a majority of the Russian public, 44.6% of whom disapproved his economic reforms in the April 1993 Russian national referendum. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev, since 1992, have also spouted a more assertive line on defending the interests of “Russians abroad” and have made a relatively successful effort to seize key nationalist slogans from their critics, as they sought to regain high ground in the rhetorical jousting over who were the true leaders and defenders of the nation. These adjustments have been important in a society with a palpable popular demand for nationalist ideas. They have shown government responsiveness to issues of great concern to the articulate public, and have lessened the risk that extremist elements might succeed in seizing the initiative on these issues. The government has also proposed domestic measures such as compensation for investment fraud victims and payment for striking miners—measures that, if implemented, would further help rejuvenate public faith in the Russian government and limit internal instability.

Fragmentation between Moscow and regional elites, and the ensuing threat to territorial integrity and cohesive state authority, have also become a less daunting problem than they once appeared. Except for Chechnya, many of Russia’s problematic

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118 Evgenii Primakov, Kozyrev’s replacement, is likely to pursue a firmer stance on defending the interests of Russian citizens in the “near abroad” and establishing Russian regional authority. See “Background of Newly-Appointed Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov,” Politica Weekly, 23 Dec.-12 Jan. 1996.

regions, including Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, and others, have signed bilateral treaties to govern their relations with Moscow without resort to violence; still others are negotiating similar agreements in order to exercise substantive autonomy within an intact Russian state. Regional tensions have highlighted Russia's multiethnic composition, and constrained state elites from exploiting extreme Russian ethnic nationalism because such a policy could jeopardize state integrity and these elites' own security.\(^{120}\)

Finally, a few words on mass unrest. Although there have been strikes and political demonstrations in Russia, the magnitude of these actions have remained within manageable parameters and have not reached dangerous proportions. Political apathy has been on the rise, and citizens seem to have ever diminishing time and energy to devote to mass action as they seek to meet their personal needs and priorities. In recent polls, 98.7% declared that they were not members of any Russian political party; only 8.6% were very interested in politics, with 5.3% having participated in mass demonstrations in the past year. More than a quarter of those polled were "not at all" interested in politics and 34.2% were not involved in activities that they considered political. Apathy has been manifested in low attendance rates at national patriotic rallies against the government in 1994 and 1995. Interestingly, however, although Russian citizens have not been enthused for political activities, especially protest action, many have preferred to participate in routine and orderly political processes such as the

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December 1995 elections, in which approximately 63% of the electorate voted.\textsuperscript{121}

B. Domestic Incentive Structure

The domestic incentive structure in Russia is a second controlling variable for the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. First, do specific incentives, linked with Russian mass politics make it profitable for elites to purvey extremist ideas in order to gain electoral victories? Second, is the material incentive structure such that elites can gain desired rewards by propagating aggressive nationalism? Is the military, an institution that potentially has much to benefit from imperialistic, chauvinistic, and xenophobic ideas, a major propagator and supporter of extremist nationalism?

The context of deep and widespread national humiliation that followed the demise of the Soviet Union was one feature that, when linked with mass politics, seemed to create high incentives for elites to use extreme nationalist rhetoric to win in electoral competitions. With the backdrop of national humiliation, reassertions of Russian national greatness and distinctiveness have become important themes for elites who wanted to be seen as legitimate national leaders in Russia's democratizing system. Some chose to corrupt these themes into slogans of malevolent nationalism, and did so with ease because of the vague rules of democratic transition, minimal accountability for one's rhetoric in political campaigning, and a pervasive public sense of demoralization to which they could appeal. But in several rounds of elections in the

Soviet Union and Russia from 1991-1995, extreme nationalists have not been highly successful. The repeated exercise of elections has highlighted the lesson that moderate, yet assertive statist nationalism, rather than extreme nationalism, appeals most to the Russian electoral public.

Many political elites in Russia have recognized the limited utility and real liability of extreme nationalism in Russian electoral politics. In 1992-93, for example, the increasing shrillness of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov's rhetoric and open support for them from ultranationalists caused their popularity to diminish, while Yeltsin's steadily rising statist rhetoric helped maintain his high approval rating at the time. Georgii Satarov, an adviser to Yeltsin, remarked that in 1993 Yeltsin was cognizant of the power of nationalist rhetoric and thus deliberately began to take a tougher line on such issues as "Russians abroad" and Russian national interests in the former Soviet space. According to Satarov, this kind of patriotism, not extremist national patriotism, would help build Russian statehood. After the elections of December 1993, a leading member of Russia's Choice also claimed that the clearest lesson of the elections for his party was that its members needed more deliberately and effectively to harness moderate nationalism as a legitimating idea.122 Even Zhirinovsky, who remains the most electorally successful Russian extreme nationalist, has emphasized less malevolent

122 See "Yeltsin Still Popular in Russia," RFE/RL News Briefs, 13-17 September 1993; Interview with Georgii Satarov, Moscow, 20 October 1993; and Interview with Sergei Blagovolin (then head of the Moscow branch of Russia's Choice), Moscow, 6 June 1994. Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and others have shown sensitivity to timing in their adoption of statist nationalist rhetoric. In 1991 and early 1992, when the Russian public favored partnership with the West, the top Russian leadership spouted mostly westernizing democratic rhetoric. Subsequently, given the rising nationalist mood in Russia, it became clear that adopting statist nationalism would be more politically profitable. Therefore, Yeltsin and some of his closest colleagues made the necessary adjustments.
nationalism and opted for ribald humor instead in his numerous TV ads for the 1995 elections.\textsuperscript{123}

The material incentive structure in Russia has largely, but not completely, discouraged malevolent nationalism. Extremist nationalists have been unpopular with the ruling regime and have not become beneficiaries of state power and patronage. Under conditions of an imperfect market and widespread corruption in Russia, the state still controls a large amount of resources for physical comfort, security, and status, as well as authority to determine how resources will be exploited or appropriated. For example, state authorities have blessed the formation of monopolistic financial-industrial groups listed in a special government registry. Membership in these groups has been restricted to those whose activities "do not contradict the government's economic and structural policy." Thus far, 281 companies, including 62 financial institutions, have become members of one financial-industrial group or other, and these are expected eventually to account for more than 50% of Russian industrial output. Although the exact relationship of financial-industrial groups with the state remains ambiguous, a highly successful businessman informed this author that all serious economic players in

\textsuperscript{123}"No Bull? Scrutinize This Russian TV Campaign Ad," \textit{New York Times}, 17 December 1995, p. E5. Statist nationalism, not extreme national patriotism, was the dominant theme for the majority of party contenders in the Duma 1995 elections. This was evident even in the names of registered political parties, whether they were classified as democratic, centrist, nationalist, pro-government, or leftist/communist: Congress of Russian Communities, Forward, Russia!, Power to the People, Russia is Our Home, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, For the Motherland, and Derzhava (Great Power). See \textit{Politicheskii almanakh Rossii}, pp. 54-118 and "Vybor Rossii' otmezhevyvaetsia ot partii Shkhraia," \textit{Segodnia}, 26 October 1993, p. 1.
Russia today are, or will become, members of these groups. Because of their intense antagonism towards the government, most extreme nationalists have not joined these groups or otherwise become beneficiaries of state economic munificence.

Although extreme nationalism may not be the most effective instrument for gaining electoral or state-sanctioned material rewards, some sectors of the Russian political and social spectrum still use it as a political platform from which they believe they can catapult to political and economic power and/or regain former privileges. For example, some of the most visible communists in the Soviet regime have transformed themselves into national patriots in order to improve their political prospects in post-Soviet Russia. A highly visible example is Nikolai Ryzhkov, former chair of the Soviet Council of Ministers, who, for the 1995 elections, marketed himself as an avid nationalist and joined forces with Baburin and Terekhov in the party, Power to the People. Others like Sakhalin's former governor, Valentin Fyodorov, formerly of Democratic Russia, joined the national-patriotic Russian National Assembly in 1992 and used nationalist ideas to discredit Moscow and seek to wrest control from the center over economic resources in his region. A leading colleague of Zhirinovsky has also remarked that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had significant financial support from regional entrepreneurs who felt excluded from the big economic game in Moscow and saw LDP empowerment as the key that would open the doors of the capital to them. Large moneyed groups, whose nationalist credentials are unclear, have also contributed considerably to the coffers of radical nationalists, including those of the LDP in the 1995

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124 OMRI Daily Digest, 27 October 1995 and Interview with Boris Grinberg, president of Ruskana Companies, Moscow, 2 October 1995.
elections. Some "new businessmen" may be strongly motivated by national patriotism, but several Russian politicians have noted to this author that wealthy groups generally liked to hedge their bets and have, therefore, contributed financially to all the leading political parties, Zhirinovsky's included, to ensure their connection with those who might win the elections.\(^{125}\)

Some leading proponents of extremist nationalism have come from the military establishment, the security services, and the military-industrial sector.\(^{126}\) These include characters already mentioned: Gen. Filatov, Gen. Sterligov, Gen. Makashov, Col. Alksnis, Terekhov, Rutskoi, Achalov, and others. These men represent a segment of society that had great privileges in the communist system and who, all of a sudden, found themselves and their institutions denied of former wealth, power, status, and

\(^{125}\) A precedent for the use of extreme nationalism to regain former privileges occurred in Germany before World War I. Many of the most vehement nationalists then belonged to the agrarian class, who felt their privileged position threatened by industrialization, and saw nationalist ideology as a means to preserve or regain their economic and social status. See V. R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1973), chap. 8. See also Interview with Mitrofanov, Madrid, 3 June 1995; "S Dumoi o narode. Kak vsegda ..." *Novoe vremia* 38 (1995):10-11; "Patriotizm--poslednee pribezhisheche," *Novoe vremia* 38 (1995):8-9; "Political Parties and Blocs Electoral Funds," (from articles in *Nezavisimaia gazeta, Moskovskii komsomolets*, and *Segodnia*) Politica Weekly, 2-8 December 1995; Interview with Aleksei Arbatov (Duma deputy), Moscow, 2 October 1995; and Pushkov, "Russia and America," p. 81.

\(^{126}\) The extremist group Pamiat', for example, reportedly had active members from the ranks of mathematicians and physicists in Arzamas-16, one of Russia's former "closed towns" for nuclear weapons design and manufacturing. These people lost most of their business with the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union's collapse. See Pavel Felgenauer, "Zakryte goroda Rossii," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 30 June 1992, p. 5 and Vitalii Goldanskii, "Russia's Red-Brown Hawks," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49 (June 1993):24-27.
Has malevolent nationalism been an effective instrument for restoring military credibility and privileges for the army and the military-industrial complex? Hardly.

There have been no open subscribers to extreme nationalism among the top echelons of the Russian Defense Ministry; in fact, defense minister Pavel Grachev, chair of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov, and other leaders have opposed some of the rhetorical excesses of nationalists in the Duma. Nationalist extremists from the military like Filatov and Makashov have had to resign their commissions to pursue their political demagoguery. As outsiders to the current system of power, they could hardly lobby effectively for the interests of the military. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, Zhirinovsky's own military adviser, Lt.-Gen. Viktor Ustinov, left the LDP to join Chernomyrdin's statist, pro-government "Russia is Our Home." Many other military personnel who have sought to play a role in Russian politics have come from a wide variety of parties, indicating that the military as a collective has not been heavily oriented towards extreme nationalism. Many among Russian senior military personnel have chosen not to be warmongering nationalists and outsiders to power, but have sought to gain political office in order to improve their chances of voting laws and

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budgets that might alleviate the military’s most severe problems. Finally, military professionalism, which demands military subordination to civilian authority, has continued to be a strong norm in Russia. As of 1995, this norm has prevented the kind of civil-military breakdown that, in Weimar Germany, for example, helped bring malevolent nationalism to power.

C. Effective Social Communication

The greater the degree of effective social communication by proponents of malevolent nationalism, the greater the likelihood that their ideas will resonate with the articulate public and with authoritative institutions and become empowered. Effective social communication depends on such factors as the kinds of symbols nationalists use, mass education, mass press, weak evaluative units, and the absence of strong

128 Although the military as an institution has not been vehemently nationalist, many junior officers (the “have-nots” in the army) have expressed support for Zhirinovsky. The level of support for Zhirinovsky in the military, however, has not been much different from that of the larger Russian public, precluding the argument that the military is institutionally and exclusively inclined to support malignant nationalism. Besides Zhirinovsky, liberal reformers like Yavlinsky and statists like Lebed have also scored high in military popularity polls. See James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, “Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps,” Strategic Forum, no. 15, January 1994, 4 pp.; Sanobar Shermatova, “Russian Rivalries Echo in Tajikistan,” Moscow News (English ed.), 5-11 May 1995, p. 3; Aleksandr Zhilin, “Yeltsin’s Worst Nightmare: The Russian Military Enters Politics,” Prism, 17 November 1995, pt. 1; “Support for Zhirinovsky in Army is Still Strong,” OMRI Daily Digest, 8 September 1995; “Russian Parliament Resists Calls to Boost Military Budget,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 June 1994, p. 7; “U.S.-Russian Exercises Incite a War of Words,” Moscow Times, 19 May 1994, p. 9; and Interview with Col. Aleksandr Sirotkin (deputy head of Russian peacekeeping in the General Staff), Moscow, 30 September 1995.

129 See Chapter One of this thesis to review accounts of military insubordination that helped undermine the Weimar Republic. On professionalism in the Russian army, see Brian D. Taylor, “Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising,” Survival 36 (Spring 1994):3-29.
alternative ideologies. In post-Soviet Russia, the variable of social communication has generally favored malevolent nationalism, but has not been sufficient to politically empower this ideology.

First, proponents of aggressive nationalism have been able to exploit the right symbols to make their ideas resonate with the politically articulate public, and have taken advantage of new freedoms in post-Soviet Russia, including freedom of speech and of association, to propagate their ideas and organize on behalf of those ideas. Laws and institutions that might check the spread of malevolent nationalism have been weakly developed and, therefore, insufficient to stop the propagation of dangerous nationalist doctrines. Second, evaluative units in Russia—though considerably improved since Soviet days—have been too few and inadequately competent to stop extreme nationalist propaganda. The Russian public itself, over time, has become increasingly apathetic to serious debate about ideas. Third, in terms of alternative ideologies, the tsarist and Soviet past did leave Russia with a legacy of statist nationalism, whose moderate strand provides a strong alternative to extreme nationalism.

Extreme nationalists have used powerful symbols including motherland (rodina), the Great Fatherland War (velikaia otechestvennaia voina), Great Russia (velikaia Rossiia), great state (velikaia derzhava), "Russians abroad," Eurasia, "Jews," the "West" and variants of the fascist swastika to appeal to a populace demoralized by loss of empire, loss of international prestige, and economic hardship, and seeking to find someone to blame. Many of these symbols are rooted in Russian history and have resonated well with the articulate public; but other symbols, especially those linked to fascism, have been less resonant. The aversion to fascist symbols has been
understandable, in light of Soviet anti-fascism and the mythology of Soviet and Russian heroic struggle against Nazi Germany in World War II.

Proponents of malevolent nationalism have interpreted many symbols to promote imperialism, violence, chauvinism, and anti-semitism. They have been able to disseminate their interpretations and programs of action in newspapers, journals, books, and television. They have also formed numerous clubs and associations in cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and in the provinces, and have organized mass rallies and demonstrations to make their voice heard. Statistics from 1993 and 1995 indicate that at least 100 fascist-oriented groups have organized in Russia, and their publications have increased from only 50 in 1993 to approximately 200 in 1995. In mass rallies, extremists have also used popular militaristic rock music to appeal to a younger audience.

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130 I have already mentioned some of the most vehemently nationalist newspapers and journals in Russia. Besides these, tracts and books that preached extremism have also proliferated—e.g., V. Ostretsov, Chernaja sotnia (a tract published by the military publishing house, extolling the virtues of Russian fascists early in this century; one million copies) (Moscow: Voennoe izd., 1991); Pamiatka russkomu cheloveku (anti-semitic; 100,000 copies); Situatsiia (has published reprints of deterministic nationalist theories by Nikolai Danilevskii and Nazi literature), and Ekho (has published articles calling into question the results of the Nuremberg trials). There have also been numerous reprints of conservative and chauvinist histories, including those by D. Illovaiskii and Karamzin. These data are from my personal copies of some of the aforementioned publications and my notes of titles found at book kiosks in Moscow, 1992-94; Laqueur, Black Hundred, pp. 298-302; Pavel Gurevich, “Filosof ili prorok?” Segodnia, 9 November 1993, p. 9; and “Predsedatel’ Moskovskogo antifashistskogo tsentra Evgenii Proshchekin: v Rossii okolo sotni fashistskich partii i dvizhenii,” Megapolis-Express no. 29, 28 July 1993, p. 6.

131 At a 10,000-strong national patriotic rally on May 1, 1994, organizers brought in the popular rock group, “Grazhdanskaia voina” (“Civil War”) to rouse the crowd with its well-known song entitled “And the battle begins again.” See “I vnov’ prodolzhaetsia boi,” Nezavisimaja gazeta, 5 May 1994, p. 8. See also Robert Orttung, “A Politically Timed Fight Against Extremism,” Transition, 23 June 1995, pp. 2-6; and “Predsedatel’
The mercurial nature, weakness, and incoherence of rules, standards, and institutions under conditions of democratic transition have also benefitted extreme nationalists. For example, Yeltsin banned the National Salvation Front in 1992, but the Constitutional Court canceled the ban on grounds of free association. In other cases, courts rejected suits by the Russian Press Ministry to terminate the publication of the national patriotic Den' and Sovetskaia Rossiia, and reinstated a military officer fired for his virulent nationalism. Al-kods, an anti-semitic publication, was closed down on the grounds that its Jordanian publisher was a foreigner; but the publisher simply took Russian citizenship and Al-kods promptly reappeared on Moscow's streets. Den', after it was canceled in October 1993, reappeared under a new name and has been left untouched by state authorities; Elementy, after a brief hiatus, was back in circulation by June 1994. The Russian Duma also amnestied in early 1994 those extremist nationalists arrested in October 1993; most have resumed their former demagogy. Finally, official laws, including a presidential decree, to combat extremism have thus far not been defined clearly nor implemented effectively.\(^{132}\)

The manipulation of symbols and exploitation of new freedoms have allowed extreme nationalists to publicize widely their ideas. However, they have failed to

monopolize key symbols of Russian nationalism and their radical, conspiratorial, and violence-prone interpretations of ideas like "Great Russia," the "West," "Russians abroad," and "motherland" have led the majority of the Russian public and policymakers to withhold support from them. Instead, statist nationalist interpretations of symbols of nationalism have proven more attractive. Polls of leading Russian politicians, journalists, experts, and the larger public show that the majority would like to see Russia as a great power that defended its own interests without unnecessarily antagonizing the West or embarking on openly aggressive or militaristic paths of action.\footnote{Russian Voters Disillusioned," p. 2; Pushkov, "Russia and America," pp. 81-83; and VTsIOM Survey Results, August 1995, xeroxed copies.}

A second aspect of social communication that has benefitted extreme nationalism has been the relative weakness and incompetence of evaluative units in Russia. Despite progress made under Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' and continued freedom of speech and press under Yeltsin, evaluative units in Russia have remained weak and incompetent for the most part. Liberalizing policies of the late Soviet period infused new life into the media, academic journals, television, and civil organizations in Russia, and the public responded enthusiastically to the first bursts of uncensored information and pluralistic opinion in the Soviet Union. In the last years of Gorbachev's rule and after the demise of the Soviet Union, evaluative units played an important role in the debate on nationalism. Variants ranging from nativist, non-imperial ideology to German and Italian fascism were published and discussed, allowing the public to sample a broad "menu" of nationalist ideas. Although the array of nationalist ideas propagated in Russia was impressive, the quality of discussion and criticism of these
ideas—particularly ahistorical, illogical, and extremist notions—was not rigorous, especially in 1989-92. Public fatigue, distrust, and cynicism during those years also grew: fatigue with glasnost' and pluralism; distrust of official efforts to combat such unofficial ideologies as national patriotism; and cynicism regarding the ideas of westernizing democracy, which many associated with the destruction of the state and economic hardship.\textsuperscript{134}

The weakness and incompetence of Russian evaluative units is a problem rooted in both the tsarist and Soviet legacies of prohibition of open political debate and ideologized social science, historiography, and journalism. These legacies have created a tendency among many observers, including scholars, to swing to one extreme ideology or other, and accept or reject ideas wholesale without a full examination of their logic, accuracy, and merit. This tendency has been manifested among proponents of different versions of nationalism, who have not engaged in vigorous debate and criticism of each other's ideas, "rarely interact, . . . resent each other . . ., and have no respect for each other."\textsuperscript{135} But in 1993-95, a few powerful voices have spotlighted fascist tendencies in the Russian national patriotic movement and argued the dangers


they posed to Russian national interests. Others have eschewed all extremist orientations, underlined the absurdity of conspiracy theories in Russian relations with the West, and begun actively to redefine concepts like "Eurasia" and "great power" in more benign terms. They have asserted that Russia was unique, but also had a mutually enriching relationship with many of the world's great cultures. Russia should be a great power, but it should influence its neighbors through its own internal prosperity and without resort to force and blatant coercion. Russia can also be a great power if it was willing to learn from its neighbors, including on ways to strengthen internal democratic rule. These voices, however, have not yet found effective means to capture mass attention and overcome widespread public indifference to debating political ideas.

In a recent poll, for example, a majority indicated preference for watching old Soviet films and game shows, and listening to folk and Soviet music, rather than watching social and political programs or the news.¹³⁶

What about alternative ideologies? Westernizing democracy has been historically weak, though present in one form or other, in Russia in the last two centuries. It is opposed to extreme nationalist ideologies that have been preached in

Russia, but has been unable to combat these ideas because many have regarded it as alien to Russian history and culture. More recent articulators of westernizing democracy, especially Kozyrev, have become severely discredited for what many characterized as their servility to western interests.\(^{137}\) Nativism, another alternative ideology, has many resonant features because of its roots in liberal Slavophilism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in dissident thought in the Soviet period, but nativist leaders have been politically weak. They have organized political organizations such as the Russian Christian Democratic Movement and the Russian Christian Democratic Party, but these have not become influential in Russian politics. Leading proponents of nativism—Solzhenitsyn, in particular—have also been disinterested in pursuing political careers, despite some indicators of potential public support for such a move. Further, nativism has been weakened by the absence of official support or sponsorship and by obstructionist state policies. For example, in an attempt to limit the number of nationalist parties running in the 1993 Duma elections, the government instituted rules that prevented nativist parties from registering for elections, leaving Zhirinovsky’s LDP to monopolize the nationalist vote.\(^{138}\) Cosmopolitan statism, also historically-rooted and widely appealing to the Russian population, represents a genuinely strong alternative to extreme nationalism and has already proven its power in the first four years of post-Soviet statehood. If tempered by Russian integration into a host of international institutions, increased Russian public interaction with the outside


\(^{138}\) McFaul and Petrov, eds., “Politicheskii almanakh,” pp. 104-105; Petro, Rebirth of Russian Democracy, p. 155; and “Peterburzhtsy govoriat amerikantsam, chto khotiat videt’ Solzhenitsyna vo glave Rossii,” Izvestiia, 9 November 1993, p. 3.
world, and a more stable economy and politics in Russia, cosmopolitan statism could well become the nationalist ideology to bind Russian state and society together and help Russia become a normal great power in the international community.139

D. Threats and Opportunities in the International System

1) Threats

If there are perceptions of grave threats to the nation's prestige, welfare, and security; if official responses to these threats are deemed inadequate; and if international cooperative measures fail to resolve these threats, then elites are likely to resort to aggressive nationalist mobilization as a policy option. In Russia, radical nationalists have consistently conjured numerous threats to the nation and have advocated forceful nationalist mobilization to safeguard Russian independence and security. Objective factors, such as the instability of borders and armed conflicts in the former Soviet space, have helped make the "threats" touted by extreme nationalists more credible. Overall, however, threats from the international system, which involve military, economic, and prestige elements, have been manageable and have not been highly favorable to the aggressive Russian nationalist agenda. In 1991-1995, moreover, these threats have not caused crises that led Russian policymakers to exploit malevolent nationalism for mass mobilization. And although international institutional resources for dealing with threats to Russian security have been initially ineffective, they

139 Some in Russia see this as a most likely development. See Pushkov, "Russia and America," pp. 76-90.
have since improved and become a genuine resource for Russia, further mitigating the
power of extreme nationalist arguments.

The first set of threats to Russian interests and security have come from the
"near abroad," referring to new states of the former Soviet Union. These threats have
some basis in reality, but have been exaggerated by aggressive nationalists. One
example has been the evolving second class status and poor treatment of Russians and
Russian-speakers outside Russia, which threaten Russian prestige as well as Russian
political and military security in the event of violent confrontation between Russians and
other ethnic groups. There have been legitimate reasons for Russians abroad to feel
threatened and discriminated. For example, Russians have encountered obstacles in
gaining full rights in the former Soviet republics, especially the Baltics, where early
versions of citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia discriminated against Russians who
were born in, or emigrated to, the area after 1940. These laws did not violate
international standards of "human rights," but did infringe on standards of humanitarian
behavior and threatened political and economic disenfranchisement of large numbers of
Russian-speaking groups. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan, sizeable Russian populations
have complained about job discrimination, limitations on mass media and educational
materials in the Russian language, and other treatment that relegated them to "second
class citizen" category. They have also felt threatened by new textbooks that presented
Russians in a negative light and created a hostile environment for their children. In
Kazakhstan, high levels of insecurity have caused as many as one million Russians to
flee, particularly in 1991-1993.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, life has been difficult for Russians in the "near abroad," and extreme nationalists have portrayed their plight in exaggerated terms to benefit their propaganda. Newspapers like Den' and TV programs like Nevzorov's "600 Seconds" have exploited the issue of "Russians abroad" and sensationalized the hardships of Russians. In one television report on Nevzorov's "600 Seconds" in early 1991, Russians in Estonia were shown making public claims that the Estonian government treated them like prisoners. Dramatic shots of Russian refugees were shown, with ominous music in the background and a voice declaring, "They [the enemies of Russia] are getting ready." Leaders like Rutskoi and others in the Russian Supreme Soviet from 1991-1993 have also sensationalized the diaspora issue and used it to support secessionism by Russian-dominated regions in the "near abroad" and their unification with Russia. But the truth has been that the most extreme forms of Russian dissatisfaction in places like the Baltics have come from narrow groups that have had shorter periods of residence, did not speak the language, and were isolated from the titular nationality.¹⁴¹


¹⁴¹ In April 1992, the Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution in support of secessionist Russians in Transdnestra in Moldova. See Eduard Kondratev, "Vizit Rutskogo v Pridnestrov'e," Izvestia, 6 April 1992, p. 1; Personal Notes from Russian TV Channel One, 1991; and "Gosudarstvennaia politika Rossii v konfliktnikh zonakh,"
Another threat from the "near abroad" has involved the outbreak of ethnic and other conflicts, which have killed tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of former Soviet citizens, including an indeterminate number of Russians. Particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan), where deadly wars have raged, Russian populations have had to flee for their lives. Those who remained, including Russian border guards and "peacekeeping" troops, have lost many lives and continue to be threatened. Conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as of 1994, accounted for approximately 80% of all immigration to Russia, causing tremendous social, economic, and political strain. The potential outbreak of other conflicts and the escalation of ongoing ones, including the possible use of chemical or nuclear weapons, have heightened security threats to Russia.\(^{142}\) Yet one more threat from the "near abroad" has been the rise of new military, possibly nuclear, powers on Russia's borders. Relations with Ukraine, in particular, have been contentious, particularly over such issues as ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and control of the Crimea.

Besides threats from the "near abroad," extremist nationalists have also emphasized threats to Russia from the West. They have accented the threat of NATO expansion to incorporate former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and FSU states such as the Baltics, and NATO aggression as manifested, for example, in the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia. As early as 1993, extremist nationalists have identified

NATO as an unwelcome meddler in areas of central interest to Russia, and have called NATO actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina a mockery of any western "partnership" with Moscow. In 1995, continued NATO use of force in Bosnia motivated nearly all members of the Russian political spectrum, not only national patriots, to express alarm at, and condemnation of, NATO actions and labeled them a "blow to Russian prestige." Prominent leaders, including Yeltsin, suggested that NATO expansion would bring the world back to a tense and confrontational situation between two armed camps, and Lt. Gen. Lebed warned that NATO expansion eastward would cause a third world war. Besides NATO expansion and NATO bombings, some in Russia have noted the threat of new geopolitical rivalry in the former Soviet space, as the United States, Turkey, and others stake claims to economic interests in the region, especially oil in Central Asia.\(^{143}\)

But threats conjured and exaggerated by national patriots, and those that many in Russia would agree legitimately exist, have been insufficient to substantiate extreme nationalist assertions of foreign conspiracies against Russia. At the end of 1995, these threats have not produced severe crises, neither have they created a sense among Russian elites and the politically articulate public that Russia was besieged from all sides and must, therefore, mobilize along extreme nationalist lines. By late 1995 most threats to Russia had diminished. Some of the most thorny citizenship issues in the

Baltics were resolved, with assistance from international organizations, especially the OSCE. Moscow also concluded citizenship agreements to help regulate the lives of Russians in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Further, the most violent conflicts on Russia's periphery had diminished in intensity, many of them due to forceful intervention either by Moscow-dominated peacekeeping forces or by remnants of the Russian army still in place in the former Soviet republics (e.g., Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova). The risks of other violent conflicts breaking out in other states near Russia's borders and harming Russian security have decreased; interstate borders have become more stable with the institution of strong presidential rule in neighboring states (except Ukraine and Moldova) and the advent of some economic progress. The denuclearization of Russia's neighbors, with assistance from the United States, has also removed another threat to Russian security. In addition, international organizations have contributed to lessening Russian insecurities; the U.N. has approved Russian peacekeeping in Georgia and has sent a special envoy to facilitate the peace process in Tajikistan, and the OSCE has successfully assisted the drawing up of a peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh and has been working actively with all parties, including Russia, to operationalize that plan.¹⁴⁴

Although the prospect of NATO expansion continues to be an unpleasant and

unwelcome development for Russia, the U.S. government has taken steps to assuage Russian concerns via diplomatic communication, active engagement with Russia in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and special arrangements for Russian troops in NATO-led operations in Bosnia. These intermediate steps have not eliminated the humiliation that the majority of Russians feel at the prospect of a western Cold War institution expanding close to their borders, the creation and training of armed units that may be hostile to Russia, and the potential stationing of nuclear weapons on territories formerly controlled by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{145} Thus, NATO expansion in the future could be a weighty factor that will help the arguments of malevolent nationalists regarding western hostility against Russia. As for geopolitical competition in the FSU region, the October 1995 decision by the multinational Azerbaijan International Operating Company to export Caspian Sea oil via two pipelines—one through Russia and another through Georgia—has shown that international actors took Russian interests seriously and that other powers did not desire hostile confrontation over resources on Russia’s periphery.\textsuperscript{146} Western leaders, in general, have also helped create a benign international ambience for Russia by tolerating Russian military and other interventions in the “near abroad,” helping Moscow save face by refusing to condemn the war in Chechnya as genocide, announcing support for Moscow-led “integration” in the FSU as long as it is done on a “voluntary” basis, reacting sympathetically to Russian concerns


about revising such treaties as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), and honoring Russian history and sacrifices by joining in Moscow’s landmark celebrations in May 1995 of the fiftieth anniversary of Russian victory over fascism.¹⁴⁷

2) Opportunities

There have been few, if any, real opportunities in the international system to help advance the malevolent nationalist agenda. First, although many of Russia’s neighbors have been relatively weak, the costs to Moscow of reconquering or coercively (and even peacefully) swallowing them into the Russian state would be staggeringly prohibitive. The Russian military’s dismal performance in the war on Chechnya, for example, has illustrated Moscow’s incapacity to launch an aggressive imperial policy without paying high costs. Moscow has also fully withdrawn its troops from the Baltics, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and was preparing to disband its last major land force in Ukraine in September 1995, with the overall effect of corroding further the remnants of former Soviet capacity for effective power projection. Moreover, most states would likely offer serious resistance against any blatant coercion by a Russian nationalist government. Already, states like Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and even Moldova have on different occasions resisted pressure from Moscow on such issues as CIS integration, the division of former Soviet military assets, joint guarding of borders, the creation of a CIS military bloc, and the formation of a single air defense

system. In part because of the absence of cheap opportunities, the majority of Russian elites and officials have not been willing to advocate a policy of conquest or imperial rule over neighboring states.148

Second, proponents of aggressive Russian nationalists have not received significant material or political support from outsiders, and in some cases they have been openly and officially shunned by outside powers. Available evidence shows moral and some financial support for extreme nationalists coming mainly from fringe radical right groups in Europe. There have also been rumors of support from Saddam Hussein, but these have not been substantiated.149 Third, official Russian elites have not shown great appetite for territorial conquest as a norm of international relations. Many have been gravely concerned, for example, about repeating the Soviet Union's traumatic experience in Afghanistan and about falling into the slippery slope of dangerous military engagements in places like Tajikistan. Further, Russia's partial integration into


international institutions in the post-Soviet period has created potential opportunity costs should state elites embark on an aggressive nationalist course. These costs might include curtailment of sizeable loans and other assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the World Bank; setbacks to conscientious Russian efforts to join the World Trade Organization; exclusion from valued association with the G7 or group of advanced industrial democracies; and possible cancellation of membership in the Council of Europe and other multilateral institutions. Moscow has already experienced a taste of international sanctions when, due to its war in Chechnya (which it argued was an "internal" matter), the European Union delayed for six months a pending trade pact with Russia. The pact was eventually signed, after Moscow began negotiations with Chechen rebel leaders. On other occasions, such as the period following NATO bombings of Serbian positions in Bosnia, Russian officials have pursued conciliatory policies to avoid international isolation after they had verbally condemned NATO actions.\(^{150}\)

**VI. MALEVOLENT NATIONALISM AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Malevolent nationalism has not been politically empowered in post-Soviet Russia, and this is illustrated in Russian behavior on critical foreign policy issues from 1991-

1995.

A. Russians Abroad: Crimea/Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Baltics

The fate of the estimated 25 million\textsuperscript{151} Russians living outside the Russian Federation has been a highly sensitive issue in Russian politics since 1991. At times, the rhetoric of Russian officials, and western analyses of actions emanating from Moscow, have pointed to an aggressive approach in protecting the rights of the Russian diaspora. In 1994, for example, shortly after the victory of Zhirinovsky and his extreme nationalist cohorts in the Russian parliament, Kozyrev declared that it would be dangerous for Russian troops to withdraw completely from former Soviet lands and unwise to “ignore historic ties, and what has been achieved over centuries . . . in [the former Soviet] space sealed by the common history and culture of the multimillion Russian-speaking population.” Yeltsin, months later, in declaring war on Chechnya, justified Russian violence on the grounds of protecting the security of Russian “citizens not only in Chechnya, but also beyond,” leading one Russian commentator to write that Chechnya might only be the beginning of the “Kremlin’s radical turn from isolationism to neoimperialism.”\textsuperscript{152} But has official Russian behavior on behalf of “Russians abroad” been truly malevolent—i.e., supportive materially, financially, and militarily of pro-Russian groups that would secede from their own states and join Russia?

\textsuperscript{151} This figure is from the last Soviet census of 1989, and has not been changed since.

1) Crimea/Ukraine

The Crimean Peninsula has been part of Russia since 1783, but in 1954 Khrushchev presented it as a gift to the Ukrainian republic. Crimea is the only region in Ukraine with a clear Russian majority—67% of the population—and political elites that have openly favored reunification with Russia. Crimea is also the location of the port of Sevastopol, home of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet and a disputed possession between Russia and Ukraine. Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, nationalist-minded members of the Russian parliament raised the issue of reexamining the Soviet decision to bestow Crimea on Ukraine. In a provocative step, parliamentarians led by Baburin visited Crimea in early 1992, called for the "third defense of Sevastopol," and asked for Russian intervention in defense of the "honor of the Russian people." In July 1993, the Russian Supreme Soviet's confrontational tone over Crimea intensified when the legislature unanimously passed a declaration on Sevastopol as a constituent part of Russia. These developments drowned out more moderate voices, including that of Kozyrev's, who warned about avoiding conflict with Ukraine and noted the lack of political and military resources to implement drastic steps favored by extreme nationalists.  

From 1991-1994, pro-Russian parties were active in Crimea, including the Republican movement and the Russian Party, which advocated separatism from Ukraine and a Slavic union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. In 1992, these groups

announced Crimean independence and passed a constitution that annulled Kiev's authority. Tensions with Kiev worsened when, in the 1994 Crimean elections, leaders of the movement to reunify Crimea with Russia won both the presidency and the majority of seats in the Crimean parliament. A crisis arose in March 1994, when the Crimean parliament voted to restore its 1992 pro-independence constitution (which Kiev had canceled earlier). But infighting among Crimean separatists and Crimea's financial dependence weakened the separatists' position vis-a-vis Kiev, and by March 1995, the Ukrainian central government managed to impose measures that reined in Crimean separatism and installed leaders in both parliament and the cabinet who were more accommodating of Kiev's demands. By the end of 1995, it was clear that Kiev had regained control of Crimea and also avoided severe conflict with Russia.154

Given the potential pay-offs of reincorporating Crimea into Russia, it would have been natural for Russia's political elites to exploit Crimea's Russian separatist movement. And indeed, some elites behaved this way, particularly those who subscribed to aggressive nationalism and wanted to restore the former Soviet empire. Among some of the provocative steps taken by political elites in Moscow were an offer of dual citizenship to Russians in Crimea; the Supreme Soviet declaration on Sevastopol as Russian territory; inflammatory rhetoric by Supreme Soviet deputies and leaders like Rutskoi and Oleg Rumiantsev who visited the Crimea; declarations of support for Crimean separatists from the extremist National Salvation Front, Pravda,

and others; and economic pressure from Moscow that was indirectly linked to the Crimean issue.\footnote{155} These moves generated pressure against Kiev on behalf of Russians in Crimea, but they hardly constituted a coherent Russian malevolent nationalist policy. The majority of these confrontational measures were undertaken by critics of the Yeltsin government, while the government itself pursued a moderate approach. Executive power in Moscow used rhetoric in support of the Russian diaspora in Crimea, but this was done mostly to appease the nationalist sector of Russian public opinion. The Kremlin did not actually supply weapons or money to Crimean separatists, and Yeltsin and Kozyrev have consistently characterized Crimea as a Ukrainian domestic problem.

In March 1994, when the Crimean parliament restored its 1992 independence constitution and caused a crisis with Kiev, Kozyrev warned that the “Yugoslav drama should not be repeated in Crimea. . . . There the [war] started with demands of sovereignty and ultimatums to back up state integrity.” During the worst quarrels between Kiev and Crimea in 1995, leaders in the new Russian legislature and the cabinet basically ignored numerous missions and appeals for economic and political assistance by Crimean separatist leaders. Given Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy (90% of Ukrainian fuel comes from Russia), Moscow could have tightened the noose to pressure Kiev on behalf of the Russian diaspora, but it did not. By late 1995, as Kiev continued to clamp down on Russian communities in Crimea, Moscow remained largely silent and Crimean separatists have acknowledged that their cause must be

\footnote{155}{Hill and Jewett, \textit{Back in the USSR}, pp. 70-85.}
shelved, at least for the moment.\textsuperscript{156}

2) Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan provides another test case on the impact, or lack thereof, of malevolent nationalism on Russian policymaking on its diaspora population. Of the former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan stood out as the sole republic where the titular nationality, the Kazakhs, constituted a minority population. In 1989, the Kazakhstani population of 16.5 million consisted of 40% Kazakhs, 38% Russians, and the rest a mix of various nationalities. Most of the Russian population in Kazakhstan is concentrated in the north and east, which are mostly industrial cities or "virgin lands" which Khrushchev tried to settle with Russians in the 1950s; those in the north live within a day's drive of Russia's three-thousand-mile border with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is also rich in natural resources, especially oil and gas, and therefore presents potential lucrative gains for Moscow should it succeed in controlling Kazakhstan, in part by playing the ethnic Russian card.

Although Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev has tried to be a balancer between Kazakh and Russian nationalisms, he has not been entirely successful in protecting his country's Russian population from discrimination. From 1991-1995,

\textsuperscript{156} Crimea Votes for Greater Freedom," p. 4; Bukkvoll, "A Fall from Grace," pp. 46-49; Hill and Jewett, Back in the USSR, p. 71; and “Russian Community of Sevastopol Accused of Instigating National and Racial Hostility," Segodnia, 1 November 1995, p. 9, in CIS Weekly, 28 October-3 November 1995. It has also been argued that Russia's preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, which Moscow justified in terms of preserving Russian territorial integrity, was a significant factor in constraining Russian reaction to developments in Crimea. See "Rossiia pozitsii v Krymu ne sdala," Nezavisimaiia gazeta, 22-28 April 1995, p. 3.
Russians have complained about increasing job discrimination, particularly in the
government sphere, where most employment has remained. They have witnessed the
replacement of many Russians and Slavs in political and industrial leadership positions
by ethnic Kazakhs; perhaps the most visible of these was the dismissal of Slav prime
minister Sergei Tereshchenko in 1994 and his replacement by Kazakh Akezhan
Kazhegeldin. In the 1994 Supreme Soviet elections, Russians also felt aggrieved about
what they saw as unfair procedures of disqualifying candidates, which resulted in only
128 Russians running out of 750 parliamentary candidates. Russians have witnessed
as well the narrowing of their educational opportunities, and those with families have felt
deeply discouraged about their children's future prospects in the country. In addition,
creeping authoritarianism has led to the persecution and arrest of moderate Russian
activists, including Russian writer Boris Suprunyuk. Suprunyuk was hardly a criminal,
but was arrested in 1994 for writing about Kazakh discrimination against Russians and
for favoring the legalization of Russian social and cultural organizations, the granting of
dual citizenship, and the raising of Russian language status into a second state
language (Kazakh is currently the state language, and Russian the language for
"interethnic communication"). Russian publications have also been banned, and official
recognition denied to organizations wishing to represent the interests of Russians and
other Slavic peoples. Altogether, these phenomena have led Nurbulat Masanov, a
Kazakh professor of history and ethnography, to comment that "Russians living [in
Kazakhstan] are second class citizens." More than a million Russians have fled
Kazakhstan and many of those left behind have remained deeply demoralized.\textsuperscript{157}

Official Moscow has reacted to the plight of Russians in Kazakhstan in a largely moderate manner, even though extreme nationalists in Moscow have argued for drastic measures to be taken. The majority of Russians in Kazakhstan have themselves been moderate and have expressed their desire to avoid violent confrontation. The exception might be Cossack groups in northern Kazakhstan, but there is no evidence that these groups have received material, financial, or military support from Moscow. Zhirinovsky supposedly donated a car to an extremist Cossack organization, but this could hardly be characterized as malevolent Russian nationalist policy. Other measures Russia has taken have been outright disdainful of the plight of its diaspora; for example, taking Kazakhstan out of the ruble zone hurt ethnic Russians the most because they were dependent on Russian-linked industrial production. Moscow refused to compensate these people, and failed to pressure Kazakhstan to do so after claiming that responsibility was in the hands of the Kazakhstani government. Moscow has also lobbied for dual citizenship for its diaspora, but has refrained from blatantly coercing Almaty on this issue, which Russians in Kazakhstan have desperately wanted. Russian officials would even have had good grounds for pressing dual citizenship because that right was already constitutionally granted to ethnic Kazakhs, who might also hold Chinese or other citizenship. By late 1995, leaders of the most active Russian

social and cultural organization, LAD, had given up on assistance from Moscow, claiming that Russian leaders liked to brandish their concern for "Russians abroad" but ultimately did nothing effective on behalf of these people.\textsuperscript{158}

3) Baltics: Estonia and Latvia

At the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, roughly one-third of Estonia's 1.6 million population was either ethnic Russian or native Russian speakers, with areas like Narva in Estonia being almost completely Russian. In Latvia, approximately 40\% of the over 2.5 million population was Russian, including approximately 50,000 or so retired military officers and their families. These demographic figures were largely the result of Russian migration and resettlement in the Baltics between 1935 and 1989. During the days of glasnost' and perestroika, Baltic activists persistently lobbied and demonstrated for their independence from the Soviet Union. Interestingly, many Russian residents and even Yeltsin supported these bids for independence, but discovered shortly after 1991 that the consequences might not be completely judicious for Russian interests.

From 1991-1995, Russians in Latvia and Estonia have complained about discrimination in Baltic citizenship and language laws. Many were particularly resentful about being excluded from political and economic rights when they had lived most of

\textsuperscript{158}\textsuperscript{158} Russian Rumblings," p. 42; Sociopolitical Situation in the Post-Soviet World. Ethnopolitical Studies Center, Foreign Policy Association, Moscow, February 1993, p. 25; "Gosudarstvennaia politika Rossii v konfliktynkh zonakh," pp. 56-58; and Interview with leaders of LAD, Almaty, October 1995. For a perspective that interprets Moscow's policies in Kazakhstan to be more sinister, see Hill and Jewett, "Back to the USSR," pp. 30-38.
their lives in the Baltics and had their children and grandchildren born there. They were also deeply unhappy about being branded as "occupiers," and some have complained that they should not have to "answer for Stalin and the Soviet Union"; after all, "many Estonians served the regime, . . . and don't bear any responsibility . . ." Many who were, or had been, associated with the Soviet military and security services were also specifically penalized in the process of citizenship acquisition. Others who were non-military professionals experienced what they felt were unfair practices in the administration of language examinations and felt threats to their job security.¹⁵⁹

Russian official and unofficial figures have proclaimed over and over again that the "human rights" of Russians in the Baltics were being massively violated in the post-Soviet period. Russian elites spouted this rhetoric not only, and perhaps not chiefly, because they were concerned about the fate of their Russian kinsmen and wanted to prevent the massive influx of Russian refugees from the Baltics to Russia. By maligning Baltic policy, Moscow could also more easily justify retaining its troops in Estonia and Latvia and maintaining access to military-strategic sites in the area. Yeltsin's government did exert pressure on the governments of Estonia and Latvia to push them to reexamine their language and citizenship policies. In June 1993, for example, Russia halted deliveries of natural gas to Estonia. Yeltsin also halted Moscow's pull-out of Russian troops from the Baltics in October 1992 and the Russian Defense Ministry threatened to do the same again in 1994. The Russian Supreme Soviet further

¹⁵⁹"In the Baltics, There May be No Home for Russians," pp. A1, A12; for a history and overview of citizenship issues in the Baltics, see Citizenship and Alien Law Controversies in Estonia and Latvia, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University, April 1994, pp. 1-41.
expressed approval for a referendum on autonomy in Narva, thereby posing a threat to Estonia's territorial integrity; it also called for economic sanctions against the Baltic states. Ultimately, however, Moscow's bark proved worse than its bite. Such measures as the halting of gas supplies to Estonia, for example, lasted no more than a week, and Moscow completed the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia by September 1994 (after a one year delay). Overall, official Russian policy on the Russian diaspora in the Baltics has been assertive, stern, and even aggressive in tone, but cannot be characterized as malevolent nationalism.

B. Russian Intervention in Zones of Conflict: Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan

Has Russian intervention in zones of conflict in the "near abroad" been a manifestation of nationalist-inspired neoimperialism? Was Moscow responsible for causing specific conflicts? Did it exploit these conflicts to further its own interests? Did Moscow rely primarily on force to pursue its own interests, and did its intervention ultimately have a destructive or constructive impact? This section will not render a full history of conflicts in the former Soviet space, but focuses on answering the preceding questions pertaining to Russian actions in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, the Transdnestr-Moldova dispute, and the civil war in Tajikistan. I will argue that Russian activity in these conflicts amounts to opportunism that has helped Moscow retain some influence in the "near abroad"; such activity also largely reflects the military challenges

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associated with post-imperial collapse\textsuperscript{161} and the limits, rather than beginnings, of hegemonic Russian power projection.

1) Georgia

Moscow did not create the conflict between separatist Abkhazia and the central government in Georgia; in fact, this conflict had roots that extended throughout the Soviet period. Abkhazia, a sizeable region on Georgia’s western Black Sea Coast, became part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in December 1921, but retained its Union republic status, granted by the Bolsheviks in March 1921, until the early 1930s. Tensions have always been thick between Georgians and Abkhazians. The former, which for decades constituted a majority in Abkhazia (46-48%), resented the fact that Abkhazians, the titular nationality (whose proportion of the population never exceeded 25% and had decreased to 18% by the early 1990s), held practically all positions of power in the republic. The Abkhazians, in turn, resented their loss of Union republic status and rallied, unsuccessfully, to have it restored in 1978 and 1989. They have also sought to unite with the Russian Federation and supported the preservation

\textsuperscript{161} As Sherman Garnett has argued, there has been a “gravitational pull” on Russian armed forces to participate in conflicts whether or not Moscow’s hand was in it. See Garnett, Impact of the New Borderlands. The former Soviet (now Russian) military has been scattered on the territory of the former empire; military officers possessed weapons which disputing parties have wanted; and soldiers have sought to defend parochial interests (such as finding alternative means to provide for their families when Moscow could not pay military wages). These circumstances, along with weakening civilian authority in the wake of imperial collapse, helps explain Russian military intervention in conflicts in the former Soviet Union.
of the USSR in the 1991 Soviet referendum, which Georgia itself boycotted.\(^{162}\)

Tensions flared in 1992 when, under the leadership of Vladislav Ardzinba, new electoral rules in Abkhazia further skewed the proportionality of Abkhaz-Georgian representation in the republic’s Supreme Soviet (28 of 65 seats were allotted to Abkhazians and only 26 to Georgians). Violence broke out in August 1992 when, most likely in response to Abkhazia’s renunciation of the Georgian constitution and the restoration of its own 1925 independence constitution, Georgian forces attacked the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi. The Abkhazians were not entirely unprepared for this onslaught because Ardzinba had by then created his own National Guard. Fighting continued until 1993, with Moscow brokering at least two ceasefires in September 1992 and July 1993, both of which were broken by the Abkhaz side. The war with Abkhazia, coupled with Tbilisi’s battles against forces loyal to deposed Georgian ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, created a state crisis for Georgia and almost caused the state’s dismemberment and military collapse. By July 1993, President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia turned to Russia for assistance, and decided to accept membership in the CIS as the price for Russian intervention. Moscow then brokered a ceasefire in December 1993. In June 1994, Russia deployed 3,000 Russian peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia. The United Nations endorsed this operation in October 1994 and sent its own observers to the region.\(^{163}\)


\(^{163}\)“Gosustvarstvennaia politika Rossii,” pp. 77-78; Kevin O’Prey, Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia, Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper 23, July 1995, pp. 23-24; and Elizabeth Fuller, “Between Anarchy and Despotism,” Transition, 15
There is evidence that Moscow exploited the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia to further its own interests, which consisted of bringing Georgia into the CIS fold and gaining agreements to keep Russian bases on Georgian soil. Moscow achieved both of these by opportunistically exploiting Georgian political and military vulnerability. First, Russian officials did nothing to discipline Russian military officers and mercenaries who were helping Abkhazian separatists. Russian friends of Ardzinba were giving military-technical assistance to Abkhaz fighters, and some fought directly on behalf of Abkhazia. For example, various jet fighters and fighter bombers downed by Georgian forces had Russian military markings and were piloted by Russians. There has been no proof, however, that Moscow authorized these military actions, nor that Russian officials ever declared support for Abkhazian independence or absorption into the Russian Federation. Second, Moscow did nothing to discipline the Abkhazians after they unilaterally violated two ceasefires mediated by Yeltsin himself in 1992-1993. These violations created great advantage for the Abkhaz army and its policy of “ethnic cleansing” against Georgians. In September 1993, for example, after the Abkhazians retook Sukhumi, over 200,000 Georgian refugees had to flee through the Caucasus mountains and hundreds of them died. Third, Russian officials ignored volunteer troops and other military assistance to Abkhazia from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples (Chechnya, Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Adygei). The message was that Russia would not do much toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict until the Georgian state made clear that it would take steps favorable to Russian strategic interests. Thus, in 1992 Shevardnadze blamed Russia for siding with Abkhazia and remarked that “we

were let down, treacherously deceived . . . It's very bitter that, in some measure, representatives of Russia took part in this dirty affair."164

Russian intervention in Georgia, although not benign, was neither completely malevolent, and ultimately had a constructive impact. Although Moscow officials either closed their eyes or tacitly approved unofficial military assistance to Abkhazia, they did not allow the buildup of overwhelming force that could have allowed Abkhazia to truly rout Georgia. Once Moscow had Georgia's cooperation, Russian officials including Yeltsin and defense minister Grachev kept their side of the bargain and pushed Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations along when they stalled. Russian officials have also made clear to Ardzinba, a noxious ethnic cleanser, that he could no longer count on favors from Moscow. In fact, Moscow imposed a blockade on Abkhazia and closed all cross-border trade with the republic in 1995.165 Moscow's intervention, regardless of its unevenness, also did stop the bloodshed in Georgia at a time when, despite Shevardnadze's pleas, no other power or international organization was willing to intervene in any effective manner. Finally, Russia has signed numerous cooperative agreements with Georgia and has promised much-needed economic assistance in


exchange for rights to keep three bases in Georgia.\textsuperscript{166}

2) Moldova

When Moldova\textsuperscript{167} became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991 and its nationalist government declared intentions to reunite with Romania, the Transdnestr region (on the left bank of the Dniestr River) protested this move and declared secession from Moldova in September 1991. The new "Dniestr Moldovan Republic" (PMR, in its Russian acronym) has a population of approximately 700,000, 60% of which are Russians and Ukrainians. More important than the ethnic composition of the republic, however, (70% of Russians in Moldova live, after all, quite contently outside the PMR) are several facts: Transdnestr is home to numerous retired Soviet military personnel; it is the headquarters of the 14th Army of the Soviet Union; 40% of its factories served the Soviet military-industrial complex; and the leadership in Tiraspol, the capital, consists mostly of unreconstructed, hardline, pro-empire figures from the Soviet era.\textsuperscript{168} These facts help explain why the region, including its ethnic Moldovan population, did not support reunification with Romania but preferred to stay within the Soviet Union because their interests and security were best served in the Soviet context. They


\textsuperscript{167}The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was a creation of the Bolshevik government, combining Bessarabia (which once belonged to the Russian empire but was part of Romania until the USSR regained it via the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939) and the east bank of the Dniestr (which used to be part of Ukraine).

further help explain why, in 1992, elements of the Russian military joined the conflict in support of the PMR; after all, the PMR leadership represented support for the welfare of military personnel and their families.

Violence broke out between Moldovan forces and PMR military formations in the summer of 1992. The Moldovan army, however, did not prevail against PMR forces, which were supported by elements of the former Soviet 14th Army, stationed in Transdniestr. In July 1992, Moldovan leaders agreed to sit in negotiations with their Russian counterparts in Moscow; a ceasefire agreement was subsequently signed by Moscow, Chisinau (capital of Moldova), and Tiraspol (capital of PMR); and CIS peacekeeping forces deployed, consisting in a combination of Russian 14th Army, Moldovan, and PMR troops. These developments notwithstanding, there has been no permanent or stable solution to the status of PMR within Moldova. Transdniestr authorities have stubbornly refused offers by Moldovan authorities for autonomy (this despite the fact that pro-Romanian nationalism has died down in Moldova), and the 14th Army may remain in Transdniestr despite an agreement for its withdrawal signed by Moscow and Chisinau in October 1994.169

Moscow did not create the Transdniestr conflict, which had its roots in Moldovan radical nationalism, Soviet political and military legacies in Transdniestr, and the fever of secessionism that hit the Soviet Union in its last years. Russian officials, however, exacerbated and exploited the conflict to advance Russian interests, which included getting Moldova to join the CIS and maintaining Russian military facilities in Moldova.

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Obstructive and destructive actions emanating from Moscow included, first, declarations by the Supreme Soviet that "genocide" was being conducted against Russians in Moldova and calls for Russia to use the 14th Army "to defend our countrymen in the Transdnestr region." This rhetoric, along with visits to the PMR by figures like Rutskoi and Stankevich, encouraged radical leaders of the PMR to pursue a violent course in their conflict with central Moldovan authorities. Second, authorities in Moscow, especially Yeltsin and his ministers, permitted the 14th Army to participate in the conflict blatantly on the side of PMR secessionists. Army personnel, for example, gave weapons and ammunition to the "Dnestr Women's Defense Committee," and members of the army fought actively in such PMR operations as the seizing of the city of Bendery from Moldovan forces. Further, the 14th Army drafted local Moldovan-Dnestr citizens into its ranks, thereby blurring the ranks between the Russian military and military forces of the secessionist Transdnestr republic. Third, Russia did not use its political, military and economic leverage to pressure recalcitrant PMR authorities to accept reasonable Moldovan offers of autonomy; a move in this direction would most likely help bring a lasting settlement to the conflict and stabilize internal Moldovan politics. Neither has Moscow been eager to begin implementation of the withdrawal of the 14th Army (Moscow has until 1997 to do this, however). Instead, Yeltsin and Russian defense

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ministry officials have proposed establishing a more permanent military base in Moldova, but Moldovan authorities have refused because the continued presence of Russian troops on their soil would violate their state's declared policy of permanent neutrality.\textsuperscript{171}

Many of Moscow's actions in the PMR conflict were destructive, but did not amount to a program of forceful nationalist neocolonialism. Moreover, intervention by the 14th Army did prevent full-scale civil war in Moldova and was a positive contribution to the situation.\textsuperscript{172} Only Moscow had the will and resources to do something about the conflict in Transdnestr in 1992; efforts by such international organizations as the OSCE failed to prevent war and the OSCE later refused a Moldovan request for peacekeeping forces. Moscow did not rely chiefly on force, but also worked with the Moldovan leadership, for example, in jointly guaranteeing the peace agreement signed in 1992. Russian officials never declared support for Moldovan dismemberment, neither did they recognize the PMR as an independent state.\textsuperscript{173}

Russia's actions in Moldova also reflected opportunism. Moscow exploited (and was itself exploited by) a population that supported the larger spread of Russian influence in the "near abroad." Even as late as March 1995, for example, well over 90%

\textsuperscript{171}Gribincea, "Challenging Moscow's Doctrine," pp. 4-8.

\textsuperscript{172}Moscow's assignment of Lt. Gen. Lebed to lead the 14th Army in 1992 was a move that restored some discipline to the military. President Snegur of Moldova commented in 1995, for example, that Lebed was "a man who can strictly control the arms stores and prevent distribution of arms to local formations--features his predecessor didn't possess. . . . My opinion of him is good." Duplain, "Chisinau's and Tiraspol's Faltering Quest," p. 12.

\textsuperscript{173}Gosudarstvennaia politika Rossii," p. 81 and O'Prey, Keeping the Peace, p. 44.
of Transdnestr voters still welcomed Russian intervention and opted in a referendum to keep the 14th Army in Moldova. Other actions, particularly Moscow's inability to control the army, was not malevolent nationalism, but part of the overall erosion of military discipline since the breakup of the Soviet Union. By the time the 14th Army was officially transferred to Russian jurisdiction, for example, Gen. Lebed reported that 2041 units of small arms had already been stolen from military warehouses in Transdnestr. Moreover, Moscow could not be blamed for actions taken in the Soviet era, such as the Soviet Ministry of Defense's offer of support to Cossack volunteers who came to the defense of Transdnestr in December 1991.174

3) Tajikistan

The roots of civil war in Tajikistan, a country of five million people, were not created by Moscow. Numerous analysts have traced the origins of the war to inter-clan rivalry for power in the context of imminent Soviet disintegration and in the period thereafter.175 In fact, from 1991-1992, there was a succession of four ruling groups in Tajikistan, with the last group led by Emomali Rakhmonov managing to hold on to power chiefly because of Russian military and economic backing. Fighting among Tajik groups—governmental neo-communists, on one hand, and opposition democratic and Islamic groups, on the other—became extremely bloody in 1992, with an estimated 20-


Russian intervention in Tajikistan has not constituted a policy of rabid nationalism or malevolent neoimperialism. In fact, there has been little enthusiasm in Russia for this operation. A September 1993 poll showed 60\% of Russians opposed to troop deployment in Tajikistan, while elites have also criticized Moscow’s military involvement.\footnote{Sergei Gretzky, “Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace,” in Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds., \textit{Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change} (Washington, D. C.: Center for Post-Soviet Studies, 1995), p. 241 and Interview with Arbatov, Istanbul, 26 August 1995.} But there have been aspects, nonetheless, of Russian behavior that have elicited concern. These include backing of Tajikistan’s neocommunist government, ignoring or perhaps even approving acts of aggression by Russian soldiers against Tajik and Afghan civilians, and allowing Russian troops to participate in military
operations against Tajik opposition forces on the territory of Tajikistan. These
criticisms have been warranted, but must be qualified. It would have been impossible,
for example, for Russian forces to maintain pure neutrality in the Tajik civil war when
their central task, especially that of the border guards, was to prevent unauthorized
incursions from Afghan territory into Tajikistan (by protecting the borders, troop actions
automatically became biased toward the ruling neocommunist regime). The breakdown
of military discipline, especially in the observance of human rights, was in part a natural
consequence of the breakup of the Soviet state and army, and a problem that
unconsolidated civilian authorities in Moscow could not solve immediately or fully.
Soviet troops that were stationed in Tajikistan were mostly Russians who had lived
practically all their lives in Central Asia and had minimal chances of continuing their
service in Russia. With no secure future to look forward to as the Soviet Union
disintegrated, some of them in 1992 chose to desert the army and support one side or
other in the civil war.179

Although Russian behavior has not amounted to nationalist malevolence, one
danger sign has appeared that could potentially substantiate the argument of
nationalist-inspired Russian aggression. This is the publication of articles in relatively
respectable Russian newspapers like Nezavisimaja gazeta and the military's Krasnaia

178Works that censure Moscow for its role in Tajikistan are Hill and Jewett, Back in
the USSR, pp. 40-44 and Helsinki Watch, War or Peace? Human Rights and Russian
Military Intervention in the "Near Abroad", vol. 5 no. 22 (December 1993), p. 12. A
perspective that notes Russia's constructive role is O'Prey, Keeping the Peace, pp. 34-
36.

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zvezda that have colored the wars in Chechnya and Tajikistan with the antagonistic hue of "Islamic jihad against Russia." Some Russian elites have carelessly spread anti-Islamic rhetoric, and the broadening of this phenomenon could encourage greater Russian aggression against Muslims both inside and outside Russia in the future. 180

On the positive side of the ledger, Russian forces in Tajikistan have been credited for "restoring order after a civil war that killed more than 20,000, and, by their presence, helping end the most serious abuses of human rights that followed and aiding the return of more than half a million displaced persons and tens of thousands of refugees to their homes." 181 Moscow has also sought avenues other than force to find a way out of the Tajik dilemma; its intervention in Tajikistan, after all, has been very costly militarily and economically. 182 Yeltsin and his top aides have supported U.N.-mediated talks among the warring Tajik parties since 1994, urged the reluctant government in Tajikistan to come to the negotiating table, and sought the assistance and participation of other countries like Iran and Pakistan in the peace process. These efforts paid off when a ceasefire was achieved with U.N., Russian, and Iranian mediation among the Tajik parties in Teheran in September 1994. But the Tajik conflict has remained ultimately unresolved, and this could not be blamed on Moscow. Conflicting sides in the civil war have not shown much constructive effort to solve their problems. In early 1995,

182 Moscow has basically subsidized up to 70% of the Tajik national budget. Tajikistan adopted the ruble as its currency in January 95 and will likely continue to drain Russian resources as its economy becomes unified with Russia's. See Jawad and Tadjbakhsh, Tajikistan, p. 22.
for example, both sides took turns breaking the U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Moreover, the present Tajik government has not been accommodating of what may be the only measure toward a lasting resolution to the conflict: the creation of a federal structure that would allow local autonomy, regional development, and power-sharing.¹³³

Russia's actions in Tajikistan illustrate the normal reaction of a former great power to some of the dilemmas of post-imperial collapse. Moscow intervened to stop a bloody civil war in its traditional sphere of influence, and did so because it had legitimate interests to protect and was the only actor with the will and resources to respond. Russian interests in the conflict included protecting the old Soviet borders with Tajikistan and preventing the entry of mujahedin Islamic fundamentalism into the former Soviet space (a task the new Tajik state could not fulfill). Moscow also had some concern about the estimated 200,000 Russians still living in Tajikistan as of autumn 1993 (down from 400,000 two years earlier). By the end of 1995, there was not much hope for other actors to replace Moscow's peacekeeping role in the Tajik conflict, and no resources or support was forthcoming to meet opposition demands for U.N. peacekeeping and U.N.-monitored elections that might end the war.¹³⁴


¹³⁴Ibid.
C. Conflict in Bosnia

History and tradition have dictated generally close and amiable relations between Russia and Serbia. In the war among Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia, Russia initially took a position that was supportive of the West and the international community, even if it meant standing behind measures—such as economic sanctions—that hurt Russia's traditional Serbian allies. In 1992 Russia also joined with the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to underline its solidarity with the collective policies of the international community in former Yugoslavia.

Nationalists in Russia were never pleased with Moscow's initial policies in ex-Yugoslavia, and consistently deplored "one-sided" international sanctions against Serbia. Those of particularly extremist persuasions tried to depict Serbia as a victim of international "intervention" that targeted not only Serbs, but Slavs and Orthodox believers in general. They argued that, in the future, Russians in Ukraine and Belarus may well find themselves in a position similar to that of their embattled Serbian kin, who have been held hostage by westernizing Croats and Slovenians. In that situation, the international community will likely intervene to prevent Russia from coming to the aid of its citizens abroad, just as it has already done in former Yugoslavia.186

185 These extremists conveniently denied that Serbia's opponents in former Yugoslavia were themselves Slavic peoples.

186 See the collective appeal of nationalist leaders in "Brat'ia-Slaviane," Den', no. 3 (83) 1993, p. 5; the analysis of the Eurasianist Center for Metastrategic Research in "Geopolitika jugoslavskogo konflikta," Elementy, no. 2 (1992):2-5; and "Mnenie obozreva tie," Pravda, 2 June 1992, p. 3. The latter includes this warning: "Punishment [for Serbia] is now being arranged under the U.N. flag. But what will happen tomorrow? If one day Russia stands up in earnest for a Russian-speaking population somewhere in the CIS, they will punish us, too."
In 1992-1993, criticism by nationalists of Russian cooperation with the West in the Balkans proliferated and intensified. An important source of such criticism was the former Supreme Soviet, some of whose members engaged in their own shuttle diplomacy with Belgrade in 1993 and returned to Moscow with comments and recommendations opposing the foreign ministry and chiding Kozyrev for his servility towards the West. The Supreme Soviet also passed a resolution calling on Russia to support sanctions against all sides in the Yugoslav war, not just Serbia, and to oppose "military interference" in the conflict. Discreditation of Kozyrev's foreign ministry increased when Den' published a classified memo written by the Russian ambassador to the U.N., Yuriii Vorontsov, which, in reference to further sanctions against Yugoslavia, argued: "It is very important not to oppose ... the western countries and the U.S., where public opinion is strong against [Serb leader] Milosevic."\(^{187}\) This leak ignited an explosion in the Supreme Soviet, and led some deputies to question the legality of Russian actions in the U.N. Pressure from the Supreme Soviet and extreme nationalists in the media prompted Kozyrev to weaken his rhetoric on Russian solidarity with western policy and, in April 1993, Russia abstained from a U.N. vote on additional sanctions against rump Yugoslavia.\(^{188}\)

By late 1993 and until the fall of 1995, Russian and western policies in the

\(^{187}\)Interfax, 3 June 1992.

\(^{188}\)Kozyrev maintained that he felt "sick at heart" for this decision which was taken because of pressure from nationalists. See "Kozyrev Regrets Abstaining on UN Vote," RFE/RL News Briefs, 26-30 April 1993, p. 3; see also Suzanne Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 19 March 1993, p. 4 and "Decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 'On the Russian Federation's Approach to the Yugoslav Conflict',' in FBIS-SOV, 4 January 1993, p. 34.
Balkans increasingly diverged. In February 1994, for example, Russia dispatched a 
battalion of airborne troops into Sarajevo, essentially nullifying a NATO ultimatum to 
Bosnian Serbs. Russians also bristled at NATO bombing of Serbian positions after 
Serbian troops refused to stop their assaults on U.N.-protected “safe havens.” 
Zhiringovsky declared the bombings tantamount to a “declaration of war on Russia,” 
while other Russian officials, including the defense minister, also condemned NATO 
actions. Public opinion supported this position, with 77% of 4800 people polled by the 
Center for International Sociological Research expressing their agreement with Mr. 
Zhiringovsky. 189 In late summer 1995, Moscow and Washington were engaged in 
competitive diplomatic initiatives in the Balkans. Yeltsin condemned renewed Croatian 
aggression in the conflict, while U.S. officials highlighted and criticized Serbian 
atrocities. In September 1995, in response to a Serb attack on a Sarajevo marketplace, 
NATO once again launched airstrikes against Serb positions. This prompted another 
barrage of bitter and angry comments from Moscow, including Yeltsin’s denunciation of 
“the cruel bombardment and shelling” of the Serbs. The Russian Duma also called for 
the sacking of Mr. Kozyrev because of “multiple serious mistakes that have led to the 
humiliating failure of Russia’s Balkans policy,” and for an end to Russian participation in 
U.N. economic sanctions against Serbia. 190

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189 James Sherr, “Doomed to Remain a Great Power,” The World Today, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, January 1996, p. 9; “Pax Russiana?” Economist, 19 
February 1994, p. 57

190 See the following reports from the Financial Times: "U.S. and Russia Divided on 
Bosnia," 14 August 1995, p. 1; “Yeltsin Condemns ‘Cruel Bombardment,’” 31 August 
Although by late 1995 a crisis was brewing in Russian relations with the West, and the United States in particular, over the war in Bosnia, moderate policies ultimately emerged despite Russia's fierce rhetoric. First, in September 1995, Kozyrev met with U.S. deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott and subsequently issued a conciliatory tone reaffirming "partnership" with the West and Russian cooperation with NATO in the search for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia. Second, Yeltsin and U.S. President Clinton met in New York a month later and agreed on Russian military participation in peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. Although this agreement was beset by difficult details regarding the command of Russian troops under a NATO operation, a deal acceptable to Moscow was eventually concluded. Although the deal did not give Russia its maximum goal of gaining a veto over NATO decisions, Russian defense minister Grachev declared that it was sufficient for Moscow to be "gradually . . . introduced into NATO's political kitchen" and to have a "consultative voice." Third, Russia's chief executives snubbed the foreign minister of the self-declared Serb republic of Bosnia when he visited Moscow in September, and prominent voices in the Duma conceded finally that Russia was too weak economically to be too assertive in the Balkans or to expect to block NATO.191 These policies, by the end of 1995, indicated that malevolent nationalism has not been enthroned in Russian policy in the Balkans. Russian troops have not fought on behalf of Serbian allies, massive numbers of Russian volunteers

have not gone to fight on behalf of "Slavic" or "Orthodox" brothers, and Moscow has not seriously sabotaged western policies on the war in former Yugoslavia.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has described five contending strands of Russian nationalism in the post-Soviet period, ranging on a spectrum that is benign on one end and malevolent on the other: westernizing democracy, nativism, cosmopolitan statism, ethnocentric statism, and national patriotism. After examining indicators of nationalist political empowerment, I have argued that the most virulent strands of Russian nationalism—national patriotism and ethnocentric statism—have not been empowered in Russia. Virulent nationalism has been a response to deep and widespread Russian national humiliation in the late Soviet period and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But of four controlling variables that should have helped the empowerment of extreme nationalism, three—internal instability, domestic incentive structures, and threats and opportunities in the international system—have developed in ways that countered the malevolent nationalist cause. Only the degree of effective social communication in post-Soviet Russia has helped aggressive nationalism, but even this variable has opposed extremism in some respects.

While it is true that the Russian state, Russian nationalist ideology, and Russian foreign policy will continue to change in the coming years, the experience of 1991-1995 gives reason to be optimistic about Russia's future as a generally non-aggressive member of the international community. The majority of Russian elites and the articulate public have not supported nationalism that preaches ethnocentrism,
chauvinism, imperialism, and militarism. This will likely remain the case in the coming years if relative internal stability holds in Russia; if domestic incentive structures continue to provide few rewards, if any, to extreme nationalists; if the international environment continues to be benign for Russian interests and Russia is integrated into an ever thicker and larger web of international cooperation; and if Russia's own neighbors in the "near abroad" develop stronger economies and more stable polities. None of these, of course, is guaranteed.

The last words on post-Soviet Russian nationalism have not yet been said. The moderate statism of most Russian political elites thus far is a hopeful sign that relatively benign nationalism could close the gap between Russian state and society. The themes of Russian national honor, dignity, welfare, and great power status are legitimate causes, after all, and they resonate deeply and widely with the majority of Russian elites and the articulate public. Thus far, cosmopolitan statisticians have operationalized these themes in relatively benign ways and have not exploited national humiliation to pursue a chauvinistic, militaristic, or neoimperialistic course against Russia's national "enemies."

Russians themselves will decide ultimately what kind of nationalist ideology will bind their state and society more permanently together, but it is important to remember that nationalism is an ideology thickly intertwined with comparisons and relations of the self with the outside world. Therefore, the actions of the international community will matter to the choices Russians make. It will be important that both moderate Russian nationalists and international actors make choices and implement policies in their respective spheres that will encourage the development of a nationally confident, stable,
and peaceful Russia as the twenty-first century begins. In my next and concluding chapter, I will explore potential changes in my concluding variables that could lead to the empowerment of aggressive nationalism in Russia after 1995. I also spell out some of the policy implications of the preceding analysis for Russia's interlocutors among western states and international organizations.
Chapter Five

“Russian Nationalism: Mirror of the Past?”

A central idea for me is Russia as a great power. Why must Russia be a great power? Because it has always been a bridge between Europe and Asia. . . . There are five key questions every Russian must ask: What is the state? What is society? Am I, as an individual, a member of a nation or part of a herd of cattle? What is my role in society? What do I get in return if I play my role well?2

Aleksandr Rutskoi, 1994

The Russian nation is one of the most complex and tragic nations on earth. In the twentieth century, Russia does not want to lose any part of the heritage it has gained over the course of its history. This is a terrible load which Russia has taken on its back. I pronounce this conviction after innumerable meetings with Russians and after studying the Russian people all my life. . . . Wherever I have been—in the poorest, rural areas, among families of peasants and fishermen, with families who, one might say, constitute the soil and foundation of the Russian folk, or among those in elite intellectual circles, . . . I have seen one thing. A Russian—in the family, in conversation, at the table—discovers in himself an amazing historical depth. He can live in the twentieth century, but be nourished by emotions and historical events which occurred five or six hundred—even a thousand—years ago. He can sing songs composed not recently, but in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. Not one of the European nations has been able to preserve in itself a volume of historical information as that possessed by Russia. Herein is our greatness, and also our present tragedy. . . .

Stanislav Kuniaev, 1993

The development of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a vital interest of the Russian Federation, and our relations with CIS states are a critical factor in Russia’s integration into international political and economic structures. . . . Our fundamental tasks toward the CIS states are: to provide for enduring stability in political, military, economic, legal, and humanitarian terms; to assist in the creation of . . . stable states that have friendly policies toward Russia; and to strengthen Russia’s role as the leading force in the creation of a new system of interstate political and economic relations on post-Soviet territory.

Presidential Decree, 1995

I. Introduction

In the theory chapter of this thesis, I underlined the idea that, in the last century

1My thanks to David C. Speedie for helping phrase this title.

2Interview with Aleksandr Rutskoi, Moscow, 8 June 1994.

3Interview with Stanislav Kuniaev (editor of Nash sovremennik), Moscow, 14 October 1993.

and a half, nationalism has not been a consistently dominant ideology of the Russian state. Russia has always been an imperial, multiethnic state, whose rulers have not been able to resolve the dilemma of nationalism. They could not overly emphasize ethnic Russian nationalism and russification for fear of alienating large groups of non-Russians in the empire and rendering more difficult the already complex task of governing an immense and diverse territory.\(^5\) Neither could they encourage civic nationalism that would be inclusive of all peoples in the empire because it would mean legitimating and encouraging popular political participation, and would, therefore, undermine Russia’s autocratic and authoritarian government.

Despite official reluctance to embrace nationalism, however, my case studies show that there have been “outbreaks” of nationalism in Russia. Two of these, in 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, culminated in the empowerment of Russian panslavism and great power nationalism, both of which were aggressive types of nationalist ideology. These ideologies, as I have demonstrated, had an impact favoring state decisions to go to war on behalf of the “nation.” In the last period I examine, 1991-1995, malevolent nationalism was preached widely in Russia but did not gain widespread institutional support, neither did it exert a powerful influence on key areas of Russian foreign policy.

This concluding chapter will accomplish several tasks. In section II below, I describe the myth of greatness in Russian nationalist thought as it has evolved over the

\(^5\)Edward C. Thaden has documented the limits of ethnic Russian nationalism and russification in the Russian empire. He argues that, in order to carry out the business of government, tsarist officials at the center depended on the goodwill and cooperation of non-Russian elites in the hinterlands. Extreme russification was risky because it meant alienating these regional elites. See Edward C. Thaden, *Russia’s Western Borde:lands 1710-1870* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
centuries. The theme of being a "great state" or "great power" has been an inalienable component of past nationalisms that have become empowered, and is also prevalent in cosmopolitan statism, the dominant and relatively benign form of nationalism in post-Soviet Russia. What has been the basis of claims of Russian greatness? How is this theme linked with the variable of national humiliation, and how has it helped the agenda of proponents of aggressive nationalism?

In Section III, I reiterate the findings of this thesis on four controlling variables that have an impact on the political empowerment of nationalism; these variables are internal instability, domestic incentive structures, social communication, and threats and opportunities in the international system. I also rank these variables in terms of relative strength, and specify which had the greatest impact on empowering aggressive nationalism. Although I have tested hypotheses on these variables only in the Russian case, my study as a whole has generated propositions on aggressive nationalism that other students of nationalism and foreign policy might apply to cases outside Russia. In particular, other researchers might determine if, in other countries, national humiliation has been as strong a factor as in Russia for eliciting malevolent nationalist reaction from intellectuals and other elites. Once extreme nationalist ideas have been articulated, do the variables of internal instability, domestic incentives, effective social communication, and threats and opportunities in the international system help or hinder these ideas from becoming politically empowered and influencing a state's international behavior?

In Section IV, I summarize the path that nationalism has traversed in Russia in 1991-1995, and point to continuity and discontinuity between this period and past cases of nationalist empowerment. Does Russian nationalism today mirror the past? Is it
destined to become aggressive? What changes in my controlling variables will increase or decrease the likelihood that malevolent nationalism will become politically empowered in Russia in the near future? What other variables might I study more systematically in revising my thesis on factors that obstruct or facilitate the empowerment of virulent nationalism? What are the policy implications of this analysis for western states and the larger international community?

II. Russia as a Great Power: The Persistence of a Nationalist Myth

Nationalism is an ideology whose content can change over time and under different social and political circumstances. But, as I have noted in Chapter One, some ideas are transmitted from one generation to the next and become embedded in collective tradition and memory. The presence of these ideas in collective memory make them more likely to resonate with the public and increases the probability that they will have an impact on social attitudes and actions. In studying the content of Russian nationalism from 1856-1995, I have found that the theme of “greatness” or

6By “myth,” I do not mean necessarily untrue assertions, but ideas that are prevalent or widely accepted. A myth is akin to what Eric Hobsbawm calls “invented tradition,” or a set of practices which seeks “to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior . . . [and] which automatically implies continuity with the past.” See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 1. A “myth,” however, is less a “set of practices” and more a set of ideas, stories, or beliefs.

Russia as a "great power" runs through all dominant currents of Russian nationalist ideology.

What are the foundations of the idea of greatness in Russian nationalist thought? To answer this question, one must return to the eighteenth century which, as the work of Hans Rogger and Liah Greenfeld show, was the formative period of Russian national consciousness. Although nationalism did not then exist as a systematic ideology, the reigns of Peter the Great (1682-1795) and Catherine the Great (1762-1796) were significant periods in the articulation of concepts that connoted the nation; the polity, as it was defined, evolved from what was exclusively the personal domain of the tsar into more of a "common wealth, an impersonal patrie or fatherland in which every member had an equal stake and to which every one was naturally attached." Such terms as otechestvo (fatherland), obshchee blago (general good), and narod (people) became part of official Russian political vocabulary and, under Catherine the Great, the monarch explicitly identified her glory and interests with those of the "state" and "nation." 8

The emergence of nationalist-oriented discourse in the eighteenth century also coincided with the rise of Russia as an imperial power. Thus, from the beginning, nationalist thinkers associated the idea of national greatness with war, conquest, and external power projection. Under Peter the Great, the monarch's goal was to make Russia a state equal to other major European states, and victory in war was the chief method for doing so. Peter accomplished his goal in the early eighteenth century, particularly during the Great Northern War against Sweden, which started in 1700. In

1709, in what has become the mythical battle of Poltava in Russian history, 40,000 Russian troops routed a Swedish army of 22-28,000. In 1713-1714, Russia further conquered Finland and the Baltics; the result was the "sudden rise of Russia" as a great power, causing "a shock to other European countries." In 1719-1721, the Swedes finally admitted defeat and signed the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721. With this treaty, Russia acquired large territories and gained control of the Gulf of Finland. In celebration of the peace, the Russian Senate conferred on Peter the titles "Great," "Emperor," and "Father of the Fatherland." The conclusion of the Great Northern War signaled the birth of Russia as a major power. In the words of one historian, in "this manner Russia formally became an empire, . . . and the imperial period of Russian history was officially inaugurated."9

Peter the Great cultivated national pride among Russians by emphasizing that they were subjects of a famous ruler and part of a great empire. He also underlined the hostility of foreign powers, and preached that their main goal was to humiliate Russia. In one of the most important works commissioned by the tsar in 1703, The Discourse on the Just Reasons of the War Between Sweden and Russia (printed at 20,000 copies five years after its first appearance, and at a time when the usual print for such works was only around 200 copies), the tsar added his own conclusion:

    The past times are not like the present, for then the Swedes thought of us differently and considered us blind . . . And not only the Swedes, but also other and remote peoples, always felt jealousy and hatred toward the Russian people, and have attempted to keep the latter in . . . ignorance, especially in the military and naval arts. . . . [You] may conclude what was the eternal hostility of these

neighbors even at the cradle of Russia's fame . . . all the more now, when the Lord God [made Russia] so famous, that those, who, it seems, were the fear of all Europe, were defeated by us. And I can say, that no one is so feared as we are. For which one should thank God . . .

Catherine the Great continued to emphasize the themes of greatness inaugurated by Peter. She accentuated—along with Russian international prestige, military might, and political power—the theme of cultural accomplishment. Catherine paid homage to the Russian people in the Charter of 1785, an important and widely-circulated document which defined the nature and privileges of the nobility. The empress opened the Charter with these words:

The All-Russian empire in the World is distinguished by the expanse of the lands in its possession . . . comprising within its borders 165 longitudes [and] 32 latitudes . . . in true glory and majesty of the Empire [we] enjoy the fruits, and know the results of the actions of the obedient, courageous, fearless, enterprising, and mighty Russian people, . . . [whose] labors and love of Fatherland together tend primarily to the general good.  

Besides its great monarchs, Russia’s nobles and intellectuals also contributed to the theme of Russian greatness. In the eighteenth century, and especially after their emancipation in 1762 from compulsory service to the tsar, many of Russia’s nobility traveled to the West and returned to their homeland with an earnest desire to define the qualities that made Russia distinct from other peoples and their deficiencies. The dominant line that emerged among educated nobles was that, in terms of national character, Russia need not yield to any other country. Russia was imbued with greatness and might, and deserved international respect. The most indelible sign of

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10Quoted in Greenfeld, Nationalism, pp. 197-98.

11Quoted in Greenfeld, Nationalism, p. 203.
Russia's greatness was its battlefield victories, which intellectuals celebrated in their political, historical, and literary writings. In the words of Mikhail Lomonosov (1711-1765), renowned Russian poet, scientist, and founder of Moscow University: "The Russian empire, by the wealth of its internal resources and its great victories is the equal of the first European states and even exceeds some of them." He emphasized that Russia had defeated not only the Turks, Swedes, and Prussians, but even succeeded in extending its power to Japan and China. Russian intellectuals asserted that even Russia's backwardness was a sign of greatness because it constituted "evidence of originality and freshness of mind as yet undamaged and unrestrained by rule and repetition."\(^\text{12}\)

Despite their rhetoric of greatness, Russian intellectuals remained painfully conscious of the fact that Europeans continued to look down on Russia. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a native and patriotic historiography developed, which sought to show Russia's cultural and political development independent of Europe. Alongside this process of native historiographic development came the work of foreign historians who had lived in Russia and produced histories which criticized Russia's past and minimized Russian greatness and glory. These writings evoked intensely negative reactions from Russian intellectuals.\(^\text{13}\)


\(^\text{13}\)Two German historians, residing in Russia, who wrote critically of Russian history were Gerhard Friedrich Mueller and August Ludwig Schlozezer. In the late 1700s, Schlozezer wrote of Russian origins: "May patriots not be incensed, but [Russian] history does not go back to the Tower of Babel; it is not as old as that of Greece and
approved work finally emerged with the publication of Nikolai Karamzin's *History*, on which the author labored from 1803 until his death in 1826. Karamzin's *History* clarified Russian political tradition, accepted autocracy and centralization as key to Russian order and progress, criticized rulers who strayed from national tradition and implemented ideas borrowed from abroad, emphasized Russia's tremendous cultural heritage and uniqueness, and justified Russia's wars as long as they brought immediate and palpable gains to the empire and were not fought for mere abstract notions. In other writings, Karamzin set out to prove that Russia had a "highly developed material and spiritual culture at the beginning of her existence as a state." 14 Karamzin's *History* reinforced the theme of Russian greatness, and has enjoyed the status of a Russian classic in the years since its publication. 15

Russian nationalist thought is, indeed, steeped in the theme of greatness and the

Rome; it is younger even than that of Germany and Sweden. Before . . . [the calling of the Varangians] all was darkness, in Russia as well as in adjacent regions. Of course there were human beings there, but God alone knows whence and when they came. They were a people without a government, living like the beasts and the birds of their forests, undistinguished in any way, having no contact with the Southern nations, which is why they could be neither noticed nor described by a single enlightened South European." Quoted in Rogger, *Nationalist Consciousness*, p. 220. Needless to say, comments such as these roused the indignation of Russian nationalists and intellectuals.


15Although Karamzin's multi-volume history was banned for most of the Soviet period, it has been republished in post-Soviet Russia.
sense that the Russian state and people deserve international prestige and respect. The persistence of this theme helps explain why national humiliation is such a powerful factor in the articulation of malevolent Russian nationalism. As I have shown in this thesis, national humiliation—triggered by defeat in war or other developments that highlighted Russia's weakness, ineptitude, or backwardness vis-a-vis its international competitors—stimulated an aggressive nationalist reaction from Russian elites, particularly, but not solely, intellectuals and other opinionmakers. This was the case in 1856, after Russia lost the Crimean War; in 1905, after Russia's defeat to Japan; and in 1989-1991, after Russia's "defeat" in the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet (and what was formerly, the Russian) empire. National humiliation elicited aggressive nationalism because it fundamentally contradicted and violated the Russian sense, and myth, of greatness. The articulate Russian public, over centuries, has derived much of its national pride from the powerful position of Russia relative to other states. Whenever this position was challenged, threatened, or lost, an opening was immediately created for extreme nationalists to pronounce and promote ideas that had tremendous potential to reach and mobilize a favorably disposed audience. In the two cases discussed in this thesis of the political empowerment of malevolent nationalism, there was a common thread linking humiliation and the belief in Russian greatness, on one hand, and decisions to pursue aggressive nationalist action, on the other. At the final moments when nationalism spurred Russian officials to go to war, in 1876 and in 1914, decisionmakers and the articulate public shared the consensus that they could no longer accept a further violation of their traditional sense of Russian might, greatness, and prestige. Thus, against nearly all rational calculations, state and society adhered
together, if only temporarily, in the common cause of fighting to assert the idea that
Russia was still a great state and nation.

III. Empowerment of Malevolent Russian Nationalism

A. Membership in the Nation

The findings of this thesis confirm the proposition in Chapter One regarding the
greater potential malevolence of ethnic, as opposed to civic, criteria for defining
membership in the nation. In 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, dominant Russian nationalists
defined the nation in terms of such ethnic and cultural criteria as race, language, and
religion. To them, all Slavs were part of Russia; Russia, therefore, had a moral
obligation to defend Slavs in other empires, and incorporate and lead them in a Slav
Federation. This type of thinking predisposed panslavs toward aggression and war as
options for Russian foreign policy vis-a-vis states that ruled over large numbers of
Slavs, particularly the Ottoman empire.

At the same time, this thesis shows that not all ethnically based definitions of the
nation have to have uniformly malevolent implications. There were, for example,
variants of panslav ideology which emphasized racial and religious criteria for national
membership, but also promoted liberal and non-hegemonic relations among all Slavs.
One example was neoslavism which, especially in 1908-1910, advocated cultural and
political solidarity among Slavs but rejected the idea of Russia as a Slavic hegemon.
Proponents of neoslavism also refrained from preaching expansionism or unification of
Slavs by forceful means. In post-Soviet Russia, cosmopolitan statism incorporates both
ethnic and civic criteria for defining membership in the nation. In this case, the malevolent implications of ethnic nationalism are mitigated by a non-chauvinist self-image, civic criteria for citizenship and political participation, and a fundamentally cooperative approach towards the outside world.

B. Controlling Variables on the Empowerment of Nationalism

I have established in my three case studies (1856-1878, 1905-1914, and 1991-1995) that national humiliation is the necessary precondition for the emergence of aggressive nationalist ideas in Russia. However, national humiliation does not, by itself, lead to the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. The four controlling variables which I have examined in this thesis complete the explanation for why extreme nationalism reaches the zenith of Russian political discourse and exerts an impact on international behavior.

In the table below, I have assigned values of Low (L), Mixed (M), and High (H) to my controlling variables to denote their relative weight in empowering malignant nationalism. In those cases where extreme nationalism succeeded in capturing debate and influencing foreign policy (1856-1878 and 1905-1914), the two controlling variables that had values of “High” were internal instability, and threats and opportunities in the international system. The variables of domestic incentive structures and social communication were not consistently strong in both cases.

As I have shown in Chapter Two, in 1856-1878, there were no political incentives linked with mass politics that would have rewarded proponents of aggressive nationalism. However, there appeared to be some (though not overwhelming) evidence
that material and other parochial rewards did motivate careerist individuals and some
groups to promote panslavism. In the same period, advances in mass press and mass
education, weak evaluative units, and the absence of strong alternative ideologies
allowed extreme nationalist proponents to communicate their ideas widely and
effectively, and make them resonate with large sectors of the articulate public.

In contrast to 1856-1878, there were political incentives linked to incipient mass
politics in 1905-1914, which stimulated political elites to purvey and support aggressive
great power nationalism. These incentives were particularly salient after the tsar’s
Manifesto of October 1905 and the subsequent creation of the Duma, the first Russian
elected national representative assembly. At the same time, there was no
overwhelming evidence to conclude that material rewards strongly motivated malevolent
nationalist propaganda and activity. Advances in mass press and education, and the
absence of strong alternative ideologies, also helped advance aggressive nationalism,
as they did in 1856-1878; this despite the fact that some strong and competent
evaluative units had emerged in Russia and did subject great power nationalism to
vigorous scrutiny and criticism.

Although aggressive nationalist ideology was empowered in both 1856-1878 and
1905-1914, mass nationalist mobilization was definitely stronger in the earlier case.
This is evidenced in the numbers and types of Russians who rallied for support of their
Slav brethren, donated money and other resources to the Slavs, volunteered to fight in
the Serbian army, and enthusiastically marched to the front when Russia finally
declared war on Turkey in 1877. The main variable that might explain this difference in
scale of mass mobilization is social communication. In 1856-1878, competent
evaluative units were almost entirely absent in Russian political discourse, allowing proponents of panSlavism to propagate their ideas to an unsophisticated mass audience. This was less the case in 1905-1914, when a more sophisticated (albeit not fully mature) culture of debate was developing in Russia and a greater number of political ideas competed for societal support.

In my third case study (1991-1995), only the variable of social communication strongly favored the cause of aggressive nationalism. But even this variable has had nuanced impact because a number of competent evaluative units have actually debated and criticized extreme national patriotic propaganda in post-Soviet Russia. The variable of internal instability has been present in Russia in 1991-1995, but its severity has been partly offset by signs of economic recovery, social adaptation to ongoing changes, and a measure of cooperation (and therefore, less fragmentation) among political elites. The variables of domestic incentives and threats and opportunities in the international system have also not strengthened the credibility or attractiveness of virulent nationalism. Although incentives did exist for political elites to use extreme national patriotic demagoguery to advance their political careers in the context of national humiliation and mass politics, narrow groups of elites that did resort to extremism have not fared well in repeated elections in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. The exception has been Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who seems to have a committed core following.\textsuperscript{16} At the

\textsuperscript{16}Although Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party did not do as well in the Duma elections of December 1995 as it did in the elections of 1993, the party nonetheless bested tens of others who did not even receive the minimal five percent of votes to be represented in the Duma. Supporters of Zhirinovsky, however, do not constitute an overwhelming majority among the Russian electorate.
same time, material advancement, much of which still depended on strong contacts with a state apparatus ruled by moderate cosmopolitan statists and on positive relations with the international community, also has not worked in favor of aggressive nationalism.\(^{17}\)

Finally, the international system has not posed severe or intractable threats to Russian national interests and national honor since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Despite a few disputes and colder rhetoric in 1993-1995 between Russia and its western interlocutors, particularly the United States, considerable goodwill and cooperation have nonetheless characterized key aspects of Russian relations with the United States, other western countries, and international institutions. Russia, for example, has continued to receive IMF loans and has been admitted into the Council of Europe—this, despite western unease with Moscow's more assertive foreign policy rhetoric, its suspicious interventions in conflicts in the "near abroad," and its cruel prosecution of the civil war in Chechnya. Further, American and Russian troops have cooperated thus far in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, and American and other western leaders have paid homage to Russian valor and heroism in such events as the fiftieth anniversary celebrations in Moscow in May 1995 of the victory over fascism.

There have been, as well, hardly any cheap opportunities for implementing a malevolent nationalist agenda, even in Russia's "near abroad." Moscow's catastrophic military operations in Chechnya have proven how militarily weak Russia was and is: if Russia could not efficiently invade itself, it would be suicidal for it to invade neighboring states and coerce them to accept blatant Russian hegemony. Even the case of

\(^{17}\)See, for example, David Remnick, "Gorbachev's Last Hurrah," *New Yorker*, 11 March 1996, p. 76.
Belarus, which has been the most enthusiastic proponent of confederative arrangements with Russia, has made Russian political elites balk because the reintegration of Belarus into Russia would entail enormous economic costs. The international community’s commitment to the independence of such states as Ukraine and the Baltics have also implied high costs for Russian nationalist aggression, thereby rendering malevolent nationalism less attractive than it might be otherwise.

Table I: Relative Value of Controlling Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Case I 1856-1878</th>
<th>Case 2 1905-1914</th>
<th>Case 3 1991-1995</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Instability</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M/H(^1)(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Incentives</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Communication</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Threats and Opportunities</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L (?)(^1)(^9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Internal instability in post-Soviet Russia may not be as prolonged as that in 1856-1878 or 1905-1914, but it’s severity, especially on the socio-economic front (i.e., economic hardship and insecurity, crime, and so on) is high. I will discuss this issue further below, when I outline changes in my controlling variables that will have to occur for malevolent nationalism to become empowered in Russia after 1995.

\(^9\)I put a question mark here because the issue of NATO expansion could be a potentially major threat to vital Russian interests and could deeply wound Russian honor, especially by undermining Russian leadership and stature on the former territory of the Soviet/Russian empire.
In reviewing the relative impact of my controlling variables, a central conclusion that emerges is that severe and prolonged internal instability and a high level of international threats and opportunities, when paired, are the strongest factors that cause the empowerment of extreme nationalism. Internal instability weakens the legitimacy of ruling elites and, when international threats are high and crises arise, delegitimized political elites become vulnerable to the temptation and pressure to resort to aggressive nationalism to bolster their legitimacy and prolong their political lives. Nationalism is an ideology with strong legitimating effects, and promoting aggressive versions of it allows elites to appear decisive in times of threat to the nation. It was the perception of severe threats to Russian interests and national honor in 1876-1877 and in 1914, and the accompanying failure of multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve crises linked to these threats, that caused malevolent nationalism to have the impact it did on Russian foreign policy.

Crises in the Balkans in 1875-1876 severely threatened a key Russian interest to retain international status as patron of the Slavs, and numerous efforts to resolve these crises by means of collective Great Power agreements and diplomacy failed. Similarly, in 1914, a crisis involving Serbia, Russia’s traditional ally, also constituted a grievous threat to Russian interests and international prestige. Again, multilateral efforts to resolve the crisis failed. In both cases, Russian elites resorted to aggressive nationalist mobilization as the most effective way to preserve Russian interests abroad, and honor and legitimacy at home. Many of these elites were also encouraged by opportunities for aggressive expansionist action created by the weakening of the Ottoman empire, the rise of indigenous nationalism among Slavs outside Russia, support from allies, and the
absence of a decisive international or western front to combat aggressive Russian nationalist action. My case studies of 1856-1878 and 1905-1914 underline how critical the international environment is for the empowerment of aggressive nationalism, especially for a state like Russia, whose self-image is steeped in notions of greatness relative to the outside world.


A. Russian Nationalism in 1995: Continuity with the Past?

In October 1991, shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, publicist Aleksandr Tsipko wrote that the Russian Federation was "the heart of the Russian empire, the focal point of its most overt imperial gains. . . . [I]t can never get rid of its [sense of] imperial supremacy [no matter how many decrees it issues on the sovereignty of its neighbors]."\textsuperscript{20} An implication of this statement was that any nationalism that dominated in post-Soviet Russia was highly likely to resemble other ethnic, chauvinist, and aggressive types of nationalism that became empowered in Russian history. But does this necessarily have to be the case? Does nationalism in Russia have to mirror malevolent cases in the past? The findings of this thesis indicate that the answer is no.

In Chapter Four, I have argued that Russian political elites including Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and others, initially promoted westernizing democracy as a brand of nationalist ideology in 1991-1992. Westernizing democracy, however, was not as deeply rooted in

\textsuperscript{20}Aleksandr Tsipko, "Drama rossiiskogo vybora," Izvestia, 1 October 1991, p. 6.
Russian history, tradition, and culture as other types of nationalist thought. Therefore, it did not resonate strongly with Russian society and has been replaced by a more assertive yet, ultimately, benign cosmopolitan statism. Elites currently in power, particularly president Boris Yeltsin, foreign minister Evgenii Primakov, defense minister Pavel Grachev, and Duma leader Vladimir Lukin, subscribe to, and promote, this ideology. Echoing aggressive nationalists of the past, they articulate a strong refrain on Russia's inherent greatness. They see Russia humiliated by defeat in the Cold War, suffering from a drastically diminished international reputation, and struggling with internal reform and such problems posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union as the loss of traditional Russian territories. They highlight the need to restore Russian statehood, power, and international honor and prestige.\(^1\)

But, as I have argued in Chapter Four, although the nationalism of cosmopolitan statists is oriented towards great power thinking, it diverges from past versions of malevolent nationalism because it is not ethnically exclusive, rabidly chauvinistic, or militantly imperialistic. It seeks, rather, to repair some of the damage of national

\(^1\)Many tenets of cosmopolitan statism have been formalized in Russia's official statement of policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Signed as a presidential decree in September 1995, the policy states, \textit{inter alia}, that a) the government of Russia will "pay particular attention to the restoration of Russia's position as the main creative center on post-Soviet territory, bearing in mind the need to educate the young generation of CIS states in the spirit of friendly relations toward Russia"; 2) Russia will "strive to attain from CIS states the fulfillment of their obligation to refrain from participating in any unions or blocs that are directed against any of the CIS states" [a clear reference to NATO expansion]; and 3) in cases of violation of the rights of Russian citizens in CIS states, the Russian government will link the resolution of these questions with "issues of financial, economic, military-political and other cooperation between Russia and the CIS state in question . . ." See "Strategicheskii kurs Rossii," p. 4.
humiliation that Russia has suffered since the demise of the Soviet Union. The majority of its proponents want to restore Russian prestige and greatness, but are either highly reluctant to use force, or reject it outright, as a primary instrument of Russian foreign policy. Russia, under a government dominated by cosmopolitan statist from 1991-1995, has exploited opportunities to improve state power and stature whenever possible, especially in the “near abroad” or former republics of the Soviet Union. But Russian actions have not amounted to a program of malevolent nationalism. Instead, they reflect the exploitative or opportunist behavior of a weakened great power, wielding whatever remaining instruments it has to maintain international stature and strengthen its influence where possible. The majority of Russian ruling political elites have been strongly averse to the high costs of a genuinely imperial-nationalist policy; nowhere has this aversion been more manifest than in the dearth of decisive action to defend the interests of “Russians abroad," or to facilitate Russian Federation citizenship for ethnic Russians and russified groups in states of the former Soviet Union.22 As I have shown in Chapter Four, Russian attempts to assist diaspora populations in areas such as Kazakhstan, Crimea, and the Baltics, have been irresolute, sporadic, unsystematic, and, ultimately, ineffective.

B. The Present and the Future

I concluded my case study of the post-Soviet period, 1991-1995, with an

optimistic scenario on Russian nationalism. However, this third case study is only artificially ended. The period 1991-1995 is much shorter than my two previous case studies of malevolent nationalist empowerment. As the case study of 1856-1878 shows, in particular, aggressive nationalist ideas can take decades to develop and ultimately manifest their power in influencing state behavior. Based on the findings of this thesis, what changes might be anticipated in the future that will increase or decrease the likelihood of empowerment of extreme nationalism?

1) Internal Instability

Internal instability is a key variable that strengthens the credibility and attractiveness of aggressive nationalism. Although internal instability in Russia in 1991-1995 has neither been prolonged nor severe enough to propel the empowerment of virulent nationalism, this need not remain the case in the future. What developments will likely intensify internal instability? On the political and social front, a worsening in the number and degree of challenges to state authority, arising from Chechnya, could yet lead to catastrophic consequences. Although the war in Chechnya is formally over, fighting has continued between Russian troops and Chechen contingents who, because of their military tradition and the long history of vile Russian treatment of their people, are unlikely to surrender any time soon. In fact, Chechen fighters have shown that, using terrorist tactics, they could inflict severe pain on their Russian rulers.23 If Moscow

23The Chechen taking of Russian hostages in Kizlyar and the ensuing bloodshed in Pervomaiskoe in Dagestan in January 1996; the taking of hostages in Budennovsk in June 1995; and the planting of radioactive material by Chechens in a park not far from the center of Moscow could well be harbingers of greater terror that might undo the
fails to negotiate a lasting settlement of the conflict in Chechnya and Chechen terrorism
rises in scope and malevolence, an embattled Russian government might promote
nationalism to further demonize Chechens and Islamic groups in general, and to
mobilize Orthodox Russians to fight against these enemies.\textsuperscript{24}

Politically, it will be important to see if the fundamental ideas on which post-
Soviet Russian statehood has rested thus far—i.e., democratization and market
liberalization (however imperfect)—become completely delegitimized. If, as one analyst
has argued, Russia is in the midst of a peaceful “revolution,” characterized by a highly
bipolar polity consisting of uncompromising proponents and opponents of “reform,”\textsuperscript{25} will
the latter group succeed in completely discrediting the relatively new foundations of the
Russian state? Will extreme nationalists and unreconstructed communists, for
example, succeed in convincing the articulate public that they should not cooperate
with, or participate in, the present regime in Russia, and that they should sweep away

\begin{center}
Russian state. Such terror could lead to bitter recriminations between the Russian
executive and legislative branches, and thereby cause deep fragmentation among ruling
elites. It could also intensify public delegitimization of government leaders, who may well
resort to extreme nationalist demagoguery to preserve their political lives. See “Duma
Votes No Confidence in Government,” \textit{OMRI Daily Digest}, 22 June 1995; “Chechen
Insurgents Take Their Struggle to a Moscow Park,” \textit{New York Times}, 24 November
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{24}As I mentioned in Chapter Four, there have already been worrisome references

\textsuperscript{25}See Michael McFaul, \textit{Russia Between Elections. What the December 1995
Results Really Mean} (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
this regime and replace it with something completely different? Thus far, this has not been the case in Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin and his team have staved off regime delegitimation by shifting their early and unpopular westernizing democratic rhetoric to cosmopolitan statist nationalism; by making administrative changes, including the dismissal of radical reformers from the executive cabinet; and by pursuing a measure of political accord and cooperation, after October 1993, with government critics and popular representatives in the Duma.\textsuperscript{26} If these adjustments and others similar to it are maintained and pursued in the future (whether by Yeltsin or a moderate nationalist successor), there will be lesser internal instability in Russia and a lesser likelihood of malevolent nationalist empowerment.

On the socio-economic front, the government must implement more effective measures to combat crime and spread economic benefits to a broader sector of Russian society. Polls consistently indicate that order, social security, and economics are of central concern to the majority of Russian citizens.\textsuperscript{27} Yeltsin and his team are articulating the right rhetoric to address these concerns; indeed, they have adopted as

\textsuperscript{26}Regime delegitimation, including, for example, the undermining of autocracy as the basis of Russian statehood and government in 1856-1878 and in 1905-1914, helped the empowerment of aggressive nationalism. Regime delegitimation entails the rejection of an entire political system, as opposed to administrative delegitimation, which entails the rejection only of particular state officials or state offices. My thanks to Stephen Van Evera for pointing out this insight. I would argue that only administrative, not regime, delegitimation has taken place in Russia as of 1995. Further, by adopting cosmopolitan statist ideas, Yeltsin has managed to deny his malevolent nationalist detractors control in addressing issues of concern to society. This situation differs from 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, when the ruling regime failed to articulate and promote alternative and less benign variants of nationalism in response to issues that mattered to the articulate public.

\textsuperscript{27}See "Russia '96. The People Choose," \textit{Time}, 27 May 1996, pp. 51, 56.
campaign themes for the upcoming June 1996 presidential elections the following:
economic growth with greater social support, the strengthening of Russian statehood,
crimefighting, and promotion of stability.\textsuperscript{28} But rhetoric alone will not suffice. Although it
is doubtful that any government can permanently resolve Russia's multiple internal
challenges soon, greater effort and more effective policies on several fronts are needed
to forestall the deterioration of Russia's domestic situation. A danger looms that
uncontrollably permissive fiscal actions by the Yeltsin government itself,\textsuperscript{29} or
harebrained economic policies by a potential communist government successor, might
undo the progress that Russia has made thus far in macroeconomic stabilization (e.g.,
control of inflation), privatization, and market development. If a severe economic
depression ensues (as in Weimar Germany), then there will be a greater likelihood that
political elites will resort to extreme nationalist propaganda to regain legitimacy and
public trust.

Post-Soviet Russian society has demonstrated a low appetite for extremism and
violence, as evident in public disapproval of, and anger against, such policies as the
October 1993 violent shutdown of parliament and the war in Chechnya. The fact that
the radical market reformer Yegor Gaidar and the rabid nationalist Zhirinovsky tend to

\textsuperscript{28}See \textit{Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest} (OMRI, electronic version), 11
and 19 March 1996.

\textsuperscript{29}It is necessary for Yeltsin's government to spend more resources on social
welfare in order to alleviate popular suffering and cap internal discontent, but there may
be a dangerous point when these expenditures, if done with reckless abandon, could
lead to serious economic crisis. See "Russia '96," p. 52, for a description of some of
Yeltsin's monetary largesse intended to win him votes in the June 1996 presidential
elections.
rank lowest in popularity polls is yet one more indicator of popular distaste for extremism, whether of the liberal or conservative variety.\textsuperscript{30} This factor, perhaps attributable to Russian patience or mere exhaustion, contributes to relative stability and, if it continues in the future, will diminish the likelihood that the articulate public will support malevolent nationalists and their maximalist promises and programs.

2) \textbf{Domestic Incentive Structures}

I have noted that a helpful factor for benign nationalism in Russia is the state’s continuing leverage over concrete material incentives and rewards; of note, for example, are various forms of state assistance and privileges granted to business and bank conglomerates ("financial-industrial groups").\textsuperscript{31} This helps promote moderate nationalism in at least two ways. First, those who desire to benefit from powerful evolving economic trends in Russia must seek good relations with the Yeltsin government, which consists mainly of moderate cosmopolitan statists. Second, the dispensation of material incentives under the current government depends, in part, on solid linkages and positive relations with the outside world, including trading partners, international financial institutions, and the developed democracies. If the present


\textsuperscript{31}The formation of financial-industrial groups (FIGs) is a powerful trend in Russia today. The largest banks and businesses are already part of one FIG or other. See "Insider Banks Rebuild the Soviet Monopolies," \textit{Business Review} (Moscow), 19 March 1996, pp. 1, 11 and "New Tigers Corner Russia’s Ringmaster," \textit{Business Review}, 26 March 1996, pp. 1, 11.
Russian government or its successor continues the current mode of economic
development and state-based dispensation of material rewards, then the attractiveness
and utility of malevolent nationalism for those who seek material prosperity in Russia will
continue to be low.

3) Social Communication

The variable of social communication has largely helped advance the cause of
aggressive nationalism in Russia in 1991-1995. There are, however, at least two
developments that, in the future, could potentially reshape the impact of social
communication so that it diminishes the power of virulent nationalism. One is the more
effective use of mass media, especially television, by cosmopolitan statistists to promote
their ideas and simultaneously underline the dangerous implications of the propaganda
of their extreme national patriotic competitors. Already, for example, Yeltsin and his
colleagues have successfully used television, focus groups, and mass mailing to
communicate government sensitivity to public economic hardship; to express respect for
those who have defended Russian pride and greatness, including, for example, millions
of women veterans of World War II; and to refashion Yeltsin’s image from a
westernizing democrat to that of a patriot who represents Russianness and is worthy to
lead the Russian nation, but who is not chauvinistic, anti-semitic, militaristic or
imperialistic.32

32One journalist has commented that Yeltsin successfully plays the role of a
“tough though just tsar.” This may explain, in part, why he has managed to raise his
popularity rating from single digits in January 1996 to roughly 28% by May 1996. See
“Russia ’96,” p. 49 and Tatiana Malkina, “Boris Yeltsin: A Start Between Good
Another development that would decrease the likelihood of empowerment of aggressive nationalism is the increased sophistication of the Russian public as consumers of information and ideas. This sophistication will likely grow with the increased intensity, breadth, and abundance of contacts between Russians from all walks of life, on one hand, with ideas, citizens, and institutions from outside, especially the West, on the other. I would argue that the period from 1989-1995 constitutes Russia's most serious (though, of course, incomplete) break to date with its past. In 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, Russia also implemented liberal policies that allowed ideas and people to travel to and from Russia, but not to the extent that has been true in the past six years. Russians have been exposed to the outside world in greater and more intense ways than ever before, and the world, similarly, has been exposed to Russia.\textsuperscript{33} Thousands of Russians now regularly travel abroad to work or study, while numerous international non-governmental and governmental entities are working inside Russia to advance democratization, civil society and the culture of debate.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33}John Lloyd has expressed these points eloquently when he noted that "so much has changed for the better in [Russia in] the past decade. . . . If [Russia's] rulers do not wholly trust their citizens, at least they have been constrained, or have persuaded themselves, to treat them as citizens, as people with a potential stake in a potential society. . . . The world all about Russia has broken into it, and Russia has broken out into the world which surrounds it with a vigour and an appetite hitherto limited to the aristocratic elite." See John Lloyd, "The reform of Russia: for worse, for better," Financial Times, 24 January 1996, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{34}For an overview of some of these activities, see Nancy Lubin and Monica Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union: \textit{When Less is More}, Project on the Newly Independent States, March 1996 and Holt Ruffin and Joan McCarter, Channels. A Guide to Third Sector Projects, Organizations, and Work Opportunities in the New Independent States
4) **Threats and Opportunities in the International System**

A central finding of this thesis is that the perception of high threats to Russian interests and national honor, coupled with relatively "cheap" opportunities to pursue aggressive nationalist policies, are an extremely powerful factor in the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. In the next several years, two potential international developments could increase the likelihood that extreme nationalism will become empowered. One is rapid NATO expansion, especially if it includes Ukraine and the Baltic states. This would not only bring the borders of a widely-perceived Cold War anti-Russian institution and its weapons to the borders of Russia (thereby constituting a real threat), but would also wound Russian pride and honor, perhaps irreparably. In my numerous interviews and meetings with Russian political elites from nearly all prominent political parties in Russia, I have heard the same refrain: NATO expansion will feed virulent nationalism and anti-westernism in Russia, and will strengthen arguments for, and political resolve to, reassert Russian regional hegemony (by force if necessary) and diminish cooperation with the West on arms control and other matters.

Another development that would help aggressive Russian nationalism is severe crises or implosion in states in the "near abroad." The weaker and more unstable Russia's neighbors are, the more opportunity there will be for Russia to pursue aggressive nationalist actions at minimal or acceptable cost. Thus, for example, Tajikistan today, which exemplifies a failed state, has also given Russia the greatest

(Seattle, WA: Center for Civil Society International, 1995). Although I have not done so in this thesis, in a future revision it would be useful for me to examine more systematically how these activities have helped mitigate aggressive Russian nationalism, if at all.
room for projecting military power outside its borders. Although Russian actions in Tajikistan do not amount to a program of malevolent nationalism, they are nonetheless an unsettling sign of the hegemonic control which Russia can exert over weak neighbors and which could turn into a program of nationalist aggression in the future. One could, for example, imagine a scenario in which a disintegrating Ukraine might create an opportunity for Russia to retake the Crimea on the pretext of protecting the interests of the majority of Russian irredenta that lives there.

A difference between my case studies in 1856-1878 and 1905-1914, on one hand, and 1991-1995, on the other, is that, in the latter period, there have been no serious provocations from Russia’s neighbors in terms of the treatment of their Russian diaspora populations. In contrast, instances of tyrannical treatment and brutality against Slavs in 1856-1878 and in 1905-1914, roused Russians to aggressive nationalist action on behalf of their persecuted kindred. In addition, moderation has characterized the behavior of the bulk of Russian diaspora populations themselves in the "near abroad." Thus, unlike fervidly nationalist Serbs and other Slavs in the nineteenth century, "Russians abroad" today have tended to refrain from provocative actions to compel Russia to launch war or other sustained aggressive action on their behalf.

Finally, another development in the international system that would decrease the likelihood of empowerment of extreme nationalism is greater Russian incorporation into international institutions. It is important that Russia develop greater stakes as a member of the international community and as an adherent to international norms that eschew malevolent nationalism. Thus far, Russians representing nearly all opinions on the political spectrum, have expressed their desire for increased interaction and
integration with the international community.\textsuperscript{35} This bodes well for moderate nationalism; as long as political elites (who desire international recognition and international credits), intellectuals (who want to continue to travel and interact with outside colleagues), entrepreneurs (who desire to benefit from international commerce), and other groups have a stake in healthy Russian relations with the outside world, malevolent nationalism is unlikely to become empowered.\textsuperscript{36}

C. Some Policy Implications

As I have emphasized in Chapter Four, it is Russians themselves--both elites and the articulate public--who will largely decide whether or not a benign cosmopolitan statism is the nationalist ideology that will bind their state and society together. At the same time, I have shown in this thesis that variables in the international system do play a critical role in the empowerment of malevolent nationalism. Therefore, the policies that external actors take, including western states and international organizations, will

\textsuperscript{35}Interview with Gennadii Seleznev, member of Communist Party (currently Speaker of the Russian Duma), Moscow, 29 September 1995.

\textsuperscript{36}In a future revision of this thesis, it would be useful for me to examine systematically the impact of "carrots and sticks," or international incentives and sanctions, on mitigating extreme Russian nationalism. Do Russian elites refrain from aggressive nationalism for fear of losing benefits from, or status in, the international system? Do those who promote moderate nationalism do so because they believe that it would benefit Russia as a member of the international community? Another international variable that I might explore is "imitation." In 1856-1878, Russian pan-slavs promoted their ideas in part because they were imitating the successful national unification of Germany and Italy along racial-linguistic lines. Do Russians today refrain from supporting malevolent nationalism because they do not want to imitate the catastrophic experience of a state like the former Yugoslavia? Do they, instead, want to imitate the example of moderately nationalistic states that lead the world in prosperity and influence, including Germany, the United States, and Japan?
also help facilitate or prevent the enthronement of aggressive nationalism in post-Soviet Russia. What policies might help prevent the empowerment of virulent Russian nationalism?

First, to strengthen internal stability in Russia, western states and institutions should encourage the Russian government to pursue a lasting settlement to the ongoing war and crisis in Chechnya. Second, it will be important to monitor the impact of NATO expansion, if and when it occurs. The mere fact of expansion is unlikely to cause a crisis in Russia, but how it is done and who is included may induce crisis. Specifically, if expansion occurs at an accelerated pace and includes the Baltics and Ukraine, and if nuclear weapons aimed at Russia are stationed in countries on Russia's borders, a crisis of national humiliation and insecurity could lead Russian state elites to use malevolent nationalism to mobilize against external forces hostile to the Russian nation. The policy implication of this potential scenario is that NATO expansion should occur slowly and carefully, with leading western states continuing parallel diplomatic consultations and cooperative military engagement with Russia (this is what has happened until the end of 1995).

Third, western states must continue to engage Russia in such institutions as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe because the standards set by these institutions will help guard against malevolent

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37The peace agreement signed by Yeltsin and Chechen leader, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, on May 27, 1996, is a hopeful development. But it still remains unclear how this agreement will be implemented, what Chechnya's long-term status will be, and where resources will come from for the rebuilding that Chechnya direly needs. See Michael Specter, "Chechens' Leader Signs Peace Pact with the Kremlin," New York Times, 28 May 1996, pp. A1, A6.
Russian nationalist demagoguery and behavior. Engaging Russia in these institutions is likely to appeal to deep Russian desires for validation by, and respect from, the international community. If Russia is treated as a bona fide member of the international community, it will develop a serious stake in international cooperation and will become more likely to adhere to norms of behavior that preclude aggressive nationalism. Fourth, the World Trade Organization should also use its leverage over membership to help ensure sound economic policies that will strengthen internal stability in Russia. International financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should also continue their assistance to Russia, again for the sake of economic stabilization. At the same time, the IMF and other organizations should dispense loans and aid with attached conditionalities regarding tolerable standards of nationalist rhetoric and behavior. These conditionalities should be made explicit to Russian partners, but must be articulated and communicated in ways that do not unnecessarily insult or offend Russian pride.\(^{38}\)

Although it is judicious for international actors to pursue policies that are largely benign toward legitimate Russian interests, this does not mean that Russian destructive behavior in the "near abroad" should be tolerated, or that Russia should have a free hand in dealing with its neighbors. Two other policy measures might thus be helpful. One is for western countries to pursue cooperative relations with, and render economic assistance to, Russia's neighbors. The optimal policy is not one that chooses between Russia or the newly-independent states on Russia's periphery, but one that engages

both sets of actors. International measures that could help strengthen and stabilize the
polities and economies of states in the "near abroad" will help create a more predictable
and benign international environment for Russia and help prevent the empowerment of
extreme nationalism. The international community must also strengthen its efforts to
persuade states in the "near abroad" to implement and maintain fair and humanitarian
policies toward the Russian diaspora and to cultivate Russian loyalty by integrating
diaspora populations as fully as possible into their new states of residence. These
steps will remove potential arguments for aggression by malevolent nationalists in
Russia. A second helpful policy would be to call Moscow's "bluff" on peacekeeping in
the "near abroad." It is not constructive for western actors simply to condemn Moscow
for "aggressive nationalism" and "neoimperialism" while doing nothing to prevent or
resolve real catastrophes occurring on Russia's periphery.\(^39\) Instead, it would be useful
to take seriously Russian officials' calls for international approbation and financing for
their "peacekeeping" activities in the former Soviet region, and to work with Russia on
alleviating such problems as the influx into Russia of millions of refugees who, for one

\(^{39}\) Even Helsinki Watch has acknowledged that Russian intervention in the "near
abroad" has often "mitigated great hardships and saved innumerable lives." See
Helsinki Watch, *War or Peace? Human Rights and Russian Military Intervention in the
"Near Abroad,"* vol. 5, no. 22 (December 1993), p. 2. Russia has also given greater
assistance than other actors to crumbling states on its borders, as has been the case
with Armenia and its energy crises. While G7 countries have pushed Armenia to close
down a risky nuclear plant, for example, they have offered "virtually no assistance to
develop alternative energy strategies." One Armenian official has responded that he
"might be more sympathetic [to western concerns] had anyone helped us over the past
two years, but no one, apart from the Russians, who have helped us a lot, has done
reason or other, have fled from states in the "near abroad." Approbation and financial assistance for Russian "peacekeeping" might be offered on the condition that Moscow agrees to clear and strict standards of military behavior, as well as international monitoring.

V. After 1995, Whither, Russian Nationalism?

Russia has not, in the past, succeeded in finding and using an appropriate brand of nationalism to bind state and society together in a lasting manner. Today, another opportunity exists for Russia to find an ideology that will cement ties between citizens and rulers, and help make Russia a democratic, modernized, and self-confident member of the international community. This goal might be more achievable now than at any other previous time in Russian history. The dilemma of nationalism in a sprawling, multiethnic empire has largely diminished. Russia today is, indeed, more ethnically homogeneous than in 1856-1878 or 1905-1914. Figures from the 1989 census indicate a breakdown of the population of 147 million in the Russian Federation as follows: 120 million Russians (82%), 5.5 million Tatars (4%), 4.4 million Ukrainians

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40 Organizations like the OSCE and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees are already assisting Russia in solving problems of involuntary migration and mass refugee flows, and should continue their efforts. See "Ex-Soviet peoples on move," Financial Times, 23 May 1996, p. 3. For a view that condemns Russian "aggressive nationalism" in "peacekeeping" interventions in former Russian "colonies" and highlights the threat that the Russian military poses in the former Soviet Union, see John J. Maresca, The End of the Cold War is Also Over (eds. Gail W. Lapidus and Renee de Nevers), Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, April 1995, esp. pp. 10, 15, and 20. The desire of Russian military officials to achieve international recognition of Russian "peacekeeping" as a "sincere defense of Russian interests, not a pretext for rebuilding an empire" is recounted in Steven Erlanger, "An Army in Need of a Role," New York Times, 23 May 1994.
(3%) and 1.8 million Chuvash (1%). This factor, combined with substantive
democratization in post-Soviet Russia, implies that the task of using nationalism of
either the ethnic or civic variety, or some combination, to bind Russian state and society
may now have the chance it never had before to succeed.

I would argue that cosmopolitan statism is the best candidate nationalist ideology
to play the role of cementing Russian state and society. It is strongly linked to
historically resonant ideas of Russian distinctiveness and greatness (unlike westernizing
democracy, for example), and yet does not promote malevolent chauvinism and
expansionist imperialism. Not all nationalisms lead to aggressive behavior, and a
healthy dose of nationalism has proven critical for relatively successful democratic
transitions from communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central
Europe.\(^{41}\) In Russia, state and society have been strongly bound together by national
humiliation after the end of the Cold War. But humiliation is a negative basis for social
consensus, and only healthy nationalism can provide a more constructive and lasting
foundation for national consolidation. Wisdom, cunning, and control will be required of
Russia's leaders in the near future to allow cosmopolitan statism to take root and
become the basis for Russia's consolidation as a national state. In particular, political
leaders and intellectual opinionmakers will have to expend more effort to move
definitions of Russian "greatness" and "great power" status away from traditional notions

emphasizing military might, imperial expansion, and hegemonic behavior. If leaders succeed in redefining the basis of Russian greatness, they may yet see their country ready, finally, to enter the world of "normal, civilized nations."42

42This thesis, ending in late May 1996, does not cover the outcome of Russian presidential elections in June 1996. Frontrunners in the electoral campaign are Yeltsin and the communist Gennadii Zyuganov. Some have characterized Zyuganov as committed to "extreme ideas" and "the latest incarnation in a centuries-long tradition of Russian nationalists who celebrate Orthodox Christianity, Slavic unity, and imperial expansion." See, e.g., Adrian Karatnycky, "The Real Zyuganov," New York Times, 5 March 1996, p. A23. My own reading of Zyuganov's writings, his behavior as a political figure in 1991-1995, and an assessment of his responses to questions in a two-hour interview in October 1993 lead me to believe that Zyuganov does not belong to the most virulent and militant group of Russian nationalists. He favors a strong state and emphasizes the distinctiveness of the Russian nation, but does not advocate force as the primary instrument for restoring Russian greatness and prestige. If Zyuganov does win, several questions will be paramount: Will he have actual control of the Communist Party and policies that the party will take? If he reveals himself as a truly malevolent nationalist, will he have the right instruments for implementing an aggressive nationalist foreign policy? Will the army, the Federal Security Service (successor to the KGB), the police, and Russian bureaucrats obey his orders and implement his policies?
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