ELECTORAL REFORM IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME:

THE CASE OF MEXICO

Vol. 1

by

JOSEPH L. KLESNER

B.A., Central College (Iowa), 1980

S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1983

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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ABSTRACT

Mexico's authoritarian political regime has been more stable and long-lived than any other regime in a continent known for its instability. Mexico's exceptionalism by regional standards is not explicable in terms of the factors frequently used to explain regime change. Two peculiarities of Mexico's regime may account for this instability: its unified civilian elite and that elite's reliance on elections to legitimize its rule. Two contributions to the analysis of regime change are suggested. First, because change of regime from one ideal-type (e.g. democracy) to another (e.g. authoritarianism) is infrequent and often incomplete, the concept of regime should be disaggregated into its constituent dimensions so that change within regimes can be studied. Second, regime change (either drastic or minor) should be seen as the result of conscious choice by political elites, although a choice the consequences of which are not always known in advance. Furthermore, the likelihood that certain choices will be exercised depends on the structure of the political elite, e.g., whether the members of it share common interests or have competing interests.

In the post-revolutionary Mexican regime, the regime dimension expected by the ruling elite to provide an outlet for popular pressures has been the electoral system and the system of parties associated with it. At times, this dimension of the Mexican regime has required adjustment in order to provide both an escape valve for popular pressures and electoral victories for the ruling elite's electoral organ, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. The Mexican political elite has consciously chosen to "reform" the electoral and party systems at several key junctures in post-revolutionary history in line with these two requirements. In the years between 1968 and 1976, pressures were again mounting in Mexico due to a crisis in the economic development model and a popular delegitimation of the regime in the aftermath of the repression of the 1968 student movement. The electoral reform promulgated in 1977 to confront these challenges, its causes and consequences, is the focus of this research.

The general hypothesis was that the reforma política, Mexico's 1977 electoral reform, was an elite response to political and economic
crisis designed to channel dissenters into opposition parties operating within the legal electoral arena. Three sub-hypotheses were explored to address the general hypothesis. First, Mexico's electoral system, which had led to the development of a hegemonic party system in the 1930s and 1940s, was by the early 1970s failing to provide credible competition for the PRI and was not channeling the growing Mexican potential electorate effectively, causing many to choose alternative modes of participation. Second, Mexico's political elite (or a portion of it with access to the right organs of power) perceived that this problem existed. Third, those promoting the reforma política designed new electoral and party systems so as to insure that the PRI would not have suffered defeat. A second set of questions which were explored concern the results of this electoral reform. First, has increased attention to the electoral arena diverted participation from non-electoral channels? Second, has the opposition been divided and thus conquered by the electoral opening to the left? Third, has the development of the individual parties has generated credible alternatives to the PRI?

The decline in electoral participation, the atrophy of opposition parties other than the relatively conservative Partido Acción Nacional, and growing use of alternative modes of participation (including guerrilla insurrection, urban terrorism, independent unionism, and student unrest in the universities) in the early 1970s caused a group of progressives within the ruling elite led by PRI president Jesús Reyes Heroles to ponder an electoral reform which would expand the menu for party choice, especially on the left, and in that way encourage dissenters to reconcentrate their efforts in the electoral arena. When Reyes Heroles became Secretary of Gobernación under José López Portillo in 1976, he took advantage of his position and prestige to initiate the reform attempt known as the reforma política. While some on the left were initially hesitant about entering the electoral arena, they eventually chose to register their parties and compete legally. Multivariate analysis of district-level aggregate election statistics show that in many areas the legalization of the left has diverted some opposition support from the PAN to parties of the left, effectively dividing the opposition. In other areas, notably in the north, the PAN has taken advantage of economic crisis and aspects of the reform intended to eliminate electoral fraud to build a regional power base. Overall, the divide and conquer strategy has so far been successful despite the rise of the PAN. Furthermore, no opposition party, not even the PAN, has developed a powerful national organization nor a policy program with wide appeal. However, electoral participation has only improved in instances when specific efforts were made to bring out the vote, as in the 1982 federal election, although violent non-electoral participation has declined in salience.

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This thesis, no different from other works of this length, could not have been produced without help from many individuals and institutions. A few words of thanks are in order, understanding that gratitude alone cannot repay intellectual and other debts accumulated in the past four years. Many who helped me in Mexico cannot be publicly thanked for political reasons. Of course, no one mentioned below bears any responsibility for the errors remaining in this thesis.

This research was made possible by a Fulbright Grant for dissertation research in Mexico in 1983-1984. The arrangements which the USIS, particularly the Fulbright program coordinators Marsha Grant and Areceli Suárez, made for all Fulbright Scholars allowed for a relatively hassle-free year of research. Later, additional funding from the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Kenyon College made possible earlier presentations of work associated with this dissertation and additional research.

Peter Smith provided stimulating and well-grounded intellectual guidance from the time I arrived at MIT, pointing me in a direction different from the mainstream at a time when the importance of electoral matters in Latin America was not apparent to many. He and Walter Dean Burnham showed through their example and advice the value of aggregate electoral analysis and gave pointed suggestions for dealing with data that were far from perfect. Brian Smith provided my introduction to the theoretical issues surrounding democracy and authoritarianism in Latin America. Brian has taken much time to discuss these issues and gave me opportunities to present early
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Set in the geographical and cultural context of Latin America, Mexico exhibits a conspicuous peculiarity: political stability.¹ In a continent which in the past half-century has suffered and in many places continues to suffer from civil strife, coups d'etat, and political and social revolution, Mexico stands out and apart by having been ruled by what is essentially the same form of government since 1929. Presidential succession in Mexico has been carried out according to constitutional procedure since that year. Not even Stroessner's Paraguay shares this nearly sixty-year period of political stability with Mexico. The manner in which the other societies of this region have been governed has changed at least once during this period; some countries have experienced a number of unscheduled political turnovers. Not so Mexico.

However, in terms of the factors frequently used to explain political instability in Latin America, Mexico does not differ much from its neighbors to the south. Mexico has the same cultural heritage as the rest of the region, so explanations basing instability on aspects of Hispanic culture are inadequate for the case of Mexico. It is often argued that the Hispanic character tends toward violence and

¹Political stability is here defined as continuity or slow evolutionary change in the rules and practices of political behavior, including adherence to constitutional procedure regarding governmental succession.
authoritarianism.\(^2\) This is said to contribute to violent challenges to central authority and therefore to instability in the political sphere. Surveying these types of cultural analysis, one scholar wrote: "[t]hese sensitive reporters of impressions . . . emphasize the compatibility between the values and styles imparted by nonpolitical institutions and the perpetuation of patterns of political violence and revolution in Latin American political behavior."\(^3\) These nonpolitical values include, most notably, machismo and the mystique of death. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of violence in general is said to encourage the acceptance of political violence as a means for pursuing political ends. The same author thus concluded that "many Latin American political systems are characterized by manifestly violent political behavior and acceptance of violence as a 'legitimate' means for the pursuit of power."\(^4\) Yet, in Mexico, a serious violent challenge to central authority has not been mounted since the 1930s, despite the fact that Mexico shares Hispanic culture with its neighbors to the south and does evidence violence in nonpolitical interaction and even in some political activities which do not threaten to change the

\(^2\) See, for example, William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, 5, 3 (1952), pp. 445-469, esp. 468-469.


composition of the government.

As have all Latin American countries, Mexico has suffered the economic stresses that come with being a dependent economy. Yet, the effects of the Great Depression, especially the introduction of import-substituting industrialization, did not coincide with a major change in the way Mexico was governed, while it did so in most countries of Latin America. The exhaustion of the import-substituting industrialization model of development, said by some to be an important cause of the collapse of democracies in Latin America, led to no change in the Mexican political order. Austerity programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund, which strain the legitimacy of governments, have not led to the fall of a Mexican president much the less to a change of the constitutional order. Nor have overwhelming

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5 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 56-57 describe the general effects of the Great Depression on the political systems of the region. Wiarda, Critical Elections and Critical Coups, p.63 provides a time line of major political realignments in each Latin American country. Profound changes did come to Mexico in the period 1930-1940, in both the economic and political spheres, but the procedure for governmental succession established in 1929 was followed throughout the period and any challenges to the Mexican political order were effectively stopped.


levels of foreign debt generated the degree of political strife and instability in Mexico that they have in other Latin American countries, at least not to date.\(^8\) Mexico has experienced these economic crises no less than have other Latin American nations, but neither political instability nor abrupt political change have been associated with economic crisis in Mexico to the extent that they have been in the rest of the region.

Mexico is no less subject to the intrusion of outside philosophies and ideologies than other Latin American countries. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberalism and positivism did create many of the problems in Mexico that they did in other parts of the region: weak efforts to install democratic government superceded later by authoritarian, modernizing dictatorships which justified their rule with positivist philosophy.\(^9\) The norms of liberal democracy have pervaded Latin America, but they have not contributed to political stability throughout the region. Meanwhile Mexico, which is stable, strays from democratic practice. The gap between the ideal of liberal democracy and the social reality upon which it can be based may be great in all of Latin America, perhaps increasing the challenge of peaceful and regular transfer of possession of political authority.\(^10\)


\(^10\) This explanation is advanced by Martin C. Needler, \textit{Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change} (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 20-26, who argues that permanent instability in "Latin American political life is due to a continuing disharmony between the formal structure of government, the
Yet, this gap also exists in modern Mexico, where succession has been handled peacefully at least since 1940. Anarcho-syndicalist and Marxist ideologies have been important influences throughout the continent, inspiring revolutionary movements, but these have not occasioned political change in post-revolutionary Mexico. Overall, these ideological factors do not seem to explain political instability nor abrupt political change in contemporary Mexico.

Thus, arguments which stress cultural, economic, or ideological roots of political instability and changes in forms of government in Latin America inadequately explain the lack of instability in Mexico and the lack of abrupt change in the manner in which Mexico has been governed. Arguments which try to explain Mexican exceptionalism are often based exclusively on political factors. Such explanations emphasize the existence and operation of Mexico’s dominant political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), or the successful use by the Mexican state of revolutionary symbols to bolster its legitimacy, or a combination of these factors, as being the behavior it requires, and the ideas which sustain it, on the one hand, and informal sociopolitical realities, summarized by the set of dominance relations, on the other." (p. 21.)


12 This is O'Donnell's argument in Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 91-93: "the Mexican revolutionary heritage made possible the entry into high modernization with a low level of popular activation and demands, most of them channeled through established and largely 'encapsulating' political institutions."
important determinants of Mexican political stability. Others argue that Mexico’s political stability rests upon successful bargaining among the political elites.\(^{13}\) Still other perspectives on the exceptionalism of Mexican stability are based on the difference in the sequencing of political development and either economic change\(^ {14}\) or value change\(^ {15}\) between Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Certainly the existence of a dominant political party in the center of the Mexican political system and symbolic reference to the historical experience of the Mexican Revolution are important factors


\(^{14}\) Robert R. Kaufman argues that the reason Mexico did not suffer the collapse of democracy and the installation of bureaucratic-authoritarianism as a result of the economic crises characterizing the end of the easy phase of ISI as in the Southern Cone was that a moderate authoritarian regime was already in place in Mexico and the popular sectors had already been incorporated into corporatist structures when this economic phase was reached. "Mexico and Latin American Authoritarianism," in Authoritarianism in Mexico, edited by Jose Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), pp. 193-232.

\(^{15}\) Needler suggests that "instability results from the maintenance, after their implantation by processes of cultural diffusion, of public ideologies and sets of institutions incompatible with the attitudes and dominance relations of the informal sector of the polity." Thus, "the achievement of stability requires that the two sets of elements [ideologies and institutions versus attitudes and dominance relations] be brought into mutual harmony." He continues, "It is surely only in following the Mexican way—that is, by accepting temporarily less than ideally democratic modes of operation which are still consonant with social realities, while at the same time strenuously reforming those realities so that ever more democratic political practices can be adopted—that political stability can be achieved by nonegalitarian societies in a democratic age." Political Development in Latin America, pp. 27, 30. Needler’s argument, in a nutshell, is that institutions (the actual, operating institutions, not the formal ones) must be congruent with attitudinal and socioeconomic power factors or instability results and that in Mexico they are, so Mexico is stable.
leading to the stability observed in Mexican politics. Furthermore, different sequences in political institutionalization and the development of the types of economic difficulties or the diffusion of those political ideologies that encourage large-scale political participation contribute to understanding why Mexico’s experience has differed from that of many countries in South America. However, in theoretical and comparative terms, the resort to explanation based on political factors (the peculiarity of the PRI) in the case of Mexico and the use of economic or other explanations of political instability in the rest of Latin America is not logically consistent, parsimonious, nor particularly useful for application outside the context of Latin America. Those arguments which explain Mexico’s continuity of civilian rule while other Latin American countries ruled by civilians were at the same time succumbing to military coups which are based on Mexico’s development of adequate political institutions earlier than its participation crisis do have some plausibility. However, these arguments do not explain why these institutionalized military governments in South America are now falling before the growing participation of the civilian opposition while at the same time Mexico is only slowly liberalizing its system of governance.

None of the arguments so far considered have explained what is generic about the elements which cause Mexico to be politically stable. What about post-revolutionary Mexico is different from its

16 The argument that stability and instability are largely dependent upon whether institutionalization preceded participation or not is most forcefully stated by Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
neighbors to the south and why does this difference create stability in Mexico and lack of stability in, for example, Argentina and Brazil? I will argue in this study that two aspects of the Mexican political system are different from most other Latin American political systems and that these can be placed in a theoretical framework which can be applied comparatively.

First, Mexico's political elite is an unusually unified set of rulers who have been forced to cooperate with each other against all other potential contenders because of the political regime established in 1929. In a comparative perspective, the ideological and institutional location and strength of those elites ruling the nation (occupying the government) in relationship to those who are opposed to them (and wish to replace them) are important factors in determining what means (nonviolent, evolutionary versus violent, revolutionary methods) either side will use to obtain and/or maintain the reins of power. The importance to these governing and opposing elites for the maintenance of their social status of having the reins of power is also critical as is the actual degree of control over society that they

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would have as the occupiers of the upper reaches of political power. Furthermore, the ability to impose different rules for the competition for power is crucial for disposing elite groups to take those actions that, when looked at over a long period of time, would appear to the political analyst to be political instability. In political systems such as Mexico's, in which mechanisms have been developed for political aspirants to ascend the political ladder without having to distinguish themselves publicly from other contenders, the incentive to take extreme positions and thus invite political polarization and instability is lessened.

An approach to the question of political change which abandons either cultural or economic determinacy, which downplays ideological factors, and which raises political factors to highest level of importance almost necessarily requires great emphasis on choice, often choice made in times of crisis. Particularly if the Mexican elite's peculiarities are to be used to explain Mexican exceptionalism, then choice, in this case the elite's collective decisions about how to handle crises, is a critical aspect of political change. Models of political change which emphasize cultural or economic determinacy reject or severely downplay the importance of choices made by political leaders individually or the political leadership collectively. Some models of political change which stress the importance of economic factors do recognize that choices are made by political elites to modify the character of the political system, but the importance of
elite choice is often deemphasized. This study will approach the issue of political stability and political change from the perspective that choices made by elites matter very much. Especially in crises, there is latitude for choice on the part of elites. That is, when crises confront those ruling a society, when they must decide about the future of the political regime, there is uncertainty about the outcome. Elites may choose an institutional solution to the crisis, but even then the eventual outcome cannot be predicted.

A second aspect of Mexico's political system which distinguishes it from other Latin American countries concerns the specific features of its authoritarian regime. Political change can take many forms and can have many objects. The focus of this thesis is change at the level of the regime (further explored in Chapter Two), that is, change (or stability) in the formal and informal processes of government, in the

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18 E.g., Guillermo O'Donnell's work on the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism recognizes that a coup coalition must be formed from several social actors and that this coalition chooses to overthrow a government. Yet, he emphasizes more strongly the underlying changes in the economic and social structure which cause new "problem spaces" for which solutions must be sought. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 53-85.


rules of the game by which Mexican politics are played out. Since Mexico's Revolution of 1910, there has been only one major instance when Mexico's political regime was substantially changed, in 1929, when the features of the current Mexican regime were established. Since then, there have been modifications of this political regime to insure that it continues to guarantee the continued rule of the relatively unified ruling elite which still governs Mexico. One such modification came in 1977 in an electoral reform project known as the reforma política. This thesis is a case study of that project, of the underlying changes in Mexico's political economy and society which created the crisis the reforma política was designed to solve, of the process of choice by the ruling elite, and of the results of the venture. The distinguishing feature of Mexico's authoritarian regime is that, because of choices made by the revolutionary elite decades ago, Mexico's political regime places a heavy burden upon its electoral and party systems to legitimize the elite's rule and to channel discontent into relatively safe forms of political participation. In other important Latin American counties, the electoral and party systems have played their usual key role during periods of democracy. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for the downfall of democratic regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile has been the polarization which the dynamics of party competition exacerbated if not created. 21 Thus

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21 See particularly Valenzuela, Chile; Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict Among Political Elites, 1904-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Ch. 4 (the thesis of which differs slightly from that of the rest of the work); and Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, ed. by Juan J. Linz
it is the electoral and party systems which have been tinkered with by Mexico's elite so as to insure both political stability and its own continued dominance.

So, as a secondary theoretical focus, this study considers the critical role played by electoral and party systems in civilian authoritarian regimes. The electoral and political party systems in any political system are important regulators of political competition and political participation. This is true for authoritarian (or near-authoritarian) regimes as well as for democratic and totalitarian regimes.22 As Chapter Four will show, the major locus of regime change in Mexico since the foundation of the current regime in 1929 has involved the electoral and party systems. Various modifications within the Mexican regime regarding elections and political parties have been effected, the most important coming in 1977. Taking the reforma política undertaken by the administration of José López Portillo in 1977 as its focus, this thesis will explore changes within the electoral and party system as components of Mexico's authoritarian regime.


Mexico has suffered economic crises just as the countries of South America have. One such crisis took place during the administration of Luis Echeverría, in office from 1971 to 1976. If Mexico were to have experienced a military coup like those which took place in Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966, and in Chile in 1973, it would have come about during Echeverría's administration. As Chapter Three will detail, crisis in agriculture compounded by a growing unwillingness of Mexican industrialists to invest led to a general economic crisis by end of Echeverría's term. Inflation, capital flight, and two major devaluations of the peso resulted. Few economic groups felt that their interests were being served. This economic crisis added to the general dissatisfaction felt with the regime in the aftermath of the massacre of students at Tlatelolco in 1968. Declining electoral participation, increased electoral support for opposition parties, the development of new, more extreme, and unregistered opposition parties were evidence to all of the growing loss of legitimacy by the regime. Social polarization was high by Mexican standards as many leftists chose non-electoral forms of participation, including urban terrorism and guerrilla activities. Many entrepreneurs began to speak out against the government's economic policy and "populism." Rumors of a military coup became widespread at the end of Echeverría's term. But no golpe occurred. Instead, the López Portillo administration initiated an electoral reform soon after coming to power which had important consequences for the political party system.

Chapter Five will examine this reform, showing how the Mexican political elite responded to crisis by preempting possibilities of more
profound regime change which might have come from outside this elite. Modification of the electoral and party systems was chosen as preferable either to a more authoritarian crackdown on participation outside established channels or an inclusion of challengers in the policy-making process. Participation and competition was to be channeled into relatively safe, electoral channels instead of permitted to exist outside them. As the organizers of the most extensive study of recent attempts at liberalization and democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe remark, "parties, whether revived or emergent (at least those who estimate having a good chance of obtaining representation), show themselves to be not only, or not so much, agents of mobilization as instruments of social and political control."23

Of course, the results of the strategy of "convoking elections and provoking parties" are difficult to predict.24 Here the ingenuity of the Mexican ruling elite stands out in comparative perspective. Still, the outcome of this reform strategy have been mixed for the Mexican regime. Chapters Six and Seven examine, respectively, the changes in patterns of electoral participation and the sources of electoral support received by the opposition parties and by the electoral arm of the elite, the PRI, since 1977. Electoral participation has not consistently rebounded since the reforma política was enacted but the 1982 election demonstrated that electoral mobilization can be encouraged. New parties on the left have entered the electoral arena,

23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, p. 58.

24 The phrase is from ibid, pp. 57-64.
splitting the opposition in some settings. However, in other settings the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) has grown rapidly in popularity. Chapters Eight and Nine will investigate the development of opposition organization and ideology. Mexico’s political elite has not been replaced by the opposition as a result of electoral reform. However, it is receiving profound challenges from a source which the electoral reform did not sufficiently hamper, the PAN. Prospects for a profound change of regime due to this opposition challenge will be analyzed. At the same time, it must be recognized that change in Mexico to date is not of the scope of recent transformations in Argentina nor even of Brazil. This is a study of electoral reform designed to preserve the status quo in its most general aspects. While this reform had the potential to blossom into change of greater magnitude, to date it has not sparked democratization.

Two major points are central to this work. The first is that elite responses to challenges frequently involve changing the rules of public contestation so as to minimize the effectiveness of that challenge. The manner in which they are changed, the scale of elite response, depends on the very structure of that elite. A unified, cohesive elite responds differently than a divided, competitive elite. Comparative and theoretical perspectives on this issue will be provided in Chapter Two. Chapter Two will also discuss a second point, the utility of disaggregating regime types in the study of regime change. Whether certain dimensions of a regime can change without causing all others to change will be considered. In Mexico’s case, whether changes in the electoral system can alleviate pressures on other aspects of the
regime is the open question.

Chapter Ten, the concluding chapter, will comment on this second point, which is that the manner of channeling of political competition and participation can be important for regime stability. The role of the party system, often ignored in analyses of more authoritarian, but non-totalitarian, regimes (because interest representation receives more attention\textsuperscript{25}) is crucial, but not well understood. It is a task of this thesis to explore that dimension of authoritarian regimes.

Mexico's apparent exceptional political stability in the years since at least 1929, especially in the context of Latin America, require explanation, or so it was argued in the introductory chapter. Arguments that stress cultural, economic, or ideological roots of Latin American political instability were found wanting in the case of Mexico. Political factors have usually received more attention by those trying to understand Mexico's relative stability and its capacity to initiate preemptive social and political reform, including reforms such as the electoral reform of 1977, the reforma política. If political factors are crucial to explaining political change, then to be truly comparative, to be able to place Mexico within its geographical, cultural, and economic context of Latin America, a framework of analysis is needed. This chapter provides such a framework, examining first what a political regime is, what different ideal-type regimes there are, and disaggregating the ideal types to establish the dimensions upon which any regime may be compared. Then, to understand why regimes change, either drastically in the form of a change from one ideal-type regime to another, or less massively, in the form of reforms within a regime, the functions performed by a regime will be explored. Suggestions as to the possible sources of regime change will then be offered.
ASPECTS OF CHANGE AND STABILITY

Any discussion of change and stability, including a discussion of political change and stability in Mexico, is made with reference to something that changes or remains the same. A discussion of political change and political stability can conceivably focus on any one of a number of aspects of politics—party systems, modes of representation, styles of leadership, administrative capacity, and so on. Politics, following Weber, \(^1\) involves "striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." Since a state, in Weber's definition, \(^2\) is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," political action can be seen as the struggle over the source of legitimate authority in society. It is the struggle to establish and maintain or to change those means of making public policy which are considered to be legitimate by the various groups within a society.

The aspects of politics which are subject to change are, in general, four. First, the definitions of politics and the state advanced above imply that those institutions which claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a society might change. These institutions are those which make the decisions that are authoritative for the whole society and those which administer these decisions and ensure compliance with them. These institutions,

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\(^2\) Ibid.
collectively referred to as the state apparatus, or simply the state, can change in their structure, in their function, in their capacities to fulfill their functions (due perhaps to a change in their institutional structure), and in their interrelationships with each other.  

A second aspect of politics that can and does change over time is that which is the output of the state apparatus: public policy. The content of public policy generally follows some pattern in terms of costs and benefits for social groups. It is this pattern which may change over time. A third aspect of politics which might change is that information which affects how authoritative decisions are made by state institutions: information about what type of public policy is desired by different social groups, what type and how much support the

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3 The state apparatus, in this conception, equates to what David Easton called the "authorities" within what he called the "political system." See Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), esp. pp. 103-118 and idem., A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), esp. pp. 17-33. The making and administering of decisions, if administration of decisions includes judging how they should be applied in specific instances of conflict with the ends of other decisions, is similar to what Gabriel Almond and others have called "the three authoritative governmental functions, rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication." Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, edited by Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). While these theorists were somewhat unclear in their use of terminology, especially regarding the term "state," as Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. 3, points out, and while they have not focused on the role of this state apparatus in structuring public policy, as Stepan (p. 13) and Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics, 16, 2 (1984), pp. 223-246, both assert, it is important to note that this conception of an authoritative decision-maker and implementor did not leave political science during the time when "state" was not a common expression.
state can expect from these groups, and so on. Both the demands on the
state and the coalition of groups supporting the state are very
changeable.

Finally, the manner in which the struggle over the state is waged,
the way in which politics takes place, is subject to change. Within
political systems there exist rules and norms about how the struggle
over legitimate authority will be allowed to take place, such as who
will be allowed to participate, how this participation will take place,
what procedures will be followed in making decisions, how the
decisions, once made, will be implemented, and so forth. This aspect
of politics is more likely to change than the structure of the state
institutions over which the political battle is fought. This aspect of
politics, the formal and informal rules and practices of political
behavior, is usually called the regime, and is the conceptual focus of
this study. Political instability in the sense of frequent and/or

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4Fernando Henrique Cardoso states: "By 'regime' I mean the formal
rules that link the main political institutions (legislature to
executive, executive to the judiciary, and party systems to them all),
as well as the issue of the political nature of the ties between
citizens and rulers (democratic, oligarchic, totalitarian, or
whatever)." See "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in
Latin America," in The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, edited
Robert Kaufman equates the regime to "the rules of public
contestation." "Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt
distinguishes a political "regime," of which he writes: "The regime
refers to the general matrix of regularized expectations within the
limits of which political actions are usually considered
authoritative. . ." A Systems Analysis of Political Life,
pp. 193-194. It is, for Easton, both the constitutional order, "A
written code [which] offers a first approximation to the values, rules,
and structures that constrain the ways of processing demands and
circumscribe the nature of the outputs" and other "established
expectations in political life." (p. 193)
abrupt change in the manner in which public contestation takes place, as used in Chapter One, is regime instability.

The State and the Regime as Concepts

Studies of political change have focused on various aspects of politics. Those studying "political development" have studied numerous things which they have seen as "developing." Over time, the focus of development theorists has changed. Early studies emphasized development toward democracy, usually conceived of as political democracy of the Anglo-American type. Later studies focused on the development of differentiated political and administrative institutions and institutional capacity. More contemporary studies have examined the rise of authoritarianism and the changing role of the state and


6 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) was the most influential work within this approach. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, pp. 226-239, provides a survey of works of this type.

7 Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); Collier, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America; and James Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977) are the most important comparative studies.
state-owned enterprises in economic development. Yet, whether they have explicitly thought of their work in this way or not, these theorists have usually been looking at two general aspects of politics: The first is the policy-creating and administering institutions which claim to make authoritative decisions for society, that is, the state. Studies of political development as institutionalization and institutional differentiation, and those which examine the development of political capacity, especially the capacity of political authorities to penetrate society (to regulate and extract resources and to distribute politically valued goods and services), are essentially studies in state-building. Likewise, recent works on the state's growing role in directing economic development and of its relative autonomy vis-a-vis economically and politically powerful groups are examinations of the development of the state apparatus, of the authoritative allocator of societal goods and values.

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9 See especially Huntington's works.


11 Krasner provides a review of several recent studies which examine the growth of a state capacity and will to reorder the economy or the society. See "Approaches to the State." A similar review is provided by Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
The second aspect of politics frequently said to be "developing" or at least changing is the manner in which the society and the authoritative decision-makers interact, the manner in which the struggle for legitimate authority takes place, that is, the regime. "Developed" or "modern" societies were said by earlier development theorists to have a different way of reaching political decisions than traditional societies, a manner of decision making that was more open, competitive, and participative, that is, more democratic.\(^1\)\(^2\) Such analyses were precisely about the development of a relatively new type of regime, democracy (on a national scale). Other studies which were more pessimistic about the development of democracy in modernizing societies stressed the potential for a more closed and authoritarian style of rule to develop. Such works were concerned about the emergence of an alternative type of regime, authoritarianism.\(^1\)\(^3\)

Both of these aspects of politics, the state and the regime, are apt to change. But while conceptually distinct, they are seldom presented that way.\(^1\)\(^4\) Certainly some elective affinities exist between types of states and types of regimes, thus confusing the conceptual

\(^1\)\(^2\) See, most notably, Lipset, Political Man, esp. Ch. 2.

\(^1\)\(^3\) O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; Collier, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America; Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil; Stepan and Linz (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. See also the review essay by Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Authoritarianism," Comparative Politics, 5, 2 (1973).

distinction and leading to aggregated ideal types. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism may be one such aggregated ideal type: a highly bureaucratic state apparatus combined with relatively closed, authoritarian rules of contestation. But certainly many other combinations of highly bureaucratic states and regime types, or authoritarian regimes and types of states exist. Totalitarian and democratic regimes often coexist with extensive state bureaucracies, as for example in the Soviet Union (totalitarian) and France (democratic). Mexico, too, has presented difficulties to political analysts seeking to typologize its political system. For conceptual purposes, these elements of a political system, state and regime, should be kept distinct.

Furthermore, the way in which changes in the regime affect changes in the state, or work to maintain the stability of the state, is seldom addressed. Presumably, in some particular empirical context, a particular type of regime becomes paired with a particular type of state for some reason. To change the type of regime, the formal and informal patterns of political interaction, must have to do with maintaining or changing features of the state apparatus that currently exists. The fundamental thesis to be presented here is that an alteration in the characteristics of a regime change is a basic method of maintaining the coalition of elites and masses which support a particular type of state. Of course, regime change might also coincide with a major changes of the coalition supporting a state. Indeed, the latter is often analyzed by scholars studying regime change. Transformations such as those taking place in Argentina in 1983 are of
this type and are eminently worthy of study. Mexico since 1929 has experienced the former type of regime change, alterations in certain features of the regime to protect the status quo.

The Concept of the State

As noted by others, the state as a conceptual variable, especially as an independent explanatory factor, was ignored by political scientists for about three decades.15 This occurred at almost exactly the same time as social scientists became deeply interested in processes of political change. Studies of political development thus focused on change in some of the constituent elements of the state, institutions such as executive authority, legislatures, and bureaucracies, or on informal political institutions, such as interest groups and political parties, or on more general aspects of the political culture, such as political attitudes. Change in the state as a whole was seldom discussed. Part of the reason for this must be that it is difficult to observe change in the state as a whole. It is particularly difficult to treat the state as a dependent variable and explain what causes the development of the state.

However, the new interest in the state as a conceptual variable does not treat the state as a dependent variable, but rather as an independent variable.16 Thus, the state is seen as acting to promote economic development, to structure class relations, or to act in one

15 Stepan, The State and Society, p. 3.
16 Krasner, "Approaches to the State," pp. 230-240; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In."
way or another in the international environment. Two points should be made here: First, certainly the whole apparatus of the state is not involved in any particular act which appears as an instance of autonomous state action. Particular parts of the state apparatus act autonomously or independently in particular conjectures and not in others. Second, and more importantly for this study, raison d'etat and an independent "state interest" must be considered as sources of political action and causes of political change. This notion constitutes a definite contribution to (or reassessment within) the study of political change.

As noted, the state does not simply exist as a monolith that acts independently in the social sphere. Weber's classic definition of the state as being "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" goes on to state that "the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence." The state, then, exists at the analytical level as a reflection of the relationship of domination and subordination in society. This relationship of domination is multifaceted and includes, at the least, the relationship of the domination of those who form the coalition which is the backbone of the state's support over those who regard the state as illegitimate. While

all groups in society make some demands on the state, it is those who form the coalition which is dominant who normally provide "specific" support for the state. This specific support is based upon satisfaction with the outputs of the state's decision-making process, that is, it is linked to satisfaction with public policy. Generally, states produce public policies whose contents, over the long term, appear to follow a pattern, this pattern having a general thrust which tends to support the policy preferences of particular groups or classes within society. Typologies of states are frequently made based on the class composition of the social coalition which supports them and the content of their public policy, especially as regards the economic system which is in place or which the state is trying to put into place. Thus we have capitalist states, socialist states, feudal states (or non-states), populist states, and so forth.

At this abstract level the state also involves the domination of those who lead, that is, the governing political elite, those who fill the top positions of the state apparatus, over those who are denied these positions and over the masses who follow. Given this aspect of the state's existence, raison d'etat or the state interest can easily be seen in many instances to be the motives of those who dominate and wish to continue to dominate by changing the basis of their support or protecting that base of support, not some mystical motive of the state or of a statesman who perceives the needs of the nation-state.

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18 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, pp. 124-126. This is distinguished from diffuse support, "a type of support that continues independently of the specific rewards which the member may feel he obtains from belonging to the system." (p. 125)
While this characteristic of the state is in some senses analytical and abstract, the state likewise exists at a more concrete level as a set of institutions and laws that can, in the last instance, draw upon the legitimate use of violence to insure that its policies are in fact executed and followed. Those who occupy these institutions make laws, administer them, and adjudicate them. The state is thus manned by legislators, administrators, and adjudicators, although individuals and even institutions can certainly play multiple roles. Now, these institutions of course do not always act together as a unit. One major source of political change is in fact the conflict between particular institutions within the state apparatus. But, these institutions are all similar in that they can all draw upon the legitimate use of violence in the last instance. This distinguishes them from other political institutions in society, such as political parties and interest groups. They are thus considered authoritative, rather tautologically, because if they were not, their recourse to violence would not be considered legitimate.

At this concrete level one can distinguish between states which have more or less power to make and enforce policies within their societies. This includes both the ability to make and carry out policy within a hostile, or potentially hostile, society and the capacity to disregard the demands of various social actors (including international actors) when making this policy.\(^{19}\) Thus we have weak states and strong states.

\(^{19}\) Alfred Stepan, "State Power and Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. by Evans, et al., provides one conception of how to characterize the power of the state versus the power of civil society.
states, autonomous and dependent states.

The state, then, exists as a set of institutions (legislatures, executives, government ministries, judiciaries, local governments) which are considered to be the ultimate authority in society. This status as the ultimate authority permits the state to effect political change with probably greater efficacy than any other actor in society, at least for as long as it maintains its legitimacy. This state is supported by a coalition of social forces which has sufficient political power to maintain the relationship of domination and subordination that is reflected in the public policy generated by those institutions which form the state apparatus. Changes in this political coalition may not lead to actual changes of the institutions of the state itself, but they could certainly lead to changes in the output of the state apparatus, namely those public policies which reflect the relationship of domination and subordination in society. The state apparatus does change, but just as likely to change are the social functions of its constituent parts, depending to a large extent on which social groups are in the political coalition which supports the state and which are not.

The state as a set of institutions is subject to change, but even more changeable is the staff of the state. The state exists as a set of institutions but these institutions do not themselves make public policy, although their structure may strongly condition the content of that policy. Those who ultimately make the decisions about the content of public policy are the individuals who staff the state.

The staff of the state is not homogeneous in its functions. There
are at least two analytically separate functions performed by those who staff the state: policy making and policy application. Frequently the institutions of the state are structured to separate the performance of these functions, although in practice individuals within the state apparatus perform both functions. Generally, those who legislate policy and who are involved in executing that policy at the highest levels (at these levels the application of policy is in many ways the making of it) are called the government. Those involved in everyday policy administration are said to form the state bureaucracy.

The first group of individuals, those who form the government and who can be said to be part of the political elite of a society, is potentially subject to complete turnover at regular or irregular intervals. Those who are available to fill these high positions in the state usually belong to a relatively small group, small because political and administrative skills combined with popular appeal and other necessary social conditions of rule are limited to a small group within any society. This elite of potential rulers may or may not have relatively similar views about what should be the content of public policy, but in many systems of government they are expected and they themselves expect to spend periods of time outside the government. The government can therefore be said to be relatively changeable, especially compared to the institutions of the state themselves.

The bureaucracy, however, is a much more stable group of individuals. Certainly there is mobility within state bureaucracies, but this mobility is usually very incremental in nature and based on merit, somehow defined. Individuals slowly move up the administrative
hierarchy or move to positions in other parts of the bureaucracy while not fundamentally changing the character of the tasks they perform. Turnover in the bureaucracy usually means replacing individuals who are leaving or being promoted with individuals who are more or less similar to those they replace. Those who fill these positions in the bureaucracy in modern states are usually appointed for their technical capabilities, not for their political perspectives and goals, although these may be used as minimal requirements for a job. Chosen to administer day-to-day activities of the policy application process, bureaucracies are not subject to great and total change. Such change only comes with large scale changes of the state apparatus itself: when the institutions of the state are restructured or their functions redesigned, their staffs, or large parts of them, are often replaced so as to facilitate the change. When governments change, the bureaucracy usually does not change unless the new government’s goal is to completely change the whole state itself.

The state, then, can be seen as being staffed by two types of individuals: those who form the bureaucracy, taking care of the day-to-day aspects of policy application, whose individual positions and whose status as a group are relatively secure and stable, and those who form the government, those actually making public policy and seeing that it is executed at the highest levels, who are regularly turned out of office on either a fixed schedule or at least through some formally defined rules. This is not to say, however, that those who form the government are only politicians, although politicians are usually well represented in the upper levels of policy making and policy
application. Frequently, individuals with technical backgrounds (technocrats) are involved in policy making and the upper levels of policy application, especially in the translation of general policy goals into specific policies. It is important to note that the politician and the technocrat have different bases of support and authority and thus see the need for different types of public policy in order to bolster this support.

To recapitulate, the state is a set of institutions which claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a territory. It tends to support by means of its policy output a relationship of social domination and subordination within that territory. This relationship of domination and subordination and the policy that contributes to it are furthered by the state usually as a reflection of the social coalition that supports the state. Change in that coalition can, but need not, change the pattern of policy output by the state apparatus, and thus can, but need not, change the nature of domination and subordination in society. The state is staffed by a government, which experiences relatively frequent turnover, and a bureaucracy, which is more stable.

The point of this discussion of the state is to emphasize the extremely weighty role played by the state in society. It is the ultimate allocator of society's benefits and burdens. Thus, control of the output of the state, that is, of public policy, is very critical to each of society's many groups. These groups, then, have good reason to demand certain outputs from the state, even to seek to take the government so as to have command of the state and at least some control
of its outputs. None of this discussion of the state itself, however, tells how policy is made and applied by the state, who is permitted to make demands for specific policy measures and how that is to be done, how dissent can be voiced, and what type of informal institutions will be used and how for making policy demands, for competing for control of the state apparatus, and for ensuring conformity with the policy that has been made by the state. These latter aspects are features of the regime.

The Concept of Regime

The regime is the formal and informal rules and practices of political behavior. It is, in other words, the rules of the political game: who is allowed to play, how they are allowed to play, what instruments they are permitted to use, what rules determine when higher authority will be asked to intervene and which higher authorities will be deferred to, what specific processes will form the bases for determining who has the upper hand in the game, how the rules can be amended, when and how someone can bow out of the game and what the consequences are for doing so. Describing the political system in terms of inputs (demands on the state, support for it and those who occupy it, dissent, and so forth), a decision-making and executing apparatus (the state), and outputs (public policy) certainly identifies the boundaries of the political system, the major actors, the institutions through which they act and interact, and the results of the interaction. It does not say anything about how they act or interact nor even how this is determined. Furthermore, it does not say
how the way they interact conditions the output of the decision-making and executing apparatus. To do this one must include analysis of the regime and its relationship to the state.

Of course, regimes, or what have been defined as regimes here, have been discussed before, Aristotle being the first contributor. However, the distinction between a regime and a state has frequently been blurred.20 Furthermore, even while the distinction has at times been drawn, and the separate terms used, the tendency has been to either associate a particular type of state with a particular type of regime and see the two as almost necessarily linked, or to at least associate one type of regime with one type of state and view them as an ideal type, while using the terms regime and state interchangeably to refer to it (thus, bureaucratic-authoritarian state or bureaucratic-authoritarian regime), and discussing this combination to the exclusion of all other possible combinations.21 The argument here is that even if there are tendencies or correlations between types of

20 For clear distinctions, see especially Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritative Regimes in Latin America," pp. 38-40. In his discussion of authoritarian regimes, Juan Linz points out that "Our concept focuses on the way of exercising, organizing power, linking with the societies, on the nature of the belief systems sustaining it, and on the role of citizens in the political processes without, however, paying attention to the substantive content of policies, the goals pursued, the raison d'etre of such regimes." (emphasis added) "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 265.

21 Cardoso cautions: "An identical form of state -- capitalist and dependent, in the case of Latin America -- can coexist with a variety of political regimes: authoritarian, fascist, corporatist, and even democratic." He goes on to argue that "there is room for exploring the degree of 'compatibility' between different forms of dependent capitalist states and different types of regimes." "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," pp. 39-40.
regimes and types of states, the two concepts are analytically distinct and should be treated as such in order to more fully understand political stability and political change.

**Ideal-Type Regimes**

**Democracy.** Regimes have been discussed by scholars for generations, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. At least three ideal type regimes have been defined and defended (conceptually as well as politically), being frequently mentioned in everyday discussion. The ideal type most subjected to discussion is democracy. Definitions of democracy vary widely, mostly depending upon what is the realm of democracy. To the extent that we use the term democracy to refer only to a political regime as defined above, we can follow Juan Linz and define democracy as a system of governance that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for peaceful competition for political power (and not just a share of it) to different groups without excluding any significant sector of the population by force.

This implies, according to Linz, legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and

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nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political preferences.

In this usage, democracy is synonymous with Robert Dahl’s notion of polyarchy. To Dahl, "polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation." However, for Dahl "a key characteristic of democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals." While the political institutions of a polyarchy may allow for political participation and public contestation for power, they do not guarantee that public policy will mirror the citizens' preferences (weighed equally). However, as Dahl states, no political system in the world is democratic as he would define the term. For that reason, even though a polyarchy is not a democracy in Dahl's sense, the term democracy will be used here to mean what Dahl means when he speaks of polyarchy because an polyarchy does include citizen participation and public contestation for political power, and is thus an approximation to Dahl's democracy.

The important dimensions of a democratic regime, then, are relatively high levels of political participation, at least compared with traditional forms of rule, and the openness of the political

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26 Ibid., p. 1 (emphasis added).
struggle to most, if not all, groups within society.\textsuperscript{27} This openness of public contestation implies that no ideological currents are completely prohibited from efforts to gain representation in the state, although it is certainly possible that the ideology of those who control the state, of the social coalition which backs it, would be hegemonic.\textsuperscript{28} The important point of consensus in a democracy, however, is on procedure: methods for selection of alternative governments and through this for selection of alternative public policies.\textsuperscript{29} That is, the important point of consensus in a democratic regime is precisely on the regime itself.

**Totalitarianism.** A second ideal-type regime is totalitarianism. Linz,\textsuperscript{30} drawing on Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Franz Neumann, and others, identifies a totalitarian regime as having the following characteristics:

1. There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the preexisting society.


\textsuperscript{28}That is, the openness of public contestation to all ideological currents does not prohibit ideological hegemony of the sort discussed by Gramsci. See Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), esp. the essays on "The Intellectuals," "The Modern Prince," and "State and Civil Society."

\textsuperscript{29}This is Schumpeter's point: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd edition (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 269.

\textsuperscript{30}Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," pp. 266-269.
2. There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them. . .

3. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups.

Authoritarianism. A third ideal-type of regime is authoritarianism. Again following Linz, authoritarianism is a political system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in [its] development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.

Authoritarianism, as defined by Linz, thus has four dimensions: limited pluralism, usually limited political mobilization, weak or nonexistent ideology, and poorly defined but predictable limits on the power of leadership. In contrast to democracies, authoritarian regimes allow little pluralism within the political sphere, in the operation of interest groups and political parties most notably. Yet there is a possibility of some interplay of interests and social groups have some opportunity to be represented in the state in an authoritarian regime. Authoritarian regimes tend toward depoliticization and demobilization of the population. At some point, in some regimes, mobilization is encouraged by those controlling the state, especially in order to consolidate the regime in the face of opposition. However, as Linz

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argues convincingly, most authoritarian regimes converge on low levels of limited mobilization of the population since "[m]obilization and participation ultimately become difficult to sustain unless the regime moves in a more totalitarian or democratic direction."32 Authoritarian regimes do not usually develop elaborate, explicit ideologies to guide political activity. Certainly those who rule in authoritarian regime have general ideas about how they are ruling and to what end, but unlike in a democracy, there is little population-wide consensus as to what procedures are to be followed, and unlike in a totalitarian regime, there is little agreement as to the final goals of the state and political activity in general.33 Finally, leadership has few constraints on the exercise of its power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, unlike in a more totalitarian regime, an authoritarian ruler generally limits the exercise of his power to certain generally expected limits. These limits would be explicitly defined in a democracy.34

These three ideal types of regimes are the most pervasive in the modern (twentieth century) world. Some vestiges of traditional authority and personal rule do still remain, as Linz points out.35 However, these three ideal types are much more common in societies in which modernization (industrialization, urbanization, mass education) have led to social differentiation (hence pluralism) and the potential


33See ibid., pp. 266-269.

34These four characteristics of authoritarian regimes are covered in depth in ibid., pp. 264-274.

35Ibid., pp. 252-264.
for mass participation in politics.

Yet, for the study of regime change, these ideal types present limitations. First, like all ideal types, they are not meant to perfectly mirror reality. Rather, they are meant to provide logically consistent categories. As such, the internally-created dynamics of such regimes should lead them towards the ideal characteristics. However, regimes in the real world of politics seldom perfectly reflect any one of the ideal types defined above. Frequently, they mix characteristics from different ideal types or they deviate from the perfect representation of a particular characteristic. For example, many democracies do not have completely open contestation over public office and public policy or the political participation of some groups or individuals is somehow limited. Yet, if a polity’s characteristics seem more like those of the ideal type of democracy than of authoritarianism or totalitarianism, they are called democracies.36

Second, despite the fact that few regimes actually fit the ideal types elaborated above, analyses of regime change usually focus on change from one ideal type to another. There are bodies of literature on the emergence of democracy from traditional forms of rule, on the imposition of totalitarianism on societies formerly ruled by a traditional regime, on the breakdown of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism or authoritarianism, and on the liberalization of authoritarian regimes. These literatures examine many of the most intriguing questions in the study of politics yet their analyses are

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36 Dahl’s Polyarchy contains one such attempt to classify polities into democracies (or polyarchies) and non-democracies.
usually limited to changes of regime type, not changes within regime type, which are undoubtedly more frequent.

Furthermore, studying change of regime from one ideal type to another implies that each of the components of the regime changes from the quality it exhibits in one ideal type to the quality it exhibits in another ideal type. The study of change from democracy to authoritarianism, for example, would involve studying how open public contestation becomes limited pluralism and how a mobilized citizenry is demobilized, to take just two important components of any regime. But how many regimes commonly referred to as democracies have completely open contestation for public power and how many have one-hundred percent political participation? How many authoritarian regimes completely demobilize the potentially active population and how many varieties of limited pluralism are there? To focus only on change from one ideal type of regime to another, while very important in itself, is to eliminate from analysis the majority of changes in regimes, which are of a less total character. Also, it leads one to force the study of the change of any regime into the patterns observed or hypothesized for the change between ideal types even when the particular case to be examined might not fit into those types in the first place. Misinterpretation of even the potentially observable changes is a likely result.

Third, and related to the second point, the emphasis on ideal types thus leads the analyst to deemphasize analysis of change in the constituent parts of a regime: the degree of pluralism and potential political competition, the participation of the masses in politics, the
manner of choosing the successors to political authorities, and the type and function of ideology, the style of decision-making and policy implementation, and the protection of civil and political liberties. Changes in any of these characteristics are important changes in a regime. A change in one of them does not necessarily lead to changes in other of the characteristics. Indeed, a change in one of the constituent aspects of a regime may be consciously designed to discourage changes in any of the other regime dimensions. That is, reform in one regime dimension may be intended to preserve the status quo overall. Now, such a reform may have unintended consequences which lead to change in the overall matrix of regime dimensions at a later date, especially if the ideal types have the internal logic that they reputedly have as ideal types. But studying the change of the whole package of regime characteristics usually means ignoring change in the constituent characteristics and the possibility that change in one of the characteristics will either lead to further changes in all of them or to retard change in the others.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the ideal types be decomposed. What are the major aspects of any regime? In discussions of regimes, there are six functional dimensions on which regimes can be compared. These are (1) the degree of social pluralism and the possibility for its political expression, (2) the extent and type of citizen participation in politics, (3) the mechanism for resolution of the succession of the political authorities, (4) the type and role of ideology, (5) the manner of making and implementing public policy, and (6) the protection of civil and political liberties (or openness of the
political process to criticism).

Of course, a single political institution may play a part in one or more of these functional characteristics of a regime. Likewise, more than one institution may be involved in a single functional regime characteristic. While upon observation a change in one or more functional characteristics of a regime may be said to take place, that change will have to have had to take place in some institution. The study of Mexico’s reforma política is an examination of a change in the electoral and party systems, a change with consequences for three functional dimensions of Mexico’s regime: pluralism and competition, electoral participation, and protection of civil liberties.

DIMENSIONS OF REGIMES

Pluralism and Competition

Proponents of liberal democracy have long argued that pluralism within society, if permitted to express itself politically, would inhibit tyranny by both majorities and minorities. Tyranny being the antithesis of democracy, social and political pluralism is therefore seen to be an important contribution to democratic decision-making. Dahl makes competitiveness, or the degree to which social and political groups are permitted to compete in the political arena, one of his measures of a polyarchy.37 While the political representation of social pluralism has long been held to be nonexistent in totalitarian regimes, some have argued that decision making in totalitarianism must be seen

37Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 7.
as resulting from an interplay of groups. As Linz argues, however, "[t]he pluralism of totalitarian systems is not social pluralism but political pluralism within the ruling political elite. . . whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the preexisting society." In authoritarian regimes, social pluralism exists and is expressed politically, but the expression is limited. To quote Linz again, "In authoritarian regimes, the men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and institutions derive their position not from the support from those groups alone but from the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling group, which certainly takes into account their prestige and their influence."

The political representation of sociopolitical pluralism can take several institutional forms. Political parties and interest groups are institutions which most often assume this function and which compete to form or influence public policy in democracies and to some extent in authoritarian regimes. Both party systems and interest representation schemes vary greatly in their capacity to provide an arena for political competition. Party systems range from single-party and hegemonic-party systems through two-party systems to multiparty


40 Ibid., p. 266.
Interest intermediation systems also vary, some providing few limits on a group's ability to pressure policy-makers, others rigidly controlling the capacity of groups to exert pressure on the state. Under totalitarianism, political pluralism is not institutionalized but rather takes the form of bureaucratic struggles at times or of conflict within the highest levels of the political elite. Group competition and political pluralism thus varies from regime to regime on the dimensions of the extent of its existence and the institutional location of its expression (see Figure 2-1). A regime can have more or less political pluralism or group competition than another and it can be found in differing institutional locations. When a regime changes, this change may be reflected in an increase or a decrease in group competition and/or where this competition takes place.

Political Participation

The level of political participation varies greatly from polity to polity. Some parties are characterized by an intense amount of mobilization into politics among all groups in society. In others there is little involvement in politics outside of a small political

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41 See, most notably, Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Because party systems will be examined throughout this thesis, no extensive treatment of them will be given here.


43 All figures and tables will be found at the ends of the chapters in which they are contained.
Authoritarian regimes are characterized by relatively low levels of political mobilization; the masses are usually unwilling or unable to participate politically in an authoritarian regime because of disinterest or constraints imposed on their political activity by the state. In totalitarian regimes, however, mobilization is quite high: the state encourages or demands participation in collective undertakings. In a democracy, participation can vary greatly in intensity (witness highly contested electoral contests) and in extensiveness (while in early liberal democracies the range of relevant participants was extremely narrow, in many contemporary democracies all groups engage in political activities). In sum, regimes vary a good deal on the amount of social intercourse which they permit or encourage to be specifically political.

But not only do regimes differ on the sheer volume of participation which they permit or encourage, they also differ on how that volume of participation is channeled. The formal expression of a preference for individuals to fill the various posts in the state, that is, voting, is but one manner of participating. Even that method of participating differs in form and function from regime to regime. Within democracies, participation usually takes the form of placing demands on the state for political goods, although support for the government and the regime in place is also a critical component of political involvement. Even within a democratic regime, demand-making

44 Dahl makes participation one of his dimensions of democratization, along with competition. Polyarchy, p.6.
and support takes place through many channels: citizen-initiated contact with public authorities, voting, campaigning, engaging in cooperative group activity, among other methods. Participation outside of formal, established channels of participation, such as open protests and revolutionary activity, also takes place in democracies, but its importance is perhaps even greater in non-democratic regimes, particularly authoritarian regimes, which seldom have numerous institutionalized modes of expressing discontent. In totalitarian regimes, most political participation is state or official-party initiated mobilization of the citizenry for the achievement of collective goals, or goals defined by the state or the party to be for the public good. (See Figure 2-2 for a summary of channels of participation.)

Political participation, then, varies by the amount of participation which takes place and the manner in which it takes place. When a regime changes, this change may include a modification of either of these aspects. For example, a constitutional reform or policy initiative which would encourage greater electoral participation must be considered a change within the regime. In the same way, executive decrees which suspend political party or labor union activities modify the regime.

Transition of Power

Individual governments and governors do not maintain control of a

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state indefinitely. Some regimes mandate regular changes of
government, while others do not effectively regulate the transition of
power. When a government is to be changed, the new government must be
chosen and power transferred. Perhaps the central component of
democracy is the formal procedures it establishes for choosing new
governments and transferring control of the state to them. As Lindblom
states, "What is distinctive about a contest for authority designed
under polyarchical rules is that top authority is assigned in response
to a routinized indication of citizens' wishes—that is, an
election—an indication, moreover, in which any one citizen's vote is
by some formula counted as equal to any one other's."46

The existence of formal constitutional rules for the transfer of
power which are followed in spirit as in law is one extreme type for
this dimension of any regime. Most, if not all, regimes in the world
provide formal constitutional procedures for executive succession, but
in many regimes these constitutional procedures merely validate or
ratify a process of struggle for power which takes place behind the
veil of these formal procedures. In military authoritarian regimes and
one-party authoritarian regimes the struggle for succession usually
involves factional in-fighting which is not even well-concealed.
Sometimes, but not always, the successful faction's candidate assumes
power through a formal selection procedure, such as an election; at
other times the winner simply assumes power in a very naked fashion. A
regime in which succession takes place through factional struggles at

46 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's
also Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 269.
irregular time intervals which are not hidden from the public and not ratified by formal constitutional processes forms another extreme type for this aspect of regimes.

More common than either strict adherence to constitutional procedure in both the selection and ratification of new leadership or a completely visible naked power struggle for top authority which is never made constitutionally legal is a factional power struggle which is concealed to a greater or lesser extent, depending upon the ideological unity of those in power, ratified by adherence to constitutional procedure. Regimes controlled by an ideologically-unified elite, such as many totalitarian regimes, tend to mask factional power struggles in order to maintain the outward appearance of unity of purpose. One-party authoritarian regimes also tend to try to maintain an appearance of unity, hence formal mechanisms used in the transfer of power, such as elections, are emphasized.

Role of Ideology

Regimes may be marked by an ideological emphasis which is transferred to all aspects of political activity. This may take the form of ideological struggle between competing groups of elites, as is often seen in democratic regimes, or of efforts by a unified ruling elite to force its ideology on the whole population and to justify all of its actions in terms of its chosen ideology, as is observed in

47 Ideology is used here to refer to an explicit system of thought, more or less intellectually elaborated and organized, frequently existing in written form.
Regimes in which political activity is highly oriented by a single ideology, or in which political struggle is predicated upon the clash of such orienting ideologies, differ greatly from regimes in which explicit schemes which direct political behavior are absent. In such regimes, which include democracies not characterized by ideological conflict and authoritarian regimes, there may exist a "mentality" (to use Linz's term), or an "elite consensus," or a type of Gramscian ideological hegemony which does guide political activity. However, this mentality, or elite consensus, or hegemony is seldom explicitly defined or written down. For this reason, the lines of societal cleavage are more difficult to draw than in a regime marked by the existence of a strong ideology or more than one ideology, and political conflict is thus often muted.

Regimes in which ideological orientations are dominant usually witness efforts by those who control the state to legitimate their rule in ideological terms. In regimes in which ideological orientations are weak, legitimation is based upon adherence to procedural norms, as in democracies, or upon traditional or charismatic sources of authority, as in authoritarian regimes. As the latter sources of legitimacy are

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48 Linz makes the existence of an orienting ideology in totalitarianism and the absence of an orienting ideology in authoritarianism a crucial reason for distinguishing between the two. See his seminal article on Spain: "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," esp. pp. 257-259.

49 Susan Kaufmann Purcell, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study," World Politics, 26, 1 (1973), p. 31. Note that Purcell does not view a high degree of elite consensus as a defining characteristic of an authoritarian regime (there is this consensus in Mexico). Rather, individual authoritarian regimes can vary from having high to low degrees of elite consensus. This argument supports the notion that regime types should be disaggregated into their constituent dimensions.
fleeting in the modern world (charismatic authority, because it is by nature tied to a single leader or small group; traditional authority, because the diffusion of modern, rationalist ideas has undercut it), and in the absence of ideological means of legitimizing themselves, authoritarian regimes face the major dilemma of not being able to develop the diffuse support needed to continue their existence and thus have to be so successful in public policy making and implementation that their specific support is strong enough to eliminate the need for diffuse support. 50

Decision-Making and Implementation

The making of public policy can be done in a very centralized way, or it can be carried out in a more decentralized manner. Centralization here can refer to geographical centralization, in the sense of policy being made in the capital for the provinces. It also may refer to centralization within the apparatus of the state, in the sense that a few individuals in the highest posts of the state make most public policy decisions. Likewise, implementation of the public policy which has been made can be directed from the nation’s and the state’s center, or that policy can be put into practice by local officials and bureaucrats at lower levels in the state apparatus.

Totalitarian regimes tend to be highly centralized in both policy-making and implementation. Policy-making is particularly concentrated in the highest reaches of the central state and while

policy may be implemented at the local level, this implementation is closely monitored by agents of the central state. Authoritarian regimes, too, are highly centralized in the making of public policy. Policy tends to be initiated by those at the top levels of the state as well as being legislated or decreed into law by them. However, the degree of centralization of policy implementation in authoritarian regimes tends to be more variable. The authoritarian rulers at the center may be more tolerant than their totalitarian counterparts of regional discrepancies in the implementation of their policy if they are unable or unwilling to rock the boat of regional strongmen who are their allies.

Democratic regimes are often heralded as offering local autonomy in both the making and application of public policy. The trend, however, has been for centralization to intensify even in democracies, more so in some states that in others. Yet, democratic regimes permit a greater number of people to take part in decision-making than do their authoritarian or totalitarian counterparts.

Centralization, though, is more an aspect of the state than of the regime. The aspect of decision-making that is more specifically a regime-level variable is the openness of the decision-making process to public inspection, criticism, initiation, and pressure. Closed policy-making processes are characterized by policy initiation by high-level members of the government in the name of that unified government, sometimes as a response to issues that have arisen in civil society, many times in anticipation of pressures that may arise in civil society. Policy-making in such a closed system is usually veiled
from the public; who supports a measure, who writes the legislation or
decree, and how the chief executive becomes convinced of its merit are
never revealed to those upon whom it will be applied. This process
often is closed to criticism, either about the process itself or its
output, by the public and the press. Furthermore, the ability of those
with common interests either to group together or, if they can
associate, to put pressure on policy-makers, is either nonexistent or
very limited.

This sketches a picture of a policy-making process in which those
at the upper reaches of the government initiate policy and design it in
relative secrecy, free from public criticism and interest group
pressures. Such a picture of an autonomous state resembles the
policy-making processes in totalitarian regimes and, to a less extreme
extent, in authoritarian regimes.51 Authoritarian regimes are
characterized by a less ideological inclination than totalitarian
regimes; governments in authoritarian regimes are hence often more
tolerant of criticism of policy-making than totalitarian political
authorities, but there are acknowledged limits to this criticism.
Because a state in an authoritarian regime is somewhat less autonomous
than its counterparts in totalitarian settings, it is more subject to
interest group pressures, by again this is limited.

In democratic regimes, on the other hand, policy is frequently
initiated by those outside the government, either from among the

51 Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative
argues that one purpose for authoritarianism is to create state
autonomy vis-a-vis important social actors.
organized opposition or from interest groups. The opposition and the press is free to criticize the policy process and the output of it. Of course, the intensity of this criticism varies greatly from democracy to democracy and depends upon the international situation (criticism is usually less virulent during wartime even in democracies, except when support for war is not widespread). One consequence of press and opposition freedom to operate is a relative lack of secrecy in the democratic policy-making process, again depending upon the external situation and the policy issue. In general, democracies differ from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in that the decision-making process is more open to inspection, criticism, and initiation from those in civil society.

Regime change in regard to this dimension of a regime, then, involves an opening or a closing of the decision-making process. A change which diminishes the ability of those in civil society to observe, critique, or initiate public policy must be seen as a move away from a democratic decision-making process toward a more authoritarian process of making policy. As policy-making becomes less secretive or as members of the larger society become more able to openly comment about it, the regime can be said to be moving away from an authoritarian or a totalitarian decision-making style to a more democratic one.

Protection of Civil Liberties

In designating the nature of a regime, perhaps as much attention is paid to the provisions that regime makes for protecting civil liberties as any other indicator mentioned thus far. Numerous groups
currently monitor the state of human rights, or civil liberties, or political rights in the many countries of the world, using different measures to determine the ranking of countries on some scale of civil liberties provision. Because of the development of such scales to monitor the state of human rights in the world, this dimension of a regime is probably the one about which there is the greatest understanding that regimes vary even within the broad categories of democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian.

Freedom of speech, association, and religion, and protection against political imprisonment are liberties usually protected by democratic regimes. Indeed, whether it is possible to maintain the political competitiveness and voluntary political participation demanded for a regime to be democratic without at the same time making it reasonably certain that the civil liberties of those who participate will be protected is unlikely. Yet, not all regimes which seem to be democratic on most counts provide civil liberties for all of their citizens. Many regimes which have permitted some social groups to participate in politics, to compete for power, and to join in public policy-making have denied to other groups these same civil and political rights. So even among the regimes which score high on competitiveness and participation there is variability concerning the protection of civil liberties.

Among regimes considered to be undemocratic, the protection of civil liberties is even more variable. It is this very uncertainty which often inhibits the formation of political oppositions in authoritarian and totalitarian settings. General perceptions are that
authoritarian regimes are less absolute in their denial of civil liberties than are totalitarian regimes. Yet, authoritarian rulers have within the past two decades proven capable of total and merciless disregard of human rights.

On this dimension of regimes, regime change entails either more complete protection of civil rights or more complete disregard for them. Completeness here can refer to completeness of the population covered (all individuals or just those from some groups) or completeness of the set of freedoms which are protected (speech, religion, association, and so on, or some subgroup of these). A move towards more complete provision of civil liberties to all members of the population would be a liberalizing, democratizing change while a trend or abrupt movement away from complete provision of civil liberties is a move away from liberal democracy.

As has been argued above, regime change may involve change along any or all of these dimensions. A regime may be changed in regard to the ability of different social groups to participate in some parts of the political arena while the decision-making process at the highest levels of the state stays closed. Progress might be made in the area of protection of civil liberties while the ability of many social groups to compete for power remains limited or nonexistent. Figure 2-3 displays the extreme values that may be taken on within these dimensions of the regime. The values along these dimensions that the ideal types typically take on are illustrated in Figure 2-4.

To argue that regimes can exhibit numberless combinations of these
characteristics is not to argue that the ideal types introduced earlier are useless. If these ideal types have an internal logical consistency (as ideal types should have), then the aspects of regimes may tend to cluster in groups that resemble these ideal types. Furthermore, change in the characteristics of one of these dimensions from that which is exhibited by one ideal type to that exhibited by another ideal type may also cause the characteristics of other regime dimensions to change in that direction. But this change is not always of an abrupt nature in which all of these dimensions change immediately from one ideal type to another. Changes such as those in Argentina in 1983 or Chile in 1973 are infrequent. Even Hitler changed the German regime in stages. Thus, analyzing the change in each separately and the manner in which their change interacts should help to clarify how change in regimes takes place.

A final point to be made regarding types of regimes concerns the functions that regimes play in the political order. It is clear from the categorization of regime dimensions that one function of a regime is to structure public contestation, to define the rules of the game in the struggle over control of the state and its output, public policy. A second function is somewhat less clear, but equally important. A regime, because it structures public contestation in a certain way, causes those who participate in politics to be either happy or unhappy with the outcome of the game of politics. Those who are pleased with the outcome may be satisfied because of the outcome or simply because of the way the outcome was achieved. In either case, they support or legitimate those who come to control the state. Of those who are
dissatisfied, some are only dissatisfied because of the policy outcome, not because of how the result came about. This group still supports the system. It is only those who are displeased with both the policy outcome and the method of obtaining this outcome who are not providing support for the system. A regime, then, provides legitimacy for those who control the state. A more stable regime will be one which creates public allegiance to the state regardless of who wins the battle to control it.

REGIME CHANGE

Above it was stated that studies of regime change typically focus on change of regime from one ideal type to another. It was further argued that this limits the analyst's ability to understand regime change, first, because it eliminates from study all those occurrences which are less extreme than a change from one ideal type to another and, second, because it discourages inspection of change along each of the component dimensions of a regime. The empirical study of regime change, then, should involve examination of developments along each of these dimensions.

In many ways, change of regime can be seen as simply more drastic change along these dimensions than change within regimes. If, however, the ideal types have a logical consistency that leads the values of their dimensions to cluster in the groups commonly associated with the ideal types, then more moderate regime change, say a change only along one dimension of a regime, could be the beginnings of a more general, large-scale change, a change of regime. At the same time, changes
within a component of a regime may only be intended to uphold the
general function of that regime: to structure public contestation so
that the political elite in power maintains its grip on authority,
perhaps even with widespread public acceptance. For either reason,
empirical investigation of changes within regimes is warranted.

Regime change, then, can and should be examined. But what causes
regimes to change? Why are modifications and major changes made to any
and all of these dimensions of a regime? Further, why are some
countries less stable in this aspect of politics than other countries?
It is the task of this study to make some suggestions precisely about
regime stability and instability, particularly with regard to Mexico.
First, however, it would be useful to categorize the possible sources
of change within and of regimes so as to have a roadmap or laundry list
of possible causal agents to direct investigation toward both what the
causal agents might be and how they might operate. Such categorization
should also include notions of how the state, either as an actor or as
the object of the political struggle between sociopolitical coalitions
which the regime regulates, is related to regime change. This is
necessary since it seems unlikely that the state, which itself is the
ultimate regulator of all social life within a particular territory,
will not be involved in a regime change, a change which is ultimately
an alteration in the way in which the struggle over the state itself
takes place.

Sources of Regime Change

Almost by definition, a regime's stability rests upon its bases of
support. If a regime is stable and those sociopolitical groups which
form its foundation do not change in regard to their preferences about it nor in their ability to translate their preferences into an effective outcome, then the status quo will be maintained. The preferences of those who are the pillars of the regime and of those who would prefer to see it replaced or amended are thus a major source from which a regime change might originate. The other major cause of regime change must involve changing power relationships of those who prefer one or another type of regime. These two principal sources of regime change will be discussed sequentially in light of treatment of them in the literature on regime change.

Preferences for Regimes

Individuals and groups support or oppose a particular regime or an aspect of a regime because they prefer it to its alternatives. A change in the political actors’ beliefs about a regime’s qualities and desirability, then, is one thing that motivates their desire and their effort to change a regime. Dahl summarizes the assumptions of a whole body of theoretical and empirical literature with the simple expression

Factors determining beliefs→Political beliefs→

Political actions→Regimes

which can be interpreted as "Factors determining beliefs explain political beliefs, which explain political actions, which affect the probability that certain regimes will exist." 52 This raises the

52 Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. 124ff.
critical question: What causes individual and group preferences for a regime to change?

A regime, which defines how the game of politics is played, will reflect certain moral principals about how humans should interact in the political sphere. That is to say, a regime may be liked not for its results (the public policy which is determined through the political struggle), but for the manner in which the results are achieved; the methods of politics may be considered to be more important than the goals of politics. In other words, the means may not be justified by the ends, but may be their own justification. To return to the metaphor of politics as a game, it may be that who wins or loses is less important to the players than how the game is played. An expression of such a preference for a regime is to say that this particular way of behaving politically is the most appropriate. The support given to the state and those who occupy the government as a result of an actor's agreement with the rules of public contestation is diffuse support, a legitimation of the political order.

A traditional concern of political science and political sociology is the development of such diffuse preferences for particular regimes, especially the development of beliefs that favor democracy or the recurrence or continuation of traditional attitudes that favor political authoritarianism. Socialization is the process through which such beliefs are transmitted, so having the appropriate conditions in which the transmission of democratic beliefs is likely to take place is key to instilling democratic principles, hence important to the evolution of democratic practices and the implantation of a democratic
regime. Likewise, an environment in which authoritarian or even totalitarian principles are apt to be fostered is important in encouraging authoritarian behavior, thus making an authoritarian regime more likely to be installed.\textsuperscript{53}

Are there settings that favor democratic or authoritarian socialization? Exposure through education and social interaction to the beliefs and practices associated with democratic or authoritarian regimes is usually considered the most important source of political socialization.\textsuperscript{54} Being socialized in an environment in which trust in others and willingness to compromise are common, in which centralized authority is viewed with suspicion, and in which participation in politics and competition for power are encouraged but not apt to become all-important will thus lead one to prefer democracy. Socialization in a hierarchical, patrimonial culture in which suspicion of others is common and the central authority is deferred to will cause one to choose a more authoritarian regime. That is to say, growing up in a democracy will make one a democrat, growing up in an authoritarian culture will make one authoritarian.

Such an argument explains much about the regeneration of the attitudes that support an existing regime, especially about "the more


\textsuperscript{54}Thus Almond and Verba conclude: "A major part of political socialization, then, involves direct exposure to the civic culture and the democratic polity themselves. In this way each new generation absorbs the civic culture through exposure to the political attitudes and behavior of the preceding generation." Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 368.
widespread and diffuse aspects of the widely shared [by both masses and elites] political culture of a country. It says much less about the formation of new, or at least different, attitudes, among either the elites or the masses, that could cause change in the status quo. Thus, traditional political culture studies are of limited utility in the investigation of regime change. This is not to argue that a gradual change in the beliefs of the politically active about the rules of how political struggle should be conducted will have no effect on the actual conduct of politics. Nor is it to say that such change in beliefs at the mass level will not be reflected in mass pressures on elites to reform the practices of political conflict, especially regarding who is allowed to participate and how open to criticism the policy-making process will be. However, such changes in principles, the diffusion of such changes in attitude, are gradual, almost a generational phenomenon. In contrast, changes in the rules of political behavior are more abrupt. Certainly changes of regime are abrupt, a coup d'etat being the most dramatic example, but even a process of replacing a military regime with a democracy occurs over a period of time that is much briefer than that associated with attitudinal change. Changes within regimes may occur over longer periods of time, as minor reforms are made at two, five, or ten year intervals, but even these occur more rapidly than attitudinal change. The actual reform-making may reflect changes in public morality, but that it usually happens abruptly suggests that other factors are involved.

Another source of preferences for a regime is the interests that individuals and groups have in the maintenance or change of a regime. Interests are much more changeable than principles, especially when their relationship to a particular political or social structure is considered. An individual's or his group's interests may coincide with his principles about the desirability of a particular type of regime, but they may very well conflict with moral preferences for a type of regime. Whether an individual's interests will win out in a struggle with his ethical principles about a regime is impossible to say a priori, but it is not hard to imagine that interests would dominate, especially if one's principles are not strongly held or if these beliefs are to some extent based upon a regime's ability to satisfy interests.

A political actor's interests, though, can concern different aspects of social life. At the very least, an individual's or a group's interests may concern the maximization of material welfare or they may concern the maximization of political power. They may also concern some other goal of social interaction. Further, the

56 That is to say, it may always be in someone's interest to maximize income, power, or prestige, but the current method of doing so depends upon the structure of the environment in which this person or group is and where he or it is positioned in this structure. An individual currently at the top of the political power structure may maximize his power by maintaining the status quo whereas he may have maximized his power decades, years, or maybe only months ago by trying to change the status quo.

57 This is, of course, the position held by Marxists, but it is not hard to find liberal scholars and philosophers who would argue that the legitimacy of a regime (the belief that it is the right type of authority) is based upon its efficacy and efficiency in public policy making and implementation.
maximization of material welfare and power may be sought because they are means to another end (happiness somehow defined) or because they are considered good in and of themselves.

Now, one’s interests might change, hence altering preferences about regimes, because one’s goals change (for example, a religious renewal may mean that spiritual salvation becomes preferable to bodily satisfaction in the material world) or because the best or even the only means of achieving those goals change. Those seeking wealth may find its achievement possible in a democratic regime by means of investment in and management of business enterprises. At another point in time, such a method of wealth maximization may be less successful in the same type of regime, because other economic groups have used their political power to redirect the distribution of material benefits in society. One possible solution to this dilemma is to advocate a change within this regime to weaken the ability of others to make claims on the economic benefits held by the society, in that way making the accumulation of wealth once again easy to achieve. Perhaps the solution may even seem to be to make a drastic change of regime so as to promote wealth accumulation.

To reiterate the point, a regime becomes incompatible with the pursuit of individual or group interests either when interests change or when the objective conditions or even the subjective conditions (the evaluation of the objective conditions) making for attainment of those interests change (see Figure 5). To elaborate on the latter possibility, the evaluation of the conditions for fulfillment of interests may have little or nothing to do with the regime itself. But
their combination with the patterns of political behavior that an existing regime permits may be seen by a segment of the population as incompatible with the achievement of its interests. A way of resolving this situation may be changing the regime (perhaps so as to change these objective conditions).

The role of changing objective or subjective conditions in regime change is a theme covered by many of those who have studied breakdowns of democratic regimes. O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism comes about, in part, because of changing objective conditions (the end of the easy phase of import-substituting industrialization), which changes subjective conditions (economic policy-makers and industrialists become concerned with the nation's ability to attract foreign investors and with the ability of the regime to enforce the application of orthodox economic policies).58 These concerns, though, are not felt equally by all. Lower-class interests, especially working-class interests, are concerned with the continuation and expansion of social welfare policy. The working class thus opposes the introduction of a law-and-order type of regime which would limit labor's ability to agitate for wage increases. It is the interests of domestic entrepreneurs that are to be served by the introduction of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. That bureaucratic-authoritarianism can be introduced reflects the preference for it among certain social groups, including industrialists, but it also reflects the fact that these groups have the ability to install it. This ability to see one's

interests satisfied is as crucial to regime change as the existence of preferences for it.

Similar arguments have been made about the willingness of certain segments of the German and other European industrial elites to change their loyalty from democracy in the relatively prosperous 1920s to rightist authoritarianism in the aftermath of the economic downturn in 1929. In a nutshell, these arguments say that industrialists favor democracy when conditions of economic prosperity permit easy profit-making without the tough law-and-order practices associated with authoritarianism. More difficult economic times, however, are seen to call for repressive measures toward those whose actions could limit profit rates, especially labor agitators and the labor movement in general. A changing objective condition (increased difficulty in profit-making) thus leads to changed preferences about regimes (a more authoritarian regime becoming preferred) among certain powerful groups (profit earners) so that their interests can be satisfied (profits made).

But satisfaction of interests, even of interests which do not change, such as the desire of businessmen to make profits, is not accomplished by the same methods at all times. Authoritarian political regimes may permit profit maximization in certain countries during certain times, such as in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or

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in Germany in the 1930s. At other times, an authoritarian regime may be seen to be an impediment to profit maximization, as perhaps the Franco regime became to be seen in the early 1970s by industrialists, both Spanish nationals and foreigners, who wished to export from Spain to the EEC, but who knew that it would be more profitable to do so if Spain were a member of the EEC, a membership that could only come about if Spain had a democratic regime. Likewise, groups which in some countries favored democracy at a particular stage of economic development might in another country favor authoritarianism at the same stage of development. Thus, industrialists favored liberal institutions in Britain and France at the beginning of industrialization, but industrialists in Germany resisted liberalizing measures in the German Empire when Germany began industrializing.

The point is that the interests of a group do not alone define its preferences for a particular type of regime. Rather, the group’s evaluation of the objective economic or political conditions, when combined with the political behavior of various other social groups made possible by the political rules that a particular regime permits, will define the possibilities for attainment of a group’s interests. Given that objective conditions are often not amenable to alteration, a group’s possibilities for satisfaction of its interests may be viewed as only becoming possible by altering the regime so that the right combination of objective conditions and regime characteristics obtains.

The previous discussion has been illustrated with the example of

61 Ibid., pp. 330-337.
industrialists' interests in relation to objective economic conditions and to the types of political behavior a regime would permit. This example is common in scholarly discussions of regime change, the assumption being that the interests of economic classes are possibly the dominant set of interests represented in political struggle, and that these interests are advanced by these groups' political representatives. Another set of interests which is vitally affected by the nature of the political regime, though, is those of the political activists themselves. Just as it may be in the interests of certain economic groups to favor a particular type of regime because such a regime will promote an increase in their welfare, so it may be in the interests of certain groups of political activists to favor a kind of regime because it will promote their achievement or maintenance of power, and hence of prestige and wealth. Those in political power, that is, those who control the state, are usually interested in staying in power. Those not in power have an interest in obtaining it. These interests exist independent of the political activists' roles as representatives of other interests. Their congruence with the interests of the groups represented by political activists provides their raison d'être. The interests of those on each side dictates that each support a regime which is likely to permit that their own political interests be fulfilled.

This might suggest that it is always in the interests of those who are out of power to support a regime which would permit them to compete to regain control of the state while it is in the interests of those who are in power to try to limit competition so as to hold on to the
state. Generally, this is true, but it does depend on the objective (and subjective) political conditions in which those in the government and the opposition are operating. A most important factor defining these political conditions is the political inclination (and the perception of this inclination by other political actors) of those who have the most immediate control of the forces of violence and coercion, who can and must enforce the rules of political competition, that is, the aspects of the regime. This means that the political preferences of the military, the police, and any extra-legal military units (guerrillas and terrorists) factor into the definition of who can impose what type of regime—authoritarian regimes in which leftists control the government are somewhat rare in societies in which the military has not been defeated and replaced by a revolutionary armed force, for example.

Other factors determining the conditions under which political forces must choose whether to support a more democratic or more authoritarian regime are the relative balance of forces between the governing group and its opposition(s) and their preferred modes of competition. A political force controlling the government may not be able to hamper its opposition's ability to compete by changing the rules of public contestation if that opposition is relatively strong and willing to use methods of exerting pressure that are not permitted by the regime in force; the opposition's strength (because of sympathy for it in the military or its ability to mobilize the masses) may not even prevent the government from changing the regime. Furthermore, a demonstrated willingness on the part of the governing group to resort
to authoritarian solutions to its problem of maintaining power will invite reprisals on the part of the opposition should it gain power. In contrast, if the opposition is very weak and unable to realistically gain control of the state through the constitutional channels of competition, the governing coalition will probably see little reason to limit the opposition’s ability to compete, unless ideological unity is important to the governors, as it is to totalitarian rulers.

More problematic is the situation of an opposition which is of moderate but potentially greater competitive strength (due to its attractiveness with groups with latent power) or of an opposition which is willing to compete for control of the state in extra-legal ways. The existence of an opposition of the first type certainly would not encourage those in power to open the political sphere to greater competition. The growth of such a challenger may actually encourage those in the government to tighten access to the political arena. An opposition of the second type may be dealt with in two different ways. If it is participating in political activity outside the preferred channels of political competition, it is probably doing so because it is achieving greater success there. Removing the extra-constitutional, or at least irregular, channels of participation through an authoritarian type of solution is one option. The other option is to encourage the opposition to return to regular channels of participation and normal modes of competition by improving its perception of its opportunities for success in these channels. Of course, a governing group is unlikely to enhance this last avenue of participation for an opposition which may actually defeat it in constitutional competition.
A final factor which affects the objective conditions within which political groups try to achieve their goals, to fulfill their interests, is the type of legitimation formula which whomever governs is apt to have to satisfy. This is where the principles about how politics should be played become important. A society with a strong commitment to democracy will probably demand some type of democratic legitimation—the existence of at least nominal electoral choice, for instance. A society imbued with a need for ideological unity may be uneasy with an allowance for the existence of minor opposition groups, or may at least have no commitment to the preservation of their existence. These principles constrain political actors in the selection of methods by which they may pursue their interests.

In sum, group or class preferences are crucial determinants of the pressures in any society for a change in the regime, in the way that political activity will take place. These preferences reflect the moral principles of the various groups about how social interaction should be conducted, but they are also determined by the interests which these groups have. These interests may be economic, but they may be simply political, especially for groups whose reason for being is defined by their relation to politics. The regime which a group prefers for the purposes of satisfying its interests depends partly on the nature of those interests and partly on what type of political behavior must be permitted in order to see these interests achieved within the constraints of the economic or political conditions currently reigning. (Figure 2-6 provides a summary of these arguments.) These question of which groups' preferences will actually
be satisfied depends, though, on their ability to implement their preferences.

Power to Change Regimes

A major reason why studies of regime change focus on the role played by industrialists, by members of the armed forces, by the church (or more generally, institutionalized religion), by landowners, by the middle class, or by unionized labor is that these groups have or have had at one point or another the power to actually see their regime preferences enacted. This power is based upon these groups', or classes', or institutions' numerical strength (especially the popular classes), organizational cohesiveness (unionized workers), access to the means of coercive force (the military and police), moral authority (the church), strategic position in the economy (economic elites), or some combination of these factors (the middle class has both numbers and strategic position in the economy and/or the state). The role played by these groups in regime change will vary from political system to political system and from time to time within a country depending upon the structure of the economy, which changes as modernization and industrialization proceed, the nature of church-state relations, which depend much on how secularization has taken place, and the nature of the country’s international affairs, which affects both the role of the military in society and the power of economic groups within the economy.

The social groups whose power must be considered important are generally defined by either (1) their relationship to the means of
production, (2) their role in the relationship between organized religion and the state, and (3) the repercussions of the nation's international transactions. Economic groups are defined both in terms of conflicts between the rural and urban sectors and between classes within each of these sectors. The power of these economic groups is not determined by their numerical strength alone, although that is important. Equally important is their economic bargaining power and their ability to conclude alliances with other political actors, including the military. While modernization (industrialization and urbanization) influences the numerical strength of these classes, their bargaining power is defined by a far more complex calculation, including as factors the general economic structure of the society, the role of the national economy in the international division of labor, and the economic climate (boom or bust) at any particular time.

The relationship between organized religion and the state spawns at least three types of groups. One type is groups whose existence is based on common goals regarding public policy on religious, family, and educational policy. Another is groups whose existence is based on allegiance to one or another faith. The third is groups strongly in favor of or opposed to secularization and separation of church and state. Organized religion often contributes its not inconsiderable financial resources and its moral authority to support groups with whose views its agrees.

A nation's international transactions creates two major categories

of groups. Involvement in international affairs creates the need for a military to perform national defense functions. Militaries also often have strong political preferences. Because the military, along with the police, controls most immediately the instruments of violent force, alliances with it (and politicization of it) are important if other groups are to have the necessary power to overthrow a government and install a new regime. International interaction also creates groups whose economic well-being depends on the state’s economic foreign policy. Thus, these groups depend on a regime to create the conditions in which foreign economic policy favorable to them will be promoted.

But despite the interest which these different social groups have in one or another type of regime, and despite the power which they can exert vis-a-vis one another to see that their preferences be implemented, ultimately the enactment of their desires depends upon the behavior of those who are highly active politically, who through their political activity represent the interests of certain of these social groups while at the same time pursuing their own interests. These interests include advancing their own career goals of leading others, acquiring prestige, and accumulating wealth (or at least material well-being of some sort). A change in the characteristics of a regime is highly unlikely unless some element within this political elite wants that change to take place and sets about developing the sources of power which will support that change. Even the military, which controls the ultimate source of force in a society, very seldom intervenes in politics to change a regime until it has been invited to do so by politicians who want to change the regime. Further, those
politicians who do ask the military to intervene seldom expect to leave
the political scene when the military enters. They ask the military to
enter because they think that it will enhance their prospects for
control of the state when the military is in power and/or after the
military retires from the political arena.

Regime changes, especially of an abrupt nature, then, are likely
to come about when the interests of a part of the political elite in
favor of a regime change coincide with the interests of a social actor
sufficiently powerful to see that change takes place. In most
societies, there are differences within the political elite, between
those who have control of the top levels of the state and those who
aspire to control them. The crucial issue for regime change is whether
those among the political elite who wish to gain control of the state
are willing to act according to the established procedures of the
regime for gaining that power over the organs of the state, whether
they are willing to modify these procedures in accord with rules
established for amending them, or whether they are willing to act
extra-constitutionally to change the regime and gain control of the
state. Factors which determine the path that aspirants for power will
take include the degree of cohesion within the political elite and the
ability of the power holders to mollify the aspirations of the power
seekers and/or to discipline the dissent of disappointed power seekers.

Even relatively cohesive political elites will initiate small
scale changes in a regime so as to structure political competition and
to channel political participation in a way which better serves their
interests. Indeed, it is in the interests of a cohesive elite,
especially to the extent that it is seen from the outside to be a single group, and thus subject to complete turnover, to discourage the development of a situation of social and political polarization rather than run the risk of creating factions within itself which might initiate a major change of regime, such as inviting the military to intervene, sidelining most of the members of this governing elite in the process. Minor changes in the current regime, tinkering with the mechanisms of political competition and participation, for example, can serve such a unified elite by disarming the potentially hazardous political consequences of a social or economic crisis, especially the development of potential challengers for the state coming from within this elite or outside of it. Such an elite may by choice or by necessity modify the rules by which the political game is played as a preemptive measure in order to prevent the development of political challengers who would initiate wholesale regime change as a way to turn out the governing group.

Of course, there are no guarantees that minor modifications at one point in time may not create the conditions for further modifications later. In other words, there may be unintended side effects of modification in the regime. Hybrid regimes, which share the features of two ideal types, may lack the logical consistencies necessary to maintain themselves unchanged, without setting loose the social forces which would push the regime toward one or the other ideal type.

In contrast to the above situation, when those who can legitimately claim to be potential governors, able to run the state, are distributed into more than one competing groups, a different set of
incentives regarding the regime is created. This situation provides incentives for those of one or more of the competing camps to suspend the normal rules of the game so that their group will be insured the control of the state. Now, the military or some other armed force must be willing to suspend the regular rules of the game by stepping in on the side of those who invite them to do so, and the military or any other armed force may not be willing to actually do this for all political groups. Ideological factors may prevent the military from supporting a particular group, especially groups of the left, which usually must rely upon their own source of violent force or upon their potential to incite the masses. But if there is social stress, and if one or more groups of potential governors have the sympathy of factions within the military, then those groups have an incentive to try to increase the degree of polarization in society, spreading it to the political sphere, in order to convince the military to step in to remove the current governors. Once removed, the former governors have good reason to support a counter coup or, if they have no strong support from any segment within the military, to campaign for a return of competitive politics, since that is the one way this eliminated group will be able to return to contention for control of the state.

To recapitulate, the interests supporting regime change may be located in various parts of a society, but they must almost inevitably operate through the elite of political activists who can legitimately represent themselves as the potential governors of that society. These activists have their own incentives regarding the control of the state which may or may not coincide with the preferences of those who support
regime change. A crucial factor determining whether or not a segment of this elite can be found which will represent (or even create) the preferences for regime change existing among powerful social forces is the degree of cohesiveness within the pool of potential rulers. Proponents of regime change will easily be found within a political elite which is itself fundamentally divided. A unified elite may resist the preferences of other social actors for regime change, perhaps even sponsoring preemptive modifications to prevent the possibility that the social tensions will be translated into political polarization and the fracturing of its own ranks. This, it will be argued, is the key to understanding political stability within Mexico and crucial to explaining why preemptive reforms such as the reforma política take place.

The next two chapters set the stage for the preemptive electoral reform which took place with 1977's reforma política. Chapter Three explores the establishment of the cohesive political elite which continues to rule Mexico and the rise of a potentially dangerous challenge to that elite in the form of economic stagnation, of the failure of economic development policy, a principal legitimizing tool of this elite. The following chapter, Chapter Four, traces the changes within Mexico's authoritarian regime, especially within its electoral system, to illustrate the political aspects of a crisis which in 1976-1977 was perceived by the ruling elite as dictating reform.
Figure 2-1
Location of Political Competition

Competition Located with the State Apparatus

Competition exists among Individuals in Upper-Level Institutions of the State
Competition exists among Institutions within the State Apparatus

Competition Takes Place between Informal Institutions Competing for Control of the State

Competition takes place among interest groups over public policy outputs of the state
Competition takes place among political parties for control of the state
Figure 2-2

Channels of Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Less-Competitive, Control-Oriented Regimes</th>
<th>In More-Competitive, Expression-Oriented Regimes</th>
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<td>Autonomously Generated Groundswells of Support via Collective Action</td>
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<td>Autonomously Developed Mass-Based Demonstrations to Show Support for the Government</td>
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<td><strong>Demand-Oriented Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-System Behavior Outside Established Channels of Participation (e.g., guerrilla activity, urban violence, etc.)</td>
<td>Anti-System Behavior Possible Within Established Channels of Participation (attempts to stall the policy process, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Initiated Attempts to Establish Patron-Client Relationships with Power Holders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual or Group Attempts to Pressure Occupants of Influential Positions in the State about Public Policy Decisions</td>
<td>Group Pressures Upon Occupants of Potential State Positions regarding Public Policy Decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual or Group Attempts to Influence Succession within the Official Party or within the Highest Levels of the Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Individual or Group Attempts to Influence Succession via Campaign Activities and Voting for both Public Office and Party Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 2-3

Dimensions of Political Regimes

<table>
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<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Range of Qualities Taken on in Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pluralism and Competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Competitiveness</td>
<td>Little Open (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Much Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Competition</td>
<td>Located within the State (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Institutions Competing for Control of the State</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Mobilization and</td>
<td>Low Levels of Political Involvement (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) High Levels of Political Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization</td>
<td>Few Issues Politicized (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Most Issues Politicized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of Participation</td>
<td>Government Organized Collective Action Schemes; Basic Support- Oriented Activity (----&lt;-------&gt; Open; Voting &amp; Petition Channels in Addition to Collective Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of Power</td>
<td>Naked Power; Power Struggle for (----&lt;-------&gt;) Legitimated through (----&lt;-------&gt;) through Constitu-Succession Constitutional Forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Ideology</td>
<td>Heavy Ideological Emphasis due to Ideological Struggle (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Ideological Emphasis due to Pragmatic Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy Ideological Emphasis due to Efforts to Resocialize and Legitimize (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Hegemonic Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-Making and Implementation</td>
<td>Decision-making not Open to Inspection, (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Criticism, Inspection, Criticism, or Pressure Initiation, and Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Civil Liberties Possibility of Complete Legal Suspension of (-----------------&lt;-------&gt;) Protection of Certain Civil Liberties Disregarded for All Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pluralism and</td>
<td>Open competition for exercise of power and influence on policy-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Voluntary participation encouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Multiple channels, oriented mostly to demand-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition of</td>
<td>Well-established formal procedures respected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Ideology</td>
<td>Sometimes ideological conflict, sometimes consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Open to inspection, criticism, and pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of</td>
<td>Respect civil and political rights for the most part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 2-5

**Interests and Regime Change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of Conditions</th>
<th>Evaluation of Conditions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for Attainment of</td>
<td>for Attainment of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interests Changes</td>
<td>Interests does not Change</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests Change</th>
<th>Perhaps Change Regime to Help Attainment of Interests</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest do not</td>
<td>Perhaps Change Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Need to Change Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principles about Modes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Interests</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE

LEGACIES OF THE REVOLUTION, GROWTH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OF CRISIS IN THE MEXICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

A political reform, a modification of the political regime, becomes law at a particular point in time. Even the process of discussing the reform and deciding that the regime requires change and change of a particular type, then initiating the legislation for it takes but a short period of time. Thus, it may seem that describing and explaining the reason for such a reform means centering on a short time span. However, a political event like the reforma política occurs within an historical context which both defines the nature of the problem which reform is intended to remedy and constrains the choice of possible changes which can be included among the elements of the reform. To understand why change in the rules of the political game becomes a perceived necessity, then, requires historical analysis both of the evolution of the phenomenon which is the target of the reform and of the development of a perception that the phenomenon is a problem which must be remedied.

This chapter will focus on three aspects of that phenomenon, the first being the ways in which the Mexican Revolution framed the future development of Mexico’s polity and economy, constraining thereby the choices available to revolutionary elites as they sought to shape Mexico’s political regime and economy. Second, it will recount the formation of the unitary Mexican ruling elite. Finally, it will
discuss the formation of Mexico’s post-revolutionary economic policy, including its interventionist state, at state very worthy of struggle for control. Going further in that vein, this chapter will analyze the results of economic modernization, the Mexican Miracle, especially those results which affected alliances between the state which promoted that development and the classes which benefitted and did not benefit from it.

Chapter Four will trace the evolution of the political regime that came into being in 1929, the characteristics of which served to promote the economic modernization project discussed within this chapter, but which began to falter at the same time as this modernization project and which came to be seen in the early 1970s as requiring an electoral reform if it were to continue and political stability were to be maintained. Chapter Five will chronicle the development of the perception of need for reform and will recount how that reform was enacted. In other words, this chapter and the next will analyze the rise of a problem, potential dysfunctions in the political regime, in objective terms. Chapter Five will give an account of how that problem first came to be perceived as a problem and then will discuss how the ruling elite chose to respond to it. First, this chapter will set the context of the modern Mexican political economy, especially as it affects class interests in modern Mexico. The legacies of the Revolution and the rise of a new ruling elite, the growth of the interventionist state and its ramifications, the founding and evolution of the new regime, and the Mexican Miracle and the development of crisis in the economy will be chronicled.
THE REVOLUTION AND ITS LEGACIES

The principal political fact about Mexico is that it underwent a violent political revolution in the twentieth century. From 1910 to 1917 Mexico was wracked by revolutionary struggle. Sporadic violence continued for more that a decade after that. Perhaps one million people died in this upheaval, the political ramifications of which were ambiguous at best, if not outright contradictory. But whether ambiguous or contradictory, the Mexican Revolution defined the terms by which politics has been played in Mexico since the second decade of this century.

Legitimation by Election

First, the Revolution established a methodology of legitimation which continues to constrain those seeking to mold the rules of the political process to their advantage. Porfirio Díaz, dictator of Mexico for the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, had originally taken power in 1876 in a coup with the promises of "effective suffrage" and "no re-election." These slogans expressed protest against Benito Juárez's four terms as president of Mexico and Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada's declared intention to seek re-election in 1876. Once he had power, however, Díaz was unwilling to surrender it in a free election with effective suffrage. He did permit his friend, Manuel González, to be president for one term from 1880 to 1884, but he returned to the presidency in 1884, not to

1Díaz had earlier opposed Juárez's re-election in 1871 and had attempted to seize power at the time of Juárez's death in 1872.
exit until 1911. Elections occurred during his rule, but real opposition was scant when tolerated, especially before 1904. By 1908, serious opposition had developed, particularly from among those who were politically ambitious but who had been barred from assuming positions of power because Díaz’s circle of advisors and subordinates was so small and tight.

Among the members of this opposition was Francisco I. Madero, whose *La sucesión presidencial en 1910* spoke of the need for "effective suffrage and no re-election." Nominated for president in 1910 by the Partido Antireeleccionista, Madero was allotted but 196 votes in the election, against 18,625 for Díaz. Escaping to Texas, Madero issued his Plan of San Luis Potosí, calling for armed insurrection. This proclamation contained but a single clause which protested the socioeconomic aspects of Díaz’s regime; it concentrated instead on the need for political freedom, for free elections, and for an end to the practice of re-election. Díaz soon abdicated, paving the way for Madero to win a second election in 1911, and become president. Although he pursued no particularly revolutionary initiatives, Madero was later killed in 1913 in the counter-revolutionary coup by the General Victoriano Huerta, thus becoming a martyr and the "Apostle of

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2 As these numbers indicate, suffrage was extremely limited.

3 Nor had *La sucesión presidencial en 1910* spoken at great length about socioeconomic reform. On Madero and these two important documents, see Charles C. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), esp. Chs. 3 and 6.

4 In fact, Madero clearly wished to avoid revolution at all costs. Ibid., esp. p. 119.
the Mexican Revolution." At the same time as he became a hero, his political liberalism became an important component of the revolutionary creed.  

The Mexican Revolution, then, began as had the Porfiriato, as a protest by disgruntled members of Mexico's upper class who were excluded from the upper reaches of political power. Their rallying cry, which touched off the Revolution, was simply "effective suffrage and no re-election." Because of this and because the faction of revolutionaries who emerged dominant (the Constitutionalists, popularly known at the time as maderistas) also shared this limited perspective on the goal of the Revolution, any post-revolutionary regime would have to include the electoral mechanism and exclude the possibility of re-election if it were to be legitimate. True to this heritage, the Mexican Constitution dictates that political succession take place through elections but prohibits re-election. Thus, elections have been a primary way of legitimating the transfer of power in post-revolutionary Mexico.

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6 Peter Calvert, Mexico (London: Ernest Benn, 1973), p. 156.

Conflict between Church and State

One of the deepest political cleavages in post-revolutionary Mexico developed over the status of the Catholic Church. This division has spawned the bases of the political Right in Mexico. Conflict between church and state in Mexico began as early as 1833, but reached its first climax in 1857 when the Liberal Juárez "confiscated all of the Church's properties, suppressed the religious orders, and empowered the governors to designate the buildings to be used for religious services." With the victory of the Liberals over Maximilian, the French, and the Conservatives in 1867, the church's position was further weakened; President Lerdo stripped the church of its ancient prerogatives and its special juridical status in 1873-1874. However, Porfirio Díaz permitted the resurgence of the church during the long Porfiriato. Because of its reappearance under Díaz, the church regained its reputation of being extremely conservative and linked with foreign interests. The church did little to dissuade those who held this view when it allied itself with conservatives and foreign interests against the Revolution in 1910: "The Mexican Church sided with the Díaz regime, was hostile to Madero, proved friendly to Huerta, and later opposed the Constitution of 1917."9


9 Ibid., p. 132. Jean Meyer argues that the Church did not oppose Madero on ideological grounds (in fact it had begun to promote social reform in the pre-Revolution period) but its political party, the Partido Católico Nacional (PCN), competed vigorously and ruthlessly with Madero's followers in electoral politics in 1912-1913, "practising party politics of the worst kind," despite the hierarchy's request that it obey the constituted authority. With Madero's overthrow, the Church
Aligned as it was with counter-revolutionary forces, the church was persecuted by the revolutionaries. Local revolutionary leaders executed priests, closed churches for religious services, exiled foreign clerics, burned confessionals, forced pastors to provide cash to finance revolutionary armies, and confiscated sacred vessels for their resale value. At the Constitutional Convention in Querétaro in 1916-1917, those who defended the church against attacks on its rights to provide education, to practice all of its sacraments (confession and clerical celibacy were at issue), to post foreign priests to Mexican dioceses, and to own property, did so only on the expressed desire to maintain human freedom. Members of the convention were reluctant to in any way side with the church for its own sake. The result was that the Constitution of 1917 denied the church a legal standing, prohibited it from owning property, reduced its influence in education, and imposed other restrictions.

However, the Constitution did not end the struggle between church and state. When Adolfo de la Huerta rebelled against Alvaro Obregón's was identified by Huerta's enemies, especially the Constitutionalists, as being allied with him because of the PCN's previous behavior. The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People between Church and State, 1926-1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 11. The Constitutionalists were much more antagonistic toward the Church than supporters of Zapata and Villa. On the anticlerical attitudes of the leaders of the Constitutionalists, see Barry Carr, "The Peculiarities of the Mexican North, 1880-1928: An Essay in Interpretation," Occasional Paper No. 4, Institute of Latin-American Studies, University of Glasgow, 1971, p. 12.


choice of Plutarco Elías Calles to be his successor as president in 1923, many Catholics supported the rebellion. Calles responded by taking anti-clerical action upon assuming the presidency. In 1926, members of the Catholic hierarchy expressed opposition to the anti-clerical articles in the Constitution, saying that Mexican priests would not obey them. Calles cracked down harder, closing Catholic primary schools, deporting foreign-born clerics, and forcing priests to register with the federal government. The hierarchy chose to lead the clergy in a religious strike of sorts, closing the churches and holding no services.

This conflict between the Catholic hierarchy and the Calles administration did not remain at the elite level. It spread to the masses in the states of the Bajío (Guanajuato, Michoacán, Jalisco, Colima, Nayarit, and Durango) where the traditional conservative church was strongest. There peasants who were loyal to the church, calling themselves cristeros, rebelled, attacking trains and burning government schools. Civil war dragged on in the hills of the Bajío for three years with the support of some elements of the church's hierarchy. But while the hierarchy of the church and Calles came to an agreement in 1929, through the intercession of U.S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow, the


14 On internal divisions within the church at this time, see Ortoll, "Faccionarismo episcopal en México y revolución cristera."
cristeros, "not consulted . . . and abandoned to their luck," remained alienated from the state and the ideology of the Revolution, forming a social and regional base for the radical right in modern Mexico. 15

The Populist, Interventionist State

Third, the Revolution created a nationalist and populist ideology and a public demand for a pattern of public policy which would satisfy popular demands for social justice and economic redistribution. This ideology justified large-scale state intervention in the economy and required the development of a strong state which could accomplish it. As a result, a state which is exceedingly important to control came into being in post-revolutionary Mexico. Moreover, yet another basis for political cleavage was formed over the issue of state intervention in the economy.

The Porfirián state had generally limited its role in the economy to maintaining "order" so that "progress" could take place. The economic policy of Díaz's científicos may have seemed successful since the economy grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century. However, most of Mexico suffered under Díaz; only the rich of Díaz's circle and especially foreign investors benefitted from this growth. Real wages of workers declined while the peasantry was deprived of its land. 16 In retrospect, it is not surprising that when Madero called for armed


insurrection against the Porfiriato in 1910, he was supported by peasants, rural and urban workers.

Three major revolutionary forces of these downtrodden workers and peasants were key actors during the Revolution. They were thus politicized by their revolutionary efforts, insuring that their interests would have to be considered after the end of the upheaval. The first of these forces was Emiliano Zapata's campesino army from Morelos. The zapatista movement was formed by peasants who had lost their land during the Porfiriato. Madero's failure to take initiative on the land reform issue, particularly the zapatista demand that village lands be returned, led Zapata to break with him in the Plan de Ayala. Zapata's plan included not only returning village "fields, timber, and water which the landlords, científicos, or bosses have usurped," but also demanded that one-third of the lands of "monopolists" be expropriated so that the people of Mexico would have fields to sow and "the Mexicans' lack of prosperity and well-being may improve in all and for all." In brief, the zapatistas sought social justice and an end to their poverty. Land reform was the means to this end.

Second was Pancho Villa's División del Norte, a force consisting of cowboys, small ranchers, miners, and unemployed workers. In Chihuahua, Villa confiscated haciendas, handing them to the Chihuahua state government to administer while using the revenues from them to finance his army and to redistribute income to the urban poor. Villa

supported state efforts to reduce unemployment and free public schooling. He reduced the price of meat in Chihuahua by having his soldiers round up cattle on the confiscated ranches, and he fed the unemployed. In general, his reform plans were more worker-oriented, less peasant-oriented, than Zapata's. His interventions in the local economy benefitted the poor and unemployed, generating great popular support in Chihuahua.\(^\text{18}\)

The Red Battalions of the Mexico City-based, anarcho-syndicalist Casa del Obrero Mundial constituted a third force. These battalions of workers sought favorable labor legislation and an important role for organized labor in the post-revolutionary state. Through the intervention of Alvaro Obregón, his principal military leader, Venustiano Carranza agreed to the workers' demands,\(^\text{19}\) thus winning their military support and strengthening his Constitutionalist Army sufficiently to defeat Villa and Zapata and secure control of post-revolutionary Mexico for himself and his successors Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles. While Carranza later betrayed his promises to the labor leadership to institute labor reforms,\(^\text{20}\) Obregón and Calles renewed the alliance with organized labor leaders when they succeeded Carranza.


\(^{19}\) For the terms of the Constitutionalist-Labor accord, see Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years, p. 259.

\(^{20}\) See ibid., pp. 264-266.
Despite the lack of a strong, clear ideological orientation, the Constitutionalist Army of Carranza and Obregón, strengthened by the Red Battalions, emerged victorious by 1916. The Constitutionalists were divided into two groups, "Moderates" and "Jacobins," the former associated with Carranza, the latter with Obregón. Because of strong Jacobin representation, the Constitutional Convention which Carranza convened in 1917 defied his preferences for a liberal, though nationalist, state and wrote articles into the new constitution which established the basis for land reform (Article 27) and affirmed the rights of organized labor (Article 123).\textsuperscript{21} Carranza had included neither land reform nor workers' rights in his draft constitution, which was similar to the 1857 Liberal Constitution. Yet, this Constitution formalized the post-revolutionary state's commitment to a populist economic policy. As Steven Sanderson\textsuperscript{22} puts it,

the postrevolutionary pact dates from the Constitution of 1917. This document declared the principles of the Revolution to be class conciliation, agrarian reform, worker rights, civil liberties, protection of private property, and administrative reform.

Over the course of the next two-and-a-half decades both land redistribution and labor unionizing took place, the timing and pace of which were dependent upon the needs of successive presidents for political support and on their personal perspectives on the problems of labor and the peasantry. What is significant is that for either

\textsuperscript{21} For the debate on constitutional rights for organized labor, see Niemeyer, Revolution at Querétaro.

ideological or political reasons (or both) post-revolutionary
governments could not completely ignore the demands of the lower
classes. The ideology of the Mexican Revolution, with its emphasis on
social justice and liberty, meant that even if the government wished to
restrict the advancement of the peasants and workers so as to promote
capital accumulation, it could not do so by open repression for to do
so would be to risk losing its revolutionary legitimacy.

This need for revolutionary legitimacy presented the
Constitutionalists with a dilemma upon assuming power because what
Carranza and the Sonorans (Obregón, Calles, and Adolfo de la Huerta)
could agree upon was that Mexico must grow economically, that this
growth must be relatively independent from reliance upon American
foreign investment, and that the private sector be the source of
investment. But if the capitalism was to be Mexico's way to
development, and if it was to be Mexico's own private sector which led
this growth, the Sonorans recognized that "both major restrictions on
the demands of the lower classes and the forceful entry of the state
into the areas of the economy where the private sector was unwilling or
unable to enter, or had entered and failed" were required.\(^{23}\) In 1920
the Mexican private sector was weak and politically disunified. In the
eyes of the Sonorans, it could stand neither the demands of organized
labor for higher wages nor the competition of foreign investors. At
the same time, its small size and political division meant that this

\(^{23}\) Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe, "The State as Banker and
Entrepreneur: The Last Resort Character of the Mexican State's
private sector could not form the political base of the new state. 24 So, a strong state had to be formed which could regulate both foreign capital and the lower classes but which still had a political base in the lower classes.

This need for a strong state to promote development had been perceived at the Constitutional Convention by the Jacobins (of whom the Sonorans were a part) who "wanted to build up the power of the government as a socio-economic institution in order to compete with rival institutions, particularly the Church and private banks." 25 In addition, building a strong state was particularly important to the Sonorans, who hoped to continue to hold power, because in the early post-revolutionary period political power had yet to find an institutional basis and was sought by numerous revolutionary caudillos who had the support of various parts of the revolutionary army. 26 Only a militarily strong state supported by the mobilizable masses could hold off the frequent challenges of usurpers.

To resolve this dilemma, the Sonorans followed an innovative two-pronged approach. To shore up their political base, Obregón and Calles allied themselves with the Confederación Regional Obrero Mexicana (CROM), the only nationally-based organization "capable of


26 The various military-backed challenges to Obregón and Calles are described by Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, pp. 60-63.
mobilizing large sections of the community for the defense of presidential authority. This does not mean that workers necessarily fared well under the Sonorans; rather, the CROM was granted monopoly over labor organizations while CROM leaders, particularly Luis Morones, were granted some of the highest positions of national power in the cabinets of Obregón and Calles, especially that of Calles. A close association of the state and organized labor thus began at this early period, building the state’s ability to penetrate and control this segment of society. Official strikes were thereby held to a minimum.

To further strengthen themselves against the uprisings of regional strongmen and counter-revolutionary movements, the Obregón and Calles governments followed a strategy of mobilizing peasants, arming them so that they could oppose the military and paramilitary forces of these counter-revolutionary movements (the de la Huerta uprising of 1923-24 and the Cristero rebellion of 1926-29 being the most important). Of course, some government response to peasant demands was a necessary quid pro quo, a response which at the same time bolstered the revolutionary legitimacy of the state. Thus, the beginning of agrarian reform dates to the Obregón administration. Although the quality of the land distributed to peasants was marginal, Obregón’s action had strong symbolic content.

28 Ibid., passim. Also, see Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 90-96.
At the same time that the state-peasant alliance was consolidating the Sonoran's control of the Mexican state and the state-labor alliance was minimizing the economic disruptions which organized labor could have created, the state was simultaneously encouraging capitalist economic development. Owing to the large foreign influence in industrial and capitalistic agricultural investment prior to the Revolution, Mexico's domestic entrepreneurial class was very weak by the beginning of the Revolution and was no stronger at its end. Meanwhile, the other domestic source of capital, the landowners, had been dispossessed or greatly weakened in the Revolution. Because Carranza and the Sonorans were very nationalistic, especially in the economic sphere, and therefore did not want to finance industrial development with foreign capital, and because their own social origin was bourgeois or petty bourgeois, they chose to encourage development through the growth of a domestic capitalist class. This class being weak, though, meant that first its strength had to be fostered. To do so, the Mexican state under Obregón and Calles undertook major infrastructural investments in both irrigation and road building. The Obregón and Calles governments also built a system of state development banks to help the new entrepreneurs fund the investments needed to begin Mexico's industrial growth.31

Thus, by the end of Calles's presidency, a strong central state had been established which could fend off the challenges of regional strongmen, which was beginning to develop the capacity to foster the

growth of an entrepreneurial class, and which was responding to popular
demands for social justice at a rhetorical and symbolic level while at
the same time controlling the ability of workers and peasants to
disrupt the economy and the political process. This strong state was
the locus of political power in the decade following the end of the
military phase of the Mexican Revolution. Other sources of power, such
as economic power, whether of investors or of organized labor, were
clearly dependent upon this state. Furthermore, this state was
beginning to become a source of great economic benefit for those who
had power within it. 32 For this study, what is important about this
strong state is that it was very important in post-revolutionary Mexico
to be able to control this state to have national-level power. No
other position in society offered comparable power base. To have power
meant to be able to pursue one’s ideologically-defined goals and one’s
own desires for wealth. Hence, it is not surprising that the Sonoran’s
were frequently challenged for control of the state nor that in 1929
Calles saw a need to establish a set of political rules, a new regime,
that would permit his continued control of this state.

THE NEW RULING CLASS

The Revolution effectively broke the monopoly on power and wealth
held by the few who were Díaz’s closest cronies during the Porfiriato.
The elite families who controlled both political power (as governors
and cabinet members) and economic power (as landlords, industrialists,

32 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 84-90.
and mine owners) \(^{33}\) were eliminated from contention for the state. A number of "out" groups sought to fill the power vacuum created when Díaz abdicated, Madero was assassinated, and Huerta defeated. The duration and intensity of the Revolution was much more due to the difficulty in resolving this issue than to defeating the counter-revolutionaries.

The Constitutionalist Army which finally won the struggle over direction of the Revolution was united mainly by its opposition to the Díaz regime, especially the closed nature of the political and economic elite. Its leadership was middle class in origin, including rancheros, school teachers, muleteers, store keepers, and bank tellers, \(^{34}\) thus it was perhaps somewhat less upper class in origin than the Porfirian elite, but the individuals who assumed political power with the Constitutionalist Army included a large number of lawyers, doctors, and engineers, not extremely different from the Porfirian elite. \(^{35}\) Despite this social similarity to their predecessors, neither the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1916-17 nor the high office holders of the Carranza, Obregón, and Calles governments were likely to have been

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\(^{35}\) Smith, Labyrinths of Power, pp. 87-103.
politically prominent during the Porfiriato. The members of this new elite shared a newness to political power, a break with the Porfirian elite and its control on politically important positions.

Fewer members of this revolutionary elite had substantial wealth than their Porfirian predecessors. Some revolutionaries, such as Madero and Carranza, were rich ranchers who opposed Díaz only because he denied them political power. But many others were self-made men and lower-middle-class individuals who, while not destitute, did not have a solid financial base of power or well-being. These revolutionaries were not involved in politics to protect their fortunes, as were many of the Porfirian elite, but to make them. Certainly altruism was a motive of many revolutionaries, not only the peasant and working-class followers of Villa, Zapata, and the Casa del Obrero Mundial, yet the self-seeking were well represented too: "the mestizo revolution and its accomplishments have represented an interplay of altruism and egoism, of a commitment to liberal reform and a desire for wealth and power in the nineteenth-century tradition of Mexican politics." 37

The Constitutionalists, led first by Carranza and later by Obregón and Calles, took power at all levels of government at the end of the Revolution. Acquisition of power was not institutionalized, however. The electoral path to political positions was established by the Constitution, but the organizational prerequisite for institutionalized competition for electoral positions, nation-wide political parties, had

36 Ibid., Table 6-2, p. 165 and Smith, "The Making of the Mexican Constitution," Table 6-1, p. 189.

not yet developed. The method of gaining power, and of reaping the
economic harvest that often went with it, rested in one's own hands or
in the hands of a patron.

Establishing a regional power base, bolstered by a military force,
was one way that a revolutionary could guarantee that the national
leadership of the Constitutionals consider his claim to a voice in
national decisions and to control of local decisions. Many
revolutionaries thus became governors and retained the personal loyalty
of the armies which they commanded during the military phase of the
Revolution. For those who were not military chiefs, political
positions had to be obtained through the intercession of those who had
military forces. The path to power then lay through personal loyalty
to those who had military power, which increasingly became concentrated
in the hands of Obregón and Calles as they eliminated regionally-based
challengers and professionalized the army.\textsuperscript{38} Positions in the national
state apparatus in Mexico City were particularly under the control of
Obregón and Calles because they had closer command of the army there.

The military jefes who remained loyal to Obregón and Calles, plus
the civilians who came to fill the positions of the national state
through the intercession of the Sonorans and their lieutenants, came to
form a more and more coherent political elite, called by many the
"revolutionary family." The consolidation of this "family" came about,
on the one hand, through the gradual defeat of those military caciques
who challenged the Obregón-Calles group in military engagements,

\textsuperscript{38}See esp. Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise
and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1968), pp. 57 -112.
especially in 1923-24 and 1928. Both of these challenges were over presidential succession. The 1923-24 rival was Adolfo de la Huerta, the fellow Sonoran who had been disappointed in his hopes to become the chief caudillo of the Revolution when Obregón chose Calles instead to succeed him in the 1924 election. In 1928, Calles returned the favor, selecting Obregón to follow him. A constitutional amendment was necessary to permit Obregón to reassume the presidency, an amendment which was opposed by many, but the Sonorans secured congressional approval. The well-founded fear by power-seekers that Obregón and Calles would thereafter continually rotate the presidency among themselves led Generals Francisco Serrano and Arnulfo Gómez to postulate themselves as opposition candidates for the presidency. Both were eliminated by the army in short order. The number of revolutionary jefes (and potential rivals) was quickly being reduced.

On the other hand, the revolutionary family was being consolidated by a diminution of the number of government functionaries with military backgrounds, and thus a decline in potential personal sources of autonomy from the Sonorans. Civilian politicians and bureaucrats began to form a larger part of the political elite. To obtain such positions in a period in which the control of force was still the most important basis of power, these professional politicians and bureaucrats had to have been selected by Obregón, Calles, and those loyal to them. As civilians came to fill positions of greater importance in the state, they too chose their subordinates, more and more often from the civilian population. Those in important government

39 See Smith, Labyrinths of Power, Figure 3-4, p. 94.
and bureaucratic positions were thus largely selected by the president; their personal loyalty was an important consideration in their recruitment. Upper level functionaries in turn chose lower level functionaries, again based largely on personal loyalty. The loyalty of lower level elites to those at the highest level was based on a transitivity of loyalty. Rivalry existed among different camarillas, or political cliques, but loyalty to the president, the highest chief of the Revolution, was assured. 40

This revolutionary family, an increasingly civilian political elite, one separated from Mexico's economic elite, whose emergence it was in fact promoting, became a self-selected ruling group. Despite the existence of the democratic institutions of elections and legislatures, "[t]he government tallied the votes, and at both the state and national levels the practice of imposición was the norm." 41 Those imposed were friends, past colleagues, and subordinates whose loyalty was formed at school, during the revolutionary struggle, or while serving together in the state or federal bureaucracy. 42 Relatives, or relatives of friends, have also been recruited. This political elite regenerated and continues to regenerate itself.

This regeneration, though, has not been by reproduction alone. As Roderic Camp's data show, blood relationships have throughout the post-revolutionary period have been important, but they are far from


42 Camp, Mexico's Leaders, pp. 22-23.
the only way that individuals are chosen in the recruitment process.\textsuperscript{43}

What then has bound this elite together?

Initially, the glue included common revolutionary objectives and loyalty based on service together in the military phase of the Revolution and the later struggles with the church and foreign interests. Yet, a common pursuit of power and prestige, both of which were most completely satisfied through political or bureaucratic positions in the state, both of which could only be obtained through the intervention of those who were already in possession of political power, was perhaps more important. A successful political career depended upon establishing political loyalty to someone who was also going to be politically successful. This in turn depended upon that person having established a patron-client relationship with a successful political superior. In addition, the economic incentive for pursuit of political power and jealous protection of it from outside challengers should not be discounted. In a tone of derision and disgust, Mexican historian Jesús Silva Herzog wrote in 1944: "Politics is the easiest and most profitable profession in Mexico."\textsuperscript{44} But politics would not remain easy and profitable if state positions were shared with all those seeking part of the spoils.

In choosing a patron, choosing a winner has been critical.\textsuperscript{45} With winners choosing winners, and losers sidelined from the political

\textsuperscript{43}About 25 percent of Mexico’s post-revolutionary elite had family ties with other members of this group. Camp, Mexico's Leaders, pp. 29-32. See also Smith, Labyrinths of Power, pp. 254-255.

\textsuperscript{44}Quoted in Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{45}Smith, Labyrinths of Power, pp. 255-256.
process (during the praetorian period of the 1920s, being sidelined could mean being buried, literally), a pyramiding of loyalties developed. Those in politics understood their future to depend on loyalty to the Revolution and its current leadership, not on those who were outside the governing elite. The continuation of the revolutionary family's control of the state (and thus control of prestige and patronage) and the regeneration of the ruling elite through the process of camarilla-building held the promise of social and political mobility along with financial prosperity.

A critical characteristic of this elite has been its separateness from other elite groups. As discussed above, this revolutionary elite did not become Mexico's national bourgeoisie; rather, it created and sponsored the development of Mexico's business class. A power elite in Mills's terms, an elite which combined control of a society's economic resources and its political institutions, did not arise in post-revolutionary Mexico. Instead, an elite which recruited its membership from sources different from the origins of the economic elite, which attained its prosperity from different sources than did the industrial and financial elite, and which had different ideological loyalties than the business class consolidated control of the Mexican state.46 As one Mexican stated: "It has been traditional in Mexico to draw a dividing line between what has to do with private enterprise and what belongs to politics... Both fields of activity, private and public, have regarded themselves, from the Revolution of 1910 until

now, as not only separate but even as opposed to each other." 47

Whether called the "revolutionary family," a political elite, a
bureaucratic class or state bourgeoisie, 48 or a political class, 49 this
self-perpetuating political and bureaucratic group came to control the
state. "[T]he system has become one of a class of career political and
technical administrators." 50 And, as Chapter Two argued, such a
unified political elite has a set of incentives regarding the formation
of political rules of the game different from the incentives facing a
divided elite.

FOUNDING THE NEW REGIME

Since control of the state was profitable and prestigious, and
because it allowed one the ideological direction of society,
maintenance of a monopoly on its control was important to the
revolutionary family. Challenges to the Sonorans even from within the
ruling group during the 1920s underlined this interpretation. Yet, the
constitutional sanction "effective suffrage and no re-election"
demanded that succession take place and be formalized if not actually
effected by electoral means. The controversy surrounding Obregón’s
re-election in 1928 affirmed this; Calles’s own perception that it

49 Needler, Mexican Politics: The Containment of Conflict.
50 Ibid., p. 79.
would be impossible to succeed himself after Obregón’s assassination indicates that the "maximo" chief of the Revolution himself realized the importance of electoral legitimacy. The problem was how to maintain control of the state while permitting the semblance of electoral choice and insuring that internal elite competition over presidential succession did not bring down the leaders of the Revolution, particularly Calles. Calles’s solution, which permitted peaceful resolution of succession and continued control by him and his closest collaborators of the Mexican state, while at the same time not threatening regional strong men, was the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR).

While Calles and Obregón had put down national military challengers, they had not routed out regional strong men. So long as these regional revolutionary strong men did not make extra-constitutional challenges for control of the central state, they were not incompatible with Calles’s monopoly on the central state and with the continuation of political stability in Mexico. It was the every sixth-year (formerly every fourth-year) presidential succession that brought out those regional strong men, with their regionally-based

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51 For Calles to have succeeded himself, yet another constitutional amendment to remove the "no re-election" stipulation would have been necessary. Given the uproar that passing the amendment allowing Obregón to be re-elected caused, and given that Calles was far less popular than Obregón, Calles realized the impossibility of succeeding himself. Lorenzo Meyer, with Rafael Segovia and Alejandra Lajous, Los inicios de la institucionalización: la política del Maximato, vol. 12 of Historia de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978), pp. 17-21.
parties and military forces, to vie for control of the central state. 52

Calles's goal was to institutionalize presidential succession to eliminate bloodletting and anarchy during every presidential election. To do so he sought to form a "party of strong men" within which the issue of succession could be resolved. 53 In essence, the PNR was to be a party which was a confederation of lesser, regional parties, which in turn meant it was to be a unified party of caciques. 54 His ability to convince these regional strong men, many of whom had been Obregón supporters, to join him in a unified party was probably based on two factors: First, they each realized that their own presidential aspirations were doomed to failure in a praetorian world because, with Obregón gone, none had sufficient military power to overwhelm the others and make himself president. Only through an institutionalized process were any of them likely to be able to come to power and expect to remain there. Second, the Cristero rebellion, raging with success against the federales as it was precisely at this time of disunity and crisis, was a danger to the revolutionary generals as a group because

52 Jean Meyer writes of the post-revolutionary period: "There did not exist true political parties in the modern sense of the word . . . More than parties, one could find electoral committees, clubs and societies . . . Many times the 'parties' were confused with a person or disappeared shortly after being born . . . Each political chief, each ejidal manager, each union leader organized his own party as an electoral machine. Those 8,000 parties federated at the regional level and confederated at the state and national level." Jean Meyer with Enrique Krauze and Cayetano Reyes, Estado y sociedad con Calles, vol. 11 of Historia de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977), p. 97.


it illustrated their weakness when confronted by serious, committed rebels. Unity was necessary until this problem was resolved.55

In reality, unity meant submission to Calles, whose idea it was to form the PNR and who initially led its organizing committee. While challengers to Calles's authority existed, particularly Aarón Sáenz, who sought to win the loyalty of past supporters of Obregón, Calles and interim president Emilio Portes Gil controlled the agenda. For different reasons they colluded to elect Pascual Ortiz Rubio, who had no mass political support whatsoever, as the PNR's candidate to fill the remaining years of Obregón's presidential term. When Sáenz and a group of Obregón's closest followers rebelled, they were militarily defeated by government forces. "From then forward political struggles would not be settled by arms, or would not divide the army, at least."56 Political struggle would focus on selection of PNR candidates for the presidency.

Founding the PNR, then, meant the initiation of a new political regime in Mexico. The 1910 to 1929 period of Mexican history had been characterized by the lack of any established political regime. The rules of the game had been rule of the strongest, that those who had control of the most powerful military force were most able to rule the central state, which was the source of the most prestige and wealth in the country. Even those who had controlled the central state, though, were not guaranteed control of the whole country.

55 Ibid., p. 23. Note that the Cristero rebellion was never defeated militarily; a diplomatic solution was reached between the church and the state with the intervention of Dwight Morrow.

56 Meyer, et al., Los inicios de la institucionalización, p. 84.
The formation of the PNR institutionalized the struggle over the Mexican state. Henceforth, the PNR candidate for president would become the chief executive of the central state after an electoral campaign in which the PNR would use its many constituent parties as local organizers and mobilizers to assure PNR victory.

The major characteristics of this new regime were official party control of electoral positions and executive succession, hence suppression of electoral competition; presidential control of the official party, within the limits required to keep most members within the ranks of the party; hence presidential control of patronage in the forms of electoral and upper-level executive jobs, which usually meant loyalty to the president by most politically-prominent Mexicans and by their supporters. By monopolizing the organs of mobilization, the PNR controlled participation. By using these organs of mobilization, the PNR could overwhelm any electoral opposition. The new regime was thus characterized by the lack of electoral competition, strict channelling of participation through the PNR, and presidential division of the spoils of politics.

The institutional location of political recruitment was a crucial feature in the formation of the political elite. Higher office, either electoral or administrative, was not open to just anyone who had the skills necessary to fill it. Only those with political careers were apt to be chosen by the party and/or the president for higher office. Others with the requisite skills, professionals and intellectuals without party affiliation, leaders and administrators from the private sector, and unaffiliated local leaders, were excluded from contention.
Lateral movement from the private sector into electoral or state administrative office was impossible. The spoils of the state were to be limited to those with "revolutionary" credentials, demonstrated first and foremost by official party membership. So, the new regime functioned to maintain the revolutionary family's monopoly on the state.

THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

That the Sonorans and the revolutionary family in general sought to promote economic development with a directing role played by a strong, interventionist state has already been established. The weakness of the national bourgeoisie gave greater impetus to this goal. As the central state developed the capacity to actually intervene economically and came to control larger parts of the economy, the direction of the state became more important to possess, not only for purposes of power, prestige, profit, and patronage, but also for the ideological direction of Mexican society. Again, structuring the rules regulating the struggle for this state was critical to those seeking to give society a particular direction and to those desiring the lion's share of the proceeds of societal development.

Growth and Distribution under the Sonorans

So long as Calles directed the Mexican state either as president or as the "power behind the throne," though, state intervention in economic life to promote the interests of the popular groups it claimed to represent was largely rhetorical. Land redistribution was
undertaken, although considering the recentness of the Revolution it was minor. In 1934, at the end of the presidency of Abelardo Rodríguez, the third of the puppet presidents who succeeded Calles, twenty-four years after the beginning of the Revolution, only 3.9 percent of Mexico's surface area had been redistributed to campesinos. Much of what was distributed was unusable. During the years of Calles's rule and his time as "jefe maximo de la Revolución," the labor movement was shackled. There were usually fewer than 50 strikes in the entire country in each of the years from 1925 to 1933; the number of strikers averaged about 3000 per year during this period. Salaries for workers ranged around a peso per day, not really enough to feed a family; local unions in Mexico City demanded a 400 percent increase in the minimum wage in 1933 in order to bring it up to a reasonable level, but to no effect. The effects of the worldwide depression after 1929 only made life worse for the Mexican peasant or worker.

57 Granted that not all of Mexico's surface area is arable; nonetheless, most of the land distributed was not arable either. For land distribution figures, see James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910, 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 188.

58 Sanderson reports that in Sonora, during Obregón’s administration, less than 9 percent of the land distributed was cultivable, and only about 3 percent was irrigated. During Calles’s presidency, 13 percent of the distributed land in Sonora was cultivable, and only a little over 5 percent was irrigated. Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State, pp. 228-231.

59 See the figures presented by Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, p. 184.

Campesinos and workers were not prospering under Obregón and Calles, but neither were many other social groups. Economic growth was not particularly rapid, although the mining and petroleum enclaves did well, growing at 5.6 percent per year in the value of their production. The destruction of the 1913 to 1916 period meant that much of the economic growth after 1917 went toward redressing previous declines. Throughout the 1920s the investment climate was uncertain since unrest had not been completely eradicated and the goals of redistribution of land and income were part of the frequently voiced revolutionary creed. Thus little new investment was undertaken either by foreign or domestic investors.61 The state was establishing an institutional capacity to intervene in the economy, but as of the 1920s its emphasis was still limited to building infrastructure and creating a central bank which could direct investment.62 Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) was founded in 1934, near the end of Calles’s political hegemony, to oversee a number of projects involved in the expansion of the financial sector, but until 1940 it did not have a major impact on the Mexican economy.63 Those who were most benefitting during this period were revolutionaries who were using their political power to establish financial empires and to accumulate large landholdings.64


62 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 79-84.

63 Bennett and Sharpe, "The State as Banker and Entrepreneur," p. 175.

64 Ibid., pp. 84-90.
But these military officers and government officials who were becoming the "capitalists of the revolution" were not extremely numerous.

What recovery there had been up to 1925 or 1928 was reversed by the onset of the worldwide depression in 1929. While the 1910 to 1925 period had seen an estimated 2.3 percent growth per capita per annum (higher after 1916), 1925 to 1930 witnessed an estimated 3.9 percent depreciation of per capita income each year, much of this concentrated in the 1928 to 1930 period, of course. This decline was particularly marked in the external sector, where the value of Mexico’s exports was cut in half between 1929 and 1932. So although by the end of Calles's rule in 1934 or so power had been consolidated in the central state and a new regime instituted in which succession was regularized and the major revolutionary forces were given a voice within the PNR, little progress had been made on the economic front either in terms of satisfying revolutionary popular demands for more equitable distribution or in terms of economic growth.

The State, Distribution, and Intervention under Cárdenas

The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas initiated the redistribution of land and encouraged labor organizing to take a new militancy. As Figure 3-1 shows, the pace of land distribution took a huge leap during the Cárdenas administration. The period from 1934 to 1940 saw Cárdenas grant more than twice as much land to campesinos as all of his predecessors since 1917 combined. He not only accelerated land

66 Meyer, El conflicto social y los gobiernos del maximato, p. 23.
67 See Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, p. 188.
distribution, but greatly increased agricultural credit provision to
the campesinos who had received land so that they could actually plant
and cultivate their newly received fields.\(^{68}\)

In the labor sphere, Cárdenas supported the labor movement in its
struggle with employers. He also called for labor unification, which
partly came about through the formation of the Confederación de
Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), which was created by unions which were
dissident within the CROM. As a result of Cárdenas’s encouragement and
the new militancy of the CTM, the number of strikes and strikers
increased manyfold during the Cárdenas administration, as illustrated
in Figure 3-2. Wages increased, especially during the first years of
the Cárdenas presidency, but these increases were undermined by
inflation. Still, benefits, work conditions, and union organization
improved under Cárdenas.\(^{69}\)

As is often the case, more equitable distribution and rapid
economic growth did not coexist in Cárdenas’s Mexico. Income per
capita grew only at about 1.8 percent per year during the 1930s. The
effects of worldwide depression and radical social reform, including
the nationalization of the petroleum industry, continued to discourage
investment.\(^{70}\)

\(^{68}\) Ibid., pp. 136-142. As Wilkie notes, there is some dispute as
to whether Cárdenas provided enough credit to the ejidatarios to be
effective, but he allocated a larger share of the federal budget and
more pesos per capita to agricultural credit than his predecessors or successors.

\(^{69}\) Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 145-163.

\(^{70}\) Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 33-36. Reynolds notes that
"many firms permitted net depreciation to take place." (p. 33) He also
observes that it was less the result of social reform that discouraged
investors than the announcement that it would take place.
So, economic growth was not rapid during the reformist phase of the middle and late 1930s. However, the 1930s witnessed the continuation of economic institution-building by the state. In addition to the birth of NAFIN at the end of the Maximato came the establishment under Cárdenas of a series of state development banks to do what the private sector could not or would not: the Agrarian Credit Bank [under Calles, 1926], the Ejidal Bank [1939], the Workers' and Industrial Development Bank [1937], the Foreign Commerce Bank [1937], the Small Merchants' Bank . . . . The postrevolutionary leaders had come to define a strong development-oriented banking system as a critical need, and state intervention as legitimate when the private sector was unable or unwilling to act. The particular kinds of public-sector banks needed were defined by more specific historical factors: the sectors earmarked to lead growth, and the needs and demands of the groups and classes that constituted the social foundations of the postrevolutionary Mexican state.  

Besides furthering the growth of state-run and financed development banks, Cárdenas took the critical step of moving the state into entrepreneurial activities. The activities of the state in the economy before Cárdenas came to power, other than development banking, were oriented toward building infrastructure. Cárdenas nationalized the petroleum industry and those railroads not already owned by the state. He also "created the Comisión Federal de Electricidad, which built hydroelectric and hydraulic works and purchased several small local electric companies as a first step in the eventual unification of the electric power industry under state control." So, while economic growth was not spectacular under the Cárdenas government, progress was

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71 Bennett and Sharpe, "The State as Banker and Entrepreneur," p. 173. See also Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, esp. chs. 4-6.  
72 Ibid., p. 198.
made in institution-building and in answering long-established demands for social justice and redistribution.

Industrialization and Inequality, 1940-1970

The end of Cárdenas's administration saw a shift away from an emphasis in economic policy on redistribution to a stress on industrialization. During the Second World War external demand stimulated Mexican exports of manufactures, thus encouraging industrial growth, with a multiplier effect increasing domestic consumption of locally-manufactured products. The consequences for economic growth were very favorable, with per capita income increasing at nearly 4 percent per year in the 1940s. After the end of the war, President Miguel Alemán created the conditions for further industrial growth by introducing a "full-scale program of import substitution." The private sector responded with high rates of capital formation.

Inflation threatened continuing high levels of investment, especially foreign investment, until the establishment in 1954 of desarrollo estabilizador (stabilizing development), a strategy which successive administrations followed until 1970.

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73 Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 36-38. "The measures the government used to encourage industrialization were primarily (1) tariff protection; (2) licensing arrangements (which restricted competing imports); (3) government tax incentives and subsidies; (4) the establishment of public enterprises in key sectors; and (5) the provision of electric power, roads, communications systems, and fuel at subsidy prices." Robert E. Looney, Mexico's Economy: A Policy Analysis with Forecasts to 1990 (Boulder: Westview, 1978), p. 14.
This stabilizing strategy had as its basic premises an increase in capital accumulation and a reduction in dependency on foreign markets. Measures to increase employment were not directly implemented, since most officials believed the growth process itself would automatically absorb the expanding labor force and permit a gradual improvement in income distribution. That is, it was a set of policies designed to favor private investment with a "trickle down" philosophy on distribution. Essentially, this strategy was an understanding between the state and the private sector in which business invested in response to what it considered to be the appropriate economic policies. The main elements of government policy followed under desarrollo estabilizador were control of domestic inflation so as to maintain a fixed exchange rate, encouraging the growth of private savings and investment (hence the "trickle down" approach rather than income redistribution), and "sectoral allocation of public resources in a way that increased the profitability and hence stimulated the growth of the private sector." NAFIN was particularly important for the latter aspect of this stabilizing approach.

Despite this pro-business economic strategy, the Mexican state remained a competitor to the private sector in the economy. Figure 3-3 compares the relative importance of private sector and public sector investment in Mexico. As it shows, even in the 1950s public investment was growing relative to private investment. Of course, public investment can be complementary to private investment; this was in fact a component of the desarrollo estabilizador strategy. Mexican leaders

74 Ibid., p. 15.
75 Ibid.
76 Bennett and Sharpe, "The State as Banker and Entrepreneur," pp. 177-182.
liked to emphasize this. As President Adolfo López Mateos said in 1959, "In practice there is no possible conflict between private enterprise and the state."\(^7\) At the same time, however, state enterprise is many times perceived by businessmen to be competition for business.\(^8\) Table 3-1 shows that in 1960 the state was a strong competitor of the private sector, especially among the largest firms in the economy. Thus Mexican business, while supported by the state's economic development strategy, had many reasons for regarding the state as a major competitor for profitable investments. The interventionist state, while fostering the development of Mexican private business, could not depend upon this private sector as a political supporter because its effects on businessmen were somewhat ambiguous, creating the conditions for their economic prosperity but at the same time threatening to exclude private businessmen from important sectors of the Mexican economy.

The social results and potential political ramifications of this development strategy can be determined by examining its consequences for class formation and income distribution. Table 3-2 displays one measure of social class in Mexico, occupational stratification. From this data it is evident that the middle and upper classes have grown in size in comparison to the lower classes during the 1950 to 1970 period. The percentage of the economically active population employed as professionals and office workers grew dramatically during the era of


desarrollo estabilizador. Politically, this has created a problem of image for Mexico's political elite because the social groups which the state's economic policies have favored are not in the "revolutionary coalition," or to the extent that they are, as part of the "popular sector," they are much more demanding in terms of political rewards than the campesinos or the workers.

In contrast, the class which declined in proportion to all others was the campesino class. The peasantry, supported in rhetoric by the Revolution and its institutionalization, the PRI, and rewarded in practice by Cárdenas's land reform, even declined in absolute numbers after 1960. Where these campesinos went is clearly shown in Table 3-3: they moved to the city. Those who have remained in the countryside are less and less the ejidatario so glorified in revolutionary rhetoric and so favored by Cárdenas and more and more rural workers, engaging in seasonal labor. Cockcroft describes the situation this way:

Nearly 80 percent of Mexico's 25,000 ejidos and Indian communities can no longer support themselves on farming alone, even though "legally" they account for 43 percent of cultivable land. Since they are forced to rent or migrate, they, together with similarly desperate small private landowners, actually possess less than 30 percent of cultivable land—and most of it is arid, high risk, and of low productivity. More than 90 percent of ejidos are noncollective units composed of minuscule individual holdings. There no longer exists sufficient space for the owners' sons to receive parcels; most therefore join the rural proletariat.

Table 3-4 shows how the process of proletarianization of the campesinos proceeded within the single decade of the 1960s. The condition of one

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79 Cockcroft, Mexico, pp. 191-192.
of the major pillars of the Revolution was thus deteriorating during the period from the end of the war up through the 1960s.

Within urban areas, other than the growth of the upper and white-collar middle classes already noted, there was an increase in the size of the blue-collar workforce employed in industrial and service occupations (see "artisans," "service," and "unspecified" in Table 3-2).\textsuperscript{80} The labor pillar of the Revolution was thus strengthened in size by urbanization and industrialization in the post-war decades. Yet, a growing urban working class should not be confused with a growing class consciousness and a growing organizational strength among urban workers. While in 1950 the unionized percentage of the economically active population was 9.8 percent, by 1970 it had only reached 14.8 percent.\textsuperscript{81} While the non-agricultural workforce grew by 4.75 million individuals between 1950 and 1970, the number of unionized workers increased by only 1.16 million.\textsuperscript{82} So less than a third of the

\textsuperscript{80}While Wilkie and Wilkins do not conjecture as to which types of people are apt to fit into the "unspecified" category, it is highly likely that, other than those employed in illegal activities (often a lower-class services sector occupation), this category is overwhelmingly made up of underemployed services occupations, the street vending and personal service occupations that are often difficult to define in the empirical setting.

\textsuperscript{81}Note that the economically active population (EAP) includes the agricultural sector workforce, which was 58 percent of the EAP in 1950 and had declined to 39 percent of the EAP in 1970. In the agricultural sector, less than 3 percent of the EAP is unionized. Of all unionized workers, only about 7.5 percent come from the agricultural sector. See the data provided by Raúl Trejo Delarbre, "El movimiento obrero: situación y perspectivas," in México, hoy, edited by Pablo González Casanova and Enrique Florescano (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979) and Cockroft, Mexico, p. 183.

new members of the urban working class went into the labor movement. Furthermore, the most rapidly growing sector of the Mexican economy, the services sector, was much less unionized than the industrial sector. In sum, while the labor pillar of the Revolution grew as a result of the state's economic strategy in the post-war period, this growth was not reflected in the allegiance to the Institutionalized Revolution, at least as defined by union membership.

In terms of class formation, post-war economic growth led to an increase in the size of the urban classes and in their proportion of the total economically active population. This included the growth of those the Revolution opposed (at least rhetorically), the upper class; the growth of those about whom the Revolution was ideologically somewhat ambivalent, the middle classes; and the growth of those in whose name (among others) the Revolution was made, the working class. However, the growth of the latter did not lead much change in the organizational expression of loyalty to the Revolution, union membership. Meanwhile, the other class in whose benefit the Revolution claims to stand, the campesinos, were increasingly marginalized in the post-war period.

The paradox that the Mexican revolutionary elite had not effectively promoted the interests of those for whose benefit they claim to rule is perhaps most vividly shown by income distribution statistics. Table 3-5 reports income distribution figures, both distribution by quintiles and Gini coefficients, adjusted for underdeclared income as well as unadjusted, from various surveys from
1950 to 1968. It is abundantly clear from these data that the relative income status of the campesinos, represented in the two lower quintiles, had drastically deteriorated by 1970. For the lowest quintile, the poorest campesinos, this represents an absolute decline in real income (see Table 3-6). Meanwhile the second lowest quintile, relatively better off campesinos and some services sector workers, enjoyed but a marginal increase in real income over the two decades. The relative condition of urban workers and those who came to the city (the 41 to 80 percentile range) changed little during these eighteen years, their real income increasing at about the national average. Those who most benefitted from this development strategy were not so much the richest 5 percent of the population that forms the upper classes (big businessmen, managers, more successful professionals), although their real incomes and thus their standard of living improved by at least 50 percent. The real benefactors of Mexican development were the middle classes, those in the 15 percent of Mexican households next to the top of the income pyramid. Their incomes more than doubled in the period 1950 to 1968. Again, the commitment of this group to the

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83 The adjustments were made by David Felix, "Income Distribution Trends in Mexico and the Kuznets Curve," in Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development, edited by Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), where both adjusted and unadjusted figures are reported (see pp. 267-268). The same income distribution survey results are reported in Smith, Labyrinths of Power; Jorge Buzalo, Planning the Mexican Economy: Alternative Development Strategies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 37; and Cockroft, Mexico, p. 188.

84 Felix calculates that for the lowest quintile, the annual household income (in 1950 pesos) declined from 2064 in 1950 to 1813 in 1969, a 12.2 percent decline. The second-lowest quintile experienced a 31.5 percent increase in real income, from 2580 to 3392. "Income Distribution Trends in Mexico and the Kuznets Curve," p. 307.
often articulated goals of the Revolution was unclear and whether the Revolution was made to promote this group's interests is somewhat ambiguous. By 1970, sixty years after the opening salvos of the Revolution, the popular groups which had formed the mass base for revolutionary activity and provided a target for revolutionary rhetoric had either lost out on the benefits of the Revolution, as had the campesinos, or had barely kept pace with the development of the society as a whole, as had the urban lower class.

In sum, the strategy of desarrollo estabilizador successfully promoted Mexican economic growth without inflation in the last half of the 1950s and the 1960s. However, as Clark Reynolds has summarized, beneath the surface a number of problems were brewing:

(a) A high and growing rate of underemployment resulting from productivity gains in both agriculture and manufacturing, rapid demographic growth since the 1940s, massive urbanization and growing female participation in the work force.

(b) Rising pressure for land redistribution due to lags in rural income growth, concentration of land in commercial farms at the expense of smallholders, and unkept promises of land reform.

(c) Deterioration in income distribution, as upper incomes rose disproportionately, combined with growing resentment of the gap between rich and poor.

(d) Pressures for wage increases which were becoming more difficult to disarm through time-honored means such as co-opting of union officials and jailing of dissidents.

(e) A chronic and growing trade deficit financed by increased dependence on foreign capital, with a deteriorating positive balance in tourism and "errors and omissions."

(f) An anaemic public sector revenue base, given the large and growing demands for current and capital expenditures of government caused by rapid population growth, urbanization and development.

Luis Echeverría, who assumed the presidency in December 1970, brought an end to desarrollo estabilizador. The difficulties which the economy began to have in the late 1960s, especially in the agricultural sector, whose production grew at only about 1.2 percent in the last half of the 1960s, were a stimulus to Echeverría’s activist economic policies. The political movement of 1968, which included demands for reorientation of Mexico’s development strategy so as to greater benefit the popular masses, meant that the state’s new activism was focused especially toward alleviation of the misery of Mexico’s poor, both urban and rural.

Echeverría’s government professed very early to include among its goals the following measures: fiscal reform as a redistributive mechanism; pilot programs to alleviate the misery of arid zones and indigenous communities; modernization of the agricultural sector through land reform, greater productivity, rural industry, and self-finance; channeling health, community development, social security,


and housing funds to the poorest rural and urban areas; achievement of a new balance of regional development among sectors and classes; decentralization of industry; and a reform of national education to benefit the working classes. 87

The Echeverría administration's activist economic policies were matched by the president's active style, a populist style reminiscent of Cárdenas which brought hope to reformists but was abrasive to its opponents, particularly businessmen, both large agricultural capitalists and industrialists.

Echeverría's economic reforms headed in three directions which alienated Mexican business. As the fiscal debt of the Mexican state had been growing and because Echeverría wished to expand social welfare spending, it seemed prudent to reform tax policy. In early 1971, he recommended passage of a fiscal-reform bill, initially envisioned as including measures to eliminate tax evasion, taxing capital gains at the same rate as salaries, introducing progressiveness in the income tax, and other revenue generating measures. The private sector reacted quite negatively, with COPARMEX (the Mexican Employers' Confederation) threatening to "interrupt the dialogue between government and private initiative." 88 Echeverría responded by criticizing businessmen for their selfishness, but fiscal reform was largely ineffective, the

87 Sanderson, Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State, pp. 169-170. See also Looney, Mexico's Economy, pp. 60-64.

88 The COPARMEX quote and a summary of this exchange is in Sanderson, Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State, p. 171.
Echeverría administration instead choosing to rely on foreign borrowing to make up its fiscal deficit. 89

Perhaps the reform area of greatest rhetorical and symbolic importance for Echeverría was agrarian reform. The administration sought to increase effective land redistribution, which Echeverría pressed forward with determination. The land of a number of "revolutionary" caciques was expropriated and Echeverría granted more than one million hectares of land to 22,000 campesinos on the anniversary of the agrarian reform law in 1975. 90 However, the actual distribution of land which was granted was frequently held up by court-ordered amparos, injunctions won by landowners to postpone distribution. 91 Perhaps more importantly, Echeverría passed a new Agrarian Code designed to weaken the economic power of larger farmers and cattle-raisers while strengthening the ejido through internal changes. These reforms were intended to remove the influence of local caciques who were allied with large farmers and to begin a collectiviz-


91 For instance, see Latin America, 17 December 1976. The right of amparo, which was repealed for land reform measures under Calles, was later reintroduced under the rightist administration of Alemán. Echeverría was unable to remove it under his new Agrarian Code because of opposition from large farmers and cattlemen. Sanderson, Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State, pp. 98, 173. For this reason, the relatively higher land redistribution figures for the López Mateos, Díaz Ordaz, and Echeverría administrations in Figure 2-1 do not reflect real land distribution. For Díaz Ordaz, the landowners' right of amparo may have provided the opportunity to be rhetorically committed to land reform without being substantively committed.
atation movement within ejidos. The collectivization effort was intended, at least in principle, to address the problem of inefficiently small production units within the ejido by creating larger units which could operate more efficiently and with mechanization.92 In addition, new sources of credit and marketing were introduced to encourage greater production by ejidatarios.93

Again, Echeverría faced the opposition of the private sector. The agricultural bourgeoisie feared the loss of its lands while the ejido collectivization plans raised the specter of communism, which the private sector as a whole feared. The right of amparo and other appeals to the judicial system were frequently used in land redistribution.94 Vigorous organizing and criticism of the government took place within the business sector, culminating in the formation of the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (Enterprise Coordinating Council---CCE) in 1975 to be the principal organ of business for expressing this sector's political interests.95

Finally, efforts were made by the Echeverría administration to lower import barriers so as to increase the competitiveness of Mexican industry, in effect ending import substitution, or at least the state's support of it; to improve the operation of state enterprises and even to set up new ones to compete with inefficient private industries; and to strengthen the state's power to regulate foreign investment.

92Latin America, 3 January 1975, pp. 6-7.
93Ibid., p. 173; Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, pp. 192-193.
94See Latin America, 17 December 1976.
95Sanderson, Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State, pp. 181-186.
Domestic and foreign investors opposed these measures. The CCE and the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico expressed their discontent in vocal public criticism.\footnote{96}{Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, pp. 193-194.}

This falling out between the partners in desarrollo estabilizador led to a crisis of economic development which began early in Echeverría’s term and accelerated after 1974, reaching its peak in 1975 and 1976 and even stretching into the administration of José López Portillo, Echeverría’s successor. One aspect of this crisis revolved around the private sector’s willingness to invest in Mexico. Given the fluidity of capital and the ease of convertibility of pesos into dollars, the private sector enjoyed the possession of an important lever of power: it could invest or not invest in Mexico as it chose without great concern about allowing its capital to lay fallow. Figure 3-4 shows that the relatively high rates of growth in private investment in the Díaz Ordaz administration before the political crisis in late 1968 did not continue past the political crisis of 1968 even with the change of administration at the end of 1970. In fact, the new administration faced strong opposition from the private sector which was expressed by lagging investment in 1971.\footnote{97}{Latin America, 17 December 1971.} Only 1974 was a year of major investment effort by private business during the Echeverría term. Lacking private sector commitment to investment, the state attempted to make up the difference. This effort was motivated not only by the administration’s commitment to economic development but also by the desire by Echeverría and others within the political elite.
to shift the balance of economic power back to the state, away from "dangerous and inconvenient concentrations" of power in the private sector which had developed over the previous three decades.\textsuperscript{98} The state's share of total investment, which had declined steadily since the last half of the López Mateos administration began to increase after 1971, as Figure 3-3 illustrates.

The results of lagging investment by the private sector were declining rates of growth in industrial production and in the gross domestic product.\textsuperscript{99} Figure 3-5 shows that 1974 through 1976 were low growth years in terms of GDP per capita and that GDP per capita growth rates were declining from 1973 on. In addition, 1971 had been a very low growth year, although this is partly due to the timing of the sexenio, first years of presidential administrations being generally worse for economic activity as the new government learns its job and the private sector becomes accustomed to a new president. The decline of GDP growth continued into the first term of the López Portillo presidency. The decline in the growth of GDP per capita was paralleled by a decline in the growth of value added in industry (see Figure 3-6). This indicates that even the most dynamic sector of the Mexican economy was slowing down in the last half of Echeverría's term.

An even more worrisome economic problem developed as a result of Echeverría's inability to enact successful fiscal reform, thus his need

\textsuperscript{98} The quote is from Horacio Labastilla, a prominent PRI ideologist of the period. Latin America, 17 December 1971, pp. 403-404.

to finance growing state involvement in the economy by growing
government deficits and debt, both foreign and domestic: inflation,
effectively that problem which had been avoided under desarrollo
estabilizador. The increase in consumer prices, which had usually
ranged under 3 percent in the 1960s, rose to over 20 percent in 1973
and 1974 and over 25 percent in 1976 (see Figure 3-7). Growing
inflation only further alienated private sector investors who had been
so favored by desarrollo estabilizador. The reluctance on the part of
businessmen to invest which characterized the beginning of the
Echeverría administration became a willingness to move capital outside
of Mexico by the end of it. Whereas there had been net inflows of
short-term capital prior to the end of desarrollo estabilizador due to
higher real rates of interest in Mexico, after 1972 the categories
"short-term capital" and "errors and omissions" in the balance of
payments showed a net outflow, which became a serious instance of
capital flight in 1976, rising to over US$ 2 billion.

Partly a political reluctance to invest, this capital flight was
also economically motivated, especially in 1976 when it reached new
heights. Rumors of a peso devaluation had caused runs on the peso as
early as April 1976 and made the promise of profits to be made by
investing in dollars hard to turn down. The pressure on the peso,
which had not been devalued since the beginning of desarrollo
estabilizador in 1954, forced Echeverría to devalue at the end of

100 Reynolds, "Why Mexico’s ‘Stabilizing Development’ Was Actually
Destabilizing", p. 1015; Looney, Mexico’s Economy, p. 38.

101 Latin America, 10 September 1976.
August 1976, going from 12.5 to 20.50 to the dollar, later declining to about 26.5 pesos to the dollar.

While it was a necessary economic correction, the devaluation of the peso was politically embarrassing to the state. It was an admission that the state-led and regulated economic development of Mexico was faltering, that the state had had to resort to deficit financing in order to begin to address the issue of the welfare of its poorest citizens, and that it did not command the loyalty of the private sector nor could it successfully regulate its actions. The revolutionary coalition had achieved social justice, economic modernization, and the creation of an indigenous private sector to lead growth. Social justice had lost its weighty importance somewhere in the process of economic modernization; Echeverría’s state could not resurrect it without seriously wounding the private sector which had benefitted most from this modernization and whose cooperation was needed if growth were to continue. The possibility that the Mexican Miracle was reaching the end of the cul-de-sac down which it had journeyed had to be seriously considered.

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE REVOLUTION AND MODERNIZATION

One of the first cataclysmic events of the twentieth century, the Mexican Revolution destroyed much of the Porfirian political, economic, and social order. Establishing a new order proved far from easy, a task which created enemies for the political elites who were founders of the new state but which also created class allies among much of the Mexican population. While the new political elite alienated and even
persecuted strong, traditional Catholics and those hacendados who were unwilling to become revolutionaries, its revolutionary myth which promised effective suffrage for all, the end of permanence in office, and most importantly, social justice, won it friends. Rural campesinos and urban workers, both of whom suffered under the Porfiriato, formed the mass base of this new revolutionary alliance. Members of the middle class were also attracted to the new revolutionary alliance under the promise that their goals would not be constrained in the way they were under Porfirian rule.

Distributing social justice to the teeming masses and protecting national sovereignty over economic resources is, of course, difficult to do in a backward economy without modernizing it, so that more is available to distribute and outsiders are not needed to create what must be distributed. The Sonorans who controlled the early direction of the new state appreciated this and insured that the new state would be powerful enough to lead economic growth. In the course of so doing, they created a strong state which was therefore all the more valuable to control for those who wished to influence the course of Mexican development. Few who sought to give direction to Mexican development in the succeeding years tried to do so outside the state, a situation much different from the course of Western European or North American modernization. This also meant, though, that the success or failure of the development process more heavily affected the support for the political elite which came to monopolize the post-revolutionary state.

The Sonorans did not intend to only rely upon this new, stronger state to create a modern economy, however. They also fostered, through
the state, a new private sector. This new private sector was not made a political bulwark of the state when Cárdenas reorganized the official party, but it prospered greatly under his successors. Mexico's Miracle came to depend upon agreement between the state and the entrepreneurs it had created. When that agreement broke down, efforts to revive the economy sputtered, but the state bore the brunt of criticism from those whose dreams were being threatened, the middle class. Maintaining the agreement for as long as it lasted depended upon the state ignoring its promises of social justice. Thirty post-war years during which income distribution did not improve for the lower-class supporters of the Mexican Revolution was long enough for these groups as well to begin to question their loyalty to those who controlled the state.

While the political elite had once enjoyed the political support of all but those who had fought against the Revolution, especially traditional Catholic elements, by 1976 its political bases were eroding because it had been unable to provide to the various social classes within Mexico those specific goods required to ensure their support. The private sector was feeling threatened by growing state involvement in the economy under Echeverría and his populistic rhetoric. The urban working class had barely maintained its standards of living despite being staunch political supporters of this elite for six or more decades. The situation of the campesinos was worsening rather than even staying the same; those measures enacted to provide social justice to them, especially land reform, had many times only been symbolic. Land without credit to buy seeds and fertilizer or without irrigations systems to water the planted seeds was only a tie binding the campesino
to his condition of poverty. The middle class which had once benefitted from post-revolutionary social mobility was feeling threatened by the inability of the state to either open enough addition bureaucratic positions for its growing numbers or maintain the economic growth necessary for its members to find employment outside government jobs. In short, the political bases of Mexico’s political elite were in danger because of economic crisis. A modification of Mexico’s political regime, the rules of Mexican politics, so as to restore the solid grip of the civilian political elite on the Mexican state was perhaps necessary.
Table 3-1

Foreign Private, Domestic Private, and State Enterprise in Mexico in Early 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LARGEST 100</th>
<th>LARGEST 200</th>
<th>LARGEST 300</th>
<th>LARGEST 400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN CONTROL</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
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<td>STRONG FOREIGN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATION</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC PRIVATE</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.1*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. DIVISION OF INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LARGEST 100</th>
<th>LARGEST 200</th>
<th>LARGEST 300</th>
<th>LARGEST 400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN CONTROL</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRONG FOREIGN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATION</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC PRIVATE</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>STATE ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.9*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.1*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Errors due to rounding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Category</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UPPER</strong></td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STABLE MIDDLE</strong></td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Workers</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARGINAL MIDDLE</strong></td>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Workers</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSITIONAL LOWER</strong></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULAR LOWER</strong></td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTE:** Wilkie and Wilkins divide certain occupational groupings into more than one class category in the manner devised by Howard F. Cline.
Table 3-3

Urbanization in Mexico 1930-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Living in Localities &gt; 2500</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>33.5 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35.1 %</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>42.6 %</td>
<td>7.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>50.7 %</td>
<td>8.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>58.7 %</td>
<td>8.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>68.5 %</td>
<td>9.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-4
Social Structure of the Mexican Countryside

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>Thousands</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Commercial</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Proletariat</td>
<td>3400</td>
<td>3030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The category "peasantry" includes ejidatarios, small private landowners, and medium private landowners. The category "rural proletariat" includes the census categories empleados and ayuda familiar sin retribución," essentially those called jornaleros and their families.

Table 3-5
Trends in Income Distribution in Mexico, 1950-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Percentile)</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Disposable Household Income</td>
<td>UNADJUSTED FOR UNDERDECLARED INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 5% (96-100)</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5% (91-95)</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 10% (81-90)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Top 20% (81-100)</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (61-80)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (41-60)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (21-40)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 20% (1-20)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Coefficient</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>.543</td>
<td>.529</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ADJUSTED FOR UNDERDECLARED INCOME</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richest 5% (96-100)</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5% (91-95)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 10% (81-90)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Top 20% (81-100)</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (61-80)</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (41-60)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (21-40)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poorest 20% (1-20)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Coefficient</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-6
Annual Household Real Income, 1950-1968
(By income class, in pesos of 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Percentile)</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNADJUSTED FOR UNDERDECLARED INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 5% (96-100)</td>
<td>31,205</td>
<td>28,160</td>
<td>41,060</td>
<td>50,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5% (91-95)</td>
<td>9,598</td>
<td>11,426</td>
<td>19,138</td>
<td>26,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 10% (81-90)</td>
<td>6,683</td>
<td>9,815</td>
<td>12,512</td>
<td>14,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (61-80)</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>5,782</td>
<td>6,896</td>
<td>8,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (41-60)</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>3,964</td>
<td>3,977</td>
<td>5,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 20% (21-40)</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>3,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 20% (1-20)</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>1,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>5,285</td>
<td>5,807</td>
<td>7,166</td>
<td>9,114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|               | ADJUSTED FOR UNDERDECLARED INCOME |       |      |      |
| Richest 5% (96-100) | 51,636 | 58,133 | 64,610 | 76,984 |
| Next 5% (91-95)   | 10,452 | 14,133 | 28,579 | 46,987 |
| Next 10% (81-90)  | 7,209  | 12,192 | 17,502 | 22,166 |
| Next 20% (61-80)  | 4,888  | 6,863  | 8,421  | 11,879 |
| Next 20% (41-60)  | 3,418  | 4,102  | 4,371  | 6,968  |
| Next 20% (21-40)  | 2,580  | 2,751  | 3,257  | 3,488  |
| Bottom 20% (1-20) | 2,064  | 1,733  | 2,377  | 1,973  |
| National Average  | 6,427  | 7,920  | 10,241 | 13,273 |

Figure 3-1

REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN MEXICO
BY ADMINISTRATION, 1920–1976

Figure 3-2

LABOR ORGANIZATION AND MILITANCY

STRIKES AND STRIKERS, 1920-1940

Figure 3-3

DIVISION OF INVESTMENT IN MEXICO
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, 1963 TO 1976

Source: Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario estadístico (Mexico City, various years).
GROWTH OF PRIVATE FIXED INVESTMENT

DIAZ ORDAZ AND ECHEVERRIA TERMS

Source: Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico (Mexico City, various years).
FIGURE 3-5

GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA
1960-1978

FIGURE 3-6

GROWTH OF VALUE ADDED IN INDUSTRY
1980—1975

FIGURE 3-7

INFLATION IN MEXICO
1965 TO 1978

CHAPTER FOUR
THE STATE AND SOCIETY:
EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN REGIME

Typologizing Mexico's regime has probably caused scholars, journalists, and politicians to write and speak more words than any other topic on Mexico in the past three decades. At the risk of piling one more typology on the growing stack, I will seek in this chapter to expostulate the aspects of Mexico's regime using those regime dimensions laid out in Chapter Two. Rather than attempting to categorize the Mexican at any point in time, even in the critical years of 1976 and 1977 when the reforma política was being formulated, I will focus on the evolution of the different aspects of this regime, especially in the years leading up to the reforma política. As students of Mexican politics have come to appreciate, the Mexican regime defies placement within any ideal-type regime at any point in time.¹ Special attention will be paid to the dimensions of political competition and political participation (or repression and control of these) as expressed through the electoral process and the political party system. An understanding of the role played by the electoral and party systems within the Mexican political process is the goal sought

in this effort, which is critical for analyzing the reasons for electoral reform in 1977.

REGIME DIMENSIONS IN MEXICO

Although the electoral and party systems are the parts of the Mexican regime whose change I am most interested in exploring, it is impossible to understand their role or their evolution in isolation. Other aspects of the Mexican regime, aspects which in other settings in Latin America have undergone extreme change and thus generated much political interest, form the context in which the electoral and party systems operate. The relative stability of these other regime dimensions and their importance to the continued rule of the "revolutionary coalition" should be highlighted because this will help to explain why many members of the political elite were willing to modify the electoral and party systems in 1977. This will also go a long way toward an understanding of the limitations on major regime change offered by electoral reform.

Non-Electoral Aspects of Limited Competition and Participation:

Corporatist Interest Intermediation

While analytically separable, as argued in Chapter Two, in practice the regime dimensions of competition and participation are frequently performed by the same political institutions. In Mexico, the system of interest representation, a critical provider of opportunities to participate politically and enter into the competition over public policy, is largely mediated institutionally through the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which also plays the
central role in the other major of public arena of participation and competition, the electoral system. Much of the real competition over the direction of public policy, though, takes place within the political elite, as will be discussed below.

Mexico’s hegemonic political party, the PRI, plays a political role far wider than simply ensuring constant electoral victories to support Mexico’s political elite. The PRI is also a corporatist-type intermediary between the state and the interest associations of the popular classes, especially the organized working class and the peasantry. The PRI is divided into three sectors, the Labor, Agrarian, and Popular Sectors. Membership in the party is usually through membership in one of organizations belonging to one of these sectors. The Labor Sector includes most unionized workers in Mexico, excluding those in the Federation of Unions of Employees in Service to the State (FSTSE), the state sector workers union, which belongs to the Popular Sector. The Labor Sector includes several confederations of unions, but it has been dominated since the late 1930s by the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), by far the largest confederation of Mexican unions. While the Labor Sector in general, and the CTM in particular, could form a very powerful and independent pressure group within the PRI, in practice it has been quite subservient to the wishes

Francisco Zapata estimated in 1975 that the CTM’s membership was 1,400,000, while the roles of its closest competitor, the Confederación Revolucionario de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), had 700,000 workers. "Afiliación y organización sindical en México," in José Luis Reyna, et al., Tres estudios sobre el movimiento obrero en México, Jornadas 80 (Mexico City: El Colegio Mexico, 1976), p. 123. A brief history and description of the major components of the labor movement are provided by Reyna and Marcelo Miquet, "Introducción a la historia de las organizaciones obreras en México: 1912-1966," in ibid.
of the political elite. Methods used by the party leadership, and the revolutionary elite in general, to control the labor movement and the CTM include divide-and-conquer strategies (the CTM is not the only labor confederation; others are occasionally favored by the president to counterbalance the CTM's power), co-optation of labor leadership (into party and electoral positions), governmental regulation (legal recognition of labor unions and strikes), and corruption (especially the opportunity for the sale by union leaders of union membership in favored industries).³

While the autonomy of the labor movement is constrained, the representativeness of the interest groups of the peasantry is even more limited. The dominant organization within the Agrarian Sector is the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), which was founded, as was the CTM, under the Cárdenas administration to provide mobilizational support for the Mexican state.⁴ The ruling elite has either coopted or repressed attempts to create independent campesino organizations.⁵


⁵Vicente Lombardo Toledano's General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (UGOCM) was repeatedly denied recognition after its founding in the late 1940s and later coopted into the Peasant Sector of the PRI in the early 1970s. The Independent Peasant Confederation (CCI), founded in 1961, was assumed into the Peasant Sector in 1974. Leaders
Although the CTM's leadership, especially Fidel Velázquez, forms an autonomous and continuous, although coopted and loyal, part of the PRI's hierarchy, the leadership of the CNC has neither been autonomous nor continuous, being appointed from above by the president. Most importantly, as many observers note, the peasantry receives very little in the way of government support despite its designation as one of the three pillars of the revolutionary party, certainly taking a position less advantageous than either of the other two sectors.

In accord with corporatist reasoning, the toiling masses within the functionally-distinct agricultural and industrial sectors have been kept separate in Mexico. Considering the political power which a unified organization of labor and the peasantry could possess, this is critical for understanding the political weakness of the poor in Mexico. Far from being motivated by a corporatist ideology, one might argue, as does Rosa Elena Montes de Oca, "Ever since the Red Battalions of the Casa del Obrero Mundial were formed to fight the peasant armies in 1915, the state has been very careful that workers and peasants never be united. This was especially important during the Cárdenas


7Córdova, La política de masas del cardenismo, pp. 146-149.
regime in order to keep the process of social reforms under the control of the state and not allow the mass movement to outgrow them." The reorganization of the official party into four sectors under Cárdenas reflected this concern by the revolutionary elite. It is a revolutionary heritage that is still felt today.

The third sector of the PRI, the Popular Sector, consists of corporatist-type interest associations for members of the middle class, both urban and rural, state sector employees, and urban marginals organized through neighborhood associations. The primary organization within the Popular Sector is the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP) whose original structure divided the membership into ten functionally-defined categories, including bureaucrats, members of cooperatives (other than ejidatarios), small shopkeepers and manufacturers, small farmers, professionals and intellectuals, youth, women's groups, and artisans. Unlike the organizations of either the Labor or the Agrarian Sectors, the organizations of the Popular Sector regularly achieve the ends for which interest groups are formed: state attention to the demands of members of the group. The demands of the rank-and-file members of the Popular Sector have been fulfilled (at least until recently) and Popular Sector representatives have been more successful than their labor or peasant counterparts in their political careers, as indicated by the greater frequency of Popular Sector politicians achieving high

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8 "The State and the Peasants," p. 52.
political office.\textsuperscript{10} As Evelyn Stevens argues, "The sectoral organization of the party provides a rudimentary and incomplete kind of corporatism."\textsuperscript{11} The PRI's corporatism is incomplete because a number of the usual corporate bodies, the business community, the church, and the military, do not have their interests represented through the PRI. Members of the business community are obligated to belong to "singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories,"\textsuperscript{12} but these associations\textsuperscript{13} are not affiliated with the PRI. As discussed in the previous chapter, the church is not allowed by the Constitution to participate in politics, thus any church-affiliated interest group would not be recognized or licensed by the Mexican state as an official intermediary and certainly no such group would be affiliated with the PRI. The military did originally form one pillar of the PRI's sectoral structure,\textsuperscript{14} but it was dissolved in 1940


\textsuperscript{12}To use the words of Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 93.

\textsuperscript{13}The obligatory business confederations are the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) and the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN), neither of which is affiliated with the PRI. Other, less official or even private chambers and associations of businessmen exist, but membership in them is not obligatory. See Dale Story, "The Private Sector and Policy-Making in Mexico," SECOLAS Annuals, 12 (1981), pp. 78-88.

\textsuperscript{14}Actually that of the PRI's predecessor, the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM).
with most of its office-holding members joining the PRI's Popular Sector.15

Non-Electoral Aspects of Limited Competition: The Game of the Political Elite

As discussed in the previous chapter, those holding high political and administrative office in the Mexican state very early in the post-revolutionary period began to form a separate and privileged social group, known variously as the ruling elite, the revolutionary family, the revolutionary coalition, the political bureaucracy, and so forth. The formation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 institutionalized the struggle over the Mexican state. Henceforth, the PNR (later PRM, then PRI) candidate for president would become the chief executive of the central state after an electoral campaign in which the party would use its many constituent parties as local organizers and mobilizers to assure electoral victory. Theoretically, the party would meet every six years to elect a presidential candidate.16 Practically, the candidate was chosen prior to the convention of the party by the executive committee of the party, which during the first six or seven years of the PNR's existence was itself chosen by Calles. Later, after Cárdenas had successfully defied Calles and exiled him, the executive committee and party president came to be controlled by the president of Mexico who selected them. This being

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the case, the president was able to choose his own successor since he controlled those who selected the official party candidate. In the same way, the president was able to choose his subordinates in the state, who in turn could choose their subordinates. These presidential subordinates were usually disproportionately chosen from the president’s camarilla, his circle of political supporters. Likewise, presidential subordinates, such as cabinet members, chose their subordinates from their own camarillas.

Thus, the regime became dominated by the party and by the president who controlled it. This is not to say that the regime was completely autocratic nor that the president could do as he would on any matter. Because the party convention did choose presidential candidates, those being chosen had to have the confidence of those at the convention. While the president could pack the convention he had to do so with care since alienating any major group within the party could lead to its withdrawal from the party. Therefore, the president had to choose his successor with an eye to satisfying major powers within the ruling elite. Of course, presidential control of the patronage flowing from positions within the state and the party helped to insure that most políticos supported him and his choice. To not do so could mean being cut off from this patronage, which any serious politician needed merely to sustain his camarilla.

A major characteristic of the regime, then, has been presidential

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17 One of the major differences in competing theories of the Mexican regime concerns the extent of presidential power and its exercise. See Koslow and Mumme, "The Evolution of the Mexican Political System."
control of the official party, within the limits required to keep most members within the ranks of the party; hence presidential control of patronage in the forms of electoral and upper-level executive jobs, which has usually meant loyalty to the president by most politically-prominent Mexicans and by their supporters. Presidential division of the spoils in the forms of electoral, administrative, and party offices has reinforced the trend towards unity among politically ambitious Mexicans. If electoral or party office is sought, it has to be achieved in or through the PRI. If administrative office is sought, it has to come from someone higher up in the administration, who in the last instance was a choice of the minister, a member of the cabinet and personal selection of the president. Support for the PRI and/or the president has become the sine qua non for advancement. Recruitment of such politically ambitious individuals has become institutionalized. A revolutionary family less and less committed to the Revolution, more and more interested in personal advancement, located principally in the PRI, has come to dominate Mexican politics.

The institutional location of political recruitment was a crucial feature in the formation of the political elite. Higher office, either electoral or administrative, was not open to just anyone who had the skills necessary to fill it. Only those with political careers were apt to be chosen by the party and/or the president for higher office. Others with the requisite skills, professionals and intellectuals without party affiliation, leaders and administrators from the private sector, and unaffiliated local leaders, were excluded from contention. Lateral movement from the private sector into electoral or state
administrative office was impossible. The spoils of the state were to be limited to those with "revolutionary" credentials, demonstrated first and foremost by official party membership. So, the new regime founded in 1929 has functioned to maintain the revolutionary family's monopoly on the state.

**Respect for Basic Civil Liberties**

Compared to the violent era of the Revolution (1910-1917) and the period of consolidation of power (1917-1929), the post-1929 period is one in which the basic freedoms of the Mexican citizen have been respected most of the time. Although the police have become increasingly corrupt, there is a rule of law in Mexico. The government has on few occasions directly and violently repressed its opposition. Mexico has been, since the Spanish Civil War, a haven for those, especially those of Hispanic roots, who have been exiled or otherwise repressed by their governments. This regime of civil liberties, established by the Constitution of 1917, is one reason why Mexico was and sometimes still is ranked with the democracies of the world.

The general respect for civil and political rights which has characterized Mexico since the early 1930s makes the exceptions to this rule of law all the more striking. The exceptions fall into two groups: long-term disrespect for the rights of certain groups of citizens, especially campesinos, and suspension of the civil liberties

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18 Again, see Koslow and Mumme, "The Evolution of the Mexican Political System," on competing interpretations of the repressiveness of the Mexican regime.

19 See esp. articles 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 24. Constitución política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación, 1983).
of groups displaying manifest opposition to the state and/or the regime. A general disregard for the civil rights of peasants, especially peasant leaders demanding land or other reforms, is commonly understood to exist. Peasant organizations and peasant leaders who actively seek reform outside the informal rules of the game for agrarian reform ventures have had their rights to assembly and speech disregarded, some have been jailed and others murdered. 20

Of greater concern to politically conscious, educated, urban Mexicans is the occasional disregard for civil liberties displayed by the rulers of the Mexican state when faced by a significant protest movement. The two most prominent examples of this blatant disregard for constitutionally-protected freedoms took place when the Mexican state confronted a railroad workers' strike in 1958-59 and the student movement of 1968. It is not my intention to retell the stories of these movements and their repression by the state here. 21


important is that each was a large-scale movement that was extremely
visible and could possibly be imitated across the country. Also,
neither movement’s leadership was vulnerable to co-optation by the
political elite in its usual practice of moderating protest movements,
the railroad workers’ leader Demetrio Vallejo being unwilling to be
coopted, the student movement’s leadership being too numerous and
dispersed to be easily identifiable. In each case the Ministry of
Gobernación harassed and attacked the movement, hoping to deflate it,
without success, until finally force was used to suppress the movement.
In the case of the railroad workers’ strike, the leadership of the
railroad workers’ union and many of the members were imprisoned. In
1968, after repeated efforts to defuse the crisis, a massacre of
protesters by army units took place at Tlatelolco.

The uncommon aspect of these two incidents is not that the ruling
elite tried to defeat its opposition by non-competitive methods. Co-
optation of protest group leaders has taken place throughout the
history of post-revolutionary Mexico. The press has been indirectly
censored as well on politically sensitive topics. Incumbents
normally tend to try to diminish competition and manipulate the press
for their purposes. The unusual characteristic is that the state
overtly used violence to repress these movements and in so doing
violated the protesters’ freedoms of speech and assembly, not to speak

\[22\] Censorship of the press has been practiced by two methods: (1)
the state has owned the only distributor of newsprint and thus has been
in a position to alter any publisher’s allocation of newsprint; and (2)
the state, through its many state-owned enterprises and government
ministries, has been the principal advertiser and could withhold the
advertising that would be vital to a periodical’s profitability. See
Stevens, Protest and Response in Mexico.

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of their physical integrity. This reduced the possibility of mounting effective opposition to the ruling elite to near nil. Moreover, the use of repression probably "enhances the persuasive power of its co-optive techniques," as Judith Adler Hellman argues. She goes on to write that "persuasion and coercion should be understood as the two integral elements in a highly efficient system of class domination. In this process, the stick does not appear only when the carrot has been refused. It is the ever-present threat of the stick which helps to make the carrot look so juicy and tempting."23

But for many these examples of repression clearly demonstrated, perhaps for the first time, that the ruling elite had no intention whatsoever of permitting any opposition element to create an effective challenge to the rule of the revolutionary family. The façade of democracy, to say nothing of the government’s alleged concern about the plight of the common masses, was put into question. Concerning the protection of civil liberties, then, the critical problem for the regime is that what is remembered is not that civil liberties are protected most of the time but that in periods of intense social conflict the government chose to violate those civil liberties.

Access to Decision-Making

Decision-making in Mexico is a highly centralized, usually secretive process. For this reason, it is difficult to study.

However, as Susan Kaufman Purcell has demonstrated, certain characteristics of the typical decision-making process in Mexico can be delineated.

Despite the existence of a legislature, "the means and ends of public policy . . . depend squarely on the executive branch of government." The Mexican federal legislature, its bicameral congress, does not serve as a policy-initiating body. Rather, it serves chiefly to provide patronage positions to rising (or declining) members of the political elite. Decisions on public policy are initiated by the president. The president might not personally devise a policy direction, his staff might not even do so, but a policy proposal is not a policy proposal, is not on the agenda, until the president becomes committed to it. Due to the corporatist interest group structure, the president feels few interest group pressures and can ignore many of the demands which he does receive. The initiation of a policy remains at his discretion.

Even when a policy proposal is chosen, the formulation of the

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24 This section draws heavily from Purcell's The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).


26 As Alejandro Portes concluded, "To recruit, promote, and demote individuals within the Mexican system, a relative wealth of official positions becomes necessary. The apparent advantage of legislatures in this regard is to furnish a pool of strategic posts, characterized by high symbolic prestige and low power, which party leaders can dispose of in fulfillment of the recruitment function." "Legislatures under Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Mexico," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 5, 2 (1977), p. 195.

27 Purcell, The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision, p. 131.
specific aspects of a policy is kept within a small circle of presidential advisers. Purcell writes: 28

Once the president has committed himself to a particular course of action, a phase of deliberation follows. A very small number of people participate in the initial deliberations, which are not made public. If a recommended decision is expected to provoke opposition, the president and his advisers will agree to make the decision, provided they believe they will be able to demobilize its opponents during subsequent phases of the decision-making process and, even better, to convert them into supporters. In addition, they must be able to mobilize the sentiments of their supporters (who are relatively quiescent) in order to balance the opposition that the decision is expected to generate.

Thus, the decision-making process is highly centralized within the executive. At best, interest groups are reactive to policy proposals. Sometimes they simply assent to presidential initiative.

The secrecy practiced by the executive helps to keep potential critics off guard, thereby insuring that the policy becomes enacted with a minimum of opposition. Typically, potentially controversial measures are announced quite unexpectedly, again to disarm possible opposition. 29 To the extent that opponents of a policy are brought into the decision-making process, it is only after the major dimensions of the proposed policy have been announced (and therefore accepted). The best that opponents can expect to do is to modify some aspects of the policy because at that point presidential commitment to the principle of the policy has been made and the PRI’s majority in the legislature will be organized to enact it. 30

So, decision-making in Mexico has tended to be a highly

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28 Ibid., p. 135.
29 Ibid., p. 138.
30 Ibid., p. 139.
centralized and secretive process. The degree to which open criticism of the president and his policy proposals has been permitted has also been quite limited. As mentioned above, the press has tended to be indirectly censored since the state controls the allocation of newsprint and provides the largest share of advertising to the privately-held media. Press criticism of policy and policy-making has therefore been quite muted. In a notorious incident in 1976, President Luis Echeverría actually closed down Mexico City's principal daily Excelsior and forced it to change its editorial staff because of its heightening criticism of his administration. Lesser periodicals have been subject to similar fates.

Two other arenas where criticism might be expressed have, until recently, been closed to expression of discontent with policy. The legislature has been dominated by the party of the government, the PRI, to the extent that until 1979 fewer than 15 percent of the deputies and only one senator were non-priístas. In this atmosphere, the possibility for open criticism of the president's initiatives was minimal. Different factions within the PRI might have differed over the value of an initiative, but criticism had to be couched in language that was generally supportive of the president. Thus, little criticism has been forthcoming in the legislature until just recently.

Open demonstration is a final way of expressing criticism against a policy. This has been used, but with the exceptions of occasional labor marches by both official and independent unions and student

32 Latin America, 1 October 1976.
demonstrations, these have not been large affairs, at least before the economic crisis of the 1980s. A major constraint on open demonstrations is the ability of the Ministry of Gobernación, through its control of the police, to put down demonstrations or not approve them if requested.

In sum, when considering non-electoral aspects of the Mexican regime, we must conclude that Mexico after 1929 has been a relatively authoritarian regime. Its pressure groups exert little pressure because they are captured by the official party's corporatist structure, their activities regulated and their leaders coopted if not outright appointed. Political competition is thereby controlled and constrained. The political competition that does exist is mostly limited to the circles of the political elite, those civilian politicians who are carefully recruited and promoted by the leadership of the "revolutionary coalition." This is a competition in which the citizenry has little or no opportunity to express its preferences. Decision-making is limited to the upper reaches of this political elite, with any major policy initiative originating in the office of the president. Not only is decision-making highly centralized, it is also highly secretive. Opponents of a policy find it difficult to criticize a policy proposal and even more difficult to contribute to shaping the final executive decree or law. Basic civil liberties are usually respected, but exceptions to the rule are glaring and well remembered by Mexicans.
THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Given the authoritarian nature of non-electoral aspects of the Mexican regime, even though it is a relatively non-violent version of authoritarianism, the interpretation of the role of elections in Mexico becomes critical for those Mexicans seeking to change the nature of the regime and for those foreigners who want to evaluate the state of democracy in Mexico and its likely evolution. Elections in which opposition parties are permitted to compete provide the most convincing evidence that Mexico's regime is democratic, or tending toward democracy. This evidence is useful for disarming critics both at home and abroad and for legitimizing the rule of the political elite. What is the role of elections in the Mexican regime? How has this role evolved over time?

Overwhelming Dissent through the Electoral Process

As was argued in Chapter Three, and as Lorenzo Meyer has concisely put it, "in its origin, the Revolution was no more than an uprising in favor of liberal democracy, whose spirit had been systematically violated by the old regime and whose practice had disappeared in Mexico." The cry of "effective suffrage and no re-election" motivated maderistas to rebel against the Porfirian regime. Upon the abdication of Díaz, Madero's movement came to power, an assumption of power which Madero legitimized in an election held in

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October 1911 with a very limited electorate.\textsuperscript{34} The Constitution of 1917 instituted elections with an electorate greatly widened by a new electoral law enacted in 1918\textsuperscript{35} (all males over the age of 21 and all married males over the age of 18) as the mechanism through which power would be transferred from incumbents to their successors. Because of the revolutionary injunction against re-election, all incumbents in national office were to transfer power to successors. This prohibition of re-election weighed particularly heavily on executive offices, both the presidency and governorships.\textsuperscript{36}

To those who took up arms behind the slogan "effective suffrage, no re-election," that injunction meant more than just a conjunctural complaint against Díaz's gerontocracy. As Luis Medina argues, it was an affirmation that an open electoral process does not lead to disorder, as Díaz's ideologues had claimed, but rather channels the aspirations of the society.\textsuperscript{37} But even after 1940, perhaps not until after 1952, the victors of the Revolution had yet to prove Porfirio's ideologues wrong. When they did, when elections finally became orderly, it was no longer clear that elections channeled the aspirations of Mexican society.

\textsuperscript{34} An excellent history of elections in Mexico from the beginning of the Revolution through 1940 is given by Lorenzo Meyer, ibid., pp. 69-99. Madero won in 1911 with 19,997 votes out of 20,145 cast.


\textsuperscript{36} Jorge Carpizo, "El principio de no reelección," in Las elecciones en México, ed. by González Casanova, pp. 121-122.

From the end of the military phase of the Revolution until at least 1968, the major political struggle in Mexico was not between veterans of the Revolution, including their civilian heirs, and counter-revolutionaries or yet more radical elements. The major political conflict in Mexico was and perhaps still is over which subgroup within the revolutionary coalition will have the greatest influence over the direction of the Mexican state. Succession is the time at which this influence is maintained or altered. Since there is no re-election, all elections involve the succession at least of individuals if not of subgroups within the revolutionary family. Presidential elections are especially critical for determining who will succeed to power in the coming sexenio.

Each presidential election from 1920 to 1952, with the exception of the 1934 election, saw serious conflict within the ruling elite about who would become the new leader of the Mexican state. Opposition outside of the revolutionary coalition existed, but was extremely weak, especially electorally. The legitimacy of those affiliated with the revolution either as victorious veterans of that conflict or as the appointed heirs of those veterans was relatively unquestioned. The legitimacy of those unaffiliated with the revolutionary coalition was practically non-existent.

The problem for the development of a respected, open electoral process, one that would have contributed to democracy in Mexico and would have channeled the aspirations of Mexican society, was that revolutionaries with presidential intentions who suspected that they were not to receive the blessing (and political support) of the
incumbent chose to circumvent the electoral process. Alvaro Obregón was the first to follow this path and the last to be successful when he and his Sonoran cohort rebelled against President Venustiano Carranza because Carranza had supported Ignacio Bonillas, who was not even a military veteran of the Revolution, as his successor. 38 When the election did take place in 1920, after Carranza was assassinated, Obregón was faced only by a nominal, non-revolutionary candidate, Alfredo Robeles Domínguez of the Partido Católico, who he defeated by a 1,131,751 to 47,442 margin. 39

In the following presidential elections the same pattern was repeated. Nominal or no opposition was presented by contenders from outside the established circle of revolutionary elites. Within revolutionary circles, presidential aspirants who knew or suspected that they would not be promoted by the incumbent launched preemptory armed rebellions, only, unlike Obregón, without success. When it became apparent in 1923 that Obregón would support Plutarco Elías Calles for president in 1924, fellow Sonoran Adolfo de la Huerta instigated an insurrection which was put down in short order. Calles won the 1924 election against token competition from Angel Flores (another Sonoran), 1,340,634 to 252,599. 40 In 1928, after the Congress amended the Constitution to allow re-election (but not immediate re-election) so that Obregón could run again with the support of Calles,


40 Ibid., p. 289.
Generals Arnulfo Gómez and Francisco Serrano, both considering themselves contenders for the presidency, launched a rebellion. The end result was that Gómez and Serrano were both shot and Obregón won the uncontested election.

Before the 1929 presidential race to fill the remaining years of the assassinated Obregón's sexenio, a military challenge from obregonista generals led by Gonzalo Escobar was put down by forces loyal to Calles. In the electoral race José Vasconcelos, who was clearly within the revolutionary camp (he had been Minister of Education under Obregón), headed an electoral challenge to the newly-formed PNR's colorless candidate, Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Vasconcelos himself demonstrated loyalty to the Revolution by refusing to support the rebels headed by Escobar. In the election, though, Vasconcelos was overwhelmed by the PNR's mobilizational capacity and by electoral fraud, 1,947,848 to 110,979. Again, token competition was offered by a non-revolutionary candidate, this time the Communist Party's Pedro Rodríguez Triana who received but 23,279 votes.

After 1929, preemptory armed rebellions of disappointed presidential hopefuls ended. Professionalization of the army was probably a key deterrent against these coup attempts: army commanders were more loyal to the government, less politically-motivated, and

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41 For a summary of these events, see Lorenzo Meyer, Rafael Segovia, and Alejandra Lajous, Los inicios de la institucionalización. La política del Maximato, vol. 12 of Historia de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978), pp. 64-104.

42 Ibid., p. 291. That fraud took place is undoubted given that Vasconcelos had appeared before rallies of more than 100,000 in Mexico City alone. Meyer, "La Revolución Mexicana y sus elecciones presidenciales," p. 88.
perhaps more talented at defeating such insurrections by others among
them. For example, when General Juan Andreu Almazán, a maverick from
within the ranks of the revolutionary family, lost his bid to defeat
the officially-supported Manuel Avila Camacho in the violence-ridden
and blatantly fraudulent elections of 1940, he backed down from his
promise to lead an armed rebellion to unseat the government.43

The pattern in which the major challenge to the revolutionary
party came from within its own ranks continued until 1952, although in
1934 challenges to the campaign of Lázaro Cárdenas withered away early
and he faced only non-revolutionary challengers in the election.44 In
1940, 1946, and 1952, however, major challenges to the official
candidate of the revolutionary party came from disgruntled
revolutionaries who bolted from the party to run independent campaigns.
These challenges were far more serious to the political stability of
Mexico than the competition provided by non-revolutionary opponents. To
the extent that these challenges were threatening to capacity of the
president as the grand caudillo of the Revolution to name his
successor, thus causing him to sanction electoral fraud as a means to
assure that he and his successors would have that capacity, these
campaigns severely undermined the possibility for democratic elections


44 Cárdenas received 2,225,000 votes to 24,395 for Antonio Villareal of the Confederación Revolucionario de Partidos Independientes, 16,037 for Adalberto Tejeda or the Partido Socialista de las Izquierdas, and 539 for Hernán Laborde of the Communist Party. Again, the final figures are highly circumspect, especially the vote for Laborde. Ramírez Rancaño, "Estadísticas electorales," p. 292.
in Mexico. As Albert Michael concluded from his study of the Almazán campaign, "The real issues in the election of 1940 were over who would control political power from 1940 to 1946 and whether or not the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana would allow a free election" because on most policy issues, Almazán and Avila Camacho did not disagree. 45

As in 1940, divisions within the official party, now the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), led to electoral campaigns by disappointed presidential aspirants in 1946 and 1952. Ezequiel Padilla who, along with Miguel Alemán, had sought to become the PRI candidate in 1946, formed his own party (the Partido Demócratico Mexicano) when he was passed over because he was allegedly too friendly toward the United States. 46 Padilla, who was close to ex-Presidents Calles and Portes Gil, 47 was soundly defeated by the PRI candidate, Alemán, 1,786,901 to 443,357. These figures do not indicate large scale fraud, especially since the Padilla campaign was not well coordinated. 48

While both the Almazán and Padilla candidacies were seen as efforts by right-wingers within the PRI to take control of the direction of the Revolution, the campaign of Miguel Henríquez Guzmán in 1952 was a reaction by more radical elements in the PRI against a

45 Ibid., p. 49.


48 Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. 95.
perceived drift toward a non-revolutionary position. Cardenistas in particular supported the movement, which expressed "the frustration experienced by older members of the revolutionary family from the exclusion of the army from direct power during the Alemán administration; the discomfort of collaborators of General Cárdenas provoked principally by the amendments made in the revolutionary family's policy on agrarian reform; and the diffused discontent of popular groups, especially campesinos, by the deterioration of their level of living that resulted from the braking of agrarian reform and the policy of salary contention followed during the 1940s." The henriquista candidacy was forced into opposition by PRI leaders who felt that the henriquistas had engaged in "premature campaigning," that is to say, of challenging the authority of the party leaders, especially the president, to choose the candidate without undue interference from groups within the party. It is noteworthy that the revolutionary family did not inhibit the henriquistas from forming a party, the Federación de Partidos del Pueblo Mexicano, and competing against the PRI in the presidential election. Equally significant is that since 1952 no maverick candidate has challenged the PRI for the


50 Ibid., pp. 33-34.


all-important presidency. Internal party discipline has reigned since then, although in the current (1988) presidential campaign Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the ex-president and a long-time priísta himself, is mounting a campaign outside the PRI.

The post-revolutionary period up through 1952, then, was one in which the coalition of revolutionary "generals" and their civilian inheritors faced no serious electoral challenge from outside their ranks. The non-revolutionary electoral opponents were, in fact, extremely weak: the Communist Party ran candidates in 1929 and 1934, the Catholic Party ran a candidate in 1920, and other insignificant candidates ran in 1924, 1934, 1940, and 1946. Only Angel Flores in 1924 received more than 100,000 votes and the independent nature of his candidacy is doubted by some. That the revolutionary elite permitted the opposition candidacies of failed contenders for the official candidacy in 1940, 1946, and 1952 shows that a certain respect for the electoral process existed among the political elite. It also suggests that the revolutionary family was confident of its ability to defeat even challengers from within through the mobilizational capacity of the official party. That widespread fraud was committed against at least the challenges of Almazán in 1940 and Vasconcelos in 1929 demonstrates that that respect did not extend so far as to permit even the possibility that those triumphing in the contest for the electoral support of the revolutionary elite would consider surrendering power to others within their ranks. The rebellions associated with the

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54 Meyer, "La Revolución mexicana y sus elecciones presidenciales," pp. 82-83 suggests that Flores's campaign was intended to maintain the appearance of democracy by providing a competitor for Calles.
elections of 1920, 1924, 1928, and 1929 suggest that the rebels expected that nothing akin to democratic process was associated with the selection of the official candidate within the revolutionary circle and furthermore, even if that selection was favored by a majority of revolutionaries, the rebels were not going to respect it. The democraticness of elections in early post-revolutionary Mexico was clearly of a mixed nature.

**Development of Control through the Official Party**

As argued in Chapter Two, democracy assumes that those in power are and can be faced by a relatively permanent opposition which has some reasonable expectation that it may succeed to power if it wins a popular election. Leaving aside the question of whether an opposition would be permitted by the revolutionary elite to assume control of the government should it win an election, Mexico clearly had no relatively permanent opposition that could legitimately compete for power in the years immediately following the Revolution. In institutional terms, no party of opposition existed after 1917 other than the Communist Party whose potential thunder was stolen from it by the "revolutionary" record of those in power. Parties such as the **Partido Liberal Constitucionalista** (PLC), the **Partido Nacional Cooperatista** (PNC), the **Partido Nacional Agrarista** (PNA), and the **Partido Laborista Mexicano** (PLM) were formed between 1915 and 1920 but with few exceptions they did not survive the 1920s.55 Numerous parties existed at the state


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level. Regionally-important parties included the Partido Socialista del Sureste (PSS) and the Partido Socialista Fronterizo (PSF). These local and regional parties were vehicles for regional caudillos, the PSS being the party of Felipe Carrillo Puerto, dominant in Yucatán, the PSF being founded by Emilio Portes Gil in Tamaulipas. The short lives of these parties, and their inability to provide effective opposition, can be attributed to their personalist character. But even "the national parties of general character existed in great part as dependent organisms of the caudillos emerging from the civil war," argues Robert Furtak. The PLC, for example, was a vehicle for Carranza and did not long survive his death. The PNC and PNA were more independent but closely associated with Obregón. The PNC did not survive the struggle over succession after Obregón’s first term in 1924; the PNA was disbanded after obregonistas were unsuccessful in their attempt to defeat the callistas at the first PNR convention in 1929. The PLM, founded and run by labor leader Luis Morones, disappeared after Morones’s power in organized labor declined in the 1930s. These parties, lacking much in the way of organization and independent ideology, were quite ephemeral, as short-lived as many of their leaders in that violent post-revolutionary decade. And they were not even non-revolutionary parties, parties of opposition.

Prior to 1929, those revolutionaries controlling the highest posts in the Mexican state insured that their chosen successors actually won

57 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México.
the necessary elections by mobilizing the electoral support of one of these short-lived parties, by practicing electoral "alchemy," and by using their military power to defeat opponents who sought to short circuit the electoral process. With the PNR's founding in 1929 as a confederation of these disparate revolutionary parties, inter-elite conflict was institutionalized and a new organizational mechanism was created with the capacity to overwhelm opponents, either those outside revolutionary circles or mavericks from the PNR, using both legal and illegal methods.

The PNR was not a party of the masses, but a party of elites, of leaders of personalist parties and other factions. 58 As such, the PNR provided an arena of sorts for powerful revolutionaries to struggle over presidential succession and various other electoral positions. This struggle took place behind the scenes, although the result of the conflict was approved at PNR conventions. Selections for various party and electoral positions were made by the party leadership which was not chosen by those Mexicans at the base of the party, but rather, by the same party leadership, especially by ex-President Calles. 59 As Alejandra Lajous has argued, the PNR was a unique solution to a succession crisis in 1929 that threatened to tear apart the revolutionary coalition. 60 The solution was to resolve succession crises peacefully, by consultation, rather than violently, by rebellion and its suppression. Furthermore, by uniting all revolutionaries (or

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58 Lajous, Los orígenes del partido único en México, p. 86.
59 Ibid., p. 87.
60 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
all who wanted to bear that label) into one party, the PNR granted to its candidates a legitimacy that other maverick candidates with revolutionary backgrounds could no longer have. Its very unity and clear capacity to overwhelm opponents enforced further unification and centralization. The identification of the PNR with the Revolution further delegitimized the military challenge of defeated contenders, thereby reducing the threat of military rebellions. Disappointed presidential hopefuls had to take their chances with opposition electoral challenges, challenges destined to fail.

The capacity of the PNR to overwhelm its opponents, either maverick or from outside the revolutionary elite, at election time was clear at the outset. Being a coalition of regional parties, caudillos, and other regional politicians, the PNR had a tremendous ability to mobilize votes. Whether these votes were actual or fraudulent made little difference in the succession since the Congress, which approved the electoral results as an electoral congress, was dominated by PNR adherents. The PNR's capacities were demonstrated in its initial electoral foray against Vasconcelos in 1929. The Vasconcelos candidacy was crushed by the PNR, although certainly a great deal of fraud and repression of vasconcelistas took place.61

The PNR's capacity to control the electoral process, thus to insure a peaceful succession to power by its candidates, depended upon avoiding two hazards: (1) that the various parties integrated in the

61 Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous, Los inicios de la institucionalización, p. 104.
PNR did not bolt from the party, and this was by no means assured; and (2) that other organizations with mobilizational capacity, from within the Revolution or from without, did not emerge. To deal with the first challenge, the PNR in 1933 amended its constitutions so that state-level parties lost their autonomy and were disbanded, their functions being assumed by the PNR. Some regional parties resisted this centralization effort, but they were soon marginalized by the reorganized PNR. The PNR, which began as a party of parties, successfully eliminated the parties that composed it, becoming a single, centralized national party controlled by the major political leaders of the Revolution.

Competition from potentially autonomous organizations posed a threat to the PNR which led to the transformation of the party into the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), later into the PRI. The more radical direction taken by Cárdenas after 1934 led to a social ferment in Mexico that included much labor union and peasant association organizing. Cárdenas encouraged this organizational effort not the least because it provided him an alternative institutional base in his conflict with Calles. This effort led, most critically, to the formation of the CTM, which provided a significant mobilizational threat. Discussions by labor leaders about forming a union of workers and peasants were even more worrisome to the politicians of the PNR.

62 Castillo and Paoli, El poder robado, p. 38.
63 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 125.
The party under Cárdenas responded in a way that became a standard operating procedure: it chose to bring these potential opponents within its ranks. The initial action in this direction was the formation in February 1937 of a popular front composed of the CTM, the Confederación Campesina Mexicana, the PNR, and the Communist Party, a popular front intended to promote the continuation of social reform, including creating the possibilities of success in the nationalist struggle against the foreign oil companies.65 In December 1937, Cárdenas suggested that the PNR be transformed into a party that incorporated peasants, workers, public employees, and military men into its ranks. In March 1938 that was accomplished when the military (as civilians, not as a corporate body) and the major organizations of workers and campesinos joined together in a transformed PNR, now called the PRM. The organization of the party was to be sectoral, with sectors for labor, the campesinos, the military, and a fourth sector called the Popular Sector for individuals in the middle sectors, especially including government employees.66 Very significantly, the Labor Sector and the Peasant Sector were kept separate, with different leaderships.67

The PRM was not a party of the masses so much as a party of sectors, of corporations. The organizations within each sector were guaranteed their autonomy, so long as elements of the Labor Sector did


67Córdova, *La política de masas del cardenismo*, pp. 163-164.
not involve themselves in the affairs of the Peasant Sector and vice versa. Furthermore, these organizations sacrificed their freedom in the electoral arena. The first clause of the Pacto Constitutivo of the PRM established that "each and every one of the members of the four sectors that subscribe to this pact is obliged, in express and categorical manner, to execute no act of an electoral-political nature if it is not by means of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana and with strict subjection to the Statutes, Rules and issued accords of the corresponding superior organs." Thus, the electoral capacities of the most powerful organizations of Mexican society were harnessed to the electoral ambitions of the revolutionary elite. In return, leaders and other representatives of these organizations were supported by the PRM for electoral posts, especially for the no longer autonomous federal congress.

Reforms in the early 1940s led to the elimination of the Military Sector and the strengthening of the Popular Sector. After Miguel Alemán, more conservative than either Cárdenas or his successor Ávila Camacho, was chosen by Ávila Camacho to be his follower, the PRM was transformed into the PRI. The PRI differed from the PRM in both ideology and structure. Ideologically, the PRI was much less stridently revolutionary, less radical than its predecessor. In place of the PRM's slogan "For a Democracy of Workers" was substituted "Democracy and Social Justice." The party's commitment to socialism

\[68\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 165.}\]
vanished; the struggle of classes was downplayed. Structural changes were made too, although they should not be overly stressed since many of these changes were later rescinded. As Lajous summarizes:

The PRI differed from its predecessors in three aspects:

(a) Individual membership no longer depended on the subscription of the aspirant to one of the mediating sectors.

(b) The function of the sectors of the party were redefined, which meant that in the nomination of candidates to elective posts geographical criteria would have a greater weight. This implied a limitation of the autonomy of the associations in their ability to make decisions regarding their members and a strengthening of the directive organs of the party. The change implied a weakening of the sectors.

(c) An agreement was reached in which the sectors promised not to fight among themselves.

These changes greatly limited the independence of the sectors and associations within them. Discontent followed these changes, with the result that, formally, the first two changes mentioned above were rescinded in 1950. However, despite the return to the sectoral organization of the party, the independence of the sectors has remained constrained because the leaders of the sectors came to be functionaries, not independent leaders of the associations. The PRI, in distinction from its predecessors, became the electoral organ of the political elite that controlled the state apparatus, no longer a

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71 González Casanova, *El estado y los partidos políticos en México*, p. 62. Fidel Valázquez of the CTM and Labor Sector may be an exception to this characterization. Note, however, that he is a PRI leader and certainly dominates the Labor Sector, thereby having the capacity to recruit and nominate his underlings.
coalition of revolutionary mass organizations, but a bureaucracy, the state’s electoral ministry.

The founding of the official party contributed significantly to the revolutionary elite’s capability to resolve succession crises in a non-violent manner. By integrating nearly all revolutionary electoral organizations within the PNR, the highest powers within political elite insured themselves that they could overwhelm their electoral opposition, whether it came from within revolutionary circles or from outside them. The elections of 1940, 1946, and 1952 proved that the official party could prevail even over popular maverick candidates. At the same time, by being able to win all or nearly all elections, the elite reserved to itself the democratic legitimacy resulting from electoral victory. Through its transformation into the PRM and later into the PRI, the party successfully integrated non-electoral organizations with significant mobilizational capacity into its ranks and then came to control them by dominating their leadership. By the 1950s, the PRI controlled the organizations which could mobilize the masses; the revolutionary leadership, by dominating the PRI, could recruit and nominate its preferred candidates and insure their election to public office. The revolutionary elite used its electoral organ, the PRI, to maintain its monopoly over the state apparatus.

The Rise of Institutionalized Opposition

As chronicled above, in the first three decades after the Revolution, the electoral opposition to the revolutionary coalition tended to come from within its ranks. Other electoral opposition was quite ephemeral. Prior to the founding of the PNR, political parties
were the organizational reflections of personalist factions. None lasted through the Maximato. Only the PCM remained as an organized electoral (as well as non-electoral) opposition, but the PNR's revolutionary connections and rhetoric filled much of the PCM's ideological and political space, thus weakening its appeal.

In the late 1930s, continuing through the 1940s and 1950s, opposition of a more institutionalized nature emerged. Three opposition parties organized and became registered as political parties which could and did compete in elections at all levels of government. Later chapters will detail the intellectual roots, political strategies, and institutional peculiarities of these parties. The role of these parties in the electoral system is our theme here.

As the official party came to exercise greater control over the discontented within its ranks and to more surely defeat its opponents in the electoral arena, the appearance of democratic struggle for the control of the state became more and more tenuous. This was perhaps less true of presidential elections, since mavericks ran in every election from 1929 to 1952 with the exception of 1934, than of state and local elections. It appears that the existence of loyal oppositions willing to run candidates in some if not all electoral races appealed to priístas since it gave greater credibility to their claims that they were democrats. It also seems that the governing elite favored moderate, loyal oppositions over the more radical oppositions on both the left and the right. Thus, the existence of moderate oppositions provided the "democratic" competition needed for

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72 See Chapters Eight and Nine.

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legitimacy, making radical oppositions of little value to the regime. The nuisances could eliminated, or at least sidelined from the electoral process.

We might interpret the rise of institutionalized opposition in the forms of the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), the Partido Popular (PP), and the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) in 1939, 1948, and 1954, respectively, as providing the semblance of the electoral competition so vital to the democracy the revolutionary elite wished to display to the world and to Mexicans while at the same time allowing the elite to suppress more radical oppositions, namely the militantly Catholic Unión Nacional Sinarquista (UNS) on the right and the Stalinist Communist Party (PCM) on the left. Thus, although the UNS presented or supported candidates under various labels in the 1940s and 1950s, when it sought to form a party named the Partido de Unidad Nacional in 1953-54, this party was denied registration. The PCM, on the other side of the ideological spectrum, lost its registration after a new electoral law was passed in 1946.

Ideologically, the PAN, PPS, and PARM have not differed dramatically from the PRI, at least they did not during the 1950s. The PAN was founded in September 1939 by a group of traditionally Catholic professionals led by Manuel Gómez Morín who enlisted the support of some Mexican businessmen who opposed the interventionist economic policies of Cárdenas. Three main groups were drawn into the PAN: Catholic activists who had fought anticlericism with Gómez Morín when he was rector at the national university in 1933-1934, professionals

73Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 155.
and intellectuals who knew Gómez Morín from his days at the national university, and some leaders of business and industry who thought Gómez Morín would protect their interests. The latter group was only marginally important, at least numerically, in the PAN’s founding. 74 Although the strident anticlericism of Calles was softened by the Cardenas administration, the threat of its return, combined with Cardenas’s ruminations about socialist education, spurred these middle class, professional and intellectual Catholics to civic action, to form an opposition party.

In 1940, the PAN supported the Almazán campaign as a way of expressing dissent without dividing the opposition to the PRM. 75 The PAN put forward its own legislative candidates in 1943, although its first presidential candidate did not run until 1952. As early as 1946, the PAN received four seats in the federal deputy elections. From that point through the 1950s its electoral strength grew steadily, although its legislative contingency remained at roughly four to five members or less. The PAN has been without doubt Mexico’s strongest opposition party.

Ideologically, the PAN consistently supported certain abstract political principles embodied in progressive Catholic social thought. Founded partly to counter trends toward socialistic education introduced by Cardenas, one of the PAN’s most prominent early goals was to broaden educational opportunities at the primary and secondary

74 Donald Mabry, Mexico’s Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 34.

75 See the comments of Gómez Morín in Wilkie and Wilkie, México visto en el siglo XX, p. 177.
levels so that Catholic education could take place alongside "state indoctrination". Because of the strong Catholic heritage of its leaders, because it sought to promote Catholic education, and because early members included businessmen, the PAN was immediately labeled a party of the right although by the 1960s it had become a secular social reformist party to the point of being accused of sharing traditional PRI rhetoric. An analysis of the PAN's platforms, however, reveals that they closely parallel the Catholic reformism called for in the papal encyclicals of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, a parallel that the PRI's ideological statements could not claim to share. Overall, though, PAN ideology through the 1960s diverged little from PRI ideology. In the realm of policy issues, the PAN brought no major challenge to the PRI's hegemony over policy initiation.

In fact, the major rhetorical orientation of the PAN from its beginning has been a commitment to expanding and improving democracy in Mexico. As much as anything, the PAN has stood for the respect of the popular will as expressed electorally. Discouraged by the apparent continual reliance on force to decide succession issues, PAN founders sought to promote, in Gómez Morín's words, "the formation of civic

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77 On the evolution of PAN ideology up to 1972, see Mabry, Mexico's Acción Nacional, pp. 50-95.


79 Again see the comments of Gómez Morín in Wilkie and Wilkie, México visto en el siglo XX, pp. 176-177, 192.
consciousness, the creation of a civic organization." While the PAN's expressed concern about the incivility of Mexican politics and its frequent accusation that Mexico under the PRI was non-democratic directly affronted the leaders of the revolutionary elite, and could have damaged the legitimacy of the Mexican regime were they either believed by the citizenry or considered serious problems at any rate, the PAN provided the PRI with regular electoral competition after about 1946 and thus legitimized Mexican "democracy." While it has occasionally debated the wisdom of participating in the elections it nearly always loses, sometimes because of fraud, the PAN has usually presented electoral candidates for most national offices and many local offices. The existence of competition, a necessary component of nearly any definition of democracy, has been thereby insured, allowing the regime to at least formally meet the standards of democracy. But since the PAN has seldom been able to present a challenge sufficiently powerful to win any particular election, the revolutionary elite has been assured that its candidates in the PRI will achieve electoral success, thus ascending to the offices chosen for them by revolutionary leaders. That the PAN could be called a more conservative party than the PRI permitted the PRI to hang on to its self-proclaimed revolutionary and leftist label, thus maintaining the legitimacy accorded to the victors of the Revolution.

Even less serious challenges to the PRI's hegemony came from the PP and the PARM. Radical intellectual and labor organizer Vicente Lombardo Toledano founded the Partido Popular in June 1948, during the

80 Ibid., p. 176.
presidential term of relatively conservative and pro-capitalist Miguel Alemán, to provide an electoral option for leftists. A founder and the first secretary general of the CTM, Lombardo was the leading Marxist intellectual and the most active leftist political leader in Mexico during the 1930s.81 Later, in the early 1940s, Lombardo lost the leadership of the CTM to more moderate elements led by Fidel Velázquez.82 In January 1948, Lombardo was expelled from the CTM. He had used his time away from CTM leadership responsibilities to begin to rally the Mexican left, clearly suffering as the PRI shifted to the right after Cardenas left office. A major conference of Mexican leftists held in Mexico City in January 1947 and the formation of the PP the following year capped Lombardo’s effort to provide a leftist alternative to the ever more conservative PRI.83 Initially supported by alienated unions, Lombardo’s new labor confederation (the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México—UGOCM)84, and leftist intellectuals,85 the PP lost its labor support other than the UGOCM rather quickly.86 Its intellectual support also deserted it when the


82 Ibid., pp. 138-139.

83 Ibid., pp. 156-159.

84 Originally, the Alianza de Obreros y Campesinos de México. Ibid., pp. 142-143, 145-146.

85 Notable members included Lázaro Rubio Félix, Enrique Ramírez y Ramírez, Narciso Bassols, Diego Rivera, Luis Torres, and José Revueltas. Ibid., p. 159.

PP moved closer to the PRI (endorsing the PRI presidential candidate since 1958) and as other options became available to intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s. 87

Ideologically, the PP was more stridently anti-imperialist than the PRI and favored greater state intervention in the economy. 88 Unlike many other sectors of the Mexican left, however, the PP did not and has not found it necessary to oppose the regime. Because the PRI is generally anti-imperialist in rhetoric and favors state intervention, the PP has often allied with the PRI electorally and legislatively. Yet, again promoting the regime's and the elite's democratic image, the PP has run its own candidates in congressional elections. In 1949, the first federal election after it was founded, the PP ran candidates in more than half of the federal deputy districts. During the 1950s, about one-third of the deputy races were contested by the PP. 89 The PP garnered far fewer votes than even the PAN, but did present the image of an electoral opponent to the left of the PRI but one not promoting violent revolution against the existing order.

The Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana has generally been

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87 The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) in the early 1960s was a rallying point for leftist intellectuals. In the years after 1968, a number of other leftist groups formed, some of them becoming parties. A relatively exhaustive list of these groups, with some description of them, is given in Rogelio Hernández and Roberto Rock, Zócalo rojo (Mexico City: Ed. Oceano, 1982).


89 Millon, Mexican Marxist, pp. 163, 173.
considered to be slightly to the right of the PRI although its ideology has been basically the same as that of the PRI. It was founded in 1952 by retired revolutionary generals who considered themselves carrancistas and who were alienated from the PRI because of the corruption of the Alemán administration. Many of its complaints were soon remedied or forgotten and it has generally supported the presidential candidates and policies of the PRI, although it provided electoral competition in legislative and local races, especially in the state of Tamaulipas, particularly in Nuevo Laredo, where it has expressed local discontent with Mexico City. The PARM produced fewer electoral candidates than the PP throughout the 1950s and 1960s, seldom receiving more than one percent of the popular vote nationwide in congressional deputy races. Yet it too contributed to the appearance of multiparty competition in electoral races, important for the regime's democratic image.

Because the PAN, the PP, and the PARM regularly ran candidates for most national offices and could seldom present a serious challenge to PRI candidates, especially during the 1940s and 1950s, the appearance of genuine competition could be maintained without requiring the participation of either more extremist parties (like the PCM or the UNS) or of mavericks from the PRI. As the revolution had been institutionalized in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), so

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had the opposition been institutionalized in these weak parties of opposition, the PAN, the PP, and the PARM. To keep the more extreme parties and the less predictable opponents out of the electoral process, electoral legislation was amended.

The Evolution of Electoral Legislation

The new electoral law\textsuperscript{91} enacted in 1946 made it more difficult for opposition parties to operate legally: any party had to have certified registration of at least 30,000 members, 1,000 or more of them being distributed in at least two-thirds of the federal entities (states and territories) at any time. This law threatened parties of the far right and far left because it required that individuals in their ranks be listed on party roles so that the party could maintain the minimum membership. Understandably, militants hesitated to list their names since the authorities would then be more able to identify them and harass them. It forced the Communist party underground because it could not meet these requirements nor provisions of the law which prohibited parties from entering into accords with international organizations or affiliations with foreign political parties. Members of the more moderate PAN and PP were less likely to be harassed by the authorities, thus these parties were more able to meet registration requirements. The regional concentration of the UNS in the Bajío made difficult its registration since the law stipulated an extensive territorial spread of the membership.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91}Ley Electoral Federal, January 7, 1946. For the text, see Legislación electoral mexicana, 1812-1973, pp. 330-362.

\textsuperscript{92}See the table provided in Meyer, El sinarquismo, p. 47, which shows the regional concentration of sinarquistas.

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The 1946 electoral law also gave the government and the PRI complete control over the electoral process by giving government, therefore PRI, personnel controlling positions in the Comisión Federal Electoral (CFE) and by giving formal confirmation of both presidential and congressional election results to the two chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) of Congress. The Secretary of Gobernación was given the right to investigate the activities of parties and cancel their registration if in violation of the law. Control of the CFE insured that even if undesirable parties managed to meet the membership requirements for registration, their registration could be held up or denied if the ruling elite decided that such parties did not direct their public actions in line with "the precepts of the political Constitution of the United Mexican States and in respect to the national institutions it establishes." The power of the Secretary of Gobernación over the parties was demonstrated in 1949 when the registration of the Partido Fuerza Popular, an electoral arm of the UNS, was cancelled because militants of the UNS had shown disrespect for a statue of Juárez at their annual gathering. The elite's control of the Electoral Congress enhanced its capacity to reward more moderate opposition parties by granting them occasional victories in deputy races. At the same time, wholesale opposition victories could be staved off in the Electoral Congress. Overall, the 1946 electoral law therefore contributed to the PRI's hegemony in electoral politics.

93 Article 24 of the 1946 law, Legislación electoral mexicana, p. 336.

by stifling the less moderate opposition's legal opportunities to compete in elections.

The elite's resolve to suppress those electoral challenges considered potentially dangerous was reiterated in January 1954 when, in response to efforts by the henriquista movement's effort to achieve permanent registration for the Federación del Partidos del Pueblo (FPP), the Congress passed new legislation which increased the minimum required party membership to 75,000 distributed so that at least 2,500 members were enrolled in two-thirds of all federal entities. Furthermore, parties were to register at least one year before sponsoring candidates in a federal election which, for the FPP, meant completing its paperwork in less than six months if it were to compete in the 1955 deputy races. The impossibility of completing this requirement led a group of frustrated henriquistas to a violent confrontation with authorities in Chihuahua, an act which caused the FPP's effort at registration to be halted by the Ministry of Gobernación for having violated the sedition acts.95

Between 1946 and 1977, when the electoral reform proposed by the López Portillo administration studied herein was passed, a number of less comprehensive electoral laws were enacted which produced minor changes in the electoral process. One group of these changes concerned the extension of the franchise. In 1954 women were finally granted the right to vote and in 1970 the franchise was extended to the eighteen-to-twenty age group. Both of these acts incorporated previously excluded social groups which could or had become frustrated

at the lack of avenues for political participation.

The other major group of modifications of the electoral process concerned the representation of opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies. These reforms demonstrated clearly the elite’s desire to maintain the appearance of electoral and even legislative opposition without having to face serious competition and the possibility of losing control of the legislature. In 1963, the Congress adopted a combined winner-take-all and proportional representation system for the election of deputies (but not senators). Under this system, opposition parties were granted five seats in the Chamber of Deputies if they received at least 2.5 percent of the national vote and up to fifteen additional (twenty in all) deputies, one for each additional 0.5 percent of the national vote. This reform greatly improved the opposition’s opportunities to win seats in the Chamber and insured the government that opposition voice, an important component of a democratic regime, be heard in the Chamber of Deputies while in no way threatening the PRI majority there. The PAN’s decision to boycott the legislature in 1958 after being rewarded six deputy seats in the July elections because it considered these victories to be fraudulent and the entire effort as being designed to split the party had denied the PRI and opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. Party deputies, as they came to be called, insured that at least some opposition would exist in the legislature. The reform provided the opposition with some opportunity to be heard, essential if it was to prosper. Additionally, the introduction of party deputies decreased the PRI’s need to allot to

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96 Ibid., pp. 31-34.
the opposition some wins in district races to maintain the veneer of competitiveness in the political and electoral systems. Thus, hard decisions about who among the PRI candidates would lose these elections could be avoided and internal party conflicts kept to a minimum. 97

Despite the introduction of the party deputy system, the established moderate opposition parties other than the PAN could not meet the minimum vote necessary in the deputy races to be legitimately offered party deputyships. Yet, the appearance of multiparty competition amongst four moderate parties weighed heavily enough on the government that the PARM and the PPS (formerly PP) received party deputyships even though neither reached the critical 2.5 percent of the vote in the elections of 1964, 1967, and 1970. In 1964, the votes for the PARM and the PPS from the presidential, senatorial, and deputy races were summed in order that they reach the 2.5 percent minimum for party deputyships. 98 No such mechanism was used in 1967, but these parties were given party deputyships by the Comisión Federal Electoral anyway. 99 In 1972, in an attempt to end this pretext, a reform of the


98 This was through a liberal interpretation of Article 54, section 1 of the Constitution, not covered in the electoral legislation. Furtak, El partido de la revolución y la estabilidad política en México, pp. 99-100.

99 Ibid; Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 32.
method of selecting party deputies was introduced. After three elections in which the 1963 reforms had failed to legitimately produce four-party representation in the Chamber of Deputies, the political elite had two choices: bipartism, although of a very skewed nature, if the 1963 law was actually enforced; or, multipartism, if new electoral legislation permitted less moderate groups to compete electorally. The government of Luis Echeverría chose neither, preferring to tinker with the party deputy system so as to keep the old four-party system (dominated as it was by the PRI). New legislation lowered the threshold for representation in the Chamber from 2.5 to 1.5 percent. The maximum number of seats available to an opposition party under this party deputy system was increased to twenty-five.¹⁰⁰

The episode of party deputies for these (extremely) minority parties demonstrates clearly the political elite's desire to maintain the appearance of electoral competition to fortify the regime's democratic image. That the PARM and the PPS (earlier PP) could not muster 2.5 percent of the national vote indicates on the one hand that they had neither a distinctive ideological appeal (they differed little from the PRI) nor adequate organizational capacity to mobilize voters (such capability the PRI was very jealous about) and on the other hand the very dominance exerted by the PRI. Yet, the government remained absolutely convinced of the need to keep both the PPS and the PARM in the electoral system and carried out various manipulations, both legal

and illegal, to benefit the PPS and the PARM.\footnote{Mabry summarizes: "Through interpretation of the law and probable manipulation of electoral returns, the government can reward all PRI federal deputy candidates or can discipline selected candidates if necessary while simulating legislative opposition and democratic practices, control who enters the Chamber of Deputies, and enable opposition parties to survive. PPS and PARM were the true beneficiaries of the party deputy system, a result which the government must have anticipated in 1963. PAN, in fact, was hurt by the implementation of the system." "Mexico’s Party Deputy System," p. 230.} Competition from the PAN, though real, was inadequate to seriously erode the PRI’s hegemony. While some in the PRI desired the legitimacy accorded successful victory in a competitive election, others were satisfied to remain the hegemonic power that the PRI had become after 1929.

In a regime whose non-electoral dimensions were so clearly authoritarian as post-revolutionary Mexico, elections assumed a critical role in maintaining the revolutionary legitimacy so strongly sought by the civilian elite which ruled it after the 1930s. After the formation of the PNR in 1929 and certainly following the election of 1940, Mexico was no longer a country whose leadership was determined by "revolutions," that is, coups d’etat and insurrectionary challenges. But succession to leadership of the increasingly civilian elite, to the presidency, required electoral legitimacy since the Revolution had originally been made in the name of "effective suffrage, no re-election." Elections were necessary, but completely non-competitive elections would have mirrored too blatantly the Porfiriato, the regime against which the Revolution had arisen. Moderate opposition, though, was preferred to more extreme opposition, since in the post-World War II era the extreme left was suspected throughout the Western world and...
in Mexico the extreme right was considered a counter-revolutionary threat. Thus, through legal tactics more extreme oppositions were disqualified from electoral competition and less extreme, maverick challenges were overwhelmed through fraud and even more violent methods. In David Torres Mejia’s terms, this system illustrated “electoral protectionism” at work, designed to protect the PRI from internal splintering and from the organized left with the ultimate purpose of promoting political stability.\[102\] In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in Mexico, to oppose meant to provide loyal but non-competitive opposition. For this, the PAN, the PARM, and the PPS were well placed.

THE PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS: PRI HEGEMONY AND ITS EROSION

The completeness of PRI hegemony in post-war Mexico through 1976 is effectively illustrated by Tables 4-1 and 4-2. While the PRI did not go unchallenged, only after 1960 did PRI hegemony begin to erode with the growth of institutionalized opposition in the form of the PAN. Even this erosion was, on a national scale, in presidential elections, of little concern for the political elite. Causing greater apprehension was the regional concentration of this challenge to the PRI’s dominance and the decline of electoral participation.

Trends in Electoral Participation

Given the one-party hegemony exercised by the PRI in Mexico since 1929, participation trends can provide as much evidence concerning popular support for the regime as can trends in the distribution of the


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vote. Those not participating in elections form the party of those not actively supporting nor incorporated into the PRI nor actively supporting the opposition. This party of non-voters represents those dissatisfied with the electoral alternatives and those who do not feel that their vote will matter because of the PRI's long-standing monopoly on electoral victories. The existence of this group creates a challenge to the legitimacy of the Mexican regime because it demonstrates the existence of a large body of potential voters who choose neither to indicate their approval for the government by voting for the PRI nor to indicate approval for the system by which the political elite maintains itself in power, by elections. Furthermore, it is threatening to Mexican political stability because it demonstrates the existence of a large number of Mexicans who are not incorporated into the PRI nor directing their political expressions through the electoral system. This unincorporated group is available for mobilization into non-electoral patterns of political expression, such as guerrilla movements and mass political demonstrations, the very activities for which the formation of the PNR was intended to provide an alternative. As Adam Przeworski asserts, "incorporation into existing institutions is a strategy that serves to keep things as they are." This is exactly the role played by Mexico's electoral system. Electoral participation as a means of demonstrating approval for the regime can perhaps be the only way to explain why, after 1952 or so, the political elite continued to encourage turnout. If it was clear,

103 Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" American Political Science Review, 69, 1 (1975), p. 66.
as it should have been after the PRI had soundly defeated three maverick challengers, not to speak of the innumerable victories by the official party in local, state, and federal congressional elections, that the PRI need not fear defeat at the hands of its electoral opposition, why continue to encourage electoral participation? What purpose could it have served other than to demonstrate to this elite that the Mexican people considered its rule legitimate and that no other political movement had captured the allegiance of the masses?  

Arguably, intraparty competition among those vying for power and seeking to show their value to the party by bringing out the vote explains some of the effort to increase participation rates. Even that explanation, however, only confirms that the party had little to fear from external challengers.

As Figure 4-1 illustrates, until 1970, with exceptions for the 1946 election and the 1958 election (the first in which women were permitted to vote), the rate of participation by eligible voters in presidential elections grew steadily. That is, the electoral system had succeeded in incorporating larger and larger parts of the Mexican population. This period of incorporation of new voters corresponds directly with the era of the Mexican miracle, of steady economic growth, described in Chapter Three. However, this growth of participation was not to continue.

Figures 4-2 and 4-3 illustrate trends in participation in the period from 1961 to 1976 in federal deputy elections. Note that there is a significant and apparently growing divergence between

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104 This theme will be explored further in Chapter Six below.
presidential-year participation rates and off-year participation rates, which is not terribly different from the growing dropoff rate experienced in the United States. At the national level, the rate of participation by the potential electorate did grow steadily up until 1970. After 1970, perhaps as a reverberation of discontent associated with the student rebellion in 1968, the rate of participation by eligible voters declined; the large declines between 1970 and 1976 were dramatic given the previous growth of the participating share of the potential electorate.

The rate of participation by the potential electorate tells an important story about how well the electoral system has performed in incorporating the population into electoral channels. The Mexican electoral system was effective at this up until 1970. The rate of participation by the registered electorate tells another important tale, this one about how well the electoral system and the parties perform in actually controlling those who have been nominally incorporated. Figure 4-3 shows that the PRI had begun to fail in this effort as early as 1964. By 1970 there was little doubt that there was a growing politically unincorporated sector of the population and a growing group of previously incorporated but uncontrolled voters.

This decline in participation by registered voters was felt throughout Mexico. Table 4-3 shows the results of a pooled time-series regression analysis of the trend in participation rates by registered voters at the state level in federal deputy elections from 1961 to 1976. The analysis presented includes the aggregate trend for the nation as a whole as well as a disaggregation of the participation
trend stratified by the level of urbanization of the states. (See the Appendix at the end of the thesis for an explanation of the statistical analysis performed here.) On the whole, participation by registered voters declined by about 1.9 percent in each election between 1961 and 1976, yielding a fall of participation in the fifteen-year, five-election interval of 9.5 percent. While the rate of participation varied greatly across states and elections (see the intercept ranges in Table 4-3), the trend did not differ greatly between the more urbanized states and the less urbanized states. In both the most urban states and the most rural states, participation by registered voters fell off by slightly more than 2 percent per election. An interpretation might be that the PRI, and the other parties too, were steadily losing their grip on previously incorporated voters in most parts of the country.

Explaining the decline in turnout may involve a number of possible interpretations, such as growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system, especially after economic growth began to slow, and increasing awareness by voters that, given regular and overwhelming PRI victories, their vote mattered little in the result. Both of these explanations probably contain important elements of truth. Equally important to these attitudinal shifts, though, was the growing capacity of eligible voters to shirk their obligation to vote.

Chapter Six will explore this issue in greater detail. For now, a few brief comments will suffice.

Voting in Mexico, especially in rural Mexico, was traditionally at least overseen if not orchestrated by local caciques affiliated with
the PRI. Stories of campesinos being trucked to polling places abound. However, as Mexicans leave traditional lifestyles in which their political information is highly limited and in which they are subject to the coercion of rural caciques, the pressure on them to vote (and vote in a certain way) diminishes. Again illustrating the results of a pooled time-series regression on participation rates of registered voters at the state level in federal deputy elections from 1961 through 1976, Table 4-4 shows that, at all levels of urbanization, increasing industrialization and urbanization were inversely correlated with turnout. That is, as states became more industrialized and more urbanized, turnout declined. It would be an ecological fallacy to say that moving to a city or into an industrial occupation (or, likely, both) causes a former campesino to be less likely to vote. Yet, it would not be an error to say that in the 1960s and 1970s accelerating urbanization and industrialization are correlated with growing abstention, regardless of the initial levels of urbanization of the populations involved.

The Mexican regime, then, initially and for several decades was successful at incorporating new voters into the electorate, thus directing their political participation into safe and acceptable

105 Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann L. Craig describe it: "Many participants in elections and government-sanctioned demonstrations are mobilized by local political brokers who 'deliver' participants, often assisted by local police and using government-provided vehicles. The acarreados ('carted-in' participants) may receive chits redeemable for a free meal, tickets for a raffle, or simply free transportation to another town for the day. Their demonstrated participation also becomes a resource that the broker of acarreados can utilize in future exchanges with government functionaries." "Politics in Mexico," in Comparative Politics Today, ed. by Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 452.
channels. However, by the 1960s and 1970s, participation by these previously incorporated voters was declining. Attitudinally, this may have been associated with growing dissatisfaction with the political regime and the development model and with an increasing realization that, given pre-ordained victories by the PRI, one’s individual vote mattered little. Structurally, declining turnout was probably associated with changes in the social structure, particularly with the movement of the population out of rural areas and agricultural occupations where they were subject to the domination of caciques. In either case, the party of non-voters was growing, a party that could be directed into non-electoral channels of political expression.

The Growth of Electoral Opposition Support

While throughout the 1950s and 1960s the vote for the opposition, especially the PAN, was small, the PRI’s share of the vote has been falling ever since the PAN began competing in elections. This is quite unambiguously demonstrated when one observes the party shares in Chamber of Deputies races, shown in Table 4-2. Except for the

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106 This is not to suggest that Chamber of Deputies races are as important as presidential races. Since the president has clearly been both the policy initiator and implementor in Mexico, the selection of the president is the most important decision made through the electoral process. However, Chamber of Deputies races are held twice as often as presidential contests (every three years as against every six) and thus provide a greater number of cases for analysis. Furthermore, when elections are held simultaneously for president and deputies (every six years), the results by party are usually very similar between the two races (as well as the elections for senators and party deputies), seldom differing by more than 10 percent. This is especially clear at the district level. For example, see the results for the elections for president, majority deputies, party deputies, and senators in 1982 printed in Excelsior, July 12-19, 1982. Thus, these legislative races do seem to offer a measure of public electoral support for the various parties.
election of 1976, when the PAN did not present a candidate for president and thus lost support in the legislative races through a coattails effect, the PRI’s share of votes in races for Chamber of Deputies was falling steadily from 1961 on.

This deterioration of the PRI’s monopoly occurred even earlier and more rapidly in urban areas than in the nation as a whole. Figure 4-4 compares the decline in the vote for the PRI in urban states and in rural states through the 1976 election. The PRI’s share of the vote in urban areas has been consistently lower than the national average, and dramatically lower than the average for rural states. The decline in support for the PRI in urban areas was rapid. Table 4-5, which again illustrates the results of a pooled time-series regression, this time on PRI shares of the total vote at the state level in federal deputy elections from 1961 through 1976. Again, the results of this analysis are stratified according to the level of urbanization of the federal entities. The coefficients which are statistically significant at the .05 level seem to indicate that the decline in support for the PRI was more rapid in more urban states and less rapid in more rural states. Within the most urbanized states, modernization, measured by growth of the share of the workforce in industrial occupations, seems


108 Urbanization is measured here by the percent of the population living in communities of over 2,500 inhabitants in 1980.
to be associated with the development of opposition to the PRI (see Table 4-6). This decline in support for the PRI in cities was (and is) especially critical because of the rate at which the nation as a whole has been urbanizing. The PRI was losing its hold on precisely those areas which were growing most rapidly. The potential for the opposition to seize an important source of new electoral support was thus great. Moreover, the main beneficiary of this deterioration of the PRI’s hegemony was a single party, the PAN, which built its percentage of the total vote in deputy elections from 7.6 percent in 1961 to 16.5 percent in 1973, before its 1976 collapse (see Table 4-2).

The Social Bases of Electoral Support for the Parties. The social bases that might support political cleavages reflected in the modern Mexican party system include (1) religion, (2) the factors which together are referred to as modernization and industrialization, and (3) regional issues.\(^{109}\)

The statistics presented in Table 4-7 are zero-order Pearson’s correlation coefficients which measure the relationship between voting for the official party (PRI) and various social and economic measures. This is district-level data and thus refers to the propensity of certain types of districts to produce more or less overwhelming percentages for the PRI (see Appendix). The statistics in Tables 4-5 and 4-6 above suggest that in Mexico’s authoritarian regime, opposition

\(^{109}\)The data used here are ecological data at the level of the federal electoral districts, for which it is impossible to determine differing patterns of political behavior of women and those of different age cohorts. They are thus not discussed here.
to the regime via electoral means expanded during the decade-and-a-half prior to 1976. This broadened expression of opposition resulted from the long-term development of the PAN as a voice for expressing opposition and changes in Mexican social structure. The statistics in Table 4-7 suggest that the opposition came from the more modern, urbanized, industrialized areas of Mexico, from religiously-alienated rural areas, and from the northern states. Table 4-7 shows that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the PRI’s strongest bases of support were in electoral districts which were rural with the workforce concentrated in the agricultural sector and agricultural jobs. Those districts with concentrations of poorly-educated peasants were the PRI’s strongholds. The opposition, meanwhile, did well in urban districts where the workforce was more concentrated in industrial jobs and white-collar occupations. The opposition did better among the well-educated as well. These statistics are quite robust, even for ecological data. Moreover, the social characteristics of districts supporting the opposition were those most likely to spread to other districts still strongly in the PRI camp: urbanization, industrialization, and education. Yet, the most notable point about trends in opposition support during the 1960s and early 1970s was not that it was increasing and increasing in the most rapidly growing parts of the country, but rather that the opposition still trailed the PRI in almost all elections by at least a two-to-one margin. The PRI was not yet threatened with losing access to power via the electoral channels.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CRISIS, 1968-1976

The channels of electoral participation had, after the 1960s, begun to decline in their capacity to produce continually high turnouts of voters and had even witnessed the increase of support for the moderate opposition, especially in urban areas. These trends were undoubtedly associated with Mexico's socioeconomic modernization, but they indicated something more. It was increasingly apparent after 1968 that Mexico's regime, always labeled democratic and lauded by Mexican leaders as such, was not so democratic after all. The non-electoral aspects of Mexico's regime, described at the outset of this chapter, were more clearly perceived by Mexicans as well as by foreign observers as non-democratic. More than any other event, the repression of the student movement in 1968, especially the massacre at Tlatelolco, revealed the true nature of Mexico's authoritarian regime.

Of course, as suggested in Chapter Two, it is the perception that a regime is becoming unable to fulfill the interests of a group that will spur that group to action. The development of that perception of regime crisis will be examined in the next chapter. Here it will be shown that such a perception was not unreasonable given events in post-1968 Mexico, especially when combined with the deterioration of PRI hegemony and the growth of abstentionism just described.

The initial events which crystallized into the 1968 movement are not so significant. They included protests against the huge government expenditures on the 1968 Summer Olympic Games being held in Mexico City and the suppression of a leftist march to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the start of the Cuban Revolution. It was the political
elite's (the Díaz Ordaz administration's) response to these protests that touched off a much more significant confrontation. As Alan Riding recounts, the initial repression in 1968 only mobilized the disenchanted middle classes to join the protests. The issue became freedom, not for peasants and workers, but for the educated and affluent, including many bureaucrats. And the rallying cry was opposition to the regime rather than support for any specific alternative.

Huge rallies numbering in the hundreds of thousands paralyzed Mexico City streets and Mexican politicians. Yet, in reality, the system had not been threatened, because neither organized labor nor peasants had identified with the movement, while the private sector and the Army never doubted that Mexico was the target of an international Communist conspiracy. But the regime's response shattered the concept of rule by consensus and undermined the legitimacy of the entire system. During the remaining twenty-six months of Díaz Ordaz's term, the country lived in fear. The President assumed responsibility for the Tlatelolco massacre, but rarely appeared in public. Organized opposition was impossible and critics of the regime spoke in whispers.

The general delegitimation of the regime was paralleled by an unmasking of the weaknesses of the party system. The PRI, traditionally assigned a role of mediating and harmonizing groups' interests when they were in conflict with state objectives, was unable to provide a satisfactory settlement to student leaders. Nor was it able to mobilize the masses against anomic actions (for the movement at its start was little more than anomic) in the way it was expected to be able do. True, the workers and peasants did not join the movement, but neither were they responsive when called for counter-demonstrations. The FSTSE turnout for counter-demonstrations was poor; many of these

110 Distant Neighbors, p. 84.  
111 Ibid., p. 86.
bureaucrats in fact showed sympathy for the students. On the other side of the issue, the various opposition parties exercised no role either in support or in opposition to the students. The PPS and PARM, being generally pro-system parties and strongly supported by the government, had reason to fear being purged. The radicalness of the students probably discouraged the PAN. Even the underground PCM did little to lead or support the students.

The violence used by the Díaz Ordaz government against the student demonstrators certainly unmasked a regime long considered democratic. In so doing it created a crisis of legitimacy for the revolutionary elite which had for so long dominated the Mexican state. A North American political scientist, observing the Mexican regime in the mid-1970s wrote:

Since Tlatelolco the revolutionary symbols of the state . . . have been desecrated publicly and in derogation of established custom. . . . Many today feel that Tlatelolco meant the beginning of a new renaissance in Mexico, just as the Spanish triumph at the same spot during the sixteenth century signaled the birth of a new nation.

The efforts by many to bring a renaissance to Mexican politics, and the tenacity with which many others defended the established regime, kept Mexico in a period of political crisis for the first half of the 1970s during the sexenio of Luis Echeverría.

Echeverría, who had been Minister of Gobernación under Díaz Ordaz

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112 Furtak, El partido de la Revolución y la estabilidad mexicana, p. 195.

113 Manlio Fabio Murillo S., La reforma política y el sistema pluripartidista (Mexico City: Ed. Diana, 1979), pp. 102-104.

and thus in charge of domestic order, came to the presidency tainted by his involvement in the repression of the student movement. He had cause, if his sexenio were to be successful and his name to be remembered positively by future generations of Mexicans, to distance himself from his involvement in the Tlatelolco massacre. To do so, he adopted a populist style reminiscent of Cárdenas and populist policies partly designed to overcome the economic stagnation also plaguing Mexico. He also sought reconciliation with those who had risen against the regime in 1968. To do so required addressing some of the underlying concerns of those who had been willing to join and lead the student movement. These concerns were at least three: that the state had misplaced development priorities, ones that ignored the plight of the poor, the peasantry, and the working class; that paths of social mobility were blocked to those who were unwilling to compromise their principles by playing the political game of joining the PRI and the camarillas of prominent or hoping-to-be prominent politicians; and that the state would willingly repress those expressing dissent.\footnote{Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, 2nd ed., pp. 180-181.}

Echeverría's economic populism was designed, in part, to address the first problem. To resolve the latter two concerns, he incorporated large numbers of young people into his administration, greatly expanding the bureaucracy, and promised a democratic opening (apertura democrática).\footnote{Jaime González Graf, La perspectiva política en México, 1974 (Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Estudios Políticos, 1974), p. 23.}

His success in all three areas was limited. As recounted in

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Chapter Three, Echeverría ran up against the opposition of the private sector as he sought to increase redistributive measures. The growing involvement of the state in the Mexican economy also engendered the disaffection of the Mexican bourgeoisie. The economic crisis which resulted in 1975-76 contributed greatly to an atmosphere of alarm at the time of the succession in 1976.

Despite, or in some cases because of Echeverría's initiatives, political unrest reemerged after he took office in 1970. This unrest was manifested in continued confrontations on Mexico's university campuses, guerrilla movements in areas where the agrarian crisis was acute, and urban terrorism, including the kidnapping of leaders of the private sector, public officials, and their relatives. That these avenues were chosen to express discontent indicated that Mexico's traditional channels of political participation, especially the electoral and party systems, but also including the modes of interest representation, were failing in the functions they usually perform in stable polities. Pressures to change these channels of participation, emanating both from within the political elite and from outside it, grew stronger during the Echeverría sexenio but they were never adequately responded to.

Campus unrest persisted during the first half of Echeverría's sexenio. Two sources of the turbulence may be delineated. First, leftist students appear to have genuinely sought to protest the distortions of Mexican development, especially the inequality of the fruits of that development. Many were apparently not taken in by Echeverría's populist rhetoric or thought that he was likely to be
constrained by conservative forces such as those which had repressed the student movement in 1968 and provoked the violent suppression of another student march in Mexico City in 1971 (the Corpus Christi massacre). Campus unrest was particularly strong at the National University (UNAM) and at universities in Puebla, Sinaloa, and Nuevo León with students defending the rights of peasants and workers, especially university non-academic workers. Strong protests were also directed against attempts by the police and state authorities to impose or reinstate unpopular university rectors. While the students' intentions may have been well placed, they were poorly linked with peasant and worker organizations and thus had little success creating united fronts to attack the local problems of peasants or workers.

Second, struggles between those promoting reform on a national scale, perhaps with the support of the president, and those resisting it fought out their battles on campuses as well as in other settings. In particular, right-wing gangs called porras, associated with local police forces and locally-based conservative politicians, provoked confrontations by attacking leftist administrators and students.

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117 See Latin America, 11 August 1972, 17 November 1972, and 29 December 1972. Also, Dan Hofstadter (ed.), Mexico, 1946-73 (New York: Facts on File, 1974), pp. 128-138. At UNAM and in Monterrey, students supported strikes by the universities' non-academic employees. In Puebla, one source of student protest was a sympathy movement with dismissed employees of state-owned bus lines. In Culiacán, students burned down the offices of the PRI to protest the murder of two peasants who had presented land claims. In all cases, the autonomy of the university before the perceived conservative authoritarian regime was an issue.

118 Latin America, 11 August 1972.
Porras were implicated in university violence in Mexico City, Nuevo León, Puebla, and Sinaloa. It seems that these incidents were designed to intimidate the left and to encourage the government to put down the student demonstrations and other movements, restoring law and order to Mexico.

Both types of causes for the conflicts on Mexico's campuses demonstrated a failing of the party system. Many students and academicians felt there was no efficacy in protesting and trying to ameliorate the inequities created in Mexican development by acting through existing channels, whether those channels be within the PRI or any of the existing opposition parties. The right seemed content to deny to reformists the opportunity to choose either the established channels, such as through the PRI, or the more confrontational approach of demonstrating and marching in the streets. If anything, the right's provocative actions were designed to force a crackdown on independent leftist activities by the state and a closing to the left of opportunities within the PRI.

In the hills and mountains of Guerrero, less privileged Mexicans sought to change the existing social arrangements outside the established political avenues, in their case through guerrilla

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120 Latin America, 2 February 1973.


122 Latin America, 11 August 1972.
insurgency. One guerrilla group, known as the Asociación Cívica Nacional Revolucionaria (ACNR) sprung up in the late 1960s under the leadership of Génaro Vázquez Rojas. Vázquez had led the Asociación Cívica Guerrerense (ACG), a protest movement in Guerrero which was founded to confront non-violently the extreme poverty of most residents of that state (Guerrero was and is among the least developed of Mexican states) and the autocratic, corrupt, and nepotistic rule of the governor. 123 The ACG was repeatedly and brutally suppressed when it demonstrated publicly and sought to run candidates against the PRI in state elections in 1962, Vázquez spending time in prison for his leadership of the organization. In 1968, after being sprung from prison by ACG supporters, Vázquez abandoned the constitutional route of seeking reform, choosing instead guerrilla resistance. The ACNR was led by Vázquez for four years until his death in a mysterious car crash in 1972. Its most spectacular acts included kidnapping the rector of Autonomous University of Guerrero and the director of the Banco de Comercio de Sur. 124

Even more notorious than Vázquez was Lucio Cabañas, who also led an insurgency in the hills of Guerrero. Cabañas's insurgency began in 1967 and was known as the Partido de los Pobres (Party of the Poor). Its fundamental goals, as articulated in a communicado to a Acapulco newspaper in 1972, included

To defeat the government of the rich class so that a government of campesinos and workers, technicians and professionals, and other

124 Ibid., pp. 55-58.
revolutionary workers can be formed

That the new government of the poor class will give laws that protect and make valuable the interests and rights of the people. That the right to work, the right to strike, the right to meet and speak in public and in private, the right to form unions, parties, and other associations, the right to choose and vote on candidates and governors be given value.

Other objectives included nationalization of the means of production and the provision of social security to all. 125

Cabañas engaged in a number of daring escapades, including bank robberies and kidnappings. The most notorious kidnapping was of the PRI’s gubernatorial candidate for Guerrero, Rubén Figueroa. The Echeverría government’s response to the insurgency was to send the army to repress the uprising. Reportedly, 16,000 federal troops were dispatched to Guerrero to put down the Party of the Poor. 126 Losses were relatively heavy on both sides before Cabañas was killed in an ambush in December 1974. 127

That both Vázquez and Cabañas could organize armed resistance against the government in Guerrero is not too surprising given that Guerrero was one of the poorest states in Mexico and that it was famous for the repressiveness of the local representatives of the ruling elite. These insurgencies were cause for some alarm in Mexico, especially since the army was unable to quickly crush Cabañas’s movement, but rural Guerrero was far both geographically and temporally from Mexico City. These movements did not seriously threaten the

125 López, Diez años de guerrillas, pp. 86-87.

126 Latin America, 5 July 1974.

regime, although certainly they did indicate a paucity of channels of expression of dissatisfaction and a failure of the channels of control. Perhaps more ominous to urban Mexicans were incidents of terrorism in Mexico’s largest cities.

Numerous groups and subgroups of leftist terrorists sprung up after Echeverría came to power at the end of 1970. In September 1971, Julio Hirschfeld, director general of airports and auxiliary services and a son-in-law of sugar baron Aaron Sáenz, was kidnapped by the Frente Urbano Zapatista (Urban Zapatista Front). He was later ransomed. 128 In 1973, the U.S. Counsel General in Guadalajara, Terrance Leonhardy, was kidnapped by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People) and later released after being ransomed. 129 Others suffering similar fates included the father-in-law of President Echeverría (also kidnapped by FARP), who embarrassed his son-in-law and the revolutionary elite by saying (after he was released) that he fully agreed with the guerrillas’ aims. 130 His good fortune was not shared by Eugenio Garza Sada, the leader of the Monterrey group, assassinated in September 1973; Gabino Gómez Roch, son of the president of the Banco de México, killed in October 1973; and Fernando Aranguren, a Guadalajara businessman, also assassinated in October 1973. 131 These

128 Latin America, 1 October 1971, 8 October 1971.
130 Latin America, 13 September 1974.

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incidents, clearly directed against the Mexican private sector, its foreign allies, and its perceived domestic allies in the government, brought denunciations of the government from the private sector for not ensuring the preservation of law and order in Mexico. Violence of this sort continued up through the end of Echeverría’s administration. It was directed especially in the later years of the Echeverría administration by the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, whose exploits included an assassination attempt on the sister of President-Elect José López Portillo in 1976, a kidnapping of the daughter of the Belgian ambassador, and a bank robbery in Mexico City which involved twelve deaths.

Again, this breakdown of order, while not widespread, indicated intense discontent with the existing political options in Mexico. It also undermined the legitimacy of the government with those who were wedded to the status quo. Actions of this sort increasingly polarized Mexican politics, but those moving toward the poles had no established channels into which they could direct their energies. The party system did not polarize simply because it did not channel the more extreme views which were becoming articulated in the early 1970s.

This violent non-electoral participation mostly by people on the left was paralleled by the growth of two non-violent alternatives to the traditional party system. An important development which began early in the Echeverría administration was the growth of independent unions and democratic tendencies within existing unions which sought to

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132 Ibid.
bypass the corporatist structure of the CTM. Significant examples of this independent direction within the labor movement included the Tendencia Democrática (Democratic Tendency) within the electricians union (SUTERM), independent union competition for the CTM in the auto industry, the rise of independent labor organization on the campus of UNAM, and challenges to existing leadership in the oil workers' union, the railroad workers' union, and in the unions of the teachers, and the miners and metalworkers. These independent tendencies within the labor movement, especially Tendencia Democrática, were leftist in orientation, opposed to what they considered the conservative, pro-regime orientation of the CTM. One public statement issued by Tendencia Democrática called for, among other demands, collectivization of agriculture, expropriation of imperialist enterprises, and worker participation in the reorganization of the state sector of the economy. Most immediately, though, it called for independent and democratic unions and reorganization of the labor movement.

Coupled with independent unionism as a non-violent opposition challenge to the Mexican regime was the development of unincorporated opposition parties, especially on the left. The development of the individual parties of the left will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Nine. Here it is critical to note that as leaders of the 1968 student movement were released from prison after Echeverría succeeded

134 Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, pp. 241-146 provides a brief summary of independent union activities.

Díaz Ordaz, some sought to form an independent party of the left. One group of former student leaders crystallized around Heberto Castillo, a university professor involved in the 1968 movement, and Demetrio Vallejo, the leader of the 1958-59 railroad workers' strikes. Castillo and Vallejo barnstormed the country seeking to win further affiliates in the early 1970s and formed an unrecognized political party, the Partido Mexicano de Trabajadores (PMT) in 1974. While it later suffered fissures, the most notable splinter group becoming the Partido Socialista de Trabajadores (PST) in 1975, the PMT represented the first serious attempt since the early 1960s to found a new, independent leftist political organization. Its popularity among intellectuals on the left indicated the bankruptcy of other party alternatives, the failure of the party system and the electoral system in Mexico.

The resurgence of the PCM in the 1970s also reflected growing dissatisfaction with electoral alternatives. The PCM had been forced underground by the Alemán administration and, while it continued to militate among those on the left, had been more or less sidelined from the most important political movements in post-war Mexico, most critically in 1968. Echeverría's ruminations about apertura democrática reopened for the PCM the question of returning to the electoral process. In 1976, the PCM advanced Valentín Campa, a lifelong PCM militant, as a write-in candidate for president.

Overall, the diminished efficacy of electoral channels of...
participation observed in aggregate electoral statistics was reinforced by the development in the 1970s of a willingness on the part of many Mexicans to seek alternative modes of political participation, some of them violent, others non-violent but considered improper or illegal by the authorities. Because these activities were outside the ideological spectrum of the traditional party system and because Echeverría chose to respond to these leftist critiques of Mexican development in part by populist rhetoric and economic reform, a not unsurprising result was increased polarization in the political system. The national bourgeoisie, already feeling threatened by populism and the growth of the state sector under Echeverría, was further aggravated by outright attacks (kidnappings and assassinations) on it by leftist groups. The response of Mexican business was criticism of Echeverría for his inability to maintain law and order. When combined with the breakdown of the business-government understanding described in the last chapter, this blatant criticism of the government only further polarized Mexican politics in the last half of Echeverría’s sexenio.

The presidential succession in 1976 thus took place in an atmosphere of political crisis. The events of the succession did little to allay that sense of crisis. An initial challenge to the regime at the time of the 1976 election was posed by the absence of an electoral opponent for PRI candidate José López Portillo. The PAN had advanced electoral candidacies in 1952, 1958, 1964, and 1970, with its candidate gaining larger and larger shares of the vote each election, although the PAN vote remained at below 15 percent. In certain areas though, the PAN presidential candidate and PAN deputy candidates did
much better, especially in urban, middle-class districts. In 1973 in particular, the PAN had performed well in federal deputy races in most urban states. In that year, in the thirty-five largest cities of Mexico, 28.7 percent of the valid vote (votes less annulled votes) went to the candidates of the PAN. Some of the popularity of the PAN can be attributed to the dissatisfaction with Echeverría felt by the conservative, urban middle class which thought that Echeverría intended to "Allendize" Mexico.\footnote{138}

The growing polarization of Mexican society under Echeverría was reflected by divisions within the PAN. In 1972, José Angel Conchello, a Monterrey-born businessman, became president of the PAN. Conchello sought to move the party more to the right, to represent the interests of the urban middle classes.\footnote{140} The desire to represent interests as well as the move in a more conservative ideological direction were changes for the PAN. The PAN's former mainstream, led by Efraín González Morfín, followed an approach which stressed that the PAN "should be an instrument for the global common good of society and not 'the transitory or permanent agent of partial interests, of classes or groups.'"\footnote{141} González Morfín's view implied a national orientation for the party, in which the party sought to disseminate a post-Vatican II


\footnote{140}Ibid., p. 554. See also Chapter Eight for more details.

\footnote{141}Ibid., p. 546, quoting González Morfín.
perspective on politics and society to the widest possible audience. Contesting individual elections with the clear intent to win them was secondary. Conchello’s view, on the other hand, directed the party “besides participating in elections, . . . to make common cause with the people in concrete cases of injustices and abuses and not only at the level of grand national pronouncements.”\[142\]

The division in viewpoints between the Conchello and González Morfín wings of the PAN became more heated in 1975 and 1976 when, first, González Morfín defeated Conchello in Conchello’s bid to be re-elected party president and, later, when the PAN held its national convention in October 1975 to choose a presidential candidate and a party platform. The party platform was approved overwhelmingly. It reflected González Morfín’s philosophy of solidarismo, which Carlos Arriola has summarized as holding that “human values neither subsist nor are perfected if the collectivity is exhausted or decayed.”\[143\] Briefly, the platform spoke for societal reform that would insure that private property served its social function, that the capitalist firm be humanized, that education be reformed, and that the private and public sectors perform complementary functions in the mixed economy.\[144\]

The consensus on the platform was not to continue as conflict broke out over the choice of the party’s presidential candidate. Conchello had promoted the candidacy of Pablo Emilio Madero, nephew of

\[142\]Ibid., p. 545.
\[143\]Ibid., p. 546.
\[144\]Ibid., pp. 547-548.
the apostle of the Mexican Revolution, for some time before the convention. Madero was the favorite of the convention, but despite three ballots, was unable to attain the necessary 80 percent approval for the presidential nomination. González Morfín then called for an extraordinary convention in January 1976 to try again to find a presidential nominee. Despite seven ballots in January, Madero was unable to amass the required 80 percent approval. The PAN’s Executive Committee then decided not to present a presidential candidate in 1976.145 Several congressional districts were also uncontested by the PAN as a result of the rupture.

The PAN’s abstention from the 1976 presidential race created as many difficulties for the regime as for the abstaining party. Because the PPS and the PARM followed their traditional practice of supporting the PRI’s presidential candidate, no opponent faced José López Portillo in an electoral race taking place in time of economic and political crisis. The image of López Portillo competing against abstentionism dominated the minds of many politically-conscious Mexicans, as will be explored further in the next chapter. The PCM’s Valentín Campa ran a write-in campaign for the presidency, but was not listed on the official ballot.

López Portillo, of course, won the race. The transition of power in December 1976 was no smoother than the election itself, though. The period from election day, the first Sunday of July, through inauguration day, December 1, was a period of intense crisis in Mexican political life. As Soledad Loaeza explains,

145 Ibid., pp. 549-551.

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The atmosphere around José López Portillo's taking of power in December of 1976 was totally different from that of his predecessor. The economic crisis which had set the country back at that time, of which the most spectacular manifestation was the successive devaluations of August 31 and October 27, dramatically swayed the confidence of public opinion in Echeverría's policies. Given the expectations traditionally whetted by sexenial change, it fell to the entering president to preserve the integrity of the governmental institutions, "as ordained structures of change," and what was more important, to restore the "social pact" that had guaranteed the stability of the country for the last thirty years.146

The devaluations of the peso in August and October heightened the tensions between the private sector and the Echeverría administration that had been building for six years.147 Echeverría himself suggested that there were plots of an undetermined nature against him and the nation from abroad with which unnamed groups of Mexicans were conspiring.148 In the setting of economic crisis and of political polarization which characterized the last year of the Echeverría term, suggestions such as those being made by the lame duck Echeverría fed easily into the Mexican capital's rumor mill. Because of the closed nature of the Mexican political elite and the censorship and self-censorship of the Mexican press (heightened by the Echeverría-inspired ouster of the critical editorship of Excelsior in July), politically active Mexicans had long relied on rumors for their political information.149 Rumors about the plot being hatched against Echeverría


147 See Chapter Three above.


149 For insightful comments on the rumor mill, see Loaeza, "La política del rumor," esp. p. 139.
and Mexico varied, "but the most grave and the most menacing was that a
coup d'etat was being prepared, for some it was from the right, for
others from the left, but the case was that the system was being
threatened." It was even suggested that Echeverría was planning a
barracks revolt to lengthen his own time in office. Of course, when
such a coup might occur was also subject to speculation, September 16
being the first rumored date, November 20 the second.

The coup never came but until López Portillo took the oath of
office on December 1 political polarization remained intense,
particularly in October and November. Echeverría was the target of
discrediting rumors, but he did not remain on the defensive. He
criticized Mexican business in its bastion of Monterrey, saying that
the rich and powerful of Monterrey who call themselves Christian
and beat their breasts . . . refuse to help their fellowmen, and
although they create industry, it lacks a social sense; they have
changed into profound reactionaries and enemies of the people.

Furthermore, within two weeks of the end of his term, Echeverría
expropriated 100,000 hectares of land from large private landowners in
Sinaloa and Sonora for distribution to campesinos who had seized it in
land invasions. The outcry from the private sector was shrill.

López Portillo's inauguration on December 1 came as a relief to
those who felt threatened by Echeverría's populism and to those who

150 Ibid., p. 141.
151 Smith, Labyrinths of Power, p. 296.
152 Ibid., p. 295; Riding, Distant Neighbors, p. 104.
153 Quoted in Loaeza, "La política del rumor," p. 140.
154 Ibid., pp. 141-143.
feared an overthrow of the regime by opponents on the right. However, to restore the confidence of the private sector and those in the middle class threatened by Echeverría-style populism, López Portillo had to demonstrate that he was not a puppet of his predecessor. The confidence of the private sector was essential for a return to economic growth. Of equal importance, though, was that López Portillo had to satisfy the educated urban middle class, a middle class dissatisfied by constraints on upward mobility, more threatened by devaluations and economic instability than the Mexican bourgeoisie, dubious about the capacity of the government to maintain political order, and unhappy about its inability to express itself politically due to the limitations of the party system.

In 1976 the Mexican political regime was in crisis partly because of the economic setbacks suffered by Mexico as import-substituting industrialization experienced difficulties. The modernization engendered by this industrialization and the urbanization associated with it had created an urban middle class highly dependent upon continuing economic growth to provide it with the opportunities for social mobility and consumption which it so desired. State-sponsored industrialization had also created a entrepreneurial class which demanded that the state promote an economic climate healthy for it to continue to easily reap high rates of profit as well. To give these groups what they demanded, the Mexican political elite had long relied upon the corporatist structure of the PRI, the power of rural caciques, and revolutionary myths to shackle those who were not benefiting from
this modernization, despite promises to the contrary. By the late 1960s, the plight of the poor was becoming recognized by intellectuals and represented by mostly alienated middle class youths. When Mexican economic development stagnated in the early 1970s, and Echeverría attempted to respond to the conditions of the urban and rural poor, those who had always benefited from Mexican development left the coalition too. Various social bases of the Mexican elite’s rule had or were considering changing political allegiance.

The other aspect of the political crisis which came to a head in 1976 was that these dissatisfied groups had no institutionalized outlets to express their discontent but those controlling the Mexican state, dependent on the Mexican regime’s image as a democracy (despite being a relatively closed political elite protected by state corporatism) and chastened by the fallout of the 1968 massacre of students, were unwilling to violently repress much discontent. The Mexican electoral system functioned to provide democratic legitimacy, sought for both revolutionary legitimacy at home ("effective suffrage and no re-election") and political goodwill abroad. The Mexican party system operated to insure that the revolutionary elite obtain this electorally-provided legitimacy without the worry of losing an election and thus a valid claim on the reins of the Mexican state, by far the most lucrative source of both power and wealth in that nation. Thus the Mexican party system functioned well at channeling the electorate to the ballot box to vote for the revolutionary elite’s electoral machine, the PRI. But it did not serve to channel expressions of discontent and opposition to the elite. Those who were discontented in
Mexico in the late 1960s and early 1970s were unable to effectively voice their feelings through interest groups. Nor were they able to do so at the polls, especially in 1976 when no party provided an opponent to Echeverría's hand-picked successor. The discontented had three choices: cast a meaningless ballot for one of the weak opposition parties,155 abstain to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the choices, or take other types of political action. The latter came to include, in the early 1970s, guerrilla insurrection, student demonstrations, urban terrorism, and the beginning of illegal opposition party formation on the left and outspoken criticism, including threats of investment strikes, by those on the right. All three of these options were being exercised at a growing pace in the years preceding 1977. Which of them were more dangerous to the political elite and how did it respond?

A consideration of the reforma política may provide an answer to this question as well as an insight into the Mexican political elites perception of the importance of elections in Mexico’s authoritarian regime. In the terms used in Chapter Two (see Figure 2-5), the interests of Mexico's political elite had not, by 1976, actually changed. They still sought to maintain their monopoly of control over the state apparatus. What had changed by 1976 was the Mexican society which this elite ruled. That is, again in Chapter Two's terms, the objective conditions for attaining the political elite's interests had been altered by modernization. Attaining the elite's interests, that is, staying in power, could perhaps require changing, at least in a

155 Meaningless in the sense that no representative would be chosen as a result of that vote.
minor way, the way of doing so, that is, some particular aspect of the regime. Regime change was initiated in 1977 and known as the reforma política.
Table 4-1

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS 1929-1976
(percentages of total vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organized Left</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>Other Right</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
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</table>


Table 4-2
FEDERAL DEPUTY ELECTION RESULTS
1961-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>PARM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>83.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anulled votes have been excluded as have votes for a minor party, the PNM in 1961, to facilitate greater comparability of party shares from year to year.

Table 4-3
Rise of Abstension, 1961-1976
(Stratified by Level of Urbanization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Intercept Range</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All States</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 16 Most Urban States| 54.7            | 86.3  | -1.6  | .66| 9.63 
|                     |                 |       | (-3.38)|    |
| 8 Most Urban        | 56.3            | 69.7  | -2.3  | .50| 4.94 
|                     |                 |       | (-4.25)|    |
| 8 Next Most Urban   | 47.6            | 84.7  | -0.9  | .70| 11.20|
|                     |                 |       | (-1.23)|    |
| 16 Most Rural States| 55.3            | 90.9  | -2.1  | .65| 9.34 
|                     |                 |       | (-4.43)|    |
| 8 Most Rural        | 69.8            | 84.9  | -2.6  | .63| 8.21 
|                     |                 |       | (-5.75)|    |
| 8 Next Most Rural   | 54.0            | 89.6  | -1.6  | .64| 8.52 
|                     |                 |       | (-1.92)|    |

(T-ratio in parentheses)

The dependent variable is participation by registered voters. The independent variable is a counter designed to measure time (1961=0, 1964=1, . . ., 1976=5). Observations are at the state level, pooled for the six deputy elections from 1961 to 1976. Intercepts vary within groups by state, being identified by the difference between the intercept for the equation and the intercept for a dichotomous variable assigned to each state.

See Appendix for further details.
Table 4-4
Trend of Abstension and Modernization, 1961-1976
(Stratified by Level of Urbanization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
<th>( F )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Urban States</td>
<td>-0.73 (-2.56)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>8.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.09 (0.55)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Urban</td>
<td>-1.12 (-3.26)</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.55 (2.34)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Urban</td>
<td>-0.39 (-0.86)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>10.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.13)</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Rural States</td>
<td>-1.35 (-3.43)</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.16 (0.44)</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>7.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Rural</td>
<td>-1.19 (-2.99)</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.70 (1.52)</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Rural</td>
<td>-1.62 (-2.15)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>8.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.35 (-0.56)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-ratios in parentheses. The dependent variable is participation by registered voters. The independent variables: Industrialization is measured by the percent of the economically active population in the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction). Urbanization is measured by percent of population living in localities of greater than 50,000. Constants vary by state and are not reported.
Table 4-5
Decline of PRI Electoral Hegemony, 1961-1976
(Stratified by Level of Urbanization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Intercept Range</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All States</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Urban States</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Urban</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Urban</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Rural States</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Rural</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Rural</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(T-ratio in parentheses)

The dependent variable is percentage of votes received by the PRI. The independent variable is a counter designed to measure time (1961=0, 1964=1, . . . , 1976=5). Observations are at the state level, pooled for the six deputy elections from 1961 to 1976. Intercepts vary within groups by state, being identified by the difference between the intercept for the equation and the intercept for a dichotomous variable assigned to each state.

See Appendix for further details.
Table 4-6
Trend of Opposition and Modernization, 1961-1976
(Stratified by Level of Urbanization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th>Industrialization</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Urban States</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.63)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.13)</td>
<td>(-2.74)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>30.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.61)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>26.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(-2.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.13)</td>
<td>(-1.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Most Rural States</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(-0.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(-0.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Next Most Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-ratios in parentheses. The dependent variable is percent of votes received by the PRI. The independent variables: Industrialization is measured by the percent of the economically active population in the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction). Urbanization is measured by percent of population living in localities of greater than 50,000. Constants vary by state and are not reported.
Table 4-7

Correlations between Electoral Support for PRI and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1976*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 2,500</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>-.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrants</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td>-.62</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>-.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Primary Sector</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Secondary Sector</td>
<td>-.63</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Tertiary Sector</td>
<td>-.72</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Upper (Professional, Managerial)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Middle (Administrative, Supervisory)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Working Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants, Rural Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: The 1970 census does not divide occupational categories sufficiently to make class categories comparable to that possible for the 1980 census.
*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. Range of N = 159 to 182. All correlations significant at .02 level.
Figure 4-1

PARTICIPATION OF POTENTIAL ELECTORATE

Figure 4-2

TREND IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION
BY POTENTIAL ELECTORATE, 1961-76

PERCENT OF POTENTIAL ELECTORATE


□ OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS + PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
Figure 4-3
TREND IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION
BY REGISTERED ELECTORATE, 1961-76

PERCENT OF REGISTERED ELECTORATE


OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS

PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
FIGURE 4-4

EVOLUTION OF VOTE FOR PRI
RURAL VS URBAN DIMENSION

Most Rural States

All States

Most Urban States

CHAPTER FIVE:

MAKING THE REFORMA POLITICA

By the end of Luis Echeverría’s sexenio, political and economic pressures which had been developing during the period of the Mexican Miracle had reached a crisis level. Chapter Three established that Mexico’s import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and the financial policy associated with it, desarrollo estabilizador, had by the late 1960s run into difficulties, especially in the countryside. Echeverría’s attempts to overcome ISI’s limitations by populist distributional policies, agrarian reform, and expansion of the state’s participation in the manufacturing sector broke the alliance between the state and the private sector which had been so carefully fostered in post-war Mexico. The devaluations of 1976, and the capital flight associated with them, made very apparent to anyone who doubted it that Mexico’s political economy was in crisis.

Chapter Four made the case that the regime was also in crisis. The regime had traditionally functioned to insure the continuation in power with access to the resources of the state for a group of revolutionary elites and their chosen civilian followers by co-optation of potential opponents, constraint of interest groups’ demands on state resources through corporatist institutions, channeling of discontent through a limited party system dominated by the party of this revolutionary elite, and legitimation of the elite’s rule through an apparently free electoral process. By the early 1970s, the regime’s difficulties included declining participation in the electoral process; challenges
to the corporatist interest representation system; the rise of new, but illegal, opposition parties; and a willingness on the part of many to circumvent the elite’s preferred channels of participation, the limited party system, choosing instead demonstrations, guerrilla insurgency, and urban terrorism. Dissatisfaction with the regime followed the suppression of the 1968 student movement, which made clear to many Mexicans that the regime was not as democratic as their leaders said it was nor as open as they wished it to be, and demonstrated that the political institutions, designed in the 1930s and 1940s to legitimate the elite’s rule without threatening them with excessive demands on the resources they controlled, were unable to effectively control opposition peacefully in a more modern, urbanized, and educated Mexico. Discontent with the course of economic development on the part of both the left and the right was not handled well by the regime during Echeverría’s term, as demands on the state either to distribute more to the urban and rural poor or to reestablish a healthy climate for private sector investment and profit accelerated. That many questioned whether the succession in December 1976 would follow the normal and constitutional pattern following an election which was not normal by modern Mexican standards (since no opposition candidate stood against the PRI’s choice) indicated the depth of the crisis. Mexico’s regime may not have been as seriously challenged in 1976 as Chile’s was in 1973 or Brazil’s in 1964, but the tensions building up in the 1970s were not being mediated effectively by the regime at the end of Echeverría’s sexenio.

The principle of no re-election, though, means that hope can
spring eternal in Mexican politics. So long as the no re-election principle is respected, and it has been since the Revolution, it is impossible for a president to sustain his personal control over Mexican politics. Even if a new Maximato were to be established, and some suggested that Echeverría was interested precisely in that in 1976, such a ruler would have to work through another man. Cárdenas showed in 1935 that as president of the republic, one could break such behind-the-scenes control and establish one’s own independence. Any type of political struggle or policy dilemma based upon the intransigence of a conflict between the president and other groups need only last until the end of the sexenio. Thus, José López Portillo had the capacity in 1977, as newly elected president of the republic, to bring the political crisis of the end of the Echeverría sexenio to a close. However, whether he was sufficiently autonomous from the influence of Echeverría, a long-time friend of his, or inclined to change policy directions so as satisfy those in conflict with Echeverría, had yet to be demonstrated.

López Portillo did make initiatives shortly after becoming president to deal with Mexico’s twin crises. To close the gap between the state and the private sector, López Portillo proposed an "Alliance for Production." To satisfy those concerned about the growth of the state and its inefficiencies, he instituted an administrative reform. And to address the general decline in legitimacy of the Mexican regime, particularly the skepticism about the electoral process and the dissatisfaction with the political party alternatives, López Portillo initiated a process of political reform known as the reforma política.
This chapter will explore the process of making the reforma política. It will begin by establishing that the political crisis described in Chapter Four was perceived similarly by many in the Mexican political elite. It will then explore the non-public process of making the reforma política, the behind-the-scenes process which preceded the announcement of the reforma política by Secretary of Gobernación Jesús Reyes Heroles in April 1977. Following that will be a discussion of the formal, public process of political reform which began in April 1977. The chapter will close with a consideration of the decision-making process involved in the reforma política: did the manner of decision-making about the reforms reveal anything about the reforms themselves?

THE PERCEPTION OF CRISIS

When dealing with a concept such as political crisis, it is difficult to even analytically distinguish between the events and processes which objectively manifest the existence of such a crisis and the perceptions of crisis in the minds of those in key political roles because a critical component of political crisis is precisely the perceptions of it by those with the power to convince others that it exists. Yet, at the close of Chapter Four, I have tried to delineate a number of phenomena taking place in the early 1970s which I think indicated that, in the eyes of an outside observer, Mexico was experiencing political and economic crises. In Chapter Two I argued that initiatives to change a regime would not be forthcoming unless those with the power to force a change in the rules of the game
themselves perceived the need for such change in order to protect their interests. Those with the power to effect such a change in Mexico have long been those in control of the state, the "revolutionary" elite. Did Mexican intellectuals, opposition leaders, and especially the political elite conclude that some political change was necessary in 1976-77?

Certainly the perception of crisis in Mexico's economy was broadly shared, with accusations about the responsibility for the crisis situation being hurled back forth by the government and the private sector. As suggested in Chapters Three and Four, Mexican businessmen took numerous actions that left no doubt of their lack of confidence in the investment climate in Mexico. Capital flight most clearly demonstrated severe dissatisfaction on the part of business, but the establishment of the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE), which increasingly abandoned the private sector custom of not openly criticizing the president as business became increasingly dissatisfied with Echeverría, also showed private sector worries and demands. By the end of his term, Echeverría openly questioned the patriotism of the Mexican bourgeoisie. How to deal with the economic crisis was a question which even divided the major opposition party, the PAN.¹

Prior to 1968, the number of analyses of Mexico's political and economic systems by foreigners and, more importantly by Mexicans, which were critical or pessimistic about the regime or the direction of

Mexican development were few. In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, a group of leftist intellectuals supported by former President Cárdenas founded the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN); many of the same individuals were involved in the publication of Política, an independent leftist weekly. However, both the MLN and Política were more critical of U.S. imperialism and any Mexican associations with it than they were of Mexican development. Pablo González Casanova's Democracy in Mexico\(^2\), published in Mexico in 1965, seriously questioned the consequences of Mexico's development path and illustrated the lack of expression of pluralism in the nation's political institutions. It was not followed by a torrent of similarly critical studies by influential Mexican intellectuals. After Tlatelolco, however, criticism of the government and pessimism about Mexico's future were more forthcoming from intellectuals. As Roderic Camp has argued,

the student massacre broke the link between future intellectuals (then students) and the state . . .; it reflected the deterioration of the optimistic image many educated Mexicans had about Mexico's development . . .; it encouraged the development of intellectual groups that believe that only with the creation of large groups or political organizations can intellectuals have a real chance of influencing governmental policy in Mexico . . .; it encouraged intellectuals to take the lead in criticizing the government and defending the students, thereby making intellectuals more open about their ideas and promoting a more realistic posture in the expression of their views . . .

Of course, as Camp notes, not all intellectuals swore off cooperation

\(^2\)Oxford University Press, 1970.

with the state. However, the more pessimistic scenario has received much more attention by Mexican scholars and journalists and a more critical stance toward the state has characterized their writing since 1968. Of course, much of the new critical scholarship and journalism about Mexico by Mexicans has been published since 1976, but a number of early critical studies appeared during Echeverría's sexenio.

Indeed, the Echeverría administration itself seemed to recognize the need for political reform. In addition to his populist initiatives in the economic and social spheres, Echeverría had promoted a process of apertura democrática, a somewhat vague concept which was intended to heal some of the rifts between that political elite and those alienated by the events of 1968 and which caused many in the opposition to become optimistic about the possibilities of a more open political process. Although not limited to the electoral and party systems, electoral reform was a key part of Echeverría's apertura democrática. In his inaugural address, Echeverría suggested the need for electoral reform:

"We demand that our electoral system be improved, that the parties and ideological activity be strengthened, that civic consciousness be more alert and always truthfully informed . . ." The hope was that

---

4 Ibid., pp. 208-212.

5 One way to verify this is to peruse a couple of relatively complete bibliographies of materials on the Mexican state, economy, and society, such as those given by Basañez, La lucha por la hegemonía en México, 1968-1980 and Jorge Alonso (ed.), El estado mexicano (Mexico City: Ed. Nueva Imagen, 1982). One will note that a number of critical studies appeared between 1970 and 1976 from both moderate and radical scholars and journalists.

electoral reform would, by the end of the 1973 congressional electoral campaign, "defeat the 'party of abstention,' strengthen the opposition parties, and improve the image and credibility of the PRI."\(^7\) PRI President Jesús Reyes Heroles emphasized these shortcomings of the electoral process in his opening address to the Seventh Assembly of the PRI in 1972, saying

"certainly the doubt over the efficacy of the political parties is universal. Indifference about them and electoral abstention have increased . . . we believe that only the functioning of the parties, based on the idea of democratic representation, can impede the fall into social and political disintegration, into totalitarianism. To impede both, we are obligated to struggle resolutely, since our party remains the majority, to defeat that enemy of democracy and of the nation that we call electoral abstention, to debate our problems permanently, by constant ideological action, without reservations or fears, conscious that on the realization of our tasks depends, in good measure, the political and practical evolution of Mexico."

To address these perceived problems, Echeverría proposed constitutional amendments to increase the number of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies (to make the congress more representative), to raise the number of party deputies and lower the barriers to minority parties' capacities to obtain them (to revitalize the opposition parties, especially the Partido Popular Socialista and the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana\(^9\)), and to lower the age requirements for becoming deputies and senators (to increase the

\(^7\)Saldívar, Ideología y política del estado mexicano, p. 163.
\(^8\)Quoted in ibid., p. 157.
Additionally, a new federal election law was passed which lowered the voting age to 18 for all Mexicans and reduced the minimum membership requirements for parties to 65,000 from 75,000.\textsuperscript{11} Overall, these reforms were not that sweeping. That they were enacted indicated that the Echeverría administration was concerned about the functioning of the electoral system, especially in regard to opposition representation and abstention, but that they were not of larger scale suggests that Echeverría hoped to relegitimate the regime without promoting major changes that might threaten (or be perceived as threatening to) important sectors of the party. Secretary of Gobernación Mario Moya Palencia (who before entering government had written the major scholarly work on the electoral reform of 1963 which had introduced the party deputy system\textsuperscript{12}) and PRI President Reyes Heroles continually emphasized the important role of the opposition. Moya Palencia testified before the congress that "it is as antidemocratic to restrict the minority in its function of critic as to incapacitate the majority from governing,"\textsuperscript{13} while Reyes Heroles lamented that, in Mexico in the early 1970s, "the opposition doesn't

\textsuperscript{10}These were passed by the congress in February 1972. The amendments made five party deputy seats available to parties receiving 1.5 percent of the vote (previously it had been 2.5 percent) and increased the maximum number of party deputyships available to each minority party to 25 (up from 15). \textit{La reforma política del Presidente Echeverría}, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 106-110.

\textsuperscript{12}Mario Moya Palencia, \textit{La reforma electoral} (Mexico City: Ed. Plataforma, 1964).

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{La reforma política del Presidente Echeverría}, p. 71.
even complete the elementary role that belongs to it in any political regime: to resist to support. 14  Yet, it seemed clear that there was no real intention to encourage the registration of new opposition parties since the rules for registration were only superficially modified. 15  Moreover, the modifications to the party deputy system only legalized a practice that already existed, allowing party deputies for the PPS and the PARM even if they did not meet the 2.5 percent minimum level nationally. 16  So, a concern about the shortcomings of the electoral and party systems was felt at the highest levels of the Mexican elite, but serious reform was not contemplated.

Not surprisingly, then, the Echeverría electoral reforms had little effect, abstentionism rising in both 1973 and 1976, so that by 1976 the politically conscious stratum of the Mexican population shared a perception of crisis about the party system and the problem of abstentionism. The press, especially the influential Mexico City daily Excelsior, clearly expressed this perception, even though criticism of the regime in the press had always created a risk of indirect censorship of a critical periodical by the state. 17  In both 1973 and 1976, editorials complained about the lack of a truly multiparty system for representation of opinion. Certainly expressing the opinion of

14 Quoted by Saldívar, Ideología y política del estado mexicano, p. 163.
15 Ibid., p. 162.
16 See Chapter Four.
17 The editorial staff of Excelsior was replaced in an internal shakeup promoted by Echeverría in July 1976. The former editorial staff founded the weekly Proceso which first appeared in November 1976.
many, Miguel Angel Granados Chapa wrote, when surveying the alliance of the PPS and the PARM with the PRI in Federal Electoral Commission voting in 1973,

In this panorama, the PAN is converted into the only party of formal opposition. But it is not the true opposition. Part of the true opposition operates within the PRI itself, for in the heart of that party occurs the true struggle for political position. The other part of the true opposition lies dispersed throughout the nation. Those who try to organize it are those who, to use the schema, can call themselves the "broad left." 18

When the PARM and the PPS supported López Portillo's candidacy in 1976, the fiction of a multiparty system was roundly attacked. 19 Such criticism only increased when the PAN was unable to put forth a candidate to challenge López Portillo. As one example, Carlos Peyrera argued that "the Federal Electoral Law is not designed to organize the electoral activity of parties produced by diverse social currents, but to protect an artificial multipartism." 20

The artificial multipartism was, by 1976, suffering from severe internal party divisions that were not well hidden. The conflicts in the PAN have already been described, 21 but they were not the only example of dissension to cripple the formal opposition. The PPS was very divided as the result of cooperation between PPS leader Jorge

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19 E.g., Carlos Peyrera in Excelsior, 12 January 1976 and Vicente Leñero in Excelsior, 14 January 1976.
20 Excelsior, 16 February 1976.
21 See Chapter Four. Sociologist Julio Labastida said of the PAN's crisis: "The crisis of the PAN should be seen from this possibility: as this radicalization to the right of the middle sector is a search for political channels of expression and the Madero-Conchello tendency represents this possibility." Proceso, no. 12 (22 January 1977).
Cruikshank and the state. Members of the PPS from Nayarit (led by Alejandro Gascón Mercado and Manuel Stephens) felt they had won the governorship of Nayarit in elections held in November 1975, but the official victory went to the PRI. In 1976, Cruikshank stood unopposed by the PRI in a senatorial race in Oaxaca which he won, becoming the first non-PRI member of the federal senate. The Nayarit faction of the PPS, not surprisingly, suspected collusion between Cruikshank and the authorities and protested loudly. For their dissent, the failed gubernatorial candidate Gascón Mercado and his followers were expelled from the PPS. The PARM, too, had its problems, with the president of the party expelling the party’s secretary general and the leader of its congressional delegation. These apparent weaknesses of the party system were duly noted by the press.22

The challenge of abstentionism received even more attention. In the same article cited above, Peyrera noted "there exists no other country in the world, besides Mexico, in which abstentionism has been erected as the principal enemy of the government apparatus" and observed that the PRI exhibited a "horror of abstentionism . . . converted now into a true obsession," which caused the PRI, in 1970, to circulate the thesis that a vote against the PRI was preferable to an abstention.23 To Peyrera, the political elite may have been overvaluing the threat of abstentionism,24 but nevertheless it was

22See Proceso, no. 1 (6 November 1976).

23Excelsior, 12 January 1976.

24Laurence Whitehead argues that this type of overreaction by Mexican authorities is common. Realizing the degree to which they have used the Mexican state as their instrument to bring about social change
perceiving abstentionism as a severe challenge to the regime's legitimacy. In 1973, Reyes Heroles made the (perhaps demagogic) assertion that to abstain from voting was to open the road to dictatorship. In 1976, especially after the PAN chose not to contest the presidential election, the press gave great attention to the issue of abstentionism, with editorial pieces ranging in subject matter from why voters abstain to what abstentionism means in the Mexican context to whether or not voters should abstain in the upcoming federal elections. Since López Portillo faced no real opponent, abstentionism became the major political issue in the 1976 campaign. For some, the 1976 presidential race finally brought out the true contradictions of the Mexican regime. Abelardo Villegas wrote:

There can be no doubt that this system of elections is split by a profound contradiction. The falseness of the opposition creates abstentionism and put legitimacy in danger. On the other hand, it creates the condition that the real opposition does not show itself in elections but in other ways that, in some cases, can be lethal for national security.

Put this way, the 1976 election can be seen as serving a function for the political elite: demonstrating a fundamental weakness of the

and viewing with alarm what happened to those attempting similar projects in Iran and Chile (as well as remembering the consequences of political disorder in Mexico at the time of the Revolution), Mexican elites often react to any measures of political dysfunction by interpreting them as indicators of political crisis, a perception not shared by the masses they rule. "Why Mexico is Ungovernable—Almost," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, Working Paper no. 54, 1979.


regime and thus a need for reform.

Beyond the electoral arena alone, the sense of crisis, confusion, and danger of violence reigned during the 1976 election year, especially after the election. Echeverría himself suggested that Mexico was threatened by a coup from the right. Rumors about a coup d'état were the most grave of a whole range of concerns expressed editorially about the status of Mexico. Among other serious challenges delineated by opinion makers were the lack of direction in economic policy, the disastrous agrarian and trade situations, and the conflict between the private sector and the state. Fascism was seen by some as looming on the horizon. Parallels with the fateful year 1968 were noted by one writer who saw three similarities in the 1968 and 1976 conjunctures: the economic model had deceived the nation, the government had lost the confidence of the people, and no alternatives existed because the real opposition could not participate politically.

Those coming into power in 1976 included many who shared these perspectives on the condition of the Mexican political system and some who proposed to do something about it. Among the cabinet ministers chosen by López Portillo was Reyes Heroles who, as former director of


29 See Chapter Four.

30 See the summaries in Pensamiento de México en los periodicos, pp. 10-13.

PEMEX (Mexico's largest economic enterprise) and former president of the PRI (its largest political organization), was the premier member of the cabinet and initially enjoyed a political stature equal to the new president. He had, as PRI president, stood up to Echeverría on at least three occasions: once, when Echeverría tried to impose an unpopular gubernatorial candidate for Veracruz on the PRI, Reyes Heroles protested and Echeverría backed down; later, when Echeverría began to dream of a second term as president, despite the no re-election clause, Reyes Heroles squelched that dream by publicly arguing that the constitution should not be reformed for the sake of one man's goals; finally, though, Echeverría finished Reyes Heroles as PRI leader by revealing López Portillo as his successor prior to the completion of the PRI's electoral platform, despite Reyes Heroles's public statements that events would proceed in the reverse order.32 As Minister of Gobernación, Reyes Heroles's charge was regulation of internal security and politics, a task for which he was as well prepared as anyone in Mexico. As a result, early in the López Portillo presidency, Reyes Heroles was the initiator of the new administration's political strategy while López Portillo managed initiatives in the realm of economic policy,33 a task for which he was better prepared, having previously been Secretary of the Treasury.

Reyes Heroles, a scholar of liberalism, was perhaps the principal

32 Proceso, no. 438 (25 March 1985). Reyes Heroles himself could not be a precandidate for the presidency because his parents were born in Spain, thus he was constitutionally ineligible for the presidency.

liberal within the governing party. As Carlos Monsiváis wrote of him,

For him, and that was his insistent legacy, the respect for the
tform (of the modes of transmission of command, of the juridical
recourses of the nation, of the obligation of all policy to be
rooted in history) was the key to the survival of the system... But his obsessive conviction was the importance of the change of
governmental attitudes, in the comprehension of the importance of
an autonomous civil society, in the creation of spaces of
tolerance and dissidence. This... was a major contribution of
Reyes Heroles: his insistence that the governmental apparatus not
be abandoned to the conveniences of realpolitik, to an apparatus
of government increasingly unwilling to justify its acts to the
public, proud of its insolence, ... Reyes Heroles brought the
desire to rationalize, almost the conditioned reflex of adding to
all public action his corresponding theory.

A believer in constitutional government, Reyes Heroles argued, at his
first meeting of the Federal Electoral Commission as its president (a
position which fell to the Secretary of Gobernación, that "if we want
to approach a more and more real democracy, we have to care for formal
democracy." 35 A proponent of political parties, he also asserted that
"political parties are the best instruments for the existence of a
society pluralistic in ideas and also, why not say it, in interests." 36

Often a critic of the revolutionary party and the revolutionary
state, Reyes Heroles was nonetheless a man of the Revolution. As he
put it, "Within the Mexican Revolution have been committed many errors;
yet it was not in itself an error." 37 He summarized his practical
approach to politics under the apparently paradoxical slogan "Change to
conserve, conserve to change." This, translated roughly, meant that

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34 "Reyes Heroles, muy oído y poco entendido; admirado y apenas

35 Proceso, no. 7 (18 December 1976).

36 Ibid.

for Mexico to advance it had to maintain its post-revolutionary political system, but political reform was necessary to maintain the political system. No reactionary, he looked forward to a more modern Mexico; a man of the Revolution, he expected that the post-revolutionary political state could bring modernization to Mexico; yet, as a critic, he saw the need for the reform of the political system for "the subsistence of the nation and the peaceful coexistence of Mexicans."  

While PRI President from 1972 until Echeverría sacked him by moving him to the directorship of the Social Security Institute in 1975, Reyes Heroles came to perceive the need for political reform, particularly electoral reform, in order to resolve the crisis of the Mexican regime. In a remarkable speech at the close of the 1973 electoral campaign in Yucatán, Reyes Heroles made the diagnosis that Mexican society was in crisis; that profound reform to remake Mexico, reform of a revolutionary character, was necessary to resolve the crisis; that such revolutionary reform was possible within Mexico's "living constitution;" that the violence being practiced in Mexico served no purpose since those practicing violence were only avoiding dealing with real ideas; and that abstaining on election day was contrary to the duties of Mexican citizens.  

Throughout this speech, Reyes Heroles emphasized the crisis atmosphere in Mexico and the threat of violence to the free exchange of ideas so necessary if Mexico was to make the reforms consistent with the Revolution which could bring it

38 Quoted in ibid.  
out of crisis. Abstentionism only strengthened the hand of those who sought the violent path.

Your voting is going to count, whether in favor of the PRI or against, and your not voting is also going to count. Your voting is participation, it is intervention in the political decision; your not voting is negation, it is to not do, contrary to your promises to the society in which you live. Your not voting means that you give equal preference to democracy and antidemocracy, to totalitarianism and liberty; your not voting implies that you believe yourself incapable of governing, that you feel inferior, that you should be governed; your not voting is an open road to dictatorship, in which someone decides for you, in your place. Your voting will help to sustain and perfect our ideologically multiple society; your voting will help make surface better options for the elected.

The rhetorical excesses notwithstanding, Reyes Heroles's oratory linked a number of significant phenomena in Echeverría's Mexico: the sense of crisis, the danger of the violent path, the problem of abstentionism, and the importance of reform within the Revolutionary political system. That the leader of the party responsible for over forty years of public policy would admit that Mexico faced crisis is remarkable. Above all, Reyes Heroles feared the rise of México bronco, his euphemism for the barbarity and chaos that could emerge if the violent path succeeded, if Mexico fell into another revolution of the type already experienced in this century. Thus, he valued change within the existing "revolutionary" political regime. Such change would have to preclude the violent path and encourage the positive contribution of the citizenry, that is, discourage electoral abstentionism.

MAKING THE REFORMA POLITICA: THE NON-PUBLIC PROCESS

The political elite was united over the need to maintain political

40Ibid.
stability in Mexico. In the language of Chapter Two, the Mexican elite’s interests had not changed; the revolutionary oligarchy remained committed to holding on to the reins of power in the state. What had changed as a result of the crisis of the early 1970s was the evaluation of the conditions necessary for the attainment of that interest (see Figure 2-5). More precisely, the Mexican elite was split in its evaluation of what was necessary for holding on to power. Some, such as Reyes Heroles and his followers, saw reform of the political regime as the way of resolving the crisis and maintaining their grasp on state power. They fell into the lower left corner Figure 2-5. Others evaluated the situation differently: traditional methods of maintaining power were considered adequate if they were used because the crisis was not so deep as imagined by Reyes Heroles. They fell into the lower right corner of Figure 2-5. It bears repeating: neither group had abandoned the traditional desire of priístas to stay in power, they just differed over how to do it.

While opinions about the advisability of electoral reform as a way to exit the crisis were far from black and white, at least two camps can be clearly delineated. On the one hand, led by Reyes Heroles, was a group of reformists promoting liberalization. They included, most conspicuously, those working under Reyes Heroles in the Ministry of Gobernación, particularly José Luis Lamadrid, the oficial mayor of Gobernación and Ignacio Vázquez Torres, the head of Gobernación’s Political and Social Research bureau.41 Within the new PRI hierarchy, 

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41 Interview with former Federal Electoral Commission official, 21 May 1984.
the director of the PRI's Institute for Political, Economic, and Social Studies, Luis Dantón Rodríguez, and the head of the Gran Comisión of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodolfo González Guevara, also seemed to favored Reyes Heroles's approach.

Opposing them was a circle which feared an electoral opening, led by PRI President Carlos Sansores Pérez and including most of the rest of the PRI hierarchy and the leadership of the official labor movement in the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). The opponents of reform had prospered under two of authoritarian Mexico's methods for political control, corporatism and caciquismo, and tended to favor continued reliance upon them. On the one hand, they gained much power and wealth from the use of such authoritarian instruments and because of them they enjoyed a certain autonomy from the presidency, an autonomy which federal bureaucrats did not have. On the other hand, they felt that these methods were most suited to insure political stability for Mexico. Sansores Pérez was a traditional political boss from the backward state of Campeche in the Gulf region. Other high-

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43 Unomasuno, 12 December 1977.

44 One report in Proceso (no. 80, 15 May 1978) asserted that Sansores had become the largest entrepreneur and landowner in his home state of Campeche and had large investments in the other Gulf states of Yucatán and Quintana Roo, where tourism was bringing an influx of investment. Further, in typical cacique style, Sansores had used his political power to expand his empire. While governor of Campeche, many
ranking PRI party officials were the Labor Secretary, Blas Chumacero, a close lieutenant of CTM leader Fidel Velázquez, no proponent of political reform, and Velázquez’s son-in-law Joaquín Gamboa Pascoe, PRI Political Secretary and Senator from the Federal District. Sansores Pérez’s followers, local, state, and regional caciques, opposed any reform process which would extend liberalization beyond the federal level. The caciques’ political power depended in large part on their capacity to provide political patronage to their local supporters. This required control of the local state apparatus, the state or municipal government. Reforms which might threaten the ability of these caciques to maintain their monopoly of the local state apparatus could therefore undermine their local power base. This threat was quite immediate; the PAN, the PARM, and the PPS, to the extent that they had seriously challenged the PRI in the past, had done so at the municipio and the state level in certain areas of the nation. So, traditional political bosses had much to fear if political reform was extended to state and local government.45 Sansores Pérez and his circle believed that the extension of electoral reform or party system

of his competitors had been forced out of business by violence and labor difficulties. At the time the article was written, while Sansores was still PRI president, it was suggested that the same thing was happening in Quintana Roo. See also Unomásuno, 12 December 1977.

45Middlebrook, "Political Change and Political Reform," pp. 20–21. From the viewpoint of the national political elite, the introduction of greater competition in localities might spur the caciques to bolster their political machines, improving their capacity for political mobilization, which the national elite could tap at times of national electoral or other political challenge. From the viewpoint of the cacique, of course, it would require greater risk and perhaps greater expenditure of resources on his part in order to maintain his local monopoly.
expansion would mean suicide for the PRI. The caciques also feared that electoral reform could strengthen the hands of the central PRI apparatus vis-a-vis the autonomy of local caciques. Undoubtedly, progressives such as Reyes Heroles intended this as well.

The CTM leadership also had a range of suspicions about the possibility of reform. Significant reform to the electoral and party systems would have to mean the entry of at least the Communist Party (the PCM) if not a broader range of leftist parties into legalized operation. These parties all favored greater independence for the labor movement and, to bolster their own organizational strengths, would likely reach out to the independent unions which had formed under Echeverría to form alliances. Both of these possibilities threatened the very personal interests of the CTM leadership. The CTM bosses also worried that reform of the party system would have to mean greater opposition representation in the federal legislature. Lacking any real political power since the president's initiatives were always passed in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, positions in those two bodies were primarily used by the PRI for patronage, divided up between the CTM, the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), and the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP). If the Chamber of Deputies and/or the Senate were not significantly expanded in size when


47 Unomásuno, 12 December 1977.

the opposition was granted greater representation there, then the PRI would have to take a cut in the number of its legislative seats. This would have meant diminished capacities for patronage for the three sectors of the party, including the CTM. More generally, any reform measure giving greater emphasis to elections as the arena for political competition and as the means of legitimation of the elite’s rule would have diminished the importance of the sectoral organizations, including the CTM. Apparently, the CNOP and CNC sided with the CTM in voicing concern (outside of the press, of course) in this regard.

Bureaucratically, the proponents of reform were concentrated in the Ministry of Gobernación, while their opponents were by and large in the PRI, especially in the sectoral organizations and state-level affiliates. In part, this reflected the peculiarities of sexenial turnover: López Portillo had been able to install his people in the state apparatus, but many of Echeverría’s appointees still held their positions in the party. López Portillo, of course, held the ultimate

49 Middlebrook reports that initial reform plans had suggested an increase in the Chamber of Deputies to 250 from 235 but with 100 of the seats reserved for the opposition. This would have involved a loss of 85 PRI seats, which may have meant a decrease of 20 to 30 CTM seats. "Political Change and Political Reform," pp. 18-19.

50 Ibid., p. 18.

51 Middlebrook argues that echeverristas generally favored the reform. "Political Change and Political Reform," n. 40, p. 78. Despite his populism and socioeconomic reformism, there is evidence that Echeverría and some of his followers were not so disposed to political reform. Echeverría himself had been deeply involved in the decision to suppress the student movement when he was Secretary of Gobernación under Díaz Ordaz. He had also seemed to relish the great arbitrary power he exercised as president, using it to dismiss those who were or who became his political adversaries from their posts. See Proceso, no. 1 (6 November 1976). Reyes Heroles himself was the victim of Echeverría’s exercise of personal power, being dismissed from his
ability to dismiss those too closely affiliated with Echeverría from their posts in the party, but for purposes of national balance and to convey the perception of consensus he left them in power. Moreover, positions in the state were more important than positions in the party for purposes of achieving the new administration's policy goals. This was true even in the realm of political affairs, where the Ministry of Gobernación could check the activities of the PRI since it ultimately controlled the apparatus of coercion, the police. Furthermore, the president ultimately controlled the patronage available from the Mexican state which was necessary for the PRI and its leadership to have access to if they were to maintain their popularity among aspiring políticos.

Despite his high profile in the state, to bring about political reform Reyes Heroles required the agreement, if not the enthusiastic support, of López Portillo. This was not difficult to obtain. López Portillo, after all, had had to mount a vigorous electoral campaign without an opponent. While Mexican electoral campaigns serve purposes other than competition over state power, such as introducing the candidate (and hence president-elect) to the nation and vice versa, running a campaign against no opponent still made López Portillo look

PRI presidency in no small part because he stood in the way of Echeverría's personal ambitions. Many of Reyes Heroles's struggles during his time in Gobernación were against echeverristas still in power. Proceso, no. 438 (25 March 1985). Sansores, for example, was seen by many to favor and be favored by Echeverría. That he remained at the helm of the PRI until February 1979 may be explained by López Portillo's need to establish balance between reformists and those in the status quo. Interview with former PAN leader, 18 June 1984. See Abraham López Lara, "Sansores Pérez, ¿agonia del echeverrismo? Proceso, no. 119 (12 February 1979).
somewhat ridiculous. Political cartoons showing López Portillo and abstentionism in a foot race were embarrassing to the ruling elite, but probably more so to the candidate himself. The general sentiment in the political elite that the 1976 experience not be repeated was shared for very personal reasons by the man most able to initiate such a reform, the president. Furthermore, López Portillo, not unlike most Mexican presidents, wished to enhance his reputation with those who would be writing history. Becoming the great democratizer was one path to historical greatness which López Portillo considered.

López Portillo had campaigned under a platform written by Reyes Heroles while he was still at the head of the PRI which called for a number of political reforms: a growth in the size of the Chamber of Deputies, which would make electoral districts smaller and communication between representatives and their constituencies easier; improved access to the mass media for political parties; and a revision of the national electoral registration lists. Political reform was certainly being discussed within the PRI during the 1976 campaign and

52 In interviews with nearly everyone I spoke to either from the government or the opposition, especially from ex-PAN officials, this point was expressed.

53 Those who worked in Gobernación under López Portillo were all convinced of his democratic tendencies. Interviews with former Gobernación officials, 10 May 1984 and 22 May 1984. In the opposition, both those in the left and the right felt that López Portillo at least wanted to appear to be a democrat. Interview with former PAN leader, 26 June 1984; interview with former PSUM leader, 2 July 1984.

was even promised by López Portillo in one speech. In his inaugural address, López Portillo announced his desire to achieve a "clean authenticity of political representation within our plural society, free and open, as a way to legitimate and give genuine value to the life of our republic and its institutions." This suggested he was seriously considering reform. However, political reform is often promised in Mexico. It was unclear in 1976 as López Portillo came to power how extensive the reforms would be and to what degree they would be formal, institutional reforms.

Sometime within the first four months of López Portillo's presidency, Reyes Heroles convinced his boss that the political situation demanded a political reform initiative and soon. Despite the existence of opposition within the political elite, there is no evidence that there was great political struggle behind the scenes to

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55 Ibid., p. 14; Interview with former Gobernación official, 22 May 1984.


57 Political liberalization in Mexico has taken two routes: (1) constitutional and statutory reform of formal political institutions and (2) greater respect for the rules currently on the books. More frequently, apertura democrática takes the latter approach as, for example, under current President Miguel de la Madrid, in 1983 at least. On the De la Madrid administration's liberalization attempts, see Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985," in Mexican Politics in Transition, edited by Judith Gentleman (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 22-25.

58 As one more piece of evidence about Echeverría's hatred of Reyes Heroles, in an interview in 1982, Echeverría accused Reyes Heroles of stealing the credit for the political reforms, which he said was López Portillo's idea, an idea which they had often discussed since they were young. Proceso, 12 July 1982.
scuttle Reyes Heroles's initiative. Reyes Heroles's announcement on 1 April 1976 that López Portillo intended to implement a political reform came as a surprise to many, less because a political reform was being contemplated than that it came at that time with little or no warning.59 Reyes Heroles presented his opponents with a fait accompli. Once it had been announced that the president supported political reform, it was politically impossible for members of the revolutionary coalition led by the president to publicly oppose reform. The opposition parties and organizations may have suspected that reform was in the offing, but there is no evidence that direct negotiations between Gobernación and the parties about the reform and their participation in it took place prior to the public announcement.60

The timing as well as the content of the reform initiative reveal underlying goals and objectives of the reforma política. The temporal proximity of the reform process to the 1976 presidential elections suggests that the problem of abstentionism on the part of voters and of parties (the PAN) motivated the reformers to act on the problem before it faded in the memories of participants. Certainly PAN leaders saw the reform in this light, as a response to their abstention in the 1976

59 Rodolfo González Guevara said about a week before the announcement that a reform initiative was in the offing, but the journalist who reported it for Proceso, Francisco José Paoli, a PMT member, discounted it. Proceso, no. 21 (26 March 1977).

60 The president and secretary general of the PAN received no overtures from Gobernación prior to the announcement. Interviews, 26 June 1984, 9 July 1984. Leaders from other parties would not admit to me that their parties were approached.
presidential election. However, given the elite's obsession with abstentionism, it is unlikely that it would not have been addressed sometime before the 1982 election if it had not been addressed in 1977.

Perhaps more importantly, the reform initiative came almost simultaneously with López Portillo's other major policy venture, a rapprochement with the private sector which he called the Alliance for Production. The Alliance for Production was announced shortly after López Portillo took power in December. By April, industrialists from Monterrey had been convinced and promised to return their capital to Mexico and invest in new facilities to create hundreds of thousands of new jobs. Basically, the Alliance for Production was an agreement by the state and the private sector for cooperative investment ventures and a pledge by the state to help financially induce investment from the private sector by offering state guarantees to businessmen who would agree to continue investing, create employment, and in some cases export. As part of the agreement, López Portillo called on the official labor movement to limit its wage demands to no more than 10 percent increases annually, despite the erosion of workers' real incomes by inflation. The Alliance for Production strategy was a significant departure from the Echeverría confrontational approach toward the private sector. Inducements for the private sector could just as well be called subsidies; the 10 percent wage increase limit

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61 Interview with former PAN leader, 9 July 1984; Interview with PAN leader, 28 June 1984.


could be considered containment of workers' justified demands. For the popular classes and their self-appointed leaders in the Mexican left, the Alliance for Production had to be considered retrogressive since its distributional consequences were regressive.

The Alliance for Production was but one conspicuous aspect of López Portillo's economic program to right Mexico's crisis-ridden economy. Two other aspects were an IMF austerity program and the beginnings of petroleum development and exportation. The austerity program had been negotiated with the IMF before López Portillo assumed power. It provided a $1.5 billion credit to Mexico to help address the balance of payments crisis caused by capital flight. To obtain the IMF loan, the Mexican state agreed to cut government deficit-spending, limit its foreign borrowing, and hold down wage increases. The result was very beneficial to the Mexican private sector. The future looked much bleaker for labor and the peasantry.64 Furthermore, the coming oil boom, foreseen by many, would be a great financial bonanza for Mexican business and the middle class as it brought Mexico foreign exchange (thus a return of the capacity to import consumer goods), increased government revenues through PEMEX sales (thus greater state employment was likely), and many spin-off industries to service the petroleum industry. Thus, the more conservative middle and upper classes were going to be satisfied during the López Portillo sexenio;

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the conditions of the poor were not as likely to be alleviated.65

In this context of rapprochement between the state and the private sector, the preferences of the left that the state continue to fight against the bourgeoisie, as it was seen to have done under Echeverría, were not going to be met. In the economic sphere, the demands of the right would be satisfied. The fear of many in the political elite was that the unincorporated left, perceiving the López Portillo government as reactionary because of its approach to the private sector, would go into action in the cinturones de miseria, the "belts of misery" around Mexico City and other growing industrial cities where poor, underemployed migrants lived in squatter settlements. Thus, it was thought that the unregistered left should be brought into the electoral game so as to discourage it from developing into an effective non-electoral opposition.66 In a sense, political reform as a bone to be thrown to the left to keep it satisfied with the López Portillo administration.67 As we shall see, that bone had to have some meat on it, had to be more than just symbolic, if the left were to be incorporated into legal political competition.

The longer-term objectives which the López Portillo team sought to achieve through reform seem to have been five-fold. First, at the most general level, a relegitimation of the post-revolutionary Mexican

66 Ibid.
political system was a must. Many had been calling for wider and improved possibilities for participation. Modernization, especially education, had changed many people's perspectives on proper means of participating in politics. The PRI was not favored by all and the rest of the party system was decrepit. A change at least allowing for the appearance of greater opportunities for participation was expected to relegate the rule of the political elite.\(^{68}\)

Second, the reforma política was intended to bring the left into the electoral process. On the left, as has already been noted, a range of forms of participation were taking place which greatly worried those holding political power. Those working in Gobernación under López Portillo clearly feared the outbreak of violence. As one put it, "There was at this time a great concern about guerrilla movements, subversion, etc. Channels of institutionalized participation were thus needed, both electoral and non-electoral."\(^{69}\) In the speech announcing the reforma política, Reyes Heroles emphasized that "Democratic unity assumes that the majority avoid means directed to constrain minorities and impede them from converting themselves into majorities; but also it assumes that the minorities respect the majority's will and its renunciation of violent means," implying that the minorities must also renounce violence. In exchange for renunciation of violence, the right

\(^{68}\) On this, both government officials and opposition politicians whom I interviewed agreed. Some emphasized that the reforma política was just the most recent of a long line of such reforms intended to invigorate the party system and thus improve opportunities for participation. The introduction of party deputies in 1963 and Echeverría's apertura democrática were earlier examples of such reform.

\(^{69}\) Interview, 22 May 1984.
of minorities to express themselves would be respected. López Portillo for his part stressed that his administration was committed to carrying out political reforms in order to amplify the possibilities of national representation and to guarantee the plural manifestation of ideas and interests existing in Mexico. Providing the left with institutionalized channels of expression and participation was expected to divert leftists from violent, revolutionary modes of participation.

Developments within the PCM illustrated the administration's choices in this regard. The PCM had at its party congress in 1973 begun to "anticipate that the revolutionary transformation in Mexico would come about through armed struggle." Some elements within the party had nonetheless been demanding that barriers be lowered so the PCM could participate in electoral politics. The postulation of Valentín Campa for president in 1976 certainly indicated a willingness to pursue the electoral path on the part of the PCM. However, to deny the PCM the availability of the electoral path risked pushing those most inclined to violent struggle within the party to actually take up


71 Letter to Reyes Heroles asking him to hold public audiences, 14 April 1977. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

72 One former Gobernación official proudly pointed out that after the reform initiative, guerrilla movements ended. Interview, 22 May 1984.


74 Interview with former Gobernación official, 22 May 1984.
arms. More dangerous still would be the unification of the PCM and other leftist groups underground if they became sufficiently frustrated by the lack of free, open, and fair legal channels of expression and participation. The PCM itself was highly suspicious of the electoral system. To lure the PCM into the open and into electoral politics required a significant demonstration that the administration intended a reform that was more than just symbolic. What was true of the PCM was even more true of Heberto Castillo’s Partido Mexicano de Trabajadores (PMT) and the Trotskyist Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores (PRT).

By restoring the regime’s legitimacy and encouraging the left to enter the electoral arena, the reform-makers expected that the clearest indicator of these two dysfunctional phenomena, the illegitimacy of the regime and the left’s inability to participate, namely, abstentionism, would decline in salience. Abstentionism, "the most acute expression of the crisis in the political system," was identified by all as the major reason to modify the electoral process. However, abstentionism is but an indicator of the deeper problems just mentioned, although one apparent to all. Abstention, as Chapter Six will argue, takes place because the regime is viewed as illegitimate and/or because the channels of participation in elections, the parties, are inadequate.

Third, an objective of electoral reform must have been to keep the left fragmented even while bringing it into the electoral arena. The

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Mexican left has suffered sectarianism to extent not mirrored in any other country with which I am familiar. Its divisions are due principally to differing strategies for achieving power and implementing socialism in a political system whose revolutionary space has been conquered by what is now a status quo party, the PRI. The debate about whether to collaborate or not collaborate with the PRI has been one source of division, the issue of whether to follow the violent path or not is another, and whether to pledge allegiance to Moscow or not has been a third. Personal rivalries also have inhibited unification of the forces of the left.

The PCM and other leftist groups had remained underground because they feared suppression by Gobernación forces. The barriers to legal existence as a party for the PCM and other leftist groups were less the membership minimums established by federal electoral laws than the need to submit a list of members. The latter opened anyone whose name was on the list to harassment by Gobernación, thus making membership drives (an important form of mobilization and conversion of voters) difficult.

If underground but not pursuing armed insurrection (which the PCM was not and which a number of leftist groups which sprang up after 1968 were not, at least to that point), there was no need for unity among the groups. Furthermore, even if legalized, these groups would have little motivation to overcome their factional struggles so long as they were far from strong enough to come to power (a majority in the

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77 This is evident from the electoral successes which these parties have had since 1977. While certainly no party should be expected to have as many members as people who vote for it, but all parties easily poll far more than 65,000 voters at election time.
congress or control of the presidency) and not threatened with losing their legal registration. In the electoral legislation which emerged from the reforma política, which will be analyzed later in this chapter, precisely this last possibility was arranged. The new legislation permitted a method of obtaining legal registration which did not require submitting a list of party members' names but in which the effort required to retain registration was not so stringent as to force the various parties of the left to unify (see below). Furthermore, since even today they remain far from strong enough to exercise power, there is little reason for them to unify. 78

Fourth, the reforma política clearly included the objective of forcing the most successful opposition party, the PAN, which tended to represent moderate-to-conservative urban middle-class members who were dissatisfied with the PRI's performance, to always participate in federal elections. If elections were the way of demonstrating the "democraticness" of the Mexican regime, competition was a must. The PAN offered that competition. In 1976, it reneged on its duty and abstained. Reyes Heroles and his team had no intentions of permitting this to happen again, especially so long as the PAN continued to be the largest opposition party. A provision of the new electoral law produced through the reforma política cancelled the registration of any party which did not participate in a federal election (see below). The target of this provision is quite clear. Additionally, the reforma política may have included the goal of diverting some of the electoral

78 The PSUM and the PMT recently unified as the Partido Mexicano Socialista (PMS), but the PRT, the PST, and the PPS remain separate.
support the PAN had been getting to other parties of the right and left so as to diminish the PAN’s challenge to the PRI in certain districts and municipios. This suggestion may be correct if the PAN’s vote was mainly an anti-system vote; there is some evidence that it was.

Finally, the political reforms had the goal of forcing the PRI to reform itself so as to confront the opposition with better candidates, candidates which the electorate could support without cynicism. This, of course, is why caciques in the PRI so opposed reforms. A more vitalized PRI would mean a PRI in better control of the countryside and in better control of the working class. A more vitalized PRI might recoup some of the lost legitimacy of the Mexican political regime.

MAKING THE REFORMA POLÍTICA: THE PUBLIC PROCESS

On 1 April 1977, in a speech before the legislature of the state of Guerrero in Chilpancingo, Reyes Heroles announced that López Portillo intended to initiate a political reform. That Reyes Heroles chose Chilpancingo as the site for his speech introducing the reform was highly significant because Guerrero was itself a symbol of violence...
in Mexico. Guerrero had been the location of the most serious guerrilla challenges to the existing order and was well known for cacique repression of the campesino population.

In his speech, Reyes Heroles argued that the country was in economic crisis and that rigidity in government would impede the political system from adapting to those new realities. Therefore, the system should be opened to widen the possibilities for political representation so as to capture in the organs of representation the "complicated national ideological mosaic" of the majority current and the small currents that form part of the Mexican nation. Even in this speech, cloaked in revolutionary and democratic rhetoric, the constraints within which the reform would be made were clear. That there is a majority and other small currents made apparent that the notion that the PRI represented and would continue to represent the majority still dominated; hence to expect the PRI to give up power would be illusory. Furthermore, the intention of "capturing" in the organs of representation the various parts of the complicated national political mosaic was made plain. Thus, some suspicion of the Secretary of Gobernación's intentions on the part of the various incorporated and unincorporated opposition groups was well-founded. However, everyone involved knew that the reform, once announced, would go forward with or without the opposition's cooperation. In fact, because it was a government initiative, to have not cooperated at all would have suggested that the opposition was not disposed to democratic reform, to democracy itself, a suggestion that would have delegitimized opposition

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efforts among the wider masses. Especially because Reyes Heroles was identified as the foremost Mexican liberal, his intentions were probably less subject to mass suspicions than those of any other members of the political elite.

The speech served the purpose of presenting to opponents within the political elite a fait accompli. Reyes Heroles overtly attached López Portillo's name to the initiative, saying that López Portillo had committed the state to this venture. At this point, to have tried to completely halt the introduction of any political reform would have been impossible for those committed to the status quo. Their efforts had to be directed toward paring down the provisions of the reform. 83

Two weeks after the Chilpancingo announcement, in a letter that was made public, López Portillo instructed Reyes Heroles to begin a public process of reform-making which was to include public hearings before the Federal Electoral Commission in which political associations, academics, and private citizens were to be invited to express their opinions about the electoral process and political reform. 84 This public hearing process seemed to offer those who favored reforms, especially those in the opposition, the opportunity to press for more extensive reforms. Perhaps more importantly, though less apparently, the audiences provided a chance for opponents of

83 See the comments of Manuel Buendía, El Sol de México, 17 April 1977, reprinted in Reforma política, v. 2: comentarios, pp. 86-89.

reform to put the brakes on. Given that five months would have to pass between the April announcement and the beginning of the legislative session in September, when constitutional and statutory reforms could be introduced, opponents had a good deal of time in which to operate. Whether the reform's opponents could publicly derail it was unclear, however, because to do so would require appearing anti-democratic.

Strong presidential control and initiation usually characterizes Mexican policy making. Typically the executive branch formulates policy, writes the legislative initiative, and submits it to congress, which duly passes it. Why then did this initiative include a series of public audiences?

The purported reason for holding public hearings, and the one that Gobernación officials clung to when asked, was that it was in accord with the spirit of the project to hold audiences and allow the opposition to express its views about what the reform's contents should be. If Mexico was to make a move in the direction of democracy, that move should be made with the participation of all the democratic political currents in the nation. What better way to democratically reform Mexico than to publicly consult with the important opposition groups, experts on electoral issues, and informed private citizens? Ideally, the points raised during the hearings would be used to inform

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85 Miguel Covian Pérez, a close associate of Sansores Pérez and official mayor of the PRI, approved whole-heartedly of the open forum offered by the audiences in an article written for El Día, 15 April 1987, reprinted in Reforma política, v. 2, pp. 75-76.

the drafting of the legislative initiative for constitutional and legal (electoral law) reform.

It cannot be denied that holding public hearings on these electoral and party reforms was congruent with the spirit of the project. It probably also helped to convince unregistered parties to come into the open since they were permitted to speak their minds there even if they were not closely listened to. Further, the public audiences probably provided Reyes Heroles and his team with information about the parties’ attitudes toward the reform, such as whether they would cooperate with it or not, and on what terms or in which circumstances. 87 The public audiences may have served a further function, however, one quite important for the López Portillo administration’s success. The hearings took place throughout the late spring and summer of 1977, from April to August. They attracted a great deal of media attention with most of the top journalists and social scientists in the country turning their attention to them. 88

The political parties, too, focused on the political reform project which continued into the autumn with the legislative consideration of López Portillo’s legislative initiative. The ferment over the reforma política played a key role in distracting attention from other critical issues, particularly in economic policy, about which the elite’s

87 Interview with Gobernación official, 21 May 1984.

88 The outpouring of journalism was astounding. The Federal Electoral Commission compiled and reprinted all journalism from Mexico City sources from April 1977 through February 1978. These articles together filled two volumes, 500 pages each, of small type, double-columned 8 1/2 by 11 inch pages. See Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, v. 2 and v. 5 (Mexico City: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1977, 1978).
opponents on the left had much to be dissatisfied. This is not to say that the left reacted uncritically to the introduction of the reform idea. Indeed, many thought it was "a trap of the bourgeoisie" or "a truce until the petroleum gush."\textsuperscript{89} However, the confrontational atmosphere of the close of the Echeverría sexenio did not continue into the early part of López Portillo’s term and López Portillo’s pro-business policies did not receive the criticism they could have at exactly the time when an IMF stabilization plan and government promises of subsidies to business were being carried out.

The public hearings began on 28 April 1977, four weeks after Reyes Heroles’s initial announcement and but two weeks after it had been announced that the parties would be consulted via public audiences. The theory was that the parties should put forward in their presentations their suggestions for a reformed electoral and party system. They were invited to come forward when ready, one party per weekly hearing.\textsuperscript{90} Given the briefness of the warning that they were invited to come forward, the quality of the presentations suffered accordingly. Few concrete proposals were made, particularly in the early presentations. The PARM and the PPS gave their statements at the first two audiences. Not surprisingly, their criticism was relatively mild and their suggestions, to the extent they gave any, were

\textsuperscript{89}See the summary comments and critique by Pablo González Casanova, "Las alternativas de la democracia," in México, hoy, ed. by González Casanova and Enrique Florescano (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979).

\textsuperscript{90}Experts and private citizens made presentations after political party statements. Questions and comments from members of the Federal Electoral Commission were allowed after presentations.
relatively general. That the arms of their leaders may have been twisted to cause them to appear so early in the process seems to be a reasonable conclusion. The PRI, the PAN, and the unregistered parties followed in a week-by-week sequence.

The opposition of hardliners in the PRI to electoral or other political reforms became quite apparent during the hearings. The party president, Sansores Pérez, made his party's presentation at the third public audience. He was accompanied by Enrique Ramírez y Ramírez, founder and director of the then staunchly pro-CTM daily, El Día, and by Blas Chumacero, PRI Labor Secretary. Their objection to almost any reform was clear. Sansores Pérez boldly stated his opinion that the current electoral law was far from being obsolete, thus implying it was not in need of replacement. If minority segments of the population were not being effectively represented, it was not in his view due to deficiencies of the electoral law, but to the minority parties' incapacities. The majority, on the other hand, was well represented. Certainly minority opinion should be better represented, he continued, but it should not be permitted to usurp the majority will. Further, parties should not be multiplied in number further than necessary for representing the plurality of opinion. Thus, for Sansores, proportional representation was out of the question. The basic characteristics of the party deputy system were considered by the PRI

91 The transcripts of the public audiences are printed in Reforma política, v. 1.

92 Criticism of the opposition's incapacities and underhandedness was a frequent tactic of Sansores Pérez and his team. See the interview with the ideologue of Sansores Pérez's group, Miguel Covián Pérez, in Unomásuno, 18 March 1978.
hierarchy to be functioning fine. Moreover, the Federal Electoral Commission was seen to be unbiased and thus in no need of alteration. Although the PRI had (outwardly at least) embraced the reform initiative, what needed to be reformed in the eyes of the PRI hierarchy was a mystery. In response to a query by PAN representative Abel Vicencio Tovar about the political freedom of union members to affiliate to the party of their choice, another PRI representative, Ramírez y Ramírez defended the PRI’s corporatist structure by retorting that this was an era of mass politics, "democracy of the masses," not of "formal individualistic democracy of the past." The implication that the PRI would resist efforts to outlaw corporate inscription into the party, a major basis of its mobilizational power, was thus unambiguously made.

During the early part of the hearings schedule, the Sansores wing of the PRI continually expressed its reservations about reform, particularly by criticizing the opposition. The original representative of the PRI on the Federal Electoral Commission was Miguel Covían Pérez, oficial mayor of the party and a close associate of Sansores Pérez. Covían Pérez was the most vocal member of the commission, defending the PRI, especially its internal democratic nature and its national popularity, against all of its critics. He strongly opposed the notion of party senators (parallel to party deputies), arguing that minority representation in the Chamber of Deputies was sufficient for opposition expression of opinion on issues. Furthermore, he rejected amnesty for political prisoners, suggested by

93 This was as much a criticism of the PAN as a defense of the PRI.
the PCM’s Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, because Mexico should be, in his words, "a state of law."

In the 2 June 1977 session of the public hearings, the last attended by Covían Pérez, he forcefully articulated the hardline position on the reform initiative. Responding to the presentation of Manuel Camacho, then a professor at the Colegio de México, but addressing himself to the president of the Federal Electoral Commission, Reyes Heroles, Covían Pérez stated what he considered should be outside the scope of reform: the presidency of the republic and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. As he argued:

If a political reform would involve changing those two great institutions [the Presidency of the Republic and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional], Mr. President of the Federal Electoral Commission, I would oppose it with all my force. And that, I believe, is a declaration which not only would the National Committee of my party support but also the entire population of Mexico. Undoubtedly, the Sansores Pérez-led faction of the PRI did support Covían Pérez's position. However, those associated with Reyes Heroles did not which perhaps explains why Covían Pérez was removed from his position as representative of the PRI to the Federal Electoral Commission immediately after this outburst. He was replaced by Luis Dantón Rodríguez, IEPES director and a man more amenable to the Reyes Heroles position. However, Covían Pérez remained in the good graces of Sansores Pérez, staying on in his more important role as oficial mayor of the PRI.

The PRI hierarchy led by Sansores Pérez, thus, opposed the reforma política as much as it possibly could (given that López Portillo had

publicly supported it) throughout the public audience phase of the reform process. The opposition parties, highly absorbed by the reforma política, were nonetheless both critical of the initiative and at the same time willing to extend suggestions for areas where reform was needed. Some of their suggestions are worth mentioning because they indicate the degree of dissatisfaction felt by the opposition with the electoral system.

The form of choosing federal deputies and the makeup of the legislature required modification in the eyes of many. The PPS, the PCM, the PSR (a splinter of the PCM), and the PMT all suggested that selection of deputies take place through a system of proportional representation. That is, the single-member district system should be replaced. Along with this, the PPS asked that continual reelection of deputies be allowed so as to make legislative careers and legislative professionalism a possibility. Of the two largest parties, neither the PRI (as already mentioned) nor the PAN favored proportional representation. The left also suggested that the Senate be opened to representatives of minority parties as well. Again, the PRI was adamantly opposed to expanding the party deputy system or any other system of minority representation to the Senate.

A change in the representation of the opposition on the Federal Electoral Commission was likewise a demand of the left. Both of the

95. More extensive analysis of the parties' positions on the reforma política will be presented in Chapters Eight and Nine.

96. The PAN's position was that PR would not be necessary for it to be fairly represented if only the government would recognize its legitimate victories. Interview with former PAN leader, 26 June 1984.
collaborating parties of the left, the PPS and the PST, suggested that the membership of the commission include only the Secretary of Gobernación and representatives of each of the registered parties. This would have pared down or eliminated the hegemony of the political elite’s representatives on the commission. The PAN, in line with its emphasis on protecting the integrity of the electoral process, went further to recommend a range of reforms to the system of casting and counting ballots. Some parties of the left (the PCM, the PST, and the PRT) further suggested that, in order to make the electoral contest fairer to small parties, the state should provide campaign financing to all parties and that it should provide access to the mass media for all parties on an equal basis. The PAN and Castillo’s PMT, fearing that this would make their parties dependent on the government and vulnerable to government pressure, opposed such ideas.

The truly independent parties sought to improve their competitive position by cutting into the PRI’s electoral base. The demand that corporate group affiliation to parties be outlawed was repeated by the PAN, the PCM, the PMT, and the PRT. Instead, they argued, membership in political parties should be on an individual basis only. Sansores Pérez, of course, had made clear that the PRI would not accede to this demand. The PCM (followed by the PRT) made a considerable stir in Mexican public opinion by going even further to recommend allowing members of the clergy and the military to return to active participation in politics. This cut at the foundation of Mexican liberalism, the exclusion of the Church from the political sphere.

The hesitancy of the left to enter the open and participate in
electoral politics was underscored by their request (made by the PCM, the PST, and the PMT) for a grant of amnesty to political prisoners. The leaders of the PST and the PMT had been instigators in the student movement in 1968, had spent time in prison for it, and knew many who were still in exile or in prison because of their actions at that time. PCM leaders had also at times been imprisoned for political reasons and thus had cause to support an amnesty bill.

Finally, a number of recommendations were made to introduce greater electoral competition to political entities below the national level. The introduction of party deputies or proportional representation at the state level was an almost universal demand of the opposition. The left lobbied hard for the introduction of elections for choosing Federal District officials. Mexico City, containing almost a quarter of the nation's population, was ruled by officials appointed by the president. In the locality where the opposition on the left had its greatest support, it could not compete for control of the local organs of the state. Nation-wide municipal reform was an additional demand made by the PSR.

To what extent were these demands and suggestions taken into account when the actual legislative and constitutional reforms were introduced? When López Portillo sent his legislative initiatives to the congress in September and December 1977,97 some of the parties' recommendations could be recognized in the proposed constitutional amendments and the new electoral legislation (LOPPE). Table 5-1

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97 Constitutional reforms were addressed first, then the new electoral law, the Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procesos Electorales (LOPPE) was introduced.
compares a relatively exhaustive list (prepared by a subcommittee of the Federal Electoral Commission which included representatives of the PRI, PAN, and PPS) of more or less specific proposals made by the various parties at public audiences with the actual actions taken by the Gobernación when it drafted the legislative initiative. Table 5-1 shows that Gobernación did respond to most of the recommendations although of course not by implementing them without modification. In some ways Gobernación ignored or was more generous than the PRI and the collaborator parties (PPS, PST, PARM) wished. For instance, it went beyond "party alderman," magnanimously proposed by the PRI and PARM, to require proportional representation for the city councils of large cities. The minimum support necessary to remain an active political party was made lower than the 2.5 percent of the national vote suggested by the PST. Gobernación responded to the left parties' demands for financial assistance and access to the mass media, to requests that minority party activity and representation at the state and local level be insured, and to suggestions that parties be constitutionally recognized as serving the public interest. Responding to these demands probably created no serious threat to the PRI at the national level. However, to do so meant to threaten many local-level priístas. Such reforms were, then, acts of political courage by López Portillo, Reyes Heroles, and the Gobernación team.

If one looks carefully at Table 5-1, however, another story emerges as well. The political elite yielded to the need to bring the

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98 The author of the legislative initiatives was José Luis Lamadrid, a close lieutenant of Reyes Heroles.
more extreme parts of the opposition into the open electoral process. At the same time, it protected itself and its chief electoral agent, the PRI. To begin with, the loudly expressed demands that the corporate-group affiliation to parties be ended were ignored. The PRI's chief advantage, the affiliation to it and mobilization by it of unions and peasant organizations, was thus protected. Requests that the clergy and soldiers be granted full political rights and privileges were also tabled, keeping the church and the military as institutions outside the political arena and at the same time denying priests and soldiers the opportunity to participate individually in politics. Demands that the coercive economic power of the central state over local areas be reduced or eliminated were not paid heed. The likelihood that any opposition victory in a municipal or state executive race would bring harassment and obstructionism from Mexico City thus remained.

Even those suggestions upon which Gobernación acted were not followed perfectly. In most cases, they were only addressed partially and in such manner as to minimize the advantages yielded. The registration of parties is perhaps the most critical example. The provisions of the LOPPE included relatively easy ways to become registered conditionally. To become conditionally registered, parties had only to provide to the Federal Electoral Commission a declaration of principles, program of action, and list of statutes, as well as proof that it had been active for four years prior to its request for registration. No membership list had to be provided. Conditionally registered parties could present candidates for office at all levels of
government. However, remaining conditionally registered was less easy. Any conditionally registered party not attaining 1.5 percent of the vote in a national election lost its registration and the rights associated with it. This highly contingent status could be avoided by petitioning for definitive registration. Definitive registration, though, required providing a membership list including at least 65,000 names distributed in one of two ways: 3,000 members in at least half of the thirty-two federal entities (states plus the Federal District) or 300 members in at least half of the 300 federal electoral districts. Definitive registration, too, could be lost by parties not achieving the 1.5 percent electoral minimum, but required that the definitively registered party fail to meet that minimum in three consecutive national elections. Thus, small parties whose members feared persecution could still become active electorally, but to do so they had to be sure that they could obtain as many as 300,000 votes nationally in an election whose results were tabulated by the very commission which presided over the registration of such parties. Otherwise they had to find 65,000 members across the country willing to put their names on a registration petition. The relatively simpler methods of registering parties preferred by parties of the left were considered too easy.

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99 LOPPE, arts. 31-35.
100 Ibid., art. 27.
101 Ibid., art. 68.
102 This estimate is based on 20,000,000 total votes, which was roughly the total for the 1982 presidential election.
The new system of representation introduced through the *reforma política* is another example of partially listening to the opposition's demands but insuring that no major advantages were sacrificed. The left, recognizing its weakness when confronted by the winner-take-all single-member district electoral system, requested the introduction of a pure form of proportional representation for the selection of members of the Chamber of Deputies. Proportional representation had the potential to erode the PRI's majority in the Chamber, making executive-legislative confrontation a possibility and diminishing the number of seats available to the PRI leadership to use for patronage.

Gobernación submitted a unique compromise which expanded the number of single-member district seats to 300 (from 197) and introducing 100 seats chosen by proportional representation and given to minority parties (those unable to win one-fifth of the district races). This provided more patronage for the PRI, congressional representation for the opposition, and insured a PRI majority in the Chamber of Deputies so long as it could win two-thirds of the district races.

Another provision of the LOPPE which responded only partially to parties' demands for reform of the electoral process concerned the electoral organs which organized, supervised, and approved the results of elections. The most important organ for day-to-day supervision of electoral processes had been since 1946 the Federal Electoral Commission. This commission, presided over by the Secretary of Gobernación, ruled over the legal fate of political parties and organized elections, tabulated the results, and passed them on to the Electoral Colleges of the two chambers of the congress for approval. A
common demand of the opposition parties was that the dominance of the political elite and its representatives from the state and the PRI on the Federal Electoral Commission be lessened or eliminated so that the likelihood that those in power could manipulate electoral results in order to stay in power would be lessened or removed. By the 1973 electoral law, the commission was made up of the Secretary of Gobernación, as a representative of the executive branch; one senator and one deputy as representatives of the legislative branch; and one representative from each nationally-registered political party.\textsuperscript{103}

This made the voting lineup four to three for the state if the PARM and the PPS chose to vote with the PAN or six to one if they chose to vote with the government.\textsuperscript{104} Were there fewer government representatives on the commission or only representatives of the parties on that board, the chance that the government’s position on a question of a party’s registration or an electoral result could be overturned would be greater. Since more independent parties would become registered and thus join the Federal Electoral Commission as a result of the reforma política, the possibilities of defeating the government position on the commission was likely to be improved. Such suggestions were made by parties of the left. In fact, Gobernación officials chose to increase the number of representatives on the commission which could be counted on to vote for the government position by giving the commission’s

\textsuperscript{103} Ley Federal Electoral, 5 January 1973, art. 43.

\textsuperscript{104} It can be assumed that the two congressional representatives would come from the PRI and thus vote the government’s side.
secretary, a notary public, both voice and vote. A similar structure was created for state-level electoral commissions with the Federal Electoral Commission selecting four members of the state commissions and each party being permitted to name a representative. The final approval of electoral results for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate was left in the hands of the newly elected deputies and senators themselves, a form of self-approval. Again, the membership and decisions of these Electoral Colleges was guaranteed to be in the hands of the majority party in each chamber.

These amendments to major aspects of the electoral process clearly minimized the damage to the advantages already enjoyed by the PRI. Reyes Heroles had certainly listened to the recommendations and petitions of the parties which made presentations at the public audiences, but in acting upon them and giving the unregistered parties greater latitude for involvement in the electoral process he did not seriously undermine the position of the PRI. As a result of the public hearings, some minor improvements in the electoral process or the status of political parties may have been introduced. However, it is unlikely that any of the parties' major demands at the hearings were the basis for the final constitutional modifications and the new electoral legislation. It is more probable that the major provisions of the reform had been decided upon by Gobernación officials before the

105 LOPPE, art. 77.
106 Ibid., art. 86.
107 This was established by amendment to art. 60 of the Mexican constitution.
public announcement of the reform process. An article published by the well-connected journalist Manuel Buendía prior to the public hearings predicted a number of major provisions of the reforms (see Table 5-2). In terms of the registration of parties, campaign financing and access to the media, and the new system of representation, the three major areas where changes were made, Buendía's "predictions" turned out to be closer to the actual reforms made than the recommendations of any of the parties at the audiences (compare Tables 5-1 and 5-2). Thus it seems that the hearings were more important for purposes of public relations and to reach out to the unregistered parties to bring them into the open than to actually solicit suggestions from the parties and others.

The congressional debate on the presidential initiatives during the autumn of 1977 affected the content of the reform package even less than did the public hearings. Other than minor changes in wording, the only effect that the legislature had on the constitutional reform package proposed by the executive was to amend proposed changes which would permit the congress to review the federal budget in a session meeting earlier than the congress's usual September session. The general result of the congressional debate was that PAN party deputies in the Chamber criticized the reforma política as a PRI stratagem to maintain its hegemony while the PRI, PPS, and PARM deputies applauded it. PRI representatives especially defended the right of collective groups to affiliate their entire membership to a party. The PAN's

108 These were amendments to art. 74 of the Constitution intended to increase the power and meaning of the legislature.
criticisms were directed at almost every aspect of the reform but especially at two specific measures: the clause which legislated cancelation of registration for not obtaining 1.5 percent of the vote in a general election, because this penalized parties for abstaining, a frequently discussed PAN strategy; and subsidy of political parties by the state, which panistas considered threatening to the independence of political parties. More generally, the PAN considered the reforms a type of smokescreen, the introduction of a number of technical changes in the law which would not change the major problems in the electoral process unless those in power wished to address those problems. As one PAN deputy put it, "electoral techniques do not represent either the only or the principal of the problems of political life and of the possibilities of a democratic society in Mexico. The fundamental problem is of political will." Despite such criticisms the presidential initiatives were passed with minor modifications, usually of wording only. The congressional debates did demonstrate, however, that Reyes Heroles's concerns about the Mexican political system were shared by other priistas. Ramírez y Ramírez, the El Día

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109 The PAN would have had to, by the 1977 LOPPE, abstained in three elections in a row, but for conditionally registered parties abstention in one election would have led to cancelation of registration.


111 In the LOPPE, the only substantial change made by the congress was one which allowed those candidates standing for election in district races to also be included in the lists for the PR races. The presidential initiative had not permitted candidates to stand in both races. This was particularly significant to the opposition parties because the amended art. 18 of the LOPPE allowed the opposition to present its best candidates (usually the party leaders) in district races and also allowed them to be chosen as deputies under PR.
ideologue who had appeared with Sansores Pérez at the public hearings, repeatedly emphasized that the reform was limited, but reform could go further in the future, and this reform was intended to reject and to defeat notions that the only way to transform Mexican society is by the road of violence and armed struggle, to overcome golpista sentiments, and to discourage abstentionism. Another PRI deputy, Enrique Sota Izquierdo, summarized the purposes of the reforma política well in another debate:

We are searching—this is part of the intention of the political reform—to give access, to open the door to institutional participation in conformity with the popular will, to dissident groups until now outside of our political-electoral party system. We are, in effect, working so that those currents which are now encountered at the margin of this system be integrated; especially, that those who because of desperation, myopia, or whatever reasons have thought that violence could be the way to achieve power; we are searching, we are encouraging democratic participation by the pacific path of all Mexican citizens who form a political current which forms even 1.5 percent in national life. . . . we don't want to settle questions of power with arms in hand, we don't want another way, by the way of terrorism or by the way of assassination, or by the way of coup d'état, as has occurred in many countries of Latin America. We are trying to define who is to remain in power, against minorities that, with arms in hand, would want to institute supposed rights to power, against the governing majority at this moment, that is, our party. We are seeking, precisely, that these questions be resolved by the democratic way, by the democratic electoral way.  

Or, "we want to make understood that dissidence is not violence, that

112 See especially the debate on 19 December 1977, reprinted in Reforma política, v. 4.

113 Chamber of Deputies debate, 20 October 1977. Soto Izquierdo had also been involved in ideological activity for the PRI for many years, having been editor of La Republica, the official magazine of the PRI, in the late 1960s. Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, p. 291.
the opposition should not associate itself with crime." But, was the reforma política a successful tactic for bringing those currents within the system? Did it discourage violence, terrorism, and the threat of a coup d‘état?

COMPLETING THE REFORMA POLITICA

One frequently made demand at the public hearings was the release of political prisoners. Neither the LOPPE nor the constitutional reforms associated with it included a grant of amnesty to political prisoners. However, in his second annual address to the nation in September 1978, López Portillo indicated that he would be submitting an amnesty bill to the congress shortly. He did so within the month, saying in his initiative to the congress that because there were new possibilities for political participation, those radical dissidents being held for actions with clear political motivations which had put them in violation of the law and in prison should be released. The presidential initiative had denied amnesty to those who had committed very violent crimes, such as terrorism, murder, and kidnapping, but the Chamber of Deputies significantly modified this so as to permit many accused of such violent crimes to be released as well.


115 Javier López Moreno, La reforma política en México (Mexico City: Centro de Documentación Política, 1979), pp. 22-23.

116 The presidential initiative is reprinted in Proceso, no. 98 (18 September 1978).

117 López Moreno, La reforma política en México, pp. 24-25.
amnesty law, those in self-imposed exile or hiding still accused of political crimes (sedition, incitement to rebellion, and conspiracy) were likewise forgiven their offenses. Overall, about 500 to 600 were expected to benefit.\textsuperscript{118} The amended bill passed the Chamber of Deputies on 19 September 1978, almost ten years to the day after the Tlatelolco massacre.\textsuperscript{119}

Besides the reorganization of the electoral process which the Ministry of Gobernación, the Federal Electoral Commission, and the National Registry of Voters carried out in 1978 and early 1979,\textsuperscript{120} the primary process for completing the provisions of the reforma política was the registration of new political parties and political associations.\textsuperscript{121} In May 1978, five months after the LOPPE became law, three new parties were registered conditionally (see Table 5-3 for a list of party registrations). The PDM was granted registration even though it was opposed by the PRI and the PPS. The PRI representative to the Federal Electoral Commission voted for the PDM's registration, but stated that his vote for the PDM should not be taken as indicating agreement with the PDM's ideology. The PPS associated the PDM with Nazi Germany, accusing the PDM's parent organization, the Union

\textsuperscript{118}Latin America Political Report, 29 September 1978.

\textsuperscript{119}Proceso, no. 99 (25 September 1978).

\textsuperscript{120}Officially, the Federal Electoral Commission and the National Registry of Voters are autonomous from the Ministry of Gobernación. However, in practice both are subject to the Secretary of Gobernación's control.

\textsuperscript{121}Political associations are non-electoral organizations which can become parties or unify with parties for purposes of electoral activity. LOPPE, arts. 50-67.
National Sinarquista (UNS), of receiving resources and support from the Nazi ambassador at the time of its founding.\textsuperscript{122} While condemning the rightist PDM, the PRI and government officials spoke more favorably toward the PCM and the PST, both of which were also registered. Indeed, speaking of the collaborationist PST, PRI Senator Arnulfo Villaseñor Saavedra stated that it was easy under the LOPPE to militate in opposition, what was difficult was "to be a reasonable opposition."\textsuperscript{123}

His statement was perhaps directed at Heberto Castillo and the PMT who initially chose to seek definitive registration so as to avoid the contingent nature of conditional registration. The PMT, perhaps the most genuinely Mexican party of the left, thus did not contest the 1979 deputy elections in which the PDM, the PCM, and the PST achieved the 1.5 percent of the vote necessary to remain registered. When the PMT sought conditional registration in 1981, its petition was denied by the Federal Electoral Commission, the PRI, the PAN, the PPS, the PARM, the PDM, and the PST all voting against it.\textsuperscript{124} Not until 1984 did the PMT receive conditional registration.

Before the 1979 elections, then, an independent party of the left (the PCM), a more extreme party of the right (the PDM), and a party of the left willing to cooperate with the government (the PST) joined the electoral contest and widened the ideological spectrum of available electoral alternatives. Before the 1982 presidential election, the

\textsuperscript{122} Transcript of 3 May 1978 session of the Federal Electoral Commission.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Unomásuno, 24 June 1981.
Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), a Trotskyist group, and the Partido Socialdemócrata (PSD), a moderate organization, broadened the ideological spectrum further when they were admitted to conditional registration. The PSD did not meet the requirements of conditional registration by receiving 1.5 percent of the vote in 1982 and so disappeared from legal status. Overall, by 1985, eight years after the reform process began, five new parties had been registered and met the 1.5 percent condition to remain registered. Because four relatively important unregistered parties merged with the PCM in 1981 to form the Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM), it is probably fair to say that by 1985 the most important of the unregistered marginal groups which sought to participate electorally were incorporated into the legal, open political process. On the left there existed a Trotskyist party (PRT), a communist (or at least ex-communist or Eurocommunist) party (PSUM), an independent, nationalist party (PMT), and two parties which cooperated with the government (the long-established PPS and the newer PST). On the right was the PAN and the more extreme PDM. A voter could not complain about a lack of ideological choice. Of course, the capacity of any of the parties to put their ideological platforms into action was less certain.

As PAN repeatedly asserted, regardless of the technical changes in the electoral process, political reform would yield democracy only if

125 Unomásuno, 12 June 1981. They were each approved with three votes against them, by the PST, the PPS, and the PAN. Besides the PMT, the following parties applied for conditional registration and were denied it in 1981: the Partido del Pueblo Mexicano (PPM), a splinter from the PPS; Unidad de Izquierda Comunista (UIC), a PCM fragment; the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), which originated from the same group as did the PMT and the PST; and the Liga Obrera Marxista.
there was political will on the part of the political elite manning the organs of state. It is debatable, but probable, that Reyes Heroles would have recognized PRI losses in those congressional races where they occurred. As Secretary of Gobernación and head of the Federal Electoral Commission he would have had the opportunity to actually recognize opposition victories. As it turned out, he did not get the chance. In May 1979, two months before the first national elections after the reforma política, Reyes Heroles was abruptly dismissed. He was replaced by Enrique Olivares Santana, an old-time orthodox politician. The dismissal seemed to be a concession to conservatives in the political elite who had been disappointed at seeing Sansores Pérez replaced at the head of the PRI in February 1979. Yet, Olivares Santana seems to have attempted to supervise


127 Conservatives had continued to undercut the reforma política's goals. Soon after the LOPPE became law, the CTM had issued a document from its Institute of Worker Education, reprinted in El Día (16 January 1978), calling the reforma política "the most important concession of the Mexican Revolution to its extremist opposition." This statement also said that "the increase of political parties . . . will weaken two fundamental political institutions of the system: the presidency . . . and, if not restructured, the PRI, including the sectors integrated in it." The latter implied that the CTM sought greater power within a restructured PRI. Proceso, no. 64 (23 January 1978). Later, in February 1978, IEPES head Luis Dantón Rodríguez, the only PRI official to attend an important speech by Reyes Heroles where the latter called on Mexicans to help avoid the development of "México bronco, violento, mal llamado bárbaro." Ibid., nos. 67 (13 February 1978), 69 (27 February 1978), and 70 (6 March 1978). Sansores Pérez argued at the PRI's 49th anniversary ceremony of the PRI in March 1978 that political reform "should be the fruit of the self-determination of the society itself and not the result of imposition or tutelage, however well intentioned," clearly a suggestion the Reyes Heroles had imposed the reforma política on a society that didn't want it. Proceso, no. 71 (13 March 1978). Even after Sansores Pérez's dismissal, conservatives
relatively clean elections in 1979 and 1982, although only four
district races went to the opposition in 1979 and only one in 1982.

An important blow against the reforma política came in 1981, however. The 1977 LOPPE had provided that a party which had become
registered definitively or had met its 1.5 percent minimum if
conditionally registered would lose registration after failing to meet
the 1.5 percent minimum in three consecutive elections. In October
1981, López Portillo sent an initiative to the congress to reform
article 69 of the LOPPE so that parties would lose their registration
after failing to meet the 1.5 percent minimum only once. This
insured that any party considering abstention would reject
abstentionism if it seriously valued its registration. It also
threatened the parties which had been successful in 1979 but which
faced additional competition on the left in 1982 since the PRT had
become a participant. Generally, this was considered regressive by all
parties of the opposition.

By the time Reyes Heroles left Gobernación, most of the provisions
of the reforma política had been set in motion. New parties were being
registered, the electoral process was being revamped to introduce PR
for part of the Chamber of Deputies and to redistrict the country, and

continued to put up obstacles. Prior to the election of the new
legislature in 1979, PRI congressmen, led by Joaquín Gamboa Pascoe,
blocked a proposal which would have democratized the Chamber of
Deputies by putting some opposition deputies on the Gran Comisión, the
committee which carried out the Chamber’s business while it was in

the state was financing party activities. In addition, amnesty for political prisoners had been introduced. The next critical stage of the reforma política still had to take place: would the political elite have the political will to recognize opposition victories? Would the new opposition parties be able to generate electoral support? Would they develop into more dynamic political organizations offering a true opposition to the political elite and its electoral representative, the PRI? Would the party of non-voter be brought into the electoral channels of expression in the same way as the opposition parties? These questions will be considered in the following chapters.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REFORMA POLITICA

Studying decision-making processes in authoritarian regimes is notoriously difficult. The Mexican state has been as unyielding of information about how officials make public policy as any. Susan Kaufman Purcell's study of the Mexican profit-sharing decision of the early 1960s is a key exception to the dearth of analyses of Mexican public policy-making. Some conclusions about the process of choosing political reform as a way to exit the political crisis of the mid-1970s might be revealed by using Purcell's conclusions as a framework. In so doing, we should be able to expand upon our

129 An estimate for the expenditure by the Federal Electoral Commission on party activities for 1982 was approximately 52 million pesos per party (at that time equivalent to about 1 million U.S. dollars per party). About one-half of that sum (23 million pesos) went for radio and TV time. Comisión Federal Electoral internal document, not dated.

understanding of Mexico's regime, particularly its dimension of
decision-making (see Chapter Two).

Purcell points out that "the decision-making process is formally
initiated by the executive... The actual origin of the idea is not
important, however. What matters is the president's commitment to
it."131 In the case of the reforma política, President López Portillo
did not have the original idea for the reform, but he very early
committed himself to it (or was committed to it by his Secretary of
Gobernación, who certainly knew these rules of the game). Although
political reform is often bandied about by politicians as a need of the
Mexican regime, no one else who was coming to power in 1977 in other
parts of the Mexican state had it on his agenda. Most of those talking
about political reform were in the opposition, which had no power at
all.

Presidential initiatives, Purcell argues, are seldom due to direct
pressures by interest groups, which have limited autonomy anyway.
Usually, the president can ignore the indirect pressures of groups.
The weakness of interest groups leaves great latitude for the president
to decide which course of action to take to address a problem.
President Echeverría did not, for example, propose significant
political reforms as a result of political unrest in 1968 and the early
1970s. He tried instead to address some of the policy concerns which
these groups were articulating, such as agrarian reform and
redistributive measures.

Yet, sometimes

131 Ibid., p. 131.
the president’s freedom of choice is restricted by indirect pressures from groups within the polity that have patiently watched as the president consistently neglected their demands and interests. The president may finally decide that such groups can no longer be kept demobilized by promising future rewards, co-opting group leaders, or replacing uncooperative leaders with more cooperative ones. He may therefore make a decision that he feels will placate these groups, ideally without sacrificing any of his other goals.

The reforma política took place because the groups pressuring the state, especially unregistered political parties, had demonstrated that they could not be co-opted under the current electoral rules of the game. Nor could they be replaced without direct repression (which had been tried in 1968). There were no future rewards to promise them without actually modifying the political regime. López Portillo, following Reyes Heroles’s advice, apparently thought that a minor modification of the regime, in the form of electoral and party system reforms that would not threaten the PRI’s dominance, could actually help him achieve other goals by redirecting the activity of the left toward peaceful paths which would at the same time improve the national bourgeoisie’s perception of the business climate in Mexico.

In terms of the decision-making process, Purcell points out that interest groups play an essentially reactive role in the decision process, either supporting or opposing some or all aspects of the decision. If they oppose a decision, direct criticism of the president is avoided, since such criticism would imply insubordination. Criticism is therefore focused on specific aspects of the decision, upon the procedure followed in making the decision, or upon a subordinate of the president who has been closely identified with the decision.133

132 Ibid., p. 134.
133 Ibid., p. 132.
In the case of the reforma política, few could come out openly against a political reform. Some of the opposition parties expressed suspicion, but generally went along, trying to get a political reform which would present the best terms for them. Within the political elite, the hardliners did focus on certain aspects of the political system which they adamantly opposed seeing changed, particularly the corporate-group affiliation to political parties. Generally, though, Sansores Pérez and his followers expressed outward support for the reforma política while working behind the scenes to try to pare it back and to attack Reyes Heroles.

As Purcell argues, presidential decisions in response to particular demands or outbreaks of violence are made so that they do not appear to be the results of direct pressure. This implies waiting for a substantial time to pass between the articulation of demands or the outbreak of violence for the decision to be made. The reforma política may seem to have come very late in response to the demonstrations of 1968 unless this aspect of the Mexican political regime, with its reverence for the president, is considered. Perhaps it was impossible for Echeverría to make such a reform, were he so inclined, because of his involvement in the suppression of the student movement.134

The method of introducing the reforma política differed little if at all from the standard Mexican practice. To insure success in any policy venture, demobilization of critics is necessary. As Purcell suggests, "One way of demobilizing the decision's opponents involves

the use of secrecy. Unexpected announcements find potential critics unprepared. For this reason, no consultations with interest group leaders occur before the decision is announced."\(^{135}\) This describes as accurately as I can ascertain the process of making the reforma política. Neither the opposition parties nor the opponents of the decision within the PRI and the political elite more generally seem to have been consulted although many may have foreseen some such reform on the horizon. In any case, Reyes Heroles’s announcement caught many off guard. Also conforming to Purcell’s suggestions, the elite sought to bring those who were demanding reform into the decision-making process but, as she says, "Incorporation only occurs . . . after the vague version of the decision has been announced."\(^{136}\) The reforma política involved a long process of consultation, in the form of public hearings, although the actual effects of those hearings on the final legislation proposed is less clear since it appears that the main characteristics of the reform were already in the minds of the initiative’s authors before the hearings began. Furthermore, the legislation, once presented, was highly complex and included a number of elements not previously discussed in the hearings. The congress debated the reform thoroughly, but it is unlikely that it could have presented a serious alternative to the LOPPE given its scope and detail.

Overall, it is fair to conclude that the reforma política, a reform intended to democratize Mexico, was introduced in a way quite

\(^{135}\)Purcell, The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision, p. 138.

\(^{136}\)Ibid., p. 139.
consistent with the usual practices of authoritarian regimes. Despite attempts to make an appearance of democratic consultation with affected groups, the main lines of the reform were the result of imposition from above, just as hardliners within the PRI implied in their criticism of Reyes Heroles. An authoritarian decision-making process brought about a reform intended, at least on the surface, to bring greater democracy to Mexico. This may seem to be an inconsistency. Yet, as Enrique Krauze has written of Reyes Heroles: "his mission was to conserve in the sense of consolidation. But his method was change. The best example was the reforma política."\textsuperscript{137} It is not unusual, then, that that change would be carefully managed, in a way that only an authoritarian decision-making process would insure.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Proceso}, no. 438 (25 March 1985).
Table 5-1
PUBLIC HEARING RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTUAL REFORMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE AREA</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
<th>ACTION (CONSTITUTIONAL)</th>
<th>ACTION (LEGISLATION)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>constitutional reform to regularize existence, nature, and principal functions of parties (PARM)</td>
<td>amendment to art. 41, para. 1, to state that parties' specific forms of intervention in politics be determined by law</td>
<td>by art. 34 of LOPPE, any party not obtaining 1.5 percent of the national vote loses registration if it is conditional; those obtaining more than 1.5 percent are conditionally registered; art. 68 of LOPPE states that any party loses registration if it doesn't obtain 1.5 percent in three consecutive national elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constitutional reform to recognize parties as serving the public's interest (PST)</td>
<td>amendment to art. 41, para. 1, to state that parties are entities of the public interest</td>
<td>arts. 22-26 of LOPPE require declaration of principles, program, and statutes plus a national assembly for any party registered with the Federal Electoral Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>minorities should not displace importance of the majority (PRI)</td>
<td>see Systems of Representation below</td>
<td>art. 27 of LOPPE requires membership of at least 65,000 nationally, distributed in one of two ways: 3000 members in one-half of the federal entities or 300 in one-half of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registry of Parties</td>
<td>registration should be determined by popular vote of at least 2.5 percent nationally (PST)</td>
<td>amendment to art. 41, para. 4, to state that parties must have an unspecified minimum membership</td>
<td>registration to any party presenting a declaration of principles, a program of action and statutes, and the backing of 2000 citizens in one-half plus one of the federal entities (PCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>registration to any party presenting a declaration of principles, a program of action and statutes, and the backing of 2000 citizens in one-half plus one of the federal entities (PCM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>declaration of principles, programs and statutes, plus 3000 signatures nationally (PMT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>declaration of principles, programs and statutes, plus 3000 signatures nationally (PMT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>a minimum of one member for each 1000 inhabitants in 51 percent</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local-level Activity of Parties</th>
<th>Campaign Finance</th>
<th>Access to Mass Communication</th>
<th>Affiliation to Parties</th>
<th>Systems of Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>at the local level, parties with national registry should be permitted to participate in elections with no other requirements (PAN, PDM)</td>
<td>state should pay for expenses of campaigns and party registry (PCM)</td>
<td>free access for limited time to television (MAUS)</td>
<td>individual affiliation to parties (PAN, PPS)</td>
<td>increase in number of seats in Chamber of Deputies (PRI, PCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amendment to art. 41, para. 1, to state that national parties have the right to participate in state and local elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>daily access to mass communication (PST)</td>
<td>liberty for union members to affiliate to party of their personal choice (PRT, PCM)</td>
<td>amendment to art. 52 to increase Chamber of Deputies to 300 seats elected in single member districts, and 100 elected by proportional representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 percent of time of means of mass communication should be reserved to parties (PRT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 percent of time of means of mass communication should be reserved to parties (PRT)</td>
<td>worker organizations should have the right to determine methods of adherence to parties (PRI)</td>
<td>amendment to art. 54 to provide that the 100 seat chosen by PR be reserved for those parties receiving more than 1.5 percent of the vote nationally but receiving less than 60 seats in the single-</td>
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member district races; furthermore, if two or more parties eligible for PR seats receive 30 or more seats in single-member district races, they are together limited to half of the PR seats.

- Amendment to art. 53 to provide that the PR seats be chosen in up to five circumscriptions (districts).

- Amendment to art. 54 to provide that PR seats be available only to parties which presented candidates in one-third of the single-member district races.

- Amendment to art. 115 to require states to pass laws providing for party deputies in state legislatures and the use of PR in city councils of cities of over 300,000 in population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Organs</th>
<th>Proportional representation for municipal councils (PPS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Electoral Commission</td>
<td>If two or more parties receive 30 or more seats in single-member district races, they are limited to half of the PR seats.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amendment to art. 53 to provide that the PR seats be chosen in up to five circumscriptions (districts).</td>
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<td>Amendment to art. 115 to require states to pass laws providing for party deputies in state legislatures and the use of PR in city councils of cities of over 300,000 in population.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority “party” aldermen for municipal councils (PARN, PRI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 77 of LOPPE sets Fed. Electoral Commission membership as Sec. of Gobernación plus representatives of each registered party (PPS, PST).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Art. 66 of LOPPE sets state electoral commission membership as four nominated by Federal Electoral Commission and one representative from each nationally registered party; conditionally registered parties have voice but not vote; parallel structure for district electoral commissions. |
the Federal Electoral Commission should be the body which approves electoral results (PCM)

the nationally-registered parties should form a commission for organizing, supervising, and approving electoral results (PMT)

amendment to art. 60 to provide that the electoral results for the Chamber of Deputies be approved by an Electoral College made up of 60 members chosen by the Federal Electoral Commission from the newly elected deputies from the single-member district races and 40 chosen from the victors in the PR races

amendment to art. 60 to provide that the newly elected senators form an Electoral College for the Senate

amendment to arts. 60 and 97 to allow recourse to the Supreme Court to consider violations of the law in the electoral process

Federal District the head of the Dept. of the Federal District and political delegates to it should be chosen by popular vote (all left parties)

amendment to art. 73 to allow the use of the referendum in the DF in issues permitted by law

amendment to arts. 73 and 74 to reserve to the Chamber of Deputies the right to legislate on all matters pertaining to the DF

Political Rights clergy and military members should have right to participate in parties (PCM)

Amnesty for Political Prisoners urgent to enact a bill granting amnesty to political prisoners (all left except PPS)

Amnesty Law passed in 1978 to release those imprisoned for the crimes of sedition, invitation to rebellion, or conspiracy so long as those crimes were not murder or other acts against a person's physical integrity.
terrorism, or kidnapping—committed by individuals acting in groups motivated by political reasons; the Federal and DF Attorney Generals can even pardon those accused of the above violent crimes.

Municipal Government

Municipal government should have constitutionally-guaranteed economic independence (PPS, PSR UIC, MAUS)

Politics of Universities

National parties should be free to militate on national issues but not take part in university politics (PRI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE AREA</th>
<th>PROJECTION</th>
<th>ACTION (CONSTITUTIONAL)</th>
<th>ACTION (LEGISLATION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registry of</td>
<td>care will be taken &quot;to close the door to the proliferation of miniparties and fictitious parties&quot;</td>
<td>amendment to art. 41, para. 4, to state that parties must have an unspecified minimum membership</td>
<td>by art. 34 of LOPPE, any party not obtaining 1.5 percent of the national vote loses registration if it is conditional; those obtaining more than 1.5 percent are conditionally registered; art. 69 of LOPPE states that any party loses registration if it doesn't obtain 1.5 percent in three consecutive national elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>&quot;the modifications to the law will be of such nature that it will authorize the immediate cancelation of whatever party does not obtain a minimum of votes previously designated.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 percent of the votes in a general election might be the minimum chosen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the requirements to obtain registration will be simplified so that it is unlikely that parties will have to achieve a certain membership minimum in municipios, but rather in states and districts although certainly at smaller proportions than before</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance</td>
<td>there will be subsidies for the political parties that are registered, beyond just radio and TV time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Access to Mass Communication: free access limited time on television during campaigns. Amendment to Art. 41, para. 3, to state that parties have a right to use the means of mass communication in accord with established legislation. Art. 49 of LOPPE gives Fed. Electoral Commission responsibility to coordinate access to mass communication and finance adequate to cover costs incurred.

Systems of Representation:
- Increase in number of seats in Chamber of Deputies to double the present size (to about 400). Amendment to Art. 52 to increase Chamber of Deputies to 300 seats elected in single-member districts, and 100 elected by proportional representation.
- "The political reform will not bring us to proportional representation." Amendment to Art. 54 to provide that the 100 seat chosen by PR be reserved for those parties receiving more than 1.5 percent of the vote nationally but receiving less than 60 seats in the single-member district races; furthermore, if two or more parties eligible for PR seats receive 90 or more seats in single-member district races, they are together limited to half of the PR seats.
- Amendment to Art. 53 to provide that the PR seats be chosen in up to five circumstriptions (districts).
- Amendment to Art. 54 to provide that PR seats be available only to parties which presented candidates in one-third of the single-member district races.

Ch. 8 of LOPPE establishes alternative PR formulas and empowers Federal Electoral Commission to choose from among them prior to each election (Arts. 154-163).

Sources:
Table 5-3
REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 1978-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date Founded</th>
<th>Date Registered</th>
<th>Type of Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partido Comunista Mexicana (PCM)</td>
<td>25 Aug 1919</td>
<td>3 May 1978</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM)</td>
<td>23 May 1971</td>
<td>3 May 1978</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Socialista de Trabajadores (PST)</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
<td>3 May 1978</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores (PRT)</td>
<td>Sept 1976</td>
<td>11 June 1981</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Social-demócrata (PSD)</td>
<td>14 Dec 1980</td>
<td>11 June 1981</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Mexicano de Trabajadores (PMT)</td>
<td>Sept 1974</td>
<td>July 1984</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1Merged with Partido Socialista Revolucionario, Partido del Pueblo Mexicano, Movimiento de Acción Popular, and Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista in November 1981 to form Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM).

2Failed to meet conditions of registration in 1982 election; registration cancelled.

3Merged with PSUM to form Partido Mexicano Socialista in 1987.
CHAPTER SIX
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND THE REFORMA POLITICA

Jesús Reyes Heroles feared the advent of México bronco, his label for a Mexico racked by barbarity and anarchy, a Mexico in which violent forms of political participation would replace the more pacific electoral arena. He and other members of Mexico's ruling civilian elite became alarmed by a high incidence (by post-revolutionary Mexican standards) of violent protest in the early 1970s directed against the regime and the elite which ruled through it. They worried that increasing electoral abstentionism indicated the growth of a mass of alienated Mexicans available for mobilization into anti-system violence by the left. They sought to redirect the efforts of the potential leaders of those masses by drawing them into the electoral process. Thus, Reyes Heroles initiated the reforma política process.

In following chapters we shall see that the potential leaders of the revolutionary left willingly joined the electoral game, with modest success to date. Before studying that aspect of the reforma política's implementation, I will turn to the problem of participation. This chapter will examine, sequentially, theoretical points about participation in a hegemonic party system, including the understanding of it by Mexican políticos and commentators; the initial effects of the reforms on the composition of the party of non-voters; and more recent attempts to extend and improve the effort to incorporate and reincorporate Mexican non-voters in the electoral process.
PARTICIPATION IN A HEGEMONIC PARTY SYSTEM

In Giovanni Sartori's typology of party systems, Mexico has had, since the formation of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional's first precursor in 1929, a hegemonic party system. Sartori describes this genus:

The pattern can be described as follows. The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. Not only does alternation not occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the possibility of a rotation in power is not even envisioned. The implication is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not.¹

Miguel Covían Pérez's assertion during the public hearings on the reforma política that the PRI leadership would not stand for any reforms which would threaten the primacy of the PRI suggest that PRI leaders themselves, perhaps including Reyes Heroles, thought of the PRI as a hegemonic party.

In democracies, electoral participation permits citizens to become involved in the choice of those who will control the organs of the state. In so doing, they participate indirectly in the making of public policy. However, for that choice to have meaning for the final determination of public policy, there must be a serious possibility of alternation in power. If there is a likelihood of alternation of control of the state, then by voting citizens can encourage a high degree of responsiveness by elected officials to their demands. However, if there is no expectation or intention of permitting an

alternation in power through the electoral process, then the act of voting is not an act of choosing among competing teams of potential rulers and is not likely to have an indirect effect on public policy making, or at least no greater effect than any other form of political participation, violent or non-violent. The question then becomes, why should the voter vote? Why Mexicans vote even though they are faced with a hegemonic party and several much weaker, ineffective challengers is not a question which I can definitively answer. This is a micropolitical question for which the aggregate data that I have at my disposal can yield at best only clues. I can and will make some conjectures on why Mexicans vote or abstain based on others' theoretical and empirical studies, though, because suggestions about the answer to this question can contribute to an understanding of another issue, a macropolitical issue: what is functional role of electoral participation in a hegemonic party system? Empirically, in the Mexican case, this translates to another question: why are Mexican leaders so preoccupied by abstention? Why is abstention a problem in their perspective? The Micropolitical Issue: Individual Voters in Hegemonic Party Systems

Studies of the electoral participation of individual voters have often approached the decision to vote or to abstain from the perspective of rational choice. The individual's decision about whether to vote is determined by a comparison of perceived costs and perceived benefits. In competitive elections, costs include for the

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most part the opportunity cost of the time involved in registering to vote, deliberating among the alternatives (including the cost of obtaining the information to do so), and actually casting the vote. The benefits are affected by the voter’s desire to see his party triumph and his calculation of the value his vote will have for his party’s victory (which depends on his perception of the closeness of the race). Even in elections in which there are effective choices confronting the electorate, the voter may be indifferent among the choices, and thus choose to minimize his costs by abstaining. Otherwise, he may discount the value of his one vote because there are so many voters that his vote will mean little or because the race is not sufficiently close that his vote will matter, again deciding to abstain so as to minimize costs. Thus, short-term rationality may lead voters to abstain when they are indifferent about the outcome of a race or, even if they are not indifferent, when they believe the contest is sufficiently one-sided that the cost to them of voting outweighs the benefit of adding one small vote to either side of a lop-sided result.

In a hegemonic party system, the consistent and apparently inevitable one-sidedness of election results should lead the rational voter to completely discount the value of his single vote for the final outcome, whether he supports the hegemonic party or not, thus reducing the perceived benefits from voting to below the costs of doing so. Why then do voters cast their ballots in hegemonic party systems? Of course, they must vote if the hegemonic result is to be obtained, but

\[3\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 267.}\]
to each voter little is apparently gained by casting a vote.

Downs and others following him have found in civic duty the explanation for why abstention does not run completely rampant in competitive democracies. As Downs formulates it,

Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by a sense of social responsibility relatively independent of their own short-term gains and losses. If we view such responsibility as one part of the return from voting, it is possible that the cost of voting is outweighed by its returns for some but not all rational men.

Participation in elections is one of the rules of the game in a democracy. Since the consequences of universal failure to vote are both obvious and disastrous, and since the cost of voting is small, at least some men can rationally be motivated to vote even when their personal gains in the short run are outweighed by their personal costs.

The problem this approach illuminates for the study of hegemonic party systems is two-fold: First, as already pointed out, since elections are not close, no one has a strong motivation to vote to insure that his preferred candidates win. Second, this sense of duty to vote so as to contribute to the maintenance of the regime may be completely absent. This is not to say that hegemonic party systems by nature lack legitimacy. It is to say that the existence of such a sense of duty is an empirical question. The legitimacy of such systems is often very weak or can decline over time. Indeed, in Chapters Three and Four I argued that the Mexican revolutionary elite has drawn on the vestiges of its revolutionary legitimacy for decades after its actions have ceased to be revolutionary. However, cynicism grew as the fortunes of ordinary peasants and workers, the supposed beneficiaries of the Revolution and those counted upon to insure the electoral

\[4\] Ibid., pp. 267-269.
success of Institutional Revolutionary Party, worsened. The events of 1968 were a watershed because the façade of revolutionary commitment and democracy was destroyed by the government’s repressive treatment of student demonstrators.

Where the legitimacy of a hegemonic party system is weak, maintaining that hegemony depends upon the hegemonic party’s capacity to manipulate the costs and benefits involved in voting so as to induce more voting, particularly (but not entirely) more voting in its favor. To do so, hegemonic parties often rely upon the clientelist networks which their operatives have established with those who are politically weaker, often uniformed, and sometimes disinterested. Alain Rouquié distinguishes between two kinds of votes provided to parties by clientelist networks. One type of vote is the "sold vote," in which an individual exchanges his vote for some other scarce commodity, such as money, alcohol, or food. But as Rouquié points out, "The goods received are more often a job, a place to live, credit or irrigation for crops, or proper payment for the sale of agricultural produce." The latter benefits should be underscored; where political and economic power are combined in a local setting, an individual’s lack of cooperation on election day can ruin the few economic opportunities he has. In essence, the sold vote is a way in which a client increases the potential gain from voting enough to participate. Looked at from the other side, the operative of the hegemonic party’s machine increases the voter’s cost of abstaining, some times to very high

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The other type of vote is the "gregarious vote," in which groups of voters are organized by patrons who are representatives of the hegemonic party to collectively support that party. Usually, this "vote of the herds" is rewarded by lodging, feasting, entertainment, and even presents. As Rouquié puts it, "Feasting and drinking reward organised civic zeal."\(^6\) Thus, again the gains to voting for the individual member of the herd are increased, and moreover, the costs of not voting are often escalated by the patron's agents' resort to violence. "Beware the voter refusing the delights of patronal generosity and preferring to vote in another direction."\(^7\)

The Mexican revolutionary family has promoted the electoral fortunes of its electoral arm, the PRI, through the use of the Mexican variant on clientelist vote production, caciquismo.\(^8\) Both the sold vote and the gregarious vote have been employed by the PRI machine to increase turnout and the PRI margin of victory.\(^9\) The use of either the

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 25.
\(^7\)Ibid.
\(^8\)Caciquismo is, of course, not unique to Mexico, but it is ubiquitous in rural Mexico and even certain urban areas, such as squatter settlements.
sold vote or the gregarious vote necessitate the availability of individuals whose costs and gains of voting can be so manipulated. Historically, this has been maximized in the Mexican countryside, where both methods can be combined effectively by rural caciques. Some indirect evidence that sustains the hypothesis that turnout has been most effectively produced by rural caciques is contained in Table 6-1. This table illustrates the zero-order correlation coefficients between the turnout of the potential electorate and various socio-economic variables at the federal district level in the four federal deputy elections between 1967 and 1976. Care must be taken in the interpretation of these statistics because they are correlations between aggregate-level figures and, strictly speaking, they measure aggregate behavior in districts, so they are correlations which describe types of districts, not types of individuals. On the other hand, though, caciques operate effectively in certain areas where there are aggregations of types of individuals, in particular where there are aggregations of indigenous peoples, engaged in marginally-productive agriculture, illiterate and marginalized in relation to the larger society. As a prominent Mexican social scientist has argued, caciquismo is an integral part of the internal colonialism of such groups. So, we are as interested in the types of settings in which the costs and benefits to individuals of participating electorally can be modified as we are in the actual calculations of those costs and


benefits made by individuals.

While each of the elections considered in Table 6-1 has its own unique characteristics, in each of the elections prior to the reforma política, the characteristics associated with those most subject to cacique domination are among the variables most strongly correlated with electoral participation. Specifically, districts in which those most marginalized socially and culturally (those still speaking indigenous languages), those least educated, and those who are illiterate are concentrated tend to have the highest rates of electoral participation. Generally, as Table 6-1 also shows, participation is concentrated in rural settings, although the election of 1973 introduces some ambiguity into that relationship. Moreover, Table 6-1 demonstrates that participation also tends to be higher in districts where a relatively larger share of the workforce is involved in agriculture.

The capacity of the ruling elite’s electoral machine to manipulate the voter’s cost–benefit analysis so as to encourage him or her to turn out on election day becomes more difficult as the voter leaves the rural setting. The use of the gregarious vote is more problematic among more educated individuals living in the more anonymous urban setting. As argued in Chapter Four, by the 1960s the phenomena of urbanization and industrialization were contributing to an erosion of the PRI’s capacity to get out the vote. The participation rate of registered voters declined in the nation as a whole after 1958 (see Figure 4-3). After 1970 the participation rate of the potential electorate was also on the decline (Figure 4-2). Moreover, it seems
that the PRI's mobilizational capacity was exercised with greater indifference in non-presidential election years, perhaps reflecting an unwillingness to expend great resources in the manipulation of voters' cost-benefit analyses of participation in non-presidential elections. This is shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-3 by the larger and larger dropoff rates in non-presidential election years.

To return to the question raised at the beginning of this section, why vote in a hegemonic party system such as Mexico's? Both anecdotal and statistical data suggest that those who do vote do so because they can be convinced that to not vote would be more costly to them than to actually vote. As Chapter Three's review of Mexico's political economy established, it is obvious that the gain involved in voting does not come either directly or even indirectly from the public policy made by the officials chosen in those elections. Rather, some individual or group benefits may be provided by the PRI machine to those who vote and, more ominously, some high costs may be imposed against those who do not vote (or do not allow their vote to be cast for them). This threat of violence undercuts any interpretation of Mexican electoral participation as voluntary, at least in the most backward parts of the countryside. However, the parameters of this individual cost-benefit analysis of voting differ for those not sharing the characteristics of persons dominated by caciques. The urban voter, the educated voter, the voter not tied to the land by debt obligations, the voter able to communicate and function in modern society is less subject to having his costs of not voting manipulated. The gregarious vote or the "vote of the herds" is more difficult to organize in urban, industrial
settings and the sold vote costs more to buy when individuals are more highly educated and thus more mobile in their employment. Thus, the individual voter in urban settings, in settings where people are more highly educated, and where they are not engaged in agriculture uses a cost-benefit model more similar to that proposed by Downs for competitive democracies with the additional proviso that such voters often do not even feel the citizen duty to vote so as to maintain the regime since they reject it. By the 1970s, as a result of modernization, this component of the Mexican electorate had grown larger and larger, making older methods of producing votes less adequate for the electorate as a whole.

11 Urban caciques in working class and migrant neighborhoods do, however, engage in various forms of vote buying, generally with the goal of minimizing generalized demands by groups by distributing individualized benefits to members of the group. Wayne A. Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 135-165.

12 Kenneth M. Coleman's study, Public Opinion in Mexico City about the Electoral System (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 45-56, showed that many in his 1969 survey who did not vote abstained because they did not enjoy voting. The enjoyment of voting was correlated with their evaluation of elections as being conducted fairly and as being democratic. That is, they saw little intrinsic value in the act of voting, so they did not enjoy it, and tended to abstain. This is not to say that the city is a radicalizing environment for those moving to it. As Cornelius's studies have shown, migrants do not tend to change their allegiance to the PRI or the revolutionary elite after they escape the countryside. Second generation urban dwellers are more likely to defect from the PRI, though. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, 63, 3 (1969), pp. 833-857, esp. p. 855 and Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City, pp. 63-67. Despite Cornelius's conclusions, though, it is not clear that Mexican leaders view migrants in the colonias proletarias or the cinturones de miseria as being so docile. Interview with Federal Electoral Commission official, 21 May 1984.
Certainly it is important for Mexico's ruling elite to promote votes for the PRI and, by so doing, to promote increased turnout. Yet, the PRI won by comfortable margins in nearly all elections until into the 1970s and by overwhelming margins in a considerable share of those elections. Why the elite should expend such great resources to encourage even greater participation than that necessary to win comfortably is not on the face of it apparent. Why must the PRI machine manipulate the rational calculations of voters when PRI victories are not really endangered? What is the functional role of electoral participation in Mexico's hegemonic party system?

As delineated in Chapter Two, provisions for political participation make up one crucial dimension of any political regime. Numerous recent studies of political participation have highlighted that such participation can take many forms. Indeed, the focus of

13 The bibliography is now quite enormous. A major body research was directed by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, the most important works for our purposes being Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971); Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Participation in developing countries has also been the focus of a number of studies and multi-person research projects. For a summary of one such effort, see Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). Nelson provides an updated review of studies of participation and development in "Political Participation," in Understanding Political Development, ed. by Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 103-159. See also Henry A. Dietz, "Rational Choice Perspectives on Modes of Participation: Longitudinal Data across Regime Types in the Third World," paper
participation may not even be governmental decision-making, but instead some other way of creating and distributing collective goods. These alternative foci of citizen activism are frequently at the local level, but nonetheless important instances of that "behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods" which we call political participation.

However, while not intending to downplay the significance of those forms of participation not focused at trying to influence governmental decision-making, this study is directed toward regime change or regime modification at the level of the central state. Thus, I will not discuss participation in Mexico focused at local-level collective action projects. Before completely dropping the discussion of citizen activism directed to provision of collective goods so that a community and its constituent individuals can consume them, I should make one comment. It is characteristic of the Mexican elite to be suspicious of political participation it does not control and for local PRI activists to be jealous of their monopoly on efficacious political participation. For that reason, the PRI tries to coopt as many ventures of this type presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 30-September 2, 1984. The papers of major conference on participation in Latin America are contained in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, Political Participation in Latin America, vol. 1: Citizen and State (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978) and Seligson and Booth, Political Participation in Latin America, vol. 2: Politics and the Poor (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).


15 The definition is from John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Images of Political Participation in Latin America," in Political Participation in Latin America, vol. 1, ed. by Booth and Seligson, p. 6.
as it can, creating links between the leaders of local participant
groups and the PRI. Where co-optation fails, violence against local
leaders often succeeds.  

Taking participation oriented to influencing governmental
decisions as our focus, we can follow Huntington and Nelson to identify
five different modes of participation: electoral activity, lobbying
government officials and political leaders to influence decisions on
issues that affect large groups of people, membership in organizations
dedicated to influencing governmental decisions, contacting government
officials to secure individual benefits, and violence directed at
influencing governmental decisions or the composition of the state
itself. As I argued at length in Chapters Four and Five, those
controlling the Mexican state much prefer that the Mexican masses
pursue electoral activity to any of the other modes of participation.
Their hope has been that the PRI’s corporatist structure shackles the
independent organizational efforts of and lobbying by the masses.  

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16 Historically, participation in minor opposition parties has been
less subject to such envy so long as it does not become efficacious.
Once it does, it is typically either coopted or attacked. The recent
experience of local activists in Juchitán who were associated with the
Partido Socialista Unificado de México is a case in point. These
activists, organized in a local party known as COCEI, won control of
the local town hall. They could not be coopted by the PRI, so they
were attacked by the state government of Oaxaca.

17 I do not want to deemphasize the various independent peasant
associations and labor unions which have risen at different points in
recent Mexican history. My point, though, is that the Mexican
political elite usually confronts those independent campesino movements
and labor unions with a combination of the carrot (to leaders anyway)
and the stick with the intention to bring those groups within the
corporatist structure it controls, or to destroy them for their refusal
to be coopted. The spirit of independence exhibited by those campesino
and worker movements must be admired, but realistically it must be
recognized that their impact on public policy, even where they have
Individual contacting of officials to receive particularized benefits from the state presents little threat because these benefits can be cheaply dispensed to those who are extremely persistent. Thus, these three forms of participation which are usually complements to electoral activity have not for the most part been threatening to the Mexican political elite.

Violence, on the other hand, is not usually a complement to these other forms of participation, but a substitute for them, resorted to when other forms of participation fail to achieve the activists' goals. Violent forms of participation, as I argued in Chapters Four and Five, have been perceived as a great threat to political stability by Mexican leaders. Given this fear of violent participation, electoral activity and the institutions which practice it, political parties, become all the more important to the Mexican elite. As Sartori argues, parties and participation through them (that is, electoral activity) can serve two functions in mass-based politics: channelment and expression. In a society in which the masses have been politicized (a role which the Mexican Revolution performed), a system of parties and the electoral participation in which they engage are far preferable to that society's rulers than a traditional authoritarian regime of no parties and no electoral participation. "No parties at all leaves a society out of reach, out of control, and no modernized regime can afford, in the long run, to settle on this unsafe and unproductive solution. A post-traditional society either can be freed or has to be seized; but the

more it modernizes, the less it can be left to itself or be expected to remain dormant."\textsuperscript{18} Or, as Adam Przeworski argues, "new people are recruited into political institutions when the stability of these institutions is already threatened; . . . incorporation into the existing institutions is a strategy that serves to keep things as they are; in short, . . . electoral mobilization is a process through which electoral institutions preserve their stability."\textsuperscript{19} For Mexico's ruling elite, electoral participation provides a channel in which to direct the Mexican masses, an alternate channel to the path of violent confrontation. As Charles L. Davis and Kenneth M. Coleman write, "because the electoral process provides institutionalized channels for expressing opposition, it defuses the potential for direct, spontaneous, antiregime political activity based on coercion."\textsuperscript{20}

It is crucial to emphasize here that this electoral channel forms a vital complement with the corporatist system of interest intermediation. Without that corporatist control, and the efforts made to rout out independent interest groups, the organizational basis for mass participation in non-electoral forms of participation (demonstrations) would exist and defeat the channelment of the masses into electoral activity. Moreover, without that corporatist control, the capacity of the elite to predict with certainty its electoral

\textsuperscript{18}Sartori, \textit{Parties and Party Systems}, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{19}"Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" \textit{American Political Science Review}, 69, 1 (1975), p. 66.

success would disappear, causing the electoral channel to be as great a threat to the elite as other modes of independent participation. In sum, electoral activity provides to the Mexican elite a viable means to channel the participation of the Mexican masses into a safe (for the elite) mode of participation. The challenge is to convince individual voters of the value of the electoral arena as the locus of their participation.

The view that elections primarily serve a channeling function in hegemonic party systems such as Mexico's tends to downplay the role that elections and electoral participation can play as a demonstration of the legitimacy of the regime and of the rule of the elite. Yet, as many have recognized, elections in hegemonic systems can serve to periodically organize consent for the rule of the elite and the way in which they rule, perhaps even to remind the citizenry that it does consent to that rule.21 While this consent may not be the profound consent that a party winning an overwhelming majority in truly competitive elections would enjoy, nonetheless elections and electoral participation can to a limited extent serve to legitimize the governing elite's rule.22

Those studying Mexican elections often cite the legitimizing role of elections even to the extent of arguing that the electoral process is a valuable instrument of socialization. One North American scholar


put it this way:

Most importantly ... elections serve to create and fortify a sense of nationality among Mexico's urban and rural masses. To be sure, this process has long been underway and methods other than elections perform this same function. But congressional elections are times when the nation-building instructions are carried out nation-wide. Millions of people are bombarded with the idea that they belong to a community that extends beyond their neighborhood or village, that they are participants in the grand drama called the Revolution that is still being played out, that they must help protect the social and economic gains that the Revolution has accomplished, and that they can contribute to its ultimate fulfillment.23

The implication for participation is clear enough: electoral participation shows that the message is being heard, that the citizenry has agreed with the notion that the Revolution is being made for it, thus that the rule of the elite is legitimate. Davis argues:

authoritarian regimes are well equipped to generate support among deprived groups by dispensing psychologically satisfying symbolic reassurances about the regime’s commitments to particular goals. In this way, "successful" authoritarian regimes manage to rule by means other than force alone, and to gain popular consent from politically and economically deprived groups at minimal cost in terms of claims upon scarce resources.24

He found a close relationship between diffuse support for the regime and electoral choice (for whom to vote and whether to vote).25

Moreover, his survey findings indicated that "the lower-class Mexicans in our sample who evaluate the PRI favorably do so mainly because they believe that the regime is committed to the long-term goals of the


25Ibid., p. 664.
Revolution."26

Wayne Cornelius ties the legitimation function and the channelment function of Mexican electoral participation together as he writes:

The elections serve primarily to legitimize existing policies and to demonstrate mass support for the regime. If voter turnout is not high enough, or if the principal opposition party (PAN) makes a good showing, the legitimacy of the regime is diminished.

In general, political mobilization in the Mexican context serves to channel the energies of the citizenry into carefully controlled, officially sanctioned activities. Controlled participation helps to build popular support for the regime, to legitimize its authority, and to minimize the possibility of "spontaneous" political activity that might have unpredictable consequences for the system's stability.27

Electoral turnout, then, becomes one way of measuring the legitimacy of the revolutionary family's rule and of the PRI's capacity to channel the energies of Mexicans into safe modes of political activity.

Abstention can, then, have one or another or both of two different interpretations. First, it can signify that the mobilizer and channeler of citizen participation is failing in its task of directing participation into the safe, non-spontaneous electoral arena. This could mean that Mexicans are merely apathetic about politics or at least about electoral politics. Second, abstention can indicate that the legitimacy of the ruling elite or the method by which it continues to rule is being called into question. That is, Mexicans are alienated by the elite's dominance or by the regime itself.28

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26 Ibid., p. 666.

27 Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City, pp. 79-80.

28 These two reasons for abstention correspond to what Rogelio Ramos Oranday calls on the one hand passive, or involuntary abstentionism and on the other hand conscious abstentionism. See
Either of these sources of abstention can pose a danger to Mexico’s rulers. Either the regime as a whole is perceived as not legitimate, that is, alienation is being expressed by abstention, or the elite’s electoral machine, the PRI, is failing in its incapacity to mobilize voters and direct them into safe channels. Mexican observers in the 1970s could not agree on which of these interpretations was correct. Was growing abstention due to apathy? Many were willing to argue that it was. Others argued strongly that alienation was the cause of abstentionism, that abstentionism was a form of protest or civil disobedience. But in either case, and they are not necessarily inconsistent with each other, they were seen as posing a danger to the PRI and the governing elite.

Table 6-1 provides statistical suggestions about who still


29 E.g., see Ricardo Garibay in Excelsior, 28 June 1973; Miguel Bueno in El Universal, 25 February 1976; Pedro Gringoire in Excelsior, 10 April 1976; and Carlos Pereyra in Proceso, no. 144 (6 August 1979). Some commentators, such as Francisco José Paoli, Proceso, no. 136 (11 June 1979) argue that indifference is has been produced by distrust, and thus a limited form of alienation (though not profound cynicism) has produced the apathy that leads to abstentionism. Rafael Segovia, Vuelta, no. 68, July 1982, argues that decreased rates of participation in recent elections are due to changes in electoral rules which have made questionable practices more easily detected by opposition observers and those observers’ complaints more likely to be redressed. Real abstention is due to apathy and indifference which was formerly covered up by electoral fraud. See also Segovia’s comments before the Comisión Federal Electoral, reproduced in Reforma política; gaceta informativa de la Comisión Federal Electoral, v. 1: audiencias públicas (Mexico City: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1977), pp. 149-153.

performed the actions before 1977 which Mexican leaders could use to illustrate the legitimacy of Mexican "democracy." Alternatively, we might say that these correlation coefficients indicate who was still being channeled effectively prior to 1977. While these correlations are not nearly as close as they could be, especially when compared to the correlations between these socioeconomic variables and the direction of the vote displayed in Table 4-7, they do seem to indicate that the districts with the highest rates of participation were those with concentrations of those speaking indigenous languages, those with no education, and those in agriculture. Those districts in which the party of non-voters was strongest, that is, where abstention was most frequently practiced, were those with concentrations of city dwellers, of those who could read, of those with higher levels of education, and those employed in both the industrial and the service sectors. This tends to mirror the bases of support for the opposition (compare Tables 4-7 and 6-1) in the years prior to the reforma política. As has been reiterated throughout this study, Mexico’s electoral districts were increasing taking on these latter characteristics.

Table 6-2 goes further to make suggestions about the organizational bases of participation and abstention. With the exception of the 1973 election, electoral participation is correlated with PRI voting. The conclusion to be drawn seems to be that electoral participation was highest where the PRI was most dominant, in those districts in which it most strenuously mobilized its electoral supporters (not necessarily political supporters). Where the PAN was more competitive with the PRI, participation was lower. We might infer
that electoral participation was generally spurred by the PRI organization. Competition, on the other hand, did not seem to encourage a strong turnout, despite the normal expectation that it should do so by making the election more interesting and more of a choice.

What are the reasons for this high correlation between PRI support and electoral participation? To give the Mexican elite the greatest benefit of the doubt, one might argue that PRI support and electoral participation are two measures of the same phenomenon: the legitimacy of the Mexican regime. Where voters are most dissatisfied with the regime, where they are most alienated, they respond in one of two ways: the more hopeful ones vote for the PAN or another opposition party, the more cynical ones simply do not waste their time voting. But this is to give priistas the greatest benefit of the doubt. An account which gives less credence to the priistas' honor is to say that the corporatist structure of the PRI produces both votes and votes for the PRI. This has its greatest effect in those areas where peasants and workers are concentrated. Furthermore, the corporatist structure functions most effectively where it can be combined with caciquismo, which again produces both votes and the right kind of votes. Finally, to give the least credit to the honor of priistas, one could argue that electoral fraud perpetrated by the PRI is most able to take place in those areas where the opposition is poorly organized and thus least competitive. This fraud, designed as much to impress superiors as to

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31 This opinion is shared by many Mexican commentators, among them those listed above in fn. 30.
overwhelm the token opposition, produces both high rates of participation and PRI votes, at least officially. These arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is likely that some combination of all three factors combine to produce the high correlation between electoral participation and PRI vote. Furthermore, in any particular single election, it does not really matter whether the voters of a district willingly or unwillingly cast votes for the PRI and cast them in large numbers because it is, after all, the official results that matter so long as the electoral process is the method used to choose successors.

The 1973 election seems to be an anomaly in this relationship. Some suggestions may be made about why this was so. To begin, the Echeverría administration made promises when it entered office to begin a political opening, the apertura democrática. This political opening included some relatively insignificant electoral reforms but generally produced a climate in which there was hope that the democratic process would be respected. It is possible that Echeverría’s team was somewhat more honest in counting votes than previous administrations had been, at least in 1973. Also along this line was a great deal of internal ferment in the PRI, as Reyes Heroles took over the party intending to reinvigorate the party by conducting an internal housekeeping, including lessening the importance of caciques to the overall operation of the party. Such internal dissent may have led to both flagging effort on the part of the party machine and efforts by the central party administration to lessen the incidence of fraud. Finally, the opposition PAN mounted its most serious challenge to the PRI ever in
the 1973 deputy races. This effort may have included mobilization efforts by the PAN which could have diminished the negative correlation between PAN vote and participation.

However, whatever the underlying causes of the 1973 anomaly, the 1976 race, including as it did the PAN's abstention from the presidential race, saw a return of the old patterns, even a strengthening of them (compare the correlation coefficients for 1970 and 1976 in Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Moreover, the 1976 race included the most notorious incident to date of the challenge of abstentionism, a challenge which the 1977 reforma política was supposed to alleviate.

Chapters Three and Four presented evidence that in 1975-76 the Mexican political system experienced heightened political crisis, a crisis which Chapter Five argued was perceived widely as a crisis by those participating in or observing politics at that time. Apparently, the Mexican electorate shared that perception. To begin, potential voters of various social categories more clearly lined up on the side of the party of non-voters or one of the registered parties. The correlation coefficients for 1976 shown in Table 6-1 are all significant, with but one exception. This contrasts strongly with earlier elections in which not voting was not so closely identified with particular social groups. Moreover, the correspondence in sign between the correlation coefficients for participation (Table 6-1) and voting for PRI (Table 4-7) in 1976 suggests that in 1976 voters saw clearly that to vote for the opposition or to not vote at all were both ways of voting against the regime and the elite which ruled through it and the PRI. Because the PAN did not present candidates in several federal deputy races,
including the presidential race, many voters simply chose to stay home. Table 6-2 shows that this heightened social group identification with the party of non-voters happened across most social categories of voters regardless of whether or not the PAN presented a deputy candidate in their district, but this tendency to abstain was intensified in districts where the PAN presented no candidates. This confirms a conclusion which can be drawn from Table 6-3, namely that the strong correlation between not voting and voting for PAN in 1976 clearly shows that only the PRI was mobilizing voters; the rest of the party system was failing to do so.

PARTICIPATION IN THE WAKE OF THE REFORMA POLITICA

The actual reform measures associated with the reforma política, which were detailed in Chapter Five, were designed to confront the perceived challenge of abstentionism in three basic ways. First, by encouraging new parties to enter the electoral arena, the reforma política was intended to draw in those who had not been participating because of their dissatisfaction with the choices on the ballot. This measure was primarily directed at those on the left. Its underlying goal was to encourage the left, both leaders and supporters, to abandon non-electoral modes of participation. By extension, the broadening of the party system would hopefully relegitimate the electoral system with those dissatisfied with their electoral choices, drawing the alienated back into electoral participation.

Second, the reforma política included measures which would make poll-watching less dangerous for the opposition and more effective in
guaranteeing honest vote counts. Reyes Heroles probably hoped that this would weaken and expose to national attention many of the caciques who he would have just as soon excluded from the revolutionary party. From the perspective of the rational voter contemplating electoral participation, though, these measures were expected to improve the possibility of opposition victory and thus lead the voter to upgrade the value of his individual act of voting. Closer races caused by a cleaner electoral process would lead to a more positive evaluation of voting by the individual voter, thus greater rates of participation, especially among those who really had a choice to participate or abstain, those in the cities.

Third, the legislation associated with the reforma política included an order to the Federal Electoral Commission and the National Registry of Voters to investigate the accuracy of voter registration lists and to carry out a drive to purify them and to register the unregistered. Voter registration drives are basic efforts to politicize the unpolticized and to remind those already registered of their duty to vote. This was considered an integral part of the reforma política, especially by those in the López Portillo administration.

Overall, the intended effects of the reforma política for participation were, on one hand, to relegitimize the regime and especially the act of voting by having the López Portillo government engage in a very public promise to respect the integrity of the electoral process. The drive to purify the voter registration lists helped to keep this effort in the spotlight after the reforms were
implemented. On the other hand, the reforma política included measures which would modify the electoral process and the party system to change the voters' calculations of the value of voting, especially among those voters most able to exercise a choice between voting and abstaining. These latter voters, especially among the urban middle class and those of the urban masses not incorporated into the PRI through the Labor Sector, were those thought to be most alienated and most available for recruitment into more unorthodox modes of participation.

The initial test of the reforma política came in 1979's deputy elections. The results were decidedly mixed. On the one hand, as Figures 6-1 and 6-2 make plain, participation rates plummeted in 1979, dropping below 50 percent of registered voters and to 42 percent of the potential electorate. This seemed to be a decisive repudiation of the intent of the reforma política's makers and occasioned a good deal of comment and criticism in the press.32 On the other hand, some of the stronger social bases of the party of non-voters seemed to have been broken in 1979. With the exception of the measures of traditional culture (indigenous languages spoken), practically no variable shows any significant correlation with electoral participation in 1979. Whether participation by potential voters or by registered voters is considered (see Tables 6-4 and 6-5), this result seems to obtain. When compared to the correlations for the 1976 election (see Table 6-1), this appears to be a drastic change. In 1976, measures of modernization (higher levels of urbanization and education, larger

32 See, e.g., Proceso, nos. 142 (23 July 1979), 144 (6 August 1979), and 147 (27 August 1979).
shares of the workforce in industry or services) were relatively strongly and negatively correlated with participation. In 1979, that relationship no longer held. In the 1982 and 1985 deputy elections, the apparent lack of social bases for the party of non-voters again surfaced. Even the strong and positive relationship between indigenous language speakers and participation declined in strength. Moreover, the previously significant relationship between voting for the PRI and electoral participation declined somewhat in strength in the 1979 elections and seemed to disappear in the 1982 elections, as a comparison of Table 6-3 and Table 6-6 will show. In 1976, the correlations between (1) abstaining and voting for the opposition and (2) voting and voting for the PRI were highly significant. In 1979, abstaining and PAN voting were still correlated, although more weakly correlated, but voting and voting for the PRI had declined in strength and statistical significance. In 1982, no significant relationship between the direction of the vote and participation remained, although a weak relationship seems to have reemerged for 1985. How can these new relationships (or lack of relationship) be explained?

Some general comments might be made based on available survey evidence. Charles L. Davis and Kenneth M. Coleman found in their 1980 survey of workers that within the working class, some socioeconomic and educational correlates of abstention could be found: "we might suggest an emerging portrait of the Mexican working-class abstainer: an individual who is (a) slightly more educated than other workers, (b) younger than other workers, (c) slightly less likely to be a union member, (d) psychologically somewhat more involved in politics, but (e) 365
less likely to believe him/herself capable of influencing Mexican political elites, and (f) inclined to the belief that Mexican elites are not easily influenced." Moreover, their strongest conclusion is that those who are satisfied with the Mexican political system and who believe that the state is responsive will vote while those dissatisfied will not. That is, legitimacy (or diffuse support) and voting go hand in hand. 33 Perhaps the main inference to be drawn from the combination of survey and aggregate data analysis is that diffuse support (the grant of legitimacy) is a strong determinant of participation, but there is no strong correlation between diffuse support and the socioeconomic sources of it in post-reforma política Mexico. Whereas in the crisis atmosphere of 1976, there did seem to be a relationship between certain socioeconomic characteristics (urbanization, industrialization, education) and abstention, a relationship mirroring that between the same socioeconomic characteristics and voting for the opposition (especially the PAN), since then and probably because of the introduction of new channelers of participation (the parties on the left), that relationship has diminished and nearly disappeared.

Two more specific explanations can be put forth, one applicable to all three post-reforma política elections, the other particular to the 1982 election. First, as Rafael Segovia has forcefully argued, the provisions of the new electoral law, the LOPPE, led to a deflation of previously inflated figures for participation. That is, in 1979 (and

subsequently), the reported election figures more closely conformed to the actual behavior of the electorate. A purification of voting lists so that the number of registered voters was now less than the number of potential voters contributed to this result as did more careful observation of the electoral process by the opposition parties. 34 These factors explain both the decline in participation in 1979 (since many fewer votes were fraudulently registered) and the decline in the salience of the social bases of voting and abstaining (since the previously inflated relationship in the countryside was at least partially undermined).

Some Mexicans, such as Segovia, argued that the decline in participation could be evaluated in a positive light because it indicated a respect for the electoral process and for the political possibility for Mexicans to choose to abstain if they so desired. 35 Those worried about unchanneled potential participants, however, thought differently. Those replacing Reyes Heroles's team at Gobernación, Enrique Olivares Santana and his deputies, were extremely concerned to improve electoral participation for the 1982 presidential campaign. 36 Their effort was two-pronged. First, the National

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36 The members of Olivares Santana's team to whom I spoke took great pains to emphasize the importance of the efforts to increase participation. Interviews, 10 May 1984, 21 May 1984.
Registry of Voters was charged in 1980 with completely renovating the voter registration lists in a campaign known as the Programa Padrón Electoral (Electoral Registry Program). Some 1.5 million volunteers were mobilized to reregister the entire voting-age population. In an effort to maintain appearances of fairness, neither the army nor school teachers (traditionally strong PRI supporters) were included. A new voter identification card was to be issued to all of the new voters. Such a voter registration campaign, we may suppose, would likely raise citizen consciousness of their right and duty to vote.

The second prong of the government's get-out-the-vote effort involved both the Federal Electoral Commission and the PRI in a massive media campaign to encourage voting. This included both attention to the various individual presidential candidates, especially the PRI's Miguel de la Madrid, and emphasis on voting itself.

The result was an overwhelming increase in participation (see Figures 6-1 and 6-2) in the 1982 election. That significantly increased rate of participation, though, did not hold for the 1985 deputy races. Indeed, the post-reforma política electoral process seems to include an accentuated dropoff in turnout between


38 Interview, 21 May 1984.

presidential-year elections and all off-year elections, including federal deputy races. 40

From which sources did the new voters come in 1982? Which voters disappeared for the 1985 deputy elections? Table 6-7 provides some statistical evidence to evaluate these questions. It shows that the districts with increases in electoral participation, whether by potential or registered voters, shared no social and economic characteristics. Nearly all of the correlation coefficients between participation and socioeconomic variables in the first and third columns of Table 6-7 are small and most are statistically insignificant. In effect, the absence of a relationship between any socioeconomic variable and participation which had appeared in 1979 continued in 1982. Apparently, no particular socioeconomic group was targeted for mobilization.

However, it does appear that certain types of districts were chosen for special efforts at mobilization. In particular, those districts in which the PAN did relatively better and the PRI relatively worse in 1979 showed the most marked increases in participation in 1982, as the second half of Table 6-7 shows. Basically, those districts in which the elite’s electoral organ, the PRI, showed the least vigor in 1979 were chosen as places where the PRI had to improve the most. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the negative

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40 One of those most closely involved in the voter registration drive told me in 1984 not to expect these rates of participation to continue into the 1985 race because he believed that the plebiscitary nature of Mexican presidential elections brought out a larger number of voters. The implication is that electoral participation will always be lower in non-presidential races. Interview, 21 May 1984.
correlation coefficients between the percent of the vote to the PRI in 1979 and the change in electoral participation from 1979 to 1982 (and likewise the positive correlations between PAN voting in 1979 and the change in participation from 1979 to 1982). Moreover, it is significant that these correlations are stronger for the change in the registered electorate's participation than the potential electorate's participation because the government (and indeed all observers of elections in Mexico) place more emphasis on the former measure. Furthermore, the districts in which participation, especially that measured by the turnout of registered voters, was lowest in 1979 were the districts in which participation increases were greatest in 1982. To a certain extent, these increases can be attributed to the greater publicity given to opposition parties because they presented high-visibility presidential candidates, thus increasing the appeal of voting to many.\textsuperscript{41} The PAN, for instance, more than doubled the number of votes it received in 1982, even over its previous best finish in 1973, in several states (see Table 6-8). However, the bulk of this increased vote was garnered by the PRI (again see Table 6-8). In a number of states, the PRI's increased vote in 1982 over what it had received in 1973 totaled over 20 percent of the potential electorate (see the last column of Table 6-8). While all parties mobilized new voters, the PRI mobilized by far the greatest number in 1982. Furthermore, these new voters came from all social strata.

The conclusion is that when the changes in the rules of the game

\textsuperscript{41}Middlebrook, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime," pp. 97-98.
imposed by the reforma política did not produce increased participation in 1979 (indeed participation declined), those in charge of such matters at Gobernación took a more direct approach for the 1982 elections, targeting districts which based on the 1979 performance showed the greatest potential for improvement, those areas where the PRI had done less well in 1979 and where participation had been poorest in 1979. However, this effort did not continue in 1985.

The mobilization of 1982 was followed by another drastic dropoff in participation in 1985. Again there are no clear social bases to this change. Increased rates of abstention in 1985 were most strongly concentrated in districts in which participation had been highest in 1982 (Table 6-7). In this way, the decreases in participation in 1985 mirrored the increases which took place in 1982. However, the decreases in turnout in 1985 were not correlated with the parties’ strengths from 1982. That is, whereas districts in which the PRI did poorly in 1979 were the loci of its efforts in 1982, districts in which it did better in 1982 were not the sites of demobilization in 1985. In general, a possible conclusion is that perhaps it cannot be expected that the regime can produce the intensity of interest in off-year elections which will lead to the high levels of electoral participation it prefers. The presidential race, since it includes a long campaign that reaches to all parts of the nation and thus draws intense media coverage, may simply be more efficacious for producing voter interest and participation.

So, the experiences of 1979, 1982, and 1985, when combined with
previous examples, seem to indicate the emergence of an important trend: participation will be much higher in presidential elections than in off-year elections (see Figures 6-1 and 6-2). I interpret this to mean that while a majority of Mexicans of all social strata are mobilized into electoral channels during presidential races, they are not kept there consistently by the institutions of mobilization, the party system and especially the PRI. So long as the potential voters' minds can be focused on the electoral contest, participation will follow, especially if they are encouraged (or herded) to vote by the PRI. However, even the more competitive post-reforma política environment and the heightened awareness of the importance of politics in the current economic crisis do not insure that sufficient motivation will be given to the voters. The continued domination of the important elected positions by PRI members probably causes many to downgrade the value of their individual vote: if the PRI will win anyway, now by a 60 percent to 40 percent margin instead of the previous 80 to 20, how important can a single voter's ballot be? This is probably particularly salient when the voter is asked to choose among candidates for elected posts which matter very little in policy making. Thus, presidential races can be expected to produce greater participation than do other contests because in that election the important policy maker will be chosen. Presidential election politics, because of the way they focus the attention of both voters and party militants, may produce a greater feeling of duty to mobilize and to be mobilized. At the same time, the reforma política instituted some measures which diminish the cost of not voting. For all these reasons, many rational
voters probably choose to abstain, especially in off-year elections.

Thus, while the reforma política's macropolitical objectives may have included seeking to direct a larger share of the population into electoral channels, the electoral system has not consistently achieved this goal. It has shown the capacity to do so, but not the wherewithal to continue the practice in less critical elections. So far, no massive mobilization of voters and especially non-voters into other modes of participation has taken place, even in this time of crisis. Indeed, the post-reforma política mobilizations of Mexicans have tended to be demonstrations connected with electoral results. That is, dissatisfaction with PRI victories and proclamations that the PRI engaged in electoral fraud have followed elections, and some have become violent, but they have been narrowly focused on achieving fair elections. Perhaps one reason for this result is that the potential leaders of such non-electoral activities have themselves chosen the electoral path. After examining the electoral successes and failures of these opposition leaders in Chapter Seven, we will return to consider their objectives and strategies in Chapters Eight and Nine.
Table 6-1
Correlations between Electoral Participation
Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1976*

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Table 6-1 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Participation
Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1976*

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<td><strong>Economic Sector</strong></td>
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<td>% EAP in Manufacturing</td>
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<td>(.14)</td>
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375
Table 6-2

Correlations between Electoral Participation and Socioeconomic Variables, Controlling for PAN Participation, 1976

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<th>Variable</th>
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<td>All</td>
<td>PAN Contested</td>
<td>No PAN Candidate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Urban (&gt;2500 population)</td>
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<td>-.50</td>
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<td>Percent Urban (&gt;20,000 pop.)</td>
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<td>Percent EAP in Primary Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent EAP in Tertiary Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Urban Upper Class</td>
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<td>Percent Urban Middle Class</td>
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<td>Percent Urban Working Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Rural Manual Workers</td>
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<td>Percent Rural Non-Manual Workers</td>
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N=186 N=129 N=57

Zero-order Pearson's correlation coefficients. Coefficients > .15 significant at the .05 level.
Table 6-3

Correlations between Electoral Participation and Support for the Official and the Opposition Parties, 1967-1976*

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<td>(.00)</td>
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Table 6-4

Correlations between Electoral Participation by Potential Voters and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

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<td>Urbanization</td>
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<tr>
<td>% in localities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>of ≥ 2,500</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% in localities</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>of ≥ 5,000</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>of ≥ 10,000</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<td>% in localities</td>
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<td>of ≥ 20,000</td>
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<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.09</td>
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<td>(.06)</td>
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<td>% with No Schooling</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Primary Education</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
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*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N = 290 (all districts except those from Oaxaca). Significance levels in parentheses. Electoral participation measured by dividing valid votes by potential electorate (population aged 18 and older).
Table 6-4 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Participation by Potential Voters and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>1985</th>
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<td>Economic Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>% EAP in Agriculture</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Manufacturing</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Construction</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Commerce</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Services</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Occupation)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.11</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
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<td>Urban Middle (Administrative, Skilled)</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.18)</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
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<td>Rural Popular (Peasants, Rural Workers)</td>
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<td>(.21)</td>
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<td>Rural Middle and Upper (Administrative and Supervisory)</td>
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379
Table 6-5  
Correlations between Electoral Participation by Registered Voters and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*.

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<th>1985</th>
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<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 2,500</td>
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<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 5,000</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
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<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
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<td>(.13)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
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<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
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<td>.03</td>
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<td>(.36)</td>
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<td>% with Primary Education</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
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Table 6-5 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Participation by Registered Voters and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*  

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<th>1985</th>
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<td><strong>Economic Sector</strong></td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Construction</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.49)</td>
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<td>% EAP in Services</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.41)</td>
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<td>(.44)</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
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Table 6-6
Correlations between Electoral Participation and Support for the Official and the Opposition Parties, 1979-1985*

Electoral Participation by Potential Electorate

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<th>Party</th>
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<th>1985</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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<td>-.18</td>
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<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
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<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.40)</td>
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<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
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Electoral Participation by Registered Electorate

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<th>1982</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL LEFT</td>
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<td>.09</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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Table 6-7
Correlations between Change in Electoral Participation
and Selected Political, Social, and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Registered Electorate</th>
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<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td>% in localities of ≥ 2,500</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrants</td>
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<td>.09</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
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<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with Primary Education</td>
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<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
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</table>

*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N varies because of missing data. Range of N = 221 to 289. Significance levels in parentheses. Electoral participation of Registered Electorate measured by dividing valid votes by registered electorate; Electoral participation of Potential Electorate measured by dividing valid votes by potential voters (population over 18 years of age).
Table 6-7 (continued)
Correlations between Change in Electoral Participation and Selected Political, Social, and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
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<td>(.45)</td>
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<td>% EAP in Manufacturing</td>
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<td>% EAP in Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% to PRI 1982</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>% to PAN 1979</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% to PAN 1982</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>-.29</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
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Table 6-8

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Increase in Participation</th>
<th>Increase PRI Vote</th>
<th>Increase PAN Vote</th>
<th>% Total Change PRI</th>
<th>% Total Change PAN</th>
<th>PRI Change as % potential vote</th>
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<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>88,361 96.6</td>
<td>59,854 81.0</td>
<td>17,260 144.2</td>
<td>67.7</td>
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<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>239,786 102.3</td>
<td>56,873 30.2</td>
<td>did not run in 1973</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>Baja California Sur</td>
<td>50,916 155.7</td>
<td>33,439 114.2</td>
<td>9,046 363.9</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<td>Campeche</td>
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<td>2,311 2.4</td>
<td>6,085 512.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<td>Chiapas</td>
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<td>76.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
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<td>54,214 19.0</td>
<td>93,036 151.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>28.1</td>
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<td>Distrito Federal</td>
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<td>389,424 31.3</td>
<td>5,026 0.5</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Durango</td>
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<td>55,520 518.3</td>
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<td>61,008 12.3</td>
<td>112,937 175.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>43.0</td>
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<td>-93,917 -18.7</td>
<td>9,640 80.4</td>
<td>228.9</td>
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<td>127,996 36.8</td>
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<td>76.5</td>
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<td>Jalisco</td>
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<td>105,088 16.1</td>
<td>125,858 56.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>México</td>
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<td>630,776 79.1</td>
<td>300,285 100.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>129,088 21.7</td>
<td>35,018 6.7</td>
<td>32,616 59.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morelos</td>
<td>140,888 95.4</td>
<td>113,409 101.2</td>
<td>1,586 5.2</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>112,338 150.4</td>
<td>107,246 246.5</td>
<td>1,130 27.6</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>467,611 117.7</td>
<td>305,639 95.6</td>
<td>143,780 213.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>87,787 18.8</td>
<td>57,716 11.4</td>
<td>17,841 62.5</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>512,004 70.0</td>
<td>489,506 107.3</td>
<td>15,828 -10.0</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
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<td>Queretaro</td>
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<td>57,631 44.4</td>
<td>26,958 278.7</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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<td>Quintana Roo</td>
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<td>50,683 142.4</td>
<td>3,012 1506.0</td>
<td>88.5</td>
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<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
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<td>253,947 125.0</td>
<td>51,306 350.4</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
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<td>112,108 812.8</td>
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<td>60.3</td>
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<td>131,243 80.6</td>
<td>3,026 30.6</td>
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<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>168,148 41.8</td>
<td>92,651 30.2</td>
<td>12,437 49.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
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<td>21,675 18.2</td>
<td>11,305 90.0</td>
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<td>25.1</td>
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<td>615,853 69.3</td>
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<td>74.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>50,183 18.7</td>
<td>8,538 3.5</td>
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<td>17.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20,100 107.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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Figure 6-1

PARTICIPATION BY POTENTIAL VOTERS
FEDERAL DEPUTY ELECTIONS, 1961-1985

OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS

PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
Figure 6-2

PARTICIPATION BY REGISTERED VOTERS
FEDERAL DEPUTY ELECTIONS, 1961-1965

PERCENT OF REGISTERED ELECTORATE


☐ OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS  + PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE REFORMA POLITICA AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO'S PARTY SYSTEM

The dominance of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has been the most noted aspect of post-revolutionary Mexican politics. Since 1929 the PRI and its earlier manifestations, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) and the Partido la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), have overwhelmed opponents regularly to the extend that no other party has claimed the presidency, a governorship, or a senatorial seat in an election which the PRI contested. This unblemished record, which was detailed in Chapter Four, and the non-ideological character of Mexican public policy making, described in Chapter Three, have led observers to label Mexico's party system a "established one-party system"\(^1\) or a "hegemonic-pragmatic party system."\(^2\)

Such labels imply domination over other political forces for such a long time that observers can feel justified in calling the party system a one-party or a hegemonic party system. Yet, as Huntington argues, politics in one-party systems are not static; they have a dynamic component. Typically, Huntington suggests, such party systems pass though a sequence of stages, beginning with a transformation of the old society and polity, followed by a consolidation of power and

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finally a phase of adaptation. As recounted in Chapters Three and Four, Mexico's "revolutionary family" began to transform the Mexican society and polity even before the PNR was formed in 1929, then quickening the pace under Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. Following the sexenio of Cárdenas, more conservative members of Mexico's ruling elite effectively rebuffed the challenges to the PRM and later the PRI in a series of elections which, by 1952, established the clear hegemony of the PRI in the electoral sphere. Until 1968, the PRI's electoral dominance guaranteed that the hand-chosen successors to Mexican presidents and their hand-picked lieutenants would not only win elections but would be accorded the support due to legitimately-elected rulers. Only after 1968 has the PRI's dominance and its capacity to generate diffuse support for Mexico's political elite become problematic. In effect, the reforma política described in Chapter Five is a most prominent example of attempts at adaptation in this one-party or hegemonic party system, at modifying the rules of the political game so that the political elite does not have to fear losing power either constitutionally or extra-constitutionally.

By the early 1970s, Mexico's hegemonic party system had encountered challenges similar to those which Huntington suggests all such one-party systems, totalitarian or authoritarian, eventually must face:

In the third, adaptive phase, the party deals with legal-rational challenges to its authority which are, in large part, the product of its earlier successes. The creation of a relatively

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homogeneous society and the emergence of new social forces require the party to redefine its roles within that society. Four developments which the party must come to terms with are: (1) the emergence of a new, innovative, technical-managerial class; (2) the development of a complex group structure, typical of a more industrial society, whose interests have to be related to the political sphere; (3) the reemergence of a critical intelligentsia apart from and, indeed, increasingly alienated from the institutionalized structures of power; and (4) the demands by local and popular groups for participation in and influence over the political system.

The Mexican elite had long counted on the PRI to manage such difficulties. Its corporatist structure was supposed to deal with the demands of interest groups, satisfying some, but constraining more. Those seeking an opportunity to participate were to be recruited into the party through its clientelistic system of camarillas, their attitudes to be changed by a heavy dose of socialization within the party and by healthy opportunities to enrich themselves through appropriation of public funds. The party was counted upon to coopt intellectuals, too, if it were carefully monitoring societal developments. Public administrators were expected to join the party if they sought to advance in their careers.

Yet, by the early 1970s, the PRI was beginning to fail at all of these tasks. While able to constrain working-class and campesino demands, the PRI proved less capable of mediating and limiting the demands of the growing middle class. The successes of the 1968 student movement proved that the PRI could be by-passed by those intent upon non-electoral forms of participation; the events of the Echeverría sexenio outlined in Chapter Four confirmed that the PRI was not channeling all participants. Intellectuals increasingly rejected the

\[4\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 32-33.}\]
PRI in the early 1970s, preferring to form their own, as yet illegal, political groups and becoming increasingly strident in their criticism of Mexico’s rulers (see Chapter Five). Finally, a divorce between políticos and técnicos became increasingly apparent. Políricos, who operated mostly within the PRI, grew concerned that they were being ignored by the técnicos who occupied more and more of the positions in the state apparatus.

The reforma política contained provisions which seem to at least implicitly respond to the PRI’s deficiencies in meeting these challenges. The problem of participation was the subject of Chapter Six. Here it must be stressed that there was little desire on the part of President José López Portillo, Secretary of Gobernación Jesús Reyes Heroles, and their associates to allow that participation to force policy responses by the state. Rather, the hope was that additional participation would be channeled into futile efforts to win election races, efforts bound to be frustrated, but for which a reward of token representation in the Chamber of Deputies would be given, a form of representation that could not possibly lead to actual policy changes.5

The reforma política encouraged the new, critical, unco-optable intelligentsia to enter the electoral arena by forming and registering new parties on the left. In a sense, Reyes Heroles took a calculated risk here. On the one hand, since these intellectuals would be even more in the public eye than before and would receive even greater media attention than before, their critiques of the Mexican regime and the

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5 This seems to be the reason for the introduction of the 100 deputy seats awarded to minority parties based on proportionality.
governing elite would be more widely disseminated, possibly gaining greater adherence among the electorate. Of course, López Portillo hoped that the benefits of petroleum-produced prosperity would undercut this appeal of more radical elements on the left. On the other hand, though, Reyes Heroles thought it better to have such radical elements within the sphere of open contestation than to force them to operate outside of it.6

López Portillo and Reyes Heroles waged one more calculated bet. They wagered that despite the fact that Mexican society was now far more complex, that by the mid-1970s social pluralism had increased because of urbanization and industrialization, that still the growth of new groups less disposed to support the official party had not advanced so far that these new groups outweighed traditional bases of PRI support. Some of this pluralism, they recognized, would flow into the support bases of new parties. But they counted on some of the previous protest vote, which had generally been directed to the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), being redirected to the new parties. Thus, they calculated that dissatisfied voters, who tended to reflect the many groups of modern Mexico, would disperse the vote to various opposition parties, some old, some new. This was a classic divide and conquer strategy. The elite recognized that the bases of opposition were larger than before, but still not a majority. To minimize the effect of such opposition groups, it was better to disperse them and then

6This strategy has been used by authorities in other Latin American countries facing challenges to liberalize. See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
defeat them with the concentrated forces backing the PRI.

Finally, declining rates of electoral participation and declining margins of victory for the PRI might have indicated the growth of a new, more pluralistic Mexico, one less subject to control by the traditional methods of the PRI, which were more appropriate to a rural society. However, they were also symptoms of complacency in the PRI. That complacency may have come from over forty years of easy victories. It may also have been due to the growth of a technocracy in Mexico under Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría, a technocracy whose members did not arrive at their positions of high power because of their militancy in the PRI, but rather because of educational qualifications and bureaucratic experience. The result, though, was that those políticos who agitated within the PRI found their career goals frustrated when they were passed over in favor of técnicos. Diminished effort to advance the goals of the party would have been a rational response. The effort to legitimize the regime and the rule of the political elite through elections, though, required militancy by the PRI’s rank and file. In the late 1960 and early 1970s, those políticos were providing it with less vigor. Reyes Heroles apparently thought that by giving them more competition in the form of new, more ideologically challenging parties, and by denying them their reliance on fraud and coercion to create the appearances of vigor, the PRI rank and file would be forced to renovate itself, producing new and better local leaders to replace decrepid caciques, new candidates who could win on their merit, not by fraud and threats of violence.

To what extent have these efforts met with success? How has the
system of parties changed since 1977? Chapters Eight and Nine will detail the development of specific opposition parties. This chapter will assess the relative weight of the parties, comparing electoral results since 1977 to those from before the reforma política, considering the growth of opposition support since the reforma política, and analyzing the social bases of the official party and the opposition, both old and new, to determine if the reforma política has led to any realignment of social forces in Mexico.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE BY THE PRI SINCE THE REFORMA POLITICA

The PRI’s national vote share has now fallen to below 70 percent in federal deputy races. Table 7-1 shows that the PRI’s finishes in 1982 and 1985 left its vote share at about 8 to 9 percent below that of its previous worst finish in 1973. This seems to be the continuation of the trend observed for the period up through 1976 described in Chapter Four. The PRI continues to yield ground, but gradually. The PRI’s lost share has been divided by the various parties of the opposition, old and new. By 1982, the PAN had regained the ground lost when it abstained from the presidential race in 1976, so that it now officially receives 16-18 percent of the vote nationally, about the same as it did in 1973. This implies that the PRI’s lost percentage has gone to the new parties registered since 1977. In fact, because the official finishes of the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) have declined somewhat since the 1973 and 1976 races, the new parties have even a little more than the PRI’s lost percentage to divide among themselves.

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To date, the far right Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM) has garnered 2 to 3 percent, the collaborationist Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) has achieved about 2.5 percent, and the parties of the independent left have taken 5.5 to 6.5 percent. Overall, the new parties received 9.7 percent of the vote in 1979, 9.8 percent in 1982, and 11.8 percent in 1985. The introduction of new parties has thus not put the PRI’s life on the line in post-reforma política Mexico. To repeat, though, this was expected by those making the reforms. Indeed, the reforma política would not likely have been initiated if the left had been expected to do exceptionally well.

However, competition has surfaced in certain regions of Mexico, especially in the northern states and the states of the Bajío. This competition has come mostly, but not entirely, from the PAN. Table 7-2 provides a breakdown of PRI’s share of the vote by state. The converse of this measure is the degree of competition faced by the PRI in each state. Table 7-2 shows that few drastic drops in the PRI’s percentage were registered in 1979. Only Aguascalientes, Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Colima, and Jalisco registered levels of opposition voting greater by more than a couple percentage points than that ever achieved before. Of these, only Jalisco was a very populous state.

Since that first post-reforma política election, though, competition has grown in a number of other states. As of the 1985

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7 The Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM), earlier the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), and the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT). See Chapter Nine for a discussion of these parties.
federal elections, the PRI had fallen to below 70 percent of the vote in the following states: Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, Coahuila, the Federal District, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Mexico, Sonora, and Veracruz. Of these, Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, and Sonora are all in the north and the Pacific north. In other northern states, such as Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, Nuevo Léon, and Tamaulipas, the PRI's share was approaching 70 percent. The Bajío states of Jalisco and Guanajuato were among the below 70 percent group, and the other major Bajío state, Michoacán, had fallen dramatically to just above that level. In all of these states, with the exception of Tamaulipas, the PRI's competition came from the right, almost entirely from the PAN in the north, and from the PAN and the PDM in the Bajío (see Table 7-3 for 1985 results by party). Figure 7-1 displays the geographical concentration of PRI and opposition support for the 1982 presidential race. Figure 7-2 shows the geographical support bases of the PAN. In the Federal District and the adjoining state of Mexico, competition has been more dispersed. Indeed, the PAN has fallen on hard times in Mexico City, hardly increasing its total number of votes since 1973, and losing ground in percentage terms. The independent left has gained major support in the Mexico City area where the PSUM, the PMT, and the PRT together attained over 16 percent of the Federal District's votes and over 11 percent of the state of México's ballots. Finally, in Veracruz the PRI's competition has come mostly

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8 The heart of the Bajío is usually considered to be Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán; sometimes parts of the adjoining states of Aguascalientes, Colima, México, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas are included when references are made to the region.
from the left, the PPS, the PSUM, and the PST having performed relatively well there.

Increased competition in these regions is not only expressed by narrowing margins of victory for the PRI. The opposition has actually won victories in a handful of races in the 1980s. In the 1985 federal deputy races, opposition parties won eleven of the winner-take-all, single-member district races. Nine of these seats went to the PAN, four in Chihuahua and one each in Durango, México, Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Sonora. In addition, the PARM won two seats in Tamaulipas. All of these states fall into the regions mentioned above as loci of opposition strength: the north, greater Mexico City, and the Bajío.

Beyond national-level elections, there has been a growth of competitiveness in state- and local-level elections. These elections allow an opposition party an opportunity to concentrate its efforts and take advantage of local dissatisfaction with the PRI, or its current local leadership, or the domination of Mexico City to defeat the PRI.  

On the other hand, it is these elections which provide the patronage which the local PRI organization so badly requires to reward its activists, so the local PRI organization is often unwilling to yield its advantages and thus struggles violently against opposition

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9 This is not a particularly new phenomenon. Opposition candidates made a number of successful challenges to the PRI at the local level in the late 1950s and 1960s, notably in the cities San Luis Potosí, Hermosillo, and Mérida, all of which are state capitals. The sources of these challenges were mostly local problems caused by the local PRI's actions or impositions from Mexico City. Robert R. Bezdek, "Electoral Oppositions in Mexico: Emergence, Suppression, and Impact on Political Processes," Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973, esp. pp. 143-162.
challenges. Local elections can thus become highly charged contests.

Table 7-4 compares the performance of the PRI in state-level legislative races which took place in 1980 and 1983. In several states, even where the PRI brought out significantly larger number of voters in 1983, the PRI share of the vote fell dramatically. In some instances, in Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, and Veracruz, the PRI even lost votes. Again, the PRI’s failings came largely in the north, where the PAN gained at the PRI’s expense (this PAN advance also occurred in the PARM’s stronghold, Tamaulipas, because the PARM was ineligible to run candidates that year, having lost its national registration after the 1982 elections). In Veracruz, the beneficiaries included the PST and the PFS in addition to the PAN.

At the local level, the PRI conceded a number of mayoral and city council races to the opposition between 1980 and 1983. The PAN took the majority of these victories, but the PDM, the PSUM, and the PPS also did well (see Table 7-5). Most of these opposition victories were in small towns, but some came in important provincial cities, including Ciudad Juárez and the city of Chihuahua in the state of the same name (both to the PAN), Durango (PAN), San Luis Potosí (PAN and PDM in alliance), Hermosillo in Sonora (PAN), Juchitán in Oaxaca (PCM in alliance with a local group, COCEI),

10 Guanajuato (PDM), and Monclova in Coahuila (PAN). Chihuahua, Hermosillo, Durango, San Luis Potosí, 

and Guanajuato are all state capitals while Juárez is the fourth largest city in Mexico.\textsuperscript{11} Again, a regional concentration is evident: the PAN was most successful in the north and in the Bajío, the PDM succeeded in the Bajío, the parties of the left did better in the south and in Veracruz on the Gulf.

Opposition victories in state and local elections have all but disappeared since mid-1983. As many have observed, the local-level victories came about because new President Miguel De la Madrid chose to abide by the spirit of the reforma política in the first months of his presidency, then pulled back from it when it became apparent that the opposition challenge was much stronger than he originally thought.\textsuperscript{12} Because the De la Madrid administration chose to close the electoral opening, statistical indicators of competition, such as opposition victories or larger vote shares for the opposition, do not indicate the growth of competition since 1983. Both peaceful and violent demonstrations against the government because of alleged electoral fraud do indicate that competition is on the rise, especially in northern Mexico. Gubernatorial races in Sonora and Nuevo León in 1985 and in Chihuahua in 1986 were strongly contested by the PAN. The PRI won in all three cases, putting forward appealing candidates but also


engaging in undisguised electoral fraud on a huge scale. 13

But whether opposition victories are recognized or not, it is clear that the opposition is more competitive in certain venues today than it was before the reforma política. Certainly the reforma política does not deserve full credit for increased competition. Lower margins of victory for the PRI are a continuation of an historical trend, and the economic crisis which has gripped Mexico since 1981 has intensified opposition to the PRI among voters. However, the competition to the PRI offered by the left is new, and while of smaller proportions, arguably the left has cut into the PRI’s share of the vote in some areas where the PAN would not have done so were it the only opposition party, notably in Veracruz and other southern states. Indeed, the left has probably also siphoned off some PAN supporters in the Mexico City area, to the delight of the ruling elite. The reforma política also encouraged this new competition by forcing the PAN to participate (see Chapter Eight), thus giving the participationist forces in that party the upper hand. These participationist panistas are among the most confrontational panistas, which probably wins them support from voters inclined to cast a protest vote. 14 Furthermore,


the reforma política's emphasis on respect for the electorate's choice, while certainly not honored in all cases (as recent events have shown), has generated an expectation that competition will be permitted, encouraging parties to postulate candidates for election and voters to cast ballots for opposition nominees. Finally, provisions permitting election observers from opposition parties to take their places at polling places and become involved in the vote count has probably improved the accuracy of vote tallies, even in places where actual competition has not increased. Again, at times in certain places this has not been permitted, but in most urban areas these aspects of the reforma política have been carried out, improving the appearance of competition at least.

SOCIAL BASES OF ELECTORAL SUPPORT\textsuperscript{15} FOR AND OPPOSITION TO THE PRI

Because of the reforma política a number of new parties have joined Mexico's party system. We have just argued that for the most part this has not led to an acceleration of the erosion of PRI hegemony, although in some areas genuine PRI hegemony is no longer clearly there. But has the expansion of the party system caused a realignment of social forces in Mexican politics? This question will be considered through the use of two statistical techniques,\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15}By this I do not mean that those supporting the PRI electorally would not, given an opportunity, oppose the ruling elite in various ways politically, just that as the system operates today they provide the votes which elect PRI candidates and thereby keep the elite in power. Of course, given a breakdown of the regime, many of the means by which this electoral support is attained would no longer function adequately, most particularly the PRI's corporatist structure and the widespread network of caciques who control the countryside. In that case, many of those formerly shackled to the PRI electorally could become the base of a revolutionary effort to overthrow the old masters.
correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis, performed on aggregate electoral and census data at the level of the federal electoral district. The data come from four elections from before the reforma política (1967, 1970, 1973, and 1976) and from the three elections which have occurred since 1977 (1979, 1982, and 1985). These elections provide one election (1967) which took place before the repression of the 1968 student movement, one normal pre-reforma política presidential election (1970) and one crisis-charged pre-reforma política election (1976), one post-reforma política presidential election (1982) and two post-reforma política off-year elections, one of which took place during the petroleum boom (1979) and one during the height of the economic crisis which continues to this day (1985). They thus provide ample bases for comparison of Mexican electoral behavior at the aggregate level.

Correlation analysis. The PRI has been most successful electorally in districts with concentrations of those living in the countryside, with little or no education, largely engaged in agriculture, many of them still living in traditional communities and speaking indigenous languages. That is the message of Table 7-6. Very strong negative correlation coefficients emerge between PRI support and

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The appendix describes the data used and explains the choices of these two techniques. Basically, they are among the most simple statistical procedures for examining aggregate data of the type used here. The results of correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis are also the most easy to interpret, especially when dealing with data which can be transformed into percentages, as can votes and census data, and when using dichotomous variables. Moreover, those percentages (percent of the vote to a party) are very meaningful. The coefficients obtained in the regression equations using these variables have clear meaning, so that the coefficients are easier to explain than those which might be obtained using factor analysis, for instance.
variables tapping the modernization phenomena: urbanization (regardless of city size), literacy, higher levels of education, and industrialization. The correlation coefficients show that the districts in which the PRI has performed well are those with a large workforce engaged in agriculture, with large percentages of uneducated people, and where many still speak their native tongues. As articulated in Chapter Six, these are areas where caciques can still dominate and intimidate the local population.

An equally important message of Table 7-6 is that this has not changed as a result of the reforma política. The correlation coefficients for the years since the 1977 reforms are roughly the same as those for before the reforma política. Now these coefficients are

17. These results are similar to those reported in the earlier studies by Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party," American Political Science Review, 64, 1 (1970), pp. 153-167 and John Walton and Joyce A. Sween, "Urbanization, Industrialization and Voting in Mexico: A Longitudinal Analysis of Official and Opposition Party Support," Social Science Quarterly, 52, 3 (1971), pp. 721-745. Using state-level data (N=32) pooled from the period 1952-1967, Ames found strong negative correlations between PRI voting and urbanization (population in communities > 2,500) and modernization (as measured by the percent of the population benefitted by drinkable-water programs), with r=-.69 and -.65 respectively (p. 163). Walton and Sween's data came from the country's 318 largest municipios for the elections of 1961-67. They found their strongest correlations (again, negative) for PRI voting with urbanization and industrialization variables, for example, with these variables: percent urban in municipio (-.282 in the 1964 presidential race), literacy (-.255), electrical energy consumed (-.336), value of industrial production (-.323), percent nonagricultural labor (-.315), percent nonmanual labor (-.308), and percent professional and technical labor (-.249). (pp. 732-733) A more recent study by Rogelio Ramos Oranday, "Oposición y abstencionismo en las elecciones presidenciales, 1964-1982," in Las elecciones en México, edited by Pablo González Casanova (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1985), again using state-level data, this time from presidential elections only in the 1964-82 period, found the strongest correlations for opposition voting to be with industrialization (.74—measured by share of the EAP in industrial occupations), urbanization (.69—again the > 2,500 figure), median family income (.69), and literacy (.43). (p. 189)
based on aggregate data. They do not mean that majorities of individuals with the opposite characteristics do not also support the PRI. Indeed, the survey evidence that exists indicates that majorities, or at least overwhelming pluralities of individuals of all social groups identified the PRI as their party of choice in 1983 (see Table 7-7). These correlation coefficients in Table 7-6 do indicate the socioeconomic characteristics of districts in which the PRI does the best. That is, the PRI machine is most effective in rural districts whose residents are mostly engaged in agriculture, are less likely to be literate, and are more likely to be Indians. The survey evidence from Table 7-7 suggests the same: of the occupational strata other than those directly in the political elite or employed by them (Public Officials, Political Leaders, and Bureaucrats), peasants are the group most likely to be PRI sympathizers. As argued in Chapter Six, districts with the characteristics listed above are those most liable to cacique domination. One possible interpretation of the statistics in Table 7-6 is that the PRI still relies on caciques to produce majorities even larger than those which should be predicted based on the preferences of the districts’ residents alone; the survey

18 This survey’s director and its administrators were then working for the governor of the state of México, so some care should be taken in the interpretation of the evidence since it is possible that the respondents felt uneasy about rejecting the PRI as their preferred party. This is likely even though the survey director made no attempt to bias the results.

19 This result may obtain because peasants are most likely to be intimidated by the question “Which party do you like?” For electoral purposes, though, it does not matter whether the peasant votes for the PRI because of definite preference or intimidation—the PRI still wins overwhelmingly.
evidence in Table 7-7 may contradict the domination interpretation, but we do not know whether peasant responses are subject to intimidation bias.

Tables 7-8 and 7-9 illustrate the social bases of opposition party support. The social bases of both left and right opposition in Mexico seem to be the converse of those of the PRI. The opposition, both the PAN and the left, does better in districts which are urban, which are more industrialized, and which are populated by those with higher levels of education. Districts with concentrations of those speaking indigenous languages, with little or no schooling, and involved in agriculture are not strongholds of the opposition. Again, there seems to be little change in this relationship since the reforma política (at least for the PAN, for which we have data because it contested elections before 1977). The survey evidence in Table 7-7 indicates that the PAN scored well with people in the private sector (business executives and industrialists), housewives (who tend to be

20 The same message is given by Walton and Sween, "Urbanization, Industrialization and Voting in Mexico," pp. 732-733.

21 José Luis Reyna's state-level study of the 1952-67 elections (the elections were pooled in the same way as Ames's study), "An Empirical Analysis of Political Mobilization: The Case of Mexico," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1971, pp. 128 and 134, showed that opposition voting was positively correlated with the ratio measuring non-manual to manual occupations (.741) and negatively correlated with a measure of traditionalism, that is, the percentage of the population speaking Indian languages (-.386). The positive non-manual to manual correlation resulted from positive correlations between the shares of the workforce in the urban upper class (.498-managers, directors, professionals, and technicians), the urban middle class (.570-clerks and kindred people, salesmen), and the urban working class (.388) and opposition voting and a negative correlation (-.495) between the share of the workforce in the peasantry and opposition voting.
more religious than their husbands), and interestingly enough, blue collar workers. That employers and their employees both are more likely to be PAN sympathizers than other social strata suggests that class interests are not the basis, or at least the only basis, of PAN support. Perhaps the liberating atmosphere of urban, industrial settings is really what is being tapped here.

Something of a realignment of the social bases of support with opposition ranks can be delineated. For the PAN, there has been a slight reduction in the strength of the relationship between PAN electoral support and the urbanization variables, the post-primary education variable, and the services sector of the economy variable. The former two of these three are among the variables most strongly correlated with voting for the left, particularly the independent left (the decline of the PAN coefficients for services sector may simply be due to changes in census categories). This is in accord with others' observations that the independent left (especially the PMT and the PRT) only does well in very large cities and especially among intellectuals in the universities and that the PAN may be expanding its support among the discontented in general (see Chapters Eight and Nine for more extensive discussion).

Within the left, the addition of two new parties in the independent left, the PRT for the 1982 elections and the PMT for the 1985 elections, has encouraged a division of the social bases of left support. This can be observed by examining Tables 7-9 and 7-10. The noteworthy observation in Table 7-9 is that whereas the correlations between Total Left voting and variables measuring urbanization,
traditional culture, economic sector, social class, and some measures of education all decline in strength from 1979 to 1985, the correlations between Independent Left and those same variables either do not fall or fall less drastically. The implication is that the independent left continues to tap those sources of support mentioned above, but the collaborationist left (PST and PPS) does not. In fact, as Table 7-10 shows, the social bases of the PST and the PPS are something of a mystery. Nearly every variable shows no statistically significant relationship to PPS and PST electoral support. Only the variables measuring indigenous language speaking show much correlation with PPS and PST voting, and that correlation is in the positive direction, suggesting either that the PPS and the PST also practice caciquismo, or that they become organizational bases of the caciques who leave the PRI, or that they have undermined some caciques and stolen their support. These two parties would prefer the latter interpretation, but their opponents more often level one of the former two. On the other hand, the PRT and the PMT do particularly well in the cities, in districts with the highest levels of education and the largest percentages of the workforce in industry or services. The correlations between PRT and PMT support and those variables are even higher than those for PSUM voting and those variables.

Multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression allows us to go beyond correlation analysis to ascertain which distinct factors contribute to the support bases of these parties and with how much strength they do so when controlling for the contributions of the other variables. Each of the many variables listed as explanatory variables
in Tables 7-6 through 7-10 do not measure distinct factors. Many of those explanatory variables are in fact highly intercorrelated; they tap the same forces (see Appendix Tables A-4 and A-5). The task here is to separate out the distinct social characteristics of those districts which more strongly support the PRI and those which more strongly support the opposition. 22

The difficulty with using aggregate-level data to examine political cleavages as they are reflected in electoral preferences is that it is impossible to identify in aggregate certain salient cleavages. In the case of Mexico, three factors that could potentially affect party preference at election time cannot be separated out from aggregate data: gender, age, and religious practice. Gender and age are so evenly dispersed geographically that electoral districts do not differ significantly in the shares of the population divided into male and female or various age groups. They must therefore be dropped from the analysis, although age cohort (especially in relation to the events of 1968) is likely to be an important factor determining a voter's inclination to vote for the opposition. Some survey evidence about gender and age as indicators of PRI and PAN sympathies have been presented by Charles L. Davis and Kenneth M. Coleman 23 and reprinted in

22 Factor analysis would be the best way to separate out these factors, but it seems possible to separate out conceptually distinct factors both conceptually and statistically without factor analysis here, so I have foregone factor analysis since it tends to create variables for which the regression coefficients have no concrete contextual meaning.

Table 7-11. These data are not from a panel study, so trends over time cannot be definitely identified, although tendencies might be noted. One major conclusion from Table 7-11 must be that women in Mexico were less likely to admit a party preference, at least before 1973. Otherwise, at least in Mexico City, no major difference appears between men’s and women’s political party preferences. Another major conclusion might be that older people came to be more supportive of the PRI than the younger generation. This might be a result of the 1968 student movement’s repression by the Díaz Ordaz government. Finally, it appears that all voters, male and female, young and old, became more willing to admit sympathies with the PAN over the fifteen-year period covered by these surveys. But overall, age and gender differences do not seem to be major sources of partisan preference in Mexico, at least not Mexico City of the late 1950s through the early 1970s.

As Chapter Three argued, the church-state issue was a source of violent conflict in the 1920s; the PAN began as a vehicle for Catholic political action and the PDM is the political heir of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista, itself founded by veterans of the Cristero Rebellion. Thus, it is likely that strong Catholics will differ from their more secular countrymen on political party preference. However, because almost all Mexicans are nominally Catholic, and because the census does not ask the counted whether they practice their faith or not, no information is available about the distribution of practicing Catholics by electoral district. Coleman’s survey evidence from a 1969 survey in Mexico City (N=405), and Davis’s 1973 survey in Mexico City (N=346).
sample of Mexico City residents questioned in 1973 suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between religiosity and voting for the PAN, at least not in Mexico City. 24 Whether that is true of voters in the Bajío is unclear. Again, this factor must be dropped from the analysis to be performed here.

The factors we are left with are in one way or another related to modernization phenomena, region, and political mobilization (as measured by participation rates). Regarding the modernization phenomena, we can conceptually distinguish factors that relate to place of residence (rural or urban, the degree of urbanization), occupation (sector of the economy, place in the occupational hierarchy), and education. While these factors are themselves correlated, they are probably not so highly correlated as to produce multicollinearity in a regression model, thus introducing bias into the estimates for the regression coefficients (see Appendix). However, no more than one variable measuring each of these factors should be used in the model.

Tables 7-12 through 7-19 report the results of regressions performed on different variations of the following models:

1. \[ \text{Direction of Vote} = f(\text{Urbanization, Industrialization, Education}), \]
2. \[ \text{Direction of Vote} = f(\text{Urbanization, Industrialization, Education, Participation}). \]

Industrialization, measured by the percent of the workforce in the

secondary sector of the economy, was chosen as the independent variable to tap the occupation factor because it was less correlated with the other independent variables than was the percent of the workforce in the primary sector and because it seemed to have greater interpretive meaning than did the percent in the tertiary sector. The measure of urbanization used was the percent of the population living in localities of greater than 20,000 population. This cutoff was used because 20,000 seemed to measure a more urban experience than did lower cutoffs and because it produced less multicollinearity with the other modernization variables. Two separate measures of education were tried: the percent without any education, essentially a measure of the lack of education, and the percent with some post-primary education, to provide a measure of the highest levels of education. Participation is defined as the quotient of total valid votes divided by the total of potential voters.

The regression equations shown in Tables 7-12 to 7-19 can be interpreted in the following way: the predicted vote for the PRI (Tables 7-12 to 7-15) or for the PAN (Tables 7-16 to 7-19) in a particular district equals (1) the constant (2) plus or minus the regression coefficient for the percent of the workforce in industry multiplied by the percent of the workforce in industry in that district (3) plus or minus the regression coefficient for urbanization multiplied by the percent of the population living in localities of greater than 20,000 in that district (4) plus or minus the regression coefficient for the education variable used in that equation multiplied by the actual percent of the population in that district having that
The educational characteristic and, if included, \( (5) \) plus or minus the regression coefficient for participation multiplied by the percent of the potential electorate voting in that district. The difference between the actual percent for the PRI or the PAN and that party's predicted finish (from the regression equation) is the residual. The statistic \( R^2 \) is a measure of the goodness of fit between the predicted values and the actual values for the direction of the vote. \( F \) is a measure of the statistical significance of the regression equation; all regressions using the modernization and participation variables were highly significant.

The region factor was entered into the analysis through an examination of the residuals of regressions performed on the variables defined above. The reason for this is that much of the regional variation in the direction of the vote is due to variance in the other explanatory variables, which themselves vary greatly by region. By using region as a factor to explain the residual variance in the direction of the vote, we are essentially saying that region either does or does not explain variance in the direction of the vote after the other factors have been accounted for, that is, that the regional variation in the vote is greater than (or not greater than) that which can be explained by the differences in modernization of the regions.

The analysis performed on the residuals of the initial regression equations is a standard multiple regression analysis in which the

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independent variables are dichotomous variables indicating whether an individual district is in the region (= 1) or not in the region (= 0). All regions except one are entered into the equation (one must be left out to avoid perfect collinearity in the model). The regression coefficient for any particular region, then, simply measures how much the constant should be increased or decreased for districts falling in that region. The constant itself is functionally equal to the regression coefficient for the region not included in the regression equation, which in this case was the Federal District (D.F.). By adding the regression coefficient for a region to that listed for the D.F., one obtains the average residual of the first regression for districts in that region. If that sum (X) is negative and statistically significant, one can say that the first equation overestimated the actual PRI or PAN vote in that region by an average of X percent.\(^{26}\) As an examination of Tables 7-12 to 7-19 show, in some cases the underestimate or overestimate of the first equation was relatively large, on the order of 5 to 6 percent, meaning that regional factors explain a significant amount of variance in the vote even after other factors have been accounted for.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) Residual is defined as the actual value minus the predicted value, so a positive residual is an underestimate and a negative residual is an overestimate.

\(^{27}\) Another way of determining whether regional factors matter after other explanatory variables have been accounted for is to perform an analysis of variance on the residuals of the first equation using a variable which measures region as the explanatory variable. This would produce an F statistic which, if statistically significant, would allow us to say that region does or does not account for variance in the direction of the vote after the other variables have been accounted for. However, because the F-statistic for the ANOVA test is equal to the F-statistic obtained in the analyses done on the residuals in

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Tables 7-12 and 7-13 show that as much as 70 percent of the variance in the PRI vote (measured by $R^2$) can be explained by the three variables measuring modernization and that for the most part each of the three has an independent effect on the size of the PRI share of the vote even controlling for the effects of the other two (this is shown by the statistical significance of the regression coefficients). These variables have the same effect on the PRI vote described above in the section on correlation analysis: urban and industrial settings tend to depress the PRI vote as does the presence of larger concentrations of those with higher education; higher shares of uneducated voters bodes well for the PRI. Adding participation as an explanatory variable (Tables 7-14 and 7-15) increases the amount of the variance explained by the model, but not appreciably (compare $R^2$ for each equation in Table 7-12 with its equivalent in Table 7-14; likewise for Tables 7-13 and 7-15).\(^2\)

One notable observation can be made about the addition of the participation variable: its most pronounced effect was felt in 1976, in which the regression coefficient is positive and highly significant statistically and in which it increases the explanatory power of the model by about 3 percent. As shown in Chapter Six (Tables 6-1 and 6-2), the 1976 election witnessed a dramatic emergence of a party of non-voters identifiable by socioeconomic characteristics.

\(^{28}\) The $R^2$ reported is the $R^2$ adjusted for degrees of freedom in the equation, which is always less than the unadjusted $R^2$. It is possible that reducing the degrees of freedom by adding another explanatory variable would offset the improved explanatory power of the additional independent variables in the model.
Indeed, abstention was the major issue in the 1976 election and this show up in the regression results reported in Tables 7-12 to 7-15. Perhaps the ruling elite feared the party of non-voters for good reason. Overall though, no trend emerges over time in the importance of the three modernization factors. They are important predictors of PRI success and have been so for the eighteen-year interval examined here.

The analysis of the residuals of these models produces more critical results, though. The regional bases of PRI strength have changed. In Tables 7-12 to 7-15, the regression coefficients for each region other than the D.F. were positive and usually highly significant in the elections prior to 1976. For the 1976 election, not even the regression equation for regional factors is significant, much the less the individual regional variables. This again points to an interpretation of the 1976 election which argues that in the crisis atmosphere of 1976 the socioeconomic lines were drawn more sharply with the result that regional and other factors were relatively unimportant. Since the 1976 election, regional factors have resurged somewhat in importance to the PRI, but not much. Whereas before 1976 the PRI was underperforming in Mexico City and overperforming everywhere else, including in the north and the Pacific North, more recently it has not exceeded the performance predicted by the modernization factors or the modernization factors plus participation except in the south and in the Gulf region. Perhaps only in the center (which includes the states of the Bajio plus the states of Mexico and Puebla, all of which are populous) is the PRI underperforming. The conclusion is that
regionally the PRI has come to rely more and more on support in the
states of the south and the Gulf (Figure 7-1 certainly shows a
geographical concentration of PRI support in the Gulf and South) and
has given up ground in the north and in the center but overall region
is a less salient source of PRI support; the socioeconomic bases of
electoral support for the PRI—rural, agricultural, backward Mexico,
the Mexico that can still be controlled by the PRI machine or
hoodwinked by its politicians' rhetoric—have grown more important.

Tables 7-16 through 7-19 provide further, though different,
evidence to bolster the conclusion that the regional bases of support
for the PRI and the PAN have shifted since 1977. Two trends can be
discerned in Tables 7-16 through 7-19. First, the capacity of the
regression models using modernization factors alone or modernization
factors plus participation to predict the PAN's share of the vote has
declined since the reforma política. The scores for $R^2$ in all four
equations are lower for the years 1979 through 1985 than for the years
1970 through 1976. The PAN's vote must be explained by something in
addition to modernization factors. Second, the regional variance in
overestimation and underestimation of the PAN vote has changed
dramatically in 1979, 1982, and 1985. Before 1976, these models tended
to underestimate the PAN's finish in the Federal District and

29 In another paper I have argued that the predictability of the
PAN vote declined in 1985 from 1982 partly because of PRI cheating in
some more advanced states such as Sonora, Coahuila, and Nuevo León.
"The 1985 Mexican Elections." However, the PRI regularly committed
fraud before 1977, and the elections were relatively clean in 1979 and
1982, but still the 1979 and 1982 $R^2$ scores were lower than those for
1970 through 1976. Thus, I am willing to conclude that these
differences are not just due to fraud.
overestimate it everywhere else. That suggests that the PAN was overperforming in Mexico City, that its supporters were overly concentrated in Mexico City. Since the *reforma política*, the PAN has underperformed in Mexico City and is overperforming in the Pacific north, the north, and the center. The PAN has moved its regional base to the north and into the Bajío and other states in the center. Figure 7-2 provides additional graphical evidence to support the conclusion that the PAN is moving north.

If the PAN has for a long time been the recipient of protest votes, as many argue, then the *reforma política* and events since then have dramatically changed the way in which the protest votes are cast and the sources from which they come. The PAN no longer receives all the votes of the discontented, which is the main reason why the explanatory power of the regression equations reported in Tables 7-16 to 7-19 has declined since 1977. The PAN has come to specialize in attracting opposition voters in certain areas, most notably the Pacific North, the North, and to a lesser extent, the Center (especially the Bajío). The *reforma política* can in a sense be given the credit (or blame) for the PAN's mediocre performance in Mexico City since 1977. The PAN has lost many discontented Mexico City residents to parties of the left, including the PSUM, the PMT, and the PRT. Whereas these discontented Mexico City residents formerly cast a protest vote, a negative vote for the PAN, they now cast a positive vote for the left.

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The growth of support for the PAN outside of Mexico City is less due to the *reforma política* than to the PAN's message, especially the PAN's new message. As Chapter Eight describes, the PAN has become more stridently free-market oriented and anti-statist in its rhetoric because of changes in the composition of the PAN leadership. This new leadership is more confrontational and participationist in approach than its predecessors. The *reforma política* has encouraged that confrontational and participationist element within the PAN, but the appeal of its anti-statist rhetoric is more due to the development of dissatisfaction with the populism of Echeverría and López Portillo than anything else (see Chapter Three). This message has greater appeal in the north where the private sector is strongly represented and because people in the north have traditionally distrusted the Mexican state centered in Mexico City, which they suspect has favored the campesino and worker masses of the center and south at the expense of northerners. The confrontational approach also seems to be more appealing to northerners, who many other Mexicans describe simply as being "muy hombre." The PAN is now more strongly represented in the north by people from the north. This produces electoral success in the north beyond that which we might predict by the north's levels of modernization alone.

Assuming that no political explosion is produced by the continuing economic crisis in Mexico, a couple of different electoral scenarios are suggested by this analysis of post-*reforma política* elections. The first is a continuation of the trends identified above. That may mean
an even greater regionalization of support for the principal opposition party, the PAN. Whether its victories are recognized or not, this option is potentially dangerous for the ruling elite. It does not threaten to undermine the PRI’s capacity to elect the elite’s presidential nominee nor does it threaten PRI control of the federal congress. It does create the possibility that the northern states could come under PAN control. Those in the PRI fear that conceding a loss in any gubernatorial election in the north could produce this result and that the precedent it would set for the rest of the country could erode PRI hegemony everywhere. If PAN victories are not recognized, an equally dangerous possibility could be created: a radicalized north. There is some evidence that the PRI’s declared triumphs in 1985 and 1986 is pushing northern Mexicans in this direction. Significantly, anger over electoral chicanery in the north has not spilled over to other parts of Mexico. Whether PAN victories are recognized or not, the danger is a Mexico divided on territorial lines in which secessionist sentiments can find sympathy.

It seems unlikely that the PAN’s electoral success will extend beyond these regional bases. While the PAN has increased its vote share in some areas outside of the north since the reforma política, for the most part the PAN’s growth has been limited to the north and some center states, especially those in the Bajío. The PAN has been stymied in Mexico City since the introduction of new leftist parties, a result which cannot be attributed to electoral fraud. Thus, the possibility that Mexico could develop into a two-party system with the PAN as the second party is slim. Indeed, one reason for the opening to
the left in the reforma política was to divert protest votes away from the PAN in a classic divide-and-conquer strategy. In the reforma política Reyes Heroles confronted the challenges of the growth of a more complex group structure and the emergence of a critical intelligentsia by discouraging intellectuals from concentrating their effort in the two channels most dangerous to the elite: a single, efficacious party of opposition (PAN) and non-electoral, violent forms of participation. If new social groups were to be represented politically, for the PRI it would be better not to channel those groups into a single catch-all party of opposition. Thus far it appears that in the country as a whole, these goals of the reforma política have succeeded. In the north, the PAN has perhaps overcome these roadblocks.

A second scenario does predict the emergence of a two-party system, but not with the PAN or some collected party of the left as the second party. Rather, it is clear that the PRI itself still has a sufficiently large electoral base to support two parties. The PRI’s effective control of the masses through corporatism and clientelistic networks has denied those masses to the left. Presumably any successors of the PRI will not abandon these organizational advantages, although if a left version of the PRI and a right version (or a labor-based party and a non-labor-based party) were to be born they would have to divide up these organizational components of the old party.

The exact division of the current PRI into different potential parties is difficult to define. The Labor Sector would certainly form a powerful base for any new party, but whether the Peasant and Popular
Sectors could do so is less clear. Tensions between políticos and técnicos have not been resolved through the reforma política or any other reform of the party or the regime. Técnicos have been unwilling to share important government positions with políticos, but have not been very effective at producing electoral legitimacy for themselves. While políticos could form the militant base of a new party, técnicos probably could not and probably would not want to do so. Any pair of successors to the PRI is likely to have both políticos and técnicos. Certainly having more competition such as a divided PRI could produce would encourage better candidate selection, whether those candidates are políticos or técnicos. When faced with challenges from the PAN in the northern gubernatorial races, the PRI has responded by nominating more attractive and qualified candidates, some veteran políticos, some técnicos.

Dividing the PRI, though, would significantly change the nature of Mexican politics. As I have argued at length in this study, reform measures such as the reforma política are introduced because the relatively unified Mexican elite wants to continue its hegemony, not to fall divided. Dividing the PRI would imply dividing the political elite. Some would lose their relatively secure access to state positions; some could be forced into permanent opposition. Despite tensions in Mexico’s revolutionary family, this is not an attractive option for everyone even if it might become liberating for many common Mexicans currently faced with the choice between a vote for the elite or a protest vote for one of the many parties of opposition. Dividing the PRI would be a last-resort response to the impossibility of
continuing to channel a majority of Mexicans into the PRI and a defeatable minority into other parties destined to remain minority parties.
Table 7-1
FEDERAL DEPUTY ELECTION RESULTS
1961-1985

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<th>PARM</th>
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Annulled votes have been excluded as have votes for two minor parties, the PNM in 1961 and the PSD in 1982, to facilitate greater comparability of party shares from year to year.

### Table 7-2

**PERCENTAGES OF THE VALID VOTE TO PRI**

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Sources: See Table 7-1; Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.
### Table 7-3

**Percentages of Valid Votes Cast, 1985**

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Percentages for unregistered candidates not included.

Source: Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Table 7-4

PRI VOTE IN STATE-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE RACES, 1980 AND 1983

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<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>North</td>
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<td>103,934</td>
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<td>North</td>
<td>188,889</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>242,258</td>
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<td>North</td>
<td>44,361</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>44,295</td>
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<td>Gulf</td>
<td>55,555</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>88,923</td>
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<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>221,618</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>189,943</td>
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<td>North</td>
<td>196,501</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>162,067</td>
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<td>South</td>
<td>320,877</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>389,266</td>
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<td>81.9</td>
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*Michoacán is in the Bajío region.

Table 7-5

OPPOSITION VICTORIES IN LOCAL RACES, 1980-1983

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STATES IN WHICH OPPOSITION VICTORIES TOOK PLACE

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Table 7-6

Correlations between Electoral Support for PRI and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1985*

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<td>-.78</td>
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<td>-.67</td>
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<td>-.73</td>
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<td>-.78</td>
<td>-.78</td>
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<td>-.75</td>
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<td>-.69</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>-.71</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>-.77</td>
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<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
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<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>-.71</td>
<td>-.78</td>
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<td>-.62</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>-.63</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.63</td>
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<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
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<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
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<td>.33</td>
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<td>-.64</td>
<td>-.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
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<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>-.74</td>
<td>-.69</td>
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<td>% with Primary Education</td>
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<td>.22</td>
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*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N varies because of missing data and changes in electoral districts. Range of N = 159 to 290. All correlations significant at .02 level. All correlations > .24 significant at .001 level.
Table 7-6 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Support for PRI and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1985*

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<tr>
<td>% EAP in Primary</td>
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<td>.80</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>% EAP in Secondary</td>
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<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.77</td>
<td>-.79</td>
<td>-.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>% EAP in Tertiary</td>
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<td>-.44</td>
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<td>-.67</td>
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<td>-.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Service Workers</td>
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<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Popular (Peasants, Rural Workers)</td>
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<td>.83</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.78</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Non-Manual Workers</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NB: The 1970 census does not divide occupational categories sufficiently to make class categories comparable to that possible for the 1980 census. These are thus excluded from the analysis.
Table 7-7
Survey Evidence Regarding Party Sympathies by Occupational Strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
<th>NONE</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Executives</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Leaders</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrialists</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<td>Professionals</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Students</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar Workers</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginals</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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</table>


Note: Some occupational categories and parties have been deleted from this table in order to facilitate legibility. For the complete response set, see the source. The question asked was "What political party do you like?" The survey was carried out in 1983 in all 32 states. Total N = 7051.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td>% in localities of ≥ 2,500</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.54</td>
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<td>.60</td>
<td>.52</td>
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<td>% in localities of ≥ 5,000</td>
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<td>.78</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 10,000</td>
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<td>.72</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
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<td>.65</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.60</td>
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<td>.63</td>
<td>.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Migrants</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Primary Education</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N varies because of missing data and changes in electoral districts. Range of N = 159 to 290. All correlations significant at .02 level. All correlations > .24 significant at .001 level.
Table 7-8 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Support for PAN and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1967-1985*

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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Primary</td>
<td>-.70</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.82</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>-.71</td>
<td>-.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Secondary</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Tertiary</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.49</td>
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</table>
Table 7-9
Correlations between Electoral Support for Left and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Left**</th>
<th>Independent Left**</th>
<th>PSUM 1985</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% in localities of &gt; 2,500</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of &gt; 5,000</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of &gt; 10,000</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of &gt; 20,000</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrants</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
<td>-.53</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Primary Education</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N varies because of missing data and changes in electoral districts. Range of N = 231 to 290. All correlations > .24 significant at .001 level.
### Table 7-9 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Support for Left and Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1979-1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Left**</th>
<th>Independent Left**</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Primary</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Secondary</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Tertiary</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Occupation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Upper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Professional, Managerial)</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Middle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Service Workers</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Popular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Peasants, Rural Workers)</td>
<td>-.63</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>-.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Non-Manual Workers</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7-10

Correlations between Electoral Support for Left Parties and
and PDM with Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>PMT</th>
<th>PST</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>PDM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 2,500</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 5,000</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 10,000</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in localities of ≥ 20,000</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrants</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking indigenous languages</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% speaking no Spanish</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with No Schooling</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Post-Primary Education</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Primary Education</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients. N varies because of missing data and changes in electoral districts. Range of N = 231 to 290. All correlations > .24 significant at .001 level; > .09 significant at .05 level.
Table 7-10 (continued)

Correlations between Electoral Support for Left Parties and PDM with Selected Social and Economic Variables, 1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>PMT</th>
<th>PST</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>PDM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Primary</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>% EAP in Secondary</td>
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<td>.51</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EAP in Tertiary</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
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<td>Social Class (Occupation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Upper (Professional, Managerial)</td>
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<td>.45</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
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<td>Urban Middle (Admin., Supervisory)</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Working Class</td>
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<td>.51</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Service Workers</td>
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<td>.54</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Popular (Peasants, Rural Workers)</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Non-Manual Workers</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
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</table>
Table 7-11
Survey Evidence Regarding Gender and Age as Indicators of PRI and PAN Sympathies, 1958-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>Nonaligned</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>Nonaligned</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>49.3</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<td>25.8</td>
<td>54.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Over 30</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
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Table 7-12

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PRI

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

<table>
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONSTANT</th>
<th>% in Industry</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% without Education</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>N=</th>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>84.14</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.46</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>93.35</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td>.56</td>
<td>73.51</td>
<td>168</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td></td>
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Table 7-12 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. \( F \) in regression on residuals is equivalent to \( F \) obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % without education = % never attending school.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PRI

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Table 7-13 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. F in regression on residuals is equivalent to F obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % post-primary education = % ever attending post-primary school.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Table 7-14

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PRI

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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(continued)
Table 7-14 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION**

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS**

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. F in regression on residuals is equivalent to F obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % without education = % never attending school. Participation = total votes divided by potential electorate.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Table 7-15

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PRI

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>% in Industry</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Post-Primary Education</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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(continued)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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444
### Table 7-15 (continued)

**MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PRI ELECTORAL SUPPORT**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION**

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS**

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. $F$ in regression on residuals is equivalent to $F$ obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % post-primary education = % ever attending post-primary school. Participation = total votes divided by potential electorate.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Table 7-16
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PAN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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<th>% in Industry</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% without Education</th>
<th>R²</th>
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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(continued)
Table 7-16 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. F in regression on residuals is equivalent to F obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % without education = % never attending school.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Table 7-17

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PAN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONSTANT</th>
<th>% in Industry</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Post-Primary Education</th>
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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(continued)
Table 7-17 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. \( F \) in regression on residuals is equivalent to \( F \) obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

\% in industry = \% of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. \% urban = \% of population in localities > 20,000. \% post-primary education = \% ever attending post-primary school.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

### Table 7-18

**MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE = \( \% \) OF VOTE TO PAN**

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:**

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<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% without Education</th>
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**DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION**

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS**

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(continued)
Table 7-18 (continued)

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels of regression coefficients in parentheses. F in regression on residuals is equivalent to F obtained in one-way analysis of variance using region as the explanatory variable.

% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % without education = % never attending school. Participation = total votes divided by potential electorate.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Table 7-19

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = % OF VOTE TO PAN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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452
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = RESIDUAL OF ABOVE REGRESSION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE FOR REGIONS

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</table>

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% in industry = % of EAP in manufacturing, construction, and utilities sectors. % urban = % of population in localities > 20,000. % post-primary education = % ever attending post-primary school. Participation = total votes divided by potential electorate.

Independent variables chosen from the census closest to the election year.

Figure 7-1

Vote for the PRI in 1982 Federal Deputy Races; Regional Aspects

KEY:

- 90.0 %
- 90.0 - 89.9 %
- 70.0 - 79.9 %
- ≤ 70.0 %
Figure 7-2
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
OF PAN SUPPORT 1970-1985

KEY:

- < 15.0 %
- 15.0-24.9 %
- > 25.0 %

MAP 1: 1970

MAP 2: 1982

MAP 3: 1985
"That which opposes, supports." Jesús ReyesHeroles made this point when discussing the political parties of the Mexican regime. His political reform initiative was designed, in part, to foster that opposition which would support the Mexican regime into the 1980s. To Reyes Heroles, the regime dimension of political competition did not provide the level of competition necessary to encourage channelment of Mexican social pluralism into the electoral arena. He did not, though, seek to overturn the electoral hegemony of the Mexican political elite's electoral organ, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); he simply sought to encourage enough electoral competition to channel undirected political participation and to re legitimate the electoral hegemony of the PRI. Reyes Heroles was, in 1977, greatly concerned that no such supportive opposition was participating legally in the Mexican political process. Many provisions of the electoral legislation passed in 1977 were designed to encourage the development of relatively autonomous parties of opposition, perhaps not parties which could really defeat the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, but parties which could at least provide coherent ideologies of opposition so that elections would not look like shams. In that way the opposition would, by opposing, support the continued rule of the political elite that had, through various generations, governed Mexico.
since the Revolution.

This chapter and the next seek to address a simple question: How has the opposition developed since the reforma política of 1977? Chapter Seven analyzed the electoral success of and the bases of electoral support for the opposition since the reform in the quest to provide a view of the electoral evolution of the party system as a whole. This chapter and Chapter Nine will take a micro view, investigating the development of the individual parties of the Mexican opposition. How have they evolved since 1977? Do they provide effective competition, at least effective enough to be indirectly supportive of the ruling elite’s dominance? To what extent are changes within them due to the reforma política, to what extent are they due to changes in the political environment not associated with that reform? What is the likely future of these parties? Do they present credible and popular opposition to the PRI?

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE OPPOSITION

A host of intriguing and critical questions present themselves to the analyst of political oppositions. To give order to the investigations to follow, I have chosen to borrow and modify the framework provided by Robert Dahl in the seminal study on oppositions which he edited.1 Dahl’s framework was intended to facilitate comparison of oppositions across countries. Because I seek to compare opposition parties within one country, some modifications are in order.

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However, the issues raised by Dahl are by and large as applicable to single parties as to the whole opposition seen as a unity. The points for comparison that I will use in this chapter, as modified from Dahl, are listed in Table 8-1.

An initial point of comparison, although of lesser significance than for the comparison of oppositions across nations, is the organizational cohesion of an opposition party. The opposition, in Mexico, is divided into several parties so as a whole the Mexican opposition demonstrates little concentration. But to go further, how unified are those different parties? Are they more than coalitions of slightly like-minded individuals who have joined together to present candidates for election? Do they present organizational strength which can withstand electoral failure and governmental harassment?

Secondly, how competitive is a party electorally? This, of course, begs the further question, how does one measure competition in Mexico? For my purposes here, it may be sufficient to consider that competitiveness may vary between two poles. One pole would be to be sufficiently competitive to be able to defeat the PRI in a number of federal deputy or gubernatorial elections, that is, to be able to truly challenge for control of the organs of the state. The other pole would be as a disunity. Dahl’s first point of comparison is "the organizational cohesion or concentration of opponents" which can, of course, range from completely unified, as in a two-party democracy with great internal party discipline, as Great Britain may once have been, to very disunified, which could mean a multiparty system with little party unity and (although Dahl does not discuss this alternative) nonparty opposition groups. Ibid., pp. 332-336. It will be worthwhile to examine this point at the end of the next chapter, but for purposes of comparing the parties it is less essential except perhaps to address the problem of intra-party factionalism.
be to be competitive enough not to be eliminated from national elections, that is, to be able to continue to present the party's ideological and programmatic perspectives to a national audience. If any party or parties become strong enough to approach the first pole, Mexico will have evolved into a competitive multiparty or two-party democracy. So long as some parties remain strong enough so as not to slip below the level measured by the second pole, at least multiple perspectives will be offered in the electoral setting, a minimum for a pacific pluralistic polity even if no real chance of alternation in power exists.

The setting in which the opposition parties and those controlling the state confront each other is due to at least two critical factors. The first relates to the characteristics of the political system, that is, aspects of the regime itself (especially in the sense of the written and unwritten rules of the game) as well as characteristics of the party system. The second factor is the goals of the opposition parties. Different sites of competition or confrontation may be chosen depending upon the ultimate goals of a party.³ The reforma política had the objective of modifying those aspects of the Mexican regime which affected the party system in the hope that by doing so the goals of the unregistered political parties might be deflected away from revolutionary (or reactionary) change. A corollary of that objective was to encourage these parties to shift the setting of their encounter with the authorities from clandestine activities and the creation of interest associations parallel to those monopolized by the state into a

³Ibid., p. 347.
Political parties and other opposition groups can be identified or make themselves distinctive in a number of ways. First, they can borrow or develop, then disseminate, an ideology which provides an explanation of political and socioeconomic reality and a programmatic prescription for how to operate within it to change that reality or maintain the status quo. The elaborateness of these ideologies is bound to differ across political parties. Second, parties may promote the leadership potential of particular individuals. Some parties are little more than personal machines of individuals while others try to discount individual leadership to favor organizational and ideological development. Third, parties may seek to represent particular social groups and some may succeed at capturing the electoral support of particular groups. Thus, parties may become associated with certain interests. The interests represented by a party may be very broad and inclusive or very narrow and exclusive.

Without doubt, the long-term policy goals of the opposition parties differ greatly. Most times these goals are identified in a party’s ideology. Whether those goals are created and motivated by the ideology or whether the ideology is developed to rationalize the goals of a party’s leaders or the interests they represent is open to inquiry. Mexican parties do differ in the extent to which their goals are ideologically motivated.

The short- and medium-term strategies of opposition parties will in part be dictated by the long-term goals they espouse. Strategies, though, must also be determined by the setting chosen by party for its
confrontation with those in power. The setting selected, in turn, will depend on aspects of the regime, both legally and extra-legally defined, on characteristics of the party and the party system as a whole, and again, on the long-term goals embraced by the party. The range of strategies available to opposition groups in Mexico includes following the electoral path or avoiding it, seeking to win local electoral positions or focusing on national elections, simply trying to disseminate its perspectives on the Mexican political system and public policy or attempting to replace those in power so as to be able to implement those perspectives.

In addition to the comparative points suggested by Dahl, two other more general issues for comparison should be kept in mind when looking at the opposition and its development. First, do any of these parties of opposition in Mexico have the capacity to govern should they win a gubernatorial race or, unlikely as it may be, the presidential race? One of the strongest arguments in the PRI's favor is that almost everyone with governmental experience at every level of government is a member (whether a strong member or simply a formal affiliate) of the PRI. Opposition parties may receive votes because people prefer their policy prescriptions to those of the PRI or because they perceive that another party's candidates will be less corrupt than PRI candidates. However, if the opposition parties really expect to come to power, they probably have to convince many voters of their capacity to govern the nation when they do.

Second, opposition perspectives on itself and its roles may differ greatly from those opinions on opposition held by the political elite.
These perspectives may differ among the parties of the opposition itself. Finally, these perceived roles may change over time. Some sensitivity to these differences is essential for understanding what members of a particular opposition party consider to be their reason for being and for participating as an opposition party.

I now turn to consider the parties of the Mexican opposition, beginning with parties of the right in this chapter, then examining independent parties of the left, and finally looking at what I call the collaborationist parties in Chapter Nine. 4 Throughout I will seek to provide a historical background on these parties but, since this thesis is not a complete history of the opposition in Mexico, I will generally try to focus on only that history necessary to provide a context for the occurrences of the last twenty years or so. Changes within the parties on the comparative points discussed above will be examined with the effort to bring the analysis up to date as of about 1985, the last federal election. Some discussion of the recent unification of major parties on the left will be provided with the caveat that it is recent and thus, given the history of the Mexican left, may be transient.

4 It is always dangerous to put parties into a ideological spectrum. They themselves generally reject the notion that they are more left or more right than one or another other party. However, they are generally perceived by journalists and, although less so, by the voting public as fitting into a particular spectrum. Aligning them along the left-right continuum within the groups I distinguished is more difficult because they differ on a range of issues, not just strategies of socioeconomic development. Among the "collaborationist" parties, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores and the Partido Popular Socialista are self-proclaimed parties of the left. The Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana is more difficult to label; it differs little from the PRI ideologically.
PARTIES OF THE RIGHT

Because Mexico has had a revolution in this century, a revolution which must be the basis of the legitimacy of any governing party, no party can easily identify itself as being of the right. Conservatives were defeated in the Revolution and have no legitimate claim to power. As Roger Bartra writes: "The symbolism of the Revolution of 1910 has provoked in all politicians a great repugnance of seeing themselves identified as being of the right. And although the existence of an equilibrating and mediating center point an essential ingredient of the Mexican political system, almost all flee, like the plague, the space reserved to the right and try to situate themselves in the center and the left." 5 That does not mean that conservatives do not vie for power in Mexico, both within the political elite and outside it, in the opposition. 6 Again, Bartra's comments are to the point: "The illusion that the right doesn't exist is because the right in Mexico is not found only, not even principally, to the right of the central power of the 'government of the Mexican Revolution;' the right is simultaneously in power and in opposition, in the government and in society." 7 However, while the left might call itself radical, progressive, or revolutionary, the right cannot easily call itself conservative, or


6 Frank Brandenburg identified what he called "New Conservatives" within the Revolutionary Family as well as a revolutionary left and center. The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 131-140. The most illuminating recent essay is that of Bartra, "Viaje al centro de la derecha."

7 Ibid., p. 16. Emphasis in original.
defenders of the status quo, or reactionary.

Two parties in the opposition can safely be called conservative: the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM). Both are much more closely associated with Mexican Catholicism than any of the other parties although, in keeping with the Mexican Constitution, they carefully deny any affiliation with the church hierarchy and there is no evidence of such a link with the church at this time. Both tend to emphasize traditional morality, promotion of the family, and opposition to abortion. The PAN has in recent years called for greater privatization in the economy, a position also favored by Mexican business. Thus, they generally share conservative perspectives.

The Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)

Origins. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the PAN was founded in September 1939 by a group of men led by Manuel Gómez Morín, a well-known public figure who had served in a number of governmental and private-sector positions, most notably the National University rectorship. Gómez Morín's collaborators included Catholic activists, especially from the National Union of Catholic Students; professionals and intellectuals who had known Gómez Morín when he was at the National University; and some business leaders and industrialists. Their principal grievances against the elite in power were the loss of the

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Church’s rights, the struggle for religious liberty including freedom for Catholics to educate their children in parochial schools, and the move by the Mexican state toward socialism under Cárdenas. By the settlement between the state and the Church at the end of the Cristero Rebellion in 1929, the Church had acquiesced to the separation of Church and state and the constraints on the secular activities of the clergy established by the Constitution of 1917. While the federal government-directed anticlericism of the Calles administration ended in 1929, several state-level governments continued to make inroads against the Church in the 1930s by establishing very small quotas of priests for their states. The Cárdenas government, while not persecuting the religious, did begin to implement the 1934 amendment to article 3 of the Constitution which mandated socialist education. This seriously challenged parochial education or, as PAN leaders called it, "liberty of teaching." Moreover, Cárdenas’s movement of public policy to the left disturbed not only the businessmen directly threatened by it but also Catholics who, since Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891), had rejected both communism and liberal capitalism. These factors combined to motivate Gómez Morín and Efraín González Luna to form an opposition movement that would be more permanent than the various impulses that had sprung up both at election time and outside of electoral politics. The PAN was that organization.

Ideology and Leadership. The PAN’s leadership was initially composed largely of professionals and businessmen. According to Donald

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9 Ibid., p. 163.
10 Mabry, Mexico’s Acción Nacional, pp. 27-28.

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Mabry's research, the twenty-nine members of the first National Executive Committee of the party included nine lawyers, seven bankers, four businessmen, four journalists, and two doctors. Many members of this initial National Executive Committee and the first National Council were well-known intellectuals, experienced former government officials, and important businessmen.\textsuperscript{11} Equally important, though, is that they were strong Catholics.

Although businessmen and individuals strongly objecting to the anticlericism of the Mexican state were central figures in the group which founded the PAN, it was not, prior to the 1970s, a strongly pro-capitalist party nor did it seek confrontation between Church and state. Rather, it tended to follow Catholic reform philosophy.\textsuperscript{12} PAN ideology has always been at a relatively general and abstract level, avoiding precise prescriptions for action.\textsuperscript{13} During its first thirty-to-thirty-five years of existence, the PAN's ideology tended to emphasize political principles parallel to those enunciated in reform encyclicals such as Rerum Novarum, Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno (1931), John XXIII’s Mater et Magistra (1961) and Pacem en Terris (1963), and Paul VI’s Popularum Progresso (1967). Thus, the PAN argued against the intrusion of the state into the affairs of individuals and their families and for the right to private property so long as that property serves useful social functions, yet also that the state had an obligation to serve the common good, although generally by intervening

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{12}The characterization is Mabry's. Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{13}González Graf and Ramírez Lugo, "Partido Acción Nacional," p. 173.
to defend fundamental values, particularly the liberties of individuals. Much of the PAN's ideological emphasis has been on establishing the kind of democratic regime in which individuals can participate in national political life, enjoy their fundamental liberties, and by their own efforts, in their families and communities, make a living for themselves. In line with Catholic reformist teaching, the PAN does not seek to achieve such a democracy through bloodshed or violent revolution, but through political reform. Such reform may require changes in socioeconomic conditions so that the economically privileged do not retain too much political power.\(^{14}\)

Besides this relatively abstract Catholic reformism, early PAN ideology sought a change in the anticlerical policies of the revolutionary elite. The PAN called for repeal or amendment of articles 3 and 130 of the Constitution of 1917. Article 3, which forbade parochial education at the elementary level, was particularly repugnant to the PAN and considered by some members to be communist-inspired.\(^{15}\) Despite this advocacy of positions very similar to those of the Mexican Catholic hierarchy, the PAN carefully avoided too close an association with the Catholic Church by calling not for an established church in Mexico, but for religious freedom.\(^{16}\)

Many of the early PAN leaders who promoted this Catholic social reformism had begun their involvement in politics in Catholic interest

\(^{14}\) On PAN ideology, see *ibid.*, pp. 168-174, 212-232.

\(^{15}\) Mabry, *Mexico's Acción Nacional*, p. 47.

associations. Efraín González Luna, PAN founder, author of its first statement of principles, and its first presidential candidate in 1952, had been the President of the Guadalajara chapter of the Catholic Association of Mexican Youth (ACJM), a part of the Mexican branch of Catholic Action. While Gómez Morín, the first president of the party (1939-1949), was relatively secularist, his successors were not. They moved the PAN into a more militantly Catholic direction. Juan Gutiérrez Lascurain (president 1949-56) and Alfonso Ituarte Servín (1956-1959) were each involved in two organizations associated with Catholic Action, the ACJM and the Union of Mexican Catholics, a men's organization. Itaurte Servín in particular “encouraged the development of uncompromising political Catholicism which the party’s important youth sector was pressing upon it.”17 His successor, José González Torres (1959-1962), was an ex-seminarian deeply involved in Catholic Action, serving as president of the central committee of the ACJM; president of Pax Romana, the international university Catholic Action; and president of Mexican Catholic Action. Under González Torres, the PAN shifted towards Christian Democracy, as its youth organization was encouraging it to do, modifying its ideological statements to be more in line with Latin American Christian Democratic thought (thus more socialist or social reformist, less accommodating toward business than previously), and even making overtures about membership in the international Christian Democratic movement.18 González Torres ran for president in 1964 under the PAN banner.

17 Mabry, Mexico’s Acción Nacional, pp. 50-51.
18 Ibid., pp. 51, 66-67.
Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola followed González Torres in the party presidency. While steering the party away from the possibility of organizational affiliation to the international Christian Democratic movement, thus improving the PAN's appearance as a secular party, Christlieb (1962-68) and Manual González Hinojosa (1969-72) oversaw the movement of the party into an even more Christian reformist position. Mabry argues that under their leadership, the panista faction which might be labeled "Christian socialist" came to dominate over the previously powerful "Christian capitalists," led by González Torres and Ituarte Servín.\textsuperscript{19}

The intellectual dynamism of the Christian socialist group came from Christlieb and especially from Efraín González Morfín, son of PAN founder González Luna. The brilliant, young González Morfín campaigned for as the PAN candidate for president in 1970 under a document he wrote the year before, Cambio democrático de estructuras (Democratic Change of Structures). González Morfín called on Mexico to choose a third way between "individualist" capitalism and "collectivist" socialism, a path he called solidarismo, meaning "responsible participation of persons in coexistence, and organization of authority and institutions to promote and guarantee order, progress, and peace to the individual, the family, and social groups." In such an order, "The universal use of goods demands structures that spread private property among the greatest possible number of persons and concrete families."\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 73.

\textsuperscript{20} Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979), p. 129.
González Morfín did not shrink from criticism of business: "the firm should manage itself also by the norms of the common good, respecting the interests of the national economy in its entirety and eliminating antieconomic practices that favor the economically strong and hurt the rest of the population. In this aspect, the enterprise should be integrated into national development plans, completing its imposed obligations and respecting policy measures of national interest in international commerce."21 Thus, solidarismo called for a more equitable socioeconomic system, one that guaranteed order and private property to individuals, especially in their natural grouping, the family, but one emphasizing the social obligations of property owners. It was thus clearly a variation on reformist Catholicism, but of a more socialist nature than early version of PAN ideology.

González Morfín's leadership in the PAN was short-lived. Luis Echeverría's populism brought out divisions within the PAN in the same way it polarized the larger Mexican society. Raúl González Schmal, former PAN Secretary General and a close ally of González Morfín wrote:

During the presidency (of the PAN) of José Angel Conchello (1972-1975) the party began gradually turning toward rightist and frankly conservative positions, abandoning thereby the great lines of socioeconomic thought which previous presidents like Christlieb Ibarrola and González Morfín had instilled in the party's platform and doctrine. The progressive ideas of the PAN's founders dating from 1939 were abandoned by Conchello and substituted for a thesis which was clearly of the "Liberal Manchesterian" variety, a thesis which the PAN has always opposed. On the other hand, the internal organization of the party suffered a gradual splintering owing in large part to the ideological confusion which Conchello created by making wild declarations to the press, a demagoguery intended to

attract followers from middle class sectors outside the party. From 1974 to 1978 a bitter factional dispute of an ideological nature divided panistas against each other. Conchello, hailing from Monterrey, was quite sympathetic with the free enterprise spirit of the Monterrey Group, the powerful group of industrialists who had opposed Echeverría's populist reformism. Echoing the criticism of Echeverría emanating from the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE), Conchello vilified the administration in a 1975 speech:

The regime must invent and cultivate political crises permanently as fertile soil so that one day, with all the means of pressure, oppression, and repression, we may be threatened with a regime—socialist in name and fascist in content—that would destroy our precarious liberty and betray the Revolution . . . those who want to bring us to Marxist socialism forget that the Mexican Revolution was not a socialist revolution.

Conchello and other young panistas whom he apparently favored (during his time as president and later) with resources which some allege came from the Monterrey Group came into violent conflict with more leftist


23Proceso, no. 76, 17 April 1978.

24Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México, p. 131.

25Both Raúl González Schmal and Manuel González Hinojosa affirmed that this struggle was principally ideological, but had a generational aspect: younger panistas tended to favor Conchello's approach. The latter group also tended to be more activist in nature, willing to confront the PRI wherever possible. Interviews, 9 July 1984 and 26 June 1984. Efraín González Morfín had in November 1975 accused Conchello of financing from separate sources of unknown origin a subgroup of the PAN loyal to him. This allegation was repeated by ex-PAN leaders David Alarcón, José Herrera Marcos, and Mauricio Gómez Morín (son of Manuel Gómez Morín). Proceso, no. 76 (17 April 1978).
elements of the PAN at the party's national nominating convention in November 1975 (described in Chapter Four). González Morfín had succeeded Conchello as party president in March 1975. Conchello then spent several months promoting the candidacy of fellow Montonero Pablo Emilio Madero, nephew of Francisco I. Madero. In November 1975 the two factions met head-to-head over the choice of the presidential candidate, the result being a stalemate. González Morfín resigned the party presidency in December 1975 and was replaced by former president Manuel González Hinojosa, who accused Conchello of thinking in a way similar to the extreme right and of having a fascist ideology and attitude.\(^{26}\) In February 1976, the nominating convention reconvened and again ended in stalemate but with an additional result: the convention ended in violence allegedly initiated by troublemakers from the Conchello-Madero faction.\(^{27}\) Because of the stalemate (Madero could not achieve the 80 percent vote of the nominating convention stipulated in PAN statutes), the PAN presented no presidential candidate in 1976.

The internal struggle continued until 1978, when Abel Vicencio Tovar replaced González Hinojosa in the party presidency. Vicencio was expected by some to be a unifier, to bring the party back together.\(^{28}\)


\(^{27}\)This chronology is taken from González Schmal's letter to Johnson, in Johnson "Opposition Politics and the Future of Mexico."

\(^{28}\)Proceso, no. 130 (30 April 1979). Conchello, though, was apparently pleased with Vicencio’s selection, saying it would unify the party. Unomásuno, 26 February 1978. Electoral analyst Octavio Rodríguez Araujo suggested, though, that Vicencio would be easily managed by Conchello. Subsequent events seem to have proven him right. Unomásuno, 2 March 1978.
Party unity, however, came about partly through the resignations of former leaders. González Morfín and many of his followers, a number of them having held very high party positions, left the party in early 1978.\(^{29}\) Another of Conchello’s compatriots from Monterrey, Jorge Eugenio Ortiz, allegedly labelled those who quit the party "Marxist-Jesuistic."\(^{30}\) González Hinojosa and his sons resigned from the party the following year.\(^{31}\) A number of these ex-panistas have since formed a political association known as Solidarismo, publishing an unregistered periodical of the same name.

Those remaining in the leadership of the party, Vicencio, Madero, Bernardo Báñez (who had been in the party’s central committee under Conchello and has more recently been secretary general), Jesús González Schmal (the more conservative brother of Raúl), and Conchello also claim to follow the solidarismo line. Madero, the PAN presidential candidate in 1982, later the party president, told interviewer Elena Poniatowska in 1982:

> We believe in solidarismo, not in hate between classes. We do not believe that class struggle is the solution; there are differences between classes and there are interests also, but the destruction of the competitor is not the solution, but rather mutual support, the development of man by reciprocal help of men living together,

\(^{29}\)Among those who left with González Morfín were Raúl González Schmal (a former secretary general), Julio Senties, Francisco Pedraza, Javier Boelsterly (leader of the PAN’s university students’ sector), David Alarcón (a candidate for the presidential nomination in 1976), José Herrera, Mauricio Gómez Morín (son of the founder), and Fernando Estrada Samano (former head of the party’s political commission). *Proceso*, nos. 75 (10 April 1978), 76 (17 April 1978), and 381 (20 February 1984).

\(^{30}\) *Proceso*, no. 381 (20 February 1984), p. 19.

\(^{31}\) *Proceso*, no. 130 (30 April 1979).
this is solidarismo for us. 32

At the level of official party ideology, little change has taken place, the party program of 1985 not differing much from that of 1939. 33 The modern PAN sets forth a platform which demands respect for four rights: the right to life (i.e., rejection of abortion), the right to the truth (including freedom of choice in education), the right to justice (i.e., respect for the state of law by both governed and governors), and the right to liberty (especially of association, including to labor unions and political parties). 34 These have always been in the PAN program for Mexico.

Yet in statements by its leaders, the PAN has tended to emphasize certain criticisms of the government which suggest that it has drifted to the right. 35 One set of issues currently receiving much attention from the PAN are moral issues, including abortion, which the PAN vehemently opposes, 36 and Church-state relations and constitutional

32 Elena Poniatowska, Domingo Siete (Mexico City: Ed. Oceano, 1982), p. 254. See also El Universal, 8 March 1982 and Ovaciones, 8 March 1982 for similar statements from Madero.


35 The PAN's current leaders usually deny that the PAN is a party of the right or that it has moved further to the right. Ex-panistas such as Luis Calderón Vega, Efraín González Morfín, Fernando Estrada Samano, Manual González Hinojosa, and Raúl González Schmal have on many occasions argued that it has indeed moved to the right since they left. Many independent observers to whom I spoke agreed.

36 The PAN has opposed legislation legalizing abortion in Mexico, at one point introducing a constitutional amendment to protect human life "from conception until death." Latin American Regional Reports:
amendments regulating them, an issue which had been relatively
deeplimkized for some time by the PAN.\textsuperscript{37} The PAN is still very careful
about its linkages to the Church, but as Bernardo Bátiz recently
admitted: "I believe that our basic principles, philosophy and ethics
coincide with many statements of the Catholic Church, and with many
organizations that in some manner have some connection with or are
derived from the Church. . . . our principal theses, such as the
respect for the dignity of the individual, the independence of the
individual, the common good—come from a common root which is Christian
social thought."\textsuperscript{38} The issues of abortion and euthanasia, only
recently of grave importance in Mexico, are points on which the PAN
draws clear distinctions between itself and other parties of the
opposition, those on the left.

Receiving even more attention from PAN leaders is the issue of
state participation in the economy. González Morfín had approved state
participation to promote the common good. By the end of the sexenio of
José López Portillo, the PAN's new leaders were noticeably less
enthusiastic about the state's involvement in the economy. One
national leader argued that "when the state takes the role of
industrialist it corrupts its function as rector of the economy and the
multiple errors committed in managing public enterprises serve to fill
the pockets of functionaries" and that "what the state should do is

\textsuperscript{37}Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico, 23 March 1984.
\textsuperscript{38}El Cotodiano (Universidad Autónomo Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco),
February-March 1985, p. 6.
leave to the private sector not only the economy but also sectors such as education and research."³⁹ López Portillo’s nationalization of the banks in September 1982 brought a great outcry from PAN leaders.⁴⁰ During his presidential campaign in 1982, Madero argued that the administrations of Echeverría and López Portillo, which greatly increased the participation of the state in the economy, were heading Mexico toward a future socialism. He suggested that a return to desarrollo estabilizador (see Chapter Three) would serve Mexico better than heavy state involvement in the economy.⁴¹ Along the same lines, Madero harshly criticized communist visions for Mexico, arguing that it promoted a kind of slavery.⁴² In its 1985 campaign platform, the PAN called for constitutional reforms to define economic spheres to belong to the public sector and the private sector and for the elimination of both public and private monopolies. The sale of para-statal firms not considered priorities for national development was demanded; the party asked that subsidies to them be revised to be selective, transitory, and transparent; and it insisted that control of para-statal firms be given to the Chamber of Deputies. Further, it called for lower taxes and austerity in public expenditures, with more information about and


⁴¹ El Heraldo, 1 March 1982.

⁴² Unomásuno, 8 February 1982; El Universal, 8 March 1982.
control of state spending given to the Chamber of Deputies.⁴³ All of these planks in the PAN platform suggest a preference for greater latitude being given to private enterprise, less for the state's involvement in the economy.

These shifts in doctrinal statements reflect the entry of a number of important private sector-based individuals into the party, the so-called neo-panistas, who include Manuel Clouthier, a former president of COPARMEX and the CCE, now the PAN's presidential candidate; José María Basagoiti, another ex-leader of COPARMEX and a principal in Mexico's version of Opus Dei; José Luis Coindreau, yet another ex-president of COPARMEX; Emilio Goicoechea Luna, former president of CONCANACO; and Fernando Canales Clariond, a Monterrey businessman who put up a stiff challenge to the PRI in the 1985 Nuevo León gubernatorial race. A number of businessmen in Monterrey have joined the party recently.⁴⁴ As another former president of the CCE and CONCAMIN said of Clouthier and Coindreau, their involvement in the PAN is a "response to the displacement of private initiative by the government. 'Their independence and their uneasiness are born of business philosophy, which believes in free enterprise.'" Their participation in the PAN is "a situation in conformity with the


terrible results of the last two sexenios." 45

In some ways, then, the PAN may have moved to the right ideologically in recent years. However, the PAN's major message, the one it reiterates more often than any other, does not have to do with the preferred socioeconomic order or the place of religion and morality in society. The message the PAN has put forward repeatedly since it was founded is that Mexico needs democracy, a democracy it is being denied by the PRI-government (as the ruling elite is called by the PAN). At times this demand for democracy, defined as respect for the real electoral results, a more equal balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, and autonomy for states and municipalities, becomes a kind of panacea: with democracy will come participation in all aspects of life, thus development, prosperity, and national pride. Responding to its official loss in the 1970 presidential elections, González Hinojosa asserted:

Acción Nacional will continue, with firmness and decision, with purity and dignity, its task of initiating the people into democratic life, to redeem the vote and give status to the exercise of rights. We continue to demand that democratic principles be put into force and to demand for a radical change of systems and men, with the eloquent language of free votes. 46

The PAN has not abandoned its rhetoric of democracy. The 1985 platform was insistent:

In this nation that is of all of us, in this model of the country that Acción Nacional proposes, the will of the Mexicans will have to be respected, and there will be no dams, no roads, no material works, no monuments that can have primacy over the urgent

45 Jorge Sánchez Mejorada, quoted in Proceso, no. 409 (3 September 1984).

electoral and political reform, so that in this ordered nation [a
state of laws] that we propose, it will be the people themselves
who designate their authorities. Only in this form will the
governors be at the service of the people, and not the people at
the service of those who occupy power.

This call for democratization is at the center of nearly all PAN
statements and has been for decades.

Goals. Very little evidence exists to suggest that many panistas
have been PAN members out of a desire to reach power in Mexico. The
PAN’s electoral showings have been too disappointing for too long for
many to hold on to the dream of achieving high governmental positions
through the PAN. The standard definition of a party as a team of
individuals combining to compete to gain control of the government can
only with reservations be applied to the PAN. It does put forth slates
of candidates at election times, and genuinely wishes to defeat the
PRI. However, since the chance of victory is so slight, panistas must
have other goals besides electoral victory. How else can one explain
the persistence of a party which has lost literally thousands of
elections over the years and won but a handful?

Mabry suggests that "the original and continuing goal of Acción
Nacional was to become a force for the political reeducation of Mexico
along Catholic social doctrine lines" in order to prevent the
revolutionary coalition from moving too far either toward communism or
toward bourgeois-liberal capitalism. This, argues Mabry, was a more
important goal than taking power, certainly in the early years.48 In
this view, the PAN functions more as an pressure group, pushing for a

47 PAN, Plataforma 1985-1988, p. 11.
48 Mexico’s Acción Nacional, p. 183.
public policy and a public philosophy closer to Catholic social thought than the government philosophy that has dominated since the Revolution. Gómez Morín himself conceived of the PAN as a pressure group as well as a political party. In a regime that promoted open anticlericism and which organized interests corporatively, but excluded certain vital interests, including at times those from the private sector and nearly always those associated with Catholic organizations, electoral politics offered a more effective way to pressure the state than to try to do so through ordinary lobbying efforts. In its campaign efforts, the PAN has an excellent opportunity to criticize the regime and the government in power. However, having never had entry into the halls of power in the executive branch (or even the legislature) because of its pro-Church orientation, lobbying on behalf of particular policies has been difficult. Thus, a political party made a more effective tool than a simple interest association.

PAN leaders have also traditionally sought to teach the masses, to form a citizen consciousness which would, of course, be consistent with PAN philosophy. Again, political campaigns provide an excellent setting to disseminate a public philosophy since they receive media attention. Former PAN leaders associated with González Morfín emphasized to me the role of the party in opinion formation and creation of democratic citizen consciousness. While this tutelage

50 Ibid.
51 Interviews with Manuel González Hinojosa, Raúl González Schmal, and Fernando Estrada Samano.
may seem elitist, with enlightened PAN militants teaching Mexicans to be democratic citizens following the proper moral positions, these panistas nevertheless considered themselves egalitarian. 

In the last decade, especially since economic crisis hit Mexico in 1981, PAN leaders have come to entertain the possibility of achieving power, at least in some states and localities. Changing membership and leadership, particularly the entry into the party of bankers and businessmen since 1982, helps explain a growing desire to win electorally. Many argue, though, that the desire to come to power, which requires achieving an electoral victory, has tended to weaken the PAN’s consciousness formation effort. Effective electoral competition may, in this view, require compromising and diluting the internal consistency of the PAN’s ideology.

Settings for Encounters with the Ruling Elite. The PAN has basically two options available to it for confronting the political elite: do so within the electoral process, and if effective electorally, in the legislature, or outside of electoral and legislative processes. The PAN has consistently chosen to operate within the electoral process since 1943. Given the PAN’s ideological approach, operations outside the electoral process are likely to have little success. The PAN’s rejection of violent or revolutionary tactics rules out a whole range of ways of confronting the Mexican state. Non-violent, non-electoral methods of achieving the PAN’s goals

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53 Interviews with González Hinojosa and González Schmal.
are few and unlikely to be very effective. With no real sanction against those in power, since the PRI is so dominant electorally, regular lobbying efforts have little chance of achieving anything. Proselytizing depends on having a medium for transmitting the message. In a regime in which the state has subtle methods of censoring the news media, an opposition party must provide a reason for why the media should carry its message. Consistent electoral campaigning provides the most defensible reason for carrying PAN criticisms of the government and PAN policy prescriptions. Thus, the principal site for encounters between the PAN and those in power is in the electoral process. The PAN’s minor electoral success has also brought it some deputy seats so that in the past two decades or so the PAN’s criticism of the government has taken place in the Chamber of Deputies.

Strategies. The strategy best suited to achieving PAN goals became a source of debate within the party almost immediately after its birth and has remained an issue since. In its effort to make known its criticisms of the Mexican government and to disseminate its philosophy, the PAN had the choice of participating or abstaining from elections. In 1940, it chose to participate in the presidential election, giving conditional support to General Almazán, most of which it withdrew before the election was held. Antiparticipationists opposed PAN involvement for one of two reasons: by not expending its efforts in the electoral campaign, it could have focused on membership recruitment

55 Mabry, Mexico’s Acción Nacional, pp. 37-38.
and citizen education; or participation would be "playing the government's game, allowing it to assert that Mexico was democratic when it was not." Participationists retorted that it would be inconsistent for the PAN to encourage democratic participation in politics while the party itself abstained.\textsuperscript{56}

This debate has divided the party since the 1940s, with the participationists almost always winning. It reemerged into the open after a number of state and local-level elections in the late-1960s when the PAN put up strong challenges to the PRI in Sonora, Baja California, and Yucatán but was denied victory. Many within the PAN then made the case for abstaining from the 1970 federal elections or only participating conditionally so as not to give the PRI legitimation in its victory. Both the leadership and the membership were divided, with participation winning out, but by a very narrow margin.\textsuperscript{57}

This division within the PAN over strategy, whether to participate or abstain, came in the 1970s to mirror the split in the party over ideology. Although the overlap is by no means perfect, the more leftist Christian socialists in the party, such as González Morfín, opposed participation, while the new challengers with free market liberal leanings, such as Conchello, tended to favor activism.\textsuperscript{58} The crisis within the party from 1975 to 1978 was most openly about participation, although, as described above, there were underlying

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., pp. 37, 42.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 86-87.

\textsuperscript{58} Obviously there are many exceptions to this rule, but many of those exceptions have since left the PAN, the most notable example being González Hinojosa.
ideological roots to the crisis. González Morfín most forcefully made the case against participation, saying that "in the concrete historical reality of our country, of the group in power, and of the PAN, it is impossible to achieve, by the road of electoral activity, the panista methods of service to Mexico." He also linked this activism closely to the "fascist and demagogic conservatism, the manipulation of religion, [and] the materialism of those who . . . unjustly defend money, [that] are within PAN, natural fruits of abandoning political education, the sincere cause of the original existence of PAN." 59 While it was principally individuals associated with González Morfín who advocated abstention, this perspective became more widely dispersed throughout the party by 1978. 60 However, the abstentionists remained a minority of the party.

Since 1978, the strategy of electoral participation has dominated within the party. A subsidiary concern is where to focus the party's efforts when it participates. The PAN initially concentrated its efforts at the national level, beginning to support federal deputy candidates in 1943. Not until 1953 did it run candidates in a state-level election, in Baja California. By the mid-1960s, the PAN was presenting candidates in nearly all federal electoral districts in nearly all states (see Table 8-2). By the late-1960s, the PAN was concentrating great effort to win elections in certain municipalities.

59 Proceso, no. 75 (10 April 1978).
and states. These two strategies, working to present candidates as widely as possible and trying to win where victory is a reasonable possibility, demonstrate an interest in achieving two separate, not necessarily competing goals: disseminate the PAN message and obtain control over local organs of the state. The PAN continues to seek these two goals (arguably the political education goal has fallen by the wayside) by competing in as many elections as possible and to focus on winning municipal races, where it thinks it can win power. Of course, the new federal electoral law passed with the reforma política, as amended in 1981 (see Chapter Five), forces the PAN to compete in federal elections if it is to retain its registry. This has greatly strengthened the hands of the participationists within the party, insuring that the party lends to the regime its legitimizing involvement in elections.

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61 See, for instance, Calderón Vega, Reportaje sobre el PAN. Franz A. von Sauer sees three phases in the PAN's electoral participation up through the 1960s: 1939 to 1952 saw an emphasis on federal deputy elections; from 1952 through 1964 the focus was on presidential elections; after 1964, the PAN turned its efforts to state and local elections. "Ideological Politics in Mexico and the Partido Acción Nacional: A Case Study in Political Alienation," Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1971, pp. 164-177.

62 Critics such as Raúl González Schmal argue that this is producing poorer candidates and actually undermining the party's goals.

63 Interview with Bernardo Bátiz, 28 June 1984.

64 González Morfín's analysis of the reforma política was that it "drastically reduces the margin of freedom with respect to electoral participation in order to insure that there will always be the external appearance of democratic content." Proceso, no. 75 (10 April 1978). In general, the abstentionists have been more critical of the reforma política, which is why the PAN was so critical of the venture when it was proposed in 1977 (when González Hinojosa was president). Participationists have been much less critical, recognizing certain faults in it, but saying that it has its positive values. See
deputyships introduced with the mixed system of representation makes more patronage available to party leaders, also encouraging the participationists within the party. 65

Electoral competitiveness and support. Looking at global figures, the PAN seems to present little challenge to the PRI electorally. In national elections, it has never obtained above 20 percent of the national vote. Arguably, the true figures are higher, but the PAN has not been powerful enough to force the Federal Electoral Commission to recognize its real success. It has won a handful of deputy elections since it began presenting candidates in 1943, as shown in Table 8-2. Before the introduction of the party deputy system in 1964, though, many suspect that the ruling elite simply "gave" a small number of district races to the PAN as a way to illustrate the democratic nature of Mexican elections. 66

The PAN is becoming more competitive electorally, however. Table 8-3 is a breakdown of the PAN’s federal deputy race results by state from 1961 through 1985. In a number of states the PAN’s recent performances have been quite respectable. As can be noted, in some of the PAN’s strongholds, such as the Federal District, Baja California


65 Interview with González Hinojosa, 26 June 1984.

66 In 1958, for example, only one PAN victory was initially recognized. After a furious outcry from the PAN, with some discussion about abstaining in the future, the Electoral College granted five more seats to the PAN, in districts never strong for the PAN. This suggested to the party that these seats were being given to it to make a public demonstration of Mexican democracy. The PAN ordered those deputies "elected" not to take their seats, expelling the four who chose to ignore the party’s demands. Mabry, Mexico’s Acción Nacional, pp. 57-60.
Norte, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, and Nuevo León, the PAN's popularity is not new. Figure 7-2 is a compilation of maps illustrating the past and present geographical bases of PAN strength. As is clear from these maps, the PAN has drawn strong support in a number of different states of the north and the center of the nation in the past two-and-a-half decades. These strong finishes, however, were not consistently achieved, except in the Federal District and Baja California Norte (PAN did not present candidates in Baja California Norte in 1973). The extension of the PAN's popularity to numerous states is recent. It has in effect consolidated its following in states where it previously enjoyed temporary success. As Figure 7-2 and Table 8-3 show, PAN strength has been expanded to all of the northern tier states except Tamaulipas, a PARM stronghold, spreading south now to Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, and Durango. It has consolidated its following in the states of the Bajío despite the entry of the PDM in this area of UNS strength. In the central states, including the Federal District, the PAN has not lost voters, but its share has declined somewhat (in Mexico and Puebla, for example) as the left has entered the electoral arena.

The degree to which the reforma política of 1977 facilitated this growing electoral strength is probably slight. The PAN's rebound from its 1976 debacle was not immediate, the 1979 race being rather disappointing for the PAN since it did not achieve the level of its 1973 success in what was considered a relatively clean election. Furthermore, to the extent that the PAN's share of the vote has not increased more in a number of the urban states of the nation's center, it is probably due to the entry of the new parties of the left. Now,
in 1982 and 1985, the PAN did considerably better than previously. These most recent achievements, though, can be attributed in large part to the economic crisis which has gripped Mexico since 1981 and the political fallout from it which has hurt the PRI but helped the PAN.

Table 7-8 showed a matrix of Pearson's correlation coefficients to illustrate the social bases of the PAN vote. These correlation coefficients show the PAN vote to be concentrated in urban areas, in districts with high concentrations of the most educated of Mexican citizens, and in districts which have substantially industrialized. The PAN's urban base of support has been steady for the past twenty years and the level of urbanization does not seem to matter much. As we might have expected given the PRI machine's rural base, the PAN has not penetrated rural Mexico. Those areas with concentrations of those not incorporated into modern Mexico, as measured by the percentage still speaking indigenous languages, have not been a fertile field for the PAN's seeds. Among the education variables, measures of post-primary education are closely and positively correlated with support for the PAN while measures of the complete lack of schooling are quite negatively correlated with PAN support. To make the case that the PAN draws support from the most highly educated an even stronger case is the relatively weak correlation of PAN support with primary education, formerly the basic measure of an educated Mexican, now less important as education has advanced further. Besides finding its supporters concentrated in urban areas with the highest levels of education, the PAN also finds its voters clustered in districts where the economy is the most industrialized and, presumably, the most advanced. The
tertiary sector, a relatively less advanced sector in Mexico, is less strongly correlated with PAN support, especially of late.

Over a decade ago, Mabry concluded that "PAN derives most of its electoral support from protest voting. Votes for PAN because of regionalism and independent attitudes fall into this category as do middle-class votes." The PAN's recent electoral results seem to validate this conclusion. The PAN's most strenuous challenges of late have come in the northern states, in Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora, Durango, and Coahuila, and the conflicts have been particularly acute in local elections. In 1982 and the first half of 1983, the PAN won control of city hall in twenty-two municipios, including the capitals of the northern states of San Luis Potosí (in coalition with the PDM), Sonora, Durango, and Chihuahua, as well as Chihuahua's border giant, Ciudad Juárez, the fourth largest city in the country, and six other cities in Chihuahua. Aspects of the current economic crisis have had a particularly negative impact on these northern states for two reasons: On the one hand, the northern states are relatively more urbanized and industrialized than the rest of Mexico, with the exception of Mexico City and its environs. The groups benefitting from industrialization, including especially the middle class, are more concentrated in the north. On the other hand, because of the proximity


of the northern states to the United States, those living there have always relied more strongly on trade with and travel to the U.S. The huge decline in the dollar value of the peso and the imposition of exchange controls have had a relatively greater impact on northern Mexicans, again especially on the middle class which was accustomed to buying many of its consumer goods across the border. Thus, the middle class, especially in the north, have had good reasons of late to lodge protest votes against the political elite in Mexico City and the party which represents it, the PRI. In some cases, the state of Sonora for example, the PAN began reaping the benefits of the government’s economic policy failures at the end of the Echeverría administration, when local businessmen entered the party for the first time.

Table 8-4 shows how effectively the PAN built its local electoral bases, especially in northern states, between 1980 and 1983. Note, in Table 8-4, that since the beginning of the crisis in 1981, PAN support has grown across the board, but especially rapidly in states just below the northern tier, particularly Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Durango, and Sinaloa. If there are positive externalities in organization and mobilization, the PAN may be reaping some benefits in these states and developing a powerful regional base to challenge the

69 Jorge Orlando Espíritu, "Evaluación de las elecciones locales durante 1983," Nueva Antropología, no. 25 (October 1984), concluded "the PAN has achieved triumphs in the municipios where capitalist development is most advanced, and where the fractions of the bourgeoisie has entered into conflict with the priista bureaucracy. . . . the crisis has in some places accelerated this phenomenon." p. 122.

70 The private sector-PAN alliance in Sonora apparently dates from Carlos Bierbrich’s fall from power as governor in 1975 when he came into conflict with Echeverría. Business then began its opposition to the PRI. La Jornada, 25 June 1985, 27 June 1985.
PRI. Another perspective, though, is gained by observing that the PAN's support also grew dramatically in Tamaulipas, where the PARM could not present candidates because it had lost its registration in the 1982 federal election. This underscores the degree to which votes for the PAN are protest votes. In this case, the previous vehicle for protest had been the PARM, but in 1983 became the PAN. The PAN may be consolidating support throughout the north, but perhaps less because of PAN ideology than because it is an efficacious vehicle of protest.\textsuperscript{71}

Overall, the PAN's support seems to be concentrated among educated, urbanized Mexicans working in the most advanced sectors of the Mexican economy. Many of these voters are concentrated in northern Mexico where industry has grown rapidly in the recent decades and where the left has been less able to penetrate. Undoubtedly much of this support comes from a protest vote, a rejection of the PRI and of Mexico City's rule. Furthermore, the PAN undoubtedly enjoys some organizational economies in the north; it has taken advantage of a regional concentration of discontent to build a regionally-powerful organization and has become the primary vehicle for protest in the north. Because of the introduction of the new parties of the left, the

\textsuperscript{71} Many argue that northerners are more sympathetic to PAN ideology, especially as it has become more individualistic since 1978. Because of the harsh climate of the north, the sparse population (outside the border cities), and the proximity of the southwestern United States, northerners are said to be more individualistic than those living in the south, where communal traditions have survived. In the words of one ex-panista, northerners are "muy hombre," and thus inclined toward liberalism and protest. Another observer of the PAN argued that many protest voters in the north see the PAN as a real source of opposition that can win, which is why the PAN seems to do better in these areas in municipal and even federal deputy races than in presidential races. Interview, 4 May 1984.
PAN has lost some of this edge in Mexico City and its environs, but it remains popular in that urban agglomeration as well.

**Can the PAN govern?** This is a key question, one that many voters may have to ask in the near future should PAN competitiveness improve to the extent that it stands a significant chance of coming to power nationally. Many have expressed doubt about the PAN's capacity to govern Mexico since its leadership has little or no experience governing more than a few dispersed municipalities for never more than a single term of office. Until recently, PAN representatives had very little legislative experience either, again seldom having more than a single three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies. 72

If the *reforma política* and the more open political atmosphere in Mexico created by it have had a positive effect on the PAN, it may be in helping it create a greater capacity to govern. *Ex-panistas* who left the party after 1978 would deny and have denied this. 73 Others, though, distinguish between those who left the party in 1978, a group which they call *señoritos,* the gentleman politicians based in the Federal District and Guadalajara who never expected to govern, and another group, the *políticos,* the neo-panista conservatives from the north who are increasingly modern party politicians, both ready and

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72 In comparison with many PRI party hacks who make it into the legislature, these panista deputies were model parliamentarians, more knowledgeable about legal matters and public policy issues than their *priista* colleagues.

73 Interviews with Estrada Sámano, González Hinojosa, and González Schmal.
willing to rule. Because of their electoral victories in municipal races in 1982 and 1983, a number of these neo-panistas now have administrative experience at the level of large cities, including Luis H. Alvarez, a long-time PAN leader who was mayor of Chihuahua and is now PAN president, and Francisco Barrio Terrazas, former mayor of Ciudad Juárez and failed gubernatorial candidate in Chihuahua in 1986. The entry of businessmen into the party of late may have brought greater administrative experience as well. Furthermore, more panistas are receiving legislative experience since the reforma política expanded the opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies. The 1982-1985 Chamber included fifty-one PAN deputies and the 1985-1988 Chamber includes forty panistas.

Only actual PAN victories will reveal whether the PAN has the capacity to govern successfully. PAN politicians do tend to be well-educated, as well-educated as or better educated than PRI politicians. This bodes well for the PAN's potential as a governing party. It is relatively clear, at any rate, given its historical emphasis on democracy, that should the PAN come to power it will govern more democratically than the party currently in power.

A relatively important trend of late is the willingness of voters

74 Interview with electoral analyst, 7 May 1984. Yet others point out that these professional politicians in the PAN are relatively unable to bring relatively large numbers of those who vote for it into membership in the party and cannot get these PAN voters involved in other electoral activities, suggesting that should it come to power, the PAN may not be able to mobilize support against its enemies. La Jornada, 14 June 1985.

associated with the PAN to openly demonstrate against government electoral fraud. Many times these protests are peaceful. However, electoral violence associated with PAN losses took place in Coahuila in 1984, Sonora and Monterrey in 1985, and Durango in 1986. Huge, mostly peaceful protests took place in Chihuahua in 1986. These activities indicate great alienation from the Mexican ruling elite and its tactics for remaining in power. However, it does not indicate that the PAN has developed great mobilizational ability. In fact, these demonstrations seem to be quite spontaneous, perhaps out of the control of the PAN. Should the PAN wish to genuinely challenge the PRI, it must take control of this dissatisfaction. At present, it seems merely to be the recipient of such protest votes, not the director of them.

The recent assumption of the party presidency by Luis Alvarez may indeed lead to a PAN that is more aggressive, willing to itself direct the outrage of protest voters denied their expected victory. Although a panista for decades, a presidential candidate in 1958 when the party was far less militant, Alvarez has recently demonstrated a willingness to extend the PAN’s political activity beyond the electoral arena, engaging in a widely-publicized hunger strike in 1986 to protest electoral fraud in Chihuahua’s state and local elections, and heading

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77 There were press reports in 1985 that the PAN had organized shock troops among charismatic Catholics to be used in anti-government violence should it lose the elections. The PAN, of course, denied organizing such groups or promoting violence, but Madero did predict that violence would take place if the PRI committed electoral fraud. La Jornada, 17 June 1985, Unomásuno, 2 June 1985, 14 June 1985.
the PAN's non-violent civil disobedience efforts. Although not a neo-panista, Alvarez apparently has their strong support especially because of his vow to radicalize the party, to make it more militant. Yet, this militancy must be controlled. Recent revelations that a former PAN candidate for the governorship of Puebla had met with U.S. organizations involved in funding the Nicaraguan contras has put the party on the defensive. In the past two or three years, panistas in the north have made overtures to the U.S. government to protest electoral fraud and have generally shown an enthusiasm for the North American lifestyle and North American efficiency. Such overtures, Soledad Loaeza reminds us, suggest that the PAN is an agent of a nation which has frequently pillaged its neighbor to the south. Not only does it create questions about the PAN's patriotism, but also about the political savvy of panistas. The inability to control its militants certainly demonstrates a democratic tendency within the PAN. However, it also shows a weakness which not only creates embarrassment for the party, but in addition calls into question its capacity to govern. Is the PAN something more than a "front of heterogeneous oppositions" now that it has opened its doors to almost anyone who opposes the elite in power? If Alvarez cannot improve the coherency and organizational

78 Proceso, no. 505 (7 July 1987).
79 Proceso, no. 532 (12 January 1987) and no. 539 (2 March 1987).
82 Ibid., p. 25.
strength of the PAN, can it govern?

The Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM)

Origins. The PDM finds its roots in the same Church-state struggle which gave impulse to the PAN. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Catholic Church and the Mexican state more or less agreed in 1929 to suspend hostilities between their respective institutions. However, as pointed out above, anticlerical activities on the part of regional and local authorities continued well into the 1930s. In addition, the cristeros, having lost the institutional support for their antisecular struggle, nonetheless remained deeply alienated in post-revolutionary Mexico. Former cristeros formed the basis of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista. The foremost historian of the radical right in Mexico, Jean Meyer, summarized its purpose succinctly:

The UNS presented itself as a national movement (not a party), of union (not division), of salvation that wished to save the country from revolution, from the Bolsheviks, from the "gringos" of the North, from the Masons, from the Protestants, and from the Jews; its Yankee-phobia was united with a moderate irredentism (the lost territories are California and the whole southwest of the United States) .... The movement appealed to popular religious sentiment, traumatized and exacerbated by the conflict between the Church and the state (1926-1029, 1931, 1934-1938), by the summary anticlericism of a state that, in 1935, permitted no more than five hundred priests to minister the faith in a Catholic country of nearly twenty million inhabitants. Sinarquismo was born in the Mexico of The Power and the Glory and of Lawless Roads (both by Graham Greene), which doesn’t mean that it was identified with the Catholic Church or that it was controlled by it. Inseparable from the religious question, the problem of "socialist education," that from 1934 aspired to be radical and proselytizingly atheistic, constituted the other battle horse.

It would save Mexico for the Catholic faith, Hispanic traditions, the family, the people that lived within it, Christian political order, and the economy of the "common good." It exalted valor, asceticism, sacrifice, and made a call for virility and
discipline. 83

The UNS was founded officially in León, Guanajuato (sometimes called Sinarcópolis), in May 1937, from a section of the Base, a Catholic organization associated with the Church. 84 The message disseminated by the UNS had appeal in the politicized Mexico of Cárdenas: during the years 1940 and 1941, as many as 400,000 militants registered with the movement, concentrated particularly in the Bajío, 85,000 in Michoacán, 75,000 in Guanajuato, 25,000 in Querétaro, 20,000 in San Luis Potosí, and over 20,000 in Jalisco. 85 These militants were overwhelmingly concentrated in rural Mexico, in traditional rural professions, many being day laborers, small farmers, some ejidatarios, and artisans and small merchants. 86 Traditional Catholicism and a traditional social order appealed to these conservative campesinos, artisans, and shopkeepers who lived in the most Spanish part of Mexico, the Bajío, where the Church-state struggle had reached its most violent form in the 1920s.

The UNS suffered the same internal debate as the PAN: whether to participate electorally or not, and through which party. In 1946, two UNS leaders founded the Partido Fuerza Popular (PFP) and presented

84Ibid., p. 34.
85Ibid., pp. 46-47. For Querétaro, Guanajuato, and Michoacán, these figures represent 10, 7.5, and 7.3 percent of the states’ populations, respectively.
86Ibid., p. 53.
forty-seven federal deputy candidates in 1946. The PFP lasted less than three years, failing not because of electoral difficulties, but when its registration was cancelled by the Ministry of Gobernación because UNS members had put a black hood over the statue of the great Mexican liberal Benito Juárez in Alemada Park in Mexico City during a rally, reportedly saying "We don't want to see him, nor him to see us." In 1953, the UNS tried again to establish a party, this time named the Partido de Unidad Nacional. Its request for registration was denied by Gobernación in 1954. The UNS tried one more time to find an electoral vehicle before the 1964 elections, choosing to approach the Partido Nacionalista Mexicano, a splinter party in danger of losing its registration. However, it lost its registration immediately when Gobernación learned of the UNS–PNM alliance, apparently because it was feared that sinarquistas would become party deputies under the PNM banner (this was the first election after the introduction of party

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87 Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México, p. 169.


89 Ibid., p. 155.

90 Very little information is available on this party. Jesús Anlen reports that it was founded in 1934, received registration in 1951, and had its registration cancelled in 1964. Origen y evolución de los partidos políticos en México (Mexico City: Textos Universitarios, 1973), p. 144. One of the PNM’s party leaders was Salvador Rivero Martínez, an ex-Cristero. One scholar suggests that the PNM had fascist origins in the 1930s. Fátima Fernández Christlieb, "Cuatro partidos políticos sin registro electoral: PCM, PDM, PMT, PST," Estudios Políticos, 1, 3-4 (1975), p. 77.
deputies). UNS attempts to participate electorally, then, were turned back by the fears of the authorities, not by its lack of support.

In 1970, the UNS again initiated the formation of a political party. The following year, the Partido Demócrata Mexicano was officially constituted in an assembly of mostly sinarquistas, convoked by UNS national head Juan Aguilera Aspeitia in Iraputo, Guanajuato. A four-year membership campaign followed, under the leadership of Baltazar Ignacio Valadez, in which party leaders claim to have attained a membership of 100,000 by the time its first national assembly was held in Mexico City in June 1975. At that assembly, former UNS head Ignacio González Gollaz was elected PDM president. González Gollaz immediately applied for legal registration, but Gobernación denied the request. Following the implementation of the provisions of the reforma política, the PDM received conditional registration at the same time as the Communist Party and the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) in May 1978.

Ideology. Perhaps even more vehemently than the PAN, the PDM

91 Kenneth F. Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," American Political Science Review, 59, 3 (1965), p. 659. There was, apparently, some complicity on the part of the PAN to pressure the government to cancel the PNM registration. Mabry, Mexico's Acción Nacional, p. 76. Officially, the PNM registration was cancelled because of factionalization within the party. Christlieb, "Cuarto partidos sin registro," p. 77.


93 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 80. The PDM applied for registration within a week of this assembly, with a list of 84,432 members and 22 state assemblies. Proceso, no. 25 (23 April 1977).
seeks the third way between liberal capitalism and communism, the common good defined in *Rerum Novarum*, *Mater et Magistra*, and *Popularum Progresso*. PAN leaders had generally disseminated a relatively progressive and elitist version of this Catholic social philosophy. The PDM, on the other hand, has set forth a more populist, rural-oriented, and reactionary version of Catholic political philosophy, tempered to fit the demands of the peasantry of the Bajío. Thus, it has given great emphasis to the problems of the countryside, with the proposal that the state keep itself and its parastatal firms out of any solution. A more just and equitable distribution of private property in the countryside, a Mexico of small property holders, is seen as bringing prosperity back to the nation.

The UNS ideal, shared by the PDM, has been "Free men on free soil, all property owners." As Meyer relates, "This idealized campesino is the key figure in UNS ideology. . . . The soil is more than a means of life, it is a manner of living, of enriching oneself, a vital link: a solid people of small landowners, such is the best protection against subversion." That being subverted, which must be protected, is the nation, the nation's people, and their fundamental Christian values. The subverters are both Marxists and liberals.

This relatively reactionary populism, which the PDM shares with the UNS, coupled with its appeal to traditional sectors of the

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population and a militant style of action, often causes it to be labeled fascist. As Meyer concludes, there are some parallels between sinarquista and fascist ideology: the critique of formal democracy as inadequate, the rejection of the left-right spectrum, the opposition to all other political groups, its extreme nationalism, and its opposition to class struggle and Marxism in general. Certainly the UNS's adversaries have sought to label it as fascist. Yet, the PDM seems committed, in rhetoric anyway, to democratic practices and has rejected violence and revolutionary tactics, a significant movement away from the practices of its cristero ancestors. Its anti-communism, though, is quite marked, so it considers Marxist parties (and all Mexican parties of the left) which seek a dictatorship of the proletariat to be totalitarian. Classical liberalism is also suspect for two reasons. First, it is associated in Mexico with virulent anticlericism, liberals

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97 Ibid., pp. 130-131. Meyer observes, though, that careful studies of the UNS by U.S. intelligence services at the time of the Second World War found no connection with the Axis even though it was anti-Yankee. Scholars on the left have sought to find evidence of connection between UNS founders and either the Nazi German embassy or Franco's forces.

98 López Moreno, La reforma política en México, p. 238. See the interview with Gumersindo Magaña, then PDM president, in Proceso, no. 105 (6 November 1978). Critics on the left, of course, would argue that the PDM, like the National Socialist Party of Germany, will abandon democracy if it ever attains power. Bartra argues that the mixing of sinarquista nationalism (a Guadalupean nationalism) and Christian social reformism both veils the proto-fascist roots of the party and creates divisions within it. "Viaje al centro de la derecha," p. 17.

99 See the interview with González Gollaz in Poniatowka, Domingo siete, p. 203. Gumersindo Magaña, then party president, suggested in 1982 that many of Mexico's problems were due to communists who had infiltrated the state. El Heraldo, 16 March 1982.

100 Unomasuno, 29 May 1978.
having instituted the reforms of the 1850s which stripped the Church of much of its power. Thus, Juárez is not a hero for sinarquistas, but someone who helped to ruin the traditional Christian social order. Second, liberal democracy, the regime of parties and elections, is considered formalistic. It does not bring the integral democracy, a democracy for the downtrodden campesino or artisan. Finally, the PDM’s policy suggestions reveal an extremist style. So, the PDM may not be a fascist party, but it certainly shares many features with previous fascist experiments.

Leadership. Besides their ideological similarity, the PDM and the UNS tend to share leadership, with individuals moving back and forth from positions in the UNS to positions in the PDM. González Gollaz is the most conspicuous and powerful example. A long-time UNS militant, González Gollaz became head of the organization in 1959, remaining chief sinarquista until 1961. He became the first party president in 1975 and the PDM’s first presidential candidate in 1982, returning to the head of the party in 1984. Baltazar Ignacio Valadez is another example. After the UNS formed the party in the early 1970s, Valadez was its chief promoter, traveling about the country organizing state and local PDM committees. He later became UNS head.

This is not to say that the PDM-UNS leadership does not suffer from internal strife. Indeed, there have been struggles over the direction of the party, centered about the use of the financial

101 González Gollaz, for example, called for the use of the death penalty for officials engaged in fraud. La Prensa, 6 February 1982.
102 Poniatowska, Domingo siete, p. 191.
resources given to the party by the Federal Electoral Commission (in conformity with the LOPPE). The most violent of these conflicts was over the reelection as party president of Gumersindo Magaña in 1981, when he was opposed by long-time UNS head Juan Aguilera Aspidia. Magaña won reelection, but open fisticuffs broke out between his followers and those of Aguilera at a later meeting.\textsuperscript{103} If one of the hidden intentions for giving parties state funds was to promote divisions and suspicion among their leadership, it succeeded in the case of the PDM, at least temporarily.

Goals. The UNS sought, and the PDM seeks, the return of an idealized Mexico, the Mexico of peasants who till their own soil, worship their God, and raise their family without the intrusion of foreigners (especially North Americans and communists of all nationalities) or the state. Such a Mexico will not suffer from the divisions brought on by class struggle and thus will be unified against a hostile world. It will be a nation of order in which the individual and his family can enjoy liberty, liberty to contribute to societal well-being, not license to enrich oneself.

How serious is the PDM about achieving such a utopia? At least three possible responses might be given to this query. First, UNS members and PDM members tend to be very militant, true believers of a sort. Most have not been extremely well educated, many not having the university educations that tend to make skeptics of others. They have strong Catholic faith. It is entirely possible that PDM members

\textsuperscript{103}Rodríguez Araujo, \textit{La reforma política y los partidos en México}, pp. 319-320.
believe they can bring about their utopia, or at least they will die trying. In this vein, the PDM has chosen as its symbol the fighting cock. As its president says, "It expresses exactly what the Partido Demócrata is, a party that struggles, that fights, and that there is but one alternative, win or lose. In the ring, the fine cock wins and sings or loses and stays there, dead. So, we, in elections . . . where we lose, we are not going to invent robberies and frauds, we will recognize the defeat, but where we win you are not going to doubt that our candidate is converted into the governor . . ."104 This "win or die trying" attitude contributes to suspicions that the PDM is fascistic.

Second, and not necessarily inconsistent with the first point, the PDM may hope to at least promote its utopia in those states and localities where it can defeat the PRI and other challengers. Given the unlikelihood of winning nationally, it may be possible to win in areas where supporters of the sinarquista cause are concentrated. Then, at least those who want this utopia may be able to have it on a small scale.

Third, the PDM may simply be acting as an interest group for those desiring a more reactionary, populistic version of the Christian social order in the same way as the PAN has done in the past for those seeking the elitist, modern version. Their goal may not be to actually return Mexico back to what they perceive was a better time, but simply to resist the further incursions of secularist, collectivist, materialist modernity. By reiterating this philosophy as frequently and as

104 Poniatowska, Domingo siete, pp. 178-179.
publicly as possible, PDM leaders may keep that message in the minds of policy makers. By competing electorally, they may demonstrate the national appeal of their ideology so as to convince decision makers to respect its tenets.

Most likely, PDM leaders share some combination of these goals. Furthermore, some seem to be more militant, others more pragmatic. Overall, though, compared to priístas, pedemistas clearly show a greater commitment to achieving a different order by their political activity.

Settings for Encounters with the Authorities. The UNS itself is probably best considered a social movement, albeit one successfully marginalized by the Mexican revolutionary elite. For those involved, it is far more than an interest group, with a scope of issues far wider and an ideology much more completely developed than an interest group usually has. It is not a political party and never has been. 105 Encounters between the authorities and sinarquistas have been sporadic and sometimes violent, usually occurring when the UNS calls together its militants for a national or regional assembly. The UNS was for many years an anti-system movement, but in the post-war years when social peace and a modus vivendi reigned between Church and state, the UNS had in fact little purpose in being. 106 Only as Mexican society polarized, especially as radicalism returned by the end of the 1960s, and economic development stagnated, affecting the countryside in particular, did the UNS again find a major need to participate

105 Meyer, El sinarquismo, p. 108.
106 Ibid., pp. 110-112.
politically. From the end of the Second World War until the end of the 1960s, the UNS was largely marginalized.

The PDM, as an organ created by the UNS to participate electorally, faces the political elite, or more correctly, its electoral organ, the PRI, in the electoral arena. For the PDM, the reforma política was a godsend, saving it from the fate of its predecessors, the PNM and the FUN. For that reason, the PDM exhibited great enthusiasm for the reforma política and, unlike other opposition parties, remained uncritical even when the provisions of the LOPPE where made known. Even after direct experience in the electoral arena, the PDM has little to say critically about Reyes Heroles’s reform.

The electoral arena provides the PDM and the UNS an opportunity to spread its message to a far wider audience than the traditional UNS clientele, those who were involved in the Cristero Rebellion and their descendants. Geographically, the PDM can reach much further than the UNS ever had, beyond the Bajío and to urban areas. Still, the PDM concentrates its electoral effort in its traditional locale, the Bajío.

Electoral Competitiveness and Support. As is the case with the PAN, the competitiveness of the PDM varies greatly by district and region. Overall, it is but a marginal party, receiving less than 3 percent of the national vote in deputy elections, although that share has been steadily growing from 2.2 percent in 1979, to 2.3 percent in 1982, then to 2.9 percent in 1985. In certain areas, especially the

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107 Proceso, no. 59 (19 December 1977).
states of the Bajío, the PDM can be a serious challenger to the PRI. Figure 8-1 demonstrates the regional concentration of the vote for the PDM for the 1982 deputy election; its strength was clearly in the Bajío plus Mexico City. In 1985, the PDM exceeded 15 percent of the vote in Guanajuato. In addition, it has conquered the mayoralities of smaller cities in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Tlaxcala as well as the city halls of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí (in alliance with the PAN). Again, these are cities of the Bajío.

The party itself is relatively large in membership by standards of the Mexican opposition if its reports can be believed. The PDM originally solicited registration in 1975 with about 85,000 members. By the end of 1977 it claimed to have 160,000 adherents, and in mid-1978, after the UNS and the PDM formally fused so as to share membership, the size of the PDM membership was given to be of a magnitude of about 350,000. The degree of commitment of the membership is unclear, however, since the PDM’s national vote in 1979 was only 285,000 and in 1982 it was about 475,000.

The PDM has become more competitive electorally, but remains weak vis-a-vis both the PAN, which has outpolled it even in the Bajío, and of course the PRI. An open question is how large the PDM’s base of support can grow. It seems unlikely that the PDM can break out of its region of origin without changing its ideology to address issues of concern to urban dwellers. Were the PDM to do so, it could be betraying its parent, the UNS. The issue of whether the PDM could


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govern, then, is academic at the national level.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RIGHT

The Mexican electoral right seems to be the big winner from the growth of electoral competitiveness in the past decade. Those making the reforma política do not seem to have intended this result; the increased vote for the PAN cannot itself be attributed to the measures included in the reform and many expected that the regional concentration of sinarquistas would doom the PDM. It does not seem that the introduction of the PDM has taxed the PAN, nor that the latter’s recent popularity has wrecked the opportunities for the PDM.

Although the issue of state intervention in the economy and the orientation of Mexican development policy in general have become more and more important since 1970 as determinants of the right’s orientation, the more deeply felt source of conservative adherence in post-Reform and post-revolutionary Mexico has been rejection of the secularist aspects of public policy, especially educational policy and measures taken against the Church. Both the PAN and the PDM trace their roots to the Church-state struggles of the first two decades after the Constitution of 1917 was introduced and to the socialist education measures of Cárdenas. While those issues have largely died out, other moral issues have replaced them in the past two decades, particularly the campaign against abortion. Both parties have reacted strongly against the explosive growth of the state’s entrepreneurial role during the Echeverría and López Portillo sexenios. The PAN, though, or an element of it, the neo-panistas, has moved further toward
free-market liberalism than has the PDM, which remains enamored of a more traditional Catholic socioeconomic order.

This movement towards liberal capitalism by the PAN is perhaps one reason why the PDM has demonstrated a great unwillingness to cooperate electorally with the PAN, at least at the national level.\textsuperscript{110} The UNS had, on occasions in the past, suggested that \textit{sinarquistas} support PAN candidates. However, UNS and PDM leaders feel that the PAN has abandoned a critical portion of its electorate, the \textit{campesinos}.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, PDM leaders suspect the PAN of collaboration with the state. Thus, a fusion of the right is improbable even though a combined party of the right could draw anywhere from 2 to 15 percent more votes at the state level than the largest party of the right, the PAN, now does.

The Mexican right extends beyond the PAN and the PDM. There are some who are disloyal to the Revolution and uninvolved in electoral politics. The city of Guadalajara is known to be a bastion of the ultra-right as well as of the more moderate right, the PAN and the PDM. In particular, the Autonomous University of Guadalajara, a private university founded in 1935 in reaction to state-directed anticlericism, is reputed to be controlled by a secret society called Los Tecos which is committed to anti-communism and anti-semitism.\textsuperscript{112} Again, by national standards the ultra-right is a marginal movement, although a worrisome one.

\textsuperscript{110}Unomásuno, 30 January 1978.

\textsuperscript{111}Proceso, no. 105 (6 November 1978).

So long as the economic crisis continues to afflict Mexico, the parties of the right, especially the PAN, will continue to convert the middle class to their cause. There are limits, however, to the long-term growth of the PAN, unless it can convert groups larger than the middle class, particularly the urban working class and urban marginals. These groups may in some cases support the PAN in order to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the PRI and the failure of the state’s economic policy. However, the PAN’s message is not particularly well-suited to these large groups. Furthermore, given a chance to fail in economic policy, the PAN may find that the votes of these temporary supporters will remain temporary. For the PAN to realistically become a governing party, Mexico’s party system will have to become a two-party system with the PRI and the PAN as catch-all parties. Whether Mexico’s social mosaic will permit this is doubtful, although it is not impossible. Furthermore, the left, to which I now turn, seems determined to head off this eventuality.
Table 8-1

POINTS FOR COMPARING OPPOSITION PARTIES

1. The organizational cohesion of the party.
2. The competitiveness of the party electorally.
3. The sites or settings for encounters between the party and those who control the state.
4. The distinctiveness of the party:
   a. ideology;
   b. defined leadership;
   c. defined support group.
5. The goals of the party.
6. The strategies of the party.
<table>
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<th>YEAR</th>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>139 (160)</td>
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Numbers in parentheses refer to total number of districts.

Table 8-3

PERCENTAGES OF THE VALID VOTE TO PAN

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Note: Annulled votes are excluded in calculating percentages of the vote.

Sources: Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma Politica, v. 9 (Mexico City, 1982); 1985 data provided by Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Table 8-4

PAN VOTE IN STATE-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE RACES, 1980 AND 1983

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*Michoacan is in the Bajio region.

Figure 8-1

Vote for the PDM in 1982 Federal Deputy Races; Regional Aspects

KEY:
- \( \geq 3.0\% \)
- \(< 3.0\% \)
CHAPTER NINE
ANATOMY OF THE OPPOSITION II:
THE LEFT AND THE VERY LOYAL OPPOSITION

The most conspicuous result of the reforma política is the emergence into the open electoral arena of the independent Mexican left. By bringing the left into the electoral process, the reforma política has greatly broadened the spectrum of ideological choice for the voter, precisely what all proponents of the reforms said was their main intention, but thereby increasing the appearance of political competition and improving the capacity of the electoral system to channel Mexican political participation. For that reason, one must conclude that the reforma política was a resounding success, at least as a public relations effort to relegitimate the regime. The left itself sometimes complains about roadblocks which still impede its growth, but does not suggest that the Mexican regime return to its reforma política characteristics, or that it would have been better that it never happen.

The left approached the reforma política with a combination of enthusiasm and fear, some eagerly entering the electoral arena, others coming into the open with doubts, still others choosing to keep their distance, at least for a time, from the government-sponsored reforms. Pablo González Casanova captured the left's ambivalent feelings well while exhorting the left to action: "The reforma política (and the political struggle) is not 'just a trap of the bourgeoisie' as some
groups of the left fear: it is also the possibility of opening a field of ideological and revolutionary struggle, with the intention of amplifying and consolidating the political space of the workers, the middle classes, and the country.\textsuperscript{1} Whether with eagerness or doubt, the left has entered into the open political struggle, some parties keeping an independence from the state, others collaborating more closely with elements of the PRI. Their entry has had some limited effects on previously registered parties, the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS). This chapter will examine both the independent parties of the left and those which cooperate more closely with the ruling elite and its party, the PRI. It will close with some conclusions about the overall development of the Mexican political parties.

THE INDEPENDENT LEFT

The most common news coming from the Mexican left usually tells either of unification attempts or the splintering of existing parties. The Mexican left is incredibly factionalized, at first glance looking very much like alphabet soup, numerous parties and groupings with names indicating their allegiance to the plight of the workers, their commitment to revolution, and their vision of socialism. One study reported that in the decade between 1972 and 1982 alone there appeared sixteen political parties, movements, or currents; five broad fronts; four student political groupings; and dozens of groups in distinct

\textsuperscript{1}"Las alternativas de la democracia," in México, hoy, ed. by González Casanova and Enrique Florescano (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979), p. 370. Emphasis in original.
areas.  A complete history of the Mexican left would highlight the many factors which have divided committed leftists in Mexico: personality conflicts and jealousies, the link to Stalin and Moscow, the assassination of Trotsky, and questions about strategy and tactics in contemporary Mexico. Such a history would also have to tell why certain unification attempts have succeeded while others have failed. Such a history cannot be provided here.

As of 1987, ten years after the reforma política, the party system of Mexico includes four parties of the left: the Partido Socialista Mexicano (PSM), founded in 1987 with the merger of the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT) and the Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM), itself the product of an earlier unification of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) and other groups of the left; the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), a Trotskyist party; the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), founded in the 1970s as a splinter from the group which included the PMT; and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), a party founded by labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano and registered since the 1940s. Numerous unregistered parties and "political associations" operate in Mexico as well, forming coalitions with the registered parties at times in order to participate electorally. The PST and the PPS tend to cooperate with the ruling elite and the PRI, considering the threat to the nation from imperialism greater than the threat to the working class from those who

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govern the nation. The other parties maintain a good deal of autonomy from the state, although they do rely on the state for a large part of their campaign finances and are always threatened by the possibility that the Ministry of Gobernación could pull their registrations.

The PSM is Mexico's most potent leftist party. For that reason, and because the two major currents which formed it, the PCM and the PMT, have been the sources of most other parties and associations of the left, I will begin with the PSM. Because it is so new and we have little evidence as to its longevity, I will consider its constituent parts, the PCM (and the PSUM) and the PMT, in turn.

**Mexican Communism**

**Origins.** The PCM dates from 1919, when it was founded as the Partido Nacional Socialista, affiliated with the Third International in Moscow, and then changed its name to the Partido Comunista Mexicano. As with most Mexican parties, the issue of whether to participate electorally or not arose immediately. Anarcho-Syndicalist tendencies within the party kept it out of electoral politics until 1925, when it decided to support candidates. While vigorously active in the last

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3 This does not pretend to be a complete history of the PCM. For further information on the early years of Mexican communism, through the 1950s, see Manuel Márquez Fuentes and Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, El Partido Comunista Mexicano (Mexico City: Ed. El Caballito, 1973); Karl M. Schmitt, Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965); Gerardo Peláez, Partido Comunista Mexicano: 60 años de historia, 2 vols. (Culiacán: Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, 1980); and Barry Carr, "Crisis in Mexican Communism: The Extraordinary Congress of the Mexican Communist Party," Science and Society, 50, 4 (1986) and 51, 1 (1987).

4 Peláez, Partido Comunista Mexicano, pp. 14-16.

half of the 1920s, the PCM membership grew to only about 1500 by 1929, although its influence in Mexican society was definitely of a greater magnitude than implied by that figure.\(^6\) In 1929, though, the PCM was declared illegal, its printing press destroyed, and its members and its labor union and peasant organization repressed.\(^7\) Throughout the Maximato, the PCM had to maintain a semi-clandestine existence.

Cárdenas lifted the repression of the party when he entered office at the end of 1934. The ferment of the Cárdenas sexenio greatly affected the PCM, which became intensely involved in worker and peasant mobilizations. Its efforts and the generally radical climate of the time promoted an enormous growth in numbers of members, up to perhaps 35,000 by the end of 1939.\(^8\) Organizationally, however, Mexican communism faced difficult questions about whether to form a popular front with the governing party and, in the realm of labor relations, with the Confederación de Trabajadores de México which the influential Mexican Marxist Vicente Lombardo Toledano led. To begin with, the Cárdenas government turned back PCM efforts to have communists included in state positions as part of a popular front. That meant that any alliance with other progressive forces would have to be directed at the labor movement. However, Lombardo, although a Marxist, had been involved in repression of the PCM during the Maximato. Moreover, Lombardo shared power in the CTM with Fidel Velázquez and other fervent anti-communists and often was forced to rely on them to achieve CTM

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\(^6\) Carr, "Crisis in Mexican Communism," part 1, p. 392.

\(^7\) Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, pp. 62-63.

\(^8\) Carr, "Crisis in Mexican Communism," part 1, pp. 395-396.
goals, frequently to the detriment of PCM-linked unionists. This created division within the PCM over whether or not to ally with Lombardo and tacitly accept his leadership. In favor of the argument for a popular front was the continued organizational activity of the Christian right (the sinarquistas had recently founded their organization) and the intransigence of business (national and foreign) in the face of Cárdenas's reforms. Lombardo was also playing with the idea of forming a new party of the left, which he finally did in 1948. These conflicting factors caused the PCM to follow a zig-zag approach toward the Cárdenas government and the CTM, contributing to an internal crisis which was dealt with at an extraordinary congress of the PCM in 1940.9

Compounding the tensions within the PCM in 1939 and 1940 were events in international communism: the Nazi-Soviet Pact (and the invasion of Finland) and Stalin's continuing attempt to have Trotsky assassinated. The first created tensions with the Cárdenas government, which was being supported by the PCM but which had openly criticized the Soviet Union over the attack on Finland. Moreover, the Comintern was quite suspicious of the direction of the PCM because, while Lombardo remained a strong defender of Soviet foreign policy, the PCM kept Lombardo at an arm's-length distance.10 The assassination of Trotsky eventually led to purges in the PCM and an open schism, with many members leaving the party. PCM leaders Hernán Laborde and Valentín Campa refused to cooperate with Stalin's plan to have Trotsky

9 Ibid., part 2, pp. 43-48.
10 Ibid., p. 51.

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eliminated. These inadequacies of Mexican communism, its weak defense of Soviet foreign policy and its lack of zeal about killing Trotsky, eventually led the Comintern to send a foreign delegation to Mexico, the to the formation of a purging committee, and finally to an extraordinary congress in 1940. The result of the congress was the expulsion of Laborde and Campa, mass resignations from the party, and the assassination of Trotsky. By 1941, the PCM was reporting but 4,500 members. In 1951, for want of members, its registration was cancelled.

A period of extreme sectarianism in the Mexican left followed the extraordinary congress in 1940, with major expulsions and schisms in 1943 and 1947. When Lombardo formed the Partido Popular in 1948, a number of prominent ex-communists were included among its founders: Enrique Ramírez y Ramírez, Rafael Carrillo, Diego Rivera, and José Revueltas. In 1950, two associations of ex-communists, Acción Socialista Unificada, led by Laborde and Campa, and Movimiento de Reivindicación de Partido Comunista, led by among others Carlos Sánchez Cárdenas, founded the Partido Obrero Campesino de México (POCM) which never received legal registration. Throughout the 1950s, the three parties of the left made attempts to cooperate, above all in the

11 Ibid., pp. 48-62.

12 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 68.


14 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, pp. 112-113.
railroad workers' strike of 1958-1959, but unification never came about. After the repression of the strike, the POCM disappeared in the early 1960s, some members joining the PP, others the PCM.15

Until 1968, the PCM remained for the most part clandestine, participating marginally in the formation of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), a movement of leftist intellectuals that sprung up in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. The events of 1968 proved that the PCM was unable to coordinate and lead a mass uprising. Although it participated in the student unrest, it never provided effective leadership, which was one reason why some communist sympathizers chose the path of guerrilla insurrection in the years immediately following 1968. Overall, though, the events of 1968 helped to reinvigorate the moribund PCM. Many new members who had been involved in the student movement entered the PCM and the party began to redirect its ideology and strategy.16 By 1977, it was ready to enter the electoral arena as the strongest party of the left.

**Ideology.** Ideologically, the PCM was an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party. It sought socialism, the classless society which would come about after a revolution overthrowing the exploitative capitalist order. The way in which this would come about, of course, would have to take account of the peculiar circumstances in which Mexico found itself. As of the early 1970s, the PCM was calling for a state directed by workers, a dictatorship of the proletariat to benefit the


working class, campesinos, the revolutionary intelligentsia, and all laborers. To bring about socialism, the PCM believed that the means of production should be concentrated in the control of the state. This revolutionary state would nationalize imperialistic foreign capital, the banks, monopolies, and large landholdings. PCM programs assured that small and medium-sized firms would not be nationalized, but they would have to form associations so as to incorporate and coordinate their production into the national effort. To improve the well-being of Mexicans, urban government, housing administration, and existing welfare agencies would have to be reformed and rationalized. Workers would be reorganized and have their salaries raised. All landholdings larger than fifty hectares would be expropriated; private landholdings will be limited to twenty hectares; and the confiscated land would be used to create a national ejidal system.\(^\text{17}\)

After the PCM entered the electoral arena in the reforma política process, elements within it found the need to modify elements of PCM ideology in order to appeal to a wider body of Mexicans. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat and its association with totalitarian repression of dissidents and class enemies became particularly problematic in the effort to build a wider base for the party. Thus, the use of the concept was deemphasized and a distinction was drawn between the concept, which remained valid because the bourgeoisie as a class still had to be defeated, and its programmatic

\(^{17}\)This summary based on Fátima Fernández Christlieb, "Cuatro partidos políticos sin registro electoral: PCM, PDM, PMT, PST," Estudios Políticos, 1, 3-4 (1975), pp. 91-102.
use. In the realm of the mode of production, the PCM began to argue that Mexico had and would continue to have state monopoly capitalism, which was not necessarily bad, but could be. For instance, state monopoly capitalism in the Brazil of the 1970s was associated with political repression. The task, then, was to form an "advanced democratic government," presumably one in which the bureaucracy could resist the regressive demands of finance and foreign capital. Proceeding to democracy seemed to take precedence over overthrowing capitalism. As Carr argues,

> The notion of a "final" rupture with capitalism was not entirely omitted from PCM statements. There was a clearly stated, if imprecisely detailed, notion that the party's strategy of gaining greater democratic space was designed to make the contemporary crisis of Mexican capitalism more acute, thereby leading to what were called "decisive confrontations." What these confrontations were and how they would be resolved was unclear.

Overall, this ideological shift was designed to increase the popularity of a party which had chosen to participate electorally.

**Sites for Encounters with the Authorities.** The law has been an important variable delimiting the PCM's choice of settings for confrontation with the Mexican revolutionary elite. For many years of its existence, from 1929 through 1934 and from 1951 through 1978, the PCM was an illegal organization which could therefore not participate electorally. The degree to which it had to remain clandestine varied from administration to administration, but the PCM nearly disappeared from sight during the height of the cold war.

The two settings in which the PCM has been most likely to confront

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19 Ibid., p. 218.
the authorities have been the electoral arena and labor and other mass organizations. In neither setting has the PCM enjoyed much success. Prior to the reforma política the PCM presented candidates on an irregular basis, depending on its legal status and its inclination toward popular frontism at the time. In 1940 and 1946, the PCM supported the presidential candidate of the official party. After Lombardo formed the PP and the PCM lost its registration, the PP’s candidates were sometimes supported by the Communist Party, depending upon the relations between the parties at the time. For instance, in 1958 the PCM had sought an electoral alliance with the PP and the POCM, but the PP chose to support the PRI candidate, Adolfo López Mateos. The PCM and POCM continued to support the PCM candidate, Miguel Mendoza López, but his candidacy was an unofficial write-in campaign because both parties were unregistered. 20 Unofficial candidacies were presented for the 1964 and 1976 presidential races as well. Such campaigns, of course, stand no chance of victory and, in pre-1968 Mexico, little chance of even being recognized by the media. Since the reforma política, the PCM and its successor, the PSUM, have enthusiastically participated in elections for all levels of government throughout the nation.

In the labor sphere, the PCM had difficulties before the radicalization of the universities in the late 1960s. As Barry Carr reports, the PCM has been intensely involved in peasant and worker organization at times in its history, particularly in the formation of the CTM in the 1930s and in the railroad workers’ strike in 1958-1959, 20

Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 69.

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but it was unable to hold onto its support bases among these workers because, as much as anything, of government repression. The party purges of the 1940s also cut deeply into the PCM's union base. Only since 1968 have communist-affiliated unions resurged, especially among university employees.\textsuperscript{21} Compared to the official union movement, though, PCM and PSUM labor organizing has been quite weak.

\textbf{Strategies and Leaders}. Socialism has remained a steady goal of Mexican communists. The strategy for getting there, however, has changed dramatically in the past twenty-five years. From the time of Cárdenas until the early 1960s, the PCM leadership under Dionicio Encina, who had assumed the position of first secretary during the party's 1940 crisis, tended to interpret the official party as a nationalist and revolutionary party, one that could push Mexico toward socialism, as Cárdenas seemed to be doing. Therefore, the PCM followed a strategy of support for the PRI and its predecessors, under the delusion that the PCM could push the PRI toward the left. Encina maintained this interpretation despite the introduction of the desarrollo estabilizador development strategy (see Chapter Three) and official suppression of the PCM itself.

In 1960 Encina was deposed, replaced first by collective leadership and then, after 1963, by the secretary-generalship of Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo. Under Martínez Verdugo, the PCM began to consider new interpretations of Mexican society and new strategies for advancing it toward socialism. As Carr puts it, "Central to this overall revision of party strategy was the contention that the Mexican


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Revolution had finally exhausted its progressive potential. As a result, the party abandoned 'rightist' delusions about the possibility of transforming the ruling party, the PRI, and of pushing it to the left. Martínez Verdugo also de-Stalinized the party, thereby improving its appeal to radicals of varying sorts who emerged with differing critiques of capitalism in post-1968 Mexico. For a time in the early 1970s, the influx of student radicals caused the party to consider armed revolutionary struggle. However, by 1976 the PCM seemed to have chosen the electoral path, a path which it hoped to follow through a coalition of the left. To some extent, to choose electoral alliance meant abandoning "the vanguardist conception according to which it awarded itself monopoly rights over marxist interpretation and socialist strategy in Mexico." In 1976, when the PCM postulated the write-in candidacy of Valentín Campa, it even cooperated with Mexican Trotskyists.

The long process of unifying the Mexican left, a still incomplete process, served to disinter and illustrate the many sources of division within the left. From even before the announcement of the reforma política, the PCM engaged in discussions with Heberto Castillo's PMT, a dissident faction of the PPS headed by Alejandro Gascón Mercado (the Partido Popular Mexicano), and a small Marxist-Leninist party called the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), achieving its greatest

22 Ibid., p. 211.
23 Ibid., p. 211.
24 Ibid., p. 212.
25 Proceso, no. 18 (5 March 1977).
success with the latter two, with which the PCM formed a coalition to contest the 1979 federal elections under the PCM banner. The PCM’s continued identification with communism and its symbols made alliance or unification with the PMT difficult. Castillo also expressed great doubt about the provisions of reforma política, an initiative which he distrusted but which the PCM more openly embraced. The PPM and the PSR, on the other hand, were more orthodox Marxist-Leninist parties. The PPM was founded after Gascón Mercado’s wing of the PPS was expelled from that party by Jorge Cruikshank, who was more willing to collaborate with the ruling elite than was Gascón Mercado. The latter considers himself the true and loyal disciple of Lombardo, Mexico’s most prominent Marxist-Leninist; the PPM openly embraced scientific socialism as its ideology. The PSR, led by Roberto Jaramillo, was founded as a splinter from the Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Coordinación (National Committee of Auscultation and Coordination—CNAC), a committee of personalities and groups who had been involved in the 1968 movement and the MLN in the early 1960s who organized in 1971 with the intention of forming a new mass party of the left. The CNAC is also the font of the PMT and the PST, particularly of the PMT since Castillo headed the CNAC. However, the PSR leadership, with roots in the PPS of Lombardo, was far more willing to follow Marxism-Leninism

26 Unomásuno, 1 October 1978.

27 Hernández and Rock, Zócalo rojo, pp. 310-311.


29 Hernández and Rock, Zócalo rojo, pp. 296-297.
than other factions of the CNAC. Finally, the 1979 Coalition of the Left included an association called Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista (MAUS), a group of older leftists led by Carlos Sánchez Cárdenas and Miguel Angel Velasco which was originally a part of the PCM, later forming the POCM, and then militating within the PPS until Lombardo’s death, when it was expelled. The MAUS also subscribed to Marxism-Leninism. So, despite calls for unity of the Mexican left, the PCM could only successfully recruit Marxist-Leninists who had been affiliated previously with the PCM or with Lombardo’s PPS for the 1979 campaign. In fact, the PSR and the MAUS were openly anti-Trotskyist, making negotiations with the PRT very difficult.

In 1981, the parties involved in the 1979 Coalition of the Left, plus a group called Movimiento de Acción Popular, formally united as the PSUM. Again, efforts to include the PMT failed at the last

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32 Junquera, La reforma política, p. 46. Like the PPS and the PST, the MAUS viewed the PRI as being led by a progressive, national revolutionary group and thus the PRI (or at least progressives within it) should be supported by the left. By this time, the PCM no longer subscribed to this view. Arturo Martínez Nateras, El sistema electoral mexicano (Culiacán: Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, 1979), pp. 136-137.


34 The MAP had been formed in 1981 from another group called the Frente Nacional de Acción Popular, which included a number of UNAM faculty members, UNAM union leaders, and leaders of the nuclear workers’ union. The MAP gave to the PSUM a number of important leaders, among them the prominent university professors and leftist ideologists Arnaldo Córdova and Rolando Cordero, and nuclear workers’ leader Arturo Whaley. Hernández and Rock, Zócalo rojo, p. 314. Latin America Regional Reports: Mexico and Central America, 18 September
moment as Castillo pulled out of the unification talks, in disagreement about the unified party’s leadership organ and with the other parties’ preferences that the hammer and the sickle remain the unified party’s emblem and that it be a Marxist party, called either communist or socialist. These alliance and unification efforts demonstrate a desire on the part of the PCM to abandon its role as an organization only engaged in propaganda and "advanced" agitation and become a mass party. Becoming a mass party, though, meant not only disseminating its ideology to as wide an audience as possible and gathering in as many like-minded militants as were available in other parties, but also changing its ideology to appeal to a broader audience. In this latter effort, the PCM and later PSUM leaders, Martínez Verdugo and Pablo Gómez, ran into conflicts with the leaders of the parties with which the PCM merged. Although the oldest of the partners in the PSUM, the PCM (along with the MAP) was in many ways the most ideologically and tactically innovative of the parties. The PCM under Martínez Verdugo and Gómez was clearly headed in a direction toward what in Europe is called Eurocommunism. Martínez Verdugo, Gómez, and members of the MAP sought to abandon Leninism, international proletarianism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The PPM’s Gascón Mercado and the PSR’s Jaramillo opposed these ideological and strategic changes and especially opposed the foreign policy statements made by Martínez 1981.

Verdugo. 37

For instance, the PCM had at a public hearing on the reforma política suggested that the clergy be restored their rights to participate politically. After unification, both Martínez Verdugo, as the PSUM 1982 presidential candidate, and Gómez, as the party's secretary-general, continued to push for an understanding with the Church and for reestablishment of the clergy’s political rights. Extensive talks were held between Martínez Verdugo and radical members of the Church hierarchy during the 1982 campaign, much to the displeasure of other parts of the Mexican left, especially the PPS. 38 However, the approach toward the Church created divisions between ex-PCM leaders and those coming to the PSUM from the MAUS and the PPM (both formerly associated with the PPS), eventually forcing the PSUM to moderate its appeal for the rights of the clergy. 39 The support given the PAN by some members of the Church hierarchy in 1985 caused the PSUM to become openly critical of the Church once again. 40

An earlier, but perhaps more important example of the frictions between the PCM and its allies took place after the 1979 electoral campaign. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Martínez

Verdugo condemned the Soviet action for violating the sovereign rights and self-determination of nations. The PPM, the PSR, and a segment of the PCM called the "Luis Morales" cell, headed by former PCM leader Dionicio Encina, opposed this criticism. A PSR member stated that "the whole organized Mexican left has shown backing for the Afghan Revolution and the solidarity shown by Russia. All except the PCM."\(^4\)

These conflicts, as well as others over control of national and local leadership organs,\(^4\) eventually caused Jaramillo and Gascón Mercado to leave the PSUM, taking a number of their followers with them. The split between Gascón Mercado and the PSUM, occasioned by a struggle for the party leadership between Gómez and Gascón Mercado, greatly weakened the party since he took a large number of adherents with him and because the struggle was very open, an airing of the party's dirty laundry which damaged the PSUM's reputation.\(^4\) This left the PSUM essentially in the hands of ex-PCM and ex-MAP leaders.\(^4\) It was, however, a weakened PSUM. Furthermore, the attempt at unification on the left had clearly failed again. The strategy of establishing a mass party of the left, encouraged by the reforma política, continually faced a serious contradiction: to broaden the appeal of the party to the masses and bring in more leaders of the left almost inevitably meant that someone's ideological toes would be stepped on or that

\(^{41}\) Proceso, no. 172 (18 February 1980). Martínez Verdugo's position is stated in an interview in Proceso, no. 169 (28 January 1980).

\(^{42}\) See, for example, El Universal, 21 February 1982.

\(^{43}\) Proceso, no. 407 (20 August 1984).

\(^{44}\) Proceso, no. 434 (25 February 1985).
someone's ex-enemy might be asked to become a friend. Castillo and his PMT would not allow their ideological preferences to be compromised and the Trotskyite enemies in the PRT would not trust the ex-Stalinists nor were they trusted. Jaramillo and Gasón Mercado would not sacrifice ideology for a larger mass party either. Thus, the PSUM withered.

Electoral competitiveness and support. Presenting its first full slate of candidates ever in 1979, the PCM-led Coalition of the Left made a promising finish. Nationally, it received over 5 percent of the popular vote, nearly half that received by the far more established PAN. However, this support was highly concentrated and remains so, as Figure 9-1 demonstrates. Well over half of the coalition's national vote in 1979 came in the Federal District and the adjoining state of Mexico, where it finished with 11.5 and 7.9 percent of the vote, respectively. In Nayarit, the base of the PCM's coalition partner, the PPM, the coalition also finished respectably.

The PCM's initial success did not continue, though, after the formation of the PSUM. In 1982, the PSUM's share of the national vote fell to 4.4 percent from the PCM's 5.3 percent finish in 1979. The party held its own in to its strongholds of Nayarit, the Federal District, and Mexico and forged ahead in Jalisco (especially in Guadalajara, the nation's second-largest city) and Sinaloa, where the PCM had long been active in organizing the peasantry. The influx of participation in 1982, however, did not yield many new PSUM voters. While 7,000,000 additional votes were cast in 1982 over the 1979

45 About one-third of the PPM's membership was in the small state of Nayarit. Junquera, La reforma politica, p. 45.
figure, only about 220,000 went to the PSUM. This result came as a surprise and a disappointment to PSUM leaders expecting to capitalize on the economic crisis to garner protest votes. The 1985 race was a disaster for the PSUM, with its total vote falling below the 1979 figure (602,530 in 1985 as opposed to 684,154 in 1979). In the party's strongholds, this decline also showed. In the Federal District, the PSUM received 7.8 percent of the valid votes, and in Mexico it finished with 5.5 percent of the total. About half of the PSUM's total still came in these two states. (Table 9-1 shows the geographical concentration of the vote for parties of the left.)

The PSUM is said to have the best national organization among the parties of the left. Martínez Verdugo's 1982 campaign demonstrated that it left much to be desired, however. Table 9-2 lists the interpretations of the PSUM's local organization and following by state made by two journalists who covered Martínez Verdugo's campaign in 1982. The PSUM did have organizations in place in most states, many left from the PCM, others from the PPM and the PSR. However, outside of Mexico City, the state of Mexico, and Sinaloa, the PCM core of the party showed relative weakness. The defection of ex-PPM and PSR leaders led to a decline in the vote for the PSUM in 1985 in Nayarit and Jalisco.

One reason for the decline of the PSUM's electoral fortunes is the entry of other parties of the left into the electoral arena. In 1982, the PRT began to compete for the left's electorate and in 1985 the PMT entered. The PMT in particular probably cut heavily into the PSUM's vote.

46La Prensa, 7 July 1982.
vote in Mexico City, the state of Mexico, and Guadalajara (see Table 9-1).

The statistical analysis of the social bases for the PSUM and other parties of the left discussed in Chapter Seven (see Tables 7-9 and 7-10) pointed to rather a rather pessimistic future for the PSUM or its successor, the PSM. The PSUM was shown to have done well primarily in urban districts. Its vote correlated strongly with the highest education levels and it did well in the most advanced industrial districts. In these districts, however, the PSUM or its current embodiment must take on not only the PRI but also the PAN, which has apparently garnered the lion’s share of the alienated middle class. Indeed, it may be that the PSUM has been recruiting precisely among the middle class, the more educated who are occupying the most advanced sectors of the economy. For the most part, though, this has been a losing struggle for the PSUM.

It is probably fair to conclude that the electoral space for the left in Mexico is limited. Its message is too radical for much of the middle class and although the reforma política gave the PCM and other parties of the left legal rights to try to convert voters to their cause, it did not remove two serious impediments to a mass party of the left: the corporatist organization of worker and peasant associations and the control and violence exercised under caciquismo in the countryside. If the left, including the PPS and the PST, is limited to about 10 percent of the electorate, then the entry of additional parties of the left is bound to cut into the already existing parties’
bases. This seems to have been the fate suffered by the PSUM. The alternative is to confront the PRI on its own turf and defeat it. The left has thus far been unable to do so splintered as it is. The PCM and PSUM, at any rate, were unable to do so outside of very limited areas despite becoming more flexible ideologically and following strategies designed to make the party more appealing to a wider body of Mexicans. The lack of organizational cohesion in the PSUM may have contributed to this. The unwillingness of the intellectuals who led the party to leave the environs of Mexico City to actually militate among the worker and peasant masses instead of writing about it and arguing about it in endless symposia may have something to do with the PSUM’s lackadaisical appearance as well. But then, the reforma política’s intellectual authors had this in mind anyway: draw the PCM and other parties of the left into the electoral process so as to keep them out of the factories, fields, mountains, and jungles where they might organize the masses and arm them against the state.

The Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores

The PCM’s chief rival in the independent left since the reforma política has been the PMT. Although not a registered party before 1984, the PMT has been active politically since the early 1970s, officially forming itself as a party in 1974. The PMT’s weak organizational base relative to the PCM has been at least partially offset by the high profile of its leader, Heberto Castillo. Indeed, if

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47 The left seems to recognize this too. See the article by Enrique Semo in Proceso, no. 530 (29 December 1986).
any party of the left has been a personal vehicle, it has been the PMT, Castillo's declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. Unlike the PCM, the PMT is not a Marxist-Leninist party, but is certainly nationalist and anti-imperialist. PMT leaders, especially Castillo, are unusually outspoken, irreverent, and frank in their discussions of divisions within the left and in their criticism of the ruling elite, including the sacrosanct president. For leftists uncomfortable with Marxism-Leninism and unwilling to try to operate within the PRI's left wing, the PMT has become the party of choice.

Origins and Leadership. The PMT is essentially the residual of the Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Coordinación, those remaining after various individuals and groups left the CNAC in the three years after it was founded in 1971. Original CNAC members sought to determine whether or not a new party of the left was called for in Mexico and what it might look like. Among those involved in the organization of the CNAC were leaders of the student movement of 1968, such as Castillo and Luis Tomás Cervantes Cabeza de Vaca, some prior members of the MLN, including Castillo and novelist Carlos Fuentes, 1958-1959 railroad workers' strike leader Demetrio Vallejo, and prominent intellectuals Octavio Paz and Luis Villoro. Also involved were members of the MAUS and former PCM leader Valentín Campa. Many of these individuals left the CNAC relatively early, including Paz, Fuentes, and Campa, some with declared objections to the direction of the group, others with no reasons given.48

The CNAC's stated objectives were essentially in three categories.

48 Proceso, no. 401 (9 July 1984).
First, it sought political reform, particularly guarantees of individual liberties, freedom for political prisoners, and electoral reform. Second, it demanded greater state control of the economy and a more just distribution of income. Finally, it insisted on greater national control of the economy. This platform put the CNAC on the left of the ruling party, but did not necessarily place it in the camp of Marxist parties.

According to Castillo, the Echeverría administration, itself veering to the left, sought to co-opt the CNAC as it had co-opted numerous other radicals. Castillo himself resisted the Echeverría overtures. However, a large group from the CNAC, led by Rafael Aguilar Talamantes and Graco Ramírez, left to form the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) in March 1973. Castillo asserts that the PST faction was co-opted by Echeverría. Aguilar Talamantes, on the other hand, criticized the CNAC leadership for using personalistic procedures, not democratic ones. Extremely hard feelings between the PST and the PMT over the break continue to this day.

The remaining CNAC (renamed the Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Organización—CNAO) founded the PMT in September 1974, after Castillo and Vallejo had made a four-month trip to twenty-seven states to organize state committees. This relatively late birth as a party


50 Proceso, no. 401 (9 July 1984).

51 Castillo recounts this trip and other aspects of the origin of the PMT in Castillo and Francisco J. Paoli, El poder robado (Mexico City: Edamex, 1980).
created difficulties for the PMT later, after the reforma política. The provisions of the LOPPE for registration as a political party required four years existence as a political party before solicitation of registry, making it ineligible to request registry until September 1978, the Federal Electoral Commission being then not obligated to decide on the registry until November 1978, too late for the July 1979 federal deputy elections. Since the PST had the requisite four years of existence, the PMT was very suspicious that four years was chosen as the cutoff, instead of three, to reward the PST for cooperation and penalize the PMT for its outspoken criticism of the regime. 52

Despite its inability to become a registered party, the PMT remained a relatively high profile opposition party throughout the last half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. This was in no small part due to Castillo’s persistent criticism of the policies of the administrations of López Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid. Castillo writes regular columns in the influential weekly Proceso and El Universal, a major Mexico City daily. During the oil boom of the López Portillo sexenio in particular, Castillo vilified the policy of developing the oil industry to increase Mexican exports as a sell-out of Mexico’s patrimony to the U.S., receiving much attention for his efforts. Castillo’s high profile, though, has meant that the party is often identified only with him. This is a problem Castillo recognizes but which he seems unlikely to do much about, as much because he is the most dedicated pemetista as because of his own

52 Proceso, no. 59 (19 December 1977).
egocentrism. Since Vallejo left the PMT, there is no other pemetista of Heberto's national stature. Not surprisingly, Castillo's high profile has created difficulties within the party which resulted in an airing of differences between Heberto and some members of the PMT's National Committee in 1986. A movement within the PMT which accused Castillo of anti-democratic leadership was formed in the same year. Whether the PMT could go beyond the reputation of being a personal vehicle is now largely an academic issue since the PMT has chosen to join the PSUM in a united party of the left. However, were the PMT to leave that united party it would again confront the problem of personalismo, a characteristic which the Mexican left regularly rejects as being anti-democratic but one into which it frequently falls, the PMT being the foremost example.

Ideology. Although its name, the Mexican Workers' Party, might suggest that it is a socialist party, the PMT has repeatedly denied being Marxist. After the PMT received its registration in 1984, Castillo asserted, "We are offering an alternative to totalitarianism and an alternative to socialism. We are the new left of Mexico. We are going to have workers in our party, not Marxists or Leninists or Trotskyites. . . . The Mexican workers are not, and never will be, Marxists." It might best be considered a populist nationalist party

54 Proceso, no. 498 (19 May 1986).
55 Proceso, no. 528 (15 December 1986).
in the cardenista tradition. Unlike the other parties of the left, it does not have an elaborate ideology and analysis of society to guide it.

Adolfo Gilly, another prominent leftist intellectual, characterized the PMT as

a nationalist and popular party (different than the socialist parties such as the PSUM and the PRT), whose dominant preoccupation is the struggle against U.S. imperialism as the determinant origin of Mexican evils. This preoccupation also exists in the campaigns of the PSUM and the PRT, but it is the PMT which explicitly places the accent on the threat of a denationalization of the country, including a loss of northern territories. Of course, the PMT also proposes a moratorium on the payment of interest on the foreign debt and continues the persistent campaign of Heberto Castillo on the petroleum issue. The critique of official corruption occupies a place of the first order in its campaign and in the language of its orators; more than popular, it is populist.

Castillo's own characterization of the PMT does not differ much from this, as he clearly distinguishes its approach from those of other parties of the left:

With the registration of the PMT rises the possibility of the formation of a great party of the people, of the masses, revolutionary, without dogmas, without taboos, without any dependency on the outside world, without aspirations of being considered by foreign revolutionary parties as the best, as the vanguard, aspiring only that it be the Mexican people who assess it and consider it their instrument of struggle. A party in which all revolutionaries fit, all those that aspire to change the economic, political, and social structures of Mexico so that the nation's riches truly serve the people and not just some nationals or foreigners.

Although calling for a far greater role for the state in the economy

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58 Domínguez, "Quién es quién en la izquierda mexicana," p. 29.
59 Proceso, no. 452 (1 July 1985).
than was the case under Echeverría and López Portillo, including nationalization of most natural resource exploitation industries and the industries providing basic services (food and health) as well as the banks, the PMT stopped short of calling for full-scale central planning.61 Indeed, Castillo emphasized that the PMT’s struggle was against large industry and transnationals, not against small and medium-sized industries.62 In particular, the PMT struggle is for national control of the national economy. One of the PMT’s favorite slogans is "Economic Independence, National Sovereignty, and Revolution." If anything, the emphasis is on the first two, for while the PMT persistently argued that some type of limit should be placed on private property holdings and that firms and industries should be small so that all can participate in them, it itself was unsure how small these limits should be.63

In sum, the PMT’s ideology is basically nationalist and populist. Among its heroes are prominent nationalists and populists and those who have fought against dictatorship and corruption: Morelos, Hidalgo, Juárez, Ricardo Flores Magon, Zapata, Villa, and Cárdenas. Furthermore, perhaps more persistently than any of the other parties of the left, the PMT has sought political reform and electoral democracy.

62 Proceso, no. 405 (6 August 1984).
63 Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, Informe del Comité Nacional a la III Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria (Mexico City, 1984). The emphasis on the dangers of U.S. imperialism weigh heavily in this document, including an indictment of the PAN for its complicity in U.S. imperialism.
Strategies and Settings for Encounters with the Authorities.

Although it has sought electoral reform and political democracy, the PMT has been exceedingly suspicious of overtures to it from the Mexican state trying to lure it into the electoral game. The PMT was especially wary of embracing the reforma política. It worried about accepting the ruling elite’s new rules of the game for participating electorally since the Federal Electoral Commission was still stacked in the government’s favor. At the time of the reforma política, the PMT particularly opposed conditional registration, which it felt was too precarious. In addition, pemetistas feared that although the reforma política could bring about a limited democratization of Mexico, the electoral participation it facilitated would likely absorb the energies and resources of the left, leaving too little time and energy to militate in labor organizations and the countryside. Instead of participating electorally, the PMT favored continued pressure on the López Portillo administration to modify the LOPPE to make it more democratic. In the meantime, the PMT sought to continue organizing the masses.

The PMT has not hidden its ultimate objective: the conquest of power. This has been stated boldly:

For the conquest of power there are various paths and means. It is necessary to use all those that are just and possible according to the circumstances. Our party proclaims that it will struggle, with all the means in its reach, to take political power.

64 See statements by Vallejo in Proceso, no. 45 (12 September 1977).

65 La reforma política y la izquierda (Mexico City: Ed. Nuestro Tiempo, 1979), pp. 36-40.

66 Ibid., p. 41.
Statements such as these rebounded against the PMT when it did seek conditional registration in 1981. Its solicitation was rejected because, among other reasons, it statutes did not "expressly" and "literally" commit the PMT to follow the constitution. Finally, in 1984 the PMT was granted conditional registration, despite the opposition of the PST. In 1985 it achieved the required 1.5 percent of the national vote and became definitively registered.

In reality, though, before it began contesting elections in 1985, the PMT's primary site for confronting the authorities has been in the press. Castillo's campaign against squandering the nation's petroleum resources was particularly vigorous. Indeed, PMT leaders met with López Portillo in 1979 to discuss such matters, with no success. The party also likes to point out that Petroleos Mexicanos director Jorge Díaz Serrano, the architect of the oil boom, was dismissed just prior to the rejection of the PMT's 1981 solicitation of registration, suggesting that the López Portillo government was giving the party something instead of registration. The PMT regularly argues that it has penetrated the worker and campesino masses; however, it has provided little concrete evidence of these conquests.

Electoral Competitiveness and Support. No statistical analysis is necessary to describe the bases of PMT electoral support. In its one

68 Proceso, no. 401 (9 July 1984).
69 Proceso, no. 145 (13 August 1979).
70 Jorge A. Villamil Rivas, ¿Por qué nace y lucha el PMT? (Mexico City: Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, 1984), p. 27.
venture into the electoral arena in 1985, it received 274,308 votes, 1.6 percent of the total vote, just enough to maintain its registry. Of these, nearly half (128,814, or 47 percent) came from the Federal District. Another third came from the state of Mexico, that is, the environs of Mexico City (56,920 votes), and Jalisco, that is, Guadalajara (37,161). This leaves but one-sixth of the PMT's vote to be divided among the other twenty-nine federal entities. In most of these states, the PMT received less than 2,000 votes; in some states, it received less than 1,000. The skewed nature of the PMT's support is amply illustrated in Table 9-1. It is safe to conclude that outside of Mexico City and Guadalajara, the PMT is simply non-competitive; it has not penetrated the campesino masses, nor the working class. Even in Mexico City and Guadalajara, the PMT is only the second strongest force on the left, receiving less than 5 percent of the popular vote even in these strongholds.

Despite this electoral weakness, the PMT seems to be a more influential party than its 1.6 percent of the popular vote would indicate. Its outspokenness, its independence, and its fervent nationalism bring its point of view attention and respect among the politically active population. The influential political weekly Proceso has given the PMT's perspective widespread circulation. Its leader, too, is highly respected and recognizable, more so than other leaders of the opposition, both right and left. The PMT's viewpoint, then, has a force behind it far stronger than its electoral support would suggest.
The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT)

Origin. The third force in Mexico's independent left is the Trotskyist PRT. Five Trotskyist groups merged in 1976 to form the PRT: the Grupo Comunista Internacional, the Liga Socialista, the Liga Obrero Mexista-Fracción Trotskista Leninista, the Grupo Rojo, and the Liga Socialista-Fracción Bolchevique Leninista. Although at various times Mexico had had organizations linked with the Fourth International founded by Trotsky during his exile in Mexico, these seldom lasted more than a few years before becoming moribund. By the time the 1968 student movement arose, no active Trotskyist organization was to be found in Mexico. The present PRT is constituted by Trotskyists who became politically active in the Faculty of Philosophy and Literature at UNAM during the 1968 movement, many of them the most radicalized of those involved in the anti-government uprising. As a result, many spent time in prison until Echeverría released them in 1971. The early 1970s were a time of profound factionalization for these Trotskyists, generally regarding strategy: Should the Trotskyists militate among worker organizations or student organizations? Should they support the write-in candidacy of Valentín Campa in 1976 or stay out of electoral politics? To what extent could pluralism in ideas be accepted within their ranks? Finally, in September 1976 the PRT was founded and in 1977 other Trotskyist groups still outside the PRT

71 Hernández and Rock, Zócalo rojo, p. 298.
72 Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México, pp. 205-207.
joined it. In 1978 it was granted recognition as a political association (since it did not yet have the four years’ history necessary to become a registered party) and in 1981 was granted conditional registration as a political party.

Ideology. Ideologically, the PRT does not differ drastically from the other parties of the Marxist left. In emphasis, it is perhaps more revolutionary and more single-mindedly determined to promote the interests of the working class than other parties of the left. Following the inspiration of Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution, the PRT rejects notions that socialism will be achieved in two stages, first democracy and then socialism. Instead, socialism will be implemented by a dictatorship of the proletariat immediately upon the assumption of power in a socialist revolution. This dictatorship of the proletariat, though, will respect the pluralism within the labor movement: "Proletarian democracy implies, then, that no repressive act against any current of the worker movement is justifiable. To educate the proletarian vanguard and the masses in this conception is one of the principal tasks of the revolutionary party." Other models of socialism, such as the Soviet Union since Stalin came to power, are inappropriate because they do not defend civil liberties and democracy. While the dictatorship of the proletariat will be directed against the

73 Ibid., pp. 207-209.
74 Proceso, no. 27 (9 May 1977).
exploiting classes, it will be achieved by peaceful means so long as the capitalist state does not use violence against the revolutionary masses first.\textsuperscript{76}

The revolutionary nature of the working class is highly emphasized: "The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores considers that the working class is the only revolutionary class. . . . The working class, being situated in the center of society, because it is the creator of social wealth, is the only class capable of destroying capitalism."\textsuperscript{77} However, the proletariat must recognize that in societies like Mexico which have peasant majorities, the working class must ally with the peasantry if it is to be successful in its revolutionary task. While the PRT will work daily with the workers and campesinos to defend their constitutional rights, the PRT does not want this to divert it from its primary task, which is bringing about the socialist revolution so that the proletariat can come to political power.\textsuperscript{78}

The PRT is anti-imperialist, but unlike the PMT does not raise the role of the imperialist powers to the highest source of evil in Mexican society. As Gilly summarizes:

\begin{quote}
The PRT, which also proposes a moratorium on the payment of the foreign debt and denounces imperialist penetration, does not however place the center of the conflict outside the country, on the foreign enemy, on dependency, but rather inside the country, in the division between the classes that exploit and those that are exploited: those above and those below. The exit from this
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 357.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 355.
\textsuperscript{78} Rodríguez Araujo, \textit{La reforma política y los partidos en México}, p. 215.
conflict is, for the PRT, in three precise demands that do not appeal to all, but only to those from below: democracy (against repression), salaries (for the workers), land (for the campesinos). The definition and the exit from the crisis is first internal, in favor of those from below, in order to later confront and reject, with solidarity, external intervention: imperialism and the debt.

Again, these themes are echoes of those of other leftist parties, but with the PRT the message is more confrontational, more single-mindedly worker oriented, with a vision which might be more threatening to the PRT's class enemies, despite its promises that it will be respectful of democratic principles. These theme puts the PRT on the far left of the Mexican political spectrum, which is a characterization the PRT probably would not reject. When discussing other parties of the left in an open letter to the PCM in 1978, two PRT leaders saw them in this way: the PCM was moving to the right and allying with neo-lombardistas, the PMT's program contained no mention of socialism, the PPS faction associated with Gascón Mercado was Lombardist (meaning willing to collaborate with the government) and had supported the Díaz Ordaz government in the 1968 repression of the student movement, and the PST was also servile toward the government. That leaves the PRT to the left of everyone else.

Leadership and strategies. To emphasize its democratic nature, and perhaps to insure that none of the Trotskyist factions become dominant, the PRT has tended to have collective leadership. The leadership is young, none of the leaders being over forty years of

79 Proceso, no. 452 (1 July 1985).

They began their political careers at UNAM in 1968, many spending time in prison for their involvement. None seems to stand head and shoulders above the others, although Pedro Peñaloza, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, Edgar Sánchez Ramírez, and Manuel Aguilar Mora seem to get more press attention.

The PRT has expressed doubts about the efficacy of the electoral path. Elections are not considered sufficient for bringing the workers to power: the true struggle will take place in the factories, the unions, the countryside, the schools, and the streets. If workers are going to vote, they should vote for socialist parties. However, they should not be fooled by the promise of the reforma política.

Despite its relatively developed Marxist and Trotskyist ideology, an ideology with which the PRT engages in polemic with others on the Mexican left, and despite its reservations about the electoral path, the PRT has followed an unusual political strategy: allying electorally with non-Trotskyists. The PRT’s principal electoral ally has been Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, leader of the National Front Against Repression, an organization which has sought the release of political prisoners and the disappeared. Ibarra de Piedra was a housewife whose son Jesús was arrested and disappeared in 1975, prompting her to political activity on behalf of those like him. A charismatic and widely respected figure for her campaign against political repression,

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82 La reforma política y la izquierda, pp. 32-33.
83 A brief biography of Ibarra de Piedra appears in Elena Poniatowska, Domingo siete (Mexico City: Océano, 1982), pp. 7-9.
Ibarra de Piedra was postulated by the PRT in alliance with other small groups of the left for president in 1982.

The postulation of a humanist and an activist against government repression is not entirely inconsistent with the PRT's historical experience. Time spent in prison for political activities has caused PRT leaders to more energetically protest the existence of political prisoners, torture, and repression in Mexico than have others on the left. Thus, Ibarra de Piedra's candidacy was not as surprising as one might think. Yet, many political activists in Mexico held suspicions that the PRT put forth Ibarra de Piedra for very opportunistic reasons: the PRT itself was too small to achieve the necessary 1.5 percent to maintain its registry otherwise. The electoral analysis here was correct: in 1982 Ibarra de Piedra received 1.85 percent of the national vote, enough for the PRT to maintain its registry. The party's deputy candidates, on the other hand, only received 1.3 percent of the vote, which would have been insufficient to avoid cancellation.

Again, the PRT does not believe that the electoral path is sufficient for achieving socialism. However, its activities in other realms again leave much to be desired. Although involved in small protest marches, especially against political repression, it has not been overly successful in gaining adherents. As of 1982, the PRT claimed 25,000 members, up from a list of 7,000 in 1978. Most of these were concentrated in Mexico City, mostly people involved in

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85Hernández and Rock, Zócalo rojo, p. 298.
public education, especially at the UNAM.  

**Electoral competitiveness and support.** The PRT is the party most in danger of having its registration cancelled. As mentioned above, it only received definitive registration after the 1982 election because of Ibarra de Piedra's popularity. It received no plurinominal deputies in that election, thus had no representation in the 1982-1985 Chamber of Deputies. In 1985, its single-member district candidates for deputyship again failed to meet the requisite 1.5 percent. This time, the lists in the PR races received 1.7 percent of the total votes, so the PRT kept its registry and six PRT candidates became plurinominal deputies. Most of the PRT's votes come from the Mexico City area. Of its 224,565 votes in 1985, 89,511 came from the Federal District and 53,327 from the adjacent state of Mexico. As Table 9-1 shows, the PRT's support is nearly nonexistent in several states.

In sum, the PRT is an electorally weak, underpublicized, and little recognized party. Ultraradical, it probably has no solid base of support outside the university, despite its ideological imperative of organizing the workers for non-violent social revolution. Except for the boost given it by Rosario Ibarra de Piedra's 1982 presidential candidacy, it probably would not exist as a legal political party today.

**Unification on the Left**

The sketches of the three parties of the independent left given above have drawn out a number of sources of division within the left.

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86 This is a U.S. Embassy assessment.
Even putting aside the issue of collaboration with progressive forces within the PRI, an issue about which these three parties are in agreement, historical distrust (such as that between the Trotskyists and the communists), ideological differences, questions about participation in the reforma política process, and disputes about international politics divide these groups. Various attempts have been made to unify the left, initially coming from Castillo in 1977, before the reforma política. The formation of the PSUM in 1981 was a major unification of Marxist-Leninists and lombardistas, but it fell apart as the lombardistas eventually filtered away. Yet, the virtue of unification has remained on the minds of leaders of the left.

Recently, a major unification effort succeeded as the PSUM and the PMT merged to form the Partido Mexicano Socialista (PMS) after nearly a year of talks. There were important incentives for unification on both sides. The PSUM had been losing its share of the national vote in each election as the independent left fragments entered the electoral arena, the PRT in 1982 and the PMT in 1985. It could recoup some of these losses by bringing its competition within the fold. Furthermore, the PSUM would obtain the most recognized and charismatic figure on the left, Heberto Castillo. The PMT’s 1985 electoral finish gave it little reason to be optimistic about the future. It only received plurinominal deputies in two of the five circumscriptions and most of

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87 Proceso, 5 May 1977.

its votes came in Mexico City and Guadalajara. By unifying with the PSUM, it would obtain an organization which was much more widespread than the PMT organization. 89

To unify, some compromises had to be made. The PSUM, made up mostly of ex-PCM adherents, gave up the hammer and sickle as the party symbol and the concept of scientific socialism, which it had not been willing to concede to the PMT in 1981. For its part, the PMT accepted the label socialist, integrated into the new party’s name. 90 For the time being, a collective leadership organ was designed to overcome the possible arbitrariness of a single leader. Originally, the PRT was a party to the unification talks, and considered a fusion with the PMT, but this fell apart after it became apparent that the PMT was interested in a wider unification effort encompassing the PSUM and other groups on the left. The PRT decided that for the short term the differences between the various parties were too great for unification to take place. 91 The unspoken problem for the PRT is that it still considers the PSUM as a pro-Moscow communist party, not to be trusted. 92 The PMT-PSUM fusion was not without costs: a section of the PMT called the Corriente de Base, which had been promoting unity with the PRT, left the party as a result of the unification with the

89 Unomasuno, 8 June 1987.


91 Proceso, no. 528 (15 December 1987) and no. 540 (9 March 1987).

PMT and PSUM leaders saw that for the left to contend for power in Mexico, it could not stay fragmented. Whether a more unified left can appeal to the dissatisfied Mexican electorate remains to be seen, however. By unifying, it is seeking to appeal to those who are abstainers, who do not take an active role in politics. This may require, as one PMT leader remarked, that "the new party will have to prove to people that socialism is not in conflict with Christianity and that in the new society the existence of small enterprises will be assured." Both the PMT and the PSUM have moved the left in this direction in the past decade since they have accepted the ruling elite's invitation to become active in electoral politics. Perceptions of the masses, however, sometimes lag behind the changes in party ideologies. An immediate rush to the PMS on the part of voters is probably unlikely.

THE COLLABORATIONIST PARTIES

A certain fiction surrounds the Mexican multiparty system. The overwhelming electoral strength of the PRI creates some of this unreality. Equally important, though, is the existence of parties which openly cooperate with the PRI, often postulating the same candidates as the PRI. They thus give the appearance of competition while offering no real challenge to the PRI. Three parties clearly fit into this category: the PST, the PPS, and the PARM. Both the PPS and

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93 Proceso, no. 528 (15 December 1986) and no. 543 (30 March 1987).
the PARM have long existed as collaborators. In part, the reforma política took place because the competition provided by the PPS and the PARM was too widely viewed as being fictitious; more realistic competition became necessary to the Mexican elite. The reforma política has created more competition for them, threatening in particular the PARM’s registry. The PST was given electoral life by the reforma política. I will briefly discuss each.

The Partido Popular Socialista

Origins. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the PPS was founded by Vicente Lombardo Toledano as the Partido Popular in 1948, following a major conference of Mexican leftists held the year before. Its initial membership included former members of the PCM who had left or been expelled because of the purges of the 1940s and former PRI members dissatisfied with the party’s shift to the right under Avila Camacho and especially Alemán. The PP began contesting federal elections in 1949 and put forth Lombardo as its presidential candidate in 1952. Since 1952, it has supported the PRI presidential candidate. Usually, however, it has presented its own deputy candidates.

Originally, the PP was not founded as an avowedly Marxist party, despite Lombardo’s Marxist inclinations. Instead, "the statement of principles adopted by the Constituent Assembly indicated merely that the PP was formed as an instrument to continue the struggle for realization of the goals of the Mexican Revolution." In 1955, at

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95 Robert Paul Millon, Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 159. Lombardo later said that to openly embrace Marxism would have prevented
Lombardo’s suggestion, the PP accepted scientific socialism as the ideological foundation of the party. In 1960, to reflect the ideological change in the party, the PP became the Partido Popular Socialista. 96

Ideology and Leadership. The early direction of the PP was shaped by its founder and first leader, Lombardo. As the principal labor leader under Cárdenas, Lombardo had been important in pushing the Revolution to the left. This direction he sought to continue, in opposition to the efforts of the Alemán administration. Originally, what the PP sought was advanced state capitalism. It did not call for socialism, simply state intervention to promote more rapid economic development and to restrict imperialism’s intrusion into the Mexican economy. 97 This did not differ from the direction in which Cárdenas had moved the nation.

Lombardo was a vehement anti-imperialist and defender of Moscow. For that reason, perhaps, the PP and PPS have always put the fight against imperialism at the top of their agenda. 98 This emphasis did not change with the party’s acceptance of scientific socialism as its guiding theory. Accepting scientific socialism meant accepting dialectical materialism as the party’s guide to the analysis of national and international issues, pursuit of proletarian

the party’s registration by the Alemán administration; p. 167.

96 Ibid., pp. 169-170.

97 Ibid., p. 161.

98 See the summary of party platforms by former PP member Vicente Fuentes Díaz, Los partidos políticos en México, v. 2 (Mexico City, 1956), pp. 128-129.
internationalism, and support for greater state intervention in the economy to achieve national autonomy. Furthermore, the party accepted democratic centralism as its guide to party governance.

These ideological emphases have changed little since the mid-to-late-1950s. Lombardo's anti-imperialist rhetoric is echoed by the present party leaders, Jorge Cruickshank, who has been secretary general since Lombardo's death in 1968, and Lázaro Rubio Félix, the principal party ideologist. The PPS's party principles begin by referring to the Mexican people's struggle for national independence, both political and economic. Its 1985 campaign platform begins by discussing not Mexican politics, but the belligerency of Ronald Reagan's administration in the U.S. The principal campaign flyer distributed by the PPS considered the major danger to the Mexican people to be imperialism, which at that time included the following characteristics: the worldwide "neoliberal" project, the foreign debt and the intervention of the International Monetary Fund, other pressures against Mexico such as the U.S. campaign against drug trafficking, the PAN as the local lackey of imperialism, the violent anti-electoral fraud campaigns led by the PAN, and the pro-North American attitude of public functionaries.

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99 Ibid., pp. 170-171.
100 Partido Popular Socialista, Principios, programa y estatutos (Mexico City, 1983).
102 Partido Popular Socialista, La perspectiva de México está amenazada (Mexico City, 1985).
Cruickshank has maintained control over the party at least as tight as that exercised by Lombardo. As a result, the party has suffered two major splits since Lombardo’s death. In 1969, after Cruickshank took over, former POCM members who had joined the party in 1963 left because of their dissatisfaction with Cruickshank’s assumption of power. Many of these later formed the MAUS, which merged into the PSUM. 103 In 1975, a second, more important division took place when Cruickshank acquiesced in the PPS’s defeat in the Nayarit gubernatorial race, a result most considered fraudulent. The next year, Cruickshank was unopposed by the PRI in a senatorial race in Oaxaca, in fact being tacitly supported by the PRI. Gascón Mercado, the failed gubernatorial candidate, and Manuel Stephens led a protest which resulted in their expulsion. They later formed the PPM. 104

Goals and Strategies. The intense anti-imperialistic stance of the PPS, and perhaps Lombardo’s long militancy within the ruling elite, have caused it to willingly cooperate with the PRI and the government. The PPS tends to characterize the ruling elite as a nationalist group. It often sides with the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Federal Electoral Commission. Most prominently, it regularly supports the PRI presidential candidate.

A reasonable conclusion, then, is that the PPS is essentially a pressure group pursuing a strategy similar to that followed by the PAN of old: participate electorally in order to disseminate a viewpoint and in that way put pressure on the governing elite to modify its

103 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 117.
104 Ibid., p. 118.
policy inclinations in the PPS's direction. Perhaps more accurately, I should say that the goal is not to modify or moderate PRI platforms and government policy, but to radicalize them. This pressure group orientation of the PPS seems even more pronounced than with the old PAN since it overtly allies with the PRI. Furthermore, this strategy seems to have been somewhat successful as some presidential initiatives have followed propositions originally put forth by the PPS. So, while the setting for confrontation between the PPS and the authorities is the electoral arena, this does not tend to actually by a confrontational setting but one in which the PPS tries to trade its electoral support, small though it is, for some radicalization of the PRI's platform.

Electoral Competitiveness and Support. The PPS has never been a competitive force in Mexican elections. In its best finish, in 1973, the PPS received a possibly inflated 3.8 percent of the national vote. Since then, its electoral fortunes have declined so that in the most recent elections, 1982 and 1985, it obtained 1.9 and 2.1 percent respectively. In terms of total votes, the PPS has also suffered since 1976, the year in which it received the greatest number of votes. The reforma política has not been particularly good for the PPS.

The PPS's strength is not in Mexico City and other urban centers, unlike the parties of the independent left. In 1985, for instance, the PPS finished quite respectably in Oaxaca (5.5 percent) and Veracruz

Among its better campaigns were those in Tabasco, which is also in the south, and the state of Mexico. Historically, it has done well in Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Tabasco. In other states, its share of the vote tends to mirror its national share: about 2 percent or less (see Table 9-1).

Overall, the PPS is a moribund party. Ideologically, it has nothing innovative to provide to the Mexico of the 1980s. Electorally, it is in decline. One reason Jesús Reyes Heroles introduced the reforma política was because the Mexican opposition was not even doing what he considered was the minimal task of an opposition: to oppose so as to support. The PPS was one part of that failing opposition. It continues to fail at its task.

The Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana

Origins. If the PPS is a moribund party, the PARM is doubly moribund. It emerged out of a group within the PRI called the Revolutionary Social and Political Association "Men of the Revolution," formed by carrancistas and villistas who had been in the PRM's Military Sector before that sector was dropped. President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) had served as the private secretary to this group's leader, General Jacinto B. Treviño, during the Revolution. During his presidency, when Treviño appealed for registry as a political party, Ruiz Cortines granted it. The PARM became a

106 Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, p. 57.
registered political party as of 1954.\textsuperscript{107} The PARM has never presented its own candidate for the presidency.

\textbf{Leadership and Ideology.} The PARM has traditionally been composed of former military men. Its principal leaders were Treviño and Gen. Juan Barragán and among its members were two brothers of Francisco I. Madero. Ideologically, the PARM is Mexico’s version of a strict constructionist. Its ideological statements closely parallel those of the Constitution of 1917, for which these military men fought under Carranza.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, its ideology does not differ much from that of the PRI. As its membership and leadership has aged, the PARM has come to suffer more and more internal divisions. Since Barragán died in 1975, the party has had a succession of leaders, with each change of leadership causing internal tensions.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Goals and Strategies.} The PARM tends to follow the same strategy as the PPS, with less success. It supports PRI candidates in the hope that it can thereby encourage closer adherence to the ideology of the Revolution. That is, on the national level, it is essentially an interest group. Its campaign efforts and attempts to disseminate its opinions are too weak to suggest that it is anything else.\textsuperscript{110}

However, in the northern state of Tamaulipas, the PARM is the

\textsuperscript{107}Luz María Silva Ortíz, "Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana," in México: realidad política de sus partidos, ed. by Delhumeau, pp. 311-312.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., pp. 313-317.

\textsuperscript{109}Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México, pp. 158-160; Lajous, Los partidos políticos en México, pp. 58-59.

\textsuperscript{110}Silva Ortíz, "Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana," p. 312.
embodiment of opposition to Mexico City. In Tamaulipas, especially in Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa, the PARM plays the role that the PAN fills in the rest of the north. It is quite successful in this role in Tamaulipas, obtaining two federal deputyships in the 1985 elections. Electoral fraud practiced against PARM candidates had in fact led to violence in Tamaulipas in the past.111

Electoral competitiveness and support. The PARM has never put up a serious struggle at the national level. Its best finish in a national deputy race came in 1976 when the PAN did not compete in a number of districts. In that year the PARM received 2.7 percent of the vote. Since then it has declined precipitously, losing its registration in 1982 for not having received 1.5 percent of the vote. The PARM was resurrected, however, in 1984 so that it could compete again in 1985. The common interpretation of this event was that the government needed the PARM’s vote on the Federal Electoral Commission to offset the growth in number (and thus in votes on the Commission) of independent opposition parties. Indeed, the votes in favor of giving the PARM conditional registration came from the government (the two congressional representatives), the PRI, and the PPS. Furthermore, two parties greatly in need of staying in Gobernación’s good graces, the far left PRT and the far right PDM, abstained from the vote so that the PAN, the PSUM, and the PST could not outvote the government’s side.112 The PARM’s new registration became definitive when it received 1.7 percent of the vote in the 1985


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deputy race, just enough to stay registered. By far its best finish came in Tamaulipas. In 1988, the PARM has put forward the candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who broke from PRI ranks. This seems to be electoral opportunism, an opportunism made necessary by the PARM’s meager performances of late.

In sum, the PARM is very marginal party. It offers nothing to the Mexican party spectrum except an extra vote to the government’s position in the Federal Electoral Commission and a channel for local discontent in Tamaulipas. If the pre-reforma política party system was a fictitious multiparty system, the PARM’s existence suggests that there is still a certain amount of fiction in the Mexican party system.\(^{113}\)

The Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores

Origins. The newest, most vigorous, and most independent of the collaborationist parties is the PST. As discussed above in regard to the PMT’s origins, the PST emerged from the Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Organización in March 1973, separating from Castillo “in order to seek a road that will bring us effectively to participate in the formation of a new political party in Mexico.”\(^{114}\) Some of the PST’s founders, particularly Rafael Aguilar Talamantes, had actually begun their political careers as porras (political hitmen) at the

\(^{113}\) An electoral reform in 1986 changed the composition of the Federal Electoral Commission so that the government will no longer need the PARM’s vote to get its majority. Whether the PARM will remain registered long is certainly in doubt.

\(^{114}\) _Proceso_, no. 191 (30 June 1980), emphasis added.
Long before the *reforma política* created the political and legal conditions for the PST's registration as a political party, its leaders had begun establishing contacts with the ruling elite, particularly certain of Echeverría's cabinet members, among them López Portillo, then Secretary of the Treasury. PST leaders tended to support the policies of the Echeverría administration, considering it a progressive administration. This attitude of support for the ruling elite and willingness to cooperate with it differ substantially from Castillo's viewpoint which was one reason for the PST's separation from the CNAO. As one PST member stated about the PST: "we don't do panismo of the left of Heberto Castillo's or Gascón Mercado's type . . . we seek an alliance with democratic and progressive forces in general, including from the government." About Castillo and Vallejo, this PST member said, "in a year-and-a-half they showed us that they had no idea about what a political party is and they were seriously affected by vices very common among people of the left." Castillo, for his part, accused the PST leaders of having been coopted by Echeverría. A former member of the PST revealed that from the time of its founding in 1973, the PST received regular monthly payments from the state. Following the *reforma política*, the PST was among the parties first receiving registration in 1978. At that time, it was considered by one analyst

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115 Ibid.  
116 The quote is unattributed and cited by Junquera, *La reforma política*, p. 51.  
117 *Proceso*, no. 186 (26 May 1980).
the most numerous force on the left. 118

Ideology. The PST is essentially a Marxist-Leninist party. It follows scientific socialism and dialectical materialism. Generally, though, it is careful not to identify itself primarily as a Marxist party. 119

The PST's analysis of Mexican society and its crisis concludes that the principal enemy of the working class and the Mexican people is not the ruling elite, but North American imperialism and the Mexican bourgeoisie. U.S. imperialists seek to exploit the Mexican working class and peasantry. They seek to make Mexican energy resources their own. 120

Consequently, the PST has encouraged the nationalization of the leading sectors of the Mexican economy, those firms controlled by foreigners, and the banks. It also wants the state to take complete control of international commerce and finance. Extensive economic planning is also called for. Finally, the PST demands greater rights for the working class, including union democracy and the participation of a firm's workers in its management. 121

Strategy and Leadership. This quick sketch of the PST's ideology shows that it parallels that of the PPS in its essentials, particularly its emphasis on the threat from imperialism. 122

Two conclusions

118 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
119 Mancilla Guzman, Las opciones políticas en México, pp. 163-165.
120 Ibid., p. 165.
121 Ibid., pp.165-167; Proceso, no. 27 (9 May 1977).
122 Proceso, no. 186 (26 May 1980).
regarding party goals and strategy can be derived from this observation. First, the PST's ideology will lead it to cooperate with "progressive forces," including those within the government, much the same as the PPS does. PST statements have, in fact, been very complimentary toward the PRI. As one PST statement from 1979 put it,

The PRI is a party made up mostly by workers. And when they have made their weight within the PRI known, it has produced important advances. This occurred during cardenismo, at certain moments in the government of López Mateos, and others in the regime of Echeverría... In recent years, the revolutionary nationalist sector has been hegemonic in the PRI. But the increase of contradictions has penetrated the interior of the party and forces have polarized. Against the interests of the bourgeoisie of making the PRI its political-electoral instrument, the popular PRI forces have responded by seeking to make their interests predominant.

The PST tries to cooperate with this popular nationalist wing of the PRI. To underline this cooperation, during López Portillo's sexenio, the president addressed PST national assemblies. Secondly, the PST is seeking to attract that sector of the electorate that the PPS had traditionally garnered. It is essentially trying to displace the PPS as the collaborationist party of the left.

The PST enthusiastically responded to the invitation to participate presented by Reyes Heroles in the reforma política. The PST felt that the reforma política would permit the working class to advance politically, making its power felt. This was easily the most uncritical reception of the reforma política on the left. Because of its friendliness with sectors of the ruling elite and its uncritical

123 Proceso, no. 191 (30 June 1980).
125 La reforma política y la izquierda, pp. 12-21.
approach to elections, other parties on the left have been cautious in approaching the PST for unification talks. Castillo is openly hostile. 126

Until recently, the PST seemed unified in its willingness to act as shock troops for the left of the PRI and the CTM, operating sometimes against those in the PRI more closely associated with the business community. 127 In the past year, however, divisions have emerged within the PST between Aguilar Talamantes, who has been secretary general of the party since it was founded, and a group headed by Graco Ramírez. The sources of the division are many, but the event which touched off the open struggle for direction of the party was the revelation that Aguilar Talamantes had been involved in corruption through the construction firm he headed. The party's close cooperation with the government was another source of friction between the two as was the future direction of the party. Aguilar Talamantes seeks to rename the PST the Partido Cardenista de los Trabajadores, a more open admission of the populist, nationalist ideology of the PST. Ramírez, who has been purged from the party, prefers that the party be called the Partido Comunista de los Trabajadores, a more Marxist-Leninist, socialist label. 128

The continued leadership of the PST by Aguilar Talamantes suggests that the PST will remain a collaborator with the PRI. Although a

126 See, for instance, Castillo's column in Proceso, no. 188 (9 June 1980).

127 Proceso, no. 191 (30 June 1980).

participating electoral competitor, the PST is less interested in coming to power than in influencing the exercise of power by the party in power, the PRI. As such it is, in the same way as the PPS, primarily an interest group. However, it is not an independent interest group, but a captured one, captured by a portion of the PRI, used to promote the causes of leftists in the PRI, and rewarded for its actions.

Electoral competitiveness and support. The electoral fortunes of the PST are somewhat similar to those of the PPS. It receives a small percentage of the vote, 2.6 percent in the 1985 deputy elections, 1.8 percent in the 1982 deputy elections. Moreover, these votes are not concentrated in the Mexico City area, unlike those of the independent left. The PST performed particularly well in Veracruz in 1985.

As a collaborator party, the PST is rewarded. This was made particularly manifest in 1985 when members of the PRI-controlled teacher’s and oil worker’s unions were asked to vote for the PST in the plurinominal deputy races after voting for the PRI in the single-member district races.\footnote{M. Delal Baer, "The Mexican Midterm Elections," Report no. 4, Latin American Election Studies Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 5 November 1985, p. 8.} The results were dramatic: whereas in the single member district ballot the PST received 437,137 votes, in the PR race it finished with 592,822, a difference of over 150,000 votes. This gave the PST 12 deputy seats in the Chamber of Deputies, equal to that of the PSUM, which had outpolled the PST by about 150,000 votes in the first-past-the-post races. These deputies have been relatively
supportive of the government's initiatives in the congress. 130

The reforma política was made in part because the party system existing in 1976 did not provide the multiple options demanded to satisfy the diversity of political perspectives in Mexico. Until the reforma política, a certain fictitious multiparty system existed in which only the PAN was truly a party of opposition. Yet, the ruling elite has been unable to part with fictitious or collaborationist parties. Despite the rise of the relatively vigorous PST, it has been unwilling to eliminate the PPS. Thus, there now exist two parties of the left which cooperate with the PRI and share nearly similar ideologies. They are essentially redundant. They are valuable to segments of the ruling elite, however, so they continue to function and apparently receive subsidies from the state to do so. Despite the clear marginality of the PARM, the ruling elite chose to resurrect it even after it had died according to the rules established in the reforma política. It has served a minimal, though necessary role for the revolutionary elite: supporting it in the Federal Electoral Commission when the government side is on the defensive. Collaborationist parties, then, play sufficiently important roles for the ruling elite that they will survive despite marginal support. Furthermore, so long as políticos exist who are willing to be coopted, a breed in no threat of dying out in Mexico, the government will have no difficulty fielding fictitious collaborationist parties.

130 Proceso, no. 545 (13 April 1987).
THE REFORMA POLITICA AND OPPOSITION IN MEXICO

What has the reforma política meant for the opposition in Mexico? How has the opposition changed as a result of Reyes Heroles's venture in political liberalization? What does the future hold for the opposition? Using Dahl's framework proposed at the beginning of the last chapter, I shall consider these questions briefly.

Organizational Cohesion of the Opposition

An unstated, but clearly prominent goal of the reforma política was to keep the opposition from uniting against the elite in power. Competitors who would channel participants but not provide real competition were sought. In this the reform's makers had the advantage that the opposition was arrayed ideologically on both sides of those in power: some more to left, some more to the right (at least in the public's minds). Furthermore, the contenders for registration only added to the extremes of this spectrum: the PCM, the PMT, and the PRT were generally more radical than the existing parties (perhaps excluding the PPS; however, the PPS may put forth a radical ideology, but does little to implement it) while the PDM was even somewhat reactionary. Because some parties remain willing to collaborate with the authorities (the PPS and the PST on the left) while others steadfastly refuse to be co-opted (the PMS and the PRT on the left), yet another obstacle to unification presented itself regardless of the provisions of the reforma política. The opposition as a whole has not unified. In its campaign rhetoric, the left accuses the PAN of being an agent of imperialism and the bourgeoisie; meanwhile the PAN and the PDM warn of the danger of communism or tell of socialism's bankruptcy...
as a blueprint for exiting Mexico's current crisis. The furthest extent of opposition unity has been the willingness of the independent parties to form alliances against electoral fraud. For example, in the state-wide elections in Chihuahua in 1986, the PSUM, the PMT, and the PAN united in the Movimiento Democrático Electoral to resist electoral fraud.\[131\] Another grouping of the same parties called the Frente Civico Potosino marched in San Luis Potosí in January 1985 to protest abuses of power by the government.\[132\] These demonstrations may eventually prove valuable for protecting the sanctity of the electoral process. They are not likely to lead to a united movement to overthrow the government.

Even on the left and the right there is no unity. The left has repeatedly made attempts at unification. The recent merger of the PSUM and the PMT into the PMS is a significant advance. It may produce a more viable, more efficacious, and thus more popular independent left. However, even if the PMS yields results greater than the sum of those produced by its parts, it still must compete with one independent party of the left (the PRT) and two collaborationist parties of the left (the PST and the PPS) for the vote of the electorate on the left. The conditional registration provisions of the LOPPE have permitted the alphabet soup of the left to continue stewing. No force seems able to soon end the proliferation of leftist groupings. On the right, the PAN has at least captured a sizable electorate so that the contribution of the PDM in terms of either militants or voters would not significantly

\[131\] Proceso, no. 504 (30 May 1986).
alter the PAN's weight in the Mexican party system. However, in certain regions of the Bajío, the PDM does cut into the PAN's local strength.

**Ideology**

An expressed purpose of the *reforma política* was to provide electoral expression for Mexico's complex ideological mosaic. That it has done. Ideologically, the opposition is a mosaic, very difficult to easily array on a single left-right axis, difficult to even set in two-dimensional space, perhaps possible if three dimensions are used. Critical factors defining the ideological placement of parties are (1) the attitude toward the state's involvement in the economy, (2) the analysis of the importance of imperialism as a cause of Mexico's ills, and (3) moral issues. A party's willingness to cooperate with the revolutionary elite must also be considered. Figures 9-2 and 9-3 attempt two variations on a two dimensional ideological placement of existing political parties. In Figure 9-3, the Church-state axis can also serve as a surrogate for party opinions on other moral issues, in which the PMT and the PRT tend to be more aggressive on women's issues, education, and political repression than other parties of the left.

Figure 9-4, which records the historical development of the Mexican party system also attempts to array parties on a one-dimensional left-right continuum. On this continuum, willingness to collaborate with the PRI has led to the placement of collaborationist

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133 The PRI is excluded since it possesses various currents within it. The PMS is excluded because it has yet to publish extensive materials on its party principles and program of action.
parties in the center with the PRI although rhetorically the PST and the PPS, at least, tend to be very radical. In this presentation, self-placement and actions are given greater credence than some informal content analysis of party statements.

In regard to the effects of the reforma política, it is important to recognize that the need to attract voters has actually forced the parties to modify their ideologies to be more appealing to the Mexican electorate. So, the PCM, later the PSUM, and the PMT have abandoned certain ideological positions in order to first appeal to voters while they were separate parties and then to arrive at the ideological compromise necessary for unification into the PMS. Since the beginning of economic crisis in Mexico under Echeverría, the PAN has moved to a position more critical of the state’s economic policies than previously, attempting to attract alienated members of the middle class and more recently the business community. So, all of the parties (except perhaps the collaborators) have come down from the heights of ideological purity to campaign among the masses, pragmatically altering certain ideological tenets in order to win more votes. To the ruling elite, the left’s modification of its ideology is probably quite comforting while the PAN’s move to more rightist positions may be somewhat troubling.

Settings for Encounters between the Opposition and the Authorities

The reforma política was a resounding success in the quest of Reyes Heroles to insure that the electoral arena became the primary site for conflict between the opposition and the authorities. Guerrilla insurgency and urban terrorism have not emerged during this
economic crisis in the way that they did in the early 1970s. Ex-
guerrillas and student demonstrators now operate peacefully in the
parties of the left. Independent unionism still emerges now and then,
but the parties of the left have not conquered any large portion of the
unionized labor force. Their major incursion into the labor movement
is in the universities, an important setting but far from the largest
source of workers, especially of blue collar workers.

Of late, the PRI's reversion to the use of electoral fraud to
insure its domination has diminished the success of the reforma
política in channeling opposition away from public unrest. Both
spontaneous and orchestrated demonstrations against electoral fraud
have brought many dissatisfied Mexicans into the streets. These
manifestations of vehement opposition are not completely controllable.
Moreover, through press accounts and reporting by the international
media, knowledge of their activity reaches millions of Mexicans. Thus,
the possibility that such demonstrations might be mimicked in other
parts of the country is much more likely than that guerrilla insurgency
would have been copied during the early 1970s. This is, therefore,
dangerous to the authorities. However, it is not hidden and the way to
stop such activities is plain to see: respect electoral results.
These demonstrators generally ask no more than that. They do not call
for socialist or other revolution.

The bases of the political elite's power remain relatively free
from confrontation with the opposition. In Chapter Two a number of
dimensions of any political regime were delineated. In Mexico, the
political elite carefully controls these dimensions so as to insure its
continued dominance. The reforma política's effects on the contenders for the political elite's privileged position, on the opposition, has not been such as to make them threatening competitors. The opposition parties have not made advances against the corporatist system through which organized labor and the peasantry are controlled. Electoral participation, in fact, seems to have redirected the efforts of parties of the left away from this critical pillar of support for the elite. By participating electorally instead of through interest groups, the opposition has tacitly ceded to the elite its hold on power. This was undoubtedly the goal of the reforma política's makers. Competition within the Chamber of Deputies has been carefully managed through the LOPPE so that this site for conflict between the authorities and the opposition remains stacked in favor of the governors. Again, the opposition engages in energetic debate with PRI deputies, but to no practical effect. The result is that a decision-making process which is essentially secretive and centrally directed by the presidency has not changed despite greater representation for the opposition in the legislature.

Electoral Competitiveness of the Opposition

The PRI's electoral dominance is declining, that much is clear. However, one of the virtues of the reforma política for the PRI was that it encouraged dissatisfied voters to cast their ballots for an ever growing number of opposition parties. Thus, while the competitiveness of the opposition, or more appropriately, the dissatisfaction with the PRI, has increased, the competitiveness of individual parties of the opposition has not improved across the board.
With the exception of the PAN, the opposition parties have not increased their share of the vote significantly since they entered the electoral arena in 1979 or 1982. The PDM and the PST have increased their percentages, but they remain at below 3 percent of the national vote. The vote for the PCM, later PSUM, has actually declined. The PSUM's merger with the PMT may cause it to recoup some of its losses. Whether the PMS can go beyond the PCM's 1979 achievement has yet to be proven.

As the most efficacious party of the opposition, the PAN seems to have reaped the electoral rewards of many years of electoral activity. During the economic crisis which has now lasted six years, the PAN has grown into a serious challenger in a large part of the country. While the reforma política's makers certainly did not want to eliminate the PAN, and in fact installed provisions to insure against PAN abstention, they did want to channel protest votes away from the PAN. In this the reforma política seems to have both failed and succeeded. The other parties of the opposition probably receive votes from those who are ideological sympathizers and they have done well in former PAN strongholds, especially the Mexico City area. The PAN's electorate, on the other hand, includes a large number of protest voters, especially from those middle class protest voters who are unable to bring themselves to vote for a communist party, especially from the north, where the PAN has grown in strength.

But while the PRI's percentage of the vote is declining, it still

134 Interestingly, the left is now openly making this admission. See the article by Enrique Semo in Proceso, no. 530 (29 December 1986).
is overwhelming dominant at the polls. No party of the opposition has stepped over that threshold beyond which exists electoral catastrophe for the PRI. The heated resistance to the PAN's challenge in Chihuahua demonstrates that the authorities fear that it could happen if a gubernatorial race is lost. Whether their analysis is correct, or whether they are overreacting is an unanswered question. On the one hand, six years of economic crisis can ruin the reputation even of a party which has brought economic development and social peace to Mexico, especially when that party is associated with corruption on a massive scale. On the other hand, the PAN is not well organized in many parts of the country and has not significantly increased its share of the vote in the most populous areas of the country since the reforma política unleashed other opposition parties. The PAN may develop a regional bloc of anti-centrist voters, perhaps a regional bloc of governors in time. Whether it can ever win Veracruz or Guerrero is doubtful.

Goals and Strategies

The opposition does seem to recognize the effects of the carefully structured encounters between itself and the political elite. It also recognizes the overwhelming power of the Mexican state and its own weaknesses, particularly the limits of its electoral appeal and the near impossibility of undercutting the PRI's control of the masses. What then are its goals and how does it try to achieve them?

The goals of the opposition parties seem to be two: influence the content of public policy and capture portions of the state apparatus where possible. All of the parties of opposition pursue the former,
disseminating perspectives on various public policy issues, from the general direction of Mexican development to detailed judgments about which industries to nationalize or privatize. Not all of the parties truly seek to win elections and take power. Since the reforma política's introduction, the PAN, the PCM, and the PMT, the latter two now unified as the PMS, appear to have decided that eventually winning power is a possibility.

The strategies for achieving these goals can perhaps be divided into three categories. The goal of simply influencing public policy is pursued by two different strategies. The independent parties of opposition, recognizing their inability to have effect on the legislature, nonetheless use their legislative positions and the electoral stump to articulate perspectives on a whole range of national policy issues in the hopes that the appeal of their statements will lead the government to make preemptive reforms. National elections are excellent opportunities to make policy perspectives known. Since the Mexican elite rarely acts immediately upon such demands since it seeks to maintain the image of the omnipotent presidency, it is hard to know how much effect the opposition's efforts have. The collaborationist parties, on the other hand, pursue a second strategy. They offer their support electorally, legislatively, or in the Federal Electoral Commission, in return for policy concessions. Again, it is hard to determine to what extent they are successful since portions of the PRI and the elite may be pursuing the same policy goals. Overall, though, given the Mexican elite's eagerness to head off social conflict before it begins, it is likely that the government does eventually act on many
of the opposition’s demands.

The goal of taking power, at least locally, if not nationally, requires a third strategy: effectively competing in elections. The reforma política has reinforced the sectors within the PAN and the PCM which prefer the electoral path. Previously, the PAN was led by individuals who preferred a national effort to disseminate a public philosophy. Today it is led by individuals who want to win elections. The seriousness with which the PMT and the PCM have pursued eventual electoral victory is shown by their repeated initiatives toward unification on the left, now achieved.

Both the left (the PMS) and the right (the PAN) now seem to follow the strategy of trying to win important local and state races in the hopes that these local victories will improve their efficacy with the electorate. To take power locally, though, requires adopting platforms which appeal to a plurality of voters and making sure that the PRI respect the wishes of a plurality. To achieve popularity, the PAN and the parties forming the PMS have engaged in more ideological amendment than any of the other parties of the opposition. To make the PRI admit its electoral losses, these parties have worked together to form citizen groups pledged to civil disobedience and demonstration against electoral fraud. The PAN has gone further, appealing to the international, particularly the U.S. media in an attempt to embarrass the elite into respecting PAN electoral victories.

The PAN and the parties forming the PMS have had only minor success so far in their quest for power. Of all the parties of opposition, the PAN and the PMS have the greatest credibility as
potential governors. Although the PRI organization puts their organizations to shame, they have the best institutional basis for wielding power. Moreover, they have the best known and perhaps the most capable leaders, the PAN now including a number of business leaders as well as party leaders of long standing, the PMS having Heberto Castillo and a number of experienced Communist Party leaders and academics, such as Pablo Gómez, Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, and Rolando Cordero. However, as yet neither the left nor the right has either developed sufficient popularity to get its plurality or, if it has, been able to make the government concede defeat.
Table 9-1

PERCENTAGES OF VALID VOTES CAST, 1985

PARTIES OTHER THAN PRI AND PAN

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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>FDM</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
<th>PST</th>
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Percentages for unregistered candidates not included.

Source: Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.
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<th>State</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>PSUM is practically nonexistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>About 5,000 attended PSUM rallies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campeche</td>
<td>Local PSUM could not put together a meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>About 7,500 attended PSUM rallies in two cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>About 5,000 attended 14 PSUM meetings in 10 cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>Local PSUM hopelessly disorganized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>About 600 attended one meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>100,000 attended the campaign closing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>About 3,700 attended 4 meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>Less than 2,000 attended meetings in 6 large cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>PSUM has small pockets of support in certain villages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>200 attended one meeting; another meeting failed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>PSUM strongly integrated by ex-PPM and PSR members</td>
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<td>México</td>
<td>at least 8,000 attended meetings in Mexico City suburbs</td>
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<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>About 16,000 attended meetings throughout the state</td>
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<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>20,000 attended Martínez Verdugo rallies; later 8,000 attended rallies for Gascón Mercado and Manuel Stephens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>small party organization; less than 1,000 attended rallies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>Locally strong PSUM organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>factionalization within state party organization</td>
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584
<table>
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<tr>
<th>State</th>
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<td>Querétaro</td>
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<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>700 attended two meetings</td>
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<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>650 attended two meetings</td>
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<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>About 10,000 attended meetings over five days</td>
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<td>About 7,000 attended 20 meetings</td>
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<td>800 attended meetings over three days</td>
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<td>About 3,250 attended meetings in four cities</td>
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<td>About 2,000 attended meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>About 3,600 attended meetings in three cities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9-1: Regional Concentration of PCM and PSUM Vote, 1979 through 1985

Shaded entities indicate PCM or PSUM vote greater than 5 percent of total in deputy races.
IDEOLOGICAL PLACEMENT OF MEXICAN OPPOSITION PARTIES:

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMY AND PERSPECTIVES ON IMPERIALISM

Imperialism causes Mexico’s ills

PPS  FMT
PST

PCM

PRT

State should be more less involved in economy

(former panistas)

State should be involved in economy

(neo-panistas)

Imperialism is not major source of Mexico’s economic crisis
### Figure 9-3

**IDEOLOGICAL PLACEMENT OF MEXICAN OPPOSITION PARTIES:**

**STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMY AND CHURCH-STATE MATTERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition to clerics in politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State should be</th>
<th>PCM</th>
<th>State should be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more --------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involved</td>
<td></td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- (former panistas)  
- PAN (neo-panistas)  
- PDM

In favor of greater church role

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Figure 9-4
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEXICAN PARTY SYSTEM


Cristero--UNS--PPD--PDM--
War
PPM--
FAN--

FARM--
PNR--FPM--PRI--

PP--
PPS--

POCM--
PCM--

(Cuban--MLN--)
Revolution/
RR strike

Student
Movement--CNAC--PMT--

(Trotsky
assassination)--(various Trotskyist parties)--PRT--

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CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSIONS

The reforma política introduced by Jesús Reyes Heroles in 1977 modified one part of the Mexican political regime, its electoral and party systems, so that even greater change, perhaps a change of regime, could be avoided. A transition of the magnitude enjoyed by Argentines in 1983 or suffered by Chileans in 1973 was not envisioned by the reforma política's makers, nor has it occurred unintentionally since 1977. Reyes Heroles practiced preemptive reform by putting forth the reforma política, a preemptive reform that fits securely within the Mexican political elite's standard practices. Preemptive reform reflects "an intention to institute that degree of change, apparent or real, necessary to preserve essential features of the existing institutional order"1 It is one type of elite response to challenges from below, a response radically different from that instituted in many Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s, systemic closure, which is a radical change of regime, not a change within an existing regime.2

To be able to institute preemptive reform, especially to make it a standard practice, requires a certain unanimity of purpose among those empowered to initiate such reforms. That unanimity of purpose is created by consensus in the evaluation of the political interests of


2Ibid.
the elite which is itself highly conditioned by a unity of interest among elites. To repeat the argument made in Chapter Two, where political leaders' interests diverge too much, those adversely affected by preemptive reform are likely to cancel out such preemptive reform attempts. Political change in such settings must often come via the fait accompli, which can be provided via the military coup d'état, or through open confrontation, which can encourage a coup or a revolution. Such events are rightly called changes of regime, for they usually involve changes not only in the type of competition henceforth permitted but also in the organization of interests, the modes of participation allowed, and frequently in respect for civil liberties. In contrast, where the fundamental interests of members of the elite are the same, as in Mexico, developing consensus on reform measures is less difficult.

I have argued that because Mexico’s ruling elite is a unified elite, unified by a common pattern of recruitment, unified in opposition to an economic elite which the political elite itself created, and unified in the quest for social mobility and financial enrichment through access to state resources, it has much to lose by disintegrating from within. Were this political elite to be overthrown, it would give up its source of income, of power, and of prestige, the Mexican state, by far the biggest plum in that society, even when sliced up and divided among many aspirants. Unlike elites in competitive regimes, these "revolutionary" elites usually do not have to sit out terms when they are out of office. Sometimes individuals are "burned" because they have failed in their policy tasks or because
they have made transgressions against those more powerful than they are. However, they do not have to worry about submitting their names to an electorate which might reject them in favor of a competitor. Competition among political leaders in Mexico has not been the zero-sum game that it often becomes in more competitive regimes, in part because the injunction against re-election produces rapid turnover in offices. Furthermore, these Mexican politicians are not tempted to change aspects of the rules of the political game so as to completely eliminate other politicians from the spoils. Until recently, the PRI and the camarilla system worked as a filter to narrow the number sharing the spoils somewhat, but equally important was the fact that the spoils were copiously available. The challenge to this elite has been simply to preclude those contingencies which could bring the game as a whole to a halt. Electoral defeat has been one such contingency, but one which Mexico’s political elite was sure it could control by mobilizing its massive support base or by rigging the results of elections in the PRI’s favor. A violent overthrow of the government which would eliminate the political class from further access to the spoils of state has been a more frightening possibility. A new revolution or a military coup provoked by insurrectionary violence are contingencies which have worried Mexican leaders, perhaps excessively, but given Mexico’s apparent exceptionalism in Latin America, such worries by Mexican political leaders may not have been unreasonable.

Mexican leaders do differ with each other about the best strategy for maintaining the monopoly of control of the state. Indeed, there was disagreement among factions of the ruling elite about the wisdom of
the reforma política. That disagreement did not extend to questioning the ultimate objectives of the reforma política, that is, maintaining the monopoly of control which was threatened on one side by the open breach between the private sector and the state on economic policy issues and on the other side by the increased use of non-electoral modes of political participation among those on the left. More traditional priistas preferred to take a hard line, to use the PRI’s traditional means for compelling the right kind of participation, that is voting and voting for the PRI. Carlos Sansores Pérez and those he represented would have resorted only more frequently to clientelistic and corporatist control of the masses along with military suppression of insurrection. Modernizing priistas led by Reyes Heroles disdained the open use of coercion but were sufficiently sure of the PRI’s capacity to overwhelm opponents electorally that they did not fear a limited electoral opening which was carefully crafted to encourage electoral participation but to also disperse opposition support. Because they had the ear of President López Portillo, Reyes Heroles and company could implement their preemptive reform, the reforma política.

The reforma política was a change in one dimension of Mexico’s political regime, its arena of open political competition, its electoral and party systems. Mexico’s revolutionary elite created a hegemonic party system long ago to promote its own interests in a post-revolutionary society which demanded electoral legitimation of political succession. That hegemonic party system has required some attention on the part of Mexico’s rulers since its creation in 1929, usually to modify its traits to more effectively function in a changing
Mexico. The reforma política has been the most extensive and problematic of those modifications. In a regime which preaches democracy but practices constraint on participation and competition in other dimensions of the regime—a state corporatist system of interest representation, highly centralized and secretive policy making by the executive, some limitations on public criticism of key leaders—elections can be critical for building the regime's legitimacy and for opening an escape valve for built up pressure, essentially allowing the discontented to let off their steam in a way that will not damage the functioning of other aspects of the regime.

This Mexican case study suggests that the electoral process and the party system can play three essential roles in an authoritarian regime. First, elections play an important role in building diffuse support for the authoritarian rulers. Having elections narrows the gap between the rhetoric of democracy and the reality of authoritarianism. A critic of elections which offer no real choice might counter this conclusion by saying that democratic competition implies a choice between alternatives, not a simple assent. The Mexican response, though, is to provide choice, although a choice the results of which can be readily anticipated. The outcome of such an election demonstrates the overwhelming support for the ruling elite and shows that it is legitimate. The voter casting a vote for the PRI reminds himself that the PRI is heir to the revolutionary tradition and is the best alternative on the ballot. Indeed, an overwhelming number of votes cast for opposition parties in the post-reforma política period are probably still protest votes, cast not for the opposition but
against the PRI. Now that indicates a certain lack of diffuse support among the population but also a deficiency within opposition ranks. Simply put, opposition candidates are infrequently credible as governors. Many votes cast for the PRI are probably not for the PRI either, but an expression that "PRI candidates are the best candidates that we have." The upshot of this may be that the legitimacy provided the rulers by the electoral process may not be a deep, profound legitimacy, but the result of the electorate's (especially the electorate that can choose) realization that these are the best of the available alternatives. Of course, the PRI's very dominance directs the more talented aspiring politicians to it, contributing to its electoral hegemony. Deficiencies within the various opposition parties are glaring, as Chapters Eight and Nine tried to show, and while some of these flaws are being slowly addressed, no opposition party in Mexico presents a slate that appears credible as a potential government.

Second, the electoral arena is a safe and controllable channel of participation so long as the governing elite can be sure that its electoral machine is effective at producing majorities. When majorities become problematic, an electoral reform can be introduced that reduces the demands on the electoral machine so that it only has to produce pluralities. Frequently expressed opposition to bipartism in favor of multipartism probably taps fears by Mexican authorities that the dynamics of a two-party system are more likely to lead to the PRI’s downfall than are the dynamics of a multiparty system which can divide the opposition more effectively.
There are two different aspects of the channeling functions of elections which are important to highlight. One is that political participation in the electoral arena is much less threatening to the political elite, to the economic elite, and to the military than are non-electoral political activities. Minor parties that want to play the electoral game, to continue to play it, will not risk their legal registration through violent or other types of confrontational anti-system behavior. Such behavior guarantees repression by the authorities. Leaders of the PAN, for example, have been quite careful about their involvement with post-electoral demonstrations for this reason, although some are abandoning their caution. Priistas and members of the collaborationist parties frequently remind PAN leaders of the tenuousness of a party’s registration, too. Moreover, electoral activities are very transparent. Sudden and unexpected offensive campaigns seldom arise. Victory can be predicted with the use of surveys and, when victory is shown to be in question, additional resources can be committed to assure victory. In contrast, guerrilla cells, terrorist bands, and mass demonstrations are harder to keep tabs on and they produce more unpredictable results. Thus they create high anxiety among political, economic, and military leaders, an anxiety not produced by elections.

A second aspect of the channeling function of elections is that elections can provide an outlet for the frustrations of the discontented or those unwilling to join the established elite for principled reasons. Electoral campaigns in Mexico, as in other political systems with fixed terms of office, are long, drawn out
affairs. Much speech-giving and travel is required even of opposition candidates. Few opposition leaders can sustain their campaign against all things associated with the governing elite for years (Heberto Castillo of the PMT may be an exception) without some breaks. The electoral campaign is a time when it is legitimate to criticize the government and it is appropriate that the press report those criticisms. After the campaign is over and the opposition has lost, a result which even opposition leaders know in advance, the time of intense criticism is supposed to be over. It does not always end with election day, but seldom are opposition perspectives given the same degree of attention by press or public after the campaign that they are granted before election day. The election campaign is a time for malcontents to get it out of their systems and then go back to life as usual. In some ways, this is a variation on the election as festival, with a particular kind of expressive outlet available to the discontented.

Third, elections in authoritarian regimes, as in democracies, fill a communications function. Communications flow both ways, from candidates to citizens, and from citizens to candidates. In authoritarian settings, or hegemonic party systems, the critical flow of communications is between the citizenry and the hegemonic party candidates. The candidate’s message is something more than a promise that if he is elected, he will do something. Because he will be elected, the message must be that when he takes power he will do

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something. The campaign is then a time when the population can alerted about changes to come. From the other side, the citizenry makes its demands known by openly expressing them when the campaign comes to town. Or, if the citizenry doubts the efficacy of its oral expression, it can vote against the hegemonic parties' candidates on election day. There is evidence that many spontaneous uprisings of support for opposition candidates are due to these types of expression, not conversion to the opposition's stated objectives. Moreover, these electoral expressions of demands appear to get responses. For instance, it was said that before the 1985 deputy elections, in response to the surge in voting for the PAN in 1982 and 1983, the government broke its budget before July by spending on public works projects in the north.

Mexico's vaunted political stability, I would argue, comes from a combination of these two factors: the existence of a unified political elite and the use within its authoritarian framework of elections which can legitimate that elite's rule, channel the opposition into safe modes of participation, and provide a communications link between rulers and ruled. Mexico's unified elite recognizes its own unanimity of interest and very calculatingly reacts to social change in order to remain where it is. Civilian elites in other Latin American societies, being divided and encouraged to remain that way by the electoral systems in which they participate, have at times chosen to invite the

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military into the political arena to deal with their opponents within the civilian elite. The choice to abstain from the temptation of using the military against one's civilian opponents is seldom made consistently over time. Perhaps the National Front agreement of 1958 in Colombia is an exception, in which a politically divided elite recognized that the interests of both Conservatives and Liberals would be served by carving up the state between them. This self-conscious choice to refrain from confrontation within the political elite has been reinforced in Mexico by the care taken not to criticize the ultimate dispenser of the spoils, the president (although this self-control by opponents is growing weaker), nor to take actions which leave the impression that the symbolic unity of the elite within the PRI is not an accurate reflection of reality. In any case, the unspoken rule is that that unity is not to be broken by calling on outside forces to mediate the struggle or reinforce one side or another even when there are conflicts beneath the surface. Such recruited forces always demand payment and frequently refuse to leave the political arena once invited to join.

As an authoritarian regime relying on electoral legitimacy and on elections for the purposes of channelment, the Mexican regime is

See the argument on regime breakdown in Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium, vol. 1 of The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

somewhat unique in Latin America. This is not to say that another
regime could not develop an electoral system which performed those
functions. None has done so effectively to date, although Brazil’s
military rulers tried to mimic the Mexican example. The Mexican PRI
was developed by legitimate revolutionary leaders to mediate their own
struggles and became a tool of mobilization at election time, then
later an agent for control of nascent social movements. Brazil’s
rulers tried to create a PRI-like hegemonic party, the ARENA, but it
was not legitimate because their rule was not legitimate in the minds
of substantial parts of the population. The result was that it could
not overwhelm the opposition which was supposed to a patsy, the MDB. 7
Brazil’s military rulers responded to the failure of their electoral
system by trying to modify the micro rules of the game (particular
electoral rules) so as to insure that the macro rule (that ARENA win
and give legislative legitimacy and support to the military government)
continued to hold. In this they behave as has Mexico’s elite,
frequently tinkering with the electoral rules so that the principal
rule of the regime, that the PRI always wins, not be changed. Brazil’s
military rulers, though, have failed in this venture.

Developing a hegemonic party which is both legitimate (and thus
able to obtain honest majorities) and capable of mobilization to

7Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, "Elections and the Redemocratization
of Brazil," in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–
1985, ed. by Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva (LaJolla: Center for
Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
and Institute of the Americas, University of California at San Diego,
1986) and Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or
the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of
Brazil," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New
overwhelm opponents requires both a legitimate founding and a social structure amenable to controlled mobilization. It is conceivable that a legitimate hegemonic party could be founded in the appropriate historical context. Few modern societies are structured in such a way that they are subject to the control of a political machine unless that machine intrudes deeply into their lives, as a totalitarian party might. Few Latin American societies are any longer so traditional that an authoritarian (not totalitarian) party machine could take hold. The PRI itself, as we have seen, has had difficulties of late because Mexican society has been transformed by urbanization, industrialization, and the spread of education. Reforms such as the reforma política have been used, with some success, to rechannel people into other, non-dangerous parties. This comes at the cost of diminished PRI shares of the vote, as we have seen. Because the PRI’s previous margins of victory were so great, it has the capacity to give up some of its vote share and still win comfortably. This it has done. Whether it can do so forever is less clear. Long-term economic crisis makes the possibility that opposition parties will convert the PRI voter greater. The political elite itself recognizes this problem and has reacted by resorting to its old practices of fraud and intimidation in some cases in the north. A danger that these practices create is that the political opening originally intended to prevent a violent political explosion will lead to a situation in which an explosion will arise out of anger at the elite for reneging on its promise to respect the will of the voter. This tenuous condition is not one about which I wish to make predictions, but it highlights a law about political
institutions which applies even to the crafty, calculating Mexican political elite: political institutions, once established, are hard to eliminate. In this case, an electoral opening, once made, is difficult to close completely.
APPENDIX
DATA AND METHODS

This appendix will discuss the data and methodology used for the aggregate electoral analyses presented in Chapters Four, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine. First the problems of using aggregate data will be examined. Second, aspects of the data used will be presented. Finally, specific methodologies will be discussed.

Analysis of Aggregate Electoral Data

For more than three decades social scientists have been aware of the problems inherent in using aggregate data to analyze electoral behavior.\(^1\) The dangers of the ecological fallacy and other limitations of aggregate data analysis have directed much effort by social scientists toward survey research. Unfortunately, little in the way of survey research has been done in Mexico. The only nation-wide surveys done there which are available are the one associated with the Civic Culture study of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, done in 1958, and a recent survey sponsored by the New York Times in 1985 which did not become publicly available until after this research was completed. A number of surveys with more narrowly targeted populations have been carried out in the intervening years. Many of their conclusions have been referred to within the body of this thesis.\(^2\) Few of them have


\(^2\)A summary of the surveys conducted up through 1976 is provided in Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Culture in Mexico: Continuities and Revisionist Interpretations," in The Civic Culture
been drawn from samples even representative of a particular geographical area. There are severe limitations for the purposes of this thesis in the secondary use of surveys which were conducted to explain other types of behavior. The proper questions were not asked, quite simply. Moreover, none of these surveys was administered in the critical 1975-76 period. Finally, due to considerations of time, I chose not to obtain any of these surveys for secondary analysis.

Lacking survey evidence, no real direct conclusions can be drawn about individual voter behavior in Mexico. Aggregate data only tells stories about the behavior of the populations living within electoral districts. Thus, the conclusions which can be made are only about the electoral results which tend to obtain in certain types of districts. Even that information is very valuable, though, because the structural determinants of Mexican electoral behavior, particularly caciquismo, tend to affect groups of people in certain types of geographical and economic settings (rural, agricultural areas) as much as they affect certain types of individuals (peasants living in those areas).

Aggregate data has a further contribution to make to electoral analysis: it is the official record of the Mexican electoral process. Of course, fraud does take place. Moreover, because a peasant votes for the PRI, it does not mean he really supports the PRI politically. However, until such time as the electoral arena fails to function as the legal mechanism of political succession, what obtains in the electoral arena is critically important. So long as the PRI wins a

Revisited, edited by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
Thus, this thesis relies on aggregate electoral data. There are limitations to the conclusions which can be reached using aggregate data, particularly for exploring the complementarity or substitutability of different modes of political participation. However, so long as conclusions are not drawn which are unwarranted, aggregate electoral can provide useful knowledge and in many ways it is the only information available.

**Mexican Electoral and Census Data**

Mexican aggregate electoral data is publicly available at two levels, the state and the federal electoral district. Complete data exist for presidential election results at the state level since the Revolution\(^3\) and for federal deputy elections at the state level since 1961.\(^4\) Despite its publication, however, the volume containing the latter had all but disappeared in Mexico City by 1984: it was not in libraries, scholars with copies kept them locked in file drawers, and the Ministry of Gobernación, despite the fact that it had a room full of such documents, was not issuing them. I was able to photocopy a well-worn copy from the library of the Ministry of Gobernación, although I did not win the admiration of either the librarians or the

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photocopying staff for doing so. Earlier studies of electoral behavior have been done based on official statistics presented by Pablo González Casanova\(^5\) and newspapers.\(^6\) Barry Ames\(^7\) and José Luis Reyna\(^8\) performed multivariate statistical analysis on state-level election data from the elections of 1952 through 1967. More recently, Rogelio Ramos Oranday has presented a pooled cross-sectional correlation analysis of results from the four presidential races from 1964 to 1982 and I have done multiple correlation and regression analysis on deputy election results from 1961 through 1985.\(^9\) In all cases, the analysis has been constrained by the small number of cases (thirty-two) and the limitations on the range of variance of the variables since some of the cases are aggregations of up to forty individual electoral districts.

Lacking survey evidence, we are forced to seek statistics from lower levels of aggregation in order to increase the number of cases and to expand the range of the variables. John Walton and Joyce A. Sween gained access to municipio-level electoral results from the 1961 through 1967 federal deputy elections and the 1964 senatorial and

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presidential elections but only for municipios of 5,000 or more inhabitants.\textsuperscript{10} While data from this level of analysis for all municipios would be the preferred data for an ecological study, I was unable to obtain it. However, I was able to locate data for deputy elections at the federal electoral district level. These data are reported in the issues of the Diario de los Debates de la Camara de Diputados for August of the election year when the newly elected deputies form themselves into an Electoral College to approve their own elections. For the elections from 1967 through 1982, with the exception of 1979, the data are complete or nearly complete. The results from about two-thirds of the districts were reported in 1979 with no apparent pattern of reporting and non-reporting. By using district-level data instead of state-level data, the number of cases can be expanded from 32 to 167 for 1967 and to 300 for 1982. Data for the 1985 deputy elections were reported in a Federal Electoral Commission working document and were made available to me by Leopoldo Gómez and John Bailey of Georgetown University.

While electoral data are available at the district level, data to measure characteristics of the social structure are not. Census data come in the form of state-level or municipio-level information. Fortunately, the municipio-level census data can be aggregated to the electoral district level. Most electoral districts consist of multiple municipios. Information about the constituent municipios can be added together to produce the characteristics of the electoral district.

Also fortunate is the fact that the makeup of the federal districts is published in *Diario Oficial* about seven months before an election. In some cases a single *municipio* may be broken into multiple electoral districts, for example large cities such as Mexico City, Guadalajara, Puebla, and Monterrey. In these cases, the characteristics of the *municipio* were designated to be the same for all districts within it. This causes some loss of information because aspects of the social structure surely vary within large *municipios*. However, if anything, this should diminish the range of variation in the independent variables and thereby dampen the strength of correlation coefficients. Conservative inferences would more likely be drawn than overestimations of the strength of relationships.

Unfortunately, though, these electoral districts have not remained the same over time. The division of the country into 177 electoral districts drawn in 1961 remained in place until after the 1970 elections. The number of districts was increased to 187 and district lines were redrawn for the 1973 elections; the same division with a slight modification to add one district in Baja California Sur and one in Quintana Roo was used in 1976. As a consequence of the *reforma política*, the number was increased again to 300 for the 1979 elections and the lines were again redrawn. This districting was used in 1982 and 1985. This redistricting has made time-series analysis of the district-level data all but impossible. In particular, before and after analyses of the effects of the *reforma política* on particular types of districts cannot be done. Thus, the best approximation to understanding the dynamic processes of electoral behavior in Mexico is
a series of snap-shots taken at three-year intervals.

The attributes of the social structure of the over 2300 municipios making up the electoral districts were taken from the 1970 and 1980 Mexican censuses. Because the 1970 census did not report municipio-by-municipio statistics for the greater than 500 municipios of the state of Oaxaca, I have excluded Oaxaca from the analysis. This results in the loss of only nine districts (nine cases) for the 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1976 elections and ten districts for the 1979, 1982, and 1985 elections. Missing data caused a handful of additional districts to be dropped from the study: nine from 1967 and three each for 1982 and 1985. Sixty-two districts lacked electoral data for 1979, thus the 1979 analyses are based on a much reduced population of districts. The census information and the electoral data do not come from the exact same years. Rather than interpolate to arrive at estimates for the exact year of an election, I chose to use the census data from the closest census as independent variables. This is most problematic for the 1976 and 1985 elections, both of which are studied using 1980 census data. Again some loss of information is likely but more conservative inferences should be drawn.

Tables A-1 and A-2 are lists of independent variables taken from the 1970 and 1980 and their definitions. From these transformed variables were produced; all variables (other than dichotomous variables representing regions) entering into the statistical analysis were percentages. The sectoral and occupation variables were divided by the economically active population (EAP) to determine the shares of the EAP employed in each sector or occupation. The separate population
totals for total population and for specific age groups were used to determine the percentages of the population educated to certain levels, and so forth. Because the sectoral and occupational information was disaggregated into a number of relatively insignificant categories (in terms of total weight in the EAP), larger sectoral and occupational (class) groupings were created. Table A-3 provides definitions of the three sectoral groupings and class groupings. The class groupings were more intelligible for the 1980 census because the original occupational categories were sufficiently disaggregated that some intuitive sense could be made of the jobs performed in those occupations. The 1970 census did not provide such a convenient disaggregation, so class groupings were more difficult to define.

Statistical Procedures

Correlation. In this dissertation I relied most heavily on correlation analysis for the following reasons: First, correlation analysis gives a simple and easily comprehensible measure of association between the variables measuring the social structure and the electoral variables. Of course, it does not allow one to infer the direction of causation between the variables, but then in this case there may not be unidirectional causation, but rather bidirectional (the PRI does well in backward, rural districts and sees no reason to change the status of those districts through government policy). Second, the likely alternative to correlation analysis, regression analysis, is more problematic statistically. The problem, in brief, is that the likely independent variables are highly intercorrelated. Thus, a large number of social structural variables would disappear.
from the analysis if regression were used alone. For instance, only one measure of the sectoral distribution of the workforce or only one measure of the occupational distribution of the workforce is likely to be used in a regression equation. Yet, it is highly worthwhile to know how strongly correlated all sectoral and occupational variables are with electoral variables (participation and direction of the vote). Thus, correlation analysis provides a more extensive analysis of the association between the Mexican social structure and Mexican voting behavior, although at the cost of not knowing the relationships among the independent variables.

Multiple regression. To go beyond correlation analysis to understand more intensively the social bases of electoral support for the PRI or the opposition, multiple regression analysis was used. No regression equation with more than one or two significant independent variables could be found for electoral participation, thus not taking the statistical study of electoral participation much beyond that delivered by correlation analysis, so this was dropped. Because the variables being used as independent and dependent variables in the study of the social bases of the PRI and the opposition make direct intuitive sense, the regression equations produce meaningful regression coefficients. Simple multiple regression can thus be used without the need to transform variables and lose direct intuitive meaning in the process. For that reason I chose not to attempt factor analysis on this data, although the data would easily lend itself to factor analysis, because that direct intuitive interpretation of the regression coefficients would be lost.
Some cautions about drawing conclusions based on these regressions should be made. First, there is a high degree of intercorrelation among the independent variables (see Tables A-4 and A-5). I have tried to select measures of each important dimension of the social structure (industrialization, urbanization, and education) with an eye to decreasing multicollinearity in the model. It is unlikely that multicollinearity is completely gone. Therefore, the exact relationship between independent and dependent variables suggested by the regression coefficients should be tempered in inference. Perhaps more important is the change in the magnitude of these coefficients from one election to the next.

Second, some care in interpretation must be taken because of the incidence of electoral fraud (this applies to correlation analysis as well). This problem has both synchronous and longitudinal dimensions. Presumably the incidence of fraud does not occur in the same magnitude or proportion in all districts in an election. If it did, not particular problems of statistical inference would follow. If it does not occur in the same magnitude or proportion, but occurs randomly (or approximating a random distribution), that would not create problems of inference either; the strength of the correlation coefficients would be depressed, but conservatively-drawn conclusions should follow. Only if fraud is very targeted should difficulties of interpretation arise. Two possibilities present themselves. First, the fraud by the PRI takes place in backward rural districts where the opposition is weak and produces the result that PRI margins of victory and the rates of participation are exaggerated. This result should magnify the strength
of correlation coefficients beyond that expected if the PRI just did well in rural districts, not incredibly and unbelievably well. On the one hand, these results would exaggerate the actual popularity of the PRI in rural districts. On the other hand, if we are interested in the districts in which the PRI does well officially, then it does not matter how those margins of victory are produced. That is to say, this type of fraud might exaggerate the actual political support of the PRI in the countryside, but so long as the electoral process is the manner in which succession takes place, it is the official results which matter. Presumably the PRI is not kidding itself about how its victories are produced. A second way in which targeted fraud can take place is that the PRI commits fraud where it is most strongly challenged. This seems to have been the case in 1985. The statistical ramifications of this practice would be to dampen correlation coefficients so long as the model for PRI voting is correctly specified. Again, conservative inferences should be the result, not overdrawn inferences.

With these precautions in mind, the interpretation of the multiple regression results in Tables 7-12 through 7-19 is straightforward. In each case, the predicted percentage of the vote for PRI (or PAN, as the case may be) in any district is equal to a constant plus the regression coefficient for the first variable times the actual value of the first variable for that district, plus regression coefficient for the second variable times the actual value of the second variable for that district, and so forth. An increase of one percentage point in the first variable will result in a percentage change in the PRI vote equal
to the regression coefficient of the first variable. The difference between the actual value of the PRI percentage in a district and the predicted value is the residual. $R^2$ is a measure of the percentage of the total variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the model. $1-R^2$ would be a measure of the share of the total variance still residual or made up by the residuals. As can be seen in Tables 7-12 through 7-19, between 30 and 60 percent of the variance is unexplained by the independent variables in the different models. The regressions on the residuals of the equations predicting PAN or PRI vote attempt to remove further variance by examining the independent role of regional factors. In these equations, each regional variable is a dichotomous variable in which a district is scored 1 if it is locate in that region and 0 if not. These regressions are equivalent to one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the exception that some idea is given of whether the first regression model underpredicted or overpredicted the performance of the party in question in each region.\textsuperscript{11}

Pooled Time-Series Regression. The longitudinal analyses of abstentionism and the decline of electoral support for the PRI presented in Tables 4-3 through 4-6 are pooled time-series multiple regression analyses of electoral data aggregated to the state level from federal deputy elections between 1961 and 1976. The basic technique used is to combine all cross-sectional (thirty-two different states) and time-series (six elections) data and then perform ordinary

\textsuperscript{11}Thus the $F$ produced in these regressions equals the $F$ for a one-way ANOVA and the $R^2$ is equivalent to the statistic eta.

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least-squares regression on the entire data set. For the analyses presented in Tables 4-3 through 4-6, the entire data set was also broken into subsets, the defining criterion for membership in a subset being the level of urbanization of the state (defined by percent living in localities of greater than 50,000).

The assumption of pooled-time series regression is that the slope of the regression equation remains the same for all cross-sectional units. The intercept, however, may differ. This difference is captured by introducing dichotomous variables for each cross-sectional unit. The intercept for any particular cross-sectional unit (state, in this case), then, is equal to the global intercept plus the regression coefficient for its dichotomous variable. The regression equation, then, is

\[ Y_{it} = a + b*X_{it} + c_2*W_{2t} + c_3*W_{3t} + \ldots + c_n*W_{nt} + e_{it} \]

where

\[ W_{it} = 1 \text{ for the } i^{th} \text{ individual } i = 2, \ldots, n \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise.} \]

That is, there are \( n-1 \) dummy variables in the model (collinearity would result if there were \( n \) dummy variables). The intercept for state 1 would be \( a \), for state 2 it would be \( a + c_2 \), and so forth. It is assumed that the slope for each cross-sectional unit is equal to \( b \).

To relax the assumption that the slope is equal for all states in Mexico, I have grouped them by level of urbanization as well as performing the analysis for the whole data set. In Tables 4-3 and 4-5,

then, will be found both a range of intercepts (high and low for each grouping) and the slopes, labeled "trend" in Tables 4-3 and 4-5, and given under the independent variables urbanization and industrialization in Tables 4-4 and 4-6. The regressions reported in Tables 4-3 and 4-5 simply record the decline of electoral participation and PRI electoral support. The independent variable used was a counter to measure time, in which 1961 = 0, 1964 = 1, . . . , 1976 = 5. To interpret the first line of Table 4-3, then, one would say that in 1961, that of participation by registered voters throughout Mexico ranged from a low of 49.8 percent to a high of 90.3 percent. In each subsequent election, participation declined by an average of 1.9 percent. Obviously, there is variation in this decline across the units of analysis, but the $R^2$ of .66 indicates that the fit is relatively tight. As might be expected, the range within the subsets grouped by urbanization is smaller than for the nation as a whole. The interpretation of Tables 4-4 and 4-6 is a more standard interpretation of regression analysis. In this case, the intercepts have been omitted because they vary by state.
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<th>LABEL</th>
<th>SOURCE*</th>
<th>VARIABLE DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>C 2</td>
<td>POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;2,500 HABITANTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;5,000</td>
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<td>POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;5,000 HABITANTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>C 2</td>
<td>POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;10,000 HABITANTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;20,000 HABITANTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;18 YEARS</td>
<td>C 4</td>
<td>POTENTIAL ELECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORN OUT</td>
<td>C 10</td>
<td>MIGRANTS INTO STATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (INDIAN LANGUAGES)</td>
<td>C 5</td>
<td>TOTAL INDIAN LANGUAGE SPEAKERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO SPAN.</td>
<td>C 5</td>
<td>THOSE WHO SPEAK NO SPANISH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>C 5</td>
<td>THOSE WHO SPEAK SPANISH AND AN INDIAN LANGUAGE</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Table A-1 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FROM 1970 CENSUS

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 POP1080</td>
<td>C 14 (1st column)</td>
<td>POPULATION &gt; 10 YRS OLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 LITERATE</td>
<td>C 14 (2nd column)</td>
<td>LITERATE POPULATION &gt; 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 POP680</td>
<td>C 15 (1st column)</td>
<td>POPULATION &gt; 6 YRS OLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 NO SCHOOL</td>
<td>C 15 (2nd column)</td>
<td>NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 POST-PRIM.</td>
<td>C 15 (con instuccion post-primaria)</td>
<td>ATTENDED SCHOOL PAST PRIMARY SCHOOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 PRIMARY</td>
<td>C 15</td>
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**Economic Sector**

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>AGRI.</td>
<td>C 24 (2nd col.)</td>
<td>AGRICULTURAL SECTOR POP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PET</td>
<td>C 24 (3rd col.)</td>
<td>PETROLEUM SECTOR POP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MINES</td>
<td>C 24 (4th col.)</td>
<td>MINING SECTOR POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MANUFACT.</td>
<td>C 24 (5th col.)</td>
<td>MANUFACTURING SECTOR POP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>EGW</td>
<td>C 24 (7th col.)</td>
<td>POP IN ELEC., GAS, WATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CONSTR</td>
<td>C 24 (6th col.)</td>
<td>CONSTRUCTION SECTOR POP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>COMMERCE</td>
<td>C 24 (8th col.)</td>
<td>SALES SECTOR POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>C 24 (9th col.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>SERVICES</td>
<td>C 24 (10th col.)</td>
<td>SERVICES SECTOR POP.</td>
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</table>

**Occupation**

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<tr>
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<th>VARIABLE DEFINITION</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>28</td>
<td>PRF&amp;TECH</td>
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<tr>
<td>VARIABLE</td>
<td>SOURCE*</td>
<td>VARIABLE DEFINITION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 MANAGERS</td>
<td>C 24 (funcionarios..)</td>
<td>PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ADMIN</td>
<td>C 24 (personal administr....)</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATORS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 AG WORKERS</td>
<td>C 24 (trab. en lab. agropecuarias)</td>
<td>AGRICULTURAL WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 WORKERS</td>
<td>C 24 (trabajadores no agricolas)</td>
<td>IND. WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 SALES</td>
<td>C 24 (comercs. vendadores...)</td>
<td>SALES WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 SERV</td>
<td>C 24 (trab. en servicios...)</td>
<td>SERVICE WORKERS</td>
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*C 1 refers to Cuadro (Table) 1 of the 1970 census.
Table A-2
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FROM 1980 CENSUS

<table>
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<th>VARIABLE DEFINITION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>LABEL</td>
<td>POPULATION AND URBANIZATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>POP80</td>
<td>VOLUME 2, CUADRO NO. 2, POPULATION IN 1980 (V 2, C 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&lt;2,500</td>
<td>V 2, C 2, POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;2,500 HABITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;5,000</td>
<td>V 2, C 2, POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;5,000 HABITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>&lt;10,000</td>
<td>V 2, C 2, POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;10,000 HABITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>&lt;20,000</td>
<td>V 2, C 2, POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;20,000 HABITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>V 2, C 2, POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OF &lt;50,000 HABITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>&gt;18 YEARS</td>
<td>V 1, C 1, POTENTIAL ELECTORATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BORN OUT</td>
<td>V 1, C 11, MIGRANTS INTO STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>V 2, C 15, TOTAL INDIAN LANGUAGE SPEAKERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>V 2, C 15, THOSE WHO SPEAK SPANISH AND AN INDIAN LANGUAGE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Table A-2 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FROM 1980 CENSUS

<table>
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<th>VARIABLE</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>POP680</td>
<td>POPULATION &gt; 6 YRS OLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NO SCHOOL</td>
<td>NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
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<td>ATTENDED SCHOOL PAST post-primaria)</td>
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Economic Sector

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<tr>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>AGRI.</td>
<td>AGRICULTURAL SECTOR POP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MINES&amp;PET</td>
<td>MINING SECTOR POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MANUFACT.</td>
<td>MANUFACTURING SECTOR POP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>EGW</td>
<td>POP IN ELEC., GAS, WATER</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>CONSTR</td>
<td>CONSTRUCTION SECTOR POP.</td>
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<td>COMMERCE</td>
<td>SALES SECTOR POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>TRANSPORT SECTOR POP.</td>
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Occupation

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<td>--------</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>TEACHERS</td>
<td>V1, C7 (maestros y ...)</td>
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<td>ARTISTS</td>
<td>V1, C7 (trabajadores del arte)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PUBLIC FUNC</td>
<td>V1, C7 (funcionarios publicos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>MANAGERS</td>
<td>V1, C7 (gerentes ..)</td>
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<td>AG ADMIN</td>
<td>V1, C7 (admin. agro.)</td>
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<td>AG WORKERS</td>
<td>V1, C7 (agricultures)</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>AG MACH OP</td>
<td>V1, C7 (op.maquinaria...)</td>
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<td>SUPERVISOR</td>
<td>V1, C7 (supervisores...)</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>WORKERS</td>
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<td>V1, C7 (ayudantes de obreros)</td>
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<td>V1, C7 (oficinistas)</td>
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<td>V1, C7 (vendedores depenientes)</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>SERV</td>
<td>V1, C7 (empleados en servicios)</td>
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<td>DOMESTIC</td>
<td>V1, C7 (trab. domesticos)</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>V1, C7 (op. de transportes)</td>
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Table A-2 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FROM 1980 CENSUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>LABEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>V 1, C 7 (proteccion y ...) SECURITY PERSONNEL</td>
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*V 1 refers to Volume 1 of the 1980 census; C 1 refers to Cuadro (Table) 1 of the 1980 census.
Table A-3

Definitions of Transformed Variables

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<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
<td>% EAP Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sector (1970)</td>
<td>% EAP Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
<td>% EAP Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector (1970)</td>
<td>% EAP Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
<td>% EAP Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sector (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Construction</td>
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<tr>
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<td>% EAP Utilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
<td>% EAP Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Sector (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Mining and Petroleum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of EAP in</td>
<td>% EAP Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector (1980)</td>
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<td>% EAP Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Transport</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>% EAP Technical</td>
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<td></td>
<td>% EAP Public Functionaries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Managers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Middle Class (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Working Class (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Transport Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Domestic Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Office Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Sales Workers</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>% EAP Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Part-Time Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Services Workers (1980)</td>
<td>Urban Working Class LESS % EAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Manual Workers (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Agricultural Machine Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Non-Manual (1980)</td>
<td>% EAP Agricultural Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% EAP Mayorales (Foremen)</td>
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### Table A-4

**Intercorrelations of Independent Variables, 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Urbanization (&gt;2500)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urbanization (20,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.87</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Secondary Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Primary Sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.94</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>-.89</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tertiary Sector</td>
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<td>.92</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.96</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. % without Education</td>
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<td>-.79</td>
<td>-.70</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.86</td>
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<td>7. % Post-Primary Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Participation (1967)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.19</td>
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Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
Table A-5
Intercorrelations of Independent Variables, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. Urbanization (≥2500)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urbanization (20,000)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Secondary Sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Primary Sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tertiary Sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. % without Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.67</td>
<td>-.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. % Post-Primary Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Participation (1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Participation (1982)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<td>10. Participation (1985)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.07</td>
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Zero-order Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
This study relied upon five types of primary source materials: interviews with political elites, documents from the Federal Electoral Commission, aggregate electoral and census statistics, newspapers and other journalistic media, and party documents. Interviews with former officials in the Federal Electoral Commission and with former leaders of opposition parties were used to investigate the decision to initiate the reforma política, the public process associated with the reforma política, and the opposition's perceptions of it. Interviews with opposition party leaders were also a source of information about current party strategies. The interviewees were promised anonymity and while notes were taken in the interviews, no verbatim quotes were recorded and no tape recordings were made.

Below are listed by type the primary documents and journalistic sources used in this study:

**A. Federal Electoral Commission Documents**

The Federal Electoral Commission printed extensive materials to publicize the reforma política of 1977 and the electoral reforms of the Echeverría administration. The following documents included valuable transcripts of Federal Electoral Commission meetings and the public audiences, reprints of newspaper articles about the reforma política, political party documents, and raw electoral data.


Reforma política, gaceta informativa de la Comisión Federal Electoral, vol. 5: comentarios, 2. Mexico City: Comisión Federal Electoral,
1978.


The following internal documents were also informative:


B. Aggregate Electoral Data

District-level election results were reported in the minutes of the Electoral College sessions, which has met regularly in August after the July federal elections. These minutes are recorded in Diario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, usually 15 August through 31 August of the year of a federal deputy election.
The following sources provided information about the territorial division of municipios into electoral districts:


Estimates for the size of the potential electorate for the 1979 through 1985 elections came from Federal Electoral Commission estimates reported in Reforma política, vol. 7.

El Día ran a series entitled "Conozca su distrito" from 21 May 1985 through 29 June 1985 which provided additional electoral information (size of district, past election results) about the forty electoral districts in Mexico City. Unfortunately, five of the issues in the series were unavailable in Mexico City at the time I was there in June 1985 and have not appeared in U.S. libraries either.

C. Census Data

Census data from the level of the municipio is printed in separate volumes for each of the thirty-two federal entities (states) and was gathered from the 1970 and 1982 census. The following are the general citations for these two censuses:


D. Party Documents

1. Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI):

2. Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and Solidarismo:


Various press releases and communications to PAN members, 1978-1981 (provided by Donald J. Mabry).


3. Partido Popular Socialista (PPS):


PPS. Como actuar en la organizaciones de masas. Mexico City, May 1968.


PPS. Plataforma electoral del Partido Popular Socialista. Mexico City, 1 April 1961.

PPS. Por la democracia, el bienestar popular y la soberanía nacional: declaración programática de partidos de izquierda. Mexico City, not dated.

PPS. Principios, programa y estatutos. Mexico City, 1983.


4. Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM):


PSUM. La creación del PSUM. Mexico City, 1982.

PSUM. Declaración de Principios, Programa de Acción y Estatutos del PSUM. Mexico City, 1982.

PSUM. Informe y resoluciones del Segundo Congreso Nacional del PSUM. Mexico City, 1983.


PSUM. Resoluciones del IV Pleno del Comité Central del PSUM. Mexico City,
1984.


5. Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM):


PDM. Boletín-1. Informativo de la Fracción Parlamentaria Demócrata. Mexico City, 1983.

6. Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT):


7. Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT):


PMT. Declaración de Principios, Programa de Acción, Estatutos. Mexico City, not dated.


PMT. Manual de casillas electorales; documento de estudio. Mexico City, not dated.


E. Periodicals: Dailies and Weeklies

A number of periodicals were consulted for information about the reforma política and about recent elections (1970-1985). The weeklies Proceso (Mexico City) and Latin America Weekly Report (London) were followed more rigorously, LAWR (and its predecessors Latin America, Latin America Political Report, and Latin America Economic Report as well as the complementary Latin American Regional Report: Mexico and Central America) being examined from 1972 through 1986 and Proceso from its initial issue in November 1976 through June 1987. The following is a list of newspapers and magazines which I examined for 1977 to study the reforma política and, if noted, the years of elections from 1970 through 1985. Citations from other periodicals which appear in the text were uncovered through clipping services and other compendia of newspaper articles such as ISLA (Information Services on Latin America) (Oakland) and Aktueller Informationsdienst Lateinamerika (Hamburg).

La Jornada (Mexico City), 1985.
Nexos.
Proceso.
Unomásuno (Mexico City), 1979, 1982, 1985, and various other issues.
Vuelta.
SECONDARY SOURCES


Baer, M. Delal and Bailey, John. in *LASA forum*


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________. *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City.* Stanford:


González Casanova, Pablo. "Las alternativas de la democracia." In


Hellman, Judith Adler. Mexico in Crisis, 2nd ed. New York: Holmes and 641


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