THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE MILITARY
IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1927-1959

by

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The Chinese Communist military is analyzed to reveal its political and economic contribution to the CCP. The analysis also considers the political and economic activities of non-Communist Chinese armies and the relevance of the Chinese military experience to armies in other modernizing societies.

The non-Communist Chinese armies discussed are those of: Yen Hai-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Taipings, Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Kuomintang. The political and economic role of each of these armies is delineated to reveal its limitations and accomplishments and to locate some sources of Chinese Communist military behavior.

The military history of the Chinese Communist movement is summarized to indicate the difficulties impinging on CCP political and economic activity and the military resources available for these tasks. We analyze Mao Tse-tung's ascendency and doctrine to reveal the acceptance, postulates, and problems of a broad political and economic role for the army.

We then explore: 1) the relationship of army and party, especially the political control mechanism and the influence of military men in the party; 2) modernization and indoctrination within the army, especially literacy, organizational, and technical training and the replacement of old loyalties with allegiance to the party and to a "New China"; 3) the military political contribution to civilian rule, especially propaganda, government, and mass organizations; 4) the military contribution to the economy, especially to agriculture, land reclamation, transportation, and industry; 5) the role of veterans in economic and political development; and 6) the development and non-coercive duties of militia bodies.

The years from 1958 to 1959 are analyzed in detail. Factual analysis of the people's commune movement and its "militarization of life" program, the "All People in Arms" Campaign, the Quemoy crisis, and PLA rectification allows us to relate political, economic and defense policy during these years.

Military political and economic activities are summarized in terms of: 1) years of the military contribution; 2) the part in policy played by the military; 3) the intensity of the military contribution; and 4) the social significance of military activity.

Finally, we ask what benefits and problems the CCP derived from military political and economic activity and what benefits and problems other modernizing societies can expect from their particular types of armies. An appendix categorizes probable changes in the PLA political and economic role in different specified situations.

Thesis Supervisor: Ithiel de Sola Pool
Title: Professor of Economics
Abbreviations and General Notes

These abbreviations are used in the text and footnotes:

CB . . . . . . . . . . . . Current Background
CC . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCP . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese Communist Party
CFCP . . . . . . . . . . . . Chieh-fang Chun-pao (Liberation Army News)
CPR . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese People's Republic
FCMM . . . . . . . . . . . . Extracts from China Mainland Magazines
JMJE . . . . . . . . . . . . Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily)
KJJP . . . . . . . . . . . . Kung-jen Jih-pao (Daily Worker)
KMT . . . . . . . . . . . . Kuomintang
NDC . . . . . . . . . . . . National Defense Council
PLA . . . . . . . . . . . . People's Liberation Army
PRMC . . . . . . . . . . . . People's Revolutionary Military Council
SCMP . . . . . . . . . . . . Survey of the China Mainland Press
URS . . . . . . . . . . . . Union Research Service

General Notes:

For consistency in the footnotes and bibliography authors' names, Chinese and English, are treated alike. In the footnotes the last name appears last, e.g., Tse-tung Mao. In the bibliography the last name appears first, e.g., Mao, Tse-tung. With these exceptions Chinese names appear in their customary form, e.g., Mao Tse-tung.

Citations of Chinese articles reproduced by translation services give the name of the Chinese periodical as it appears in the translation.
Preface

This dissertation combines personal interests in the process of political and economic development, the political and economic functions of military establishments, and the Chinese Communist movement. When the topic was selected in early 1959, little attention had been paid to the possible assistance the military could render to economic growth and political development. In the ensuing months the military staged a number of coup d'états in modernizing nations. In many of these instances, as in earlier military seizures of power in the Middle East, the armed forces leadership declared itself dissatisfied with the stage of national economic development, social welfare, political institutions and international status.

It was clear that the armed forces felt they could make a significant contribution to the non-combat aspects of policy in modernizing nations and that their members had acquired a somewhat different set of orientations and skills from those of the general population and the political and socio-economic elite. I hoped through comparison of the military in Communist and non-Communist modernizing nations (China, U.S.S.R., Burma and Argentina) to discover what contribution the armed forces had made and could make to economic and political development. I hoped to discover why specific armies accepted and sought certain political and economic tasks and how they defined political and economic success. I hoped to discover how specific armies educated their members to help achieve the military's definition
of political and economic success.

The first case I had hoped to study, the political and economic role of the military in the Chinese Communist movement, eventually became the whole dissertation. The Chinese Communist case was originally chosen because of personal interest, the publicized contribution of the military to the political and economic programs of the People's Republic, and the inadequacy of the literature on this aspect of the Chinese Communist military. I soon discovered that the role of the armed forces under the Peking government (1949-1959) derived from the role of the revolutionary CCP forces. I also discovered that the role of the revolutionary forces derived from the role of non-Communist Chinese military bodies. Study of the role of the armed forces under Peking government had to be expanded to include these precedents and the Soviet, Burmese and Argentinian cases dropped from the dissertation.

Although I had to restrict the thesis to the Chinese Communist case, it still provides us with comparative material. We deal with Communist and non-Communist armies; insurgent and incumbent armies; armies controlled by one man, by non-Communist political movements, and by the Communist Party; armies engaged in guerrilla war and in conventional war; armies designed to win popular support and armies designed to crush popular opposition; armies involved in a primitive economy and in a modernizing economy; and armies involved in internal and in international warfare.

I found a plethora of English-language material for this study. I was also fortunate enough to have the service of
translators. In spite of my personal lack of knowledge of Chinese, I am confident that limitations in the analysis are not caused primarily by the language barrier. Various press translations abundantly reproduce the mainland press. On the earlier period of the movement there is much quantity of academic and journalistic publication and Communist-sponsored periodicals. If the scope of the study had been narrower, other Chinese sources could have been consulted, e.g., the file of Yenan newspapers at the Hoover Institute. However, this study is based on sufficient Chinese-language material for a legitimate exploration of the topic: that of the Harvard Yenching Institute.

Finally, some thanks are appropriate. Generous financial support was provided by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Social Science Research Council; and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Perceptive and patient advice and criticism were given by Professors Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lucian W. Pye, and Robert C. Wood of the Political Science Section, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Professor Frederick T. C. Yu of Montana State University. Messrs. Duncan Wilson and Edgar Snow made themselves available for interviews. Helpful translations were rendered by Mrs. Hwei Li-Chang and Mrs. Betty L. Wang. Most of all I would like to thank my parents for perpetual encouragement and my wife for large quantities of physic balm and editorial incisiveness.

Davis Bobrow

Princeton, February, 1962
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The areas of information which scholars have often used to analyze the military in society are not uniformly helpful for this case study. The Chinese Communist experience has been so different from that of modern European and American armies that the scholar finds it necessary to sort out his information in new ways. For example, the distinction between the "wartime" and "peacetime" roles of the military does not clarify the Chinese Communist material. CCP doctrine does not consider this an important distinction. The Communist forces have always operated in a real or cultivated atmosphere of war. Similarly "Civil-military relations" has been used to illuminate what was supposed to be the most important aspect of the military in society: "To what extent did the military run the government or the government run the military?" In the Chinese Communist case this question does not illuminate the authority of the military in relation to the holders of political power. The crucial area of information here is that of Party-army relations. The relationship of the Chinese Communist military to the civilian government is unimportant compared to the role of soldiers in the Party and of Party members in the armed forces.

Five areas of information are helpful in this case study. These are: 1) the institutional nature of the army, 2) the relationship of the military to official national authority, 3) the strategic assignment of the military, 4) the socio-economic nature of
the society, and 5) the political nature of the society. The political and economic role of the Chinese Communist military at a given time can be determined from these five areas of information.

To analyze the political and economic role of the Chinese armies the author found it convenient to sort and label the information in each area. The institutional nature of the army was broken into six types: a) the materialist army, which seeks personal benefits and is loyal to any leader who provides them (the Latin American caudillo force); b) the professional army, which only accepts coercive tasks and is loyal to whoever holds political office (the American army); c) the veto-group army, which accepts self-selected non-coercive tasks and considers itself the judge of foreign and colonial policy (the French army); d) the programmatic army, which implements a broad socio-economic program and which is its own master (the Pakistani army); e) the politicized-generalist army, which implements a broad socio-economic program and is completely controlled by one political group (the Cuban army); and f) the politicized-specialist army, which implements coercive programs and is completely controlled by one political group (the Soviet army). The relationship of the military to official national authority was divided into: a) insurgent army which operates out of a "base area" into an "aspiration area" held by its opponents; and b) an incumbent army. The strategic assignment of the military was broken into three types: a) guerrilla war; b) conventional war; and c) nuclear war. The socio-economic nature of the society was broken into three
stages: a) a stagnant society, one not yet affected by the modernization process (Paraguay); b) a modernizing society (Egypt); and c) a modern society (Japan). The political nature of the society was broken down into three types: a) competition among leaders, whose legitimacy rests on their access to physical power; b) totalitarian political party control; and c) a democratic political process.

A. Environment of Transitional China

The political and socio-economic environment of contemporary China, the degree of success in achieving its national needs, the power of military groups, and the prevalence of armed conflict have not been reflected in the American image of China and the Chinese. We have pictured a people and nation of:

philosophic calm and patience, timelessness, immobility, and intelligence too great for combativeness or truculence, a genius for achieving ends not by direct action but by smooth circumlocution ...\(^1\)

The real state of Chinese society in this century has been a far cry from the serenity of the Ming vase or the delicate silk-screen print in the American living room. The Chinese nation has been fragmented; the old beliefs have become impotent; poverty has been great; and violence, frequent. China has been undergoing philosophic, psychological, political and economic disruption.

Stagnant China was violated by modern societies, e.g., England, France, Germany. Her responses ranged from retention

of the socio-economic characteristics of the stagnant society, to efforts to modernize partially, to efforts to pull the whole society into the modernizing stage. Essentially all efforts failed. Repeated failure produced increased demands for new political executors and for fundamental revisions in the recognized list of national needs. The pattern of failure followed by response and more failure is clear in the history of modern China.

Failure was largely caused by a series of blows to Chinese society by foreign powers. These coercive, socio-economic and political blows are normally referred to as "the Western impact." Foreign strategies to secure unequal treaties, foreign concessions and extra-territoriality began with the Opium War of 1840-1842. Hong Kong was ceded, five ports opened, and tariff control taken out of Chinese hands. In 1856, after defeat by Britain and

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France in the Arrow War, several ports were leased and foreign
legations allowed to open in Peking. In succeeding years Russia
seized the Trans-Ussur territory, and the French triumph of
1884-1885 resulted in the loss of Indo-China. Ten years later
Japan occupied Formosa as the prize of victory in the First
Sino-Japanese War.

The Chinese response to these blows was primarily agi-
tation for "change within tradition". The Restoration, the
"Self-Strengthening" and "100 days of reform" movements all sought
to combine modern Western techniques, e.g., machine operation,
and equipment, often arms, with the political and socio-economic
institutions of the stagnant society. The Chinese elites
assumed that a change in the institutional nature of the armed
forces would achieve the needs of the stagnant society and remove
the pressure for profound change in Chinese society. They con-
tinued to assume this in the first two decades of this century
and repeatedly failed. In 1900 foreign troops crushed the Boxer
rebellion and carried out the "sack" of Peking. The partial
reform movement authorized by the Dowager Empress was too little
and too late. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea and in 1915 presented
the Twenty-One Demands, which constituted a fundamental attack
on China's autonomy. The Versailles Treaty awarded Japan


extensive concessions in Shantung Province.

During this period groups had been developing within Chinese society who were the unwanted fruits of the "change within tradition" strategy: the industrial working and bourgeois merchant classes, who began to emerge in the newly industrialized urban areas of Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton. 6 A small group of intelligentsia adopted the goals of a modernizing society and agitated to have them accepted as the needs of Chinese society. 7 Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese educated by British missionaries in Western medicine, founded the Revive China Society in 1894 and the T'ung Meng Hui, the forerunner of the Kuomintang, in 1905. 8 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a university professor educated in France, influenced the formation of and became the first head of the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921. 9 The appeals of modernization were interwoven with the anguish of humiliated nationalism. The advocates of modernization and the elements dis-illusioned with the stagnant society were caught up in nationalist agitation against "imperialism." A series of historical landmarks were the nationalist demonstrations by the advocates of modernization. The first of these was the Peking student demonstration of May 4, 1919—the May Fourth

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demonstration.¹⁰ This protest against the Versailles concession to Japan was accompanied by a merchants' strike and boycott of Japanese goods. The students were in the vanguard of the May 30, 1925, demonstrations at Shanghai and the June 23 Shameen Massacre at Canton.¹¹ Urbanized workers struck and boycotted British interests in Hong Kong in the mid-twenties.¹²

The attainment of power by the Kuomintang formally transformed the agenda of China to one of development of democratic politics, socio-economic modernization, and reconstruction of national sovereignty. However, the regime was not able to achieve either success against external forces or against the socio-economic obstacles to modernization. The Nationalists were able to achieve some resurrection of Chinese sovereignty. After 1927 they wittled down the 49 foreign concessions and 400,000 aliens with extra-territorial rights.¹³ The Nanking regime regained tariff autonomy in 1930. However, the Japanese inflicted a series of defeats and territorial annexations on


¹³ Hornbeck, op. cit., pp. 419, 466, 474.
China at the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese War. In 1931, they occupied Manchuria; in 1932 they attacked Shanghai; and until the outbreak of declared war in 1937 they nibbled away in North China. In the following years large sections of northern and eastern China were occupied.

External failure was not compensated for by internal success. The possibilities of economic improvement were drastically limited by a prolonged and rapid increase in population. China's inhabitants numbered about 200 million in the early 18th century, 350 million by 1850, 435 million in 1923, and 586 million by 1953-1954. The impact of mass manufacture on handicraft cottage industries increased peasant poverty. The progress of the regime in linking the nation through modern transportation and communication networks was minute compared with the national requirements. China is a nation larger than all Europe, with an area of 4,300,000 square miles. In 1926 there were only 7,683 miles of railway trackage and in 1942 only 12,036—less than that of Illinois or Italy. The major means of transportation were human muscles and major water routes. As recently as 1935 ships of British registry carried more freight than Chinese vessels on the water routes. In 1926 there was less than one motor vehicle for every 2,000 people, and by 1943 highway mileage was only

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15 The most reliable is the last of these figures arrived at in the Communist tabulation. The earlier figures are estimations of Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 123-127, and the 1923 Chinese Post Office estimate.
slightly greater than Spain's. In 1926 less than 20% of the population was literate, and even by 1940 China, with a population of about 450 million, had fewer children in high school than Illinois and New York with a population of 23 million.16

American comprehension of the "gap of rising expectations" and of the intense difficulties of a modernizing society is recent, but these have been the realities of Chinese political life for the last half-century.

The political and socio-economic dislocations and inadequacies just summarized affected the institutional nature of armies in China and the political and economic role they played. Two types of armies emerged in Chinese military development. The first type was the warlord army, a basically materialist army. These armies possessed minimal technical and organizational skills, were independent of external authority, and gave sole loyalty to themselves and to the commander who brought the most loot to the army. Their status was low, and they considered themselves successful to the extent that they did better than other armies and than the civilians subject to their guns. The second type of army was an uneasy combination of a programmatic-professional army, which was created as a result of the failure of the stagnant society. This type awarded authority on a rank and skill basis, cultivated technical and organizational abilities, and supported a political group which was trying to modernize Chinese society. Their status was higher than that of the first type of army. Defeat at the hands of foreign

16The figures are drawn from Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 6-7 and 210-215; and Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 417.
powers, foreign training, and German, Japanese and Soviet military advisors had made them aware of the superiority of the modern nations. Therefore, they compared themselves professionally with modern Western and Japanese armies and their society with modern societies. In other words, this type of army had the nationalism of the programmatic army and the coercive specialist interests of the professional army in a modern society.

The non-coercive role of these diverse armies had only one common characteristic: it was large. Political elites were continually discredited, and since the society contained no power groups other than the military, the army continually filled these power vacuums.

To minimize, if not eliminate, foreign intervention and internal aggression, China resorted to its second type of army. It began a strategy of "defensive modernization" to supply its army with modern equipment and supplies. This process unintentionally created an army which was more modern in skills and attitudes than the political authorities and which increasingly lost respect for the ineffective politicians. As Chinese politics degenerated into a shifting panorama of many generals, many alliances, many conflicts and little civilian authority, the relatively professional Chinese army had two alternatives: 1) it could become programmatic to realize the needs of the society that the politicians were incapable of realizing; or 2) it could become materialist. In fact, by the time of the advent of Communism in China, the army had both materialist and
programmatic elements. This dual nature of the military created a dilemma for the reformers, revolutionaries, and personal power-seekers. They required coercive strength to achieve power and to repel external assaults and internal insurgents. This dependence decreased the pressure that could be put on the materialist element of the military to implement programs which could meet national needs. The failure to meet these needs in turn maintained the situation in which the military was a requirement for political power. Failure also alienated the programmatic elements of the military, who would grant legitimacy only to governments which could meet China's internal needs.

B. Communism in China

The context and military behavior summarized above constituted the childhood environment of Chinese Communism and formed the opinions of its leaders on China's needs and the uses of and dangers posed by armed forces. Those who turned to the Communist Party in its early years were aware of the failure of piecemeal reform and of the piecemeal rebellions so frequent in Chinese history. They were the fruit of piecemeal reforms, but were convinced of their fundamental failure. The creed of Dewey, Russell and the other purveyors of democracy who visited China seemed to come from a hostile source and to be inadequate to meet the needs of Chinese society. The heritage of rebellions by either peasants, military groups or students demonstrated the need for new methods.

They were shoppers and communism seemed a good buy. We can enumerate some of the general appeals of communism to Chinese desirous of internal modernization and national integrity.\footnote{18} Communism fitted the conflicting desires to modernize socially and economically, i.e., to imitate the West, and to expel a foreign influence that seemed oppressiv\textsuperscript{e}, contemptuous and depriving, i.e., to reject the West. Communism provided the objectivity and truth of science and the inevitability and righteousness of religion. It provided organizational procedures suitable to elite control of the bulk of the population and appealed to the "vanguard" self-image of the dissatisfied intelligentsia. One of the most important organizational prescriptions was the one to insure that the military remained a dutiful servant of a political master.

The applications of communism by the Chinese Communists involved significant adaptations to their environment. This was the genius of Mao: his ability to combine alien ideology with local reality. One such adaptation has often been singled out:

Mao's great achievement was to secure recognition of peasant movements as the moving force of the Chinese revolution, rather than as a phenomena of merely temporary and tactical utility.\footnote{19}


\textsuperscript{19} Fisher, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 296, quoting Mary C. Wright, \textit{op. cit.}
These adaptations to a changing environment affected the institutional nature of the Communist armed forces and the CCP theories of their political and economic role. ²⁰

Until 1949 the Communists were insurgents. Because of inferior arms and smaller numbers of soldiers, the Communists were unable to overwhelm the Nationalists. Therefore, they resorted to political and economic tactics. Their strategy was simple: increase demands of the population in the aspiration area and hamper incumbent efforts to meet them; demonstrate greater success in meeting similar demands in the base area. Because of the nature of their insurgent situation and of their political system, the Chinese Communist Party needed an army with two primary characteristics: 1) an army amenable to heavy participation in political and economic programs; and 2) an army amenable to political control. They developed a politicized-generalist army, in which the soldiers were the "new Communist men" in the "New China". ²¹ The soldiers were taught basic technical skills and political attitudes in order to participate obediently and effectively in the Party's political and economic programs. To the extent that the Party could develop this type of army where soldiers were also farmers and killers also propagandizers, the Party could minimize the independence that accrues to a coercive specialist military. ²²

²⁰Mao's most relevant concepts are discussed in Chapter 4 of dissertation.
²¹Attempts and techniques of doing this are discussed in Chapter 6.
²²Non-coercive activities of the Communist military are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
Several factors helped the Party develop this type of military: 1) during most of the insurgent period the Communist military was a guerrilla force. Since guerrilla success requires the support of the local population--for food, manpower and information--and political and economic measures to secure popular support,\textsuperscript{23} the military was interested for coercive reasons in non-coercive activities; 2) since these non-coercive activities were implemented in a stagnant area, the military did not have to acquire advanced skills in order to implement them; 3) the military's primitive combat equipment minimized the time needed for weapons training.

Since the CCP became the incumbent power in 1949, the relationship between national needs and institutional nature of the armed forces has become less harmonious. The Communists face multiplied and more complex modernization problems. The modernization problems of their base area have become the problems of all China, and the modernization needs include the creation and operation of heavy industries as well as the operation of a pump or radio. Since the distinction between base and aspiration areas has disappeared, it is less possible to define success in terms of relative socio-economic gains and losses. China's national needs can only be met by positive progress by the Communists, not by sabotage of an incumbent's progress. The external opposition, the Kuomintang, has been replaced by nations at a much higher level of socio-economic

Several factors helped the Party develop this type of military: 1) during most of the insurgent period the Communist military was a guerrilla force. Since guerrilla success requires the support of the local population—for food, manpower and information—and political and economic measures to secure popular support, the military was interested for coercive reasons in non-coercive activities; 2) since these non-coercive activities were implemented in a stagnant area, the military did not have to acquire advanced skills in order to implement them; 3) the military's primitive combat equipment minimized the time needed for weapons training.

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development, e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese Communists do not define external success to mean immediate elimination of all opponents, they do define it to mean elimination of inequality with or dependence on other nations.

The change from an insurgent to an incumbent situation has affected the institutional nature of the armed forces. To the extent that the political leadership competes with modern superpowers, the military evaluates itself in relation to the armies of these powers. When it compares itself with the American or Russian forces, it has to note the technical gap. To the extent that technical equipment and skills become more important to the PLA (People's Liberation Army), it becomes less amenable to political and economic activities and increasingly concerned with coercive activities and officer prestige.

The conjunction of national needs and institutional nature of the military is inevitably strained: the relatively compatible definition of success by military and Party in the insurgent years has become less compatible in the incumbent years. The socio-economic needs of the society are aggravated by the Communists’ incumbent position and militate against fewer non-coercive assignments to the military, which is becoming less and less amenable to these assignments. To the extent that the Party's desire for external success must be achieved militarily, by limited war or demonstration of nuclear power, military and civilian energies and materials required for internal modernization must be channeled into internally less productive uses.
The non-coercive usefulness of the politicized-managerial army led the CCP leadership to see broader possibilities for military organizational forms and psychological traits. If civilians could be organized and indoctrinated like Red soldiers, they would be equally amenable to political control and socio-economic change. The Party applied this philosophy occasionally during the insurgent years and during the 1958 "militarization of life" campaign which was an integral part of the People's Communes. In 1958 the Peking regime assumed that: 1) popular acceptance of militarization under an incumbent regime would be comparable to acceptance under an insurgent regime; 2) popular acceptance in a "peacetime" situation would be comparable to that in a situation of external invasion of the homeland; and 3) popular acceptance of militarization without perceived personal benefits would be comparable to acceptance with perceived personal benefits.

C. Hypotheses of the Case

The following chapters on the political and economic role of the military and on the civilian militarization in the Chinese Communist movement test these hypotheses:

1) To the extent that armed forces membership is from a stagnant area intensive training is required to instill the basic skills and attitudes of a politicized-managerial army.

\[2^{4}\] Civilian militarization is discussed in Chapters 9 and 11.
2) To the extent that basic skills and appropriate political attitudes are scarce in the society, politicized-generalist military training has a "multiplier effect" through the diffusion of veterans.

3) To the extent that military service inculcates skills and attitudes desired by the political leadership, it attempts to expose the largest possible proportion of the population to such experience.

4) To the extent that the insurgent army is popular with the base area and aspiration area inhabitants its use in political and socio-economic activities has increased returns.

5) To the extent that a successful insurgent movement enlarges the number of vocational groups it controls the non-coercive influence of the military decreases.

6) To the extent that socio-economic modernization requires non-coercive specialization the value of a broad non-coercive military activity scope decreases.

7) To the extent that internal and external threats are great, the possibility of military implementation of political and economic policies decreases.

8) To the extent that socio-economic needs are pressing and military leadership participates in policy formation and policy selection, the maintenance of the politicized-generalist institutional nature of the military is facilitated.

9) To the extent that the politicized-generalist army anticipates becoming a politicized-specialist army it acquires advanced skills and helps implement socio-economic modernization.
10) To the extent that totalitarian leadership in a modernizing country desires to expand at the expense of modern countries it requires a politicized-specialist army.

11) To the extent that the political leadership is unpopular with the civilians it is unable to impose unwanted political controls on the military.

12) To the extent that the political leadership fears external attack, military preferences on non-coercive as well as coercive policies have increased influence.

13) To the extent that the politicized-generalist army contains other elements, the political leadership must either appease, expel, or change them. The choice of action depends on the power of these elements in comparison with that of the political leadership.

14) To the extent that the political leadership desires implementation of non-coercive policies by the politicized-specialist army, it must impose stringent political controls.
PART I

INFLUENCES ON THE MILITARY ROLE
Chapter 2

Antecedents of the Chinese Communist Military

We deal here with selected non-Communist Chinese armies: the army of Yen Hsi-shan (1911-1945), the army of Feng Yu-hsiang (1914-1928), the army of the Tai-ping (1850-1865), the armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang (1853-1878), and the army of the Kuomintang (1923-1949). In all these cases these armies were more than materialist forces. Some had programmatic tendencies; some, professional; some, politicized-generalist. All these armies were involved in attempts to modernize all or part of China. Their ranks were taught basic skills and political ideologies. However, for one reason or another, the political and economic activities of these armies did not significantly modernize their social environment.

The experience of these armies poses questions about the prerequisites for significant and sustained military contributions to modernization. What attempts did these military leaders make to raise the technical competence of their soldiers? What attempts did they make to create military commitment to a broad political and economic program? How were these armies used to implement non-coercive policies? What attempts did they make to militarize civilian society? Why did all these attempts fail to fulfill the socio-economic needs of the society and maintain the political power that the military served?

We also deal with the relationship of non-Communist armies to Chinese society. The position of the military in Chinese society had three negative implications: 1) the military was too
powerful in relation to the civilian population to accept unwanted political and socio-economic directives; 2) the status of the military was too low to attract elements committed to non-personal goals; 3) uncontrolled materialist armies diverted scarce socio-economic resources from modernization programs and from programs to maintain the stagnant society.

In other words, this chapter explores the military inheritance of the Chinese Communist Party. We become aware of: 1) the sources of Communist policies on how to develop an army politically obedient and socio-economically useful, on how to use this type of army effectively in political and economic activities, and on how to militarize civilian society; 2) the pitfalls that the Communists had to avoid to carry out these policies; and 3) the degree of Communist innovation in their political and economic use of the military, and their alteration of the relationship of the military to Chinese society.

A. Antecedents

The use of the military for political and economic purposes, the militia and militarization devices were not sudden flashes in Mao's brain. The Chinese Communists were aware of these devices because they were used in contemporary or prominent earlier programs to modernize China socio-economically.

1. Yen Hsi-shan, Model Governor of the Model Province:

Governments came and went in China, but Yen seemed to go on forever. From 1911-1935 he maintained a state of de facto autonomy in Shansi province and until the Communist drive of
194/8 held part of the province as his own. Yen's policies and ultimate failure illustrate the conflicting desires for social change and maintenance of personal power that characterized many military men of twentieth century China. Because of the physical isolation of Shansi and Yen's adept alliance switching, he had an opportunity to show what this type of militarist would do.2

Educated at the newly created Manchu dynasty military school at Taiyuan, the provincial capital, Yen pursued further studies at the Japanese Imperial Military Academy. By the time of his graduation in 1909 he had added to his training in mathematics, physics, and other Western subjects, the philosophy of strength and progress through militarism. "China can save herself only by embracing militarism."3 He went so far as to organize a "Blood and Iron Society," hoping to parallel in the Chinese revolution the function of the Prussian military caste


in the strengthening of Germany. 4 By educating modern military men such as Yen, the dynasty created dangerous foes. Yen allied Shansi with the birth of the Republic in 1911. After attempts to play a wider role in national politics he contented himself with strengthening his own castle—Shansi Province.5

Chinese realities and Yen's inclinations gave a prominent place to military bodies and military methods. "Yen tried by means of conscription and the creation of a civilian reserve to make his army the foundation of society in Shansi."6 By the end of his reign, over 500,000 of the four million people under Yen's control were claimed to be combat ready (200,000 regular troops and 300,000 in the People's Self Defense Army). Old men, young boys and some women were supposedly mobilized in the haphazard People's Self-Defense Corps.7

Yen attempted to make his army not only large but skilled. Officers received two years of middle school education at government expense, and some were even sent to Japan for training.8 A mass literacy campaign was conducted and perhaps the best industrial arsenal in North China established. Even after it was stripped by the Japanese, it turned out 75 millimetre artillery, machine guns and mortars, as well as small arms.9 Peasant conscripts were trained to operate these weapons. He attempted to

4Ibid.
5Ibid., pp. 291-294.
6Ibid., p. 294.
8Pye, op. cit., p. 70.
create loyalty and esprit by capitalizing on provincial loyalties and the "Soldier's Heart Washing Society."\(^{10}\)

His armies were used to only a small extent for developing the economy and arousing popular allegiance. They did repair roads, harvest crops and were told to pay the peasants for whatever they took. The *North China Herald* felt Yen's troops were more popular than those of other warlords.\(^{12}\)

Yen concentrated more energy on mass mobilization. In 1930 local government was described as "an almost military organization."\(^{13}\) However, the "Soldier-Farmer Unification", begun in 1943, received his greatest attention.\(^{14}\) Rural Shansi was organized into mutual aid farm units in which one-third of the men were on active duty and two-thirds members of militia organizations. These units were an elaboration on earlier militia units and civilian service groups.\(^{15}\)

The "Model Governor's" reputation for progressive administration far exceeded the results he obtained. His Irish stew ideology, "...militarism, nationalism, anarchism, democracy, capitalism, communism, individualism, imperialism, universalism,\(^{10}\)Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 70; Gillin, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
\(^{11}\)"Reciprocal surveillance" was also practiced. *Ibid.*
paternalism and utopianism" revealed his conflicting goals. In reality his army tended to be sloppy, spiritless and unreliable. In spite of fine claims, e.g., a Ten Year plan, he failed to "raise appreciably the living standards of most of his subjects." His casting of society in a military form merely aroused peasant discontent, and army food priorities did not secure affection for the military.

The army was not meaningfully indoctrinated and was not broadly used for economic development and political persuasion. Mass mobilization, as everything else under Yen's regime, was for Yen and never successfully linked to popular desires. His hostility to social revolution, his provincialism, and personal despotism hindered full use of the military as an instrument for political and social change.

The practices of the Chinese Communists parallel Yen's in several ways. Within their armies emphasis is placed on military techniques, literacy, indoctrination and self-examination organizations. Party armed forces have advertised that they repair roads, harvest crops, and recompense peasants. The Peking leadership has organized large militia forces, and in some cases fused production and military organizations in the guerrilla years.

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16 Gillin, op. cit., p. 300; quotes from Yen's Lecture.
17 Often they ran from bandits or deserted to the Communists. ibid., p. 294; Barnett, op. cit., pp. 3, 6.
18 Gillin, op. cit., p. 303.
20 The army came first with Yen, not political and social change. He diverted to it funds for railway construction and used it against strikers. Gillin, op. cit., pp. 305-306.
and in the recent "All People in Arms" Campaign and the People's Communes.

Similarity in technique is overshadowed by the difference in accomplishment. Yen admitted his basic failure to a foreign visitor near the end of his 37 year reign. He declared that the poor seventy percent of the population might be attracted by the Communists' bait, and the well-to-do thirty percent might be politically apathetic. 21

2. Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian General":

Yen Hsi-shan was influenced by Japanese militarism and was opposed to sweeping social innovation. In contrast, Feng advocated broad social change, was influenced by Christianity, Marxism-Leninism and Sun Yat-senism. 22 He was also a militarist seeking personal power. 23

21 Barnett, op. cit., p. 17.

22 Herbert Weisshart, "Feng Yu-hsiang: His Rise as a Militarist and His Training Programs," in Papers on China, Vol. 6, Cambridge: Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, March, 1952, pp. 75-111. This is a good survey of all aspects of his life.

Feng's greater use of the military instrument for political and economic purposes was necessary for survival. His power flowed from that of his army, the Kuomintang (People's Army). The army lacked a secure base such as Shansi, and arsenals such as those at Taiyuan, and depended on internal esprit and popular support. When the People's Army disintegrated, after defeat and bribery by Chiang Kai-shek in 1929-1931, Feng's power waned. However, between 1917 and 1928 he realized the broad utility of the military in society and created a revolutionary army and thereby may have provided a textbook for the Communists.

a. Developing a Revolutionary Army.

Feng attempted to develop simultaneously the combat skills and the discipline and morals of his forces. He emphasized technical training and literacy. Strict discipline was complemented by unity between officers and men. Indoctrination was combined with care for the common soldier.

Technical Training

In 1914 he established a "model company" of lower grade officers and literate soldiers. This cadre development organization was enlarged to over 200 in 1917. In 1921, when Feng was Military Governor of Shensi Province, the Soldier's Cadet Corps

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Estimates of the size of his army vary. One journalist gives a 1927 strength of 300,000 (Hallet Abend, Tortured China, New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1930, p. 39). In the spring of 1925 the Soviets estimated Feng's total strength at 230,000 divided among three armies. The First Army under his personal command was estimated at 50,000 (Wilbur and Ho, op. cit., p. 322).

MacNair, op. cit., pp. 168-169.
School was established. The School offered a four month course in tactics, strategy and other aspects of efficient coercion. 26

From 1925 to the Nationalist-Communist split in 1927, these efforts were expanded with the aid of Soviet advisors. 27 Organizational expansion included: Cadre School, Higher Echelon Officer's Cadet Corps School, Training Staff Headquarters, and individual schools for artillery, cavalry, engineering and machine gun operation. 28 The troops participated in daily combat training. 29 The Kuominchun even had a small number of such complex weapons as airplanes and armored cars. 30

Literacy

The Christian General inculcated basic modern skills in his peasant troops and officers of primarily peasant origin. Literacy was the most prominent example. By teaching his men to read, he hoped to increase their military knowledge and their exposure to indoctrination. In 1917 he established a reading club whose members studied the 800 basic characters. 31 Eventually education was supposedly compulsory not only for soldiers but also

26 Weisshart, op. cit., pp. 88, 89, 91.
27 The group which arrived at Peking in April, 1925, included "twenty-nine military experts, two military-political experts, one doctor and four interpreters." (Wilbur and How, op. cit., pp. 321-322). Soviet dissatisfaction with their relationship with Feng is detailed in Chapter VI of their work.
28 The number of schools does not reflect their small size. For example, the artillery school had 114 students, the engineering school 40. Ibid., pp. 344-346; Weisshart, op. cit., p. 97.
31 Weisshart, op. cit., p. 89.
for the dependents of officers living with the garrison. While running Honan Province (1922-24), he required the men to memorize two characters before meals.

Unity and Discipline

Feng's personal success required an army which would fight fiercely and also secure support from the peasantry. "With the help of the people, achievements will come naturally." He therefore attempted to create attitudes that would serve both purposes. He attempted to create unity between himself, officers and men. Officers were held to "Eight No-Hit" rules in their treatment of the common soldier. Feng on occasion even punished officers before their subordinates. His armies were noted for discipline and strict morality. "Smoking, drinking and gambling were strictly taboo." Surprised missionaries in Ninghsia in Kansu Province observed, "They are not allowed on the streets at night; they are well behaved."

Feng made a virtue of conspicuous non-consumption.

In his soldier's grey cotton uniform and worn-out shoes, and without any sign of his high rank, he presented a unique figure amongst the military and

34 Weisshart, op. cit., p. 87, quotes from Feng's autobiography.
35 Ibid., p. 90.
36 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 117.
38 Upton Close, op. cit., p. 278.
39 Strong, op. cit., p. 317.
civil officials of modern China...he was the only one of the military leaders who lived as a common soldier and underwent all the toils and hardships of a soldier's life.40

Indoctrination

Clubs and competitive groups of many kinds were formed, e.g., the Military Service Club, Sports Club, Pension Research Club. While the content of the meetings changed, morning and evening meetings, slogans, dramatic presentations, songs, libraries were used from 1917 on.41 The message propagated by these devices was at one time a useful Christianity and later a useful Sun-Yatsenism. In 1928 these words were sung to the Christian doxology before meals:

This food is supplied by the people;  
We should all work for the people;  
Imperialism is the enemy of the nation;  
Serving the country and the people  
Is our Sacred Duty.42

Slogans such as "Repent and Enter Heaven"43 gave way to "Politacize the troops", "Remove Corrupt officials", "Truly Love the People".44 Political workers operated in many units. Whether they were Christian, Kuomintang or Bolshevik, Feng insured that they did not undermine loyalty to him.45 He finally set up his own propaganda school.46 Part of each soldier's day was devoted to indoctrination, at first Bible study and later social reform.47

40Kotenev, op. cit., p. 114.
41Weisshart, op. cit., gives details.
42Holcombe, op. cit., p. 73.
43Kotenev, op. cit., p. 116.
44Weisshart, op. cit., p. 98.
45He had good reason to be careful. See Wilbur and How, op. cit., pp. 350-351, 356-358, 366.
46He even used women propagandists. See Strong, op. cit., pp. 65, 247.
47Kotenev, op. cit., p. 116; Close, op. cit., p. 278; Weisshart, op. cit., p. 91.
Care of the Soldier

In the Kuominchun, indoctrination was complemented by care of the common troops. Christian missionaries provided medical service, rare among Chinese armies.\(^{48}\) The various clubs entertained the troops. Commissaries were set up. Regular remittances were made to soldiers' families.\(^{49}\) A home for disabled veterans was established. There were frequent promotions from the ranks.\(^{50}\) Feng hoped that a judicious combination of rewards and indoctrination would create a military instrument which would not follow the maxim of Kuan Tzu, "the joy of battle lies in a full belly and a possible reward."\(^{51}\)

He aimed at "The Secrets of Victory" printed on the shoulder patches of the Kuominchun ranks.

1. Every officer must in all integrity and bravery stand ready to die for God and country.
2. If somebody doesn't get killed, it's not real war—and there can be no real heroes and no real braves.
3. The man may die but the gun must not leave the hand. Ammunition must not be wasted.
4. Go in to kill the enemy. When your ammunition is finished use your fists. When your fists are crippled bite them with your teeth.
5. Who is able to give his life to save a fellow thereby emulates true courage.\(^{52}\)

b. The Social Impact.

Feng used his army for administration, propaganda and economic tasks. His soldiers were taught modern skills of a

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 83.
\(^{49}\) Kotenev, op. cit., p. 118.
\(^{50}\) Weisshart, op. cit., pp. 91, 93.
\(^{51}\) Quoted in Kotenev, op. cit., p. 95.
\(^{52}\) Close, op. cit., p. 316.
productive nature. He not only used the army for modernization and trained it in modern life-ways; he also made several abortive attempts at civilian militarization.

At one time or another Feng controlled Shensi, Honan, Chahar, Suiyuan and Kansu provinces. Kuominchun officers were in charge of county and district civil government. At the provincial level Feng or a trusted aide occupied the post of Military-Governor. His officers ran civil training institutions to develop administrators and village leaders. At least in Honan they organized embryo mass organizations, e.g., the "Farmer Movement Committee", and the "Labour Movement Committee".

The army was used to enlist support for Feng, and his goals. Officers lectured to the people. Drama groups in 1917 presented such themes as "Increase Resistance Against Japan", "Promote Home Industry" and "Eliminate Opium". Special army facilities—hospitals, libraries, recreation centers—were available to the public.

Part of every soldier's day was devoted to economic labor, the "Soldier-Labor Policy". Feng boasted that his army more than earned its own living and lightened the support burden on the peasantry. Considerable attention was devoted to production, e.g., with competitions in vegetable gardening. Slogans

53 Weisshart, op. cit., p. 99 from Feng's autobiography.
54 Holcombe, op. cit., p. 76.
56 Weisshart, op. cit., p. 90.
57 Ibid., p. 93; Close, op. cit., p. 278.
58 Ibid.
such as " Produce when not fighting" were prominent. Soldiers eliminated flies, planted trees, cleaned streets, worked on flood prevention, and built highways and a railroad.

The men of the Kuomintang were required to learn one skill: weaving, carpentry, ironworking, canning, soap-making, map-making, or photography. On discharge their skill allowed them to act as disseminators of modernization and indoctrination.

Feng Yu-hsiang made several attempts to merge military and productive functions, to form a common social unit. Two attempts deserve mention: the "New" or "Model Village" established near Kalgan in August, 1925, and his Northwest "colonization" scheme.

The "Model Village", possibly a Soviet suggestion, seemed to be the epitome of a new and unique army life in China. Army, home, factory, school, church were all rolled into one. Officers' and men's living quarters were the same. The soldiers were employed in the flour mill, mint, various factories and construction projects. The current ideology, Christianity, was accorded an important place. One building contained a training school for army chaplains, and all the officers and 50% of the men were claimed for Christianity.

In the same year as "defense Commissioner of the Northwest", he launched a program to settle the Yellow River valley.

59 Weisshart, op. cit., p. 94.
60 Strong, op. cit., p. 317; Weisshart, op. cit., presents many instances.
61 Ibid., pp. 89, 91; Kotenev, op. cit., p. 118.
62 Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 351.
63 Weisshart, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
below Kansu. If the project had been successful, it would have given him a powerful and strategically located territorial base accessible to the Soviet Union and within striking distance of Peking. In this area he hoped to fuse a military-peasant community—"every colonist a convenient recruit." However, only a start was made on the project before Feng fled to Russia early in 1926.

Feng can be seen as a precedent for the Chinese Communists in the following ways. First, he emphasized the key roles of the peasant, "Our people are chiefly employed upon the land and the success of the revolution largely depends upon its services to those who dwell in the villages." Second, he attempted to forge a peasant-soldier alliance. The Kuomintang was to be identified with the peasant and become his helper in concrete ways. Third, he realized that an effective army drawn from the peasantry needed training and the ordinary soldier needed care and medical service. Fourth, he used a whole array of indoctrination devices that were to be adopted by the Red forces in later years. His methods could reach illiterate and semi-literate soldiers and peasants. Finally, he tried to create an interesting all-purpose social unit militarily strong, economically developed, and socially anti-traditional.

Feng's actual accomplishments did not match his grand plans. His ingenious devices were never applied on a massive

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64 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
66 Holcombe, op. cit., p. 79.
scale. The Communists learned from his lack of success. First, they could observe the disadvantage of frequent movement. Feng never remained in an area long enough to establish his programs. Second, they could observe technical failings in Feng's indoctrination program. Among these were the lack of trained cadres, loose control of information, non-specialization of propaganda.

Fundamentally the fate of Feng demonstrated the weakness of a personal focus of loyalty. Feng's personal ambitions acted as a constant brake on indoctrination and organization for social change. Although he foresaw the necessity of social reform and the advantage of launching reform while military conflict was in progress, he had no comprehensive system of popular organization and no systematic set of goals. In short, his appeal to the peasantry was spasmodic and inadequate; his appeal to the intelligentsia was weak and undeveloped compared to, for example, that of Sun Yat-sen.

3. The Tai-ping Rebellion and the Inventive Opposition:

To the Communists the massive Tai-ping Rebellion of 1851-1865 is a lovingly distorted turning point in the history of China. Unlike Yen and Feng, this precedent has Marxist legitimacy. It has even been raised to the exalted status of a

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67 Ibid.
"Revolution". Marx described the Tai-pings in the *New York Herald Tribune* as "the first cry in the creation of a Chinese Republic", and declared that their uprising was "a popular war for the maintenance of Chinese nationality." Chu Teh stated the CCP perspective on the Tai-pings:

> Our people have struggled for liberation for a hundred years, and the first and greatest of these struggles was the Tai-ping Revolution ... We will yet complete the bourgeois democratic revolution begun by the Tai-pings.\(^6^9\)

The policies of the successful opponents of the Rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang, have equal historical importance. They marked the "origin of the modern Chinese army"\(^7^1\) and were the seeds of regional militarism.\(^7^2\)

**a. The Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace**

Three characteristics of the Tai-ping rebellion served as positive examples to the Communist revolutionaries. The first was a strict and demanding code of military behavior. Some of the code was literally plagiarized by the Party.\(^7^3\) The second was a system of merging civil and military activities in one social unit. The third was the value of a pervasive, self-justifying ideology, in their case, Christianity, combined with

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70 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
72 *Pye, op. cit.*
nationalism and economic and social reform. "Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, in the role of T’ien Wang or Celestial King was not only the political and military chief of a gigantic religious revolutionary movement, but also the religious head of a church...."

Discipline and Unity

The core of the original Tai-ping army was immigrant, "guest settlers" in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. Previous to the rebellion they were a unified minority. The esprit and unity of this core was intensified and that of later conscripts developed in line with the following military commandments:

1) observance of "the heavenly rules"—Sunday services, morning and evening prayers, grace before meals and the ten commandments;

2) absolute loyalty and bravery—the penalty for desertion or communication with the enemy was death;

3) harmony and cooperation with fellow Tai-pings;

4) military discipline. Orders were to be obeyed and officers

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76 Teng, op. cit., p. 64; Michael, op. cit., p. 67; Li, op. cit., p. 56.

77 Teng, op. cit., p. 65.

saluted;
5) military skill. Officers and soldiers were supposed to become familiar with basic tactics and drills;
6) personal morality. Smoking, opium or tobacco, alcohol, gambling, laziness, and graft were forbidden. Rape and withholding wealth captured in battle were punished by decapitation.\textsuperscript{79}
7) befriending people. The "Elder Brother" enjoined: "you should not go into the villages to seize people's goods."\textsuperscript{80} Soldiers were required to carry their own oil, salt and cooking utensils. Requisitioning and forced entry were major sins.\textsuperscript{81}

The behavior of the Tai-ping soldiers contrasted sharply with that of their early opponents. "A Chinese army on a campaign treats friends and enemies with the most perfect impartiality, plundering all alike."\textsuperscript{82} Tai-ping combat effectiveness was increased by securing the support of the peasants.\textsuperscript{83} The soldiers' morale was raised by promotion from the ranks, equality in relation to the deity, and care of their families.\textsuperscript{84} The military ranks were swelled by the use of women in combat forces and in military workshops.\textsuperscript{85} In Nanking, the Tai-pings claimed

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.; Kotenev, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 62; Li, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{80}MacNair, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{81}Payne, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{82}Quoted by Teng, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 64 from M. M. Gallery and Yvan, \textit{The History of the Insurrection in China}, London: Oxenford, 1854, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{84}Payne, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10; Kotenev, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 61-62.
\textsuperscript{85}Payne, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10; Kotenev, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 59; Linebarger, Chu and Burks, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 112-113.
that 100,000 women were making clothing and shoes for the army. This figure is probably exaggerated, as was their claim to a 3,085,000 man military establishment.

Civil-Military Fusion

The Tai-pings sought unified direction by fusing civil, military and religious organization. Table I pictures the institutional arrangement they sought. It indicates both the centralized authority in Tai-ping society and the organization of the fundamental social unit, the family, in a para-military framework. This institutional arrangement is strikingly similar to that planned for the CCP People's Communes in 1958. Within the institutional chain control of economic, military, social and ideological activities rested in the hands of the same official.

The Celestial King received information through this ladder of authority on "births, deaths, promotions and demotions, obedience, and diligence in farming." Within the ladder--

All officials in the metropolitan area, in the army or in the local administrations were in one and the same administrative hierarchy, and all of them were entrusted with both civil and military duties.

The company leader served as "a military chaplain, an army officer, a teacher and a judge." This master sergeant led a man from each family both to war and to the fields. The company

86 W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Soldier and Statesman of Old China, Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1937, p. 119. The women were organized in 40 units of 2,500 each.
87 Ibid.
88 Li, op. cit., p. 62.
89 Ibid.
90 Linebarger, Chu and Burks, op. cit., p. 113.
Table I
Organization of Tai-ping Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The Celestial King</strong></th>
<th><strong>Marshal (King)</strong></th>
<th><strong>State Minster (Marquis)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Supervisor</strong></th>
<th><strong>Director</strong></th>
<th><strong>General</strong></th>
<th><strong>Field Commander</strong></th>
<th><strong>Army Controller</strong></th>
<th><strong>Army Commander</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in charge of 5 divisions or 12,500 families)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right D. C.*</th>
<th>Left D. C.*</th>
<th>Central Division Commander*</th>
<th>Rear D. C.*</th>
<th>Front D. C.*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right B. C.*</td>
<td>Left B. C.*</td>
<td>Central Brigade Commander*</td>
<td>Rear B. C.*</td>
<td>Front B. C.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 B. L.*</td>
<td>No. 2 B. L.*</td>
<td>No. 3 Battalion Leader*</td>
<td>No. 4 B. L.*</td>
<td>No. 5 B. L.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West C. L.*</td>
<td>East Company Leader*</td>
<td>in charge of 4 companies or 100 families</td>
<td>North C. L.*</td>
<td>South C. L.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal*</td>
<td>Corporal*</td>
<td>Corporal*</td>
<td>Corporal*</td>
<td>Corporal*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Metropolitan Officers

** Local Officers

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91 The chart is an adaptation of one on page 114 of Linebarger, Chu and Burks, op. cit., Various authorities disagree on the specific size of the units, but agree on the proportions. The figures used here are used by Payne, op. cit., and Linebarger, Chu and Burks on page 115 of their work.
unit was ideally a communal economy.\textsuperscript{92} While the Tai-pings modified this system where it met popular resistance, it existed around Nanking as late as 1856.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{Ideology}

The code of the God-Worshippers' armies and their method of social organization derived from their peculiar ideology. The existence of their creed provided a theocratic unity under an infallible leader. It justified his control and provided a body of desirable ends for their government and its subjects.\textsuperscript{94}

However, it did not prevent internal decay and eventual military defeat. The Communists were alerted to these weaknesses: 1) the faith blinded leaders to practical problems;\textsuperscript{95} 2) corruption, favoritism and personal strife developed in high places;\textsuperscript{96} 3) an indoctrinated following was sacrificed for a larger number of less committed soldiers;\textsuperscript{97} and 4) ideological principles, in this case quasi-Christian, openly clashed with peasant ways of thought.\textsuperscript{98}

The Communists also learned a tactical lesson—to avoid combat with larger and better armed forces.

The Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace did not eliminate these errors and succumbed to better trained and equipped forces under such men as Tseng and Tso.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., pp. 110-111; Li, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{93}Linebarger, Chu and Burks, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{94}Li, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 64-65.
\textsuperscript{95}MacNair, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 366-367; Li, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., pp. 59, 72-74, 80.
\textsuperscript{97}Kotenov, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 59-60.
\textsuperscript{98}Li, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 70; Michael, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67.
b. The Inventive Opposition

After 1852 the militarily insecure Manchus sanctioned the creation of militia armies on a largely provincial basis. In the course of developing and leading such armies Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang recognized the dependence of the military on modernization, popular support and a functioning economy. Tseng and Tso recognized that through a self-support policy the military could fill all of its needs to some degree.

Before the military armies could develop the industrial and agricultural base it needed for self-support, they had to develop internal discipline and unity. Tseng and Tso sought out healthy farmer conscripts, and tried to stamp out opium smoking, gambling and rape. Unity was cultivated by quasi-patriarchal relationships between officers and men and frequent lectures on loyalty and patriotism. Tseng vividly described this policy; "My humble attempt is to train 10,000 militia ... whose pains and itches will be of common concern to one another, and who will even rush together into fire or into a pool of boiling water...." Tso tried to eliminate riff-raff from his forces and opposed perpetuation of a large army of no peacetime value.

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100 Li, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

101 In 1856 their total strength was 60,000. It probably never exceeded 120,000. Bales, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

102 Ibid., pp. 46-49.

103 Li, op. cit., p. 67.

104 Bales, op. cit., pp. 46, 201, 210-211.
Ts'ao Ts'ung-t'ang sought to maximize the non-coercive value of his trained body of men. He did not want a voracious military to drive the peasants into banditry. "In all of his campaigns he struggled mightily to minimize the drain on the resources of the people ...occasioned by the presence of his armies." 105 During the suppression of a Moslem rebellion in Sinkiang, he listed the reasons for the use of soldiers as farmers. Bailes summarizes them: save the government money, reduce transportation, keep the soldiers busy and in physical trim, and encourage the people to return to work on the land. 106

In campaigns in Formosa, Fukien, Shensi, Kansu and the Northwest provinces he used his men to sow, plough, repair canals. 107 Ts'ao did not pretend that these activities increased fighting skill. He remarked that using soldiers as farmers resembled trying to draw circles with one hand and squares with the other. He presented political and economic justifications in a letter from the Northwest that suggested a Military Colonists Bureau:

This bureau will select a strategic location where water, grass, tillable soil and grazing are available and will undertake the cultivation of this land with soldiers. Those worn-out Shensi soldiers who are weeded out of the active army and who desire to remain and become soldier-farmers will be registered on the rolls and put to tilling the soil and tending the animals....As a result of such measures discipline in the army will improve, internal discord will be avoided and the army will gradually accumulate a surplus of foodstuffs. 108

For the most part he saw economic activity by the military as a

temporary expedient to attract the peasants back to the land, and as a demonstration of military-peasant co-operation. Tso's policy tried to minimize the possibility of future rebellion.

Tseng's and Tso's recognition that only a new type of army could put down internal threats to the dynasty and culture ran parallel with their thinking on national defense. Personal experience against the Tai-pings had shown the value of Western arms and methods. Tai-ping successes in 1857 and 1860 were facilitated by foreign weapons. The dynasty began purchasing them, and by 1864 every squad of the Hunan army had several "squads with foreign rifles." The methods of the Western-led "Ever Victorious Army" were watched and admired.¹⁰⁹ French and English victories in the Arrow War (1857-1860) emphasized national weakness.¹¹⁰

The problem facing these supporters of the Manchu dynasty and the territorial integrity of China was this: how could they secure the know-how and hardware of more industrialized nations and still maintain their independence? They tried to become militarily self-sufficient and petitioned for arsenals, steamships, shipyards, sent students for foreign training. They hired foreign advisers but kept real authority from them.¹¹¹ Tseng expressed the fear, "that in their hearts [foreigners] will conceal a purpose that spells disaster for us."¹¹² He sought to develop Chinese technical skill to the point of eliminating

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 45.
¹¹⁰Li, op. cit., pp. 81-88.
¹¹²Michael, op. cit., p. 69.
"further dependence on foreigners".\footnote{113} The efforts of even such dedicated men as these were bound to fail. They sought a little modernity to preserve a great amount of tradition; they were concerned with saving a tottering old society rather than designing a new one. The militia armies they created to save the Manchu Dynasty and the gentry-literati who governed China produced its later executors, the personal armies of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Two effects of the new militia armies altered the power structure of China.\footnote{114} First, the provincial governors-general and governors secured real military authority and increased their power accordingly. Second, a diversified, decentralized military organization replaced a unified, centrally controlled military.\footnote{115} Military experience became a legitimate avenue to civil power.

The period after the rebellion (1861-1890) saw the rise of the militia leaders. Almost half of the governors-general and governors appointed had a career history of military leadership, and about one fourth of the governors had not attained a high civil service degree.\footnote{116} The Communists noted the regional independence that resulted from locally financed and locally led and recruited armed forces and exercised great vigilance to avoid creating this type of military autonomy.

\footnote{113}{Ibid.}
\footnote{114}{Powell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.}
\footnote{115}{Li, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 93-94.}
4. The Kuomintang-Allies, Contemporary, Enemy.

Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party he has dominated existed simultaneously with the Communists. They have been quasi-allies twice, 1923-1927 and 1937-1946, mortal enemies at other times. Both parties and governments faced two major problems. The first was unifying and modernizing China as a nation. The second was defeat of military enemies to secure and maintain power. During the first alliance both learned from and were influenced by Soviet methods. They participated in the application of three important policies by Sun and the Soviets:

1) an army subordinate to the political control of a political party;
2) political workers in all units of the army responsible to the party; and
3) an indoctrinated, loyal army used to secure popular support for the party. During the second Alliance both tried to mobilize the masses against the Japanese and to develop a base of support against the other.

a. The First Alliance

When the Kuomintang turned to the Soviets for aid in building up a military force, they tried to keep the new army instrument, and not master. Next it tried to arm and train the army and nation to overcome modern "imperialist" forces.

Sun Yat-sen learned of the importance of the military instrument the hard way. The 1911 revolution was in essence military, and his party could not hold power. He was endowed

with the title of "Generalissimo" in the following years, but his political position was highly vulnerable. He seemed to be on a shuttle run between Canton and the International Settlement at Shanghai, depending on the whims of the various armed bodies around Canton. His experience with Ch'en Chiung showed that placing a Kuomintang member in command of an old-style army was no solution. Finally Sun turned to the Soviets for help in creating an army under political control. In the course of this brief entente Soviet methods were combined with Chinese militarism.

In 1913 Sun recognized this military requirement: "Unless we appeal to the force of arms there is no way to settle the present national crisis." To Sun China was "a sheet of loose sand," and without an army he kept losing his footing. As early as 1921 he expressed interest in Soviet military organization. Sun's power failed to expand, and his control of Party-supported but not staffed armies remained ephemeral. In August,

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121 Quoted by Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

1922, he informed Chiang of his request to send a Cominform agent and a military officer to Shanghai. In 1923 he sent Chiang to Moscow. The latter remained in the U.S.S.R. from September 2 to November 29. During his stay he spent considerable time with a Soviet infantry regiment, the 144th, and had long conversations with Soviet military leaders, among them Trotsky and the Director General of Military Training, Petrovskii. Meanwhile, on October 6, 1923, Michael Borodin arrived in Canton, and the Moscow-patterned political and military re-organization of the Kuomintang began. Sun's statements in the early months of 1924 indicate the prominence attached to the armed forces in the Chinese revolution. He postulated a three stage development, the first one being military rule.

In the stage of military rule the whole administrative system shall be placed under military rule. The government on the one hand should employ its armed forces to eradicate all internal obstacles and on the other to disseminate its principles so that the people may be enlightened and national unification hastened.

Without passing through a period of military rule it will be impossible to sweep away reactionary forces and to spread the revolutionary doctrine among the masses of the people so as to secure acceptance based on their sympathetic understanding.

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123 MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 149.
124 Ibid., pp. 150-151; Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 143.
In his speech at the formal opening of the Whampoa Military Academy on June 16, 1924, Sun explicitly stated the problem of his Party.

We have not thus far had a secure base from which to defend the Republic because our revolution has had only the support of the revolutionary party without the assistance of a revolutionary army. Because we have lacked a revolutionary army, the war lords have dominated the Republic and impeded the progress of the revolution. Our aim in opening this academy is to create the revolutionary task anew from this day, and students of this Academy will be the bones and trunk of the forthcoming Revolutionary Army. 127

Otherwise, failing to achieve this armed might, the Chinese revolution will be foredoomed from its beginning. This academy, therefore, has the sole purpose of creating a new revolutionary army. 128

The National Revolutionary Army was to be imbued with a political ideology, was to envision itself as a military instrument for political and social change, to defeat counter-revolutionary armies, to serve as an intermediary between the Party and the people. 129 Political training of the army and organization of the populace by members of the armed forces received primary emphasis. Earlier attempts to increase the military's technical skills and to raise its status were renewed. Conflicting desires for control and social revolution were to fracture the first Nationalist-Communist alliance in three years. 130

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127 Quoted in Li, op. cit., p. 461.
128 Quoted in Liu, op. cit., p. 8.
130 Numerous, conflicting accounts of the split have been written. See: Harold R. Isaacs, op. cit.; Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958; Manabendra N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, Ltd., 1946; Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, translated by Max Shachtman,
But during the short period of agreement both learned much from the Russian advisers based in Canton.¹³¹

Political supremacy was best achieved in the Whampoa military academy, the Whampoa training regiment, and the Party Army staffed by Whampoa graduates. Whampoa itself was under the titular direction of the head of the party and actually operated by a military and a political director. The latter was responsible for party affairs and political training, and for a while his counter-signature was required on orders of the military commander. Daily sessions were administered by the Political Department to inculcate a spirit of self-sacrifice, specifically dealing with revolutionary warfare, politics and economics and Sun's ideology.¹³²

In 1925 the system of political control was expanded into the ranks of the troops allied with the Kuomintang. In June of 1925, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to the chief Soviet military adviser General Galen (Bluecher) the establishment of "political departments in all armies divisions, regiments and brigades to instruct officers and soldiers in common political knowledge."¹³³ Eventually there was on paper "one 'political soldier' to every

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¹³¹ According to Wilbur and How, forty Soviet advisers came to Canton with Borodin, op. cit., p. 150. Details of their activity follow.


¹³³ Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 179.
100 fighting men."  

The political commissars had both wide functions and wide authority. Commissars organized party cells and soldiers clubs, taught reading, writing and ideology, and protected the soldier's interests. Their authority was equivalent to that of the military commander's. They countersigned orders, reported subversive or inadequate activities by officers, imposed punishments commanders had to enforce. This pervasive system of control was intended to curtail autonomous militarists and to maintain Party supremacy.  

As a result of political control, the army was expected to fight with greater determination. "Rank and file were given to understand that they were not fighting in some game beyond their understanding, but for security of people like themselves."  

Efforts were also made to keep the generals under the orders of the civil politicians. In early 1926 regulations were promulgated that made the Kuomintang Political Council supreme over all areas of military activity. Appointments, finance, size, supply, and tactical decision rested in this body. The subordinate administrative Military Council had three civilian members out of a total of eight. The civilian chairman,  

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134 Liu, op. cit., p. 18, he cites no source. Possibly he merely expanded an interview on the 36th Army quoted in Anna Louise Strong's China's Millions, op. cit., p. 54. No other authority gives specific figures.  

135 Strong, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Liu, op. cit., pp. 18-20; Wilbur and How, op. cit., pp. 200-202, "Regulations of Political Departments in the National Revolutionary Army."  

Wang Ching-wei, had the power of final decision.\footnote{\textsuperscript{137}}

Political control of the army was also required if the army was to expand the political as well as the military sphere of the Party. The National Revolutionary Army became an instrument of mass persuasion. "Troops themselves were propaganda brigades as well as military units."\footnote{\textsuperscript{138}} The political commissars were instrumental in these activities, especially during the Northern Expedition of 1926-1927.

\ldots we work not only among the soldiers but among the masses of the people, persuading them to bring tea and hot water, and to care for our wounded. We organize peasant meetings and explain the program of the KMT. We leave behind us if possible peasants\footnote{\textsuperscript{139}} and workers\footnote{\textsuperscript{139}} organizations under their own civilian leadership.

Political workers were specifically instructed to:

\ldots see to it that the troops do not disturb the people during wartime \ldots explain to the soldiers their duty of liberating the people from foreign imperialism. \ldots maintain contact with the people where the army is stationed. \ldots exert special efforts to bring peasant and labor organizations close to the Army.\footnote{\textsuperscript{140}}

Specialized propaganda was undertaken by a women's corps. Placards and wall newspapers displayed appeals like this one of the Fourth Army:

Up to this time to see a soldier was like a rat seeing a cat. You were so frightened you couldn't run fast.\ldots If you couldn't escape you said: 'Most exalted, Sir'\ldots We are no longer 'Most Exalted Sir'; we are your soldier friends.\footnote{\textsuperscript{141}}

\textsuperscript{137}Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17; Wilbur and How, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 162-163, 205.

\textsuperscript{138}Linebarger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{139}Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{140}Wilbur and How, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{141}Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20, 115.

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The Kuomintang armies received considerable assistance from the people. Provisions and ammunition were transported, intelligence and supplies provided, opposing armies harassed.\footnote{142} Skills were of equal importance to the Kuomintang military success. Chiang, trained in modern Chinese and Japanese military schools, depended on Whampoa and other KMT military academies to train officers in modern technical and administrative skills.\footnote{143} Soviet advisers taught at the academies and administered staff and technical military operations. The initial training at Whampoa did not differ from that of other academies of the time, including artillery, engineering, infantry and service corps instruction, but the Soviet officers introduced an expertise absent in other Chinese armies.

At their zenith of power in December, 1925, Soviet officers occupied the following major positions: Chief of Staff to the General Staff (Rogachev), head of the Navy Bureau (Smirnov), head of the Aviation Bureau (Remi), head of the Communications Department. They served as high ranking advisers at the various military academies and to these departments of the KMT General Staff: intelligence, administration, infantry, artillery, engineering and sanitation.\footnote{144} A staff organization of this type showed a marked advance in military specialization and administrative skill over other Chinese armies. Chiang and the Soviets desired

\footnote{143} MacFarquhar, op. cit., pp. 155-160.
\footnote{144} Wilbur and How, op. cit., pp. 190, 196, 212.
to implement this organizational skeleton. Galen suggested a communication specialist school to teach more than operation of a field telephone. At the time of his letter of April 16, 1925, there were only twenty-two soldiers "half educated and with only a slight knowledge of the written language" who were receiving a two-week course. A publishing office was suggested to teach the new literates of the army military tactics and political doctrine. Medical services were marked for improvement.

In a June, 1925, letter to Galen, Chiang called for intensified technical training and establishment of defense industries. He suggested the establishment of: 1) central training organs to direct schools for officers' training, medicine, logistics, chemical warfare, surveying, advanced officers' training, and naval warfare. The curriculum would include infantry, cavalry, army service corps, chemical warfare, artillery, bombardment, airplane manufacture, mines, navigation, shipbuilding, submarines and staff work; 2) central supply and finance organs to construct or reorganize these industrial facilities: mine factory and shipyard, airplane factory, steel mill, cannon factory, rifle and ammunition plants.

The policies and aspirations of the Kuomintang from 1923-1927 were impressive. The reality of political control, benevolence to the lower classes, and modernization fell far

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\[145\] Ibid., pp. 174-175.
\[146\] Ibid., p. 198.
\[147\] Ibid., pp. 177-180.
short of the dream even in this period of high revolutionary idealism. Except for military technology, the gap widened in later years. The Nationalists and Communists took different paths of military development. The former developed a professionalized, regime-preserving fighting force, while the out-of-power Communists developed a military instrument capable of advancing political and social as well as coercive revolution.\footnote{148}

In the years between the first and second periods of cooperation, the years labelled in Peking histories as the "second civil revolutionary war", the Nationalists failed because: 1) within the Kuomintang decisive power passed into military hands, 2) the urge for social change receded, and 3) power and wealth in Chinese society were not redistributed.\footnote{149}

The Kuomintang leaders repudiated the system of political control and mass movements because it feared that the Communists would gain control of the military and civilians through these devices.\footnote{150} Whether or not the Communists used their influence to the fullest, they did infiltrate the army and mass organizations to a considerable extent.\footnote{151} At Whampoa they organized

\footnote{148} Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 107, 119.
\footnote{151} The items cited in note 130 explore this question. For relevant documents on Communist policy during this period see: Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, London: George
the Union for Military Youth, and the sub-heads of the Political, Training and Education departments were Party members of sympa-thizers—Chou En-lai, Teng Yen-ta, and Yeh Chien-ying.  
In the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh the bulk of commissar positions were held by pro-Communists.  
Communists headed political work in four of the five divisions of Chiang's own First Army. The Political Department of the Navy Bureau was headed by Communist Li Chih-lung.

In mass organizations infiltration was substantial. The Organization Department of the Party was directed by Commander T'an P'ing-shan. Mao Tse-tung was deputy director of the Propa-ganda Department and Director of the Peasant Movement Training Institute. He and two other Communists were among the five men in charge of the KMT's Political Training Class. A Communist headed the Peasant Department. CCP members were secretaries in the Labor, Youth, Overseas, Merchant and Women's departments. Under their direction sizeable labor and peasant organizations took shape. By the summer of 1926 the Second Enlarged Plenum of


152 MacFarquhar, op. cit., pp. 156, 161.
153 Chiang, op. cit., pp. 46-49.
154 Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 218.
155 Ibid., p. 217.
the CCP claimed organization of 1,200,000 workers and 800,000 peasants. By January, 1927, Mao claimed a two million strong peasant organization in Hunan. With the death of the key civilian figures in the KMT, Sun and Liao Chung-k'ai, Chiang's position became increasingly important. This weakening of civilian leadership was coupled with rising tensions between military commanders and commissars. Officers resented the need to secure approval of their policies and checks on their personal behavior. An extreme occurred in the 4th Army.

...the officers especially hated the political councils... when the officers were forced to attend these weekly councils of soldiers and officers, common privates had the right to arise and demand from them explanation or accounts of expenditures of money; or to ask why the officers had not paid the wages that the soldiers were supposed to get ...

The military was not amenable to befriending the populace. Soldiers had to be commanded not to shoot civilians at will, and the Twentieth Regiment of the First Army clashed with the peasants. Officers did not enthrone over mass movements which threatened the power and position of their relatives. A good example of this reaction was that to peasant attempts at land reform. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, at that time head of the Chinese Communist

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Party, later wrote,

Not a single one of the bourgeoisie, landlords, war lords and gentry of Hunan and Hupeh provinces but was the kinsman, relative or old friend of the officers of that time. All the landowners were directly or indirectly protected by the officers.\textsuperscript{162}

In fact, the political control system existed largely on paper. The Communists chastised themselves for failing to "establish close contacts with low-ranking officers and the masses of soldiers";\textsuperscript{163} Political workers were inadequately trained and in short supply.\textsuperscript{164} The various Chinese "military politicians" could double cross as nimbly as the Communists.\textsuperscript{165}

Chiang capitalized on these tensions to alter the institutional structure of the Kuomintang and its armies and to enhance his personal power. On March 20, 1926, he declared martial law at Canton and arrested a number of Communist Party representatives. On April 3 he proposed the withdrawal of CCP representatives from the First Army. On June 4 the Military Council was abolished and Chiang was appointed commander-in-chief. In the following five weeks he assumed a position on the National Government Council and took charge of the Military Personnel Department, in other words took control of appointment and


\textsuperscript{163} Wilbur and How, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 317.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 190-198.

\textsuperscript{165} All accounts of this period cited in note 130 devote some attention to repeated Chinese Communist and Soviet attempts at alliances with various generals. A disillusioned Borodin summed up their success: "When the next Chinese general comes to Moscow and shouts 'Hail to the World Revolution' better send at once for the G.P.U. All that any of them want is rifles." Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 242.
dismissal of Party representatives to the Army.

Chiang's accumulation of power culminated on July 6 when he was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee Standing Committee. The "Organic Law of the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army" promulgated on July 7 "placed in his hands the reins of all military, party, civil and financial control." On April 12 he crushed the Communist-dominated Shanghai Insurrection. On April 18, 1927, he set up a government at Nanking which rivalled the left-wing politicians' groups at Wuhan. Late in June, 1927, the Wuhan group succumbed, and Chiang demanded that Russian advisers and the Chinese Communists be expelled from the Kuomintang. On July 15, 1927, the Political Council of the KMT formally expelled the Communists.

Coupled with the decline of political control mechanisms was a vast expansion of the Nationalist forces. Chiang deliberately minimized the political-generalist characteristics of the Kuomintang armies. The power of the party representatives was reduced and that of the officers strengthened. The Commission for the Reorganization of the KMT commanded: "...political workers are no longer under the orders of a political department at Wuhan, but under the orders of their local commander in all


things, and under army law and treatment like any other soldier. 168

Tremendous expansion of the Kuomintang forces further militated
against indoctrination. Chiang's own First army swelled rapidly,
from 960 in May, 1924, to 30,000 in November, 1925. During the
Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 the army expanded by absorbing
soldiers from defeated warlord forces. 169

Until the alliance with the CCP was resumed after the Sian
incident of December 12-December 25, 1936, regressions continued.
The Kuomintang was caught in a vicious circle. To achieve
national power other armies had to be defeated. To defeat other
armies a strong military force took priority over other needs of
government. The army took control of the KMT, and purely coercive
ends came before social change. However, failure to accomplish
social change served to perpetuate opposing armies. 170

From 1927-1937 the Nationalists were continually involved
in large-scale military operations. Wars were fought against
the Northern militarists, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, the
Kwangsi armies of Li Tsung-jan and Pai Chung-hsi, and five
major campaigns fought against the Communists. The Japanese
armies were a looming threat. 171 Attempts were made to lessen

168 Strong, op. cit., p. 179.
169 Ibid., p. 50; Liu, op. cit., p. 25.
170 Holcombe, op. cit., pp. 120-121; MacNair, op. cit., p. 224;
Ch'ien, op. cit., p. 248.
171 For details of these numerous campaigns see: MacNair, op. cit.,
Chapters XII, XII; Liu, op. cit., p. 74; Leang-li T'ang, op. cit.,
pp. 40-54; Po-ta Chen, Notes on Ten Years of Civil War, 1927-
1936, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954; Huan-wen Tsai,
"China's Second Revolutionary Civil War, 1927-1937," China
the burden of armed forces on the people and economy, but they failed. As of July, 1928, the KMT and its allies had two million men under arms. After the failure of the Nanking Disbandment Conference of January, 1929, the number rose to 2,500,000, not including the Communist forces. In 1930 78% of net government revenue was used for military purposes.\textsuperscript{172}

As long as the key to political importance was an army, the provincial leaders would not disband or weaken their forces. But until this was done, the Kuomintang could not weaken or disband its forces.\textsuperscript{173} Within the party founded by Sun, perpetual preoccupation with military victories was accompanied by a diluted ideological \textit{elan}. The Nationalists became increasingly a military-merchant alliance, and the peasants and intelligentsia looked for political involvement elsewhere.\textsuperscript{174}

The elites and institutions of the KMT reflected the rise of the military, and the personal control of General Chiang. In 1926 25% of the members of the Central Executive Committee had military career histories; by 1935, 42.9%. Chiang's partisans were centered in the military groups to a much greater extent than were the partisans of the Left and Right wings of the KMT. Officers who had been trained in Japanese military academies were Chiang's especially steadfast supporters.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{172}Abend, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 147-148; MacNair, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 160-171; Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 72-73.

\textsuperscript{173}Linebarger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 112-113; Harold S. Quigley, "Chinese Politics Today," \textit{The Day and Hour Series of the University of Minnesota}, No. 8, 1934, p. 13.


\textsuperscript{175}Date cited is drawn from Robert J. North's \textit{Kuomintang and
The civilian-political control of the institutions of the Nanking regime steadily disintegrated after the first alliance period, especially after the autumn of 1931. Chiang's early maneuvers in this direction have already been detailed. Chosen President of the National Government in October, 1928, military power was effectively placed in his hands. The General Staff, the Military Advisory Council, the Directorate General of Military Training, the National Defense Council and metropolitan garrison headquarters were all directly responsible to him. After a brief interregnum in early 1932, Chiang returned to formal power. The Military Commission of the National Government was re-established in 1932. Paper safeguards did not prevent Chairman Chiang from controlling the War and Navy Ministries, the Central Military Academy and the Central Political Institute. He was the unifying link between army, government and party. In 1932 he was also made Commander-in-Chief of a General Bandit Suppression Headquarters to exterminate the Communists. Within Communist-threatened areas he had complete administrative, Party and military authority. Accordingly, when the Communists evacuated these areas, his authority was expanded.

Chiang imitated Japanese and Prussian, rather than Soviet, military models. His army was not programmatic, professional or

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177 *Liu, op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.
politicoized-generalist or specialist. It was a veto-group army which wanted

the major military function to operate independently, run by military men and not by civilians, and to coordinate the whole through the absolute control vested in the military head of the state. 179

The desirable internal characteristics of the army were high skill level and esprit. Numerous German advisers aided the Central Military Academy and the Army Staff College, and the "Generalissimo's Own" armies assumed these characteristics. 180 The rank and file in these elite armies were relatively well and regularly paid, well-treated and glamorized in the Party press. 181 Within the officer corps, group spirit was cultivated through organizations such as the Officer's Moral Endeavour Society. 182 At the Central Military Academy annual classes of 3,000 received an intensive two-year course supplemented by a year or more of specialized study at one of the following schools: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineering, Genfarmerie, Chemical Warfare, Anti-Aircraft Defense, Armor and Mechanized, Communications, Transport and Supply, Fortress Artillery, Quartermaster, Naval, Air, Finance, Surveying, Medical, Veterinary, Ordnance Technical, Foreign Language. Technical skill and modern equipment were used to an unprecedented degree in Chinese armies. 183

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180 Ibid., Chapter 9.
The use of the army to modernize and organize society did not increase with its internal development. Paper declarations of intent to use demobilized soldiers as a disciplined labor-construction force, regular troops as propagandists and organizers of mass organizations, e.g., the "Iron-Shoulder Corps," remained on paper.\(^{184}\) Walking a tightrope between the hostility of other generals, the Communists, and the Japanese, Chiang substituted a neo-Confucian code of responsibility to authority, and personal morality for social reform. This code was represented by the pao-chia system of collective responsibility begun in 1913 and the New Life Movement of 1934.\(^{185}\)

In late 1936 and early 1937 a complicated series of events brought the Nationalist Government into war against Japan.\(^{186}\) National and KMT survival required military mobilization. Yet mass mobilization could aid Chiang's personal opponents and those of his party. The relevance of the 1937-1946 period lies in the conflicting moves of Chiang's regime to arouse and control the mass of the population and to modify the provincial power structure at the highest levels without changing popular subordination to landowning, commercial and military elites.

\(^{184}\) ibid., p. 72; T'ang, op. cit., pp. 44-46, 53; Chiang, op. cit., p. 208.

\(^{185}\) MacNair, op. cit., p. 181; Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

b. The Second Alliance--1937-1946

The Kuomintang's resistance to Japan was an effort which lasted eight years and conscripted over fourteen million men into the armed forces. The Nationalists had to conscript millions to supplement their "elite" army and to organize the populace to support the armies. As the tide of the war pushed the regime inland from its coastal areas of strength, the army had to act as the wedge of central authority in organizing hitherto largely autonomous provinces. As Chiang retreated into the backward areas of China, modern men and equipment had to be created to support the military. In the early years of the war valiant efforts were made toward these ends, but conflicting interests of the KMT increasingly paralyzed these attempts.

Preparation for an eventual conflict with the Communists, galloping corruption, fear of popular organizations and uncontrolled social change reduced the probability that the KMT would use the military instrument to organize a new society. War exaggerated the importance of generals and military needs. Chiang's concern with modernization increasingly narrowed to weaponry and his image of future Chinese society became increasingly traditional. As the Communists made greater efforts to unite army and populace and to exploit the economic and modernization potential of their soldiers, Nationalist non-coercive efforts diminished.

In 1937 the KMT and CCP renewed their alliance. The initial program called for a politicized-generalist KMT army committed

Liu, op. cit., p. 135.
to mass mobilization. An extraordinary Congress of the Kuomintang meeting from March 29-April 1, 1938, drafted a "Program of Resistance and Reconstruction". Relevant points were:

8. The army shall receive more political training so that both officers and men may appreciate the importance of war, the national reconstruction, and be ready to lay down their lives for the nation.

10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive the support and encouragement of the Government and under the direction of local military authorities shall cooperate with the regular army to defend the country against foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged in the enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his military forces.

11. Both the wounded and the killed [sic.] shall be pensioned; the disabled shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers fighting at the front shall be treated with the utmost consideration, so the people will rejoice to fight for their country and the work of national mobilization may proceed with the highest degree of efficiency.

25. The people throughout the country shall be organized into occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants and students. The principle is that the rich shall contribute in money and the able bodied shall sweat. All classes of people shall be mobilized for war.188

Chiang Kai-shek himself declared in the Loyang Conference in late 1937,

It is not surprising that we have been defeated so far, for we have had a nineteenth century army. We must build a new army with new relations between officers and men and between army and people. There must be ways in which even the common soldiers can make suggestions and criticisms possible through some sort of soldiers' club. There must be unified discipline; generals who retreat without orders or sufficient reasons will be executed. We must organize not only the army but the whole of the Chinese people.189

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The Political Department was re-established within the army. Communist Chou En-lai served as Deputy Director. In October, 1939, a government release claimed that:

Special commissioners were assigned to every group army, and political departments in the divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization, and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political corps were formed to organize and train civilians...

Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or fortnightly talk by the officers, where as now well-planned lessons on political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clocklike regularity. Singing theatricals, cartooning, sports are promoted among the soldiers...

Attempts to raise the status and skills of the Nationalist soldiers accompanied increased indoctrination, called "ethical training."

The Nationalists claimed to have raised the literacy level from 30 to 70% in their forces. Paeans were sung to the soldiers, and the technically more advanced air force received special praise (an "air force is a highly mechanized army in the modern time."). The Army Medical Service was improved. Students were brought into the army.

Organizations were formed and campaigns launched to link the soldier and civilian in common effort. The military Political

190 Carlson, op. cit., p. 32.
192 Liu, op. cit., p. 142.
195 Liu, op. cit., p. 143. 43,000 were in training by 1945.
Department played a sizeable role in this policy. It was charged with war propaganda among the people, organizing "people's service corps, self defense units and money contributions to the war chest."\(^{196}\) "Political workers ... should be held responsible for promoting spiritual mobilization among the masses."\(^{197}\) In 1941 under the slogan of "work, fight and train", soldiers on the Ichang and Tungkwan fronts were described as cooperating with farmers, e.g., they grew crops and learned productive skills.\(^{198}\) Soldiers' families and disabled veterans were organized into small factory work groups under military supervision.\(^{199}\)

The "all inclusive mobilization"\(^{200}\) was harnessed in a myriad of organizations linked to the war effort, e.g., the Association for Supporting Armed Resistance against Japan.\(^{201}\) Affiliated with the New Life Movement and the National Spiritual Mobilization were the: War Area Service Corps, Rural Service Corps, New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, Wounded Soldier's League, Friends of the Wounded Society, New Life Secretaries Camp and the Women's Advisory Council.\(^{202}\)


\(^{202}\) Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
created in July of 1938 the Three People's Principles Youth Corps. The Corps activities were stated to urge youths to join the practical work connected with the war of national defense; to enforce military and political training; to encourage civil progress, labor and skill in production.

By April, 1940, the organization claimed 126,111 members. Its work of propaganda and organization was carried on in the army as well as in civilian society. 203

In 1938 the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives were first established with central government sanction and H. H. Kung as President. The co-operatives sought to combine economic modernization and production of military goods. 204 In Hupeh and Hopei production plans were co-ordinated with local military commanders. 205 In many parts of China blankets, soap, uniforms, shoes, light weapons and medical supplies for the army were turned out by the Co-ops. 206 At their peak in June, 1941, there were 1,867 societies with a total membership of 29,284. 207

The regime also spoke of a "Mass Mobilization" under the Training Department of the Military Affairs Commission. 208

203 Ibid., p. 132, Appendix, II (E) and (C).
207 Ibid., p. 27.
War Area Headquarters are requested to help the local populace organize citizens' militia corps. These corps in turn are authorized to train, organize and supervise the able-bodied youths in their areas.\textsuperscript{209} The "Able-Bodied Citizens' Corps" was made an organizational unit at all levels of local government.\textsuperscript{210} As developed in Kiangsu, the organization was divided into four departments: 1) organization, military and political training of men between 18 and 45; 2) propaganda, mass meetings, wall papers, stage presentations; 3) war aid, help for the wounded, refugee welfare and maintenance of order; and 4) intelligence work.\textsuperscript{211}

Chiang supported these part time militia units--

The able-bodied citizens corps are necessary in peace as well as in war time. Attention should be paid both to training and to the supervision so that their usefulness may be fully developed. The constituents of the able-bodied citizens' corps are the pillars of society.\textsuperscript{212} During the training emphasis should not be on military alone, but also on general and vocational ability in order to turn corps members into useful members of society.\textsuperscript{213}

We must re-establish the system of combining soldiers and farmers...because this system is essential to enable the nation to fight a modern war.\textsuperscript{213}

The realities of wartime China, the actual use of the military as an instrument for political unification, social change and economic development hardly matched this picture.

The institutions could have served such a purpose, but they did

\textsuperscript{209}China at War, Vol. VII, no. 1 (July, 1941), p. 64.
\textsuperscript{210}Linebarger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{212}Speech of Chiang on "Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of Hsien," published as Conclusions of the Party Chief, originally delivered before the Party and Government Training Class of the Central Training Corps, reprinted in Linebarger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 400-401.
\textsuperscript{213}Chiang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 276.
not. The Military Affairs Commission, under the chairmanship of Chiang Kai-shek received broad powers in September, 1937.

In the following year the military council took control of:

- military operation, political policies, heavy industries, light industries and commerce, international relations, civilian defense...
- committees on agricultural production, mining and manufacturing, trade and commerce and land and water transportation.

Even after the supposedly restrictive "Organic Law of the Military Commission" of January 17, 1938, was announced, the Commission as the arm of its all-powerful Chairman was in a position to unify military, political, and economic policies. Formally it was organized into twelve departments—Military Operations, Military Training, Courts-Martial, Pensions, Military Advisory, Personnel, Service, National Aviation, Naval, Military Affairs, Political, and the Party and Government War Area Commission.

Because Chiang and his personal staff were present in the Commission it over-rode the five civil Yuans. Chiang, Party leader and head of the government, administered largely through the Office of Aides to the Chairman of the Commission. The three sections of the Office of Aides dealt with espionage and intelligence, general national administration and policies, and records and appointments for military, civil and educational posts.

The possibilities of a co-ordinated coercive and non-coercive use of the military by the Nationalists were great.

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217 Ibid., pp. 247-248; Linebarger, Chu and Bur, op. cit., p. 168.
Unfortunately the spread of Communist power, and the pillow of American support reduced efforts to use the army for social and economic purposes.\textsuperscript{218} Internal modernization was limited to elite armies for future use against the Communists. The internal role of the military was limited to expanding Chiang's control over hitherto semi-autonomous provinces.\textsuperscript{219} The best armies were kept out of the front lines of resistance to the Japanese, and concern switched to the Chinese opponents of the KMT.\textsuperscript{220}

The Political Department checked the loyalty of higher officers to Chiang.\textsuperscript{221} It was never established within the frontline forces.\textsuperscript{222} Political workers not absolutely loyal to Chiang and the Conservative Organization clique in the KMT were weeded out.\textsuperscript{223} The Army Medical Service was a farce. It was controlled by individual officers; its supplies were a source of corrupt revenue, and it employed only about 2,000 doctors.\textsuperscript{224} The highest KMT officers had a spotty modern education; "at the


\textsuperscript{219} Perhaps the most progressive part of the Nationalist war effort was the breaking down of provincial autonomy. Central government influence markedly increased in Yunnan, Szechwan, Sinkiang, and Kwangsi. Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{220} Peck, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 78. An exception was the force receiving American training and supplies in Burma.

\textsuperscript{221} Smedley, op. cit., pp. 286, 292; News Release, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{222} Peck, op. cit., p. 138.

\textsuperscript{223} Carlson, op. cit., Chapter IX.

\textsuperscript{224} Freda Utley, China at War, New York: The John Day Company, 1939, pp. 121-122; Liu, op. cit., pp. 139-141.
general officer level 70% had not been graduated from regular military academies." 225 Students comprised less than one-tenth of one percent of the forces. 226

Mass organization for militia and military support purposes was totally inadequate. Under the impact of Chungking hostility and inflation the Co-ops died. The New Life groups concentrated on obedience and prudery rather than social and economic modernization and had little mass appeal. 227 Militia were not developed because the KMT feared that it could not control them. Even in as conservative a province as Szechwan they existed only on paper. 228 Soldiers became competitors with peasants for food. Conscription into the army was viewed as a sure death. 229

There was not only a failure to use the army for social development and to mobilize the people in a military framework. The Nationalists failed to create a modern army able to secure popular support and to spread modern skills. The life of the average Nationalist soldier was hardly conducive to political loyalty or social responsibility. The conscript was more likely to be a peasant or poor man than a student or a wealthy son able

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225 Ibid., p. 146.
to purchase a substitute. Roped in gangs of fellow conscripts, he would be marched many miles with little food and shelter. 230

Here is a description of one group:

Slowly around a bend in the yellow road staggered the long line of spectres, their flapping black rags thick with dust. They were roped together of course, and they cruelly jerked and cut each other as they lurched about. Many seemed delirious staring wildly and talking to themselves. 231

Conspects died, deserted and committed suicide. In 1943 only 56% of inductees reached their assigned units. 232

After the recruit reached his unit, his conditions did not improve. Personal possessions were confiscated by officers. Sand was added to their rice. Barracks were often stone floors. Medical supplies were almost non-existent. Officers exploited their men by profiteering on soldiers' supplies, and hiring out their units as a labor force to local merchants and landlords. Compensation went into the officer's pockets. With the exception of the American-trained Chinese armies in Burma, modern equipment for the army shrunk. Officers often used modern equipment for personal benefit. 233 As Carlson observed in 1940,

There is still a crying need for a re-orientation of the mental attitude of military leaders toward their duty, and toward the rights and sensibilities of the civil populace as well as of the men whom they lead. 234

230 Carlson, op. cit., p. 31; Utley, op. cit., pp. 152, 260-261; Liu, op. cit., p. 137.

231 Peck, op. cit., p. 217.


234 Carlson, op. cit., p. 33.
As the war drew on, the soldiers were increasingly forced to extract supplies from the peasants. Soldiers and officers took food, animals and labor from the countryside, killing those who resisted. An extreme reaction occurred in Honan Province. Following the famine of 1943, in April-May, 1944, peasants attacked disorganized Nationalist troops. Feng Yu-hsiang warned—

One reason we suffered a setback in the Honan campaign is that our soldiers made themselves enemies of the people....Unless we make far-reaching reforms now we will very soon see the disintegration of our country.

The "far-reaching reforms" were not effected. Within the government and party the Whampoa clique and the highly conservative "CC" or "Organization" clique strengthened their position. Generals more oriented toward social change, e.g., Feng and the Kwangsi leaders Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, were care-fully isolated. Immense corruption permeated the regime.

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236 Ibid., p. 123, quoting from the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury (N.Y.), Nov. 3, 1944.

237 Ch'ien, Government and Politics of China, op. cit., p. 131; North, op. cit., pp. 18, 75. For the 1924-29 period the "left" group held 48.6% of KMT Central Executive Committee seats. After the Sixth National Congress of 1945, it held only 31.9%.


239 For a brief summary, see: Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 220-225.
Beneath the seemingly modern superstructure at Chungking, the social base of KMT support shrank. In the post-war years the Nationalists did not meet the Communists' non-coercive challenge and Communist prestige rose in the aspiration area. Chiang ignored his own conclusion in the 1943 ideology texts, *China's Destiny* and *Chinese Economic Theory*—"... when soldiers are not also farmers they become loafers and hoodlums."\(^{241}\)

The Kuomintang evolution from "revolution to reaction" provided opportunities and warning to their CCP opponents. Communist opportunities were Nationalist failures, failures to create a unified army and to use the military, or indeed any other instrument, to unify the populace. Equally dependent on military strength for survival, the Communists sought to compensate for technical limitations by political training in their army. Equally required to wage war across the fields of the peasants, the Communists attempted to secure popular support by military assistance, and to instill an attitude of common struggle.\(^{242}\)

The Nationalist failure pointed out the results of internal decay in a party and government organization and the problems of repression by force without mass use of persuasion. It showed that an army divided internally was a weak fighting force. It showed that a military caste could take over a revolutionary

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\(^{240}\) This was as true of the all-important intellectuals and students as of any other sector of Chinese society. Robert Payne describes the process at length in *Chungking Diary*, op. cit., and the first section of *China Awake*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1947.

\(^{241}\) Chiang, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 274.

\(^{242}\) Kuo, *op. cit.*, Chapter III.
party and become obsessed with military as contrasted with social modernization.

B. Norms, the Military as a Social Problem.

Yen Peng, the Tai-pings, Tso and the Kuomintang envisioned broad social, political and economic use of their armies. These generals and groups were extraordinary in China and the Communists benefited from their experimentation. There was another side to Chinese military history which affected the Communists' policies and public reaction to them. Three factors merit discussion: the political power of generals, the low status of the military profession, and the exploitation of the citizens by soldier and officer.


The disruption of Chinese society was accompanied by the increasing supremacy of the generals over the scholars. Violence and coercion were not new instruments of government, but their perpetual domination of the political scene was new.

Previously:

...every dynasty has been founded by the sword...
(but) ...once an imperial regime has been instituted, civilian government has been esteemed over military. 243

The theoretical expression of this pattern was the "Divine Mandate". Victory in revolt against the dynasty implied legitimacy; defeat defined the attempt as "banditry".

Heaven's pleasure only became manifested in China when some warrior untutored in the lore of Confucius established his claim to the throne by force of arms. 244

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243 Fairbank, op. cit., p. 50.
244 Bales, op. cit., p. 27.
The Western impact of modern arms helped to upset the cycle of bureaucratic regime-military rebellion-new bureaucratic regime. A quasi-modernized group of officers with weakened loyalties to political traditions was created. Military men rose to positions of civil authority supported by regional armies.  

After the Tai-ping Rebellion civil authority was based increasingly on military bodies. As a response to the Western impact the Dynasty reluctantly consented to the establishment of Western-style military academies. The Paoting Military Academy of Yuan Shih-Kai was perhaps the foremost of these. Among its students were Chiang, Feng, Yen and numerous warlords of the second and third decades of this century. Yuan used it to build his base of power and officer coterie.

In 1907 the government established a Council of Military Consultation independent of the cabinet. The heads of the War and Navy ministries became professional military men who reported directly to the Emperor. In 1911 a series of revolts among the modernized military forces and academies ended the Empire, and Yuan came to power. Control of the military establishment passed from more or less talented members of the literati, and control of civil government followed. Yuan retained and broadened

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246 Michael, op. cit.; and Powell, op. cit.


248 Chu Teh's account of the military rising in Yunnan is interesting. See: Smedley, The Great Road, op. cit., Chapter 3.
the power of the military in the central government. He placed provincial military governors, preferably graduates of Paoing, in control of the provinces. The Manchu provincial administrative distinction between the Tartar General and civilian viceroy was extinguished. **249** Provincial military authorities approved and disapproved cabinet ministers, legislation, constitutions, foreign policy. **250**

Even Yuan with his powerful network of personal loyalties and allegiance of the Feiyang Army failed to establish central authority. Fitzgerald has summarized the position and motivations of the generals in 1916. It indicates the military climate out of which the Kuomintang and Communist "party armies" developed.

These men suddenly found, in the confused scene of the Republic, that they the military were the real holders of power: the Emperor, the symbol of civil control was gone. The viceroy and the governors, men without prestige or experience, were feeble barriers to military ambition and only too anxious to share with the generals in the spoils of office. ... It was clear to the generals that as arbiters of the factions of a weak republic they would count for more than as the obedient generals of a new Empire. Moreover, all could aspire to do what Yuan wished to do. The dynasty was fallen so any able general could found another. Once Yuan was gone the field would be clear for all comers. **251**

From Yuan's death in 1916 to the final triumph of the Kuomintang Northern Expedition in the late summer of 1928, the position of the government has been described as

the civilian authorities in the Central Government

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**250** Houn, *op. cit.*
**251** Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 40-41.
constituted either the puppet of the warlords or their sycophants. The Peking Republic fell into the expedient of giving de jure status to every shift in the interplay of power.\textsuperscript{252}

In the provinces the generals assumed power with even less pretence. They bore the title of Military-Governor (Tuchun) and fought to maintain their personal barony and to extend influence over their weaker neighbors.\textsuperscript{253} They issued currency, controlled transportation and communication and imposed taxes.\textsuperscript{254} Since military defeat or decay would mean the end of personal power, "each spent the provincial funds upon recruiting and equipment of larger and larger armies".\textsuperscript{255} While the Nationalists subordinated many provincial military men to central authority, even they did not establish the supremacy of civil over military authority.\textsuperscript{256} In Anhwei Province in 1947-48, for example,

General and even field officers gave orders freely to district magistrates, and on one occasion ...the magistrate of a district in Honan acted as the virtual body servant of a general.\textsuperscript{257}


On the traditional social scale the soldier ranked lowest—below the scholar, farmer and merchant.\textsuperscript{258} The old proverb "as

\textsuperscript{252} Linebarger, op. cit., p. 114.
\textsuperscript{253} Kotenev, op. cit., p. 98.
\textsuperscript{256} Ch'ien, op. cit., pp. 241-249.
\textsuperscript{258} Linebarger, op. cit., p. 83.
you would not use good iron to make a nail so you would not use
a good man to make a soldier.\textsuperscript{259} was often quoted to support
the conclusion that "the army has been made up of the dregs of
the country."\textsuperscript{260} Weber, Levy, LaBarre have accepted this inter-
pretation.\textsuperscript{261} In periods of foreign attack military status rose
briefly, only to decline with the resumption of government by
the literati.\textsuperscript{262}

The characteristics and motivations of soldiers and officers
often reflected the low status of the military profession. Several
small studies found that 83.3 to 87\% of the soldiers could neither
read nor write.\textsuperscript{263} When Lang reviewed the records of soldiers
from 25 different armies, he concluded that "The professional
Chinese soldier was a man without family in the classic country
of familism."\textsuperscript{264} Conscription was viewed as breaking up the
family. Thus in the "Old Poem":

\begin{center}
At fifteen I went with the army,
At fourscore I came home.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{259} Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, \textit{The Armies of Asia and Europe}, New York:

\textsuperscript{260} Carlson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{261} H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, \textit{From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology}, London: International Library of Sociology and
Social Reconstruction, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952,
p. 422; Marion J. Levy, \textit{The Family Revolution in Modern
Fried, \textit{op. cit.}, cites Weston LaBarre, "Some Observations on
Character Structure in the Orient. II. The Chinese,"

\textsuperscript{262} Shu-ching Lee, "Comment," in Fried, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 356.

\textsuperscript{263} Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142, gathered this data from James Y. C. Yen,
\textit{The Mass Education Movement in China}, Shanghai: Commercial
Press, 1925, p. 15; and Meng-ho Tao, Quarterly Review of the
Institute of Social Science, Academia Sinica, July, 1930,
pp. 92-115.

\textsuperscript{264} Lang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
On the way I met a man from the village,
I asked him who there was at home.
'That over there is your house,
All covered with trees and bushes.'
Rabbits had run in at the dog-hole,
Pheasants flew down from the beams of the roof.
In the courtyard was growing some wild grain;
And by the well, some wild mallows.
I'll boil the grain and make porridge,
I'll pluck the mallows and make soup.
Soup and porridge are both cooked,
But there is no one to eat them with.
I went out and looked toward the east.
While tears fell and wetted my clothes. 265

Soldiers enlisted to acquire food or to escape family
tragedy. Some also joined as a way to wealth. 266 The armies
served as one of the few avenues of material mobility in China.

In a Yunnan village

a family which we knew to have been in debt for
several hundred dollars cleared up all its obli-
gations and acquired more than 10 kung of land in
one year after the son had entered the army. The
richest family in the village has a son who is the
commander of a regiment. 267

Fei and Chang summarize:

A major function of military roles in Chinese
culture is the provision of alternative possibilities
to individuals of ambition who desire to improve
their social, political and economic fortunes but
who realize that humble tilling of the soil, thrift
and virtue do not often bring success. 268

An army characterized by alienation from the society and material
motives was naturally not amenable to political control and to
non-coercive tasks. As long as the status of the military

1946, p. 51, reprinted in Hsiao-tung Fei, China's Gentry,
267 Quoted by Fried, op. cit., p. 351, from Hsiao-tung Fei and
Chih-i Chang, Earthbound China, Chicago: University of
268 Ibid., p. 61 from Fei and Chang, op. cit., p. 277.
remained low, it did not attract individuals more amenable to non-materialist behavior. Until the cycle could be interrupted, association of a political group and its socio-economic policies with the military produced popular hostility to the political group and its programs.

3. Armies and the People.

The existence of military bodies conflicted with the well-being of the mass of people. They imposed a heavy economic burden. Military power was used to support the privileged and to allow officer and soldier a free hand in dealing with civilians.

Chinese armies grew rapidly in the first half of this century.

Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1,625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

269 Gathered from numerous sources. In case of conflicting figures, the lower estimates were used.
While respective figures are not reliable, the trend of expansion is clear. T. V. Soong told the National Economic Conference of June-July, 1928, that the Central Government's revenue after paying debt service charges was $60,000,000 less than the cost of the military establishment alone.270

The generals, unwilling to depend on the shaky central government for support, intercepted central government revenues, manipulated currencies, and taxed the populations many years in advance.271 When spheres of power shifted the financial effects for the people could be disastrous. In 1929 the city of Changteh was controlled by five different generals. Each collected "annual taxes", and special levies to "pay arrears of troops".272 Taxation and exaction of this type set up a vicious cycle.

Military taxation drove peasants off the land whereupon they had no recourse but to become bandits or soldiers. If they were bandits, consolidation under a chieftain transformed them into military irregulars and induced some ambitious general to include them in his forces. If they were soldiers, the bandit stage remained in reach. In either case they added to the burden falling upon their commander, which in turn led to still greater impoverishment of peasants to a further increase of dispossessed men, bandits and soldiers.273

Li Yuan-huang, Yuan's successor as president at Peking, stated the dilemma.

If the policy is disbandment, soldiers turn bandits. If it is recruiting, bandits turn soldiers. Therefore there is no brigand who is not a soldier,

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270 Abend, op. cit., p. 147.
272 Abend, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
273 Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
and no soldier who is not a brigand. 274

In such armies,

There was no room for any ideology or high military ideals and patriotism. Everything was measured by the amount of salary, food and loot... which the soldier procured in time of warfare at his own risk either from the enemy or the population. 275

Civilians, especially those without wealth, were at the mercy of the numerous armed bodies. Even technical personnel necessary for military success, such as railway men, were abused and ordered about. 276

The military was exempt from civilian authority. The officers went untaxed and seldom checked. 277

As for the men,

My property is nothing but a gun
And these few pieces of war-time equipment.
By these I become master of all;
By these I plant, I weed, I reap.

I shall eat meat and drink wine wherever I please.
What do I care to whom they belong?
Wherever I go,
They shall ask my pity and my favor.
Because the people fear my gun
And my war-time equipment,
Tremblingly they kneel before my feet
And offer all they have to me.
And because of my gun they hold their breath
And call me sire; My gun and my equipment
What endless treasure they are. 278

The local units often known as Peace Preservation Corps, were of little help to the ordinary peasant. 279

Gentry-controlled,

274 Cloud, op. cit., p. 18.
275 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 99.
277 Chow, op. cit.; Fried, op. cit., p. 349.
279 Fairbank, op. cit., p. 37.
these local toughs served to collect rents and preserve the power of the local hierarchy.\textsuperscript{280}

MacNair summed up the nature of the armed forces relationship with the people:

When ... the passage of armies and bandit gangs back and forth across the country who seize the crops, or prevent sowing and harvesting, who impress into unpaid service all able-bodied men who do not flee their clutches, who rape the women or carry them off, and who plunder and often burn the villages are taken into account.... When in addition the high taxes of provincial autonomy under oft-changing warlords who collect the taxes many years in advance is taken into account, one can understand why the peasants of China may lend attentive ears to the promises of Communist agents.\textsuperscript{281}

The relations between the people and army also included a Robin Hood tradition on which the non-Communist Chinese reformers never capitalized. The "Robin Hood" take from the rich and give to the poor pattern occurred in the Tai-ping, White Lotus and Nien rebellions.\textsuperscript{282} It pervades the famous novel All Men Are Brothers.\textsuperscript{283} However, many Chinese liberal intellectuals were culturally biased in favor of civilian bureaucracy and bitter against the unchecked militarists. They preferred

\begin{itemize}
  \item MacNair, China in Revolution, op. cit., pp. 192-193.
  \item Pearl Buck (trans.), All Men Are Brothers, New York: The John Day Company, 1933.
\end{itemize}
to develop civil authorities rather than to use the military for social reconstruction and political unification. They hoped for "a non-military force which can overthrow the military dictatorship." 284

C. The Communist Inheritance.

The Communist use of the military instrument combined the devices of reforming and warlord generals, the revolutionary aims of earlier rebellions, the goals and discipline of Marxism-Leninism, and the talent and manpower of scholar and peasant. This synthesis was and is substantially successful in avoiding the failures of earlier Chinese military innovators and in under-cutting the negative norms of previous Chinese military behavior. By June, 1927, the Communists had learned the futility of trying to manipulate independent military leaders. A disillusioned Borodin described the Communist situation:

Did you ever see a rabbit before an anaconda ... trembling, knowing it is going to be devoured, yet fascinated? That's the civic power before the military in Wuhan, staring at the military and trembling. 285

After August 1, 1927, the Chinese Communists established their own military forces. They had to develop a military which 1) was skilled and indoctrinated, 2) was controlled by the Party, 3) would participate in administration, propaganda and production activities, 4) would secure and exploit popular support for the Party, 5) would rapidly expand military strength, develop the economy and re-organize society.


Chapter 3
History of the CCP Army

The non-coercive activities of the Communist military were responses to the CCP survival and expansion needs. They were affected by enemy military pressure, the priorities of the CCP leaders, and the human and material resources that the army had at its disposal. These factors are related in the following historical survey of the CCP movement.

Accurate statistics on the size of Chinese armies have always been illusive, and statistics on the Communist forces are no exception. The problem is one of conflicting numerical estimates, not a dearth of estimates. Tables III, IV, V, and VI present the available data and indicate sources when possible. Although there is disagreement over specific figures, there is general agreement on the increase or decrease of membership. Usually the CCP figure in the tables is the lowest available. When there is a significant gap in Communist estimates, both the high and low estimates are included.

1. Agrarian Revolutionary War, 1927-1936

The Agrarian Revolutionary War period includes these events: establishment of the Red Army in 1927, the five campaigns launched by Chiang Kai-shek against the southern Soviets in the early 1930's, the Long March of 1934-35, and the arrival of the battered Red Army in the Northwest in 1936. Even the Communist figures in Table III describe the pattern of Communist success and failure during these years. The first Communist forces suffered heavy attrition. However, during the 1930-31 months
Table III
Size of the Communist Armies, 1927-1936
Agrarian Revolutionary War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>CCP Estimate</th>
<th>Nationalist Estimate</th>
<th>Independent Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927 Aug. 1</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>117,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932 January</td>
<td></td>
<td>200,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934 March</td>
<td>385,000&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935 July</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30-50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

when Chiang was occupied with other internal opponents, the Communists were able to build up their forces. When Chiang concentrated on the Communist challenge in 1932 and 1933, the Communists incurred significant losses. However, Chiang's fifth campaign in 1934 exacted a heavier toll and reversed the trend of Red

<sup>1</sup>Collated from numerous sources.

<sup>2</sup>The higher Communist estimates given for 1934 and 1935 were published at the time in non-Chinese Communist-controlled journals. The lower figures are historical judgments contained in Chinese Communist publications.
army expansion. The ensuing Communist retreat to the Northwest of China, known as the Long March, took a heavy toll on the Communists. By the time the Red Army reached the Northwest in 1936, the Communist leaders claimed that their army was only 22% of the March, 1934, personnel figure published by their Bolshevik comrades. Independent estimates of the 1936 size of the Red Army show strikingly little improvement over the 1927 enrollment.

The Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, marked the inception of the CCP army. The core of the rebellion was drawn from the KMT "Ironsides" Second Army group. Within this core command positions were held by secret Communists, among them Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The May directions of the Communist International, which called for "formation of divisions of troops absolutely faithful to the revolution", had been followed. Chu Teh cooperated with those in revolt, and Chou En-lai also arrived in Nanchang. Other CCP members later to achieve prominence in the movement participated in the rising, among them Liu P'o-cheng, Nieh Jung-chen, and Lin Piao. The KMT quickly

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6 Tzu-min Shen, "The Nanchang Uprising-Birth of the People's Army," People's China, no. 6 (March 16, 1952), p. 19. The same article under the title "Nanchang Uprising on August 1" was reprinted in OB, no. 208 (Sept. 10, 1952) from the Shanghai Ta Kung Pao where it appeared on July 31, 1952.
7 Ibid., p. 20.
dispatched loyal forces to the scene, and on August 6\(^8\) the
"beginning of what was to become the Red Army" fled.\(^9\) The
Communists' brief occupation of the Fukien province seaport of
Swatow ended with heavy CCP losses on September 30,\(^10\) even
before *International Press Correspondence* could report it "in
the hands of revolutionary troops".\(^11\) The shrunken force then
split. One section arrived at the East Kwangtung coast. Chu
Teh led a second group to the west, toward Hunan.\(^12\) Ho Lung
fled to Hong Kong.\(^13\) Survival, not conquest, was the order of
the day. Chu Teh's force shrunk to 900 *en route*.\(^14\)

In Hunan, Mao Tse-tung led an Autumn Harvest Uprising on
September 8, 1927. It was a fiasco. Here is the current CCP
version of the fate of his four regiments--

...the 4th Regiment early betrayed its comrades-in-
arms and attacked the 1st regiment. The 2nd regiment
walked into an ambush, and the 3rd also suffered losses.

By October Mao had fled to a bandit hideaway in the mountain
area of Chingkangshang.\(^15\)

Armed uprisings in the cities met no better fate. On
December 11 the Communists launched the Canton Commune. On
December 14 it died, and with it many members of the CCP. Yeh

\(^8\)Robert S. Elegant, *China's Red Masters*, New York: Twayne Pub-
lishers, Inc., 1951, p. 69.
\(^9\)Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
\(^10\)Tzu-min Shen, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
\(^11\)*The Victorious Advance of the Revolutionary Troops on Canton,*
\(^12\)Tzu-min Shen, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-25.
\(^13\)Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
Ting's forces in Kwangtung were of little help, and were obliterated shortly afterwards. Chou En-lai and Yeh both availed themselves of the refuge of Hong Kong. A remnant broke through and fled to the Hailufeng Soviet. Founded on October 4th, 1927, this small base of Communist control lasted until February 28, 1928. The 2,000 man CCP forces did not last long.

We could not get any new recruits, and the army decreased daily. Nearly everyone in the army was sick too, because of the heat and the hard life in the mountains. The men were not native to the region and were unaccustomed to the intense damp heat. Many died from illness. Many others were captured by the enemy. Our best revolutionary cadres were sacrificed in Hailufeng.

There still remained the small bands of Mao and Chu. The latter in January of 1928 tried to form a soviet in one county--Ichang in Honan province—and failed. As the Communists later admitted--

Party affairs were in great confusion, no definite "line" had been established, and military strategy was still undecided. Chu's troops still wore Kuomintang uniforms, but they were in rags; many of them had no shoes, and poor food, or often no food at all, caused steady desertions.

In desperation in May, 1928, Chu and Mao combined their forces. Several months later they were joined by KMT mutineers led by

16 Elegant, op. cit., pp. 70, 108.
19 Snow, op. cit., p. 387.
20 "Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle--From the Red Army to the Eighth Route Army," The People's Army, no. 15 (Aug. 1, 1946). (Chinese)
P'eng Teh Huai. Their ambitions were small—to establish Communist control over six counties. However, their forces were seriously short of food. The leadership was divided on strategy. Some wanted to attack a nearby city, Changsha, in accord with the current policy of the Central Committee. Others voted for further retreat. Mao and Chu continued their efforts to establish a rural area under Communist control.

By January, 1929, the situation was untenable. On January 14 the Communist forces departed from Ichang, and were to wander until the autumn of 1930 through Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung provinces. Their successes were few.

The Red Army had no support from the masses. There were great difficulties in finding encampments, carrying on military operations and securing information. We marched across snow-covered and icy mountains closely pursued by the enemy. Our sufferings increased. We were defeated in battle four times.

In August, 1929, 2,800 survivors established the "Central Soviet District" in southern Kiangsi. At the same time mutinies and rebellions allowed the CCP to form several new "armies": the

23North, op. cit., p. 126.
24Wales, op. cit., p. 138.
25North, op. cit., p. 126.
26Wales, op. cit., p. 138.
28Ibid., p. 399.
First Red Army on the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border, the Second Red Army on the Hunan-Hupeh border; the Third and Tenth Red Armies in Kiangsi; the Seventh and Eighth Red Armies in Kwangsi; the Eleventh Red Army in Kwangtung; and the Twenty Sixth Red Army in Shensi. Realistically these "armies" could only be called small guerrilla bands. As Mao wrote:

...guerrilla character and fluidity were very prominent, the Red Army being in its infancy and the base area being yet a guerrilla area....

Neither Moscow nor the official leaders of the CCP were pleased with the military weakness of these guerrilla bands, their leaders and their behavior. The Central Committee of the Chinese Party met in Moscow and attacked Mao's forces for their "aimless plundering and burning" and "lumpen-proletarian psychology". In this period of military weakness and CCP castigation, Mao wrote two documents which underlined the plight of the Red forces and outlined a policy to compensate for their inadequacies. His reply to the quoted criticism was a frank admission:

...we often lose soldiers, e.g., when they are wounded, or killed, fall ill or desert...as fighting is going on and casualties mounting it is already no easy matter to get for replacements the lumpen-proletariat who are good fighters.


33Ibid., p. 80.
Mao was fully aware of the drift toward a "vagabond" outlook, toward the Red forces' becoming just another band of "roving insurgents". By December, 1929, he was struggling to correct this drift; took measures to install military discipline; end corporal punishment; halt desertion and establish Party leadership.

In 1930, the CCP situation in China continued to be grim. Moscow's numerous predictions of a "revolutionary wave" goaded the CCP into battles that further depleted their small and weak forces. Although the Communists claimed to have thirteen armies, a Nationalist source reported that each army only averaged 5,000 men. They were organized into four army corps. The quality of these forces can be generalized from that of Peng Teh-huai's Third Army Corps. Imprecorr noted that by the end of March, 1930, there were "2,200 men equipped with a rifle." A Communist historian described the Red forces in 1930--

Without rifles, many still cut a formidable figure armed with red-tasselled spears, or with a sword at their back.

Undaunted by such mundane details, the leadership of the CCP under the directives of the Comintern turned these "armies" against the "cities". This was the "Li Li-san line". It called

Ibid., pp. 114-115.
36 Smedley, op. cit., p. 274.
for placing peasant partisans in the "regular" forces which would then march on urban areas instead of developing small islands of strength in the rural hinterland. Mac and Chu claim to have accepted these directives "in theory", and in practice to have left their peasant partisans to protect their mountain refuges. On July 28, 1930, P'eng's army successfully attacked Changsha. The Comintern interpreted the capture of Changsha as a prelude to the capture of the industrial region of Wuhan. On August 7 it claimed that

With the capture of Changsha there has commenced a new chapter in the history of the Chinese revolution ....In the midst of the Soviet villages and small towns there now stands a big town ...which constitutes a driving force for the further development of the revolution....

The victory of the Red Army in Changsha proves the uncheckable advance of the revolutionary workers and peasants. The Chinese revolution is undoubtedly approaching a fresh upsurge.

In fact, the "driving force" described by the Comintern on August 7 had been abandoned on August 5 when P'eng abandoned Changsha. As debates within the Communist ranks revealed, the position of the Red forces "was not consolidated, no city power was organized". The foolhardy attempts ordered by the Comintern resulted in heavy losses and eventual retreat to rural districts.

42 Wales, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
In November, 1930, the Comintern in its own inimitable way changed course. New policies were decreed, and the military realities finally faced. The raggedy armies of mercenaries and peasants were to be modernized and carefully husbanded. Their weaknesses in the areas of modern organization, skills and equipment were of great concern, and internal military development took precedence over geographical expansion of power. When the Comintern recognized the improbability of immediate military success, it emphasized political control to hold the scattered bands together. The November Comintern resolution stated:

The military and technical weakness of the Red Army must not be forgotten, the poverty of armament and ammunition, lack of artillery, etc. Such conditions make it impossible to occupy big cities, to attack the modern armies of imperialism and to conquer the main centers.43

In such a situation the Party was ordered to re-orient its efforts.

The main directing cadres should be workers. [The Army] ...should be under the leadership of a strong Communist cadre and should have the best and most reliable directors and also an iron discipline. This Red Army should remain completely in the hands of the Communists and should have a strong physical basis in one or a few Soviet areas, which are supposed to be revolutionary bases. The realization of this task cannot be delayed even one second. The choicest sections of the Party should be centralized to solve this task immediately.44

Implementation of this switch in policy was more difficult. First, the discredited Li Li-san had a personal following in the Red Army, and second, Mao attempted to use the

43"Letter of the E.C.C.I. to C.C.P., received Nov. 16, 1930," Isaacs, op. cit., p. 408.
44"Letter to the Central Committee of the CCP by the ECCI, received Nov. 16, 1930," Shih-hua, Dec. 14, 1930, quoted in North, op. cit., p. 149.
policy switch to strengthen his personal power. Thus, within the CCP forces dissension was rife, and sizeable groups were liquidated in the autumn of 1930 at Huangpi and Futien. External pressure intensified on the harried Red bands. In December, 1930, the Kuomintang launched its first major offensive against the CCP forces in Hunan and Kwangsi provinces.

Somehow the scattered red bands, including those under "General Mao Tse Dun" [sic] survived the KMT campaign. In 1931 the Kuomintang launched two more "bandit suppression" drives. These last drives lasted from May until October and the retreating forces verged on extinction. The Comintern might boast of the "unheard of might and strength of the Red Army", but even Communist sources paint a graphic picture of its straits. Modern weapons were in short supply.

One red army man with a rifle who joins the fray is accompanied by several peasants with spears and clubs.

All that the CCP's "unheard of power" could do was attack "scattered groups of the enemy." "It marched at night and hid in the mountains during the daytime."

The Chinese Communist forces had barely enough to eat. The forces under Mao and Chu in Kiangsi had to launch a

45 Wan, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
48 Ibid.
49 Hsu, op. cit.
50 Ibid., p. 15.
campaign to conserve food. They reduced our rations so that we ate meagerly twice a day, at ten and at four. The food was poor and we were hungry all the time.\textsuperscript{51}

In Hunan the situation was no better. A CCP commander recalled—"My troops lived in great poverty. We had ragged clothes and not enough food to eat."\textsuperscript{52}

These hardships caused increased desertions. The CCP continued to be plagued with internal division,\textsuperscript{53} and in both the soviet areas in Kiangsi and on the Hunan-Hupeh-Anhwei border "reactionary elements" had to be liquidated. These splits occurred at the high levels of leadership in the Red forces\textsuperscript{54} and together with KMT attacks prevented unification of the scattered guerrilla groups.

In spite of these difficulties the CCP continued to press for expansion of the rural-based forces and to relegate other activities to their support. On June 10, 1931, the Central Committee defined the prime task of the "non-Soviet" districts as intensifying "support for the great victories of the Red Armies ... to recruit soldiers for the Red Armies."\textsuperscript{56}

As a result of this emphasis, small guerrilla bands came into existence in Manchuria,\textsuperscript{57} and Lin Tsu-han and Kao Kang

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[51] Smedley, op. cit., p. 293.
\item[52] Wales, op. cit., p. 98.
\item[53] Ibid., p. 157; Isaacs, op. cit., p. 422.
\item[54] Ibid., and "Fight and Constructive Work in the Chinese Soviet Districts," Inprecorr., Vol. 12, no. 4 (Jan. 28, 1932), p. 70.
\item[56] "Resolution of the Central Committee on Urgent Tasks," Bolshevist, Shanghai, Nov. 10, 1931, quoted in Isaacs, op. cit., p. 409.
\item[57] An Outline History of China, China Knowledge Series, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958, p. 357.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
finally succeeded in establishing control over a small area in Shensi province.58 While Chiang's forces concentrated on the Chu-Mao area in Kiangsi, the Communist foothold on the Hunan-Hupeh-Anhwei border (the Oyuwan Soviet) reached its "highest period".59 In the Hunan-Hupeh soviet Ho Lung claimed to have tripled his force from 1930 to a size of 30,000.60

The tenuous situation of the CCP forces caused repeated postponement of the convening of the First All-China Congress of the Soviets. Originally scheduled in February, 1931,61 it was postponed to May, then to August, then to November.62 Finally on December 11 the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was established.63 Three days later the Red Army was expanded by 20,000 mutineers from the KMT 26th Route Army as a result of Communist subversion within the KMT armies.64

The KMT admitted that the CCP somehow trebled its army between 1930 and January, 1932. The Red Army survived in the classic guerrilla manner. A missionary wrote from Kiangsi: "By attacking isolated police-stations and small parties of Government troops they have gradually increased their supply of

59Wales, op. cit., p. 157.
63Smedley, op. cit., p. 294.
64Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., pp. 175-177.
Nationalist victories were ephemeral. A KMT source reported:

As soon as Government troops arrive in any great number, the Communist detachments which do not wear uniforms quickly disperse, hide their arms, and assume the appearance of innocent peasants, but are ready to combine again and attack the regular forces as soon as the latter, deceived by the quiet appearance of the district, are no longer on their guard. Furthermore, the Communist armies operate only in mountainous and wooded regions which are difficult of access and lacking in means of communication.

The same missionary reported other KMT handicaps.

The Government troops were handicapped on every hand, unfamiliar with the locality and often disliked by the common people, they made little headway. In many areas the lower classes are secretly in sympathy with the Reds or they dare not, because of fear of future eventualities, give any information to Government troops. It is also a fact that often Government forces have been untrustworthy because of being unpaid for long periods of time. In other cases commanders of Government units who were personally acquainted with Red leaders entered into agreements which simply meant a temporary withdrawal on the part of the Red groups.

At the same time the CCP realized that guerrilla tactics could not secure decisive success. The First Soviet Congress passed a resolution which recognized the Red Army's coercive handicaps and called for rapid modernization (the "modern art of war") and the establishment of military training schools.

The army was ordered to unify its organization--"The activities of all commanders, leaders and supply organs must be strictly centralized."--and reminded that an old-style army of

65 Leang-li T'ang, op. cit., p. 57.
66 Ibid., p. 74.
67 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
roving insurgents could not stage a successful political revolution. Orders were issued to recruit workers and poor peasants in contrast to professional killers and to mould them into a Party-controlled force. The CCP reasoned that in these social classes new allegiances, habits and values could be more easily developed. "In the interest of the revolution a class conscious revolutionary discipline must prevail in the Red Army." 

In 1932 Chiang Kai-shek concentrated his efforts on the Oyuwan Soviet district, with considerable success. In addition to coping with the fourth KMT extermination campaign, the CCP leadership still faced internal dissension. The struggle among the Party leaders who had now fled from Shanghai to Juichin, the capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic, was reflected in repeated "liquidations" and exposures of "counter-revolutionary machinations". The Comintern admitted "serious damage ... in the province of Honan". While the Communists played down the extent of the Red defeat at the time, several years later a U.S.S.R. authority on the Far East revealed that

The concentration of the overwhelming forces of the Kuomintang against the fourth Red Army forced the latter at the end of 1932 to remove their basic forces from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei region.

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69 Ibid.

111
Leaving the Oyuwan area, troops under the command of Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien fled over a thousand miles before reaching Szechwan in December, 1932.\textsuperscript{73} Efforts to establish a central command also encountered serious difficulties. For example, the 8th Army which fought on the border between the provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi had extreme difficulty in communicating with the Central Soviet Government.\textsuperscript{74} The Communist forces still had to sacrifice lives to secure arms. In the same \textit{Inprecorr} article that talked of raising funds to buy the Red forces an airplane, the capture of 200 rifles and two machine guns was considered a significant accomplishment.\textsuperscript{75}

The Kuomintang ended its fourth campaign in the spring.\textsuperscript{76} By the time the massive fifth offensive was launched against the Communist districts at the end of 1933, the Red armies were experiencing the internal effects of long and arduous guerrilla struggle. The spread of defeatism was detailed in the \textit{Shanghai} Communist organ \textit{Struggle} during the summer and autumn of 1933 and labeled the "Lo Min Line" after a Fukien Party official.

The partisan bands not only rarely grow but are shrinking daily....Desertions with rifles and betrayals are constantly occurring....Corruption and degeneration constantly appear. Some partisan bands show tendencies to banditry....These are the conditions not only of the partisan bands, but in the independent battalions, as in refusal to take orders,

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., and Wales, \textit{Red Dust}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 99.
\textsuperscript{76}"Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle," \textit{op. cit.}
raids for money, etc....77

In late August Chou En-lai had to appeal for "struggle against all kinds of wavering, pessimism, passivity, desertion, weariness and capitulation before difficulties."78 Mao declared that

...a struggle must be waged against the under-estimation of the present revolutionary situation in the Soviet districts, against the tendencies to defeatism, which sometimes grow into confusions and fear....79

To bolster the morale of their forces the CCP leadership resorted to numerous economic incentives for members of the military80 and increased economic levies on the civilian population.81 Concentrated efforts were made to expand the Red forces, even at the risk of depleting the labor force and curtailing the food supply.82 Rationing was planned.83 At all costs, it was necessary to "guarantee supplies and provisions for the Red Army."84

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83 Dse-dung Mau, op. cit.
While the Communist situation deteriorated in the South, other Red armed bands were able to take advantage of conflict between non-communist local leaders. In Shensi a formal Soviet was established, and on May 18 the "Soviet Districts of Tung-Nan-Pa" were established in Szechwan. The Communist press praised the efforts of Chang and Hsu in Szechwan and claimed that their forces estimated at 60,000 to 115,000 were "fighting and winning." However, the Communist military commander, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien later described these "victories".

...the foundation of the new soviet had not time to become well consolidated although our armed forces had expanded very much, the new recruits had no experience in warfare and no training we retreated under the enemy's attack.

The Kuomintang attacks were especially heavy on the Central Soviet district. The Second Soviet Congress had to be postponed from December 12, 1933, to January 22, 1934, and the session had to be curtailed from 12 to seven days. At this Congress previous military experience was analyzed, and goals established for the following months. Mao-Tse-tung's report to the Congress claimed certain accomplishments, i.e., "there is no longer any famine in the Red districts," but he called for modernization.

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85 Snow, op. cit., p. 222.
86 Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 158.
87 Snow, op. cit., p. 330.
90 Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 159.
in the forces. Mao's suggestions dealt with organization, technical skills, supplies, and political allegiance.

First of all the central revolutionary military committee shall be strengthened in its leadership of the whole red army so as to make it possible for the red armies to act more efficiently under a unified, strengthened command. In the second place, the expansion of the red army to 1,000,000 must be popularized... Recruiting shall be made through political agitation instead of compulsion.... The families of the red armists shall be treated in a better way....

The system of the political commissioners shall be observed in all the units of the red army, more workers drawn in to act as military or political directors, more cadres turned out from the red army schools, decisive blows directed against the landlord bourgeois elements who try to steal into the red army....

Mao called for a "general rise in military technics" and improvement in rear services--

To satisfy the Red army with supplies and provisions, to organize military transportation between the front and the rear and to organize sanitary organs and hospitals for the Red fighters are all tasks of decisive importance to the revolutionary war.

Mao's proposals were obviously admissions of unaccomplished tasks, and enemies within the Party lost no time in attacking him. The Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee, also meeting in Juichin, criticized his "banditry doctrine" and weakened his control of military affairs. The Kuomintang continued to


94Ibid., p. 257.

95Ibid., p. 258.


press its attack.

During this period the Comintern maintained that the Chinese Communist forces were winning "considerable victories everywhere". In fact the Red forces fought desperately to maintain their base area instead of reverting to the "flee and strike" tactics they had been following. They failed to break the enemy cordon. With every passing day the base areas became smaller and smaller and the Red Army more exhausted. Force of circumstance left it no alternative, if it was to survive at all, but to break right through the enemy encirclement.

While the main forces under Mao and Chu Teh did not begin moving north until October, smaller groups had retreated earlier. The last soviet of Hsiao K'e's army on the Hunan-Kiangsi border was eliminated when its area had shrunk to a mere 20 miles in diameter. On August 7, 1934, these troops received marching orders, and moved north to meet the retreating troops of Ho Lung and form the short-lived "Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow Soviet District". This "Red Army of the Central Base" began its retreat in October with a force of 85,000. By January, 1935, it had shrunk to less than 25,000 men.

Not surprisingly, the Comintern found it pleasanter to publicize the Szechwan soviet and the red forces in "inner China". The CCP forces supposedly grew to 100,000 by January, 1934.

100 Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., pp. 100, 138-139.
101 Tai, op. cit., p. 29.
and to 200,000 by March. Nevertheless, "by the summer of 1934 the territory of the northern region (Szechwan Soviet) was considerably reduced." By the end of the year Communist troop estimates dropped back to 100,000 and the army retreated to the Northeast part of Szechwan. As the Communists admitted, their success here was largely due to the fissures and weaknesses of the existing military and social system. In semi-autonomous Szechwan there were at least 6 contending non-Communist military factions, all living off the people of this agricultural province. As long as this state of affairs continued, "...the possibility of a speedy victory in the Soviets ... is greater than in most other districts"

In October, 1934, the Communists began their prolonged retreat from the Central Soviet regions to the Northwest of China. This retreat is known as the Long March. Since the early 1940's the CCP has tried to bill the Long March as a march to meet the Japanese, as a march for national survival, not Communist survival. Although the CCP had declared war on Japan on


104Perlin, op. cit., part 1, p. 114.


April 26, 1932, a Chinese Communist delegate to the Comintern in 1934 explained the real reasons for the retreat in a report entitled, "The New Situation and the New Tactics in Soviet China". The reason for the "considerable losses of territory" was to create "necessary preconditions" for eventual victory. In other words, if the CCP was not to be surrounded and eliminated, it had to retreat. The delegate blamed the technical inadequacy of the Red army, the "lack of aeroplanes and artillery", as the reason for the Long March. He admitted that areas under Communist control were destitute and unable to supply "munitions and articles of first necessity for the Red army". In effect, the delegate admitted that the CCP in the central soviet area under Mao had failed to develop a stable, self-sufficient base. The army was forced to march continuously in order to milk each area it crossed of men and supplies.

Although the Red army sometimes left scattered guerrilla units behind it as it marched, the fact remained that after seven bloody years in south-central China, the Communists were forced to abandon their territories and their army was a hopelessly inadequate match for the modern KMT army. It is not surprising, therefore, that 1935 was a year of change within Chinese Communism. Mao Tse-tung became leader of the Party at the Tsunyi conference in January; his army moved toward Shensi, which was to become its base until the end of the Second World

War; and under the pressure of new Russian and Comintern foreign policy the CCP became enthusiasts for the "popular front". However, internally the movement experienced little harmony and little military success.

When Mao ascended to formal Party power, the First Red Army returned to guerrilla tactics, to the strategy of mobility and hide-and-seek warfare. Although they continued to move, their mobility was at the price of a series of costly river crossings. KMT forces continued to harry them and took advantage of their retreat to subdue the autonomous provinces of the Chinese hinterland.

In the early summer, the forces of Mao and Chu met those of Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien in Szechwan. This the Comintern hailed as a "great victory", as the "formation of a new and better strategic revolutionary basis". Militarily, the political veterans from the South were to benefit from the better weapons and supplies of the Fourth army, and vice-versa. Supposedly Szechwan was the "goal" of the retreat, and was to be the beginning of a "new stage" in the revolution, but the Communist military establishment was unequal to maintaining this

111 Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 14; Tai, op. cit.
115 Fu-pe-dey, op. cit.
116 Perlin, op. cit., part 2, p. 117.
"impregnable citadel". An independent estimate of the Red forces in Szechwan in the summer of 1935 places the total at less than 100,000 men.\footnote{117}

When the Communists assessed their position in 1935, they admitted that the modernization measures that Mao had announced at the Second Soviet Congress in January, 1934, had yet to be implemented. The Red army still needed extensive re-organization.\footnote{119} Their territorial accomplishments of the first eight years were not impressive. An article in the journal Bolshevik, published by the CP of the Soviet Union, admitted that the old base area in the South was now only "Soviet Islands" and that out of China's 1,340 counties only 199 could be called "strongholds of the revolution".\footnote{120} This figure should be treated with the same skepticism that claims of an army of "half a million" elicit.\footnote{121} The Chinese Comintern delegate finally concluded that "It would be wrong to hold that the Red Army is ready to inflict a decisive blow on the armies of Chiang Kai-shek".\footnote{122}

The next months showed that the CCP did not even possess a comfortable coercive survival margin. In August the Red Army

\footnote{117}{The Red Army in Southern and Central China,} op. cit.
\footnote{118}{Chinese Communist Movement,} op. cit., p. 2327.
\footnote{119}{Fu-pe-dey, op. cit.}
\footnote{120}{Ho-sin Chow, "The Military Power of Soviet China," China Today (Jan., 1936), p. 71. "This article, written by a leading Chinese delegate to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, first appeared in the magazine Bolshevik, the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We present it as an authoritative source of information on the state of affairs in Soviet China in the summer of 1935."}
\footnote{121}{The Red Army in Southern and Central China,} op. cit.
\footnote{122}{Chow, op. cit.
in Szechwan divided because of Mao's and Chang Kuo-t'ao's strategic disagreements. Mao's smaller group managed to join the Shensi guerrilla units under Liu Chih-tan and Kao Kang in October, 1935.\footnote{123} In July these guerrillas had formed the "Shensi-Kansu-Shansi Revolutionary Military Committee", although their number did not exceed 5,000.\footnote{124} After Mao joined them, the forces of this "revolutionary center" totalled 30,000.\footnote{125}

After Chang and Mao separated, Chang's army came under increasingly heavy KMT attack. In November, the soldiers under Ho Lung in Kweichow were also formed to retreat\footnote{126} and were able to join Chang's army in June, 1936. Ho's and KMT military pressures persuaded Chang to march with Ho to Mao's Shensi-Kansu soviet area, which they reached in October, 1936. These retreats of the various CCP armies to the Northwest of China are known collectively as the Long March.

During the Long March a change in "Party line" had been formulated in Moscow. Since 1932 the CCP had been trying to use nationalism as a weapon against the Nanking government. However, as the Seventh Congress of the Comintern pointed out, this strategy was "sectarian" and isolationist. By the July-August, 1935, meetings of the Seventh Congress the USSR had become increasingly concerned over the Japanese military preparations in the Far East. As far as Russia was concerned, the more that

\footnote{123}{"Chinese Communist Movement," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2327.}
\footnote{124}{Snow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 223.}
\footnote{125}{Edgar Snow, \textit{Random Notes on Red China (1936-1945)}, Chinese Economic and Political Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 100.}
\footnote{126}{Wales, \textit{Red Dust}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 139-140.}
Japan could be embroiled and weakened by China the better. Chiang Kai-shek appeared to be the only leader capable of unifying China for an effective war effort against Japan. Moscow was painfully aware that the CCP had not become "the leader of the whole people and ...a national factor." 127

In a thinly disguised attack on Mao's attachment to the rural soviets, the Chinese Comintern delegate Wang Ming called for a joint appeal to the whole nation, to all parties, groups, troops, mass organizations and all prominent political and social persons to organize together with us an all-China united people's government of national defense. 128

The "United Front from below", i.e., subversion of the loyalties of members of non-Communist groups, was to be replaced by the "united front from above", i.e., open alliance with these groups. 129

Chiang Kai-shek remained deaf to the continual CCP appeals for a unified resistance to Japan. He was quite aware of the unhappy military situation of the CCP at this time and knew that the Communists had nothing to lose and everything to gain from such an alliance.

The Moscow-backed strategy of the "united front" met with resistance not only from the KMT, but also from certain CCP leadership, and the Comintern complained of "mistakes and weaknesses ...of a leftist sectarian character". 130

130 Ibid.
found no disagreement over the strategic generalization

to appraise the role and significance of these
indirect reserves of the Chinese revolution properly,
to use them flexibly, capably, correctly and at the
right moment in the interests of the revolution—to
concentrate the forces of the revolution always and
everywhere against the most dangerous enemy at the
given moment, the one who is most hated by the whole
people and most isolated from internal and external
support.\footnote{131}

The Comintern found the CCP inconveniently reluctant to assist
the KMT in any way, particularly after ten years of bloodshed.
However, these "leftist" sentiments were balanced by the "correct"
view held by others of the CCP leadership: the view that the CCP
had no choice but to join with the Nationalists. Accordingly,
the CCP continued to entreat Chiang and to develop guerrilla
activity against the Japanese in Manchuria.\footnote{132}

In the early months of 1936 Moscow repeated its orders
for a united front, as a means to eventual Communist domination.
Dimitrov, head of the Communist International, noted two intra-
Party difficulties and demanded that they be resolved. The
CCP, he declared,

had to overcome the resistance of sectarian
elements who do not understand that in the present
conditions the only way to secure the liberation of
the Chinese people is that of establishing a united
national front against the Japanese invaders. It
also has to carry on a struggle against the opportu-
nist capitolators who are ready to sacrifice the
political and organizational independence of the
Party and the Red Army and to merge them in other
organizations and armies.\footnote{133}

\footnote{131}Ibid.
\footnote{132}Sachio Oka, "Soviets in Manchuria," \textit{China Today}, Vol. 1, no. 4
(Jan., 1935), pp. 68-69; Chie Hua, "Guerrilla Warfare in Man-
1036.
\footnote{133}G. Dimitrov, "The Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party
of China," \textit{Inprecorr}, Vol. 16, no. 44 (Sept. 26, 1936), pp. 1207-
1208.
Wang Ming reiterated Dimitrov's demand that the "political and organizational independence of the Party and the Red Army" be maintained. The CCP, wrote Wang, must insure that the Red force "...will wholly and completely maintain its political and organizational system, its commanding and political officers.... The Chinese Communist Party cannot agree to dissolve the Red Army among the Nanking troops...." He went on to demand that the political standards within the army itself be tightened:

...revolutionary vigilance and systematic fight against provocation and espionage is very feebly developed. The position is no better with regard to the testing of cadres, even the leading cadres, by their party organizations.

In essence, then, the call for a "united front" was really a call for competitive co-existence. Accordingly, during 1936 the CCP repeated their proposal to the Nanking government and simultaneously attempted to control anti-Japanese activity. Its concern was to fight not "class war", but seemingly "national war". Its aim of becoming stronger than the Kuomintang did not change. While its land policy became moderate, and non-Communist independents received friendly commendation, the Red forces consolidated around Mao in Shensi and began to spread the area of their influence.


While their physical expansion was small, the CCP managed to exert considerable influence on the Manchurian troops under the KMT (Chang Hsueh-liang) that surrounded them. In December, 1936, the CCP persuaded the Manchurian troops to kidnap and then to release Chiang Kai-shek. This complex incident, known as the Sian incident, was the effective beginning of the United Front, although elaborate parlay was to continue through the summer of 1937. This also marked the beginning of the rise of the Chinese Communist star.

Communist assessment of the military accomplishment of this period was a dismal one. Communist statistics show that at the end of the "agrarian revolutionary war" period (1927-1936) the Red forces were composed primarily of the dregs of Chinese society, i.e., 60% poor peasants and 30% professional soldiers. Mao described both the internal and external difficulties of the Red forces at the time of the Sian incident:

The Red Army is small in numbers, its arms are poor and its access to food, bedding, clothing and other supplies is extremely difficult.

Our political power is dispersed and isolated in mountaineous or remote regions and is deprived of any outside help. In economic and cultural conditions the revolutionary base areas are more backward than the Kuomintang areas. The revolutionary bases embrace only rural districts and small towns. They were extremely small in the beginning and have not grown much larger since. Moreover, they are often shifted and the Red Army possesses no really consolidated bases.

137 Feng, op. cit.
In other words, the Chinese Communists could not be said to have developed a modern army by the end of 1936. However, Kuomintang victories served as a constant spur to the Communists to modernize their army. Their material limitations forced them to concentrate on personnel, as contrasted to equipment, modernization, and the CCP used various devices to this end. Central CCP leadership was often in no position to punish the misbehavior of a small guerrilla band hundreds of miles away from any other Communist force. Military cadres had to be endowed with an attachment to the Party and its goal of political and social revolution, instead of to a province, individual leader, or military unit. Within the army solidarity was forged by emphasis on a close-knit community of officers and men, i.e., on the equality of hardship. In the Soviet areas the military was accorded the status of a highly valued and privileged elite.

In this context the two main modern skills developed in the Red forces were literary and sanitation. Communication of orders and ideology required literacy throughout the army. Peak combat efficiency required sanitation and elementary health measures.

Later sections of this thesis discuss the details of the growth of modern skills and political loyalties in the Red Army, but it was in this period at the insistence of Mao that the Party formulated the policy of teaching both these skills and loyalties. The application of the policy of internal modernization was limited by the guerrilla situation, but the important point is that the orientation embodied in this policy was firmly
established long before the Communist forces engaged in regular warfare after World War II.

Mao disagreed with other Communist leaders over the application of these skills and attitudes within the army and by the army. The debate was both tactical and ideological. They demanded regular warfare as opposed to guerrilla warfare. They advocated a regular army, with the rigidities of organization, the formalities, and exclusively military concerns as contrasted with Mao's advocacy of a multi-purpose, flexible and disciplined fighting organization. In this debate over "regularization" they sought to imitate the army of the U.S.S.R. As we shall see in a later chapter, the debate continues to this day. Mao stated his "military line" on this in 1936, when he bluntly told the cadres:

Although we must especially cherish the Soviet experience of war...we must also cherish the experiences of China's revolutionary war, because there were a great number of conditions special to the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Red Army. 

Recent Communist sources confirm that he had to overcome opposition from military men addicted to the "struggle for independence" from the CCP and "professional association-ism." These individuals were concerned with the army as befitted their conception of a military professional, with "the part at the expense of the whole." 

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139 Ibid., p. 177.
Modern military skills under the leadership of Mao were applied not to the primary end of developing a regular armed force along a pattern familiar in the West, but as an asset in a co-ordinated Communist assault on the military, political, economic, social and psychological supports of the Kuomintang and mainland society.

The most significant fact of the Agrarian Revolutionary War period is not that the Red forces were often defeated, that they were technologically primitive, that their morale wavered, or that their leadership developed schisms. It is that the CCP preserved and toughened a leadership nucleus which would apply the bitter lessons of these years to the future internal development of the Red Army and of the Chinese nation.

2. Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945

The period from 1937-1945 includes these events: the Kuomintang's reluctant alliance with the Communists in 1937; the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937; the Japanese victories over the KMT armies from 1938-1941; the Japanese attacks on the CCP armies from 1941-1944; the decline of Japanese military power and expansion of Communist power from 1944-1945; and the resumption of KMT-CCP hostilities in 1945.\footnote{The 8th Route Army and the New Fourth Army During Eight Years of War of Resistance, n.p.: Department of Propaganda, Political Headquarters, 13th Group Army, 1945 (Chinese).} Table IV indicates the uneven pattern of Communist military growth. The rapid expansion in the late 1930's was caused by three factors: Communist evocation of Chinese patriotism against the Japanese; disintegration of Nationalist
Table IV
Size of the Communist Armies, 1937-1945
Anti-Japanese War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>OOP Estimate</th>
<th>Nationalist Estimate</th>
<th>Independent Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>New 4th</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>156,700</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>169,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>303,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>438,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>110,960</td>
<td>450,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>125,892</td>
<td>464,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>320,800</td>
<td>153,676</td>
<td>474,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>550,835</td>
<td>293,982</td>
<td>865,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

142 Collated from numerous sources. Here again different Communist estimates, i.e., 1938, show sources for non-Chinese consumption giving a larger troop estimate.
armies; and Japanese concentration on defeating the KMT. In the 1941-1943 period military growth ceased because of these three factors: economic shortages in the Communist regions; Nationalist blockade of the Communists; and Japanese offensives against the Communists. The disintegration of Japanese and puppet armies in 1944-1945 enabled the Communists to develop the large forces required for territorial expansion.

As the Japanese engaged Chiang Kai-shek and withdrawal of Nationalist troops inland weakened Chiang's hold on China, the CCP finally made substantial military and territorial gains. However, the brief honeymoon of the United Front was soon over, and by 1939 KMT-CCP cooperation had ceased. In February, 1937, the CCP offered to give up its independent status and to drop its revolutionary title of "Soviet" and "Red Army". The Communists also offered to follow a more moderate internal policy, giving political rights to non-Communists and halting land confiscations. In the context of intense Japanese attack and the signing of a Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty on August 21, 1938, the Nationalists accepted the CCP offer and recognized the United Front alliance.

The CCP responded by renaming the Red Army the Eighth Route Army on the signature date of the treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Chiang.\(^{143}\) They accepted the Central government's stipulation that the Eighth Route should consist of 45,000 troops.\(^{144}\) In October the Nationalist Military Commission ordered the Communist

\(^{143}\) "Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle," op. cit.
\(^{144}\) "Chinese Communist Movement," op. cit., p. 2332.
guerrilla units which remained in South-Central China to reor-
ganize themselves as the New Fourth Army.\textsuperscript{145} The CCP government
changed its name to the Shansi-Kansu-Ningshsia Border Region Govern-
ment. By December the Communists claimed to have fulfilled the
terms of their February offer to Chiang.\textsuperscript{146}

The Communists quickly mobilized against the Japanese and
won a major victory in late September at the P’ing-hsing-kuan
in Shansi.\textsuperscript{147} On September 19 they began to send their forces
into the provinces of Hopei and Chahar,\textsuperscript{148} but their involvement
with the Japanese did not prevent them from using this oppor-
tunity to establish another base area in December, that of
Shansi-Hopei-Chahar.

As the Nationalists retreated before the Japanese, vacuums
of Nationalist governmental authority were left, and the Commu-
nists filled them whenever possible. They augmented their
military forces by organizing remnants of the Nationalist armies
and retrieved abandoned arms. The Communists used their
enlarged resources to secure additional territory. CCP Commander-
in-Chief Chu Teh directed:

\begin{quote}
send powerful guerrilla detachments to the newly
invaded territories. Penetrating far into the rear
of the enemy, they should restore our administration,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{145}Ying Hsiang, Ting Yeh and Staffs, The Eighth Route and New
Fourth Armies, Chungking: New China Information Committee,
\textsuperscript{146}"The Situation in the Former Soviet Territory," Inprecorr,
\textsuperscript{147}Min Wan, "The Struggle of the Chinese People Against Japanese
\textsuperscript{148}Teh Chu, "History of the First Six Months of the Eighth Route
organize the people, destroy the enemy communications and discover the situation and movements of the enemy.\textsuperscript{149}

Their expansion was hampered by dissension within the army. Mao found it necessary to attack: "feudal practices in the army ...beating and bullying [of] the men....".\textsuperscript{150} He was more concerned by the tendency of "new warlordism", i.e., the CCP army attitude that it was fighting for the Nationalist government rather than for the Communist Party.

This tendency is manifested among certain individuals who become unwilling to submit strictly to the leadership of the Communist Party, who are developing individualist heroism, and who feel honored on receiving appointments from the Kuomintang....It entails a particularly great danger and is therefore worth our special attention and must be opposed resolutely.\textsuperscript{151}

Several months after Mao's warning, CCP leader Chang Kuo-t'ao defected with an important Party document. In this document Chinese Communist policy in the Anti-Japanese War was clearly summarized: "Seventy per cent expansions, 20 per cent dealing with the Kuomintang and 10 per cent resisting Japan."\textsuperscript{152}

In 1938 the Communists expanded both geographically and numerically. Mao also outlined policies to insure party control of the rapidly expanding Red forces. Dissolved into "a shifting net of marauding bands",\textsuperscript{153} CCP troops occupied areas outside those assigned to them by the Nationalist government. This

\textsuperscript{149} Teh Chu, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{150} Mao, \textit{Selected Works, op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 111.
activity was particularly important in Honan and Shantung provinces. Peng Teh-huai, the Deputy Commander of the Eighth Route, redefined the Communist theater of operations as "Northern China in general". A new base area was established in "Central Hopeh". With Central government sanction, the New Fourth Army expanded its activities in Kiangsi, Chekiang, and Anhwei. Although the Communists were enlarging their forces, they continued to face the task of making greater numbers equal greater military strength. Inprecorr reported:

The fighters of the 8th Army keep an account of every cartridge. This means that strictest discipline is observed in firing by the troops. The material captured from the enemy makes up in part for the shortage of arms. 'Supply groups' are attached to the troops and have the task of seizing the convoys of Japanese arms, ammunition and food.

Mao reported to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in November, 1938, that a "new stage" had been reached and talked of the end of armed struggle between the CCP and KMT. However, his concluding speech spelled out a different course. The "whole Party must pay attention to war, learn military science and be ready to fight." This would assist in "expanding our

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forces in the most speedy and effective manner; ... expanding the Communist Party most extensively so that a Party branch can be organized in every village." 161

Mao also observed that the rapid expansion of forces and guerrilla tactics were no substitute for modernization and discipline in the Communist forces. Both goals were to be pursued simultaneously. The "guerrilla style in fighting" was not the same thing as the "guerrilla style in work."

Organizationally it is imperative to establish step by step such military and political set-ups, to have such military and political workers and such a series of military and political working methods, and to acquire such a regular system of supply and medical service as are required of a regular corps. In the matter of equipment it is imperative to improve its quality, acquire new types of arms and increase the indispensable means of communication. In the sphere of military training and tactics it is imperative for the guerrilla units to rise from what they used to practice to what is required of the regular corps. In the matter of discipline it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to a point where uniform standards are observed, where every order and requisition is fulfilled without fail and where all laxity and unbridled independence are done away with. 162

In 1939 the pretense of co-operation with the Kuomintang against the Japanese evaporated. CCP statistics revealed the decline in the intensity of conflict with the Japanese. In 1937-38 the Communists claimed that "average total enemy man losses per engagement" was 64.7; in 1939-40 the figure was only 16.3. 163 As CCP efforts against Japan decreased, their guerrilla

161 Ibid., p. 279.
162 Ibid., pp. 152-153.
activities were expanded in the provinces already mentioned, and
begun in Kwangtung and on Hainan Island. In areas in which
they were already active, the Communist army increased its
efforts to organize and control the population. In areas where
they were co-operating with non-Communist military groups, they
attempted to assume control. For example, in 1939, the CCP
gained control of the 53rd Nationalist Army. This process had
begun at the Communist-controlled Fu-p'ing Congress which had
established a supposedly "non-partisan" government for the Shansi-
Hopei-Chahar area. When the Commander of the 53rd returned from
the Conference, "he was accompanied by a political director from
the Eighth Route Army". The take-over was not difficult. Yen
Hsi-shan's reward for his "Sacrifice Alliance" with the Commu-
nists was the loss of his troops to them.

The geographical and physical expansion of the Red forces
focused attention on internal problems. A high casualty rate,
56,000 in the 1937-1939 period, meant the rise of new personnel
into the lower leadership levels, and the increased use of mili-
tarily "green" personnel. Emphasis was put on "political mobili-
ization" of soldiers and officers. Greater efforts were made

164 The Chinese People's Liberation Army During the War of Resis-
165 Hsiang, Yeh and Staffs, op. cit., p. 22.
166 Ibid., pp. 16-17; Shin She Tang, op. cit.
168 Wan, op. cit., pp. 50-56.
169 Yeh and Staffs, op. cit., p. 11.
170 Teh Wang, "Political Mobilization in North China," World News
and Views (successor to Inprecor), Vol. 19, no. 35 (July 8,
1939), p. 769.
to improve medical services to keep alive the experienced military cadres.\textsuperscript{171} Educational programs were accelerated so that captured modern equipment could be used instead of destroyed.\textsuperscript{172}

\textit{On the New Democracy} by Mao Tse-tung was published in January, 1940, and stated flatly that the alliance with the KMT was only a transitional stage to Communism. Mao also indicated the CCP's unwillingness to co-operate with the Central government unless allotted sizeable powers in a "joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes".\textsuperscript{173} In line with this policy the New Fourth Army attempted to expand its sphere of operations from the Third War Zone into the Fifth in order to compete directly with Kuomintang troops.\textsuperscript{174}

At this same time the CCP was engaged in repulsing the first massive Japanese attack against the Northern Communist areas. Their counter-attack ran from August 20 to December 5 and has been called the "Battle of a Hundred Regiments". During this series of encounters the CCP was able to co-ordinate its scattered units\textsuperscript{175} and communications to the point where the Red forces could initiate a "simultaneous outburst in various localities".\textsuperscript{176}

As usual, however, this prolonged battle was not waged to

\textsuperscript{171}Hsiang, Yeh and Staffs, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{172}Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{174}"Chinese Communist Movement," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2352.
\textsuperscript{175}Political Department of the 18th Army Group (ed.), \textit{Essays on the Great Battle of the Hundred Regiments of the Eighth Route Army}, n.p.: Society of Military and Political Magazines of the 8th Route Army, 1941 (Chinese).
\textsuperscript{176}The Chinese People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance, \textit{op. cit.}
national victory as much as to insure CCP victory. In this case the Party was attempting to prevent the enemy from isolating the loosely connected Communist border regions.

This expenditure of Communist resources was incurred because of military necessity. The basic strategy of the Party was of a different nature, primarily because of a shortage of munitions and supplies.177 "We must adopt instead of an impetuous and adventurist line, a line of hiding the crack forces, and of accumulating strength and biding our time."178 By the phrase "biding our time" the CCP meant that it should not expend its resources against the Japanese, but expand them in preparation for the final struggle with the KMT. The anti-Japanese war, Mao insisted, was an excellent opportunity to establish our base areas, arouse the masses there into action, and build up there the Communist-led political power ... independently and on our own initiative.179

In a 1939 textbook he defined the coming struggle as military in character and attacked those elements in the CCP who saw it as anything else. "The view which belittles armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war and army work is ... incorrect."180

The Communists have described the years 1941-42 as years of "struggle in great difficulty,"181 and their use of the

177Political Department of the 18th Army Group, op. cit.
179Ibid., p. 205.
180Ibid., p. 85.
181The Chinese People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance, op. cit.

137
military instrument reflected their beleaguered situation. The Eighth Route Army had been depleted in dealing with the Japanese in 1940, and the New Fourth had suffered heavy losses in the January, 1941, "New Fourth Army Incident". Kuomintang troops had wiped out the high echelon and rear sections of the New Fourth. The conclusion of a neutrality pact between the U.S.S.R. and Japan in April, 1941, fanned the hostility of the Central Government toward the CCP. The Nationalist troops attempted to isolate the Communist-controlled areas economically, politically and militarily through the use of a military blockade.

Partially because of their economic straits,\textsuperscript{182} the Communists began to use their army increasingly for the economic purposes to be described in a later chapter. This period of grim stalemate between the CCP and KMT not only forced CCP army self-support efforts, but also gave the Communists an opportunity to correct the army ideologically and morally. A number of instances of corruption among the military cadres\textsuperscript{183} and of officer maltreatment of troops\textsuperscript{184} were discovered. The tightening of all phases of the Communist operation was formally launched by the February, 1942, Cheng-feng (rectification) campaign. Special meetings of military and political cadres were held, and military officers who listened "only to flattery and not to criticism"\textsuperscript{185} were attacked. As will be described in detail later, the army was drilled on its obligations to the Party. In

\textsuperscript{182}\textit{Mao, Selected Works, op. cit.,} Vol. III, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{183}Ying Hsu Yung, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 88-89.
\textsuperscript{184}\textit{Mao, Selected Works, op. cit.,} Vol. III, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{185}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 155.
a statement that represented a compromise with the rigidly professional army officers, the Party reassured the military that employment in non-military (e.g., raising crops) activity was meant to complement, not replace coercive activity. "Every soldier needs only spend three months in production and can devote the remaining nine months to training and fighting." 186

In 1943 the CCP had yet to conclude its rectification campaign. The "Ten Proposals" were announced in October and called especially for an investigation of the cadres' efficiency in correcting "wrong tendencies".

In late 1943 the CCP began to recover and expand. The internal measures noted above had resulted in greater internal co-ordination and cohesiveness within the Red army. The New Fourth had been rebuilt; the Eighth Route, consolidated. Externally intensification of war between the KMT and the Japanese diminished the military pressure on the Red areas.

By the end of 1944 the CCP had made tremendous advances and could claim control of nineteen liberated areas. 187 The Eighth Route Army held six military regions: Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia, Shansi-Suiyuan, Shansi-Hopei-Chahar, Shantung, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan. The New Fourth strongholds were located in Kiangsu, Anhwei and Chekiang provinces, and on the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border. Separate columns were active in the Canton area and on Hainan Island. 188 None of these "liberated areas" measured

186 Ibid., p. 149.
187 Chia-kuo Ping, op. cit., p. 44.
more than a few hundred miles,\textsuperscript{189} and although the army had been expanded in a recruitment campaign in the spring of 1944, it was still short of the essentials of warfare. A 1944 American intelligence estimate indicated that less than two of every three Red soldiers had a rifle.\textsuperscript{190} However, this material weakness was to be remedied partially in 1945, and the rural bases obtained in this year used as springboards of activities against an apparently more-powerful Nationalist government.

The latent CCF-KMT struggle of the previous years soon became open conflict, and in early 1945 the Communists consolidated their resources as much as possible. Mao's \textit{On Coalition Government} was presented at the Seventh Congress of the CCP in April, and in it he outlined measures to implement the theory of Communist dominance of the Mainland described in \textit{On the New Democracy}.

On June 20 the Red forces clashed with the Nationalists in what is termed the Yie-t'ai-shan incident.\textsuperscript{191} On August 8, 1945, the U.S.S.R. entered the war and sent its troops, including a group of Chinese and Korean expatriates, into Manchuria.\textsuperscript{192}

When the Japanese announced their acceptance of "unconditional surrender" on August 10 and a peace treaty was signed on September 9, Chiang Kai-shek called for the dissolution of the Red Army. "There should be no private army within the country's boundary, nor should armed forces be kept by any political party."\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{189}White and Jacoby, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{190}"Chinese Communist Movement," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2448.
\textsuperscript{191}"Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{192}Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{193}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 227.
Naturally the Communists ignored Chiang's demands, and the next day ordered that all enemy troops surrender only to them. On August 10 Chu Teh directed that a total attack be carried out on cities and railroads.  

Our armies have the full power to receive, occupy, carry out military control, maintain order and appoint special commissioners to take charge of all administrative matters....Any sabotage and resistance against the above measures will be treated as treason.  

While the United States airlifted KMT troops to major cities and the coast, the Communists expanded in the Shantung, Hopei, Honan, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol provinces. The CCP was finally able to procure sizeable numbers of armaments. Lin Piao joined the Russians in Manchuria with as many as 100,000 relatively unarmed Communist soldiers and confiscated massive quantities of Japanese arms. Equally important is the fact that at this time the Communists collected tens of thousands of puppet troops, both in Manchuria and in other sections of North China. An American observer estimated that the new "people's fighters" in Manchuria totalled 75,000. The Communists also enlisted demobilized and disillusioned Nationalists.  

194 "Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle," op. cit.  
195 Liu, op. cit., p. 227.  
199 Rigg, op. cit., p. 249.
In late 1945 a dismal charade of negotiations occurred at the top levels, while skirmishing continued in the field. General Marshall arrived in China in late November in an effort to expedite negotiations, but his mission was a failure.

As the ensuing years were to prove, the Communists were the real beneficiaries of the war with Japan. In 1927 the Communists had begun to engage the Kuomintang with a raw, undeveloped and minute army. Even the policies that this army was to carry out were unsettled. By the end of the Long March in 1936 the Communists had reached their nadir. They entered the war with Japan in 1937 a weak and isolated force in one of the most backward sections of China, deprived of the sole proprietorship of the banner of resistance to Japan.

In the following years the Communists built up their forces and expanded their geographical hegemony. The CCP said it would follow this course, and it did. Within the Red armies a new generation of fighters was enlisted and trained. For the first time many intellectuals and non-Communist "modern men" were drawn into the forces. Their skills were used in training the mass of peasantry during long periods of military inactivity. A stable base area enabled a great number of cadres to be trained in administration and military affairs, if only for brief periods. The political loyalty of the military was checked and refurbished in the rectification campaign of the early 1940's. Communist build-up of human resources during the war years was made militarily
effective by the massive acquisition of arms in Manchuria, from
surrendering puppets and Japanese armies elsewhere in China.

When civil war broke out once again, the Nationalists no
longer faced a Communist force of the 1927 or 1936 years. It
faced a seasoned, armed, sizeable army under unified and uncom-
promising leadership.

3. The People's Liberation War, 1946-1950

Table V

Size of the Communist Armed Forces, 1946-1950
People's Liberation War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>CCP Estimate</th>
<th>Nationalist Estimate</th>
<th>Independent Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>4,990,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The events of these years are all too familiar. The
Nationalists—divided, corrupt, exhausted—fought to the least
of their ability. The Communists in the 1946-1947 period con-
centrated on improving the coercive abilities of their military.
By 1948 the Communists had begun their sweep over the Mainland
and the multiplication of their armed forces and their coercive
equipment. These were the responsible factors: desertion of KMT
soldiers to the Communists; control of new populations by the

200Collated from numerous sources.
Communists; bandwagon support from the population. By the end of this period the Communists controlled the Mainland, and its military had reached its maximum size since the beginning of the CCP movement, a size of approximately 5 million men.

On April 15, 1946, Chou En-lai declared a state of hostilities in Manchuria. On June 23 Mao demanded withdrawal of US troops and cessation of US aid to the KMT. At Yanan in July the Communists announced the reorganization of their forces as the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA). On January 7, 1947, General Marshall ended his futile truce efforts and returned to Washington.

Initial Nationalist successes in 1946 and 1947 imposed severe strains on the Communists. However, the CCP bided its time, letting decay spread throughout the Nationalist apparatus, and using this opportunity to unify and train their own forces. Their armies were familiarized with the modern Japanese weapons captured in 1946, particularly the artillery; and a "respect the officer and love the soldier" campaign, designed to unify the PLA, was carried out. During this period Communist guerrillas sapped the already low morale of Nationalist troops.

On December 25, 1947, Mao spoke before the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee and anticipated the end of the civil war:

> the Chinese People's Revolutionary War has by now reached a turning point. ...This is a turning point

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202 "Nineteen Years of Brave Struggle," op. cit.
203 Liu, op. cit., pp. 243-256.
in history. This is a turning point in the twenty years' reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek from development to extermination. This is a turning point of the Imperialists power in China for over a century from development to extermination. This is a great event.\textsuperscript{204}

He also instructed the CCP to

\begin{quote}
Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms and most of his personnel. The source of men and material for our army is mainly at the front. Skillfully utilize the intervals between two campaigns for restings, regrouping and training troops.\textsuperscript{205}
\end{quote}

He reminded the CC that "annihilation of ...enemy fighting strength" was a process of subtraction from the KMT and addition to the CCP.

The corollary was preservation of existing Communist forces.

\begin{quote}
Avoid battles of attrition in which the gains are not sufficient to make up for the losses, or in which the gains merely balance the losses. Thus we are inferior taken as a whole—numerically speaking—but ...As time goes by we will become superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy is totally destroyed.\textsuperscript{206}
\end{quote}

In the next months the Communists became numerically superior, their ranks swelled by ex-Nationalists and recruits from the cities that they were soon to capture. Among these recruits were many students who brought into the Red forces those skills needed to increase the military significance of mere numbers.\textsuperscript{207} These additions allowed a switch from guerrilla warfare to massive attack. The "vital points" so dear to Chiang fell in rapid succession: November, 1948—Mukden; January, 1949—

\textsuperscript{204} Quoted in Chi, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid.}
Tientsin and Peking; April, 1949—Nanking; May, 1949—Shanghai; October, 1949—Canton; November, 1949—Chungking. The Nationalists fled from some of these areas and went over to the Communists en masse in others.  

By the end of 1949 the CCP found itself in general control of the mainland, although extensive mopping-up operations were to continue through 1951. By the end of 1950 the CCP had established its basic foreign policy, internal military objectives, and faced the task of governing and developing the mainland along Communist lines. Mao had proclaimed the "lean to one side" policy and reaffirmed CCP unity with U.S.S.R. against the United States and its "running dogs". In December, 1949, he went to Moscow and on February 14, 1950, returned to Peking with the first formal trade and aid agreement between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union. In October, 1950, the Red forces moved into Korea after considerable internal delay and Soviet pressure.  

The transition from war economy to peace economy called for in the 1950 Central Committee New Year's Manifesto was postponed because of the Korean War. However, although the army continued to be a basic instrument of policy, plans for changes in the military instrument were announced and begun. The Communists were the first to admit that their victory against Chiang had been as much due to his internal weakness as their strength. They also recognized the economic drain of supporting a five

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million man armed force and the political unreliability of the many ex-Nationalists it contained. The CCP drew up a conscription and demobilization system which would reduce the size and cost of the PLA establishment and sluice out the majority of the political unreliables. It implemented the system in 1955 after the Korean hostilities ceased and the Party solved its relocation of veterans problem.

During 1950 the CCP began technical modernization of the military establishment. An air force and navy were established. Soviet advisors and Soviet aid increased the military capability in all three services. The inculcation of more advanced skills and the acquisition of complex and expensive equipment modified the PLA in a politicized-specialist direction. This modification created military objections to the CCP policies of political indoctrination in, political control of, and economic labor by the armed forces.

The Korean War involved changes in the anticipated non-coercive role of the military, acceleration of military technical training and equipment stockpiling, and formulation of an official position on nuclear warfare. The War prevented anticipated demobilization and reduced the production contribution of the PLA. When demobilization plans had been drawn up, the Politburo had anticipated only a need for

sufficient forces to liberate Taiwan and Tibet as well as sufficient forces to consolidate the national defense and suppress the counter-revolutionaries. 211

The CCP's experience with Chiang's more modern army and its involvement with modernized U.N. forces in Korea created tremendous pressure for the CCP to modernize its conventional armed forces. At this time it possessed inadequate standard modern weapons, i.e., machine-guns and tanks, and its troops were often unable to handle the weapons it did possess. The switch from guerrilla to conventional warfare revealed an unorganized and undeveloped supply system. A captured document of the Chinese People's Volunteers summarizes the pressures for military modernization:

A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops. As a result, our soldiers frequently starve....They were unable to maintain the physical strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated ....The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.

When the CCP became involved in the international dispute over Korea, the Party elite felt compelled to formulate a position on nuclear warfare. By the end of 1950 the Chinese Communists had become even more aware of the value of military modernization. They were not achieving a conclusive victory in Korea; superior military opposition had blocked their "liberation" of Taiwan. The PLA had only been conclusively successful in backward Tibet.


When the CCP became involved in the international dispute over Korea, the Party elite felt compelled to formulate a position on nuclear warfare. In August, 1946, Mao had said that atomic bombs were inadequate in a guerrilla war. Before the CCP intervened in Korea, Nieh Jung-chen, the Chief of Staff of the PLA, repeated this position to Indian Ambassador, Pannikar, "After all, China lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there.... They may kill a few million people."\textsuperscript{214} Internally the Party tried to minimize the significance of nuclear bombardment.\textsuperscript{215}

4. Change and Discord, 1951-1959

The major military events of this period were: rectification campaigns in 1953, 1955 and 1957-1959; intermittent preparations for attacks on Formosa; the initiation of a regular conscription and demobilization program in 1956; the revolution in Tibet in 1959; territorial infringement on India in 1959; and a shakeup in the PLA command in 1959.

During this period the Communist forces were reduced from their peak of 1950 because of: the economic burden of the military on the society; the adoption of more complex strategic methods which required quality rather than quantity; and the development of a reserve system composed of demobilized conscripts. It should be noted that the 1959 military personnel estimate includes approximately 400,000 members of the air force and 56,000 members of the navy.\textsuperscript{216}

\textsuperscript{215}Whiting, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142.
### Table VI

Size of the Communist Armed Forces, 1951-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>OCP Estimate</th>
<th>Independent Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular forces</td>
<td>Reserve troops and Public Security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>2,410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2,460,000</td>
<td>2,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2,420,000</td>
<td>2,330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2,380,000</td>
<td>2,290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2,340,000</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>2,210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,500,000+</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chinese Communist estimates for the 1951-1955 period are a projection based on Communist pronouncements in 1950 and 1956. Hollister's assumption in doing this was an equal rate of discharge. The Korean War raises sizeable doubts on this symmetrical rate of demobilization, but the ultimate shrinkage is undeniable. See: William W. Hollister, *China's Gross National Product and Social Accounts, 1950-1957*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1958, p. 118. Other sources are also used.
Military designs on Korea, Formosa and South and South-east Asia created pressure for more specialized military personnel and higher expenditure for more complex equipment. The Party's reluctance to abandon these ambitions created internal and external dilemmas. These dilemmas were responsible for the rectification campaigns with the military, the command shakeup, and tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

The internal dilemmas were these: how can a technically advanced and professional army be politically controlled? How can a modern army take time from technical training to engage in economic activities? When military competence is not compatible with political control and economic contributions, which takes priority? The Sino-Soviet external dilemmas were these: if China were dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment and training, how could it maintain foreign policy autonomy, how could it exercise significant influence on the formulation of Bloc policy? If the Soviet armed forces were a model for Chinese military development, how could the loyalty of the PLA officer corps to the CCP elite be maintained? If the PLA adopted foreign military practices, how could its respect for the military wisdom of Mao be maintained?
Chapter 4
Mao and the Non-Combat Role of the Military

From 1927-1949 the Party's coercive survival margin was not narrow enough for it to be eliminated nor great enough for it to eliminate the incumbent KMT. The Party was bound by the necessity for a powerful armed force and the fear that such a force would swallow rather than serve its political master. Accordingly, the CCF set out to insure that "military work is ... the Party's work".¹ Under Mao Tse-tung the interdependency of the Party and its military program was raised to the status of dogma.

Without a firm Marxist political line, no firm Marxist military line can be established, and without a firm Marxist military line, no firm Marxist political line can be carried out. The history of the Party shows that those who err politically also err militarily; and those who err militarily can trace their errors to political ones.²

The genius of Mao was his evolution of a politico-military doctrine conducive to combat victory, non-coercive military functions that increased Communist strength, and maintenance of Party control.

We discuss in the following pages the possible sources of Mao's policies, the relevant parts of his writings, and those of two CCP notables close to him, Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta.³

³Liu is now the second most important Chinese Communist, holding the office of Chairman of the People's Republic. Chen is a
We do not attempt to assess the specific effects of social and military theories and events on Mao's view of the military role. Nor do we attempt to picture Mao's theoretical writings comprehensively or to judge his theoretical creativity. 4

A. Importance

Mao's followers have made him the subject of a cult of personality. 5 Acclaim knows no bounds. "The correct leadership of comrade Mao has enabled the Party to achieve victory during the war of resistance and in the war against Chiang and the United States." 6 They hail him as, "...the most outstanding member of the Central Committee and Deputy Director of the CCP Propaganda Department.


contemporary revolutionist statesman and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism...."  

Since January 1935 Mao has been titular chief of the Chinese Communist movement. He was a delegate to the First National Congress of the KMT in July, 1921. During the first alliance he held numerous important positions, among them alternate member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, deputy director of the KMT Propaganda Department, and Director of the Peasant Movement Training Institute. In May, 1925, he began organizing the peasants in his native province, Hunan. In 1927, on the orders of the CCP Central Committee, he directed the September 5-18 Autumn Harvest Insurrection in Hunan. After its failure he


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lost rank in the Party but continued his activities in Hunan, establishing a soviet regime in November.

In the years until 1935 repeated failures led to changes in the top leadership of the CCP. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t'ien rapidly succeeded each other. These loyal followers of the shifting Comintern line concentrated on urban work and thought various "revolutionary waves" would enable quick takeover of the cities. Mao and others continued to develop autonomous areas and military forces in the hinterland. In May, 1928, Chu Teh's small band joined Mao at Ching-kan-shan and formed the Fourth Red Army, Mao built his political strength as the Commissar of this army. In August, 1929, the Chu-Mao combination established a soviet in Kiangsi province. By the time that the First All-China Congress of the Soviets convened on November 7, 1931, Mao's soviet areas had survived three KMT offensives. He had also eliminated many Party opponents as members of "Anti-Bolshevik Cliques".9 This crucial Congress established the Chinese Soviet Republic and made Mao its chairman.

In the fall of 1932 the top leadership of the CCP was forced to flee Shanghai to the areas under Mao's control. Although re-elected to the post of chairman at the Second All-China Soviet Congress at Juichin in January, 1934, Mao had not yet secured the highest offices in the Chinese Communist Party, largely because he was not supported by Moscow. However, 1934 was a bitter year for the Chinese Communists. They were forced out of their base

9Chiu, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
in Kiangsi, and their army was greatly diminished during the ensuing retreat. During this Long March\textsuperscript{10} communication was broken with Moscow, and at the Tsun-i Conference of January, 1935, Mao assumed formal Party leadership as Chairman of the Central Committee and of the Politburo.

However, his actual power was still limited by an active opposition. Following the Mao-erh-kai conference in July-August, 1935, Chang Kuo-t'ao and his Fourth Front Red Army separated from Mao and his army. Leadership friendly to Mao in the small Shensi soviet was replaced with followers of another CCP faction.\textsuperscript{11} However, Mao continued to increase his power. Late in 1935 his Red forces from the South straggled into Kansu and Shensi. By the end of 1936 he had re-installed the displaced leaders of the Shensi soviet and made Yenan CCP headquarters. Chang Kuo-t'ao, after failing to win the support of Chu Teh, rejoined the other Communist troops. However, Chang Kuo-t'ao's prominence continued until his expulsion in 1938, and reports that another opponent, Chang Wen-t'ien, held the title of Secretary General of the CCP in 1937 showed that Mao was still in the process of consolidating his power.

During his rise to power Mao expounded theories of a revolutionary base, of encirclement of the cities from the

\textsuperscript{10} The Long March was in reality a retreat in which the Communists lost heavily. See: the works cited in footnote 8. Communist historiography has turned this retreat into a glorious outing; for example, see: Chang-feng Chen, \textit{On the Long March with Chairman Mao}, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959.

countryside, of guerrilla tactics, and of the soldier-peasant alliance. He used the same writings and speeches as weapons in a struggle against competitors in the Party, chiefly the "returned students", or "twenty-eight Bolsheviks", backed by Moscow. There is evidence that they disagreed on fundamental issues: the tactics in the military conflict with Chiang Kai-shek and the United Front line launched by the Comintern in 1935. In other words, Mao was not a Kremlin designate, and his revolutionary policies and the internal support that he developed within the Chinese Communist movement were responsible for his rise to power.

B. Influence

Mao's rise to power parallels the Chinese Communist development of the military instrument, and his writings provide the major theoretical statements on the use of the Red forces. Three influences on Mao's thought deserve mention: early Chinese military thinkers; the tactics and historical views of Marx and Lenin; and the Chinese military history outlined in the last chapter.

1. Early Chinese Military Thinkers

To summarize, earlier Chinese military theorists provided Mao with these ideas: 1) the military as a rational organization; 2) the military as a psychologically manipulated body; 3) the primacy and social fusion of military and production activities; and 4) flexible tactics of warfare.

Mao's theories borrow heavily from the Confucian tradition. Communist practices in the Yenan period and in recent years have drawn heavily on this heritage, for example the place of the individual in society. Mao used the military politically and economically to attain the three characteristics Confucius saw in a successful ruler: "sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military power, and sufficiency of popular faith in the ruler."

In the 5th Century B.C. Ssu Ma Jang Chu contrasted civil and military patterns of behavior in terms of etiquette and regulations. He pointed out the military's determination and greater orientation toward action. "Those in strongholds do not run hither and thither, and when in peril they do not chatter." Military organization was essentially rational, and military success required popular support.

In war, ranks must be fixed, merit and demerit established...instructions proclaimed....The men must be examined and their capacities discovered....And in war too, the people must be consolidated and their advantage made mutual, disorder must be controlled and those who stop made to move.

According to Ssu, the successful army was disciplined, controlled,

13 Y. Muramatsu, Revolution and Chinese Tradition in Yenan Communism, paper delivered in The Seminar on East Asian Thought and Society, Stanford University, Nov. 21, 1957 (Mimeod).
17 Ibid., p. 30.
mobile, and indoctrinated.

In the next century Wu Chi contributed some psychological observations on military organization—"To govern a country or control an army there must be training through ceremony and stimulation through duty so that a sense of shame is inculcated." ¹⁸ Centuries later, the Chinese Communists were to use the army as an agent of rational organization, directed to task accomplishment in a modern sense. Mao was to propose and install a system of psychological measures designed to inculcate and capitalize on shame and guilt.

The Legalists, particularly Lord Shang (255-206 B.C.), envisioned war and military organization as instruments of unification and central authority. Other Chinese thinkers had admitted the possibility of a defensive "just war", but the Legalist school advocated pragmatic expansionist military activity. ¹⁹ Shang proposed an authoritarian state organized for military conquest and agricultural production to support that conquest. The old social structure and traditional values were to be overthrown—"the important thing in undertaking the administration of a country is to make the rich poor, and the poor rich." ²⁰ Thus, the aim of government was "to bring about a condition where people find it bitter not to till and dangerous not to fight." ²¹

²¹Ibid., p. 325.
To Shang, an effective merger of military and production functions guaranteed national supremacy. "In military enterprises the enemy is conquered . . . when the army is in reserve the country becomes rich." 22 Ideally military and production functions would be handled by a three-part social organization: an army of able-bodied men, an army of able-bodied women, and one of the weak and old people. These three "armies" would augment military capacity and prevent economic concerns from interfering with military strength. 23

As we shall see, centuries later, Mao applied plans to prepare the Chinese people psychologically for an intense effort to develop military and economic strength. He was to discard traditional social institutions and values and introduce the People's Communes to form military-production units analogous to the groups proposed by Shang.

Shang's theory of the economic role of the military was applied in the construction of the Great Wall of China. Emperor Tsin Chin Hwang-ti (221-209 B.C.) used a force of over 300,000 soldiers directed by a military engineer to construct the Wall and to grow crops near it. 24 Mao's armies later undertook many similar activities.

Mao's military tactics were strikingly similar to those

22 Ibid., p. 205.
23 Ibid., p. 250.
used in traditional China.\textsuperscript{25} Sun Tzu, 5th Century B.C., is the most often-mentioned predecessor.\textsuperscript{26} Sun emphasized stratagem and infiltration and denounced theories of rigid positional warfare. He stressed tactical use of the terrain by outnumbered forces.\textsuperscript{27} Mao summarized his tactics as follows:

- When the enemy comes forward, I withdraw;
- When the enemy withdraws, I go forward;
- When the enemy settles down, I disturb him;
- When the enemy is exhausted, I fight him.\textsuperscript{28}

Under his direction, they became a concise formula of CCP military tactics.

2. Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism

Mao's theories were often in line with those of earlier Communist demi-gods, and reflected the shifting Moscow line. He also had direct knowledge of the Soviet notion of revolutionary war and a revolutionary army. Mao came in contact with these influences in a variety of ways. Soviet military advisers during the first alliance period were the CCP's first military teachers. In later years, the Chinese Communist areas were linked to the Kremlin by wireless and couriers.\textsuperscript{29} A military adviser, known

\textsuperscript{25} For example, in Mao's favorite novel, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, according to Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 185.


\textsuperscript{27} Tzu Sun, \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{29} Snow, Red Star Over China, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 381.
by the Chinese name of Li Teh, was present and influential, at least before the Long March. High ranking officers in the Chinese Communist forces received training in Moscow.

Numerous works of Lenin and Stalin and several Red Army texts were published in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods.

In Schwartz's phrase the early Communist ideologies opened conceptual doors through which the Chinese Communists under Mao would later march. The "doors" opened by Marx and Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin were policies designed to: 1) use the military coercively to seize power; 2) win the peasantry as an ally in military revolution; 3) disintegrate opposing armies while developing Party armed forces; 4) forge a Communist army from backward peasant recruits by indoctrination and modernization; 5) increase military strength and create an economic base of heavy industry after taking power.

Marx and Engels taught the necessity of armed revolution. In their later writings they went far beyond a street-barricade notion of the revolutionary role of military bodies. In its place they called for total war, for a "nation in arms", for

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30 Snow, *ibid.*, pp. 70, 400, 417, 419, 420; and *Random Notes on Red China*, op. cit., pp. 17, 18, 28, 30, 50, 60, 63.


transformation of the armed forces into "democratic" instruments, and for mobile warfare. They found indiscriminate opposition to military bodies irrational and regarded the advent of mass armies as a great opportunity.\textsuperscript{33} Thus Engels wrote in 1891:

Contrary to appearance, compulsory military service surpasses general franchise as a democratic agency. The real strength of the German social democracy does not rest in its voters, but in its soldiers. A voter one becomes at twenty-five, a soldier at twenty; and it is the youth above all from which the party recruits its followers. By 1900 the army, once the most Prussian, the most reactionary element of the country, will be socialist in its majority as inescapably as fate.\textsuperscript{34}

A change in "class" content of the military could be exploited if the Marxists recognized the revolutionary potential of classes other than the industrial proletariat. Marx concluded from his analysis of the rise of Napoleon that the "democratic energy of the peasantry" must be aroused.\textsuperscript{35} Engels draws strategic conclusions from his review of the German Peasant War—"The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War."\textsuperscript{36} To summarize, Marx and Engels formulated the notion of armies as a potential revolutionary force, and the peasantry as an important factor in Communist revolution. They also recognized the need to demoralize non-revolutionary armed forces. "...a disorganized army and a complete breakdown of discipline has been

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 169.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 161.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.
the condition as well as the result of every victorious revo-
lution." Communist revolutionaries could both capitalize on
this possibility and beware of its development in their own
forces.

Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky were the triumvirate that formu-
lated early Soviet theory on the use of the military instrument.
Lenin pointed to the exploitation of the peasantry and the
creation of Soviets as useful tactical devices in underdeveloped
countries. His Two Tactics was required reading for the Chi-
inese Communists. He read Clausewitz carefully, as Mao was to
do later, and endorsed his dictum that "war is politics continued
by other means". War was accepted as a political, economic and
psychological struggle. He praised the use of military means for
social revolution.

In their work in the Soviet Union, Lenin and Trotsky under-
moved the Imperial armies, per Engels and Marx, and developed the
Red Army. When Lenin addressed the Eighth Congress of the

37 Ibid., p. 169.
38 V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic
Revolution," Selected Works, Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub-
See also: his draft thesis on the national and colonial questions,
pp. 462-471; and his address to the Second All-Russian Congress
of Communist Organizations of the People's of the East in From
V. I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East,
39 Karl A. Wittfogel, "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 277, (Sept., 1951) p. 25.
40 Edward Mead Earle, "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of
41 The first half of the policy toward the military was made a
general procedure in the "Conditions of Admission to the Com-
munist International" adopted at the Second Congress of the
Comintern, July-August, 1920. See: Shih Hu, "China in Stalin's
Communist Party in 1919, he used the phrases that appeared over
and over again in Mao's writings—"an army of workers and pea-
sants....which knows what it is fighting for." Trotsky focused
on the problems of developing a modern and indoctrinated armed
force from peasants, and as part of his theory of "Permanent
Revolution" emphasized the role of the armed forces.

Revolutionary violence is the means of attaining
the freedom of the toilers. From the moment of
assuming power revolutionary violence assumes the
form of an organized army.43

He advocated the creation of "a regime of military communism", i.e., civilian militarization.

Mao could not acknowledge that Trotsky had influenced his
thought. He could and did acknowledge the influence of Stalin
on post-revolutionary CCP policy. His biographers have denied
that Stalin influenced Mao's revolutionary theories. In the first
edition of Stalin and the Chinese Revolution Chen Po-ta wrote:

It was only after the 1942 movement of ideolo-
gical reorientation that Stalin's numerous works on
China were systematically published by our Party....
Many comrades of our Party who in fact led the Chinese
revolution never had occasion to make a systematic
study of Stalin's numerous works on China. Among
them was Comrade Mao Tse-tung.44

However, it is questionable that Stalin's directives on China were
unknown to a man as prominent in the CCP as Mao.

pp. 15-16.

43Drawn from an address to the Eighth Congress of the Communist

44Yigael Gluckstein compares the first and later editions of Stalin
and the Chinese Revolution, Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1953, in his Mao's China, Boston: Beacon Press, Inc., 1957,
p. 398.
Mao did not publicly advocate the creation of a CCP army and military resistance to the Nationalists until after Stalin. In 1926 Stalin recognized that "the revolutionary armies in China are the most important fact in the fight of the Chinese workers and peasants for their liberation." In June, 1927, Stalin ordered the CCP to create its own army.

This dependence upon unreliable generals must be put to an end. Mobilize about 20,000 Communists and about 50,000 revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several army corps.... organize your own reliable army before it is too late. Otherwise there can be no guarantee against failures....Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek, or who set soldiers on the people, the workers and peasants. Persuasion is not enough. It is time to act.

Stalin's description of the importance of armed forces in the Chinese Revolution has often been reproduced in Communist and non-Communist literature.

In China the struggle is not being carried on by unarmed people against the troops of their own government but the armed people in the form of its revolutionary army in action. The China armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. The Chinese revolutionaries including the Communists must make a special study of things military...for military questions in China are at present the most important factor in the Chinese revolution.

Two important meetings under Stalin's direction in 1928, the Sixth National Congress of the CCP and the Sixth World Congress of the

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Communist International, affirmed the urgent need to develop a strong party army.\textsuperscript{49} The Comintern approved this policy statement:

\begin{quote}
The overthrow of capitalism is impossible without violence, i.e., without armed uprisings and wars against the bourgeoisie. In our era of imperialistic wars and world revolution, revolutionary civil wars of the proletarian dictatorship against the bourgeoisie, wars of the proletariat against bourgeois states and world capitalism as well as national imperialism are unavoidable as has been shown by Lenin.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

Stalin also handed down to Mao these cornerstones for a solid Communist structure: 1) defense industries should be established rapidly; 2) the people should be psychologically prepared for war; and 3) the violence instruments of the Party should be strengthened.\textsuperscript{51} In 1939, Stalin put aside Lenin's pre-revolutionary notion of a stateless dictatorship.\textsuperscript{52} He declared a socialist state must have a "well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service."\textsuperscript{53} Mao was to use almost identical words in launching the Peking regime in 1949.\textsuperscript{54}

3. Chinese Experience

The third influence on Mao's theories was the Chinese military and social history sketched in chapters 2 and 3. He

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49}See the documents presented in "The Sixth Congress and the Doctrine of Prepared Revolution," in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 123-164.
\item \textsuperscript{51}Earle, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 350-359.
\item \textsuperscript{52}V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," \textit{Selected Works}, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, Part I.
\item \textsuperscript{53}Joseph Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B.)," \textit{The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow}, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{54}Tse-tung Mao, \textit{On People's Democratic Dictatorship}, London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1950, p. 16.
\end{itemize}
inherited one primary challenge—to make the development of strong armed forces and the spread of Party power and social change complementary rather than competitive. 55

C. Theories

Mao's theories on the political and economic role of the Chinese Communist military are:

1) the inevitability and desirability of war, and accordingly the value of a powerful armed force to a Communist Party and government;

2) the development of necessary internal characteristics in a revolutionary army—indoctrination, rational organization, modern skills;

3) the use of CCP armed forces to spread and intensify Party power through propaganda, production and mass organization;

4) the expansion of CCP military and political strength through militia units and quasi-military social organization;

5) the maintenance of Party control of the military.

Mao is also famous for his guerrilla tactics, 56 essentially the substitution of "strategic mobility ... for logistic weakness". 57 However, to Mao these are not general laws, for "war and the guiding laws of war are developmental". 58 He predicted

55 Ibid.
58 Quoted by Shuang Yun, "A Marxist Military Line—Notes on re-reading the Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War Written by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1936," People's China, Vol. II, no. 5 (Sept. 1, 1950), p. 28. The work can be found
the need for tactical modifications "once the Chinese Soviet Red Army becomes stronger than the enemy." 59

Mao's rationale for the non-coercive role of the military can best be understood in the context of his theory of politics. The application of his rationale can best be understood in the context of his views on the usefulness of theories.

Mao, even as a school-boy, viewed political life as a series of conflicts, of opposing pressures. "Pressure is the very essence of politics. If you are successful in keeping up the pressure that means that your politics are good..." 60 After assuming leadership of the CCP, he devoted special attention to military pressure. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun ... the whole world can be remolded only by the gun." 61 Mao was also equipped with a theory of social revolution. "We are indebted to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for giving us our weapon. This weapon is not a machine gun but Marxism-Leninism." 62

As a Chinese realist he turned to armed forces; as a faithful Communist he turned to revolution, and the expansion of Party power. His theory of politics integrates the military


59 Shuang, op. cit., p. 29.


instrument and the political end.

In China there is no place for the proletariat without armed struggle; there is no place for the people without armed struggle; there is no place for the Communist Party without armed struggle; and there is no victory of the revolution without armed struggle. 63

Mao made clear that his theory should be applied to facilitate the Communist drive for power, but that it should not be regarded as a cure-all.

When we study the guiding laws of wars of various periods, different historical periods, of different characters, and of different localities and nations, we must focus our attention on those special features and the trend of their developments. We must oppose mechanicalism in approaching the problems of war. 64

...the fundamental task of the leading bodies of the Communist Party lies in two important things, namely to know the conditions and to grasp the policy; the former is what we call knowing the world, and the latter, changing the world. 65

The Chinese Communists must also be patient.

Struggled and failed, struggled and failed again; with experience accumulated through 109 years, through hundreds of major and minor struggles, be they military or political, economic or cultural, bloody or non-bloody. 66

1. War is Welcome

Mao's writings provide information on the utility and place of war and the military in different political situations.

64Quoted by Shuang, op. cit., p. 28.
War, he contended, strengthened the fibre of a Communist Party. It is an "...antitoxin ...not only capable of expelling the evil influence of the enemy, but also of purging ourselves of all impurities". 67

In 1949 Liu Shao-chi stressed the place of war in Communist revolution:

in a colony or semi-colony if the people have no arms they have nothing. The existence and development of proletarian ...(i.e., Communist) ...organizations and the existence and development of a national united front is intimately linked to the existence and development of such an armed struggle. This is the sole path for many colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle for independence and liberation.68

The political power of both Communist revolutionaries and governments can only be maintained by armies, and advanced by war.

The main form of struggle is war; the main form of organization for this struggle is the army....The army is the major constituent of a nation's political authority. Whoever hopes to achieve and maintain political power must have a strong army. People may ridicule us by calling us advocates of the idea that war is everything. We are....It is good. It is Marxian.69


68 This quote from a December, 1949 speech to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries appears in "An Armed People Opposes Armed Counter-Revolution," People's China, Vol. II, no. 1 (July 1, 1950), p. 13. The article was originally a reply to the reader from the editor of JMJF published June 16, 1950.

69 The phrase is used by Mao in "War and Strategic Problems." The translation is that of the Chiu, op. cit., p. 290. For a slightly different translation see Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 272.
Becoming a national government does not imply a slackening in the importance of the military instrument. Mao made this clear in 1949. "Our present task is to strengthen the People's state apparatus, meaning principally the people's army, the people's police, and the people's courts...." Mao claims that the Communists are confronted by hostile nations and hostile social groups.

We cannot afford to abolish state power just now. Why not? Because imperialism still exists. Because internally reactionaries still exist and classes still exist.71

The Chinese Communist view of the world sees no permanent hope of "peaceful co-existence." To Mao "contradictions" exist even in a Communist nation.72 Externally there are those "...bastards, the Western imperialists."73 From the CCP viewpoint, if these hostile powers are strong the armed forces are needed for survival, and if they are "paper tigers" they will buckle before armed pressure.74

Although Mao values military power and armed struggle, he does not advocate continuous warfare or simultaneous battle with all opposing groups. The united front or temporary alliance is

70 Mao, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit., p. 16.
71 Ibid.
72 This theoretical admission was made in his speech entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." The full text with notes and introduction by G. F. Hudson can be found in: Tse-tung Mao, Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, New York: New Leader, n.d.
73 This phrase is used in the various Chinese editions of his 1940 work, On New Democracy, but it is tactfully omitted in the United States publication. Wittfogel, "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China," op. cit., p. 32.
74 Mao's speech entitled "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" was published in late October, 1958. For a text
a valuable stratagem to increase their military strength and to exhaust their allies. 75 For example, during the second alliance with the Chinese Nationalists, he ordered that

...in all cases we can and should expand. Time and time again the Central Committee has pointed out to you this line of expansion. By expansion is meant that we should freely expand our armed forces both independently and on our own initiative, disregarding KMT restrictions, going beyond the limits allowed by the KMT, expecting no official appointments and relying on no financial support from the higher authorities; that we should resolutely establish our base areas, arouse the masses there into action and build up the Communist-led political power.... 76

The nuclear age has not led Mao to question the advantage of war to Communists. Mao sees a silver lining in the mushroom-like cloud:

The First World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. The Second World War was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism; then there will not be much more room left in the world for the imperialists, while it is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse. 77

2. The Revolutionary Army

The facts that the CCP army was drawn from the backward peasantry and from a people tired of armies; was to be used to

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of it, see: CB, No. 534 (Nov. 12, 1958), pp. 1-14.


76 "Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces; Resist the Attacks of the Anti-Communist Diehards," 1940, in Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 204-205.

77 Mao, Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, op. cit., p. 54.
overthrow the established order; was to fight for many years against a stronger opponent; had to be used in non-coercive activities; and could be offered few material rewards necessitated inventive measures. To create the military instrument that he wanted, Mao relied on indoctrination (strong political work and strict mass discipline), 78 organization, leadership, and the development of technical skills.

a. Indoctrination

Mao stressed the "subjective" factor, the man behind the gun, for two reasons: 1) to compensate for inadequate weapons, and 2) to compensate for the demoralizing effects of his strategy of "protracted war". 79 He felt that the soldiers had to "feel that they are not fighting for somebody else but for themselves and for the people". 80 His indoctrination program was therefore designed to inculcate a sense of political purpose, an involvement in the military group, and a strong allegiance between officers and men. To implement his program he decided not to repress the soldiers' attitudes but to change them, and resorted to the psychological devices of rectification and purification. 81 These devices were intended to create a cycle of "unity-criticism-unity". Mao

78Hu, op. cit., p. 34.
79See: "On the Protracted War" and "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," in Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., Vol. II.
sought to reinforce "unity" by army "democracy", e.g., officers were not to live better than the rank and file.  

b. Rational Organization

To the extent that indoctrination was successful, Mao expected his organizational theories and administrative methods to work. Like Lenin, Mao emphasizes a hierarchical line of authority.

The individual must obey the organization, the minority must obey the majority, lower echelons must obey higher echelons, and the entire Party must obey the basic principles of the Central Committee. Absolute egalitarianism is the fantasy of peasants and the petty bourgeoisie.

The importance of rational organization could not be over-emphasized—"Japan dared to invade us chiefly because of our lack of organization." Rational organization, methodicalness, planning are of great importance—"To defeat the enemy our ranks must be in good order, our steps in perfect co-ordination, our troops well-trained, and our weapons well-made."  

Mao's theory of warfare, as is his theory of everything else, is one of cool calculation, free from "...stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war". "One's theory or cognition is judged to be true or untrue not by how it is  

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82 Mao emphasized this in his November, 1928, report to the Central Committee, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," in Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., pp. 82-83.


84 Quoted by Chen, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, op. cit., p. 71, from "Rectify Wayward Tendencies in Study, Party Affairs and Literary Work."

subjectively felt to be but by what the result is objectively in social practice."86 Accurate information is of more use than dogma. The military cadres must exert themselves to become familiar with every aspect of both our conditions and those of the enemy, to seek out the laws behind their activities and then make use of these laws in our own activities.87

Because Mao recognized the shifting situations of guerrilla warfare, he warned against rigid organization. In Liu Shao-chi's words,

The Communist Party's discipline is erected on self-consciousness. It must not be regarded as mechanistic discipline restricting the initiative and creativeness of Party members.88

There is room for flexibility of detail within rigidity of policy.89 Mao's theory of organization includes 1) clear levels of authority; 2) adequate information; 3) rational programming.

Mao's theory of the good revolutionary army is not limited to "guerrilla-ism." A regular army is desirable and eventually necessary. As Mao's co-leader, Chu Teh observed--

...guerrilla warfare cannot solve the final problem. It can only inconvenience the enemy to a certain extent. In order to win a major war, regular armed forces are necessary and the guerrilla forces can only serve in a supplementary way.90

87Quoted by Shuang, op. cit., p. 28.
Mao told the first meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949:

Our people's armed forces must be preserved and strengthened, with our heroic and tested People's Liberation Army as their foundation. We will not only have a powerful army but also a powerful navy and a powerful air force. 91

C. Modern Skills

The brevity of attention to modern technical skills in Mao's writing does not indicate indifference to them. The reality of the Chinese Communist revolutionary years drastically limited their supply of technologically advanced hardware, military and economic. Within this limitation Mao repeatedly stressed those skills the CCP was in a position to cultivate. The CCP concentrated on literacy, and soldiers were taught simple verbal skills. The army was also to spend non-combat time on improving its logistic services: "organize supplies and to study such subjects as geography, weather, and the operation of communication equipment." 92 Mao anticipated the time when

...given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and in its operations. The army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization; the operations with their guerrilla character greatly diminished will attain a high degree of regularity; what is now at a lower level will then be raised to a higher level... 93

3. Role of the Revolutionary Army

Communist political and military success required continuous control of defensible areas, i.e., base areas.

91Quoted in Chen, op. cit., p. 43.
92Hsiao, op. cit., p. 7.
There have been in history many peasant wars of the roving insurgent type, but they all failed. In the present age of advanced communications and technology it is more than ever an entirely groundless illusion to attempt to win victory after the fashion of the roving insurgents.\textsuperscript{94}

The military weakness of the Communists forced them to establish these bases in the rural hinterland and to build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military political economic and cultural revolutionary positions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts and gradually win complete victory for the revolution through protracted fighting.\textsuperscript{95}

The Communists set out to win support of the base area inhabitants to procure personnel and supplies for the Red Army. In On Coalition Government (1945) Mao enumerated the significance of the peasants to the Communist movement.

\begin{quote}
The peasants--the source of China's industrial workers....In order to build up powerful industries of her own and a large number of modernized big cities, China will have to undergo a continuous process of transforming the rural inhabitants into urban inhabitants.

The Peasants--...Only the peasants can supply the largest amount of foodstuffs and raw materials and consume the largest amount of manufactured goods.

The Peasants--the source of the Chinese army. The soldiers are peasants in military uniforms....

The peasants--the main force fighting for a democratic order in China at the present stage. Chinese democratic forces can achieve nothing if they fail to rely on the support of peasant masses....

The peasants--Would not illiteracy-elimination, universal education, mass literature and art and public hygiene become largely empty talk if the 360 million peasants were left out of account?\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{94}Quoted by Wint, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 41.


\textsuperscript{96}Mao, \textit{Selected Works}, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. IV, pp. 294-295.
The combination of CCP coercive weakness and the rural base area policy confronted the movement with these needs:

1) a sound mass basis, 2) a first-rate Party organization, 3) a Red Army of adequate strength, 4) a terrain favorable to military operations, and 5) economic strength sufficient for self-support. 97

The terrain could only be selected not created. Mao perceived that the Red Army could contribute to creating the other requirements. In other words, Mao perceived that military revolution and social revolution had to be combined for either to be successful. 98

Mao therefore had to disabuse the army of the "purely military point of view," i.e., the attitude that combat was its sole function. 99 At the Ninth Conference of the Communist Party Organization of the Fourth Red Army, the Kutien conference of December, 1929, he castigated Communists who:

regard the task of the Red Army as similar to that of the White army—merely fighting ... certainly the Red Army exists not merely to fight; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should also shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organizing them, arming them and helping them to set up revolutionary political power, and even establishing organizations of the Communist Party. 100


98 A great deal has been written about Chinese Communist agrarian policy. Of special value for the early years of the movement is K. C. Chao's Historical Survey of the Land Policy of the CCP, 1921-1950, Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954.

99 See the resolutions he wrote for the Ninth Conference of the Party Organizations of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, December, 1929.

Later he devoted considerable attention to the economic capacities of the Red forces.

If in our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies ... everyone is not only able to fight and do mass work but is also skilled in production we need not fear any difficulty and shall be ... 'invincible in the sun'. 101

In other words, the army was to develop this image:

fighting a righteous people's war in the interests of the masses and of the entire nation. The sole aim of this army is to stand firmly on the people's side and to serve them wholeheartedly. 102

4. Mass Military Mobilization

Mao devised two ways to extend the army without "recruiting deserters and taking in mutineers" or "hiring men and buying horses". 103 The first device was that of part time militia units, locally recruited and locally based. Mao envisioned militia service as an apprenticeship to serving in the Red Army. He used this argument to justify time and equipment required to train the militia. 104

The second device also involved civilians in a militarized organization. However, unlike the militiamen these civilians were not organized for combat. The justification for this device of civilian militarization was "only by resolutely and extensively rallying the whole people can inexhaustible and endless

101 "Let Us Get Organized" (1943) in ibid., Vol. IV, p. 149.
104 Ibid., and "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire" (Jan., 1930), in ibid., p. 117.
supplies for every item of war requirements be secured." Mao hoped to channel civilian energies into disciplined and organized defense support activities, e.g., transportation of wounded Red soldiers. If we consider the massive civilian militarization program involved in the 1958 Commune program, it is surprising that Mao devoted little theoretical attention to this device.

Mao's commitment to the militia device was based on the expectation that it would assist the CCP to meet its two major problems: "to organize a revolutionary war and to improve the living conditions of the masses...." The first expectation was based on Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare. Locally based and locally recruited units could complement or occasionally substitute for regular CCP forces. The dispersion of the militia units made them less vulnerable to enemy offensives and enabled them to engage in unexpected harrassments of the enemy. The second expectation was based on militia fulfillment of the same non-coercive activities engaged in by the regulars. P'eng Teh-huai summarized some of the particulars of the activities.

Red partisans are not only warriors; they are at the same time political propagandists and organizers. Wherever they go they carry the message of the revolution, patiently explain to the mass of the peasantry the real mission of the Red Army and make them understand that only through revolution can their

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107Mao's development of the tactical utility of militia units can be found in his three major military works: "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War"(1936); "On the Protracted War"(1938); and "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerilla War"(1938), ibid., Vol. II, pp. 119-243, 267-281.
needs be realized, and why the Communist Party is the only Party which can lead them.\textsuperscript{108}

Mao assumed that the part time nature of the militia would allow its members to apply their new discipline, initiative and skills to non-coercive tasks to a greater extent than could regular servicemen.\textsuperscript{109}

5. Party Hegemony

Mao had no interest in a military that was independent of Party authority. "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party."\textsuperscript{110}

At the 1929 Kutien Conference Mao presented the rules for subordination of the Red Army. These rules have been incorporated into the operational code of the CCP.\textsuperscript{111} A 1944 summary of these rules merits quotation.

Firstly this army must recognize that it is for political work to guide military work, that the Party leads the army and not vice-versa, that the Party cannot be separated from the army. ... Fourthly this army must be different from the KMT army which is used by the military commanders to monopolize political power. Fifthly, the comrades in charge of military affairs must be different from the officers in the KMT army in which KMT members holding high military posts become privileged members of the KMT. ...\textsuperscript{112}

In his Kutien speech Mao also proposed the mechanism for Party control which has been retained throughout the history of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[108] Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 299.
\item[110] "Problems of War and Strategy" in ibid., p. 272.
\item[112] Po-ma Chen, Notes on Ten Years of Civil War (1927-1936), op. cit., pp. 90-91.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
movement. Party workers were to be active in military units down to the company level, and Party Committees were to secure a position as the "nucleus of leadership and unity in the army".\footnote{Mao, \textit{Selected Works}, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. I, pp. 105-115.}

In this same speech Mao listed recurrent heresies in the armed forces that the Party should rectify: "the purely military viewpoint", "extreme democratization", "the non-organizational viewpoint", "absolute equalitarianism", "subjectivism", "individualism", "the idea of the roving insurgents", and "the remnants of adventurism".\footnote{Hsiao, \textit{op. cit.}} These can be analytically summarized in terms of Army-Party conflicts that political work had to resolve. Of special importance were:

1) Military concerns and leadership versus political concerns and Party leadership;

2) Combat and combat training versus agitation and economic activity by the armed forces;

3) Regular army strength versus an armed militia;

4) Self-interest of one army versus the interests of other revolutionary forces;

5) Individual and group independence and equality versus hierarchical authority and discipline;

6) Non-Party policies and groups versus Party policies and members;

7) Irrational and personal actions versus Marxist, realistic and selfless actions;

8) Hedonism and preservation versus asceticism and total
obedience to the Party.
The first positions purportedly led to "warlordism" or "professionalism" and a duplication of the experiences of non-revolutionary Chinese armies.

Mao later added new heresies to his list:
8) military concerns and leadership versus civil government;¹¹⁵
9) regional localism versus national interests;
10) guerrilla-ism versus disciplined organization;
11) over-centralization versus flexible people's war;
12) foreign imitation versus adaptation to Chinese conditions.¹¹

Mao's home remedies for these ills were:
1) self-criticism and rectification;
2) intensified indoctrination by political workers;
3) better political selection of armed forces personnel;
4) criticism and surveillance by non-army Party units and army Party units;
5) purge.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵"Rectify the Party's Style in Work" (Feb., 1942), in ibid., Vol. IV, p. 40.
¹¹⁷See the "Resolution" mentioned above and that on "Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," ibid., Vol. I, pp. 105-115.
Chapter 5
Party-Army Relations

The intimate link in Mao's thought between political and military struggle, the Communist concern with Party omnipotence, and the unruly militarism of China's warlord periods have combined to make the Chinese Communists extremely concerned with the place of the armed forces. Peking doctrine on the subordination and allegiance of the armed forces is unequivocal:

Since war is a political action, the troops that are engaged in the conduct of war must be and can only be the armed force that is entrusted to carry out a political task. Some bourgeois military experts claim that their army transcends politics and class. This assertion is ridiculous and deceptive. ¹

The broad military role that emerges from Mao's statements further complicated the Party's problem of keeping its hand "on the gun". Later chapters note the specific strains and tensions that have developed in using the military for various purposes. The problems that have arisen since the Communists were forced to revise the character of the armed forces from that of revolutionary weapon to international weapon and from that of lightly armed partisans to nuclear age military technicians, are also discussed in later chapters.

The remainder of this chapter investigates the degree to which the official formula: --"The armed forces led by the Communist Party of China"²--is bite and not bark. This analysis is carried

²Teh Chu, "Twenty-Five Years of the Chinese People's Liberation..."
out by examining two parts of the army-Party relationship: the
overlapping of elites, which is discussed under "Two Elites or
One?", and the political control system woven into the PLA, which
is discussed under "Party Permeation of the PLA".

Our concern in this chapter is to analyze military and
political elites and mechanisms of political control in order to
reveal the extent of "Party influence" in the army, and "army
influence" in the CCP. This knowledge helps us to discover
whether these tasks to be discussed in later chapters are per-
formed for the Party as an expansion of its power or for the mili-
tary as an expansion of PLA power.

Obviously, the final object of this analysis is a better
assessment of the extent of conflict, and the possibility of open
rupture or increased tension between the CCP and the People's
Liberation Army.

A. Two Elites or One?

The elites of concern here are the men at the head of the
Party and armed forces of Communist China. 3 Assessment of the
degree to which top military and political positions are held by
the same men is arrived at by comparing membership in these
groups: 1) the Central Committee (CC), Central Political Bureau
(Politburo), Standing Committee and Secretariat of the CCP; 2) the

3 On the value and nature of the study of political elites see:
Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The
Comparative Study of Elites, Hoover Institute Studies, Series B:
Elites, No. 1, Stanford: Stanford University Press, Jan., 1952;
Inc., 1939. On the role of elites in Communist organizations,
see: Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of
Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, The Rand Series, New York:
military councils which have been in theoretical charge of the PLA: The People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC) and the National Defense Council (NDC); and 3) the General Staff and key command personnel of the Red forces.

The Central Committee is a large body of leading Party members which meets no more than twice a year. It formally approves basic CCP policies handed down from the Politburo. In cases of serious division in the Politburo, it might make the decisive choice. The CC has both regular and alternate members, the latter being either rising young men or honored veterans who command less influence than regular members. The Politburo exercises control of "central state organs and people's organizations" when the CC is not in session and approves policies later submitted to the CC. Its membership contains the heads of the important programs and organizations of the regime—political, economic, international and military. The Politburo is led and its agenda drawn up by a Standing Committee. The Standing Committee has the greatest influence of any Party unit on policy formation. In effect it is an inner cabinet, although it tends to consult the whole Politburo on major matters. The day to day execution of policy rests in this committee and its staff, the Secretariat.

The following pages present data on the duration of Party membership and actual military experience of the key individuals in the CCP and the military councils. The "community of experience" vitally affects the tasks assigned to the PLA and can reveal the extent to which the formulators of national policy
are military men. Thus it reveals a dimension of appreciation of the military instrument. The second section of the elite analysis measures the extent to which the men who form national political policy and assign tasks to the military are the actual directors of the armed forces. We first establish the extent of influence and acquaintance political men have had in the military, and then the extent of political influence in the hands of active military commanders.

1. Community of Experience

From 1927 until the seizure of power in 1949 the CCP was engaged in warfare. Their forces were small, and men of talent were used for many different purposes. A "community of experience" was perforce developed by political and military leaders. The armed forces were the basis of political survival and political expansion. Most Party leaders active in this period were of necessity in contact with the military, and the vast majority held active military positions. In his visits in the 1930's to the Communist areas Snow observes that

...all the leadership was in a way political and military. The political men, for example Chou En-lai and Mao, had experience not only as commissars but indeed as military commanders.\(^4\)

An academic study, analyzing the CCP leaderships through the 1949 takeover of the mainland, concluded:

In China ...the present generation of Communists are themselves military men above all. Every Communist, whether a peasant, a worker, or an intellectual in origin soon became a military man.\(^5\)

\(^4\)Edgar Snow, interview on October 4, 1959 in Palisades, New York.
If political and military men were one and the same, the possibility of army-Party conflict was sharply diminished. To the extent that they remain identical, future possibilities of conflict are also diminished.

The political importance of military leaders in China did not begin with the Communists. The earlier review of recent Chinese military history has shown many other instances of the political militarist and indicated the possible "progressiveness" of military men. In many ways the military, under such leaders as Yuan, Feng and Chiang Kai-shek, was the opponent of the traditional society, and the traditional power structure. Young men attached to changing China often turned to a military career or at least to a military academy for "western-style" education. Accordingly, many of the Communist leaders were partially military men even before the period of "armed revolution". Through 1945, 44.8% of Politburo members and 54.8% of Central Committee members had attended Chinese military schools. Military affairs was the most commonly shared subject of studies.6

Nearly all leaders of the Party were affiliated with the Party of the period of guerrilla warfare. A 1953 study found that over 96% of the CCP elite had been affiliated with the Party for twenty-two years or more.7 Analysis of their activities during the middle 1930's showed high involvement in military

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7 Frederick T. C. Yu, Key Leaders in Communist China, Series III, no. 3, Human Resources Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, MS, May, 1953, p. 50.
activity. Data is available on sixty key individuals. Over 40 (66 2/3%) of these made the harrowing Long March. Information available on sixteen of the leaders who did not make the march indicates that nine were involved in guerrilla fighting in other parts of China. 8

The men who shared this community of experience continue to hold power as of 1959. Data gathered on 89 of the 97 regular members of the Eighth Central Committee, elected in September, 1956, and augmented in May, 1958, and on the twenty member Politburo, elected in 1956, reveals that in the CC 77% and in the Politburo 90% had joined the Party before 1928. 9 The seven men of the Standing Committee, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yun, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Lin Piao, 10 all joined the Party before 1925 except Lin, who obtained membership in 1925 at the age of 17. 11

These men at the top spent much of their lives leading the Party to power on the basis of the Red Army. The Party elites' actual military experience can be located in their careers. Chu Teh and Lin Piao are famous as combat commanders. Mao's personal tenure as a commissar has already been mentioned. Chou, 12

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8 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
Liu,¹³ and Teng¹⁴ all served as political commissars before the establishment of the Peking regime. Only Ch'en Yun did not occupy a responsible military post.

Military experience is characteristic of the less prominent political leadership. Prior to the selection of the Eighth Central Committee, over two-thirds of the Chinese Communist Party top level personnel had served as military commanders, commissars or guerrilla leaders.¹⁵ A cautious estimate of the military experiences of the 97 member Eighth CC categorizes 27 as principally military commanders and at least 37 as political commissars.¹⁶ Within the Politburo serving from September, 1956, to May, 1958, fourteen of the seventeen members had military experience, seven in direct command and seven as commissars.

The practice of appointing men with military experience to these high Party positions continues. Since 1956 the Politburo has been expanded from 11 to 20 members, and at least seven of these new members had exercised military leadership during the revolution.¹⁷ As of July, 1958, eight of the nine members of the CCP Secretariat had been military commanders or

¹³Yu, op. cit., p. 141.
¹⁵Yu, op. cit., p. 58.
The Party leadership, then, is composed of dedicated Communists who rose in the movement with Mao, and who have shared a wealth of military experience. Obviously this shared past serves "to bind more closely those who continued to hold aloft the Red banner".\(^{19}\) It endows the political leadership with personal knowledge of and respect for the non-coercive contribution that the armed forces can make to Communist expansion and the military leadership with sympathy for the non-coercive problems confronting the CCP. However, what implications does the community of experience have for the priority of allegiance? The Communist politico-military elite had never thought in purely combat terms. Warfare and armies are manifestations of politics and economics. The Party has spared no pains to indoctrinate its military with the primacy of political loyalty, and the prominence of militarily experienced men does not mean that the armed forces are the principle focus of their allegiance. Many members of the elite came into the Red Armies because they were Party members, and not vice-versa. They were assigned military responsibilities because of the priority of Party survival.

To the extent that the community of experience is a community of revolutionary experience, its value can be expected to lessen. The political leadership, which now averages over fifty years of age,\(^{20}\) dates from the period of extreme reliance on the

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\(^{18}\) CB, No. 513, op. cit.; and Chao, op. cit.


\(^{20}\) Chao, op. cit.
military, but now faces more complex responsibilities and is assisted by new organizational instruments, i.e., civilian bureaucracy and Mao's organizations. Its images of the institutional nature of the military also dates from the past. The successful Communist army that these men knew was a lightly armed, mobile, relatively informal body. To the extent that the military has changed and continues to change to a professional-politicized-specialist army the image and the reality clash.

2. **Community of Office Holders**

To what extent are holders of key military positions at the same time occupants of key Party offices and vice versa? Past military experience may create a common base of appreciation of the role of the military among CCP leaders, but dual office holding implies a unity of action between the Party and the armed forces. To the extent that it continues to exist it reveals the current influence of the PLA on CCP policy. To the extent that it continues to persist between commanders (men active in day-to-day military affairs) and the Party notables, the past community of experience is revised in accord with changing Party policy and military institutional nature.

Our analysis compares the membership of the Party bodies described earlier, the Central Committee and the Politburo, with holders of key offices in the military establishment. The military establishment is here defined to include two elements in the Chinese Communist military organization. The first is the high level administrative organ called the People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC) from 1937 to 1954, and since titled the
National Defense Council (NDC). The second includes the Minister and Deputy Ministers of Defense, and the high ranking officers in the PLA. The relationship of the political and military elites is therefore analyzed for: the membership of largely honorary and administrative councils; and the executors of military responsibility. The People's Liberation Army elite includes personnel from the air force, navy and general staff departments.

If there is an increasing gulf between military and Party hierarchies, it should reveal itself in reduced dual-office-holding and increased polarization. If only the top leadership in China wears "two hats", and the second level men increasingly specialize, the appearance of a unified elite is illusory.

Certainly such a community of office-holding existed in the years before 1954. In the difficult years before World War II Party leaders were forced to assume many responsibilities, but since the armed forces was the main organization under Communist control, these responsibilities were carried out through the military instrument. For example, in 1937 five of the seven known members of the Politburo were members of the Revolutionary Military Council. Mao chaired both; Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Wang Chia-hsiang held three of the four vice-chairmanships; Chu Teh was Commander-in-Chief.21

Various studies completed in the early 1950's have pointed to the high degree of overlap between political and military elites of Communist China. A study which covered the 1927-1951 period found an 80% overlap of military men in political

positions. A 1953 study found that over 40% of an 84 man elite held high offices in both the CCP and the armed forces. A Hoover Institute monograph analysis of 43 high ranking military men located 34 as alternate or regular members of the Central Committee.

Has this pattern continued? If any changes have taken place, what are their significance? Tables VII, VIII, IX and X answer the first question. The first three of these deal with dual office-holding in the CCP and the military councils. The last deals with congruence of high Party rank and positions of active military leadership (i.e., commissars and commanders).

a. The Military Councils

Analysis of dual office-holding in the military councils and in the Party is complicated by organizational changes in the past ten years. The 1953 PRMC gave way by 1955 to the much larger NDC. The Central Committee elected in 1945 was replaced by a much larger body in 1956. For our present purposes the totals in column II of Tables VII, VIII and IX are not relevant in themselves. They are only significant in so far as they illuminate the degree of dual office-holding.

Tables VII, VIII, and IX indicate various changes in the overlap of political and military elites and establish the relative importance of Party men in the military and vice-versa. Percentile consistancy of Party elite attention to military affairs (Table VII, Col. VI) conceals more than it reveals. The

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22 Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 16.
23 Yu, op. cit., p. 61.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Col. I</th>
<th>Col. II</th>
<th>Col. III</th>
<th>Col. IV</th>
<th>Col. V</th>
<th>Col. VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Members of Central Committee and Politburo</td>
<td>Alternate Central Committee Members</td>
<td>Percentage on Military Council</td>
<td>Regular Central Committee Members</td>
<td>Percentage on Military Council</td>
<td>Total Percentage of Politburo and Central Committee Members on Military Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 Name lists are found in the following sources: A Guide to New China, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953; OR, No. 316 (March 7, 1955); Handbook on People’s China, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, April, 1957; OR, No. 513, op. cit.
Table VIII

Percentage and Number of Military Council Members in Central Committee and Politburo\(^{26}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Col. I Total Members of PRMO and NDO</th>
<th>Col. II Alternate Central Committee Members</th>
<th>Col. III Regular Central Committee Members</th>
<th>Col. IV Politburo</th>
<th>Col. VI Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{26}\)Ibid.
Table IX
Military Council Officers in Central Committee
and Politburo27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Col. I Officers</th>
<th>Col. II Alternate Central Committee Members</th>
<th>Col. III Regular Central Committee Members</th>
<th>Col. IV Politburo</th>
<th>Col. V Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Ibid.
more detailed breakdown in columns III, IV and V of Tables VII and VIII reveals a decline in dual office-holding among regular CC members. The breakdown reveals a relative increase in dual office-holding of alternate members. However, since alternate positions are given to rising young stars and honored veterans, this shift implies a relative decline in the Party importance of the Central Committee members who also hold office in the military councils.

Except for the lag in organizational growth in 1955-1956, this shift in dual office-holding of regular and alternate CC members was not accompanied by a decrease of dual office-holding on the highest level of the Party and Councils (Table VII, Col. V and Table IX). Effective decision-making power was held by a small body of men who were both members of the Politburo and officers of the military councils. In large part the temporary 1955 decrease of dual office-holding in the Politburo was caused by the diversion of key CCP personnel, e.g., Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi, to increasingly important tasks in civil government. They were replaced as vice-chairmen of the military council by several ordinary members of the military old guard, and it was these replacements who achieved Politburo status in 1958. Comparison of column VI in Tables VII and VIII shows that political prominence is a more important pre-requisite for military council membership than is military prominence for Central Committee membership. It is only on the Politburo level that military prominence seems of overwhelming importance. This tendency of the Party elite to separate from the military elite except at
the top reveals a standard Communist practice of keeping inter-
locking power from concentrating at the lower levels.

b. The Active Commanders

We are trying to determine here the degree to which active 
military commanders have held and still do hold important Party 
posts. Posts with little real Party power, e.g., alternate mem-
berships in the CC, may indicate the political prestige and 
loyalty of the military elite. However, only to the extent that 
active commanders hold key political posts is the real power in 
Communist China held by a joint political-military elite.

Table X deals with the occupancy of regional military and 
political positions from 1949-1953. As the table indicates, 
regional political and military affairs were handled by a small 
group of men. Capable and politically reliable manpower was 
scarce at this time, and the Party was still involved in internal 
warfare. Formal structures were conducive to dual office-holding. 
The Mainland was divided into Large Administrative Regions whose 
boundaries were the same as those of PLA Military Districts and 
of CCP sub-bureaus.28 The regional activities of the Party were 
run by high officers of the military establishment who were 
either commissars or troop commanders or both. These men also 
were of high rank in the Party. With one exception the chief 
district commanders, commissars and Party Secretaries were regular 
members of the Central Committee, and the deputies in these posts 
were at least alternate members. This was one elite and not two, 

28 Walter Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political 
Control, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Feb., 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Military Commander</th>
<th>Political Commissar</th>
<th>Party Sub-Bureau Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Large Administrative Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Military District, First Field Army; succeeded by</td>
<td>P'eng Teh-hua1###+</td>
<td>Hsi Chung Hsun#+</td>
<td>P'eng Teh-hua1###+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ho Lung##+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Military District</td>
<td>Kao Kang###+</td>
<td>Kao Kang###+</td>
<td>Kao Kang###+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Wei-chou (dept.)#</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Military District, Second Field Army</td>
<td>Liu Po-cheng##+</td>
<td>Teng Hsiao-ping##+</td>
<td>Liu Po-cheng##+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chang Tsun-hsun(dept.)##+</td>
<td>Chang Chih-ch'un##+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ch'en Keng (dept.)#</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East China Military District, Third Field Army</td>
<td>Ch'en I###+</td>
<td>Jao Shu Shih##+</td>
<td>1. Jao Shu Shih##+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su Yu (dept.)##+</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Chen I###+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Military District, Fifth Field Army (?)</td>
<td>Nien Jung-chien##+##</td>
<td>Po I-p'o##</td>
<td>Po I-p'o##</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hsu Kiang-chien##+##</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table X--(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Military Commander</th>
<th>Political Commissar</th>
<th>Party Sub-Bureau Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central-South</td>
<td>Lin Piao**++</td>
<td>Lo Jung-huan**</td>
<td>1. Lin Piao**++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military District,</td>
<td>Teng Tzu-hui**</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Lo Jung-huan**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Field Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Teng Tzu-hui**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. A similar pattern developed in some provinces:

| Kwangtung, Sixth     | Yeh Chien-ying**+++   | Yeh Chien-ying**+++ | 1. Yeh Chien-ying**+++     |
| Field Army (?)       | Chang Yun-i (dept.)** |                     | 2. Chang Yun-i**           |
| Sinkiang             | Wang Chen*            |                     | Wang Chen*                 |
| Shansi               | Ch'eng Tzu-hua*       |                     | Ch'eng Tzu-hua*            |

* Alternate Member Central Committee
** Regular Member Central Committee
*** Member Politburo

+ Member People's Revolutionary Military Council
++ Officer PRMC
° Staff, PRMC

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and the merger often took place on the provincial level. The table shows the distribution of authority in Kwangtung, Sinkiang and Shansi (Part 3 of the table). For example, Li Sien-nien, a regular member of the Central Committee, was both military commissar and Party Secretary in Hupeh province. Another regular member, T'an Chen Lin, was Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army and Party Secretary in Chekiang province. When these examples are combined with those given in the table, it is found that 17 out of a total of 34 regular members of the Central Committee held active posts of leadership in the PLA. The table also indicates that 8 out of the 17 alternate members of the CC also held active command positions in the PLA.

Obviously top Party men were important in the military establishment, but it does not follow that military men were of equal importance in the Party center. The Politburo introduces an exception to the above pattern. As Tables VII and VIII indicated, 5 of its 9 members were on the PRMC. Table X shows that only one of the key field commands was held by a Politburo member, Kao Kang, and Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief was the only other member to hold a post in the PLA.

These conclusions can be drawn from these tables:

1) Military and Party affairs in the regions and many provinces were directed by the same men.

2) PLA and civilian Party organizations were directed by the same men.

For purposes of the analysis, numerical totals of Central Committee members do not include members of the Politburo. In reality they are also members of the CC, and the actual totals should be raised accordingly.
3) At least half of the regular and alternate members of the Central Committee held important positions in the armed forces.

4) The Politburo was not controlled by men holding military command positions.

We can say that even when the CCP leaned heavily on the generals and was still building the mechanisms of government and of mass organizations, the generals did not gain a dominant position in the key organ of Chinese Communism, the Politburo. Party control of the military continued to exceed the military voice in the Party.

In the following years active military leaders were increasingly separated from local Party organizations. Networks of Politburo power were constructed on the mainland to replace the unified regional structure and powerful personal positions shown in Table X. Military opposition on the mainland was almost completely eliminated by 1952, and the Party moved to liquidate regional independence. Kao Kang's colossal insubordination expedited this program. The removal of PLA commanders from positions of regional political power has been accompanied by a decline in their representation in the Central Committee. This relative decline in political power has not been accompanied by a decreased emphasis on the "political quality" of high officers. Political prominence is still a characteristic of the PLA top echelon, but the commanders continue to lose their control of Party policy, even military policy.
In November, 1954, official directives dropped the post of Commander-in-Chief, thus automatically placing the Chairman of the People's Republic at the head of the military establishment. The listings of the 8th Central Committee and Politburo which was elected in 1956 and augmented in 1958 also reflected the restriction of the authority of military commanders. The old elite which had held CC and military command positions in the 1949-1953 period continued on the committee. However, their PLA assignments were curtailed and active commanders formed a considerably smaller fraction of the membership. Of the 97 regular members of the Central Committee only 18 held positions in the Ministry of Defense or the PLA, and of the 73 alternates only 18 held command positions in the armed forces. In contrast with the 1949-1953 period only two of these active commanders headed local CCP organizations, Lt. Gen. Wang En-mao in Sinkiang and Colonel General Yeh Fei in Fukien. These two areas were of extreme strategic significance and contained heavy troop concentration.

The composition of the Politburo reveals a similar lack of military control. The 1956 expansion to 17 brought four Marshals of the PLA into the Politburo, and the total number of Marshals on that body to seven. However, no more than four, and possibly only three of these men still held command positions. In 1958 when the Politburo was expanded to twenty regular members and six alternates, the number of military leaders did not rise.

32CB, No. 431 (Dec., 1956).
In the seven man Standing Committee only Marshal Lin Piao was in active direction of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{33}

While active commanders held relatively fewer Party positions, key military command positions were overwhelmingly held by men of high Party position. Table X has indicated the political prominence of the key men in the PLA during the 1949-1953 period, and analysis of the military posts held by the members of the Eighth Central Committee demonstrates the continuation of this policy. The field armies and great military regions had been abolished, but CC members held the key posts in the new command hierarchy. In the Ministry of National Defense the Minister and six of seven vice-ministers were regular or alternate members of the CC. This also held true in the basic subdivisions of the PLA.\textsuperscript{34}

1) the General Staff: the Chief and all four Deputy Chiefs.

2) the Major Departments: Directorships in the General Political Department, the General Training Department, the General Cadres (Personnel) Department, the General Inspectorate and the General Rear Service (Logistics) Department, and three Deputy Directors of the Political Department.

3) Major specialized corps: The commanders of the Public Security Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Armored troops, the Artillery troops, the Railway troops and the Air Defense Forces.

4) Regional Military Commanders: Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang,

\textsuperscript{33} CB, No. 513, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{34} CB, No. 431, \textit{op. cit.}
Fukien, Hupeh, Mukden, Nanking, Canton, Peking.

5) Regional Military Commissars: Inner Mongolia, Hopei, Anhwei, Kwangtung, Yunnan, Szechwan, and Mukden.

In other words, the command elite remained in the political elite as defined by Central Committee membership. Politburo membership was a separate matter, and elevation to the Politburo was followed in two cases by relinquishing command positions.

Our analysis has primarily compared the membership of the military councils and the holders of command positions with membership in the Central Committee and the Politburo. One other organization must be considered, the CCP Military Committee. This committee existed in embryonic form before the Long March. The mainland press rarely mentions its existence. However, reports in 1957 and 1958 indicate that it makes policy recommendations and may even issue "directives". This committee is a working group under the Politburo and its membership overlaps to a considerable extent. No complete membership lists are available. However, following the May-July, 1958, meeting of the Military Committee, People's Daily carried a brief report indicating the names of some of those who spoke. Mao Tse-tung served as Chairman, and nine of the ten Marshals of the PLA were listed. In other

35Houn, op. cit., p. 400.
36 Marshalls Liu P'o-cheng and Lo Jung-huan.
39 JNAP (July 26, 1958), reported in China News Analysis, No. 242
words, the Politburo plays the key role in the committee. In addition to Mao, seven of these men were then members of the Politburo. Only two of these men are publicly mentioned in direct connection with the armed forces, the Minister of Defense and the Director of the General Inspectorate. These same nine Marshals constitute the leadership of the National Defense Council, holding nine of 14 vice-chairmanships. They are men who have been loyal to Mao for many years and have participated with him in a community of experience.

Analysis of the political and military elites in the People's Republic reveals the following pattern. Party leadership is to a great extent held by those active during the prolonged military revolution that brought the CCP to power. Since that time many men of considerable military experience have been shifted to other responsibilities. They retain awareness of the value of the military instrument, but their image of the military is outdated. They have little personal awareness of and command responsibility in the development and combat direction of a technically modernized armed force. To the extent that the military holds political power in the People's Republic, it is held by the seven Marshals on the Politburo. These men do not directly control the armed forces, and the experience and Party discipline of a lifetime make it unlikely that their policy views are those of a "professional caste". They are not on the Politburo because they are commanders of armies; they are on the Politburo because they have followed Mao's directives for many years and backed him

in time of crisis. They have a "military viewpoint" to the extent that the armed forces is considered vital to Party power and armed conflict is considered a valuable policy course. The role of the active generals in the political sphere has declined sharply since the take-over of the mainland.

At present the active commanders can feel that Party directives are formulated by men who are at least sympathetic to the interests of the military establishment. This will probably not always be the case. No longer are military commanders the largest group of "specialists" among the regular members of the Central Committee. New Politburo members will probably come from the CC. In the 1949-1953 period 17 of 34 regular members of the CC held active command posts in the PLA; in the period 1956-1958 the figure was only 18 out of 97. In other words, the interlocked politico-military elite may well be only a phenomenon of the revolutionary generation of Chinese Communists which will disappear in the years ahead.

B. PARTY PERMEATION OF THE PLA

The military voice in the Party may be waning, but the reverse is hardly the case. Party control of the army has been and is of prime concern to the CCP leadership. The Party's relationship to the army is one of control-solicitation-control. Political workers check, indoctrinate, and woo members of the PLA, both officers and rank-and-file. The Party's interest in control of the military instrument is self-evident. Its interest in solicitation of the military is to augment Party influence in the PLA. Once converted, the military members are organized into
Party committees at all levels of the PLA. This device serves the Party in two ways: it implements Party directives issued by the Commissar; and it forces the commissar to implement Party directives.

1. Political Workers

The system of using Party representatives or political commissars in military units originated in the Soviet army, and was adopted by the Chinese Communists during the first CCP-KMT alliance. When Ch'en Yi (Ch'en I), now a PLA Marshal, reviewed in 1951 the reasons for CCP success, he stressed that "...revolutionary political leadership and the system of 'political work' constituted the lifeline of the people's armed force...." 40

The first political commissars were appointed from among the remnants of the Autumn Uprising led by Mao Tse-tung in November, 1927, and from among the survivors of the August 1, 1927, Nanchang Uprising who fled to Hailufeng in Kwangtung province. 41 This soviet only lasted from October 4, 1927, to February 28, 1928, but the political worker system survived and became incorporated into the CCP military organization. Since Mao had to build the Red Army from among mercenaryst, peasants, and prisoners, he relied on the commissar to make the rank and file loyal and to check-mate the military commanders. In a 1928 report to the Central Committee of the CCP he stressed the value of the

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commissar system.

Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives must not be abolished. ...Facts have proved that the better the company Party representative is, the better is the company, while the company commander can hardly play such an effective political role... As the casualties among the lower cadres are heavy, soldiers captured from the enemy a short time ago have often been made platoon or company commanders... We hope that, besides starting training classes ourselves, the Party centre and the two provincial Party Committees will send us at least thirty comrades eligible as Party representatives. 42

During two periods when Mao was in difficulty within the Party the political worker system was abolished. 43 The first occurred immediately prior to the Long March, before he became head of the CCP at the Tsunyi conference in 1935. The motive of his competitors was to remove a channel of authority personally loyal to Mao. The second abolition occurred in the early years of the war with Japan, 1936-37, when Mao was fighting to maintain his Party leadership against Chang Kuo-t’ao. Mao's victory in both these contests was rapidly followed by re-installment of the political worker system.

In the contest between Chang and Mao, Mao made clear his view of the commissar system as a requirement for Communist revolutionary success. Chang's United Front slogan was "victory for all," i.e., both the KMT and the Communists; Mao's was "defeat for all," i.e., both the KMT and Japanese. Mao needed the commissar system to insure that the military would fight both the Japanese and KMT.

Both the system of political commissars, abolished because of the Kuomintang's intervention, and the political department, renamed the office of political training for the same reason are now restored. We have rejected the Kuomintang's request to appoint its members as cadres of the Eighth Route Army, and have upheld the principle of the Communist Party's absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army.  

Mao called for the resumption of the political worker system in November, 1937, but a note to his *Selected Works* tells us that he was opposed by "rightists", and the commissar system was not reinstated until 1938.  

When Mao constructed his commissar system, he envisioned a system which would extend its "control down from the army high command to the infantry squad". Since this time the hierarchy of political commissars has been expanded and refined in accord with the numerical and technical growth of the Red armies. In the period of the Kiangsi soviet it consisted of a relatively simple structure: General Political Department established under the Revolutionary Military Council. Sub-units of the Political Department were created in each Army, and a political chairman was appointed for each division and regiment. At the company level there were Party representatives.  

By 1940 the General Political Department had political, mass movement, and propaganda sections, and by 1953 the structure had been further expanded.

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elaborated. A Central Political Department was responsible to the PRMC. Political Departments were located in each Field Army, Army Group, Army and Division. Political offices were established at the regimental level, and Political Instructors were appointed for battalions and companies.49

When the military was "regularized" after 1953, the commissar structure was expanded, and the General Political Department became formally attached to the Ministry of Defense. This Department has eight subdivisions: organization, cultural affairs, propaganda, civilian liaison, security, youth work, army postal service, and general affairs. These subdivisions may be combined when they are attached to sub-Army units. Political Commissars direct political work down to the company level. The company commissar directs a company club which he organizes into seven committees: study, production, sanitation, evaluation, amusement, athletics and bulletin. He is assisted in his duties, which reflect the characteristics of the PLA and its social role, by a political cadre from each platoon and a political "warrior" from each squad.50

The titles of these political officers have changed. In 1937 the regiments, brigades and divisions had political commissars; the companies, political leaders; and the battalions, 

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political instructors. However, regardless of title, the political worker system has provided a column of authority parallel to that of the military commanders. Table XI presents an early form of the system used in the late 1930's in the New Fourth Army.

Table XI
Dual Hierarchy in the New Fourth Army

Deputy Commander
Hsiang Ying

Commander
Yeh T'ing

Political Director

Chief of Staff - Headquarters

Company Leaders

Company Commanders

This system of equal authority, where beside every military officer there is a political officer of the same rank, was originally built into the political worker structure and has since

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been maintained. "The Chief of the Political Department is equal in status to the Chief of Staff; the Political Instructor is equal to the Battalion Commander; and the Political Tutor to the Company Commander,"53 Usually commanders and commissars consult each other on all major decisions, although each is specifically responsible for military and political affairs.54 The commissar has sufficient military training to replace a commander killed in battle,55 but commissars have probably never had the power to countermand purely military orders.56 Although the commander does not have to consult the commissar in situations of military crisis,57 he is completely aware that his future career lies in the commissar's hands. The commissar's reports are instrumental in determining the commander's promotions within and retirement from the armed forces.58

2. Party Membership: Common Allegiance

In 1928 Mao enunciated a goal of maintaining a "fifty-fifty ratio between Party members and non-Party men" in the PLA.59 At that time Mao claimed that one-third of the Red Army soldiers were members of the CCP.60 In the early years of the United Front the Party admitted that this percent had dropped to 20 per cent. In

53 Chin and Chang, op. cit., pp. 65-70.
54 Carlson, op. cit., p. 56.
56 Chiu, op. cit., p. 4.
58 Chin and Chang, op. cit., pp. 65-70.
60 Ibid.
1951-52, after the inclusion in the PLA of whole KMT armies, CCP
and YCL members dropped to 12%.\textsuperscript{61} Recently the Party changed its
Party membership goal in the PLA to one Party member to two non-
Party members (goal of one-third).\textsuperscript{62} In 1953 there were about
two million CCP members in the PLA. This number comprised almost
a third of total Party membership and over 40% of the total num-
ber of men in the PLA.\textsuperscript{63} Since this time many older and less
reliable servicemen have been demobilized\textsuperscript{64} and political recruiters
have been able to tap younger and relatively politically untarn-
ished recruits.\textsuperscript{65}

The previous discussion of elites indicated that the mili-
tary's role in Party operations has diminished. The decreasing
proportion of military who hold Party membership also implies
decreasing military influence in the Party. By 1959 CCP member-
ship had mushroomed to over fourteen million:\textsuperscript{66} although the
Party might control one-third of the men in the military, the
military cannot possibly control one-third of the Party

\textsuperscript{61}Barton Whaley, Propin-CGA, A Study of Word-of-Mouth Communication
in the Chinese Communist Army, Prepared under technical direction
Office, The American University, March, 1961 (Mimeod.),
Chap. III, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{63}Tillman Durdín and Robert Aura Smith, "China and the World,"
Headline Series, No. 99, New York: Foreign Policy Association,
May-June, 1953, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{64}NCNA gave a figure of 6.8 million on May 22, 1958. A. Doak Barn-
nett, Communist China and Asia, New York: Harper & Brothers,
1960, p. 512, note 5.

\textsuperscript{65}For example, see: "560 Outstanding Officers and Men Admitted
Into the Party in a Certain Unit on the Fukien Front," NCNA,
Fukien Front (Dec. 13, 1958), in SCMP, No. 1926 (Jan. 5, 1959),
p. 12.

\textsuperscript{66}National Policy Machinery in Communist China, op. cit., p. 4.
memberships. In other words, the importance of active mili-
tarists in the Party has declined on both the elite and mem-
bership levels.

Those soldiers who are Party members must obey the
decisions of the Party hierarchy, must subordinate their personal
interests, and be willing to "lie on fagots and taste gall". They are also expected to sing the praises of the Party line and
to set an example to their unaffiliated peers. "Members of the
Chinese Communist Party play a leading role in the army by set-
ting an example in every activity. They are generally considered
model soldiers." In exchange for their exemplary behavior and
work they are entrusted with positions of responsibility and
power which are never allotted to the unaffiliated soldier.
Military command positions are reserved for loyal Party members.
For example, in 1938 the CCP claimed that "The political leaders
and military command of the Eighth Route Army, beginning with the
battalion commanders, consist of Communists." Since 1949 all
staff appointees and regional military commanders have been Party

67 Barnett, op. cit., p. 111 gives the three million figure.
William W. Hollister, China's Gross National Product and Social
the higher figure.

68 Shao-chi Liu, How to be a Good Communist, New York: New Century

69 "A Concrete Guide to the Work of Training," in C. Martin Wilbur
and Julie Lien-yung How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism
and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, New York: Columbia

70 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1950, p. 15.

Party members.\textsuperscript{72}

Throughout the Chinese Communist movement the CCP has had to use non-Party military personnel, both on the officer and ranks levels. However, stringent control measures have always been imposed. In late 1931 or early 1932 the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued this decree:

\textit{Any persons who shall have participated at any time in any counter-revolutionary organization and who shall have remained in the Red Army or in a local armed body must be registered irrespective of whether he shall have been sentenced or shall have repented.}\textsuperscript{73}

If a crisis forced the Party to place non-Party members in command positions, e.g., Yeh T'ing in the New Fourth Army, their power is systematically undermined and restricted to that of glorified technical consultant.\textsuperscript{74} Non-Party members are given tasks, often requiring considerable skill, but not power. For example, the ex-Kuomintang generals appointed to the PHMC were never given command positions. They were organized into the National Defense Research group where they could be controlled by the Party and their skills could be used. During the United Front period the CCP was forced to enlist into its army many individuals not under Party control. Although Mao was not opposed


\textsuperscript{74}This was observed even by as naive an observer as Smedley. See: Agnes Smedley, \textit{Battle Hymn of China}, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1943, pp. 256-259. Deputy Commander Hsiang Ying had headed the secret police in the Kiangsi soviet and in 1934 was a member of Politburo.
to milking this source of manpower, he warned that nationalist sentiment against Japan was no substitute for political subservience to the CCP.

...so long as the hegemony in the army remains in the hands of our Party (which is completely necessary and inviolable) we should not be afraid of drawing in large numbers of sympathizers to take part in a military or technological capacity in the building of our army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundation of both our party and our army has been firmly laid, to draw in sympathizers (of course not disrupters) is an essential policy because it is not only harmless, but also indispensable for winning the sympathy of the whole people and expanding our revolutionary forces.  

Since the early 1920's the members of the Communist youth organizations have augmented the Red armies. On a visit to the Chinese soviet area in 1936 Snow was told that about 20% of the Red Army soldiers, i.e., half of those who were under twenty-three, were members of the Communist Youth League (CYL). In the Kiangsi period this group was organized under the title of the Young Vanguards and was composed of youths from 16 to 18. "They are ... the crack troops who form the front line in attack and whose duty it is to clear the conquered areas of all undesirable elements...." At this time the Young Vanguards were a component of the CCP youth organization. After the Long March they became an "open" front group under Party control, and the YCL became the only youth group which declared public allegiance

78Wales, Inside Red China, op. cit., p. 101.
to the CCP and remained active in the Red forces. For example, its members directed the activity of the Young Vanguard "model companies" at the time when they were attached to most major Red military units. In Kiangsi, 8,000 Red Army members were organized into a chapter of the "Communist Youth International", and the Fifteenth Division of 7,300 men was supposedly composed entirely of its members. In later years the youth organizations provided many military and political cadres for lower army organizational positions, and their high ranking officers were frequently transferred to key political control positions.

Before the CCP took power in 1949 its primary control problem within the Red Army involved non-Party members. The nature of this problem follows from the institutional nature of a politicized-generalist army. After 1949 when the CCP began to develop a politicized-specialist army, its control problems increasingly involved Party as well as non-Party members. This quotation appeared in People's Daily, on August 1, 1955:

...modernization of the army has developed a tendency of antagonism towards...politics. Technique is highly regarded, in place of politics. When it comes to matters of employment, only the cultural and technical standings of the candidates are taken into consideration, without regard to their political inclinations.

In February, 1955, the CCP promulgated the Regulation on the Service of Officers in the Chinese People's Liberation Army.


81Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 4; Wales, Inside Red China, op. cit., p. 96.

This regulation was designed to counter the trend described by "People's Daily by stressing that "political quality" was the main criterion for promotion and assignment.83

3. Party Committees

In late 1927 Mao created a "frontline" Party committee to control his small armed band.84 He envisioned the committee as a "...genuine guarantee for the absolute Party leadership over the army and for the implementation of the Party principle and line."85 Just as Party commissars paralleled the chain of military commanders, Party committees were to parallel the military units,86 and support the lone political commissar in his political work.

Since 1928 when the committee was amplified into a hierarchical chain that extended down to the smaller army units, the structure of the committee system has changed little. The structure runs from the army committee through the regimental and battalion committee to the company branch and squad group.87 All Party members, including military elites,88 rank-and-file soldiers, and YCL members,89 attend regular meetings of their Party committee.90 At the meetings Party members in the military discuss the directives that they receive from the next higher

84 Ho, op. cit.
85 "Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," op. cit., p. 3.
86 Chiu, op. cit., p. 3.
88 Smedley, The Great Road, op. cit., p. 8.
89 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 54.
90 Gourlay, op. cit., p. 20.
Party committee and

refer them to the unit commander for execution through the commissar. The unit command may then pass these policy decisions to the lower units to be discussed. [When soldiers are] prepared by Party 'activists' in advance, these decisions are then adopted as if by democratic action.\(^{91}\)

The committee itself is directed and controlled by a select and smaller body.\(^{92}\) In recent years the committees attached to the formal military units have been augmented by committees organized on the basis of geography (e.g., committee for all the troops in South China)\(^ {93}\) and of military specialty (e.g., committee for all military artillery groups).\(^ {94}\)

The 1956 revision of the CCP constitution assigns the following tasks to the primary Party committees:

1) To carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses, and put into practice what the Party advocates and the decision of higher Party organizations;

2) To pay constant heed to the sentiments and demands of the masses and report them to higher Party organizations, to pay constant attention to the material and cultural life of the masses and strive to improve it;

3) To recruit new Party members, to collect membership dues, to examine and appraise Party members and to maintain Party discipline among the membership;

4) To organize Party members to study Marxism-Leninism and the Party's policy and experience and to raise

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\(^{91}\) Chiu, op. cit., pp. 3-4.


\(^{93}\) For example, see: "Teng Hsiao-P'ing and Li Pu-Ch'un Deliver Important Reports at Party Cadres Conference Called by the CCP Liaoning Provincial Committee and CCP Committee of Shenyang Armed Forces," Liaoning Jih-pao (Oct. 1, 1958), SCMP, No. 1901 (Nov. 25, 1958), pp. 1-4.

the levels of their ideology and political understanding;
5) To lead the masses of the people to take an active part in the political life of the country;
7) To promote criticism and self-criticism, to expose and eliminate shortcomings and mistakes in work and to wage struggle against the violations of laws and discipline, against corruption and waste and against bureaucracy;
8) To educate the Party members and the masses to sharpen their revolutionary vigilance and to be constantly on the alert to combat the disruptive activities of the class enemy.  

In other words, the committees are to discipline all members of the military units, to carry out Politburo policy and CCP Military Committee policy, to maintain constant Party supremacy in the military by guiding the units in the appropriate direction, and to report problems which require action by higher organs.

A 1948 Central Committee directive was explicit about the committee's authority within the military unit.

...All important matters ...must be submitted to the committee and fully discussed by the members present, and clear-cut decisions should be made and then carried out by individuals and organs concerned severally. The same should be done by Party committees below regional and brigade levels.  

Although the political worker is officially responsible for the execution of Party directives, the committee system lightens his burden. Ideally the Party committee serves as a consensus-building mechanism. The members agree on the implementation procedure for higher echelon directives and then are obligated to assist the commissar in implementing them.

Hopefully, the committee will not only absorb the opinions of the components of the Party committee

95 The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, op. cit., p. 43. The quotation comes from Article 49, p. 43.
96 Quoted in ibid., pp. 75-76.
and pool their ideas, but will also ensure close ties between the leaders and the masses through the activities of each member of the Party committee. As members of the Party committee include personnel of various departments and subordinate organizations, comparatively overall views can be ensured in arriving at decisions.  

The CCP has maintained that in spite of these Party committee functions, military commanders are not relieved of individual responsibility and authority. However, the Party has ordered the commanders to consult with the committees even in most combat situations, and the commander realizes that the committees judge his military performance, political warmth, and Party obedience.

There is some evidence that the CCP has strengthened the committee system to deal with increasing professionalism within the military establishment. The Party may have deprived commanders and commissars of the power to recommend candidates for the Party committee in their unit.  

Although the authority of the Party committee within the military has increased, its authority within the Party as a whole has been curtailed. A Central Committee directive of September, 1942, placed civilian Party committees in the same chain of command as the local military Party committee. During the 1949-53

97 "Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," op. cit., p. 5.  
98 Ibid.  
100 See the sources cited in notes 96, 97, 99, and 101.  
period when regional Party sub-bureaus were often directed by active military commanders, both civilian and military Party personnel were under PLA control. The Party came to regard this centralization of authority at the local level as undesirable. To decentralize this local concentration of authority Mao used a device used against him in 1928. At that time the Central Committee attempted to maintain control over Mao's armed bands by separating the authority of military Party committees from authority over local civilian Party committees. Although Mao had reversed this policy when he assumed Party power, in 1956 he reinstated it. The 1956 revision of the CCP constitution stated

Article 35. The Party organizations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army carry on their work in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee. The General Political Department in the People's Liberation Army, under the direction of the Central Committee takes charge of ideological and organizational work of the Party in the army.

Following Russian practices, the Chinese Communists created parallel and competing columns of Party control, which were only unified at the Central Committee level.

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In the past five years the military has commanded declining influence among the Party elite and within the Party organization. Military commanders play a curtailed role in the Central Committee and Politburo. Military membership is a declining proportion of

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102 Chin and Chang, op. cit., pp. 61-65.
103 Ho, op. cit.
total Party membership. Military political workers find their power increasingly restricted to the PLA. Civil CCP bodies are invited to criticize the military, the military Party branches in particular. These developments have occurred as the CCP has enlarged its power by rapidly expanding the civil administration and enrolling the populace in mass organizations.

In the earlier years of the CCP movement the problems of political control were the classic ones of civil-military relations in modern China: the Party had to prevent the military commanders from using their armed men to secure wealth and power. In the years immediately following the 1949 takeover, the Party had to prevent the commanders who held both military and political power from using it to establish independent regional enclaves. Today the problem is a different one. The Party must combat an increasing sense of professional specialization to keep the army from developing a professional esprit separate from a Party esprit. This military professionalism does not necessarily involve desires for political power, although in time it might. At the present time the military wants to establish the military sphere as apolitical. It argues that modern military men have no time for political activity. The military is willing to give allegiance to the Party, but it is unwilling to devote valuable time to ideological study and to transfer military responsibility to Party committees. Although the Party is willing for the PLA to become as proficient as the German General Staff, it has to contain the associated attitudes that characterise the veto-group army.
At this point we can assess the general Party success in handling its control problems. The commissars and Party committees serve to modify the attachment of the rank-and-file soldier to the military commander. The "soldiers [can no longer] belong to the generals" because these officers, committees, and the YCL interpose themselves between the men and their commander. The soldiers are directly responsible to the political officer, but their right to complain about him serves as a check on his power.  

Because of its control structure the Party has apparently suffered few outright desertions of military commanders with their soldiers. Kung Ho-tsung, commander of the 16th Red Army who deserted to the Kuomintang in 1934, is one of these rare exceptions.

The Party's problems with military commanders have occurred more frequently when these commanders are also key military figures involved in intra-Party strife. Famous cases are Chang Kuo-t'ao's in the 1930's and Kao Kang's and Jao Shu-shih's in 1953-1955. In 1935 Chang was political commissar of the Fourth Front Red Army, the largest surviving Red army, and a member of the Central Committee. He tried to establish a line different than Mao's and was defeated by the KMT and the backing that the command generals, specifically Chu Teh, Liu P'o-cheng, and Yeh Chien-ying, gave Mao. The initiative in this intra-Party battle did not come from the military commander of the Fourth

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107 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 75.  
army, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, who has survived in the CCP and is currently a PLA Marshal. Kao and Jao are other examples of "political" leaders who tried to organize Mao's military commanders against him and failed.\(^{109}\) Actually, shortly after Kao and Jao were eliminated, many of these loyal commanders were elevated to the Politburo.

Obviously, the common factor in these cases of crude rebellion was the political as contrasted with the military character of the rebels. These revolts failed because of military loyalty to Mao. However, these commanders are now old men who no longer hold command power. It is an open question whether present and future commanders of the PLA will ever again feel such allegiance to the leader of the Party.

The following chapters discuss less spectacular examples of military reluctance to follow the Party line.

PART II

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC USES OF THE MILITARY
This diagram might help the reader to appreciate the scope of CCP non-coercive uses of military bodies and methods. The reader will recall the dilemma of the CCP revolutionaries: if they diverted their energies from combat, they would be exterminated; even if they concentrated their resources on combat, they still
could not win battles. In reality the Party had more long-range aims than physical defeat of the Kuomintang—principal among these were social revolution, modernization and political hegemony. Short-term guerrilla dependence and long-range non-military objectives created the political and economic mission of the Communist army.

The Communists recognized that the military was politically and economically useful before the soldiers were prepared to carry out political and economic tasks. The peasant entered the Communist forces unused to discipline, unacquainted with modern skills and lifeways, and unattached to Party control. If the soldier were to be dependable in battle, these characteristics had to be changed, and the process of change required for battle success qualified him for political and socio-economic assignments. The first ring in our scope diagram is the non-coercive use of military bodies to transform their members. The second ring, dependent on some degree of transformation of the peasant recruit, is the use of military bodies to affect their environment: propaganda, administrative and economic functions. The political and economic uses of military service do not end with the discharge of the trained servicemen into society. He is capable of acting as a transmission belt for modern skills and lifeways and Party political programs.

The Party reasoned that if through military organization and psychology the peasant recruit could be disciplined, relatively modernized and made politically loyal, perhaps the same methods could produce similar results in civilian society. We
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refer to this projection of military organization and psychology onto civilians as civilian mobilization--rings four and five. Militia enlargement, ring four, offered a part-time military environment for civilians. Their training in the militia allowed them to assimilate military attitudes and skills, to reduce the coercive burden on the regular army, and to spend many hours a week on non-coercive tasks which could be implemented more efficiently because of their military training. The second device to achieve the desired combination of militarized political and economic activity was to superimpose military methods on civilians engaged in full-time non-coercive activity, i.e., all individuals not involved in the regular or militia armies (ring five). In other words, the Party tried to create three groups who comprised the entire adult population, whose activities varied in coercive content, but whose lives were equally militarized.
Chapter 6

Modernization and Indoctrination in the Army

In Chu Teh's words, the Party had to create an army which would "be able to win a fight" and "realize why to fight". Specifically, the Party had to: 1) train commanders to organize, administer and lead; 2) educate officers and soldiers to handle mechanical equipment, read directives and instruction, and observe health precautions; and 3) inculcate in officers and soldiers the incentive and rationale for fighting under Party direction.

The changing fortunes of the movement have been reflected in the CCP training priorities. In the guerrilla years material shortages forced the Party to stress literacy and sanitation. Since 1949 the CCP has commanded a much broader industrial base and has been able to stress technical skills. However, the Party's goal has never varied: to create a military establishment that would help the Party to rule China and change Chinese society.

A. Organization Men

Mao Tse-tung as Marxist may have believed in the "objective" and "inevitable" forces of history. However, Mao as politician, general and revolutionary has believed that Communist success in any particular program depends on the "subjective factor of ability of direction."  

1 Teh Chu, On the Battlefield in the Liberated Regions, Peking, 1953 (Chinese). This military report was presented on April 25, 1945, to the 7th Congress of the CCP and has been translated in a slightly different version: On the Battle Front of the Liberated Areas, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952.

2 Quoted in Hua Hsiao, "The Communist Party of China and the Chinese
as a revolution and as a government the Party has had to develop organizational ability in sufficient numbers of Chinese to implement Party programs throughout China. During the revolutionary years the organizational crisis was acute in the only major instrument under Party control, the Red Army. The Party had to equip the students, mercenaries and peasants that joined the Communist revolutionaries with basic leadership and administrative skills prerequisite for military survival. It also had to insure that its recruits did not use their new skills for personal aggrandizement, in other words, that the organizational skills and desire to use them to implement Party directives were synthesized. The Party envisioned its ideal "organizational man" or cadre as a "dynamic element ...as a transmission belt between the Party, the State and the masses ...he is at all times connected with the activity of the Party and expresses the point of view of the Party."  

1. The Good Cadre

The writings of the CCP elite disclose a theory of organization and a definition of the ideal cadre.  

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Walter Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Feb., 1952 (Mimeo.), p. iii.

virtues which the good cadre should possess, several of which are incompatible. The cadre is expected to compromise these incompatibles, and the Party reserves the right to criticize him for any particular compromise he makes.

The first set of virtues is: obedience, centralization, unity, objectivity, initiative, and personal responsibility. Obviously, the first three virtues are incompatible with the last three. Obedience to the Party has to be total. The Party refuses to tolerate two "non-organizational viewpoints": "tailism", or failure to implement Party directives because of local conditions, popular resentment, or personal reluctance; and "left-wing infantilism", or failure to accept CCP compromises in order to achieve long-range goals. Three influences led the Communists to include "a high degree of centralization and organization"\(^5\) in their list. The first was the advanced bureaucracy which had operated in traditional China.\(^6\) The second was Leninist ideology and Soviet example. The third was the Party's association of complex centralized organization with the industrialized and modern nations and powerful armies of the West. CC member Li Fu-ch'un recognized that:

In order to administer and establish a united People's country, the principle of centralization


and unity must be carried out, ideological and organizational uniformity must be achieved.\textsuperscript{7}

Cadres are also expected to implement the unified subordination of their institutions to the Party. As Mao wrote: "Members of the Party will not fight for their own personal power over the troops....However, they should fight for the power of the Party over the troops...."\textsuperscript{8}

The Communist theory of organization requires servitude to the Party Center, but it also acknowledges the problems that can result from rigidity.\textsuperscript{9} During the guerrilla years the Communist survival margin was so tenuous that the CCP could not allow a cadre to implement blindly a Party directive which was inadequate in one form or another. Accordingly, occupants of high and low positions of authority are expected to be neither dogmatic nor subjective. Commanders are to assess their unit's problems and resources coolly and objectively. During the revolutionary years the fluidity of the CCP situation and the dispersal of its forces led the CCP elite to warn against "becoming mechanistic." Cadres are empowered to exercise initiative and personal responsibility. "If they were to refer all matters big and small to superior officers, they would have to wait, and


\textsuperscript{9}Quoted in Chiu, op. cit., p. 16.
delay and lose chances of victory." When Chu Teh told Red officers "how to command," he observed: "Each segment has its own responsibilities and commanding powers." Liu Shao-chi even recognized justification for not obeying the orders of higher Party authorities.

Submission to leadership should be flexible ... the degree depending on the situation. If the situation changes, we may even have to change the whole policy ... We must carefully study every situation and each resolution and directive. If we find any error in them or that they are at variance with local conditions, we should not hesitate to raise questions; we must not blindly carry out directives.

The second set of incompatible expectations of the cadre is that he is to implement the directives of the Party and his superiors and to win the support of the populace and his subordinates. The dilemma is contained in the injunction to "enforce strictly the democratic way of life under centralized guidance." Lin Piao, the current Minister of Defense, issued this hard-to-follow organizational principle to military cadres:

We regard democracy as our means; and enhancement of unity, consolidation of discipline, and improvement of the fighting power as our goal. ... The democracy which we practice with leadership is the democracy under centralized guidance. At all times, we are opposed to anarchism and egalitarianism.

Guerrilla dependence on popular support made the Communists conscious of the futility of attempts to simply impose their policies

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11 Chu, op. cit.
on the masses. One Western observer who spent the mid-1940's with the Eighth Route Army noted:

The work of a Communist official or mass-movement organizer in the guerrilla areas was extremely dangerous ... and he could only survive if the local population was prepared to make considerable sacrifices and take very great risks in order to protect him.... Someone who refused to consider the real individual Chinese peasant as he actually was, who refused to take account of differences with the ideal Chinese peasant as he should have been according to Communist theory, was unlikely to survive.\(^{15}\)

The CCP recognized, at least in theory, that for the cadre to serve the Party effectively, he must at least appear to be a "servant of the people."\(^{16}\)

The good cadre had to be an unusual man to compromise these incompatibles to the satisfaction of the Party. Lin Piao has described him as:

...just, honest and unselfish, without any resort to deceit to achieve personal fame.... humble and modest and not arrogant ... bravely accept criticism and education and wage a struggle against all erroneous tendencies instead of rejecting criticism and persisting in mistakes. In short, individualism constitutes the source of all evils.\(^{17}\)

If the cadre did not conform to this model, he would be a "thoroughly bad egg."\(^{18}\) He would be, in effect, not expressing his personality as cleansed in the CCP laundromat, but his dirty bourgeois, unregenerate self. In the words of Liu Shao-Chi,


\(^{17}\)Lin, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

\(^{18}\)Liu, *How to be a Good Communist*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
cadres

have to shoulder the unprecedentedly 'great office' of changing the world, [therefore] it is all the more necessary for them to go through ...steeling and self-cultivation.19

With Marx, the CCP regards the formation of "talented people capable of carrying on political rule" as a long process requiring a change in the individual as well as in society.20 The change must be a permanent one to insure CCP control; it must combine utter "subordination" to the Party with capability and initiative and vigor. Only the deepest possession of a "revolutionary ideology" can enable the cadre to "work out his course in the ever-changing movement".21

The possibilities that the CCP can imbue a sufficient number of cadres with the organizational skills and ideological attitudes necessary to achieve coercive and non-coercive Party ambitions, and to implement the organizational theory just summarized has diminished. In the revolutionary period, the careerist was obviously not attracted to the CCP or its forces, and the Party drew primarily on idealists and on those dissatisfied with their lot in society. Both types of individuals were ideologically malleable. During this period the Party also had more time for ideological training: its organization was simple and so necessary administrative skills could be assimilated by the soldier on active duty. Its scarcity of weapons meant meager

19 Ibid., p. 7.
20 Ibid., p. 4.
supplies, but it also meant that less time was needed to train the forces to use their equipment. Finally, the cadres of the pre-takeover period had cut their ties with the nation outside of the Communist realm by their very act of participation in the Red forces. They were then geographically separated from all the local and family institutions which might compete for their allegiance. The end result of this process was reported by Liu in 1945:

Several hundreds of thousands ...have given up their respective occupations in society for a long time and become engaged in revolutionary military collective life and life-and-death struggle ...[thus having] ...their sense of organization and discipline strengthened.\(^{22}\)

When the Communists assumed the governing responsibility for the entire mainland in 1949, their needs for reliable and capable cadres mushroomed alarmingly. At the same time the psychological type of individual it required to fill these needs changed. No longer could it draw on the alienated and discontented of Chinese society, who once joined the movement because they were offered the opportunity to dedicate themselves to overthrow the status quo. The Party now needs cadres who will support the men in power and their programs and will accept a regimen of rigid control. It can no longer use rebels. The CCP's final problem is that the institutions which the cadres must administer have become much more complex, and the cadre needs a considerable degree of managerial and technical acumen to manage them effectively. The "good cadre" must be better than ever before, and an increasing number of "good cadres" must be produced.

\(^{22}\)Liu, On the Party, op. cit., p. 17.
2. The Evolution of Military Organization

Before the Sino-Japanese war CCP military organization consisted of isolated small bands, often out of communication with the handful of men who attempted to function as a central command. Only in 1931, after four years of war, were the armies in the Central Soviet Region placed under one command. In November of that year the First All-China Soviet Congress directed that: "all bodies whose several functions it shall be to command, administer or maintain the Red Army shall be strictly centralized." The Congress resolution "Concerning the Red Army" directed the establishment of the "Revolutionary Military Council and the Chief Staff of the Chinese Red Army to guide the organization, provide for the supply and military training of the Red Army and lead its military operations".

In spite of these directives military organization remained rudimentary until the conclusion of World War II. CCP military organization consisted of numerous units trained to "operate independently". A small command formulated policy, and numerous individuals in the field were expected to implement it with

25 Ibid.
flexibility and initiative. The lack of organization implicit in this guerrilla structure increased the need for cadres equipped with political dedication and military insight,

Reliable cadres must be developed in every unit, fully capable of replacing any commander eliminated in battle. Resourcefulness of subalterns must be greatly relied upon in partisan warfare....the partisan line must have the greatest elasticity. 27

American military observers in Yenan reported that by the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the CCP had no permanent administrative echelon or functional staff sub-divisions. The 8th Route Army's administrative divisions were geographical. Although the army was hierarchically organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, the nature of CCP operations militated against continuous use of a formal line of authority. 28 Although the Communists claimed to have "administrative sections and supply, signal, medical and service platoons", these designations often referred to non-existent units or to temporary assignments. 29

After 1947, the CCP began to engage in regular, positional, mechanized warfare. The Party was in a poor position to provide the administrative personnel this development required. Few commanders had staff experience; few had formal training in military management or in technology. 30 The Communists faced formidable

29Ibid., p. 2436.
challenges in creating a "unified regular order". Three aspects of the evolution of organization are summarized: staff development; major sub-unit structural growth; and specialist ranks within the officer corps. By 1946 a general staff with ten departments had been formed in the PLA. While the staff remained in second place to regional "field army" commanders until the mid-1950's a trend was initiated. By the end of 1953 the staff structure shown in Table XIII had begun to replace the field army headquarters as the decision-making center in the PLA. The table reflects the development of: 1)multiple services—army, navy and air force; 2)functional non-combat departments—hygiene, railway transportation, communication, rear support, and management; and 3)civil control arms—political headquarters and the bureaus of personnel, investigation and military law. However, the staff was still subordinate to the PRMC which contained the military region commanders. In 1954 the PRMC was replaced by the NDC and the staff became subordinate to a strengthened Ministry of Defense. At the same time that the field armies were being superseded by less powerful front armies, staff organization was refined into these sub-divisions: General Political, General Training, General Cadres, General Quartermaster and Finance.

Major military units below the national PLA headquarters developed along similar lines. Lt. Col. Robert Rigg has compiled

Table XIII

PLA Organization, 1954

Committee of Central People's Government

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee

The Various Military Regions

The Army Headquarters

Ministry of Combat

Ministry of Hygiene

Ministry of Railway Transportation

The Navy Headquarters

The Air Force Headquarters

The Rear Support Headquarters

Department (Office)

Section

The Various Military Regions

The General Office

The First Bureau (Personnel)

The Second Bureau (Investigation)

The Third Bureau (Communication)

The Fifth Bureau (Management)

The Sixth Bureau (Military Law)
Table XIV
The General Organization of a Field Army Headquarters

Field Army Headquarters
Commander in Chief
Two Deputy Commanders
Political Commissar
Two Deputy Political Commissars

Special Staff
Artillery,
Armor, AAA,
Engineers

Chief of Rear Services
Chief & Deputy Comdr.
Chief & Deputy Pol. Commissar

Chief of Staff
Deputy C of S

Chief of the Political Department

Secretariat
1. Organization Dept. (a cadre section and an organization sec.)
2. Propaganda Dept.
3. Popular Movements Dept.
4. Liaison Dept.
5. Defense Dept. (three sections and a Military Law Office)
7. Political Affairs Dept.
(directly under Chief of the Pol. Dept.)

Health
1. Medical Affairs
2. Medical Admin.
3. Chief of Med. Sec.
5. Stretcher Brig.
6. Field Sanitation

Supply
1. Accounts
2. Finance
3. Clothing
4. Rations
5. Ordnance
6. Transportation

Administrative Staff
1. Secretariat
2. Control Section
3. Unit Affairs Section
(personnel)
4. Training and School Section

General Staff
1. Operations Section
2. Intelligence Section
3. Communications Section
Radio Unit Telephone Unit

the structure of a CCP field army during the 1949-1953 period (Table XIV). Organizational elaborations had taken place in the administrative mechanisms for personnel maintenance—health and supply, combat—administrative and general staff, and political control of the army and the surrounding population—political. Administrative control refinements reflect the more technically complex material needs of the modernized CCP forces and their retention of numerous non-coercive functions. While the organizational table seems impressively complex, personnel assignments within the field army create doubt as to its implementation. In an army of several hundred thousand, the number of solely administrative personnel was only about 240.37 The degree of actual managerial activity must have been far less than a glance at the table would indicate.

The new services formed after the revolutionary struggle began with a relatively complex administrative format. Table XV presents the 1953 organizational structure of one of three major regional Navy commands. The table reflects openly the CCP inability to provide the experienced personnel necessary to operate the naval organization. A Soviet Advisory mission provided needed expertise for the ill-equipped Chinese guerrilla war veterans. An additional temporary support not indicated in the table was the use of former Nationalists. Both alternatives were unsatisfactory to the CCP for obvious reasons.

The personnel needs of the specialized organizational forms adopted after 1949 were formally recognized in the 1955

37 Ibid.
Table XV
East China Regional Command,
People's Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAST CHINA HEADQUARTERS, PEOPLE'S NAVY COMMANDER Deputy Commander</th>
<th>SOVIET NAVAL ADVISORY MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Naval Construction and Repair</td>
<td>Small Craft Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Torpedo Works</td>
<td>4th Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'u Tung Naval Arsenal</td>
<td>5th Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankow Naval Arsenal</td>
<td>6th Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukow Naval Arsenal</td>
<td>7th Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai, South Yangtze Shipyards</td>
<td>1st Minesweeper Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East China Naval Gunboat Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chusan Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wen T'ai Defense Patrol Squadron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Regulations for the Service of Officers". The previous personnel categories of "commanding personnel" and "combat personnel" were abandoned for more refined distinctions. Regulations now

distinguish eight types of PLA officers: command, political, technical, ordnance, medical, veterinary, adjutants and administrative. The personnel corollary of the summarized organizational changes was the requirement of increased managerial and technical skills from the officers and non-commissioned military cadres. CCP definition of the good cadre required that these requirements be additions and not substitutions to the previous requirements of political enthusiasm.

3. Training the Military Cadre

Training programs were initiated in the early years of the Red Army. Through the years, four factors have affected the content and duration of these programs: 1) an extremely high casualty rate among young officers; 2) the need to staff an expanding army; 3) the need for technically and managerially skilled cadres; and 4) the need for politically reliable cadres.

Before 1947 the CCP had to train sizeable numbers of men for command responsibility who were politically reliable and possessed a minimum of technical and managerial skills. At this time the need for rapidly trained cadres competed with the need for politically reliable cadres. A Western journalist was told that during the period before the Sino-Japanese War "casualties among Red officers averaged 50 per cent each year". The Red Army was in a perpetual state of "cadre-crisis", even though it claimed to have "forged new cadres out of local revolutionary elements ...at a feverish tempo". This hasty training did not

41 Ho-sin Chow, "The Military Power of Soviet China," *China Today,*
provide the Communists with the type of personnel they wanted, but at this point the CCP was satisfied if the cadres could survive for the moment and keep the Red Army apparatus running for the moment. During World War II the proportion of casualties probably lessened, but the numerical increase in CCP troops maintained the demand for leadership personnel. To maximize their expansion opportunity, the Communists again resorted to the hastily trained cadre. When Mao weighed the merits and risks of this policy in 1940, he directed that: "In each base area we must as far as possible open large scale schools for training cadres—the larger and the more numerous the better."42 Since the Red Army was technically and structurally primitive before 1947, the cadres could acquire requisite managerial and technical skills in schools and on location during slack military periods.

In the New Fourth Army

...commanders and assistant commanders of regiments, battalions and companies are transferred in rotation to the headquarters of the army in the rear for special training. Platoon leaders undergo training in special detachments.43

While the movement was still revolutionary, the Party relied on class origin to provide the political reliability that it needed in its cadres. It believed that a man with a grudge against the established order made a more reliable cadre, and in 1931 the First Congress of the Chinese Soviets directed:

(Jan., 1936), p. 73. The article is a translation of the original in the Soviet C.P. journal Bolshevik.


Measures shall immediately be taken to increase the percentage of workers and agricultural labourers in the Red Army, to increase the efforts to bring workers and agricultural labourers into the Red Army.... Proletarian leadership in the Red Army can be guaranteed only on condition that the percentage of industrial workers and agricultural labourers be increased....

Although the Congressional instructions stated that military qualifications were not to be ignored,

...it is essential, in the first place to promote to leading military and political positions industrial workers, agricultural labourers, poor peasants and the revolutionary fighters who in past revolutionary struggles have proved their loyalty and experience.

These policies and the use of flexible class categories, especially that of "workers" enabled the CCP to claim significant success in culling out the proletariat for cadre positions. This table, reprinted from Inprecorr, compares the first and last graduated classes of the Red Military Academy at Juikin:

Social Origin of Academy Classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Poor Peasants</th>
<th>Middle Peasants</th>
<th>Coolies</th>
<th>Small Traders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First graduation</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth graduation</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since approximately 1947, and especially since the conclusion of the Korean War, the Party has had to select its cadres

44 Kun, op. cit., p. 37.
45 Ibid.
even more carefully. The military instrument has become com-
plicated administratively and technically, and its politicized-
specialist direction has created increasing strains between
military and Party. In other words, since 1947 the need for
technically and managerially competent cadres competes with the
need for politically reliable cadres. To fulfill both of these
needs the Party has resorted more and more to formal, systematic
technical, administrative, and political training, and in the
1955 regulations on the service of officers, rank is directly
linked to level of military education. Promotion from the ranks
to the officer category can still be won by loyal service, but
graduates of military schools are automatically commissioned.
Graduates of secondary level military schools are not eligible
for a captain's appointment as are graduates of the higher mili-
tary schools. Not only does the Party have to select its
cadres more carefully, but it can afford to select them more
carefully. As the masters of a vast nation, the Party can draw
on the most enlightened members of the population for its cadre
candidates. No longer does it have to rely on the peasants as
its main source of junior leadership personnel. During the Korean
War, university students became a source of cadres. In the
Law of Military Service of the People's Republic of China, passed
by the First National People's Assembly on July 30, 1955, the


48Wen-hui C. Chen, Wartime "Mass Campaigns" in Communist China:
Official Country-wide "Mass Movements" in professed Support of
the Korean War. "Studies in Chinese Communism" of the Human
Resources Research Institute, Lackland Air Force Base: Air
Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Oct., 1955,
p. 35.
Party requires university students to pursue cadre training. "College students should receive military training at college and prepare in order to obtain a reserve lieutenant title and to assume the corresponding duty." It is reasonable to assume that as revolutionary veterans retire, the vacancies in the 300,000 man officer corps will be filled primarily by graduates of the academies.

To counteract the political effects of the increasing professionalism in the military, the Party has had to augment the political training that cadres receive in the academies with special political training campaigns and greater numbers of commissars. In 1956 the Party issued a directive entitled "On Theoretical Education of Military Officers", and consequently special "Evening Schools of Marxism-Leninism" were established.

All military officers holding the rank of a major and above were required to complete within five years the study of five subjects—the History of the Chinese Communist Party, the History of the Soviet Communist Party, political economy and economic problems, dialectical materialism and party construction. Officers holding the rank of lieutenant were required to complete within three years the three subjects of political knowledge in general, theoretical knowledge in general and fundamental knowledge of the Party. Each officer was required to complete the study of one subject each year.

In 1958 New China News Agency announced that "The PLA General Political Department plans to have 10,000 theoreticians throughout the armed forces within two or three years." These would

49 Law of Military Service of the People's Republic, Chapter 8, Article 55, n.p.: n.d. (Chinese); for a translation see CB, No. 344 (Aug. 8, 1955), pp. 4-11.
51 "Armymen Study Chairman Mao's Works," NCNA-English Peking
be the elite of the 120,000 political workers.

Cadres have attended training schools and academies throughout the history of the movement. During the guerrilla years combat strength could not be sacrificed for extended academy training. Accordingly, the CCP resorted to a "training battalion found in every headquarters for advanced study of military and political techniques". These battalions consisted of "rank and file fighters being trained as lower commanders". As the demand for active combat personnel has lessened, these battalions are no longer mentioned. The CCP is now able to send its cadres to military academies for more intensive training. Even in the guerrilla period, academies were used as much as circumstances allowed. The first institution of any size was the Red Military Academy located at Juikin, capital of the Central Soviet District. At its point of maximum influence in late 1933-1934, the Academy, sometimes called the University, was attended by 3,000 students. A pro-Communist source describes the objectives of the Academy and its student body.

The University gives a thorough training to candidates for offices above the rank of regimental


commanders such as political commissars for divisions, divisional commanders, political commissars for the regiments....Attending the university are students almost without exception recalled from the front.... They are almost all worker and peasant cadres.  

Different sources claim that the school was divided into five or six sections and offered specialized training in "artillery, engineering, air defense, chemical warfare, etc." The Party describes the length of study period, course approaches, etc. only vaguely, but we do know that "military-technical" training was differentiated to some degree from "military-political" training. Because of the material isolation and military tenuousness of the Red base area it is reasonable to surmise that the curriculum consisted of short elementary courses in political subordination and military survival.

When the Red Army began the harrowing Long March, the CCP had to abandon both base and Academy. However, the Party quickly re-established it when it reached the Northwest. The Party had to replace many lost cadres and had to rejuvenate the political spirits of the cadres who had survived the demoralizing retreat. By 1936 the new Red Army Academy, located near Yanan, had only slightly more than 800 students who studied a program of four to six months duration. The student body was divided into four sections. One section trained cadres for cavalry, engineer and artillery units. Two included "platoon, company and squad

57 Ibid.
commanders and new volunteers," the later of whom were supposedly attracted by patriotic motives to enlist against Japan. The First section contained commanders and commissars of the battalion, regimental and divisional levels. Snow was told of the following courses:

Political Knowledge, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, Political Economy, Party Construction, Tactical Problems of the Republic, Leninism and Historical Foundations of Democracy, Political and Social Forces in Japan,...Problems of Strategy in the War with Japan, Maneuvering Warfare (against Japan), and the Development of Partisan Warfare in the Anti-Japanese War.61

By July, 1938, the Party claimed that 5,000 to 6,000 students were enrolled in each seven and a half month course.62 By this date the name of the Academy had been changed to a united front name, the "Anti-Japanese Military Academy," but each cadet still divided his or her time between military and Party-oriented political studies.63 The curriculum in this and other "united front" academies was expanded to include

The National United Front against Japan, Philosophy (with emphasis on Dialectics), Historical Materialism, Political Science, Political Economy, International Politics and Economy, Social Evolution, Chinese Social Structure and the Chinese Revolution, Political Problems (current problems of domestic and international politics), Guerrilla Warfare Tactics, The People's Movement, Political Work in the Army, Map Making, Latinized Chinese, War Art ...64

The Party's cadre-training program did not change fundamentally until after the end of war with Japan. Cloaked in

61 Ibid., p. 107.
63 Hanson, op. cit., p. 296.
64 Yu-chuan Wang, "The Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung," in Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army, New
in united front patriotism, the Party was able to attract many more people to the movement, enabling the Red Army Academy near Yenan to expand and other military academies to be established at the end of 1940 in north Shansi and in Hopei.65 In the South Communist forces began the "New Fourth Army Military and Political Academy.66 Estimates of the students at this "Army Training Camp" vary from 84067 to over 1500.58 However, sources do agree that the length of training was three months and that students were on leave from duty at the front at the time.69 "Students training for military leadership give 70 per cent of their time to tactical studies and practical exercises in the art of mobile warfare, the rest to political schooling."70 Commissar trainees reversed the proportions of time. The students were divided into specialities: squad and platoon commanders, political workers, engineers, health and literacy (women).71 Although it is difficult to assess the value of this course, the shortness of the course, the Academy's inadequate training equipment, and the Academy's emphasis on daily physical exercise indicate that the course had limited value. In 1940 accelerated training courses

York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 117.
65 Ibid., p. 39.
70 Ibid., op. cit., p. 275.
71 Belden, op. cit., p. 16.
of four to six months allowed the Party to turn out an estimated "10,000 trained leaders annually".72 Although this figure and the calibre of the "training" are debatable, it is true that for example, in South Shantung "Almost all the secondary, normal and professional schools have been closed and replaced by Training Schools for Young Political and Military Cadres".73

As the Party began to reap the advantages of the war with Japan, numerous short-lived and mobile training institutions sprang up to provide a competent and politically reliable core for CCP military expansion. Common characteristics of these institutions were the shortness of the training program and the emphasis on political as well as military training. When Evans Carlson visited such a cadre training school, he found that military subjects took up to 60% of the student's time and political subjects 40%. After only nine weeks of training the "graduates" assumed leadership positions in the Red Army.74 The "Military and Political Workers' Academy" at Wutaishan, the capital of the Shansi-Chahar-Hupeh border region, had a similarly divided curriculum. This Academy was short of experienced teachers and expected the students to teach each other. To the extent that this faculty shortage existed at other military cadre training centers, the training of cadres at this time was limited. To the extent that fighting was serious and experienced cadres became unavailable for teaching the faculty shortage worsened. The

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72 Carlson, op. cit., p. 39; Snow, Battle for Asia, op. cit., p. 336.
73 Carlson, op. cit., p. 126.
Party tried to compensate for these inadequacies with a "learn-perform" device. The disadvantage of this device was that practical applications of lecture principles could lead to rote repetition and a loss of the flexibility required to wage successful guerrilla warfare.

By the mid-1940's the Party's situation allowed it to weed out undesirable cadres and to train desirable cadre candidates more intensively. At this time the Japanese were occupied elsewhere, and the Party was able to husband its resources for the final engagements with Chiang. It took advantage of this "breather" to launch its first rectification campaign to tighten up the Party instruments that had expanded so rapidly during the Sino-Japanese War. By 1944 the CCP was anticipating a shift from guerrilla to positional warfare and the acquisition of heavy weapons and motor transport. Consequently, at the largest military academy, Kangta, the training course was extended to two years, and the enrollment jumped from 800 to a purported 10,000.

After 1949 the Communists were able to give their cadres training comparable to training in Western military academies. By 1950 the first classes were enrolled in military institutes in Peking, Harbin, Shanghai, and Nanking. Probably the first of these new institutions was the North China Military Administrative University at Peking. The initial public announcement

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75 Epstein, op. cit., p. 218.
77 Rigg, op. cit., p. 160.
indicated that a student body of 6,000 would receive six months of training and possibly an additional course of twelve to eighteen months. The curriculum was fairly evenly divided between political and military subjects, and the student body was limited to middle school graduates. A Japanese source estimates that by 1952 this educational system was producing 40,000 junior officers.\(^7\) Training periods varied from eight months for armored troops to two years in naval and air force academies to five years in sciences of military relevance.\(^8\) The average training period was probably one year.\(^9\) Career staff officers were sent to the USSR for further training;\(^10\) for example, a Hong Kong source reported that "twenty regimental staff officers were ... sent to the Kiev staff school."\(^11\)

The newly created branches of the Chinese Communist military establishment, the People's Navy and the People's Air Force, had to be staffed almost from scratch. The first naval school was founded on August 15, 1949, and was called the Naval Academy for the East China Military Zone.\(^12\) Less than a year later the People's Naval Academy was in operation at Dairem, together with

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\(^7\) Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," *op. cit.*, p. 171, cites a Japanese source for this figure.


\(^9\) Rigg, *op. cit.*, p. 162.


a Submarine Training Group. By 1953 the enrollment of this latter institution was reported at 3,000.\textsuperscript{85} By 1954 there were four naval training schools in operation, called the Joint Navy Academy.\textsuperscript{86} The first CCP aviation training school was "founded in Antung ... in the spring of 1948 and was later moved to Kaimussu [also in Manchuria].\textsuperscript{87} The latter was named the Air Force Academy.\textsuperscript{88} Soviet advisors and faculty were particularly in evidence at the academies for the newer branches of the military.\textsuperscript{89} 

In the new military academies the CCP had had to cope with various technical and political problems. Especially in the naval and air force academies, there was a shortage of materials and experts required for adequate technical training. At the "First People's Naval School",

...several thousand military cadres and warriors fresh from the combatfields joined this school. They sought to master the rudiments of naval operations in the short span of three months in order to become the backbone of the naval fleet...

The school premises were inadequate and too worn out to accommodate several thousand students. There were no class rooms, desks, chairs, benches and beds, and only a few desks were available in the office. As regards equipment for aiding instruction, not a single item was available at the very outset. Later, the higher levels and various naval vessels contributed a small number of old guns, diesel engines, sextons and radar instruments which were barely sufficient to meet instruction needs. Take the guns for instance. Only six out-moded and broken guns

\textsuperscript{85} Hanrahan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 851.


\textsuperscript{87} Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{88} Chin and Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ibid.}, and Hanrahan, \textit{op. cit.}
of Japanese, American and Canadian makes were then available for over 1000 students. Most of these guns were without gunsight while others had their barrels worn smooth.

The cultural levels of the students were also very low, with an overwhelming majority at the primary school level. A fairly large number was illiterate. Many students had neither seen a naval vessel nor the sea....the school leadership and cadres of various levels were all transferred from the army. They were not familiar with naval practice and had no experience whatever in running a naval school of a fairly large scope.90

Since the materials and faculty deficiencies were first remedied in the army academies, it was here that the political difficulties first arose. To insure that the cadres would become "good politically" the Party reversed the curriculum and organization of the schools to approximate those of the revolutionary military academies. When the Party attacked the central army academy, the Military Academy at Peking, in 1958 for "dogmatism",91 it revised the curriculum to de-emphasize knowledge of military strategy and management and to emphasize political indoctrination. Political training was to occupy 20% rather than 16% of the cadets' time. Mao Tse-tung's theories of warfare and courses on Asian terrain replaced subjects such as "military geography". This quotation indicates the nature of the new program:

With regard to the procedure of training, Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works on military matters and the strategic principles of defense of the motherland are now being studied first, followed by the study of different graded of tactics. Political theory, current events and policies run through the whole

90Wang and Fan, op. cit., p. 6.
course of teaching. Specialized subjects are taught at intervals.\(^{92}\)

The Party also installed "political commissars in the courses and political directors in the classes."

B. Modern Skills and Lifeways

We deal here with the technical, health, and literacy modernization of the PLA soldier.

Technical skills refer to the ability to operate and maintain mechanical equipment, e.g., guns, radios, trucks. We can derive the skills which the CCP soldier had to acquire by knowing the equipment available to him. As early as 1928 Mao reported to the Central Committee that "The average soldier needs six months or a year's training before he can fight...."\(^{93}\) and that "our soldiers, though recruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training to speak of."\(^{94}\) Because of the movement's precarious military position and its scarcity of military equipment, the CCP continued to send soldiers into the war inadequately trained. After 1949 three factors enabled the Party to raise the technical skills of its troops: 1) ability to hold troops in the rear for training; 2) the ability to draw on the economic resources of the industrialized cities of the mainland; and 3) receipt of sizeable quantities of complex war equipment from the U.S.S.R.

Guerrilla necessity led the CCP to stress health measures. "No diseased person could keep up with the life of the rank and

\(^{92}\)Ibid., p. 16.
\(^{94}\)Ibid.
soldiers—they have to stay healthy or die." The Party's sanitation training was designed to: 1) partially counterbalance weapons inferiority; and 2) increase the coercive effectiveness and length of service of scarce experienced personnel. Physical stamina was originally cultivated through exercises in the guerrilla bands and culminated in the giant sports spectaculars of today.

The Party has had two motives for "Storming the Fortress of Culture", i.e., elementary education. The first is political. To the extent that the men can be reached by printed media, the task of indoctrination is made easier, and the time which the cadres must spend to communicate the Party line is reduced. The second is coercive. Even in the primitive stage of Communist guerrilla warfare, Chu Teh is supposed to have remarked: "If you don't study Chinese, you will never be able to read orders. And then how will you work?" With the attempt to create a technically modern armed force the problem of illiteracy became even more acute. In 1950 a leading general directed:

...the great percentage of illiteracy of the soldiers should be eliminated...It is impossible to utilize modern equipment, to learn to conduct modern warfare, or to learn how to skillfully command soldiers in

99Sung-lin Hsu, "With Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh," People's China (July 1, 1953), p. 16.
combat if the soldiers are uneducated. The importance of literacy training in the PLA was reaffirmed in 1958. "Elimination of illiteracy is the key to mastery of science and technology by the armed forces and to a great leap forward of military and political training." The Chinese Communists did not and in all probability will not consider modernization of servicemen as crucial as their political indoctrination. The reader should keep in mind that in the pre-1949 Red army "As a rule, political training ...[was] taken even more seriously than military training" and that only sixty per cent of the training periods were devoted to inculcation of modern skills, sanitation habits and literacy. 1. Technical Skills

When Mao and Chu Teh merged their forces in 1928, they claimed "some 50,000 followers. Of these about 4,000 were armed with rifles, some 10,000 being equipped only with spears, swords, and hoes, while the rest were unarmed." Often the soldiers carried a "bamboo pole sharpened at the end into a primitive pike." Obviously, Mao's 1928 hope that each company could have a machine-gun company and a trench-mortar company was unrealistic. The soldiers could only rarely practice

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103 Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 387.
marksmanship because "Every bullet was treasured." The Party foresaw no rapid or easy acquisition of equipment. "What equipment they would get in the future would have to be captured from the enemy in battle."  

Although the Party had acquired some equipment by the early 1930's, it still had to circumvent a dearth of equipment and technical skills. The Party has never contested the Nationalist estimate of its arms at this time: at most less than a thousand machine guns, less than a hundred trench mortars and less than fifty cannon at any one time before the Long March. The Party line journals estimated the Party's equipment progress in percentage figures, which may have revealed the percentage increase in equipment but conveniently hid the actual amount of technical equipment in the Red Army's possession. After seven "glorious years" of warfare the Red army was still not motorized: "We rely on our own feet for transportation."  

After the Party established a relatively secure base area, it set up schools that taught elementary engineering and radio operation in 1933. Training in the latter was particularly needed because the scattered CCP guerrilla bands necessarily depended on radio communication to maintain any semblance of integrated activity. In spite of the small number of radio sets in

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110 Ibid, p. 20.
111 Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 255.
the Party's hands, it was not until 1934 that the Party claimed that "wireless students are now sufficient in number to do the necessary work."\textsuperscript{112}

In the early years of the united front the level of technical skills was not raised appreciably. In the New Fourth Army training consisted primarily of physical conditioning and the internalization of discipline. While the army had secured some machine guns, ammunition was still so scarce that the army could not allow practice shooting.\textsuperscript{113} The Eighth Route Army also "keep an account of every cartridge."\textsuperscript{114} Materials were still acquired almost entirely by capture. The Party had had to abandon the few large arsenals it had controlled in the ill-fated, short-lived Szechwan Soviet,\textsuperscript{115} and the "factories" and "arsenals" it had hastily set up in the Border Regions were of little significance. "One rifle a day is the output of such 'factories.'"\textsuperscript{116} Obviously the Party was unable to develop the technical skills to operate equipment it did not possess or possessed in inadequate amounts. Little technical skill was required to use the "favorite guer-rilla weapon," the potato-masher type of hand-grenade.\textsuperscript{117}

American military observers in Yenan reported on the

\textsuperscript{113}Belden, op. cit., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid.
equipment and training of the CCP army in 1944. Equipment was in short supply; training, elementary. Many soldiers still had no rifles, and machine guns and mortars were scarce. Heavier equipment was almost non-existent. The shortage and age of the weapons led to unusual reliance on the hand-grenade, which the Communists euphemistically termed "Artillery for the Soldier." Training periods of from two and one-half months to four and one-half months were cut into by combat and economic activities. Little actual training in the available weapons was possible, and often recruits only had three rounds of rifle ammunition for marksmanship practice. Ammunition for other weapons was in even shorter supply. The CCP continued to depend on captured war materiel. The observers reported the existence of "a few arsenals" but remarked that "most operations are manual, precision is low and models antiquated." Motorized vehicles were rare.

In some areas there is a small amount of transport by pack animals and two wheeled carts (usually drawn by three mules), but in active areas all that troops take with them on the march is usually carried on their backs or slung on poles over their shoulders. Field officers are usually provided with horses and mules.

In conclusion the American officers emphasized the:

lack of sufficient small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical personnel, lack of signal equipment in general and especially of radio communication below regiment level ...

119 Ibid., p. 2439.
120 Ibid., p. 2444.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 2447.
By standards of an industrialized society, the Party had done little by 1944 to raise the technical level of its military personnel. However, most of the Red soldiers had acquired some familiarity with the simple mechanical instruments such as the rifle and machine gun. There were at least some partially trained engineers capable of directing the construction of simple fortifications and temporary bridges. There were enough trained communications personnel to operate a radio network above the regimental level. When the Party confiscated large quantities of abandoned Japanese equipment in Manchuria, it came into possession of sizeable quantities of weapons for the first time in its history. Lin Piao signalled a new level of technology in the Red armies when he organized an artillery division in late 1945. The improvement in technical skills was gradual. Liu Po-cheng revealed how gradual when in July, 1946, he ordered his troops to participate in training in the "four great skills". These skills were: "use of the terrain, night operations, earth fortifications, and coping with enemies who have artillery, tanks and aircraft".

When the Party launched the People's Republic of China in 1949, it published a Common Program which contained a commitment to improving the technical abilities of the army. The commitment was to "consolidate and strengthen the people's armed forces" by instituting "unity of command, system, formation and discipline"

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124 Po-cheng Liu, "Let Us Work Hard to Organize Our Army and Train Our Troops," The People's Army, No. 11 (June 2, 1945), (Chinese).
in a "modernized army" and newly created air force and navy. On the Twenty-fourth Anniversary of the PLA in 1951, Chu Teh told the servicemen what was required from them during the technological upgrading of the army.

Our troops now have a certain amount of modern equipment and have built up various arms. We shall continue to strengthen these arms. The PLA is transforming itself from the past purely ground force, depending in the main on infantry in fighting, into land, naval and air forces with various kinds of modern technical equipment and capable of waging warfare with the co-ordination of various arms to resist enemy invasion.... In order to carry out this transformation successfully, our troops must actively study technique and raise their technical level. Commanders at all levels must learn to master the new equipment and new arms and use them well. An enthusiastic campaign for technical study and for raising technical levels should be developed throughout the army.

Chou En-lai rationalized this expenditure of resources for technical equipment and training as a defense strategy.

We must build up a powerful people's air force and navy so that we may be able to beat back the armed robbers from the air and sea and protect our territorial air and waters from infringement. Our people's ground forces must be strengthened continuously so that they can defeat any aggressor.

In 1952 the CCP decided to continue military modernization. The Korean experience probably contributed to this decision. On the 25th Anniversary of the Red forces, this policy was announced:

In future, we shall devote more time and energy to the military training of army units in order to ensure continual elevation of the tactical and technical levels of the army units.\textsuperscript{128}

Speaking at the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in September, 1956, Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai summarized the technical progress of the PLA since 1949:

The People's Liberation Army which used to be entirely a ground force has now become an armed force with various military branches including air, naval and anti-aircraft and public security forces, as well as artillery and armored units, engineering, railway, communications and anti-chemical warfare units. The ground forces, which still make up the biggest and basic part of the People's Liberation Army have been changed fundamentally in equipment. The artillery and tank units have been greatly strengthened, and technical equipment for other military branches and units have also been improved greatly.\textsuperscript{129}

He reaffirmed the importance of training technically skilled individuals:

even if an army is organized and equipped along modern lines, it could not make full use of its good equipment unless it has well trained technical personnel and operational cadres. For this reason, the regular training of officers and men has been the center of the work of the PLA in ordinary times.\textsuperscript{130}

Peng did not dispute the admission by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying that:

measured with the standards of modern warfare, it must be admitted that in the grasping of modern military technique, and the employment of modern combat skills, our army is still in a relatively backward position.\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{131}"Speech by Yeh Chien-ying" (delivered on July 21, 1955, to the National People's Congress) \textit{CB}, No. 347 (Aug. 23, 1955), p. 32.
Scattered information confirms the acquisition of technologically complex weapons by the PLA in the 1949-1959 period. By 1954 the CCP claimed to have in its battle-ready forces: "eight armored divisions, four tank regiments, twelve artillery divisions, fourteen independent artillery regiments."\textsuperscript{132} By the end of 1956 a Western observer credited the PLA with 20,000 trucks. It is generally agreed that many PLA divisions are equipped with "57 mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, 70 mm. howitzers, anti-aircraft guns and automatic weapons."\textsuperscript{133} The 1958 Peking National Day parade featured armored cars, tanks, artillery and jet planes.\textsuperscript{134} The Navy is known to operate "at least one light cruiser, four destroyers, 13 submarines, 15 frigates, six gunboats, 52 torpedo boats" and numerous vessels suitable for coastal patrol and amphibious attack.\textsuperscript{135} The navy directs numerous shipyards, arsenals and a torpedo works.\textsuperscript{136} The number and caliber of Air Force planes has steadily risen since the Korean War. Nineteen hundred fifty-nine estimates range from 2,500 to 4,000 aircraft in service. It is generally agreed that the percentage of jets has risen from one-fourth in 1953 to one-half in 1955 to almost three-fourths by the end of 1957. Included in this figure are at least 100 IL-28 jet bombers.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132}Chin and Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 17-20.


\textsuperscript{135}Barnett, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{136}Hanrahan, \textit{op. cit.}.

Acquisition of this equipment produced the needs for technical training for officers and men to operate and maintain the new instruments of warfare. Specialized military academies were established, e.g., armored warfare, tele-communications and military engineering. The rank-and-file were exposed to crash training programs, for example, one in gunnery in 1956. During the 1957-59 period the PLA made a concerted effort to train the rank-and-file to repair "warships, airplanes, tanks, artillery, trucks, tools and other technical equipment." Maintenance training was expected to strengthen the CPR in both war and peace.

In time of war, this enables weapons and equipment to be repaired the moment they go out of order, thereby reducing the unfavorable effect on the fighting capacity of the army because of damage done to the weapons and equipment. In time of peace, this can increase the effectiveness and readiness of weapons and equipment and save the cost involved in maintenance and repair.

Many of the technical skills imparted to the PLA men were requisites for national modernization, e.g., driving a truck and operation of communications equipment. Others were required to maintain the facilities of a great power, e.g., operation of radar and sonar equipment.

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51; Barnett, op. cit., p. 113; Communist China Research Series, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, Nov., 1956, p. 132.


139 Ho, op. cit., p. 17.

140 Ibid.


Factors external to the equipment level and technical training programs of the PLA in the post-1949 decade affected the inculcation of technical skills. The first of these was a change in personnel policy. The PLA has demobilized the 30-50% of its 1950 membership drawn from Nationalist deserters and the bulk of its revolutionary veterans. The skills of the new recruits, although pre-dominantly peasants, reflect the educational programs the CCP has launched in civilian society. The rank-and-file conscripted under the 1955 Military Service Law can be carefully selected.\textsuperscript{143} The PLA takes only about 700,000 of the 6 million 18 year old males that register annually (12%). As revolutionary veterans of peasant background retire, they are replaced in command positions by ex-students who joined the CCP revolutionaries or by fresh graduates of the military academies. Both of these groups are more likely to have the training necessary for "mastery...of military science."\textsuperscript{144} The PLA also faces greater problems in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel. The CCP has numerous other economic, administrative and social organizations to staff all demanding skilled personnel. Conscription and automatic demobilization confront the PLA with retraining one-fourth of its enlisted men every year.

Other external factors have adversely affected the inculcation of technical skills. PLA modernization had as its corollaries acceptance of the USSR as a more advanced nation and as a model.\textsuperscript{145} "The Soviet Army of today will be the model of the PLA

\textsuperscript{143}{Law of Military Service of the People's Republic of China, op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{144}{Hsiao, op. cit., p. 37.}
\textsuperscript{145}{Ibid., p. 41.}
of tomorrow." PLA and Chinese People's Volunteers personnel were ordered to "conscientiously study the advanced military science and techniques of the Soviet Union" and to model "themselves on the great ever-triumphant Soviet Army." Mao's "military" doctrine and commitment to a politicized-generalist army were implicitly downgraded. The Party found other reasons to oppose PLA modernization. The first was the drain on scarce economic resources and the diminution of productive activities of the PLA. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying admitted the growth of such antagonism when he attacked "some people" who:

consider that it is now only necessary to concentrate all forces for Socialist economic construction, and there is no need for attaching such great importance to national defense construction [i.e., military modernization]. They do not realize that ... we must maintain a sufficient national defense force or we shall be placed in a weak position.  

Another reason for the growth of CCP opposition to PLA modernization was its implication for political control. Emphasis on technical skills as the criteria of the good soldier automatically lowered the value of political enthusiasm.

By 1955 the Party began to take steps to reinstate the supremacy of political loyalty and concern. A rectification campaign was launched, and the 1956 revisions of the CCP constitution strengthened its control over the military. The modifications

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146 Ibid.
148 Chu, "Twenty-Five Years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," op. cit., p. 15.
149 Yeh, op. cit., p. 30.
on the pursuit of technical modernization were reflected in Peng's 1956 speech quoted previously. He defined the PLA destiny to be that of a "modern, revolutionary army". In other words, technical skills were to be raised, but with a different set of corollaries. The primacy of Mao's doctrine and Chinese revolutionary example was to be preserved, the non-coercive role of the military which subtracted from technical training was to be retained and political indoctrination was re-instated as the basic element in the training of servicemen. 150

2. Health

The CCP public health program maintained the formal medical service and taught troops elementary hygiene habits.

The medical service of the early years of the Red Army was minute, untrained and ill-equipped. In 1928 Mao begged the Central Committee "to send us some iodine and a few doctors with Western training". 151 In his Collected Works Mao admits a shortage of doctors, but he does not admit that only one member of the "Medical Corps" had "studied surgery and knew the use of foreign medicine". 152 By 1934 the Chinese Communists claimed to possess a "medical university", 153 but they still continued to rely on peasant auxiliaries for almost all medical care. 154

150 Peng, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
151 Mao, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 82.
152 Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, op. cit., p. 22.
The Eighth Route and New Fourth armies of the united front years had access to a better service. Both groups had hospitals and medical schools.\textsuperscript{155} The level of these ad hoc training institutions was low. For example, the professionally qualified core of the New Fourth medical service totalled eight doctors. They directed a base hospital of some 250 beds, a medical training-school and several divisional hospitals. All equipment was makeshift, e.g., bottles were improvised from hollow bamboo.\textsuperscript{156} Progress has been slow. The organizational chart for the CCP field army from 1949-1953 indicates a developed medical service, but the average soldier probably never reached the few available doctors.\textsuperscript{157} The military continues to try to train more doctors with modern medical skills and improvement in its medical facilities can probably be expected as the graduates of the Academy of Military Medical Science enter the services.\textsuperscript{158}

While the Party still does not command a competent medical service in the military, its program begun in 1930 to inculcate basic hygiene habits in the rank-and-file has been more successful. Examples of sanitation training may seem crude or even amusing, but in the Chinese setting they represented "progress". For example, the Red servicemen memorized this rule: "Find a toilet, use a night jar in the fields, dig pits at least 500 meters from the town, village or camp of the Army." Since 1949 the "defenders of the motherland" have been singing "Love thy
teachers as thy parents.

\textsuperscript{155}Belden, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 41; "Chinese Communist Movement," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2465.
\textsuperscript{156}Epstein, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{157}Rigg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 123, 294.
\textsuperscript{158}"PLA Officers and Men Celebrate National Day," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.
Feet."

Very useful is a pair of feet;
Without us you can't do a damn thing.
I am glad to learn we're marching again.
For here comes a chance of rendering service.

In case you get blisters,
Gently pierce and dry them, applying kerosene.
For heaven's sake, don't peel blisters;
Bathe them when you camp down
And don't forget to give them credit at summing up time.

Sanitation committees, subordinate to a political director, repeat these simple instructions over and over. They use all the devices of Communist indoctrination to communicate their information: lectures, wall newspaper articles, and visually clear models. They "are charged with the organization and inspection of personal and public sanitation and hygiene." YCL members are expected to be particularly active in sanitation training. They

\[\text{\textit{give} soldiers and recruits instruction in first aid...\textit{teach} not only remedies for common illnesses but how to avoid them...\textit{enforce} health measures when the Red Army builds latrines.}\]

3. Literacy

1936, 1939, 1952, and 1957 reports indicate that political cadres have always handled "mass education" programs and have

\[\text{\textsuperscript{159} Rigg, op. cit., p. 115.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{160} S. M. Chiu, Control System in the Chinese Communist Army, Paper prepared for delivery at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, Washington, D. C., March, 1959 (MS).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{161} Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, op. cit., p. 263.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{162} Belden, op. cit., p. 43.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{163} Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 309.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{164} The Chinese People's Liberation Army, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, p. 34.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{165} Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 54.}\]
used educational materials to communicate political propaganda. The program was begun in the early 1930's by organizing cultural committees and clubs at the company level. This instruction was carried on even while the Red soldiers were otherwise occupied. On the march they would be faced with "instruction posters ...set up on the high roads". At work they would be faced with several characters posted on a convenient object. In hospital, a sheet with several ideographs would be at the foot of the bed. On the march an activist would carry a sharp stick "to scratch characters into the ground or into a box of sand ...sometimes ...carried for this purpose".

Combat pressure determined the degree to which a given unit received literacy training. When the pressure was not extreme, a daily quota of five to ten characters was required. Daily study periods were divided into grades by the number of characters at the soldier's command. As quickly as possible, the servicemen read propaganda materials written in an elementary vocabulary; contributed to the units wall newspapers to develop writing skills; and finally to various political and military texts prepared by organs of the CCP. Progress fluctuated according to available training time and casualty and replacement rates.

167 Chie, op. cit., p. 1659.
168 Rigg, op. cit., p. 146.
169 Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, op. cit., p. 252.
170 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 54.
172 Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 309; Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 32.
Several Communist claims are available. Snow was told in 1936 that only 20% of the Red soldiers near Yenan were totally illiterate.¹⁷³ This per cent does not indicate how literate the other 80% were. The low literacy of most of these troops can be inferred from the pride that a brigade commander displayed when he told a Western observer in 1944 that 80% of his North China peasant force could read an ordinary newspaper.¹⁷⁴ Since the Chinese Communists estimated that 73% of the North China recruits were totally illiterate when they entered the army,¹⁷⁵ this can be considered an impressive achievement.

By 1949 the swollen PLA forces had a higher proportion of illiterate troops, the Party had less time to teach them literacy, and its determination to build and maintain a large and modern army made literacy more imperative than ever. In late 1948 and early 1949¹⁷⁶ the PLA was accordingly turned into a "huge school."¹⁷⁷ The army aimed to wipe out illiteracy in three years. Moreover, 13 short-term schools were set up with the aim of encouraging junior cadres, model workers and combat heroes to study cultural subjects systematically.¹⁷⁸

In December, 1949, when the Party conducted a survey of troops stationed in Manchuria, it found that "a considerable number of troops and commanding personnel ... have not or have only just

¹⁷³Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 309.
¹⁷⁴Forman, op. cit., p. 44.
¹⁷⁶Life in the Liberation Army, Hong Kong: Hsin-min Book Co., 1949, Chapter II (Chinese).
¹⁷⁷Chu Teh is quoted in China's Youth Marches Forward, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, p. 43.
reached an elementary standard of education." The Party raised the number of literacy training hours in the army from five in July, 1949, to 12 in November, 1949, to 31 in early 1950. The fact that these CCP literacy campaigns were successful to some extent is revealed by a 1950 sample of Chinese Korean POW's and a UNESCO estimate in the same year of illiteracy in the population. The POW sample revealed a 12% illiteracy rate; UNESCO estimated that 50-55% of the 1950 Mainland population was illiterate, although the per cent of illiterate males was lower than the per cent of illiterate females.

The Korean War interrupted the three-year literacy campaign. On December 16, 1950, the Conference of Propaganda, Education and Cultural Workers of the PLA resolved that "under existing circumstances the Army cannot advance cultural education on a large scale, but must take cognizance of the prevailing political situation." Although most army units did not resume literacy training until June, 1952, the Southwest Military Region PLA, most removed from the battlefront, never discontinued its literacy program. The Communists claimed that soldiers in this PLA unit who "six months ago were illiterate or semi-illiterate are now able to read the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," i.e.,

179"Army on the Cultural Front," op. cit.
commanded a sophisticated reading ability.\textsuperscript{182} This claim is debatable. In September, 1958, the Communists claimed that "literacy" consisted of knowing 1,500 characters.\textsuperscript{183} Since in August, 1950, the Communists reported that the average soldier learned 370 characters in five months, it is doubtful that the Southwest Military Region soldiers learned enough characters, i.e., at least 1,500, in six months to read Mao Tse-tung.

The Communists did not launch another major literacy campaign until the middle of 1958, this time under the slogan, "Basically wipe out illiteracy within one year."\textsuperscript{184} The launching of this campaign has interesting implications for the political-technical controversy between the Party and military. The CCP implied that it had not launched earlier literacy campaigns because of "conservative thinking" in the military which maintained that "cultural studies [literacy programs with heavy political propaganda content] would hinder military training."\textsuperscript{185} This conflict might have been resolved when the military "conservatives" discovered that programs designed to train troops in anti-chemical and anti-atomic warfare failed miserably when the troops were illiterate and succeeded when they were literate.\textsuperscript{186} At any rate, the new literacy campaign recognized the value of literacy to "military perfection".

\textsuperscript{182}"Army Banishes Illiteracy," \textit{People's China}, No. 5 (Feb. 1, 1953), p. 35.
\textsuperscript{184}"Vigorous Development of Illiteracy Elimination Work in Armed Forces," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{185}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{186}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.
Apparently the military "conservatives" also felt that the
time limit for the campaign was unrealistic. They maintained
that "with so little time and so few teachers, the task of illi-
teracy elimination cannot be fulfilled within one year."

The CCP countered this criticism with three devices. The first was
a simplified system of phonetic symbolization, based on 37 sym-
boles known as "walking sticks" to literacy. They served as a
bridge between the written and spoken language. Second, the CCP
used the method of "making everyone a teacher". This method of
having the barely-begun teach the not-yet-started is usually
called the "mass line". The third device was the "shock assault"
approach to groups of words of military or ideological significance.

With some degree of certainty we can make two statements
about the CCP's "literacy assaults" within the PLA. One is that
the CCP will continue its literacy programs within the PLA until
the military is sufficiently literate to maximize its coercive
and non-coercive effectiveness. The second is that the CCP will
have to continue its literacy programs for several years before
this goal is reached. As recently as 1958 significant numbers
of PLA officers still could not read or write. For the next
decade the majority of conscripts will probably be illiterate
when they enter the PLA. The mainland press continues to write
in terms of "basic" literacy, as contrasted with real command of
verbal skills. In 1959 the Party only repeated its aim "to give

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188 Hua Yao, "The F.L.A.'s New Weapon," People's China, No. 7
189 "Vigorous Development of Illiteracy Elimination Work in Armed

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every soldier a full primary education" and talked of a ten year program to provide all officers with a secondary school education.190

C. Morale and Ideology

The CCP attempted to change the individual serviceman, the internal characteristics of their Army, and its place in society in a fundamental manner. They hoped to create an army that would win battles and popular support. They sought to change the attitudes of both the serviceman and the civilian to achieve both goals.

To the Chinese peasant armies and soldiers were a threat, the confiscators of his few belongings and the abductors of his sons. A recruit deserted his family unit and thus lost his place in society. His family lost its primary source of future support and continuity. In twentieth century China the soldier has usually been an outcast and a wanderer, a rootless individual whose only permanent allegiance has been to his own self-preservation. Economic failure, hunger, familial rebellion, or greed have been his usual motives for enlistment.

The Chinese Communists were aware that civilian attitudes and military motives hampered use of the Red Army to secure popular support and weakened its fortitude in the face of continued hardship and defeat. They set out to establish a new set of images for the Red Army and for service within it. The Communists portrayed the Red soldier as the vital agent in "saving the nation and [in] the realization of a new China."191

190"Storming the Fortress of Culture," op. cit.
191Chu, On the Battlefield in the Liberated Regions, op. cit.
The Party used many devices to fashion their servicemen into suitable servants. Material rewards have played a relatively small part. Far more important have been psychological and social rewards and punishments. Higher social status, good treatment by officers and political indoctrination have been extensively employed. These programs had implications for Communist military and Communist political success. The soldier fought harder and the civilian was more willing to enter into military service. The popularity of a Communist army increased the popularity of the Party itself. Attention to military dependents and veterans enlisted their efforts in non-combat Party activities. The transformation of Red soldiers into "revolutionary men" cut their ties to non-Communist social units, increased their usefulness to the Party, and created internalized political allegiance.

The first step in the process was to increase the appeal of military service and the self-esteem of the individual soldier through grants of special privilege and efforts to raise the social status of the armed forces.

1. For the "Dregs": Privilege and Status
   a. Material Privilege

   CCP dependence on the military for Party survival and expansion forced the Party to grant numerous privileges to servicemen and their families. Military benefits were directly correlated with the Party's recruit requirements or its need to rejuvenate military morale. The military particularly received preferential treatment during three historical periods: the Kiangsi period (1931-1934), the early years of the Anti-Japanese
War, and the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into Korea. The types of privileges extended were similar at these different times of crisis.

During the first years of the Communist struggle the Party could offer its soldiers few material advantages. Although attempts were made as early as 1928 to make life "at least a little better than that of the average worker or peasant,"\[192\] even the provision of blankets and uniforms was often impossible.\[193\] The CCP therefore offered other rewards, although some of these were to be received "come the Revolution." The most comprehensive statements of Red Army privileges appeared in the 1931 "Resolution of the All-China Congress of Soviets Concerning the Red Army" and in the "Decree No. 9 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic," promulgated on Feb. 1, 1932.\[194\] The provisions of these documents were: 1) free postage and travel to servicemen and their families and reduced theater admissions; 2) land and tax exemptions; 3) public labor to cultivate the serviceman's land; 4) rehabilitation and pensions for wounded and disabled; 5) pensions for families of casualties and free education for the dead soldier's children. Article 8 of the Resolution indicates the special status of the military during this period:

> Every Red Army man and his family shall during the term he shall be in the Service of the Red Army have the right to purchase food products and manufactured goods in state shops at a reduction of

\[192\] Mao, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 82.
\[194\] Kun, op. cit., pp. 39-51.
5 per cent in prices; products of which there shall be a scarcity shall be supplied to them in preference to other purchasers.\textsuperscript{195}

These pledges were widely publicized throughout the Central Soviet Region.\textsuperscript{196} By 1934 Red Army families were given a 20% discount in CCP-operated stores.\textsuperscript{197}

Similar inducements were offered to develop the 8th Route Army in the late 1930's. A 1938 "Proclamation" enumerated many of the items previously listed, and while it reduced the discount, it continued the purchasing priorities of those individuals connected with the Red forces.\textsuperscript{198} Local administrative officers were urged to "carry out the preferential treatment clauses."\textsuperscript{199} In some cases, soldiers' families were "exempted from all grain contributions and were privileged to buy supplies from the co-operatives at cost."\textsuperscript{200} In November, 1941, the Second Regional Assembly of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshsia Border Region approved aid to the families of servicemen and the extension of the "proxy farming" system.\textsuperscript{201} The populace was organized to supply the

\textsuperscript{195}Tbid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{196}One of the wall-posters used is translated in George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 240-241.
\textsuperscript{198}Teh Chu, "History of the First Six Months of the Eighth Route Army," China Today, Vol. 4, no. 7 (April, 1938), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{199}Feng, "Our Mission in the Second Stage of the War of Resistance," op. cit., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{200}Snow, Battle for Asia, op. cit., p. 322.
soldiers with various "comforts," i.e., gloves, socks, watermelon seeds.  

The Korean War marked the last occasion when the Communist military was allotted significant special privileges. The "June First Call" of 1951 requested a national effort to aid the serviceman and his dependents.

In the countryside we must cultivate the fields for them, while in the city urban areas we must help their children to go to school and help the families to overcome their difficulties. ...we hope all social organizations will cooperate with different levels of the government to mobilize the community resources. ...  

Village cadres received this charge in the Propaganda Handbook for July 21, 1951.

Regarding care for soldiers' families, I pledge to go regularly to their homes and comfort them, also to supervise the group in charge of working for them. I shall myself check the cultivation of their fields which is to be done for them by others. ...  

During the spring and summer of 1951 particular weeks and months were devoted to "Supporting the Army and Giving Preferential Treatment to Army Men's Kinfolk". Those connected with the PLA and the CPV were promised special consideration in land reform, medical care, and education. Special appropriations were made to buy food for the families of Army men. In Tsian the 5 percent discount was reinstated on flour, rice, edible oils and salt.  

The practice of giving the military the privileges discussed

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205 Gourlay, op. cit., p. 76; and Chen, op. cit., pp. 30-33.
above was formalized into a People's Republic policy in 1949.

Article 25 of the Common Programme promises:

Dependents of those who have given their lives for the Revolution, as well as dependents of members of the revolutionary forces who are in need shall receive preferential treatment from the State and society. The people's government shall make appropriate arrangements to provide disabled and ex-servicemen who have participated in the revolutionary wars with the means of livelihood and with occupations. 206

Similar guarantees are contained in the 1955 statute of military service. 207 Benefits have been revised to accord with domestic changes, as in 1956, for example, when the Communists claimed that since private land had been eliminated, servicemen's families were to be given extra shares in cooperatives. 208 However, to whatever extent military benefits were altered, expanded, or contracted, the Politburo retained the policy of military privileges on the assumption that "preferential treatment and rendering support to the military by mobilizing the masses has been an important factor in making our armed forces an ever victorious army." 209

The popularity of these programs with the armed forces obviously depended on their actual beneficence. In reality the military man and his family were seldom allowed their well-earned

206Common Programme, op. cit., p. 42.
rest. They were pressured by the Party to participate in "socialist construction" in order to ease the burden on non-military sections of the population and to increase food and industrial production. The Party first reneged on its pledges before the Long March, and as the number of soldiers and their dependents has increased, so has the Party pressure on the active or discharged soldier and his family not to avail themselves of their promised rewards. For example, by 1942 less than half of the dependent families in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshsia Border Region availed themselves of their proxy-farming privileges.\textsuperscript{210}

During the massive demobilization of the 1950's retired officers were forced into labor, and if they proved reluctant, were warned that "responsible organs may suspend or reduce pensions. . . ."\textsuperscript{211} Military dependents were exposed to heavy propaganda that suggested they not claim special privileges.\textsuperscript{212} According to the National press, even the following list of pathetic military dependents were not exempt from employment.

Of the 300 workers of the Social Welfare Mats and Screens Factory of Hsuchow, 21 are blind, 6 are cretins, 7 are mentally deranged, 20 are homeless children, 39 are disabled youths, 80 are disabled old men, 2 mutes, and the rest are aged or feeble women.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{210} Yung, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.


In 1958 the Communists claimed that of over 35 million service dependents and disabled, only 1 million were unable to work.214 This token return on promised "compensations" can hardly have raised military morale.

To the extent that the Party tried to honor its promises it aroused non-dependent civilian and cadre resentment. The Chinese peasants who had to implement military privileges, especially proxy farming, resented increased burdens. No amount of propaganda, political or social pressure could convince most civilians that their welfare came after that of the soldier and his family. The cadre found that execution of the military privilege policies complicated his task of securing popular support and interfered with fulfillment of his other assignments. Civilian and cadre resentment is revealed by the numerous Party injunctions to improve "pension and compensation care".215 At the beginning of these programs heavy propaganda was required to secure compliance.216 And near the end of the war with Japan the cadres were told to correct "defects", including the treatment of discharged disabled soldiers and soldiers' families.

We must understand that because the war is a protracted war, the work of looking after the soldiers' families is therefore also a long term matter and we must not be satisfied with provisional relief which is only passive in character, but must actively help the soldiers' families to run their household affairs. (aid in planting, priorities on labor and material, discounts, political consiousness, marriages and divorces.)217

214 Ibid., p. 1.
215 Chu, On the Battlefield in the Liberated Regions, op. cit.
216 Kun, op. cit., p. 48.
The motivational device of material privileges created a difficult situation for the Party: sizeable military privilege aroused civilian antagonism; minimal military privileges aroused military discontent. The Party turned to a motivational device which did not obviously subtract from civilian time and money.

b. Raising Military Status

Raising status without economic differentiation recommended itself to the CCP for four reasons: 1) it raised the morale of the servicemen; 2) it reduced civilian resistance to service in the army; 3) it improved the civilian image of the army and therefore civilian co-operation with the army; 4) to the extent Party and army could be associated in the public mind, it increased Party popularity.

The Party's basic objective in its effort to raise military status has been to identify the Red forces in their own eyes and in those of the civilian population with the revolution and with the nation, i.e., with popular and national well-being. The 1931 All-China Soviet Congress pontificated:

...the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the armed force of the agrarian revolution and of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism....The toiling masses of workers and peasants, both in China and throughout the whole world, take boundless pride in and feel unending sympathy with the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.218

Almost twenty years later the major official work on the People's Liberation Army claimed:

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218 Kun, op. cit., p. 34.
The glorious history of the PLA is the history of the prolonged armed struggle of the Chinese people under the leadership of the CCP to liberate China from the yoke of foreign imperialists and domestic reactionaries. 219

In 1951 the Party publicized this slogan: "Warm love for the PLA means warm love for the fatherland." 220

The CCP has used both direct and indirect methods to change the military's image of itself and the civilian's image of the military. Directly, the Party has told the soldier of his high social standing in Communist society. It has also attempted to convince the civilian population of the military's social value with the expectation that the changed civilian attitude would feed-back to the military. Since the Party's basic aim has been to reinforce its direct messages to the serviceman, it has concentrated its civilian propaganda on the dependents of men in military service, i.e., civilians most likely to communicate with the men on duty.

One propaganda method was slogans, which the rank-and-file of the Eighth Route Army memorized and chanted:

The Red Army is a revolutionary army.
The Red Army is anti-Japanese.
The masses hate the White Army; they love the Red Army. 221

Another device was frequent organized visits by "model dependents" to assure the Communist forces that they were held in high regard by society. Numerous laudatory messages similar to the one quoted below, were sent by various Party-controlled groups:

219 *The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit.,* p. 3.
220 Quoted from *JMJF* (June 24, 1951), in *Chen, op. cit.*, p. 32.
Dear officers and combatants of the Chinese People's Liberation Army:
We representatives of the advanced groups and outstanding workers in the fields of industry, communications and transport, capital construction, finance and trade in China, express our heart-felt respects to you—defenders and builders of the cause of our fatherland's socialist construction....All of you deserve to be classed the most outstanding son and daughter of the Chinese nation. The glorious achievements of construction scored by our fatherland and our increasingly happy and peaceful life are completely inseparable from your heroic struggle. 222

The party also used the recruiting process as a device to demonstrate the value it placed on the soldier. Entering the armed forces was sometimes given public recognition unmatched by warlord or Kuomintang regimes:

the volunteer for the 8th Route Army was given a feast by his whole village, decorated with a banner, set upon a caparisoned mule or even in a flower-decked sedan chair, serenaded by gongs, cymbals and flutes and escorted from the village by all the peasant boys and girls....When he arrived in a new unit ...he was told its history, reforms and glorious accomplishments.... 223

Even more elaborate demonstrations were reported at the time of the Korean War. University students who entered the PLA were honored by mass meetings, flower-pinnings, and escorts to the place of induction. Slogans were posted such as: "Glory to the young defenders of our nation, let us congratulate and cheer you." 224 CCP propagandists even composed a song for these "joyous" occasions.

What is more glorious, Than when people pin the red flower On your chest.

What is more glorious,
Than when people in the warmest voice cheer:
Glory is yours, the military cadres,
Glory is yours, good children of China.
Glory is yours, the glorious warriors of Mao Tse-tung. \(^{225}\)

The Communists also tried to bring the family and village into the halo of the serviceman's entry into Communist service. Congratulatory meetings were held. Cadres made special visits to the family and proclaimed that "We cannot have a strong family without a strong nation." They also posted signs which declared that the serviceman's parents and relatives were a "Glorious Family". \(^{226}\)

These were the blandishments offered by the CCP, and they were offered in a context of social pressure. The blandishments were designed to make the individual feel good when he entered the army; the social pressures were designed to distress him if he hung back. Entrance into the army then caused "pleasure" through the release of "pain". Mass meetings were held in the factory and village to shame and pressure the laggards. \(^{227}\) The process was aimed at the individual, arousing guilt in those who failed to "volunteer" and fear in his relatives and neighbors that they would suffer socially and economically if refusal persisted. The appeals of the recruiting cadres included all of these pressures and were calculated to force the peasant into a commitment that was only voluntary in contrast to the press-gang methods of other Chinese military groups. Desertion of such joyous volunteers

\(^{225}\) *Ta Kung Pao* (Dec. 26, 1950), quoted in *ibid*.

\(^{226}\) *Ibid.*., p. 34.

was a responsibility of village and family. To the extent that the blandishments were perceived as token and the social pressures resented, the recruiting process failed to raise morale. However, the important point here is that the Party, as opposed to other Chinese elites, tried to present and make military service an honor rather than a disaster.

While the recruiting process just described was abandoned in 1955 for a conscription system, the CCP has continued to use several other methods of raising military status. These have involved praise of and attention to not just new recruits, but to the military as a whole. The objective has been to: "Let every revolutionary fighter feel that all the people of the country are wholeheartedly behind him and supporting him." To this end the Party has organized civilian fetes for the military, and large-scale public entertainments by PLA units. An excellent example of the latter was the June, 1959, PLA drama festival, a week-long spectacular held in the Peking sports stadium. According to the official New China News Agency, one of the most appreciated numbers on the program was a choir of 100 generals who sang three songs. As their tour-de-force, they rendered that old standard, "I Am a Common Soldier."

The annual August first Army Day celebrations have consisted of activities designed to raise military status (via

228 Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 342; Rigg, op. cit., p. 127.
229 Peking Radio (Feb. 2, 1951), quoted in Gourlay, op. cit., p. 76.
231 "Chinese Army Drama Festival Opens," NCNA-English Peking (June 1, 1959), SCMP, No. 2028 (June 5, 1959), p. 5.
military dependents and the civilian population). Officers and men are "educated ...in the revolutionary tradition through forums, conferences, exhibitions and joint celebrations....On the walls of the barracks are posted poems, songs, slogans and cartoons introducing the 'glorious history of our army'." 232 "Comforting Parties" of civilian and Party officials visit garrison areas, stage special entertainment, and echo ministerial assurances of popular support and devotion. 233 In return the military is expected to pledge renewed efforts to justify their revolutionary tradition and popular acclaim. Military dependents are involved with this annual celebration in various ways. For example, in connection with the 1959 Army Day, the Party issued a Ministry of Interior directive that suggested that "small conferences of the families of servicemen and martyrs, disabled, demobilized and retired servicemen and servicemen transferred to civilian jobs be held." 234 Near Peking, NCNA reported that "Families of martyrs and armymen were visited by representatives of street committees and people's communes in the outskirts of the city." 235 Often these meetings were augmented by special


entertainments by the local cultural organizations.\textsuperscript{236}

Around the time of Army Day the civilian population is also mobilized to honor the armed forces, is repeatedly reminded of PLA achievements, and enjoined to imitate the activism and dedication the CCP attributed to its military bodies. The 1959 Interior Ministry directive quoted earlier instructed cadres:

that in cities, frontier and coastal areas where there are troops stationed, the masses, students and cadres should be organized into joint celebrations with the troops, with the participation of commanding officers, fighting heroes and other model personnel who are to make reports to encourage emulation, as well as to strengthen the relationship between the army and the people. At the same time, wide publicity is to be given to the glorious tradition and the heroic deeds of the men of the PLA, and the broad masses are to be educated in the significance of national defense and the work of honoring servicemen and dependents of servicemen.\textsuperscript{237}

Direct civilian tribute to the Red forces was probably most emphasized in the revolutionary period. For example, in the "Support the Army" campaign of August, 1943, the Party claimed that many "commanders and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army were invited to feasts by the people."\textsuperscript{238} The "joint celebration" and "comforting parties" of more recent years carry on this precedent.\textsuperscript{239} In areas of open military conflict direct civilian praise and gifts to military units are still emphasized. Fukien province during the Formosa Straits crisis of August, 1958, held "celebrations, get-togethers, and "lectures" which involved

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{237} "Ministry of Interior Issues Notification to Honor Servicemen and Their Dependents on 'August 1' Army Day," op. cit.
\textsuperscript{238} Tsu-han Lin, op. cit., p. 120.
\textsuperscript{239} "People in Various Areas Hold Joint Celebrations and Comforting Parties in Observance of 'August 1' Army Day," op. cit., p. 2.
peasants and fishermen and army units.\textsuperscript{240}

Relatively few members of the population personally participate in these direct contact events. Many more are exposed to propaganda intended to maintain a favorable public image of the Red Forces. In major cities special events such as film festivals and technical displays are held.\textsuperscript{241} The mass media devote special attention to the PLA. For example, in 1951, "For days before and after Army Day, the press carried special articles and memoirs written by famous PLA commanders and heroes."\textsuperscript{242} In addition to propagating a positive image of the military, the messages of these various presentations described the PLA as a model to be imitated by other sectors of the population. The press reports pledges by workers and students to "learn the heroic spirit of the Liberation Army."\textsuperscript{243}

The CCP accords to its military servants a status rarely granted in modern China. As with most "rewards" of a Communist regime, these are more verbal than material, but they may still serve to give the soldier more self-respect and dedication to the Communist cause. However, status is a matter of relative rank and esteem, and its allocation raised several dangers for the CCP.

\textsuperscript{240}For example see the several articles translated in SCMP, No. 1828 (Aug. 8, 1958), pp. 11-14.


\textsuperscript{243}"People in Various Areas Hold Joint Celebrations and Comforting Parties in Observance of 'August 1' Army Day," op. cit., p. 3.
The first has been denigration of Party instruments not associated with the military. In the guerrilla years status could be accorded to the military instrument at little risk of lowering the status of other Party instruments. To the extent that these other instruments existed, they were intimately associated with the Red forces. The problem has become more acute as they develop into Party instruments independent of the army.

A more fundamental problem has been that grants of status create an arrogant and self-serving army, and an allegiance of civilians to the military greater than to the Party. The CCP has taken great pains to point out to servicemen and civilians that the justification for high military status is service to Communism.

There is evidence that the Peking regime, partly because of efforts to avoid the repercussion described above, has accorded the military insufficient status. The CCP had to resort to intensive propaganda and pressure to secure conscripts under the 1955 draft system. It had to convince the population that "the future careers of youth are not jeopardized." Difficulties in finding willing recruits and the negative public attitude toward military service forced the conscription of Party and Y.C.L. members. The granting of low status to the PLA by the public is a reflection of three factors: 1) residues of the traditional attitude toward the military; 2) hostility to the regime and its corollary of hostility toward the military army of the regime;

and 3) the availability since 1949 of several avenues of mobility and modern training, i. e., the expansion of industry, government and mass organizations and increasing provision of mass education.

2. A "Democratic" Army

The CCP has attempted to treat the serviceman in a manner calculated to win his loyalty to the Party and to create within him a spirit of self-sacrifice. When the Chinese Communists talk of "democracy" within the armed forces, they primarily refer to officer-men relations, i. e., the allocation of privileges, authority and praise and blame.

a. Rationale and Limitation

The Party was anxious to depart from the norms of Chinese military behavior and concerned itself with the "cementing of good relations between officers and men." The good CCP officer was to lead by "explanation, persuasion, influence and example." 246

In the past in the armies of the warlords there was no harmony between officers and men. Officers ill-treated their men, scolded and beat them on the slightest provocation and enforced obedience without reason. Today it is not sufficient to do away with these evils; it is necessary to create a positive esprit de corps, to foster an atmosphere of friendship and respect, and to strengthen the spirit of sharing sorrows and happiness, of standing or falling together. 247

The Party has openly admitted that a primary reason for insisting upon military equality and better treatment for the individual soldier has been compensatory. There had to be some substitute for material benefits and victory. In 1928 Mao wrote

247 Peng Teh-huai is quoted in Forman, op. cit., p. 126.
of the attempt to make the Red soldiers "feel that, though in material life they are worse off in the Red Army than in the White army, spiritually they are liberated."\textsuperscript{248} He claimed that

Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army can sustain itself without collapse in spite of such a poor standard of material life and such incessant engagements, is its practice of democracy.\textsuperscript{249}

Hsiang Ying of the New Fourth Army expressed the Communist hope that "Our force is superior to the enemy's because our comrade-ship is deeper and the aims which unite us are greater."\textsuperscript{250}

The Communists expected several other advantages to accrue from military "democracy". They stressed the fighters "equality of personality"\textsuperscript{251} to minimize the frictions between ranks in the small guerrilla units and to motivate the soldiers to aid the party in non-combat tasks. The Party also espoused "democracy" in treatment of servicemen to make military discipline palatable. The CCP recognized that "Most of the men were peasants, to whom the whole conception of large-scale organization was foreign,"\textsuperscript{252} and tried to provide discipline with a coating which would not make it seem "mechanical and arbitrary".

Finally, the CCP realized the advantages of military "democracy" in checking the power of the officer corps, and limiting the threat of independent militarism. Although the Party used egalitarian measures to raise military morale and

\textsuperscript{248} Ma, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{250} Snow, Battle for Asia, op. cit., p. 137.
\textsuperscript{251} Chu, On the Battlefield in the Liberated Regions, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{252} Yeh Ting is quoted in Epstein, op. cit., p. 264.
strengthen the commissar's hand, it dared not undermine the officer's authority completely. The soldier was not allowed to question the structure of authority. As the CCP information chief in Yenan phrased the policy, "The officer says 'Die Here', and the soldier dies here." In 1928 Mao emphasized that Communist military "democracy" was not to be equated with "extreme democratization" and "absolute equalitarianism". He attacked those who demanded complete equality of labor, rights, and rewards; he even made material equality a temporary measure.

The distribution of material things among the personnel of the Red Army must on the whole be equal ... because this is required by the present circumstances of the struggle. But absolute equalitarianism must be opposed because ... it hinders the struggle.

During the guerrilla period even the factors of revolutionary dedication, Communist asceticism, and small group relationships did not suffice to maintain "democracy" within the Red army. Since the CCP has taken power on the mainland, these influences have diminished. The Communist officers welcome material comfort, the flames of dedication burn lower, and links with the rank-and-file are attenuated. However, Mao has made the officer-men relationship of the earlier period a dogma, and the Party has resorted to strong measures to perpetuate its version of "democracy" within the Army.

b. "Democratic" Claims

The CCP has painted a glowing picture. Communist guerrilla

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forces have often been described as an army free of special privileges. Hsiang Ying claimed:

In our army there is a division of labor, but no division of classes or ranks. We are all equal in livelihood and have the same rights. Officers wear no distinguishing bars or ribbons. Neither officers nor men receive any wages but get only their food and a small living allowance.255

Western observers confirmed the almost total equality in pay, food and lodging among the Red soldiers and the social mixing of officers and men.256 Westerners also reported that there were no separate officers' clubs,257 and that junior officers were warned against accumulating a personal entourage.258

Brutality to the ordinary soldier was curtailed. In the guerrilla period the Party could neither afford to eliminate or alienate him. The soldier had to be treated not as the officer's property, but as a valuable asset to the Party. The 1929 Kutien Congress abolished corporal punishment in the Red Army.259 Officers were ordered not to beat or curse the men.260 Reportedly the disciplinary measures were:

- admonishment by the chief; confession of misbehavior before assembled comrades in arms; confinement in a

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255 Snow, Battle for Asia, op. cit., p. 137.
257 Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 333.
258 "The Region Chief Orders the Army to Strengthen Discipline," The People's Army, No. 18 (Sept. 15, 1946), (Chinese).
259 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 8.
260 Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 343; Strong, op. cit., p. 198; Rigg, op. cit., p. 122.
local prison; temporary expulsion from the army; and permanent expulsion.\textsuperscript{261}

The ordinary soldier was also supposed to be accorded positive privileges. The most formidable of these was the Soldier's Committee. Before the Long March the CCP claimed that each unit had such an elected Committee, and that these in turn elected the Soldier's Executive Committee which was "represented directly in the General Staff and in the Executive of the Political Department."\textsuperscript{262} The latter faded into oblivion at an early date, but the unit organizations have been maintained. The committees are the directors of all extra-military activity,\textsuperscript{263} and they supposedly protect the soldier's financial and supply interests.\textsuperscript{264}

Another device which was supposedly to have exemplified the "democratic" nature of the military establishment was the joint soldier-officer meetings of information and evaluation. "Soldiers had the right to call meetings to criticize officers and to complain to superior authorities. If judged guilty, the officer generally apologized or repented at a mass meeting."\textsuperscript{265} Chu Teh declared that at such meetings, "All rank disappeared and men had full rights of free speech."\textsuperscript{266} He told a biographer that such meetings also served to locate especially promising

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{261}Uhlmann, op. cit., p. 87; also see: Carlson, \textit{The Chinese Army}, op. cit., p. 37.
\item \textsuperscript{262}Smedley, \textit{China's Red Army Marches}, op. cit., p. 76.
\item \textsuperscript{263}Snow, \textit{Battle for Asia}, op. cit., p. 336.
\item \textsuperscript{264}The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{265}Belden, \textit{China Shakes the World}, op. cit., p. 332.
\item \textsuperscript{266}Smedley, \textit{The Great Road}, op. cit., p. 240.
\end{itemize}
enlisted men.

The final "democratic" measure which the CCP has claimed to use is recognition and promotion of the rank-and-file soldier. While the Party has used group criticism to control the soldier, it has also found positive group support a valuable control weapon. Supposedly the common soldier could not only receive commendation at the frequent unit meetings, but could also be awarded special titles. At the time of the Korean conflict the titles in vogue were "Combat Hero" and "Model Troop." In the late 1950's honorary titles included "Distinguished Service-man" and "Advanced Element." The psychological purpose remained the same. In the guerrilla period the device of promotion from the ranks received more publicity than that of honorary titles. Promotion from the ranks were held out to the soldier as a lure for political steadfastness and military daring. Most officers were produced in the training units of the front-line forces; relatively few attended the rear line schools.

If the Party actually carried out these "democratic" policies, the degree of military democracy was substantial. However, Party claims of military democracy were often exaggerated, if not completely false. The gap between claimed and realized military democracy has widened even further in recent years.

c. The Realities

The lack of "democracy" has become so great in the PLA

\[267\] Rigg, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
\[269\] Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 332.
that since 1955 widely publicized campaigns have taken place under the
direction of the General Political Department to "unify"
officers and men. However, even in the guerrilla years there
was little meaningful democracy in the Red forces. "Democracy"
for the soldier only meant the substitution of a new master, the
political director. The "democratic" devices which were supposedly
designed to give the soldier leverage against the commanders
actually gave the political directors leverage against the com-
manders. Party and Young Communist cadres, not the common
soldiers, organized and voiced the protests and complaints
against the commander.270

As Mao admitted, equality of material hardship was just
making the best of necessity. Come the "liberation," the
situation changed. By 1951 high-ranking officers often allotted
themselves special privileges,271 and by 1954 there were three
different levels of material reward in the Red forces. These
were: the "salary class" for officers of the battalion level and
above; the "unlimited supply class" for company officers and non-
combat specialists; and the "limited supply class" for the rest
of the forces.272 By the end of 1955, a highly differentiated
system of ranks and status had evolved in the Communist armed
forces.273

270 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., pp. 54-
271 For example, Shaw-tong Liu, Out of Red China, New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953,
pp. 204-205.
273 "Chinese Communist Military Honors," OR, No. 368 (Nov. 15,
1955), pp. 1-17.
If in the revolutionary years material equality was enforced by the environment, humane treatment of the Red soldier was more conditional. The officers had to be reminded to curb their punishments. Mao bluntly warned them in 1945:

The influence of militaristic habits of the troops of Chinese warlords still exists among our troops....In 1945 all bad phenomena in relations between officers and men such as beating, cursing, neglecting food supplies ...and even such evil habits ...as insulting and shooting deserters, etc., should be fundamentally rooted out.274

The seemingly mild disciplinary actions listed earlier were also illusory. In the words of a sympathetic journalist: "Obvious anti-party activities were presented to mass meetings, and culprits could be shot if the mass meeting so decided."275 These mass meetings were directed by the political cadre.

Since the inception of the Soldier's Committees, Party activists have been "leading them in all their activities."276 Sometimes non-Party soldiers have not even been allowed at Committee meetings.277 The committees have functioned as assistants to the commissar, not as the voice of the ordinary soldier. As for the free criticism meetings, the political cadre again has been in charge; and the ordinary serviceman forbidden to make "irresponsible" criticism.278 Naturally the criteria of

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275 Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 332.
276 Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, op. cit., p. 76.
277 Rigg, op. cit., p. 124.
278 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 15.
irresponsibility has been established by the political, and to a lesser extent, military, command personnel.

In 1955 reports began to appear in the mainland press that officers were acquiring ostentatious clubs, offices and dormitories and were paying less and less attention to the welfare of their men. An official attack on these tendencies was launched by T'an Cheng at the Eighth Party Congress. Speaking on Sept. 23, 1956, he admitted that PLA officers had been "Neglecting the tradition of unity of officers and men and unity of the higher and lower levels." Cadres had been practicing "retaliation upon critics." Officers had been maintaining that "political works should guarantee the prestige of officers." They made numerous demands for personal services and for coercive rather than educative disciplinary measures.

The officer corps continued to expand its privileges. By 1957 their privileges were becoming a political burden to the CCP. In the 1957 hundred flowers campaign, attacks on officer cupidity and that of their families appeared in the mainland media. Critics declared that "Some military officers indulge in extravagance and waste and their wives maintain a peculiar living" and: "Some military officers are arrogant and vulgar". The articles attacked the food allowances and consumption habits of military brass and their lack of "socialist responsibility."

282 Opinions of Non-Military Comrades of the Army," OFCP (May 23,
For example:

...in Hopei Province some agricultural producer co-operatives had taken the trouble to train a number of women tractor drivers. But after they had married officers of the army stationed in the area, they would no longer work as tractor drivers, separated themselves from production, and lived with the army. They began to wear leather shoes and silk clothes, and go about in motor-cars. 283

The Party had other matters to bring to the attention of the PLA officers. Their pursuit of privilege and self-esteem have been coupled with a growing sense of professional independence and technical expertise. Remedies were sought which would restore the "democratic" image and restore the officers' subservience to political directors.

d. The Remedies

A mild rectification campaign was launched in the summer of 1956 to serve these varied purposes284 and a more vigorous program in 1957. However, both of these campaigns were theoretical and probably involved little personal castigation, blunt criticism, or self-criticism. 285 A rectification conference was held from May 7-15, 1957, under the direction of the General Political Department. Political Department Director T'an Cheng pointed out the following weaknesses:

The sufferings and difficulties of work of the lower levels are treated half-heartedly; and things

1957), **URS**, Vol. 8, No. 5 (July 16, 1957), pp. 77-82.


were run not [sic] in a democratic way; and the thought of having privileges was rampant.286

Such mild measures proved ineffective. The Party may have interpreted the ineffectiveness of its measures as an indication of an intolerable degree of independence and self-indulgence in the officer corps. In any event, the regime turned to a more effective means of evoking political conformity and "democracy" from its armed forces cadres. This device was the "Officers to the Ranks Campaign," which made compulsory the physical labor suggestion of the 1957 rectification conference.287 Literally the campaign meant that officers and cadres were to serve as ordinary soldiers. Defense Minister Lin Piao later indicated some of the aims of the policy. One was to raise the morale and zeal of the rank-and-file. Officers in turn were supposed to:

- cultivate the Communist style of work of treating others with equality, do away with the imposing air of an officer and strengthen the mass viewpoint.
- They can also learn to evaluate the directives and decisions of the leading organs, and the working styles of the leadership from the angle of the soldier.288

The "lively-Marxist lesson"289 of demotion to a less privileged

286"Rectification To Be Carried Out in the Army From Top to Basic Levels By Separate Groups," CFCP (May 18, 1957), ibid., p. 73.
289Ho, op. cit., p. 18.
rank would also teach the officers what fate might await them if they did not toe the Party line.

On September 20, 1958, the General Political Department issued a directive "Concerning Cadres at Various Levels Going Down to Serve in the Ranks for One Month Each Year," and Mao issued a special message to expedite the implementation of the campaign. At least one pilot test had been launched previous to this date. By the first week in October the mainland press began to carry numerous reports of officers who were obeying the directive joyously. Reports on the program continued to appear into the summer of 1959. The directive required veteran cadres to spend a month in the ranks annually and young officers were required to spend six months or a whole year. For a cadre to be considered both "red" and "expert," i.e., politically reliable and militarily qualified, program participation was required. Chinese Communist reports claimed that 10,000 officers, including 70 generals, had gone to the ranks by October 20, 1958. In March, 1959, the Communists claimed that


293 "PLA General Political Department Instructs Officers to Spend One Month Annually in the Ranks," op. cit., p. 2; "Serve in the Ranks' System for All PLA Cadres," op. cit., p. 9.


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over 100,000 had participated, although a later Communist summary of the first six months of the program raised this estimate to 150,000 officers, or half of the officer corps, and 160 generals. It was recommended that rotation plans be drawn up to enable all military cadres to participate in the campaign.

The officers were expected to behave as abjectly as possible.

After going down to basic units, the cadres, as privates, should first of all drop their airs and obey the command of the squad and platoon leaders and company cadres. Secondly, they should set themselves as good examples, mingle harmoniously with the soldiers, and humbly learn from them.

They have to do with eagerness all chores in the companies, including the drawing of water, sweeping of floors and grounds, cleaning spittoons, cleaning the lavatories, and so forth....the cadres would have to thoroughly abandon their superior and bureaucratic airs if they are to perform their duties well.

They were graded by the ordinary soldiers in their units and required to submit reports on their learning experience.

The correct attitude for the PLA officer to take was one of repentance and rededication. In the words attributed to an officer in Dairen: "As I have not lived the life of a common soldier for 12 years now, this time will be a good chance to

299 Ch'en, op. cit., p. 5.
temper and reform my ideological consciousness and class viewpoint." Teng Hua, the commander of the Shenyang Military Region, was supposedly a model participant. He emoted:

Comrades, my joy at being together with you to guard the coast of the Fatherland is beyond my power of description! During the past several days you have given me much help, and I hope you will continue to give me more help and instructions from now on."

Many officers did not react with enthusiasm and were warned that their views invited prosecution for "bourgeois ideas" and "individualistic tendencies". These dissidents claimed that the program was unnecessary, ineffective, and not worth the time of military leadership personnel. They were told that "to adopt the attitude of common laborer [sic] is a noble Communist spirit which should be manifested by all cadres regardless of his [sic] seniority or position." The Second National People's Congress was informed that the program could "be kept up permanently." Officers were told not only to follow immediate orders to abandon their status, but that the CCP was determined "to persist in this practice."

Although military democracy was illusory, it did have many of the characteristics of totalitarian democracy. It offered the ordinary servicemen greater participation than did other

303 Ch'en, op. cit., p. 8.
Chinese military bodies of this century. It tried to preserve the personal sanctity of the serviceman from his military superiors. Real control of the serviceman was the prerogative of the Party, and the myths of "democracy" served this purpose admirably. The system was organized in such a fashion that obedient behavior on the officer's part enhanced the loyalty of his soldiers, while any deviation or independence on his part could be checkmated. The tensions between military technician and political controller implicit in this system have increased since 1955, but the CCP uses still another set of devices to keep officer and private from perceiving the real beneficiary of "democratic" military practices.

3. The Cultivation of Allegiance

The network of Party control in the Chinese Communist armed forces and its punitive authority have been analyzed in a previous chapter. This section presents the activities of the political workers designed not to restrain dissent, but to cultivate allegiance. The machinery for this purpose is fully controlled by the Political Department and defines allegiance in terms of obedience to whatever "line" is current.

The reasons for CCP attention to the "human factor" in military accomplishment can be found in statements by political officers of the 8th Route Army. The first is in the context of guerrilla, or "liberation", warfare: "Political work is the life-line of the army ... Our weapons are antiquated and inferior, but we can compensate for this handicap by emphasizing political
indoctrination."³⁰⁴ The second is linked to past CCP dependence on prisoners and defectors for manpower. As Mao stated, the background of these individuals required a system of indoctrination comparable to "a furnace in which all captured soldiers are melted down and transformed."³⁰⁵ The third is a derivation from a broader principle:

To us, war is an emotional struggle carried on through political consciousness. Morale is composed of hatred, love, revenge and confidence in victory. It is decisive in combat and decisive in war.³⁰⁶

The practical implication of this reasoning has been drawn by Chu Teh, "The first thing in training an army is to train the mind of the soldier." This, he explained, meant "molding their attitude to life."³⁰⁷ The goal of the leadership was for "everyone, officer and rank-and-file"³⁰⁸ to become "politically minded."³⁰⁹ Through a "gradual process of education," ³¹⁰ the CCP has hoped to instill internalized "conscious discipline."³¹¹ The Communist servicemen have been organized as audience to and participants in practices designed to create "correct" attitudes and values.³¹²

³⁰⁴ Carlson, Twin Stars Over China, op. cit., p. 79.
³⁰⁶ Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 344.
³⁰⁷ Chu, The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Kun, op. cit., p. 35.
³⁰⁸ China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 43.
³⁰⁹ The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 19.
³¹⁰ Peng Teh-huai is quoted in Forman, op. cit., p. 126.
³¹¹ Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 278.
³¹² For examples, see: Calling Upon the Hero Fighters, Peking: People's Press, 1951 (Chinese); Pin Fan, Forward, Forward! Canton: n.p., n.d. (Chinese); Yen-fu Tung, The First Company
a. Committment Through Repetition

The schedule of the Communist serviceman has provided large amounts of time for political indoctrination. In the early 1930's troops not engaged in combat spent seven and one-half hours daily in political and cultural classes.\textsuperscript{313} The material in the latter was designed to support the Party's rectification of the soldier's attitudes. Shortly after the Long March six hours daily were devoted to political repetition.\textsuperscript{314} By the time of the Korean conflict the time allocation had decreased slightly.\textsuperscript{315} Even under combat conditions time was found. Frontline 8th Route Army found seven hours each week for "political and social subjects."\textsuperscript{316}

Through control of the Soldier's Committees and company clubs the political workers reached their audience continuously. The clubs were simply places in which the servicemen could be gathered to receive propaganda and where their receptivity could be observed. Various known as Lenin Corners, National Salvation Rooms, and Anti-Japanese Clubs, their purpose and program was similar.\textsuperscript{317} The conveyors of propaganda developed by the CCP--education, drama, speeches, chants, wall-newspapers--were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Marching Toward Victory}, Peking: Hsin-Hua Book Co., 1950 (Chinese); \textit{The Heroes and Models of the Eighth Route Army}, n.p.: Department of Propaganda, Political Headquarters, 8th Route Army, 1944 (Chinese).
  \item Snow, \textit{Red Star Over China}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 307-308.
  \item Rigg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 117-118.
\end{itemize}
presented through the clubs,\textsuperscript{318} groups which were encouraged to form "voluntarily." A Red Army political officer summed up their operations:

The principles of the Lenin Club are quite simple. All the life and activity in them must be connected with the daily work and development of the men. It must be done by the men themselves. It must be simple and easy to understand.\textsuperscript{319}

The political director, his political assistant and education officer have used every available device to influence the Red servicemen. If a device has non-political value as well, e.g., literacy, it is especially valuable. If it can be sugar-coated, e.g., entertainment, it is employed. Yeh Ting proudly asserted, "Through general cultural work we have promoted as far as possible the political consciousness of the fighters."\textsuperscript{320}

A PLA text on literacy training declares, "literacy work is an effective instrument of political work and a powerful instrument for resolving ideological problems."\textsuperscript{321} To make the most of this potential, "the selection of reading matter is based on the practical needs of the PLA men and on their actual experience in life."\textsuperscript{322} Books, magazines and newspapers were produced for this purpose. The army used translated standard Communist texts, and material produced especially for army use, first by the League of Left Social Scientists,\textsuperscript{323} and later by military

\textsuperscript{318}Carlson, \textit{The Chinese Army}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{319}Snow, \textit{Red Star Over China}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{320}Hsiang, Yeh and Staffs, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{321}Yin Ch'en, \textit{To Raise the Standards of Literacy Work in The People's Liberation Army}, quoted in an article in \textit{Wen Yi Pao}, No. 11 (June 16, 1957). Excerpts appear in MacFarquhar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{322}The Chinese People's Liberation Army, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.
publishing houses. The Party saw to it that the horizon opened up by literacy was one that incorporated Communist values. By the end of the war with Japan the Political Department was turning out newspapers and books, and after the takeover a series of special pamphlets was issued, e.g., "Staff Officers Must Read." 326

The wall-newspaper was an especially effective printed method of making the teachings of the Party meaningful to the ordinary soldier. Produced by the men of the individual unit under the direction of the political cadre, wall newspapers were even prepared in the front-lines. An observer has described them as often "crudely written on a single piece of paper." Each battalion or club produced this broadside daily, and it contained in addition to general propaganda, columns of praise and criticism of the unit personnel. Respectively designated "red" and "black", these columns served to point out to the individual soldier the path at least to safety and at most to approval and promotion.

The Party recognized the need to propagandize in a war that would alleviate the monotony of military life. With the establishment of the Central Soviet Government a fairly uniform

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326 Shaw-tong Liu, op. cit., p. 154.
327 China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 44.
328 Belden, The New Fourth Army, op. cit., p. 25
pattern of entertainment organizations began to emerge.\footnote{330} First there were the "Red Blouses," largely composed of regular soldiers.\footnote{331} By the time of the Long March there were several mobile dramatic groups which travelled from unit to unit, and by 1938 the Red Army Academy and each army had a special dramatics unit.\footnote{332} These activities were expanded into a Military Culture Working Group assigned to each army,\footnote{333} and by 1951 the Chinese Communists claimed to have 100,000 men and women purveying this form of indoctrination.\footnote{334} These units came to assume many of the educational duties formerly carried out by the political cadre:

Under the direct supervision of the army political commissars, they are responsible for all kinds of cultural activities in the ranks. They put on their own performances, plays, playlets, concerts, but also take care of the cultural development of the fighters themselves, helping them in their drive for literacy, to compose their own literary works, poems, essays, articles for unit wall-newspapers, or plays and sketches, closely integrating these activities with the political tasks of the moment.\footnote{335}

As the quotation indicates, servicemen were involved in dramatics just as they were in the wall newspapers. This "soldier-acts-soldier" system originated in the period when the Red forces had not organized separate cultural units.\footnote{336}

\footnote{332} Wales, \textit{Red Dust, op. cit.}, pp. 183-184.
\footnote{333} Shaw-tong Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.
\footnote{335} Ibid.
However, the CCP came to recognize that participation and role-playing were "excellent visual means of driving home ideas and examples." In 1951 they claimed that in the First Field Army alone, over 2,000 soldiers had participated in the collective authorship of these plays. The plays presented dramatically the same educational praise and blame that the wall-newspapers presented verbally.

Such plays are mostly devoted to commending model soldiers and to educating backward soldiers. Sometimes they deal with problems concerning important activities of the army at different times.

Little chance was taken that the soldier would miss the political message, either because he was illiterate or because he failed to grasp a play's moral. The political worker also delivered a daily lecture to the men. This was not a daily activity limited to the ordinary soldier. Though the lecture delivered them was more sophisticated, most of the PLA officers were on a similar schedule. The topics of these lectures ranged from preparing the men for a specific battle to broad political subjects. "Political mobilization" meetings prior to battle prepared the soldier tactically and psychologically for combat.

The fighters are told what will be the effect upon them, their Army and on China, if they are defeated, and what will be the effect on themselves, and on China if they are victorious.

339 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 31.
340 The quote is from Teh Wang, op. cit., p. 769. Descriptions of similar meetings can be found in Lyachov, op. cit., p. 634; Carlson, Twin Stars Over China, op. cit., p. 80; Anna Louise Strong, One Fifth of Mankind, New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1938, p. 135.
Broad political topics included the "glorious" history of the Red forces, current events, and general CCP policies. The historical material dwelled on the necessity of the leadership of the Party and Chairman Mao. Current affairs lectures stressed specific national and international policies of the regime. For example, PLA men were lectured about and organized to sign the Stockholm Peace Appeal and to denounce the 1958 dispatch of American troops to the Middle East.\footnote{341 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 23; "PLA Officers and Men Condemn U.S.-British Aggression Pledge to Liberate Taiwan," NCNA-English Peking (July 23, 1958), SCMP, No. 1821 (July 28, 1958), p. 33.} Finally, "the policies of the CCP and of the government are given the widest possible publicity in the army."\footnote{342 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 23.}

Mention should be made of an ingenious array of devices designed to affect the morale and ideology of the Chinese Communist servicemen.\footnote{343 Ibid., pp. 27-31.} The "telephone" refers to the passing of messages "from mouth to mouth while the troops are on the march." These slogans are chosen for military or political content. The "radio station" is a large banner commending a particular soldier, and the political cadre then draws the moral of the case. "Trench handbills", "bulletin boards", "combat pictorials", and "rifle barrel poems" are all used to repeat and repeat certain basic ideas. Even games and songs involve repetition of political slogans.\footnote{344 Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 311.}
and education officer. Such personnel had to be drawn from the better educated groups in Chinese society. During the 1957 "One Hundred Flowers" period the PLA communications specialists voiced their discontent. The Party, they contended, suppressed the individual propagandist's initiative and imagination. They challenged the usefulness of the second vital element in the propaganda program—the material used. The formats and instructions issued by Party higher echelons were dull and often seemed irrelevant to the servicemen. In other words, the audience was bored and disinterested. 345

Even if the communicators and content of the repetitious political messages had been creative and effective, these programs could not meet CCP goals. The leadership belief that "the thoughts of soldiers influence their behavior" has led to programs "to correct their thoughts." 346 We now turn to the socio-psychological measures used in this attempt.

b. Commitment Through Involvement

Through praise and denunciation and through the specific format of unit meetings, the CCP attempted to mold the soldier's basic attitudes and values. The steps in this process have been: 1) alienation from non-Communist values and ties; 2) creation of dependency on the politically controlled military unit; and 3) internalization of subordination to the policies proclaimed

345 For example, see: "Army Cultural Workers Enthusiastically Discuss 'Flowers' and 'Schools' Policy," NCHA Peking (April 29, 1957), SOMP, No. 1526 (May 9, 1957), pp. 4-5; MacFarquhar, op. cit., pp. 183-188.

by the Party.\textsuperscript{347} If successful, "their revolutionary enthusiasm
is thereby raised to a still higher level. At the same time,
this kind of political education enabled them to develop a
deep hatred for their enemies."\textsuperscript{348} The Party tried to mold
servicemen who will "see before them two entirely different
worlds, two entirely different societies. One is full of hap-
piness and brightness, the other of dimness and misery."\textsuperscript{349}

The first step in the process has been the "Speak Bitter-
ness Meetings."\textsuperscript{350} Individual soldiers recount instances of
suffering at the hands of the enemies of the CCP. The political
workers see to it that the soldiers
come to understand that their sufferings are by no
means isolated instances, but can be traced back to
the sufferings of the exploited classes as a whole.
Thus, step by step they are led to the conclusion
that at the root of their sufferings are the feudal
landlord system, the reactionary rule of Chiang
Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and imperialist aggression.\textsuperscript{352}

Information reaching the soldier is controlled as much as pos-
sible in order to expedite the severance of ties with the old
system and with "hostile" forces and ideas.

The Party realized that alienation alone would produce an
unmanageable body of men. The next step was to substitute a new
social group with new social values. The chosen group for the

\textsuperscript{347}For a first-hand description of the application of this process
in a civilian prison, see: Father Mark Tennien, No Secret is
Safe Behind the Bamboo Curtain, New York: Farrar, Straus &
Young, Inc., 1952.

\textsuperscript{348}The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 20.

\textsuperscript{349}Ibid., p. 24.

\textsuperscript{350}Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 346.

\textsuperscript{351}Life in the Liberation Army, op. cit., Chapter I.

\textsuperscript{352}The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 20.
servicemen was the military unit. Here the CCP through the political worker was in complete control of the individual's existence. Several devices have already been mentioned for allotting praise and blame to the member of a unit. These were augmented by numerous meetings in which the individual soldier was evaluated by his peers along lines suggested by the commissar. Through criticism by others and self-criticism the Party hoped to develop a sense of guilt and of shame. The soldier was required, in the words of a Western psychologist, "to lay himself bare." Social ostracism was the fate of a "lagging behind element" unless he purged himself of sins at a public meeting.

The political department's hypothesis was that once the soldier was brought to reject the old society publicly, his need for social support would create dependence on his comrades. This dependency opened up the serviceman to manipulation and "molding."

The Party has tried not to lull itself into assuming that heavy doses of propaganda will create an army of "true believers," or that anything less than internalized allegiance will insure military obedience. The small groups in which the criticism and

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self-criticism process takes place are constantly warned to be alert for "false progressives", i.e., individuals who only mouth Communist slogans. To the political worker any individual who fails to accept the Communist frame of reference in any way harbors unpurged impure thoughts, and must be subjected to more social and psychological pressures.

The "molding" process carried with it negative effects. Measures designed to inculcate obedience to the Party have clashed with the serviceman's notions of self-interest and negate primary group cohesion. Criticism and self-criticism are conducive to insecurity and mutual mistrust within military units. The danger of making an ideological error is always present since, by definition, all actions and activities have political significance. Morale can be undermined by incessant condemnation and fear of condemnation.

4. A Qualified Success

We are not able to evaluate precisely the committment of the Communist armed forces to their political masters. We can supplement the negative data presented previously with some reports on desertion. Instances have been reported for the guerrilla years, the Korean War period and the post-Korean war PLA. In 1944, the leaders of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshsia Border Region had to institute a "Return to the Front Movement" to "mobilize those who have deserted from the army or direct those whose vacations are over to return to the front."355 The refusal

355 Tsu-han Lin, op. cit., p. 133.
of repatriation by many captured PLA men during the Korean conflict is well-known. The mainland press has reported scattered desertions during the past decade, with particular emphasis on 1956.\textsuperscript{356}

The Korean War POWs who refused repatriation are not a representative sample of the PLA. Many of the defectors were ex-KMT soldiers absorbed during the Communist sweep of the mainland in 1948-1949. However, to a certain extent, their criteria for allegiance to the CCP can be legitimately extended to other groups in the PLA at the same and different time periods.\textsuperscript{357}

The justifications are both demographic and psychological. The first is the peasant origin of the Communist serviceman with the agrarian concerns this implies. During the revolution and the CCP incumbency the bulk of its military personnel have been peasants. This will continue to be the case for at least a decade. Although it is conceivable that future peasant conscripts will no longer have the traditional land desires and social values of past peasant recruits, it is not conceivable that their loyalty to the Party will not be affected by the success or failure of Peking agricultural policy. The generalization holds that the allegiance of the servicemen varies with the well-being of the peasant. The corollary is that in periods when unpopular agrarian policies are imposed servicemen's attitudes toward the CCP are increasingly unfavorable. The psychological justification

\textsuperscript{356}Communist China, 1956, op. cit., p. 189.

is that the saliency of unhappy experiences under non-Communist rulers of the mainland diminishes with time. This factor seems to have affected the attitudes of the Korean war defectors, and it should become increasingly significant. The behavior of the CCP is evaluated less and less in comparison with periods of warlord, Japanese or Kuomintang rule. Judgments of PLA members, like those of other members of society, are framed in relation to the trend of affairs during Communist rule. If the needs of the modernizing society and of its population are more and more fully met, the CCP receives more allegiance. If its performance slackens or it over-states the criteria of success, the servicemen are less affected by the propaganda barrage and less amenable to the process of political indoctrination.
Chapter 7

Contributions to CCP Popularity, Propaganda, Government and Mass Organizations

In this chapter we turn to what the Communist military and its leaders have done in the realms of propaganda and politics. We regard the Chinese Communist case materials as an example of the "potential" of the armed forces in these non-coercive areas and look for the answers to three questions: what did the army do? Why did they carry out some duties at one time and not at others? What did military propaganda and political functions accomplish? Our interest in China justifies factual descriptions; our interest in the political functions the military can perform leads us to search for the responsible factors. Several possible explanations for the political functions of the Communist military come quickly to mind: strategic needs, Party objectives, the nature of the armed forces. What is the relative responsibility of these explanations for the military's political and propaganda activities: to what extent are combat and political needs similar? to what extent are political and military elites separate? in what way does the insurgent or incumbent nature of the Party affect its propaganda and political needs and the military's political usefulness? in what way do traits of the armed forces affect its competence and motivation to engage in propaganda and political tasks? what political communication and control channels are available to the Party in addition to the military?
The answers to these question have changed from 1927-1959. During the guerrilla period the needs for battle and political success were congruent. The Party could compensate for insufficient strength only by securing popular support in both its base and aspiration areas. The guerrilla bands could compensate for insufficient strength only if the people were willing to give them and withhold from opponents personnel, intelligence and supplies.\(^1\) As Chu Teh observed, "the masses are for the army what the walls are for a city ... for guerrilla warfare the co-operation of the people is the most important factor."\(^2\) As the Communist military has become more oriented toward conventional and complex military forms, this congruence has lessened. During the revolutionary struggle and in the early years of power on the mainland the military and political elites were largely composed of the same people. There is now a trend of increasing separation of the active military commanders from the group holding key political posts--dual elite membership is declining. The final success of the Party's drive for national power has changed the appeals it can make to the population and the context which affects the reception of those appeals. The Communist army can no longer present itself as a liberating force to right the misdeeds and social evils of the incumbent regime. The army is now a major instrument for imposing programs of dubious popularity.

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on the population. Changes in the combat situations facing the
Communist forces, in the political position of the régime and in
the relation between military and political office-holders has
been accompanied by fundamental alterations in the characteristics
of the People's Liberation Army. The skill level of the army
has risen but so has its pre-occupation with coercive speciali-
zation and its separation from popular life. Finally, unlike
the revolutionary period, the Party as ruler of the People's
Republic now has numerous instruments to propagandize the popu-
lace and to organize their energies and thought. Civilian bur-
eaucracy, mass organizations and a situation of relative internal
stability have lessened the Party's dependence on the army.

In summary, the purpose of this chapter is to discover
what the political role of the Communist military has really
been and second to locate and weigh the factors which have de-
determined the role and its changes during the years from 1927 to
1959.

In the mid-twenties Pavel Mif declared that the 1927
Nanchang Rebellion was a dismal failure because:

No contact was established between the rebel
troops and the peasant movement...In its ad-
vance the Nanchang army failed to destroy the
old apparatus of government and establish organs
of the government of the toilers in their place.
As a result of these mistakes .../the/ ...cam-
paign bore the character of a purely military op-
eration and ended in complete failure.3

3 P. Mif, Heroic China, New York: Workers Library Publishing Co.,
In 1928 Mao tried to convince the Central Committee that it was necessary to combine armed strength with a "sound mass basis" and "economic strength sufficient to self-support." By 1929 he had begun to attack the "purely military viewpoint" that Mif was to criticize some years later, and guerrilla leaders who met under Mao's leadership this same year at Kutien approved this description of the Red Army non-coercive role:

Besides fighting, the Red Army should bear the great responsibility of educating, organizing and arming the masses and helping them to build up political power.

During the Anti-Japanese War Inprecorr described an expanded non-coercive role of the military:

When the Red Army occupies any place, it helps the population to form a Soviet government, assists the workers to get higher wages and establish an 8 hour day, helps the peasants to divide up the land, to sow their fields, to harvest the crops and plow up the land. It helps the youth to get an education in school, helps the teachers to obtain work. It meets the correspondents from white districts, groups of representatives of the population who come on excursions to the Soviet districts and the people of white districts who have suffered from natural calamities and who come to the Soviet districts, treats them hospitably and looks after them.

In 1945 the Seventh Congress officially restated the PLA's role:

must shoulder the threefold task of fighting, carrying on mass work, and raising funds (the last means production at present, and by mass work is meant that the Red Army must become an agitator and organizer for the Party and the people's political power), help the local populace in redistributing land (for the present, reducing rent and

interest), and in building up their armed forces, political power and even party organizations ...

A. Popular Support for the Military

The degree to which the Communist military depended on the populace for coercive support, especially during the guerrilla years, is described in this mixture of simile and metaphor:

The Army is like a school of fish and the people the water without which the fish can neither live nor move. Therefore the water must be free of obstacles and the temperature adapted to the life of the fish. It follows then that the people must understand the reasons for the war ...

The army had to overcome three obstacles before it could secure support. The first was the peasants' attitude toward armed groups.

The farmer who formerly had fled at the sight of Chinese troops and who expected nothing but expropriation of his goods and property from a military which did not protect him in the hour of need, must now be persuaded to feed, house and inform guerrilla units, whose mobility and effectiveness would depend entirely on the good will of the villagers.

The second was the destructive and brutal nature of guerrilla warfare where the battleground has to be the homes and fields of the peasants whose support the Party required. As a Westerner observed, "the armed forces fight the enemy and the people take the consequences." The third was the norms of Chinese military behavior which had showed little if any regard for the popular

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welfare. As Mao said, the servicemen had to be reminded through indoctrination that "everything we use in resistance, everything we live on is really given us by the peasantry." In other words, the CCP could not assume that the populace would support the army automatically or on the basis of utopian pledges. The army needed a new image. First it had to regard itself as an instrument of service as well as an instrument of violence and had to propagate this image among the populace.

The Party decided to change the army's image of itself through indoctrination. It decided to change the popular image of the army by having the army treat the populace respectfully and satisfy "their most urgent demands ... the practical solution of their problems of livelihood" as much as possible. Although the army could not give the peasants material goods from its meager supplies, it could provide army manpower to help the peasant acquire more material goods and could minimize its economic drain on the populace.

We deal here with the procedures used to change popular antagonism toward the army into popular support and the contradictory evidence of their success.

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11 Mao is quoted in Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, p. 201, from his A Discussion of the New Democracy (Hsin Min Chu I Min), n.p.: Shih Nien Shu Chu 1940, p. 33.

a. *Indoctrination and Army Behavior*

To produce desired military behavior the CCP ordered the political workers to convince the Red servicemen through indoctrination that they "must not make the people feel that the army was crushing their privileges." The workers used the same propaganda devices for this task that they used to mobilize military allegiance to the Party. The soldier was exposed to repetitious propaganda. For example, the rank-and-file had to memorize the "eight points for attention", adopted at the 1928 Chingkenshan conference. Basically these points demanded: 1) courteous behavior toward the people. For example, during the war with Japan soldiers were told that they "must ask permission before entering a house. Before leaving, the occupants must be thanked for their hospitality, and they must be asked if they are satisfied with the condition of the house." 2) economic compensation for anything consumed, borrowed, or damaged. For example, the troops were ordered not to damage crops, and they were told "you must not take even one potato from the peasants, for if you take one you will want to take more." 3) sanitation and cleaning

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14 For a sample, see the play described by Robert Payne in *China Awake*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1947, p. 317.
17 *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, op. cit., p. 35.
of quarters; and 4) non-molestation of women. The soldiers were
told to leave the women entirely alone and not to "offend them
by bathing naked where they can see you."19 Supposedly rape,
as well as looting, of the poor was to be punished by death.20

If a peasant father considers his daughter's honor
violated by a man of our army, we must eliminate the
cause. Unless the peasant can trust our army to
sleep in their homes, knowing that their women are
safe, our army cannot survive.21

The political cadres directed group pressure to secure "correct
behavior."22 Commissars tried to arouse guilt in the servicemen
who did not believe that "the people is our mother" or who flaunted
the slogan, "Do not take even a needle or a piece of thread from
the people."23 The Party ordered that "Before the troops leave
for another place, they must submit themselves to a disciplinary
investigation lest they should have done wrong to the people."24

General injunctions to the army were supplemented by special
propaganda about specific programs such as economic labor.25

The special manpower and material resources of the Red
Army were also used to solicit popularity. For example, Nieh

19 Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China, Boston:
20 Agnes Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, New York: Vanguard
Press, Inc., 1934, p. 79; and Jack Belden, The New Fourth Army,
21 Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China, New York:
22 Ibid., p. 199.
23 Ibid., p. 198.
24 Peng, op. cit., p. 25.
25 For example, see: "Some Experiences of the 'Forward Troop' in
Learning to 'Support the Government and Love the People,'" The
People's Army, No. 11 (June 2, 1946), (Chinese).
Jung-chen claimed that, "During lulls between active military operations, the soldiers helped in agricultural work, claiming nothing in return. We lent animals to the people for plowing...."\textsuperscript{26} Special aid at harvest time\textsuperscript{27} supposedly supplemented regular aid in repairing houses, chopping firewood, and carrying water.\textsuperscript{28} Even in the front lines the Communist forces were portrayed as placing the people's welfare first. On one island, according to a mainland publication, PLA soldiers transplanted sweet-potato sprouts to a safe zone to prevent their destruction by Nationalist gunfire.\textsuperscript{29} Special facilities, particularly the army medical service, were opened to the local peasantry. Often "modern" medicine had never been available in these hinterland areas before. In the first year of its medical service the New Fourth Army claimed to have treated about 53,000 civilian patients.\textsuperscript{30}

b. Shelter and Food

The greatest amount of consideration for the peasantry could not create Red Army popularity if peasant food was taken and housing pre-empted. The Red Army could not do without either and could not afford to purchase these fundamentals. Accordingly,

\textsuperscript{26}Epstein, \textit{Unfinished Revolution in China}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 163.


\textsuperscript{29}The People and the People's Army, Shanghai: East China People's Press, 1954 (Chinese).

\textsuperscript{30}Snow, \textit{Battle for Asia}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142; also see Belden, \textit{The New Fourth Army}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
the CCP tried to devise a system which would lessen these strains on popular affection as much as possible. The first step was to restrict consumption by the armed forces to a bare minimum.  

The second was to make the necessary exactions in a way that minimized the political detriment. During the civil war periods the soldiers were indoctrinated with the slogan, "Don't Steal a Cent From Workers and Peasants." This left the rest of the population. According to General Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, "The Red Army always paid with money when buying goods—with money confiscated from the landlords, of course."  

After the Long March the united front and the shortage of landlords forced the CCP to change its supply methods. To diminish popular hostility to the armed forces and to restrict military power, requisitions were separated whenever possible from the army itself. "The army will do its best not to collect anything directly, but will rather let the civil authorities, the hsien government, or any other popular agencies, be responsible." Since these agencies were not available in certain situations, "a committee of specially trained soldiers takes over full responsibility." The CCP directed that "poor peasants are

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31 Wales, op. cit., p. 291; for a bizarre example of this practice of the leaders of the CPR, see Victor Zorza, "Chinese Leaders Make Do and Mend," Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 81, no. 3 (July 16, 1959), p. 7.  
34 Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army, New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 119. A hsien is roughly equivalent to a county.  
to be exempted from all impositions."\(^{36}\)

The Border Region authorities promulgated various regulations to make military support palatable, for example:

1. On reaching a village an officer or representative of the detachment is required to inform the village headman of his intention to enter, and to report the number of men and horses the village is expected to accommodate. No unit has the right to enter a village until these points are satisfactorily negotiated. However, the village headman may not refuse to accommodate the troops unless he has special reasons for doing so.

2. Partisans must make special efforts to avoid disturbing the people in their homes. So far as is possible, they are to quarter themselves in public buildings, such as temples and schools. The villages are responsible for making these public buildings fit for occupation. If it is necessary for partisans to be billeted directly on the people, they are to be assigned to definite houses. They have no right to impose themselves on any other household to which they had not been assigned.\(^{37}\)

Food requisitions were controlled by a coupon system. Variously known as "wheat notes" and "grain tickets", the villagers could apply the coupons against tax payments.\(^{38}\) The army was told that "a triplicate note must be given to the people in return for whatever they give in support of the forces, and the government is prepared to pay back whatever it takes."\(^{39}\)


2. Success of Popular Support Programs

The Communists have claimed that programs designed to secure popular support for the army by making the army popular have been immensely successful. Although it admits minor problems with the program, it claims that "the PLA during ...[its existence] ...has had the sympathy and backing of the broad masses of the people."40 In 1930 Inprecorr stated that "right from the beginning" Communist soldiers "maintained close brotherly connections with the peasantry."41 The Party has attributed this sympathy to the "army's consideration for the People,"42 and people's feeling that "The Army is a weapon of the people. Therefore, the army and people are members of the same family, sharing the same joys and misfortunes."43 Chu Teh pointed out the excellent behavior of the army when he said that:

Since the regular Red Army was organized in about 1930, rape has not been a problem. Discipline on this question is 100 per cent good. In the early days in the past, however, it was necessary to court martial such offenders, and all guilty soldiers were shot.44

The proofs that the Communists offer for this "close relationship between the people and the people's army, the high quality of the people's fighters, and the love of the people for the people's army"45 are deductive and inductive. It argues

40 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 40.
44 Wales, Inside Red China, op. cit., p. 40.
45 The People and the People's Army, op. cit.
that victory would have been impossible without popular support. Since the Red Army was "victorious" against the KMT, Japanese and UN forces in Korea, it therefore had popular support. During the early years of civil war, Mao asked rhetorically: "Why ... has the Red Army scored success after success against the White troops and not only survived ... but increased its power?" Because

The Red Army won its many victories--beginning with only a few dozen rifles in the hands of determined revolutionaries--because its solid base in the people attracted friends even among the White troops and among the civilian populace as well as among the troops. The enemy was infinitely our superior militarily, but politically it was immobilized.\footnote{46}

During the war with Japan Nieh Jung-chen contended that without popular support "...the Japanese would have broken us."\footnote{47} During the Korean War Peng Teh-huai advanced a similar argument.\footnote{48}

The Party also cites three types of examples of popular support. The first type is the welcome that the people have extended the Communist army through the years. In 1930 we are told that "The Red Army ... was of course welcomed everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm by the revolutionary masses of the peasantry."\footnote{49} On the Long March peasant delegations supposedly journeyed to meet the Communist forces, pleading that their districts be "liberated."\footnote{50} Prior to the Long March, Chu Teh claimed

\footnote{46}{Quoted in Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., pp. 93-94; also see Miff, op. cit., p. 77.}
\footnote{47}{Quoted in Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China, op. cit., p. 163; and Carlson, The Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 121.}
\footnote{48}{Teh-huai Peng, "Why the Chinese People's Volunteers are Invincible," People's China, Vol. IV, no. 4 (Aug. 16, 1951), p. 8.}
\footnote{49}{Pao, "The Red Workers and Peasants Army in Nantung," Inprecorr, Vol. 10, no. 29 (June 19, 1930), p. 526.}
\footnote{50}{Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., p. 211.}
that the Red forces "never had to lay siege to any village. Whole villages poured out and often walked for miles to wait for us." During the United Front the more affluent of the population supposedly shared this attitude.

When the Red Army was here in 1936,... they took food and money from our richer neighbors. The poor people loved them then, but now everybody loges them because they protect us against the Japanese. 52

The second type of example is popular efforts to help the army. Civilians supposedly volunteered to transport military equipment, act as stretcher-bearers, and donate money and food to the CCP soldiers. 53 The New Fourth Army commander wrote that the people "even go into battle side by side with us,... [and] ... withdraw with all their goods when we retreat." 54 According to the Party, the attitude of one Li Hsing-kuo, "Mother of the People's Soldiers of Central Hopei" was typical. She is quoted as volunteering to take care of wounded soldiers with the declaration that "These soldiers had shed their blood for us who were poor ... Even though it cost my life, I would try to cure them." 55 The third type of example is popular sorrow when the army departs. For example, in the streets of a Honanese town held briefly in the early 1930's this was the tenor of conversations.

52 Strong, One Fifth of Mankind, op. cit., p. 140.
55 From Struggle to Victory, Peking: All-China Democratic Women's Federation, 1952, p. 2.
I speak from my heart—the Reds are good. But they will stay for two days only! Why, why? Now we can eat. When they are gone we can get no more! Then it will be the same old things as before.56

During the second period of civil war CCP sources report that similar attitudes were widespread.57

3. An Assessment

This section attempts to estimate how the Communist military really behaved and what success the army had in propagating its new image. The reader must remember that the populace judged the Red Army in relation to customary Chinese armies.

a. Context Changes

The changing context of the CCP movement—revolutionary, civil war, a war of national resistance, and governance of the mainland—affects our assessment. How have context "givens" affected the CCP program to win popular support, i.e., during which periods was it more probable that the Communist program would succeed and during which was it less probable?

During the civil war and especially the Sino-Japanese War it was relatively simple to equate enemies of the mass of the population with enemies of the Red Army, and consequently the Army could avail itself of a ready-made image of popular and national protector. Its brutality to and exploitation of the affluent members of the society won popular approval, eliminated CCP opponents, and allowed the servicemen to release their coercive propensities. The united front policy forced the CCP to curtail its class discriminations, but invasions by a brutal


57 Yin Chi, Attack, Shanghai: East China People’s Press, 1951 (Chinese).
foreign army engendered a compensating nationalism which the Red Army could manipulate. For example, the New Fourth Army reported that:

Warned that the villages that supported our army would suffer bombardment and destruction, the people at first refused to cooperate with us and urged us to leave their districts. Facts soon convinced them, however, that slaughter and arson reigned in every region, regardless of the presence or absence of the New Fourth Army. 58

Since 1949 the Communists have lost the advantage of opposing an oppressive rule and undisciplined, foreign troops. They search frantically for enemies to substitute for the landlord class, the Japanese, and Kuomintang, and resort to variously defined "counter-revolutionary elements," the "capitalist camp," Chiang Kai-shek and "American imperialism." Undoubtedly these scapegoats are less effective than the ones directly experienced by the Chinese population. At the same time the CCP can no longer deprive one class of the population to reward the other. A 1957 release noted the effects of peacetime and the growth of a politicized-specialist army on popular "love" of the army.

With the enemy in front, the people did not have too many opinions about their interests being impaired. However, in time of peace the matter is entirely different....Some of our comrades frequently unilaterally emphasize the needs of the army and seldom pay attention to the people's interests. 59

A "given" which has been constant during the entire CCP movement is the threat of force implied by the presence of the army. Although the army might try to win support by civilized

58 Hsiang, Yeh and Staffs, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
59 "Learn to Correctly Handle the Contradictions Between the Army and Civilians," CFCP Peking (May 21, 1957), URS, Vol. 8, no. 5 (July 16, 1957), pp. 74-76.
methods, it could always resort to arms if the populace were unwilling to extend support. Especially as the Communists grew more powerful, they made this alternative extremely clear. For example, the population was told that "People who spread rumors or lies about the Red Army will be subject to arrest and punishment." A Chinese sociologist described a meeting held in a village near Canton to celebrate the first anniversary of the People's Republic.

As the crowd marched column by column through a narrow entrance into the open field, everyone could plainly see rows of formidable machine guns manned by soldiers deployed on the high grounds on either side.

The populace also found that the CCP defined "enemy of the people" flexibly and that positive behavior toward the Red Army was expedient for this reason, if for no other. In brief, the Communists tried to make support of their army as palatable to the people as possible, but civilians who refused the "carrot" quickly got the "stick".

b. Western Vouchers

Many Westerners were able to observe the PLA in action during the war against Japan and during the 1949 takeover of the mainland. On the basis of their visits to Communist-controlled areas and observation of Communist occupation of major urban centers, they testified that the PLA was excellently disciplined and behaved courteously toward the vast majority of the citizenry.

60 The statement was made in 1936 by Chou Hsing, then chief of the National Political Defense Bureau, and is quoted in Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, Chinese Economic and Political Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 44.

After a 1936 visit Snow reported his impressions:

> There is no violence practiced on the peasantry; at any rate, I have not seen it. I have not seen a fist fight between soldier and civilian...I have seen no cases of attack on women, who move about, both old and young, in seeming freedom.62

Belden claims to have investigated army-people relations in New Fourth Army territory and summarizes his observations in the phrase: "Fear of Soldiers Gone".63 Less open to question is the observation of an official American observer in North China. The anonymous observer reported the peasant willing to support the Communist forces, "because he is doing it for the Army, which is protecting him and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels that he is getting something in return for his money or goods."64 A 1945 U.S. military intelligence report declared: "The Eighth Route Army in North China came soon to be considered the benefactor and savior of the people not only against the Japanese, but also against the rule of landlords and the former landlords...."65 A 1943 Office of Strategic Services report accepted CCP claims of popular support for their army on the grounds that: "though the Japanese usually torture any one whom they suspect may know where such people ...[Communist troops]

63Belden, The New Fourth Army, op. cit., p. 32.
65Ibid.
...or where Chinese army supplies are hidden, they seldom obtain information."66

Many Western missionaries, journalists, businessmen and teachers were present during the final collapse of Nationalist armies. A Lutheran missionary has written of the initial behavior of the P.L.A.:

They are generally polite and well-behaved, courteous of women, calling them sister-in-law and grandmother; they refrained from looting and brought back things they borrowed. Whenever there was a breach of discipline, it was followed with swift punishment in public. The soldiers were on the lookout for opportunities of being helpful; they offered to sweep floors, carry water, work in the fields... The inhabitants were completely swept off their feet by such conduct. What a contrast to the behavior of the undisciplined National troops!67

Another Lutheran missionary, who had been stationed in Honan Province, described the contrast between PLA and Nationalist military behavior and the consequent attitude of the people.

When the Communists first came to an area, they kept absolute order. They required much less grain and taxes than the old regime. Their soldiers were polite. The old militia, receiving little wages, had been reduced to stealing and squeezing for a living. Now the people were not pestered with these abuses. The newcomers did not bother the populace. When the Red occupied a place for a day or a week, they generously figured up what they owed and wrote out receipts to be applied against future taxes. If anyone offered the soldier part of his house, they would say, 'Oh, no. That will make it too crowded for you.' In this way the good behavior of the Red troops won the hearts of both rich and poor, and disarmed their hostility. Even the wealthy began to say, 'Well, if this is Communism, then we want it too.'

As the fighting seesawed back and forth, government troops would take over briefly, looting and raping as they came. When the Reds got back they would say,
by way of contrast, 'See what Communism can do for you!'\footnote{68}

In southern China a Catholic father reported of Lin Piao's troops that "Their discipline was impressively good ... Each evening for ten days several thousand were billeted in nearby villages. I heard of only one case of rape."\footnote{69}

Westerners in Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin made similar comments.\footnote{70} A journalist assigned to Tientsin wrote:

> On the civilians, at first astounded and in the end mightily pleased, the effect was enormous. The single example of pilfering that I heard of was the theft of a teaspoon that a very embarrassed officer returned to the hotel manager explaining, with deep apologies, that one of his men, a peasant from the Northeast who had never seen a spoon before, had found the treasure irresistible. This soldier's disgraceful behavior had been discussed and criticized by the whole platoon, and the manager was assured that the culprit had now reformed his attitude.\footnote{71}

A Western businessman in Shanghai during the CCP takeover of that city commented on the "refreshing change" from the "ill-paid and undisciplined Nationalist troops ...[who] ...had constantly created trouble."\footnote{72} A French journalist reported his astonishment and that of Shanghai inhabitants when the Communist troops occupied the city.

\footnote{68}Ibid., pp. 162-163.
"Martians in Shanghai!" This cry of a spectator admirably summed up the impressions of the stupefied inhabitants. Chinese soldiers who knew how to fight, who after victory did not pillage the conquered town, who slept on the pavement instead of invading the houses and raping the girls, who refused the bowl of rice or tea offered by kindly people, and who paid for their tickets in the trams, must really be soldiers from another planet. 73

c. Communist Admissions

Although the Party claimed that the military behaved perfectly, the CCP has repeatedly found it necessary to publicize their misbehavior. It should be remembered that the Party usually only publicizes such reports to warn other malefactors and that they often indicate that the "incorrect" behavior is widespread.

In 1928 the Sixth Congress of the CCP attacked "aimless plundering and burning," 74 and the Kiangsu Provincial Committee reported that the "Red bandits [were] burning, killing and robbing." 75 At the December, 1929, Kutien Conference, Mao attacked the apparently common "misdemeanor committed by some units of setting fire to houses." 76 In January, 1930, the Military Bulletin of the Central Committee of the CCP admitted that "in many of the partisan bands, lumpen-proletarian ideas persist ... often expressing themselves in unorganized burning, plundering and killing." 77

74 "Resolution on the Peasant Question," Sixth Congress CCP, quoted in Isaacs, op. cit., p. 401.
75 Sung Chien, *Report of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee*, quoted ibid.
By August, 1933, a Central Committee publication expressed deep concern since "Corruption and degeneration constantly appear."\(^78\)

During these years the Communist press also published statements on the result of this behavior. In January, 1929, small force under Mao and Chu Teh retreated from the mountain retreat, Chingkanshan. They were hardly met with "love." According to the Military Bulletin of the Central Committee, "The masses completely failed to understand what the Red Army was. In many places the army was even attacked like a bandit gang. The army had no support from the masses."\(^79\) The official Central Committee publication, Struggle, reported that peasants fled to the mountains rather than aid the Red Army in its transport work and that the Communists had failed to put over the new image of the military.\(^80\) The sight of an approaching armed band aroused a general reaction of fear; the peasants "do not care if they are Red or White."\(^81\) A similar lack of mass support prevailed in the Szechwan Soviet. Military commander Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien recounted that "...the foundation of the soviets was weak....The masses were easily suppressed by reactionary forces and subsided into passivity."\(^82\)

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\(^78\) Mai Lo, "For a Bolshevik Turn," *Struggle* (Aug. 22, 1933), quoted *ibid.*, p. 422.


\(^80\) *Struggle* (Aug. 29, 1933) is cited by Isaacs, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

\(^81\) *Struggle* (Oct. 21, 1933) quoted *ibid.*, p. 423.

\(^82\) Wales, *Red Dust, op. cit.*, p. 159.
After the Long March and until the middle years of the Peking regime the Communists castigated the military infrequently for its behavior. However, in 1956 a new series of charges began to appear. When Tan Cheng, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA, spoke before the 8th Congress of the CCP in September of that year, he listed incidents which had occurred when the PLA had been modernizing its establishment.

The army is estranged from the people and local Party and Government organs. The army does not show the same concern to the interests of the masses as they did in the past. For instance, inhabitants are unnecessarily moved away and farmland is excessively used and the forbidden area is excessively enlarged in building barracks, defense works, drilling grounds and airstrips.

After entering the barracks some army units are estranged from the local people and society. In early May, 1957, the General Political Department convened a "rectification conference ...attended by responsible members of the various military regions, various armed services, various academies and schools as well as various departments." Civilian complaints presented to the conferees and subsequent statements by key military leaders indicated severe strains between armed forces garrisons and local civilians. On May 17 Hsiao Hua, then Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department, admitted these incidents to a meeting of the Communist Youth League Congress.


84"Rectifications to be Carried Out in the Army From Top to Basic Levels by Separate Groups," Peking CFCP (May 18, 1957), JPRS, Vol. 8, no. 5 (July 16, 1957), p. 70.
the troops trampled down crops during their exercise and trenches on the farmland were not quickly filled up with the result production was hindered. When billeting in civilian houses before moving into barracks, some units paid no attention to maintenance and repair.\(^85\)

On May 30 General Su Yu, Chief of the General Staff, addressed the Chungking Garrison and accused them of similar "shortcomings."\(^86\)

Reports of public discontent with military behavior appeared in the Liberation Army News. A catalogue of complaints was printed after representatives of civilian departments and mass organizations were interviewed.

1. It is hoped that the army will withdraw from the school buildings and from scenic spots, reduce the prohibited areas and pay regard to the farmlands and farm houses.
2. Armymen make love to middle and primary school students.
3. When looking for girls, some military officers resorted to the practice of 'buying the girls with money and seducing them with material enjoyment.'
4. Some military officers indulge in extravagance and waste and their wives maintain a peculiar living.
5. Some military officers are arrogant and vulgar.
6. The environment hygiene of the garrison areas in the city is obnoxious.
7. In the course of capital construction and building roads, there were many cases of damaging property.

The News cited other instances when the military had trampled on the property and sensibilities of the citizens.

An editorial described an occasion when the military had


fired at harmless citizens.

The clash between the army unit and the fishermen in a certain place of coastal defense is an unpleasant incident. . . . the military leadership . . . set up unnecessary prohibited areas, and thus impeded the fishermen's production. After making several vain protests to the military authorities, the fishermen and the people began to hate the army. . . . the fishermen asked the military authorities for permission to anchor their fishing junks near the shore. But such a request was refused. Knowing full well that the fishermen were local inhabitants, the soldiers nevertheless opened fire to suppress and arrest them. 88

d. The Economic Burden

The Party has claimed that: 1) the Red Army supported itself to a considerable extent through production; 2) all supplies taken from the people were fully paid for; and 3) the people's "love" for the "liberation" army was so great that they gladly donated quantities of goods, money, and labor.

Regardless of claims, confiscation, taxation, voluntary labor and "donations" all constituted extractions from the income of the people. To the extent that the military and populace were convinced that the military was fighting for the people's interests the economic burden was minimized by the military and willingly provided by the civilians. To the extent that the CCP had to resort to material inducements to maintain and expand its army the economic interests of the military and civilians became different and the civilians less willing to shoulder the economic burden. To the extent that the army took products required for peasant survival, e.g., grain, the peasants resented the economic burden. 89 To assess the antagonism that the burden aroused, it

88 "Learn to Correctly Handle the Contradictions Between the Army and Civilians," op. cit., pp. 74-76.
89 Strong, "Eighth Route Regions in North China," op. cit., p. 163.
must be recalled that even if the army only paid for half the value of foodstuffs, for example, other Chinese armies confiscated goods without any compensation.\footnote{90}

Ho Lung told an interviewer that "Those who had money could contribute money. Those who had strength could contribute labor power."\footnote{91} The CCP attempted to place the heaviest burden on those elements not considered part of the "people," i.e., the wealthy and the landlords. The Party hoped that this policy would not only minimize active peasant resentment, but might even win popularity because it redistributed some of the goods of a disliked social group. During the civil war periods discriminatory confiscation was highly organized.\footnote{92} Milder, but still discriminatory, measures were pursued even during the united front period. According to one Communist officer, "Where wealthy families still remain, we ask them for contributions of money and supplies."\footnote{93} The CCP policy in one guerrilla area was that the "landlords pay for the war."\footnote{94} During the period of "solidarity" taxation was heavily discriminatory. By 1945 the tax on landlords' incomes was 52\%, that on poor peasants supposedly only 4 to 7\%.\footnote{95} Of course, to the extent that landlords had fled the region or lost their property the tax burden was born by less affluent classes.

\footnote{90}{Yang, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 131-132.}
\footnote{91}{Quoted in H. Forman, \textit{Report from Red China}, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945, p. 130.}
\footnote{92}{Snow, \textit{Red Star Over China}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 211.}
\footnote{93}{Bertram, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 238.}
\footnote{94}{Carlson, \textit{The Chinese Army}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 108.}
The poor were less exempt from "voluntary" labor. Before the Long March Communist sources reported that the workers gladly chose longer working hours in order to help the Red Army. Western observers report that during the war with Japan "labor gangs" were "recruited ...to help the army in transport of supplies and ammunition, the repair of bridges and paths, (in) carrying (the) wounded." The peasantry was organized repeatedly for three types of labor service: salt transport, grain transport and "expedient mobilization." Since taking power, the regime has repeatedly organized extra labor forces, who under political pressure contribute to special projects in addition to their regular employment. "Voluntary" labor has been coupled with significant quantities of equally "voluntary" donations raised in numerous "Help the Army" campaigns. An Inprecorr report on the Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet District alleged that "The working population ...willingly and eagerly give congee, tea, firewood, shoes, sandals, etc. to the Red soldiers...." The phrase "donations" was often a flimsy disguise for unpaid labor; for example, workers "donated" their wages to the Communist authorities. Even during the "Support

the Government and Love the People" Campaign of 1943 Communist sources claimed that "Articles and cash, voluntarily contributed by the masses to be forwarded to the army, amounted in value to no less than $4,000,000."\textsuperscript{101} Perhaps the most extensive campaign in this connection occurred after the CCP took power, the "Resist-American Aid-Korea" Campaign.\textsuperscript{102} The Campaign was publicized as a "voluntary nation-wide drive for contributions to buy planes and heavy arms for the Chinese volunteers in Korea."\textsuperscript{103} It was politically expedient to contribute, and sizeable funds were collected. As of June 25, 1951, the amount was claimed to be sufficient to buy over 1,180 modern planes.

Antagonism aroused by these exactions could have been compounded by their cumulative effect on the civilian work force. The subtraction of manpower for military service coupled with the enforced military support duties summarized above first weakened the labor force and then increased its burdens in the ways we have just discussed. For example, a Communist source reports that "In Tsachi village the men that can work constitute only 33 percent of the total labor force, while in Changkeng it is only 25 percent."\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101}Tsu-han Lin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{103Peoples China, Vol. IV, no. 1 (July 1, 1951), p. 46.}
e. *Proven Worth*

We have no exact way to evaluate the behavior of the armed forces, the number of Chinese who accepted the "new image" or the degree to which they accepted it. We can say here that Western sources all describe periods when popular support would be assumed to be high: during the Sino-Japanese War the people tended to support any army who would protect them. During the 1949 takeover the Communists had a bandwagon rolling. Since 1949, if the bandwagon is still rolling, it has been probably rolling more slowly and it is reasonable to assume that a certain percent of the populace has jumped off. However, what percent were originally on it and what percent have jumped off we cannot estimate. We can also point out that Communist press or document releases about military behavior contradict Party claims that the military was a pack of angels. Logically we know that the economic burden imposed on the population must have dampened popular enthusiasm for the military, but to what degree we do not know. At the same time we are faced with the irrefutable fact that if the Communist military had not commanded considerable support, it could not have survived.

Perhaps the most helpful point we can bring to bear here is the fact that the Chinese Communists have retained the new military image strategy in areas being consolidated by the PLA. If the total assessment made by the Peking leadership had not found the effort worthwhile in the struggle to defeat Chiang Kai-shek, they would certainly not have retained the same approach in dealing with the border area minority nationalities, Tibetans
and Koreans. The degree of success of these efforts is more questionable than those of the guerrilla period.

The Communists attempted to win over some minority groups during the civil war to serve as allies against the Kuomintang. The Red Army supposedly treated them with the same consideration shown members of the dominant Han ethnic group and exhibited special respect for their customs and mores. According to the mainland press, positive PLA behavior towards minorities continues on an expanded scale:

In the minority nationalitites areas in which they are stationed, units of the People's Liberation Army always firmly execute the Party's policy of equality among nationalities and solidarity among nationalities and respect for the customs and religious beliefs of the nationalities people.

In the Korean conflict the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) were frequently described as behaving in the best "revolutionary tradition". Once again the specifics of behavior were those employed during the civil war and Peking incumbency; the claims were also similar. The CPV showed respect for the people, held numerous social functions with them, and worked in the fields and on construction projects together with civilians. In return they were supposedly adored, and their departure aroused great sorrow. The Communist forces even tried a similar policy.

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105 For example, see: Snow, Red Star Over China, op. cit., pp. 347-354.


107 For examples of these claims, see: "The Eight Years of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea," NCNA-English Peking (Oct. 25, 1958), SCMP, No. 1884 (Oct. 29, 1958), pp. 18-27; Yung Yang, Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers, "Report on the Work of the Chinese People's Volunteers During the Eight
in their initial occupation of Seoul. Chinese-trained North Korean military personnel followed a policy of "consistent politeness and courtesy"; and respectful treatment of women.108 An anti-communist and middle-class newspaperman remarked that, "the soldiers did not arrest people directly and they did not strike persons on the streets, except some of the guerrillas."109

The PLA tried to secure popular support in Tibet through the same devices. Chinese publications for overseas consumption reported the common Tibetan's love for the P.L.A. and the soldiers' kindnesses toward the people.110 In 1953 the P.L.A.'s relationship with the civilians was described in glowing terms.

Central People's Government and P.L.A. personnel keep perfect discipline. They never infringe even in the slightest degree on the interest of the Tibetan people....During harvest time, PLA men help in the busy work of the farms. This aid springs from true friendship, and is given without a demand for returns in any form. An example of the just policy adopted by the P.L.A. in its dealings with the people is shown in the fair rates of payment for services done....Naturally the discipline and exemplary conduct of the P.L.A. have won them universal respect and unified them even more closely with the Tibetans.111

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109 Ibid., p. 66.


In 1955 the *New York Times* agreed with CCP claims, reporting that "Their troops have behaved in exemplary fashion..." According to the Chinese Communists, even during and after the rebellion the "people" continued to exhibit massive support for the PLA, and the troops in turn dealt with the civilians in the most gentle manner. "Wherever the PLA troops went, the Tibetans treated them like kinsmen returned home after a long absence."

The Tibetan case supplies an example of PLA behavior when the populace refuses the "carrot". After the Tibetan revolt in 1958-59, Tibetan refugees report extensive army brutality, economic requisitions and forced labor. The priority of Chinese Communist control over favorable public opinion is clear.

B. The Propaganda Follow-through

The Communist leadership quickly capitalized on the political propaganda potential possessed by a popular army, and the Red Army became the Party's chief "agitator and seeding-machine" of Communist revolution. A 1931 Communist publication illustrates

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113 For example, see: "The Rebirth of Tibet," *Peking Review*, Vol. II, no. 16 (April 21, 1959), pp. 6-7; and "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy," *Peking Review*, Vol. II, no. 19 (May 12, 1959), pp. 6-15. The latter article, which originally appeared in the May 6 issue of *JMP*, was also a special supplement to the May 5 issue of *Peking Review*.


the Party's use of military activists as a transmission belt for CCP policies:

The leading military cadres ... link up the struggle against counter-revolution with our agrarian policy and the reconstruction of the Soviet and Party apparatus....

Since 1949 the Party has developed other propaganda activists. However, the PLA still has a particular utility in "popularizing the policies of the national government." It derives from the PLA's function of defending the regime against external enemies, i.e., from its image as the shield of the nation. Patriotic motives can be exploited more effectively in support of Party policies if these are advocated and propagandized by servicemen.

1. Organization and Vehicles

The fundamental organizational characteristic of military propaganda work has been the location of control in the Political Department and cadres of the Communist military establishment. As the political director of the 8th Route Army stated to the CCP, "work among the civil populace" is "political work" and is organized to insure that its success will strengthen Party power rather than encourage military independence. In the early years of the guerrilla period such work was only assigned to the Political Department. An increasingly indoctrinated army has


118 Quoted in Carlson, Twin Stars of China, op. cit., p. 79.

meant more propaganda assignments for military personnel, but it has always been the Political Department which "organized special groups of men and women for agitation and propaganda." 120

The Party had to resort to other organizational devices because of the scope of the propaganda effort and the difficulties caused by assigning only political cadres to propaganda work. It formed agitation teams that included the more reliable soldiers, and have become an increasingly more important instrument of policy since 1929. 121 Described variously as the "Propaganda Corps" 122 and "agitation and propaganda departments", 123 the teams came to implement the bulk of civilian propaganda work. By the late 1930's the Party directed that "A propaganda corps should be attached to every battalion..." 124 Although the Communists relied heavily on these teams, especially important propaganda tasks remained in the hands of the political cadres. 125

The Party also organized special propaganda auxiliaries under the military establishment. These auxiliaries handled internal indoctrination in the army and external propagandizing of the population, relieved the work pressure on the military personnel engaged in propaganda work, and brought special communication skills to bear on their responsibilities. Often called "cultural groups," the auxiliaries of today stem from the part

120 Ibid., p. 205.
122 Smedley, Chinese Destinies, op. cit., p. 171.
125 For examples, see: Lapwood, op. cit., pp. 46, 50.
time "Red Blouses" of the early guerrilla years \(^126\) and more formal units such as the "Front Service Group" organized during the war with Japan.\(^127\) Organizations primarily concerned with organizing the population also handled propaganda activities. Prominent examples were the New Fourth Army's "Political Service Corps" and the 8th Route's "Front Mobilization Committees". All such groups were in the purview of the Political Department.

Within material limits the propaganda organization of the PLA used all conceivable devices of persuasion. Oral agitation was carried out by members of the army.\(^128\) Military publishing departments produced newspapers, journals and books.\(^129\) "Propaganda corps present plays, write slogans even on trees walls and stones as they march, deliver lectures and publish wall newspapers...".\(^130\) A Western observer reported that in North China Communist areas "walls are covered with simple ...drawing and appropriate slogans."\(^131\)

If possible, the Red forces "sent propaganda corps into the villages ahead of our troops to explain our purpose in coming."\(^132\) After they arrived, they organized a mass meeting where propaganda was presented in a form that could be understood.

\(^128\) For example, see: Wales, *Inside Red China*, op. cit., p. 209.
\(^129\) For example, see: Carlson, *The Chinese Army*, op. cit., pp. 127-129.
\(^131\) Uhlmann, op. cit., p. 87.
\(^132\) Ho Lung is quoted in Forman, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

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by the illiterate mass of the population. As Po Ku explained, "As a rule we use dramas to call people together for the first meetings; the dramas are political in content and explain the Red Army."\textsuperscript{133} Meanwhile, other members of the propaganda corps made speeches in the streets, taught children and adults songs, put up drawings and photographs.\textsuperscript{134} This vanguard propaganda was reinforced by repeated propaganda directed at the illiterate masses. Numerous "mobile theatrical troupes" were kept busy. One such troupe in Shansi Province made the following report on its activities in the early 1940's:

In two years we have produced twenty plays and performed them to 110,800 people. Plays have to be brief and self-contained, for the programs are often cut short by emergencies. They must be simple and realistic, for we have no more equipment than we can carry, and costumes are usually limited to what can be borrowed from peasants and soldiers. They must not depend on elaborate lighting effects, since often they are illuminated only by the torches which people bring as tickets-of-entry. Their plot must be close to the daily lives of the audience....\textsuperscript{135}

As materials became available, these "morality" plays were supplemented by lantern slides. These were used extensively during the takeover of the mainland. For example, in May and July, 1949, the cultural corps of the Third Field Army claimed to have shown their slides to 17,700 civilians.\textsuperscript{136}

By 1949 the Communist armed forces could use a large array of propaganda devices on civilians within areas under their

\textsuperscript{133}Quoted in Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{134}Belden, The New Fourth Army, op. cit., p. 228.
\textsuperscript{135}Quoted in Hogg, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
\textsuperscript{136}Bodde, op. cit., p. 228.
control. The citizens of Peking were thought worthy of a comprehensive propaganda effort, and Doak Barnett writes of mass meetings, victory parades and

Propaganda trucks . . . distributing leaflets to everyone. Professional dancers . . . performed the Communist theme dance, the Yangko. . . . Huge cloth banners with Communist slogans written in large black characters were hoisted. . . . army propaganda groups toured the streets, gave lectures, passed out leaflets. The press and radio got into the groove and repeated innumerable proclamations, official orders and memorials building up the Communists. Two large Communist information centers were set up, and in them veteran political workers from the Red Army Political Department answered questions about the Communists and their policies. Communist slogans were painted all over the place. Posters by the thousands were pasted on walls, store windows, telephone poles.137

The P.L.A. and its predecessors have been trying to adapt these devices to reach non-Han groups under their control, primarily by translating and adapting the messages and by using military propagandists affiliated with the target group. For example, after the Long March efforts to propagandize the Moslem peasantry relied heavily on Moslem Red personnel.138 After the CCP conquest of Tibet an Editing and Translation Committee was established in Tibetan P.L.A. Headquarters.139 In 1958 Han soldiers tried to learn minority languages.140

139Ginsburgs and Mathos, op. cit., p. 255.
2. Propaganda Content

The messages produced by the military propaganda apparatus tried to arouse feelings of fear, self-interest and nationalism. Although their specific content altered with shifts in CCP policy, they all proclaimed "follow the Party line, support the Communists and you will have less to fear, you will live better, and your nation shall be strong". Communist failure, the propaganda emphasized, meant misery for the many and affluence for only the unscrupulous few.

The Party propaganda machine used the themes of brutality and punishment to arouse fear in the civilians for two purposes: 1) to arouse the civilians against the Communist opponents. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War military propagandists were instructed to "expose all the atrocities and inhumanities of the enemy and to use all appropriate materials and evidence."\textsuperscript{141} The peasants were told that "It is the treacherous game of the Japanese to give grain and candies to villagers at the first moment and to kill them at the next moment."\textsuperscript{142} They were informed that "The enemy has sacked and burned hundreds of villages, violated our women, bayoneted our children, polluted our wells, stolen our food."\textsuperscript{143} During the Korean War the Party propagandists concocted germ warfare charges and lavishly detailed atrocity stories. 2) discourage resistance to the Party and Red Army. Military propagandists attacked non-conformists as

\textsuperscript{141} Peng, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
traitors, spies, Trotskyites, and counter-revolutionary elements. Armed strength was used for judicious propaganda of the act, in this case coercion of selected non-Communist civilians. Physical pressure served to warn others to cooperate.

To arouse civilian feelings of self-interest the propagandists presented the Party as a "Robin Hood". As they described the wickedness of anti-Communists, they also described the benefits which would accrue to the populace through the army and its master, the CCP. The people were told that the Party would eliminate those who preyed on them. During the movement the Party altered the definition of the "people" and the "oppressors". Before the united front the "oppressors" constituted a large group to which the Party did not appeal. The "people" were the lower economic classes to which the Party made self-interest appeals. Two 1928 posters of the Red Army Political Department illustrate this theme:

Down with the landlords and rich merchants, looters and deceivers of the poor. Land to the peasants.
Eight hour day for the workers. Down with the Kuomintang, running dogs of the imperialists. Long live the Red Army of workers and peasants.
To the masses of .... town. On this day the Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the vanguard of the Chinese Revolution, has confiscated the following from the rich who oppress and loot the poor .... The Red Army has taken nothing from the workers or peasants, nothing from the small traders, 145

The Party also circulated slogans such as "The Red Army is the army of the poor men" and "Down with the Landlords who Eat our Flesh". 146

144 Belden, China Shakes the World, op. cit., p. 234.
During and after the United Front the Communists made appeals to the self-interest of a broader cross-section of the population. For example, Lin Piao promised the inhabitants of Peking that:

1) People's lives and property will be protected. Looting and killing are strictly forbidden. 2) Chinese individual commercial and industrial property will be protected. Private factories, banks, godowns, etc. will not be touched and can continue operating. 3) Bureaucratic capital will be taken over...although private shares will be respected. Those wishing to continue serving will be employed. 4) Schools, hospitals and public institutions will be protected. 5) Except for a few major war criminals and notorious reactionaries, all Kuomintang officials, police and pao-chia workers of the provincial, municipal, and hsien governments will be pardoned if they do not offer armed resistance. 6) As soon as a city is liberated, displaced soldiers should report immediately. Anyone surrendering his weapons will not be questioned. [147]

The Party did not feel that short-term propaganda inducements had to coincide with long-term policy.

Although self-interest appeals of the earlier years of the movement have been converted into long-range utopian promises, appeals to nationalism have remained a constant propaganda theme. The advantage of this propaganda theme is that feelings of nationalism are disassociated from specific group interests. They can also be disassociated from attitudes toward the Party because the people are asked not to serve a particular political group or to accept a particular socio-economic program. They are asked to acknowledge a higher loyalty to the nation. As defenders of the nation the military was an especially appropriate purveyor of this appeal. Propaganda of this nature naturally had

particular value during the Sino-Japanese War and at that time replaced social revolution as the main theme of Communist propaganda.

C. Organizing the People

If the Party had not organized popular support, it would have become a "homeless band of adventurers"\(^\text{148}\) and the Red Army could not have compensated for personnel and armament deficiencies.

The New Fourth Army is more deficient in the point of arms than any other army participating in this war, and consequently we especially depend on the strength and support of the masses in opposing forces with superior mechanization. Our mass work is inseparable from our military work.\(^\text{149}\)

To capitalize on positive public opinion the Party had to establish organizations which 1) could direct the energies of the base area population advantageously (government) and 2) would tie popular loyalties to the representatives of the CCP (mass organizations). The party turned to the military to establish these organizations for two reasons: 1) need to restrain certain population elements, and 2) need for qualified personnel. The need for coercive restraint during the insurgent period is obvious. Socio-economic groups opposed to wealth distribution, Kuomintang supporters, and Kuomintang and Japanese attack all required the presence of coercive force to establish and operate CCP-affiliated organizations. After 1949 the CCP was involved in "bandit suppression" and establishment of "revolutionary order," and had to use force to consolidate its power well into 1952.\(^\text{150}\)

\(^{149}\) Hsiang, Yeh, and Staffs, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

\(^{150}\) See: *The First Year of Victory*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950; Yu Su, "Report on the Suppression of Bandity" (delivered at meeting on Nov. 19, 1951), of the 4th Session of the East
and 1950, 1,060,000 "bandits" were supposedly "inactivated" in Central-South China alone.\textsuperscript{151} The army received orders to confiscate all weapons\textsuperscript{152} and expose and eliminate "counter-revolutionary" elements.\textsuperscript{153} Mao admitted that the "main force" of the "counter-revolutionaries" were liquidated in China in this period.\textsuperscript{154} When Mao lectured Party cadres, he recognized that it was more efficient to use the army to organize populations which also had to be repressed.

The organizational work of the Party and the mass movement in most parts of the country are directly linked with armed struggle, and there is not, and cannot be, any Party work or mass movement that is independent and isolated.\textsuperscript{155}

The second reason that the Party assigned the military organizational tasks was its own personnel shortage. For example, in 1933, although the army only numbered 300,000, the Party had a membership of only 300,000 and needed any assistance that the army could provide.\textsuperscript{156} The population of Communist-controlled areas, even in the guerrilla years, indicates the magnitude of

\begin{itemize}
  \item S. B. Thomas, Government and Administration in Communist China, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, p. 41, extracts this figure from JMJP (Oct. 30, 1951).
  \item For example, see: Yang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 168.
  \item For example, see: Gould, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 187; Chen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.
  \item Mao, Selected Works, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 279.
\end{itemize}
administrative and organizational tasks. In the summer of 1935 the CCP claimed that the population of the "permanent revolutionary centers" was 56.57.4 million. By March, 1938, the total number of subjects was estimated at 75 million. During World War II the population increased slowly to 94.95.5 million, but by this time it was spread over an area approximately three times the size of France, i.e., 800,000 square kilometres. In the next five years the CCP came into control of over 500 million people. Even before 1949 the CCP administered an area and population comparable to that of several countries. After 1949 its administrative and organizational needs were immense. The Communists inherited approximately 720,000 civil servants, but by 1953 their civil government apparatus had expanded to require the services of 3,310,000 personnel. This number did not include the Party personnel requirements for enrolling the population in numerous mass organizations and campaigns.


159 The smaller population figure and the area appear in Yung, op. cit., p. 153; the larger population figure, in Nieu Jung-chen, op. cit., p. 28.


161 For a Communist description, see: E. Simonov, "The Fighting China," Soviet Literature, No. 10 (Oct., 1950), pp. 3-110. For the report of a Western observer, see: G. William Skinner,
Party complicated its personnel problems because it was reluctant to entrust key administrative and organizational positions to holdover personnel.

During the guerrilla years and the early incumbent years the Party relied on the military to assume organizational and administrative assignments because the army combined these characteristics: 1) a coercive instrument; 2) the most, if not only, sizeable instrument at Party disposal; and 3) a politically reliable instrument. The Party's policy, particularly during the guerrilla years, was "to train our men so that even if only one escaped alive he would be able to rise up and lead the people." 162

Military organizational and administrative activity produced three control problems for the Party: 1) the army might use control of the population to overthrow the CCP; 2) the army might be unwilling to accept the authority of civilians who occupied government positions; and 3) the army might be unwilling to relinquish these posts to civilians. In 1928 Mao characterized this military function as a stopgap measure to be terminated at the first opportunity. In 1954, as soon as the civil administrative apparatus could be staffed from non-PLA actives, the Party terminated military control of government on the regional, provincial and local levels. 163

Between 1928 and 1954 the Party resorted to these control devices. It assigned the military Political Department to

162 Smedley, The Great Road, op. cit., p. 237.
supervise organizational work, presuming that political workers
were more amenable to CCP orders. It also assumed that political
workers would respect civil government authority and not usurp
it for army purposes.  

However, Communist releases indicate
that even commissar military personnel tended to impose their
will on civilian officials. During the 1942 rectification cam-
paign Mao told the military cadres that:

Generally speaking, wherever an army cadre is actually
in the responsible position, he should principally
bear the blame if he cannot get on with the civilian
cadres. Army cadres must realize their own responsi-
bility and be modest towards civilian cadres before
we can create the conditions for both military work
and construction work in the base areas to proceed
smoothly.  

The Party began an intensive indoctrination program in 1942 to
instill respect in the military for civilian authority. An
Indian diplomat described a play presented to PLA personnel.

Its theme was the jealousy that a victorious general
felt toward the chief minister on the plausible
argument that but for his strategic abilities, the
State would have been destroyed, and there would have
been no place for a chief minister. His claim there-
fore was that the civil authorities should be con-
sidered inferior in rank and position to him. It is
the queen that mediates in the quarrel and brings
the presumptuous general to see the wisdom of allowing
the affairs of state to be run by civil authorities.  

Since 1954 the Party has continued to use the military to
organize and administer a population which must also be controlled.
For example, in Tibet the PLA established and still directs civil
institutions. In 1951 the "Seventeen Point" agreement concluded

154 Yung, op. cit., p. 158.
between the leaders of Tibet and Peking called for a "Military and Administrative Committee". The PLA then established local Military Control Committees. Since 1951 the CCP Work Committee in Tibet has been under Col. Gen. Chang Ching-wu. Military commander Chang Kuo-hua has been Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet and has frequently been the spokesman for administrative policy. The chief PLA commissars with the troops in Tibet, Tan Kuan-san and Fan Ming, have held responsible positions in the regional Party and administrative organs. In 1959 a drastic land reform program was announced by General Chang Kuo-hua, and army cadres were ordered to assist in its implementation.

a. Assignments and Devices

In the precarious years in the South and immediately after the Long March the Communists tried to leave one or two selected cadres in the villages near their sphere of influence to implement political policies and organize mass associations. The military conducted special training classes for these cadres and placed them under the direction of the "mass movement" or "People's

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167 This stipulation is contained in point 15. The text of the "Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" can be found in The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, op. cit., pp. 139-142.


169 Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic, op. cit., p. 178.


171 Fenê, op. cit., p. 30.
Movement division of the Red Army's Political Department." 172

The Party began its mass organization work in 1928, 173 and the New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies continued it during the Sino-Japanese War. 174 Preferably the personnel was political cadres or indoctrinated natives of the assigned area. To minimize the reduction in combat strength this policy entailed, the CCP resorted to special auxiliary units directed by the military political departments. These units were composed of women and senior citizens and released the regular soldiers from village work after the organizations had been launched. Examples of the former were the New Fourth Army's "War Service Corps" 175 and the South Shantung "Anti-Japanese Working Group". These groups were specifically charged with establishing political institutions. For instance, in June, 1938, the Anti-Japanese Working Group formulated a program for the reorganization of county (hsien) government and directed its application. 176 The military political Departments and these organizations then proceeded to organize "Front Mobilization" or "Mass Mobilization" committees to solidify Party control. 177 Often such committees were subordinated

173 Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 213.
to a regional executive, who in turn was directly responsible to the local Communist military political director. 178

The obligation of these military organizers was to establish a network of mass organization to involve all civilians in Communist-controlled groups and to administer CCP social policies. Various Communist sources described the assignments of the Red Army for the early guerrilla years and during the Sino-Japanese War.

We helped rearrange the old Soviet districts, and consolidate the people's sovereignty into new ones. We confiscated the food and land from the landlords, helped divide the land, established mass organizations and the Soviets.... 179

When the Red Army takes a village it first calls a mass meeting of the whole population, explains the Red Army and its program. Then it calls for formation of a temporary village revolutionary committee by popular vote. The revolutionary committee then undertakes the investigative duties preliminary to formation of a soviet. 180

The role of the Communist forces in the war against Japan was defined to include:

spreading the mass movement most extensively so that all the people behind the enemy lines, except those in his strongholds, can be organized; creating organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power on as large a territory as possible.... 181

Communists guerrillas were told that "they should restore our

178 For an example, see: Carlson, The Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 123.
179 Smedley, The Great Road, op. cit., p. 294.
180 Lo Fu is quoted in Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, op. cit., p. 88.
administration ...[and] ...organize the people."¹⁸² Military cadres set up "farmers' unions, workers' unions, student unions, teachers' unions"¹⁸³ and women's and youth organizations.¹⁸⁴ Although armed forces personnel usually did not participate in their day to day operations, cadres returned in periods of special crisis or to implement a new and important CCP policy.¹⁸⁵ Military cadres were assigned administrative tasks whose success would break the power of strong anti-Communist civilian groups. Specific rules about taxation, debts, market prices were implemented by the army political sections.¹⁸⁶ Land reform was of particular interest to the CCP, and armed forces cadres directed the redistribution process during the first civil war period and, on a diminished scale, during the conflict with Japan.¹⁸⁷

b. The Army-Government Relationship

We deal here with the relationship of military and governmental authority and the extent of overlapping responsibility and experience among governmental and military elites to determine the military's governmental role. It should be noted that during the guerrilla years the civil government was a minor organizational instrument compared with the Red Army, although both organizations

¹⁸³Strong, One-Fifth of Mankind, op. cit., p. 142.
¹⁸⁴Hanson, "The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas," op. cit., p. 287.
¹⁸⁵Band, op. cit., p. 128.
¹⁸⁶For example, see: Smedley, Chinese Destinies, op. cit., p. 172.
¹⁸⁷Hanson, "The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas," op. cit., p. 291, cites two Eighth Route publications: Shang-hsing t'ao, Fundamental Problems of Guerrilla Warfare; and Regulations on Rent Reduction and Land Distribution, Political Department, Central Hopei Headquarters, March, 1938.
were subject to political hegemony.

Fragmentary knowledge of the assignments of the Chinese Communist elite during this period makes accurate statistical analysis impossible, but available information does indicate the great extent to which important military men were also important government officials. In the initial period of Communist guerrilla warfare, the leaders of the scattered armed bands handled all tasks—military, political and administrative. After the 1931 Soviet Congress the Party sought more differentiation to minimize political control problems and the drain on military manpower and created a relatively independent government apparatus.\(^{188}\) However, differentiation was only partial during the guerrilla years. The Party was forced to assign its small corps of Marxist personnel to the highest priority assignments, i.e., to the military. When it tried to staff civil government and mass organization posts it could not remove this personnel from their military assignments. Therefore, these individuals assumed multiple tasks. Even when the Party developed a separate group of local administrators, above the county level the army appointed and co-ordinated this group.\(^{189}\) It was not until the early 1940's that significant differentiation between government and military officials appears. Even at this time the men who administered the military, and to a lesser extent, civil departments, had often had military experience.

Examples of the career flow can be found in the histories

\(^{188}\) Smedley, The Great Road, op. cit., p. 294.
\(^{189}\) Yung, op. cit., p. 8; Carlson, The Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 122.
of the six members of the first Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee whose CCP careers continued for a number of years: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Teng Fa, Wang Chia-hsiang, Jen Pi-shih, and Hsiang Ying.\textsuperscript{190} Mao organized one of the first guerrilla bands, served as political commissar with Chu Teh, was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee in 1931 and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council in 1935. Chu Teh served as military commander with Mao and in February, 1934, was appointed to the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee, People's Commissar for Military Affairs, and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee. Teng Fa served first in the Red Army and then in the political police. Wang was a prominent commissar. Jen later served as chairman of the Hunan-Hupeh Soviet and as Front Political Commissar of the Eighth Route Army, Hsiang Ying was deputy chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet and later Vice-commander of the New Fourth Army.

Concurrent office-holding was the standard procedure in new or especially vulnerable areas of Communist penetration. For example, Chang Ting-ch'eng served as Chairman of the Southwest Fukien Military and Political Committee in 1935, and Chen I as Military Governor and Chairman in Kiangsi Province in 1931. This dual assignment technique was used during the expansion of the North China Communist areas. Nieh Jung-chen's career provides an example: while he was a military commander in Hopei province, he was also the "founder and builder" of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region. It is difficult to find an early Communist

\textsuperscript{190} Wales, \textit{Inside Red China}, op. cit., p. 341.
military leader who was not at some time involved in governmental activity.\textsuperscript{191}

By the middle 1940's the Communist position had improved sufficiently that the Party was able to separate government and military cadres. By this time the Party had acquired relatively secure base areas, and military coercion had become less important within them. The Communists also sought an expanded popular base, and it became advisable for the Party to bring many supposedly non-Communists into government (i.e., the one-third policy, in which two-thirds of the civil government personnel were not to be connected with the Party). A significant pressure for the Party to separate government and military officials was naturally its theories of control, which recommended separate functional groups at the local level in the place of unified more powerful military-government organs.

By 1945 Border Region Government rosters listed few active military men, and these did not formally occupy leading positions. However, they continued to dominate the committee which was charged with military matters and which was not placed under the regional authorities.\textsuperscript{192}

2. The Incumbent Years

The People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC), the National Defense Council (NDC), and the system of large administrative regions have given the armed forces a prominent position


\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., pp. 2404-2405.
in the administrative structure of Communist China.

The Common Programme of the People's Republic, promul-
gated in 1949, created the PRMC and granted it "unified control
and command" of the "People's Liberation Army and other people's
armed forces."193 Until the PRMC was eliminated in 1954, it was
a separate unit, independent of and at least equal to the co-
ordinating administrative body, the General Administrative
Council (GAC). It was only subordinate to the Central People's
Government Council (CGPC),194 a body which often met only every
two months.195 The Council had its own staff and controlled the
regular functionaries of PLA headquarters. The PRMC controlled
special bureaus which handled national administrative functions
in militarily sensitive programs. Their responsibilities included
railways, tele-communications and civil aviation.196 The Council
was also represented on ad hoc administrative groups convened to
deal with especially critical problems. For example, the Council
was represented in the joint examination group convened in
August, 1951, to investigate timber supply problems. The PRMC
also exercised substantial control over local and provincial

193 The Common Programme and Other Documents of the First Plenary
Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952, Article 23,
5, 41.

194 Thomas, op. cit., p. 41.

195 K. C. Chao, Some Current Political Developments in Communist
China, Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massa-

196 Henry Wei, State and Government in Communist China: Their Ideo-
logical Basis and Statutory Pattern to the Spring of 1953,
"Studies in Chinese Communism" of the Human Resources Research
Institute, Lackland Air Force Base: Air Force Personnel and
Training Research Center, June, 1955, p. 35; Barnett, op. cit.,
ADB-29, Aug. 29, 1949, p. 4.
government through regional and urban Military and Political Committees and Military Control Commissions. The jurisdiction of the regional Committees was identical with that of Field Armies and their top personnel almost identical. These regional committees were not responsible to the General Administrative Council but to the CPGC and as military units to the FRMC.\footnote{197}

In December, 1951, an Administrative Committee was announced for the North China Region and placed under the GAC. On November 15, 1952, the CPGC decreed that the:

\begin{quote}
Military and Administrative Committee of every administrative area is without any exception changed into an Administrative Committee. The Administrative Committee represents the Central people's Government to direct and supervise the work of the local governments in its area.\footnote{198}
\end{quote}

According to Ho Lung, the change was designed "to meet the necessary requirements of large-scale economic construction".\footnote{199} However, the change was illusory. Except for the North China Committee the re-named bodies did not function as sub-units of the GAC, and on January 14, 1953, their former chairmen were re-appointed.\footnote{200} The change in the North China Region was substantive because: 1) Peking wanted to reduce the power of North China Leader Kao Kang and re-establish central control; 2) the Communists had ruled it longer and weeded out many of the insurgent elements; and 3) it was a Communist industrial stronghold, which implied the

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
need for administrative specialists.

The Military Control Commissions were the chosen device for the initial period of Communist occupation. Their function and duration were stated in Article 14 of the Common Program of the People's Republic:

In all places newly liberated by the P.L.A., military control shall be exercised and the KMT reactionary organs of state power shall be abolished. The CPGC or the military and administrative organs at the front shall appoint personnel to organize military control commissions and local people's governments which shall lead the people in establishing revolutionary order and suppressing counter-revolutionary activities and, when conditions permit, shall convene people's representatives conferences.

The duration of military control shall be determined by the Chinese People's Government according to the military and political conditions prevailing in the different localities.

In all places where military operations have completely ended, and where agrarian reform has been thoroughly carried out and people of all circles have been fully organized, elections based on universal franchise shall be held and local people's congresses convened immediately.

As summarized by Professor Arthur Steiner, the function of the commissions was set forth in a June 10, 1948, directive of the Northeastern Branch Bureau of the Party Central Committee. Faced with the new problem of governing urban areas, the Party had to rely on the military commanders. However, the Party took care to restrict their authority. The MCC was chaired by a PIA officer and assisted by a special garrison force. Although the MCC was supposed to reflect the policies of non-Communist groups, its subordination to the "next higher" military authority indicated

\[\text{Common Programme, op. cit., p. 7.}\]

that this was illusory. For example, in Peking the MCC did not respond to the wishes of non-Communist elites or of the population. It implemented the orders of the Peking-Tientsin headquarters of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{203} It would appear that the military ran these commissions. In reality the Party ran them through military political departments. "Within the typical MCC the Political Department becomes the key instrument, its director usually being the political commissar of the occupying forces or a person under his direct control."\textsuperscript{204}

By the end of 1954 the PLA was less director of civil government than it was implementor of the decisions of a civilian bureaucracy. On June 19, the administrative regions were abolished; consequently the local government powers of military commanders\textsuperscript{205} were diminished. In September the promulgation of a new constitution for the People's Republic sharply modified the position of the P.L.A. in the central government structure. The former SAC was replaced by a State Council which, according to Article 49, "guides the building up of the defense forces."\textsuperscript{206} The independent PRMC gave way to a Ministry of Defense which, like other ministries, was subordinate to the State Council.\textsuperscript{207} While a National Defense Council was formed on a level supposedly

\textsuperscript{203} Bodde, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{204} Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 58.
equivalent to the old FRMC, it actually had less power. Its
large membership, fluctuating between 94 and 114,²⁰⁸ and infre-
quently meetings indicate that it serves more as a sounding board
and ratification council than as a day to day executive body,²⁰⁹

Formal institution location can be a deceptive method of
analysis because it does not locate key individuals who occupy
administrative posts as well as high-level military positions.
Supplementing such information with elite analysis clarifies
the role played by the armed forces leadership in the civil orga-
nization of the mainland.

b. The Direct Role--the Wearing of Several Hats

As long as PLA units were assigned civil government tasks,
military personnel were assigned administrative posts. Whenever
possible such grants of power were given to PLA officers promi-
nent in the Party. In effect, the politico-military elite that
we have described for the early incumbent years became the admin-
istrative elite as well. Prominent examples were Jao Shu-shih and
Kao Kang. In 1950 Jao held these posts:

1) Political - regular member Central Committee of the CCP;
   First Secretary, East China Bureau of the CC of the CCP;
   Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CCP.

2) Military - Political Commissar, Third Field Army; Political
   Commissar, East China Military District; Member, People's
   Revolutionary Military Council.

²⁰⁸ The NDC was brought up to the latter figure in April, 1959.
NCNA-English, Peking (April 28, 1959), SCMP, No. 2004 (May 1,

²⁰⁹ Harold C. Hinton, "China," in George McTurhan Kahin (ed.),
Major Governments of Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
3) **Administrative** - Member, Central People's Government Council; Chairman, East China Military and Administrative Commission. ²¹⁰

In 1952 Kao was supposedly:

1) **Political** - Member, CC and Politburo of the CCP; Secretary, Northeast Bureau of the CC of the CCP,

2) **Military** - Vice-Chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander, Northeast Military District; Political Commissar, Northeast Military District.

3) **Administrative** - Vice-Chairman, Central People's Government; Chairman, State Planning Commission; Chairman, Northeast Administrative Commission; Chairman, People's Economic Committee of the Northeast. ²¹¹

Less prominent but reliable military personnel were given administrative tasks because of technical expertise, particularly when tasks assigned to the pre-1949 PRMC (a CCP organ) began to be shared with new ministries. Experienced individuals from the PRMC retained their program responsibilities in the PRMC and assumed responsibility for similar programs in the new ministries. For example, before the Peking regime was established Lu Cheng-ts'ao had directed the PRMC railway bureau. In September, 1949, he was appointed Vice-Minister of Railways. In 1950 his

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²¹⁰ Frederick T. C. Yu, *Key Leaders in Communist China*, Series III, no. 3, Human Resources Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, MS, May, 1953, p. 132.

responsibilities within that Ministry included: Director, General Engineering Bureau and Vice-Chairman, Warehouse Material Checking Committee. At this same time he was also Deputy Commander of the PLA Railway Corps.\(^{212}\)

The Party has broken up the politico-military-administrative elite. The trend toward differentiation between military and administrative elites is presented in Table XVI. The regular and alternate members of the CCP Central Committee serve as the sample on the assumption that they are the key individuals in the power structure of Communist China.

Table XVI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite assignments</th>
<th>1951 ((N = 74))</th>
<th>1956 ((N = 170))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party only</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party and Government</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party and Armed Forces</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party, Government, and Armed Forces</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1956 percentage of membership in all three elites is lower than the 1951 percentage, even when we define membership on the infrequently convened NDC as "military." Party prominence is required for membership in either the administrative or military


elite, but the CCP has taken pains to ensure that at high levels of power the same men do not control both coercive and administrative instruments.

This fundamental interpretation of the table is strengthened by separate examination of the administrative elite assignments of military council members as compared with active military personnel. If our interpretation is correct, both should have declined since 1951, but a higher percentage of council members than of active commanders should hold administrative posts. Our definition of administrative elite in the following analysis includes: ministers and vice-ministers, chairmen and members of key administrative councils and provincial governors. It excludes membership in the Central People's Government Council and in the National People's Congress since these imply little direct responsibility. Office-holding in the Ministry of Defense is excluded in order to analyze non-PLA administrative duties.

Table XVII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Council Members in Administrative Elite&lt;sup&gt;214&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>PRMC, 1953 (N=27)</th>
<th>NDC, 1959 (N=115)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council Officers</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Members</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we compare the data in Table XVII with information for the administrative elite positions of active military commanders

<sup>214</sup>Information has been collated from: A Guide to New China, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953; and GB, No. 597 (Oct. 8, 1959).
we find two conclusions: 1) a lower percentage of active military commanders than of Council members have held administrative posts since 1949; 2) after the early incumbent years very few have held administrative posts. The active commander category includes: high-ranking PLA commanders and commissars, staff directors of the PRMC and NDC, officers of the Ministry of Defense, and department directors in the PLA General Staff. Comparison of the following figures with the percentages in Table XVI supports both of our conclusions about the active commanders. In 1951 only 39% of the interlocking elite consisted of active military commanders also assigned to key Party and government posts. In 1956 this had shrunk to 9%, i.e., seven individuals.215

Examination of the civil government assignments of the Minister and Deputy-Ministers of Defense and of PLA staff department directors confirms conclusion two. The Party has not been more predisposed to assign administrative posts to Defense Ministry officials or to the PLA general staff than to field commanders and commissars. Since the establishment of the Defense Ministry in the mid-1950's, only the Minister of Defense has held another important administrative post. The eight to ten vice-ministers have not exercised substantial power in government organs not connected with the armed forces.216 PLA staff members have been similarly excluded from the administrative elite. This has been increasingly true with the aging of the Peking regime. In 1953,

215Ibid.

216See: CB, No. 316 (March 7, 1955); CB, No. 404 (July 26, 1956); CB, No. 513 (July 16, 1958); and CB, No. 578 (May 15, 1959); and CB, No. 597 (Oct. 8, 1959).
according to the official Guide to New China, two of the five staff members of the PLA were in the administrative elite.217 In 1955 and 1958 no one of the staffs of 14 and 26 men were in the administrative elite.218 Later discussion considers reasons for this decline in military membership in the administrative elite.

The nature of the administrative positions held by council members and active military commanders is as important as their percentage representation. Table XVIII and Table XIX show the changed location of administrative elite posts held by military council members and by active commanders.

Table XVIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location of Administrative Assignments of Military Council Members in Political Elite219</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location of Administrative Assignments of Active Military Commanders in Political Elite220</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

218 CB, No. 516 (March 7, 1955); and CB, No. 513 (July 16, 1958).
220 Ibid.
The presence of individuals in the "both" column indicates the gap between assignment and activity. These individuals could not perform their functions in both the provinces and in Peking. During 1951 dual assignments represented their transition to the central government structure. More importantly, these tables present evidence that the Party moved to eliminate possible independent militarism in the provinces, a revival of the geographically divisions of the warlord period. The 1956 entries reflect the dissolution of the Large Administrative Regions and of the Military Control Commissions. The change in sub-division administrative posts can be seen in the specific assignments held by a military commanders. In 1951 high-ranking PLA personnel chaired Military Control Commissions or served as mayors in the most important cities: Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, Peking, and Canton. They ran provincial governments in: Fukien, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Shensi, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Chekiang. They directed Large Administrative Regions. Party-sponsored reduction of military authority over the people at the lower levels had been completed by 1956 except in Fukien province and in Tibet. These exceptions were based on the factors stated earlier, particularly the continued need pacification in and the attack base function of these areas.

Change in the location of military directed organization of the people accompanied restriction in the scope of central government administrative tasks allotted to military personnel. A decline in the percentage of council members and active milit


222 The responsible individuals in these two areas were Col. Gen. Yeh Fei and Col. Gen. Chang Ching-wu.
The presence of individuals in the "both" column indicates the gap between assignment and activity. These individuals could not perform their functions in both the provinces and in Peking. During 1951 dual assignments represented their transition to the central government structure. More importantly, these tables present evidence that the Party moved to eliminate possible independent militarism in the provinces, a revival of the geographical divisions of the warlord period. The 1956 entries reflect the dissolution of the Large Administrative Regions and of the Military Control Commissions. The change in sub-division administrative posts can be seen in the specific assignments held by active military commanders. In 1951 high-ranking PLA personnel chaired Military Control Commissions or served as mayors in the most important cities: Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, Peking, and Canton. They ran provincial governments in: Fukien, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Shensi, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Chekiang. They directed Large Administrative Regions. 221 Party-sponsored reduction of military authority over the people at the lower levels had been completed by 1956 except in Fukien province and in Tibet. 222 These exceptions were based on the factors stated earlier, particularly the continued need for pacification in and the attack base function of these areas.

Change in the location of military directed organization of the people accompanied restriction in the scope of central government administrative tasks allotted to military personnel. A decline in the percentage of council members and active military

222 The responsible individuals in these two areas were Col. Gen. Yeh Fei and Col. Gen. Chang Ching-wu.
commanders holding administrative elite positions has been accompanied by a decline in the non-coercive significance of the positions held. In 1951 active commanders held positions of great and general influence in political and economic administration. Included were Vice-Chairmanships of the People's Republic, memberships on the General Administrative Council and the Ministries of Finance and Heavy Industry. In 1956 their responsibilities were very different. Only Minister of Defense Peng Teh-huai held a generalist position, that of Vice-Premier of the State Council. It can be assumed that he represented the needs and abilities of the PLA in the Council. Other positions were similarly attached to coercive duties: the ministries in charge of public security and defense industry. The other ministry occupied by an "active military commander" was that of land reclamation. As we shall see this function was largely entrusted to special PLA units and forced labor under their direction.

A similar decline has occurred in the importance of administrative elite positions held by members of the NDC as compared with its predecessor, the PRMC. The Council is still chaired by the Chairman of the People's Republic, now Liu Shao-ch'i, but the other officers of the Council in aggregate do not hold their former degree of administrative power. The 1953 Vice-Chairmen included the Premier of the General Administrative Council, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and two Vice-Chairmen.

223 The officeholders were: Lo Jui-ching; Sung Jen-chiung and Chao Erh-lu; and Wang Chen.
of the Republic— in other words, the heads of the administrative and economic sections and the dominant element in the Politburo were all members of the PRMC. The post-1954 NDC could not make the same claims. By 1955 Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i, then regarded as the second and third most powerful men in the CPR were no longer associated with administrative groups dealing with the PLA. Since that time the only important administrative posts held by many officers of the NDC have been Vice-Premierships of the State Council, the successor of the GAC and general overlord of administration. Even here their relative influence has declined. In 1955 five of the ten Vice-Premiers were officers of the NDC. In 1959 only six of the sixteen Vice-Premiers were officers in the Defense Council. Of the seven Vice-Chairmen of the 1953 PRMC six held important administrative posts. The same could be said for only seven of the fourteen 1959 Vice-Chairmen. However, the heads of ministries whose functions vitally affected the PLA retained vice-chairmanships of the NDC. Prominent examples are Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission Nieh Jung-chen.

Administrative elite positions held by ordinary members of the NDC are also of less importance. The 1953 PRMC membership

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224 These officeholders were: Chou En-lai; Kao Kang; and Chu Teh and Liu Shao-ch'i. See Chao, Some Current Political Developments in Communist China, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
225 CB, No. 316 (March 7, 1955).
226 CB, No. 597 (Oct. 8, 1959).
228 CB, No. 597 (Oct. 8, 1959).
occupied seven of 17 places on the State Planning Commission and six key posts in national ministries. From 1955-1959 administrative posts were relatively unimportant, e.g., membership on the Physical Culture and Sports Commission. Ministries directly involved with military personnel and military supplies were represented: 1) Minister of Finance, 2) Minister of Public Security, 3) Ministers of the First and Second Ministries of Machine Building, i.e., war materiel; 4) Minister and Vice-Minister of Railways, 5) Minister and Vice-Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation, 6) Minister of Forestry, and 7) Minister of Water Conservation and Electric Power. As we shall see, the last five administrative assignments correlate with the economic activities of the PLA. In other words, administrative directors of the major non-coercive activities of the PLA units participate in the NDC. This does not mean that they formulate policy for either the coercive or non-coercive functions of the military. The key policy decisions are made in the CCP Military Committee (see chapter 4). The status of the NDC and the ordinary membership of these ministers imply that they only approve pre-selected policy or discuss implementation.

The role of the military elite in the administration of civilians in the CPR has declined sizeably since 1953. The role of the military in the administration of the PLA has not declined.

It is true that the authority of professional staff personnel in


230 The men involved were: Sung Jen-chiang and Chao Erh-lu; T'eng Tai-yuan and Lu Cheng Ts'ao; Wang Chen and Hsiao K'o; Liu Wenhui; and Fu Tso-yi. The latter were former Nationalist commanders.
the NDC has declined. In 1955 they held three vice-chairmanships, and in 1958 they held none.\textsuperscript{231} This change is not significant because the NDC itself had lost significance. The Ministry of Defense which emerged as the key institution in PLA administration has been staffed by military professionals.

Our analysis of the direct administrative role of military personnel leads to two conclusions: 1) military administration of civilians is decreasing, but 2) military administration of the military is retained.

c. The Indirect Role: Supplying Elite Personnel

Dual office-holding has been the most visible administrative activity of the armed forces. However, a still greater number of key civil administrative posts have been held by elites transferred from military duty, where they received their original training and experience in administration. The Communist military "brass" no longer administers the People's Republic, but its former members dominate the administrative elite. In fact, the decline in dual office-holding is largely due to the transfer of many military commanders and commissars to elite government posts.

Numerous examples can be cited, both of elites who were transferred to government after the assumption of military power, e.g., Teng Hsiao-ping,\textsuperscript{232} and of elites who were not fundamentally military personnel, but executed military tasks under the pressures of revolutionary warfare, e.g., Liu Shao-ch'i. To a

\textsuperscript{231} CB, No 316 (March 7, 1955); and CB, No 513 (July 16, 1958).
limited extent the change in elite assignments signified an organizational transfer of certain administrative tasks from the military establishment to civil government. The elites themselves continued to perform exactly the same tasks; the only difference was the organization in which they performed them. The career of Wang Tzu-kang, Vice-Minister of Posts and Telecommunications in 1959, is one instance of this situation. More frequently, the change of assignment reflects changing Party priorities and the flexibility of the military cadres. For example, Cho Hsiung who had been Deputy Commissar to the 15th Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army after World War II was made Vice-Minister of Geology in 1959. Sometimes the former military responsibility has been largely of an administrative nature. For example, Sung Yu-ho, who had acquired administrative skills as Director of Supplies of the New Fourth Army, became Vice-Minister of Building in 1959.

The extent to which the military contributes indirectly, as compared with directly, to administration of the People's Republic can be seen in the interlocking elites of 1951 and 1956. Because they were prominent in the Party, these individual were deemed worthy of holding posts of power. Since Council membership since 1955 does not imply direct control of military operations, the increasing priority of administrative over military functions for this section of the interlocking elite is clear. However, the continuation of even tenuous contact of

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233 URS, Biographical Service, No. 352 (June 23, 1959).
Table XX
The Direct and Indirect Administrative Role of the Communist Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Men Holding Administrative Assignments</th>
<th>1951 (N = 73)</th>
<th>1956 (N = 76)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Military Elite</td>
<td>39% (29)</td>
<td>9% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Members</td>
<td>5% (4)</td>
<td>22% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive Military</td>
<td>25% (18)</td>
<td>22% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69% (51)</td>
<td>53% (41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

militarily experienced personnel with the armed forces is of interest. The same personnel do not control both administrative organs and troops, but military personnel are not separated entirely from the armed forces and are placed in positions where their expertise on defense policy is available to the CCP. The net result is that military administrative ability can be used without creating a powerful group capable of taking integrated action against the Party high command. At the same time former military leaders do not feel as if they have been completely removed from their former base of power.

The policy for staffing top administrative posts places elites familiar with the requirements of the pre-takeover Red forces in control of competitors with the military for funds, supplies and manpower. Either through their association with the Party or membership in the NDC many of these individuals are

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Active military men also on the Council are only considered to be in the former category for analytic purposes. Only males are included. Information is drawn from: Yu, op. cit., pp. 109-157; Hanrahan, op. cit., Appendix; CB, No. 111 (Aug. 29, 1951); and CB, No. 431 (Dec., 1956).

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continually reminded of the pressure of both military and civilian demands. Thus the military voice, at least of a former era, is well represented in executive councils in the Government of the People's Republic. While these individuals are under the immediate pressure of current administrative duties, their empathy with military needs and attitudes can be expected to exceed that of a purely civilian bureaucrat.

While the percentage of administrative members of the interlocking elite who have not held important military assignments rises, the key positions still rest in the hands of men with military experience. As late as September, 1959, their contribution to administration of the mainland was striking. In the State Council the Premier, fifteen of sixteen Vice-Premiers, and the Secretary General had been military elites.\textsuperscript{237} The Directors of the six General Offices responsible for Political and Legal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Trade, Industry and Communications, Agriculture and Forestry, and Culture and Education were all drawn from this group.\textsuperscript{238} Many major ministries were in their hands: Foreign Affairs, Public Security, Finance, Commerce, Railways, Communications, Foreign Trade.\textsuperscript{239} To these can be added two ministries held by Nationalist military defectors: Forestry and Water Conservancy. Important Commissions have as their chairmen trained military leaders: State Planning, National Economic, Scientific and Technological, Overseas Chinese Affairs,

\textsuperscript{237} The exception was Ch'\text{en} Yun.

\textsuperscript{238} The respective Directors were: Hsieh Fu-chih; Ch'\text{en} Yi; Li Hsien-nien; Li Fu-ch'un; Teng Tzu-hui; and Chang Chi-chuang.

\textsuperscript{239} The ministers were: Ch'\text{en} Yi; Hsieh Fu-chih; Li Hsien-nien; Ch'\text{eng} Tzu-hua; T'\text{eng} Tai-yuan; Wang Shou-tao; and Yeh Chi-chuang.
Nationalities. \textsuperscript{240} Vice-Ministers, who formerly held important military assignments, were found in these Ministries: Public Security, Chemical Industry, Geology, Building, Railways, Posts and Tele-Communications, Culture, and Public Health. \textsuperscript{241} A statistical estimate of trends in the employment of former military personnel for administration is not feasible because a complete list of office holders is not available and the number of ministries and staff constantly changed. Administrative expansions and the development of young experts would seem to imply a percentage decline in the use of some-time military leaders, but the number of officeholders among the military elite of the 1948-1951 period appears to have remained stable during the 1955-1959 period. \textsuperscript{242} Apparently the administrative elite is undergoing a process of augmentation, during which the seasoned veterans of revolutionary combat retain their administrative posts and relinquish the military sphere to an evolving group of coercive specialists. In staffing government posts, the Party seems to have made initial recourse to active military personnel and retained those individuals who proved administratively competent for permanent positions. The CCP has tried to develop politically reliable and technically expert civilian personnel. As these are

\textsuperscript{240} The Chairmen referred to were: Li Fu-ch'un; Po I-po; Nieh Jung-chen; Liao Cheng-chih; and Ulanfu.

\textsuperscript{241} The Vice-Ministers referred to were: Wang Chin-hsiang; Chang Chen; Cho Hsiung; Sung Yu-ho; Lu Cheng-ts'ao; Wang Tzu-kang; Ch'ien Chun-jui; and Su Ching-kuan and Ch'ien Hsin-chung.

\textsuperscript{242} This conclusion is based on the position held during these years by the military elite of 181 listed in Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg's \textit{Red China's Fighting Hordes}, Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1952, pp. 330-339.
produced, the less competent military men are shelved in favor of the new civilian experts.

The Peking diplomatic corps provides an example of this pattern in an area in which the revolutionary military elite had had singularly little experience. After its first year of existence the ambassadorial corps was predominantly military in background. In October, 1950, at least eight of the eleven ambassadors of the People's Republic had held responsible posts in the Red Army. After a decade former military men still were predominant in ministerial posts within the Communist bloc. However, the more delicate positions in neutralist and European nations were directed by specially trained personnel.

It is probable that the policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of subjecting experts without military background to the tutelage of a seasoned revolutionary, first Chou En-lai and now Chen I, is also followed in many of the other administrative sections headed by some-time military leaders. It is also probable that as the new specialists demonstrate their subservience to the CCP and the revolutionary generation goes its way, the administrative responsibilities assigned to men who have been military actives will diminish.

243 Ibid.
245 Ibid., p. 35. Wang Yu-p'ing's career is an exception to this pattern. After holding military posts during the struggle for power, he proved his ambassadorial ability in Rumania and was then sent to Norway and Cambodia. Another is the former political commissar Kan Yeh-t'ao. After serving as an attaché in North Korea and Indonesia, he was appointed ambassador to Finland in January, 1959. URS, Biographical Service, No. 316. (March 17, 1959).
d. Mass Organization

The high incidence of personnel with military experience in the central and regional government structures erected by the CCP was accompanied by activity in the mass organizations, local government and mass campaigns. Each PLA field army had a "Popular Movements Department" under the Political Department to handle such assignments. **246** These were the devices used to organize the mass of the population and execute Party policy in the smallest village. The mass organizations, which are national bodies, supplement the Communist pillars of power, and allow the Party to supervise the activities of individuals who are not already involved in its own membership, the armed forces, or in the government bureaucracy.

Military leaders have not played as important a role in these organizations as in the civil administration. However, their contributions did include labor and youth organizations, **247** the ACFTU and the NDYL, later renamed the Communist Youth League. As of 1953 the honorary Chairman, Liu Shao-chi, and two of the three Vice-Chairmen of the ACFTU had served in the Red forces. The three most important leaders of the NDYL in the 1949-1952 period had all had military experience—Fang Wen-pin, Hu Yao-pan, and Liao Ch'eng-chih.

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More significant than the role of former military personnel in mass organization at the national level has been assignment of many thousands of lower-level Liberation Army cadres to grass-roots work. In the years after the conquest of the mainland the main burden of this initial organizational work was carried out by military personnel. A Western observer has reported that PLA commissars were "candidates" for offices in local branches of mass organization, and that military organizers directed these organizations, including the supposedly democratic All-Circle's People's Consultative Conference.\textsuperscript{248} The Communists have claimed that the military effort was a massive one. For example, in a 1951 report on East China Su Yu, then Deputy Commander of the East China Military District, announced that:

\begin{quote}
In Fukien province, for instance, 12,000 cadres from the Army were transferred for service in administrative construction, agrarian reform and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. In Chekiang province, a certain unit of the Army assisted the local authorities in the establishment of 73 hsiang governments, 247 ts'un governments and the organization of 28,000 peasants as members of peasant associations, 7,700 women as members of women's associations, more than 10,000 children as members of the Chinese pioneers....\textsuperscript{249}
\end{quote}

Red Army men played a key role in the land reform program carried out in the 1949-1952 period.\textsuperscript{250} The Political Department issued special documents to military cadres\textsuperscript{251} The number of

\textsuperscript{248} Skinner, "Aftermath of Communist Liberation in the Chengtu Plain," \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 73-74.

\textsuperscript{249} The hsiang was a group of villages or an especially large village which served as the basic rural administrative unit at that time. The ts'un was an ordinary village. Yu Su, "Report on the Suppression of Banditry," \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 20-21.

\textsuperscript{250} Rigg, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 130-131.

\textsuperscript{251} Chao, \emph{Historical Survey of the Land Policy of the Chinese Communists}, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 97-98.
cadres involved in this program has been estimated as high as 300,000. 252 At least 150,000 of these were drawn from the Communist forces and their auxiliaries such as the "Southbound Working Group". 253 The Working Group consisted largely of students from the North China cities first occupied by the PLA. They were assigned to PLA cadres who indoctrinated them with military and political discipline. The Group was then attached to an advancing PLA unit to propagandize among the servicemen and among the peasants.

Military cadres participated in the national redistribution of land, just as they had in the agrarian reforms of earlier periods. Party leaders directed, "rely on the Army and the Southbound cadres and allow them to take the lead." 254 These personnel were used at a later date as the arm of the Central government to assure compliance with its directives. For example, the First Party Provincial Conference of Kwangtung in December, 1957, was told, "The southbound army and cadres were dispatched by the centre because of the rightist errors of the Kwangtung leaders during the agrarian reforms...." 255

252 People's China, Vol. IV, no. 1 (July 1, 1951), p. 47.
255 Ibid., p. 205.
Chapter 8
Contribution to the Economy
and Civilian Modernization

A. The Economic Contribution

The greater the economic burden imposed on the populace
to support the Communist army, the more difficult the Party found
its popular support and organization tasks. In 1953 Mao asked:

If the masses of workers and peasants become
dissatisfied with their living conditions, will that
not affect the expansion of our Red Army and the
mobilization of our masses to take part in the revolu-
tionary war? 1

In 1934 he stressed the need to "Take Care of the Living Conditions
of the Masses".

Our central task at present is to mobilize the
broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war
....If our comrades really grasp this central task
and understand that the revolution must at all cost
be spread through the country, then they cannot in
the least neglect or take lightly the problem of the
immediate interests of the broad masses, the problem
of their living conditions. As the revolutionary
war is a war of the masses, we can carry out the war
only by mobilizing the masses.... 2

From 1927-1936 the army was engaged in almost constant combat
activity and secured its economic contribution through coercion
rather than labor. When the 1928 Kutien Conference asked the
army "to raise money to support the struggle", 3 it set up Con-
fiscation Committees under the military Political Department 4 to

1 Tse-tung Mao, Selected Works, New York: International Publishers
2 Ibid., p. 147.
3 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York: The Modern Library,
   1944, p. 175.
4 Agnes Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, New York: Vanguard
seize money and goods from merchants and landlords.

It was after the Long March when the Communists acquired more stable base areas that the military economic potential was first exploited significantly, and the military economic role consisted to a greater extent of labor supply, loan of experts and provision of supplies and equipment. "In general the areas occupied by the Communists were the most backward and least fertile and productive regions...."5 In 1939 the Nationalists imposed a military and economic blockade which was to continue virtually unabated throughout the war with Japan.6 The population of the Communist-controlled Shansi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region was swollen during the 1939-1940 period from 600,000 to 1,400,000.7 It should be noted that this figure for the most important region under CCP control at this time casts doubt on the 1938 number of Communist subjects given earlier. For our present purposes it reveals the increased pressures on the Border Region economy. These were not alleviated by the increase of 16% in cultivated land.8 Since newly cultivated land probably was of marginal value, maintenance of population living standards required either an increase in imports or a doubling in land productivity.


6 Life in the Liberation Army, Hong Kong: Hsin-min Book Co., 1949 (Chinese).


8 Ibid.
Nationalist blockade, external food shortages and exchange shortages prevented the import increase. In 1939 the Red forces resorted to commandeering food\(^9\) and during 1940-41 cut their living standard drastically. Of this period Mao wrote: "We were almost without clothes, vegetable oil, paper or vegetables. The soldiers had no shoes or socks, and the cadres spent the winter without blankets."\(^{10}\) In 1940, to survive and to preserve popular support, the army had to resort to wholesale self-support. Mao ordered that "every armed unit ought to build its own economic base."\(^{11}\) According to Communist statistics, the self-support policy was successful. If the military living standard of 1939 is taken as a base figure of 100, 1941 and 1942 saw a decline to 88 and 84.2. The Communists claimed it climbed in 1943 to 125,\(^{12}\) i.e., an increase over the previous year of 40%. This would imply either that the army gave less to civilians or phenomenally increased its land yield. In either case, there is no evidence that the civilian living standard rose accordingly. According to Mao, this "institutions-economy" met the "greater part" of the needs of the Communist Border Regions during 1941-1942.\(^{13}\) Chu Teh told the Central Committee:

Experience gained in the border region from the army's participation in productive work shows that, in the

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\(^{10}\) Chao, *op. cit.*, p. 72.


\(^{13}\) Mao, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 231.
absence of fighting, we can in the first year, become partly self-supporting, in the second half self-supporting, and in the third wholly so. In the areas where fighting is going on, the army may by taking part in such work, become partly or half self-supporting.  

In 1945 Mao reaffirmed the self-support policy.

Since in the rural areas we are constantly ravaged by the enemy and embroiled in a protracted war, the troops and public agencies must engage in production. And since guerrilla fighting is sporadic the troops and public agencies can engage in production. And moreover as the troops and public agencies constitute an unduly large proportion of the population of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshsia border region, they would starve if they did not engage in production; and if they take too much from the people, the people would be unequal to the burden and would likewise starve.  

Mao said that the core of the self-support policy was "to utilize the intervals between battles and training to produce foodstuffs and other daily necessities so that the army may be wholly, or half, or just partly self-supporting..."  

Chu Teh told the Seventh Party Congress that using armed forces in production "Makes possible the accumulation of material resources for the long-term struggle" and "an inexhaustible source of funds to maintain the army is tapped."  

When the Party assumed national control in 1949, the economic task confronting it was staggering, particularly because it was severely short of capital, equipment and skilled personnel. Coercive power was of equal importance to the regime, but created a serious drain on the materials and labor essential for economic

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17 Chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 50.
development. In 1949 the PLA, according to the General Manager of the People's Bank, required at least "5% of China's total annual food production," although military personnel comprised less than 1% of the population. In 1951 military expenditures comprised at least 48% of the "total state expenditure." As the Party found in the Northeast region, the best way to procure economic construction funds was to cut military expenditure. By 1956 only 19.98% of the national budget was publicly earmarked for defense purposes.

The Party sought harmony between its coercive and economic needs by increasing the economic burden of the armed forces. Since the PLA was "the biggest single organized force in the land," the Peking leadership expected it to be "an important factor in the effort to repair the ravages of war and ...create a fundamental transformation in this vast country within the next few years." As Article 24 of the Common Programme indicates, the self-support and "picked troops" policies of the guerrilla years have been supplemented by military participation in overhead capital projects.

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21 Peng, op. cit., p. 7.
23 Ibid., pp. 57, 61.
The armed forces of the People's Republic of China shall, in time of peace, take part in agriculture and industrial production in a planned way, in order to assist in the work of national construction, provided their military duties are not thereby interfered with.\(^{25}\)

On December 5, 1949, Mao directed that the military contribute to agricultural production and construction of various public works projects.\(^{26}\)

Although the Korean War forced the Party to contract its economic demands of the military, it did not abandon its policy of requiring a military contribution to the economy, and assigned the military specific economic tasks as soon as possible. In 1952 Hsiao Hua, then Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the PLMCC, clarified economic priorities and military responsibilities.

\[\ldots\text{at its start our economic construction cannot but be undertaken with an eye on national defense and cannot but be directed to the needs of national defense. Hence, economic construction shall prepare material conditions for the building of national defense army units, while modernization of national defense serves as protection for the economic construction of the state and also the motive power for economic construction of the state. Divorced from economic construction, to build a powerful and modern army is merely idle talk. The PLA always assumes not only the task of fighting but the task of construction.}^{27}\]

In 1956 Peng Teh-huai stated to the Eighth Congress of the CCP


\(^{26}\)China's Youth Marches Forward, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, p. 47.

that it was the military's "responsibility" to "cope with the needs of economic construction of the state ...and promote the frugal style of work of the people's revolutionary army."\textsuperscript{28}

From 1956-1959 the Party required the following number of man-days to the nearest million.

Table XXI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Man-days (to the nearest million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7 (agriculture and conservation only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These Communist figures are impressive and would seem to imply a mammoth and time-consuming economic contribution by the PLA. Analysis in combination with the PLA personnel figures given in Table VI gives a different impression. This comparison gives the number of days spent on the average by each PLA member in production. For this purpose the size of the PLA is assumed to remain at the 2,300,000 declared by Peng Teh-huai in 1956. Here are the figures to the nearest day: 1956-three days; 1957-nine days; 1958-26 days; and 1959-17 days. The 1956 figure is lowered by its exclusion of time spent in industry and transportation.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Peng, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.

The 1958 figure reflects the economic priorities of the "great leap forward" which are discussed in a later chapter.

The general conclusion from the days per man data is the relatively little time spent by the average PLA man in production. The figures are low even if the officer corps of approximately 300,000 is excluded from our calculation. Of course all components of the PLA did not participate in production to an equal extent. Later sections of this chapter discuss the almost full-time labors of PLA branches in land reclamation, forestry and conservation and railway construction. Figures are not available on the complements of these labor specialists. However, if we assume a total size of only 100,000 men engaged in economic activity for 200 days in 1959 we can see the exaggeration of the production activity of combat personnel in the days per man data. In 1959 for example with these cautious assumptions the non-combat branches listed would have contributed 20 million man days. This would mean that troops specializing in coercion, the 2.3 million total minus the officer corps and the labor branches, contributed less than eleven days per man. The obvious conclusion is that the economic contribution of the PLA may have been substantial but did not seriously affect the time available for coercive and political training. In two directives issued in January, 1959, and entitled "program for the armed forces to participate in socialist construction" and "directive on the participation of armed forces in industrial and agricultural production", they ordered PLA units to "devote from one to two months to productive labor each year." The preceding analysis

\textsuperscript{30} Fu, op. cit., p. 2.
demonstrates that the directive was never applied.

1. Types of Economic Assistance

Probably the figures in Table XXI account for only a fraction of the PLA contribution to the economy of the People's Republic. However, they probably do reflect the degree to which the military contributed to the economy as an organized work force. The PLA has special economic work groups, and references appear in the mainland press to the "railway units ...land reclamation corps, forestry corps, and water conservancy engineering corps." Large blocs of servicemen, often the less politically reliable ex-Nationalists and less technically competent veterans, are transferred to these organizations. Peng Teh-huai has reported that in 1956, "31 divisions and 8 regiments of our army have been shifted to the work of production and construction."32

The PLA has supplied cadres for economic, as well as administrative, activities. ("...the army is continually sending cadres to various localities to participate in production and construction.")33 Cadres were assigned either for their supervisory or technical skills. For example,

In February, 1948, a huge ice dam formed at several places at the mouth of the Yellow River.... the Pohai Military Headquarters sent a number of responsible cadres from its engineering department equipped with mines and dynamite.34

34. From Struggle to Victory, Peking: All-China Democratic Women's Federation, 1952, pp. 52-63.
Armed forces personnel were also charged with the supervision of forced labor. The "voluntary" labor imposed on the citizens of the Border Region has already been mentioned, and this part-time force has been supplemented by a group of undesirables and full-time "volunteers". The Red Army assumed this role in the first years of guerrilla warfare, when forced labor was mainly performed by prisoners of war. Shortly after the Long March this group was supplemented by others whose behavior did not please the CCP. They were organized into a "company like the Red Army" and controlled by military professionals who held both political and administrative posts. By the late 1950's the PLA supervised the bulk of an estimated two million forced laborers.

Military equipment was also allocated to civilian purposes, for example cavalry horses for plowing. The newer branches of the Communist military establishment have allocated their more complex equipment to aid the civilian population. For example, according to its Deputy Director of Military Training:

In the bombing of ice packs in rivers, fighting of flood and disasters caused by snow, bringing relief to victims of such natural calamities, exterminating locusts and such activities, the Air Force demonstrates the noble quality of the people's armed forces that serve the people, and have achieved excellent results.

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2. "Byproducts," Inducements, and Dissent

Party leadership has viewed Red military work in the economy as useful for a range of purposes besides production. Mao listed what he referred to as "many byproducts" in a 1945 pronouncement:

1) relationships have improved between officers and men. As officers and men all take part in production they become affectionate to one another like brothers. 2) The love of labour has been enhanced. What we now have is neither the old mercenary system nor conscription but a third system, the mobilization of an army of volunteers.... 3) Discipline has been strengthened. Labour discipline enforced in the course of production tends not to weaken but to strengthen the men's discipline in action and in daily life. 4) The relationship between the army and the people has improved. Once the armed units have secured their own means of livelihood, encroachments upon the people's property rarely or never occur. As the army and the people exchange labour and render mutual aid in the course of production, they become more friendly towards each other. 5) The army complains less often about the government authorities and the relations between them have improved. 6) The people's widespread campaign for increasing production is stimulated. Once the army engages in production, the government organizations will find it all the more imperative to engage in production and will be more enthusiastic about it; the whole people will, of course, find it all the more imperative to start a widespread campaign for increasing production and will be more enthusiastic about it.38

One major group of "byproducts" was external to the forces, but the other major group related to their internal characteristics. Physical labor has been regarded as a valuable technique in curbing the spirit of independence in the forces, particularly in the officer corps. Continued use of economic assignments for this disciplinary purpose is evidenced by the 1957 physical labor directive to military cadres and several

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assignments included in the 1958 "Officers to the Ranks" Cam-
paign. In 1959 a high ranking member of the PLA Political
Department explicitly stated the CCP's control interest in using
the army in the economy. "Through productive labor the officers
and men will receive more political training, will increase
their appreciation of labor, and raise Communist consciousness
to higher levels...."  

The arduous labor of economic activity and the disciplinary
by-products have not been eagerly greeted by the Communist mil-
itary. To aid their acceptance the Party has offered a variety
of inducements. In the guerrilla years economic activity was a
chance to secure badly needed food and clothing. This direct
appeal to self interest was coupled on occasion with promises of
future dividends. For example, in the early 1940's the garrison
soldiers were told that the proceeds of their labor would found
co-operatives to employ them after demobilization. Material
appeals were at first accompanied, and later largely replaced,
by persuasive devices and psychological pressures. Repetitious
propaganda was focused on economic labor as on all other sanc-
tioned activities. Recognition was given for productive work

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39 For example, see: "Peking Army Officers Take Part in Farmwork," 
NCNA-English, Peking (May 8, 1957), SCMP, No. 1528 (May 13, 
1957), p. 19; "PLA Generals Go to Companies to Serve as Rank-
and-File," NCNA-English, Peking (Oct. 8, 1958), SCMP, No. 1874 
40 Fu, op. cit., p. 2; "PLA Directive on Participation in Production 
By Army Units," NCNA-English, Peking (March 13, 1959), SCMP, No. 
1976 (March 19, 1959), p. 1; and "PLA Program for Armed Forces 
to Join in Construction," NCNA-English, Peking (Feb. 25, 1959), 
41 George Stuart Gelder (ed.), The Chinese Communists (Left Book 
Club), London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1948, p. 64.  
42 China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 50.
just as for combat deeds.43 Finally, great efforts have been made to convince the ordinary soldier that no special burden is being imposed on him and that even high-ranking officers are assigned to manual economic tasks.44

Inducements have not eliminated military distaste for its economic responsibilities. As the military has become more of a politicized-specialist army, it has become more sensitive about its prestige. A 1949 Communist publication reported that "some of the troopers were shy, disliked working, and had the wrong ideas about a soldier's dignity."45 The manure-gathering activities in which the military had to indulge particularly offended the soldiers. Supposedly "a series of manure-gathering demonstrations by high officers" assured the soldiers that this activity was not below their dignity. One wonders who assured the high officers.

The military's other objection to economic activity has been the time it detracts from coercive training. Evidence of real debate on this point is available even for the guerrilla years. For example, in 1945 Chu Teh asserted, with reference to the military self-support movement, that "training is more effective, fighting spirit is enhanced,..."46 although an American intelligence report on the same period pointed out a sizeable loss in training time. "The troops would plant crops in

44"Army Chiefs Engage in Agricultural Production with Their Own Hands," People's Army, No. 12 (June 9, 1946), (Chinese).
45Life in the Liberation Army, op. cit., Chapter IV.
46Chu, op. cit., p. 50.
the springtime and tend the fields until harvest. During the period there was practically no training."\(^{47}\) Communist sources obliquely indicate that military objections were openly expressed during the 1943 "Support the Government and Love the People" Campaign.

As the military has become more professionally specialized, its objections to economic activity on these grounds would seem to increase. Even in 1949 the Party had to mollify military objections by alluding to the temporary nature of the economic assignment and to the immediate necessities of national reconstruction. In March, 1949, Mao told the Second Plenum of the 7th Central Committee, that, "The People's Liberation Army is forever a combat unit; and in the meantime, it is also a working unit."\(^{48}\) It was later admitted that at this time a sizeable group was for a quick end to "the meantime":

\[\ldots\text{a certain number of comrades held that there was a division of work between economic construction and national defense construction; that the training duties of the armed forces are very arduous and heavy; and that it is not necessary for the armed forces to participate in the mass revolutionary struggle, national economic construction, and other 'local affairs'.}\(^{49}\)

The rationale for this argument has become better since 1949, and, as will be discussed in a later section, requires repeated suppression by the Party.

A last objection to the CCP economic contribution policy


\(^{49}\)\textit{Ibid.}\)
comes from those who feel that the armed forces are not productive enough and detract from economic growth. In a 1955 speech Marshal Yeh Chien-ying challenged the holders of this opinion. He contended that "...there must be procured a sufficient quantity of the most modern equipment to arm the Chinese People's Liberation Army. For the enemy before us is a well-equipped imperialist army." But some people do not seem to appreciate this point. They consider that it is now only necessary to concentrate all forces for Socialist economic construction, and there is no need for attaching such great importance to national defense construction. They do not realize that while it is true that national defense construction must rely on the industrialization of the state, simultaneously with the promotion of Socialist economy and construction we must maintain a sufficient national defense force or we shall be placed in a weak position.

The Party has been able to play these groups off against one another and to hold in its hands the power of compromise. The military can be told that it is in effect protected against the advocates of a larger economic contribution; these advocates can be told that only because of Party pressure is the military making any sizeable contribution.

It is reasonable to say that the Party will only change its military economic contribution policy when economic assignments grossly reduce combat capability and/or result in diminishing returns. Until this time "Economic activity is a primary and productive function of the Army when not engaged in

51 Ibid.
military activities and not a secondary or time-killing one."52

3. Encompassing Economic Activity

While military contributions to the economy have either been functionally specialized or ad hoc measures to meet special crises, there have been two notable instances when military personnel and units were assigned an integrated range of economic activities. The first of these occurred during the Anti-Japanese War and served as an experiment with the creation of an economically diversified and self-sufficient social unit whose population was under military discipline and organized along military lines. The second instance has occurred since the establishment of the People's Republic and is a model of backward area development. Again the unit possessed the above military attributes. Examination of these two experiments illuminates one Communist use of the military and one type of social organism used by the Chinese Communists for production and economic development.

a. The "Nanniwan Movement"

In 1940 General Wang Chen and his 359th Brigade of about 10,000 men were "allotted a wild wasteland of barren hills and valleys in the Nanniwan district."53 The CCP declared that the land was "sufficient for a self-supporting community and plans were drawn up for the brigade to become completely independent of outside support."54 This assignment was prolonged at least

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53 Forman, op. cit., p. 38.
into 1944. By the time the brigade began its economic assignment, Commander Wang had taken control of the civil government of the area. Through a judicious use of military and civil authority, Wang established a chain of "profit-making" stores whose local branches were directed by various regiments. They sold to the "general public" and served the dual purpose of financing the armed forces and of eliminating the bourgeois merchants. The profits from such commercial activities, combined with funds from the government of the Border Region, made up the brigade's "production fund" and capital.\(^{55}\)

Securing a supply of capital was but one of the problems confronting the brigade. Two greater problems resulted from using military units for such a broad economic scheme. Some soldiers were not pleased with their new assignment. According to Wang, they "became very indignant. 'We joined to fight the Japs, not to be oxen....Send us back to the front.' A few deserted...."\(^{56}\) The esprit and motivation of the soldiers had to be adapted and re-molded to their laborious new tasks. The psychological obstacle was accompanied by inadequate skills and preparation for undertaking varied economic activity, especially non-agricultural production. Wang later admitted, "I knew too little of production myself."\(^{57}\) This inexperience led to numerous errors in equipment and material supply, personnel administration, and machine maintenance. A Communist report on one shop run by the

\(^{55}\) Yung, op. cit., p. 41.


359th Brigade illustrates these weaknesses.

To carry out the policy of self-sufficiency, the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army recalled from the front to garrison the Border Region decided to start a textile shop in September, 1940. About twenty soldiers recruited from a homespun center in Hopei province were selected as workers. Nineteen small wooden looms were constructed by the Brigade's arms repair shop. But the output, though satisfactory, was too small to meet the Brigade's demand. All orderlies of the Brigade were transferred to the shop as apprentices.

A labor shortage was felt immediately after the looms started working. The weaving shop ..., recruited fifty boys and girls from the villages. A number of military convicts and jailed bandits were transferred to the shop. The total working force now numbered over two hundred.

In October, 1941, the Mill set up a spinning section with four carding machines and about forty spinning machines, due to the fact that the local population could meet the demand of yarn neither in quality or quantity. However, because of the lack of skilled hands together with the poor quality of the cotton which could not be spun on the machines after carding, the spinning machines were laid off in July, 1942.

The second problem was personnel administration. The young orderlies had not been used to routine labor and were fond of fighting and quarreling when they were first assigned to the mill. They refused to act according to orders, and would retort by saying, 'We have met both high and low officers.' The girls ..., recruited from the villages, had left their farms due to unsatisfactory matrimonial conditions. These girls often discussed their marriage problems, resulting in emotional upset. Frequently they would insist that the authorities solve such problems for them. Former bandits, were, of course, adverse to labor. Military convicts consisted mostly of disgraced company or platoon officers. They were snobbish and disgruntled.

It took three months to teach the apprentices weaving and warping, together with instilling labor discipline....

When the personnel problem was solved a new difficulty occurred. The Mill was first installed in houses rented from the local people. A dozen caves were dug for the personnel. But dampness caused scores of workers to be infected with itch sores. To remedy the situation the caves were evacuated and turned into storerooms and the workers moved into the rented houses. The looms were placed in the courtyards. They would be housed in rocky caves to be dug
between August and October. But during the first part of the interval there were frequent rains, while morning and evening dews conspired [sic] to dampen the threads and made it extremely difficult to weave. By July, the sun became scorchingly hot, drying up the threads. To overcome this handicap, wet blankets were spread over the looms and water was sprayed on the ground. But the moisture thus created lasted for only a few hours. Weaving was constantly interrupted and much energy was devoted to watering. It was not until October when the rocky caves were finished and twenty seven houses were completed as dormitories for the workers that steady progress was assured.

After things were placed in proper order in October, 1941, a year since the plant was started, the desirability of metal looms for better products and greater efficiency became apparent. A year later forty one wooden looms were converted into metal ones. However, a lack of sufficient number of workers skilled and strong enough to operate the metal looms stopped further conversion of the remaining sixty-three wooden looms.58

The reader can see why Wang Chen later described the beginning of the Nanniwan movement as a "heart-breaking struggle".59

The production levels were low at first, and it was not until 1943 that the goal of self-sufficiency was largely achieved. Quotas were raised further, and surpluses channeled into the general economy of the Communist-controlled areas. The first year was not notably successful. Wang Chen later told a journalist:

We had some vegetables, pigs and good kitchens. Each man had reclaimed, planted and harvested an acre of land. We were drawing only a part of our food and seed from government tax stores, instead of all as before.60

The 359th supposedly had the "best record" in production of any equivalent Communist military unit during the 1943 "Support the

59 Forman, op. cit., p. 39.
60 Epstein, op. cit., p. 262.
Government and Love the People Campaign," although even pro-Communist sources differ sharply on actual amounts produced. The troops produced sizeable quantities of meat, pumpkins, potatoes, and beans. Soldiers' rations were expanded. The pro-Communist source that gives the higher production estimates also contends that "Four-fifths of these products was used to feed the brigade, while the remainder was sold." Even the low Communist figure implies that each Brigade member consumed 400 pounds of millet in 1943. It is more likely that production was significantly lower and the military was willing to dispense with only one-fifth of a lower production total.

A far greater contribution to the Border Region economy was required to compensate for moving the Brigade from the front lines. Accordingly, on Feb. 5, 1944, the Brigade personnel received this order from Wang Chen:

"Our production quota this year is twice as large as our actual production was last year. But we must exceed it by at least one-third....With the exception of those engaged in medical, industrial and transportation work, all members of the brigade, both cadres and rank-and-file, must on an average cultivate five acres of land." Livestock quotas were also announced. Every soldier was responsible for a sheep, every two for a hog and every ten for the labor animal of North China, the ox. Approximately one-third of the average individual production was to go to the government.

\[\text{Ibid., p. 262; Yung, op. cit., p. 40.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Stein, op. cit., p. 69.}\]
\[\text{Yung, op. cit., p. 44; Epstein, op. cit., p. 263.}\]
army reserve funds for use as the Party leadership might see fit. 65 However, any capital funds required for expanding the Brigade's economic facilities might also be drawn from the reserve fund. The soldiers were offered the inducement of a 50% increase in personal consumption after the state's share of the new quota was subtracted.

The soldiers of the 359th were told that "the production movement is a sacred task in the revolutionary cause"66 and enjoined to work not only in the fields but in a variety of small shops, for example, an oil and alcohol processing works, a paper mill, the spinning and weaving mill mentioned earlier, a shoe factory, a small coal mine, smithies, tailor shops and food preserving facilities. 67 Items not needed by the brigade were sold "cheaply" to the farmers. 68

The Communists contended that such intensive economic activity did not in the least reduce the combat effectiveness of Wang Chen's brigade. This conclusion is questionable since the 1944 order previously quoted also specified:

The period from March 10 to the end of October is to be devoted to agricultural production. But due to rain and the intervals between ploughing, hoeing and harvesting, there will be about fifty days during that period which are to be given to recreation, military training, and anti-Japanese political education. 69

65 Ibid.; Stein, op. cit., p. 70.
66 Ibid.
67 Band, op. cit., p. 262; Yung, op. cit., p. 40; Epstein, op. cit., p. 263.
68 Wang is quoted in Stein, op. cit., p. 68.
69 Ibid., p. 69.
Thus six months of the year would be spent in full-time economic labor, and the remainder be divided between political and military training. Wang Chen rationalized this paradox by claiming that his troops were healthier and stronger because of their labor and that "Even during the months of work in the fields, there is not a day when they don't practice hand-grenade throwing, bayonet tactics and all sorts of other techniques in their rest periods." The Nanniwan Movement, then, supposedly proved that a combat-ready and economically self-sufficient military unit could be created.

b. Sinkiang

With the resumption of civil war and the advance of the Communist forces over the mainland the 359th brigade returned to coercive tasks. By 1950 Wang Chen had been assigned to another economic task, this time in the vast and underdeveloped province of Sinkiang, abutting on the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The organizational unit for this endeavor has been the "Army Production Corps for the Sinkiang Military Area". The latter is officially defined as "a production group with a certain corps of the People's Liberation Army as its mainstay." The bulk of the force originally consisted of Kuomintang troops under the command of General Tao Chih-yueh, known as the "Sinkiang Production Reconstruction Corps". However, the composition of the

70Ibid., p. 161.
Corps has changed:

it has taken in, with the rapid developments in its various enterprises, large numbers of young students, peasants and rural women who came from Shanghai, Hunan, Shantung, Honan, Shensi, Szechwan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung and has at the same time obtained the services of some engineering and technical personnel.73 By 1957 the Corps was divided into at least three groups: agricultural and grazing production, transportation, and engineering.74 By 1959 this force, renamed the Sinkiang Production and Construction Field Army of the PLA, had subdivided the major groups into divisions.75 Wang Chen has served as district military commander and political commissar, CCP secretary for Sinkiang, and Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation in the central government.76 His deputy military commander has been the old Kuomintang general, Tao Chih-yueh, whose troops have been absorbed into the Corps.77 Through the three special groups mentioned above the PLA in Sinkiang has undertaken a wide range of economic development and production projects. The most substantial projects have been those of the agriculture and grazing group, whose responsibilities include land reclamation, irrigation works, and conservation projects in addition to farming and stock-raising.

73 Lu, op. cit., p. 21.
74 Ibid., p. 20.
While the validity of published Communist statistics is questionable, they probably reveal the general trend of Corps activity.

Table XXII
Land Reclamation by PLA Sinkiang Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949 through 1952</td>
<td>252,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 through 1957</td>
<td>247,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
<td>488,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 through 1962</td>
<td>1,309,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,630,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1958-1959 figure reflects the emphasis on production of the "great leap forward." However, even if this figure is reliable, there is a sizeable disharmony between it and the announced goal of 741,300 acres for 1958 alone, although it does seem in accord with the quota announced by General Tao in April of that year.

A similar acceleration was reported in the completion of irrigation facilities. In 1950 an official mainland source claimed that the Corps had newly irrigated over 209,000 acres. 

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80 "Reports from China," op. cit., p. 489.
The claim for only a part of 1958 was over 494,000 acres.\textsuperscript{32} Land cultivation figures follow a similar pattern.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table XXIII}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
Land Cultivation by PLA Sinkiang Corps\textsuperscript{33}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Cultivation Claimed} & \textbf{Cultivation Projected} \\
\hline
1950 & 165,303 & \\
1951 & 162,063 & \\
1952 &  & 264,397 \\
1953 &  & 494,000 \\
1958 & 363,731 & 558,486 \\
1959 & 790,720 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Once again 1958 performance fell far short of the projected goals. The rise in 1959, though it may well have been less than the figure given, reveals cultivation of the areas reclaimed in 1958.

PLA groups cultivated grain, cotton, sugar beets, rape and to a lesser extent, jute, corn and cabbages. By 1957 they were allegedly producing over 150,000 tons of foodstuffs, and 15,000 tons of ginned cotton.\textsuperscript{34} According to the Communists, the number of livestock under PLA care has risen rapidly from 89,000 head in 1950 to many hundreds of thousands.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{33}Ying, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 29, 31; "Reports from China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 489; and "P.L.A. Units in Northwest China Put More Land Under Crops," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{34}"Reports from China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 489.
\end{footnotesize}
As important as the amount of agricultural products produced in Sinkiang by the PLA are the technical and social innovations it has introduced into regional agriculture. The PLA has revolutionized with training the peasants in new agricultural methods and organizing them along collectivist lines. As a result of training classes, productivity increases are reported, and the PLA serves as a model. The Communists reported in 1952 that the first four mechanized PLA farms were:

showing the way for the organization of scientific mechanical work on collective farms which will undoubtedly be established by the most progressive peasants of Sinkiang after the completion of the land reform.

The militarily disciplined Corps personnel were used to introduce new crops and methods and to set work quotas which the civilian population is put under pressure to emulate. The social units developed by the Corps agricultural group were large and self-contained and operated their own economic, health, recreation and propaganda facilities. By the end of 1957 there were at least 39 state farms and 16 animal husbandry centers. In the first eight months of 1958 42 new farms were supposedly established. The activities of the PLA in land reclamation and

86 Ibid., p. 30.
87 Ibid., p. 31.
88 Ibid., p. 31; "Army Production Teams Successful in Developing Tarim, Sinkiang," op. cit., p. 29.
90 Lu, op. cit., p. 20.
agriculture in Sinkiang are not restricted to creation of a few models or to those of a mobile work force. The CCP claimed that in 1958 "these troops administer 30 per cent of the arable land and farm 20 per cent of the sown area."\textsuperscript{92} The 3:2 ratio is consistent with the 1958 data given in Tables XXII and XXIII.

The Corps has also been used to strengthen the relationship of Sinkiang with other areas of the People's Republic and to facilitate transportation and communication within the region. The "transportation group" of the PLA forces in Sinkiang draws on the technical help of the engineering group and on the manpower of the agricultural workers to construct the facilities necessary to their function, "the transportation of the required construction equipment and machines and daily necessities for the people from Kansu to Sinkiang."\textsuperscript{93} The military and the Party wanted access to Sinkiang for other reasons. In 1949 Sinkiang had no railways and few highways. Work was begun immediately on roads linking Sinkiang with central China and with Tibet.\textsuperscript{94} By 1960 a railroad was to run through Sinkiang and connect China and the Soviet Union. However, as of July, 1959, progress on this railroad was being made only slowly, possibly for strategic reasons.\textsuperscript{95} Troops have also been employed to make waterways


\textsuperscript{93}Lu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{94}The First Year of Victory, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, p. 58.

navigable and to build bridges over major rivers, such as the bridge which spans the Tarim and is capable of carrying heavy equipment.96

The engineering group has been charged with the construction of an industrial base and the facilities required by the growth of administration and urbanism. Around Urumchi, the major city, "The engineering group has established ...iron and steel refineries, textile mills, water conservancy stations and some of the office buildings and cinemas."97 Initial emphasis was mainly on small processing plants and primitive resource exploitation. In 1950 the following PLA-operated enterprises were reported: "85 flour mills, 37 coal pits, 2 gold mines, 15 oil presses, 8 soap factories, 3 weaving mills, 3 paper mills."98 The Sinkiang force soon acquired a "large complement of specialists in many fields of engineering and construction" who, together with retrained military personnel, undertook more complex economic development tasks.99 By the autumn of 1952 it was supposed to operate, "Steel and cement works, automobile repair shops, hydro-electric power plants and power plants run on coal...."100 By the end of 1959 the Sinkiang steel industry was expected to include 65 "steel making converters" with an annual capacity of

97Lu, op. cit., p. 20.
98Rigg, op. cit., p. 296.
100Ibid., p. 30.
440,000 tons and one large complex consisting of "two medium size blast furnaces ... converters, an electric furnace, steel rolling mills, engineering, dolomite and refractory materials workshops and a foundry." Other construction and engineering assignments of the PLA Sinkiang Corps have included installation of communication facilities, building a new city, oil field construction, and the building of seven "large and middle-sized dams." The use of the PLA personnel in developing Sinkiang has not been uniformly successful. Mistakes have been made because of lack of knowledge, especially in irrigation works; and pressures to expand production have resulted in occasional losses in productivity. The circumstances of the Corps' task argue against high morale. A Peking publication has described the conditions prevalent during the opening up of the Tarim River basin area:

Conditions at first seemed beyond human endurance: short of water in the scalding summer heat and without adequate shelter in the winter, not to mention the many difficulties in getting food supplies.

It is doubtful that the Corps population, transferred from urban and temperate sections of China, welcomed their new environment.


103Ying, op. cit., p. 29.

104"transforming the Tarim Basin," op. cit., p. 4.
Indeed, the Party has found it necessary to use "shock troops" of activist Young Communists to create "enthusiasm." Personnel obstacles to productivity have been accompanied by resistance, sometimes militant resistance, of the local population. To them the Corps represents a social change and the imposition of control by another ethnic group. In 1957, for example, "local nationalists" asserted that the PLA's activities were of no benefit to their region and people. Yet the regime persists in the development of Sinkiang. The basic reason is that a military-economic force serves its several interests in Sinkiang. First, it develops a backward and relatively unpopulated area, which helps to relieve both economic and demographic pressures in Communist China. Second, it fills the power vacuum in this historic area of competition between China and the U.S.S.R. in a most politically potent fashion. After many years of Soviet penetration, the Peking regime has re-established Chinese control.

Not until the People's Liberation Army, from the new Communist government in Peking, 'pacified' the province in 1949-50 did Chinese control extend throughout the proclaimed limit of territorial sovereignty....

Use of the armed forces in the manner described meets "two critical problems" the Kuomintang was never able to overcome, "Sinkiang's economic orientation and its anti-Chinese population."  

108 Ibid., p. 99.
The broad range of military responsibilities supports national economic development, central government authority, and Chinese territorial integrity.

4. Specialized Contributions

Area development functions, in which military bodies are responsible for many types of economic development, have not been preferred by the Communists. Usually military economic labor has been functionally specific. Specialties can be developed and power limited. Special groups of ex-Nationalist soldiers have been organized into full-time labor units and assigned to various construction programs. The specialized contribution has often characterized temporary military assignments. These are undertaken by combat units to remedy crises of the moment, for example, natural disasters and meeting especially important production goals.

a. Agriculture and Land Reclamation

Shortly after they were founded, guerrilla bands were employed in the fields to stave off hunger and to avoid pillaging the peasantry. During lulls in combat small groups of soldiers were formed into "shock brigades" or "Saturday Brigades" to plow, sow and harvest. Often when land was not available, small strips of wasteland would be cleared. The agricultural activity of the Red Army was at first both restricted and desperate. Chu Teh has described the situation in 1931:

Food was a serious problem because it was spring sowing time, our territory was small and our resources limited, and we had to conserve rice to meet the coming enemy campaign. Our troops confiscated rice from landlords, but there was a limit to this, and we not only helped the peasants plow and sow, but our troops reclaimed wasteland, which was poor in any case.\footnote{110}

The military situation prior to 1937 did not allow for systematic military participation on the land. The conclusion of the United Front and the tide of refugees into the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region made such a step possible and necessary. Peng Teh-huai ordered the Communist army

To push the spring farming movement, and increase productive enthusiasm of the farmers, to increase agricultural produce, to enlist the aid of soldiers and militiamen in protecting and facilitating farming works, and to guarantee the supply of food stuffs for the anti-Japanese armies in North China.\footnote{111}

In 1938 tentative efforts at systematic military self-support were begun on a small-scale by the garrison forces for Yenan.

But it was as yet confined to growing vegetables by officers and men on an abandoned tract of land assigned by the government. The army cooks raised a number of hogs in an open space near the barracks. The soldiers were formed into squads to burn charcoal on a distant hill. Meanwhile both officers and men gathered firewood every day for the kitchen....But staple food was still supplied by the government. Vegetables and meat were produced merely to secure a better diet.\footnote{112}

More drastic steps were required and announced to a "Cadres


\footnote{112} Yung, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37, cites as sources of this information the Yenan newspaper, \textit{Hsin Hua Jih Pao}, issues of May 19, 1941, and Oct. 31, 1938.
Production Mobilization Conference" in February, 1939. The Communists have claimed that as a result of the conference decision over 175,000 acres were reclaimed and planted during the course of the year. However, only 2.9% of the total was credited to the Eighth Route Army, i.e., 5,075 acres.\textsuperscript{113} Comparisons with Table IX indicates that either very few members of the 270,000 man Eighth Route Army participated or that they did very little indeed.

The agricultural and land reclamation achievements of the 40,000 to 50,000 man Yenan Garrison Army were the most impressive, but sizeable economic activities were also undertaken in more militarily active areas. It was only in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, where the garrison forces could devote the most time to agricultural labor, that production and productivity rose during the war with Japan.\textsuperscript{114} Even in this region the military contribution rose slowly until the crash program of the first "Support the Government and Love the People" Campaign. In the 1939-1942 period the Red forces in the S-K-N region reclaimed only 15,141 acres.\textsuperscript{115} In 1943 the Communist army reported a total reclaimed acreage of over 33,000 acres.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., pp. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{115}Struggle for Ample Clothing and Sufficient Food: Convert 200,000 Mou of Wild Mountains into Fertile Fields, n.p.: Poli-Department of the Garrison Army, Eighth Route Army, 1943 (Chinese), Chapter I.
\textsuperscript{116}Lung Ho, "Struggle in Order to Achieve the 100,000 ton of Grains Goal," in the Common Programme and Other Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, op. cit.
The 1944 quota was publicized as over 33,000 acres.\textsuperscript{117} An American journalist summarizing the economic accomplishments of the years from 1940 to 1945, credited the Eighth Route Army with at least a third of the region's gain in arable land, i.e., over 55,000 acres.\textsuperscript{118} As in the "Nanniwan Movement", the troops that reclaimed the land were then used to farm it. The Garrison Army, through its Economic Reconstruction Office, provided special instructions for the soldiers in their role as producers. One pamphlet issued on agricultural methods illustrates the farming assignments given military personnel. This pamphlet, \textit{Talks on Experience in Production}, contains instructions on how to: plant vegetables, raise pigs, raise sheep, cook taro, white turnips and squash; prepare grain, preserve vegetables, save money and food.\textsuperscript{119} Military personnel were not only to be farmers; they were to be trained within the limits of materials and time to be efficient farmers.

While the garrison force devoted the most time to production, even front-line units were drawn into the "battle for food".\textsuperscript{120} The nature of guerrilla warfare meant that even these troops were not in constant contact with the enemy and could devote some time to supporting the economy. The severity of the pressures for food and the military responsibilities in alleviating

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{118}Stein, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 166.
\item \textsuperscript{120}Epstein, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 278-279.
\end{itemize}
those pressures can be glimpsed from the production measures adopted by guerrilla units in Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh area:

First in accordance with the policy which makes agriculture the chief concern, they solved the land problem. They have nine ways in all: 1) razing the walls and filling the ditches used by the enemy for blockade purposes; 2) destroying the motor roads of which the enemy may make use and planting crops along them; 3) making use of small pieces of waste land; 4) giving help and armed protection to the militia while they plant crops on the fields around the enemy blockhouses on moonlit nights; 5) ploughing in cooperation with peasants short of working hands; 6) sending disguised soldiers to plough more or less openly the fields around the enemy's blockhouses or strongholds; 7) making use of river banks by building dykes, improving sand banks, and moving away the sand so that the fields may become available; 8) helping peasants to turn dry-lands into paddy fields; and 9) planting in company with the peasants in the villages where we are active.121

These guerrilla units also made it extremely clear that the civilian population should appreciate and emulate their labors. Their slogan was: "Knock down anyone who attempts to wreck the campaign for extensive production."122

Takeover of the mainland was shortly followed by Mao's December, 1949, directive increasing the economic responsibilities of the Communist forces. This policy and the rapid enlargement of the Communist units resulted in much higher production claims. In the ten months following the issuance of the directive, the PLA supposedly "reclaimed and tilled" almost 500,000 acres.123 This activity was concentrated in three of the Large Administrative Regions: 1) the Northwest (250,000 acres); 2) the Northeast

122 Ibid., p. 238.
(over 108,000 acres); and 3) the Central-South (over 128,000 acres).\textsuperscript{124} Another Communist source claims reclamation of 40,000 acres in parts of the North China region.\textsuperscript{125} Much of this acreage may have composed the "dozens of state farms ... run by the PLA" which included approximately 35,000 acres in that region.\textsuperscript{126} Mass labor was supplemented by the use of complex military equipment. For example, a June, 1951, news item about the Air Force reported that for "the first time in China's history ... planes have been used to help agricultural production."\textsuperscript{127} The Party continued to assume that such activities would "promote the production zeal of the masses and spur them to greater activity."\textsuperscript{128}

The 1959 directive noted above seemed to trigger a revitalization of the agricultural activity of PLA units who were not already primarily concerned with economic activity. The military's agricultural contribution has never ceased altogether, even during the military modernization program of the middle 1950's. In 1956 PLA personnel reclaimed over 16,000 acres and farmed over 130,000 acres.\textsuperscript{129} However, the regime seemed to rely primarily on select PLA groups and area task forces to provide the military's economic contribution. To counter chronic

\textsuperscript{124} The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 58; The First Year of Victory, op. cit., gives a figure of over 163,000 acres for the Central-South Region.
\textsuperscript{125} China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{126} The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 58.
\textsuperscript{127} People's China, Vol. IV, no. 1 (July 1, 1951), p. 46.
\textsuperscript{129} Hsiao, "Message of Greetings to Youth League Congress," op. cit., p. 9.
food shortages and discipline the army the Party increased its economic demands on the military. Even in 1958 the army made sizeable contributions to agriculture, e.g., 17.5 million tons of manure. In May of that year NCNA reported that "Troops of the PLA have been farming big areas since this spring. They have planted vegetables around their barracks and along rivers and streams." In 1958 garrison troops produced small amounts of produce and were mobilized as a supplementary force during harvest time. "In Canton 80% of the officers and men of the PLA units helped reap late-rice crops." In 1959 more emphasis was placed on self-support production. Special productivity was expected and supposedly accomplished, by garrison troops. For example:

The Peking Garrison this year has cultivated more than 4,400 hectares of land and raised 55,000 pigs, 1,000 head of cattle, 30,000 sheep, 18,000 chickens and ducks and 700,000 fish.

To the south, the Nanking Garrison harvested 3,000 tons of vegetables in the first season of this year, or close to four times the amount in the same period of last year. The garrison has set up 54 farms.

Agricultural production was not confined to garrison units. Troops in active military sectors were expected to contribute to their own support. In these cases the troops involved were along the coastal area facing Formosa, the "Amoy Front," the "Fukien"

Front" and Tachen Island. Here is a Communist description of the Amoy sector:

People's Liberation Army men ... have been engaged in farming during breaks in fighting and drilling. A number of units already supply by their own efforts all the meat and vegetables they need. Vegetable gardens are often demolished by bombardments by Kuomintang troops from the offshore islands, but the PLA men fill the shell craters and re-plant vegetables. On the outposts pigs are reared in dug-outs. ¹³⁴

The slogan of the Party was "Cultivating more farmland to greet National Day." Servicemen on Tachen supposedly provided "themselves all the meat and vegetables as well as weeds for fuel for nine months." ¹³⁵

b. Conservation

The Chinese peasants have experienced disasters of flood and drought to the point where they regard control of water resources as a fundamental responsibility of the central government and as an indication of the government's position in the eyes of Providence. ¹³⁶ Since the irrigation system and channel controls had decayed during the semi-anarchy of the warlord period and conflict with the Japanese, the Communists were forced to pursue irrigation and water control repair programs. They built new irrigation systems and water controls to reclaim land for agricultural production and to safeguard cultivated but previously

¹³⁴ "PLA Men on East China Front Take Part in Farming," NCCNA-English, Amoy Front (June 10, 1959), SCMP, no. 2036 (June 17, 1959), p. 4.


unprotected land.\textsuperscript{137}

The PLA "Water Conservancy Corps"\textsuperscript{138} has been composed of ex-Nationalist soldiers and less useful Red Army veterans. The Corps is partially directed by the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, headed by ex-Kuomintang General Fu Ts'ao-yü. Regular army units and engineering specialists are assigned as needed. A specialized group has been formed to handle the vast conservation construction tasks required for national development, but it has not been formally separated from the PLA.

Even during the revolutionary years Communist military personnel were assigned to dyke-building and canal digging.\textsuperscript{139} During periods of special manpower shortages they would even be assigned to digging wells.\textsuperscript{140} The takeover of the mainland signalled a sharp increase in the amount and kind of conservation activities. 1958 was the peak participation year for the army; the Communist press reported PLA participation in 20,000 water conservation projects,\textsuperscript{141} and in 1959 the figure dropped to 5,600.\textsuperscript{142} The decline was undoubtedly related to the controversy, to be discussed below, over the PLA's role. The Communist press


\textsuperscript{138}\textit{Communist China, 1955}, op. cit., p. 133.

\textsuperscript{139}Anna Louise Strong, \textit{Tomorrow's China}, New York: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, 1948, p. 114.


does not make clear the significance of the PLA contribution to these projects. We are told that the projects were undertaken "wholly or partly" by military personnel,\textsuperscript{143} but we do not know the fraction of the military contribution, the size of these projects, or the type of project. Hsiao Hua listed these 1956 achievements: 116 ponds and reservoirs, 375 ditches (canals?), and over 1,000 wells.\textsuperscript{144} Other reports have mentioned river dredging.\textsuperscript{145}

PLA units were assigned to water resource tasks immediately after the establishment of the Peking regime to raise agricultural output. The greatest effort reported was in the Northwest region, especially in the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, and Sinkiang.\textsuperscript{146} However, sizeable projects were also reported in the East and Central-South regions during the first year of the People's Republic. In Kiangsu troops were supposedly "digging and repairing six canals which will bring 60,000 dry acres under irrigation."\textsuperscript{147} In the Central-South region commissar Teng Tsu-hui reported that military personnel had "thrown up 3,640,000 cubic meters of the earthworks for irrigation systems."\textsuperscript{148} In the following years these tasks were increasingly assigned to the Water Conservation Corps but special circumstances commanded

\textsuperscript{143}Hu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{144}Hsiao, "Message of Greetings to Youth League Congress," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{145}T'an, "Report on the Military Situation in the Central-South Region," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{146}The Chinese People's Liberation Army, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{147}China's Youth Marches Forward, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{148}The First Year of Victory, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 74.
the services of regular troops. The 1958 policy of the "great leap forward" was such a circumstance, and even the front line troops in Fukien supposedly labored in "502 water conservancy projects." 149

Chinese rivers flooded in 1959, and PLA participation in water control projects increased accordingly. Participation was reported in the provinces of: Kirin, Liaoning, Hopei, Shansi, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, Yunnan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Hopeh, Shensi, and Sinkiang. 150 Major project participation was primarily composed of Corps personnel, but regular garrison and front-line troops were used, especially on small and short-term assignments. For example, over nine thousand men of the Shanghai garrison were reported as having "built a number of sea dikes and small reservoirs and dredged rivers in the outskirts." 151 In many of these projects PLA personnel were used as "shock brigades" to force up the productivity of impressed civilians. 152

A PLA conservation activity which has received less attention is the reforestation of denuded areas of the countryside. This task is largely undertaken by a labor force similar


151 "PLA Units Help in Agricultural Production," op. cit., p. 30.

152 For example, see: "PLA Units Strive to Achieve More in Celebration of 10th National Day," op. cit., p. 23.
to the Water Conservation Corps. The responsible ministry is, like that concerned with water resources, formally directed by an ex-Kuomintang militarist. Communist sources claim sizeable accomplishments for these reforestation projects. For example, in 1956 reportedly "59,900,000 trees were planted, over 20,000 catties of seeds were cast, and 20,000 mow of saplings were sowed." ¹⁵³ For the first half of 1958 tree plantings were claimed to have reached 100 million. ¹⁵⁴

c. Transportation

To consolidate political control of the nation and integrate economic planning, the party had to connect China's widely separated province and cities. The weakness of China's transportation network had both caused the disunity of the mainland during the twentieth century and resulted from it. The small amount of railway mileage in service prior to 1949 had been largely dismantled during the long years of civil and international warfare. ¹⁵⁵ To restore the previous system and expand it as rapidly as possible the CCP resorted to the PLA Railway Corps, later referred to as the "Railway Construction Corps". ¹⁵⁶ During the Communist sweep south, Mao is reported to have proclaimed: "Where the PLA goes, there the trains run too." ¹⁵⁷ A Western reporter

¹⁵³ Hsiao, "Message of Greetings to Youth League Congress," op. cit., p. 9. A cattie equals 1 1/3 pounds; a mow or mou equals 1/6 of an acre.
¹⁵⁵ Rigg, op. cit., p. 295.
¹⁵⁶ Communist China, 1955, op. cit., p. 133.
observed during this period:

After Lin Piao's first line troops had taken Tientsin and moved on south, the second line holding forces seemed largely to be working on railway repair. Bridges were brought in and lines double-tracked. 158 When the Communists developed their own governmental structure, the Ministry of Railways was placed under men who had been in prominent positions in the PLA Railway Corps, particularly Minister T'eng Tai-yuan.

During the first year of the People's Republic 100,000 PLA men were working on railway construction and repair in the Northwest and Southwest regions alone. 159 In the Northwest troops were mainly engaged on the Paochi-Tienshui and Tienshui-Lanchow segments, a total length of 690 kilometres. 160 In the Southwest on June 16, 1950, military personnel began work on the 530 kilometre Chengtu-Chungking railway. 161 Approximately 25,000 soldiers were assigned to this construction task. 162 In the Central-South region military personnel reported "435,000 work days in repairing railways and highways." 163 However, PLA personnel were supplemented and often sizeably outnumbered by civilian conscripts. 164

159 Ibid.
160 The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 60; First Year of Victory, op. cit., p. 60; Rigg, op. cit., p. 295.
161 Rigg, op. cit., p. 295; The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 61.
163 First Year of Victory, op. cit., p. 73.
164 For example, see: Barnett, op. cit.
The activity of the PLA Corps in railway construction continued throughout the first ten years of the People's Republic. The Corps mainly applied its energies to large-scale construction. Among the projects were the Fukien-Yunnan Railway and the Yunnan-Kweichow Railway. Together with regular troops they would participate in such projects as short links to raw material and processing centers. They laid track and were employed in terminal construction, bridge and culvert building, and switching-yard assignments.

While they performed these tasks, PLA personnel were expected to act as job-quota boosters. However, it does not appear that the effort in railway construction has yielded the same dividends in mileage in the 1953-1958 period as in the years from 1949-1953. Here are the figures:

Table XXIV
Growth of Transportation System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Miles of Railways</th>
<th>Miles of Highways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>13,750</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>18,757</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>19,375</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166For example, see: "PLA Units Take Part in Construction Work," op. cit., p. 5.
1691949 and 1958 figures are those given by En-lai Chou, "Chou
The explanation for this declining rate of expansion may lie in the degree to which the 1953 figure reflects repairs rather than construction of new tracks. The small difference between the 1953 and 1958 mileages may be explained by adjustment of an earlier exaggeration. The Railway Corps may have been employed more for maintenance purposes and the regular troops detailed to more pressing assignments, among them training in the PLA's new weapons. However, the Communist press has reported PLA participation in all five of the major railroad projects mentioned by Chou En-lai in his review of the first ten years of the CPR.170

There is evidence that a sizeable proportion of the PLA's contribution to railway construction was not economic but coercive. The Railway Corps provided expertise and enforced hard work by civilian corvees. One example of the use of conscript labor was the Chungking-Chengtu railway.171 According to the mainland press, "100,000 emancipated peasants answered the government's call to work on the construction of their own railway." According to a refugee engineer, "In actual fact these peasants were drafted from the villages of Szechwan and organized into semi-military work groups."

PLA troops have also been active in highway construction, particularly into the border area of Sinkiang and Tibet. The

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170 For the list of projects see Chou, op. cit., p. 4.

171 Barnett, op. cit.
three major highway projects mentioned by Chou in the article just referred to all went into Tibet and involved PLA personnel. By Chou's own admission most of the other roads were "make-shift." The PLA has not only constructed the roadways for motor transport, but also has consistently loaned the trucks and drivers to the civilian population. According to the Communists, in the first half of 1959, "the rear service transportation units and the various artillery units have dispatched vehicles amounting to 135,680 runs to help the local transport...." 

**d. Industry and Technology**

The leadership of the Party has set its economic sights not on a pastoral and agrarian goal, but on industrial power, which implied an emphasis on mechanization, technology and heavy industry. Until the CCP controlled the mainland, the Party was in no position to try to provide itself with anything more than basic supplies. However, even during the guerrilla period a certain amount of non-agricultural production was required. Military supplies, clothing, even paper on which to spread the gospel had to be found if the movement was to survive and expand. Because of its manpower resources and skills in organization and technology, the Army was called upon to contribute toward this goal. The nature and degree of the military contribution to industrialization has altered since that time, but the military has never been released from some form and degree of industrial

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172 Chou, op. cit., p. 4.
173 First Year of Victory, op. cit., p. 74.
responsibility.

During the guerrilla years the Party leadership viewed industrial development in relation to pressing military problems. Mao indicated this military evaluation of industrial production when he urged the creation of industrial cooperatives in CCP regions.

By this means we can help achieve manifold objectives: 1) stop the penetration of enemy goods from the occupied areas to the rural bases of guerrilla warfare; 2) utilize China's raw materials and resources for our own industries and prevent Japan from exploiting them; 3) create economically self-sufficient bases of guerrilla warfare to support protracted struggle; 4) train our unemployed and unskilled labor so that Japan cannot utilize it against us; 5) maintain village prosperity by giving the farmer needed manufactures in exchange for food. 175

In light of this frame of reference it is not surprising that the Army provided key personnel in organizing industry, just as it did in organizing the people. For example, in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region "With the exception of a few experimental ones, all the public factories in the region are military factories, and are controlled and managed by military authorities." 176

The managerial role played by the armed forces extended beyond the production of purely military supplies. For example, in the S-K-N region, the army controlled the only oil wells, one of two tanneries, one of two medical supply factories, and was opening several coal mines. 177 First in order of priority came

176 Gelder, op. cit., p. 195, reprints a regional report.
177 Yung, op. cit., pp. 97-100; Forman, op. cit., p. 76.
the supplies required for the war. The army had a vested interest in manufacturing uniforms, shoes, blankets, ammunition, etc. These coercive necessities were supplemented by certain other products required by the Party's revolutionary aims. Thus the New Fourth Army established several printing shops in addition to its handicraft shops which produced ammunition, hand grenades, land mines, blankets, bandages, and primitive surgical instruments.\textsuperscript{178} Within the Communist armies, special "war-economy" groups were formed.\textsuperscript{179} These were instrumental in the organization and direction of the industrial cooperatives which provided the bulk of Communist area manufactures. Often these took the form of "guerrilla industry" which operated near the front lines and were moved in event of enemy approach.\textsuperscript{180}

The capture of the mainland presented the Party with an industrial and technological task of vast magnitude. Since 1949 the industrial and technological activities of the armed forces have assumed three forms. The first was a passing phase linked to Communist takeover, namely takeover of going concerns until the civilian Communist apparatus was established. The second was continuation in expanded form of the defense industry responsibilities of the guerrilla period. A 1955 speech by Tan Cheng, then Deputy Minister of National Defense, provides an illustration. "Because we want to improve our military equipment,


development of industry, particularly heavy industry, is stressed by the Five Year Plan." The PLA was given control of the administrative organs for weapons manufacture, the First and Second Ministries of Machine Building.

The third industrial and technological assignment given the PLA since 1949 has been the use of its facilities and skills in non-military production. Military factories are expected to produce sizeable quantities of civilian goods and military, technicians and equipment are frequently assigned to assist in industrial and technological development in both urban and rural areas.

When the Communists swept South, the PLA was assigned the task of confiscating and reorganizing large concerns. Their staffs were organized into small study groups with one or two military comrades attached to each as a fellow pupil. During this period, the military comrades became extremely busy in getting acquainted with the staff and their affairs.

During this period military personnel were largely occupied with "self-sufficiency" industries and scattered resource exploitations on a level comparable to that of the guerrilla years. In 1950 the PLA controlled "70 small scale industrial establishments ... and 357 'handicraft shops', most of which are actually beancurd mills providing the army with food." Primitive implements

181 Communist China, 1955, op. cit., p. 129.
184 Rigg, op. cit., p. 296.
might be produced for other economic tasks. For example, in 1950 in East Hopei:

The army group headquarters ... has under its control 14 brick-kilns, a flour mill, a factory making army uniforms and an iron workshop to turn out the shovels, hoes, and horse-drawn ploughs that the soldiers use. ... A handicraft unit was weaving the wicker baskets used for removing earth on the canal-building projects, another unit produced the sacking for the sandbags used in constructing dykes and dams. 185

Some army units produced along lines similar to those in the S-K-N region. For example, during 1950 troops in the Central-South Region not only built barracks and made bricks, but "also participated in the development of coal, wolfram and tin mines." 186

Military production assignments changed drastically when the Party committed itself to a policy of military modernization. The armed forces were assigned to production of modern weapons, communications equipment, and transportation vehicles that would convert the PLA from a guerrilla army. The responsibility for operating the "military supply plants" fell to the Rear Service Department of the PLA staff, 187 and to the two ministries mentioned earlier, in other words, to the military itself. The newly created navy found itself in charge of China's major shipyards. 188

China was too short of labor and facilities in industry and technology to allot the total productivity of these facilities to the military. The civilian economy particularly needed these

PLA products: radio equipment, tools, surveying instruments,

185 China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 49.
186 T'an, op. cit., p. 19.
chemicals and drugs. In 1958, according to a mainland periodical:

The army, navy and air forces opened 3,300 factories. These factories, while ensuring the tasks of munition production, fulfilled some tasks of processing, repair and making civil products. Some motor-car repair and assembling plants turned out motor cars and trams. The Navy Repair Plant accepted orders from 10 provinces and municipalities for metal-lurgical equipment, machine-making equipment, trawlers and electric machinery. Last year the army factories produced 4,854 lathes and 3,100 tractors and power machines.

In early 1959 an order was issued which acknowledged the primacy of military needs but at the same time called for a greater contribution to civilian non-agricultural production.

Under the premises that the fulfillment of military production and training tasks are absolutely guaranteed, all PLA units possessing technical equipment are asked, wherever possible, to accept orders for the processing, repair, manufacture and production of civil products.

Other mainland media items throw doubt on the meaning of "absolutely guaranteed" and suggest that certain military industrial responsibilities weakened coercive strength and produced dubious industrial results. An example of the first is provided by Communist reports on 1958 industrial and technological activities by troops stationed in the coastal province of Fukien. These front-line troops supposedly built 68 factories and ten

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191Fu, op. cit., p. 3.
iron and steel mills;\textsuperscript{192} they reportedly pledged to repair or construct chemical fertilizer plants, farm tool repair shops, rice refining machines, harvesting machines, diesel and gasoline engines, lathes, tractors and trucks.\textsuperscript{193} Even a major fraction of the claimed activities would have sizeably detracted from combat training time and battle-readiness. A 1958 naval order demonstrates an example of the second weakness. It said that bringing ships into dock for repairs was extravagant and that "crew members of naval vessels should and can depend on their own power to maintain and repair their own ships."\textsuperscript{194} This policy, the Party hoped, would mean that "shipyards can spare a large part of their labor power to support industrial and agricultural construction in the country."\textsuperscript{195} It is difficult to accept the industrial efficacy of the commissar's argument to the sailors:

\begin{center}
\textit{ notwithstanding the high precision of machinery, they are after all made by men and if factory workers can repair them, we who have had constant access to them and are well acquainted with their capabilities should be able to do still a better job.}\textsuperscript{196}
\end{center}

The PLA has been exploited to reach particularly important industrial goals, for example, the 1958 campaign to increase iron and steel production, which was conducted under the slogan, "Produce more and better steel at faster speed; submerge the American imperialists in an ocean of steel."\textsuperscript{197} Armed forces

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{192}"PLA Men Make Great Contribution to Socialist Construction," \textit{SCMP}, No. 1828, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{193}"PLA Aids Production Units in Fukien," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{194}Chao-hsing Teng, "Navymen Repair Their Own Vessels," \textit{JMJP} (May 1, 1959), \textit{OB}, No. 582 (June 2, 1959), p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{195}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{196}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{197}"Big PLA Effort on the Steel Front," \textit{NCNA-English}, Peking
\end{itemize}
participation was prescribed in a directive of the Military Committee of the CCP Central Committee, publicized on September 20, 1958. By this time in the year it had probably become apparent that supplementary labor was needed to raise production to the desired level without depriving other sectors of the economy of vital labor and materials.\(198\) The order directed:

1) That the various units should earmark 4,120 transport trucks and promptly organize them into mobile battalions and regiments. Special personnel should be appointed to take care of them, acting on the orders of the Ministry of Metallurgy.

2) That the various units should promptly draw up an inventory of obsolete airplanes, tank engines, automobile engines, and warship propellers stored in their warehouses, factories and harbors and make a report to the Military Committee, which will in turn report them to the State Council for use.

3) That because of the shortage of iron ore at present, the taking back of scrap metals is one of the ways of solving the shortage of raw materials. Various units must mobilize and organize a definite number of personnel to collect these scrap metals and put them into use.

In order to effectively support iron and steel production, the General Staff Department should set up an office and the various large units set up working groups and various armed units must take prompt action to struggle to this end every minute and every second. Any sign of procrastination is impermissible.\(199\)

The directive indicated the need for supply, co-ordination and distribution felt at the iron and steel manufacturing points. The PLA was used to meet these three needs.

Armed forces personnel were urged to win "victories" on


\(198\) For some estimates of the drain on the rural labor force, see: The Economy of Communist China, 1958-1962, op. cit., p. 20.

the "scrap front" and were reported to be "looking for scrap in ponds and rivers, in the ground and in dumps." Air Force units joined in the hunt, as did Navy diving teams. On the Fukien front soldiers reportedly "collected fragments of shells fired by the enemy." According to the mainland press, the PLA exceeded its 1958 metal scrap quota by over 100,000 tons, after collecting only 60,000 tons by November 15th. The specific amount is not clear, but the service scrap collection was not a token exercise.

While various units were gathering scrap to supply iron and steel plants, the PLA Signal Corps was providing its modern skills to help to co-ordinate them. "During the national battle for iron and steel... signal units in many places helped to erect telephone wires and radio equipment at the iron and steel-making centers."

The PLA was also charged with a large burden of distribution of raw materials, finished products, personnel and machinery. An official source claimed that the PLA allocated "8,850 lorries, about 300 sorties of aircraft and dozens of naval vessels." Indicative of the stage of modernity reached by China and the PLA was the additional comment that "Officers and men of the PLA units

201 Li, _op. cit._, p. 15.
throughout the country used horse-drawn carts and push-carts to transporting [sic] of iron ore, coal and other necessities."  

The bulk of motor vehicle assignments was made by the garrisons of Nanking, Mukden, Canton and Peking-Tientsin. Supposedly these transport units functioned on a round-the-clock schedule.  

In Kiangsi province "PLA truck drivers ...have taken over responsibility for the transporting of all locally produced steel and also for loading and unloading." The air force was charged with an important role in dispersing China's iron and steel industry, which had been concentrated in Northeast and East China. According to official claims, PLA craft logged 2,000,000 ton/kilometres in this duty. Equipment and technicians were thus carried to Southwest China, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang.  

These supplementary activities were accompanied by direct military participation in the construction of steel and iron manufacturing facilities and in the production of these commodities. The mainland population was told that following the Party decision to emphasize iron and steel production, "5 various PLA units immediately amassed their manpower and material resources...

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205 Ibid.  
206 Fu, op. cit., p. 1.  
208 Li, op. cit., p. 15.  
to engage in mining, coking, iron-smelting and steel-smelting operations." Specific claims were made that army units "built more than 12,000 steel-refining and iron-smelting furnaces." Military units participated in the construction of large plants near Shanghai, Tsinan, Kunming, Chungking, Lanchow, Yaan, and Canton. In the Shanghai area the PLA contributed "more than 10,000 men" who "worked for six months". Armymen built sixty-nine blast furnaces near Tsinan. Similar activities were undertaken by military personnel in Fukien and by the Chinese Navy. The project of constructing new facilities for iron and steel production was supplemented by switching existing PLA factories to iron and steel production. In 1958 military production was reported to have reached 7,354 tons of steel and 154,000 tons of iron. While this is a sizeable production figure for a military establishment, it represents little more than 1% of the total iron output claimed.

5. External Applications

The contribution of the Communist armed forces to the mainland economy was a response to the necessities of popular support.

210 Fu, op. cit., p. 1.
211 Li, op. cit., p. 15.
212 Ibid.
214 Ibid.; and Teng, op. cit.
215 For example, see: "Liberation Army Assigns Large Portion of Personnel, Materials and Trucks to the Iron and Steel Front to Help Iron and Steel Production," op. cit., p. 13.
216 Li, op. cit., p. 15.
for survival and basic economic construction. In Tibet the PLA claimed that it supplied all of its vegetable needs by the summer of 1959 by cultivating 767 acres of "vegetables, barley and wheat." In army-run hothouses, plots and at least one state farm it cultivated a total of 17 kinds of vegetables. It also raised livestock, especially pigs. Communist sources reported that "The rebellion-suppressing forces ...are spending all their spare time in helping the Tibetan compatriots accumulate manure, transport manure, plow the fields and sow seeds." The Communist press also reported that the troops were engaged in various capital overhead projects such as road building, land reclamation and irrigation canal digging. Supposedly they were also active in the construction of a hydro-electric station for Lhasa and "a large number of tanneries, canneries, dairy mills, chemical fertilizer factories and other factories."

Tibetan refugees report that the economic contribution was often restricted to supervision of forced labor gangs, particularly in road-building and transportation projects.

221 Ibid.
223 Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic (Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee
The Chinese Communist troops contributed to economic construction in Korea, "particularly after the armistice." Accompanied by songs such as the Friendship Dam song,

For the building of the Friendship Dam,
We do not mind tiring ourselves even more,
Taking off our clothes and our shoes,
We go into the water to excavate the earth,
The mud covers up our entire bodies,
But nobody cares a bit.
Our sweat drops like a shower of rain,
To water the flower of friendship into bloom.224

In eight years, "according to incomplete statistics," the PLA helped the Korean people build 881 public edifices, 45,412 houses for civilians, restore and build 4,263 big and small bridges, build 4,096 dikes and dams totalling 429,220 meters, carry out field work on a total acreage of 284,065.8 hectares, transport 657,303.4 tons of manure, plant 36,089,519 trees and transport 63,853 tons of foodstuffs.225

The engineering corps supposedly played a large part in the reconstruction of the capital city of Pyongyang and other urban areas.226 Supposedly the Korean people were overcome with gratitude toward the "Uncle Volunteers."227 The lack of specific information prevents our evaluating the distribution of the productive time of the Volunteers in the activities summarized in the preceding quote. It is more possible to assess the validity of the Chinese

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227 Ming Wu, "The Volunteers Help Korean Rehabilitation," People's
Communist contention that in 1956 members of the CPV spent 720,000 man-days in economic assignments. We know that at the time of their withdrawal in 1958 there were 350,000 CCP troops in North Korea. It is reasonable to assume that in 1956 there were at least as many. If the Chinese force was 350,000 in 1956 it would mean that Volunteers on the average spent a grand total of two days in economic assignments. If the force was larger the time devoted to the economy was even less. Propaganda reasons alone would have justified this token effort.

B. Civilian Modernization—Diffusion from a "Training School"

The Party multiplies and prolongs the returns from modernization of the rank and file serviceman through a diffusion policy: a policy of using active military personnel and particularly demobilized veterans to teach civilians technical and administrative skills, public health habits, Communist ideology and literacy. The pressures to diffuse these skills of the military throughout society have increased since 1949. For example, during the first five year plan (1953-1958) Party officials estimated that they needed 500,000 additional "intermediate and junior technical personnel" and 150 to 200 thousand additional "top-level technicians." Although formal educational facilities were grossly inadequate to supply these technicians, military personnel who had necessarily acquired technical skills to

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operate the machinery of war could be and were used to alleviate this shortage.

1. Active Military Personnel

To diffuse these skills and attitudes in the civilian population, particularly during the revolutionary years, the Party could not afford to release it teachers from the army and lose the benefits of their services to the army. Its teachers stayed within the army to teach servicemen as well as civilians, and especially during the early years of the movement the Party publicized slogans such as "The Eighth Route Army is the 'Teacher of People'". 230

During the revolutionary years army teachers concentrated on teaching reading and writing, not only because it lacked equipment with which to teach technical skills, but because the Party wanted to create vast audiences for propaganda and modernization messages. Even the harried New Fourth Army organized literacy classes, often under the direction of a cadre from the Mass Movement section of the Political Department. 231 After 1949 the army continued to teach literacy. "The PLA helps the people to open schools and organize reading groups. The teaching materials are selected to meet the standards and requirements of the villagers". 232 During the middle 1950's the PLA was reported to have "opened literacy night schools for APC's" (Agriculture


Producer's Cooperatives). 233 A 1959 People's Daily article reported that PLA units stationed along the "active" Formosa Straits coastline were teaching literacy to civilians. 234 PLA medical personnel have disseminated public health information to help "the people to acquire the elements of scientific knowledge with a view to stamping out superstition." 235 During an epidemic in the S-K-N region the Eighth Route army reported that

The army medical service took advantage of the opportunity to convince the conservative and superstitious peasants of the imperative need for improving public health. The medical units taught the villagers the best way to dig and look after wells, popularized a code of sanitation and started medical training classes. 236

By 1958 an expanded PLA medical service was training "health personnel and clinical assistants." 237

Since 1949 the PLA teachers have become more active in economic education: agriculture, construction and industry. PLA agricultural contingents, such as that in Sinkiang, have introduced the peasants to modern methods of farming. In some areas the soldiers have "imported the techniques of plowing, trans-planting, threshing" and have set up "training classes" to impart these new methods to the local population. 238

235The Chinese People's Liberation Army, op. cit., p. 38.
237"PLA Aids Production Units in Fukien," op. cit., p. 19.
238"Chinese Army Takes Part in Production," NCNA-English, Peking
personnel in local garrisons impart industrial skills by training "truck drivers, tractor operators, electricians, telegraph operators." 239 Military units which possess technical equipment or run factories attached to them are obligated to "draw in a certain number of students and apprentices...." 240 On construction projects the PLA often holds wholesale classes to teach technical skills. A railway engineering unit of the PLA Railway Corps was allotted 12,000 civilian "apprentices" to train as technicians, 241 for the Fukien-Yunnan railway project. 242 The New China News Agency reported that these apprentices could do only the most unskilled tasks and "knew nothing about technology." The PLA assigned instructors to transform these laborers into "men able to build roads today and to manage railways tomorrow." "During off-duty hours they opened courses to train pneumatic gunners, blasting detonators, blacksmiths, carpenters and mechanics...." 243

2. The Veterans

Soldiers are destined to become civilian leaders in local communities when demobilized. They not only are learning fighting, but farming and crafts. They are also better educated in reading and writing than the average peasantry through intensive cultural programs regularly carried out in all army units. 243


239 "PLA Aids Production Units in Fukien," op. cit., p. 19.

240 Li, op. cit., p. 17.

241 "PLA Aids Production Units in Fukien," op. cit., p. 18.


243 Yung, op. cit.; p. 158.
As this quotation indicates, the Party considered "PLA ... a high school for youth." The Party wanted to insure that "when the war is over, they will still be useful members of society." In the norm of Chinese militaries the discharged servicemen had often found no productive place in society and become either a charity case or bandit. The Party also realized that the veteran could be a factor for economic and political stability at least and at best an agent and communicator of social change and economic growth.

The Party systematized conscription and demobilization when the Military Service Law was passed on July 30, 1955. Nieh Jung-chen released an "Explanation of the Draft Conscription."

The greater part of privates formerly enlisted under the system of voluntary military service will be demobilized and put on the reserve list in the next few years ... The Government will issue different amounts of production subsidies to the demobilized servicemen according to their length of service and the local governments will help them to solve the question of employment so that they will be properly resettled ... when demobilized they will endeavor to preserve the glorious tradition and working style of the PLA, contribute their maximum strength and participate in Socialist construction and Socialist transformation.

A People's Daily editorial listed the advantages of the conscription-demobilization system.

every year large numbers of young people in our country shall, according to provisions of the draft conscription law, join the PLA to receive collective education in socialism and every year large numbers of servicemen

244 China's Youth Marches Forward, op. cit., p. 43. The phrase is attributed to Chu Teh.
245 Chu, The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas, op. cit., p. 43.
will retire from active service to take part in peaceful construction. Thus, all the servicemen retired would have had 3 to 5 years' training. On the one hand, they would have had their political awareness and patriotic ardor enhanced in the army and they would have been steeled in organization and discipline. On the other, they would have learned much scientific knowledge and technique. This will enable our country to obtain continuously large numbers of construction talents educated in socialism in a concentrated manner and possessed of certain skill and it will powerfully facilitate the Socialist cause of our country.247

The Party has tried to maximize the value of the demobilized serviceman by co-ordinating his "training in production" with "training in national defense".248

The method is to take into account the civilian needs while learning military technology. For instance, tractor operators, machine-repairers, surveyors and accountants can serve both the army and the civilians. This will enable them, after demobilization, to render a better service..."249

For example, when Admiral Ten Chao-hsiang discussed the 1958-1959 policy of repair of vessels by their crews, he referred to the psychological change that participation in these technical tasks caused. He claimed that it "breaks their superstitions and fear over technology...".250 Another Communist writer claimed that "Taking part in industrial construction, officers and men tear the veil of mystery from industrial technology and establish a style of thinking, speaking and acting with courage and daring."251

249 Li, op. cit., p. 17.
250 Chao-hsiang Teng, "Navymen Repair their Own Vessels," JMJ (May 1, 1959), CB, No. 582 (June 2, 1959), p. 4.
251 Li, op. cit., p. 16.
Although demobilization began on a small scale in 1950, it moved into high gear when the Military Service Law was passed in 1955. The Party wanted to demobilize the older and less flexible Red Army veterans and Nationalist defectors as rapidly as possible in order to replace them with more malleable, healthier and younger men. Before regularized conscription and demobilization began in late 1955, the Party carried out an experimental draft program in late 1954 and early 1955. Supposedly 830,000 men were drafted in this period, although the draft quota for 1955-1956 was reported to be 500,000. Probably the Party lowered its 1955-1956 quota because: 1) the higher draft quota of the experimental program had allowed it to demobilize a significant proportion (approximately 40%) of the older and less reliable soldiers; 2) the younger men were badly needed in civilian economic activity; and 3) the public resented conscription.

Table XXV

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 5, 1956</td>
<td>5,000,000+</td>
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<td>Feb., 1958</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct., 1959</td>
<td>7,000,000+</td>
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254 Ibid.
Since 1957, the Communists have been demobilizing 400,000-500,000 of the three-year service conscripts annually. It can reasonably be assumed that their technical skills are higher than the old guerrilla veterans and Nationalist defectors previously demobilized. However, the majority of veterans are still from the latter categories, 5,500,000 as of the end of 1959. The CCP also claims that the new discharges are highly indoctrinated. Figures published claim that 80-90% of these ex-conscripts were discharged as members of either the CCP or the YCL.256

a. Functions of Veterans

On May 31, 1955, a State Council directive assured the veterans that if local authorities did not find jobs for them, the Ministry of Defense would find them work.257

The functions which veterans actually carried out have varied with their talents and state needs. Basically the Party visualizes them as "indefatigable shock troops of socialist construction" and "a political force propelling the masses forward."258


256China News Analysis, op. cit., p. 7 cites JMJP (Jan. 7, 1958), for the number of discharges. Information on them is provided by Chiu, op. cit., p. 172, from JMJP (April 15, 1957); and by "Welcome Demobilized Servicemen to Take Part in Socialist Construction," Hangchow, Chekiang Jih-Pao (Feb. 21, 1960), SCMP, No. 2248 (May 2, 1960), p. 20

257Chiu, op. cit., p. 172, cites this information from JMJP (June 16, 1955).

258"Tung Pi-wu's Speech to Conference of Activists Among Army
A 1958 policy statement summarized, if not very specifically, the functional value of the veteran.

In an emergency, demobilized servicemen are particularly suited to various forms of shock brigades, because they lend themselves readily to regimentation and organization and are always willing to do hard work. On the road of production and construction our Party often encounters formidable tasks obstacles, and large numbers of shock attackers are needed to remove them. These demobilized servicemen should be organized and educated at normal times, so that they may mix themselves with the general masses and act as leaders...At normal times they are scattered, so that they may lead the general masses in production; but they are assembled in times of need, so that they may carry out the more difficult production tasks. 259

The overwhelming majority of demobilized servicemen were sent to the countryside. In 1955 the figure was over 90%; in 1957 4 million were reportedly relocated in agricultural employment; and in 1959 a Communist source claimed that "about 5,000,000 demobilized servicemen have been placed on the agricultural front and have already become the hard-core force in the development of agricultural production and the improvement of rural work." 260

The same source claimed that veterans have been shifted en masse to areas which needed large task forces.

In the past ten years there have also been several hundred thousand demobilized servicemen collectively transferred to production and construction posts in

259 Wang, op. cit., p. 8.
the frontier areas, coastal areas, and land reclamation areas.\textsuperscript{261}

Another source wrote of "whole regiments and whole divisions (of veterans) given to the organization of army reclamation farms."\textsuperscript{262} Since these farms were located in China's backward hinterland, their population was being collectivized, the Party needed an agricultural surplus to accumulate capital for economic construction, the Party needed to concentrate political and technical leadership on these farms. Veterans were deployed for agricultural purposes in 1958. One hundred thousand veterans of the Chinese People's Volunteers were ordered to colonize and farm areas on the North Korean and Soviet borders.\textsuperscript{263} The significance of colonizers with coercive training is obvious.

Local people's councils were instructed to use the administrative and leadership talents of demobilized officers. Although no comprehensive information is available, scattered reports from several provinces indicate that veterans were often assigned to key positions. In three districts in Shantung 32\% of the discharged soldiers held cadre posts, and in 66 counties of Shensi province:

of the 36,000 demobilized men who join the mutual aid teams and APCs, more than 5,000 became team leaders, and over 1,000 chiefs of APC. There were similar figures from Honan.\textsuperscript{264}


\textsuperscript{262}Hu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.


Veterans were also used to handle many elementary tasks of organizing the rural populace, e.g.,

to handle bookkeeping, compile statistics, conduct newspaper reading, and edit wall bulletins. Army craftsmen are required to repair farm implements and to study advanced experience of production increase. Men experienced in hygienic services are needed to take care of the health of the peasants.265

The Party used veterans as "an active force ...of technological ...revolution."266 In June, 1958, the Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs claimed that of the demobilized soldiers

More than 600,000 of them are technicians of one kind or another, including automobile drivers, aircraft fliers, bulldozer operators, navigational engineers, tankists, tele-communications personnel, medical workers, meteorologists, radar technicians, designers, surveyors and draftsmen, lathe turners, fitters, welders and electricians.267

This sizeable number is, however, only 1/10 of the servicemen demobilized by that time. The Communists attribute sizeable production to demobilized soldiers, who are often organized with military dependents. In an unspecified seven provinces, they supposedly ran 63,819 factories. In 1958 the press reported that in Szechwan they "invented and trial produced 1,150,000 farm tools."268 They have been reported working in many industries, including rubber works, oilfields, shipbuilding, steel, auto repair, electronic components and appliances, and communications.269

265 Ibid.
266 Wang, op. cit., p. 8.
267 Ibid., p. 9.
Typical of these reports was one concerning "42 newly demobilized officers" who "established a ball-bearing plant with their own funds, and they themselves mastered the skills of fitters, forgers and mechanics." Retired officers with special skills and education have been assigned to staff positions in "government offices, industries, mines and capital construction projects." Even disabled and seriously physically handicapped veterans have been expected to produce, if possible, in excess of their own needs.

b. Resistance

Although the Communists have claimed that veterans are dedicated norm-raisers, "always willing to do hard work," other Communist sources contradict the image. After years of military service the veteran suddenly discovered that he was expected to labor as a model worker wherever the Party assigned him, and on November 18, 1956, the Party was forced to castigate...

...some dependents and veterans [who] have not made a good exhibition of themselves. They demand from the state and the masses special care which is unreasonable. Some veterans suited for work in rural areas do not wish to go to rural areas....

The Minister of Internal Affairs found it necessary to warn the demobilized to subdue their arrogance and concentrate on their

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273 Walker, op. cit., p. 41.
assigned tasks.\textsuperscript{274} On April 5, 1957, \textit{Chinese Youth} admitted that "some of them despise agricultural production."\textsuperscript{275}

On February 6, 1958, the Party was forced to issue a stiff Cabinet directive. The directive implied that veterans were plentiful, berated those "whose mind is not on production, who do not follow orders, and behave in a riotous way," and listed measures to "suppress the lawless activities of discharged veterans."\textsuperscript{276} For example, forced labor and "production under surveillance".\textsuperscript{277} The directive may have diminished, but did not eliminate veterans' "improper" behavior. In May a "National Conference of Activities among Dependents of Servicemen and Martyrs, Disabled, Demobilized, Retired and Rehabilitated Servicemen" was convened. The conferees obediently issued a "proposal" from which we can infer some details of the Party-veteran conflict.

We want to be hard-working heroes and dexterous experts....
We will exercise modesty and care and avoid pride and impatience....We will treasure the honor which the Party and the people have given us. We will not be conceited over our achievements or proud; we will not exaggerate others' shortcomings or magnify our own accomplishments....We will always consult the wishes of the masses, learn from them, share sorrows and joys with them and lose ourselves in them.
We will constantly ...promote the spirit of Communism....We will obey the Party, going where it wants us to go, and doing what it wants us to do. We

\textsuperscript{274} "Demobilized Soldiers in China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 651.
\textsuperscript{275} Chiu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 172; quotes from an editorial in \textit{Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien Pao} (April 15, 1957).
\textsuperscript{277} \textit{China News Analysis, op. cit.}, p. 7, from \textit{JMJP} (Feb. 7, 1958).
will get our work done well with selfless labor exertion. The Party has also had to deal with hostility between civilian cadres and veterans. The cadres found the demobilized servicemen bumptious and overly critical. Typically the Party ordered the cadres to place the veterans and assigned the PLA the task of indoctrinating the soldiers before they were discharged. The Party has retained its diffusion policy, which indicates that its returns outweigh its disadvantages. However, the CCP has had to counter the criticisms of individuals trying to "nullify this active role of the demobilized men by giving isolated instances of bad conduct." Since the Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs had to declare that "Political agitation and ideological education for demobilized servicemen should be the central task of the resettlement of demobilized personnel in future," it is reasonable to ask how isolated these "instances" were. Although the usefulness of the ex-servicemen will increase as military training becomes more sophisticated, increasing military professionalism could nullify this increment.

C. Integrative Example

This chapter has examined the non-coercive activities of the Communist army in piecemeal. Obviously, these assignments have been carried on simultaneously, and to a certain extent the

280Wang, op. cit., p. 8.
281Ibid., p. 9.
Party has been able to kill at least two birds with one stone. For example, military activity in agriculture decreased the amount of food taken from the peasantry. It also raised the living standard and fighting stamina of the troops. The visual propaganda effect of soldiers working side by side with the peasantry reduced popular resentment of the economic burden imposed on it by the military. At the same time, this co-operative effort with the ordinary peasant tended to undermine attitudes of military professionalism. The 1943 "Support the Government and Love the People Campaign" illustrates a CCP effort to use the military to kill several birds at once.

1. The Problems

The 1942 decision to launch the SGLP campaign in the following year was a response to sizeable external and internal problems facing the Communist-controlled Border Regions. "Financially and economically" the Communist territories were admittedly in "the greatest straits."282 Chu Teh indicated that famine had to be relieved in certain districts.283 Economic difficulties were coupled with political difficulties. Party and Army had undergone rapid expansion since the formation of the United Front,284 and the rectification campaign launched in the CCP in 1942 had failed to re-balance the strained military-Party

282Mao, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 149.
283Chu Teh, "Launch the Supporting the Government and Loving the People Movement," in Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, n.p.: Joint Defense and Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, April, 1944. (Chinese).
284See Table IV, Chapter 3, p. 129.
relationship. Mao described the military behavior to be corrected:

Some comrades in army work have become haughty and behave badly towards the soldiers, the people, the government and the Party; they never admit their own mistakes but always find fault with the comrades in civilian work, seeing their own achievements, but not shortcomings, and listening only to flattery and not to criticism.

The Party also wished to revise the organization of agriculture to meet the increased needs of the population moving into the border regions and to experiment with collectivization. In 1943 the peasants were organized into numerous "agricultural production cooperative societies." While the individual retained ownership of his land, "the productive relationship between individuals undergoes profound changes." Accordingly, in 1942 special conferences of senior military and political cadres were held to devise measures which would raise economic production, re-establish political control of the military, increase the popularity of the Red forces, and successfully re-organize peasant labor.

2. The Measures

The army was ordered to support a ten point program: 1) obey government orders; 2) protect, assist and respect the government; 3) take care of public property; 4) respect the people's rights;


287 Tse-tung Mao, "On the Cooperative Society," (Speech to the Border Region's Higher Cadres' Meeting, Oct., 1943), in Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.

5) return borrowed goods, and compensate for destroyed property; 6) participate actively in production and lighten the burden on the government and on the people; 7) help the people to plow in the spring, harvest in the fall, and store in the winter; 8) promote among the people the cleaning and hygiene movements; 9) respect and understand the people's customs and manners; 10) propagandize the people and receive their opinions. 289

Basically these ten commandments represented inadequacies in the behavior of the military, and in the first stage of the SGLP campaign the military was the target of an intensive indoctrination program. Party leadership suggested that the campaign would be more effective if the Eighth Route Army personnel would impose more self-discipline and would respect the civilian cadres. In the usual array of meetings, lectures, criticism and self-criticism, group approval and attack, the Party described military treatment of the peasantry in such a way as to produce guilt feelings in the soldiers. 290

The second phase of the program was aimed at re-establishing and arousing popular approval of and trust in the Red military. Major emphasis was placed on social contacts and compensation for previous economic impositions. The "Army-People Joint New Year's Parties" and entertainments were combined with an

289 "Public Agreement on Supporting the Government and Loving the People by the Garrison Army," in Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.

290 One Year's Work to "Support the Government and Love the People," op. cit.; and Representatives of Labor Heroes Among the Troops, n.p.: Political Department of the United Armies for Defense, 1944. The "Foreword" is signed by the Propaganda Bureau of the Political Department of the Garrison Army, Eighth Route Army.
accounting for civilian goods taken, loaned or damaged by the military. Supposedly the Eighth Route Army provided free medical care and helped to resettle refugees.291

However, the SGLP Campaign the military contributed primarily to the economic sphere. Army units engaged in industrial production. Selected soldiers worked with the peasants to:
1) lessen economic burdens on the peasantry to increase their support for the military; 2) increase food supplies; 3) communicate new techniques and secure support for new methods of agricultural organization; and 4) underscore the position of the army as servants of the Party. The military was reminded that when it rendered economic assistance it should behave in a way that maximized its popular image. The troops were told to:

a) not accept any payment, not even a bowl of rice, from the people for the service they render;
b) carry or transport their foodstuffs and vegetables by themselves without asking for the people's help;
c) not damage seedlings in the people's fields and weed them; and
d) use the tools of the peasants with care.292

The troops also helped the peasants collect wood, transport water, and construct homes.293

Whole army units were organized as "collective labor co-operative societies."294 These were models of the agricultural

292 Ibid., p. 122.
293 One Year's Work to "Support the Government and Love the People," op. cit.
294 Ts'e-tung Mao, "Let Us Organize," in Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.
co-operatives to be imposed on the peasantry, and army labor was
supposed to stimulate popular efforts. Some units claimed to
have achieved total self-sufficiency. According to Mao,

the soldiers have on the average cultivated 18 mou
per person and can make or produce practically
everything—foodstuffs like vegetables, meat and
cooking oil; things to wear like cotton and woolen
clothing, shoes and socks; shelters like caves,
houses, big and small meeting halls; articles for
daily use like firewood, charcoals and coal.

The most publicized military unit in the SGLP campaign was the
10,000 men 359th Brigade under General Wang Chen. A pro-Commun-

ist source claims that the brigade produced in 1943:

2,700 long tons of hulled millet, 53,000 pounds of
other cereal, 914,000 pounds of beef, mutton, pork
and game meat, 60,000 long tons of pumpkin and beans
...The brigade also operated a number of handicraft
shops, including the Ta Kwong (Big Light) Oil and
Alcohol Works, a paper mill, a spinning and weaving
mill, and a shoe factory.

Several CCP sources reported that the Eighth Route troops were
responsible for one third of the Border Region land reclaimed in
1943, but disagreed as to whether the area they cleared was over
200,000 mou, or over 300,000 mou.

3. Dimensions of Accomplishment

In late November, 1943, Mao boasted that the Party now
had "a fighting army, the Eighth Route Army, which is also a
productive army." Despite the army's productive contribution,

295 One Year's Work to "Support the Government and Love the Peo-
ple," op. cit.
296 Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 149.
297 Yung, op. cit., p. 40.
298 Ibid.; and Lung Ho, "Struggle to Achieve the 100,000 ton of
Grain Goal," in Documents on the Advancement of Production and
Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.
299 Mao, "Let Us Organize," op. cit.
the peasants still carried a heavy economic burden. At the same
time the army resented its production assignments.

Only a small part of the army achieved any significant
self-sufficiency. The garrison force produced only 79.5% of
its supplies, and it is reasonable to assume that front-line
forces produced an even lower percentage. In 1932 CCP sources
reported a large amount of "free contributions" of produce, goods
and money. Communist estimates for "expedient labor mobili-
ization" dropped from approximately 123,000 men days in 1942 to
27,000 men days in 1943. If we assume that the 1940 popu-
lation figure for the S-K-N Border Region of 1,400,000 is valid
for 1942 and 1943, the "expedient labor" demands on the population
in 1942 was .09 days and in 1943, .02 days. However, the 1943
figure does not include other types of forced labor such as grain
and salt transportation. The Communists estimated that the
civilians carried only 16% fewer pounds of salt in 1943 than in
1942. The military economic contribution lightened the
civilian economic burden; it hardly removed it.

The SGWP Campaign uncovered other "shortcomings" in the
military. At the end of the year, Mao found it necessary to say
that the "warlordist style of work" had to be uprooted. He ad-
mitted that it had been "curbed, but further effort is needed to
clear it up". The Politburo called for correction of "erroneous

300 Forman, op. cit., p. 74.
301 For a detailed list, see: Yung, op. cit., p. 33.
302 Ibid., p. 32.
303 Ibid.
viewpoints". According to Border Region sources, three objections were being raised within the Communist military establishment. The first was that the military role in the SGLP Campaign represented a "disciplinary" and not a "political" role; certain elements of the military viewed the Party's orders as designed primarily to punish the Army. The second "erroneous viewpoint" was resentment of "the civilians [who] have become superior over us troopers." Both of these objections were entitled "ideological errors" that had to be corrected.

To the third objection the CCP leadership was willing to make a concession. Some cadres thought it unwise to detract from combat training and fighting time and energy to participate in production. They regarded the SGLP as "merely an expedient for meeting fiscal deficits." The CCP leadership denied their assertion and urged them to greater efforts, even on the front lines. However, Mao agreed to compromise. "In each year every soldier need spend three months in production and can devote the remaining nine months to training or fighting." There is no evidence that the Communist military at any time in its history

305 "The CCP Central Political Bureau's Instructions on the Ten Big Policies Concerning the Reduction of Land-Tax, Production, Supporting the Government, Loving the People, and Propaganda, in Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.

306 "Instructions Concerning the Reinforcement of the Support of the Government and Love the People Activities," In Documents on the Advancement of Production and Supporting the Government and Loving the People, op. cit.

307 One Year's Work to "Support the Government and Love the People," op. cit.

308 Mao, Selected Works, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 150.

309 Ibid., p. 149.
spent anywhere near three months in production, even during the SGLP Campaign.
Chapter 9
Civilian Mobilization

The Communists have tried to multiply the coercive and economic contribution of the military establishment through civilian mobilization, i.e., through the "civilian armed forces", or part-time militia units, and through organization of a large section of the population along military lines, or civilian militarization.

The militia were assigned both a coercive and a productive responsibility. Part-time units served to expand the local coercive strength of the Party within a minimum drain on the economic work force. The individual militiaman was exposed in a smaller degree to the political and technical training given the regular soldier and was expected to use his new skills and political attitudes in ways akin to the regulars.

Even a militia much larger than the Red regular forces still left much of the population outside of the network of military organization. However, the Party objectives and circumstances called for the fullest possible imposition of discipline on the population and exploitation of its productive capacities. Accordingly, in periods of crisis the CCP resorted to mobilizing these hitherto untouched civilian groups into military types of organizations in which their full energies could be channelled to support the Red forces and Party. These mobilized civilians were assigned production and propaganda, not coercive tasks, but the Party attempted to guide their work and thought.
along military lines.

The Party had tried civilian mobilization sporadically from 1927, and these attempts were the forerunners of the campaign initiated in 1956 to achieve universal militia participation ("All People in Arms Campaign") and to accomplish within the framework of the People's Commune the militarization of life.

A. History and Size

Local militia units existed in many Chinese villages long before the Communists appeared on the political scene. These small bands might protect the interests of landlords or of the whole village against bandits. Rebellious peasants also formed such groups. During the first alliance with the Kuomintang peasant unrest expressed itself in the formation of many such organizations under names such as the "Red Spears".

The Communists were at first torn between their desire to expand their power by controlling peasant units such as the Red Spears and their orders to maintain the alliance with the Kuomintang. In July, 1926, the Central Committee ruled on peasant mobilization, "It is not permissible to establish organizations of a permanent nature because it would inevitably give rise to conflict with other groups (such as landlords, min-t'uan and military garrisons)."¹ The Committee temporized to the extent that it sanctioned interference with local government and disarmament of the "reactionary" local militia, the min-t'uan. It also passed a resolution of the CCP position toward the peasant

Red Spears Movement, then active in the provinces of Honan, Chihli and Shantung. As yet unwilling to form their own militia groups, the Party cautiously approached the possibility of controlling those in existence.

Our policy toward them is as follows: if we fail to bring them under the banner of opposition to the local militarist government, we should first of all try to take over their masses. The first step is to see that the genuine Red Spears Associations of the peasants stand independently. The second step is to see that the Red Spears Associations with bandit characteristics are not utilized by others, but stand on the side of the peasantry to attack local bullies. 2

As tension grew between the CCP and Kuomintang in the late twenties, the Communists attempted to develop some sort of an armed force by takeover of indigenous peasant groups. For example, there was a hasty effort to organize the largest possible militia force in the ill-fated Hailufeng Soviet. 3 When Mao turned to armed revolution in Hunan, he stressed takeover of landlord and peasant militia units as a means of expanding Communist military power. 4 In 1928 he wrote the Central Committee that "the masses have to be placed on a war footing." 5 He reported at that time on the initial attempts to form such organizations. Unfortunately, he wrote, the communist militia with 970 rifles showed a distressing "inability ... to hold on to their rifles." 6 Nevertheless, the Party persisted in drawing on this peasant

2 Ibid., p. 305.
5 Ibid., p. 79.
6 Ibid., p. 84.
manpower and in 1930 formed the "Red Protection Corps." Inprecorr reported that the slogan was "Arm the villages" and that these auxiliary organizations had swollen the size of the forces to 1,600,000. In view of the circumstances of the Communists at this time, this figure is the purest fantasy. It is certainly true that the CCP was making efforts to mobilize as many people as possible into a variety of para-military units. According to the Comintern, in the Communist-controlled areas of Southwest Kiangsi by the end of 1930, "The armed organizations embrace the pioneers, the youth vanguards, the red guard detachments (armed with spears) and the red guard troops (armed with native rifles)."

During the desperate years of the early 1930's, the Red Army tried to enroll the largest possible segment of the population, male and female, into groups called the "Red Peasant Defence Corps" and the "Red Youth Guard." It even stationed the Pioneers, youths of less than fifteen years of age at the front. Similar groups were supposedly organized in the different Communist footholds. When the Red forces entered a new area, they reported that new militia units had been organized. When they

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7 Li Ting, Militia of Communist China, "Communist China Problem Research Series," Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, Aug., 1954, p. 47.
were driven out, the militia units were either absorbed into the Red Army or left behind to survive as well as they could. Special publicity was given to the Young Red Guard, and in 1932 there were allegedly 108,547 members of this group in the Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi district alone.  

Although these different militia units were described as "important fighting organs," their arms were even more primitive than those of the Red Army.

In the period culminating in the Long March the Chinese Communists changed their policy from one of restraining peasant armed groups to one of encouraging them.  

The 1935 Comintern Congress was told of a great success, the creation of a militia of about one million.  

The claim and its military significance require considerable qualification. The Red Army was at this point concluding its hard-fought retreat to North China. It had in the course of this retreat given no signs of the strength such a militia force would indicate. Furthermore, the unreliability of the source on other matters, specifically the size of the Chinese Communist regular forces, throws doubt on this claim. Whatever the correct figure may have been, the combat effectiveness of the militia at this time was questionable. In the article advancing the one million claim the author admitted that "not all the ... partisans are continually in action and not all the partisans are armed with modern weapons."  

His statistics

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16 His version of Communist militia development can also be found
also help us to assess the degree of success attained by the Communists in organizing the population under their "jurisdiction" into part-time military auxiliaries. If we only include "permanent revolutionary centres," the population under control was asserted to be 57.4 million. The inflated claim of one million militiamen (slightly under 2% of the population) hardly constitutes "total military mobilization."

When the Party adopted a patriotic guise after 1935, its militia operations met with increasing success. Nationalism and improved Communist treatment of the population expedited the CCP drive toward "the universal arming of the whole Chinese people." The Communists not only organized new units but also became adept at assuming control of the small groups of resisters that sprang up behind Japanese lines. During this period there were at least two distinct types of civilian military organizations: the militia and the village self-defense units. The former received more military training. A Western journalist described the "Village Self-Defense Corps" of 1938 in Central Hopei. While it supposedly numbered 500,000 men, it was "poorly trained, poorly

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17 Ibid.
armed and used mainly for propaganda purposes." However, as we shall see later, its relative military ineffectiveness did not preclude it from performing other services desired by the Party.

The Communist army in North China had begun to organize military auxiliaries immediately after the Long March, and the New Fourth Army in Central-South China did the same in the late 1930's. In 1942 food shortages forced the Party to demobilize a percentage of the non-productive full-time military personnel. It hoped to compensate for this loss in coercive strength without a proportionate loss in productive strength through militia expansion. At the same time the CCP concerned itself with developing a reserve force for postwar expansion. The Chinese Communists tried to glorify militia service as much as possible, and by the end of 1943 reportedly one-fifth of the population in the Northwest Shansi Border Region had been enrolled in the militia. The pattern of militia growth during the late years of the war with Japan can be seen in the following table.

22 For examples, see: Epstein, op. cit., p. 175; and Militia Heroes in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, n.p.: Political Department of the Garrison Army of the Eighth Route Army, 1944 (Chinese).
Table XXVI
Size of Communist Militia, 1942-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July, 1942</td>
<td>1,301,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1944</td>
<td>2,130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1944</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring, 1945</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the spring of 1945 the Communist claimed to control 95.5 million Chinese. Obviously, the percentage (slightly over 2%) of this group enrolled in the militia was small. There were three reasons for this low enrollment. One was a question of policy. In 1944-45 the CCP was concerned with preparing its regulars for the approaching civil war. It did not wish to divert its energies into militia expansion. A second reason was economic. Military equipment was scarce and the regular army had priority. The third reason was political. The approaching change from national to civil war increased the Party’s concern with the loyalty of the militia. This was no time to put arms

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into the hands of a questionable population.

During the ensuing civil war and Communist expansion the militia was doubled in size and played an active military role. As more territory fell to the advancing Communist forces, the PLA organized militia units by drawing on the poorest sections of the population. For example, after the Communists had occupied the South China region for one year, they had reportedly organized a militia force of one million. When the urban areas came under their control, the Communists added to the rural militia urban and sub-urban counterparts, often known as "Worker's Supervisory Corps."

The Common Programme called for continuation of the militia in the new People's Republic. The 1950 force level of 5.5 million (slightly over 1% of the population) was reportedly raised to 12.8 million by October, 1951. This increase accorded with the 1950 policy statement that "Our goal lies in building up in two or three years a militia force amounting to 5 percent of our national population." The Communists did not specifically claim to have achieved this goal of about 24 million men,

26 Ting, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
28 Teng Tze-hui asserted this in his report in The First Year of Victory, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, p. 75.
and when the conscription law was passed in July, 1955, discussion of the militia in the mainland media declined. The Communists had previously indicated that "the militia system" was only a "transitional measure before the enforcement of compulsory military service." However, the Party did not allow the reserve system established by the military service law to replace the militia. In early 1958 the militia was estimated at 10-12 million, and in late 1959 a leading Communist asserted that the militia system merited retention as "a fine organization form for the training of army reserves."  

B. Organization and Command

While the Communists have used the militia device relatively consistently since 1930, organization of these units has varied according to the needs and personnel of different periods. Because of the local nature of these groups the local governmental authorities were involved; because of their military nature the regular armed forces were involved; and because of the Communists' totalitarianism the Party was involved. Organizational patterns had to be adapted to fit the respective interests of these three organizations in the "civilian armed forces."

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32 Ibid., p. 156.

33 Law of Military Service of the People's Republic of China, n.p.: n. publ., n.d., chapters 3-6 give information on the reserve system.


1. The Militia Itself

The initial pattern of organization varied as the scattered Communist bands sought the most effective organizational devices. The attempts of 1930 had in common age differentiation. In Southwest Kiangsi the Red Defense Corps attempted to enroll peasants between 20 and 40 years of age, while the young guard had as its province residents from 14 to 20.\(^{36}\) In West Fukien males and females from 16 to 40 were assigned to the Red Guards and younger people to the "Children's Band" and Young Vanguards.\(^{37}\) A differentiation was also made among the adult militia according to armament and military readiness; the more combat-ready were enrolled in the Peasant Partisans; the rear-support, in the Red Guards.\(^{38}\) By 1935 the separate units had reverted to the designations of Red Guards (23 to 45) and Young Vanguards (16 to 23).\(^{39}\) In 1934 the Communists claimed that in the Central Soviet District "Each village has its own local defense force."\(^{40}\) Coordination above the local level was extremely poor.

The age distinction was retained at the beginning of the war with Japan, the units being appropriately renamed the "People's

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Self-Defense Army" (25 to 45) and the "Young Men's Anti-Japanese Vanguard" (15 to 25). Age specifications often changed. First the Vanguard's ages were altered to 11 to 17, and then the militia expanded to include the group between 45 and 50. In some areas, notably South Shantung, the Party experimented with units known as Independent Regiments. With the exception of the headquarters personnel, these "regiments" of about 500 men based in different hsien were part-time militia. It was during the Anti-Japanese War that the Party publicized its claims of internal democracy and voluntary service in the militia, as in the regulars. Supposedly, the militia members chose their own leaders and enlisted "without compulsion or coercion". One Western correspondent even claimed that the militia could not "be ordered into action", but would go only voluntarily. Similar credence should be given these claims as those advanced for "democracy" in the regular Communist forces.

While the basic divisions within the militia were retained, the coordination mechanism and organization developed rapidly. As opposed to the pre-Long March period, the Communist militia of

44 For example, see; Chan Li, The Fighting Militia in the Liberated Regions, Hong Kong: China Press, 1947 (Chinese), Chapter II.
the Anti-Japanese War had a clear hierarchy of authority. The following chart presents the observations of American military observers stationed at Yenan of the state of militia organization in late 1944 and early 1945. The organizational levels parallel

Table XXVII
Communist Militia Organization at the End of the War with Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People’s Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sub-Military Region Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Vanguard Hq.</th>
<th>Departments: as above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsien Command Hq.; Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Vanguard Hq.</th>
<th>Departments: as above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chu Command Hq.; Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Vanguard Hq.</th>
<th>Departments: as above, no Secretariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Command Hq.; Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Vanguard Hq.</th>
<th>Departments: Women’s Chief Demolition Group, Service, Training, Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**People’s Militia:**
- Youth Vanguards
- Model Detachments
- Local Guerrillas
- Little Vanguards
- Self-Defense Detachments
- Women’s Detachments

47Adapted from the table in the "Chinese Communist Movement, 5 July, 1945," *op. cit.*, facing p. 2448.
the organization of civil government, and the highest level in a Border Region was equal with that of civil government, the Border Area Council.

The Resistance Committees had at that time no civil administration functions, and while they appeared to be independent, were, as we shall see, subject to government, military and Party control. They were elected in typical Communist fashion, i.e., the villagers chose the village committees, which in turn selected the district or chu committee. It should be noted that the size of the militia unit (company, battalion, etc.) increased with the level of the People's Resistance Committee. After the 1942 reorganization there was reportedly a Self-Defense Corps battalion in each district (chu) and a company in each small group of villages.

This structure was retained during the final overthrow of the Kuomintang, but in 1950 the CCP changed the militia organization. As indicated earlier, distinct urban and suburban units were added to the former rural militia. The previous age differentiation was replaced by a political differentiation, which was related to age. The "broad laboring mass of from 18 to 31 years of age" was to form the "basic ranks" of the militia, and in time to be augmented by organization of the 31 to 45 age group.\(^\text{48}\) The Party extended the "obligation and privilege" of militia service to reliable urban cadres between the ages of 18 and 30.\(^\text{49}\)

\(^{48}\) Chang, op. cit., p. 157.

\(^{49}\) Central-South Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, Central-South MAC, and Central-South Military District, "Joint Decision on the Organization of People's Armed Units in Municipalities of Various Levels," Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao (Jan. 1, 1952) in Steiner, op. cit., p. 159.
Training stations were to be established in all townships and admissions to the militia carefully regulated.\textsuperscript{50} While the former militia hierarchy was retained at and below the hsien level, the units were not organized parallel to more powerful civil organs as they were during the years before 1949. The units, labelled detachments at hsien (county) level and companies at hsiang (township) level, were to be assigned political commissars as well as commanders.\textsuperscript{51}

Militia organizations have remained widespread in the People's Republic, but the Party has discarded the publicity illusion of militia autonomy. The growth of the militia has created more problems of command and control, and as we shall see the Party has had to intensify its efforts to guard itself against civilian rebellion.

2. The Role of the Regular Forces

The role of the armed forces in organizing the population has been discussed at some length. An important corollary of that task was organizing them for warfare. The army has helped to implement this policy both in its former role as the CCP's major contact with the population and as the bearers of military expertise. The armed forces have trained these units and have been given considerable power over China's part-time soldiers.

Even during the harrowing months on Chingkanshan in 1928 the Red Army dispatched partisan organizers.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to this desperate effort to increase their military strength, Mao

\textsuperscript{50}Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157; Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{51}Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{52}Wales, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 213.
even recommended that the Army share its sparse arms supply with the militia whenever possible. Throughout its retreats of the thirties, supposedly even during the Long March, Red Army personnel attempted to organize militia units. However, at the earliest possible date this task was entrusted to the Political Department, to remove the opportunity from the Red Army to expand its institutional following.

During the Anti-Japanese War, militia mobilization became easier. Peng Teh-huai instructed the Red regulars to "send out staff members to help local militia bands to receive military and political training and some knowledge of guerrilla tactics." In 1938 Mao declared:

It is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousands out of the millions of China's regular troops to spread all over the enemy-occupied areas to mobilize the armed masses and coordinate with them in guerrilla warfare.

The Nationalist regime rejected Mao's policy, but the Communist forces found it advantageous, in the phrase of the 8th Route Army Political Director, to "arm the population in order that they may fight with us." In the South the mobile New Fourth Army followed its political propaganda with the selection of activists.

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55 Smedley, op. cit., p. 206.
These became leaders of local units which the regulars trained and, if possible, armed. Political Department personnel of the 8th Route engaged in similar functions. While they supplied military training, they also "set up political training classes in the farmers' self-defense organizations," and entrusted the new units to "hand-picked leader-types."

The PLA was assigned the role of "big brother" of the civilian armed forces. In 1950 the Party stated

military authorities should be charged with the responsibility for building up the militia force. Various levels of military districts should devote a large part of their activities to the guidance of militia work.

The military districts and sub-districts were charged with the establishment of training stations and the organization and review of training programs. In 1953 regular army personnel were again sent into the villages to improve the militia's military capabilities. Called "alternate training groups," 3 to 5 army officers spent a short time in various villages training the local militia. While this program was temporary, the demobilization of military personnel after the Korean War allowed many relatively "advanced" soldiers to form the core in the village units.

60 Carlson, op. cit., p. 12.
62 Chang, op. cit., p. 156.
63 Ting, op. cit., p. 40.
64 Ibid., p. 136.
During the insurgent years the regular forces were not only the "brother" but partially the master of the Communist militia. Obviously, the role of director was often a logical continuation of the role of the Communist forces in establishing these part-time units. For example, in the Fourth Guerrilla District in Shantung, the coordinating committee for all militia units was at Army Headquarters. 66 When the regulars were fighting in the vicinity, militia units came under their operational command. 67 When troops were stationed in a locality, the army was represented in the village militia staff, and undoubtedly its representative carried considerable weight. 68

After 1949 the CCP attempted to rationalize and streamline militia organization. The regular forces were entrusted with sizeable managerial powers under the new arrangements: "Various levels of leadership organs of the people's armed forces should be swiftly established and consolidated from the top down under the overall direction of military authorities." 69 Accordingly, a Department of People's Armed Forces was established under the People's Revolutionary Military Council and under regional and provincial military commands. 70 Within this organizational framework "Militia corps in localities above the level of hsien come under the concurrent control and command of military districts and

68 Carlson, op. cit., p. 123.
69 Chang, op. cit., p. 156.
military sub-districts of the People's Liberation Army.\textsuperscript{71}
Partial control was also held over urban militia units and two-thirds of the staff of the workers' supervisory corps came from the regular armed forces. While control was divided, the military directors were given veto power over the local government.

3. The Role of Civil Government

Although the civil government structure was rudimentary before 1950, the primitive structure did handle militia affairs. The use of local manpower for military purposes and the objective of establishing part-time military units in all controlled villages required coordination with the local implementors of Communist directives. By 1934 a military department or committee was a major part of all levels of the civil government apparatus.\textsuperscript{72}
During the war against Japan the people's armed forces developed their own command hierarchy, as shown in the preceding table, but the ties to civil government remained. Actually, the village Mobilization Committee established to organize the militia units were the predecessors of local government. After separate government units were established, they retained a close connection with militia affairs. County and township governments had committees on the People's Armed Forces, and the regional government supposedly appointed local militia commanders.\textsuperscript{73} Militia command headquarters at the village, township and county levels

\textsuperscript{71} Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.
were formally headed by the chief civil government official.\textsuperscript{74} Such coordination was required to minimize the drain on productive manpower occasioned by militia service.\textsuperscript{75} The Communists could not afford to have the militiamen suffer economic loss and charged civil government officials with preventing it.

When the militia was reorganized in 1950, considerable pretense was made of instituting democratic, local controls in the units. The people's armed forces committees were selected at mass meetings. Officers of the village militia units were supposedly approved by meetings of the village people's representative congress. Similar committees were formed in urban areas, and the city mayor and major administrative departments represented. One-third of militia staff personnel were drawn from the civil administration, and in urban areas the civil government was charged with many of the expenses of the people's armed forces.\textsuperscript{76}

In spite of these formal arrangements, the civil government does not have direct responsibility for or exercise direct control over the militia. Either its authority is clearly shared with the regular armed forces command at a similar level, or its orders must pass through the office of the people's armed forces where the PLA is influential. It is not surprising that the regime has to enjoin the PLA to allow the militia to be used on projects under civil government direction.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} "Chinese Communist Movement, 5 July, 1945," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2335; and Carlson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{75} Epstein, \textit{The Unfinished Revolution}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{76} Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{77} For example, see: Central-South MAC and Central-South Military District of the PLA, "Joint Provisional Regulations Governing the Duties of Militiamen," Nanning, \textit{Kwangsi Jih-pao} (Jan. 8, 1952), in Steiner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 158.
4. **The Role of the Party**

As we have seen, both the regular forces and the civil government have partially controlled the civilian armed forces. This diffusion of power has prevented either element from assuming control of the part-time soldiers. However, the Communists have resorted to more than this negative check on militia independence to insure Party control. Military organizers sent to militia units were usually from the Political Department. Party members and individuals affiliated with its auxiliaries, especially the Youth League, were ordered into militia units.⁷⁸ In 1936 a Communist official asserted:

> In every village there is a communist nucleus, and one man is responsible for Red Guard and Vanguard work....the Vanguards are led by the Young Communist League, and the Red Guards are organized and led by the Communist Party.⁷⁹

A pro-Communist source reports that during the Anti-Japanese War:

> all party organizations were required to send one-third of their members into the militia....Party men were not permitted to leave their localities when they were attacked. They were expected to study tactics, participate in defense and distinguish themselves in action.⁸⁰

This nucleus of Party-faithful provided the commanders and commissars for many militia units.

The institutional arrangement put in force since 1949 clearly demonstrates the Party's control of the militia. Local CCP branches have been formally instructed to act as a militia "vigilance committee."⁸¹ Local Party committees pay special

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⁸¹Ibid.
attention to militia matters, and often both the commander and vice-commander of the units are members of the local Party committee. The Party is in a position to decree policy on the civilian armed forces not only through its control of the PLA and the civil government, but directly through its local branches. In 1952 the Party role was clearly stated, with particular reference to urban areas:

People's armed units in the cities must be subject to the direct leadership of urban CCO organizations. Party committees at all levels should pay especially close attention to, and strengthen their leadership over, people's armed units....Youth Leagues in the cities should assist the Party in organizing people's armed units....

Youth League members have remained in key militia positions, especially those charged with political training, and act as observers during contact of the militiamen with the PLA.

The Party has not delegated clear authority to any one group of adjutants over the militia, which, in reality, has only one master through whom the orders from the PLA and the civil administration must pass. The Party branches stand at the crossroads of control, and Party members placed in key posts within the militia attempt to insure that any unsanctioned uses of the militia are prevented.

C. Functions

The division of control over the militia among the regular armed forces, the government, and the Party was more than a

82 Ting, op. cit., pp. 10, 13.
83 "Joint Decision on the Organization of People's Armed Units in Municipalities of Various Levels," op. cit., p. 160.
84 Ting, op. cit., p. 17.
political stratagem, and it reflected the variety of functions assigned to the militia. The priority allocated to these various activities has naturally altered with changing problems confronting the Chinese Communists, but there is a permanent division in militia duties which alteration of priorities does not obliterate, nor necessarily harmonize.

1. Coercive

The militia has been used as a part-time military organization. It co-operated with the PLA in a variety of ways: actual combat, military support activities, reserve training, internal security and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. In the early years of guerrilla warfare fighting was constant, and the militia's coercive activities were directly involved with combat. These local groups were assigned the task of systematically carrying out partisan fights in the neighbouring white districts, fighting against the armed forces of the landowners in the frontier districts, defending the red territory, supporting the Red Army in the fights against the white army, and protecting the peasants while at work.85

It was during the war with Japan that the Communists relied the most heavily on the militia "volunteers" for actual combat. The CCP leadership asserted that, "Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death."86 Harassment and frustration of the enemy became the task of the "civilian armed forces". They destroyed communications, acted as snipers, and developed

85"Fight and Constructive Work in the Chinese Soviet Districts," op. cit., p. 70.
techniques that did not require scarce armaments, e.g., homemade mines and extensive use of tunnels.  

The militia have also made indirect contributions to military success. They relieved the regulars of many non-combat functions required for successful warfare, such as gathering intelligence, transmitting information, caring for the wounded, and transporting supplies and disabled personnel. According to the Communists, as early as 1930 there were "special detachments for transport, for relief, for the suppression of reaction, for special services, for propaganda, etc." During World War II, a Western observer reported that members of the self-defense corps were "liable for a certain amount of work in acting as guides or porters, or doing other work required by the Chinese forces." The Young Vanguards attached to the Red Army spent all their time working as: "orderlies, messboys, buglers, spies, radio-operaters, water-carriers, propagandists, actors, grooms, nurses, secretaries, and even teachers."  

The militia also served as a training ground for future regular soldiers or as military reserve. At the Second Soviet Congress in 1934, Mao referred to militia members as "ready made

89 "The Situation in the Soviet Districts in S.W. Kiangsi," op. cit., p. 1209.
90 The Guerrilla Front in North China, op. cit.
reservists for the Red Army on the fighting front ...and the bridge that is leading the present voluntary military system to the conscription system of tomorrow." The 1949 Common Programme described the militia system as a way to "lay the foundation for national mobilization." Mao felt that the part-time and local nature of militia activity facilitated the gradual inclusion of the population in the Red Army without disturbing the population to the point of active resistance. The Communists have claimed that the militiamen were anxious to "qualify as soon as possible for the Red Army," and that the numbers that did so "ensured the growth of the people's army." During the guerrilla years most of the Young Vanguards joined the Communist forces at the age of 18, and during the periods of rapid force expansion, e.g., after the surrender of Japan and during Chinese intervention in Korea, militia units "volunteered" en masse. The conscription system now in force, with its fixed requirements of reserve service, reduces the significance of this militia function. However, this function has not been abandoned.

and allows the Party to maintain a large body of at least partially trained and readily mobilized manpower. Many of the basic unit militiamen are former regulars who are regarded as active reservists.\textsuperscript{98}

The militia's other coercive task is maintaining internal security. Their assumption of this duty reduces the need of keeping regular troops on garrison and guard duty within Communist areas of authority. During the guerrilla years a primary militia duty was 24 hour patrols which could both deny the external enemy information and check the travels of anyone out of favor with the CCP.\textsuperscript{99} These patrols questioned "all passers-by as to their names, addresses, destination, the purposes of their trip, etc.".\textsuperscript{100} After 1949 the enforcement of unpopular programs has, if anything, increased the number of "counter-revolutionaries" and the need for internal coercion. A militia regulation promulgated in 1952 indicates the scope and significance of the internal security function:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] To carry out the population census, general investigations, arrests and rendition of criminals in custody, and observation--of persons under surveillance who are suspected of trying to escape;
\item[b)] To fight against and suppress bandits, jointly with regular troops; to arrest scattered, escaped and hidden bandits, special agents, landlords and despots; and to transmit intelligence reports and messages;
\item[c)] To protect and transport state funds and property; to watch and protect railways, bridges, electricity lines, river dikes, warehouses and granaries, factories and other state properties and public buildings;
\item[d)] To preserve and protect the grain crops and autumn harvest; to carry out Winter and Summer defence
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{98}China News Analysis, op. cit., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{99}Carlson, op. cit., p. 38; Forman, op. cit., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{100}"Life in Chinese Soviet Villages," op. cit., p. 48.
work; to keep night watch; and to carry out sentry
and patrol duties;
e) To maintain peace and order in places of public
assembly;\footnote{101}...\footnote{101}

Rural, suburban and urban militia units have all been assigned
similar tasks in the maintenance of "revolutionary order." In
1959 the importance of the militia to internal security led to
Lung to describe it as an "indispensable force for the defense
of the nation" and to pay tribute to its, "great role in extermini-
ating the native bandits, putting down revolts, defending
frontier regions, maintaining public law and order and in car-
rying out the struggle against the infiltration of secret agents."\footnote{102}...\footnote{102}

2. Economic and Political

A specific reason for the formation of the "civilian armed
forces" was to expand military manpower without disrupting the
economy. The militia units were expected to continue their
civilian vocations and to assume extra political and economic
tasks.\footnote{103} Economically the militia was expected to make sizeable
contributions as a group and as individuals. Units were used
as an organized work force in repairing dikes, transporting tax
grain, and cultivating public land; they labored on construction
projects such as wells, sewers and water conservation, and their
local units were assigned to do "substitute farming" for favored
or disabled elements in the population. The 1952 "patriotic
increasing production drive" saw the militia committed to

\footnote{101} "Joint Provisional Regulations Governing the Duties of Militia-
men," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 158.

\footnote{102} Ho, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 19-20.

\footnote{103} Teh Chu, \textit{On the Battle Front of the Liberated Areas}, Peking:
Foreign Languages Press, 1952, p. 58; Gelder, \textit{op. cit.}; p. 5;
Li, \textit{op. cit.}, Chap. II; Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 38, 40.
"Performing substitute farming work for destitute families of martyrs and soldiers and ensuring equally plentiful corps of crops from farms of their families as from their own farms."\textsuperscript{104} Individually, the militiaman, like the regular soldier, was expected to be the very model of diligence and selfless labor.

The militia were indoctrinated and trained to be activists and leaders in their own social and work groups. Their leadership was to be exercised along lines decreed by the Party. A 1950 directive commanded that

\textit{Political training should be made the center of militia training with military training taking second place. The prevailing tasks of the rural areas ... should be adopted as the basis of the educational campaign, with various policies and laws of the government....}\textsuperscript{105}

The Pact in which the agricultural pledge quoted earlier appeared asked from the militia "Enthusiastic response to calls sounded by the government and leading and urging the populace to follow suit."\textsuperscript{106} They propagated for the Party and against its enemies for elementary modernization measures and against "illiteracy ... feudal habits and customs."\textsuperscript{107} Those who had proven their obedience in the militia were favored for local leadership positions. According to a pro-Communist journalist, during the war with Japan "Men with good militia records were pushed by the Communist Party and people's organization in

\textsuperscript{104}Translated in Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26, from Chang Chiang Jih Fao (July 29, 1952).

\textsuperscript{105}Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157.

\textsuperscript{106}Ting, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{107}China Today, Vol. 2, nos. 6-7 (June-July, 1934), p. 5.
village elections." After 1949 militia members were often made leaders of the new collective agricultural units and were at least expected to direct their establishment. They played a far more important role than their numbers indicated. For example, in Kirin province in 1951 militiamen made up over "50% of the total number of leaders of mutual-aid groups in the province."  

D. Conflicts of Interest

The numerous masters of the militia have had conflicting priorities, the numerous tasks assigned to the militiamen have been competitive rather than complementary, and the civilian part-time soldier has found his own interests suffering. The conflicts and discontent which resulted have been chronic in the history of the Chinese Communist "civilian armed forces".

1. The Guerrilla Years

During the struggle to conquer the mainland the conflicts of interest between the masters and between the organs of power and the militia members were mitigated. Party and military interests and elites were relatively identical. The government hierarchy was in an embryonic stage. The population had the inducements of overthrowing an unrewarding system of authority, defending themselves from a brutal enemy, and eventually winning and retaining land of their own. However, conflicts of  

111 Anna Louise Strong, Tomorrow's China, New York: Committee for
interest were not eliminated.

There was relatively little disagreement during the guer- rilla years over the functions of the militia, but much as to the burden of organization that the regular forces should assume. The army was not anxious for the Party to command another, possibly competitive, coercive instrument, especially when it had to train and equip it. Mao accused the Red Army at the 1929 Kutien Conference of "group egoism" and of not "understanding that to arm the local masses is one of the Red Army's important tasks."\textsuperscript{112} During the Anti-Japanese War military professionalism was irritated by Party orders to go into the villages to organize civilian units. In 1938 Mao tartly informed the Communist military that "they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer battles and so cannot for the time being appear as national heroes."\textsuperscript{113} In another statement at that time he attacked those who gave disproportionate priority to the well-being and growth of the regulars. He and his Party machine did not tolerate "the erroneous viewpoint of those people in the main force who are bent on their own expansion while neglecting to assist the local armed units."\textsuperscript{114}

The Party and the Communist military were in substantial agreement on the role and value of the militia during the revolution. However, the peasant enrolled in the militia had a somewhat different set of priorities and time to produce the

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. II, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. II, p. 152.
necessities of life was one of them. To the extent that militia training and obligations cut into this time, militia service was generally unpopular. The distinction that the Party has made between "basic" militia units and the general membership has been tacit admission of the lack of popular eagerness to serve in the Communist militia. The basic unit device serves to limit to younger and more politically reliable peasants substantial and time-consuming military training and access to arms. Personnel problems were not eliminated even during the Anti-Japanese War when the Party could appeal to a sense of patriotism against a foreign invader. In 1944 the Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region found it necessary to emphasize the importance of the "basic units" in the militia and to call for improved organization and propaganda to raise popular willingness to serve.\footnote{Tsu-han Lin,"Annual Report of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government for the Year 1943," translated in Gelder, op. cit., p. 132.}

2. People's Republic Years

Since 1949 there have been three conflicts involving the militia, two between the masters of the militia and one between the masters and the militiamen. The first conflict has been caused by provincial and local Party and military cadres reluctant to respect the role of the militia. They have either ignored or manipulated the militia for their own interests. In 1950 the regime issued a directive calling for correction of "the erroneous conception on the part of many of the Party cadres that victory in the Revolution has made it unnecessary to give further stress to militia work." At the same time the PLA was ordered to devote
greater efforts to the "civilian armed forces," and military cadres were castigated for using militia members as personal escorts and servants.

The second conflict was between the PLA and the Party and local government officials. The PLA wanted the militia to assist it with its coercive duties. The Party and government wanted the militia to concentrate on production. PLA pressure on local officials resulted in priority for coercive needs. In early 1952, militiamen in the Central-South Region were ordered to "guarantee the performance" of state economic assignments. By the spring of 1953 the situation had become critical. According to a report in one mainland paper:

To take determined steps, in collaboration with the relevant Government departments, to lighten the burden of duties and assignments placed on the militiamen, is now a mission of political significance which cannot be delayed.... If events were allowed to take their course then grave losses would be entailed on the farm production front....

The Party ordered military districts to reduce the militia's time-consuming coercive assignments but continued to try to harmonize the coercive and productive roles of the militia. In the spring of 1953, certain core units were completely relieved of production duties. The balance were to drill all day on Tuesdays and Fridays, and from five to seven every other morning.

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116 Ting, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
117 For examples, see items by ibid., pp. 29-31.
118 "Joint Provisional Regulation Governing the Duties of Militiamen," op. cit., p. 158.
119 Ting, op. cit., p. 126, quotes from Chungking, Hsin Hua Jih Pao (May 20, 1953).
120 Ibid., p. 135.
On the average, coercive duties were reduced.

The Party had involved itself in a dilemma. To maintain itself in power it required an armed and massive internal security force. This coercive force could either be a "part-time" militia, or a "full-time" regular force. The latter alternative was not agreeable to the PLA which had little interest in playing policeman. The Party in its turn wished to keep the regulars available for external ventures. Reliance on the militia, the other alternative, was also inherently unsatisfactory. The time demands on the militia would impose too great a drain on the nation's economic work force. The militia member's reliability might suffer if his coercive assignment were inordinately heavy.

The third conflict has been between the militia members and their "troika" of masters. The Party has found it necessary to limit "contamination" of the part-time units and to continuously guard itself against militia mutiny. The conflict between the servants and the Party has been between the militiaman's self-interest and Party desires for subservience.

Even during the land reform period the mainland press reported widespread opinions contrary to the Party's militia policy.

In 1950 one article attacked:

1) The five 'dreads', these being dreading to become a soldier; dreading night raids by bandits; dreading casualties in bandit suppression work; dreading incorporation into the regular armed forces; and dreading delays to production work.

2) The three 'impure ideas'; these being: to take advantage of assignments and to prey on the public treasury; to utilize enlistment in the armed forces as a means to avenge private grievances; and escape from obligatory labor duties.121

121 Ibid., pp. 41-42, quotes from Chang Chiang Jih Pao (Sept. 15, 1950).
The same article endeavoured to correct the notion that "peaceful times were at hand" and that accordingly militia coercion was no longer necessary. The regime's propaganda did not eliminate such "erroneous viewpoints," and in 1952 it was reported that militia enrollment, particularly in the urban areas, was lagging badly. 122 Later that year a high ranking member of the PLA Political Department admitted that:

It is necessary for the whole nation to start a publicity campaign and intensify education on patriotism, explaining this national policy which accords with the interests of the broad masses and imparting a high self-consciousness into all youths of service age so that they will join the militia.... 123

As the initial popular impetus provided by the land reform campaign waned, the public and the militiamen paid increasing attention to the disadvantages of service. The militiamen found themselves ordered to build their facilities and equipment and even labor extra hours for funds to buy equipment that they could not make. Such labor was in addition to drills and their normal jobs. They often had to provide their own food during the day-long training sessions. It is hardly surprising that scattered units decided to extort "protection" within their areas. 124

New members were unwilling to enroll and veterans bitter. In 1952 the Communist press found it necessary to castigate some attitudes current in Central-South China:

122 "Joint Decision on the Organization of People's Armed Units in Municipalities of Various Levels," op. cit., p. 159.
124 Ting, op. cit., pp. 44-45, 140, cites several such reports.
The offender frequently considered himself one class higher than the common populace. Some of his group would even make the claim that if it had not been for them nobody would have gotten anywhere to-day and hence would openly express dissatisfaction and the desire to quit the services, giving as the reasons the lack of reward and of consideration which they so richly deserved.\textsuperscript{125}

A mainland press campaign reflected the seriousness of morale disintegration when it gave space to numerous articles that reported the lack of control of higher bodies over the militia and the "spirit of laxity and disinterestedness" of its members. Within the regime's mythology such events were not caused by unpopular Party policies or official abuse of the population but by "degenerate elements, rascals and separatist elements of the landlord class."\textsuperscript{126}

The Party, in spite of its proclaimed aims of "universal" militia service, has carefully restricted entry into the general militia ranks, and even more carefully cleared entrants into the core units which receive more intensive military training. Excluding more mature sections of the population from the basic ranks aids in keeping out "undesirable elements." An example of the care taken in accepting members is provided by a 1952 directive on militia in municipalities:

\begin{quote}
As to the social background of the component members, they must belong to the working masses of workers and peasants, or revolutionary employees, who have demonstrated their activity and political awakening in various mass struggles. As to the procedures of organization, the development should be sought cautiously on a consolidated basis, and individuals
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., p. 125, translated from Chang Chiang Jih Pao (July 31, 1952).

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., p. 117, translated from Chang Chiang Jih Pao (Dec. 26, 1951).
should be absorbed with care. They must first be recommended by peasant's associations or trade unions, then approved at a general meeting of members and finally confirmed by and registered with the higher authorities.127

The Party has found that in the multitudinous and dispersed militia system control is difficult and that the larger the force, the greater the possibility of a few bad eggs. It has found that the greater the need for internal coercion, the less reliable a mass organization like the militia becomes.

Selectivity was in itself hardly sufficient. The Party resorted to intensive indoctrination and placed its members and Youth League personnel in key posts. Regulations were promul- gated to ensure that arms remained in the hands of the civilian armed forces department, and not in those of the individual militiamen. The militia was not entrusted with any heavy armament or artillery. The Party invoked a system of mutual responsibility within the militia where the misbehavior of any one member was the responsibility of all unit members. Finally, Party personnel remained alert for undesirables and purged them. For example, in 1953 orders were issued that "individual rascally elements and other degenerate elements inclined to pleasure-seeking and showing a dislike for production work should be weeded out."128 In spite of these measures the Party has not succeeded in exacting full obedience from the numerous units. The mainland press has carried reports indicating occasional mutiny among even the core

sections of the militia. On other occasions local Party cadres have attempted to assert their independence with the cooperation of the militia in the areas under their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{129}

The Party's chronic problem with the militia does not mean that the majority of the militia has been testing on the brink of rebellion. If it had been, it is unlikely that the Party would have maintained the militia system. It has continued, and the Party continues to credit militia training with the raising the members' "level of political consciousness, cultural attainment and military techniques."\textsuperscript{130} However, the possibility of serious militia rebellion has restrained militia expansion, particularly in the urban areas where vital organs of power might be attacked and the Party has adjusted the balance of coercive and productive militia activity to accord with the needs of the moment and the degree of popular discontent.

E. \textbf{Civilian Organization}

The Party has viewed the militia and the regular armed forces as instruments which can be used for all of its primary ends: military strength, economic growth, and political power. The leaders of the Chinese Communist movement have also believed that the total population under their control could best serve these purposes if organized along military lines, including appropriate structure, frame of reference and discipline. The application of this policy has not been continuous or necessarily complete, but it has often been attempted. This policy has derived rationally from the Chinese Communist ideology and experience.

\textsuperscript{129}For examples, see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 113, 137.
\textsuperscript{130}Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157.
The notion of struggle and conflict is hallowed in their ideology. If all of experience is involved in conflict, the population should be organized for combat. Second, the Party leadership is familiar with military organization and has found it on the whole both useful and controllable. Third, the Chinese leadership developed its policies and practices of social organization during the years when military victory was the sine qua non of success. The organization of all available resources to support the armed struggle was imperative. Finally, military style organization represents a break with traditional forms of social organization. A new collectivity identified with both modernity and disciplined hierarchy is, at least in theory, better fitted to the proclaimed ends of the Party.

For this combination of reasons, the Communists attempted to "militarize" the population early in the guerrilla struggle. Those who could not be enrolled in the army or the militia because of infirmity, age, unreliability, or economic contribution were organized into groups with such titles as: laundry brigades, sewing brigades, cooking brigades, and "reaping shock troops." Party auxiliaries organized "Saturday Brigades ...to collect manure, reclaim wasteland, help in sowing and harvesting," This policy was more fully applied during the Anti-Japanese War to achieve a "mobilized village." Edgar Snow has described the tasks of the population of such a village:

The aim of rural mobilization is to see that every man, woman and child is given a role in local defense. Young women are recruited to become propagandists, organizers, teachers and nurses. Old women are banded together to make shoes, uniforms and comforts for 'their boys' at the front. Old men are taught how to use hand grenades against isolated Japanese venturing too near the village. Young boys are organized in tilling brigades to help peasants with sons at the front, or trained to do espionage work, and to perform auxiliary tasks with the army.\textsuperscript{133} Mao at that time saw mass mobilization along military lines as a means not only of supporting the Communist armed forces but as a device for increasing production and popular enthusiasm for labor and sacrifice. In 1945 he called on the cadres to "mobilize all the people ...creating a great fervour for production to sustain the long War of Resistance."\textsuperscript{134} Several years earlier the Communists claimed to have found a form of social organization which could be shifted as a whole from production to military support tasks. The early stages of collectivization experimented with during the war with Japan, the labor-exchange groups, were developed with such adaptability in mind.\textsuperscript{135} Even after 1949 the Party continued to apply the terminology of war to civilian units. Work groups were "brigades," especially successful ones "model brigades," and their theatre of action was "the production front."\textsuperscript{136} However, this form of organization was not applied as extensively during the early years of the People's Republic as its claimed successes in the guerrilla years would seem to have

\textsuperscript{133} Snow, \textit{Battle for Asia}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{134} Mao, \textit{Selected Works}, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. IV, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{135} Yung, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{136} For example, see: "What is the 'Ma Heng-Chang Brigade?'" Hong Kong \textit{Ta Kung Pao} (March 22, 1951), \textit{OB}, No. 99 (July 15, 1951), pp. 1-2.
warranted. Of course, the Party was not under the military pressures of an earlier time. More important was the Party's desire to first eliminate members of the population who would strongly object to such a drastic re-organization of society. During the early years of the Peking regime the Party strengthened its hand and laid the foundation on which they would later attempt to organize the entire civilian population, along military lines. It is to the culmination of Chinese Communist efforts at mass military mobilization that we now turn. the "All People in Arms Campaign" and the People's Commune movement launched in 1958.
PART III
1958-1959
THE MILITARY IN POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE POLICY
Peking adapted its non-coercive experience with the military to the complex problems it faced by the autumn of 1958. Internally, it was necessary to spur economic development, revive popular enthusiasm and reinforce allegiance to the CCP. Externally, the regime had to compensate for its lack of a nuclear arsenal.

Four policies were adopted to meet internal and external challenges: 1) the People's Communes were formed (the Party tried to change civilians into modern Communist men by using the methods applied to the revolutionary soldiers); 2) the Quemoy crisis was created (the Party tried to defeat an ally of the United States without employing nuclear weapons); 3) the "All People in Arms Campaign" was publicized (the Party tried to marshal its human economic and coercive resources as it had in the Anti-Japanese War); and 4) Mao's "military line" was impressed on the PLA (the Party warned the military that coercive modernization would not replace CCP control and non-coercive duties).

The use of military bodies and methods in these four policies was essentially a reversion to Chinese Communist tradition. Mao believed that internal and external changes had not deprived revolutionary precedents of "universal validity." The effectiveness of these precedents in solving new and more complex problems merits evaluation. Was the traditional CCP emphasis in military training adequate to handle nuclear powers? Would an enlarged militia force support the government in Peking the way it had supported a small group of
"revolutionary liberators"? Could China's millions be organized in the same rigid manner as a small army? Mao's opponents in the Chinese elite raised these questions: Would emphasis on Party control and non-coercive duties for the PLA impair its combat adequacy? Would an expanded militia be an untrustworthy instrument for internal coercion, an inappropriate instrument to meet external attack, and a drain on the work force? Would the imposition of military organization and discipline on the civilian population lead to political discontent and economic losses?

Before we can answer these questions, it is essential to analyze: 1) the relationship of the complex events of 1958-1959; 2) the expectations and pressures which led the CCP leadership to pursue the above four policies; and 3) the extent to which the objectives of PLA reform, militia expansion and the militarization of life were realized.
Chapter 10
Chronological Survey

The following pages present the major events in the 1958-1959 period. Any conclusions are provisional and will be reviewed in the light of data given later in the chapter.

The Party agreed that 1958 was to be the year of a "Great Leap Forward" both politically and economically. The Party planned rectification campaigns to eliminate the "evil weeds" that had sprung up during the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" relaxation and to raise mass "Communist consciousness." It planned to construct a vast irrigation system during the winter to increase agricultural productivity and myriad small steel furnaces throughout the countryside to enlarge China's basis of industrial strength, iron and steel. Soviet achievements in space and weapons technology made the international scene look particularly propitious. In November, 1957, Mao told a Moscow audience that "The East wind dominates the West wind."\(^1\) The Soviets did not embrace his view.\(^2\)

Early in 1958 scattered press releases indicated problems in mobilizing the work force required to fulfill the ambitious plans for 1958. On February 16 and 24 People's Daily called for the mobilization of female labor power. PLA troops were assigned

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\(^1\)"Comrade Mao Tse-tung on 'Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,' JMJP (Oct. 31, 1958), GB, No. 534 (Nov. 12, 1958), p. 12.

\(^2\)For a revealing analysis of the Sino-Soviet differences at the time Mao made this assertion see: Donald S. Zaboria, "The 1957 Moscow Conference and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," The China Quarterly, No. 7 (July-Sept., 1961), pp. 17-34.
an unprecedentedly heavy economic burden. Apparently these measures did not procure the massive work force that was required, particularly in the rural areas. In late March Mao called a meeting at Chengtu of leading Party personnel to approve his proposal for amalgamation of the rural APC's, analogous to the Soviet collective farms, into larger units.  

A. The Communes are Launched and a Crisis is Fabricated

On April 20 the Party established its model People's Commune in Honan province and significantly named it the Satellite (Weihsing) People's Commune. On the 28th NCNA reported a shortage of raw materials for the great leap, and during that period unpublicized experimental communes were established in Liaoning Province. The 8th National Congress of the CCP met in Peking from May 5 to 23. It approved the Party's general policy for the year and attacked the internal and external moderation of Yugoslav "revisionists." The Central Committee meeting of May 25 probably confirmed and decided to continue the reorganization of Chinese society set forth at the Chengtu conference. On May 16 a People's Daily article by a provincial Party secretary hinted at a new social organization which would embody "new developments in Worker-Peasant and Urban-Rural relations." When it launched this as yet unpublicized


6 JMJP (May 16, 1958), quoted in "Khruschev and the Agricultural Commune IV, Mao's 'Uninterrupted Revolution'," (Sept. 6, 1958),
re-organization, the Party was forced to tighten its control of its servants. Government purges were completed in Shanghai, and the rectification campaign in the PLA was intensified. A May 23 article in the Liberation Army News focused the rectification program on those who placed military technology ahead of political indoctrination and were unresponsive to the non-coercive responsibilities assigned by the Party. During the month Chinese leaders also made public statements indicating a readjustment in military theory and divergence of opinion with the Soviet Union. The CPR indicated its plans to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, although it did not disavow outright Soviet proposals for an Asian atom-free zone. On May 27 the CCP Military Committee convened an enlarged conference attended by "More than a thousand high-ranking persons." The range of issues and divergence of opinion on matters concerning the PLA can be seen in the continuation of the conference for almost two months until July 22.


7See: "Over 30,000 'Five-Good' Units and Over 290,000 'Five-Good' Officers and Men Emerge from General Leap Forward of Liberation Army," NONA Peking (July 30, 1959), SCMP, No. 2074 (Aug. 12, 1959), pp. 1-3.


In June Mao and the Central Committee chose the name of "people's commune." Mao assured Party cadres that the population was infinitely malleable, but discovered that the Party and PLA were not. CCP elements were purged in Hopei, Honan, and Sinkiang. Party leaders in Honan, the site of the model rural commune, were charged with "right opportunism." One leader who was relieved was also the political commissar of the Honan Military Command. These purges were prolonged. In the military the Party tried to rectify opponents of "Mao Tse-tung's military line."\textsuperscript{11}

As the Party suppressed or removed opposition, on June 17 People's Daily attacked Chinese family traditions on the rationale of economic necessity. The Shantung Party Secretary suggested that timber and land could be saved by burying the dead without either coffin or grave marker.\textsuperscript{12} Conferences were convened of women and of internal security personnel to make plans for implementing the reorganization of the population. On June 29, without the benefit of national or regional announcement, the first urban industrial commune was established at the Chengchow Textile Factory in Honan.\textsuperscript{13} In the middle of the month the periodical addressed to mainland journalists called for increased military propaganda to raise "mass patriotism."\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} For example, see: "Military Academy Continues to Intensify Opposition to Dogmatism," OFCP (June 24, 1958), SCMP, No. 1817 (July 23, 1958), pp. 16-18.


Summary (April–June, 1958): Without publicity several experimental communes were established in both rural agricultural and urban industrial locales. Scattered admissions appeared of difficulties in securing the needed supplies and labor force to fulfill the assigned economic tasks. Purges were conducted in the Party and the Trade Unions against individuals who were insufficiently progressive, i.e., who opposed a more drastic policy of some sort. Numerous publicized directives to the regular military establishment pointed to army resentment of economic and social assignments, conflicts with Party representatives, and pressure for more modern weapons.

Commentary: The CCP was initially neither confident enough of the new social unit or of its popular reception to publicize it. Not all Party and mass organization elites were receptive to the change. One wonders to what extent the opponents were removed and to what extent they merely held their tongues. Why did they find the new plans unwarranted? We also see an apparent inconsistency in the events concerning the PLA and CPR acquisition of a nuclear capability. If modern weapons were in fact considered unimportant, if the CCP elite desired to maintain the politicized-generalist army, why did Peking not accept Soviet arms-control proposals. Another relevant question is why the Soviets offered these policies which would limit the power of the CPR.

The tempo of communication increased in July. Scattered reports of popular and elite discontent were combined with indications of economic difficulties in executing the "great leap forward" and with PLA recalcitrance. Externally the Chinese
leadership witnessed Anglo-American military commitments in the Middle East, the collapse of their trade talks with Japan, and the germination of a UN summit conference without them. The mainland media became threatening, bellicose and shrill. On July 1 Red Flag, the newly established "theoretical" elite journal of the Central Committee, published an article by Chen Po-ta, one of Mao's favorite propagandists, on the transformation of the APC into a "fundamental unit including both agricultural co-operation and industrial cooperation ... a people's commune". He stressed the economic and political advantages of the new units but did not mention their military defense potential. He did advance the claim that they represented the building of Communism. On July 5 People's Daily termed collective living facilities indispensable to achieve Communism; on the 6th People's Daily called for the creation of revolutionary families, "In the Socialist era the family is constituted along revolutionary lines, i.e., with a Government organ, factory, farm co-operative ... street or village as the unit." On July 9 Peking Radio commended a communal venture in the northern city of Tientsin. On July 21 the same station called for "liberation" of women from household tasks and on the following day People's Daily declared that with

15 Hung-Chi, No. 3 (July 1, 1958), is quoted in "Kruschev and the Agricultural Commune IV, Mao's 'Uninterrupted Revolution'," op. cit., p. 11.

16 JMJP (July 6, 1958) is quoted in "Controls in China (XV), From Cooperatives to Communes," (Sept. 16, 1958), p. 5 in RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, op. cit.

17 "Communes and Communism (III)," (Dec. 4, 1958), p. 26, RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, op. cit., Chronological Series, IV.
public mess halls women would be "freed from the bondage of individual life." On the same day this newspaper publicized some examples of urban communes. A conference was held on the amalgamation of handicraft cooperatives. Rural communes were developed without publicity. In mid-July the Communication campaign was accelerated in the model county in Honan and launched in Kirin Province and the outskirts of Peking. By the end of the month the experiment in Honan had been completed.

The Party also attempted to control dissent. In the first week of July peasant discontent was reported in the model commune province of Honan, and Peking Radio told how "rectification" led the peasants there to require less food. The Daily Worker admitted discontent among trade union members. Public reports were made on the Honan purge mentioned earlier and on the expulsion of "rightists" from the Kwangsi Party organization. The latter group had allegedly contended that earlier collectivization measures had been "the result of coercion" and had resulted in starvation. On the 11th a Party conference criticized the inadequacy of the rectification campaign, even in the central

21"Controls in China (XV), From Cooperatives to Communes," op. cit., p. 2.
22Ibid., p. 4.
organs of power. On July 1 the Liberation Army News had criticized addicts of PLA modernization and "regularization" and ordered the powers of Party Committees in the armed forces increased. Admission of political control difficulties were coupled with admission of economic shortcomings. On July 7 Peking Radio called for measures to meet a raw materials shortage and on the 13th acknowledge a "shortage of manpower." It was on July 16, several weeks after American and British troops had been sent to Lebanon and Jordan, peasant unrest in Honan had been admitted, and the rate of commune establishment had been increased, that Chen Po-ta again discussed the communes in Red Flag. Unlike the article of July 1, this article stressed the military component of the communes. Chen wrote that in the communes the "people's armed forces will protect ... material life and spiritual life--these people's armed forces are absolutely necessary pending the complete elimination of exploitation of man by man in the world." In the same article he stressed their significance for non-European nations. From this date until the end of the month mainland media castigated Western "aggression", "interference" and "imperialism" in the Middle East. Mass rallies were held to stir up the people and threats made to the West. The Party continued to rectify the PLA and attempted to strengthen

24 "Controls in China (XV), From Cooperatives to Communes," op. cit., pp. 1-2.
25 "Khruschev and the Agricultural Commune IV, Mao's 'Uninterrupted Revolution'," op. cit., p. 111.
and activate Party and Young Communist cells in the forces. On July 31 the NCNA English service praised the militia and reported that PLA cadres were studying Mao's military theories.

At the end of the month Peking responded to Khruschev's call for an immediate summit conference, and Mao and Khruschev met in Peking. Russian and Chinese Ministers of Defense also attended the meeting. The conference concluded on August 3, and the communique mentioned neither the people's communes nor "liberation" of Taiwan and the Nationalist-held islands.

Summary (July): Official comments on the need for new forms of social organization accompanied quiet commune expansion. The mainland press reacted bellicosely to unwelcome international developments, initiated by the Western powers and Soviet Union. The Party suddenly announced the coercive potential of the communes. It continued to purge its own ranks and to rectify the PLA. Peasant discontent rose in the model commune province of Honan.

Commentary: Economic failures pressed the Party to find new productive resources. The attempt to use the new communes and collective social facilities apparently met with both popular and elite resistance. It was in the face of this internal resistance, Western military activity in the Middle East and Soviet rejection of China's policy of internationalization of the Middle East

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conflict, that the press resorted to aggressive themes and cadres were told of the military value of the communes. To what extent were these actions attempts to use nationalism for internal purposes and to what extent were they intended to impress the West and the U.S.S.R.? It is interesting to note that in spite of Peking threats to dispatch "volunteers" to the middle East, steps were taken which would lower morale and PLA combat readiness. The Khruschev-Mao conference could have dealt with any of all of these issues: 1) Soviet unwillingness and Chinese eagerness to participate in local conflicts with the West; 2) Soviet pessimism that the West would necessarily bow to nuclear blackmail; 3) China's tentatively advanced claim that the communes represented a higher stage of development that Soviet ideologists claimed for their nation. It seems certain that they touched on the forthcoming Quemoy test and the communization of the mainland.

August 1 is the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Red Army and is marked with statements in the media and mass demonstrations. The messages of the 1958 Army Day threatened the "imperialists," who in event of aggression would be "wiped out"; asserted that the PLA was "Ready to Strike a Deadly Blow at War Maniacs," which was defined to include an attack on Taiwan; 29 ordered that Party authority be strengthened in the PLA; 30 and told PLA officers not to expect "outsiders" to solve

their military problems.\textsuperscript{31} After this date the press published few comments on the political inadequacies of the PLA.

During the first third of August commune development was accelerated, the Party held a conference to review the experience in Honan, Mao went on a provincial inspection tour. The mainland press later reported that communes were established during early August in Heilungkiang and Shantung provinces. Preparatory propaganda was undertaken in Inner Mongolia.\textsuperscript{32} On the 4th Mao began his tour, visiting communes in Hopei, Honan, Shantung and the outskirts of Tientsin. On the 5th the Honan Communist Party cadres of the model area concluded an assessment conference begun July 29. The communique stressed active Party control and intensive indoctrination of the population.\textsuperscript{33} It did not refer to the combat or military potential of the communes. Mao was definitely in Honan on the 6th, the day that \textit{People's Daily} indicated the approach of Communism with a vague reference to the Honan models. On the 7th the "draft regulations" of the prototype Satellite Commune were finalized. On the 11th agriculture chief Tan Chen-lin wrote in \textit{People's Daily}:

\begin{quote}
Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that we should, step by step, and in good order, organize industry,
\end{quote}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{33} "Khruschev and the Agricultural Commune IV, Mao's 'Uninterrupted Revolution'," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 4-12 reprints a BBC translation of an \textit{NCNA-French} service broadcast (Aug. 21, 1958).
agriculture, commerce (exchange), culture and education, the military forces (the militia, the armed forces of the whole people) into big communes to form the basic units of our society. Now some places are beginning to merge cooperatives into bigger ones to meet the objective needs of the great leap forward. This merger follows the guiding ideas of Comrade Mao.

On the 15th communes were formed in Shensi, and People's Daily and the Daily Worker carried Mao's praise of the commune because of its five-fold merger of functions (see the Tan quote above), which "facilitated Party guidance." 34

During the second week in August Taiwan officials became increasingly concerned over the possibility of CPR military action in the Formosa Straits. The mainland press did not reflect such preparations. However, an August 8 editorial in People's Daily termed it naive to avoid "armed resistance" to the West. 35 An August 9 item on militia training in the Northeast province of Heilungkiang was not reprinted in periodicals of national circulation and linked the training with US action in Lebanon. 36 On August 23 People's Daily reported the first ceremony of the issuance of arms to commune members. Allegedly this ceremony took place on August 13, following a visit to a Honan


After Mao concluded his inspection, the mainland media began to publicize the commune campaign persistently. However, the now numerous commune foundings were not publicized. Another subject on which the controlled publicists remained silent was the buildup of PLA jet strength on the airfields near the Formosa Straits. This buildup took place from Aug. 16 to 23. Some items stressed militia expansion. On August 15 People's Daily reported that in Shansi civilian laborers were organized along military lines attached to a smaller militia force. The article did not link this militarization with the People's Communes, and stressed the economic as well as the more purely military value of such an arrangement. On the 17th militia expansion was reported in Kwangtung province. Once again the expansion was not linked to the communes, and no claim was made of universal militia service. Both the Kwangtung and Harbin items acknowledged PLA assistance.

The Chinese Communist Politburo convened on August 17 at Peitaiho Beach in Hopei. Attendance was enlarged to include: "the first secretaries of the Party committees of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central

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Government and the responsible members of Party organs in various government departments." During the first six days of the conference mainland media became expansive on the commune theme, but barely mentioned any coercive potential created by the new social unit. The Honan model and exemplary communes in Chekiang and Liaoning provinces were heavily publicized. The economic and political advantages of the new form and its ideological advance were stressed. The Honan review conference communique issued August 5 was printed in People's Daily on the 21st under the title "How to Well Manage the People's Commune." It too did not concern itself with an analysis of the defense potential of communication. The articles published during the 17th thru 21st presented the first detailed picture of the communes and stressed their collective character. On the 20th People's Daily approvingly cited a Liaoning example where all private property was "given" to the commune. The articles also called for increased indoctrination to overcome both cadre and mass opposition.


Summary (August 1-22): After a sharp enjoiender on the 1st, public efforts to increase political control of the PLA decreased. The rate of Communization increased during and after a commune inspection trip by Mao. Scattered items appeared on militia expansion, but they did not link militia expansion to the communes. The Communist military buildup along the Formosa Straits was not mentioned. After a convention of key Party leaders at Peitaiho, extensive publicity appeared on the communes and stressed their economic and social advantages. Cadres in the model commune area were ordered to increase Party control and intensify peasant indoctrination. Since the Party did not stress the coercive value of the communes and the mainland media was silent about the Straits buildup, the primary purpose of the crisis was not to arouse the mainlanders, at least initially, or to mobilize them for a genuine invasion effort. Probably the Quemoy buildup was designed to provide support for the charge that those who would "avoid resistance" to the West were "naive." Internally, the path of communization was not a smooth one. Mao felt it necessary to support this policy personally by a field trip to Honan. When the Party leaders met at Peitaiho, they knew that the population was hostile to the communes and that the Soviet Union did not agree completely with the CPR analysis of the international situation. However, they decided to continue to impose the communes, and to prove to the Soviets that the West would retreat if faced with a military challenge.

On the 23rd People's Daily published the first in a series of articles on the Honan prototype entitled "Communes in Which
All People Are Soldiers.⁴⁴ That same day Chinese Communist
shore batteries began bombarding Quemoy, and continued until
October 6. On August 20 and 21 Peking elite newspapers had
charged that the US threatened peace by sending ships and marines
to Singapore. The mainland press observed silence on the bom-
bardment, and did not immediately call for a massive militia
expansion. On the 23rd an all day conference of Honan "Young
Activists" concluded with a resolution which stressed the politi-
cal and economic benefits of communes and called for their
establishment everywhere in China.⁴⁵ It did not mention militia
development and only touched on the "militarization of life".
Commune preparations in Heilungkiang, Kiangsu, and Kweichow pro-
vinces similarly played down the militia role.⁴⁶ A militia
expansion reported from Canton on August 25 was limited and not
connected with the communes. The Peking Review in its issue of
August 26 discussed a Shansi commune and stressed militia
expansion, but the expansion was linked with production.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Yao, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
⁴⁵Data on the Quemoy affair in this paragraph and later parts of
the chapter is largely drawn from the illuminating study of Robert
W. Barnett, Quemoy, The Use and Consequence of Nuclear Deterrence,
Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University,
March 1, 1960. For the report on the Honan conference see:
Chih-pu Wu, "On People's Communes," Peking Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien
⁴⁶"Heilungkiang Founds First Group of People's Communes," op. cit.;
"Kiangsu People Actively Prepare for People's Communes," POL
Nanking (Sept. 5, 1958), SCMP, No. 1353 (Sept. 15, 1958), p. 15;
"Kiangsu People Intensify Production Efforts to Great the High
Tide of People's Communes," POL Nanking (Sept. 5, 1958), ibid.,
p. 16; and "People's Communes Set Up on Trial in Kweichow,
⁴⁷Mu-yen Wang, "Shansi's New Form of Labour Organization," Peking
In the last week of August the mainland media reported problems connected with the new communes. The People's Daily of August 25 instructed cadres how to deal with opposition to the public mess halls of the communes. The Honan Communist Party found it necessary to convene a conference on consolidating the people's communes. It lasted from August 26 to September 7. The communiqué, delayed in publication, admitted sizeable opposition, unsatisfactory production levels, and hostility to the central government. On August 29 the Political Bureau meeting at Peitaiho directed that a "socialist and communist education" campaign be undertaken in the rural areas the following winter and spring.

That same day the Party formalized a resolution "On the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas." After attacking advocates of "Right conservatism" in agriculture, the Peitaiho resolution commended the people "for organizing themselves along military lines." The resolution supposedly approved of the "spontaneous" and "inevitable" development of communes and pretended to provide only a few suggestions. The communes should have about 2,000 households and should take over the role of the township government. Questions of private property should be left

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50 "Chronology of Events in Communist China, May-August 1958," op. cit., p. 34.

51 The text together with other documents on the public unveiling of the commune campaign can be found in: People's Communes in China, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958, pp. 1-8.
for later solution. Members should be paid on the basis of "to each according to his work." In assisting this "inevitable" development cadres should "overcome vacillation ... and expose and foil rumour-nongering and sabotage by landlord and rich-peasant elements".

It seems that the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people's communes to explore the practical road of transition to communism.

The Communists later claimed that at the time the resolution was passed, thirty percent of China's 500,000,000 peasants had been organized in communes. 52

On the 29th the Hopei Party called for intensive communication; 53 and on the 30th, Kwangtung. 54 On the 31st, although the resolution title had emphasized the rural areas, the first urban commune was established in Kweichow. 55 The Hopei instructions, which stressed the importance of the militia, first appeared in Red Flag on Sept. 16. It should be noted that a Heilungkiang Party propaganda outline of August 30 identified the militia with arming all the people. 56

The Peitaiho resolution and Hopei instructions appeared in between several developments in Chinese Communist policy on the Formosa Straits. On August 27 Peking Radio broadcast to Formosa a "warning" that invasion of Quemoy then Taiwan was imminent. The same day PLA Fukien Headquarters called on the Nationalist military commanders on bombarded and blockaded Quemoy to defect with their men or surrender. On about the same date it appears that Chinese Communist sources began to circulate rumours that the USSR was soon to supply the People's Republic with nuclear weapons, missiles and an earth satellite. On August 31, almost immediately after the Peitaiho resolution, the Hopei directive, and the Heilungkiang propaganda outline had been promulgated, Pravda pointedly warned the United States that a conflict in the Straits could not be "localized". On the last day of August, 1958, the United States began to dispatch some of its most advanced operational jet fighters to Taiwan. On the mainland during the August 27-30 period rallies and demonstrations were held and resolutions passed against imperialist "provocations". Interestingly, the rallies and resolutions concerned themselves not with developments in the Straits, but with the closing of a Communist-controlled school in Hong Kong.  

Summary (August 23-31): The Chinese public was not informed of the Quemoy bombardment begun on the 23rd. Although publicity on August 23 was given to the enlarged militia organized in a model commune, subsequent commune publicity did not stress the militia

58 Ibid.
theme. The *Peking Review* readers were told of militia growth. Elite periodicals told cadres how to deal with opposition to certain features of the People's Communes. The Central Committee officially ordered communication but restricted it to rural areas and called for a gradual takeover of private property. However, urban communes were being established and private property seized. The CCP also called for a rural "rectification" campaign to be started in several months. The West was informed that the Chinese were about to enter the nuclear club, and the Chinese Communists threatened to invade Quemoy. Although attempts were made to arouse xenophobic fervor on the mainland, these did not focus on the Straits crisis. Although the Peitaiho resolution contained an ideological slap at the Soviet Union, the USSR threatened the United States if it intervened in the Straits crisis.

Commentary: The continued domestic silence on the military venture launched in the Straits pointed to the primarily external purposes of this Communist action. The dialogue was for Western and Kuomintang consumption. A simultaneous attempt was made to undermine Nationalist morale and frighten off the United States with implications of nuclear retaliation. The Soviet Union joined in the blackmail attempt. While a foreign audience was given the impression that the communes and a vastly expanded militia force went hand in hand, the mainland audience read of other aspects of communication. The cadres were quietly advised to plan for militia expansion, but no intensive attempt was made to either frighten the West with the vision of all Chinese in arms, or arouse the people to "liberate" Quemoy and Taiwan.
The Communist leaders, faced with increasing popular opposition to the communes, modified their scope and collectivism. The generality of agitation against Western "provocations" would seem to imply that the Communist efforts to arouse patriotism were not directed to action against the West, but to extract greater effort at home and compliance with communication. The Chinese do not seem to have felt grateful for Soviet propaganda support in the Quemoy venture. Their assertion of ideological supremacy for the communes implies that either they felt extremely confident that the U.S.S.R. would have to back them up in the Straits, or that they were discontented with the Soviet position and had decided to assert their independence from the sanctity of the Soviet model.

B. The High Tide

During the first few days of September many of the commune developments noted earlier in our survey were reported in the mainland press. The majority of items did not stress their military usefulness. Reports on the establishment and multiplication of communes in Shantung, Tsinghai, Kwangsi, Liaoning, Szechwan, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Shensi, Kiangsu, Fukien, Chekiang, Kweichow, Shansi, Kirin, Hopei, Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia paid little attention to the militia, although more mention was made of organizing the population along military lines.59 NCNA-English dispatches of the 1, 2, and 6 of September paid little attention to militia development and concentrated on the rapidity of

59See the numerous articles in SCMP, Nos. 1853 (Sept. 15, 1958) and 1860 (Sept. 24, 1958).
communication and the consequent economic benefits.  

However, on September 1 Red Flag editorialized:

Although the organization of agricultural labour along military lines at present is for waging battles against nature and not human enemies, it is none-theless not difficult to transform one kind of struggle into another.

While no external enemies attack us, the people’s communes ... aim to storm the fortresses of nature and to march to the happy future of industrialization, urbanization and communism in the countryside. If and when external enemies dare to attack us, then the entire armed population will be mobilized to wipe out enemies resolutely, thoroughly and completely. 

This editorial was reprinted in the September 2 issue of Peking Review. On the same day a picture series in the Daily Worker showed the militia at one commune shouldering new rifles. On the 4th People’s Daily printed the Draft Regulations of the Model Satellite commune.

A system of citizen soldiery shall operate throughout the commune. The age-groups of young and middle aged men as well as demobilized service-men should be organized into militia units that will undertake regular military training and fulfill tasks assigned by the state.

On the 6th People’s Daily reported militia expansion in a Hopei commune, and on the same day in Canton a mass rally was held on the liberation of Quemoy.

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62 Translation appears in ibid., p. 67.

63 "Many Thousands Contend for First Place in Joining Large Communes in Hopei Province," JMDP (Sept. 6, 1958); "Kwangtung Students,
The media reported popular opposition to the communes and called for intensified pressure to maintain peasant compliance. People's Daily found it necessary on the 4th to exhort cadres to "expose and smash rumour-mongering and sabotage" and admitted the inadequacy of "forcible measures." The previous day this key newspaper gave instructions to concentrate on production and not to establish communes if this process hampered the vital economic task. In Kwangtung the situation was so serious that the Party decided on September 6 to send 2,000 cadres to supervise commune organization.

Bombardment and blockades continued in the Straits and Peking unilaterally extended its territorial waters to a twelve mile limit. On September 1, after Pravda threatened the U.S. with the nuclear consequences of intervention, the U.S.S.R. agreed to enter negotiations on nuclear testing. On the 5th the bombardment was less heavy, and the following day Chou En-lai suggested that meetings resume between the ambassadors of the United States and the People's Republic in Warsaw. The United States had been extremely vague about its willingness to use nuclear weapons in the Straits.

65 "Summarized in "Controls in China (XV), From Cooperatives to Communes," op. cit., p. 15.
On September 7 the Quemoy blockade was broken slightly, and Washington received a letter from Khruschev which combined fears and threats of nuclear war. Khruschev declared:

Nothing would be further from the truth than an attempt to assess this, my message to you, as an intention to exaggerate unnecessarily and even more to utter some kind of threats. We desire only to draw your attention to the situation from which no one can escape—neither you nor we—if in the Far East the fire of war breaks out.67

Peking expanded the militia to counter the threat of American aggression. NONA released this exhortation:

Comrade agricultural co-operative members: The Supreme State Conference has called on all people of every strata for unified mobilization to oppose resolutely the imperialist US military provocations and war threats. Our 500,000,000 peasants must resolutely respond to this solemn call. At the same time we must set up people’s communes and establish strong militia organizations and be ready at all times to defend our motherland. If the US imperialists insist on imposing war upon us, we will then deal them shattering blows and wipe them all out.68

That same day Chou En-lai broadcast to the people of China about the need to "liberate" Quemoy and the threat of US aggression.69

The following day the Peking press reported the U.S. military buildup and the growth of the militia. Mass demonstrations were organized.70 People’s Daily, in its edition of September 9,

68 "Controls in China (XV) From Cooperatives to Communes," op. cit., p. iv.
reported P'eng Chen's speech to the Peking rally:

The Chinese People's Liberation Army will struggle with the utmost effort to protect our sovereign rights and to preserve our territorial integrity. All people in town or in the country at the rear must ready preparations for war and make further efforts at work; push our big leap forward in productivity with the utmost effort, increase in great measure iron and steel, machinery and food-grains. We must establish and broadly develop the people's commune; we must double the policy of everyone in arms. We must be ready at all times to revere the holy order of protection of the great Motherland. Thus we will be able to make the American Imperialistic paper tiger tremble! The victory definitely will be ours.

Canton reported that militia units were formed in the city and in the communes to meet the Quemoy crisis.71 Numerous items on the communes continued to appear which did not stress their use for militia expansion.72 Increasing emphasis was placed on the economic and control values of organizing the people along military lines.73 The NCNA-English service and home service broadcast information about communes in Hopei, Szechwan and near Peking on September 11 and 12,74 but mentioned little about their coercive potential.

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72 For examples, see: SCMP, No. 1853 (Sept. 15, 1958), pp. 5-27, and SCMP, No. 1860 (Sept. 24, 1958), pp. 5-34.
On September 10, one day after Pravda had refrained from using nuclear threats in an article on the Straits tension, the mainland media began to concentrate on the "All People in Arms" theme. The NCNA-English service reported the mobilization of the militia in Fukien province. According to Western visitors, home service broadcasts reported that multitudes were volunteering to fight and to work to prevent American invasion and to liberate Taiwan. On the 11th People's Daily reported that "No Matter Whether Male or Female, All People Are in Arms in Heilungkiang Province." Articles appeared on militia expansion in Fukien, Shansi and in Peking educational institutions. On the 12th a poem linked militia expansion with the communes. On the 13th People's Daily headlined, "Everyone a Soldier Combining Labor with Arms" and reported that the coastal provinces had taken the lead in militia expansion. On the following day the same newspaper declared that China was a "Nation in Arms to Frighten the Enemy Out of His Wits." Astronomical militia figures were reported from Shantung, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hupeh, Szechwan, Kiangsi, Shensi and Shanghai. In all of these provinces the militia were reported to be actively participating in production. NCNA-English reported the increase in militia that had followed.

76Wilson, op. cit., p. 225.
communication in Shansi. On the 15th the Daily Worker reported increased military training in the Honan communes. On the 16th leading Chinese organs for domestic and external consumption stressed the militia multiplication. People's Daily enjoined "Arm the Whole People to Beat the Invaders" and reported that just this had been done in Liaoning, Kirin, Honan, Hunan and Kwangsi. The lengthy articles also pointed out the economic uses of this new force. That same day Peking Review proclaimed "650 Million Ready to Smash US Aggression," although also on the 16th, Red Flag reported an earlier conference in Hopei which had only called for a militia of limited scope.

During the period from the 10th to the 16th there were other significant events, media items and media omissions. On the 10th People's Daily had called for militia growth, but not at the price of removing the communes from "first place" on the Party agenda. A Peking daily of the 11th attacked cadres who did not think the commune should be on the agenda at all, "those who think minority nationalities should not be put in people's communes." An article in a specialist periodical on Sept. 11 called for a crash education program in the communes to


teach elementary technical and administrative skills to the commune members. The preceding day another journal reported a heretical non-Party intellectuals' slogan, "the layman not being able to lead the professional." An omission worth noting is the lack of credit given the PLA in publicizing militia expansion.

Externally the leaders of the People's Republic must have noticed that Pravda reprinted the Peitaiho resolution, altered to eliminate the CCP's ideological claim for the communes. It must have seen a September 11 American periodical in which a U.S. Admiral clearly indicated that nuclear weapons would be used in the Straits crisis.

Summary (Sept. 1-16): Reports for mainland and external consumption did not stress the coercive strength that the communes could create. However, Party elites were informed at the beginning of the month of their coercive potential. A model commune constitution provided for militia units of limited scope. The controlled media admitted that popular resentment of communization was affecting production. The USSR informed Eisenhower that it might use nuclear weapons to aid Communist China. Although the CCP publicized a "nation in arms," it stressed the economic role of the militia and the priority of commune establishment over militia expansion. Foreign language transmissions did not uniformly emphasize the creation of a huge fighting force. The militia expansion campaign, for which the PLA

82 Kuo-fan Chang, "Why Do We Say that the Leadership of the Communist Party is Absolute?," Tseng-ming, No. 9 (Sept. 10, 1958), FORM, No. 149 (Dec. 1, 1958), p. 7.
received no credit, moved into high gear immediately before and after: 1) the United States unofficially said it was willing to use nuclear weapons in the Straits; and 2) the Soviets lessened their nuclear commitment.

Commentary: Externally, Chinese hopes were disappointed. The U.S. did not abandon the offshore islands. The USSR did not allow China's optimism to involve it in nuclear conflict, especially since the Chinese continued the commune program which challenged the superiority of Soviet social organization. Soviet and Chinese interests diverged. In this perspective the "All People in Arms" Campaign can be seen as a CCP attempt to cow Nationalists and the Americans by the spectre of millions on millions of Chinese Communist fighting men. The Peking leadership hoped that this threat would: 1)deter invasion of the mainland; and 2)maintain respect for the military strength of the People's Republic. The Campaign was undertaken after it became apparent that American resistance to seizure of Quemoy would not "fold," and that U.S. military responses were possible.

Internally, the "All People in Arms" campaign could have been an attempt to divert and dispel political opposition to the communes and the economic problems resulting from them. The timing of the Campaign was that of an afterthought to the blockade and bombardment of Quemoy and the militia in spite of efforts to create a climate of threat to the nation was portrayed as an economic force. The Party scale of priorities placed communes before militia expansion and an increase in production ahead of communciation. Some measures had to be found to motivate the
people to increase production and to accept the communes. The
Party may have thought that mobilization of a militia force which
concentrated on economic production, was billed as the defender
of the homeland, and symbolized state power in the villages would
meet these needs.

After the 16th the mainland press no longer carried
sweeping articles on "everyone a soldier," although these claims
continued to appear in communications for overseas consumption.
It was later announced that on the 16th both Mao and Liu Shao-chi
began inspection tours of the people's communes. The latter
was reportedly less concerned with the militia than with better
use of labor power and with the fissioning of the family. NCPA-
English service of the 17th and 18th carried old news on the
militia buildup. In an article entitled "Peasants Set Up People's
Communes As Answer to US Provocation," the service emphasized the
communes' economic capabilities and played down the significance
of the militia forces. On the 17th People's Daily reported that
Hopei had seven million men "in arms," and on the following day
the same paper ordered stricter Party control of the communes
and a checkup on the cadres. That day the Minister of Finance

83 "Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i Talks on Several Conditions for Transi-
tion to Communism While Inspecting in Honan," Honan Chiao-yu
Pan-yueh-k'an, No. 19 (Oct. 11, 1958), NCPA, No. 149 (Dec. 1,
"Communes and Communism (II)," (Nov. 7, 1958) p. 4, EFE Research
Studies and Background Papers, op. cit., Chronological Series IV.

84 "Peasants Set Up People's Communes As Answer to US Provocation,"
NCPA-English, Peking (Sept. 17, 1958), SCMP, No. 1860 (Sept. 24,
1958), pp. 43-44.

85 "Realization of All People in Arms in Hopei Province," JNJP
(Sept. 17, 1958); Tsu-yu Chou, "What Are the Advantages of Com-
bining the Hsiang and Cooperative into a Single Entity?" JNJP
held a telephone conference on commune finances. On the 19th
People's Daily instructed cadres on "How to Consolidate the Peo-
ple's Commune" and did not mention the militia. Although the
establishment of the first commune in the Shanghai suburbs on
the 21st was linked with a meeting on the Quemoy crisis, no
special emphasis was placed on militia developments.

On the 19th, as the blockade became increasingly ine-
effective, Khruschev sent an extremely abusive letter to Eisenhower.
He accused the United States of nuclear blackmail and threatened
to use Soviet nuclear instruments. The next day American peri-
odicals publicized the presence of nuclear weapons on Taiwan.
Important items also appeared on the PLA. On the 19th, 20th and
21st the NCNA-English service reported that officers had been
dispatched to the ranks and that servicemen on the Fukien Front,
facing the Straits, had been engaged in heavy economic activity
during the past weeks. On the 20th the PLA Political Department
directed that all officers spend one month annually in the ranks.

86 "Experimental Draft of Financial Management System Between Hsien
(Municipalities) and Rural People's Communes of Honan Province," Tsai-cheng,
87 "How Can We Consolidate the People's Communes?" JMJP (Sept. 19,
88 "July First People's Commune, First in the Suburbs of Shanghai,
Established on September 21," Shanghai Wen Hui Pao (Sept. 22,
89 "PLA Officers Cultivate 'Experimental Plots'," NCNA-English,
Peking (Sept. 19, 1958), SCMP, No. 1861 (Sept. 25, 1958), pp. 8-9;
"PLA Units Help Steel Industry," NCNA-English, Peking (Sept.
20, 1958), ibid., p. 10; "Serve In the Ranks' System for All
90 "PLA General Political Department Instructs Officers to Spend
One Month Annually in the Ranks," Peking Chin Jih Hsin Wen
By the 22nd the Communists claimed that rural commu-
nication had been completed in Honan, Liaoning, Hopei, Shansi,
Tsinghai, Kwangsi, Heilungkiang and Shantung. According to
the NCNA-English service, only "multi-national" provinces were
still in the experimental stage. These were: Inner Mongolia,
Yunnan, Sinkiang, and Ninghsia. There reports paid no attention
to the militia.

Peking Review, in its issue of September 23, maintained
that the threat of war was "unabated". However, its discussion
of the people's communes referred to a core rather than an all-
embracing militia. The United States gave Nationalist planes
sidewinder missiles on the 24th and again publicized nuclear
armaments on Taiwan on the 26th. On the 26th major dailies
publicized newly enlarged militia units, but these articles em-
phasized the militia productive capacities. On the 28th dis-
patches on militia activity in Canton were sent to a Hongkong
newspaper.

Peking was occupied with problems other than the Quemoy-
Taiwan venture. On the 24th People's Daily itemized opposition

91"More Than 10,000 People's Communes Set Up All Over China,"
NCNA-English, Peking (Sept. 21, 1958), SCMP, No. 1860 (Sept. 24,
92"Hold a Hoe in One Hand: To Use All the People's Energy in Pro-
duction; Hold a Rifle in the Other: To Protect the Motherland,"
JMJP (Sept. 26, 1958); "Over 50,000 Middle School Teachers and
Students of Shenyang Intensify Their Military Training," and
"Militiamen of Various Institutes and Schools of Sian Actively
Undertake Military Training," Peking Kuang Ming Jih Pao (Sept. 26,
93"Six Militia Divisions Formally Established in Canton," Hong
Kong Wen Wei Pao (Sept. 30, 1958), CB, No. 530 (Oct. 31, 1958),
pp. 17-18.
to the communes among the people and called for a massive effort to reform their attitude. On the 27th Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke to a joint meeting of Party and PLA cadres in North China. He attacked cadre inadequacies and called for an intensified effort to establish urban communes. The Chinese press carried the later injunction widely. On the 28th the Liaoning Party Committee found it necessary to dispatch 2,000 government cadres to the rural communes. On the 29th NCNA and People's Daily stressed that militia training was not designed to produce specialists but to constitute one of the many functions the "new man" could perform. The Chinghai CCP committee met to revise commune administration and leadership practices. This meeting was not reported until December 2. Although several articles appeared on the merits of social organization along military lines, Peking Review

98 "To Well Manage the People's Communes at Full Strength in Shansi and Ch'ingh'ai," JMJP (Dec. 2, 1958); for an article on organization along military lines, see: "New Rise in Communist Thinking," Peking Chung-kuo Chi'ing-nien Pao (Sept. 27, 1958), SCMP, No. 1387 (Nov. 3, 1958), pp. 5-8.
stressed that any militarization had resulted from American threats. The Party did not acknowledge American State Department comments of the 29-30th which belittled the value of Quemoy and suggested that Nationalist forces be withdrawn if a "de facto" ceasefire occurred. On the 30th People's Daily accused the United States of increasing the danger of guided missile and nuclear war. The Chinese Communists were later to claim that by the end of September 98.2% of the rural population had been organized into some 26,425 people's communes. On the 30th the Soviet Literary Gazette published the first long description of the communes to appear in the Russian press. It was rhapsodic. On October 1 Pravda quoted Chou En-lai when he advanced China's ideological claim for the communes. 

October 1, 1958, was the ninth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. Demonstrations and articles on this occasion were primarily devoted to the communes, the militia and Quemoy. The major points were: 1) the Peking parade featured new militia units and stressed the Quemoy theme; 2) the people's communes were "fundamentally realized"; 3) the commune was an ideologically superior type of organization because it eliminated bourgeois elements and the old family system; 4) "In the people's

100 A. Smerdov, "Birth of the People's Communes," Literary Gazette (Sept. 30, 1958), in "Controls in China (XVII), A Significant Silence" (Oct. 2, 1958), pp. 8-14, RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, op. cit., Chronological Series IV.
101 Ibid., p. iii.
communes labor is along military lines, things are done the way battle duties are carried out, and the people live collectively."

5) the militia, while serving many purposes, were of great strategic importance; 6) the time was ripe for urban communes; 7) professional specialists were not needed because the merger of function in the commune unit meant that "education" is "combined with labor". 102 8) those who were against or would have delayed founding of communes had "baseless" fears; 9) "criticize the remnant capitalist spontaneous tendency of certain rich peasants, destroy individualism and departmentalism and foster communism." 103 On October 2, Mao called for a "tremendous number of militiamen" prepared for "criminal acts and atomic threats to world peace."

Summary (Sept. 16- Oct. 2): From the time Mao and Liu began inspection tours of the communes, publicity of universal militia participation declined sharply. Items on the militia continued to appear in publications for overseas consumption. The response to the US "threat" was increasingly pictured as an economic one, and the value of the militia and military-type organization for this purpose was stressed. Increasing attention was paid to problems attendant on communication: political, administrative.


and economic. The Communists imposed disciplinary measures on PLA officers. Khrushchev tried to blackmail the U.S. with nuclear threats. The United States publicized the nuclear potential available to meet a Communist attack.

When rural communciation was allegedly completed, the CCP called for accelerated urban commune development. The USSR broke a long silence on the communes by praising them in a relatively unimportant periodical. The United States made overtures for a compromise settlement on Quemoy. The Communists then accused the U.S. of fomenting nuclear strife, and re-emphasized the strategic and economic value of the militia. Cadres unenthusiastic about communes were cautioned, and a drive on popular opposition was called for. Mao Tse-tung explicitly stressed the militia utility in nuclear warfare.

Commentary: Apparently internal problems could not be met by inflexible application of the communization and militarization of life policies. The Party leadership was forced to deal with the internal problems the policies of the past months had created. To compensate for political discontent and economic weakness the regime continued to portray threats from the "imperialist camp" and retained the militia as mass work force. External failure also confronted the CCP leadership. It was necessary to discipline the military specialists who had doubted the wisdom of the operation while maintaining the domestic appearance of preparation for military action. This further enhanced the utility of propaganda about the militia. Mao realized that he could neither bluff the U.S. but he was unwilling to allow a significant
relaxation in international tension. Accordingly, he ignored American compromise overtures while abandoning all pretense of invasion preparation. He resorted to stress of militia value in a nuclear conflict as a means to impress both the West and the PLA specialists. Sino-Soviet relations reflect mutual concessions. Khrushchev's emotional note to Eisenhower was evidence of Soviet blackmail support of the CPR and possibly an indication of fear of the repercussions of Chinese action. The Chinese backed down on Quemoy, Khrushchev abandoned the notion of a UN summit conference without the Chinese, and the Russian press at least reported the communes and the Chinese ideological claims.

The first half of October encompassed continued emphasis on "All People in Arms", commune revisions, and military disengagement in the Straits. On October 5th and 6th mainland media publicized militia multiplication in Shansi, Shantung, Szechwan, Honan and Peking. The articles stressed the economic advantages, the role of demobilized servicemen, and military training for a "hard-core" group. On the same days Moscow and Peking announced changes in tactics on Quemoy. Khrushchev described the Quemoy crisis to a Tass interviewer as an internal Chinese affair and avoided nuclear threats. Chinese Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai announced a seven day suspension of the Quemoy bombardment if the US Navy stopped escorting Nationalist supply vessels.

On the 7th the PLA General Staff convened an 11 day National Militia Work Conference. The conference was later reported to have dealt with ways of completing the militia.

104 For examples, see: CP, No. 530 (Oct. 31, 1958), pp. 7-9, 11-13, 19-20.
expansion program, overcoming popular opposition, realizing the militia’s economic potentialities, and strengthening CCP leadership of the militia. Only a passing reference was made to the assistance of the PLA.\textsuperscript{105} On the same day it was reported that more officers had been sent to the ranks.

The Party simultaneously attempted to establish urban communes and deal with persistent opposition to and inadequacies in functioning communes. Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Hopei province from the 8th to the 14th, issued general instructions on urban people's communes, and called for local authorities to implement them.\textsuperscript{106} On the 9th Liaoning province officials were instructed to establish street communes in urban areas for economic and political reasons, e.g. to "wipe out capitalism" in the cities.\textsuperscript{107} Teng also called for increased CCP control of the population and independence from other elites. An Amoy newspaper reported opposition to commune establishment in that city.\textsuperscript{108} Measures taken to straighten out finance and management in Honan communes were published for "study and reference."\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{108}D.S.T. Luard, "The Urban Commune," \textit{The China Quarterly}, No. 5 (July-September, 1960), p. 75.

of judiciary workers was held at Chengchow which called for summary trials to be held in the fields. 110 On the 10th officials from North and Northeast China began to confer on ways of realizing the full potential of the commune labor force, heightening indoctrination, and making collective facilities palatable to the people. 111 The final communiqué which appeared on the 20th in People's Daily did not mention the militia but supported the organization of labor "along military lines."

From the 10th to the 15th a series of items stressed militia growth and the "militarization of life." On the 10th NCNA reported that the program to transform the "whole nation into soldiers" was "mostly realized." 112 On the following days the Daily Worker took up the same theme. 113 Peking Review on the 14th stressed the role of demobilized servicemen. Meanwhile, People's Daily and the Daily Worker advocated organization along military lines to maximize labor power and to impose ideological conformity. 114 On the 16th cadres were informed through Red Flag of

the close relationship of the "All People in Arms" Campaign and commune developments and of the superiorities of Mao's military doctrine. While the publicity drive was carried on, the bombardment and blockade respite for Quemoy was extended an additional week.

Difficulties continued in the commune program. On the 13th, People's Daily appealed for a better use of female labor power in the communes. Cadres were told to use forced labor, public security forces and militia to suppress opposition to urban communes. A blunt attack was made on those cadres who thought the end of class struggle had arrived, who allowed the CP to loosen its grip, and who gave too much food to commune members. On the 15th a shortage of reliable Party cadres to staff the communes was admitted and warnings given cadres who were too responsive to local wishes. That same day a conference convened at Sian to deal with financial and trade problems created by the communes.

In the second half of October there was a sharp decline in publicity on militia expansion and on social organization along military lines. Several events and reports of interest did appear

about the PLA. Chief of Staff Su Yu was replaced by a member of
the COP Secretariat, Huang K'o Cheng, who had also been serving
as Vice-Minister of Defense. Su was probably an advocate of a
modernized and specialized military establishment independent of
the Soviet Union. On the 18th the Daily Worker, while discussing
the advantages of having "all people in arms," admitted that it
was necessary to maintain regular forces for a while. Several
articles appeared on the merits of officers serving in the
ranks.118

The Communists resumed their shelling of Quemoy at the
time John Foster Dulles paid a visit to Chiang on Taiwan (Oct. 21-
23). Dulles announced at the conclusion of their meetings that
the Nationalists had renounced the use of force to return to the
mainland. On the 23rd a Leningrad newspaper firmly rejected the
ideological claims that the Chinese had made for the communes.119
On the 25th Peking announced that the final contingent of Chinese
People's Volunteers was leaving North Korea and that the bom-
bardment of Quemoy would continue only on alternate days. On
the 30th the commander of the returned Volunteers spoke to the
standing committee of the National People's Congress and the Chi-
inese People's Political Consultative Conference. He stressed the
"proof" provided by the Korean experience that more advanced arms

118 Jen Wu, "All People in Arms," KJJP (Oct. 18, 1958); Yeh Ch'en,
"General Tang Hua as a Coast.Guard Sentinel," FMJP (Oct. 25,
1958); URS, Vol. 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2, 1959), pp. 6-9; "Serve In
Ranks! System Wieldly Carried Out Among PLA Units Throughout
China," NCPA Peking (Oct. 20, 1958), SCMP, No. 1882 (Oct. 27,

119 L. Berezny, "Description of Chinese Communes for Leningrad
Readers," Leningradskaya Pravda (Oct. 23, 1958), "Communes and
were not required for military victory over the United States. He also noted the correctness of Mao's views in this regard and the advisability of challenging the imperialists militarily.\footnote{120}

On the last day of October the front pages of People's Daily carried in full a compendium of Mao injunctions, some old and some newly released, on the subject "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers."\footnote{121} The selection began with the inevitable triumph of Communism. While imperialism would no doubt give a dying military kick, this was nothing to fear. After all, only the misled could believe that "weapons are everything, or not realize that nuclear weapons were paper tigers." American strength was superficial compared to that of the Communist bloc "led by" the Soviet Union. Such a situation, however, did not allow for rashness. The proper attitude was "strategically to despise all enemies, tactically take them seriously." The historic point had been reached where the East wind prevails over the West wind.

**Summary (October):** Publicity claims continued during the first half of the month that "everyone" was a militiaman. The PLA was forced to acknowledge the value of the militia, and its control by the Party. Party control of the PLA was generally tightened. Urban communes were talked of and necessary modifications in the militarization of life discussed. The U.S.S.R. withdrew its nuclear support of the Quemoy venture and rejected CPR claims to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{121} "Comrade Mao Tse-tung on 'Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers','" \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1-14.
\end{itemize}
ideological supremacy. The bombardment of Quemoy was lessened and the U.S. promised to leash Chiang Kai-shek. The month ended with a long report of Mao's views. It stressed the relative unimportance of weapons and the illusory nature of U.S. nuclear power. Mao concluded that care must be taken but that the Communist powers were stronger than the imperialists and should not fear military action against them.

Commentary: Chinese curtailment of their military activities in the Formosa Straits was probably an inevitable recourse with the withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear shield. However the concession was one of tactics not strategy. Mao implied that any failures were due to Soviet, and possibly, PLA inadequacies and faint-heartedness. The Soviets could hardly have been pleased on this score, and they openly expressed their displeasure with the communes and China's haughty claims for them.

Mao's first reaction to mounting popular and cadre unrest was disciplining of the people and their organization into social units that could be easily controlled. The concentration on demobilized servicemen as a militia core may have reflected the need for reliable personnel to coerce the Peking subjects. As popular discontent increased militia expansion may have seemed increasingly dangerous. The decrease of tensions in the Straits decreased the possibilities of Western military attack. By the end of October internal relaxation was necessary to relieve popular discontent and the de-emphasis on "organization along military lines" may have constituted a first step.
C. Reappraisal and the Leap Forward

Perhaps the most important events of November were the little publicized series of Party elite meetings convened by Comrade Mao. The mainland public was supposedly kept busy with group discussions of the "Paper Tiger" dicta and with the establishment of urban communes. Mao convened a meeting of CCP leaders at Chengchow on November 2 which did not conclude until the 10th. During this period numerous reports appeared of discussions by civilian and PLA troops of Mao's military and foreign policy views. Supposedly the troops on the Fukien "front" dutifully concluded that the "outcome of war is decided by people, not weapons". MONA-English publicized the PLA's support for Mao's doctrine. Meanwhile, an interesting Sino-Soviet divergence reappeared. On November 1 a Soviet periodical rejected Peking's claims to ideological primacy on the basis of the communes. However, a Chinese periodical called for "entry into Communist society" by 1965. The slogans issued on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution broke with precedent to lower China to the same level as other satellites. However, the following day, November 7, People's Daily re-asserted the CCP's ideological status.

During the second week in November several items appeared

122 For examples, see: ibid., pp. 15-20.
123 "PLA Men Hail Mao Tse-tung's Writings on 'Paper Tigers'," ibid., p. 19.
124 "Communes and Communism (II)," op. cit., pp. iii, v.
which illustrated commune life. People's Daily reported that some communes had acquired even family utensils and tableware. The same newspaper advised that peasant commune members should not work more than two days and two nights continuously. Both factory labor and education were carried out "along military lines," and peasant homes were sometimes required to house new industrial and educational facilities. On the 16th the PLA was commended for its aid in the iron and steel campaign and accorded some mention for its contribution to commune development. As of the 19th the PLA was still studying Mao's views on paper tigers. On the 20th a three week conference began to deal with new tasks in the supply of capital created by the communes.

From November 21 to 29 mainland media observed relative silence on the subject of people's communes. Another meeting of CCP leaders, which included provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party secretaries, met from the 21st to the 27th. Several items appeared on communes organized along military lines and on

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127 JiJP (Nov. 9, 1958), cited in ibid., p. 375.
the need for a greater labor effort ("rest is good, work is better"). On November 28 the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee began at Wuhan.

From the 29th, if not earlier, major revisions were made in commune policy and little more was heard of the "All People in Arms" Campaign. On the 29th People's Daily called on cadres "to strengthen democratic administration" in the communes and advance a different slogan: "rest is fine, work is fine." The Tsinghai Party committee called a conference on "tidying up" the communes. While organization along military lines was praised in the People's Daily of November 30, on December 1 Red Flag urged that it be coupled with democratization of administration. On December 3 Radio Hefei reprimanded cadres for overdoing the militarization of life. Hupeh and Honan provinces held Party conferences on commune "reform and consolidation."

The Kiangsu CCP assigned 10,000 cadres to communes for December, 1958-April, 1959 period.

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131 Chun-i Li, "To Develop Commercial Production, To Increase Commune's Revenues," JMJP (Nov. 24, 1958); Chung-ming Ma and Kuang-huei Liu, "Commune's Cadres Lower Themselves and Engage in Production in Kan County Communes," ibid. (Nov. 25, 1958); "Rest is Good, Work is Better," ibid. (Nov. 23, 1958).


135 "Kiangsu Organizes 10,000-Man Inspection Corps to Tidy Up People's Communes," NGNA Nanking (Dec. 7, 1958), ibid., pp. 7-8.
In the early part of December the PLA Political Department ordered its cadres to assist in the communes. At the same time it became clear that food and livestock deliveries to Shanghai and probably other urban centers were considerably below those of 1957.\textsuperscript{136} Production in the vicinity of Shanghai was also below 1957 levels. On December 10 the Communist Plenum meeting at Wuhan concluded its sessions. Four major documents of the conference were later made public. The communique indicated the Party's intention in the economic sphere to "guard against exaggeration and oppose concealment of shortcomings," to take Taiwan "eventually," and to triumph over capitalism in "peaceful competition."\textsuperscript{137} The second was an announcement that Mao was relinquishing the Chairmanship of the People's Republic, but retaining his Party chairmanship and his "leading role in the work of the state." Cadres were told to make it clear to the people that no change in power was involved.\textsuperscript{138} The third document called for drastic revision of the financial and trade systems of the people's communes.\textsuperscript{139}

The fourth document is of principle interest to us, the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes,"


\textsuperscript{137}\textit{"Communique and Resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Special Supplement, China Reconstructs, Vol. VIII, no. 2 (Feb. 1959), pp. 5-7.}

\textsuperscript{138}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{139}"Decision of the CCP Central Committee and State Council On Improvement of Financial and Trade Administration In Rural Areas So As to Meet the Situation Arising from Establishment of People's Communes," \textit{NCNA Peking} (Dec. 22, 1959), SCMP, No. 1929 (Jan. 8, 1959), pp. 2-7.
or the Wuhan Resolution.¹⁴⁰ In general the resolution stressed the long-term nature of the commune accomplishments. All transitions were to be "gradual" ones. Urban communes "particularly in the big cities" should be postponed while the Party waited "a bit" for "capitalists and intellectuals" to overcome their "bourgeois ideology". The Resolution retracted earlier claims of proximity to Communism at great length. The system of determining wages by productivity must be retained to maintain the "working enthusiasm of the people". Special economic burdens should not be placed on commune members receiving partial outside help, e.g. from relatives in the PLA. Members under this new dispensation were entitled to retain personal property, some livestock and small plots. The conditions of commune existence were revealed in the following instructions issued to cadres. The Party leadership ordered the cadres to "correct the tendency to see only things and not human beings". The twelve-hour work-day must not be exceeded. Women during pregnancy and after childbirth "should not be asked to do heavy work ... or work at night." Dining halls should be clean, serve special menus for different age groups, and allow "some commune members to cook at home". Nurseries must be improved so "that the children want to stay there and the parents want to put them there". Only children above the age of nine should take part in labor. Housing should be designed so that the different generations of a family can "all live together".

¹⁴⁰"Communiques and Resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," or. cit.
The resolution upheld the practice of "getting organized along military lines" as analogous to industrial discipline. Militia organizations were to be retained, but their leadership should not overlap that of other commune offices. The distinction between a basic and ordinary militia was stressed. In event of aggression, the Resolution continued, all was in readiness to "turn the whole nation into soldiers". The militia was the aid and replenisher of the PLA. It was necessary to declare "absolutely impermissible" impairment of "democratic life" through the militia or military style organization.

Finally, the authors turned their attention to the Party. Party power must be strengthened:

There are some people who think that with the emergence of the commune the Party can be dispensed with, and that they can practise what they call 'merging the Party and the commune in one'. This kind of thinking is wrong.

Some cadres were "dizzy with success" and had acquired "rude attitudes". Others resorted to "exaggeration" in economic reports. Accordingly, December to April was to be spent in "checking up" on the communes and cadres in particular. Preparations should be made "to purge the leadership in the communes of those alien-class elements who have smuggled themselves into the leadership and the very few who ... have never corrected their errors."

The balance of December was devoted to a flurry of conferences and directives on the execution of the points contained in the resolution. The general themes were: admission of popular discontent; modification of collective living pressure and reinstatement of some social traditions, e.g. communes were to
allot land for cemeteries;\(^{141}\) reorganization of management and economic practice; militarization of life to be supplemented by democratization of administrations\(^{142}\) and a new respect for precision and specialization, e.g. "Skyrocketing Enthusiasm Should be Combined with Scientific Analysis."\(^{143}\)

The militia received little publicity during this initial painful reappraisal. Two items, one circulated to Party cadres and the other an interview with non-mainland Chinese, did appear. On Dec. 16 Red Flag described in some detail the organization of a commune near the Straits prepared to support and participate in war.\(^{144}\) On the 27th Kwangtung Party Secretary Tao Chu gave an interview to visitors from Hongkong and Macao in which he stressed the industrial analogy of organization along military lines and the defensive nature of the militia as a reserve for the PLA. He pointed to tangible economic and psychological benefits accrued from the "everyone a soldier" movement.\(^{145}\)

Summary (November-December, 1958): During November Mao convened several meetings of Party leaders. Publicity on the militia, Quency, and the militarization of life declined sharply. The PLA


\(^{142}\)San Chao, "Four-ization is a Practical Regulation of Democratic Centralism," JNJP (Dec. 18, 1958).


was repeatedly reported to be studying Mao's doctrine of men over weapons and the world situation as presented in the Paper Tiger selections. The Soviet Union rejected and the Chinese re-asserted the claim that the communes placed the CPR one step nearer Marxist Utopia than the USSR. Several press items indicated the total collectivization of private property and exploitation of the labor force in the communes. By the end of November the Party had to officially abandon much of the "militarization of life" program and launch intensive programs to lessen public discontent and cadre inadequacies. The PLA began to assist in the communes. The militia was divorced from commune leadership and no claim was made of universal membership. Near the end of December cadres were told of the full wartime potentialities of a commune. Overseas visitors were told of the coercive, economic and psychological gains from militia expansion and the militarization of life.

**Commentary:** In the face of economic shortcomings, popular opposition and Soviet pressure the Party retreated. It attempted to take only "one step backward" until it could refashion the life of the people with more success. The compromise was the clearest possible admission of mass opposition, CCP inability to impose its will and possible disension within the elite. Internal stress was severe enough to end the immediate usefulness of patriotic agitation against external threats. The Party did retain its view that the social experiments of the past months had demonstrated the nuclear war utility of militarization. This might be able to compensate for China's weakness in weapons.
Dispatch of PLA men to the communes in large numbers indicated the Party's immediate lack of any intentions to expand and an assumption that armed forces subordination had been sufficiently established to make such a move helpful to the Party. It further underlined the shortages of skilled personnel that plagued Party programs. The need for all internal resources was coupled with a need for external assistance and the retraction of claims to be more advanced on the road to Communism than the Soviet Union was a move to secure such assistance.

The first half of 1959 saw a switch in emphasis from quantity to quality and distinct orders to cadres to set realistic economic goals. The six months were full of increased admissions of trouble in the communes and of reports of PLA assistance in the CCP's efforts to bolster and consolidate them. The new line was to view the country as a "co-ordinated chess board." However, the Communists continued to maintain that the "new man" they were creating could perform most economic and social functions, could be a "Universal Man." The problems reported in the mainland press seemed formidable. A series of


reports on the Canton suburbs mentioned: corruption in the mess halls and nurseries, peasant sabotage and absenteeism, withholding of grain deliveries, and overly high peasant consumption.\textsuperscript{150} What foodstuffs were relinquished often could not be transported from the communes.\textsuperscript{151} In Kwangtung, landlords allegedly were poisoning the food and announcements were made of the arrest of "counter-revolutionaries."\textsuperscript{152} On the 12th of January People's Daily reported that less than 80% of the state buying plans from people's communes had been fulfilled.\textsuperscript{153}

It is not surprising that it was necessary to hold a conference of CCP Rural Work Department officers from January 13-26.\textsuperscript{154} Numerous reports appeared of rectification in commune practices, dispatch of cadres to the communes and injunctions to improve various phases of commune operations. On the 10th it was reported that 6,000 PLA cadres had been sent to assist the communes in Kansu province alone.\textsuperscript{155} On the 16th day of the new year Red Flag admitted that supplies were not reaching the cities.

\textsuperscript{150} These articles may be found in \textit{URS}, Vol. 14, no. 24 (March 24, 1959), pp. 353-365.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{China News Analysis}, No. 271 (April 10, 1959), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{155} "Over 6,000 Cadres of Lanchow Garrison Forces Take Part in Reorganization of Communes," Lanchow Kansu Jih-Pao (Jan. 10, 1959), \textit{SOMP}, No. 1967 (March 6, 1959), pp. 3-5.
and attacked "impetuous" cadres who had antagonized commune members.156 The Party made clear to Shanghai businessmen that by no means had it abandoned the urban commune project or its tactic of "getting organized along military lines."157 The seriousness of the mainland situation was indicated by the January 23 announcement of the postponement of scheduled meetings of the National People's Congress to April.

Early in the year Khruschev was quoted as telling Senator Humphrey that the communes were a futile device.158 When Chou En-lai addressed the 21st Congress of the CPSU he stressed Sino-Soviet unity and defined the communes in modest ideological terms. However, he did not support Khruschev's call on January 27 for an Asian atom-free zone.

In February the PLA was given increased credit for its economic tasks and its aid to the communes.159 An article on the militia in Sinkiang gave some credit to the regular armed forces for aid in development and training.160 On the 21st it was reported that 1,400 PLA cadres had been assigned to Rupeh communes


and on the 25th the NCNA-English service reported the PLA's new tasks.161

Numerous articles continued to appear on the economic and political inadequacies of the communes. In Fukien and Kweichow cadres were sent to the communes for "self-discipline" and manual labor.162 On the 17th People's Daily qualified the value of the militarization of life, although the following day it hailed a Kansu commune for the way it had applied this policy.163 The Daily Worker of February 19 stressed the production role of the militia in Hopei as had an earlier article on the Sinkiang militia.164

Except for a statement which appeared in a Soviet periodical, the Chinese continued to cold-shoulder Khrushchev's proposal for an atom-free zone in Asia. Indeed, on February 25 People's Daily contended that nuclear weapons could not destroy the people's communes.165

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The March issue of the English-language propaganda magazine, *China Reconstructs*, presented militia and organization along military lines as integral parts of the commune structure. Supposedly they were popular, economically valuable and a proof of the regime's popularity. On March 3 the Kiangsi Communist Party reaffirmed the desirability of military-type organization of labor. During the month the NCNA-English service frequently publicized the assistance given the communes by the PLA. The Party stressed the use of differential wages to increase the commune members' productive exertions, sent more cadres to the communes, and called for "more frugality" and more efficient use of labor power.

While the mid-month communique of a conference between the head of the Japanese Socialist Party and the President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs called for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Far East, China was not specifically included. When the People's Daily editorialized on their

166 Ming-Chao Tang, "People's Communes and Mr. Dulles," *China Reconstructs*, Vol. VIII, no. 3 (March, 1959), pp. 2-5.

167 Rural Work Department, CCP Kiangsi Provincial Committee, "Suggestions Concerning the Strengthening of Labor Administration in People's Communes," Nanchang Kiangsi Jih-pao (March 5, 1959), SCMP, No. 2025 (June 2, 1959), pp. 11-17.


169 "Use of the Managerial Experience of the High Class Commune, Establishment of the Principle of 'the More Labor the More Reward', 'Fixed Class, Flexible Wage' Has Been Generally Carried into Operation in Hupel," JNJP (March 9, 1959); "More Diligence and More Frugality, Industriously Manage Communes," ibid., (March 25, 1959); "More than 6,000 Fundamental Cadres in Every Unit of the Central Organs to Get Labor Training in Basic Units," KJJP (March 16, 1959).
meeting, mention was not made of the zone proposal. Meanwhile the Chinese found themselves confronted with a widespread revolt in Tibet.

The 7th Plenum of the Central Committee was held at Shanghai from April 2-5 to review the commune overhaul and plan for the postponed session of the National People's Congress to begin on the 18th. Interim press items stressed the use of wage incentives in the commune, the value of military-type labor organization, and the contribution of the PLA officer corps to the non-militia segment of the communes. On the 14th the State Statistical Bureau asserted that the total value of the 1958 agricultural and industrial output was 65% higher than in 1957.\footnote{170}

The 2nd National People's Congress began its first session on April 18 at Peking. Contained in the flood of words during the Congress were these points of interest: 1) during the preceding six months food shortages had caused "some tension" in the cities; 2) PLA had played and would continue to play an important role in economic production;\footnote{171} 3) the PLA wholeheartedly supported the communes and aided them;\footnote{172} 4) PLA cadres in great numbers would continue to be sent to the ranks and


\footnote{172} Ibid., p. 2.
comparable service would be required of civilian cadres;\textsuperscript{173} 5) PLA men were not specialists, and their experience illustrated the slogan of "indoctrination over technology";\textsuperscript{174} 6) Military-type production organizations and small core militia units were advisable, although in Fukien and Amoy the policy of "all people in arms" remained useful;\textsuperscript{175} 7) when all people were soldiers, all soldiers should also be producers.\textsuperscript{176} Meanwhile fighting continued in Tibet and the mainland press assigned India to the ranks of aggressive imperialists.

During the month of May the Communist press indicated continued problems in the communes. Red Flag attacked those cadres who in their economic reports took "wish as the basis, and substitute an ideal for reality."\textsuperscript{177} A purge was ordered of the Kwangtung Party membership.\textsuperscript{178} A conference was held of PLA veterans and dependents who were charged with playing a leading

\textsuperscript{173} Tsai-tao Ch'en, "Army Officers, Upholding Their Fine Tradition, Go To the Companies To Serve As Privates," \textit{JMJP} (April 27, 1959), \textit{ibid.}, pp. 5-8.

\textsuperscript{174} For example, see: Chao-hsiang Teng, "Navymen Repair Their Own Vessels," \textit{JMJP} (May 1, 1959), CB, No. 582 (June 2, 1959), pp. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{175} Meng Li, "A Beautiful Prospect of a Commune," \textit{JMJP} (April 26, 1959); Ch' u-k' uen Chang, "People in Amoy Struggle on the Coast-defense Front," \textit{ibid.}, (April 29, 1959).


role in communication. The press hailed their exemplary conduct in commune establishment and pledges for the future. Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai had a cordial meeting with Khruschev on May 25 in the Albanian capital of Tirana. He may at that time have given to Khruschev a critique of Mao's domestic policies.

June saw continued plaudits for PLA assistance to the communes. On June 25 the Christian Science Monitor reported that effective control of the PLA had passed into the hands of Lin Piao, who had just concluded meetings with a Soviet military delegation on adapting the PLA to nuclear warfare. Items appeared indicating severe problems on the mainland. The hansi Young Communist League reported the decay of its organization in the communes. On the 9th Hopei cadres were told to encourage private production in the communes. On the 11th reports appeared of crop-damaging floods in Kwangtung. On the 20th People's Daily hinted that 1959 agricultural goals would not be met. On the 23rd cadres were accused of deliberate falsification of commune economic production reports.


conference convened by the Central Committee declared cities should depend on local production to meet needs for non-staple foods. 184

The beginning of the second half of 1959 was marked by the start of a two-month conference of CCP leaders to discuss the commune device. Reports appeared of dissent within the Party. Summary (January-July 7, 1959): As publicity on commune difficulties increased, the PLA was given more credit for assistance in commune operations. Peking was also occupied with strains in its relations with the Kremlin. Khruschev ridiculed the communes and proposed exclusion of the CPR from the nuclear club. Peking contended that the communes were a social organization particularly suited to the rigors of nuclear war. Claims of success and admissions of failure were frequent. Party publicists asserted the economic success of militarized labor organization, the greatness of a politicized-generalist PLA and immense production accomplishments in 1958. But the April National People's Congress heard admission of food shortages, implicit assertions of the need for tighter political control and increased non-coercive duties for the PLA, and abandonment of the mass militia policy. The exception of the provinces bordering Formosa Straits from this militia restriction indicates the continued value the device had in dealing with infiltrators and retarding invasion. Internal problems continued and the Party convened a two-month

conference on commune problems. Meanwhile, Lin Piao, an expert on military modernization took unofficial control of the PLA.

Commentary: The Party leadership seemed unable to accept charges of fundamental mistakes in communication and the "militarization of life" or in its handling of the PLA. Instead the cadre was made the scapegoat and any concessions to the people were made most grudgingly. However, the continuance of economic shortages and political discontent emboldened intra-Party critics of communiزation and militarization. The continued series of conferences were attempts to control those critics who persisted in their attack. Increased evidence of the failure of internal policy increased the need for the Party to firmly control the PLA and to utilize its skills in domestic economy and administration. However, international developments strengthened the hand of those officers who advocated increased military modernization. The Chinese coldness toward being placed in a nuclear weapon free zone as proposed by the Soviets was indicative of Peking's ambition to be freed of reliance on the Russian nuclear deterrent and may also have been a recognition of the lesson learned in the Straits. Until China entered the nuclear club it could not pursue the aggressive policies it advocated, and Soviet efforts to keep it out may have been resented. The CCP may also have viewed its continued quest for nuclear armaments as a consolation to officers oriented towards a politicized-specialist army.

Economic problems increased in July. People's Daily attacked those responsible for setting an overly high 1959 grain
quota. Cadres were told to encourage more individual production on private plots by commune members, i.e., the "little freedom" policy in the communes. The economic role of the PLA was emphasized, and the PLA was reminded of Mao's military line of politics over technology. While the good soldier was not portrayed as a technical specialist, increased emphasis was placed on developing coercive skills. Poor treatment of PLA commune dependents was admitted and improvement announced. Warsaw newspapers reported a Khrushchev speech attacking the communes.

In August the controlled media reported prolonged and crop-damaging droughts. Some private ownership was advocated as a necessary evil to secure badly needed products. The

188 "Over 30,000 'Five-Good' Units and Over 290,000 'Five-Good' Officers and Men Emerge from General Leap Forward of Liberation Army," op. cit., pp. 1-3.
192 Chuan-lieu Chiang, "Several Questions Concerning the Ownership 588
communes were urged to produce more, but no mention was made of the militia or of production "along military lines." On August 26, Peking Radio admitted that 1958 production figures had been grossly overstated. The anniversary celebration of the communes ignored the militia and the militarization of life. They emphasized the economic sphere and lengthy attacks on "rightists" i.e., critics of the communes within the Party. In large part these attacks were aimed at the group around Peng Teh-huai which presented a blunt attack on domestic political and economic policies at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee held at Lushan from August 2 to 16. Peng was supported by Chief of Staff Huang K'o-ch'eng.

September opened with attacks on those who would not admit the "incomparable superiority" of the communes and who would blindly copy the Soviet Union. Apparently the ranks of the

196Charles, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
"rightists" had grown during the summer drought. On the 15th Khrushchev arrived in the United States, and the quickly evaporated "spirit of Camp David" waxed in Soviet-American relations. In China Lin Piao became Minister of Defense in place of Peng Teh-huai. It was also announced on the 17th that the head of the public security apparatus, Lo Jui-ching, had been appointed PLA Chief of Staff. The provincial press continued the attack on commune opponents and stressed that the needs of China were not identical with those of the USSR and should not be met in terms of Soviet precedents.

October 1, 1959, was the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic. On this joyous occasion the Chinese press carried furious attacks on "rightists," i.e., commune opponents. Lin Piao discussed the PLA at length in an article admitting rank-and-file discontent because of "rural developments" and officer opposition to Mao's military line. Lin stressed the primacy of political training and Ho Lung called for a further increase in PLA economic activity. Khrushchev and Suslov were


201 Piao Lin, "Hold High the Red Banner of the Party's General Line and Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought and Advance in Big Strides," NCNA Peking (Sept. 29, 1959), CB.
at the time visitors in Peking. Their speeches stressed peaceful competition and a nuclear free zone in Asia. These ideas were studiously ignored by the CCP leadership. Mao received even more plaudits than usual. During October and November the pitch and rate of attacks on intra-Party opposition rose.

In December, 1959, while attacks continued on rightists and the Party recruited new members to displace lower level cadres purged for rightist "opportunism," militia expansion items began to reappear. A December 13 article in a provincial newspaper quoted Mao on the "large-scale" development of militia organizations as a corollary to the militarization of life. The same paper went on to point out that the militia expansion would enable an increase in the economic construction budget at the expense of the regular forces.

While we reach the end of the period of our study, it should be noted that in late January and February the mainland press began to re-emphasize the economic efficacy of the militia and of organization along military lines. The militia was presented as a force that could withstand nuclear weapons.

Shortly after this resumption of publicity, the Communists again attempted to organize the urban population into people's communes.

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204 Luard, op. cit., p. 76.
The last half of 1959 saw the public emergence of Sino-Soviet disagreements on both international and domestic policies. Some of these have been mentioned, and there was an increasing public number of negative allusions to the other Communist power. The Soviets urged avoidance of war, support for nationalist leaders in the underdeveloped countries, a detente with the United States and the Soviet collective as the model of Communist agricultural organization. Many of these Soviet policies received support in high CCP circles. The Chinese press during the same period openly derided such policies as based on "illusions." The charges hurled against domestic "rightists" on the mainland were phrased so as to be applicable to Khruschev and his supporters. The CPR did not attend the February, 1960, agricultural conference of bloc nations at which communes would have been discussed. The aggressive Chinese speech at the Warsaw Pact powers meeting the same month was only carried in the Chinese press.205

Summary (July-December, 1959): During the last half of 1959 the Party was confronted with economic problems so serious that previous claims had to be retracted. These shortcomings made Party critics more dangerous. In the face of Soviet disdain and internal discord the Party clung to the communes. The leadership blamed failures on natural disasters and rightist "opportunism" in the CCP. Efforts continued to reform the PLA officers who pressed

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for a politicized-specialist military establishment and root out military leaders opposed to political and economic policies. China's top political policeman was installed as PLA Chief of Staff, and Lin Piao replaced Peng Teh-huai at the Defense Ministry. On October 1 Lin admitted both officer and rank-and-file discontent with Party policies. Through silence the Chinese implicitly rejected the Russian's proposal for a nuclear free Asian area that would include the CPR. The Peking publicists did not echo Khruschev's emphasis on peaceful competition with the "imperialist camp." In December discussion of an expanded militia was revived, as were assertions of its coercive value, superiority in organizing civilian life, and economic inexpensiveness as compared with the PLA.

Commentary: The most intriguing factor in this period is the relationship between opposition to Mao's internal policies and acceptance of Soviet international strategies. The more the Chinese pursued internal policies displeasing to the USSR the less likely the latter was to compromise on external policy. The more the U.S.S.R. pursued external policies unwelcome to the CPR the less likely the latter was to compromise on internal policy. This cumulative cycle can be seen at work in this time span. The return by the Chinese to the militia expansion and militarization of life policies of an earlier period can be linked with the Sino-Soviet controversy. It seems possible that the CCP sought means to alleviate its internal political and economic weakness and its external lack of success. It may have again turned to the civilian mobilization programs as a means to both these ends.
This hypothesis is explored in a later section. The remaining interpretive point about the last half of 1959 is the persistence of officer discontent and the appointment of Lin Piao, the past director of the PLA's modernization program as Defense Minister. To what extent was his appointment designed to appease the officers and to what extent was it involved with the strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship?
Chapter 11
Expectations, Achievements and Miscalculations

The rulers of Communist China came to 1958 with a vast set of problems and a new confidence in the international position of the Communist alliance. Out of a combination of necessity and optimism the regime chose 1958 to attack many domestic problems and to assert itself internationally. In the attempt to implement national policy the Party tried to exploit military bodies (PLA and militia) and military methods.

A. Objectives and Expectations

1. Economic

Although the Chinese economy had developed significantly during the first five year plan (1953-1957), the Party leaders were not satisfied with the rate of development. The primary concern was the fact that although agricultural production was increasing at an annual rate of 2-3%, population growth, placed in 1957 by an Indian scholar at 3.4%, was equal to, if not in excess of, crop increases. Party leaders may also have observed that the production yield on an average per hectare basis was not significantly better than the yield before the Japanese invasion.¹

The leadership's economic objectives created a dilemma. The rate of industrial growth depended on the amount of capitalization that could be realized from agricultural production. More production and consequently capital had to be extracted from the farming population. However, although the Party demanded more production from the peasants, it could not raise consumption standards. Population increase and industrial ambitions removed this as a viable alternative. Mao consequently adopted a policy of "capitalization upon China's vast human power so far only partially employed," i.e., the policy of the great leap forward. The plan of the great leap forward called for winter construction of irrigation facilities and conservation projects in the rural areas and increased rural industrial and agricultural production. In the cities the population was expected to contribute overtime work and special "voluntary" labor.

The Party soon discovered that the demands of the program exposed and intensified "undesirable" characteristics of mainland society. In the succeeding months the mainland media enumerated popular obstacles. The rural areas presented these problems:

1) The manpower and material force of small cooperatives were limited for the development of construction on a large scale. 2) Because of a heightened demand in farming quality, the contradiction between the heavy farm activities and insufficient labor power emerged throughout the rural villages. 3) With limited capital funds and insufficient labor power, the small cooperatives could only grasp agricultural production and were unable to develop industry, and thus were incapable of

implementing the policy of simultaneous development of industry and agriculture. 3

The mainland media also noted that within the cooperative individuals placed their interests before those of the collective, the cooperatives placed their welfare above that of the state's economic needs, and cooperatives and state farms competed crudely for materials and manpower. 4 In the area later organized as the model Satellite commune, these "contradictions" seriously hindered construction of irrigation projects, afforestation, flood control, capital construction and agricultural production. 5 In Kwangtung cooperatives there was a "drift toward capitalism." Peasants worked private plots and indulged in petty trading instead of laboring in collective work "gangs." In one cooperative the members drowned pigs so they could eat them instead of turning them over to the state. 6

Difficulties also occurred in urban areas. The labor force, materials and machinery were used inefficiently, urgent production tasks were not completed, buildings were in short supply and the labor shortage was compounded by a raw material


sho\textsuperscript{7}rtage. Factory officials were reluctant to work in production, and workers made the most of their limited sick leaves.\textsuperscript{8}

Honan Province provided a publicized example of the obstacles and hostility that blocked the economic program. The peasants demanded that their grain ration be increased to compensate for heavier work loads.\textsuperscript{9} Discontent with incessant government economic demands even affected the Party cadres. The statement attributed to the purged first secretary of the Honan CCP provides some vivid information on what the regime termed a "labour shortage."\textsuperscript{10}

The peasants were not equated to beasts of burden in the past, but they are the same as beasts of burden today. Yellow oxen are tied up in the house and human beings are harnessed in the field. Girls and women pull plows and harrows with their wombs hanging down. Cooperation is transformed into exploitation of human strength....The peasants see no hope in socialism.\textsuperscript{11}

During the initial months of 1958 it became clear that a mere increase in propaganda and cadre exhortations was insufficient. The demands of the great leap forward were too heavy


\textsuperscript{8}JMJP (March 24, 1958), and Shanghai Radio (March 21, 1958) are cited in "Land Reform and Collectivization in China," (July 2, 1958), p. iv, in RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, Munich: Office of the Political Advisor, Radio Free Europe, n.d. Chronological Series III.

\textsuperscript{9}Peking Radio is cited in "Controls in China (XV) From Cooperatives to Communes," (Sept. 16, 1958), p. 2, in ibid.


\textsuperscript{11}Chengchow Jih Pao (July 4, 1958), is quoted in "Controls in China (XVIII)," (Oct. 25, 1958), p. 2, in RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, op. cit., Chronological Series IV.
even if the cadres had attempted to secure popular compliance. In fact, the cadres were not co-operating with the regime enthusiastically and had adopted a "procrastinating style in work and desultory habits." 12 Since the regime would neither lower its goals nor compensate the population for their extra efforts with "better food and some consumer goods," it realized that it had to resort to more "powerful form of organization." 13

The Party decided to use military bodies and methods in three ways in the solution of its economic difficulties. Two of the devices are familiar from previous chapters: the assignment of additional economic tasks to the regular forces and to the militia. The third device was the imposition of military concepts and lifeways on the broad mass of the civilian population. Although Marx had made several references to an "industrial army" and Trotsky had developed its possibilities, Mao's advocacy of the economic potentialities of military bodies and military methods was probably based on his own experience with military groups and methods.

The economic uses of the PLA and the militia were simply enlargements on permanent policies. Mao expected PLA manpower, experts and modern equipment to mitigate the labour shortage and partially compensate for the shortage of technicians, administrators, mechanized equipment and transportation capacity.


Militia units were thought to have, in less degree, all the economic assets attributed to the PLA. Based on his assessment of past militia economic performance, Mao called for militia expansion in the "All People in Arms" campaign. The militia were expected to have a "greated sense of organization" and more "all-around training in productive jobs" than the civilian workers. The communists contended that the militia could: 1) serve as a "shock brigade force" whenever there is difficult work to do in the fields and whenever extra manpower is needed to do a job within the shortest time; 2) take a "leading part in production," and 3) serve as the organizers and elites of the civilian labor force.

The economic accomplishments of the PLA and the militia seemed to Mao to provide the improved organizational devices and tighter control that he required. These military groups, composed primarily of peasants, had been rationally organized, disciplined, and available for dispersed and varied economic tasks. In the course of past economic assignments the Communist servicemen had consumed little, worked long hours and acquired a variety of productive skills. If, he may have reasoned, the civilian population could be made to perform in the economic sphere as the

military had, then the dilemma posed by economic aspiration and population increase could be solved. Such a solution would seem especially desirable since it would also buttress his other internal and external objectives.

The policy adopted was called "the militarization of life" and the civilians were enjoined to "get organized along military lines, work as if fighting a battle, and live the collective way." They were to be organized into units with military discipline and lines of authority. They were to be psychologically aroused to intense effort with no limitations on hours or personal sacrifices. They were to spend non-labor time in collective institutions like those of an army, e.g. mess halls. Like soldiers, all aspects of their life would be controlled by commanders and all activities would be undertaken as part of the same artificially formed social unit. The new Chinese Communist man would have only one affiliation, that to a militarized unit fully under CCP control. Partial steps in this direction were taken prior to and outside the framework of the people's communes.17 However, it was in these new units that the policy was to be most completely applied.

The commune itself was an amalgamation of smaller agricultural cooperatives contained in the township (hsiang) local government areas. The merger ideally was to place "about two thousand peasant households" under one authority. The commune would become the basic unit of government administration and provide "all-around management of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side-occupations and fishery." Within the old

township areas the commune leadership would be in charge of industry, agriculture, trade, culture and education and military affairs. Accordingly, its membership would include farmers, workers, students, merchants and militiamen. These were not to be specialists, but multi-skilled individuals who could play several of these roles according to changes in Party policy and local circumstance. The Party admitted, in its usual humble manner, that the communes were only possible because "the people have taken to organizing themselves along military lines, working with militancy and leading a collective life," in other words because of the militarization of life. What made the communes such a sharp departure from previous Chinese Communist, and Soviet, practice was this "militarization of life" policy.

A series of economic benefits were expected from this militarization of life policy. First, the labor force would be increased by women "liberated" from household tasks. Second, a military format would increase "labor efficiency." If the civilian work force could be transformed into a "labor army" characterized


by "military organization and discipline," it would then be suited to "production tasks of an arduous and shock nature like farm irrigation and capital construction." Third, the militarized labor force would not only do what it was told, but go where it was told. The regime would be able to allocate its labor resources wherever needed without special conscription measures. Fourth, members of the militarized work force would learn basic skills, like PLA men, and provide the regime with a flexible labor capability. They would become "jacks of all trades for national construction purposes." Fifth, the fuel, clothing and food consumption of members of the new "labor army" could be carefully restricted, and greater quantities accumulated by the state. For example, the cadres were told that the collectivization of life with its public mess halls, would ensure savings in fuel and food consumption. Workers could be placed on a "supply system" analogous to that of the old Red Army. Instead of wages they would receive subsistence allotments tightly controlled by the Party.

2. Political

The Party recognized political obstacles to its economic goals and to its transformation of the Chinese people into a docile instrument of Party policy. First, Party administration and direction was inadequate to the tasks entrusted by Peking. Second, the population displayed apathy, if not hostility, to the Party's advocacy of social changes and contributions to the "collective welfare." Third, problems of administration and public opinion were intensified by the persistence of social
institutions and personal aspirations which hindered the Party drive for political, economic and psychological omnipotence.

Admissions and examples of these difficulties appeared in the mainland press during the months under examination. Administration, the first problem, suffered because of inadequacies in the Party's "transmission belt," the cadre. The latter were in short supply, overworked and sometimes less than dedicated. Some cadres described themselves in this manner: "We were full of vigor while attending hsien and cooperative meetings, getting slack on the way back, and exhausted when we reached home."20 Personnel problems were accompanied by the organizational limitations of cooperative structures for agricultural purposes.21 Once the Party decided to require the peasantry to engage in industrial production and massive capital construction projects, the previous organizational framework was "completely out of date."22

Large segments of the population were reluctant to "exert the utmost effort" that the Party required. Their opinions followed the lines described by the Party as the "Theory of Conditions," the "Theory of Cusen" and "rightist conservatism," 23

or the viewpoints that there were natural, objective limits on production; some previous practices should be preserved; and re-organization and labor exploitation had gone far enough. Party efforts to mold public opinion required the "disintegration ... of the five major categories of the enemy: the landlords, the rich peasants, the counter revolutionaries, the bad elements and the rightists." 24

The third difficulty presented the most substantial obstacle to Party control: the continued existence of an independent social unit, the family, and the continued re-emergence of popular aspirations and behavior patterns long under attack by the Party. The individual was not fully controlled as long as he could remain in the "small circle of socialism." 25 Full Communist exploitation of the population required that the CCP, in Chou En-lai's phrase, "make China over from a family-centered into a community-centered society." 26

Steps also were required to eliminate "all the individualist, departmentalist and other bourgeois ideals and habits." 27 The intellectuals, as demonstrated in 1957, were not truly "reformed." In the cities "remnants of capitalism" persisted, and

workers demanded higher compensation. In the rural areas the peasants preferred to work for themselves, petty trading continued, economic differentiation became re-established, and the state was a unit to be outwitted, not assisted. New efforts were necessary to accomplish "the wiping out of the old ideology and habits of the bourgeoisie, the heightening of the people's socialist and communist consciousness and the establishment of communist ethics." 28 The adults could not be allowed to revert to independent behavior, and the young had to be brought up to be free of "bourgeois ideology."

To meet these political challenges Mao and his followers again drew on military methods. Satisfaction with the success of administrative, control and indoctrination procedures used in the Communist regular forces led to an attempt to duplicate these procedures and techniques in civilian society. The reader will recall that the Communists successfully established unified direction of their scattered military units, simultaneously assigned them a wide variety of tasks, and through a dual commander-commissar hierarchy were able to check cadre independence and ensure maximum cadre effort.

The reader will also recall the refashioning of the Red soldier into a modern and Communist man. The existence and growth of the Communist regular army had required the conversion of peasants into inter-changeable parts of an apparatus. They had to be extracted from the mores of the old society and

28 NCNA Chengchow (Sept. 1, 1958) is quoted in "Khruschev and the Agricultural Commune IV, Mao's 'Uninterrupted' Revolution" (Sept. 5, 1958), p. 10, in RFE Research Studies and Background Papers, op. cit., Chronological Series III.
inculcated with beliefs in the total correctness and wisdom of the CCP and in its inevitable triumph. Mao may well have felt that the "noxious weeds" that emerged during the hundred flowers campaign and peasant individualism made it imperative to duplicate on a much larger scale the "experiments" carried out in the laboratory of the Red Army.

Accordingly, the internal organization of the communes was to resemble that of an army. In this way local leaders could better handle the many functions of the commune, and the Party center could direct the scattered communes as successfully as it had directed scattered Red Army units. If production work groups had "commanders", "political commissars" and "Party branches", compliance with central directives could be ensured and cadre performance continually evaluated. This replica of the control structure in the PLA would supposedly put cadres in a better "position to suppress all evil thoughts and evil acts." Replicas of military organization were to increase the efficiency of the local administration and Party control of the population, and to improve cadre performance.

Militarized organizational forms could be expected to increase Party control and economic returns, but not to create popular enthusiasm for Party directives. To secure popular

29 Chun-i Li, "To Develop Commercial Production, To Increase the Commune's Revenues," JMJP (Nov. 24, 1958).
30 "To Construct the Framework of the People's Commune in the First Place," JMJP (Sept. 10, 1958).
31 Tseng and Feng, op. cit., p. 47.
compliance, if not enthusiasm, the Party publicized the image of an external military threat. "Anti-aggression indignation", expressed in such slogans as "Produce more grain and steel in order to strike hard at the US aggressors!" was expected to provide the motive force for popular efforts. The military threat could also justify the "militarization of life" policy and "All People in Arms" campaign. Although the policy and campaign were primarily designed to expedite economic progress, the population was expected to accept them more readily if they were presented as appropriate responses to national danger. The Party decided that the populace had to be convinced that it was "still war-time."

The mainland was told that "now too there is a nationwide offensive against the age-old enemies of our country--the evil forces of nature, the survivals and remnants of the old world, of the feudal countryside." The regime asked: "Should we not experiment and work in this hot spring just as we did in the glorious days of the war?" The Party expected the "invasion scare" tactic to replace the national apathy and negativism with "the increased willingness of the whole people to struggle for national welfare" and "a stubborn spirit fearless of all difficulties and with unlimited courage," in other words, with

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34Smerdov, op. cit., p. 10.

35Ibid.

36Chu Tao, "Answers to Some Questions about the People's Communes to a Delegation of Reporters from Hongkong and Macao," Hsin-hua Fan-yueh-k'ian, No. 3 (Feb., 1959).

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xenophobic fervor. The image of the "glorious" revolutionary triumph could be revised and nationalist energies could be channeled into desirable economic activities organized "appropriately" in a military fashion to meet the threat of foreign attack.

This method of arousing popular support could only be expected to succeed temporarily. Measures were required which would produce a permanent effect. Mao saw no insurmountable obstacle to a complete "re-education" of mainland society. After all, he reminded the cadres:

China's six hundred million people are first of all poor and secondly 'blank'. That may seem like a bad thing, but it is really a good thing. Poor people want a change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no blotches and so the newest and most beautiful words can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful pictures painted on it. 37

As the Communists were the first to admit, the re-molding of the population required first the removal of some old "pictures." The people had to be "freed from the bondage of individual life." 38 In other words, the policy was to "inevitably and eventually break up the family as a social and economic unit. " 39

A unit organized along military lines could "effectively overcome the dregs of capitalist thought" and incubate "Communist factors." 40 The new unit could perform many of the functions of

40 Kwan, op. cit., p. 29; "An Important System in the Building of Socialism," op. cit., p. 56.
the family. It could provide an authority structure, a focus for loyalty, establish criteria of personal worth and allocate rewards and punishment. The Party control structure, summarized earlier, would insure that group pressures were in accordance with Peking dictates. Since, like soldiers, the unit members would work together, study together, eat together and spend leisure time together it would be easy for the commissar to ensure that "ideological education" was "facilitated" and "socialist atmosphere activated." 42

The youth who would be "taking over the legacy of Communism" would be brought up in "a tense, solemn and yet lively atmosphere" calculated to enhance "collective and communist thinking." Accordingly, at the secondary school level and above, students would be expected to "conduct all their activities through the form of military organizations." In the primary schools they would be placed in the "military organizations" of the "small Eighth-Route movement." They would emerge with "labor discipline;" a new class of educated, modern, skilled technicians would emerge free of the "erroneous thinking that 'one can live as well even if he does no work and study'." 43

The militia, since it more closely resembled the PLA, was expected to be especially effective in nurturing "Communist talents." If the militia was expanded through the "All People in Arms" campaign it could educate larger numbers in the "spirit of collectivism." Militia service would allegedly "heighten regimentation, discipline and will to fight and help to establish a calm, fearless, perserverance...gradually reform the slovenly liberal habits and selfish concepts left by the old society." The militia was also expected to repress objecters to the "militarization of life" policy. This threat of coercion euphemistically described as "reform" through "labor custody" could expedite compliance with the Party's destruction of the "family unit" and imposition of rigid discipline and heavy work loads.

3. Defense Policy

The makers of Peking defense policy were affected by their perception of international realities and the degree of priority awarded domestic economic and political objectives. Policy selection was limited by the views held by Mao Tse-tung.

By late 1957 Mao believed that a decisive change or "turning point" had taken place in the international balance of power. The Soviets' nuclear long-range missiles had reduced American strength to a "paper tiger." Mao interpreted the balance of power to favor Communist offensives on the international front.

46 Ibid.
America would submit to nuclear blackmail, although it might resort to limited, non-nuclear conflicts. This reasoning prompted a mainland journal to state that "local war could occur more often, have greater possibility, and become more necessary." If China had to confront the United States and/or its allies in war, Mao was sure that the war would be limited and would not escalate into nuclear war. Although he recognized the symbolic value of detonating a nuclear device, the pressure for China to divert its resources into a nuclear capability was reduced. Mao not only espoused limited war vis-a-vis nuclear war. He espoused war as an instrument of policy. Since Mao felt that nationalist politicians in "colonial" territories could not be trusted to support Communist bloc interests, he reasoned that war could expedite Communist takeover of "colonial" and "neo-colonial" territories.

Mao's assessment of the international military balance and of the feasibility of limited armed conflict was affected by his dissatisfaction with the returns to China from its "soft" foreign policy. The Chinese had wooed the African neutrals and procured not tangible gains. Taiwan still had not been "liberated," and the United States was contemplating a solution which would reduce the CCP claim to Taiwan—the "two Chinas" policy. The Soviet Union had not allocated nuclear weapons to Peking and had suggested that China be included in a "nuclear-free zone." The Soviet Union's efforts to ease international tensions, e.g., summit conference, distressed the CCP. Mao had nothing to gain and much to lose if the Soviet Union and United States achieved

a detente. Chinese bargaining power within the bloc would decline. Internally, Mao would find it more difficult to use an external threat to justify intensive economic and political changes. The CCP had to resort to new tactics if it were to achieve its objectives and deter the Soviet Union from its international policy.

Mao had to formulate defense policy with internal as well as external considerations in mind. He had to include his design for mainland economic and social development. The pressures for rapid economic growth and increased political control of the population have already been mentioned. Mao had to define the political and economic contribution he expected from the military. The need to use all available funds, equipment and personnel in economic construction argued against a large budget for the military and release of military personnel from economic tasks. Party control of the military had to be maintained. Rank and file servicemen knew of the social changes imposed on civilian society and probably shared or at least sympathized with the dissatisfaction of his peasant relations. The Party could not afford to contract the role of the commissar or reduce indoctrination time. At the same time Mao could not ignore considerations of war capability. Somehow international tensions had to be maintained and Communist power applied in the international arena. The PLA had to be an army capable of winning a limited war. It also had to contribute to the society politically and economically.
Mao devised a four-pronged defense policy: 1) well-publicized political moves using token coercive efforts, e.g., Quemoy; 2) rectification campaign in the regular army; 3) militia expansion called the "All People in Arms Campaign"; 4) organization of the populace along "military lines."

Political moves were expected to produce a chilling effect on the international atmosphere and to advance China's claims to territory and stature within the bloc. Peking belligerence would reduce American receptivity to any Soviet overtures. American military reaction to Peking moves would complicate the Soviet Union's efforts to pursue "peaceful co-existence." Two strategies were available to Peking: 1) involve America in military action with China; 2) internationalize local conflicts through the use of Chinese "volunteers" to evoke Western troop commitments. The expectation was that the U.S.S.R. would have to support Chinese initiatives. If it did, either nuclear blackmail would attain China's goals or successful local conflict would result in Communist victory. China would reap several benefits: gratitude from local Communist movements who would be able to assume power; and new respect from prospective territorial targets disabused of faith in American protective power.

China's coercive ability would be adequate. The Soviets could "shield" the CPR from American retaliation, and the extant PLA could handle the military establishments of nations on China's borders. The PLA could still be a "mass work team and a production team." Since China would not need additional armament

to conduct this type of war, Mao could silence officers who "one-
-sidedly stressed the part of atomic weapons and modern military
techniques."^50 If the Americans had in essence been deprived of
the ability to use nuclear weapons, why was more expenditure on
weapons and emphasis on technological training necessary? Why
was "Mao Tse-tung's military line" outdated? It would be time
enough to modernize the military further when "we can use atomic
weapons and rockets, made by the workers, engineers and scientists
of our country."^51

Mao had to rectify those officers who did not recognize
that he was "a great contemporary military expert," ^52 i.e., who
in an age of nuclear warfare did not recognize the validity of
his doctrines of Party supremacy, non-coercive duties for the
armed forces, and military "democracy." The "leading cadres"
scheduled for rectification included those who had "stood for
mechanical application of foreign experience," i.e., Soviet mili-
tary doctrine with its emphasis on technology and less optimistic
view of the value of war in the nuclear age. The rectification
of the officer corps and the rank-and-file reaction to be ex-
pected from the commune program could lead to dissension within
the PLA. Dissension required intensified control and political
indoctrination by Party and Young Communist cells to raise the
'socialist consciousness' of the armed forces. ^53 The Party would

^50 Ibid.
^51 Ya-lou Liu, "Seriously Study Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,"
^52 Ibid., p. 9. The italics are mine.
^53 "The PLA Launches a 'Five-Good' Campaign and Takes a General
Leap Forward," Peking Chung Kuo Ching Nien Pao (July 27, 1958),
also use its military "democracy" device to kill two birds with one stone. If officers were relegated temporarily to the ranks, they would be eager to prove their obedience to Party directives and doctrines; the ordinary serviceman could be made less antagonistic to Communist economic and political measures by this "proof" of equality in the "New China."\(^5^4\)

The Communists thought that the third prong in China's defense policy could increase China's capability in scattered wars in underdeveloped nations and reduce the mainland's vulnerability to attack and nuclear bombardment. The core-militia would provide a trained reserve force for the PLA, a force which would be much less costly than the regulars. This reserve force could provide the manpower needed for foreign limited wars. The prospect of every Chinese a soldier could increase American fear of military involvement on the Chinese mainland. ("If the imperialists invade China they will find it difficult to move a single step."\(^5^5\)) If the militia tactic was successful, Mao could counter PLA professionals who contended that guerrilla era reliance on ill-trained and scattered units was outdated.\(^5^6\)

Militarization of life within the commune format could strengthen China's defensive capacity. If necessary, the whole population could be transformed into units under the direction of militia officers capable of both combat and defense support


\(^{5^5}\) Mao is quoted in Jen Wu, "All People in Arms," \textit{KJJP} (Oct. 18, 1958).

\(^{5^6}\) Fu, \textit{op. cit.}
tasks, "human and material power [would be] unified and could be centrally managed to satisfy the needs of the front." These self-sufficient and scattered units could support the militia to deter invasions. In combination with the militia they could also deter and minimize the effects of nuclear attack. Unless the mainland was blanketed by nuclear bombs, China's decentralized integrated military, political and economic units could survive nuclear attack. A publication for the overseas English-speaking audience stated that China would be "invulnerable far beyond other nations." This invulnerability could serve several purposes. It would undermine those Chinese who called for a "soft" international line to avoid nuclear destruction and conversely strengthen Mao's arguments for a "hard" line. It would increase fear and respect for China if other nations believed that not even nuclear attack could destroy her. Finally, it could make the Soviet Union more compliant to Chinese desires and the Chinese less dependent on the Soviet nuclear "shield." The expectation from the communication, militarization of life, and militia expansion policies deserves quotation:

Short of a war destroying the human race on the planet—a possibility in which the Chinese do not believe—what major harm can be done to a nation whose great central irrigation dams are supplemented by millions of small reservoirs in every township, whose central steel plants are reinforced by local iron and steel works in every county, whose citizens are organized to the ends of the land as mobile warriors, with every small unit able to raise food, make clothing and steel, and govern itself on a township basis?58

58Strong, op. cit., p. 31.
In other words, Mao chose to implement his defense policy with an old technique. He insisted that the PLA remain his kind of army, the politicized-generalist units of the revolutionary years. He acted to displace and rectify those military personnel who wanted the PLA to become more like the specialist nuclear armies of the Soviet Union and United States. For Chinese Communist purposes only the type of army he had designed could be "victorious." The merits and values he claimed for a large militia and the "militarization of life" are those he claimed for the army of the past. The strategy that he proposed was that which had hampered the Japanese. Scattered, self-sufficient units like the guerrilla units of the past could not be overcome by technological supremacy and could fight on indefinitely until the enemy was exhausted.

The solutions Mao proposed were never completely applied and were inadequate to achieve Peking's needs.

B. Military Content

We are concerned here with the extent to which strategies of militia expansion, imposition of the "military form" on society and the political and economic activism of the PLA were implemented.

1. Militia Expansion

Several months after the formation of the model communes the Party launched the "All People in Arms Campaign" which supposedly enrolled the bulk of the population in militia units. These units were described as both defenders of the homeland against invasion and production "shock-battalions." What was
the place of the militia in the commune structure and who controlled the part-time soldiers? How many were there in reality and how were they organized? What coercive capability did they have? What proportion of their functions was not coercive but economic?

a. Organization

The constitution of the model Sputnik commune stated: "A system of citizen soldiery shall operate throughout the commune."59 In many areas "militia corps were formed simultaneously with the setting up of people's communes."60 Each commune supposedly established a "military department."61 Within the communes militia units were to be established at the various "levels of the production organizations."62 For example, small militia units were organized within the commune production teams. The constitution stressed that these units should "be led and controlled by the commune in a unified manner."63 The "All People in Arms Campaign" also extended beyond the confines of the communes. Extant militia and workers' guard units were expanded, and militia units were formed in those "factories, universities, schools, government offices and business establishments" which


were not incorporated into a commune. 64 In factories and schools "each workshop or class" was the unit. 65 The mainland press claimed that units were specialized along the lines of their members' civilish vocations. For example, hospital units were reportedly experts in combat medicine. 66

Control was exercised directly by the Party. Local secretaries personally directed the expansion program. 67 Units established in colleges and factories were directed by the Secretary of the Party branch who held the posts of commander and commissar. 68 The commune Military Department had the same personnel as the Military Department of the local Party Committee. 69 The October Militia Conference convened by the PLA reiterated that "it is of paramount significance for the secretaries of Party committees of all levels to assume 'command.'" 70 In February, 1959, it was reaffirmed that any leadership and guidance from the

"military establishments" should be "under the leadership of the local Party committees."\(^71\) Several months later a Peking propagandist boasted that the militia was not "thus far under any Ministry of Defence in Peking."\(^72\)

During the initial months of communication and militia expansion the Party and militia leadership often held additional administrative posts in the communes and their sub-units. This violated the Peking leadership's policy of fractioned local powers. The December, 1958, Wuhan resolution decreed that in most cases militia commanders should not be administrative officials. The militia should receive "dual leadership: from the administrative organizations of the same level and the superior commanding organization of the militia."\(^73\)

The members of the militia units were divided into "core militia" and "general militia" or "regular militia" and "field militia army." During the guerrilla years the Communists had also divided their irregulars into two groups. In the communes and "All People in Arms Campaign" the militia as a whole might include men and women from 17 to 50 years of age, but the "core" units were predominantly male and young. In some cases they included men between the ages of 16 and 30, but more often between 18 and 25. Female members ranged in age from 17 to 22.\(^74\)


\(^72\)Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

\(^73\)"Communique and Resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.

\(^74\)The Commune: A New Way of Life in the Village," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22; "A Big Transportation Troop of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers,"
members were usually politically tested militia veterans, indoctrinated PLA veterans and trusted cadres from other political and economic organizations. Party members were responsible for their selection.

b. Scope

Immediately before the autumn, 1958, "All People in Arms Campaign" the press reported militia expansions. For example, in Shansi the militia supposedly increased from 1.1 to 1.6 million between August 15, 1958, and September 11, 1958. By the time the Campaign was launched, Peking claimed a national defense reserve of "tens of millions of militiamen." In September and October, 1958, after the Campaign was launched, Peking reported the number of militiamen at hundreds of millions and called China "A Nation in Arms to Frighten the Enemy Out of His Wits." Militia units were "universally established" in the communes, in all colleges, universities, technical schools and middle schools, in all work groups, in cities, suburbs and rural areas. "Not only the youths, but also the aged and women were joining the people's militia." Large new enrollments were reported in the cities of

op. cit.; "Shansi Builds Up a Labor Army to Bring About the Integration of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers," op. cit., p. 56.


76 "A Big Transportation Troop of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers," op. cit.


79 "Canton People Arming Themselves," op. cit., p. 32.
Peking, Darien, Canton, and Nanking. The entire population of Amoy, the coastal city on the Formosa Straits, was reported to be organized into militia units. This claim was not made for Shanghai, the former "bourgeois" stronghold. The Party claimed that the highest percentage of the population enrolled in the militia was 33% in Heilungkiang, Cheking, and Inner Mongolia and about 50% in Liaoning. The Party commended these areas for their achievement in implementing the "Everyone a Soldier" policy. Examples of enrollment increases during the Campaign appear in the following table.

Table XXVIII
Militia Expansion Claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Early September, 1958</th>
<th>Early October, 1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honan Province</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>20 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung Province</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>25 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan Province</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking</td>
<td>.6-.7 million</td>
<td>2.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A non-Communist source projected the total size of the mainland militia by the end of the Campaign at 200 million, or one out of every three Chinese.\(^1\) CCP estimates of local militia unit size that have come to this author's attention reach a total of 130 to 135 million.

If we project specific Communist estimates of militia size in two model communes, we find that one in three Chinese was not a militiaman, let alone "everyone a soldier." According to the September 15, 1958, issue of the mainland periodical *Financial and Economic Research*, only 2,484 members of the over 43,000 peasants in the Weihsing commune had been organized into "a militia force."\(^2\) Several weeks later a Swiss correspondent was taken on a tour of the Lee Chai-chaio commune near Peking with a population of 29,000. According to the commune Party chief, the militia consisted of only 4,300 men and women.\(^3\) The percentage of the population enrolled in the militia in these two communes ranges from 6 to 14%. Projection of these percentages against the mainland population gives us a substantially lower militia enrollment than the Communists claimed. This projection has some validity because the two communes on which it is based were considered prototypes. Projection of the high figure (14%) gives a total

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\(^1\) This estimate can be found in Chu-yuan Cheng. *The People's Communes*, Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1959, p. 91.


militia enrollment of approximately 94 million. Projection of the average percent for these two communes gives a militia enrollment of approximately 67 million.

When the Communist directives are read in detail, they indicate no desire to make "everyone a soldier." Model commune constitutions published in journals of national circulation circumscribe the scope of the program. Article 10 of the Weihsing Constitution states that: "The age-groups of young and middle-aged men as well as demobilized servicemen, should be organized into militia units."\(^{84}\) Article 59 of the Ch'iliyng Commune Constitution names "all men of 18-40 years."\(^{85}\) On the day it published the Weihsing Constitution People's Daily editorially defined the militia scope as "all young men of the right age and retired servicemen."\(^{86}\) During the height of the campaign Peking Review limited enrollment in the same fashion.\(^{87}\)

As the word "core" implies, the size of the "core" militia units constituted a small proportion of the "general" militia units. Scattered information indicates that although they sometimes included half of the militia members before the Campaign, the proportion dropped sharply in the autumn months of 1958.\(^{88}\)

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84 "Tentative Regulations (Draft) of the Weihsing (Sputnik) People's Commune," op. cit., p. 67.
85 "The Draft Regulations of Ch'iliyng People's Commune," op. cit.
86 "How to Run a People's Commune," JMJP (Sept. 4, 1958) in People's Communes in China, op. cit., p. 82.
88 The one-half claim was made for Shansi province in August: "Shansi Builds Up a Labor Army to Bring About the Integration of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers," op. cit., pp. 55-56.
In the two model communes whose militia enrollment was given earlier, only 50% were in the core organization. In Shantung province by mid-September only one out of six militiamen was a part of the core units. In the Weihsing and Lee Chai-chaio communes core militia enrollment ranged from two to four percent of the total commune membership. Projection of these figures against the mainland population gives a maximum core militia enrollment of approximately 27 million. The average of these two figures gives a core militia enrollment of approximately 20 million. The later discussion of militia training presents mainland reports which tend to confirm this projection.

C. Coercive Capability

We deal here with the coercive capability of the mainland militia for two reasons: 1) to the extent that the militia developed coercive ability they could spend less time on non-coercive activities; and 2) to the extent that the militia developed coercive ability they could relieve the coercive burden of the regular army. To the extent that the regular army was relieved of coercive pressures it could spend more time on non-coercive tasks.

The Party publicized the militia as a force which made invasion suicidal and nuclear attack ineffective. The students at a Girls' Middle School declared that "If the American pirates dare to challenge, we will aim our rifle at the aggressors and plunge the bayonet right into their chests, so that warmongers

39"A Nation in Arms to Frighten the Enemy Out of His Wits," op. cit.

90A population figure of 673 million is used, drawn from the Chandrasekhar table in the Christian Science Monitor, op. cit.
will tremble when facing us women soldiers."\textsuperscript{91} Was militia training, leadership and equipment equal to this pretty sentiment? Was the militia capable of significant rear support services for front line troops? To what extent was the newly enlarged militia assigned to coercive tasks?

Supposedly the militiamen undertook "regular military training."\textsuperscript{92} The press soon admitted that "Since the members of the militia have their regular jobs to do, training in most cases comes after work hours, before dawn or in the evenings."\textsuperscript{93} Many drill grounds and shooting ranges were reportedly set up to accommodate the new trainees.\textsuperscript{94} In Kirin Province the new militia members were supposedly training "day and night" to complete three years worth of training in several months.\textsuperscript{95} Trainees followed this slogan in Shantung: "To take lessons at noontime and in the evening, to use land beside the field as drill ground, to practise how to dress ranks while going up a slope, and to practise aiming three times before every meal and three times afterward."\textsuperscript{96} The CCP reported that "Staff and workers in a number of factories in Nanking...worked until two o'clock in the morning and then got up at half past five to learn military skills in high spirits."\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{91}"Over 30,000 Middle School Teachers and Students of Shenyang Intensify Their Military Training," Peking Kuang Ming Jih Pao (Sept. 28, 1958), SCMP, No. 1882 (Oct. 27, 1958), p. 8.
\textsuperscript{92}"Tentative Regulations (Draft) pf the Weihsing (Sputnik) People's Commune," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{93}"The People's Militia," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{95}"Arm the Whole People to Beat the Invaders," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{96}"A Nation in Arms to Frighten the Enemy Out of His Wits," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{97}Ibid.
In Shansi the core militiaman's day reportedly began with drill at 4 a.m., continued through a full day in the fields interspersed with marching, exercise and target practice, and concluded with evening "study of cultural and military knowledge." Additional biweekly "manuevers" were reported.

For most militiamen the content of these training periods was "basic military training," i.e., exercises and marching drills, "crawling ... standing 'at attention' and marching at 'double time!'" It is reasonable to ask what coercive capability could accrue from these athletic exercises.

Knowledge of the weapons and equipment handled by the militia enables us to evaluate the combat capability that the militiaman acquired when he was not "crawling and marching." The Communist press reported to the West that the millions of militiamen were almost all armed with and qualified to use modern light weapons. Before the "All People in Arms Campaign" the English-speaking world was told by NCNA that the militia was a "powerful army ... equipped with rifles, carbines, machine guns, small caliber artillery and anti-aircraft weapons." The expanded militia supposedly had "not only rifles, but also machine guns and..."

99Smerdov, op. cit., p. 13; Steck, op. cit., p. 32.
101"Over 80,000 Middle School Teachers and Students of Shanyang Intensify Their Military Training," op. cit.
artillery."\textsuperscript{103} Numerous reports appeared of the new rifles and carbines, heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns operated by the militia.\textsuperscript{104} The basic-level-cadre divisions in Canton reportedly had "rifles, machine guns, tommy guns and pistols."\textsuperscript{105}

Miscellaneous Chinese and non-Chinese Communist reports supply more information. The militia men were reported trained in hand-grenade throwing and in marksman ship.\textsuperscript{106} East European sources reported that every militiaman under 30, i.e., members of core units, received firearm training.\textsuperscript{107} As a result of rifle training the vast majority of militiamen reportedly became excellent marksmen, for example 76% of those enrolled in Shansi.\textsuperscript{108} Selected groups of militia reportedly received more advanced training. By October 10, 1958, it was claimed that "large numbers of militiamen in the coastal areas of Fukien, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung ... can now operate heavy artillery pieces."

Parachuting, gliding, radio operation, driving and motor-cycling

\textsuperscript{103}Ming-chao Tang, "People's Communes and Mr. Dulles," China Reconstructs, Vol. VIII, no. 3 (March, 1959), p. 41.


\textsuperscript{105}"Six Militia Divisions Formally Established in Canton," op. cit.

\textsuperscript{106}Stock, op. cit., p. 32; "Arm the Whole People to Beat the Invaders," op. cit.; "Widespread Establishment of Militia Ranks," op. cit.


\textsuperscript{108}"An Important Demonstration of Militiamen in the Old Military Base of Operations in Shansi," op. cit.
were reportedly taught 130,000 militiamen in Liaoning Province.\textsuperscript{109} In the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous region 17,000 militiamen underwent training in "50 military schools ... for the various special service troops such as artillery, engineer troops, cavalry, navy and signal, transportation, medical and chemical warfare."\textsuperscript{110}

The Party sent especially reliable groups to military summer camps. Camp service ranged from one day to a week. This short time was spent more on political training than on instruction in coercion. Emphasis was placed on drilling and marching rather than on weapons training. Students at camps for the cities of Shanghai, Dairen, Canton and Harbin were sometimes taught "air defense measures" and anti-chemical warfare techniques.\textsuperscript{111}

Available evidence indicates that these weapons and equipment claims were exaggerated. At the "arms presentation" ceremony at a sub-unit of the Weihsing Commune presided over by Mao there were not enough arms for each of the 1,100 militiamen present.\textsuperscript{112} In subsequent months numerous reports appeared that

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{"Every Person a Soldier" Has Come True in Most Provinces and Cities of the Country," \textit{op. cit.}}


militia units were making their own "wooden rifles" and grenades.\textsuperscript{113} During the "Hate America" campaign in mid-September, 1958, many militia units were observed on parade with no arms.\textsuperscript{114} During his autumn visit to the Lee Chai-chaio commune a Swiss journalist was told that the militia was "to be armed with rifles, machine guns, machine pistols and hand grenades."\textsuperscript{115}

December was a month of rare admissions in the Communist press. The Wuhan resolution of the Central Committee indicated that it was only time "to prepare conditions for turning the whole nation into soldiers."\textsuperscript{116} Only the core militia was to receive regular training; the balance of the membership would find its training restricted to work breaks. Militia arms supply, the resolution stated, must be provided by arsenals to be set up locally. By the end of the month it was admitted that the ordinary militiamen had never received thorough military training. Only 30 million militiamen, approximately our projection of the core unit personnel, had been so trained. The same dispatch illuminated the weapons supply for the militia. Only four million had practiced with live ammunition.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{115}Steck, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32. The italics are mine.
\textsuperscript{116}"Communique and Resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21. The italics are mine.
\end{flushright}
figures for advanced training trainees in the Liaoning Province and the Kwangsi Chuang Region does not support claims for massive training in heavy weapons. In these two areas advanced trainees composed only about 1% of the total militia enrollment.\footnote{118}{The claimed enrollment in Liaoning was eight million. "The People's Militia," \textit{op. cit.} The claimed enrollment in the Kwangsi Chuang Region was three million. "Arm the Whole People to Beat the Invaders," \textit{op. cit.}}

Although the militia was smaller, less trained and less armed than the Communists reported during the "All People in Arms" Campaign, the militia had some military knowledge acquired primarily from battle-trained PLA veterans. The almost seven million demobilized soldiers usually held command and/or "advisory" (instructional) positions in the militia units.\footnote{119}{In Fukien 110,000 veterans supposedly supervised militia training. The PLA assigned some army regulars to assist in the militia training programs.\footnote{120}{Usually army actives trained teachers who could then diffuse coercive skills,\footnote{121}{Supposedly in Hopei alone they trained 150,000 "military teachers."}} to the militia members. Supposedly in Hopei alone they trained 150,000 "military teachers."}}

The coercive tasks assigned to the militia did not require advanced training. The militia was primarily designed to serve as an internal security force which could exercise "strict control..."
over landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and wicked elements" and bring "blows to bear" on those participating in "subversive activities.\textsuperscript{122} In practice these duties involved "guarding warehouses, bridges and construction sites," cowing the population, and crushing local discontent and unarmed demonstrators. The mainland press seldom reported occasions when the militia made an external coercive contribution. It did mention sentry and patrol duty along the Fukien coast, capture of "air-dropped U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek agents" and arrest of smugglers along the Yunnan border.\textsuperscript{123} Use of the militia for coercive purposes was for the most part directed against the inhabitants of the People's Republic.

Although the militia were inadequately armed and trained, it assisted China's frontline combatants during 1958-1959 as it had during the guerrilla years. Many of its rear-support activities were the elementary ones of the revolutionary period: transportation of food, ammunition and wounded, and construction of fortifications.\textsuperscript{124} These support duties did not require competence with or necessarily the possession of weapons. It did require organization and discipline, abilities which might be imparted during the scattered periods of militia training. However, these abilities already existed in the Party organizations.

Another rear-support militia activity was to make technological expertise available to the regular army. Special militia

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid.; "Arm the Whole People to Beat the Invaders," \textit{op. cit.}


units of technically skilled manpower were formed. For example, in Canton colleges and middle schools:

students of the faculties of civil engineering and architecture were organized into an 'engineering regiment'; those who know how to ride motor-cycles and drive motor cars were organized into a 'motor-transport regiment'; and students of the faculty of radio engineering were organized into a 'signal battalion.' A radioactive protection team and medical corps had been formed by students of the faculty of physics; and a 'chemical warfare division' had been formed by students of the faculty of chemistry... The Sun Yat-sen Medical College had also formed a people's militia contingent as a medical corps. 125

Similar specialized militia units were organized in other parts of the mainland. 126 The personnel in these units were not trained to adapt their skills to war needs.

d. Non-Coercive Assignments

Mainland reports of the "All People in Arms" Campaign and of the militia role in the new communes assigned priority to the economic capabilities of the militia. One Communist source said that "the greatest advantage of the militia system" was its combination of economic and coercive capabilities. 127 Even during the most heated period of the Quemoy crisis and the "Hate America" campaign the Party repeatedly stated its intention to capitalize on the militia's productive as well as coercive capabilities. For example, an article in a late August, 1958, issue of the Peking Review maintained that "The integration of militia training and

125 "Canton People Arming Themselves," op. cit.
127 Jen Wu, op. cit.
production has become a fine tradition and has produced excellent results.\textsuperscript{128} Workers and peasants were told that "training will be undertaken while production continues;" students were told to achieve "study and training simultaneously without interfering with each other."\textsuperscript{129} Military training periods were accommodated to economic needs under the slogan of "Training more when not busy in production, training less when busy, and not training when extremely busy."\textsuperscript{130}

Propaganda directed at the militia emphasized economic duties. "Produce an extra jin of grain and an extra bullet will be manufactured; produce an extra jin of steel and an extra rifle will be manufactured to deal with the imperialists."\textsuperscript{131} (The militia's measure of performance in the service of the "motherland" was one of production.) This indoctrination theme was used in Chekiang: "we will never stop before realizing our super-production plan of grain; we cannot be considered heroes if we do not defeat the U.S. bandits!"\textsuperscript{132} Mainland publicists claimed that the new militia units were setting new standards in labor productivity. They were responsible for higher steel production, higher agricultural yields and quick completion of construction


\textsuperscript{129}"Everyone a Soldier' Movement Spreads," \textit{op. cit.}: "High Tide of Organizing Militia Divisions and Regiments in Hunan Province," \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{132}"Everyone A Soldier': Combining Labor With Arms," \textit{op. cit.}
projects. Militia members supposedly over-fulfilled their work quota by 20%, eagerly labored in their "spare time" and on occasion even pledge to "work day and night".\textsuperscript{133}

The militiamen were not relieved of productive assignments to compensate for the demands placed on their time and energy by military training. On the contrary, they were expected to act as production pacesetters and to bring to economic tasks special discipline and zeal, or "sudden-attack methods."\textsuperscript{134} The "core" militia units which regularly underwent military training were ordered to serve as the "hard-core" of the civilian labor force, a sample order being "to push all members of a commune to achieve a war-like leap forward in production."\textsuperscript{135} They were required "first, to take up the most arduous work ... second, to get ready at all times to help other places in industrial and agricultural production and construction."\textsuperscript{136} The Party claimed that the militia welcomed and fully executed their heavy economic burden. It was even claimed that such economic duties increased the militia's coercive capability:

\textsuperscript{133}"The People Shoulder Arms," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10; "Widespread Establishment of Militia Ranks," \textit{op. cit.}; "Sinkiang Autonomous Region Makes Considerable Headway in the Organization of Militiamen," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27; for examples, see: \textit{CC}, No. 530 (Oct. 31, 1958), pp. 9, 11-13; Hsin-nien Ch'en, "Red Flag Flies Over 'Red Flag Fang,'" \textit{K\textsc{d}j\textsc{p}} (Feb. 19, 1959).

\textsuperscript{134}"The Draft Regulations of Ch'iliying People's Commune," \textit{op. cit.}, Art. 61; "Lien-hua Commune Has Set Up a General Leap Forward Plan," \textit{\textsc{d}j\textsc{w}p} (Feb. 18, 1959).

\textsuperscript{135}K'ang, \textit{op. cit.}.

due to the participation of the hard-core militia-men in the labor army in taking up production on the one hand and giving military training on the other, the work of reserve training has achieved greater, faster, better and more economical results, and is much better than the old form of training which was alienated from production.137

In summary, the mainland press makes it clear that: 1) even the 50 million core militia members were expected to devote the majority of their time to non-coercive activities; and 2) the general militia membership spent almost all of its time in non-coercive activities. The "basic military training", i.e., training without weapons, that the general militia received was designed to increase labor discipline.

2. Militarization of Life

In 1958 the Communists set out to effect "basic changes" in the relation between production units and human beings.138 These changes took place primarily within the framework of the people's communes, but they were tried before commune formation and applied to population segments not in communes. The changes were summarized in this CCP slogan: "Get organized along military lines, work as if fighting a battle and live the collective way."139 The importance of duplicating the social processes of the armed forces within the commune effort was recognized in People's Daily. "From the point of view of the development process, militarism is a prelude to the People's Commune, moreover...

in the People's Commune militarism is further advanced.\textsuperscript{140} Militarization of life measures were stressed in the summer and autumn of 1958. A hiatus and relaxation were officially acknowledged in the Wuhan resolution of December, 1958. A return to the earlier policy was officially confirmed in the Lushan Central Committee resolution of August, 1959. Our concern here is principally with the techniques used in the first period.

\textbf{a. Organization Militarized}

The communes were organized in a series of units, with military titles, i.e., regiments, battalions, companies, platoons and squads, and with an appropriate structure of authority. A parallel hierarchy of Party committees and commissars was erected. Within the production sub-units of the commune, authority was reportedly divided between a commander, sub-commanders and the political commissars.\textsuperscript{141} A model authority structure was described as a "high command" with a "commander," "deputy commanders" and a "chief-of-staff."\textsuperscript{142} Within the communes, units with military titles were assigned to special tasks. For example, an industrial commune which had been "constituted into a big military camp" had "eight hygiene regiments" assigned to various residential areas.\textsuperscript{143} Other special functions "such as finance and trade, statistics and communications and transport" were "organized

\textsuperscript{140}K'ang, \textit{op. cit.}.
\textsuperscript{141}Tseng and Peng, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 47.
entirely on military lines." For example, in the Honan county of Lushan there were "12 iron-and-steel transport battalions and 150 companies" to handle iron and steel production.¹⁴⁴

The Communists also applied organization "along military lines" outside of the commune framework. A well-publicized example was the organization of a "labor army" of some three million in Shansi province.¹⁴⁵ Members were divided into three units. The "field army" consisted of men from 18 to 45 and women from 20-25 and constituted a mobile force to be assigned to whatever economic effort was in particular need of manpower. The "local platoon" was composed of men from 16 to 17 and 46 to 50 years of age and women in the 16 to 45 category. Their assignment was "ordinary field labor." "The old, the weak, the disabled and the children" were formed into a "service team" and assigned "light labor." Similar "Labor Regiments" and "Field Corps" were reportedly organized in Kansu, Szechwan, Kwantung, Yunnan, Liaoning and Anhwei provinces. They were regarded as particularly useful in steel and iron manufacture, road and water control construction and transportation.¹⁴⁶

b. Work "Combatized"

Efforts were made to have the members of these new quasi-military organizations "work as if fighting a battle." Here are some Communist descriptions of the "combatization of action."

¹⁴⁴ For examples, see: Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., pp. 86-89.
¹⁴⁵ Wen-shan Li, op. cit., p. 59.
At daybreak bells were rung and whistles were blown to assemble in the Ch'aoying Cooperative. In about a quarter of an hour the peasants lined up. At the command of company and squad commanders the teams marched to the fields holding flags. Here one no longer sees peasants in groups of two or three smoking and going slowly and leisurely to the field. What one hears are sound of measured steps and march songs. The desultory living habits which have been with the peasants for thousands of years are gone forever.  

The marshalling included both men and women and often took place to bugle calls.

now a bugle blows at six o'clock and you know it is time to get up; it blows again for breakfast and again to go to the field. So everyone comes on time and work is much better.  

As for the children in the commune kindergarten, "They all line up at the call of a bugle and shuck corn." The general aim was to treat all activity "like a military operation," to have the people "fight for every single minute or second regardless of night or day, rain or shine." An instance of the social style of "combatization" was reported during the autumn harvest in Honan, "taking night for day and the moon for the sun, people fought day and night, shifting all the activities of life--eating, sleeping, office conference and even nursery--to the field."  

Peking workers were bombarded with slogans of combat


149 Ibid.


151 Heng-ch'i, No. 11 (Nov. 2, 1958) is quoted by Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 106.

152 SMJP (Oct. 20, 1958) is quoted in Ibid., p. 114.
such as "not to leave the forefront before tasks are accomplished" and "when lightly wounded, don't leave." The creation of this atmosphere was pictured as a response to a threat by foreign armed power, as a way "to hit back at the military provocations of the US imperialists."  

c. Life Collectivized

The third component of the refashioning of the population was the "collectivization of life" policy. It consisted of a series of measures designed to restrict and then eliminate all areas of life that had been "private", i.e., activities pursued by one or several individuals outside the web of Party controlled institutions. No longer was the family "to be the unit of production, consumption and education." The authority of and loyalty to the head of the family was a primary target of the collectivization of life. The measures are briefly summarized.

Individual family members male and female were treated as members of a larger work group organized along military lines and awarded for their individual efforts. Pay and material recompense went to the individual, not to the family head. All private property-land, livestock, housing, tools and even kitchen utensils were confiscated. The commune members then had no choice but to use collective facilities, e.g., public mess halls.

153 Ibid. (Oct. 6, 1958) is quoted in ibid., p. 110.
The mobilization of women into the commune labor force was accompanied by the transfer of both old and young to collective facilities. China Youth Daily editorialized, "children should be put under communal education as soon as they are old enough to be separated from their mothers. This is the ideal of the Communists." The Party tried to replace the family unit with isolated individuals "belonging" only to collective organizations. Similar to the army, all supplies were "government issue", all housing allocated, all authority impersonal, and all time spent in unit activities. The individual was taught to "communize" his very "thinking." In other words, militarization of life was designed to make an individual a cog in a national machine, whose work and leisure, praise and punishment, consumption and production were regulated by the national government, who had no private independence or "individualistic ideas."

The Party expected the militarization of life to create a "new productive force", to enable a labor force to "double its efficiency", to make it "easy ...to move mountain and oceans" and to create a "paradise." By December, 1958, popular discontent forced the Party to modify its expectations of the militarization policy. According to a December 3 provincial radio broadcast,

156 China Youth Daily (Oct. 31, 1958) is quoted in Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 86.
157 Wen-pin Tung, op. cit., p. 83; Yao K'ang, op. cit., p. 3.
We must follow the mass line and give equal emphasis to centralization and democracy, discipline and liberty, unification and individualism. Some of the cadres interpret militarization as absolute obedience from the masses; but this way of thinking is wrong. Militarization, adoption of the spirit of combat and collectivization are a combination of democracy and centralization.  

The press stressed the importance of "democratization of administration," and stated that the new measures only involved an improvement in "organization, discipline and efficiency." Organization "along military lines" meant nothing more drastic than the system prevalent in any modern industrialized society, i.e., militarization of organization was equivalent to "factorization." The proper analogy was not to an army but to a modern industrial workforce in both manufacturing and agriculture. Divine sanction was found in the writing of Marx. The Communists were increasing the freedom of their subjects through such organizational forms.

On December 10 the Wuhan Resolution and on December 19 the Hopei Province Resolution sanctioned what came to be known as the

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"small freedom" within the big collectivity. The private sphere
was partially restored. To a limited extent the family was rein-
stated as the production unit. Commune members were allowed to
"retain odd trees around their houses, small farm tools, small
instruments, small domestic animals and poultry." Participation
in collective facilities was made less mandatory, e.g. public
mess halls, nurseries, and old-age homes. The straight wage of
the earlier period was replaced by an incentive piece-work
structure.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}; "On the Question of the Life of the People," JMJF
373-382.}

The Party elite journal, \textit{Red Flag}, reported several cases
in which the militarization of life was more extensive. It did
not claim that these were typical cases. These examples are
significant because they illustrate the wartime potential of
the militarization of life within the commune unit. \textit{Red Flag}
might have reported these two cases in coastal Fukien Province
to instruct cadres on the wartime potential of militarized com-
munes. They represent the revolutionary period doctrine of "mass
protracted resistance" in an organized form. In the Ch'eng-men
commune:

\begin{quote}
All of the 3,168 persons, including men and women,
who are 16-50 years old have organized themselves
[sic] into a field (irregular) regiment which in-
cludes 3 field battalions and 15 field companies.
They join in military training daily and their
duties are: 1) to protect social peace and order,
2) to stand ready to fight in wartime to protect
the country. Men 31 to 55 and women 16-50 do not
have to join in the militia field corps but have
been organized into a local militia corps. They
usually take army training to maintain public peace
and order. They take part in production tasks
within their own units. They support the front in
\end{quote}
various ways and maintain order in the rear during war time. Young persons under 15, people over 50 and the weak have been organized together as a rear-service militia corps. Usually their role is in dining rooms, kindergartens and sewing-divisions. According to his ability, the individual is assigned rear service work in war periods.

The organization structure of the militia is the same as that of the commune. The chief of the commune is appointed as commander of the militia regiment. The Party committee secretary is appointed political commissar. The secretary of the militia regiment Party committee is appointed assistant political commissar. The chiefs of the large, medium and small production brigades are respectively appointed majors and lieutenants.

A December, 1958, report on a commune near Amoy reported a division of functions among the membership according to battle demands. Coercive capability was the key consideration.

The commune has over 3,600 acres of irrigated fields. These are grouped into three lines according to their proximity to the enemy's gun positions, and different production responsibilities are established for different lines: The first line is primarily for front-support functions and combat. Production should be handled well, but only on the condition that front-support duties are taken care of. Front-support and production are of equal importance for the second line. In the third line production becomes primary.

3. Regular Armed Forces

At the same time that the PLA non-coercive role was amplified to implement the commune policy and the Party tried to apply devices used in the Red Army to civilian society, the Peking elite was involved in an increasingly open conflict over three "traditional" elements of CCP military policy. The traditional policies in dispute were: 1) Party authority and political indoctrination as the core of decision-making and training in the

166. Yuan-fang Yao, op. cit.
armed forces; 2) the assignment to the regular forces of substantial non-coercive duties in the Party's economic and mass persuasion policies; and 3) the non-essential nature of expensive and complex military equipment, including nuclear weapons. At stake in the three debates was the continuity of Chinese Communist military policy and the verity of Mao Tse-tung's defense policy.

a. PLA and Communes

PLA affiliation with the communes was delayed. However, in December, 1958, after the "painful reappraisal" marked by the Wuhan Resolution, the PLA Political Department ordered the PLA "To help the people's communes with the utmost effort." Mainland reports make it clear that the Party expected two results from these assignments: 1) PLA administrative and technical skills and labor power would buttress the sagging commune program; and 2) rural labor would rejuvenate PLA allegiance to Mao's "military line."

By October, 1959, the Party claimed that "During the last winter and spring the overwhelming majority of officers and men had on one occasion or another visited the people's communes, carried out study and taken part in manual labor there." A more specific figure was given by a leading member of the Party command in the armed forces, who asserted that by April, 1959, "the PLA assigned more than 70,000 cadres to more than 4,000 communes throughout China." "Cadres" can be assumed to include

169 Chung Fu, "Enthusiastically Carry Out Glorious Tasks as the
at least the 500,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers. In other words, fewer than 12% of PLA cadres were assigned to the communes for an extended period.

(i) **PLA Contribution to the Communes**

To implement the commune policy the PLA was used as it had been in preceding years. Since the commune unit supervised all the political, social and economic activities of its members, the PLA contributed its specialists, labor force, and equipment for every conceivable function. For example, in the mess halls PLA "kitchen management personnel" were ordered "to reorganize ... and to improve the diet." In Shenyang PLA personnel "helped the people's communes to make a vegetable-cutting machine and a noodle-mixing machine. ..." They "reformed" the ovens because the cooks were being choked with smoke. The mainland press reported that only

As a result of the powerful help being rendered by the officers of the armed units, many commune mess halls are now serving good food, keeping account books, being kept clean, being kept orderly, practicing thriftiness, and serving with a good attitude.

The PLA's political contribution consisted of conducting indoctrination programs for cadres and ordinary members of the new Communist "paradise." Political cadres from the PLA "set up

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172Ibid.
Party schools" to "improve ideological educational work."\textsuperscript{173} In its grass-roots propaganda work the PLA employed the usual propaganda devices. Near Chungking the PLA sent mobile film projection teams into the fields where peasants labored.\textsuperscript{174} In the North China communes PLA officers in one week visited ...917 commune members and held 56 forums. Through broadcasts, blackboard paper, and newspaper reading they have carried out propaganda among commune members on the superiority of the people's communes and on the significance of reorganization of communes...\textsuperscript{175}

The mainland media reported these civilian responses to PLA political work. "We shall now certainly make the communes a success by following the instructions of the Party Center and Chairman Mao Tse-tung."\textsuperscript{176} One wonders to what extent the coercive presence of troops was responsible for this "correct" response.

The PLA also detailed army cadres "above the rank of company commander" to "take charge of small groups" of commune members. Other cadres, also appointed by the PLA Political Department, were given higher level posts in the communes.\textsuperscript{177} They were expected to improve commune labor organization and administrative methods.

The PLA contributed all types of its resources—labor

\textsuperscript{173} "Large Number of Officers of Garrison Forces in Hopei Ordered to Take Part in Reorganization of Communes," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{175} "Large Numbers of Officers of Garrison Forces in Hopei Ordered to Take Part in Reorganization of Communes," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Ibid.}
force, specialists, and equipment—to agricultural and industrial production and construction. The army assigned a "powerful labor force" to augment the commune labor force at the critical planting and harvesting months of May and June.\textsuperscript{178} A labor force was contributed to water conservation projects. The more skilled members of the army implemented the Party order to mechanize agriculture: to "make farming and irrigation machinery and small power-generating equipment suited to the countryside ...\textsuperscript{179} and to help local communes repair and innovate agricultural machinery and farm tools." \textsuperscript{179} For example, PLA motor repair shops made scythes and hoes. \textsuperscript{180} Cadres from a tank regiment instructed commune members on how to operate lathes and drive tractors. \textsuperscript{181} PLA technicians expedited the communes' industrial projects. According to a February, 1959, report, the PLA helped the people's commune set up many steel works, coal mines, fertilizer plants, farm tool repair plants, cement plants, lime plants, ceramic plants, oil mills and foodstuff processing plants. The PLA officers and men contributed their efforts to planning, construction and production, and helped the people's communes achieve industrialization. \textsuperscript{182}

In communication PLA signal units strung telephone and broadcasting wire, helped to manufacture and repair communications equipment, and trained commune members to operate and maintain it.

\textsuperscript{178}"PLA Men Make Great Contributions to Socialist Construction," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{180}"China's Armymen Help in Agriculture," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{181}"PLA Helps Communes in Production and Construction," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{182}Hsu-ku Li, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 15-16.
In transportation a few trucks and drivers were detailed to transport the commune work force, equipment and produce to convenient points.  

The PLA also improved commune medical facilities and disease prevention programs. By June, 1959, the press reported that the PLA had trained medical personnel and built hospitals for people's communes....Where there are already hospitals in operation, the Army helps the people's communes solve the shortage of manpower and materials.  

Special units of the PLA assisted in pest extermination, went "to kindergarten and schools of the people's communes to give vaccinations against smallpox and other diseases", and taught the commune members how to prevent the spread of contagion.  

This medical contribution benefitted only a fraction of China's population, even if CCP claims are accepted at face value. Eleven hospitals in communes in the Peking area, treatment of 150,000 civilian patients in air force hospitals, and education of 10,000 medical personnel for the communes could affect few of China's 673 million people. PLA cadres were also assigned to the "reorganization and consolidation" of the social sectors of the communes, i.e., to "cultural, educational and health

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185 Ibid., p. 2.  
work." PLA work teams reportedly trained "literary and art hard-cores and set up many cultural and technical evening schools, health institutes, medical treatment stations, libraries, theatrical groups and recreation clubs."

The PLA contributed to the communes indirectly through demobilized servicemen. The Party publicized the value of military service as a training ground for "tractor operators, machine repairers, surveyors and accountants." Military training enabled army veterans to "render a better service to local communes". Within the communes demobilized men were expected to provide a core of technical skill and political enthusiasm. Some were selected as leading cadres not only in production brigades, but for whole communes.

A relatively small percentage of PLA personnel and equipment resources were contributed to the commune program. In 1959, the year of greatest PLA activity in the communes, the average PLA member spent only 17 days in all economic activity. However, this average includes the almost full-time non-coercive labor of specialized PLA branches, e.g., the Sinkiang Construction and Production Field Army. We can infer that after the specialized effort is subtracted few mandays are left which could have spent in the communes.


189Hsu-ku Li, op. cit., p. 17.

190"A Valiant Man While Fighting on the Battle-field, a Skilled Serviceman While Taking Part in Production," JMP (May 19, 1959).
(ii) Army-Party Commune Debate

In an important statement released in late September, 1959, Lin Piao, recently appointed Minister of Defense admitted the PLA position of the communes:

owing to the fact that the overwhelming majority of our officers and combatants are farmers, it is quite natural that some comrades from time to time consider their problems based on interests of a transient and local nature and have failed to gain a clear understanding of certain questions concerning socialist transformation; it is also unavoidable that a handful of comrades, under the influence of bourgeois ideology and petty bourgeois ideology—particularly the ideology of rich middle peasants—has revealed an infirm stand in the course of socialist revolution.191

Essentially Lin said that the majority of the army was composed of peasants, many of whom had rural relatives dissatisfied with the communication program ("social transformation"). The privileges of these dependents had suffered during the program. They were discriminated against in regard to supplies and wages and in some areas "they had a living standard...below that of the general masses."192 The Party had to exhort dependents to write servicemen more "encouraging letters."193 In the meantime the servicemen reflected their relatives' discontent in their own

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attitudes toward the commune program. According to Lin, the fault lay with "bourgeois revolutionaries" who ignored the communes' "unmatched superiority" and preferred to:

pick up shortcomings and exaggerate them in an effort to disseminate the slackening, spiritless, complaining, and pessimistic sentiments, deny the achievements, and discredit the Party's general line. 194

Lin's statement contains two interesting points: 1) the opposition to the communes was coming from those who had previously supported CCP policy ("bourgeois revolutionaries"); and 2) opposition persisted even after the "educational" experience of rural commune labor in the winter, spring and summer of 1959.

One of the reasons that the Party assigned the PLA to commune tasks was to "clarify" the "misconceptions" about the communes that had manifested themselves before December, 1956. Certainly the "five-good" pledge taken by the PLA commune task force from the North China urban garrisons contains a punitive tone: "good at following the leadership of the local Party committee, good at fulfilling tasks, good at uniting with the local cadres, good at following policies and good at learning." 195

The press also reported that a "large-number of distinguished officers" were made to work "like common laborers under the unified leadership of local Party committees." 196 "Generals with many years of combat experience were no exception as they too carried baskets and walked from village to village picking up

195"Large Numbers of Officers of Garrison Forces in Hopei Ordered to Take Part in Reorganization of Communes," op. cit., p. 11.
manure."

We can infer the specifics of PLA commune opposition from the successes that were claimed for the policy. According to Communist publicists, the officers were "vividly educated ...by the hard and simple life and good conduct of the local cadres. They have further realized the correctness and greatness of the Party's policies." The CCP deemed it necessary that PLA cadres "realize more clearly that the people's commune is truly the inevitable outcome of the political and economic development in our country" and that they learn a "great lesson" from "local cadres" who "have painstakingly, frugally, diligently and wholeheartedly served the interests of the people."

b. Debate over the Politicized-Generalist Army

Some military cadres questioned the military non-coercive role and strategic assumptions that the Party had formulated during the revolutionary years. Unnamed members of the military elite contended that national power required: 1) more authority for military commanders and less for the Party authorities in the PLA; 2) more emphasis on coercive training and less on political and economic tasks; and 3) technologically complex and economically expensive weapons and equipment without which the CPR would not be the military equal of the United States and Russia. The general issues raised were ones that Mao had faced in the Red Army of the thirties. In 1958 they were raised in a new context by officer cadres of post-revolutionary experience. From their

199 *Chung Fu, op. cit.*, p. 2.

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point of view the resources of a powerful regime should support the PLA in its transition to a "new stage." The advent of nuclear weapons and the PLA's exposure to the relatively privileged Soviet officer corps increased their opposition to what seemed to be inferior armament and an inferior personal status.

Even if the Party elite had accepted the officers' assumptions, its economic pressures could not allow it to accede to military pressures. In fact, Mao and the elite rejected the officers' assumptions almost categorically: the officers advocated a military role diametrically opposed to the military theories articulated by Mao. Reduced Party control raised the spectre of independent militarism familiar in 20th Century China. Limitation of the non-coercive role of the PLA would deprive the Party of badly needed propagandists, administrators, technicians and equipment. Provision of modern weapons for the military would divert valued economic resources and because of the pro-Communist shift in the world balance of power were considered unnecessary. Accordingly, the Party tried to discipline the opponents of Peking defense policy and to prove the validity of its conservative position.

The interaction between Party and "politicized-specialist" military views is apparent in a "debate" which occurred throughout 1958 and 1959. The CCP-controlled media publicized only the Party argument, but the continuation of Party enjoiners to the PLA and the views they attacked provide us with some measure of the persistence and arguments of the elite opposition.
(i) Party Control Debate

In the summer of 1958 the official Liberation Army News charged that some cadres had "neglected Party leadership and political work" and had come under the "influence of bourgeois military doctrine." Certain officers had not only asserted independence from the political cadres and the Party committees, but had "over-stressed the individual authority of officers and neglected the promotion of democratic practices and the mass line." Some cadres had even "openly" advocated "liquidation of the system of Party committee leadership." Their independence was not just verbal. "In issuing certain orders and conducting military training they liquidated and restricted the activities of Party committee [sic] in leadership and political work."

Even before this admission the Party had taken steps to re-establish "the collective leadership of the Party committee, adherence to the political commissar system and continued strengthening of political work." The Party intensified training at the Peking Military Academy. The PLA was ordered to "strengthen the system of collective leadership of Party committees" and warned that "no scepticism and vacillation" would be tolerated.

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201 "Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," CFCP (July 1, 1958), ibid., p. 4.
202 Ibid.
203 "Military Academy Continues to Intensify Opposition to Dogmatism," CFCP (June 24, 1958), SCMP, No. 1817 (July 23, 1958), p. 16.
204 "Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," op. cit., p. 4.
activate themselves.\textsuperscript{205} The Party began to augment political work
with an increased number of ideologically trained commissars
and circulated numerous "theoretical magazines."\textsuperscript{206} On Septem-
ber 20 the PLA Political Department ordered officers to spend one
month in the ranks annually.\textsuperscript{207} This program, which proposed to
"educate" officers "through labor,"\textsuperscript{208} had already begun and was
continued throughout 1958 and 1959. In April, 1959, it was
designated as a permanent policy.\textsuperscript{209} We have already seen the
punitive content of the commune assignments. Trusted political
men were installed as Chief-of-Staff. In October, 1958, Su Yu
was replaced by Kuang Ko-cheng, a member of the Party Secretariat.
In September, 1959, Kuang was replaced by the long-time head of
mainland security operations, Lo Jui-ching. That September Lin
Piao, newly appointed Defense Minister, stressed the need for
greater obedience to the Party and indicated that army cadres had
not yet accepted the necessity "to never carry out another scheme
contrary to the Party discipline."\textsuperscript{210} Some still had "the bourgeois

\textsuperscript{205} "The PLA Launches a 'Five-Good' Campaign and Takes a General
Leap Forward," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{206} "Armenian Study Chairman Mao's Works," \textit{NCNA-English}, Peking (July

\textsuperscript{207} "PLA General Political Department Instructs Officers to Spend
One Month Annually in the Ranks," Peking \textit{Chin Jih Hsin Wen}

\textsuperscript{208} "PLA Officers Cultivate 'Experimental Plots'," \textit{NCNA-English},
Peking (Sept. 19, 1958), \textit{SCMP}, No. 1861 (Sept. 25, 1958),
pp. 3-9; "Serve in the Ranks' System for All PLA Cadres," \textit{NCNA-
English}, Peking (Sept. 21, 1958), \textit{ibid.}, p. 9; "More Officers
Serve as Company-Level Soldiers," \textit{NCNA} Peking (Oct. 7, 1958),

\textsuperscript{209} Ts'ai-tao Ch'en, "Army Officers, Upholding Their Fine Tradition,
Go To the Companies To Serve as Privates," \textit{JWJP} (April 27, 1959),

\textsuperscript{210} Piao Lin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12. The italics are mine.
world outlook" and the habits of "rejecting criticism and persisting in mistakes."^{211}

(ii) **Non-Coercive Role Debate**

PLA officers objected vigorously to heavy non-coercive assignments. Members of the officer corps regarded these activities as unnecessary, inefficient and detrimental to fighting strength. They preferred to "stand apart from the mass movement, finding fault" or in some cases to "stand on the opposite side of the movement to oppose it."^{213} They probably resented the subordination to the civilian Party cadres involved in many of these assignments, and the efforts to eliminate "bureaucratism, pride and arrogance" in the officer corps.

The Party leadership contended that non-coercive assignments were "necessary and practicable."^{214} Economically they were necessary. The Party still relied on the army for skilled and disciplined work forces and for mechanical equipment. The inadequate financial resources of the CPR recommended an economically self-sufficient military in order to save "a large amount of military expenditures."^{215} Politically the Party viewed non-coercive tasks as practicable. The army was associated with a patriotic and nostalgic motif, i.e., liberation from past misery.

^{211}Ibid.


^{213}Piao Lin, op. cit., p. 7.

^{214}Chung Fu, op. cit., p. 2.

^{215}"The PLA Launches a 'Five-Good' Campaign and Takes a General Leap Forward," op. cit., p. 6.
and the Party wanted to use PLA propagandists to capitalize on it. The Party also viewed non-coercive assignments as politically educational for the PLA. "Through productive labor, the officers and men will receive more political training, will increase their appreciation of labor, and raise Communist consciousness to higher levels."216 Contrary to the contention of some officers, the Party declared, economic and political tasks give "a great impetus to the strategical training of the armed forces."217

The Party only fanned the Army-Party debate when it imposed record economic responsibilities in 1958. The average number of mandays spent on economic labor rose from 9 to 26, or a little more than two days a month.218 The non-coercive use of personnel even with the 1958 increase should not have diminished combat capability. However, the mainland press indicates that economic assignments that involved the use of PLA planes and ships limited the capability for invasion of Quemoy. The Communists later reported that during September and October, 1958, large numbers of trucks, airplanes, and "dozens of naval vessels of Chinese People's Liberation Army rendered help in the iron and steel campaign."219

No relaxation in the economic burden was scheduled for 1959. In January the PLA Political Department ordered "officers and men

216 Ch'ung Fu, op. cit., p. 2.
217 Hsu-ku Li, op. cit., p. 16.
218 Ibid., p. 15.
of the armed forces" to "spend one to two months a year in produ-
duction."220 The Political Department noted that the order em-
body a decision of "the Military Council of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party" which indicates that the decision
was considered important and controversial enough to be made at
the highest level. However, in spite of this directive, the PLA
spent fewer man-days in production in 1959 than in 1958 (26 man-
days in 1958 compared with 17 man-days in 1959).221 This modifi-
cation may have reflected a compromise that is summarized in
the discussion of the third and most fundamental divergence be-
tween Party and "professional" military views.

(iii) International Strategy Debate

There was an important group in the PLA which disagreed
with Mao Tse-tung on the ingredients of coercive power relation-
ships of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's
Republic. The disagreements were not new, but they were exag-
gerated by events in 1958 and 1959. By the autumn of 1959 an
attempt was made to find a compromise defense policy position
acceptable both to the "professional:" military elite and the
politically-oriented old revolutionaries.

The military opposition contended that as a world power in
a nuclear age Communist China required a "modern" or politicized-
specialist army copied not from the Eighth Route guerrilla army,
but from the mechanized and specialized armies of great inter-
national powers. They contended that the new army must have

220 "PLA Program for Armed Forces to Join in Construction," op.
cit.
221 See Table XXI, p. 410.
"unification and centralization" of command instead of the division of authority preserved by the political commissar and Party Committee system. The "suddenness and complexity of modern warfare" made such a change essential. They also contended that commanders could not have a low "cultural standard." Modern warfare required competence in science and technology, not the recommendation of a proletarian background. Politics should be secondary.

The officers also maintained that technical, not productive, competence was vital for national defense. In their view it was "an extra burden for the army to participate in mass movements and assist the people in production." Such assignments were "not training but an obstruction to training which would bring 'more loss than gain.'" PLA men should concentrate on the "very heavy work" of army training because new factors in war increased the need for coercive training. China was ignoring "the part of atomic weapons and modern military techniques." The officers reminded the Party that "modern warfare is different from that of the past" when Communist "troops fought with very backward arms and equipment." This difference rendered Mao's "military line" "inapplicable, outdated, or of 'very limited character.'" 222-228

223"Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," op. cit., p. 4.
224"Ya-lou Liu, op. cit., p. 5.
225Selections from Lin Piao's speech can be found in The China Quarterly, No. 2 (April-June, 1966), pp. 15-14.
227Piao Lin, op. cit., p. 5.
228Ya-lou Liu, op. cit., p. 6.
It also rendered a nation without nuclear tools exceptionally vulnerable; consequently China should either secure from the Soviet Union or manufacture the nuclear weapons which had brought about the "new development" in "military science." 229

The Party refused to discuss the merits of alternative defense policies and carried on the debate in terms of "how to comprehend and apply Mao Tse-tung's military thinking in the process of building a modernized army." 230 Weapons, science and technology were necessary. But the officers had "overlooked" this "most fundamental principle....at all times politics must come first." 231 No matter how arms and equipment are developed, technology, in the final analysis, is to serve politics, and arms and equipment are to be handled by man, who still decides the outcome of war." 232 The Party argued that it was absurd to depart from proven concepts or to attack the "universal significance" of "long tested-truth." 233

The Party also contended that the military specialists exaggerated the demands, probability, and effects of nuclear warfare. It argued that nuclear technology was not as difficult to acquire as the military implied; it scaled down the military estimates of the probability and effects of nuclear war with its


230 Ya-lou Liu, op. cit., p. 6.

231 Ibid.

232 "Hold Aloft the Banner of Party Committee System," op. cit., p. 4.

Soviet shield and militia-commune unit arguments. The Party suggested that it might be wiser to allocate resources for a larger militia force rather than for a nuclear capability.\textsuperscript{234}

The Party rebuttal contained a second theme which implied that China would make technological concessions to the military when it could finance them. This theme did not picture the officers' ambitions as incorrect but as unfeasible, primarily because China did not have the resources to apply foreign experience mechanically.\textsuperscript{235} "Our enemies are strong and we are weak and our enemies are big and we are small."\textsuperscript{236} The Party tried to justify allocation of resources to industry on the basis that "The building of modern industries is a prerequisite for modernizing our national defense..."\textsuperscript{237} It virtually pleaded with the military to understand that national power could be increased "only by means of developing the national economy."\textsuperscript{238} Patience with and assistance to economic growth would be rewarded by military modernization. "If we catch up with Britain and then the United States in industrial and agricultural production and in the fields of science and technology, in terms of modernized equipment our army will certainly catch up and surpass them."\textsuperscript{239}


\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{237} Ya-lou Liu, op. cit., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{238} Piao Lin, op. cit., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{239} Ya-lou, op. cit., p. 9.
In the summer of 1958 the Party implemented measures to exact compliance from the officer corps and to check the apparently spreading dissent. On May 23, 1958, the Liberation Army News published orders on how to deal with "the utmost important and fundamental problem in army building."

It is proposed that a campaign be launched among all armed forces for conducting an organized and systematic study of Chairman Mao's writings on military affairs, and that all schools for military cadres include study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's military works as a compulsory course and compile textbooks on strategy and tactics, taking Chairman Mao's writings as a guide. All cadres in active service should draw up their self-study plans and the headquarters should energetically guide this study campaign.²⁴⁰

By the end of June, at least in the Peking Military Academy, curriculum changes had been effected. A major revision was that "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works on military matters ...are now being studied first."²⁴¹ Textbooks were re-written and steps taken to combine the "teaching of theory ...with political work."²⁴² The PLA Political Department ordered all officers to study two of Mao's pre-1940 writings, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" and "On Protracted War."²⁴³

The Party and PLA strategic positions were affected by the failure of the Quemoy test. Prior to the Communist-initiated Straits crisis of August-September, 1958, the CCP Military Committee had held a lengthy conference. We can infer from its

²⁴⁰Ibid.
²⁴¹"Military Academy Continues to Intensify Opposition to Dogmatism," op. cit., p. 16.
²⁴²Ibid., p. 12.
²⁴³"Armymen Study Chairman Mao's Works," op. cit., p. 5.
length and its vague communique that the conference was acrimonious. It seems reasonable to assume that the Quemoy venture was discussed at the conference. Subsequent to the conference PLA Political Department directives indicated that the Party had not changed its strategic priorities. It did not recognize the need for increased combat training and refined weapons. In the late summer and early autumn military officers were told that the army could simultaneously increase its coercive capability, political indoctrination and economic contribution.\footnote{244}

It was in this context that the Quemoy venture was launched. The Party relied completely on an American breakdown in the face of Soviet nuclear threats. The PLA was not allowed to mobilize its troops in the coastal areas, to use its complete air capability, to attack American ships escorting supplies to Quemoy or to postpone the venture to a season favorable to an amphibious invasion.\footnote{245}

In the event, the Soviet nuclear shield was only partially committed and finally withdrawn. The Nationalist garrison did not collapse, and the venture was a total failure. The specialists felt that PLA prestige had suffered because of Mao's over-optimism.

The failure required two responses from the Party: 1) consolidation of its control of the officer corps; and 2) reassessment of its strategy. The first response consisted of punishment\footnote{242}.

\footnote{244}{The PLA Launches a 'Five-Good' Campaign and Takes a General Leap Forward, op. cit., pp. 5-6.}

\footnote{245}{Robert W. Barnett, Quemoy--The Use and Consequence of Deterrence, Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, March 1, 1960, pp. 14-20.}
and praise. The Party initiated the officers-to-the-ranks campaign to discipline the loudest complainers. The Chief of Staff, Su Yu, who had revealed himself as an advocate of the specialists, was dismissed.\textsuperscript{246} The Party also attempted to conciliate the officer corps. It was reassured that the expanded militia were no substitute for an "obligatory military service system and ...regular forces." The officers were told that even "communism" was attained, the military establishment would not "wither away." While "we still have the responsibility of fighting enemy aggression from abroad, we still have to maintain a regular armed force of a certain size."\textsuperscript{247}

The strategic adaptation was presented in a selection of Mao's writings published in \textit{People's Daily} on October 31, 1958, under the title "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers."\textsuperscript{248} This compilation contained an extension of Mao's strategic timetable and a retention of his basic arguments. A substantial note of caution was introduced which admitted that imperialism could administer a powerful "dying kick to the revolutionary forces." Mao warned that optimism would turn into "left-opportunism":

\begin{quote}
if we do not attach importance to the enemy in specifics, in every question concerning every enemy we will commit the mistake of adventurism. The war can only be fought battle by battle, and the enemy can only be eliminated bit by bit. Factories can only be built one by one, the peasants
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{246}JMJP (Aug. 1, 1957), cited by Hsieh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{247}Jen Wu, "All People in Arms," \textit{op. cit.}
can only plow the farm plot by plot, and even in the case of eating it is like this. Strategically we can despise a meal: we can eat it. But the concrete act of eating is carried out mouthful by mouthful, you cannot in one mouthful swallow the whole feast. This is called one by one solution, and in military literature it is called smashing the enemy one by one.

The military might of the imperialists would not collapse with a slight push. It would have to be eroded away by a series of carefully planned operations, probably of a local, limited war variety.

Mao retained his basic arguments that: 1) the Communist bloc was more powerful than the imperialists; 2) the imperialists were afraid to fight; and 3) weapons were not the decisive ingredient of military power. He concluded that "if we overestimate the strength of the enemy taking the overall situation, and dare not overthrow him and dare not win victory, we will commit the mistake called right opportunism."

The content of the selections clearly indicates that its arguments were intended for the PLA and Soviets. Mao reported that "at this turning point in history there are many people in the world anti-fascist front who, misled by the ferocious appearance of fascism, fail to detect its actual strength." The PLA officers had contended that: 1) the imperialists were ferocious and 2) the Soviets would not commit their missile capability to Chinese military ventures. The officers were instructed to read and discuss "The Paper Tiger" anthology to obtain the proper perspective.249 As for the Soviets, Mao pleaded that "an

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anti-imperialist united front headed by the Soviet Union must be formed and pursue correct policy, otherwise no victory can be won." The Soviet Union did not accept Peking's suggestion to intensify the military struggle with the West. Moscow went so far as to support international agreements which might exclude the CFP from the nuclear club. Chinese Party and military elites agreed, at least after June, 1958, that such exclusion was unacceptable and implicitly rejected the Soviet proposals for a nuclear free zone in Asia. Peking was unwilling to sacrifice the psychological and bargaining value of at least a token nuclear capability.

In this context of Sino-Soviet tension the key personnel in China's defense establishment were changed. In June, 1959, Western sources reported that control of the PLA had passed from Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai to Marshal Lin Piao. At that time Lin was in charge of modernization of the PLA. On September 17, 1959, the CCP officially announced that Lin had become Minister of Defense, and that his old commissar, security policeman Lo Jui-ching had become Chief of Staff. We suggest that Lo's appointment reflected increased emphasis on political control of the PLA and his past working relationship with Lin. Several explanations have been offered for Lin's appointment: 1) Peng's poor health;

250"Comrade Mao Tse-tung on 'Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are 'Paper Tigers',' op. cit., p. 10. The italics are mine.
2) Peng's opposition to the communes and to the PLA's non-coercive burden; and 3) Peng's opposition to the military specialists' demands. Advocates of the third explanation have suggested that Lin was appointed to compromise Party-specialist differences and to direct necessary defense policy modification. 254

We propose that comparison of Lin's and Peng's attitudes and of the groups for and against modifications of CPR defense policy give a different explanation than any of the three above. Lin had been extremely active in PLA modernization programs. However, Peng had presided over a period of great modernization within the PLA. Both Peng and Lin had previously exhibited acceptance of the politicized-generalist nature of the PLA. There is no available evidence which requires us to conclude that explanations two and three are valid. However, we do know that Lin's appointment was followed by change in CPR defense policy along lines recommended by the specialists. To find another explanation that links personnel and policy changes we have to ask two questions: what groups were influential enough to bring about the removal of as prominent a man as Peng: what groups had most to gain and to lose by the change in policy?

To answer the first question it is unwarranted to assume that the specialist group of officers would be large enough, unified enough, and respected enough to bring about such a change. It is reasonable to assume that the revolutionary veterans at the highest level in the PLA did not hold the specialist viewpoint. The advocates of this viewpoint were probably concentrated one

254 For a contrary view to explanation three, see Christian Science Monitor (Sept. 30, 1959), p. 9.
rung lower in the command hierarchy. At this level personnel were likely to have had sufficient technical training and lack of revolutionary experience to prefer a politicized-specialist force. Only the Party high command could have removed Peng. To take this step they would have had to be motivated by more than the specialist opposition. We suggest that this extramotivation came from Peng's militant opposition to non-military policy and Peking desires to decrease coercive dependence on the USSR.255

The questionable explanations of Peng's removal require us to investigate the possibility that Peking doubted his willingness to remedy this dependence. We can only assess the validity of this explanation indirectly. If Lin and Lo implemented policies which pleased the specialists on the issues of political control and non-coercive role, this hypothesis is disproven.

On the other hand, if Lin and Lo implemented policy which reflected a Party view of political control and non-coercive role, but contained strategic modifications, this hypothesis gains support. In other words, did the policies of Lin and Lo please the PLA specialists less than they pleased the advocates of an independent CPR foreign policy?

In fact, the new policies pleased the second group more than the first. In his first major speech Lin accepted the policies of: communication, militia expansion, commissar control, non-coercive military duties, and admitted that the key role in

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war is played by men rather than arms. By early 1960 reports of officer objections to Party control reappeared. For example, in Hunan some PLA members reportedly had "worked insidiously to alienate the relations between the armed forces and the Communist Party." By the summer of 1960 the Ministry of Defense was again expanding the authority of political cadres and sending officers to the ranks.

Lin combined these policies with increased emphasis on technical modernization as the basis of "powerful armed forces." In early 1960 he summarized his synthesis of the Party position on political control and certain specialist strategic views.

The imperialists are now doing their utmost to prepare for large-scale guided missile and nuclear warfare. To deal with such a war, the most important thing for us to do is to mobilize and rely on the people to carry out a people's war. We are Marxist-Leninists, we fully realize men are the decisive factor in war; we must also recognize the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernization of our forces.

The three part debate about the institutional nature of the PLA and CPR defense policy that was waged in 1958-1959 was carried on between two sets of opponents. One set was the military specialists and the older advocates of the politicized-generalist army. The second set involved Peking groups which advocated either an independent and aggressive CPR international strategy or acceptance of Soviet policy guidelines. The first

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set of opponents have yet to resolve their debate. However, recent Chinese international policies confirm that in the second controversy the advocates of CPR independence control policy.

C. Disproved Assumptions

The political and economic expectations of 1958 rested on two false assumptions: 1) the political assumption that the population was totally pliable ("poor and blank" in Mao's phrase); and 2) the economic assumption that material, skill, and human energy were infinite. These invalid assumptions undermined the capacity of military bodies and methods to fulfill the regime's expectations. The consequences of these assumptions allowed the opponents of Mao's use of military bodies and methods to force Mao to modify his defense policy and policy of civilian mobilization (militia and militarization of life).

1. Fallacy of the "Poor" and "Blank" Assumption

Mao advertised the Chinese people as so poor that they had nothing to lose and so alienated from traditional society that they were easily indoctrinated. For these reasons he assured the cadres that the Chinese population would welcome drastic social transformation (militarization of life).

After several decades of war and internal turmoil the Chinese had been subjected by the newly established regime to a series of social shocks, e.g., land reform, mutual aid team, small cooperatives, large cooperatives, etc. The demands of the militarization of life program exacerbated the half-healed sores of previous change in social organization and touched the most sensitive points of traditional culture.
The Chinese had personal and economic objections to the militarization of life program. These objections, which the Party called "the three anxious thoughts", the "four fears" and the "one misgiving", included the fears that the "commune system meant the end of the natural and kindred relationships of man ... the disintegration of the family...". That "when children are sent to the nurseries set up by the communists, they will no longer recognize their own parents"; and that "everything must go through the transition and in the future even wives will be all-people owned." Commune members commented on their longing for their children even in front of officials. The population also resented a further "redistribution of property", particularly the peasants who had painfully accumulated their few possessions. "It is not an easy thing... to manage to save a little money after two or three years of toil" only to have it turned over to the commune. "Who would have the heart to work?" Although some peasants were resigned—"we think that the Communist Party cannot let us suffer any less"—others "persisted in keeping self-retained land, their reason being that 'without self-retained land, we shall not even have vegetables to eat.'" The peasants also anticipated that "labour intensity would be increased and

262 JNP (Sept. 25, 1958) is quoted in Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 125.
263 Yen-li Wang, et. al., op. cit., p. 7.
264 "Preparatory Work Carried Out Prior To Building the Liaojuan People's Commune," op. cit.
there would be no time for rest" and that the standard of living would be lowered.265

The cadres also had objections to the militarization of life program. The Party accused them of self-interest, unsc- phisticated interpretation of central directives, and undue sensitivity to local pressures. Although the Party traditionally blames cadres for its own errors, it is reasonable to assume that some cadres pursued personal, not Party interests.

The fact remains that a number of our com- rades have preferred commandism to reliance on the masses, not consulting the wishes of the people when they are confronted with problems, but forcing the masses to do what they dictate with the result that (they have become) estranged from the masses.

On the other hand, the cadres were aware of public hostility to the militarization of life program and knew that if they were "given over to the masses for discussion" they "would be quickly blown over."266

Other cadres took Party promises too seriously and immedi- ately tried to implement the utopian pledges of total economic equality and guaranteed supplies. "They take the simple view that more items of free supplies and smaller difference in living standards mean greater equality and more communist factors. They even think that communism may arrive at an early date."267

Caïre "departmentalism"—sensitivity to local interests—was "comparatively serious." Some were "neck deep" in asserting their own "small spheres of influence." For example, in the Humen People's Commune:

the Liuwu production team in Wisha area had concealed 17,000 catties of grain because of the following three reasons: 1) should one day the commune fail to supply free meals, the production team itself could have enough grain; 2) with grain available, the team could undertake subsidiary occupations; 3) the team could achieve better results than other production teams.268

Other groups in the population, particularly the military, technical and managerial elites, had personal, pragmatic and ideological objections to the militarization of life program as embodied in the communes. Some felt that Chinese society had undergone enough social shock and that militarization was unnecessary because "class struggle has come to an end."269 The Party wrote of this group that:

They are afraid and tired of being baptized through class struggle and of carrying out ideological re-molding by way of the class struggle due either to their rightist lethargy or to the revival of the ill nature of the intellectuals. Alternatively, they may be people who have made their way into the blind alley of vocational proficiency without red consciousness due to their concentration in their lines of business and disregard of politics. They turn the blind eye on the reality of class struggle and the process of ideological remolding at an early date.270

Others felt that the militarization of life policy was premature


270 Ibid., p. 6.
because the resiliency of the people and economic resources were insufficient to guarantee success for the program. A third group felt that collectivization of life was acceptable; when this policy was implemented, China would have arrived at a pure communist society. It argued about the other components of the militarization of life policy—the militarization of organization and work. It also disagreed with the Party that "The conducting of socialist and communist education among the cadres and the masses is a work that can never be stopped." Militarized organization, combatized work and continual political re-education were superfluous once the ideal Communist society had been attained.

a. Political Resistance

The nature and extent of political resistance to the militarization of life policy can be inferred from the content and frequency of attacks in the controlled press on various groups of the population. The Party claimed that the opposition consisted of "reactionaries at home" and a "handful of right opportunists." Scattered information indicates that the opposition base was broader: "antagonistic" intellectuals, "the majority of people in industrial and commercial circles," and "opportunists factions" in the Party itself who engaged in "criminal activity against socialism" by "disseminating poisonous germs and pessimism among the masses." The generally repressive measures which the

273 For examples, see: Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
274 New York Times (Sept. 1, 1959), p. 4; Lan-t'ao Liu, "The Chinese
Party invoked would seem to indicate that discontent also infected the masses of the peasantry.

The nature of the resistance sometimes consisted of physical rebellion and cadre poisoning but more often criticism and disengagement. According to the Szechwan Provincial Party Committee, "a number of people":

were irresolute, were disheartened by the difficulties and adopted the passive and wavering attitude. A small number of people ... who had all along been discontented with the big leap forward and the people's commune, not only showed no sympathy with the temporary difficulties befalling the state and the people, but, on the contrary, regarded others' poison as their meat. They obstructed the implementation of the general line, negated the big leap forward and the people's commune ... spread pessimistic and disheartening views....

In August, 1958, the Central Committee issued a resolution to eliminate mass resistance.

We must adopt the forms of big blooming, big contending, big debate, big character bulletins, on-the-spot meetings, and exhibitions to achieve a true settlement of problems....

At first the mass persuasion machinery was considered adequate.

The "education" it administered was coercive in a socio-psychological sense. Pressure had to be applied intensely. In a Kwangsi Communist Party. Is the Supreme Commander of the Chinese People in Building Socialism," JJMP (Sept. 28, 1959), OP, No. 598 (Oct. 15, p. 29).

275 Peking Ta Kung-pao (Oct. 25, 1958) and JJMP (Sept. 24, 1958) are quoted in Chu-yuan Cheng, "op. cit., pp. 128-129.


county, "more than 150,000 persons in the course of the big debate received education once, twice, or even thrice."\(^{278}\) In Heilungkiang opponents of the "education" brought by the militarization of life and the communes were beaten (verbally, not physically) down only "after a bitter fight lasting four days."\(^{279}\) Coercive persuasion did not eliminate mass resistance. By December, 1958, the Party admitted an increase in that most flexible of all crimes "misrepresentation of the policy of the Party."\(^{280}\) The mainland journal Political and Legal Studies reported intensified activity by a vaguely described opposition. "They spread reactionary views, carry out reactionary propaganda, fabricate rumors, post reactionary slogans, distort the various policies of the Party and slander the communes and the big leap forward."\(^{281}\) The Party itself had unwittingly accelerated the spread of "reactionary views" by assigning citizens in disfavor to arduous public mess hall duties. In the mess hall meeting places they were strategically located to disseminate their negative opinions.\(^{282}\) We can infer the extent of political resistance from the instructions issued to the legal cadres.

1) The resolute suppression of the activities of the remnant counter-revolutionaries who sabotage the people's communes; the effective attack on current criminal activities; and the timely arrest and sentence of counter revolutionaries and criminals....

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\(^{279}\) Wen-pin Tung, op. cit., p. 79.

\(^{280}\) China News Analysis, No. 265 (Feb. 20, 1959), p. 4.

\(^{281}\) Shu-wen Wang, op. cit., p. 34.

\(^{282}\) On the Question of the Life of the People," op. cit., p. 378.
3) The great strengthening of the supervision and transformation of the five categories of the enemy (landlords, rich peasants, counter revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists), the continued disintegration of the enemy, to make them bow before the people and confess their crimes.

4) The strengthening of leadership over the protection people's communes, the overhauling and strengthening of the machinery of protection, the consolidation and elevation of organs already established, and the immediate establishment of those under preparation, so as to further strengthen the dictatorship over the enemy. There may also be organized preventive teams to mobilize the masses to supervise persons placed under surveillance and bad elements, to prevent acts of sabotage.

5) The universal inspection and examination of the personnel in the important departments (of people's communes).283

The cadres, who sometimes claimed that they were only "airing the sorrows of the peasants and standing for the interests of the peasant class,"284 were accused of independence. Some repudiated "the unified leadership of the Party as well as the role of the CCP committees at the various levels as organs of supreme power and as the core of leadership...."285 Some were conceited and complacent.286 Still others:

do not show adequate enthusiasm for the militarization of organization, or when such a pattern of organization is worked out they fail to consciously strengthen the Party leadership in this sphere and carry out a systematic political-ideological program.287

283Shu-wen Wang, op. cit., p. 35.
285Lan-t'ao Liu, op. cit., p. 30.
287Sheng Tien, "The Outlook of Communism As Seen from People's
We can infer the seriousness of the political opposition that the cadres offered to the militarization of life program from the Party's decision to "overhaul the ranks." The August, 1958, meeting of the CC which formally confirmed the People's Commune program, also ordered the cadres "who fail to change their ways after repeated education, who suffer seriously from rightist conservatism and who still occupy leadership positions must be resolutely replaced...." Apparently the number of "misled" cadres increased or the Party purge was insufficiently effective. In May, 1959, the Kwangtung Party Committee called for an intensified effort at "expelling the class dissidents who managed to infiltrate into the different organizations of the Party and communes." "Plans must be made, measures must be mapped out, and periodic inspection must be conducted ...[to eliminate] ...some leadership cadres" guilty of "rightist, conservative and departmentalistic thought.""}

b. Economic Resistance

Cadres and masses expressed their political resistance economically. State requirements of food and other raw materials were withheld, and crops, equipment, and facilities were damaged. However, the fundamental type of economic resistance was the

289 "Directive of the CCP Central Committee On the Universal Development of a Socialist and Communist Education Movement In the Rural Areas In the Coming Winter and Next Spring," op. cit., pp. 3-4.


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withdrawal of effort and concern.

Cadres hindered the state plans by refusing to "squeeze out materials and money to shore up national construction." Some attempted to serve their own economic interests and those of the immediate group. They would "retain all the goods they produce irrespective of the state requirement or ... refuse to sell them." Others would "sell the surplus foodstuffs to the state only after they have substantially improved the meals of the communes...."291 The regime had persistent difficulties with cadres who failed to deliver or underfulfilled their commune quotas.292

Many peasants directly sabotaged Communist economic exploitation. Some killed their livestock; others "deliberately wasted food grains."293 In Kwangtung province the peasants "secretly scattered their stock of grain, dug up the unripe crop from their private plots and slaughtered their domestic fowls and animals."294 In Heilungkiang, Shansi and Hupeh large quantities of grain were allowed to rot or be consumed by insects and mice. In still other areas peasants put poison into fish ponds and felled fruit trees.295 By December, 1958, these varieties of economic resistance were sufficiently obstructive for the Party to order

294 For examples, see: Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 12.
295 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
security workers to ensure:

rigid protection of the property of people's communes. In addition to the resolute attack on criminals who steal and damage public property, we must make concrete arrangements for the prevention of these crimes, such as the safeguarding of fields, safeguarding of godowns, prevention of fire, and prevention of thefts.\footnote{296}

Apathy and passive resistance to labor demands were more widespread. As the Party put it, "the people do not yet have a high degree of self-awakening toward labor."\footnote{297} The Canton Suburbs Peasant News reported attitudes of "four don't cares": "Don't care about the confusion prevailing in labor organization, don't care about grain, don't care about loafings \textit{sic} at jobs, and don't care about waste of farming tools."\footnote{298} The Communists had deprived the peasants of the labor incentive of probable reward. Enthusiasm for labor waned, absenteeism increased,\footnote{299} and commune members did "not link up the elevation of their living standards with the promotion of production..."\footnote{300} Peasants supposedly said that "whether you work or not you get one and half catties of grain per day" and "Why work hard, since you get not even one dollar for a whole day's labour?"\footnote{301}

\footnote{296}{Shu-wen Wang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 35.}
\footnote{299}{"Increase Discernment and Distinguish Between Right and Wrong," \textit{ibid.}, p. 354.}
\footnote{300}{Chu T'ao, "Investigation Report on Human Commune," \textit{URS}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 322.}
\footnote{301}{Hung-ch'i, No. 12 (Dec. 16, 1958), p. 18, quoted in Chu-yuan Cheng, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 127.}
We can infer that popular apathy was extensive enough for the Party to invoke the "socialist principle of 'he who does not work neither shall he eat'."\(^{302}\) Differential wage scales were reinstated. For example, in one commune "commune members' labor attitude and achievements are assessed once in every five days. ...Those who are absent from work without justifiable reasons are to have two days' wages deducted for one day of absence."\(^{303}\) The Party suggested that peasants be graded according to "ideological consciousness, labour attitude, production technique and capacity for work." It recommended these specific criteria:

1) follow the leadership, obey instructions and be positive in work; 2) be enthusiastic in production and both quantitatively and qualitatively fulfill or overfulfill production tasks on schedule; 3) care for and protect public property, and always and in all ways struggle against wickedness whether in persons or things; 4) be progressive in thinking and energetic in studying techniques; and 5) work at least 28 days a month.\(^{304}\)

2. **Illusions of Elasticity**

Mao assumed that China's 1)physical resources, 2)skilled personnel, and 3)labor stamina were infinite and could accomplish rapid "simultaneous" economic development, i.e., in both urban and rural areas, in both agriculture and industry, and in both production and complex social organization. Although the economic planning which was based on these assumptions produced agricultural growth in 1958 which was comparable to that of the entire

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\(^{304}\) Data from *JMJ* (Sept. 20, 1958) are cited in Chu-yuan Cheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-49.
First Five Year Plan (1953 through 1957), it also set up objectives which were neither achieved nor possible of achievement.

a. Physical Limitations

Mao overestimated the capacity of China's agriculture, its transportation system, and manufacturing facilities. Accordingly, he made false projections of the mainland's capacity to produce and use increased raw material outputs. A number of serious imbalances arose:

a) supplies of raw materials—in particular construction materials—sometimes were inadequate to meet the greatly increased tempo of agriculture and industry; b) the output of certain kinds of raw materials was often of such poor quality to be useless at further stages of production; c) increases in production of main food crops were achieved partly at the expense of production of subsidiary foods such as meats and vegetables; d) storage and transport facilities generally were inadequate to handle the increased production, so that various areas suffered from shortages of food and from delays in the movement of raw materials for light industry; e) in some industries, such as the steel industry, processing facilities were inadequate to handle the increased flow of raw materials.

By the end of 1958 agricultural imbalances caused food shortages in key urban areas, e.g., Canton, which created "some tension." Because of poor planning in manufacturing machinery incurred excessive wear, and the production of replacement parts was inadequate. The village iron furnace program was an example of Mao's inability to accept resource limitations. In

306 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
October, 1958, the press admitted "that a number of highly skilled cadres did not believe that steel could be refined from village iron, and there was an attitude of resistance." They felt the village smelters were "a backward way of production." The Party denied the validity of these empirical objections. As a result some three to four million tons of steel were usable only for "village purposes" and the program was largely abandoned. In transportation there was "the contradiction between the volume of transportation which was being augmented, and the transportation forces, which were lacking." To meet this "contradiction" trucks were driven in shifts and overloaded. Inadequate transportation equipment was compounded by inadequate spare parts, and repair shops, which in many cases had been converted for manufacturing.

These economic imbalances affected the construction of new social facilities required to implement the militarization of life program. The communes had torn down homes to reclaim land for agriculture and to make room for the construction of collective facilities. The planning commissions suddenly realized that unless they altered construction, there would be insufficient mess halls, and housing facilities for the commune population. Shensi reported that most communes "have very simple facilities;

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there are no dining rooms, and the messes have to take their meals in the open air." In Honan "the absolute majority of mess halls not only have no dining rooms, but even have no facilities to keep the cooked rice and vegetables warm; consequently the commune members always eat cold meals." The significance of these economic imbalances for the individual commune member is self-evident.

b. Skilled Personnel Limitations

Had the Party commanded a sufficient number of skilled personnel, it could have maximized the effectiveness of the materials and human energy it did have, and the militarization of life policies. The Party minimized the importance of technical and administrative specialists, assumed that it had access to a sufficient number, and cultivated the "universal man," "red and expert," rather than the specialist.

Politically reliable Party cadres who did not "withdraw effort" or were not "departmentalistic" were limited and overburdened because the Party assigned local government powers to Party branches. It had been forced to wrap "up (the responsibilities) of the Party, the government and the commune into one" because of the extraordinary leadership and organizational needs created by the communes and militarization of life program. "All business, big or small" was placed "on the shoulders of the Party committees, causing the Party to be bogged down in the quagmire of routinism." What this meant was that "too many responsible

312 JMJP (Nov. 11, 1958), quoted ibid., p. 59.
313 JMJP (Nov. 9, 1958), quoted ibid.
314 Chi-min Chu, op. cit., p. 5.
members of the Party committee concurrently take up administra-
tive duties in the commune and become preoccupied with busi-
ness affairs." This weakens "the Party's leadership in politics
and ideology." When the Party recognized the "tendency to brush
aside the Party branch, to make no discrimination between things
inside and outside the Party", it ordered that "Party organizations
at all levels must carry out some proper forms of readjustment." In
October, 1958, the Party tried to adjust to its political
personnel shortage by expanding Party membership. A quotation
from a provincial newspaper indicates the kind of numerical
shortage the Party had to overcome:

> in regard to the people's communes, there are still
> many production brigades under which no Party organi-
> sation can be set up because there is no Party mem-
> ber, or only one or two; in the industrial field,
> as there are many newly-built factories and mines,
> it is still more necessary to augment the strength
> of the Party; and with respect to cultural and
> educational enterprises numbers of Party members
> have always been comparatively small. We must
> have Party members before we can set up Party
> organizations, before the Party can make use of
> these organizations to associate with the masses
> and implement its principles and policies.

The chronic shortage of administrative and technical per-
sonnel in Chinese society was also aggravated by the commune and
militarization of life programs. The communized units that these
programs produced created a tremendous need for personnel
skilled in centralized management. The majority of management

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315 Sheng Tien, op. cit., p. 7.
316 "Energetically Strengthen the Basic Organization of the Party
in Construction, and Raise Their Combat Strength," Canton
Jih-pao (May 28, 1959), SCMIP, No. 2175 (Aug. 15,
1959), p. 27.
317 "With Quality Guaranteed, To Actively Recruit Party Members,"
personnel available to the Party was inadequately trained, and the symptoms of poor planning rapidly appeared in the communes.

The Party admitted that "the production order was a little confused." In Tsinghai province "there was not time to attend properly to the questions involving the organizational structure of the people's communes, the system of management, and collective amenities." In one area a Party "tidying up" group reported: "1) massive labor power is not utilized; 2) irrational use of labor power; 3) shifting of labor power is too frequent and illogical, resulting in serious waste of labor power." The personnel for transport and distribution did not possess the training to phase their operations efficiently. Finances and loans became chaotic. The statistical lifeline of central control was clogged with false information and short on needed facts. Probably 1958 production figures, released in August, 1959, were not revised downward because of "lack of experience in assessing and calculating the output of such an unprecedented bumper harvest." However, statistical and fiscal planning

319 "Tsinghai Province Holds Meeting to Arrange for Tidying Up of People's Communes," NCNA Sining (Dec. 1, 1958), ibid., p. 6.
321 China News Analysis, No. 271 (April 10, 1959), p. 3.
322 Ibid.

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studies left much to be desired. Peking informed cadres that:

We advocate factual calculations, arrangements, and investigations and oppose exaggeration and the hiding of shortcomings. The economic work must be carried out more and more meticulously....

They were urged to "improve the working methods, increase the correctness and effectiveness of the work ... intensify the analysis and study of statistical data." This was a difficult order for the barely literate local cadre.

The inability of available personnel to perform required administrative and specialist functions was particularly apparent in the public mess halls, a key institution in the militarization of life program. By October, 1958, the mainland press admitted that some of these facilities were "improperly managed," and by December, 1958, Tsinghai Party members were told that "running collective living welfare amenities well, particularly the public mess halls ... constitutes the major task at the moment. Party committees at all levels must pay special attention to this task."

Improvement was badly needed. The mainland press reported that "the cooking in many of the mess halls is like a blindman's

325 Ibid., p. 31.
buff, with no planning whatsoever." In Hupeh lack of appreciation of management problems led to oversize messhalls and consequent inefficiency. In Kwangtung province "sanitation work in the mess halls was not properly handled." By June, 1959, it was admitted that mess halls had not yet been adapted to the local physical characteristics and work pattern and that no system of regular and precise accounts was kept by many messhalls. The Central Committee had previously found it necessary to remind cadres "to make sure that food contains enough calories and the nutriments needed by the human body."

c. Human Strength Limitations

Mao tried to compensate for the physical and personnel resource limitations that he did acknowledge with the energies of China's masses. He did not acknowledge the diminishing economic and political returns that an extreme policy of labor exploitation would bring.

Red Flag in September, 1958, warned that Party directives did "not mean that the intensity of labour should be infinitely stretched."Apparently local cadres, under pressure to meet industrial and agricultural quotas, ignored the warning. The

327Peking Ta-kung Pao (Nov. 6, 1958) is quoted by Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 60.
332"Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes," Kung-ch'i,
nature of the demands they made on the population can be inferred from the Wuhan and Local Party resolutions of December, 1958. The Wuhan Central Committee directive ordered that twelve hours a day should be free from labor. It stressed "safety in production" and more liberal labor requirements of women and children.

Adequate rest must be ensured to women both during pregnancy and after childbirth and they should also get the necessary rest during menstruation when they should not be asked to do heavy work, to get their feet wet in cold water or work at night. Children above the age of nine may take part in some labour to an appropriate extent so as to cultivate the habit of work in childhood and stimulate their physical and mental development; but full attention must be paid to the health of the children, they must only be given light work for short periods of time, suited to their physical strength and their aptitude. \[333\]

A Hupeh provincial Party directive stated that work should "in no case ... take more than 12 hours a day" and that "members of communes in rural areas should be ensured to have a half-day rest every week." \[334\]

The consequences of this type of labor exploitation were predictable. In a Shantung commune, after four days of round-the-clock work 400 of the 1,200 members of the work team fell ill, and the productivity and efficiency of the others steadily declined. In other cases miscarriages occurred. The use of tired and inexperienced labor in the village smelter program resulted in numerous accidents. People's Daily reported that "definite losses have been sustained because many industrial and mining


\[\text{333} \text{"Communique and Resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," op. cit., p. 16.}\]

\[\text{334} \text{"On the Question of the Life of the People," op. cit., p. 375.}\]
units did not protect their labour well."\textsuperscript{335} Unduly heavy work in the mess halls adversely affected the already poor quality of food.

The Party not only demanded intense labor from each individual worker. It also tried to spread labor out too thinly so that no one project was done well and all projects complained of "labour shortage." Party cadres did not have time for ideological indoctrination and the implementation of the "All People in Arms" and militarization of life programs.\textsuperscript{336} The assignment of peasant "labor armies" to capital construction tasks meant that normal production suffered.\textsuperscript{337} The New China News Agency reported that "the labor force allocated to bring in the harvest was inadequate, with the result that reaping, threshing, and storing were all done in a somewhat hurried manner." The same bulletin attributed cancellation of the village iron and steel program to a "certain degree of shortage of labor power."\textsuperscript{338}

3. The Opposition

It was later admitted that from the outset there had been Party influentials who did not accept Mao's assumptions, e.g., some economic planners, the "pro-Soviet" group, P'eng Teh-huai, etc. "They believed that agricultural production could only be developed slowly, with an increase of a few per cent each year;
that industry could only be operated by a few people and not by
the masses...."339 "They asserted that 'greater and quicker'
could not go hand-in-hand with 'better and more economical' as
this would amount to 'keeping a horse running while giving it no
feed'." They asserted:

that organizing mass movements in economic con-
struction can only cause dislocation in production
and that even though a temporary leap forward may
be effected it will inevitably result in such dis-
proportions in the national economy that it will
be impossible to keep the leap forward going.340

Although Mao's opponents voiced their objections only tenta-

tively at first, they returned to the attack after the commune and
militarization of life programs were launched and the chickens
came home to roost. The Quemoy failure gave them more ammunition.
Again we must infer the debate from the single side that is
published in the Communist press.

The Party lumped two groups of opponents together, those
who were "dissatisfied" with the communes and those who were "op-
posed" to the commune movement,341 and the militarization of life
program in particular. The latter group leveled the most drastic
charges. This group had wanted to "set limits and bounds to
restrict the movement's scale and depth."342 Although they admitted

339Ch'uan-ch'i Wu, "The 'Chronic Disease of Right Deviation' and
Its 'Remedy'," JMJP (Aug. 30, 1959), SCMP, No. 2108 (Oct. 2,
1959), p. 3.

340"Chou En-lai Writes Articles in Honor of 10th Anniversary of

341Shao-ch'i Liu, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," NCNA-

342"Long Live People's Communes!" JMJP (Aug. 29, 1959), SCMP,
that Mao's program was partially successful, "the gain does not compensate for the loss." It was objectively impossible for output to increase annually "in two figures", i.e., ten percent or more.\textsuperscript{345} They charged that the people's commune "is not an objective tendency"; that it was chosen "in compliance with the subjective whims of a small number of people but not with the demand of the broad masses of the peasants"; and that it was "merely whipped up by a few leaders through compulsion."\textsuperscript{344} The opponents said that it was predictable that the two programs should "outstep the level of social development and the level of political consciousness."\textsuperscript{345} The pro-Soviet opponents, particularly, contended that the regime should have known better. "Since the Soviet Union failed in agricultural communes, we should not repeat the attempt"; "since none of the other socialist countries have set up a people's commune, we should also refrain from the attempt."\textsuperscript{346} They inclusively charged that "the people's commune was set up too early, was a failure and should never have been set up."\textsuperscript{347}

As more and more chickens came home, sizeable numbers of Party members, who had not blankly opposed the program and Mao's assumptions or been persuaded of the sanctity of bloc precedent, became neutral or joined the opponents. The objections


\textsuperscript{345}Shao-ch'i Liu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{346}Chung-kuang Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{347}Ibid., p. 22.
to the 1958-1959 Chinese "road to socialism" were based on more limited and empirical considerations. The aftermath of the 1958 leap forward gave evidence that: 1) "a bad job was done in combining the wage system and the supply system in the distribution system"; 2) that "the communal kitchen was set up under coercion"; 3) that village industries were a failure, that "the quality of their products was fairly low, production costs were rather high and their rate of increase in labor productivity was relatively slow"; 4) that unrealistic production targets were so obviously unobtainable that they destroyed the workers' initiative; and 5) that such attempts drew away labor power which might otherwise have been "more profitably employed in other fields." 348 In their view in mainland China "things went from bad to worse" and drastic retrenchment in political, economic and social politics was required. 349 The "disappointed" group agreed with the "opposed" group in describing the communes, and thus rural China, as a "mess."

It is clear that many of the dissidents were within the Party. The press charged that "they even denied the great achievements in our work and described our great cause as being in an awful mess." 350 Some had "a definite revolutionary background and


349 Jung Chen op. cit., p. 11.

350 Shao-ch'i Liu, op. cit., p. 15.
political status." People's Daily warned that "fortresses are most vulnerable to attacks from within."³⁵¹ The same paper had already drawn a curious line between two types of Party members: "Marxists-Leninists" and to use an old phrase from the "decadent" West "fellow-travellers."³⁵² Mao denied his opponents' criticisms, specifically, "Unless we came to an abrupt halt, the worker-peasant alliance would be destroyed."³⁵³ He argued that his plans had been well-conceived and that it was ineffective local cadres who had "turned good things into bad things."³⁵⁴

D. Reluctant Modification

As we have seen, Mao made false assumptions about the Chinese people, the Chinese economy, and about Soviet and American behavior. The purpose of this section is to relate the effects of these false assumptions on his expectations of: 1) the political and economic capacity of the militia and of militarized civilians; and 2) the strategic needs of the CPR. Mao had to modify his assumption that military bodies and methods successful during the revolutionary period could meet the needs, political, economic, and international, of the Peking regime.

If we review the relationships of events and actors introduced previously, we can perceive the relationships of Mao's major policy moves and infer the strategy that he designed to fulfill regime needs and that he later had to revise. The four

³⁵² Wen Li, op. cit., p. 1.
³⁵³ Ch'ien Wang, op. cit., p. 21.
³⁵⁴ Chi-min Chu, op. cit., p. 6.
major moves were: 1) militarization of life in the commune format; 2) the Quemoy test; 3) the "All People in Arms" militia expansion; and 4) the effort to preserve the politicized-generalist nature of the PLA. The militarization of life policy was the earliest of these moves. It was initiated long before either the Quemoy crisis or the "All People in Arms" campaign. It was to be carried out in the commune format to exploit economic resources and insure pervasive Party control. The Quemoy crisis was obviously not staged to facilitate the militarization of life. The militarization campaign had been underway for many months before the Straits crisis. Even during the peak of the crisis the militarization of life campaign was not presented to the Chinese people as a response to external threats. Militarization of life was not presented to the outside world as a strategic factor until it became apparent that Quemoy could not be won. The significance of belated publicity on the militarization of life program as a strategic factor reflected Yao's tactics in the Quemoy crisis. He did not plan to invade the island, but hoped that Soviet nuclear blackmail would 1) lead America to withdraw its promise to support the Nationalists; and 2) lead to Nationalist surrender. When these tactics were unsuccessful and the militarization of life program encountered severe difficulties, the "All People in Arms" campaign was launched. The purposes of the campaign were: 1) to arouse patriotic support for the militarization of life policy; and 2) to convince at least three parties that the Quemoy failure did not indicate decisive Chinese weakness. These parties were the United States, the USSR, and the PLA. The external purposes
of the campaign account for the massive publicity magnification of the militia's actual military significance.

We can infer that Mao expected commune militarization of life, the Quemoy test and the militia expansion to support his effort to maintain the politicized-generalist army. Militarization of life was supposed to prove China's capacity to survive in nuclear attack. The Quemoy test was supposed to prove that Soviet missile capability would compensate for China's combat weaknesses relative to the United States. The "All People in Arms" campaign was supposed to prove that the regime could create an alternative coercive instrument to the PLA. In reality, none of the proofs were provided. These "disappointments" weakened Mao's ability to enforce unwelcome political control and non-coercive assignments on the military. The military was less willing to accept these impositions because of the three tactical failures. The military pressured the Party to compensate for unreliable Soviet nuclear support and Western weapons supremacy by creating a politicized-specialist army.

The false assumptions that we explored earlier did not lead to total or immediate failure, and exaggerated Peking claims had some kernel of truth. During 1958 unprecedented production increases were achieved in food crops, cotton, forestry, fishing, iron and steel, fuel and electric power, machine building and chemicals. Foreign trade shot up.\textsuperscript{355} The militarization of life resulted in an expanded labor force and increased labor intensity. The Communists claimed a 20-30\% increase in the

labor force and a 20% increase in production per worker. They claimed that in the rural areas the work force required for domestic labor was cut 75% by collectivization. Mess halls and nurseries were particularly effective in releasing female labor power from domestic chores. In Shantung the labor force purportedly increased by one-third. In Shansi, where nurseries supposedly cared for 90% of the children less than seven years old, 3.3 million women were "freed" for other economic tasks. The press published several cases to prove that "When several persons take up the work of several tens of households, several times or scores of times of labor power would be saved." Seventy percent of the increased agricultural production that resulted from the increased labor force was channeled into state-controlled savings and investment. The share of agricultural income distributed to the peasants declined sharply.

By the summer of 1959 People's Daily finally acknowledged that these gains could not be maintained on the basis of strained human and material resources. The paper admitted that agriculture could not be high-yielding without "tractors, large amounts of

356 Chia Shan, op. cit.; "The People's Communes in Honan Has Shown the Greatest Benefit," op. cit.
359 JMJF (Nov. 12, 1958) is cited ibid., p. 67.
361 JMJF (Sept. 19, 1958) is cited by Chu-yuan Cheng, op. cit., p. 23.
chemical fertilizer, modern agricultural machinery, and effective insecticide devices."362 "There is a certain limit in the rate of increase in agricultural production especially in China under the present economic and technical conditions."363 Communism could not be reached "without a higher production development level" and this was admitted to be objectively impossible for a considerable time.364

From the summer, 1959, the Chinese economic situation went from bad to worse. Since the August, 1959, revision of 1958 agricultural claims, "no new figures for agricultural production have been made public."365 Refugees have reported extensive malnutrition and food shortages of famine proportions. The Party has had to continue to attack unnamed groups "who have taken advantage of the difficulties created by natural calamities and shortcomings in basic-level work..."366 By December, 1959, Liu Shao-chi admitted that "revolutionary enthusiasm" was not enough to eliminate the need for training and analysis. Cadres had to give increased attention to "scientific spirit" to "investigation in depth" and to "plans that are of practical use."367 Once the Party made this concession to pragmatism, a spirit which has

366 JMJF (Jan. 21, 1961) is quoted ibid., p. 6.
continued through 1961, it began to emphasize "experts", "orderly division or labor", and technical expertise.\textsuperscript{368} It began to identify inadequate equipment and skill as much as ideological "backwardness" as a cause of failure.\textsuperscript{369} By September, 1961, \textit{Red Flag} sanctioned "a relatively long period of stabilization."\textsuperscript{370}

The militarization of life policy received the immediate impact of Mao's false assumptions and of his modifications. The Party had assumed that "the spiritual facade of our people will undergo the most profound change and the communist ideological consciousness and moral fiber will be greatly elevated ...[through] ...militarization for three or five years in succession."\textsuperscript{371}

Popular apathy and the inability of the Party to provide adequate managerial and material resources to capitalize on social reorganization had built up a reinforcing cycle. The less the new way of life could be implemented the fewer the economic returns. The fewer the economic returns, the less the regime could alleviate popular discontent. The less the regime could alleviate popular discontent the lower economic production fell. To salvage what economic progress had accrued from the program the cycle had to be interrupted. To do this the regime had to abandon the program. The Party retreat can be traced in each of the militarization of life sectors. Organization along military lines in the new labor armies was modified to give increased autonomy to the "large production brigade," equivalent to the pre-commune agricultural producers' cooperatives, and then to the "small

\textsuperscript{368} Schurmann, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 11, 13.
\textsuperscript{369} \textit{WP} (May 28, 1961) is quoted \textit{ibid.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{371} Sheng Tien, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
production brigade" equivalent to the predecessors of the large APCs, the small, village based cooperatives. Resemblances to military organization have been steadily eliminated. By December, 1958, cadres were being castigated for emulating military discipline. "Some of the cadres interpret militarization as absolute obedience from the masses; but this way of thinking is wrong." The change in leadership prerogatives and pressures affected the "combatization of action." The cadres were told not to lead the masses in shock attacks. They were instructed to avoid "hard leadership" and to concentrate on "orderly administration." A Western scholar has summarized this process as the "attempt to transform the commune cadres ... from little military commanders into competent administrators." In military terms the shift was one from cultivation of a psychological spirit of the offensive to cultivation of an attitude of defensive retention. It was an attempt to consolidate available resources. Part of this change in policy was an attempt to mitigate peasant and worker discontent. Part of it was an attempt to alleviate the "withdrawal of effort" by much criticized technicians and members of the intelligentsia. Part of its was a response to insufficient middle and lower level leadership and to cadres who exhibited:

'three bad styles of work' (bureaucratic, sectarianism, and subjectivism) and the 'five bad airs' (bureaucratic airs, apathetic airs, extravagant airs, arrogant airs, and finicky airs)
The collectivization institutions suffered a similar fate. Because of popular antagonism and the Party's inability to operate the new facilities, it switched to a demilitarized "voluntary principle" of membership. "The masses have the right to choose for themselves the forms of mess halls, the ways of running them, and the persons who should run them."\(^{375}\) The Party began to emphasize individual opportunities and rewards. The militarization program had not provided an adequate incentive structure, and the Party found coercion an inefficient substitute. Incentive wage scales were re-introduced and private production encouraged. The mainland was told that a ''remnant' of small peasant economy when the social production level is not yet high, must be retained for a fairly long period of time. Besides we must also foresee that the peasants will also retain their habit for small private ownership for some time to come."\(^{376}\) The peasants were assured that the heights of collectivization would not be scaled again.

It should be made known among the masses that the means of livelihood owned by members (including houses, clothing, bedding and furniture) and their deposits in banks and credit cooperatives will remain their own property after they join the commune and will always belong to them.\(^{377}\)

Political tensions and economic imbalances directly affected the degree to which Peking could fulfill its defense policy expectations. Popular resentment rendered a policy of a large number of trained and armed militiamen dangerous. At the same time it increased the need to use the militia to prevent

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\(^{375}\) Tzu-hui Teng, *op. cit.*, p. 5.


manifestations of popular illwill. The Party had to resort to more discriminating thermometers of political reliability in order to separate reliable militiamen from "fellow-travelers." In reality the Party did not even trust the core militia. The militia program was characterized by the same apathy and leadership limitations that had plagued the militarization of life program. Morale and therefore performance were poor. Organization was sloppy.\textsuperscript{378} The supply of technical instructors was limited, and often militiamen did not learn how to use the simple weapons available to them. The organization's coercive potential was minimal, and the Party abandoned its mass militia objective.

The modifications in the militarization of life and militia programs reduced the viability and combat capability of the new communes in a post-nuclear war attack. When the Party abandoned its militarization of life policy, mass mobilization could no longer be an automatic operation of switching established organizations and groups to defense-support tasks. When the Party recognized the inefficiency of rural industry, the commune unit became less self-sufficient. When the Party contracted the militia, it contracted the base for any future military effort. Since the militarization of life program had alienated the population from the regime, there was one defense advantage when it was abandoned: the population would be more willing to fight a protracted war for other than personal or local interests.

The role and influence of the regular armed forces were affected by political and economic failures and adjustments. The

Party had to rely more on the army for coercion. It was able to rely less on it politically. It had to rely more on it to help compensate for skill, labor and equipment shortages. Because the Party had to depend more on the military, the military was in a better position to demand higher arms appropriations, and reduced economic assignments and political control. (Other alienated elites, such as economic planners, joined the military elite to exert pressure on Mao.) For political and economic reasons the Party was obviously less able to accede to military demands. To solve its dilemma the Party resorted to three tactics: 1) it continued to demand non-coercive contributions from the PLA; 2) it tightened its political control of the PLA officer corps; and 3) it removed the root cause (militarization of life) of rank-and-file dissent.

Sino-Soviet relations and the failure of the Quemoy venture increased Party acceptance of the strategic views of PLA specialists. Here again Mao's expectations had not been fulfilled. When he launched the Quemoy crisis, he had expected to secure sufficient Soviet nuclear support to produce an American backdown. He expected that this strategy would validate his theory of the shift in the balance of power and would cause the Soviets and PLA elite to support his foreign policy line of local military initiatives in the under-developed areas. He also expected this strategy to secure China a higher status in Asia. In fact the Soviets did not provide the expected nuclear "shield." The Americans implied that they were willing to use their nuclear implements. The CPR did not secure the Nationalist-held islands.
Mao consequently became more partial to those officers who advocated a military establishment which did not have to rely on the Soviet shield. In other words, he agreed to provide the PLA with a token nuclear capability. He also accepted the specialist argument that the PLA should stay out of conflicts with the United States in which it would be at a technological disadvantage.

Mao still considered the United States a "paper-tiger." He still believed that the Communist camp could advance through selective military initiatives, i.e., "people's liberation wars." He tried to formulate a defense policy which harmonized the politicized-generalist capacity to fight guerrilla wars and the politicized-specialist capacity to fight without Soviet support. He tried to harmonize the achievement of a token nuclear capability with China's inadequate economic and technological resources.
Chapter 12

We summarize here the political and economic activities of the Chinese Communist armed forces, assess the validity of the hypotheses in Chapter 1 and return to the general question of the military contribution to modernizing societies raised in the Preface.

A. Factual Summary

In the factual summary the non-coercive roles of the regular forces and of the militia are treated separately. The activities of veterans (diffusion) are summarized under the indirect political and economic contribution of the regulars. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data is derived from Communist sources and is analyzed to credit the CCP military with the largest political and economic role consistent with quantitative CCP claims. This does not imply acceptance of these figures as accurate, but is an attempt to locate the maximum parameter of the military's non-coercive activities.

The political and economic functions are divided as follows: 1) the Army-Party relationship (Party leadership, Party membership); 2) the Army-Civilian relationship (mass persuasion, government, mass organization); 3) the Army-Economy relationship (agriculture and land reclamation, conservation, industry and technology, transportation and communication).

Each of these functions is analyzed in terms of four factors: time period, policy level, intensity and significance. Time Period: We concentrate on the 1937-1945 and 1949-1959 periods. In the first the Communists were an insurgent
movement, the army was politicized-generalist and the Communists were concerned with defeat of a domestic foe. In the second, the Communists were incumbents, the army increasingly politicized-specialist and the CCP concerned with international expansion. For the most part we disregard the 1927-1936 period because: 1) data are extremely fragmentary; and 2) the CCP had yet to mold the army into a politicized-generalist pattern. Although Mao had proposed the formation of such an army, his authority was too weak and the soldiers too scattered for it to be implemented systematically.

Policy Level: We separate the part which the military played in non-coercive functions into: policy formation, policy selection, implementation direction and implementation instrument.

Intensity: We measure the involvement of military personnel in the various political and economic duties in terms of time and proportion of the forces involved.

Significance: We measure the degree to which military participation in a non-coercive activity affected the whole society's accomplishments in that activity.¹

1. The Regular Forces

Fundamental to our assessment of the non-coercive role of the Chinese Communist military is its size in relation to the population under CCP control, i.e. first that of the base areas and then that of mainland China.

¹With one exception (see footnote 3) all data used in this chapter have been presented in earlier parts of the dissertation and their sources indicated at that time.
Table XXIX

Percentage of Population in CCP "Regular Forces, Reserve Troops and Public Security Forces".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages form the basis for later judgements of the significance of non-coercive military activity. They may also imply that the non-coercive assets of the military were in Chinese Communist eyes not as immense as their propagandists claim. Certainly the military was sizeable, but in relation to the total population under CCP control was minute. This may well reflect Party opinions that the political and economic contribution of the military was insufficient to compensate for: 1) decrease in individual productivity from civilian levels; 2) the cost of an expanded military establishment; and 3) the political control dangers of military enlargement. These opinions seem to have had considerable influence during both insurgent and incumbent periods.

a. The Army-Party Relationship

It is analytically useful to distinguish between Party leadership, i.e. membership in the Central Committee, Politburo, Standing Committee, Secretariat, CCP Military Committee and sub-national officeholding, and Party membership. Obviously,
leadership implies participation in some aspects of policy formation, policy selection and implementation direction. Party membership alone implies participation as an implementation instrument. The analysis distinguishes between the direct and indirect contribution to the Party by the military. Direct contributors are assigned simultaneous military and Party duties, i.e., members of the PPMC and NDC, active commanders and commissars and servicemen on active duty. Indirect contributors are Party officials who have held military positions, i.e., council members, ex-active commanders and commissars and veterans.

(i) Party leadership

During both time periods the intensity of military elite participation in Party leadership has been extremely high. The policy level of participation and its significance in total Party leadership have varied.

1937-1948: We have no statistical information to analyze participation at different policy levels or its significance. Several reasonable inferences can be made. The coercive importance of the Red forces and the shortage of Party leaders meant that the military and CCP elites were merged. Council members and active commanders and commissars constituted the bulk of Party leadership. We know that they dominated policy selection, e.g. in 1937 five of the seven known members of the Politburo were members of the Revolutionary Military Council. Personnel shortages and the discontinuous distribution of CCP forces and territories imply that they often formed, selected and directed the implementation of Party policy. Personnel
shortages imply the conclusion that the role was usually a
direct one. The previous history of the movement, i.e. Long
March and ten years of guerrilla warfare, imply that Party
leaders from 1937-1948 who were not assigned military responsi-
bilities had at some time held coercive responsibilities.
These leaders contributed an indirect contribution by the military
to Party leadership.

1949-1959, Policy Levels and Significance: The military
contribution has become increasingly indirect. It has diminished
on the most ascertainable levels, policy selection and implemen-
tation direction. On the whole it has become less significant.
1) The Greater Significance of the Indirect Contribution:
Comparison of the regular and alternate members of the 8th Central
Committee chosen in 1956 with those of the 7th Central Committee
chosen in 1947 demonstrate the decreased active commander contri-
bution to Party leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table XXX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Active Commanders in Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, approximately 66% of the 8th CC had had military
experience.

2) Policy Selection: During the incumbent years active military
commanders have never controlled the Politburo or the CCP
Standing Committee, the key organs of policy selection. Elevation to these positions has been accompanied by assumption of inactive military status. During the 1949-1953 period only two (or 25%) of the eight Politburo members held active PLA posts. In 1956 at most four members (or 24%) of the 17 man Politburo held active military posts. In 1958 the active military component declined to 20% because the Politburo was expanded to 20 full members and six alternates and the active military component did not change. The direct contribution of the Military Councils, whose members are less active in the PLA than active commanders, has been much more significant than that of the active commanders. In 1953 and 1958 half of the Politburo members also held council seats. The indirect contribution has been overwhelming. In 1955-58 only one member of the eight man Standing Committee held an active PLA post. In 1956 six of the eight members of the Standing Committee had been military actives. This contribution largely reflects the movement's guerrilla history. As the regime ages the indirect contribution can be expected to lessen.

3) Implementation Direction: In 1949-1953 active commanders and commissars directed implementation of CCP policy in the six Large Administrative Regions and numerous provinces. In 1956-58 only two active military elites directed provincial Party organizations. In 1956 PLA Political Department authority over local civilians was removed, reducing the intensity of military contribution at this policy level. There has been no direct military contribution to the Secretariat which directs implementation of CCP policy. As of July, 1956, no members were
military actives. The indirect contribution was more significant: eight of ten members of the Secretariat have seen service as either commanders or commissars.

4) Policy Formation: Policy formation has rested in the hands of the Politburo and Standing Committee, special staff groups subordinate to these Party organs and the CCP Military Committee. The comments previously made about the intensity and significance of the military contribution to the Politburo and Standing Committee also apply here. It is reasonable to assume that the increased CCP dependence on specialist advice has reduced the direct and indirect contribution of the military to the formation of non-coercive policy. Only fragmentary data is available on the CCP Military Committee. Several inferences can be made: a) since CCP military experts were active commanders in the 1937-1953 period they made a significant direct contribution to the Committee; b) since 1953 as military experts have "retired" to the military councils or from all official connection with the military the PLA contribution has become increasingly indirect. Only two of the nine CCP military experts identified at a 1958 committee meeting were still active commanders.

(iii) Party Membership

Party membership has varied in intensity and significance during the time period of interest here. It is useful to distinguish once again the direct contribution and indirect contribution of the military to CCP membership. Whenever possible, membership in the Party is distinguished from membership in the Young Communist League. Significance is not
entirely a function of the percentage of all Party members that are either connected with the military or have become indoctrinated in the forces. The greater the shortage of Party cadres, the more significant each member was. For example, in 1933 when Party membership was only 300,000 every additional member recruited through the military was relatively important.

Information on Party membership in the forces and among veterans (intensity) is incomplete. The general pattern is discernible. Command positions were only entrusted to Party members except in rare instances. In the lower ranks a much smaller percentage of soldiers were Party members. After the rapid expansion of the Communist forces in the late 1930's it was approximately 20%. The percentage probably increased during the rectification movement of 1942, but declined with military enlargement in the 1945-48 period. By 1951-52, after the defection of entire Nationalist armies to the PLA, Party membership had fallen to a low of 12%. A Party expansion program, ex-Nationalist defections and casualties in Korea, demobilization of less reliable soldiers, and reduction in the size of the regular forces produced a 1953 claimed membership of 40%. Since 1953 the Communist appear to have succeeded in maintaining military membership at 35-45%.

The direct contribution of the military to Party membership, until recent years was not paralleled by an equally intense indirect contribution. The great majority of the 5 million veterans discharged by the end of 1956 were the least politically reliable members of the forces who had been enlisted at times of revolutionary stress. The newly demobilized conscripts
represent a more valuable indirect contribution to Party membership. The mainland press has claimed that 80-90% of the over 400,000 conscripts discharged in the early conscript classes (1958-1960) were either members of the CCP or its auxiliary, the YCL.

Assessment of the significance of military CCP memberships is hampered by the failure of many statistics to distinguish between affiliation with the Party and the YCL. It seems reasonable to assume that a rise in CCP membership since 1949 combined with a decline in armed forces size diminished the significance of the direct contribution. This is supported by a comparison of 1953 and 1959 proportions of Party members in the services. The results are given in the following table.

Table XXXI

Percentage of CCP Membership Serving in Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

240% of the servicemen are assumed to be CCP members. The reader will see that this percentage was the 1953 CCP claim, and that CCP figures led us to estimate 1954-1959 membership at 33-45%. The number of CCP members in the PLA was arrived at by applying this percentage against the highest force figures presented in Chapter 3. The derived numbers were then combined with total Party membership figures to give the percentages in the table.
The lower average age of PLA servicemen under the conscription system (18-19 years) indicates that a far larger percentage of new veterans are YCL rather than Party members. These may, of course, become CCP members at a later date, but at the time of demobilization it is unlikely that 40% of the conscripts are Party members. Even if we accept 40% as valid, the PLA contributes at most 200,000 new CCP members each year. However, total CCP membership is growing at a much faster rate, which implies that the significance of the direct and indirect military contribution to Party membership can be expected to decline.

b. The Army-Civilian Relationship

Three political functions of the armed forces fall under this heading: mass persuasion (propaganda), government and mass organizations.

(1) Mass Persuasion

Little statistical evidence is available on the mass persuasion activities of the Communist regulars during either the 1937-1948 or 1949-1959 periods and we are limited to inferences.

Policy Level: During both periods armed forces personnel outside of the Political Department have served primarily as implementation instruments. During both periods propaganda activities were under the supervision of political cadres (implementation direction). From 1937-1951 the Army directed the implementation of propaganda policy by attached groups of civilians. This was because: a) CCP propagandists had to
work primarily under military protection and b) military political cadres were the only reliable managerial personnel in the newly conquered or tenuously held areas in which propaganda was most needed. The military has increasingly withdrawn from policy formation and policy selection in mass persuasion activities. Exceptions to this generalization are situations in which the PLA is engaged in warfare and suppression of hostile forces, e.g. Tibet. In these situations high-level political officers exercise the same policy-making functions as they did for the scattered armies of the revolutionary years.

Intensity: The training and indoctrination policies of the CCP during the years from 1937-1951 make clear that every soldier was expected to propagandize either directly or through support-oriented behavior. When the military became a more politicized-specialist army based in fixed garrison compounds, it had less opportunity and preparation for participation in propaganda. Active military participation in propaganda is increasingly limited to ceremonial appearances and publicized "examples" which are carried out by specialists in military indoctrination and entertainment.

Significance: Military mass persuasion contributions were extremely important during the 1937-1949 period. The armed forces were the major link between Party and people, particularly in the aspiration area. Their numbers assisted the Party to propagandize the base area population and convince them of the value of supporting the Communist cause. During the incumbent years as the Peking regime has developed a corps of
civilian propagandists it has depended less on the military. The propaganda contribution of active servicemen retains significance in three cases when: 1) the Party has to propagandize a hostile environment, 2) civilian discontent forces the Party to use all available propagandists, e.g. the aftermath of the communication campaign; and 3) the Party wants to emphasize themes of patriotism and national defense in propaganda, e.g. the Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign.

The PLA may also make a significant indirect contribution to propaganda through its demobilized veterans. The role of over five million veterans in rural China is significant to the extent that they have the ability (literacy) to assimilate and diffuse propaganda and the motivation (Communist loyalty) to do so. However, as we have seen, many of them have neither of these qualifications. As literacy and indoctrination of rural civilians increases, the significance of this propaganda contribution will decrease.

(ii) Government

Two analytic distinctions of the regulars' contribution to civil government are useful. The first is between the direct and indirect contribution as previously defined. The second is between the contribution to central government, i.e. that in charge of the base area and later of the mainland, and sub-central government, i.e. Large Administrative Regions, provinces, counties and cities. In analyzing the military contribution to government, one comment needs to be made about the significance of policy levels. Policy selection in CCP institutions is in effect made by the Party. This well-known
fact means that directors of government departments select policy only to the extent that they are also in the CCP high command. It also means that occupation of such offices without membership in the Party elite implies that the individual exercises little real power at any stage in the policy process.

1937-1948: Since no statistical data is available, we can only infer the military contribution in central or sub-central posts and to different policy levels. **Policy Level:** During most of this period the intimate military-CCP elite relationship meant that the army directly participated in civilian government at the levels of policy formation, policy selection and implementation direction. In the base areas the military unofficially supervised local government policy formation, selection and direction. As the period drew to a close and the regions became less vulnerable to enemy recapture, the military role became more one of direction of implementation. Whenever possible, e.g. the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the military contribution was restricted. However, active servicemen remained in control at all policy levels in administrative organs concerned with coercion. **Intensity:** The CCP limited administrative participation by the military to political cadres and commanders of proven Party loyalty. Civilian auxiliary organizations were under the direction of military Political Departments. Since the percentage of servicemen in the CCP at the end of this period was only about 20%, it is safe to assume that, at least in 1944-48, no more than one-fifth of military personnel participated. **Significance:** The significance of
military participation in government during this period was in relation to the general unimportance of the civil government institution. The great importance of military success and the needs of battle gave military political cadres and civilian auxiliaries importance in excess of their numbers. They were the prime agents in the formation, selection and implementation direction of government institutions and policy in most Communist areas.

1949-1954: During the 1949-1954 period the participation of the military at all policy levels was significant and for the command elite and political departments intense. Since that time it has drastically contrasted in all three aspects. As civil administration emerged as a key arm of the CCP, numerous military elites became primarily government directors. Their former military experience enables us to label these personnel as an indirect military contribution to government.

Policy Level: Military participation at the levels of policy formation and sub-central implementation direction has been largely abandoned. As the economic and administrative tasks of government have become more complex, and the Party has developed administrative specialists loyal to it, the role of the untrained revolutionary generals in policy formation probably declines. Statistical evidence relevant to the abolition of the Large Administrative Regions, Military and Political Committees and Military Control Commissions that comprised the sub-central government structure after takeover supports our assumption that military sub-central implementation direction has declined. In 1951 16 active commanders held sub-central
posts; in 1956 only two. Sub-central government posts of military council members declined from 17 in 1951 to five in 1956. Military implementation direction at the central government level has also declined. For example, PRC departments no longer direct China's railway, communication and aviation systems.

The evidence about indirect policy level participation is more fragmentary, but confirms that military implementation direction has declined, e.g. in the Foreign Ministry the ambassadorial corps is no longer almost exclusively composed of ex-military leaders. The army has come to play an indirect and undetermined role as implementation instrument. The mainland press has repeatedly reported that veterans handle government assignments in the rural areas. It is reasonable to assume that some of them, particularly retired officers and CCP and YCL members, participate at this level, but no estimate of the intensity or significance of their participation is possible.

Intensity: Intensity has declined drastically since 1949. Statistical evidence confirms the decline in the government participation of officers, members of the military councils, and PLA staff officers. It also confirms the almost complete lack of participation in civilian administration by the key officials of the Ministry of Defense. Government participation by officers of the military council declined from 100% in 1953 to 53% in 1959; of council members, from 74% in 1953 to 13% in 1959. In 1953 two of five PLA staff members held government posts. In 1955 and 1958 no members of a staff which had expanded to 14 and 26 held government posts. Since
the inception of the Ministry of Defense in 1955, no Vice-
Ministers of Defense have held other governmental posts which
do not involve direction of the military. Scattered evidence
points to a similar trend for active commanders. We know
that 25 occupied important government posts in 1951 and only
seven in 1956.

Significance: To some extent we can measure the numerical
magnitude of the direct and indirect military contribution to
the central government elite and the importance of their
assignments. The Party elite provides our sample for reasons
stated earlier. In 1951 39% of this elite held both active
command and key government positions; in 1959, only 9%. The
number and importance of offices held by active commanders
decided also. The significance of the government contrib-
ution of military council members also declined, although to
a lesser extent. For example, in 1955 council officers held
50% of State Council Vice-Premierships; in 1959 they held
only 38%. However, council members held key government
positions in all departments vitally concerned with coercion
and the use of military personnel. Active commanders and
council members still command significant policy selection
power in matters directly affecting the PLA.

The decline in significance of the direct military
contribution was accompanied by an increase in the importance
of the indirect military contribution. As of September, 1959,
the State Council, the six General Offices in charge of govern-
ment activities, key ministries and commissions were headed by
ex-military personnel. The significance of the military
contribution as a whole only declined from 59% to 53%. The military men who held government posts immediately after takeover were not replaced at the central level by civilian administrators. They tended to relinquish their military assignments. The ranks of the government elite were augmented by military personnel who may have had less prominent military experience. As these revolutionary veterans who now constitute the indirect contribution to government pass from the scene, the significance of the indirect military contribution can be expected to decline still further.

We do not expect it to become completely insignificant. Military men are still given key government posts in situations of active hostilities, e.g. Tibet.

(iii) Mass Organizations

We have only fragmentary evidence for this contribution. Policy Level: During the 1937-51 period military personnel acted as policy selectors, implementation directors and implementation instruments. Since key Party personnel in many areas were members of the armed forces, policy selection for the mass organizations rested in hands of active military personnel. Direction of the implementation of mass organization policy was entrusted during these years to the Popular Movements section of the Political Department which also directed civilian auxiliaries. The military was an implementation instrument during the revolution and after 1949. Its personnel established the organizational units. In 1951-1959 the direct contribution has been almost entirely replaced by an indirect one. Military veterans participate at the levels
previously involved in the direct military contribution.

Intensity: The reasons for the decline in intensity of the direct contribution to mass persuasion apply here.

Significance: From 1937 to 1951 shortage of reliable Communist personnel and the urgent need to establish an infrastructure of popular organizations within Communist base areas imparted great significance to the direct military contribution. During the last years of this period significance declined at policy implementation instrument and policy selection levels. After organizations were established the lower level PLA political cadres involved in the implementation instrument level were assigned to other activities. At the policy selection level the Party established a separate leadership echelon for mass organizations. It is reasonable to conjecture that at first the indirect military contribution to the high echelon of the mass organizations was substantial. During the 1951-1959 period this probably declined as a new generation of CCP reliables who had not held responsible posts during the guerrilla years appeared. The indirect contribution of the armed forces is more likely to remain significant in the lowest levels of mass organization officialdom, e.g., township chairmen, because the political indoctrination and skills, e.g., literacy that PLA veterans acquire during three years of service will continue to render them suitable for these positions.

C. The Army-Economy Relationship

To assess the intensity and significance of the regular army's contribution to the economy we must take into account active and veteran manpower, skills (managerial and technical)
and equipment. Coercive supervision of labor is distinguished from genuine production.

The military economic contribution is assessed in relation to the proportion of total active and inactive military personnel to the population and to the male labor forces of the base areas and CPR. From 1937-1948 the proportion is .4 to 1% (see Table XXX). After the mid-1950's massive demobilization added indirect military contributors, and in 1959 the total active and inactive military comprised approximately 1% of the mainland population. The probable representation of active and inactive servicemen in the full-time labor force, i.e., male adults over 15, is appreciably higher. By 1959 it probably constituted approximately 3-4%.3 If force levels are not raised, both percentages will decline as the abnormal proportion of veterans leave the active labor force and the mainland population continues to rise.

Since 1949 military supplies of skills (and equipment) have increased disproportionately to the increase in military manpower. Obviously this factor affects what the military is capable of doing and what it is asked to do. By 1958 only 10% of the six million demobilized soldiers were classified as "technicians," even if the term defined truck drivers and other semi-skilled occupations. It is reasonable to assume that as the complexity of equipment increases a higher proportion of veterans, present and future servicemen, will

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possess more sophisticated skills. Although currently the primary military economic contribution is supply of labor forces and coercive supervisors, we can assume that the economic contribution will be of a technically more complex nature as the soldiers' skill level rises. To the extent that skilled personnel are used as teachers their contribution will be more significant than their numbers indicate.

Before we evaluate the specific economic contributions of the military, we can present data on the intensity of military economic activity. This data refers to the regular forces since we presume that the economic intensity of veterans approaches full-time effort. The most intense military contribution on which statistical data are available was made in 1958-26 man days per year. Data for 1956, 1957 and 1959 give a considerably lower figure. The Chinese People's Volunteers, even after the Korean armistice, had an even lower intensity than the PLA. In 1955 it approximated two man days per year. During the period for which statistical data is available the average intensity of military participation in the economy was relatively low. However, probably the intensity of the participation of the "economic" branches of the PLA was considerably higher (see below).

1) Agriculture and Land Reclamation:

The military contribution to agriculture and enlargement of agricultural land (land reclamation) has been a response to overwhelming national needs. There have been three alternatives to military economic participation: 1) military starvation; 2) population starvation; and 3) insufficient agricultural surpluses
to provide capital for industrialization.

1937-1948: Policy Level: To the extent that military men formed and selected all CCP policy during this period, they participated at these levels in agriculture and land reclamation. To a relatively small extent the army directed civilians in the implementation of relevant programs. The military was also an implementation instrument. Soldiers plowed and sowed fields and cleared the land. Intensity: Combat necessity restricted the amount of time revolutionary servicemen could spend in the fields. Garrison forces participated more intensely than the mobile guerrilla bands, although they did participate to a minor extent. One brigade, the 359th, was assigned to almost full time economic activity and spent the major portion of its time in agriculture and land reclamation. In the one reclamation instance on which statistical data is available the army participated with low average intensity. This was the campaign of 1939-1940. The 270,000 man Eighth Route Army reclaimed on an average only .01 of an acre per man. Significance: We can infer that the military, usually did not even support itself: the 359th Brigade, after four years of almost fulltime economic labor, produced only 20% more than its own food consumption needs. Although no statistical averages are available, all evidence indicates that most CCP military units spent much less time in production. The army contribution to land reclamation was more significant. CCP sources claimed that it was responsible for one-third of the land reclaimed in the Shansi-Kansu-Ningshsia Border Region during 1940-1945. Even in the S-K-N 1939-1940 reclamation campaign the military reclaimed a more
significant percentage of land than its representation in the population would have warranted, i.e. 2.9%, although it composed less than 1% of the base area inhabitants.

1949-1959: The incumbent period witnessed the establishment of specialized PLA economic branches; the one of relevance to this non-coercive function is the Sinkiang Construction and Production Field Army. Policy Level: PLA activity in agriculture and land reclamation, with the exception of the Sinkiang Army, has become concentrated at the policy selection and implementation direction levels. The Minister and Vice-Minister for State Farms and Land Reclamation are both members of the National Defense Council, and the Minister is an active commander. Veterans have assumed direction positions in the lower level agricultural organizations according to scattered 1955 reports and publicity on the communes. The Sinkiang project, which the army controls, indicated that PLA members are used increasingly as supervisors. We know that civilian personnel have been added to the project, and since it is improbable that these individuals would be placed in control of the military, we can infer that they augment the project at the implementation instrument level and release military personnel for higher policy positions.

Intensity: Since we do not know the size of the Sinkiang Corps, we cannot assess the intensity of its agricultural and land reclamation contribution. In 1950 the direct land reclamation contribution in other parts of the mainland can be estimated at .1 acre per soldier. By 1956 it had declined by over 90%. The intensity of the indirect contribution to agriculture has declined but remains relatively high.
Table XXXII
Veteran Participation in Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As more highly skilled new veterans enter into the veteran population and the old warriors die, a higher percentage will probably be assigned to industry. **Significance:**

Military participation in agriculture and land reclamation has two significant aspects. The first is its importance in the colonization and development of strategic border areas. This program is exemplified by the Sinkiang Army on the borders of the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia and the resettlement of CPV personnel on the North Korea and Soviet borders. As of 1958 in Sinkiang the PLA Corps administered 30% of the arable land and 20% of the sown land. The second significant aspect is the indirect contribution to lower level administrative posts. We cannot assess this contribution statistically and can only infer the importance of politically reliable, literate and basically skilled personnel in these posts.

(ii) **Conservation:** Little information is available on this PLA activity. During the 1937-1948 period relevant activities were sporadic and carried out primarily for propaganda purposes. Since 1949 two special PLA arms have handled this function: the Water Conservancy Corps and the Forestry Corps.
Policy Level: Scattered information implies that PLA participation in conservation has shifted to the levels of implementation direction. Although policy selection posts, the Ministries of Water Conservancy and Electric Power and of Forestry, are held by NDC members, both are KMT defectors and hold little real power. We have no information on the identity of their staff. The implementation instrument activities of these units were particularly great when they were composed of ex-Nationalists. As the number of these declines, it is likely that they will tend to supervise forced labor corvees.

Intensity: The Corps probably comprise only a small fraction of the PLA. Some conservation activity is undertaken in its province by the Sinkiang Army previously mentioned. On rare occasions and for short periods of time other PLA units are assigned to crucial projects. This was done to a relatively great extent in 1958 when participation was reported in 20,000 projects. Decline in this supplementary participation correlates with a decline in 1959 projects to 5,510.

Significance: Corps participation has been reported in most major water control projects and tree-planting programs. No assessment of the proportional contribution to these projects and programs is possible.

(iii) Industry and Technology: This economic sector was almost non-existent in the Communist base areas (1937-1948).

Policy Level: What activity existed was either directed by the army (policy selection and implementation direction) or attached to army units (implementation instrument).
Intensity: Few industries of small size involved only a small proportion of military personnel. Significance: Industries manufacturing products for army use and run by the army predominated. In North China almost all "industries" were directed by the Eighth Route Army; in the South China CCP controlled territories this function was handled by the New Fourth Army.

1949-1959: Policy Level: Military participation in industry and technology has been increasingly confined to the levels of policy selection and direction implementation. Active commanders and council members direct the First and Second Ministries of Machine Building (defense industry) and the Scientific and Technological Commission. The PLA staff Rear Service Department controls numerous "Military supply plants". The Navy directs shipyards. There is no evidence to indicate that these factories and scientific research institutions are staffed by PLA personnel (implementation instrument). A possible exception may be the engineering branch of the Sinkiang Army. Intensity: With the exception of occasional special campaigns, very few PLA personnel participate in this function. Intensity was probably greater immediately after the takeover of the mainland when military cadres took charge of private firms. Even in 1958 when PLA economic participation was relatively intense, the military could have contributed only a fraction of the 26 days per man spent in economic labor to industrial operations and construction. Significance: The career histories of the heads of the CEP defense industry complex and of the scientific program imply military control.
in the Communications Ministry had all held important military posts and comprised an indirect contribution. The former are still on the NDC. It is reasonable to assume that civilian specialists hold middle level administrative positions. However, at the implementation instrument level the Railway Corps and the PLA Signal Corps have participated. **Intensity:** No information is available. It is probable that only a small percentage of PLA personnel are in the Railway Corps. It is also probable that immediately after takeover when it was necessary to rehabilitate existing facilities to link the main urban centers there was somewhat more activity by PLA personnel. **Significance:** The Railway Corps has participated in the major construction programs conducted in the incumbent years. PLA units, at least partially drawn from the Corps, have participated in the major highway construction projects in these years. No comprehensive figures are available on the role the PLA played in the completion of these projects. Fragmentary data indicates that it was extremely significant at the supervisory level. At the instrument level a large part of the PLA activity was coercive. For example, in the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking railway there was one Corps member to every four civilian conscripts. In communication, reports on the commune program indicated that expansion of facilities and qualified personnel largely depended on the PLA Signal Corps.

2. The Militia

The figures in the following table approximate the numbers of militia members and the proportions they comprised
of the population under Communist control. We derive the figures in our "average estimate" for the size and proportion of core and general militia personnel in the "All People in Arms" campaign from non-Communist sources. Unless otherwise indicated the percentage of significance has been maximized by using the largest militia size claims in combination with the lowest population claims.

Table XXXIII
Militia - Size and Significance

A. Period Size Significance in Population
1935 1 million 1.7 %
1945 2.2 million 2.3 %
1951 12.8 million 2.4 %
1958 (pre-campaign) 10-12 million 1.8 %

B. "All People in Arms"

General Militia:
Projection CCP claims: 200 million 29.7 %
Our average estimate: 57 million 10. %

Core Militia:
CCP claims: 30 million 4. %
Our average estimate: 20 million 3. %

CCP trained with ammunition: 4 million .06%
(projection) CCP advanced training: 2 million .03%

From 1937-1951 (national defense, revolution and land reform) when the CCP was probably most popular, the militia
comprised only a small proportion of the population. Even after the "All People in Arms" Campaign at most only 4% of the population could be considered part-time soldiers. The general militia, as the Communist later indicated, was in effect a militarized work group. The data in the table and fragmentary additional information allow us to make a general assessment of the non-coercive role of the militia. Functions: Militia members have participated in a broad range of non-coercive activities during the history of the Chinese Communist movement. They have filled lower level posts in Party and civil administration. They have participated in propaganda programs. In the economy they have directed small agricultural units, cultivated and reclaimed land, constructed and repaired water control facilities and transported tax grain and vital materials. Policy Level: Militia members were active at the levels of implementation direction and implementation instrument in the localities because the Party tried to staff militia units with politically reliable CCP and YCL members and with civil government personnel. In the 1937-1945 period one-third of local CCP members were required to join militia units. County and township headquarters were directed by the chief civil government official. In the 1949-1959 period militia commanders and vice-commanders often participated in the key local organ, the CCP committee. In the communes, at least before the December, 1958, Wuhan Resolution, the militia commanders were often directors of the commune government and chairmen of the commune CCP committee. Participation on the level of implementation direction was less a function of militia rank.
than of political reliability which led to militia rank. Participation of militia members as implementation instruments was more a function of militia membership which made them available and organized for this participation. **Intensity:**

We can infer that the militia member spent most of his time in non-coercive functions for two reasons: 1) the purpose of the militia program was to combine a little coercive training with a great deal of economic production; and 2) the level of military training was low and would not have demanded that much time. It is important to note that militiamen continued heavy non-coercive assignments even during the "All People in Arms" campaign. (See figures in table on personnel trained in advanced courses and with live ammunition.) The percentage of non-coercive activities which the militiamen undertook in his military and in his civilian capacities is not known.

**Significance:** Militia membership has comprised only a small fraction of the total mainland population, though it has been represented to a greater extent in the active work force than its proportion indicates. There is no evidence that the substantive production of militia men was in excess of their representation in the population. There is fragmentary evidence that militia members sometimes played a greater role in implementation direction than their numbers would indicate. For example, in Kirin province in 1951 they comprised over 50% of the mutual aid team leaders. The significance of the non-coercive role of the militia will always be limited by two parameters: 1) to the extent that militiamen must participate in internal security activities they cannot participate in
non-coercive activities; and 2) the Party cannot endanger its position by expanding the militia beyond a certain percentage of the population.

3. Initial Hypotheses

Although all the hypotheses advanced in Chapter I are confirmed, several require comment.

Hypothesis 3: To the extent that military service inculcates skills and attitudes desired by the political leadership, it attempts to expose the largest possible proportion of the population to such experience. We have seen that counter-vailing factors such as political control and the economy's labor needs have kept the CCP from diverting a large part of the population into the regular forces. However, the "All People in Arms" campaign and particularly the "militarization of life" program were designed to increase population exposure to a military environment without the disadvantages of regular service.

Hypothesis 5: To the extent that a successful insurrection movement enlarges the number of vocational groups it controls, the non-coercive influence of the military decreases. Since Communist takeover of the mainland other personnel have been developed to execute non-coercive functions. The CCP leadership can manipulate these groups and the military against each other. This tendency has been minimized to the extent that political and economic tasks are assigned to the PLA to affect its attitudes and skills, that the new groups are not deemed trustworthy, and that active hostilities continue.
Hypothesis 6: To the extent that socio-economic modernization requires non-coercive specialization the value of a broad non-coercive military activity scope decreases. As the Chinese Communist economy demands more advanced skills, the fundamental skills taught a backward peasantry during two years of military service have less value. As the army's coercive specialization is increased through more complex equipment, a higher order of skills has to be developed. But this implies a tacit acceptance of restriction in the activity scope of the armed services.

Hypothesis 7: To the extent that internal and external threat is great, the possibility of military implementation of political and economic policies decreases. If the CCP leadership admits overwhelming coercive threats to its existence, it cannot rationalize time-consuming military assignments which do not meet these threats. At the other extreme, if the CCP leadership overly minimizes coercive threats, it cannot rationalize the allocation of scarce resources to the armed forces. The Party can test rationalize assigning the military non-coercive tasks by locating the threat between these two extremes, particularly in situations where internal unrest seems to make the PLA the only agency able to execute non-coercive functions.

Hypothesis 8: To the extent that socio-economic needs are pressing and military leadership participates in policy formation and policy selection, the maintenance of the politicized-generalist nature of the military is facilitated. The Communist forces were most amenable to non-coercive tasks when they were immediately relevant to troop survival and battle victory, and when they were
in fact directed by men who also led the army. As these conditions have changed, the military has become increasingly resentful of non-coercive tasks and impatient with limited specialization.

Hypothesis 9: To the extent that the politicized-generalist army anticipates becoming a politicized-specialist army, it acquires advanced skills and helps implement socio-economic modernization. For many years the Party leadership hinted to its armed forces that they could anticipate more specialization when national modernization had progressed sufficiently. During the insurgent years and years immediately after 1949 the officers corps accepted this restriction. In recent years sizeable numbers of PLA officers have become impatient with delays in the "withering away" of their political and economic responsibilities. They have questioned: a) the need for further modernization before change in the institutional nature of the military establishment; and b) the good faith of the CCP elite in leading them to anticipate such a change.

Hypothesis 10: To the extent that totalitarian leadership in a modernizing country desires to expand at the expense of modern countries, it requires a politicized-specialist army. This requirement affects the Peking regime only to that extent that it: a) anticipates direct conflict with a powerful, modern nation; or b) anticipates that such a power will use its forces in response to an attack on a weak and traditional or transitional society which the Chinese attack. The Chinese leadership has not anticipated either of these types of conflicts and has used this
argument to justify maintenance of the politicized-generalist army.

Hypothesis 15: To the extent that the politicized-generalist army contains other elements the system leadership must either appease, expel or change them. The choice of action depends on the power of these elements in comparison with that of the national leadership. We have seen that the internal and external ambitions of the CCP prevent it from making the hard choices necessary to exclude either the generalist or specialist politicized alternatives. These ambitions maintain the heterogeneity of the military establishment at the price of an on-going debate about its proper duties and relationships with political authority. They require periodic rectifications to ensure Party dominance over all factions. The persistence of internal problems correlates with waning regime popularity to decrease the CCP's power to expel or change the forces. Appeasement only perpetuates and in the long run intensifies the disputes over the institutional nature of the PLA.

C. Armies and Modernization: Questions from the China Case

Our initial purpose in this dissertation was to enlarge our understanding of military contributions to modernization. We wanted to know what armies could do, how they could increase their capability, and what led them to accept or seek political and economic responsibilities. These questions have been answered in detail for the Chinese Communist Movement. The facts of our case study do not allow us to provide precise answers for military establishments in other modernizing nations. We can, however,
point to important questions whose answers determine the significance of the Chinese case for other nations. The questions we pose are essentially unanswered by the facts we have presented. This is because the CCP never had to answer these questions, e.g., military obedience to democratic leadership, or has as yet been unable to find answers, e.g., the compatibility of a politicized-generalist army with international expansion.

The factual information in the first part of this chapter demonstrates that Communist armies have not significantly modernized Chinese society. However, the CCP has continued to stress the importance of military political and economic activity to the CPR and to Communist insurgents, i.e., "people's war." This paradox leads us to ask what particular benefits the CCP expects from the small non-coercive military contribution, what problems it encounters, what possibility there is of similar benefits and problems in other modernizing societies, and what other degrees of contributions the military can make to transitional societies.

The case study shows us that the Party expects non-coercive military activity to assist political and economic development less by changing society than by strengthening Party control of society. Military activity is expected to have a "demonstration effect"—to convince the society that the Party places a high priority on modernization and is qualified to lead the nation in that direction. The military presence in these activities is an implicit demonstration of force in cases of non-co-operation. Equally important are the expected effects on the armed forces. They are reminded of non-coercive national needs and are disciplined
through non-professional assignments.

The circumstances that led the Party to seek these benefits restricted their attainment. These circumstances were the contradictions posed by the Party’s ambitions (political control, economic development, and international expansion) and environmental necessities. Environmental necessity restricted the military contribution during the revolutionary years. Guerrilla requirements and elite unity made non-coercive tasks acceptable to the army, but incessant combat and scarce resources limited the contribution it could make. These restrictions have been minimized since 1949 only to be replaced by others. The rewards of political and economic activity are no longer immediate necessities for military success. Specialized elites have developed. The more time the military spends in non-coercive assignments, the less energy and preparation it can devote to international expansion. The military’s "hard" inputs to society are no longer magnified by comparison with those of an ineffective incumbent regime. Now the CCP does not derive its support by getting the society to accept what the Party "would do if it could," i.e., controlled the nation; it derives it from what the Party "is doing." Token military efforts are no longer assessed against the failure of the KMT but against the failure of the military’s masters.

When we consider other modernizing societies, we ask if these benefits can be attained and these problems avoided. Faced with the problem of military survival, insurgent armies necessarily have to restrict their non-coercive activities. An
incumbent regime motivated and secure enough to make a fundamental modernization effort can "outbid" the rebels. In this case, is it advantageous, let alone crucial, for the insurgents to divert even a small fraction of military energies to non-coercive functions? Even if the incumbents do not "outbid" the insurgents, the revolutionary political and military leadership has to 1) instill new skills and attitudes in the servicemen; and 2) harmonize coercive and non-coercive priorities. If an insurgent movement does not have totalitarian leadership, can it do these things?

Any regime in power experiences more difficulty in securing a "demonstration effect." Several benefits can still be derived from token military political and economic activity. The population can be reassured that internal needs are not completely sacrificed for international ambitions. The military can be reminded that internal needs do not allow a fixation or international expansion. These benefits have marginal value in modifying competition between internal development and international expansion. In a totalitarian and particularly non-totalitarian society, will the population be satisfied with token political and economic inputs by the military? Will the military: 1) accept internal tasks and 2) be satisfied with civilian modernization programs?

When we consider the alternative contributions that armies can make to modernizing societies, we speculate on the relationship of non-coercive military activity to political authority in the society, to national ambitions and to the character of the
army.

Obviously, the non-coercive contribution of an insurgent army can vary only in a narrow range because of the overwhelming priority it allots to combat. If the insurgents are engaged in guerrilla operations, combat success depends on some political and economic activity.

The more interesting cases involve incumbent regimes in modernizing nations. The important variables here are: 1) totalitarian and non-totalitarian political authority; 2) internal development and international expansion ambitions; and 3) politicized-generalist, politicized-specialist, programmatic, and professional types of armies. The reader recalls that the programmatic army is one which implements a broad social and economic program and is its own master. The professional army is one which only accepts coercive tasks and is loyal to whoever holds political office.

We can pose extremes of military coercive and non-coercive activity. If a totalitarian society selects internal development as its primary ambition, it can create a politicized-generalist army capable and willing of a vast contribution to modernization. If a non-totalitarian society has the same ambition, is it possible for it to maintain control of an army capable of and willing to make vast contributions to modernization? In other words, is the only alternative to a politicized-generalist army a programmatic one which usurps civilian power?

If a totalitarian society selects international expansion as its primary ambition, it can create a politicized-specialist
army which is relatively isolated from modernization programs. If a non-totalitarian society selects the same priority, it can create a professional army. Can either type of government in a modernizing society provide the army with the requirements for coercive success, particularly against a modern opponent? If the test of combat results in defeat, do these armies remain subordinate to political authority?

Whatever the type of political authority in a modernizing society, emphasis of either internal development or international expansion to the relative exclusion of the other creates serious problems. If international expansion is abandoned or indefinitely postponed, can the regime provide other plums to nationalism during the arduous process of modernization? If it cannot, can it appeal to other sentiments to mobilize the energies modernization requires? If internal development is abandoned or indefinitely postponed, can the regime compensate the public for a diversion of resources from socio-economic progress? If it cannot and if failure is experienced in combat, do the discontented army and society unite against the regime or do insurgent movements develop against both the army and the regime?

Obviously most modernizing societies, regardless of type of government, try to pursue both internal and external ambitions. This compromise solution reduces the energies devoted to either enterprise and increases the probabilities of failure of both. Groups are created in both the army and society opposed to or at least dissatisfied with the diffusion of national energies. The military advocates of internal or international concentration
seek opportunities to justify their positions at the expense of the regime and eventually through the expansion of their faction's political authority. Can the government of a modernizing and therefore inherently unstable society survive this opposition? Does the division of military energies between coercive and non-coercive activity significantly lower the chances of internal and external success? If dramatic successes are not achieved in either area, do dissatisfied military and civilian factions continue to tolerate the regime?
APPENDIX
Memo for the Future

It is not in the province of this thesis to speculate on the future developments in the political and economic role of the Chinese Communist army. However, the reader might find it of interest to ponder projections of current trends in the PLA-Party-society relationship.

The variables in our projection are: 1) internal modernization success-failure; 2) external non-military success-failure; and 3) external military success-failure. We assume that the Chinese Communist system is totalitarian and modernizing. We assume that the PLA is divided between the authorized politicized-generalist faction and the officers who prefer a politicized-specialist orientation.

1) **Internal Success and External Military and Non-Military Success**: Neither the army nor regime will have any immediate incentive to change the military institutional nature and its non-coercive role. Although the system will be satisfied with the institutional nature and non-coercive role of the military, its internal success will allow it to diminish the military's non-coercive role and accede to some degree of specialist pressure. To the extent that the system imposes non-coercive tasks on the PLA as control devices the Party will be reluctant to diminish the army's non-coercive role. The degree to which the Party will accede to politicized-specialist pressures will depend on these variables: 1) CCP confidence in PLA loyalty; 2) the institutional nature of anticipated future military opponents. The politicized-generalist element in the military will manipulate military
external success to refute specialist arguments. The politicized-specialist element of the military will manipulate internal and external military and system success in three ways to contend: 1) that the system can afford specialization expenditure; 2) that the system does not need non-coercive contributions from the military; and 3) that the system should emulate the military establishments of great powers.

2) Internal Success, External Non-Military Success and External Military Failure: The system will react to military external failure in three possible ways: 1) it will try to change the military's institutional nature and/or non-coercive role; 2) it will change system needs; or 3) it will devalue external military ventures as a viable strategy. It is probable that it will follow the first course if the external target area cannot be won by non-military means and the system refuses to revise its agenda to exclude the need for the target area. The implications of this alternative for the military is that the system will try to alter its politicized-generalist nature to a politicized-specialist nature and will reduce its non-coercive burden. It is probable that the Party will follow the second course if the target area cannot be won by military or non-military means, and the system's internal success is not sufficient to finance modernization of the military. To the extent that the Party anticipates future military encounters in which its army might be defeated, it will retain the politicized-generalist nature of the military and increase its non-coercive role. It is probable that the Party will follow the third course if the
target area can be won by non-military means. To the extent that the Party wishes to accelerate its internal success it will increase the non-coercive role of the military and reduce military expenditure. The politicized-generalist element of the military will try to isolate defeat from the institutional nature of the military. The politicized-specialist element of the military will try to associate defeat with the politicized-generalist nature of the military and manipulate defeat to enlist system support for its specialist arguments.

3) Internal Success, External Non-Military Failure, and External Military Success: The implications of situation 1 apply here with these exceptions: 1) the Party will become more dependent on the military to assume all coercive and non-coercive external assignments; 2) the system will be less able to resist specialist pressures for a decreased internal non-coercive role and for system financial support for its specialization program; 3) the politicized-generalist element of the army will accept external non-coercive responsibilities and may manipulate its expanded external role to compensate for its internal role which internal system success renders less significant; 4) the politicized-specialist element of the army will be less willing to accept external non-coercive responsibilities, particularly at the implementation direction and instrument levels; and 5) to the extent that the politicized-specialist element in the army is assigned external non-coercive responsibilities at the policy formation and selection levels it will tend to acquire the characteristics of a veto-group army, i.e., regard itself as the final source of
authority on foreign policy.

4) **Internal Success, External Non-Military and Military Failure:** The Party will respond in these possible ways: 1) it will withdraw from external relationships; 2) it will rehabilitate its non-military external agents; but will not try to change the institutional nature of the military; 3) it will try to change the institutional nature of the military; but will not concern itself with non-military external agents; and 4) it will try to build up both military and non-military agents. It is probable that it will follow the first course if it feels that it is unable to salvage external success and/or it perceives that continued external failure will threaten internal survival. To the extent that the regime is not threatened by external powers the non-coercive role of the PLA will be enlarged tremendously and military expenditure decreased. To the extent that the system is threatened by external powers the non-coercive role of the PLA will contract. If the threatening power(s) is modern, the institutional nature of the military will tend to become politicized-specialist or professional, depending on the extent to which the PLA resents political control and the Party depends on the military to defend the nation. It is probable that the regime will follow the second course if it feels that it can salvage external success by non-military means and it is unable to afford the cost of developing a stronger army. The fate of the military's institutional nature and non-coercive role are discussed in situation 2. It is probable that the regime will follow the third course for the same reasons listed in situation
2. It is probable that it will follow the fourth course if its internal success is sufficiently great to provide the resources, the external agents of the regime have generally experienced success in the past, and the external situation is salvagable. In this situation the institutional nature of the PLA will probably change to politicized-specialist. Its non-coercive role could contract in order to expedite its specialization program or expand to augment internal resources for the program.

5) Internal Failure, External Non-Military and Military Success: The need for an expanded military non-coercive role will increase. The capacity for the system to support a politicized-specialist army will be restricted. The politicized-specialist element of the PLA will try to manipulate its external success and the regime's internal failure to attain the institutional nature it desires. However, internal resource limitation and the external success of non-military agents will reduce the total leverage it can exert. To the extent that external danger is not great the politicized-specialist element in the army will tend to become politicized-generalist. To the extent that the CCP is drastically discredited the politicized-generalist and specialist elements of the PLA will combine to change the nature of the army into programmatic.

6) Internal Failure, External Non-Military Success and External Military Failure: To compensate for internal failure the system will try to expand the non-coercive role of the PLA. To the extent that external military failure is less than internal regime failure the politicized-specialist elements of the military
will try to manipulate regime failure to secure modern coercive requirements. To the extent that internal failure is severe and non-military external success compensates for military failure the regime will resist these demands. The politicized-specialists will either accept a politicized-generalist institutional nature and heavy non-coercive assignments or become a programmatic army.

7) **Internal Failure, External Non-Military Failure and External Military Success:** To the extent that Party internal and external failure is severe, the military will reject political control. Its institutional nature (professional or programmatic) and non-coercive role will be determined by the level of specialization in the PLA at the time, the influence of the politicized-specialist elements at the time, and the severity of internal failure.

8) **Internal Failure, External Non-Military and Military Failure:** Key variables are the relative severity of the three failures and the degree of unity between military and regime leaders. To the extent that there is disunity the military will probably reject a politicized institutional nature. To the extent that civilian failure is greater than military failure the military can select their institutional nature and non-coercive role and vice-versa. To the extent that internal failure constitutes a breakdown of the political structure and/or of the provision of the necessities of life the non-coercive role of the military will be enlarged.
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Education:

The College, University of Chicago, 1952-1955, B.A.
Committee on Communication, University of Chicago, 1955-1956, B.A.
The Queen's College, Oxford University, 1956-1958, B.A.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958-1961

Fellowships and Honors:

Ford Foundation Pre-Induction Scholar, 1952-1955.
Fellow, Political Science Section, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958-1959.
Second Year Woodrow Wilson Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959-1960.
Special Honors in the Social Sciences, University of Chicago, 1955.
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Second Class Honors in the Honour School of Philosophy-Politics-Economics, Oxford University, 1958.

Employment:

Research Assistant, Committee on Communication, University of Chicago, 1955.
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