Examining the Impact of Residential Segregation on Rapid Transit Development in Chicago's South Side

by

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June 2017

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Abstract

The striking contrast between two Chicago neighborhoods Hyde Park and Englewood which exist side by side is a prime example of what Edward Soja calls socially produced geographies of institutionalized racial segregation and what David Harvey terms as territorial injustice. Hyde Park with about 26,705 mostly white residents is a thriving economic center that has realized gains in property values and commercial investment. Nearby Woodlawn and Englewood have experienced declining populations, lower densities, lower property values, and increased vacancies that border Hyde Park, creating clear spatial lines of uneven development. Englewood and Woodlawn have one asset that Hyde Park does not: two public transit rail lines, the Green Line and the Red Line.

In this thesis, I ask the question, can rapid transit be used to challenge uneven development and segregation in low income communities? I argue that public transit does not create growth, it merely redistributes it, and without the necessary development preconditions, the maximized benefits of public rapid transit in segregated communities will be hindered by persistent racial and residential segregation. I provide evidence to support that unless there is an intentional effort in conjunction with the proposed Red Line Extension to minimize residential and economic segregation, the expected benefits of transit-oriented development and economic revitalization in Chicago’s African-American neighborhoods will be greatly limited. Such a plan might include developing transit stations into economic anchors through public and private partnerships, creating a coalition of community partnerships to develop land use plans that respond to the needs of the neighborhood, and working to secure investment for rapid transit infrastructure alongside investment for economic development.

Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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May 2017
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The most striking feature of Chicago’s neighborhoods on the South Side is the stark difference in the physical urban features and development between segregated low-income neighborhoods like Englewood and integrated, prosperous neighborhoods like Hyde Park, only a mile away. Hyde Park is, in many ways, an isolated enclave physically separated from neighboring communities, surrounded by Washington Park, Midway Plaisance, and Jackson Park. Immediately on the other side of these parks, vacancies populate the edges and beyond in Englewood, Greater Grand Crossing, and Washington Park neighborhoods. Vacancies are drawn along racial as well as economic lines. According to the American Communities Survey (2015), Black and African Americans make up 90% of the population or more in the aforementioned neighborhoods where vacancies are high.

Chicago’s South Side and West Side black communities have faced a long history of redlining, divestment, urban renewal policies that plunged those communities into cycles of poverty and what Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have termed as “hypersegregation” (1993). When the Red Line was built in 1969, it was built along racial lines, stopping short of serving the Far South Side to keep Black Americans from moving into white communities (Lynch, 2016). During the same time, federal investment prioritized funding highway infrastructure over public transit to bring suburban commuters to the city.

What is interesting to an observer in these neighborhoods is that the specific area between Washington Park and Englewood is transit rich. There are two rapid transit lines through the site, the Green Line and the Red Line. And yet, vacancies persist along both transit corridors, especially the Green Line. It is not clear what impact these transit corridors have had on development and vacancies in the area.
Figure 1.1: Chicago Transit Authority Regional Map. Most of the lines outside of the Loop are elevated. Source: City of Chicago Data Portal and Cook County Data Portal.
South Side neighborhoods like Englewood exhibit some characteristics of a shrinking city. Their populations are declining. Disinvestment has shut down multiple stops on the Green Line, shortening both the Cottage Grove and Ashland/63rd branches. Major stops along the Green Line and Red Line in those neighborhoods face declining ridership in the past few years, may justify station closures (Annual Ridership Report, 2015). This observation does not include Red Line stops that have been closed for reconstruction and improvement.

Expansion of the Red Line was approved only recently, as a result of years of grassroots community organizing and an upsurge of political will. Even so, no money has yet been secured for the actual construction of the Red Line Expansion. It is likely that without federal funding, construction on the Red Line Expansion may not actually start until 2022 or later. Due to low ridership levels and CTA budget cuts, expanding the Red Line in the Far South Side was not prioritized for investment and expansion. Chicago’s “public transportation policy reveals that the city is sinking scarce transit funds into projects that transform the downtown Central Area into the image of a global city. These...public transit projects are prioritized over expanding access to transit for working-class and minority residents living in transit-poor areas of the city” (Farmer, 2011). Some CTA officials, however, argue that South Side neighborhoods are transit-rich when compared to other neighborhoods like Hyde Park.

Of course, further disinvestment only perpetuates cycles of poverty, abandonment, and uneven development. The $2-billion-dollar Red Line Reconstruction and Expansion offers a crucial opportunity for South Side neighborhoods. Despite the falling population in these neighborhoods, it is important for institutions to strategically invest in public infrastructure in a way that is intentional about challenging uneven development, reducing vacancies, and bringing economic stability to the area without “grossly violating the rights of existing residents who have remained in disinvested neighborhoods” (Ryan, 2012).

Public transit has been traditionally associated with development and growth. Often times, the issues raised with public transit is that it does not serve low income communities and when it does, it gentrifies these areas, displacing resident who may have been living there for decades. In 1996, a class action lawsuit was brought against the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) by a grassroots coalition for engaging in discrimination by funneling and prioritizing investment into expensive rail projects over investment in bus services (Soja, 2010). Low income residents and workers, many who cannot afford a car, depend on bus lines for their basic needs. The case, also known as the Bus Riders Union decision ended in a consent decree in which the MTA agreed to give “their highest budget priority to improving the quality of bus service” (Soja, 2010). By Soja’s account, it was a historic decision that reconfigured the MTA’s investment planning and priorities for the next decade.

The case of the Green Line in Englewood and, by extension, the Red Line in Roseland, reveal a different problem. It appears that years of redlining and segregation have prevented communities from experiencing the maximized benefits usually associated with transit rail. In this thesis, I hope
to explore the stark differences in the development of Englewood and Hyde Park, compare them with development in Pilsen (Lower West Side) and examine how local economics, development, and neighborhood conditions impacted rapid transit.

**THESIS QUESTION**

What is the impact of residential segregation on public transit rail in historically segregated Chicago neighborhoods such as Englewood, Woodlawn, and Pilsen? In order to better understand the
development of South Side neighborhoods, I will delve into the history and patterns of residential and racial segregation and the policies that impacted commercial and residential development. My hypothesis is that race and economic growth impact the development of transit in the South Side. I speculate that without addressing vacancies and land use development, transit oriented development along the Green and Red Lines in Chicago’s South Side will not be fully maximized. The causes of residential segregation (disinvestment, redlining) indirectly impact the ridership of the elevated railway in Chicago. An area with economic growth will likely drive up ridership, attract businesses, development, and drive up property values. An area with decreasing populations and stagnant economies will be reflected in transit ridership and the development it attracts.

METHODOLOGY

My methodology is divided into two parts, spatial analysis and interviews with professionals involved with advocating, working on, or researching the Red or Green Line. To conduct spatial analysis, I used Census Data and the American Communities Survey (2010-2015) data from 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2015 to extract data on employment, population density, and race. Census tract level shapefiles based on the Census Bureau’s 2008 TIGER/Line data for 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 were downloaded from the National Historic Geographic Information System (NHGIS). NHGIS offered shapefiles tract boundaries for those decades based on 2000 or 2008 TIGER/Line. I chose the latter due to a higher accuracy level. These shapefiles were then joined to the Census data on the tract level. A discrepancy occurred when following the same method for shapefiles in 1990 and 2000 due to different geographic identifiers in the NHGIS shapefiles and in the Census Data tract levels. Using GeoLytics shapefile information available at the Rotch Library, I downloaded 1990 and 2000 tract level shapefile boundaries normalized to 2010 boundaries.

Other shapefiles (parks, highways, roads, etc.) and ridership data were downloaded from the Chicago Metropolitan Area Planning agency, the State of Illinois Geospatial Data Clearinghouse, Cook County Open Data Portal, and the City of Chicago Data Portal. I aggregated annual ridership data 2001 to 2016 for Green Line stations from daily ridership data by station from the CTA Ridership Statistics and Reports. For the Green Line South Side elevated shapefiles, I georeferenced a map from 1946, created the shapefile and amended as needed for each decade between 1950 and 2000 based on station and line information derived from Graham Garfield’s Chicago-L.org, an indispensable website on the history of transit rail in Chicago. Concentration of jobs in Chicago was derived from the Illinois Department of Employment Security’s Local Employment Dynamics tool.

First classified by Massey and Denton (1988) in an extensive study, segregation is measured using five dimensions: (1) evenness, (2) exposure, (3) concentration, (4) clustering, and (5) centralization. When 4 out of 5 dimensions have indices, these areas are referred to as “hypersegregated.” The dissimilarity index (DI), the most commonly used segregation measure, measures evenness across neighborhoods describes the percentage of a population that would have to move to a different area for each tract to have more even distribution. A DI of 1 means complete segregation and a DI of 0
Chapter 1

means complete integration. Spatial proximity is a measure of clustering, or “the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space” (Massey & Denton, 1988). The index equals 1 if there is no differentiation between the proximity of one area inhabited by a minority to another area inhabited by another group, creating a checkerboard pattern. An index higher than 1 reveals a clustering of areas inhabited by the same group. An index lower than 1 reveals that members of the same group tend to live nearer to those of other groups than to each other. Using tract levels as a proxy for community areas, I used the Geo-Segregation Analyzer, an open source software that measures segregation using the five dimensions (Apparicio, Martori, & Pearson, 2014) to calculate the dissimilarity index for 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2015. This tool was also used by the Urban Institute for their April 2017 report, the Cost of Segregation (Acs, Pendall, Treskon, & Khare, 2017).

Finally, I interviewed six professionals, practitioners, and academics dealing with public rail transit on the South Side from public agencies, universities, and nonprofit community development groups.

OUTLINE

Chapter 2 covers the historical context of racial segregation, how it impacted development and transit’s role. Here, and throughout the thesis, when I refer to segregation, I’m specifically speaking to segregation of minorities, particularly of Black segregation on the South Side. I give a cursory overview of the role academic theories (particularly human ecology), local and federal policies, and tactics by neighborhood associations, real estate companies in the development of Englewood and surrounding communities. I also cover some theories of neighborhood change put forward by Scholars like Wilson, Sharkey, Massey, Denton, and more recently, Betancur and Smith, that challenge human ecology, which has dominated discourse for decades and impacted public policy.

Chapter 3 looks more in depth using the American Communities Survey data and Census data from 1950, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 and uses spatial analysis to understand the differences in urban development between the two neighborhoods. I use descriptive and analytical mapping describe the spatial and development patterns in the South Side alongside development of the Green Line.

Chapter 4 examines the attributes and layout design of the Red Line Extension, and discusses if the conditions exist for opportunities for transit oriented development. I compare ridership patterns between Green Line stations in Woodlawn and Englewood with Pink Line station in Pilsen, or the Lower West Side. The Lower West Side, like Englewood and Woodlawn, has experienced a history of disinvestment, redlining, and segregation. It is also located near a university campus (University of Illinois at Chicago). However, the trajectory in recent years of the Green Line neighborhoods and the Pink Line neighborhood differ from one another. Pilsen has attracted real estate investors and developers and its majority Latino population is facing gentrification. Very little investment and
development has been attracted in Englewood. While ridership on the Pink Line 18th St. station in Pilsen has rapidly increased in recent years, the Green Line stations in Woodlawn and Englewood have decreased in the last few years. I examine some of the reasons that drive ridership in all three areas. Some indicators of ridership patterns include population growth, local economies, percentage of vacant housing units, number of vacant lots, percentage of people in the labor force, percentage of people unemployed, the number of people who reside outside these neighborhoods but commute to work there, and the number of people who live in those neighborhoods and commute to work outside their neighborhood boundaries.

Chapter 5 outlines conclusions and implications of the impact of residential segregation on expensive transit rail lines. Based on lessons learned from the elevated Green Line and Pink Line stations, unless the Red Line chooses a design option and develop a land use and investment plan that is meant to increase densification, attract retail, incentivize locally owned businesses, the Red Line will not trigger economic revitalization. The indirect impacts of racial segregation heavily influence economic conditions and preconceived views of the South Side that deter developers from investing, even when conditions are conducive to development. In fact, it will do little more than decrease travel times, an important purpose but its potential benefits to unlock its full potential will not be fully realized.
CHAPTER 2

Literature Review, Context, & Theory: Transportation as a Tool of Residential Segregation

"As soon as the blacks moved in, and the whites saw they weren't moving out, the [for sale] signs went up like a disease. One house in her neighborhood that was owned by a black family was bombed. Threats of burning and bombing were regular occurrences. My dad took the opportunity to move to Englewood rather than move to a black neighborhood. In his thinking, Englewood [offered] a much better education for his kids."

– Lillie Abbot, on moving to Englewood in 1958, cited in Daily Herald, 3 March 2006

"Move out or sell. There is nothing else for you to do. We missed you last night but we will get you the next time. We are determined."

– Message delivered to an African American family who moved to north of Hyde Park in 1920, cited in The Slum and the Ghetto, 1973

In order to address why the maximum benefits of transit are not fully realized on Chicago's South Side, we must first understand Chicago's persistent "hypersegregation" (Massey & Denton, 1993) and "super ghettos" (Betancur & Smith, 2016) and their role in shaping transportation investment decisions and defining the urban forms of Englewood and Hyde Park. Theories attempting to explain the persistence of racial segregation in the South Side of Chicago have been covered extensively in literature over the past eighty years. The great migration of African Americans to Chicago's South Side from southern states started since before the Civil War and heightened post-World War II.

The majority of Black Americans moving to Chicago, a city founded by a French Haitian, was concentrated in an area called the Black Belt. While the color lines that define the black belt have shifted, its core still exists today. During the 1920's, the Black Belt was overcrowded but commercially and economically prosperous. Scholars and writers referred to it as a "city within a city," or the Black Metropolis (St Clair Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). In this chapter, I cover only a small subsection of the literature available, and highlight theories that attempt to explain and impacted the persistence of segregation and development in Hyde Park, Englewood, and by extension, Roseland, the area of the Red Line Extension. I show how segregation was created and
Table 2.1: Population change of Chicago neighborhoods from 1930 to 2010. Douglas and Grand Boulevard were two neighborhoods that were part of the Black Belt core in 1930, and together are today referred to as Bronzeville. Source: Census 1930-2010.

reinforced on multiple institutional levels by a range of institutional actors, from local homeowner associations to federal housing policies, and how these forces shaped development and transportation lines.

**MULTI-SCALAR DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT RACIAL SEGREGATION**

*Human Ecology: Self-Segregation vs. Compulsory Segregation*

Early mainstream social theories hypothesized that when people immigrated to Chicago, they chose to self-segregate. However, the same cannot be said for African Americans coming from the South (Philpott, 1978/1991). Black communities were often confined and restricted within spatial color lines enforced by a combination of homeowners’ associations, redlining by banks, local and federal government policies, and harassment campaigns. The conditions that defined the social dimension of urban form have always operated at multiple institutional scales: local, city, state, and federal. Modern urban theorists like Edwards Soja and David Harvey assert that the development of distributional inequalities between Hyde Park and Englewood are due to the “normal functioning of labor, housing, real estate markets, as well as the locational decisions of planners, bankers, developers, and retailers” (Harvey, 1973; Soja, 2010). I would add that early urban theorists and sociologists have contributed to the problem.

Leading University of Chicago sociologists Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth have portrayed low-income black communities as communities “in transition,” and whose segregation was voluntary and would prove to be temporary like other immigrant communities (Burgess &
Figure 2.1: Chicago neighborhoods 2015. The ecological communities or neighborhoods as defined by Burgess in 1933 remain largely unchanged today, with exception of O'Hare (76) and Edgewater (77). The shaded outline area shows the neighborhoods where the Black Belt was approximately defined in 1930. Englewood (68) is to the southwest of the Back Belt and Hyde Park (41) and Woodlawn (42) to the east.

Bogue, 1967; Philpott, 1978/1991). These sociologists explained segregation as a natural phenomenon of market competition and labor division, or what Park has termed, human ecology.
In an essay in *Urban Sociology* (Burgess & Bogue, 1967), sociologist Ronald Freedman categorized black neighborhoods as falling within the "Migrant Zone," noting black migrants held lower socioeconomic status than white migrants. He offers no further analysis or explanation. He postulates that migrants segregate "in urban subareas on the bases of their social and cultural characteristics" (Burgess & Bogue, 1967). Notably, Freedman observes that one of the characteristics of the migrant zones is that they are concentrated along transit lines, "affording, easy rapid access to the Loop" (Burgess & Bogue, 1967). The Loop is a moniker for Chicago's Central Business District that is encircled by elevated and subway transit lines in a loop.

Using the theory of human ecology, Ernest Burgess and Charles Newcomb wrote *Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1930* (1933), in which they divided Chicago for the first time into seventy-five communities based on race and ethnicity. Even though neighborhoods have changed over time, the boundaries have not. Englewood is still considered a single community even though a highway was carved through it, splitting the neighborhood into two distinct areas that are spatially separated and demographically different. The "homogenous" neighborhoods continued to be used even as demographics and physical characteristics changed, until 1970. In 1970, O'Hare Airport was added as a "neighborhood," and Uptown was divided by separating Edgewater, an upper middle-class community that wanted to be defined separately from the lower income and declining southern portion (Betancur & Smith, 2016). These seventy-seven neighborhoods (Figure 2.1) still exist today and guide investment and development decisions based on neighborhood boundaries from almost ninety years ago (Betancur & Smith, 2016).

Human ecology impact was not limited to Chicago. For an extended period of time, human ecology was a prevailing social science theory that shaped public policy on local, state, and federal levels across the United States. Another proponent of human ecology, Amos Hawley, believed that "inequality among places is even more explicitly construed as a natural consequence of differentiation" (Logan & Molotch, 1987). They theorized that people prefer racially and economically homogenous neighborhoods and used this to classify Chicago spatially and demographically. This classification influenced government policies and institutions, which in turn impacted real estate development and public investments (Betancur & Smith, 2016). Having been challenged by many critics, human ecology is no longer a mainstream urban theory today, but its principles and impacts on policy have created a legacy difficult to overcome.

The theory of invasion succession builds on human/urban ecology. It seeks to explain the phenomenon of a series of events that are triggered that lead one group to dominate, or replace, another group in a neighborhood as a natural characteristic of neighborhoods "invaded" by immigrants. What the human ecology theory and its derivatives miss, however, is that the glaring difference between immigrants from other ethnicities and Black neighborhoods was that while Blacks were able to secure employment (much to the chagrin and dismay of white laborers'), they

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1 In their landmark two volume book, *The Black Metropolis*, St. Claire Drake and Horace Cayton (originally published in 1945) document white riots, bombings, and beatings in Chicago in response to Blacks migrating
Figure 2.2: Ecological areas within the Black Belt in Chicago in 1920 (left) and 1930 (right). Note how the railroad "property" define edges of the Black Belt. Hyde Park is east of Washington Park. Categories of types of neighborhoods ("best", "worst", "mixed") were superimposed on Frazier's zones and are based on Frazier's indicators. The 1930's map on the right shows expansion of the Black Belt and the "blighted" areas that were cleared. Source: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, Volume II, Drake and Cayton, originally published 1945.

were not able to secure housing nearby their places of employment (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962; Philpott, 1978/1991). Thomas Philpott breaks with the urban ecology theory put forward by University of Chicago sociologists, pointing out that the Black Belt and its offshoots, including north and gaining employment. White laborers feared a depression of wages and expressed bitter sentiment towards Blacks finding work. Initially, Blacks pre-World War II were not incorporated in unions to the same extent as European immigrants, and were used to break up strikes which sowed deeper resentment in white ethnic communities towards the Black community. During the twenty years preceding the civil war Irish workingmen rioted against fugitive slaves who secured employment. In 1864, mobs of white laborers beat dozens of black lumber dock workers. The 1919 Riots in Chicago started after whites on a beach were outraged a black boy swam across an imaginary color line in the lake. The riots were preceded by a number of bombings on black households. White mobs used the riots to terrorize black families living in white neighborhoods.
Englewood, were unique (Philbott 1978/1991). Burgess defined Chicago neighborhoods based on ethnicity and nationality, but a closer look at ethnic neighborhoods (Swedish, Irish, Italian, German, etc.) revealed that no ethnic minority was in the majority of any these neighborhoods.

“The typical neighborhood that shows up on the map as the exclusive domain of a single ‘nationality group’ was in fact an ethnic hodgepodge” (Philbott 1978/1991). No one neighborhood contained a vast majority of a single ethnic population. The total population of Polish immigrants and their children were scattered over nineteen locations, and almost half of Little Poland’s population was not Polish (Table 2.2). Similarly, most of the inhabitants of Chicago’s eleven “Little Italys” were not Italian. Neighborhoods were actually much more integrated and immigrants were much more dispersed across various communities and less constrained by geography than previously assumed by University of Chicago sociologists, with one glaring exception: Black neighborhoods.

E. Franklin Frazier, a Black University of Chicago sociologist, wrote that human ecologists’ mistake was to treat the Black Belt as a homogenous group (Burgess & Bogue, 1967). He was among the first to show that there were clear differences within the Black Belt (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). Frazier divided the Black Belt further into seven ecological zones based on social stability in *Negro Family in Chicago* (1932). In a 1967 essay summarizing his research since the 1930’s, he investigates “social disorganization” in the Black Belt, a theory cited by human ecologists claiming that certain neighborhood indicators explain neighborhood decline and increasing crime rates. He used many indicators to track the demographic and social characteristics of Blacks in the seven zones including: occupational class, literacy, rates of “illegitimacy,” Southern born heads of families, “charity cases” or welfare recipients, family desertion, juvenile and adult delinquency, warrants for non-support, median rents, “insanity cases”, diseases, and median education. Using these indices St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton categorized the seven zones as “best,” “mixed,” and “worst.” They superimposed their classification onto Frazier’s 1920 map and showed how the “worst” areas began to encroach on the “mixed” areas in their 1930 map (Figure 2.2).

Their 1930 map also shows the development of “satellite” Black communities, which were unable to expand freely even though “white people in immediate proximity tended to move away” (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). Areas with substandard housing in 1920 in the northern part of the black belt designated as “blighted areas” and were cleared by 1930 (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). This action of allowing housing to deteriorate beyond repair and making it difficult to secure investment needed for repairs, and then tearing it down becomes a regular feature of segregated areas. Once housing is cleared, the land is “unlocked” for private investment and to accommodate a growing central business district and its middle-class workers. Drake and Cayton summarize, “Houses in Black Metropolis pay off now. The land they occupy will do so in the future” (1945). Betancur and Smith describe it as for-profit destruction, “necessity of accumulation” (2016).

Other ethnic minorities and ethnic whites, were free to move around and were not confined to the invisible but ever-present Maginot Line. Philpott contests the urban ecologists’ theories when he concludes that while white and Mexican immigrants had access to housing near industrial
Figure 2.3: Concentric Zone Model of Chicago by Ernest Burgess. Source: Originally published in Burgess' essay "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in The City, edited by Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, 1925.

communities, Blacks only had access to these spaces “during working hours.” Philbott argues that the only ghetto that existed was the Black ghetto. European immigrants were able to move out of “transition” zones near the city center, or the Loop, to more prosperous neighborhoods in Zones III and IV (Figure 2.3) as they became more “Americanized.” White groups had the choice to opt for a “combination of mild clustering and wide dispersion.” Blacks never had that choice (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962; Moore, 2016; Philpott, 1978/1991).

Denton and Massey (1993) affirmed Philpott’s conclusion and added that European immigrants were able to use the “transition” zones as a temporary enclave for adaptation, adjustment, and assimilation into American society, whereas for blacks it proved to be “permanent feature of black residential life.” If upward socioeconomic and geographic mobility defined the “immigrant” experience, then “institutional factors in the market structure, in the political system, and in the
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Thomas Philpott’s “Ghettoization” of Ethnic Groups, 1930” table makes the case that only Black residents were constrained geographically in comparison to other immigrants. Philpott comments, “The Negro ghetto, it turns out, was Chicago’s only ghetto.” Source: The Slum and the Ghetto, originally published in 1978.

cultural realm did not allow blacks to be immigrants” (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Human ecologists did not consider exogenous factors like racial discrimination as a contributor to what was described as of social disorganization in families and neighborhoods. Furthermore, when data on “black crime, teenage pregnancy, female-headed families, and welfare dependency are released to the public without sufficient explanation, racial stereotypes are reinforced” (Wilson, 1987). Nonetheless, it was clear to Frazier in 1930, as it was to Drake and Cayton in 1945, and Massey and Denton in 1993, and Betancur and Smith in 2016, that the concentration of disease and poverty and other types of social disorganization were exacerbated by overcrowding, congestion of people in a small area, inability of the Black Belt to expand to accommodate the Black population.

Restricting and Reinforcing the Color Lines on Multiple Scales

When Blacks moved out of a populated Black Belt and crossed the color lines, white homeowners met this shift with tactical withdrawal, warnings, and violence. When middle and upper class whites realized the limits to violence, they organized and developed legal mechanisms and other systems to keep Black Americans within their designated neighborhoods.

Whites fled neighborhoods en masse as soon as black families moved in, pushed to sell by realtors who peddled panic for profit. In a sort of frenzy, ethnic whites were united in their fervor to preserve the color lines because they greatly feared their property value lessening. White homeowners aggressively organized neighborhood associations to target real estate investors and dealers who engaged in blockbusting. Realtors sold to Black families to purposely trigger white flight from neighborhoods, bought houses cheap from panicked white homeowners, and sold them to black families at higher prices than original selling price (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962; Massey & Denton, 1993; Philpott, 1978/1991). Overcrowding combined with poor housing conditions within the Black
Belt had created a surge of demand for housing that exceeded supply made rents within the Black Belt “abnormally high” (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). People living within the Black Belt were desperate to get out. The potential profits were massive and both white and black realtors engaged in blockbusting. Realtors are most concerned with extracting value and maximizing profitability. Blockbusting afforded them that opportunity. Redlining and blockbusting have been described by some scholars as exogenous forces that produce racial succession or tipping (Massey & Denton, 1993; Squires, 1994).

Racial tipping assumes that race is the primary cause of neighborhood change (Betancur & Smith, 2016). It was a phenomenon based almost entirely on white homeowners’ fears that the mere presence of African-Americans will lower their property values, a fear that real estate realtors have been anxious to exploit (Betancur & Smith, 2016). Betancur and Smith recount that scholars have concluded “[re]segregation was an inevitable result of racial tipping.” It is the point in which whites no longer feel comfortable living in a neighborhood that is racially mixed, usually once a neighborhood becomes one-third black (Massey & Denton, 1993). In fact, the Village of Oak Park, a Chicago suburb that is today celebrated for being an exemplary integrated town, established a “threshold of no more than 30 percent black on a block in an effort to ‘maintain’ integration and an ‘equity assurance’ program for homebuyers to assuage fears of property value decline in a racially mixed community” (Betancur & Smith, 2016). This was enforced through a coordination effort between Oak Park housing and government agencies. The Oak Park Equity Assurance Program insured homeowners if their home’s market value drops below the original purchase price. Homeowners paid a one-time fee and had to wait five years before selling the house in order for the program to cover the difference between the purchase price and market value (Betancur & Smith, 2016). This strategy delayed white flight.

Fears of declining property values and losing their equity were compounded in white neighborhoods bordering the overflowing and overcrowded Black Belt. Housing in the Black Belt suffered from abhorrent living conditions (Philpott, 1978/1991). Housing was in short supply, forcing Blacks to move to areas deemed undesirable for development which eventually became satellites of the Black Belt. White homeowners, particularly those bordering the Black Belt, were loath to relinquish houses in their neighborhoods to black homeowners and resisted the expansion violently. Despite this, the color line was not immovable. But as the Black Belt bulged and expanded, and as Black families took their chances in nearby neighborhoods, there was opposition and resistance.

Threatening letters and warnings were followed with escalating acts of violence, including gunshots, rock-throwing, bombs, and mob violence. Denton and Massey (1993) count fifty-eight black homes were bombed between 1917 and 1921, or “one every twenty days.” Philpott documents with great detail Hyde Park-Kenwood Association’s campaign of terror and violence against Black Americans who dared venture beyond the Black Belt into the Hyde Park area. Threatening anonymous notes were left to realtors engaging in blockbusting and to black homeowners living in white neighborhoods (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962; Philpott, 1978/1991). Improvement associations
such as the Hyde Park Improvement and Protective Club, and the Woodlawn Society were formed exclusively to “rid their neighborhoods of unwanted black settlers and to prevent future black entry (Denton and Massey 1991).

Neighborhood and homeowner associations were especially creative in restricting black mobility. Denton and Massey outline a few: they boycotted white businesses and real estate agents that serviced black clients, lobbied for restrictive zoning, pressured real estate boards to reprimand real estate agents who broke the color lines, and organized funding drives to buy out black homeowners. In 1928, the Hyde Park Herald praised the efficiency of the restrictive covenant, new tool developed by the Chicago Real Estate Board. “It consists of a contract which the owner of the property signs not to exchange with, sell to, or lease to any member of a race not Caucasian,” a columnist for Herald wrote (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962). Within two years, three fourths of all residential property in the city was bound by restrictive covenants (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962).

A University of Chicago economist Homer Hoyt, influenced by human ecology, went as far as to link racial and ethnic groups to land use values in 1933 and created a hierarchy of ethnicities based on land value impact. This was detrimental to non-white homeowners. It gave academic credibility to the racist belief that the mere presence of race lowers land values. After graduating from the University of Chicago, Hoyt went on to use this hierarchy at the Federal Housing Authority, where he worked as an economic consultant to “guide the agency and its employees in allocating mortgage insurance” (Betancur & Smith, 2016). This standard was accepted without questions as “scientific,” and was adopted by real estate companies, insurance agencies, and researchers in classifying neighborhoods, defining criteria for investment, and determining property values. Homer Hoyt’s work racialized urban spaces and legalized mortgage discrimination.

Government housing programs institutionalized racial discrimination in housing loans and in opportunities for mortgage refinancing. During the Depression, the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) provided low interest funds for homeowners in danger of defaulting and for homeowners who lost their homes through foreclosure. To evaluate the risks of these loans and to decide who could get access, HOLC developed a ratings systems based on Homer Hoyt’s hierarchy to produce Residential Security Area Maps (Massey & Denton, 1993; Sharkey, 2013). These maps divided neighborhoods into four categories based on how racially and ethnically mixed they are. The lowest of these categories and least likely to gain access to these loans were outlined in red and were often black neighborhoods. Just being near a black neighborhood usually meant a lower categorization than areas farther away. Thus, towns and suburbs had more access to federal capital simply by virtue of being farther from the Black Belt.

The reinforcement of segregation and disinvestment fed uneven development spatially. Black financial institutions in the Black Belt were the first to collapse and their black patrons were the first to lose their money during the Great Depression (Freund, 2007; Reed, 2011). Black workers were often the first to get fired when consumer demand dropped (Drake & Cayton, 1962; Massey & Denton, 1993). Within a few months of the onset of the Great Depression, prominent black
businesses, including Binga State Bank, Douglass National Bank, and Harlem Realty Company collapsed (Massey & Denton, 1993; Reed, 2011). When Jesse Binga, founder of Binga State Bank, appealed to the Chicago Clearing House Association of which his bank was a member for a bailout. The Clearing House president refused, and reportedly said that Binga’s black bank “didn’t mean anything” (Reed, 2011). Thousands of people, including the Chicago NAACP lost their funds in July 1930. Douglass National Bank had better luck securing a small but significant loan. However, the concentration of many suddenly unemployed black clients who were the first to feel the impacts of the Great Depression put a financial strain onDouglass Bank. The drain of deposits reduced the bank’s resources by 75%, and the bank closed in 1932.

Neighborhoods in the Black Belt, more than any other neighborhood had the highest concentrations of welfare recipients. Drake and Cayton found that in 1934, neighborhoods that had concentrated welfare recipients also had high concentrations of poverty. Decades later, in The Truly Disadvantaged, William Julius Wilson mapped out welfare recipients in 1980 and found that of the four neighborhoods with 1934 welfare rates between 30% and 50%, three had poverty rates in this range in 1980, in addition to neighborhoods included in the Black Belt post 1930 (Drake & Cayton, 1945/1962; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). Denton and Massey argue that racial discrimination concentrates poverty in space. Economic downturns hit black workers the hardest, and because of racial segregation, increase in black poverty is exclusively absorbed by black neighborhoods, increasing poverty concentration. Compared with integrated communities, Denton and Massey found that poverty concentration increases to 30% in segregated black communities as opposed to only 10% in white neighborhoods (1993).

Denton and Massey (1993) further found that even affluent black Americans were just as likely as low-income Blacks to live in segregated neighborhoods, and rising economic status had little to no impact on levels of segregation they experienced (1993). Urban ecology sought to explain geographic locations of ethnic groups and asserted that the Central Business District, labor markets, and commercial and industrial developments are the primary and natural drivers of neighborhood change, but racial tipping and succession linked race as the principal driver of change in neighborhoods and in housing values. When racial tipping occurs, housing values are initially increased as realtors sell to non-white families at high prices, and then quickly deflates when a neighborhood becomes exclusively non-white. Drake and Cayton document cases in 1940 where many white and black families lived in the same building, but the “latter paid – for equivalent accommodations – rentals much higher than those paid by whites” (1945/1962). The realtors would then urge white families to leave so that their apartments could be rented to blacks at a higher rate.

Supreme Court made restrictive covenants illegal in 1948, allowing some black families to move to South Side neighborhoods, but white flight immediately followed (Moore, 2016). Despite the Supreme Court ruling, banks, the real estate industry, and insurance agencies continued the use of redlining, blockbusting, racial steering, and racial discrimination to determine the racial makeup of neighborhoods until the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 (Betancur & Smith, 2016; Massey & Denton, 1993; Sharkey, 2013). Despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act, racial tipping was still
widely accepted in academia and continued to influence policy. “Local fair housing organizations began to carry out audit studies [of realty companies] toward the end of the 1960’s, and these efforts quickly revealed that discrimination against blacks continued despite the Fair Housing Law” and continued well into the 1980’s (Massey & Denton, 1993). Audits of the real estate industry in 1977, 1989, and in 2000 yielded similar results (Sharkey, 2013). It seemed that by the time the FHA became law, systematic racial discrimination was deeply ingrained in the everyday operation of the real estate industry and financial institutions. The evidence demonstrates the prevalence of racial discrimination in residential markets persists and “that it affects every aspect of individual’s search for housing” (Sharkey, 2013).

The Residential Security Area Maps continued to be used as guides for private lenders. Federal banking agencies regularly cut off mortgage loans and lines of credit from minority neighborhoods. Government agencies redlined minority neighborhoods as “high risk” areas and as late as the 1970’s, “examiners from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board routinely redlined” areas with increasing black populations (Massey & Denton, 1993). Federal mortgage policies accepted the myth that the market for housing demanded segregation, thereby creating a new kind of market that created more credit but carefully structured how it was distributed and to whom. The federal government created, sustained, and required racially exclusionary housing market and culture (Freund, 2007).

Public agencies were also guilty of driving segregated residential development. In 1971, in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals found the Chicago Housing Authority guilty of discrimination by developing public housing only in black neighborhoods. Instead of addressing access to capital, resources, and segregation, Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) projects have often contributed to the isolation of Chicago’s black communities. The Robert Taylor Homes, a high rise public housing complex consisting of twenty-eight buildings and stretching 2 miles that were first built by Mayor Richard Daley Sr. in 1962, concentrated in a single black neighborhood, Bronzeville (comprised of the Douglas and Grand Boulevard community areas), and were torn down by his son Mayor Richard Daley Jr. starting in 1998, after it was notoriously allowed to deteriorate through a process of federal and local abandonment (Moore, 2016; Sharkey, 2013; Vale, 2013). Any CHA integration plan was met with intense resistance and was routinely blocked by City Hall. Segregation lives on because white populations are resistant and reluctant to allow black families to move into their neighborhoods. The fear of dropping property values due to black neighbors persists and racial tipping continue to drive development patterns and residential segregation on the South Side (Massey & Denton, 1993).

**EVOLUTION OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE THEORY**

*Exogenous Factors That Sustain Racial Segregation*

As I have attempted to outline in previous sections, mobility of Black Americans was tightly controlled in Chicago, and how they moved impacted perceived housing and land use values. The
ultimate interests of realtors are the profitability of their operations and the control of factors that may impact that profitability (Logan & Molotch, 1987). As such, often times, who determines the values of ghettoized areas are, in fact, outside the "ghetto." I have outlined how ecological theories normalized racial segregation and how institutionalized racism impacted land use values based on the mere presence of blacks in a neighborhood above a certain threshold.

In *Urban Fortunes*, Logan and Molotch (1987) write that patterns of unequal and deeply limited autonomy are found in ghettoized neighborhoods. Residents tend to be more likely to be renters and pay rent to landlords who live outside the neighborhood, and financial institutions tend to extract more than invest in the form of mortgages, equity, and loans. Residents of segregated areas have little control or agency over land values or even their neighborhood boundaries and, consequentially, they have little control over the exchange values of their homes and businesses (Logan & Molotch, 1987)

University of Chicago sociologists have focused on decontextualized theories that focus on individual attributes or traditional neighborhood compositional features (Sampson, 2012). In *Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), Wilson provides an alternative analysis. He develops a political economic critique exploring the concentration effects in urban areas. Wilson writes that post-Civil Rights era, as deindustrialization and economic dislocation took place in cities like Chicago, the exodus of many middle class and working-class families from low income city neighborhoods “removed an important ‘social buffer’ that could deflect the full impact” of joblessness that plagues cities in 1970s and 1980s. We can see this impact on population on some South Side neighborhoods in Table 2.1. He argues that the spatial separation between middle class and upper income people from low income neighborhoods concentrated poverty and increased spatial inequality (Sampson, 2012; Wilson, 1987).

In *American Apartheid* (1993) Douglass Massey and Nancy Denton add that the “missing link” in Wilson’s theories is that racial segregation is the most significant variable for concentrated poverty, more than middle class exodus. For the same reasons that Black financial institutions could not survive the Great Depression, segregated neighborhoods could not absorb the shock of economic dislocation post-deindustrialization in the 1970s, and arguably during the recent Great Recession. Massey and Denton postulate that in segregated black neighborhoods, an economic shock that diminishes black income and increases black poverty is geographically constrained to black neighborhoods, and the “greater the segregation the smaller the number of neighborhoods absorbing the shock and the more severe the resulting concentration of poverty” (1993). The change in environment becomes even more dramatic in neighborhoods that are both racially and economically segregated.

*American Apartheid* and *The Truly Disadvantaged* marked a shift in the way sociologists, planners, and geographers explain racial segregation and neighborhood change. Many scholars build on the theories posited in the two books to move away from describing the internal characteristics of a neighborhoods as causal variables of social disorganization, and move towards exploring the social,
regional, and national forces and processes that influence neighborhoods and in turn how neighborhoods alter the trajectories of families (Sampson, 2012; Sharkey, 2013).

Patrick Sharkey in his 2013 book, Stuck in Place, builds on American Apartheid and The Truly Disadvantaged and posits that segregated, black, low-income neighborhoods are inherited and its impacts are multi-generational. He analyzes how changes in urban communities impacts the fortunes of families over time. He finds that not only concentrated poverty and racial segregation has persisted since post World War II, but neighborhood “advantage and disadvantages are remarkably stable” and the same “families that currently live in impoverished neighborhoods” are likely to do so for generations. Even if they do not stay in the same physical space, they end in the same neighborhood environments. Misguided housing policies worsened racial and economic segregation that exacerbated multigenerational disadvantages.

**Investigating the Relationship Between Segregation and Transit Investment**

What is transit’s history in residentially segregated neighborhoods on Chicago’s South Side and are CTA disinvestments correlated with changing demographics? Is racial segregation a primary causal effect on transit disinvestment? Can transit be appropriated to alleviate the impacts of segregation and uneven development? Can planners maximize the benefits of public transit to spur economic revitalization and transit oriented development? In this partial literature review, we saw how a combination of racially driven policies and segregation moves capital, investment, and development around and through the South Side’s segregated neighborhoods. In the next section, I will trace the development of the Green Line in conjunction with changing demographics and populations within segregated areas in an attempt to answer these questions.
CHAPTER 3

Development of the South Side's Green Line

"I firmly believe that if the 'L' structure was not there, 63rd from Cottage Grove to Stony Island Avenue could be redeveloped with commercial nodes, which create jobs, and with housing for mixed-income people. I believe that if they leave the 'L', they doom 63rd Street to be nothing more than a glorified alley over which that track runs."

- Bishop Arthur Brazier, pastor of Apostolic Church of God, 63rd and Dorchester Avenue, as cited in Chicago Tribune, April 27, 1994.

"I think it was an act of cannibalism. They are eating up their own rapid-transit infrastructure."

- Jackie Leavy, Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, in response to the CTA Board backing the demolition of the Green Line Woodlawn (Jackson Park) branch, as cited in Chicago Tribune, June 06, 1996.

[DIS]INVESTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSIT IN ENGLEWOOD AND HYDE PARK

Before Englewood became an offshoot of the Black Belt, it was a prosperous white immigrant neighborhood with a small black population of less than 1% of Englewood's total population. Immigrants moved there to be closer to transportation, railroads, and jobs (Betancur & Smith, 2016). The Columbian Exposition in Jackson Park, and the elevated train line to Jackson Park (in 1893) and its Englewood branch (in 1907) spurred further development in Englewood (Betancur & Smith, 2016). In the 1930's, Englewood boasted the largest retail district (63rd and Halsted) outside of the Loop. While the Great Depression ravished the nearby Black Belt, Englewood remained relatively stable and even experienced a population increase in the 1940’s, attracting local and regional investment and development, and support from City Hall.

After World War II, demographics changed due to white flight and banks and realtors eagerly engaged in blockbusting. A new wave of black immigration in the 1940’s pushed some black families to seek residence in Englewood, causing much anxiety among whites (Betancur and Smith). Whites responded first with violence (bombing, arson, and physical attacks) and then by organizing the Englewood Property Restriction Association to implement restrictive covenants. One black homeowner in Englewood was urged to cover his property in the Englewood covenant, making it impossible for him to leave the house for his family (Philpott, 1978/1991). As the racial tipping
process began, banks and realtors were eager to take advantage of profits from blockbusting, and helped blacks move in (Betancur & Smith, 2016).

Property values temporarily increased as whites impulsively sold their homes below market rates and blacks were sold homes and rented apartments at inflated rates. Many white owners burned down their properties to recover some of their losses through insurance, and in the process banks redlined Englewood (Betancur & Smith, 2016). Redlining was among the first ways in which systemic disinvestment dilapidated Englewood, making access to mortgage loans almost impossible, driving up foreclosure rates and contributing to building blight. Edward Soja write in Seeking Spatial Justice (2010) that redlined zones are natural byproducts of the market and its capitalists’ endless search for maximum profits. Soja argues that unless there is substantial and constant government intervention, “There will always be some area of a city that is virtually redlined, where local and residential income are drained away to other areas and to external interests, based largely on the perception that the affected area is...an unattractive place to do business.”

Segregation and disinvestment exacted costs on transit infrastructure as well. As demographics began to shift, a series of budget cuts resulted in station closings on the Englewood and Jackson Park branches. The Englewood-Jackson Park rail line (Figures 3.1 and 3.2) was made up of sixteen stations and would eventually be linked to South Side elevated the Loop and renamed the Green Line (Garfield, 2017). Originally it connected State Street and 59th, east to Ashland and 63rd where the Englewood Branch ended, and west to Jackson Park. A shorter branch called Normal Branch comprised of four stations was attached to the Englewood Branch when it opened in 1907, connecting Harvard station to 69th street. Between 1950 and 1980, five stations closed on the Englewood Branch alone due to budgetary constraints (Garfield, 2017).

Hyde Park’s homeowner associations, meanwhile, had better success at preventing blacks from moving in and triggering white flight (Betancur & Smith, 2016; Philpott, 1978/1991). The Hyde Park-Kenwood Homeowner Association’s and the Woodlawn Homeowner Association’s campaign of terror outlined in previous sections discouraged blacks from moving into white neighborhoods east of Washington Park. Horace Cayton rebuked the University of Chicago, located in Hyde Park, for making large contributions to homeowner associations to preserve the color lines, “maintaining a buffer zone between the campus and the black community” (Dolinar, 2013).

In 1961, as part of a larger urban renewal strategy, the city of Chicago constructed the Dan Ryan Expressway (I-90/94) on the western edge of the Black Belt, carved through Englewood, between black west Englewood and white east Englewood and Hyde Park (Betancur & Smith, 2016). Black communities on the path of construction were labelled blighted and then cleared. It was another example of creative destruction. The Dan Ryan Expressway’s purpose was to cut travel times between the suburbs and the Loop, to connect the north suburbs with the south suburbs, and increase accessibility to O’Hare Airport. The Dan Ryan’s location and placement, however, also made it an instrument of segregation. The Robert Taylor Homes were part of a five-mile Chicago
Housing Authority high rise public housing were built parallel to I-90/94, in the former Black Belt. Betancur and Smith write that the expressway “further concentrated and segregated the black population” (2016). When the Red Line was built on the South Side in 1969, it was nestled between the inbound and outbound lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway, and was known as the Dan Ryan Line. Because of its layout, incorporated within the Dan Ryan Expressway, transit oriented development around the Red Line was not possible.

Post-World War II deindustrialization saw white populations and jobs move out of cities and into suburban areas. By 1980 the racial turnover of both east and west Englewood was complete, with a majority black population. Redlining and disinvestment had depressed home values, eliminating the possibility of blacks minimizing return on investment or any benefits of property ownership. Betancur and Smith write, “The exploitation of property and development of high-rise public housing helped to contain black demand to certain areas of the city while at the same time expanding white demand for suburban living” (2016).

Blacks expanded into Woodlawn and other South Side neighborhoods. Economic dislocation had severely impacted Englewood’s once historic retail district, and converted many retail stores into empty stores and lots.” At a time when Englewood needed it the most, disinvestment further crippled the South Side’s economy. Hyde Park was exempt from the impacts of deindustrialization due to a stable population, property values, and job anchors in the form of the University of Chicago and the hospital. Expansion of the Black population alongside the development of the Green Line can be seen in Figure 3.3.

**PUBLIC TRANSIT & TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS**

Local infrastructure is thought to enhance the economic activity of the area of where it is located (Moreno & López-Bazo, 2007). Public transit can create opportunities to jobs, schools, retail, and services, creates place based advantages, and attracts real estate investment and development (Farmer, 2011). Public transit is widely thought of as a means to promote social equity in cities by providing an affordable mode of transportation to low income residents (Glaeser, Kahn, & Rappaport, 2006; Revington, 2015). Public transit reduces costs of automobile use, including increased traffic safety, traffic relief, improved air quality, accessibility, and has positive implications for mobility, livability, and public health (Ewing & Cervero, 2010). Many researchers have also found that transit access has a positive effect on residential property values, land values, and apartment rents (Revington, 2015). In some cases, anticipation of transit accessibility increases property values and rents near transit stations even before the transit line is constructed.

Changes in house prices has been perceived by some researchers as an indicator of advancing gentrification, displacing low-income residents who are priced out of neighborhoods due to rising rents and property taxes. From a neoclassical economic framework, transit lines unlock and increase the potential value of nearby properties. Owners capitalize on the maximum potential
value by increasing rents and prices, thereby closing the "rent gap" between a site's potential rent and its current rent (Smith, 1979). In revitalizing declining neighborhoods, gentrification is a symptom that transit-oriented private development was too successful. Planners and local governments are faced with displacement of low income residents and workers, and a need for affordable housing that is also accessible to transit stations. Nick Revington (2015) cites Kahn (2007) who observes that gentrification often occurs near walk-and-ride stations where property values commonly rise, but not near park-and-ride stations where property values more commonly fall. Overall, Revington concludes from multiple studies that "proximity to transit corresponds to higher land values for residential properties in more cases than not" (2007).

Furthermore, in an extensive literature review on transit oriented development, Daniel Baldwin Hess and Peter Lombardi (2004) found that private developers benefit from "higher occupancy rates and sales volumes" due to their proximity to rail stations. Benefits of transit-oriented development include provides mobility choices, increases transit ridership, plays a role in economic development, reduces air pollution, and decreases infrastructure costs, curbs sprawl, reduces traffic congestion, increases density, and expands housing choices (Cervero et al., 2004; Hess & Lombardi, 2004). In the same publication, Hess and Lombardi (2004) outline five impediments to transit oriented development in inner-city neighborhoods: (1) Disinterest of the private sector to locate and invest near the inner city, (2) absence of market demand that can pay for a mixed-use development, (3) competitive disadvantage of the inner city, (4) preconceived disadvantages of the inner city, and (5) lack of financing or inner-city locations. They note that in Chicago, transit oriented development (TOD) is "occurring in affluent and gentrifying neighborhoods but has been largely absent (along with development in general) from that city's poorer district" (Hess and Lombardi 2004). A strong local economy is also seen as essential for transit oriented development.

In an interview with the author, Dr. Robert Ginsburg, research assistant professor at the Urban Transportation Center at the University of Illinois in Chicago, says that the issue of economic development is a primary driver of transit development (April 5, 2017). In order to have successful transit oriented development, certain pre-conditions must be met. "Transit oriented development becomes viable when you already have a certain base of activity," says Dr. Ginsburg. He adds that that the problem in areas like Englewood is that "there is not enough development that brings people down there initially to support the retail that is needed for transit oriented development." Well maintained transit with reliable services is only a part of the solution for transit oriented development that may trigger economic revitalization. Cervero et al. (2004) observe that public transit investment does not generate new growth, rather it "redistributes where already committed development occurs," and "there must be growth to redistribute for development to occur" (Hess and Lombardi 2004).

COSTS OF RACIAL AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

In an April 2017 report by the Urban Institute, researchers assessed the relationship between segregation and income and education related outcomes for 100 "commuter zones," or metropolitan
areas in the United States (Acs, Pendall, Treskon, & Khare, 2017). They found that racial and
economic segregation in the Chicago metropolitan area were much higher than the national
median levels of economic and residential segregation levels. While black-white segregation in the
Chicago metro area dropped 36% between 1990 and 2010, and Chicago remains the 10th most racially
(black-white) segregated metropolitan area and the 5th most economically and racially segregated
area in the country. If Chicago has the median national levels of black-white racial segregation,
incomes for African Americans in the metropolitan Chicago region would rise an average of $2,982
annually, the region’s homicide rate would drop by 30%, and 83,000 more people would have a
bachelor’s degree (Acs et al., 2017).

THE GREEN LINE

The development and eventual disinvestment of the Green Line is closely linked to economic
growth. When development and local economies grow, so does the Green Line. When residential
segregation and disinvestment stagnate the local economies, the Green Line responds in kind and
shrinks. Station closures and reduction in service have been justified by ridership. The beginning
of the elevated transit system or the “L” started with a private company, the South Side Rapid
Transit Company, constructing the first rapid transit line in Chicago in 1892 (Garfield, 2017). The
following year, the company extended the line to right into Jackson Park, site of the Columbian
Exposition (Garfield, 2017). When the Exposition ended, ridership dropped dramatically from
116,000 in June 1893 to less than 40,000 in February 1894 due to lack of development in the area
(Garfield, 2017). The original Jackson Park stop was demolished and the station on Stony Brook Ave
was renamed Jackson Park. Over the next several decades, multiple branches were added to the
main elevated line. The Englewood, Normal Park, and the Kenwood branches were all added in
1907, and the Stock Yards Branch was added in 1908, primarily to service the Chicago Union Stock
Yards in Back of the Yards neighborhood, also known as the New City community area (Garfield,
2017). Success of the Stock Yards was made possible by the Stock Yards Branch, bringing in freight,
workers, and other passengers to and around the stockyards and meatpacking district. Housing
development, job centers, commercial and retail districts had incentivized private railroad
companies to build the branches.

The Chicago Rapid Transit Company consolidated the South Side Elevated, the Northwestern
Elevated, the Metropolitan Elevated and the Oak Park Elevated. During the 1930’s and 1940’s when
ridership declined, the elevated railway became unprofitable and difficult for a private company to
manage. The Chicago Transit Authority assumed operations and management of all elevated and
streetcar lines in 1947. Almost immediately, the CTA embarked on increasing efficiencies in the
elevated lines. The successive closures of stations, many of which were experiencing ridership
decline before the CTA, on the Green Line before and after the Chicago Transit Authority assumed
management of the lines can be seen in the diagrammatic maps in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of the Green Line South Side branches.
Graham Garfield, general manager of customer information at the CTA, says that in the last fifty years, the first broad-stroked examination in determining whether a station closes is based on "ridership and operating costs versus revenue, which is a function of ridership and operating costs station itself" (personal communication, April 28, 2017).

It is not coincidental that the bulk of station closures on the Green Line occurred before 1970, even though significant closures occurred in the 1990's as well. Before Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, CTA closed stations for budgetary, operations, maintenance, and efficiency reasons. When private companies owned the elevated rail lines, they closely spaced stations to compete with motor coaches, streetcars, and other transit companies. However, once consolidated under a single public agency, it made little sense to continue maintaining and operating stations as close as one block apart. Additionally, the CTA was expected to be financially self-sufficient in its early operating days. The city and state did not subsidize public transit in the same way it does today, nor was it able to levy taxes the way the Regional Transit Authority does today. Therefore, cost recovery and revenue was critical part of the decisions to close many stations and sometimes entire branches as we've seen with the Stock Yards and Kenwood Branch (G. Garfield, personal communication, 2017).

Post 1964, closures or change of service to a station be evaluated to ensure that they are not "unduly burdensome to a community in some way" (G. Garfield, personal communication, 2017). Garfield cites declining ridership as the single largest contributor to station and branch closures on the Green Line South Side Elevated. Once the Chicago Union Stock Yards, home to Chicago's meatpacking industry, began declining in the 1950's, there was little need for the Stock Yards Branch
Figure 3.3: Expansion of Black clustering from 1950 to 2000, alongside development of the Green Line.
for either freight or passengers. The same applied to the Kenwood Branch. The CTA was responding to changes in land use, populations, and ridership. Without growth to redistribute, transit lines’ operating costs will exceed their revenue, making it difficult to maintain. Economic dislocation exacerbated by decentralization post World War II and the exodus of people out of the urban core to the urban periphery and suburbs where land is cheap impacted job growth and demographics which in turn impacted ridership. There was a shift in where jobs were located.

Despite consolidations and increased efficiencies, ridership continued to fall on transit lines, reducing revenue. In 1970, the state of Illinois approved public funding be used for public transit agencies, and in 1974, a six-county public transit authority, the Regional Transit Authority, was formed (Garfield, 2017). The RTA subsidized the CTA and other public transit agencies in the region. In an effort to curb rising costs, in 1986, the RTA identified five CTA lines to be designated as a “Tier 2” category, or secondary lines that should receive funds only after the most important components of the “L” are funded (Washburn, 1986). Both the Englewood and Jackson Park lines were identified in this category. At the time, the Metra, the suburban commuter rail, chairman remarked that the successful commuter rails should not have to pay for “deteriorating portions of the public transit system” (Washburn, 1986).

Figure 3.4: Annual Ridership Data for rail only from 1988-2000. Source: Chicago Data Portal, data.cityofchicago.org

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1 Additional lines identified as Tier 2 were the Lake Street Line, the Ravenswood Line, the Evanston Line, and Skokie Swift. Both the Evanston and Skokie Lines connect the northern suburbs to the Loop. The Evanston Line today has two lines: the Express and Purple Line, the latter which is seen in Figure 1.2, from Chapter 1.
Figure 3.5: Close up of CTA lines in a 1991 map. Notice the line marked in red is the modern day Green Line, which at the time connected South Side with the north suburbs. The "green" line or the Dan Ryan line that extends to 95th and completed in 1969 is the modern day Red Line connected residents in the South Side and Far South Side with job opportunities in the west suburbs. The Dan Ryan Line and the South Side Elevated were revamped in 1993. Full map in Appendix B. Source: Chicago-L.org

In the 1990's ridership plummeted again (Figure 3.4), sending the CTA into crisis mode. The Dan Ryan Line, which was laid in between inbound and outbound Dan Ryan Expressway, went north to the loop and then west to Oak Park and western suburbs, which allowed those living in low income communities in the Far South Side and surrounding areas access to jobs in the west suburbs (Figure 3.5).

The South Side elevated (later Green Line) connected Englewood and Woodlawn to the North Side. In 1993, the CTA revamped the route, connecting the South Side Elevated and the Jackson-
Englewood Branches to the Loop Elevated and divert it to the west suburbs. The switchover saved the CTA millions of dollars, but community residents were fearful that the CTA was preparing for cuts to the Jackson Park–Englewood line. Jackie Leavy, a project coordinator for the Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, remarked in a *Chicago Tribune* article in 1993, “You take two of the lowest ridership rail lines, both of which have been heavily redlined for over a decade and you hate to ask what comes next” (Washburn, 1993), referring to residents’ fear that the lines will experience further cuts. Though initially the CTA president reassured residents that there were no immediate plans to close the Green Line, he acknowledged that the CTA was “going to have some pretty hard choices” in light of federal budget cuts and a deteriorating system that needed over $1 billion in repairs (Washburn, 1993).

The CTA embarked on a two-year overhauling of the Green Line, during which the CTA admitted that when the Green Line reopened, it will do so with fewer stations (Carlozo, 1993). Some residents were angered with the decision, criticizing it as a “scheme to build superstops” (Carlozo, 1993) and were fearful that it meant longer walking distances to stations through gang territory. In another *Tribune* article, a Woodlawn resident remarked that the neighborhood used to have retail where there are now vacant lots. By 1998, disinvestment and budget cuts had removed the Normal Branch and closed all but four stations on the Englewood-Jackson Park rail line. Today, the Englewood Branch (renamed Ashland/63rd) and Jackson Park Branch (renamed Cottage Grove) have two stations each. Whereas at the turn of the 20th century, transit contributed to development of retail and population growth, some Woodlawn residents in a *Chicago Tribune* article describe the Jackson Park Branch’s elevated rails produce “noise pollution, darkens the street underneath, and contributes to a perception of crime and a lack of security” (Washburn, 1994).

**Vacancies, Population, and Ridership**

Despite the Jackson Branch shortening and other station closures on the Green Line South Side elevated rail, however, vacancies continue to plague Woodlawn, Englewood, and surrounding communities today. Hyde Park on the other hand, remains relatively stable. Figure 3.8 shows existing vacancies in areas between Hyde Park and West Englewood. Clusters of vacancies throughout Chicago correlate firmly with racial demographics. High concentrations of vacancies are located in the South Side and the West Side of Chicago, where the percentage of Black populations are above 50%. Hyde Park is largely immune from economic downturns due to the vital economic and institutional anchors in the community area. As such, Hyde Park has very low vacancies, and is a racially integrated community.

A closer look at commercial and retail vacancies in particular reveal what was once thriving retail corridor on Halsted St. in Englewood. On the Woodlawn Cottage Grove (Jackson Park) elevated branch, there are several vacant commercial and many vacant residential lots. It does not seem that the shortening of the branch and the station closures did much to reverse Englewood has 1,619
Figure 3.6: Change in population in South Side community areas between 2000 and 2010. Source: City of Chicago website.

vacant lots compared to 3 in Hyde Park. The vacancies mapped in Figure 3.8 refer to empty lots only. For vacant housing, the Chicago wide community area average of percentage of vacant units of total housing units hovers around 12.44%. Hyde Park is at the average almost exactly (12.32%), while Englewood (29.41%), Washington Park (20.55%), Woodlawn (22.4%), and Grand Boulevard (18.37%) area all well above the city wide average (CMAP Datahub 2015). This is a drastic difference in numbers.

The impacts of residential segregation are economic as well as demographic. High levels of commercial, retail, and residential vacancies indicate low population densities. Between 2000 and 2010, the city of Chicago has experienced a 6.9% drop in population (Figure 3.6). Englewood has seen a 23.8% decline. Even Hyde Park was not entirely immune from this larger trend; between 2000 and 2010, there was a 14.2% decline, a difference of 4,239 people. In Roseland, there was 15.4% decline in population. What that has meant for ridership differs by neighborhoods. The Loop and the Near South Side (a community area relatively close to the Loop) has seen population increases. For the Ashland (Englewood Branch), a combination of factors, including population decline, has seen an overall decline in ridership.
If we look at annual ridership numbers over a ten-year period from 2001 to 2015 (Figure 3.7) for the Green Line South Elevated branches (not including the main branch), we see that ridership patterns do not correspond to system wide patterns of ridership over roughly the same period, with an exception in 2013. 2013 was an outlier, due to the Red Line trains running on the Green Line during a five-month shut down of the Red Line’s south branch from May 2013 until October 2013 for renovations. Post 2013, there is a returning decline in ridership. The trend for the CTA system wide rail ridership can be seen in Figure 3.4. After a downturn in the 1990’s, ridership has steadily increased. Even through the economic recessions of 2001 and 2008, ridership has slightly fell only to rebound and head towards an overall increase. The Green Line branches to Englewood and Woodland follow population patterns over the last 15 years more faithfully than overall CTA rail ridership.

As populations declined in Black neighborhoods, lack of investment and redlining led to increased vacant lots. Dr. Ginsburg, citing a job training program in the 1970s for residents in South Shore, a community area that was devastated by white flight, says that once people secured better jobs, without amenities, retail, grocery stores, and good schools, they leave (personal communication, 2017). It becomes a cycle of low populations reinforcing high vacancies. In Englewood, the question is, what type of development will create the type of growth which will leverage public transit rail
infrastructure? “The more development there is, the more people take advantage of transit,” says Dr. Ginsburg. It can be clearly seen in Englewood and Woodlawn transit alone cannot generate growth. It needs to be done in conjunction with development. As a case in point, while Hyde Park has relatively poor transit access, it has a Metra Rail Line (Figure 3.9) running through it, but the service level is comparable to the CTA’s lines only during weekday rush hours, otherwise service is

Figure 3.8: Vacant lots abound around the Green Line.
relatively poor. When the Jackson Park Branch was shortened to Cottage Grove, even though it also reduced accessibility to Hyde Park and Jackson Park.

*Jobs and Economic Anchors*

While Englewood has access to transit, Hyde Park has something far more significant: economic anchors (Figure 3.9). The institutional power of the University of Chicago and the hospital there has kept the number of vacant lots low. The historic influence of the university has additionally shielded it from residential segregation and its consequences. Martin Menninger, associate planner with the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) says the South Side has adequate public transit, including busy bus lines, the Green Line, the Red Line, and several Metra commuter stations (personal communication, March 2, 2017). However, the issue is that it does not have many jobs and has lower density than the North Side. As a result of low number of jobs, the South Side, particularly Roseland, has some of the longest commutes in the city. “There’s just no jobs locally,” says Menninger, “Anybody that lives in that area has to travel an extremely long way to get to work” (Menninger, 2017). In a recent study by the RTA, entry level jobs are mostly located outside of the city, in suburban areas like Joliet, where companies prefer to build warehouses on greenfields.

Figure 3.9: The map on the left shows the concentration of jobs in the site area. In Chicago, jobs tend to be more concentrated in the Loop and the North Side. The few major economic anchors south of the Loop include Midway Airport and the University of Chicago. The top right map shows institutional land uses in the Hyde Park-Englewood area, and the lower right map shows transportation and utilities land uses.
rather than on the city periphery in brownfields like in Pullman, even if the land costs are comparable (Menninger, 2017).

CMAP advocates for jobs to move to the South Side. They believe the South Side has the infrastructure and transit accessibility in areas like Woodlawn and Englewood that have workers and can handle an influx of new people and businesses and have workers. More jobs may cut commuting times. Whether the South Side needs more transit is an open question, says Menninger. What is certain is that the South Side needs jobs and economic anchors.

*Segregation, the Green Line, and Future Development*

Can we say for certain that the Green Line lost stations either directly or indirectly because of residential segregation? Looking at Figure 3.3, the Green Line ran through the Black Belt for decades before the beginning of major station closures in the 1950's and 1990's. In the 1950's the population density was much higher in the Black Belt than it is today, and the South Side contained several economic anchors beyond the ones in Hyde Park.

There certainly seems to be a correlation between population decline in South Side neighborhoods and a decline in ridership. Vacancies where thriving retail and commercial districts once existed are no longer there, due to white flight, disinvestment, and redlining. Even though index of dissimilarity has fallen in the City of Chicago over the past 50 years (Table 3.1), it is much higher than 0.60, the threshold at which a city is considered to be hypersegregated (Massey, 2001). Spatial proximity in Chicago has also fallen, but only slightly. In 1990, the spatial proximity index measuring clustering of areal units dominated by African Americans was 1.6881. In 2000 it was 1.654, and in 2015, it was 1.5827, indicating a high clustering of areas inhabited by African Americans.

This is not to say that development is not happening in Englewood. Whole Foods recently opened as part of the Englewood Square plan that also included a Starbucks and other chain stores. It was a controversial move but many exuberant residents welcomed it (Moore, 2016; Trotter, 2016). The plan costs about $20 million and has almost half of that in city subsidies. Critics pointed out that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index of Dissimilarity</th>
<th>% Change from Previous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Dissimilarity segregation index of the city of Chicago between 1950 and 2015.
favoring big store chains over local ones is “Trojan horse for gentrification” and that money could have been better spent on incubating neighborhood businesses (Moore, 2016).

Another significant development coming to the South Side is the Barack Obama presidential library, to be located in Jackson Park. It is unclear if the development will spur development along the Green Line Cottage Grove Branch, like the Columbian Exposition did before it, or if the city will invest in (re)extending the Green Line to Jackson Park. Given the number of vacant lots that border Hyde Park, it is a missed opportunity to bring the library closer to areas that are in desperate need of development. Washington Park, Englewood, and Woodlawn are all served by CTA rapid transit lines and could benefit from new institutional development. Instead, Hyde Park will add another institutional force to its neighborhood, further reinforcing its enclave status.
CHAPTER 4

Developing Segregated Neighborhoods as Origins and Destinations

“Anything positive would help the neighborhood. Most people here don’t have jobs.”

– Ellis Mack, pastor in Roseland, whose church might be displaced by the extension, on the Red Line Extension, as cited in Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2016.

COMPARING PILSEN AND ENGLEWOOD

The Lower West Side, or Pilsen, shares common characteristics with Englewood and Woodlawn. While Englewood and Woodlawn are majority Black (Table 4.1), Pilsen is 82% Latino, mostly Mexican Americans. A low income working class immigrant neighborhood, Pilsen experienced drastic population decline like many South Side communities, decreasing from (Table 2.1) 66,198 in 1930 to 35,769 in 2010. It was a white ethnic enclave until the 1960s when a wave of Mexican immigration and urban renewal brought mostly Mexican Americans to Pilsen, triggering white flight (Betancur & Smith, 2016). Like the Black Metropolis and eventually Englewood and Woodlawn, Latino settlement was met with “disinvestment, public neglect, and...convulsions of racism [and] disinvestment” (Betancur & Smith, 2016).

Unlike Woodlawn and Englewood, Pilsen has experienced waves of gentrification starting during the 1970’s and continuing throughout the 1990s. Mayor Richard M. Daley in coordination with organizations with tried to commodify ethnicity by presenting Pilsen as a place to “see Mexican culture live,” and promoted the construction of large scale mixed use developments (“Pilsen Develops New Tools To Fight Gentrification,” 2017). The cultural branding of Pilsen has evolved over the past 25 years. “Once the image of blighted Pilsen started to disappear, an exciting and cultured Pilsen replaced it” (Betancur & Smith, 2016). The changing representation of Pilsen drove up property values. A network of community organizations coalesced to form the Pilsen Land Use Committee, created through a nonbinding referendum, that established a strict inclusionary zoning and a 21% affordable housing mandate in Pilsen. Pilsen’s proximity to the Loop and the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC), and access to the Pink Line has made the community area very attractive to developers.
Annual Daily Ridership Totals on Green Line and Pink Line Stations in Englewood, Woodlawn, and Pilsen

Figure 4.1: Annual Ridership Totals on Green Line and Pink Line Stations between 2001 and 2015. The core of Pilsen is concentrated around the 18th St. station stop. Source: City of Chicago Data Portal

Local Economies and Ridership

The heart of Pilsen surrounds the 18th St. station on the Pink Line. Ridership on Pink Line stops took a different turn than Green Line stops (Figure 4.1). Ridership on Pink Line stations in Pilsen has grown steadily since 2004, reaching and exceeding Green Line stations' ridership numbers. While the Green Line stations have remained rather stagnant (except for the outlier in 2013 when the Green Line ran Red Line cars due to renovations). Though the two communities are serviced by rapid transit lines, exogenous factors impact transit. Transit, as Cervero (2004) and Hess and Lombardi (2004) have observed, redistributes growth; it does not create it. Pilsen has the preconditions necessary to take full advantage of public transit; Englewood and Woodlawn do not.

The first precondition I consider is the density of vacant lots (Figure 4.2) and percentage of vacant residential housing units (Table 4.1). At 14.4%, Lower West Side, or Pilsen, has rates of vacant residential units that are closer to the city rate (13.6%). 34.9% of Englewood’s residential units are vacant, more than double the city average. 25.4% of Woodlawn’s residential units are vacant. It does not seem that the Green Line, has had much of an effect on vacant lots and residential vacancy rates.
Figure 4.2: Current vacant lots around the Pink Line and the Green Lines. Lower West Side has much less vacant lots than Englewood or Woodlawn. Source: City of Chicago Data Portal

Public transit cannot alleviate issues of residential segregation. Instead, it is a tool distributes growth, but it alone cannot create it. While vacancies have plagued South Side and West Side communities with high percentages of African American populations, it is not enough to build a rapid transit line and hope people will simply move there. Pilsen has only 19 vacant lots, while Englewood has a staggering 1,619 vacant lots and Woodlawn has 3,897. Partly due to high vacancies, Englewood and Woodlawn have much lower residential density rates.

Jacky Grimshaw of the Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT), a community development advocacy organization, says that in disinvested communities, the density needed for transit oriented development cannot be achieved without good transportation but transportation alone will not cause development, though it can stimulate it. “It’s a chicken and egg problem,” Grimshaw says (personal communication, March 15, 2017).

To increase ridership and density of the built environment, a community area cannot just be an origin, it must also be a destination (Figure 4.3). Pilsen, with a population of 34,979, has an inflow of 12,569 workers who do not live in Pilsen but work there and an outflow of 8,843 workers. People are moving in and out of Pilsen, with more people travelling to work there than people travelling
Chapter 4

Inflows and Outflows of All Workers in Each Neighborhood

**Inflow:** Work in Area, Live outside

**Outflow:** Live in Area, Work outside

**Shaded Area:** Live in Area, Work in Area

---

**Pilsen** (Lower West Side)

Pink Line Stations: 18th St., Damen

- Inflow: 12,669
- Outflow: 8,843
- Shaded Area: 477

**Englewood**

Green Line Station: Halsted/63rd

- Inflow: 1,770
- Outflow: 7,826
- Shaded Area: 110

**Woodlawn**

Green Line Station: King Drive, Cottage Grove/East 63rd

- Inflow: 1,981
- Outflow: 9,135
- Shaded Area: 159

**West Englewood**

Green Line Station: Ashland/63rd

- Inflow: 1,567
- Outflow: 10,380
- Shaded Area: 79

**Hyde Park**

No CTA Lines

- Inflow: 23,820
- Outflow: 8,619
- Shaded Area: 3,193

**Roseland**

Red Line Station: 95th, future Red Line Extension Stations

- Inflow: 3,559
- Outflow: 13,868
- Shaded Area: 240

---

Figure 4.3: Inflows and Outflows. Source: 2010 U.S. Census Tracts, 2014 Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics

out. Though the inflow numbers are small in comparison with Hyde Park's, they nonetheless indicate economic activity moving in and out of Pilsen. Economic activity is not completely...
One may argue that perhaps due to the high levels of people who work outside of the city, people leaving Englewood and Woodlawn tend to drive while people in Pilsen use transit. Table 4.2, however, shows that not only is that not true, but Englewood residents are more likely than residents in Pilsen to use public transit. This category includes buses, so it is entirely possible that residents in Englewood use buses instead of rail to get to work. If true, this would tell us that transit rail does not take Englewood workers and residents to their destinations. The argument still stands, however, that without economic activity in Englewood, Woodlawn, and West Englewood, few people will travel to these areas for work and other activities, further minimizing the use of a public rapid transit. Low ridership levels on the Green Line cannot be attributed to mode choice.
Another point to consider is the percentage of people of the total population in the workforce in segregated neighborhoods. West Englewood and Pilsen have a population difference of a less than 700 people, but the number of workers in the labor force and those differ greatly, impacting outflows. West Englewood has 34,272 people, only 54.4% are in the labor force, and of those people, 36.8% are unemployed. Pilsen has 34,979 people, but 70% are in the labor force and only 14.3% are unemployed.

Economic conditions influenced by neighborhood representation, racial composition, vacancies, residential densities, and population decline cannot be overcome by public transit infrastructure. Ultimately, transit is a tool, not a magic bullet.

EXTENDING THE RED LINE

The Dan Ryan Expressway and the Red Line were both built in the 1960’s to help facilitate white flight. Roseland, home to the end of the Red Line, the 95th/Dan Ryan station stop, has a population of 44,276, of which 96.7% are Black (Table 4.1). Professor Lou Turner of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign told the Chicago Reporter that the Dan Ryan Expressway expedited white flight and cut commuter travel times from the suburbs (Lynch, 2016a). The unofficial purpose of the Red Line was to prevent black residents from following by stopping the Red Line short of reaching the suburbs. “It wasn’t going to be some means for black people to follow white people out of the city,” Turner says (Lynch, 2016a). After the Supreme Court ruling against racially restrictive covenants in 1948 and the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, the demographics changed rapidly and Far South Side communities are now majority Black. Since then, the idea of the Red Line extension was brought up multiple times by politicians, activists, and residents, but never fully materialized due to lack of funding. Since the construction of the Dan Ryan, Mayor J. Daley promised an extension to open in 1969, but nothing materialized (Vance, 2013; J. Grimshaw, personal communication, 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Drive Alone</th>
<th>Carpool</th>
<th>Transit</th>
<th>Walk or Bike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower West Side</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Englewood</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5.5%</td>
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<td>29.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>60.2%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Mode of Travel Choice. Source: American Communities Survey 2014.
Figure 4.4: Abandoned and boarded up houses are a common sight in Roseland, but it is not the only sight. Lawn and houses are generally well taken care of and some private and public affordable housing units are available like this one, Mercy Housing (lower right), an affordable housing development serving low-income families and seniors, near where the future 111th stop.

After decades of campaigning by multiple stakeholders and organizations, led by the now defunct Developing Communities Project, found political will that resulted in a $2.3 billion proposal to extend the line south to 130th (Chicago Transit Authority & Federal Transit Administration, 2016). In October 2016, a draft Environmental Impact Assessment was released to the public. The City of Chicago has secured $75 million to finalize the environmental impact assessment and for a preliminary engineering study. As it stands now, the proposal extends the Red Line from the 95th Dan Ryan terminal station down to 111th and Eggleston, following the path of the Union Pacific railroad to 130th, near the Bishop Ford Expressway. There will be four new stations (Figure 4.5), each with Park & Ride facilities. There are two possible routes for the line, one to the east and one to the west of the Union Pacific Railroad, and 248 properties could be affected based on the current layout of the line (Lynch, 2016b).
"[The Red Line Extension] should have been built fifty years ago with the Dan Ryan Expressway," a community activist and minister Sylvia Jones told the Chicago Tribune (Wisniewski, 2016). Other residents expressed concern that the extension would raise property values, displace residents, and "unleash gentrification forces" (Lynch, 2016b). Martin Menninger, associate planner with CMAP, does not anticipate gentrification and says that the sheer amount of vacant lots and open land along the transit lines is so abundant, that it is not likely gentrification will take place (personal communication, 2017). "It might have modest impacts on prices but I can't see that there is really a market to gentrify Roseland," says Menninger (2017). In fact, for residents who will lose their homes to the CTA for the development of the extension, their property values have appreciated little in value and stand to lose a lot even if the CTA compensates them for their homes at market price (La Risa Lynch 2016b).

There is certainly transit need in Roseland, if only to decrease commuting time and increase accessibility. A study of the extension by CMAP shows that "hundreds of thousands of jobs, and dozens of colleges, are unavailable by transit to residents in one hour" (Vance 2013). It would also decrease trips from Roseland to downtown by 20 minutes. But will this impact overall average commute times? Looking at average commutes in Figure 4.6, however, an interesting pattern is revealed. The Englewood area and the Roseland area both have similar commuting lengths. Englewood may have slightly less average commuting times but the area is comparable to Roseland. It makes little since residents in Englewood have relatively close access to two rapid transit rail lines and Englewood is located much closer to the Loop. Menninger says, "The question is, is the Red Line going to take people somewhere they're going?" (2017).

**Economic Revitalization and the Red Line Extension**

Hyde Park's population consists of 32% Black, just 2% above the white tolerance threshold for Blacks living in their neighborhoods before triggering white flight and initiating racial tipping. Massey (2001) places actual threshold for white racial tolerance at 20%; a higher number "fuels a process of neighborhood turnover." Regardless, the central issue is not only racist fears of whites having black neighbors, but additionally, a racist market that devalues property due to the mere presence of blacks in a community area. Home to institutional and economic centers, Hyde Park has a lower unemployment rate, higher median incomes, and lower vacancies than any of the neighborhoods surrounding it. 33.9% of Hyde Park residents commute to work by walking or biking, much higher than any of the nearby neighborhoods, and lower average commute times than either Roseland and Englewood. Englewood, on the other hand, has a 36.8% unemployment rate, a number further complicated by the fact that almost 50% of all residents in Englewood are not in the labor force. Roseland has comparable numbers, with a 24.9% unemployment rate and 47.8% of all residents are not in the labor force.

There doesn't also seem to be much economic spillover from Hyde Park into surrounding areas with the exception of Kenwood. 30.7% of Washington Park residents work outside of Chicago, but only 2.8% work in next-door Hyde Park. That's 94 people. Meanwhile, almost no Woodlawn and
1.5% of Englewood residents work in Hyde Park. A significant number of residents living in Woodlawn (31.5%) and Englewood (38.8%) work outside of the city. The percentage of residents with a college degree in each of those neighborhoods is 30% or much less, making finding jobs in the Loop or Hyde Park more difficult (M. Menninger, personal communication, 2017). This factor may explain the long commutes by residents of both transit poor Roseland and transit rich Englewood. 36.8% of Roseland residents work outside of Chicago, and 22% work in the Loop.

What we have seen from the Green Line is that transit alone will not spur development in an economically devastated area. For the Green line South Elevated, low ridership due to lack of

Figure 4.5: Site area of the proposed Red Line Extension.
Figure 4.6: Average commuting times by Census tract, in minutes. The averages times do not take into account the proposed Red Line extension stations.

economic development and low populations forced station closures. It is highly unlikely that low ridership will close any Red Line stations any time soon, as it would create hardship for poor communities of color.

The placement of the Red Line in the median of the Dan Ryan Expressway physically separates it from the surrounding community that makes transit oriented development all but impossible. There could be opportunities between the proposed stations on 11th and Michigan for transit oriented development. But, without a market and demand, and without public or private investment in local businesses, it is unlikely to happen. Roseland’s inflow and outflow worker pattern is closer to Englewood and Woodlawn than to Pilsen or Hyde Park. The inflows and
outflows are imbalanced, with a much higher rate of people leaving the neighborhood for work than people coming in to work. Roseland is an origin, not a destination, and unless it is made a destination it, the maximized benefits of the Red Line Extension will not be realized. Without increased populations, density, and economic development, it is not likely that there will much opportunity for transit oriented development. The preconditions are simply not there.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

"'If economic development isn't structured to increase household income, what the hell is it doing?'"


IMPLICATIONS

Speaking of segregation indices, Massey (2001) says, “A high level of segregation on any single dimension is problematic because it isolates a minority group from amenities, opportunities, and resources that affect socioeconomic well-being.” I would add that even when public transit infrastructure is within segregated communities, its full potential benefits are blunted. Public infrastructure investment is critical to segregated communities, but in hypersegregated neighborhoods, it is unlikely that investment of transit will overcome social forces that are working to inhibit economic growth. There are deeper issues that must be addressed before transit oriented development will be possible.

Planners should be wary of proclaiming that rapid transit will economically revitalize dilapidated neighborhoods. Further analysis of the social and economic conditions of an area is needed. First, planners should look at racial and economic demographics. If a neighborhood is deeply racially segregated, planners must investigate the following aspects of neighborhoods:

1. Find if the transit agency and the city will face difficulty in securing private investment for development
2. The representation or perceived image of a neighborhood
3. Number of vacant lots and the percentage of vacant residential units
4. Inflows and outflows of workers in the area, and locating where people work

The purpose of these considerations is not to dissuade transportation planners from building. Residential and economic segregation have negatively impacted ridership and other benefits of the elevated rail in Chicago's South Side communities. While they have increased accessibility, the
problem is that average commute times remain high even in transit rich neighborhoods like Englewood.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Extending the Red Line to the Far South Side is a crucial step to enhance access to “jobs, education facilities, public services, and cultural attractions for the 28,000 new daily riders the CTA estimates the expansion will attract” (Farmer, 2011). Undoubtedly, the Red Line Extension would reduce travel times and increase accessibility but it will not immediately alleviate uneven development experienced by the South Side. The Green Line has been functional in Englewood and Woodlawn for decades, but disinvestment, deterioration, and residential segregation has crippled its benefits. The positioning of the Red Line makes transit oriented development an impossibility. The new Red Line Extension stations may provide a different opportunity if pre-conditions for transit oriented development are met. Pre-conditions include economic growth, residential density, population stabilization, and low commercial, residential, and retail vacancy rates.

To address maximizing rapid public transit benefits, we must address residential and economic segregation. Redlining, racial tipping, and disinvestment have allowed the market to create certain disadvantages for residents who live in segregated neighborhoods. Properties and homes are valued less in segregated Black neighborhoods than comparable homes in other neighborhoods.

Secondly, attracting public private partnerships to drive development may have unintended consequences. In Pilsen, the City of Chicago’s efforts to engage public-private partnerships to change the image of the neighborhood and create developments to attract middle and high-income workers is gentrifying Pilsen, pushing out low-income residents.

Some possible policy recommendation to amend disadvantages incurred by residential segregation:

- Creating a tax incentive or credit in the form of mortgage interest reduction to address the fact that people who live in predominately black neighborhoods take a market penalty on the value of their home (Moore, 2016)
- Creating a local coalition of community and city partnerships to develop land use plans, zoning, and ordinance codes that respond to the needs and conditions of the neighborhood
- Developing transit stations into economic anchors by selling air rights to private and public developers, in conjunction with a neighborhood coalition
- Long-term affordable housing opportunities near transit stations

The CTA has long prided itself on efficiency. A recommendation of this thesis is to encourage the CTA to resist the urge to cut services and reduce frequency on lines with low ridership. The CTA, working with the community development advocacy coalitions, should develop policy headways and frequencies in low income segregated communities that provide reasonable services. The Green
Line has long experienced reduced services and frequencies due to low ridership, which makes it less effective as a rapid transit line and perpetuates a cycle of reduced service that leads to reduced ridership.

Some issues of residential segregation may take years to alleviate and will not be solved by rapid transit. However, working with public and private developers to develop Red Line and Green Line stations to become localized economic anchors that increase employment opportunities and the inflows and outflows of workers.

In developing strategies to incorporate transit as a tool to address some of the persistent causes of racial and residential segregation, planners must keep in mind the capital available to drive infrastructure and economic development in disinvested areas. Finally, I recommend that securing investment for rapid transit infrastructure in disinvested areas be coupled with securing investment for economic development.
References


## List of Interviews

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<tr>
<td>Martin Menninger</td>
<td>Associate Planner</td>
<td>Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning</td>
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<td>Kyle Whitehead</td>
<td>Government Relations Director</td>
<td>Active Transportation Alliance</td>
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<td>Jacky Grimshaw</td>
<td>Vice President for Government Affairs</td>
<td>Center for Neighborhood Technology</td>
<td>March 15, 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Ginsburg</td>
<td>Research Assistant Professor, Urban Transportation Center, Department of Public Administration</td>
<td>University of Illinois - Chicago</td>
<td>April 5, 2017</td>
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<td>Graham Garfield</td>
<td>General Manager, Customer Information</td>
<td>Chicago Transit Authority</td>
<td>April 28, 2017</td>
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APPENDIX B

Historic Maps of Chicago Rapid Transit Lines

Chicago Rapid Transit Lines circa 1946.
Chicago Transit Authority in 1954.
Chicago Transit Authority in 1991.