BULLETS OR BALLOTS?
Transnational Alliances and Regime Transition
in the Philippines, 1898-1986

by

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ABSTRACT

On February 25, 1986, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda fled to Hawaii, leaving behind the infamous shoes and a twenty-year legacy of cronymism and corruption. Hours later, Corazon Aquino was swept to power, launching a resurgence of democracy in the Philippines, soon followed by similar changes in the region, in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Earlier eras have experienced waves of revolutionary or authoritarian transitions, suggesting a connection between such domestic changes and the international system. To date, however, the literature on regime transition has emphasized either purely domestic or purely international factors, overlooking the linkages between the two. Moreover, the literature has tended to treat diverse types of regime change in isolation, overlooking the historical legacies which link one regime with its successors. What, this dissertation asks, causes regime transition? What determines the direction of change -- revolutionary, authoritarian, or democratic? Are these related? And, if so, how?

The central thesis presented here is that in states facing recurring revolutionary threats, regime transitions result from on-going political competition over time among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces. Hard-liners are here defined as those forces who seek to avert revolution through repression and military force, while soft-liners are those who seek to avert revolution through political inclusion and reform. When external forces with a stake in the contested state's regime type ally with revolutionary, hard-line or soft-line forces, the sources of regime transition become transnational, beyond either the purely domestic or purely international sources emphasized in the literature. The thesis demonstrates that when transnational hard-liners gain control of the political process in both the external and the contested state, an authoritarian transition in the contested state results. When soft-liners gain control, a democratic transition results. When neither has control, either revolution or state failure results, depending on the viability of revolutionary forces.

Using four consecutive cases of regime transition in the Philippines, including the 1898 transition from Spanish to U.S. colonialism, the 1946 transition to independent democracy, the 1972 transition to authoritarian rule under Marcos, and the 1986 return to democracy, the dissertation contributes an integrated, historically-based model to explain diverse types of regime transition as linked outcomes of on-going political competition among revolutionaries, hard-liners and soft-liners in successive bids for power.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan Fox
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In the spirit of "Bayanihan," thank you!
for my parents
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Questions

On February 25, 1986, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda fled to the U.S., leaving behind the infamous shoes and a twenty-year legacy of cronyism and corruption. Hours later, Corazon Aquino was swept to power, launching a resurgence of democracy in the Philippines, soon followed by similar changes in the region, as well as in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Earlier eras have experienced waves of revolutionary transitions, such as those in Latin America in the early 1800’s, and authoritarian transitions, such as those in Europe prior to World War II. And these waves of regime change have had historic, transformative effects on international alliances, on the global balance of power and so on the international system. The tendency for regime change to occur in waves suggests a connection with forces at the level of the international system, beyond the apparent accidents of history driving domestic politics. To date, however, the literature on regime transition has emphasized either purely international or purely domestic sources, overlooking the relationship between the two. Moreover, regime change, by definition, replaces one regime with another -- authoritarian with democratic, democratic with authoritarian, etc. Despite the connections among regime transitions, however, the literature has tended to analyze the diverse types of regime change ahistorically, and in isolation.

What, this dissertation asks, causes regime transition? What are the international sources of such change? What determines the direction of change -- revolutionary, authoritarian or democratic? Are these related and, if so, how? Finally, is there an explanation, beyond either the purely domestic or purely international politics so often emphasized in the literature, for each type of regime transition?
Thesis

The central thesis of this study is that regime transitions in chronically contested states result from competition over time among revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces vying for control of the state. A chronically contested state is hereby defined as a state whose authority and institutions face on-going challenges from recurring patterns of revolutionary opposition. This is particularly prevalent in countries where social, economic and/or political structures exclude enough of the population to challenge the legitimacy of the social contract. As long as such structural instability persists, the state will likely remain a contested one, with revolutionaries continually seeking a broad restructuring of society. Hard-liners are here defined as those who seek to avert revolution through repression, while soft-liners are those who seek to avert it through political inclusion and reform. The hard-line and soft-line approaches agree on the need to avert revolution, but diverge on the issue of strategy, on whether repression or reform, military force or political inclusion, in short, bullets or ballots, will stem revolutionary opposition. While hard-liners argue that only repression of revolutionary opposition can resolve an essentially military problem, soft-liners argue that repression not only fails to address an essentially political problem but may also fuel the militancy of the insurgency. The theoretical model presented here, and depicted in Figure I, is that when hard-liners gain control of the political process, a transition to authoritarian rule results. When soft-liners gain control, a transition to democracy results. When neither gains control, either revolution or state failure results, depending upon whether a viable revolutionary opposition exists or not. Once a regime transition occurs, moreover, it creates structures, or strengthens existing ones, and so establishes new parameters for the on-going conflict among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces. For this reason, regime transitions must be understood in their historical contexts.

Further, regime type can affect international alliances; thus, the competition among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces has global
implications. As a result, foreign powers may use transnational strategies to influence the domestic balance of power among revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces. The term transnational is used here to encompass private transnational as well as transgovernmental interactions which link segments of states and/or society in one nation with those in another. While Keohane and Nye (1970) emphasized non-governmental interactions as well as relations between governmental actors "not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their governments" in their seminal work on transnational relations, Cox in his essay in the edited collection on neorealism by Keohane (1986) notes that the traditional separation of state and society overlooks the links between these spheres. He argues that these links lead to complex interactions characterized by "a range of private transnational activity as well as transgovernmental networks of relationships among fragments of states." It is this notion of the state as fragmented, with each fragment potentially forming coalitions with sectors of society, and then forming alliances with similar fragments of other nations, as depicted in Figure II, which is the cornerstone of the transnational model presented here.

Using this framework, a foreign power vying to ally with the contested state may support revolutionary forces in a bid to improve its own international standing by creating a new ally, as Libya under Qaddafi has backed Muslim insurgencies and the former Soviet Union communist ones throughout the Cold War. The revolutionaries may also garner support from revolutionaries in the existing ally. More commonly, the existing ally will back counter-insurgency forces in order to protect its international standing, as well as any economic, political, strategic or other interests at stake in the event of revolution. Both the existing ally and the contested state will not behave as unitary actors, however, if their own officials dispute the use of repression versus reform. Coalitions of hard-liners and soft-liners may then form in the existing ally, forming alliances with similar coalitions in the contested state. A transnational hard-line alliance may then compete with a similarly transnational soft-line alliance, using transnational
strategies to cultivate competing institutions and political actors both in the existing ally and in the contested state, with implications for regime type as depicted in Figure III. The debate between hard-liners and soft-liners is thus ideological, centered on divergent views regarding the nature and sources of revolution and so on the appropriate strategies for addressing it. As associated hard-line and soft-line institutions evolve, become embedded in the political structures, and take on a life of their own, however, the debate may involve competing individual, group, and/or institutional interests. The pressure for regime change may then reflect these interests irrespective of any revolutionary threat.

Competing transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances will form when these interests are transnational, when the relative strength of hard-liners in one country is affected by the relative strength of hard-liners abroad, and likewise for soft-liners. Each side of an alliance will then exchange economic, political, strategic or other resources in order to strengthen its own position. Hard-liners in the contested state may, for example, offer their foreign allies access to military bases in exchange for technical and/or financial assistance to counter-insurgency forces. Similarly, soft-liners in the contested state may give their foreign allies political legitimacy at home, or simply an alternative means of securing access to military bases or other interests, in exchange for technical and/or financial assistance to protect democratic processes and reformist efforts. In this construc, the exchanges within both transnational alliances may be official, but may also be channeled through private organizations, such as foundations, corporations or universities, or through individuals. In transnational processes involving individuals, immigration patterns will come into play. If, for example, soft-liners displaced by an authoritarian regime with foreign support are forced to flee, they may take their cause abroad. If allowed into the foreign power backing the authoritarian regime, they may seek to influence the foreign power’s policies in order to influence the domestic balance of forces back home. If these immigrants become citizens, they will further enhance their potential influence, particularly in
democracies where they will be able to vote. Most likely, they will press hardliners to withdraw support from the authoritarian regime and will work with softliners toward this end. They will also enhance the flow of information between the contested state and the external power, using non-official channels not easily censored by the authoritarian regime such as phones, letters, and, increasingly, e-mail.

Such transnational processes are particularly likely to occur, and to have an effect, when states are linked by colonial legacies of interdependence and state interpenetration. The term interdependence applies when states are dependent upon each other to protect shared interests -- economic, strategic, and/or political. The term interpenetration applies when interdependent states intervene in each other's domestic politics and/or institutions, influencing each other's legal, economic, military, political or other structures in order to manage and protect their shared interests. As Waltz notes, states that are closely interdependent, with the common vulnerability that this entails, will seek to control that which they depend on.¹ Since this attempt to control foreign interests by establishing colonial states was the driving force behind imperialism, while colonial extension affected as well institutions within the imperial state, such interpenetration is particularly prevalent in states linked by colonial legacies. State interpenetration is expected to persist in the post-colonial era when shared interests remain. In such cases, the vulnerability of the external power's interests to the domestic politics in the contested state, and vice versa, is likely to be greater and more entrenched than in states lacking colonial legacies. A fact often overlooked in the literature is the leverage which the contested state will have in such situations vis-a-vis its former colonial power, despite even substantial power imbalances.

Under colonial rule, the foreign power will cultivate both hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances to secure its colonial authority; and it will lead both alliances during moments of regime change. In a post-colonial relationship,

¹Waltz in Keohane, ed. (1986), p. 103.
however, the exchange is more mutual, more interactive, as hard-liners in the contested state take action, then respond to hard-liners abroad, and likewise for the soft-liners. A useful model for understanding this interaction is Putnam's "two-level game" approach, which recognizes that central decision-makers are typically required to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. To finalize an international trade deal, for instance, a state negotiator may have to promise domestic constituents more jobs in order to secure ratification votes, and may then include job provisions from international corporations as a demand during bargaining. Unlike "second image" theories which cast international interactions in terms of domestic causes and international effects or "second-image reversed" theories which emphasize international causes and domestic effects, Putnam suggests that neither purely domestic nor purely international analyses can account for cases when the two spheres are intertwined. The model is especially relevant in cases where states are interdependent and interpenetrated, where mutual interests are at stake and a solution is sought, such that domestic and international politics become entangled, as in the crises of regime transition analyzed here. For this study, the model illuminates the interaction of domestic and international politics, and the effects of this on the exchanges both within and across the two transnational alliances as political actors respond to domestic and international circumstances simultaneously.

Evans builds on Putnam's model, arguing that officials in international negotiations who are either "hawks" or "doves," with approaches similar to the hard-liners and soft-liners of this thesis in their tendency toward aggression versus cooperation as strategies for managing conflict abroad, will be particularly likely to manipulate their domestic constituents in two-level games. This is so, Evans argues, because both hawks and doves will need domestic support if their international positions during negotiations are to be credible. This insight is useful in underscoring the domestic constraints in two-level games involving, in this study, transnational hard-liners and soft-liners, and the effects of such constraints on their respective strategies, effectiveness and ultimate influence during moments
of regime transition. The model is useful as well in examining the exchanges which take place within each transnational alliance, wherein hard-liners in one state will require credible domestic backing in order to form an alliance with hard-liners in another state, and likewise for soft-liners. At the next level of the interaction, once the transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances are operative and in conflict with each other, both sides of a given transnational alliance will need to secure their respective domestic constituents in order to compete effectively with the other transnational alliance. Without credible domestic backing, neither hard-liners nor soft-liners, in the contested state or in the external one, will be able to convince their negotiating partners that their positions, threats, or offers are meaningful.2

Finally, the relative strength of revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces during moments of regime change is determined by a complex interaction of domestic, international, and ultimately transnational factors. If, for example, hard-liners in the foreign state are weakened, through international economic, political or strategic losses, this will reduce their capacity to support hard-line forces in contested states elsewhere. Watergate and Vietnam, for example, weakened the ability of U.S. hard-liners to support their allies in Central America during the 1980's. On the other hand, if an international conflict or other event increases the relative power of hard-liners, as during the pre-Vietnam phase of the Cold War, the strength of authoritarian forces in the contested state will likely grow. This may be crucial to the success of an authoritarian transition since, without a pledge of external support, the transition may not even take place. Similarly, if soft-liners in the foreign state are weakened, again through international economic, political or strategic losses, as Truman was after the 1949 Chinese revolution, this will affect soft-liners in contested states. If they are strengthened, as U.S. soft-liners were after Watergate and Vietnam, the prospects

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2The essays by Putnam and Evans, together with other theoretical and case studies attempting to build new models for explaining the interaction between international and domestic politics, are included in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, eds. (1993).
for soft-liners abroad improve. Thus, losses in the international arena affect the balance of forces within the foreign power which then affects the balance of forces within the contested state. Regime change in the contested state then affects, in turn, international alliances, the global balance of power, and so the international system. It may also affect the balance of forces within the foreign power, particularly if the change is viewed as a loss to either hard-liners or soft-liners.

In short, regime transitions in contested states where there is a recurring revolutionary threat result from on-going competition among revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces over time. While hard-liners cultivate authoritarian institutions to avert revolution through repression, soft-liners cultivate democratic institutions to contain the threat through political inclusion and reform. As such, the competition evolves from one founded on mere ideology or strategy to one reflecting individual, group, and/or institutional interests. When foreign powers have an incentive either to preserve the existing regime or to help usher in a transition, they may use transnational strategies, intervening in the domestic politics of the contested state in order to influence the balance of power among the competing forces there. When political actors in the contested state use similarly transnational strategies to improve their position, especially when they have something to offer in exchange for external support, a transnational alliance is formed. This pattern is particularly important in countries with colonial legacies, wherein foreign economic, political, strategic, etc. interests are threatened by regime change in the contested state and, likewise, when political actors within the contested state rely on external support to either protect or to alter the domestic balance of forces. Out of the mutual help and political exchange which keep the alliances intact emerges an interactive political process, involving a chain of actions and reactions among actors on both sides of a transnational alliance and between the alliances.

As long as revolutionary opposition, or the structural conditions which create it, persist, hard-liners and soft-liners will struggle for control of the political process, debating whether to use bullets or ballots to contain revolutionary
opposition. Moreover, such conflicts may continue even if revolutionary pressures recede, when individual, groups or institutional interests created to combat revolutionaries develop a life of their own over time. For instance, military leaders may continue to seek large budgets irrespective of revolutionary threats in order to protect their own positions, power, and, particularly when corruption is involved, personal wealth. When transnational hard-liners gain control of the political process, a transition to authoritarian rule results. When transnational soft-liners gain control, a democratic transition results. When neither gains control, either revolution or state failure results, depending upon the viability of the revolutionary opposition.

Methods

Comparing four diverse cases of regime transition in one country over time, the study examines the interplay of transnational revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces to explain key transitions in Philippine history -- from Spanish to U.S. colonialism in 1898, to independent democracy in 1946, to authoritarian rule under Marcos in 1972 and back to democracy in 1986 when Corazon Aquino swept to power. The historical approach frames each regime transition as linked outcomes of on-going political competition among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces in successive bids for power. Although attention is given to the role other foreign powers have played through time in influencing the balance of power within the Philippines, the emphasis is on the U.S. role since 1898 in cultivating Philippine hard-line/authoritarian and soft-line/democratic institutions to protect U.S. and elite Philippine interests from recurring revolutionary threats. Further, the study traces the interaction of domestic U.S., domestic Philippine, international and transnational factors affecting the balance of power among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces in order to test the thesis as well as to expose the limitations of the two main competing arguments centering on
either purely domestic or purely international rather than transnational factors. Here, the analysis focuses on the leadership, political exchange, and strategies by which the transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances have competed, the effects of this on their relative strength, and so on the direction of regime change. Evidence was drawn from personal interviews with U.S. and Philippine political actors, and from secondary interviews, biographies and historical accounts as well as national, presidential, private and other archives.

In examining the historical causes and effects of the power struggle among revolutionary, hard-line/authoritarian, and soft-line/democratic forces in the Philippines, the dissertation exposes the domestic Philippine, domestic U.S., international and transnational sources of Philippine regime type from Magellan’s arrival in 1521 through the 1986 transition from Marcos to Aquino. This historical methodology, tracing the political sources of successive regime transitions through time, is informed by the work of Fernand Braudel (1973), who understood the interdependencies created over centuries between countries linked by colonialism, and enduring long afterwards. While changes in the colonizing state might affect the colonized, he argued, likewise, changes in the colonized state might affect the colonizer, with reverberations felt throughout the international system. For instance, the immediate cause of the decline of the Spanish empire was the rise of revolutionary opposition to Spanish rule throughout the colonies during the 1800’s, as Dominguez (1980) describes. To understand the rise of such opposition, however, it is necessary to understand as well the international conflict with France as well as the domestic conflicts within Spain which weakened its capacity to provide the assistance needed by the colonial regimes to manage the revolts, as Carr (1982) describes. Further, Spain’s decline was both affected by and itself affected the international system when, in the war of 1898, the U.S., already strengthened by the absorption of former Spanish territories on the American continent, capitalized on Spain’s overextension and acquired Puerto Rico and the Philippines, taking as well Guam and Hawaii enroute. Thus, longstanding domestic Spanish, domestic colonial, transnational and international
forces, too complex for this brief discussion, explain the wave of revolutionary change in Spain's colonies in the 1800's, the decline of Spain by 1898, and the simultaneous rise of the U.S. as a world power.

The model also integrates structural explanations of regime transition such as class conflict and the position of the state within the international system with voluntarist explanations emphasizing historical contingencies and the elements of choice which affect the direction of change. Specifically, the thesis traces as an on-going source of conflict within the Philippines the role of a land tenure system introduced by Spain which survives largely intact today, as well as the presence of U.S. military bases from about 1905 through 1992. Recent review articles have charted the evolution of the literature on regime transition from an initial phase dominated by structural approaches, through a second phase emphasizing voluntarist approaches, to current attempts to integrate structural with voluntarist approaches. This study contributes to the latter body of literature by linking structural explanations of interests with voluntarist explanations of outcomes for both authoritarian and democratic regime change, with implications for revolutionary change as well. While domestic Philippine structures such as the land tenure system or international structures such as the bases may create interests for either change or preservation of a given regime, the outcomes of structurally-based conflicts depend upon the strategies various actors choose and the relative success of these. That is, the choices political actors make during crises of regime transition may be structurally constrained but they are not predetermined. Rather, they evolve as events unfold, often in dramatic, interactive, contingent processes of debate, action, and response -- in short, politics. Moreover, the structures themselves -- the military bases, land tenure system, as well as authoritarian and democratic institutions -- were not predetermined but evolved through time, out of political competition at the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{See for example Herbert Kitschelt's article in the "American Political Science Review" (December 1992) and David Levine's in "World Politics" (April 1988).}\]
domestic, international and transnational levels.

In sum, the dissertation provides an historically-grounded, transnational model of regime transition which establishes a connection among revolutionary, authoritarian and democratic change, establishing as well a connection between domestic politics and the international system. The Philippine cases of authoritarian change in 1972 and democratic change in 1986, in particular, demonstrate that the two types of transitions are related, arising from similar goals but different strategies for managing revolutionary opposition, with the direction of change determined by the relative strength and political proficiency of transnational hard-liners, transnational soft-liners, and revolutionaries. Although the focus of this study is on the transnational strategies used to prevent revolution, the discussion covers as well the more limited but nevertheless instructive transnational support given to revolutionary forces by the U.S. in the war against Spain in 1898, by Japan in the 1930's, by the Soviets via the U.S. Communist Party also in the 1930's, by Libya to Muslim separatists in the 1970's, and by China after 1969 until the rapprochement with the Marcos regime in 1975, all attempts by contending international powers to gain control of the Philippines. The model is expected to have particular relevance in the many Latin American countries with similar legacies of Spanish then U.S. ties. It should also be relevant, however, in countries whose domestic structures have been shaped by foreign powers, particularly when the foreign power continues to intervene in order to protect its interests. It should have relevance as well to democratic transitions in countries where foreign powers have withdrawn support from authoritarian regimes, as with the Soviet withdrawal from its Eastern bloc satellites since the late 1980's.

**Literature Review**

Recent years have witnessed what Huntington (1991) terms the "third wave" of democratic resurgence, with urgent questions posed by the on-going
changes following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the associated withdrawal of international support from regimes which had formed alliances configured along Cold War lines, and the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflict in partial response to this withdrawal of external support. The thesis will show that a crucial factor in the 1986 transition from Marcos to Aquino was the withdrawal of U.S. support for Marcos. Though the transition is special due to the historical colonial relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines, the case offers broader lessons since the withdrawal of external support from authoritarian regimes has been a key factor in democratic transitions elsewhere, notably in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Philippine transition in 1986 was the first in Asia during the so-called third wave, and had a strong "demonstration effect" in the region, and elsewhere.\(^4\) Despite the spread of "people power" as an opposition strategy, however, scholars have had difficulty situating the Philippine case into existing theories of democratic transitions, primarily because of the prevalence of transitions launched by authoritarian rulers.\(^5\) While Marcos did help speed the transition by announcing the presidential elections, he did so as a strategy for prolonging his regime, and he fully intended to remain despite Aquino's victory at the polls. Attempts by authoritarian leaders to legitimize their rule through rigged, or at least questionable, electoral processes is a common strategy, used in Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, etc. In this case, however, a combination of domestic and external pressures and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. support, forced Marcos from office, offering an important case for examining the transnational sources of democratic regime transition.

Most of the literature on regime transition has emphasized either purely domestic or purely international factors, as described below. This study offers instead a transnational model which emphasizes the role of interdependence and

\(^4\) Huntington, p. 76.

\(^5\) From Thompson, citing Jackson in the collection edited by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, and Wurfel in the collection edited by Ethier.
state interpenetration, factors particularly crucial in countries linked by colonial legacies. The literature has also tended to analyze democratic, authoritarian, and revolutionary transitions in isolation, while this study offers an integrated, historically-based model for explaining all three types of transitions as diverse outcomes of on-going transnational political competition among soft-liners, hard-liners, and revolutionaries through time. The thesis suggests that although these types of transitions are distinct, they are comparable in that they arise from similar, recurring conflicts typically rooted in the contested state's social, economic, and political structures. From this, the dissertation suggests as well a need for more attention to the transnational causes and consequences of civil war, since this is often how the conflict among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces is expressed. The dissertation thus contributes to new models of interdependence, which grow out of earlier debates on the international sources of domestic structure, by examining patterns of mutual influence, adaptation, and coalition formation among U.S. and Filipino officials leading to the four regime transitions, from Spanish to U.S. colonialism in 1898, to independent democracy in 1946, to authoritarian rule in 1972, and back to democracy in 1986, all with roots in Philippine political development since 1521.

Further, the study will contribute to our understanding of the transnational sources of U.S. foreign policy. In this case, while U.S. foreign policy has affected Philippine regime type, likewise, Filipinos have affected U.S. foreign policy. During the colonial period, two Filipino representatives even held seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Filipinos learned during this period about the U.S. system of government, about lobbying in congress and the strategic leak of information to the U.S. media. They cultivated a network of personal and professional ties in corporations, universities, foundations, the media, as well as in government. And they used these networks to influence U.S. policy toward the Philippines in order to influence, in turn, Philippine regime type. In addition, the long-standing debate between U.S. hard-liners and soft-liners regarding policy toward the Philippines, launched in 1899 with the outbreak of war with Filipino
nationalists, will shed light as well on how consensus among U.S. officials can break down and then be reestablished. Moreover, the thesis shows that the debate was linked to partisan politics, as well as the bureaucratic politics Allison (1972) identifies. Finally, because much of the U.S. debate surrounding the 1986 transition took place in the U.S. media, the study will contribute to the surprisingly scant body of literature on the role of the media in the U.S. foreign policy making process. In this case, the thesis highlights media participation as actors in both the hard-line and the soft-line alliances.

**Transitions to Democracy**: The theoretical model presented here builds upon the work of O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), contributing an historical, transnational perspective to their argument that soft-line opposition to hard-liners within an authoritarian regime creates the possibility for a democratic transition. The central conflict between hard-liners and soft-liners, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, relates to the legitimation problem authoritarian regimes have faced since World War II, when fascism fell as a viable long-term solution to the problems of political order. Now, authoritarian regimes can typically justify repression and dictatorship only as a short-term path to eventual democracy, freedom, and prosperity. Still, hard-liners are those who believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is not only possible but desirable, while soft-liners may initially endorse repression to suppress opposition but eventually recognize the need for legitimation and the reintroduction of certain freedoms if the regime is to survive in the long-run. O'Donnell and Schmitter conclude that the main impetus for transitions from authoritarian rule is therefore domestic, centered on the internal conflict between hard-liners and soft-liners, though military defeat in international war, as in Argentina after the Falklands crisis, is cited as well. This dissertation argues, however, that foreign as well as domestic forces must be incorporated into the model, particularly when an authoritarian regime relies on external support to survive, and falls when this is withdrawn. This was particularly true throughout the Cold War, when both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union backed a network of authoritarian regimes in order to protect their international alliances, overseas military bases, economic investments and other global interests.

The dissertation extends the scope of the definition of both hard-liners and soft-liners to the transnational level, including societal as well as state actors. Describing the colonial and post-colonial connections between U.S. and Philippine political actors, the dissertation describes 1972 as a transnational hard-line defeat of soft-liners and the reversal in 1986 as a transnational soft-line defeat of the hard-liners. Further, O'Donnell and Schmitter focus on the domestic conflict between hard-liner and soft-liner political and/or military elites, but underplay the broader societal forces, the pressures exerted on both hard-liners and soft-liners by opposition outside of an authoritarian regime. This dissertation extends their model to assess the historical, structural roots of opposition to authoritarian rule, including both revolutionary opposition as well as a moderate opposition comprised of elites displaced by Marcos. In this way, the dissertation adds a structural, historical context to the O'Donnell-Schmitter model, placing the internal regime conflicts they describe within a less voluntarist framework. The dissertation does not, however, view political or economic structures, whether domestic or international, as a determining force in regime change. Like O'Donnell and Schmitter, and much recent literature, the dissertation critiques earlier, deterministic models of regime type, from the modernizationists, who tried to define the economic, political and other preconditions for democracy, and generally endorsed foreign intervention toward this end, through the dependency theorists, who reacted that such arguments overlooked the constraints centuries of colonization placed on development in the "periphery." Although these theorists did not address the question of regime transition directly, the thesis argues that both the "trickle-down" model of the modernizationists and the exploitation model of the dependency theorists miss the crucial role of interdependence and mutual influence.

Whitehead, in a chapter in the O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead
collection (1986), offers an important contribution in a less deterministic direction on the international aspects of democratization; but, while he describes the history of U.S. democratization efforts abroad as well as the conflict with realist concerns, he does not probe the transnational interests, alliances and strategies beyond morality underlying such efforts. In the model presented here, the U.S. is not a unitary actor but is, rather, a conflicted one, with competing views on the best means of defending U.S. interests. Thus, where Whitehead emphasizes the liberal intentions of democratizers and concludes that "U.S. security objectives often conflict with liberal democratic goals" in determining U.S. foreign policy, this thesis identifies the source of the conflict as strategic not just moral, wherein democratizers are often soft-liners motivated by interests to contain opposition in allied regimes through reform and inclusion while attempting to tame U.S. backing of hard-line regimes as much out of a belief that it does not work beyond a certain point as out of moral indignation. In this model, then, democratizers have a tactical as well as a moral stake in undermining authoritarian regimes abroad and have only lost out to "U.S. security objectives" due to the prevalence of the hard-liners up to the mid-1970's, when soft-liners gained ground.

Huntington (1991) also offers useful international explanations for democratization, including the international legitimacy problems faced by authoritarian regimes in an increasingly democratic world, economic and educational advances since the 1960's, Vatican II and the new democratizing role of the church, the rise in international concern for human rights since the 1960's, and the demonstration effect of regime change. He also describes Carter's human rights efforts and Reagan's National Endowment for Democracy. Like Whitehead, however, Huntington overlooks the transnational interests underlying such strategies. Further, although he identifies a pattern of oscillation between democratic and authoritarian rule in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey and elsewhere,⁶ he does not relate this pattern to revolutionary opposition, as this thesis does, nor to

⁶Huntington, p. 41.
the limits of electoral democracy in countries plagued by gross inequity.

In short, unlike either the purely domestic or purely international approaches to democratic regime change, this dissertation emphasizes the role of transnational alliances and mutual influence among political actors in countries linked by economic, military, and political interdependence, particularly where colonial legacies, or newer alliances between the U.S. and authoritarian regimes, have allowed substantial interpenetration of state and society over time, as with the U.S. and the Philippines.

**Transitions to Authoritarian Rule:** In order to understand the processes, conflicts, and barriers involved in transitions from authoritarian rule, it is therefore essential to understand the initial transition to authoritarian rule -- the sources of the authoritarian regime's power, the strategies used to maintain that power, and the impact of these strategies on key sectors of society. With the wave of authoritarianism which swept Europe, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Germany prior to World War II, and a similar wave in Latin America during the Cold War until the 1980's, the study of authoritarian regime change has progressed in phases, centering, like the democratization literature, on either purely international or purely domestic sources of transitions to authoritarian rule. As with the critique of the literature on democratic transitions, this dissertation argues that a new, transnational approach, combining as well structuralist with voluntarist explanations of such change is needed. In the European cases, for example, there is an apparent connection between the loss of overseas empires with economic decline and political crisis at home. In Spain, as in its colonies a century earlier, revolutionaries battled for structural changes, though here the reactionaries prevailed, and retained power until Franco's death in 1975. In the Latin American cases, there is a similar connection to overseas empires, though in this case in the reverse direction, as the U.S., particularly from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administrations, intervened in the domestic affairs of
Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, etc., to promote or sustain authoritarian rule. The dissertation describes the evolution of U.S. support for such regimes as an outgrowth of hard-line strategies to contain Communism during the height of the Cold War, particularly after NSC-68, signed in 1950, outlined U.S. anti-Communist, interventionist policies abroad, though with roots in U.S. expansionism since the 1800's.

In the early literature, Gerschenkron (1963) emphasized the effects of the international economy on "late" industrializers, on their greater need for central authority to compete effectively with countries who industrialized early. Using this internationally-based argument to explain regime type in Europe in the nineteenth century, Gerschenkron links England's early industrialization with its democratic institutions and Germany's later industrialization with its corporatist political economy. To explain regime change in the twentieth century, Moore (1966) establishes a connection, as this thesis does, among democratic, authoritarian and revolutionary transitions; but, like Gerschenkron, cites a state's position in the international economy as a determining force in the development of domestic structures. Using a deterministic schema of successive modes of industrialization, Moore explains Japanese and German authoritarianism, as well as later peasant-based revolutions in Russia and China, as political manifestations of the state's attempts to compete economically. Although the model is useful in its attempt to provide an integrated explanation for each type of regime change, it is overly deterministic, missing the surprising twists and turns which precede change as well as the oscillations between authoritarian and democratic transitions Huntington cites. While such transitions may be linked to the international economy, to shocks like OPEC or stages of industrialization, they are not predetermined by it.

In more recent literature, notably a collection of works edited by Linz and Stepan (1978) on transitions from democratic to authoritarian rule in Europe and Latin America, the emphasis moves further from the international to the domestic level. While the international economic crises certainly played a central role in
the political crises which fostered the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1920's and 1930's, the domestic focus of the works on Italy, Germany, Austria, Finland, and Spain clarify the non-deterministic politics behind the transitions. In the Latin American cases, however, particularly in Valenzuela's analysis of the Chilean transition in 1973 and Stepan's analysis of the earlier transition in Brazil in 1964, both from the Linz and Stepan (1978) collection, more attention to the role of the U.S. in encouraging and sustaining transitions to authoritarianism is needed. For instance, while Valenzuela describes President Nixon's attempts to first prevent the election of Socialist Salvador Allende Gossens and then cites U.S. economic and political destabilization of Allende's regime as contributing to the coup which ousted him, more analysis is needed to explain why the U.S. acted as it did, what impact U.S. support to Pinochet has had on the development of Chilean authoritarian institutions, and what implications this holds for current Chilean efforts to democratize. Likewise, Stepan cites the U.S. decision to cut economic and other aid to the democratically-elected Goulart government, as well as the strong U.S. economic and political support given to the military before and after the coup; but he does not address the reasons for this support, its impact on Brazilian authoritarian institutions, or the continuing implications for the consolidation of Brazilian democracy.

In short, if we are to understand democratization, we must first understand the authoritarian processes which led to its demise. Such processes, the dissertation suggests, can have a lasting effect, creating continuing barriers to democratic regime transition and consolidation. Where the U.S. played a key role in authoritarian transitions, as in the Philippine case as well as in the Latin American ones, U.S. policy and the subsequent transnational U.S. support to authoritarian regimes, including their military institutions, contributed, in varying degrees, to the survival of authoritarian regimes and so to the forces impeding democratization. What then explains the need for authoritarian institutions and the Cold War pattern up to the mid-1980's of U.S. support for these? The dissertation suggests that such militarization of the state is a response to
Communist, Socialist and/or nationalist threats to U.S. and elite domestic interests, and will continue as long as the root causes of such threats, in this case peasant revolutionary opposition, remain unanswered.

**Revolutionary Movements:** The literature offers several competing explanations of the root causes of peasant opposition. As this is a central issue in the debate between hard-liners and soft-liners, on their conflicting views on the merits of military versus political strategies, it is useful to survey the literature on this as well. First, the "moral" economists, including Scott (1976), Wolf (1969) and Migdal (1974), predicted that peasants would revolt to restore the traditional order when the penetration of capital broke down personal landlord-tenant bonds, undermining the peasantry's traditional subsistence rights. While the approach provided a useful alternative to the earlier modernization theories which emphasized urban industrialization as the solution to rural poverty, it has been challenged by political economists including Popkin (1979), Paige (1975), and Bates (1981) as an overly romantic portrayal of village life as egalitarian, mutually supportive, and essentially conservative. The political economists emphasize instead rural class stratification and the effects of this on "rational" peasants as they assess the anticipated costs and benefits of joining revolutionary movements. In this, the theoretical debate centers on which strata of peasant society is most likely to rebel -- the landless, the smallholders, the landed elite, etc. In the Philippine case, Jones (1989), Kessler (1989), and this author's own field research, indicate that the sources of peasant anger extend far back in time to the beginnings of Spanish rule and the colonial land tenure arrangements which benefitted a few "caciques" at the expense of the majority. Further, while both the moral and political approaches offer important insights into the changing rural relations resulting from the commercialization of agriculture, they tend to focus too narrowly on the peasant, overlooking the role of the state and its place in the international system as sources of peasant militancy. Skocpol (1979) addresses this, arguing that when interstate conflicts reduce the state's domestic capacity for
coercion, revolutionary movements can succeed.

All of these writers fail, however, to address the core question concerning peasant militancy. Whatever we hold to be the economic, political or social factors which create the incentive for peasants to seek dramatic changes, we must ask on a more basic level what might make peasants, whether conservative as the moral economists believe, utility maximizing as the political economists hold, or opportunistic as in Skocpol's model, risk their lives, especially since Olsonian constraints to effective collective action are operative in most peasant revolutionary situations? Why would they not simply pursue the "everyday forms of resistance" Scott (1985) describes? Contrary to Skocpol's expectation that increased militarization will prompt a decrease in revolutionary activity, the Philippine experience, as well as the literature on low intensity conflict of the 1980's, indicates that the reverse may also be true. As U.S. and Filipino officials, and even the revolutionaries acknowledged by the mid-1980's, the hard-line tactics used by the Marcos regime with U.S. assistance not only failed to stem the growth of the revolutionary opposition but actually provided the movement with most of its arsenal and, moreover, helped recruit new members. Personal and secondary interviews in the Philippine countryside during the period suggest that while peasants had long sought reforms in such areas as land tenure, political access, elite control of the economy, and other sources of peasant anger, it was human rights violations by the military against peasant revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries alike which encouraged many otherwise risk-averse peasants to support the revolutionary opposition, as much for protection as for political expression. Thus, the case supports soft-line arguments that hard-line tactics of repression can actually stir, not silence, revolutionary opposition.

Moreover, the literature has emphasized the role of successful peasant revolutionary movements at specific moments in time, overlooking both the

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7See in particular Jones, as corroborated by declassified U.S. government documents in the National Security Archive collection, and personal interviews with Philippine peasants and with U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth.
historical roots of such opposition as well as the potential impact even unsuccessful movements can have over time in creating a need, for instance, for authoritarian institutions, particularly when revolutionary pressures pose a recurring challenge to the state. This is particularly true when the structural conditions for revolutionary opposition, such as land tenure and, later, abuses by the military, remain unresolved through successive regime transitions. In the Philippine case, recurring waves of peasant revolutionary opposition have threatened regimes since the 1500's, including first Spanish then U.S. colonial rule, the Japanese during World War II, the independent Philippine democracy after 1946, Marcos' authoritarian rule from 1972 to 1986, and thereafter attempts to consolidate democracy. While revolutionary opposition has thus contributed to each of the regime transitions discussed here, it has also prompted the development of both authoritarian and democratic institutions. Further, contrary to the prevailing view of revolutionary opposition as a recent response to the influx of foreign capital, the Philippine case demonstrates that neither peasant opposition nor foreign investment is a recent invention; rather, both have evolved over centuries. Up to the present, the Philippine peasantry can, in fact, be seen as a creation of Spanish colonial policies which granted colonists and Filipino collaborators privileged access to land, still the primary source of political and economic power in the Philippines, as well as to state resources and military protection. Despite repeated attempts at land reform since Spanish times, however, roughly 70 percent of all Filipinos remained, through the 1986 transition, landless peasants. Although increased urbanization since 1986 has reduced this figure, the thesis suggests that attempts to resolve the problem of political order in the Philippines either through authoritarian or democratic measures will continue to fail until the land tenure issue is addressed.

The Causes of War: The vast international relations literature on the causes of war has emphasized interstate rather than civil war, wherein domestic
forces battle for control of a contested state; yet the latter are not only far more prevalent, they can also escalate abroad as in Lebanon in the 1980's; create new renegade states as with the Soviet, Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and other revolutions; or otherwise affect international alliances and the global balance of power, depending upon who wins and what implications this holds for regime type. In the on-going Philippine civil war, there is an international context which warrants attention as a relatively overlooked cause of war. Because Philippine revolutionary movements have long been anti-imperialist, first Spain, then the U.S. cultivated indigenous authoritarian institutions to carry out colonial policies. U.S. concerns about revolutionary opposition continued after Philippine independence in 1946, when the U.S. greatly expanded its bases there during the Korean and Vietnam wars, as part of the broader Cold War. To manage its war effort in each of those civil conflicts, the U.S. needed to secure its Philippine bases from nationalist opposition within the Philippines. Thus caught in a web of civil wars, the U.S. contributed substantially to the build-up of armed forces in allied regimes in the region and elsewhere. In the Philippine case, where the most recent revolutionary opposition, the New People's Army (NPA) has relied almost exclusively on weapons stolen from the military, the influx of U.S. military aid has, therefore, been a key source of armed conflict on both sides. Had the revolutionary opposition succeeded, as in Iran and Nicaragua, the result of the Philippine civil war would likely have been equally if not more destabilizing to the international system due to the loss of the U.S. bases. Because the transition was moderate, however, it spawned other "people power" uprisings in Korea, South Africa, and, sadly, in China.

Likewise, although the NPA has received little outside support since the Philippine government's rapprochement with China in 1975, it has learned from the Indochinese and Nicaraguan revolutions. Moreover, earlier revolutionary movements have received support, as noted above, from foreign powers competing

*See Levy's comprehensive survey of the literature on the causes of war.
for control of the Philippines, as with U.S. support for the revolutionaries in their war against Spain in 1898, Soviet and Japanese support for revolutionary movements in the 1930’s, and Libyan support for Muslim separatists in the 1970’s. Though such support has been much less significant in magnitude than Spanish, U.S., or Japanese support for the Philippine military, it nevertheless adds another transnational dimension to the question of civil war, particularly in relatively weak, unstable countries like the Philippines. In short, international conflicts from the Spanish-American War, World War II, and the Cold War have all played out in the rice paddies, villages, and mountains of the Philippines, as foreign and domestic forces continue to vie for the "hearts and minds" of Filipinos.

New attention to ethnic conflict is a promising trend in the international relations literature, but more analysis of the external causes and consequences of civil war is needed, given the continuing tendency of the U.S. to involve itself militarily in domestic conflicts abroad. Moreover, the current trend toward splintering states leads formerly civil conflicts to evolve into inter-state conflicts, as in Yugoslavia and parts of the former Soviet Union, further creating a need for this type of research. Such analysis would not only help us understand the role of civil conflict in the international system, but also posits a more fluid model of the state than most realist theories allow for, suggesting a model of the state and its role in the international system as an historically created, frequently contested, ultimately contingent domestic configuration of power with contingent international alliances, subject to transnational forces. This, the Philippine cases suggest, is particularly useful in the study of civil war in nascent states faced with widespread domestic opposition and entrenched elites whose power derives largely from external sources.

In viewing the international system from this perspective, we might then redefine security to encompass interdependence between segments of states,

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*See, for example, Diamond's "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict: A Review of Ethnic Groups in Conflict."
anticipating the kind of transnational cooperation, conflict, and political strategies which segments of the U.S. and the Philippine state and society have exhibited, particularly since the latter's independence in 1946. While Walt (1987) predicted that small states like the Philippines might "bandwagon" with a more powerful state like the U.S. as an alternative to balancing, this study suggests a need for an historically-based, transnational understanding of such behavior and the domestic conflicts and contingencies out of which it arises. Similarly, there is a burgeoning literature on interdependence and cooperation, but the tendency to describe these as new forces overlooks the continuing effects of centuries of colonization on the domestic development and external relations of formerly colonizing as well as colonized states.

**U.S. Foreign Policy:** The approach to the state as divided, facing ongoing political competition for control of policy, extends beyond the Philippines to the U.S. While officials may agree on the goals of foreign policy, they often disagree on the best means of achieving those goals. For long stretches, such disagreements may play out in congressional hearings, executive debates, and other strategies for rebuilding consensus. During crises, however, the disagreements may lead to open conflict if one coalition attempts to redirect policy against the plans of the coalition in control. The Philippine transition in 1986 offers a particularly useful example of such a crisis, given the revolutionary threat to U.S. economic and strategic interests and the conflict between those advocating continued support of Marcos vis-a-vis those advocating moderate change as strategies for managing the revolutionary threat. To explain such conflicts and their outcomes, the dissertation extends the O'Donnell-Schmitter model to the U.S. foreign policy making process, particularly as the policy pertains to weaker allies where U.S. interests are at stake. Since the beginning of U.S. expansionism, especially since 1898 and the subsequent war to subdue nationalist opposition in the Philippines, the U.S. has used hard-line and soft-line tactics to control foreign populations. While the two approaches have sometimes been
complementary, they have frequently vied for control of U.S. foreign policy.

To explain this competition, the dissertation builds upon the work of Joseph (1981), who uses the Vietnam war to describe "policy currents," essentially hard-line and soft-line coalitions running through the U.S. government, media, business community, foundations, think tanks, and academia. Joseph argues that these policy currents seek to defend elite U.S. interests, but favor different strategies, notably force versus coercion, for containing threats such as revolutionary movements abroad or opposition at home. This thesis examines the evolution, strategies, and factors contributing to the relative strength of each current over time, examining as well the transnational modes by which U.S. hard-liners and soft-liners have competed for control of U.S. foreign policy as well as the policies of other states where U.S. interests are at stake.

The dissertation also examines the transnational sources of U.S. foreign policy, wherein immigrant, later ethnic, communities, in this case Filipinos in the U.S., have since 1898 worked through the American political system to influence U.S. policy toward the Philippines. While Koen (1974) described the influence of U.S.-based Nationalist Chinese supporters of Chiang Kai Shek in shaping U.S. policy against Mao in the 1940's and 1950's, identifying the export of one side of the Chinese civil conflict abroad and their alliance with hard-line Republicans, the Philippine case offers an opportunity to examine the influence of hard-line, soft-line, moderate, and even revolutionary U.S.-based Filipinos on U.S. policy. In this case, the dissertation will describe the strategies, and their effects, each side of the Philippine conflict used through time to influence U.S. policy in order to advance their own cause back home. This approach should prove relevant to our understanding of U.S. policy toward other countries with large, politically active ethnic communities in the U.S., as with the Polish influence on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the onset of the Cold War, which Gaddis (1972) describes, Jewish influence on U.S. policy toward Israel since 1948, African-American attempts in recent years to influence U.S. policy toward Africa and Haiti, as well as the efforts of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, El Salvadoran, and

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other groups to influence U.S. policy abroad. This study suggests that ethnic communities in the U.S. will be most likely to try to influence American foreign policy when the U.S. role in their "home" countries is significant. This is expected to increase further when "home" country politics restrict political participation and create large numbers of political refugees, who are forced to take their anger overseas. Future research might identify the various strategies and their relative effectiveness which ethnic communities have used, distinguishing as well between the role played by immigrants and that of ethnic minority citizens with voting privileges.

Other transnational sources of U.S. policy towards the Philippines included a human rights movement which emerged in the 1960's but burgeoned in the early 1970's as a result of the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the Chilean coup, and then expanded further in the 1980's amid opposition to U.S. policy in Central America, as Sikkink (1993) describes. Robinson and Sheehan (1983) identify as well the transnational civil rights, women's, nuclear freeze, anti-war, anti- and pro-abortion, and the Central American movements as key forces in U.S. foreign policy in the 1980's, while Haas' (1992) work on scientific and environmental groups in Europe has relevance to the evolution of U.S. policy on transnational environmental problems like acid rain and global warming. In the Philippine case, after 1972, anti-Marcos Filipinos in the U.S. worked with human rights activists in church and other non-government organizations as well as congress and, eventually, the State Department to expose the moral flaws in U.S. support for Marcos. This suggests another important source of U.S. foreign policy and bureaucratic conflict. Specifically, during the Carter administration, human rights activists gained a toehold in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Reagan tried in 1981 to rid his administration of the "Carterites"; but enough remained in the bureaucracy, with ties to displaced "Carterites" outside of government and to transnational human rights organizations who could provide documentation of human rights violations, to challenge Reagan's ultra-hard-line policies. Thus, the dissertation adds as well a partisan/ ideological, societal, and transnational dimension to the foreign policy

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literature of Jervis (1968) and George (1969), who outline the effects on policy of individual personality and perception, as well as Allison (1972), who offers insights into bureaucratic interests as a source of conflict.

Although realist strategies have dominated U.S. foreign policy toward the Philippines since 1898, and particularly during the Cold War, the dissertation shows how these strategies have consistently been challenged by Philippine opposition, both moderate and revolutionary, and by the ethical and strategic issues such opposition has raised.

**The Media and Foreign Policy:** Finally, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been given to the influence of the media on foreign policy since Cohen's (1963) watershed analysis of the interaction among U.S. foreign policy officials and journalists, and the influence of this interaction on the foreign policy making process. Cohen argued that few beyond Washington cared about foreign policy, such that media coverage was designed more for elites. Almond (1966) echoed this view, arguing that the media most affected public opinion via media "opinion leaders." Linsky (1986) sought to identify a more direct link between media coverage and policy outcomes, and cited the elite press as a kind of bulletin board for officials to exchange ideas. He found as well that U.S. officials in foreign policy spent substantially more time cultivating media coverage than did their counterparts in the rest of government. O'Heffernan (1991) builds upon Linsky's work, as well as Allison's, to create an "insider's model" wherein the media are used by foreign policy actors in conflict resolution processes, and that the media actively participate in the competition for their own interests. Although it is difficult to identify correlations between such processes and policy outcomes given an abundance of intervening variables, the research tends to fall into two camps, from a view of the media as watchdogs with liberal biases who pressure politicians toward reform, as in Vietnam and Watergate, to a view of the media as

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10The Jervis, George and Allison essays can be found in the collection edited by Ikenberry.
lapdogs with conservative biases toward guarding the status quo. Politicians and journalists comprise the bulk of analysts in the former category while media critics and leftist analysts such as Chomsky and Herman (1988), Bagdikian (1987), and others comprise the bulk of the latter category.

In keeping with the metaphor, the Philippine case, particularly during the 1986 transition, builds upon the works of Cohen, Linsky, O’Heffernan, and Joseph to suggest instead a sled team analogy, wherein competing coalitions of transnational hard-liners and soft-liners cultivated anti- versus pro-Marcos journalists, essentially watchdogs versus lapdogs, to “pull their sleds.” The soft-liners from the U.S. and the Philippines were most effective in leaking information to displaced "Carterites" and other Marcos opponents in the media, and in creating enough attention to the Philippine elections to restrict Marcos’ ability to cheat, a point Marcos himself later conceded. In fact, U.S. media coverage was the most extensive ever accorded a foreign election. Why? This study suggests that the U.S. media served as a forum for conflict resolution between the competing coalitions, with soft-liners in the State Department with their allies in Congress, the media and other sectors of U.S. society as well as in the Philippines using the U.S. media as an alternative channel of communication to wrest control of Philippine policy from Marcos, Reagan and Reagan’s inner circle. When they were no longer being heard via official channels, soft-liners leaked information on Marcos and on the inner policy debates to the media in order to discredit Marcos, embarrass Reagan, and thus undermine U.S. support of the Marcos regime. In this way, the soft-liners also helped create political space for a moderate alternative to gain credibility among U.S. officials.

Further, as the moderate alternative began to emerge, the U.S. media, with American public relations advisors and campaign strategists, helped redirect

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11Personal interview with Mydans, February 1989.

Aquino’s campaign platform from an initial openness to nationalist critiques of the U.S. bases, toward a more pro-U.S. pledge of support for the bases. Thus, the media also helped define the boundaries within which a new leader might expect to gain U.S. support.

**Overview**

In sum, a legacy of revolutionary opposition and competing transnational strategies to contain it has fostered the development of transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances, as well as Philippine authoritarian and democratic institutions. Contending international powers seeking to undermine Spanish, U.S., Japanese, and again U.S. control of Philippine politics have also used transnational strategies to cultivate Philippine revolutionary opposition to further their own ends. This study argues that the competing transnational strategies to contain revolutionary opposition explain both the 1986 soft-line/democratic and the 1972 hard-line/authoritarian transitions, while continuing neglect of the land tenure issue and the human rights abuses associated with hard-line strategies, as well as some transnational support, explain the recurring pattern of revolutionary opposition. Transnational forces also explain civil conflict in the Philippines, given external support for the Philippine armed forces and police, its implications for arsenals available to revolutionaries, as well as the smaller, but nevertheless significant direct external support various revolutionary movements have received through time. This model of Philippine civil conflict challenges realist notions of the state as a unitary actor, offering as well a transnational perspective on regime transition, civil war, the U.S. foreign policy making process and the associated role of the U.S. media. Here, revolutionary, democratic, and authoritarian Filipinos and their allies in the U.S. government and society export their domestic conflicts, using U.S.-oriented strategies to influence U.S. foreign policy and so their position at home.

The next chapter examines the Spanish legacy in the Philippines and its
implications for U.S. colonial rule after 1898, particularly in creating the structural
sources of a potentially revolutionary peasantry, and the transnational hard-line
and soft-line responses to it. The chapter also analyzes the debate in the U.S.
surrounding the Spanish-American War and the processes which launched the era
of U.S. overseas imperialism. Chapter three examines the early U.S. colonial
legacy from the outbreak of war between U.S. forces and Filipino nationalists in
1899 through the Jones Act of 1916, wherein the U.S. pledged eventual
independence for the Philippines. The chapter describes the genesis of the
transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances in response to Filipino nationalism,
and then describes the strategies Filipinos developed to influence U.S. policy
towards the Philippines. Chapter four examines the continuing transnational
processes which shaped Philippine institutions from 1917 through the crises of
World War I, the Depression, and World War II, and the interplay of
international, domestic U.S. and domestic Philippine forces which led to the 1946
transition to Philippine independence. The chapter describes international and
domestic Philippine forces which contributed to the transition, but cites partisan
politics in the U.S. as the driving force for change. Specifically, when Democrats
held the White House, which oversaw colonial policy, pro-independence U.S.
farmers, Filipino immigrants, and others gained ground. The chapter also
describes the rise of Soviet-inspired revolutionary forces known as Huks, who
fought the Japanese during World War II.

Chapter five examines the causes of the 1972 transition to authoritarian
rule under Marcos. The chapter cites the rise of the transnational hard-line U.S.-
Philippine alliance in response to continuing Huk revolutionary pressures in the
1950's, and the increased strategic importance of the Philippines for U.S. Cold
War "containment" strategies, as the central explanation for the transition.
Chapter six describes the impact of martial law on Philippine society from 1972
through the 1983 assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino, the
continuing predominance of the hard-liners, but the rising power of the
transnational soft-line alliance due to a combination of Watergate; revolutions in
Indochina, Iran, and Nicaragua which reignited the U.S. debates between hard-liners and soft-liners; an international human rights movement with allies in the U.S. congress and State Department; and new Maoist-inspired revolutionary pressures in the Philippines. Chapter seven examines the causes of the 1986 transition back to democracy, the sources of the "people power" revolution which swept Corazon Aquino, Benigno's widow, to power on a sea of yellow confetti. The chapter describes the expansion of the revolutionary forces and the strategic battle which broke out between the hard-liners and soft-liners after the 1983 Aquino assassination, culminating in the eventual success of the soft-liners in 1986. The chapter then cites the rise of the transnational soft-liners as the central explanation for the 1986 transition.
Chapter 2. The Sword and The Cross: Conquest, Resistance and the Foundations of the Transition from Spanish to U.S. Colonialism, 1521-1898

Overview

This chapter examines the Spanish legacy in the Philippines and its implications for the development of Philippine economic, political and social structures at the moment of U.S. conquest in 1898. The chapter then describes the debate in the U.S. surrounding the Spanish-American War and the decision-making processes leading to the subsequent war with Filipino nationalists. How, the chapter asks, did U.S. foreign policy progress from a war of liberation in Cuba to a war of conquest in the Philippines? What explains the divergent patterns, from revolutionary to collaborationist, of the Filipino response? The chapter will illuminate these questions, examining in the process the various factors - Spanish, Philippine, U.S., and international - which laid the foundation for transnational U.S.-Philippine hard-line and soft-line alliances with their sometimes competing, sometimes complementary strategies for quelling revolutionary opposition in the Philippines. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the emergence of the two transnational alliances in 1898, during the first powerful explosion of Philippine opposition to U.S. rule. As such, the chapter sets the stage for analyzing the evolution and relative strength of the two alliances and their role during key turning points in the Philippines from the 1898 transition from Spanish to U.S. colonialism through the 1986 transition from Ferdinand Marcos to Corazon Aquino.

Spain Emerges as a Colonial Power

The tale begins with an earlier Ferdinand. On March 16, 1521, Ferdinand Magellan sighted an archipelago of islands in the far reaches of the ocean he had named the Pacific. A few weeks later, on Easter Sunday, he strode ashore, planted
a large wooden cross near what is now the city of Cebu and claimed the islands for Christianity and for Spain. The latter, freed in 1492 from nearly 800 years of conquest by the Moors, was, at the time of Magellan’s discovery, a society in transition. After 711, when Gebel Tarik and his troops landed on the rock that was later named Gibraltar in tribute to Tarik, the Muslims were able to subdue the entire peninsula with the exception of areas in the northwest, notably Leon, Castile, Navarre and Aragon, which remained Christian. Throughout the period of conflict with the Moors, known as the reconquista and considered part of the Crusades, feudal armies in these states fought in alliance with the Catholic church, steadily pushing the Moors south toward the kingdom of Granada, until the Moors were finally ousted in 1492. Throughout the reconquista, the monarchy granted land and titles of nobility to military and church leaders who fought against the Moors, as a reward for their services. From this, an elite with strong regional identities, loyalties, and interests was born. By the late 1400’s, a new urban economic elite emerged as well, as emancipation of serfs, trade abroad, technological advances, and the concomitant rise of industrial and commercial centers marked the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism.

While the regional elite created centrifugal tensions, challenging the authority of the monarchy, the transition to capitalism required centralization if the Iberian kingdoms were to compete with rising European centers of commerce. The marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, also in 1492, joined the Spanish kingdom of Castile, which after the 13th century encompassed Leon, with the kingdom of Aragon, which now encompassed Navarre, greatly increasing the possibility of a unified Iberian nation. Pressures from the countryside, however, threatened the monarchy’s bid for centralization. In particular, the nobility and the clergy, unwilling to yield power to the monarchy, allied again, this time against

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1Karnow, pp. 34-36. See also Guillemand’s biography of Magellan.

2Information for the above is culled from Vives’ account of the economic history of Spain, from Braudel’s analysis of the European transformation from feudalism to capitalism, and from the description in Nadel and Curtis of Spain’s experience during this transformation.
the King. To counter this, the King bought the allegiance of the urban elite by granting them special privileges in taxes and trade. The one exception is the expulsion of the Jews and Jewish-leaning conversos as part of the Inquisition launched also in 1492. Because the Jews and conversos had long served as money collectors for the military and the church, they largely controlled financial markets, particularly in Castile. Moreover, the two groups held the chief public offices in the courts and municipal governments, and also comprised some of the best artisans. Their expulsion seriously undermined financial institutions. Intense domestic conflict between the nobility and the clergy on one side versus the monarchy and the urban elite on the other now ensued, both within and among the farflung provinces of the Iberian peninsula. If Spain was to survive the challenges of the new capitalist international political economy, it would have to unify its merchants, monarchy, nobles, clergy, military, and other key sources of Iberian wealth and power.

Where these forces came together was in Spain’s overseas exploration and colonization of new territories. By providing new sources of raw materials and labor, and eventually markets for Spanish goods, colonization strengthened the national economy vis-a-vis external competitors, thus serving the merchant class. It also served the Crown by offering a source of revenues free from the constraints of the Cortes. Further, with the reconquest of Granada in 1492, King Ferdinand had asked for and had received from the pope a patronato real over all of the churches to be established in Granada, as a reward for Spain’s contributions to the Crusades. King Ferdinand had then secured from the papacy extensions of his patronato to all of his overseas dominions, arguing that spreading Christianity to the new territories was akin to recovering Granada for Christendom. Under this agreement, missionary work abroad fell under royal

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3Ibid.

4Information on the Jews and conversos is from Vives, p. 297.

5See Nadel and Curtis.
supervision, thus linking church interests with those of the monarchy. The military was then needed to carry out colonization, which was, by the mid-1500's, administered from Mexico.\(^6\)

Because there was no papal legate in the Americas, Rome had no direct contact with the colonial clergy. The Spanish monarchy had veto power over the promulgation of papal bulls in the colonies. Moreover, the patronato real conferred upon the king the right to nominate bishops and priests, which further extended the political autonomy of the Spanish colonial church from Rome while strengthening its allegiance to the Spanish monarchy. Now, as during the reconquista, the military and the church were allies in the service of the monarchy, using a powerful amalgam of threat and coercion to subdue native populations throughout the newly discovered territories. Tensions between the church and the military surfaced as each struggled to define Spain's colonial mission, with the sometimes competing, sometimes complementary determination to capture souls as well as profits. Tensions within the colonial church surfaced as well, as the autonomous orders of the church welcomed the Crown's money but resisted intervention from the Spanish monarchy, particularly in such areas as the ordination of priests and the use of church funds.\(^7\) The divisions within the colonial administration would later form the basis of both a soft-line alliance centered around reformist elements of the church and the bureaucracy, and a hard-line alliance centered around the military.

Another papal agreement had even more significant implications for Spanish colonialism. With the rise of capitalism, Spain faced fierce competition from Portugal, England and the Netherlands for markets, overseas territory and access to the sea. Of particular interest was the lucrative spice trade centered in the East Indies. When the Turks, still at war with Europe as part of the

\(^6\) The above is culled from Fieldhouse, Chapman (1965), and from Constantino (1975), pp. 12-17. Note also that throughout the Spanish colonial period, Mexico was known as New Spain; but it will here be referred to by its modern name.

\(^7\) Fieldhouse, pp. 23, 36-38.
Crusades, captured Constantinople in 1453, the Middle East route to the spice islands was made less attractive to Europeans, challenging explorers to discover new sea-lanes to Asia. It was, in part, this challenge which brought Columbus to the Americas in 1492 and this discovery which fueled, in turn, conflict between Portugal and Spain over exploration rights. Pope Alexander VI intervened to resolve the dispute and, on May 4, 1493, he issued a series of bulls. Later known as the Alexandrian donation, the pope's decree divided the globe in half, granting Spain the right to lands west of the Cape Verde Islands, including the Americas, and Portugal the right to lands to the east. In 1494, Spain and Portugal signed the agreement, known as the Treaty of Tordesillas. Far from settling the dispute, the Alexandrian donation was to contribute to centuries of conflict between Spain and Portugal as they struggled in vain to demarcate boundaries in a spherical world. This on-going conflict would have important implications for the development of the Philippines, as Spain increasingly used the archipelago as a military outpost against Portuguese influence in the region. At the moment of discovery, however, Magellan's archipelago, which he discovered by sailing west from Spain, opened the possibility of a new base for Spain to trade in spices without infringing upon Portugal's claims to the region.

The Sword and the Cross: Conquest of the Philippines

The first European to establish contact with the islanders, Magellan stepped ashore the tiny island of Limasawa on Easter Sunday and from there began negotiating with a local chief, Humabon, who seemed receptive to Christianity, to trade, and to continued contact with Magellan and his crew. According to an account later written by Magellan's personal aide, Antonio

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*The above information on the conflict between Spain and Portugal, the role of the pope in mediating the conflict, and the implications for the Philippines is most concisely presented in Karnow, p. 29.
Pigafetta, Humabon welcomed Magellan with a delegation of his emissaries bearing rice, pigs, and chickens. Humabon then converted to Christianity and encouraged his followers to do the same. Magellan soon after signed a blood pact with the chief and, within a week, roughly 2,000 Cebuanos had converted to Christianity. Magellan then directed them to pledge allegiance to Humabon, as his surrogate representative of Spain. Soon after, however, Lapu Lapu, a chief on a nearby island and Humabon's traditional enemy, resisted. Humabon now persuaded Magellan to attack Lapu Lapu, as the first transnational hard-line alliance was born. On April 27, 1521, Magellan and his sixty men set out in three boatloads, crossing the narrow strait from Cebu to the island of Mactan to attack Lapu Lapu. Overconfident of their superior weaponry and underestimating their adversaries, a miscalculation westerners would repeat again and again in Southeast Asia, the Spaniards were quickly overcome. In fact, word of the plan had leaked to Lapu Lapu, who had mobilized over 1,500 warriors. Magellan, left alone in battle, covered his crew's retreat; but he died in the process. Humabon, disappointed, then turned against the Spaniards, slaughtering all but a few who managed to escape.\(^{10}\) It was to be more than forty years before Spain would return in full force to conquer the archipelago; but in that first clash between Lapu Lapu and Magellan, the patterns of international collaboration by some Filipinos\(^{11}\) and resistance by others, both of which can be seen as strategies for dealing with local conflict, were established.

Following Magellan's defeat, additional expeditions were sent to the Philippines; but there seemed little profit to be gained there and strong winds

\(^{10}\) Information on Magellan's mission is from Karnow, pp. 34-37. See Blair and Robertson for a comprehensive collection of original documents covering the Spanish colonial era, including papal bulls, Pigafetta's eyewitness account, etc.

\(^{11}\) The term Filipino was used throughout the Spanish colonial period to describe Spanish colonists based in the Philippines. The modern usage describes natives of the Philippines, including those with Spanish, Malayan, Chinese, American, and other ancestry. For the sake of simplicity, this dissertation applies the term Filipino in its modern usage for all periods, referring to Philippine-born Spaniards as "criollos."
made a return trip via the Pacific apparently impossible. For the next four
decades, Spain all but ignored the archipelago Magellan had discovered, focusing
instead on the Americas and the gold and silver mines there which fed Spain's
mercantilist economy. In 1564, however, interest in the islands was rekindled,
though less for what the islands had to offer per se than for their strategic
importance vis-a-vis the Portuguese. The real prize sought by Spain were the
Moluccas, the spice islands, which Portugal had claimed under the Alexandrian
donation. Spanish kings had long coveted this prize; but after sending out three
expeditions in what became a futile effort to seize the spice islands for Spain,
King Charles V finally conceded to the Portuguese claim. In 1556, Charles V
abdicated and was replaced by his son, Philip II, who reigned for the next forty-
two years, during the peak of Spanish glory. Determined to undo Portuguese
supremacy in the East, Philip II ordered his viceroy in Mexico to mount yet
another expedition to the East, this time to reestablish Spanish control of the
archipelago Magellan had earlier claimed for Spain. The islands were to serve as
a base for Spanish trade and military force in the region and as a counterweight
to the Portuguese colonies in the Moluccas as well as in Macao, from which
Portugal had a monopoly over trade with China, another prize Spain sought to
take from the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{12}

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, a Basque bureaucrat based in Mexico, was
chosen to lead the Spanish expedition, while Andres de Urdaneta, an Augustinian
friar and noted geographer, was chosen as navigator. Setting out in November
1564, Legazpi, with Urdaneta's guidance, charted the Pacific route from Mexico to
the archipelago Magellan had discovered, establishing a direct link between Asia
and the Americas. Legazpi and his crew reached the island of Samar on February
15, 1565 and renamed the archipelago, comprised of over 7,000 islands, the
Philippines, in tribute to King Philip II. Legazpi then sailed on to Cebu to
establish contact with Humabon's successor, Chief Tupas. Far from the newly

\textsuperscript{12}Karnow, pp. 43-47. See also Blair and Robertson.
Christianized natives Pigafetta had described, Legazpi found virtually no trace of Christianity among the islanders and instead faced open hostility. When talks with Tupa's failed, Legazpi resorted to force, bombarding nipa huts with cannon fire, setting them aflame, eventually forcing the inhabitants to flee as two hundred Spanish troops staged an amphibious landing to conquer the villages, which had now been reduced to rubble. Tupa's followers, unlike those of Lapu Lapu, were not well organized for battle; nor were they equipped for the superior military power of Legazpi's troops. Having conquered Cebu, Legazpi signed a blood pact with Tupa and then sent a ship back to Mexico to report to Spanish colonial authorities there of his conquest. Using an innovative northeastern route devised by Urdaneta, the Spanish ship San Pedro sailed across the Pacific toward Acapulco, discovering along the way a critical link from Asia to America, as well as the coast of a virgin wilderness which would come to be known as California.\textsuperscript{13}

When news of the conquest in the Philippines reached the king, he agreed to send more men and equipment. Because the islands apparently lacked spices, gold, or anything much of value, however, it was not until 1571 that King Philip II decided to formally accept the Philippines as a colony.

\textit{Debajo de las Campanas: "Under the Bells" of Spanish Colonialism}

Most of the Spanish colonists arriving in the Philippines were sent from Mexico, placing the Philippines in the unusual position of being essentially a colony of a colony. While native resistance persisted, there was no centralized, politico-military threat to Spanish rule as the Aztecs of Mexico or the Incas of Peru had presented; so military requirements were relatively small.\textsuperscript{14} With few

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14}The very size and power of the two indigenous American empires actually contributed to their strikingly rapid demise. The empires may have been in crisis at the moment of conquest; but the Spanish invasions undid them, as the long-standing and large-scale brutality of the top Incan and
colonists and little to attract them to the countryside, the Spanish focused their attention on Manila, using the port there as a center for ship repair, ship-building and trade. Manila quickly became an entrepot for the galleon trade, with Mexican silver exchanged for goods like silk and porcelain from China and spices from the Moluccas. These goods were then brought, via Mexico, to European markets. Though Manila was the center of colonization, the rapid growth of non-farming populations there, comprised of Spanish colonists and Indian and Chinese traders, affected the countryside as well, as a primarily subsistence economy was forced to produce surpluses adequate to sustain capitalist development, something which European farmers had taken centuries to achieve. Compounding the need for surpluses while reducing the numbers of agrarian producers, native Filipinos were taken periodically from their villages and their fields to work as laborers for Spain. Without mines, the need for slaves was much lower in the Philippines than in Latin America; but Spain did need labor to cut and transport timber for ship-building, demand for which increased during Spain's frequent periods of warfare. For this, Spain used Filipinos in gangs of up to 8,000.¹⁵

Spain then added to the burdens placed on rural Filipinos by requiring all adult males to pay a tribute, essentially a tax, under an encomienda system resembling the manorial rights granted to church and military elites during the reconquista. In order to avoid the emergence of a feudal aristocracy in the colonies mirroring that which now created so many problems for the monarchy in Spain, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, in the initial phase of Spanish expansion, had decreed that all uninhabited lands in the colonies were to be reserved for the Crown; but, after 1500, they allotted land to the colonists under the encomienda system, which granted colonists the right to collect tribute from the inhabitants of the land. The colonial encomiendas were not hereditary beyond

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¹⁵Information for this paragraph is from Constantino (1975), pp. 42-55, and Karrow, pp. 48-57.
the third or at most the fourth generation and were then to revert back to the monarchy, thus insuring the eventual demise of the system while preserving the power of the monarchy. With little incentive to develop the long-term profitability of the encomiendas and with much incentive to maximize short-term gains from them, encomenderos frequently abused their privileges. So great were the abuses in the Antilles, in fact, that King Charles V decreed the abolition of the system in the early 1500's, though this was ignored by Hernan Cortes, who brought the system to Mexico. In the Philippines, Legazpi, pleading the poverty of his men and the paucity of natural resources in the archipelago, convinced King Philip II to reinstate encomiendas in the new territory. In fact, Spain eventually abolished encomiendas everywhere but in the Philippines. Spain abolished the encomiendas in part because of the system's abuses but also in part because of the economic independence from the monarchy which the system granted the encomenderos.  

While conflicts among tribal groups pre-dated Spanish conquest, as with the conflict between Humabon and Lapu Lapu, the encomiendas intensified these. Initially, the Filipino "nobility," those who came forward as chiefs, were excluded from paying tribute but were typically required to collect it. A chief who fell short of the expected amount was often publicly humiliated or killed. Others collaborated with the Spanish for personal profit, while taking bribes from villagers seeking to avoid Spain's labor conscription. Since other villagers had to be used as replacements, the bribes added another layer of conflict among Filipinos. Out of this early colonial policy emerged a Filipino "cacique" comprised of gobernadorcillos, akin to town mayors, who were responsible for collecting tributes and administering colonial policies. In return, they were exempt from paying tribute and from having to provide forced labor. Spain also

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16 Ibid. See also, Ofreneo, pp. 3-13 for an explanation of the Spanish debates on the encomienda system.

17 From the Arawak tribe now living primarily along the coast of Guyana, the term cacique refers to native chiefs who served as local bosses carrying out Spanish colonial rule.
intensified regional conflicts among tribal groups in areas with diverse political, economic, and social identities. One notable example is that of Pampanga, a fertile region near Manila which became a critical supplier of foodstuffs to the Spanish. To secure Pampangan loyalty, the Spanish cultivated a native Pampangan elite by offering them access to Spanish markets and granting them preferential treatment under colonial rule. Based in the Pampangan town of Macabebe, the emerging native elite prospered. Select natives of Macabebe were also trained as soldiers by the Spanish military, and served a vital strategic role in Spain's wars in the Moluccas and in guarding Manila from Portuguese or other incursions. In an early phase of a transnational hard-line alliance, the Macabebes were also used to quell recurring revolutionary opposition to Spanish rule, which the brutal exactions of the encomienda system and labor conscriptions fueled throughout the archipelago.\(^\text{18}\)

By the end of the 1500's, native resistance to Spanish rule became increasingly widespread, as insurrections spread from island to island, sometimes as isolated events, sometimes as coordinated rebellions, and sometimes as conflicts among Filipinos.\(^\text{19}\) Meanwhile, the Spanish colonists were themselves divided, as the clergy and military fought for control of the conquered territories. While the encomienda was intended to support both the Spanish military and missionaries, because the military oversaw collection of the tax, they often took more of it for themselves than they gave to the clergy. In response, the clergy publicly assailed the abuses of the encomienda, building popular opposition to it among their followers in what may be seen as an early form of a transnational alliance of soft-liners centered around the Catholic Church, emphasizing non-military, in this case spiritual, solutions to peasant resistance. As part of the effort to undercut the power of the encomenderos, the clergy raised theoretical questions regarding the king's legal and moral authority in the colonies vis-a-vis

\(^{18}\)Information on the role of the Macabebes of Pampanga is from Constantino (1975), pp. 94-99.

\(^{19}\)Constantino (1975), pp. 85-112.
the pope. To resolve the crisis, the Synod of Manila surveyed such issues from 1581 to 1586. In the end, the Synod upheld the friars, emphasizing the role of the clergy in governing the colony and in taming abusive Spanish military forces, while curtailing the rights of foreigners, with the exception of designated friars, to enter remote areas. Far from the church and the state, the clergy hereafter gained substantial power and many used this to accrue vast tracts of land as well as wealth from taxes, tributes, and trade. While vestiges of a soft-line alliance persisted, alliances were also reestablished between the church and the military, again combining threat and coercion to subdue the native population.20

The land expansion drives of the friars made religious corporations the largest landowners in the Philippines by the end of Spanish rule. These drives were carried out through several modes of acquisition,21 including land grants from the Spanish Crown, the official owner of all lands in the colony; purchases of land from the colonial government; donations and inheritance from religious Filipinos; purchases from natives, typically at very low rates; foreclosure of lands mortgaged by natives to the friars; and outright landgrabbing. As increasing numbers of native producers became dispossessed from the land, then the principal means of production and subsistence, feudal sharecropping arrangements emerged as the predominant pattern of agricultural production. The produce of the land was then appropriated as a fixed share of the harvest, as tributes, or as forcible purchase by the state at government-set prices.22 The friars also became monopolists over the internal trade of their districts and were often powerful enough to fix the prices at which produce was bought and sold.23 Religious

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20Information on the conflict between the church and the encomenderos is from Constantino (1975), pp. 12-25. See also Phelan, pp. 31-40.

21At the moment of U.S. conquest, friars owned 185,000 ha or about 1/15 of the total land under cultivation. Of this, about 110,000 were in prime land surrounding Manila. From Constantino (1975), p. 74.

22Ofreneo, pp. 3-13.

23Constantino, p. 75.
corporations and other Church organizations also participated in the galleon trade, even before a royal decree in 1638 conferred upon them this right. To further tighten their grip over the natives, whose villages were autonomous, the Spanish built townships, the centerpieces of which were massive stone churches named for patron saints. The towns that built up around these churches helped bring the native Filipinos "debajo de las campanas," or "under the bells" of Spanish colonial authority.

Pressures on Spain and the Impact on the Philippines

It was at about this time that Spain's foreign relations shifted. Beginning in 1568 and lasting until the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, Spain was at war with Holland, which had risen up against Spanish rulers there, and was frequently at war with England as well, primarily over access to the seas and control of the periphery as well as the spread of protestantism. In 1580, and lasting until 1640, Spain absorbed metropolitan Portugal, though the Dutch seized Portuguese colonies in the East. Despite Dutch incursions into Philippine waters and other Dutch challenges to Spain, the Spanish presence in Asia grew, such that, at its peak around 1597, the Manila trade was as valuable as the official Spanish trans-Atlantic trade. With Spain's domestic economy in decline, due to continued centrifugal tensions, international war, and a general failure to compete industrially, the Asian trade could have provided a crucial alternative source of revenue; instead, the trade was seen as a threat to the centralizing drives of the monarchy. In particular, independent trade between the Americas and Asia began to emerge, with Mexican and Peruvian silver being siphoned off to Asia rather than Madrid. Further, manufactured goods from Asia, which were often

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*Fieldhouse*, p. 142.
superior in quality and cheaper than those from Spain, now entered Mexican and Peruvian markets directly, threatening to displace Spain's hold over markets there. The Manila trade, in short, threatened to detach Mexico and Peru from their intended place as conduits for Spanish colonial trade, enabling them to emerge as independent commercial centers. To curtail this, the Spanish Crown forbid trade between Mexico and Peru after 1631 in order to close Peruvian markets to Eastern goods. Serving only Mexico, the Manila trade dropped sharply, and the Philippines slipped back into the periphery, becoming thereafter one of Spain's poorest, most isolated colonies.\(^{26}\)

As profits from trade dropped, the Chinese in Manila, known as Sangleys after the Chinese word xang lai meaning "to barter and trade," were among the first to face increased abuse from the Spanish colonists, who both depended upon and feared the large Chinese population in the Philippines. Alternately tolerated and persecuted, the Chinese staged two separate rebellions against the Spaniards in the 1600's; but native troops, notably those from Macabebe, helped the Spaniards put down the revolt, leaving thousands of Chinese massacred.\(^{27}\) By the mid-1600's, domestic tensions within the Philippines spread as rural areas surrounding Manila threatened to revolt. Over-extended in war and still in decline at home, Spain turned an increasingly heavy hand on the Philippines, using primarily hard-line strategies to extract labor for ship-building as well as tribute and food supplies from the countryside. The decline in the galleon trade further exacerbated domestic tensions, as Spanish colonists now looked to the countryside for new sources of wealth.\(^{28}\)

Even in the Pampangan town of Macabebe, rebellion surfaced in a 1660 revolt, known as the Maniago revolt after its leader. The immediate cause of the

\(^{26}\)Information for this paragraph is culled from Fieldhouse, from Nadel and Curtis, and from Livermore, pp. 183-206.

\(^{27}\)Karnow, pp. 61-63.

\(^{28}\)Constantino (1975), pp. 85-112, and Fieldhouse.
Maniago revolt was ill-treatment of timber cutters, one thousand of whom mutinied and set fire to their camps. The Spanish were alarmed not only because of the military prowess of the Spanish-trained Macabebes, but also because the Spanish presence in the Philippines had been greatly reduced by then. In preparation for a large-scale uprising, armed Filipino rebels gathered in nearby provinces, and chiefs exchanged messages to coordinate revolts. The Spanish colonial governor, Manrique de Lara, however, managed to defuse the situation by exploiting divisions between the native elite and the masses, divisions which the encomienda and other Spanish devices had in fact either created or intensified. First, De Lara entered the rich and populous town of Macabebe with a massive show of troops. Frightened, the Macabebes feigned friendliness, a pretense De Lara reciprocated. This mutual cordiality created distrust and an eventual withdrawal of support from other rebels in Pampanga and surrounding provinces. When Governor De Lara, together with church negotiators, offered Pampangan chieftains money in exchange for disarming the rebels, an agreement was struck and the Maniago revolt was quelled. The Macabebes, themselves now a target of revolutionary opposition, demanded and received two garrisons for their own security and then quickly silenced opposition within Pampanga, reinforcing regional divisions between Pampanga and surrounding provinces. Throughout the remaining years of Spanish colonialism, there were to be no other such revolts in Pampanga, now a loyal bastion of Spain and a central player in what was to become a long-standing transnational hard-line alliance.29

In other provinces, however, rebellions of the late 1600's and early 1700's marked the development of soft-line alliances with the Church as well, as rebel leaders used Catholicism to inspire their followers, recognizing the spiritual, as well as economic and political, hold the church had by then won over the masses, though Filipinos were barred from entering the clergy. From 1757 to 1788, the "enlightened despot" and Bourbon King Charles III of Spain, hailed by the salons

29The description of the Maniago Revolt is from Constantino (1975), pp. 94-99.
of Europe, tried to liberalize the church, expelling the powerful Jesuits from every
colony, including the Philippines, and allowing the Dominicans, Augustinians and
others to remain on the condition that they give over several of the provincial
parishes to a new breed of Filipino priests. This strengthened the transnational
soft-line alliance but it also fueled conflict with hard-line factions of the colonial
administration. Faced with continued economic decline and widening social unrest
at home as well as continued threats from external powers, Charles III also
liberalized colonial trade and reopened the Philippines to world markets. In
addition, he promoted plantation crops such as tobacco and indigo, and allowed
for the emergence of haciendas. Unlike the encomiendas, haciendas were owned
and could be passed from generation to generation, thus encouraging investment
in the land. Though the Chinese, with their financial resources and access to
trade, were perhaps best suited to commercialize agriculture, their prospects were
upset in 1762, when Britain, as part of its seven years war with Spain, captured
Manila.30

Long abused by the Spaniards, the Chinese allied with the British; but,
when Spain retook Manila two years later, the British left the Chinese to the
mercies of the Spanish. Many Chinese were massacred. The rest were expelled.
Chinese mestizos, those of mixed Chinese and Filipino extraction gained the right
under Spanish law to reside in the provinces by converting to Christianity, and
now filled the commercial vacuum left by the Chinese. They also developed new
enterprises in export agriculture and accrued vast tracts of land, becoming the
second largest group of landowners after the religious corporations for the
remainder of the Spanish colonial era. The mestizos succeeded further in

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30Information for this paragraph is culled from Constantino (1975), pp. 113-149 on the patterns
of resistance to Spanish rule; Fieldhouse on Spain's colonial policies; Karkow, pp. 57-77 for an
overview of the period, notably the evolving Chinese role as well as Charles III's economic and
church reforms; Ofreneo, pp. 1-13 on the economic role of the Chinese and on Charles III's
agricultural policies; and Doyle, pp. 117-118 on the evolution of Spain's imperial economic policies.
controlling nearly all phases of agricultural production. Some Filipinos emerged too as merchants and middlemen, though the majority were left more alienated from the land than ever. In short, the commercialization of agriculture extended profits to a broader class of mestizos and Filipinos, who formed a new class of elites; but it also increased the concentration of land ownership as well as concomitant social tensions and the threat of peasant revolts.

Nevertheless, the commercialization of agriculture in the colonies could not save Spain or its colonies. As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the Spanish Crown faced increased threats both at home and abroad following revolutions which rocked the foundations of European power. While the American revolution of 1776 fired a warning shot regarding the limits of colonial taxation, and inspired rebellious agitation among Spanish colonists throughout Spain's territories, the French revolution of 1789 posed a more direct challenge to Spain's monarchy. Long-standing tensions between Spain's conservative traditionalists, centered in the countryside, and liberals, centered in the cities, were reignited, and debates concerning Spanish governance exploded. By 1808, Napoleon's expansionary drives into Spain forced Charles IV to abdicate in favor of France's Joseph Bonaparte. When the French dissolved the monasteries in 1809 and the Spanish liberals readily accepted this, much of the Spanish Church allied with reactionary forces, establishing ties between the Church and the military, recalling ties forged during the reconquista and the subsequent Age of Discovery. During the French occupation, which lasted until 1814, the Spanish populace united to oust France; but domestic debates over Spain's future simmered. Overseas, the link between Spanish colonists and the peninsular monarchy was, for the first time in Spanish colonial history, broken. With the flow of Spanish friars to the Philippines cut off, vacancies were filled by the new Filipino priests, who further strengthened soft-line attempts at non-military pacification of peasant resistance.

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31 Ofreneo, p. 10.

32 Ibid. See also Constantino (1975), pp. 55-65, 113-132, in particular.
In Manila, the last galleon left port in 1811, ending centuries of trade between Spain's Asian colony and its counterparts in the Americas.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, blockades separated the Americas from Spain. Though some Spanish colonists remained loyal to the Crown, others reveled in their sudden freedom from centuries of restrictive Spanish economic policies. As commerce spread, the appetite for independence among Spanish colonists and emerging native elites grew, even after the Spanish monarchy was restored in 1815. A surge of revolts in the periphery left Spain with just Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by 1826, and the ultra-conservative King Ferdinand VII stepped in to undo the work of Charles III. When it was discovered that Latin American clergymen had contributed substantially to the emancipation of their countries from Spain, the Spanish church strengthened its ties to reactionary forces as well as to the monarchy, which now sought to reverse the economic, social, and political liberalizations in the remaining colonies. In 1826, suspecting Filipino priests of the kind of liberal ambitions which had swept Latin America, King Ferdinand VII removed them from their parishes. Even when the Liberals gained strength for a brief period in 1829, when Ferdinand VII married his young niece Maria Cristina, who used her influence to mitigate the harsh intolerance of her husband's policies, the Liberals could not curb Spain's increasingly hard-line colonial policies.\textsuperscript{34} Hoping to stem the liberation fever that had undone Spain's hold of Latin America, the hard-line policies instead fueled a new wave of agitation in the Philippines, and reaction from Spain, which now extended restrictions to Philippine-born Spaniards, or "criollos."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33}See Carr for a thorough description of the Spanish politics during the French occupation and the implications for the colonies. See Know, pp. 57-77, for a concise account of the implications for the Philippines in particular.

\textsuperscript{34}See Clarke for a detailed description of Spanish politics from 1815-1898. See also Carr, pp. 72-154.

\textsuperscript{35}See Schumacher (1979) and (1981) for detailed descriptions of Spanish policy toward the Filipino clergy and the Filipino reaction.
In 1833, when Isabella II inherited the Spanish crown as a child under her mother’s regency, yet another storm of conflict broke out in Spain, this time among monarchists. Known as the Carlist Wars, the conflict centered around the rights of ascendancy, with the followers of the ultra-conservative Don Carlos, Isabella II’s uncle, clamoring for Isabella’s removal, adding another layer of conflict to the many conflicts among liberals, democrats, royalists, and others. After 1833, Spain experienced a wave of revolutionary challenges, with intermittent periods of liberalization, reaction, military juntas, and other political transitions. These, in turn, created uncertainty and instability in the Philippines, where the colonial administration was constantly shifting, and a new generation of ultra-conservative friars began to reach the archipelago. In 1849, the Recollects reclaimed parishes from Filipinos in Cavite Province, located just beyond Manila. Tensions further escalated when the Jesuits began to return in the 1850’s. Moreover, new decrees barred Filipinos from serving in the church except as assistants to Spanish clergy. Many "criollo" clergymen, like their earlier Latin American counterparts, began to oppose such policies, rallying Filipinos against Spain while decrying the friars for violating canon law. Their first leader was Pedro Palaez, the Philippine-born son of a Spanish official, who had risen to the rank of ecclesiastical governor of the Manila archdiocese, the highest rank ever conferred on a criollo priest. Just as he was gaining adherents, however, he was killed in an earthquake in 1863. He was succeeded by Jose Burgos, also a Philippine-born Spaniard or "criollo," who began his campaign against the friars and for Filipino ordination in 1864. Meanwhile, the Carlist conflict continued in Spain, as a military junta staged a coup in 1868, replacing Isabella II with the more liberal Amadeo of Italy.36

The junta chose one of its officers to be governor of the Philippines; but the initially moderate General Carlos Maria de la Torre quickly turned reactionary, suspecting even his most ardent supporters of sedition. "With very

36Karnow, pp. 57-77; Carr, pp. 257-306; and Clarke, pp. 251-335.
rare exceptions," he wrote, "every priest and lawyer born in this country, now as always, has been using his education and his influence to create aspirations for independence." Such attitudes further strengthened growing ties between the Philippine-born Spanish criollos and the native Filipinos. Still, de la Torre was considered too moderate for the increasingly powerful reactionaries in Madrid, as King Amadeo tried to cover his conservative flank by replacing de la Torre as governor in 1871 with the extreme hard-liner General Rafael de Izquierda. Izquierda promised to govern by the "sword and the cross," and soon had the opportunity to do so, when he fanned opposition to Spain by annulling the privileges of several criollo army officers and non-combatants, replacing them with Spanish-born peninsulares. By January 1872, an uprising led by a newly displaced criollo sergeant named Lamadrid, with about two hundred native troops, brought two Spanish regiments to the Philippines to restore order. The Spanish regiments swiftly slaughtered the insurgents, including Lamadrid, and summarily executed other rebels in subsequent days. Izquierdo then ordered the arrest of thirty prominent Filipino lawyers, priests, and other elites, assuming without substantiating their complicity in the uprising. Worse, Burgos and two other priests, Mariano Gomez, then in his seventies, and Jacinto Zamora, were implicated in a farcical trial, and condemned to die. Their execution on February 17, 1872 has been cited as the birth of a nationalist consciousness, forging a link between criollos and Filipinos, moderates and revolutionaries, rich and poor against a common enemy, setting the stage for the next, final wave of rebellion against Spain.38

Nationalism and Revolution

It was Spain's eventual undoing to encourage solidarity among elite and

37Karnow, p. 66.

poor Filipinos, and among Filipinos and criollos, by excluding all, regardless of class, from non-economic sources of prestige such as membership in Spanish social clubs and ordination as parish priests. Such exclusion not only fed agitation against Spain; it also gave formerly divided groups a common enemy and a new sense of Filipino nationalism, which strengthened by the mid-1890's when two opposition movements joined forces to oust Spain. The first group emerged in 1892, when a group of elite Filipinos who came to be known as "ilustrados" or "enlightened ones" formed the "Liga Filipina" under the leadership of Jose Rizal. The Spanish-educated doctor, novelist, linguist and scholar had studied in Madrid and had experienced first-hand the political ferment of late nineteenth century Spain where debates raged among monarchists, democrats, socialists, republicans, and others. Rizal wanted the same freedom of political expression for his compatriots and argued for moderate reforms including Philippine integration with Spain so as to provide Filipinos the same rights as Spaniards. He also argued for improved educational, judicial, and welfare systems as well as Filipino representation in the Cortes. In his irreverent novel Noli Me Tangere, Rizal gave voice to his anger, wickedly satirizing the excesses of the Spanish friars who controlled much of Philippine political, economic, and social institutions while urging reforms in order to avert revolution. As Uncle Tom's Cabin had ignited the indignation of abolitionists in the U.S. decades earlier, Rizal's novel sparked the growing indignation among elite Filipinos and criollos toward Spanish rule, fueling moderate opposition to Spain.39

At the same time, Andres Bonifacio, a Manila clerk with peasant roots, founded a revolutionary secret society with the remarkably alliterative, if tongue-twisting name -- the "Kataastaasang Kagalinggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan," or roughly the "Most Noble Society of the Sons and Daughters of the

39Rizal's novel, a biting satire of the friars and other Spanish colonists, can be found in translation. Information for this paragraph was culled from Constantino (1975), pp. 150-172; Karnow, pp. 66-72; and Schumacher (1981) on the role of the revolutionary clergy from 1850 through the uprising against first Spain and later the U.S.
Country" known simply as the Katipunan. The Katipunan grew rapidly among the lower and middle classes in the region surrounding Manila, particularly among dispossessed peasants. They sought, among other things, redistribution of land. Using Tagalog rather than Spanish, the Katipunan hoped its name would symbolize mass resistance to Spanish rule; yet the Philippines was, and is, both linguistically diverse and regionally fractious, with Tagalog not widely spoken beyond the provinces surrounding Manila. Rather than symbolizing mass unity, the use of Tagalog exemplified the challenges that the Katipunan and all subsequent revolutionary movements would face in seeking to unite socially diverse and geographically dispersed communities. The movement failed to develop a national stronghold and was also unable to gain acceptance from the ilustrados, who condemned the Katipunan as too radical. The Katipunan did, however, gain strength in southern and central Luzon, the area surrounding Spanish forces in Manila. On August 29, 1896, Bonifacio declared war on Spain. Spain was able to subdue the uprising, though a young rebel named Emilio Aguinaldo waged a particularly effective battle in Cavite. When Spain subsequently arrested hundreds of Bonifacio's men as well as roughly 500 ilustrados, among them Rizal, Spain made a critical tactical error. Treating reformers and revolutionaries equally harshly, Spain encouraged moderate and revolutionary forces to ally.\(^\text{40}\)

Although Rizal pledged allegiance to Spain, arguing only for reforms while rejecting the radicalism of the Katipunan, he was executed for treason on December 30, 1896. Rizal became an instant martyr and symbol of both moderate and revolutionary opposition to Spain. The emerging rationale for an alliance between the ilustrados and the Katipunan was then nudged along by Bonifacio, who forged the signatures of hundreds of elite Filipinos on the Katipunan's membership rolls and then secretly passed the list along to Spanish

\(^\text{40}\)Information for this paragraph was culled from Constantino (1975), pp. 150-172 and Karnow, pp. 67-77.
officials. When the Spaniards retaliated in a reign of terror, arresting, humiliating and killing many of these Filipinos, those remaining together with a growing base among the peasantry quickly rallied behind Bonifacio in a mounting revolt against Spain. The friars brought in a new ultra-hard-line governor named Polavieja to silence the revolutionaries with all out military action. A veteran of the on-going rebellion against Spain in Cuba, where war had broken out in 1895, he used similarly harsh policies in the Philippines, emptying crowded jails by executing prisoners while stepping up the campaign against the insurgents. Still, by mid-1897, he acknowledged to Queen Maria Cristina that he lacked the resources to crush the Filipinos completely. He urged either negotiation or an escalation of the war. She rebuffed both proposals, the first because she feared opposition from the ultra-hard-line Spanish clergy should she negotiate, the latter because the war in Cuba was draining her resources. Instead, she replaced Polavieja with another hard-liner, General Fernando Primo de Rivera. What finally undid the Filipino resistance, however, was internal feuding.\footnote{Karnow, pp. 55-77 and Constantino (1975) pp. 150-203.}

In early 1897, Aguinaldo and Bonifacio began to compete for control of the Katipunan. In May, Aguinaldo had Bonifacio executed and assumed leadership of the revolutionary forces. Spain had been having difficulties subduing the Filipinos while waging war against revolutionaries in Cuba as well; but the dispute between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo seriously weakened the Filipino movement and, later in May, the Filipinos were forced to retreat. Aguinaldo then negotiated a settlement with Spain, which provided him with P800,000 to lay down his arms and go into exile abroad in exchange for promises of reform from Spain. Aguinaldo chose Hong Kong and, from there, as Spain failed to fulfill its promises of reform and as unrest continued to simmer in the Philippines, he plotted the next course of action.\footnote{Ibid.} This new course of action began to evolve in 1898, when a new international player entered the drama.
The Roots of the Debate Between Anti-Imperialists and Expansionists

On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey sailed into Manila harbor and quickly routed Spanish forces there, in what came to be known as "the splendid little war." A less "splendid" war of U.S. conquest followed, leaving as many as half a million Filipinos dead while raising to a pitch a long-standing tension within the U.S. between isolationists and interventionists.\(^{43}\) The debate, in fact, had its roots in the American Revolution. Behind the primary grievance of the colonists against England, taxation without representation, was the widespread belief that the ties to Great Britain's mercantilist economy had impeded expansion of American trade and territory, a view which ran parallel to that of many Spanish colonists as well. Though the American revolutionaries wanted to adhere to Paine's call "to steer clear of European connections" in order to protect trade with all of Europe, the Americans needed external support if they were to succeed militarily against the British. Positioning themselves within the European balance of power system, the Americans accepted covert financial and military assistance from France and Spain, who were then allied against Great Britain. Loss of America, reasoned France and Spain, would severely wound Britain's financial, commercial, and naval power, thereby recalibrating the European balance of power. Under the direction of French Foreign Minister Vergennes, the shipments were channeled through a bogus corporation, Roderique Hortalez et Compagnie. In the first third of the revolution, ninety percent of the gunpowder Americans used came from Europe, primarily through Hortalez.\(^{44}\)

Soon, however, the superior British forces required the U.S. to form an open alliance with France. The challenge was to procure French support with no political strings attached, a challenge which fell to Benjamin Franklin. Though

\(^{43}\)Karnow, pp. 78-80, and Combs, pp. 155-156.

\(^{44}\)Combs, pp. 1-17.
French Finance Minister Baron Turgot presciently warned that the costs of such support might lead to national bankruptcy or to levels of taxation so great as to trigger a French revolution, Louis XVI ignored this forecast and continued negotiations with the Americans. After the Americans defeated the British in the Battle of Saratoga in 1778 and an American victory seemed possible, Vergennes agreed to an official alliance but on the condition that the U.S. not make a separate peace with Great Britain and that it protect France's territories in the Americas. Though the Americans had sought to avoid such strings, under the pressures of war they agreed and the Franco-American alliance was forged. The alliance proved critical to America's success, as French and Spanish forays into English waters forced Britain to keep ships and supplies close to home. The alliance did, however, create the entanglements the Americans had feared. In particular, France lured Spain into the war in 1779 without informing the Americans, promising no peace with Britain until Gibraltar, taken from Spain in 1704 by the British, was recovered. This meant that the U.S. could not make peace with Britain without French consent, while the French could likewise not make peace without Spain's consent. Spain also refused to ally with the American revolutionaries because of their stand against monarchy and imperialism, and because of the message it would send to Spain's own colonial outposts. Moreover, Spain wanted to control the Mississippi and so viewed its territorial interests as conflicting with those of the Americans.45

France, near bankruptcy, grew desperate for peace. With the recovery of Gibraltar apparently beyond reach, France hoped to mollify Spain by supporting its claims to the Mississippi. The Americans feared, however, that France also sought to contain U.S. expansion for its own ends and so the Americans edged closer to Britain. To draw America away from France and regain much of American commerce, Britain offered a liberal treaty in 1783, granting the U.S. the right to the Mississippi and access to the Great Lakes. The resolution of the war

45Ibid.
thus left the U.S. in a substantially better position than it had enjoyed prior to the revolution, particularly vis-a-vis Europe, with the British empire seriously diminished, the French monarchy in financial ruin and threatened by domestic revolution, and Spain facing a newly powerful adversary for American territory, as U.S. expansionists gained power. The first Spanish loss was the Louisiana territory, which Napoleon had secretly forced Spain to retrocede to France. Napoleon then sold the territory in 1803 to the U.S. for $15 million, more than doubling the size of the new nation, while further enclosing Spain's North American territories. The U.S. then targeted Spanish territory along the Gulf of Mexico known as West Florida and, in 1810, James Madison accepted an invitation from American rebels there to occupy lands not garrisoned by Spain. Conquest of all of Florida was completed in 1819, when the U.S. wrested control of it from Spain. After Mexican Independence in 1821, the U.S. faced down a new adversary, taking formerly Spanish territories from Mexico. The U.S. conquered Texas in 1848 after years of warfare and then, with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signed that same year, took what are now New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada and the land Urdaneta had discovered so long ago -- California. 46

America's territorial expansion was spurred by population pressures, a belief in "manifest destiny," and technological innovations attending the industrial revolution, which allowed for communication and transportation across ever increasing distances. Prior to the Civil War, acquisition of territory in North America had fed U.S. expansionism; but afterwards the rising industrial economy together with the lack of empty, contiguous territory made economic rather than territorial expansion the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy. The North's victory also shifted power from southern planters to northern industrialists and financiers. America now looked abroad, seeking territories in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific, less for their land or resources than as

46The above information is culled from Combs, pp. 1-100.
steppingstones to markets in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The completion of the transcontinental railway in 1869 was one factor facilitating increased trade, particularly with Asia, though the American treatment of immigrant Chinese rail workers had strained U.S. relations with China. The opening of Japan during the Meiji Restoration, beginning in 1868, was another.47 At home, the value of U.S. manufactured goods rose from fourth in the world in the 1860's to first by 1894, almost equalling that of Great Britain, Germany and France combined.48 Such progress was not without cost, however, as frequent periods of economic depression and labor unrest threatened American expansion from within.49 Abolitionists, linking expansion with slavery, also clamored for restraint, as did various economic interest groups who feared competition from new territories. The isolationists, now anti-imperialists, formed a broad coalition and, through the 1880's, worked effectively through Congress to try to check American expansionism.50

The U.S. Emerges as an Imperial Power

This shifted after 1893, when the worst economic crisis and the most intense labor unrest the U.S. had yet seen reignited debates between anti-imperialists and interventionists, now expansionists. With over 600 bank failures, 156 railroads in receivership, a Treasury deficit of $69.8 million, unemployment of 20 percent of the workforce, and increasingly violent labor confrontations such as

47Combs, pp. 101-129.

48Ibid, p. 131.

49Mills, pp. 29-35 provides a concise description of rising labor activism from 1794 through the particularly volatile period through the end of the nineteenth century.

50Schirmer (1972) provides an excellent, detailed account of the anti-imperialist movement and its role in the U.S. campaign to take the Philippines.
the 1894 Pullman strike, America's golden era was tarnishing. Expansionists argued that the crisis was caused by overproduction and underconsumption, that the industrial growth and enhanced efficiency of the post-war era had to be met with an expansion in market size. Given the limits of the domestic market, they argued, the U.S. must look abroad for new markets. It was this rationale which Hobson and later Lenin would cite as the driving force behind imperialism. Social Darwinists supported these claims, arguing for "survival of the fittest" in crudely racist terms. At the same time, the U.S. navy was expanding, following the 1890 publication of Captain Alfred Mahan's important work, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, and the authorization by congress the same year to build the nation's first battleships. Mahan had argued that national security as well as international supremacy required a strong navy, and the U.S. congress had acquiesced. Moreover, the rise of trusts in steel, oil, sugar, and other key sectors led to high concentrations of capital, and the attendant political power such concentration conferred. Core elements of the trusts, with the notable exception of Andrew Carnegie, sought overseas expansion to improve the supply of raw materials, increase their market, and sell excess goods.

Despite the daunting array of pro-imperialist forces, the anti-imperialists continued to have a powerful voice in the debates of the period. In fact, despite their much greater wealth and power, the expansionists faced serious challenges at several critical moments in U.S. foreign policy of the period. The first moment came in 1893, when Hawaiian sugar planters staged a nearly bloodless coup, ousted Queen Lilioukalani, and offered the islands to the U.S., primarily so that Hawaiian sugar could be free of U.S. tariffs and thus more competitive with domestic U.S. beet sugar as well as Cuban cane sugar, which was closer to the

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81 The data is compiled from Combs, p. 132; Mills, pp. 34-35; and LaFeber, pp. 197-203.

82 LaFeber provides a detailed account of the economic, social, moral, political and other forces contributing to the rise of imperialism. He argues that U.S. foreign policy from about 1893 through the Spanish-American War was driven by a belief in the need for expanding foreign markets as a cure for domestic depression caused by surplus production.
major East Coast refineries. U.S. soldiers were sent to maintain order during the coup, thereby lending support to the Hawaiian planters' regime. Despite intense pressure from the planters and their allies in the U.S., notably the American investors who accounted for nearly three quarters of the capital invested in Hawaiian sugar, newly elected President Cleveland refused to resubmit a treaty calling for Hawaiian annexation which his predecessor, Benjamin Harrison, had sent to the U.S. Senate. In declining to seek annexation of Hawaii, Cleveland cited the "undue influence" U.S. soldiers had exerted during the overthrow of Lilioukalani.53

Perhaps a more important factor, however, was the growing power of the Sugar Trust, which now controlled 98 percent of the U.S. sugar trade and had given Cleveland's campaign the largest single gift in the history of American politics to that time.54 In exchange, Cleveland had privately agreed to grant the Trust "protection and immunity," not just from anti-trust cases but also from annexation of Hawaii as well as the development of beet farms in the U.S. That is, the power of the Sugar Trust, comprised of sugar refiners, rested on its ability to control the price and supply of raw sugar. At that moment, annexation of Hawaii would have strengthened the hand of planters there vis-a-vis the Trust's refiners; while support of U.S. beet farms, which produced refined sugar, posed a threat to the Trust's control of sugar supplies and prices. By 1899, the Trust would seek annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines to bring raw sugar within newly established tariff walls, which had raised the price of foreign sugar.55

The second, more contentious moment came in February 1895, when the insurrection in Cuba broke out. As in the Philippines, Spain's colonial policies

53 Combs, pp. 120-123.

54 The amount of the gift has been estimated at between $250,000 and $500,000. From Francisco and Fast, p. 67.

55 For a detailed account of the role of the Sugar Trust in U.S. foreign policy debates during the late 1800's, see Francisco and Fast.
encouraged moderates and revolutionaries among the 800,000 white Cubans and 600,000 blacks, recently released from slavery, to ally. In fact, Spanish colonial authorities in Cuba had endured nine separate rebellions since 1823, and the endemic chaos worried American leaders, who watched Cuba closely throughout most of the nineteenth century. The U.S. had long coveted Cuba, primarily for its sugar plantations but also for its markets and harbors. American investors in Cuban sugar were also an important force both in Cuban and in American politics. As the war heated up, American exports to Cuba dropped from $20 million in 1894 to half that by 1898, while $50 million worth of American investments were similarly threatened.66 Meanwhile in Cuba, Spain developed a harsh "reconcentrado" policy of rounding up Cubans into camps, which led to widespread human rights abuses as well as illness. International doctors rushed to Cuba to ease the crisis, among them Jose Rizal, who was captured by Spanish forces enroute to Cuba from the Philippines. As word of the reconcentrado policy and its abuses spread to the U.S., enraging former abolitionists, liberals and anti-imperialists alike, U.S. expansionists, notably Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and their allies in the religious, business, newspaper, and other sectors, used this to persuade congress in April 1896 to support the Cuban revolutionaries. For the moment, anti-imperialists and expansionists joined forces, clamoring for intervention in Cuba.67

Under pressure from the U.S. as well as from opponents of the monarchy within Spain, Spain promised in 1897 to end the reconcentrado policy and announced plans for limited Cuban self-government. The remaining Spanish colonists in Cuba bitterly resented Spain's concessions, however, and, in January 1898, Spanish officers led a riot in Havana. U.S. interventionists now demanded that U.S. battleships be sent to support the Cuban revolutionaries. To avoid a

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66Combs, pp. 141-144.
67The above is from Kornow, pp. 88-105 and Schirmer (1972).
debate on Capitol Hill, President McKinley agreed to send the battleship Maine to Havana to provide a U.S. military presence while Spain and the U.S. pursued diplomatic solutions. On January 25, 1898, the U.S. battleship Maine arrived in Havana Harbor. A tense period of negotiations and mutual suspicion among Spanish and U.S. officers in Havana followed; but on February 15, an explosion blew the Maine to pieces, instantly killing 254 men and an additional eight who died shortly after. Though a subsequent U.S. inquiry into the source of the bombing cited a floating mine, not an overtly hostile act by Spain, the phrase "Remember the Maine! To Hell with Spain!" became the battle cry of U.S. interventionists clamoring for war. Among these was William Randolph Hearst, publisher of the New York Journal. Six months earlier, Hearst had sent Frederic Remington to Cuba to report on the hostilities there. When Remington had cabled back that there would be no war and had asked to return home, Hearst reportedly sent a reply now famous in the annals of U.S. journalism. "Please Remain," Hearst cabled, "You Furnish the Pictures and I'll Furnish the War."

While Hearst's influence was less than he might have liked to admit, New York newspapers, including the New York Times, which was revived in 1896 under the new ownership of Adolph Ochs, were engaged in a circulation war. With competitive pressures high, the unfolding story in Cuba provided the color and drama which publishers hoped would attract new readers. And these readers followed events and U.S. policy with passion, adding new voices to the debate between expansionists and anti-imperialists.

Again, however, the anti-imperialists held sway, despite hard maneuvering by the expansionists. Under pressure from U.S. expansionists, McKinley sought congressional support for intervention while simultaneously pressuring Spain to halt the reconcentrado policy. The Spanish Crown, in severe financial and political straits at home, readily complied; but McKinley then added a new

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*58* Ibid.

*59* Schudson, pp. 88-120.
ultimatum, setting as a precondition for a settlement Spain’s pledge to grant Cuba "full self-government, with reasonable indemnity." In early April 1898, McKinley formally requested Congress to authorize "neutral" intervention in Cuba. The vote was to take place April 6. Meanwhile, Spain declared an armistice in Cuba, but declined to grant Cubans independence. Some U.S. officials, particularly those in Madrid, saw openings for diplomacy, but Congressional interventionists had gained too much momentum. The debate now shifted from the question of U.S. intervention to whether or not the U.S. should recognize the Cuban revolutionary government. McKinley, and his allies in the Sugar Trust, Congress, and other key sectors, opposed this. Senator Henry Teller of Colorado and others representing beet sugar farmers, populist opposition to colonialism, and various sources of anti-imperialism, grew suspicious of expansionist motives behind U.S. policy towards Cuba.60

On April 11, McKinley submitted his resolution to Capitol Hill, requesting neither support for the Cuban rebels nor for their cry for independence. Instead, he requested permission "to take measures to secure a full and final termination of the hostilities" in Cuba, as well as authorization to send U.S. ground and naval forces there if necessary. A heated debate and political struggle in Congress followed. The outcome was a narrow victory for the anti-imperialists in the form of the Teller Amendment, which avoided the question of recognition of revolutionary forces in Cuba altogether but achieved nearly the same ends. In short, the amendment explicitly disclaimed American "intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over (Cuba) except for the pacification thereof, and assert(ed) its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." With that stroke of the pen, U.S. expansionists were forced to look elsewhere for new territory. Looking to Asia, the expansionists would use the Spanish-American War, which broke out in

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60Information on the debates leading to the Teller Amendment is culled from Francisco and Fast; Combs, pp. 148-149; and Schirmer (1972).
Cuba on April 22, 1898, to wrest the Philippines from Spain, ushering in a new era of colonial struggle in the Philippines while marking as well the emergence of the U.S. as an international colonial power.61

The Less "Splendid" War

Earlier in 1898, and prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had developed a plan to simultaneously attack Spanish forces in Cuba and Manila in order to ensure U.S. success in Cuba. Militarily, the plan did not make much sense, given that Spanish ships in Manila could not have been deployed rapidly to Cuba and, in any case, were outmoded relics of Spain’s earlier grandeur. Nevertheless, the plan was put into effect while Roosevelt’s less expansionist boss, Secretary of the Navy John Long, was out sick one afternoon. Aware of the plan months before its execution, Aguinaldo, from his exile in Hong Kong, met with U.S. diplomats. Through unauthorized negotiations, the substance of which has been contested by Filipino and American historians, the U.S. diplomats secured promises of an alliance with revolutionary forces in what Filipinos believed was an exchange for U.S. support for Filipino independence. Though the U.S. diplomats later claimed not to have made such an offer, Aguinaldo wrote in his memoirs that Dewey himself had assured him that the U.S. was "rich in territory and money, and needed no colonies." Whatever the deal was, three weeks after "the splendid little war," as fighting escalated from Manila Harbor into a battle for control of the city and outlying areas, the U.S. requested and received support from Aguinaldo and his forces in the war with Spain. Its meager fleet in Manila destroyed, facing growing revolutionary pressures throughout the Philippines, embattled at home, in Cuba, and now with the U.S., Spain nevertheless still held Manila. To help put down Spanish forces, the U.S. summoned Aguinaldo and his troops, who quickly rallied

61Ibid.

-72-
in support of the Americans. Numbers of Filipinos now quit the Spanish army to join the insurgency.\footnote{This paragraph is culled from Karnow, pp. 100-138.}

While U.S. forces awaited reinforcements from newly assembled volunteer troops, including a batch of 2,500 shipped out on May 25 from San Francisco, Filipino troops encircled Manila, cutting off supplies to the Spanish. By now, nearly all of the native auxiliaries had defected from the Spanish army, and the revolutionaries had amassed thousands of rifles and rounds of ammunition from defeated Spanish outposts and Chinese smugglers.\footnote{Karnow, p. 115.} On June 12, Aguinaldo declared Filipino independence from his home in Cavite, near Manila, and affirmed Philippine freedom "under the protection of the mighty and humane" United States. Though Aguinaldo had invited Dewey to attend the ceremony and had hoped for an official U.S. presence, only one retired American officer, who was in the Philippines on business, attended. Still, it was not until late June, when U.S. forces began to crowd in with his near Manila, that Aguinaldo began to grow suspicious of U.S. intentions. He became even more wary when an invitation to American Independence Day celebrations addressed him as General, not President. Aguinaldo boycottted the event but continued to seek reassurances from the Americans. He also moved his headquarters from Cavite to Bacoor, ten miles farther out from Manila, to reduce the chance of friction between his and U.S. forces. In addition, he continued to provide U.S. forces with supplies, though he was able to secure no more than vague promises of U.S. support for his cause. In late July, fresh U.S. detachments arrived under the command of Generals Arthur MacArthur and Francis Greene, but in order to attack Manila they would have to first cross through the Filipino encirclement. Under strict orders from McKinley to preserve peace with the Filipinos, an unofficial delegation of Americans resorted to a ruse, promising Aguinaldo artillery and a measure of official recognition if his forces would withdraw from their trenches south of
Manila. Aguinaldo complied and U.S. forces quickly moved in.\textsuperscript{54}

The Filipinos realized too late that they had been duped, as U.S. forces gained control of the fight against the Spanish in Manila. Now entering their fourth month of siege, Spaniards in Manila faced serious food and water shortages as well as disease, as 70,000 people crammed into the walled Spanish enclave within Manila known as the Intramuros, which previously housed just 10,000.\textsuperscript{65} Literally walled in, the Spanish officials sought an alternative to capitulation, in part because this would have led to court-martial at home and in part because they wanted to surrender to Americans not to Filipinos. After covert negotiations between American and Spanish forces, a plan was devised. On August 13, 1898, U.S. and Spanish troops staged a mock battle, allowing Spain to call a ceasefire with honor and open diplomatic talks with the U.S. Caught by surprise, the Filipinos were then blocked by U.S. forces from entering Manila. The U.S. forces, approximately 75 percent of whom were civilian volunteers with diverse educational and professional backgrounds, quickly established in Manila a legal system for addressing criminal cases; penal reforms allowing for the release of 2,000 unsentenced prisoners; public works projects to build or repair bridges and restore water supply systems; and public health policies, including the creation of improved sanitation systems, a smallpox vaccination program which reached over 80,000 of Manila's inhabitants, and the monitoring of prostitutes for venereal disease. The Americans also reopened the schools and deleted courses on religious instruction, a reform the Philippine revolutionaries had long sought under Spanish rule. Finally, the American forces introduced tax reforms, revised customs and tariff regulations, and prohibited the entry of Chinese immigrants to

\textsuperscript{54}Karnow, pp. 100-138. See also Gates, pp. 3-42, for a detailed description of U.S. relations with the Filipino revolutionaries during the siege of Manila following Dewey's success in Manila Harbor on May 1, 1898.

\textsuperscript{65}Gates, p. 55.
the Philippines, all policies the majority of the Filipinos applauded.66

While some Filipinos cooperated with the American forces in the
development of new health, education, tax and immigration policies, widespread
resentment persisted, particularly when the Americans prohibited popular
pastimes like gambling and cockfights and sought to enforce such new sanitation
codes as the cleaning of sidewalks. The tensions were exacerbated by the U.S.
military's penchant for centralized bureaucracy, wherein public works projects
were assigned directly to the U.S. military rather than to an agent of the private
sector of the economy.67 Hostilities really heated up when Filipinos were
excluded from peace negotiations between the U.S. and Spain in Paris, which
began in September of 1898. In open protest, on September 15, Aguinaldo
convened a national assembly in the city of Malolos, a market town located about
twenty miles from Manila. There, he reasserted Philippine independence and the
legitimacy of his revolutionary government, as he waited to see what America
would do. Even America waited, as U.S. officials vacillated among various
options, with no apparent plan. Regional elections conducted by Aguinaldo's
regime late in 1898 limited suffrage to a very small, affluent elite, who sought to
reclaim the power and privilege conferred upon them by the Spanish. Meanwhile,
Americans and Filipinos refrained from outright conflict, but tensions heated up
further after December 10, when the U.S. acquired the right to purchase the
Philippines from Spain under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty, which also
granted Cuban independence as well as U.S. control of Guam and Puerto Rico.68

The expansionists still would not garner control of U.S. foreign policy
without a fight from the anti-imperialists, however. The U.S. congress now
entered a contentious debate on ratification of the treaty and related issues, as

66All statistics and information on the role of the U.S. forces in Manila during the period of
occupation after August 1898 are from Gates, pp. 3-42.

67Ibid.

U.S. troops were ordered not to fire upon Aguinaldo's. No clear plan or consensus drove U.S. policy during this period and debates raged as to whether the U.S. should take Manila, all of the Philippines, or apply the Teller Amendment and simply withdraw. U.S. expansionists, led by Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and segments of the religious and business communities, sought Philippine annexation, reviving arguments that the economic depressions of the late 1800's could be resolved through expansion of international trade in surplus goods and capital. They pointed to the Social Darwinists as well as Mahan's writings to support their views. They argued further that if the U.S. did not take the Philippines, another power such as Germany, Japan, or Britain was sure to, with potentially serious implications for America's prospective China trade, as well as the global balance of power, should a scramble for imperial control of Asia result from American hesitation. The expansionists made their case forcefully in popular newspapers, religious journals, and in the congressional debates.69

The anti-imperialists, led by a coalition of blacks, labor unions, beet sugar farmers, as well as former abolitionists and intellectuals, including Mark Twain, William James, and Charles Eliot, all of whom participated in the Anti-Imperialist League which formed in Boston in November 1898, argued that conquest in the Philippines would reignite and internationalize the racism of the Civil War while damaging key sectors of the U.S. economy. Republican congressman Henry Johnson of Indiana, for instance, argued that annexation would bring the Philippines within American tariff walls, precluding the possibility of "a tariff against their sugar, tobacco, hemp and other products raised by cheap tropical labor." Like others taking this line of reasoning, Johnson predicted "immense injury to the American farmer and laborer.70 Added to the threat of competition from "tropical labor," Johnson and other cited the cost of sustaining

69This paragraph is culled from Schirmer (1972) and from Brands, pp. 20-35.

70The quotes from Johnson are from Brands, p. 29.
an overseas colony, and anticipated a heavy increase in taxation to support the attendant military requirements. Addressing even the trade issue, one Senator Hernando Money of Mississippi questioned the logic of having to possess the islands in order to successfully spread American commerce there and in Asia. Like the expansionists, the anti-imperialists made their case in the popular press, appealing to increasingly politicized immigrant, labor, and other groups with a stake in restructuring American economic and political life.\footnote{This paragraph is culled from Schirmer (1972) and from Brands, pp. 20-35.}

The anti-imperialists also actively lobbied senators to their cause, with another Massachusetts Senator, George Frisbie Hoar, becoming one of the most articulate of the congressional anti-imperialists. In late January 1899, however, Hoar and a group of anti-imperialist senators caved in to pressure from business interests, later accused of vote-buying, as well as from the military and from President McKinley to authorize an early vote on the Paris Peace Treaty, which was now scheduled for February 6, 1899. Two days prior to the vote, on February 4, a minor incident led to a general war between Americans and Filipinos that was to last until 1902, while occasioning a crucial debate within the U.S. not just on questions of strategy but on more fundamental questions of interests and the appropriate role of foreign policy to serve these interests. Some analysts have argued that the outbreak of war was not accidental and that it was scheduled to coincide with the treaty ratification vote in congress. Whether this allegation is true or not, the war did increase pressure on congress to ratify the treaty; yet, even with passions high, the vote of 57 in favor of ratification versus 27 opposing was extremely narrow, with only one vote more than was needed to carry the required two-thirds majority. Moreover, several last minute defections from opposition to ratification occurred when William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic presidential hopeful for the 1900 elections, decided prior to the vote to support ratification and urged his followers to do the same, arguing that this would allow for the formal conclusion of hostilities with Spain, while clearing the way for his
free silver and anti-trust campaigns.

McKinley, who now claimed divine guidance as the source of his decision "to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them...", somehow overlooking the fact that roughly 90 percent of Filipinos were already Catholic, had lobbied hard for annexation. So, too, had Senator Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt and others. In all, eleven Democrats changed sides and only two Republicans, including Hoar, remained opposed to ratification. Lodge later noted that it had been "the hardest, closest fight I have ever known, and probably we shall never see another like it in our time." 72 The outcome of the debate, one of the most pivotal in the history of U.S. foreign policy, was the painful birth of the U.S. as an imperial power, with the acquisition not only of the Philippines, but also annexation of Hawaii, said to be needed to carry out the war with Filipinos, and new possessions in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, all taken during the war against Spain. Moreover, for the first time in America's history, U.S. soldiers would fight overseas, totalling 70,000 at the peak of the Philippine-American War. 73 This further raised the stakes of the debate on expansion while underscoring for the American public and its volunteer army the attendant costs of such ventures.

Far from being quickly or easily subdued, as U.S. military strategists initially predicted, Filipino opposition proved broader and more potent than U.S. expansionists had anticipated, posing a serious challenge to American colonization. 74 The Americans, like the Spanish before them, allied with the Macabebes, who worked as scouts for the American forces to help militarily suppress Filipino opposition, and a U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance was

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72Ibid.

73Karnow, p. 185.

74For a description of the evolution of the Filipino resistance, see Gates, pp. 156-178; Brands, pp. 39-59; and Karnow, pp. 139-195.
launched. Where the Americans would prove more proficient than Spain, and less constrained by reactionary forces both at home and abroad, was in the exploitation of divisions within the Philippine opposition, notably between revolutionary and reformist elements. Working with the reformists to establish the foundations for Filipino participation in a post-war colonial administration, a transnational alliance of soft-liners would emerge, helping in the process to undermine the political roots of revolutionary opposition. The next chapter will describe the evolution of the revolutionary opposition as well as the strategies and influence of both the hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances throughout the early period of American colonial rule from the February 6, 1899 ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty up to the Jones Act of 1916. The Jones Act allowed for eventual independence, which was not to be granted until July 4, 1946. Even in granting independence, however, the Americans would try to graft their own culture onto that of the Philippines. Nevertheless, as a continuing symbol of opposition, many Filipinos continue to celebrate June 12, the day of Aguinaldo’s announcement in Cavite, as their true day of independence.

Conclusion

From Magellan’s arrival in the Philippines in 1521 until Dewey’s in 1898, Spain shaped the archipelago’s economic, political and social structures as well as the strategies Filipinos would use to address local conflict, leaving a legacy that persists today. In brief, this legacy includes land tenure arrangements and associated conflicts which continue to provide the foundation for a mass-based revolutionary peasantry. Likewise, the land tenure system sustains a narrow elite, descended from the "caciques" and Chinese-Filipino merchants, who continue to derive their wealth and power from the land. The Spanish legacy also includes a prominent political role for the church, with clergy still actively participating in

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78Brands, pp. 56-59.
both revolutionary and soft-line bids for control of Philippine politics. In its soft-line role, the church continues to tame the abuses of hard-line policies, particularly when church leaders are directly threatened as they were with the 1872 executions of Burgos, Gomez and Zamora. Moreover, the Spanish legacy persists in the archipelago’s hard-line traditions, particularly in the role of the Macabebe in establishing a native military. Finally, though Spanish stabs at liberalism were generally undone by hard-liners, a tradition of reform was introduced into political, social, economic and even military institutions. Reformist elements of these institutions were later cultivated by U.S. soft-liners during the colonial period. Spain’s failure to reform and the apparent link between the extreme hard-line policies and the rise of revolutionary nationalism, leading to the eventual loss of empire, also served as a cautionary tale to U.S. soft-liners, who cited the Spanish experience as evidence of the need for reforms in order to thwart revolution. The legacies of Spanish rule, in short, continue to shape Philippine politics, as later chapters will describe.

Spain exported to the Philippines many of the tensions among church, military, monarchy and merchant classes which had arisen during the reconquista and later during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. These tensions created fissures within the colonial administration between those of the sword who sought to colonize through force and those of the cross who sought to colonize through coercion. While the sword and the cross generally worked together in the service of their own shared interests and those of the Spanish monarchy, moments of crisis exposed the underlying conflicts between the two colonizing forces. In the first such crisis at the end of the 1500s, the Synod of Manila resolved the growing conflict between military and church forces over tax collection by granting increased autonomy and power to the friars. The friars then used this to accrue vast tracts of land, making the church the largest Philippine landowner for the remainder of the Spanish colonial period. Though Filipinos had already been exploited for shipbuilding, food production, and encomienda taxes, the rise of the friar estates now created a massive underclass of
dispossessed peasants who would, thereafter, frequently pose a revolutionary threat to the colonial administration. To carry out colonial administration despite such threats, a Filipino cacique of local bureaucrats was created in each of the provinces where Spain had a presence. In order to secure food supplies, the Spanish also created a Filipino elite in the town of Macabebe, located in the fertile Pampangan region near Manila. In addition, the Macabebes were cultivated as soldiers for Spain's international conflicts as well as its domestic efforts to silence revolutionary opposition in the Philippines. This transnational alliance of hard-liners would be a continuing force for the rest of the Spanish colonial period, with one brief but formative break in the 1660 Maniago Revolt, which eventually strengthened the bond between Macabebe and Spanish military forces.

As Christianity spread, peasant uprisings often took on a religious character, with some soft-line alliances forged between moderate peasants and liberal factions of the Spanish church, who shared an interest in stabilizing the countryside. The commercialization of agriculture after the late 1700's strengthened this alliance by creating a Chinese mestizo elite who not only had gained power by converting to Catholicism but also, like the church, needed to protect the productive capabilities of the peasants and so preferred coercion to force. Nevertheless, coercion and force were generally used as complementary strategies to quell revolutionary opposition in the countryside, though, again, moments of crisis exposed the underlying conflicts between the two approaches. Such crises intensified in the 1800's as Spain lost colony after colony to revolution, until it was left with just Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by the mid-1820's. Riven by Carlist and other civil strife at home as well, Spain turned to increasingly hard-line strategies in its remaining colonies to protect them from revolution. In this, it was Spain's eventual undoing to encourage Filipino and mestizo soft-liners to ally with revolutionary forces by barring the native elite from ordination as parish priests, from membership in Spanish social clubs, and from other means to social and political power. Inspired by the debates within Spain.
over similar controversies, Jose Rizal formed the moderate opposition Liga Filipina in the late 1800's just as Andres Bonifacio was forming the revolutionary Katipunan. When Rizal was executed by Spain on December 30, 1896, the moderate and revolutionary movements allied, though internal disputes would undermine their strength until a new international player surfaced.

On May 1, 1898, Commodore Dewey entered Manila Harbor and quickly routed Spanish forces there as part of a U.S. mission designed to free Cuba from Spain. Having defeated Spanish forces in Manila, however, Dewey's forces remained, as debate within the U.S. raged over whether to take Manila, the rest of the Philippines, or simply leave, as the Teller Amendment required U.S. forces in Cuba to do. In Manila and surrounding areas, tensions rose between U.S. forces and Filipino nationalists, who had allied with the U.S. in the belief that they would then be granted independence. These tensions threatened to explode after December 1898 when the U.S. secretly won the right to purchase the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris. A long-standing debate within the U.S. between expansionists and anti-imperialists, with its roots in the American Revolution, now intensified, as congress deliberated on whether to ratify the treaty or not. Abolitionists, labor unions, populists, religious groups, and other U.S. anti-imperialists had held sway in several such debates in the late 1800's; but the economic crisis of the 1890's strengthened the arguments of U.S. expansionists, led by Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Lodge and comprised of Social Darwinists, military strategists, the Sugar Trust, and other social, economic and political interests. A combination of opportunism on the part of Theodore Roosevelt, jingoism stirred by newspaper circulation wars, the political and economic power of the U.S. expansionists as well as the naivete of the Filipino nationalists led the U.S. into its first overseas war to suppress a native revolutionary opposition.

As the Spanish had done for centuries, McKinley cited divine guidance as the source of U.S. colonial policies in the Philippines. Far from divine guidance, the source of U.S. imperialism lay with expansionary drives dating back to the
American Revolution, the subsequent wars with Mexico, native American Indians, and others as the U.S. exercised its "manifest destiny." Stymied by the Teller Amendment, U.S. expansionists of the late 1890's turned to the Philippines, where revolutionary opposition proved much harder to subdue than U.S. strategists had anticipated while U.S. opposition threatened the feasibility of what was then an all-volunteer army. As the next chapter will describe, the Philippine-American War lasted from 1899 to 1902 leaving as many as half a million Filipinos dead while igniting a debate in the U.S. over foreign policy much like that experienced generations later over policy toward Vietnam. In the Philippines, U.S. forces quickly established a hard-line alliance with Macabebe soldiers, using them as the Spanish before them had, to militarily silence revolutionary opposition. Following the war, the U.S. would strengthen Philippine military forces, partly to deflect criticism at home. Where U.S. forces were more adept than Spain had been, and less constrained by reactionary forces at home and in the colonies, was in isolating moderate oppositionists from revolutionary forces. The moderates, comprised largely of Filipino, mestizo and criollo elites, would form the Philippine nexus of a transnational soft-line alliance which would come to play a major role in U.S. policy towards the Philippines throughout the colonial period, as outlined in the next two chapters.

While the U.S. anti-imperialists failed in the immediate sense, they alerted U.S. policy makers to the limits domestic opposition would place on international intervention, not just in congress but also in sustaining the all-volunteer army. U.S. policy makers were also forced during the war to acknowledge the extent and power of the Philippine opposition, an acknowledgement which set the stage for many future debates among U.S. policy makers as to the best strategy for subduing such opposition to U.S. colonial rule. Thus, the outbreak of war in order to annex the Philippines as a U.S. colony led to the emergence of a transnational U.S.-Philippine alliance of hard-liners, another of soft-liners, as well as a Philippine revolutionary opposition with clear nationalist goals, all of which grew out of Spain's four hundred year colonial experiment in the Philippines. The
war also led to the birth of the U.S. as an international colonial power, replacing the sword and the cross with a quintessentially American strategy combining bullets and ballots.

In sum, neither purely international factors such as the conflict between Spain and the U.S. for control of the Philippines nor purely domestic factors such as nationalist opposition among Filipinos explains the transition from Spanish to U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. While both sets of factors weakened Spain’s hold over the archipelago, the initial transnational alliance between the U.S. and Philippine revolutionaries helped oust Spain. Moreover, when war subsequently broke out between Filipino nationalists and U.S. forces, it was the transnational hard-line alliance between the U.S. and the Macabebes which would prove crucial to the U.S. military victory and the similarly transnational soft-line alliance which would prove crucial to the institutionalization of U.S. colonial authority, as the next chapter will describe.
Chapter 3. Bullets and Ballots: Early U.S. Colonialism, 1899-1916

Overview

This chapter provides an historical overview of the early U.S. colonial legacy in the Philippines from the outbreak of war between U.S. forces and Filipino nationalists on February 4, 1899, leading to a brutal war which was to last until 1902, through the Jones Act of 1916, in which the U.S. pledged eventual independence for the Philippines. The chapter examines the transnational processes by which the U.S. asserted colonial control of the Philippines and then in 1916 began to relinquish this. Although the key explanation for the Jones Act lies in the U.S., the locus of decision-making on Philippine governance throughout the colonial period, the chapter also describes how Filipinos used transnational strategies to press their nationalist cause, lobbying effectively in the U.S. for eventual independence. Specifically, American imperialism was hotly contested along partisan lines in the U.S. throughout the period, with Republicans generally supporting it and Democrats generally opposing it.¹ For most of the period, Republicans controlled the presidency and used the authority conferred on the office by congress to appoint Republican governors to manage the Philippines and to establish political, economic, military, and social institutions in the service of U.S. interests there. When Democrats won the White House under Wilson in 1912, however, Filipino nationalists and their allies in the U.S. congress capitalized on the opportunity for change, pushing through the Jones Act in 1916.

¹The reasons for the partisan division are complex, rooted in the broader economic struggles in the U.S. of the time, and are beyond the scope of this chapter. In brief, however, the division centered on powerful agricultural and industrial interests which expressed themselves forcefully through their congressional and presidential allies. While the Democrats tended to ally with populist movements of small farmers, who were most threatened by imperialist efforts to bring Philippine competitors within tariff walls, the Republicans tended to ally with industrialists and agricultural refiners, notably the Sugar Trust, who sought to circumvent the restrictions the tariffs imposed on their access to cheap agricultural supplies. For an excellent account of the Sugar Trust's links with the Republican party and its influence on foreign policy, see Francisco and Fast.
They also helped appoint a Democratic governor who loosened American control of the colonial government in the Philippines and paved the way for eventual self-rule.

To understand the political processes of the period, and their implications for the later transitions to independence in 1946, to authoritarian rule in 1972 and back to democracy in 1986, the chapter will also describe the recurring patterns of revolutionary opposition and the transnational politics launched in response during the colonial period. In particular, the chapter will describe the emergence, strategies and impact of transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances comprised of Filipino elites, who sought to retain the economic privileges acquired during centuries of Spanish colonialism, and U.S. officials, who needed these Filipinos to help establish a viable colonial regime. From the outset, the main threat to Filipino elites and U.S. colonists was revolutionary opposition in the Philippines, which sought independence as well as structural economic and political change, particularly in land tenure, as described in chapter two. Though both the hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances sought to contain the kind of revolutionary opposition expressed so forcefully during the war of 1899-1902 and recurring in diverse guises thereafter, the hard-liners emphasized military strategies designed to repress such opposition while the soft-liners emphasized political strategies of attraction and incorporation. Working in tandem to manage domestic conflict, the transnational alliance of hard-liners created the Philippine Insular Police in 1901, later known as the Philippine Constabulary, while the transnational alliance of soft-liners created public institutions to manage health, education, economic development, political change and other issues of central concern to the masses of Filipinos. As these institutions evolved, so too did personal, group, institutional and other interests, adding a new dimension based on ideology as well as on these interests to the conflict between hard-liners and soft-liners.

By 1912, the opportunity for a more autonomous Philippines came when Wilson won the White House, as Filipinos and their U.S. allies pressed for
change. One of two Filipinos sitting in the U.S. House of Representatives, Manuel Quezon, lobbied successfully to name anti-imperialist New York Congressman Francis Harrison the new governor of the Philippines. Shortly after his arrival in Manila in 1913, Harrison began a reorganization of the Philippine government, greatly reducing the American presence while increasing Filipino participation. In addition to influencing the gubernatorial selection, Quezon worked with Virginia Congressman William Atkinson Jones of the insular affairs committee to write what was to become known as the Jones Act, which eventually passed in 1916. Quezon now returned to the Philippines to parlay his success into a political career, while the Jones Act, which Wilson signed into law on August 29, 1916, acknowledged Philippine sovereignty and established provisions for a gradual transfer of power from the U.S. to elected Filipino officials.

The chapter is organized chronologically, and covers the complex interplay of U.S., Philippine and international politics during the colonial period, as well as the emergence of the hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances which will be central to the discussion of the later transitions in 1972 and 1986. The chapter will first cover the U.S., Philippine, and international politics surrounding the transition from military occupation to U.S. civilian colonial rule in the Philippines from 1899 to 1902, as well as the emergence of the two transnational alliances during that war. The chapter will then describe the evolution of these alliances and the institutions they created to secure U.S. colonial rule in the first decade after the formal conclusion of war. Next, the chapter will describe the U.S. and Philippine political processes which led to the Jones Act of 1916, laying the foundation for subsequent transnational political processes surrounding the colonial question and the eventual transition in 1946 to Philippine independence. The next chapter will cover the international crises of World War I, the Depression, World War II and the Japanese occupation of the Philippines from 1941 to 1945, examining the role of on-going political competition among transnational revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces in the eventual transition to Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.
Prior to the U.S. congressional vote on ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty, which accorded the U.S. the right to purchase the Philippines from Spain for $20 million, tensions had mounted between Filipino and U.S. forces surrounding Manila, reaching a pitch in January 1899, when Major General Elwell Otis, who succeeded Merritt in August 1898 as head of the U.S. operations, moved the Nebraska regiment to an area inside territory claimed by the Filipinos. Though McKinley had directed the troops to preserve the peace, Otis authorized his troops to use force if necessary for self-defense. On the evening of February 4, 1899, while on a routine patrol, Private William Grayson of Beatrice, Nebraska stumbled upon four drunk, unarmed Filipinos. When he ordered them to halt, the Filipinos mocked him. Grayson repeated the order and again the response was mocking. Grayson fired and one man was felled. Grayson's partner, Orville Miller, shot another while Grayson reloaded and shot a third Filipino. Miller and Grayson then rushed back to camp to inform the other Nebraskans. Within minutes, war exploded along the ten-mile front separating U.S. and Filipino forces near Manila. "The ball has begun," yelled one Major Wilder Metcalf of Kansas.\(^2\) Two days later, the U.S. congress narrowly voted to ratify the Paris Treaty, as a war to subdue Filipino nationalists raged. The U.S. would come to term the struggle the "Philippine Insurrection," nicknaming the insurgents "ladrones," or bandits, implying that the Filipinos were rebelling against the lawful authority of the U.S.; yet the war would ultimately serve as a cautionary tale to American expansionists regarding the frailty of a European treaty in the face of nationalist opposition abroad as well as anti-imperialist opposition at home.\(^3\)

Immediately following the Grayson incident, U.S. regiments of volunteers from Kansas, Idaho, California, Montana, and Pennsylvania captured bridges,

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\(^2\)Karnow, p. 140.

\(^3\)The information for this paragraph is from Karnow, pp. 139-167.
Filipino arsenals and other key strategic sites. In the process, they leveled nipa huts and churches, and slaughtered roughly 3,000 Filipinos in the first day of fighting, while U.S. troops suffered only minor losses, including 59 dead and 300 wounded. U.S. military officials issued forecasts that the war could be won quickly, with little loss of American lives. Meanwhile, Aguinaldo, stunned, sent two representatives to offer a truce, the creation of a buffer zone, and peace talks. Otis rebuffed this and turned instead to the business of war, ordering troops to seize the port in Iloilo and the nearby Visayan islands of Cebu and Negros, though McKinley still had not clearly stated whether the aim of U.S. forces was to control Manila or all of the archipelago. Nevertheless, an alliance was soon formed between the U.S. forces and Macabebe soldiers, the long-time military aides to Spain, who acted as scouts and helped carry out the military policies of the war. Still, American military strength totalled just 24,000 men, about a third of the number mobilized by Aguinaldo. To manage military strategy, administration of U.S. policy towards the Philippines now shifted from the State Department to the Department of War, as McKinley issued his "benevolent assimilation" proclamation:

It should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice for arbitrary rule.

Unfortunately, such benevolence did not extend to the battlefield. American forces inflicted terrible casualties on Aguinaldo's troops, easily overcoming entrenchments that were "beautifully made and wretchedly

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*The information is, again, from Karnow, pp. 139-167.

*Farkas (October-December 1978), p.33.
defended, as Aguinaldo's choice of conventional rather than guerrilla tactics proved increasingly untenable. Despite heavy losses, however, Aguinaldo continued to control the main island of Luzon and maintained a favorable ratio of about two Filipino soldiers to every one American, as the U.S. forces soon learned that they could win battles but could not hold territory. The first major offensive of the war, launched by Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton in March, was carried out with efficiency and exacted a heavy toll on the revolutionaries; but it also revealed the breadth and effectiveness of the opposition, forcing Otis to concede that he did not have enough troops to wage war in the interior, nor to occupy territories captured there, and still defend Manila. By the end of March, U.S. troops under the command of Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur captured Malolos, seat of Aguinaldo's government, only to have Aguinaldo relocate the capital to San Fernando in Pampanga province. As one American journalist wrote, Aguinaldo simply "took up the goal-posts and carried them back," whenever U.S. forces advanced. In spite of early U.S. military forecasts of a quick and easy victory, Otis now struggled to proclaim success while simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, requesting additional troops. Concerned that he would be replaced should officials back home learn the truth of the situation, Otis increasingly exercised the right of press censorship which the War Department had conferred upon him.

Though coverage of the U.S. campaign in the Philippines was initially

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*Linn, p. 12, and Sand-30 (pseud).

*Karnow, p. 185.

*For a detailed description of this and other early offensives and their effects on Otis' policy, see Linn, pp. 1-13.

*Karnow, p. 147.

*The information for this paragraph is derived from Lee.
favorable since the early reporters\textsuperscript{11} relied almost exclusively on U.S. military sources, it became more and more negative after the rainy season descended in the Spring, bringing with it a host of tropical diseases. The correspondents now began to hear of illness as well as atrocities of the war from the men at the front; yet the military continued to announce victories known to be fictitious, while issuing false reports on the number of U.S. casualties. Disillusioned, the journalists sought alternative sources of information, particularly from soldiers returning from the "boondocks," from the Tagalog "bundok" or mountains. By early summer, the correspondents complained of "wholly ridiculous estimates" of enemy killed and other misrepresentations of the war, while Otis criticized the press for trying to influence opinion back home and for playing into the hands of the enemy. Otis now ordered censorship of dispatches sent via the trans-Pacific cable which was controlled by the U.S. military and was at the time the only direct line of communication to the U.S. With the censors allowing less and less to pass through, the correspondents, led by Robert Collins of Associated Press, drafted a statement in July protesting that Otis was feeding the American public "an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field." Though Otis threatened court-martial for "conspiracy against the government," the statement was transmitted to American journals via Hong Kong, and even pro-imperialist papers printed it.\textsuperscript{12} McKinley publicly backed Otis but instructed Secretary of War Elihu Root to urge Otis to adopt more liberal press policies. Instead, Otis continued to withhold cable privileges to any reporter who implied, as most American soldiers now believed, that the U.S. forces in the Philippines were inadequate.\textsuperscript{13}

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\textsuperscript{11}In part because so many reporters had been sent to Cuba and in part because the U.S. War Department had predicted that the war in the Philippines would end quickly, few reporters were sent to the Philippines.
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\textsuperscript{12} Lee, op. cit.
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\textsuperscript{13} Karnow, p. 148.
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Meanwhile, back home, the Anti-Imperialist League, which had formed at Boston's Faneuil Hall on June 15, 1898, just days after Aguinaldo's declaration of independence in Cavite, had been narrowly defeated in its attempts to prevent ratification of the Paris Treaty. As described in chapter two, they had lobbied hard in congress, and claimed among their ranks such notables as former president Grover Cleveland, Senator George Hoar, Mark Twain, George Santayana, Andrew Carnegie and William James. They now launched an active anti-war campaign after the outbreak of hostilities. Given that no military draft was then in effect, the army relied on good relations with the American public for its new recruits. Focusing on the Northwest and the South, where most of the 12,000 new volunteer soldiers had been recruited, the League published anti-war advertisements in local newspapers, held meetings and helped stir up discussion about the war. Meanwhile, letters home from soldiers at the front spoke of the brutality of the U.S. troops as well as the much higher levels of U.S. casualties than the government had been reporting, all undermining the credibility of and support for the U.S. operations in the Philippines. When U.S. officials tried to intercept mail, further outcries about freedom of speech were heard, as attention to the subject mounted in the press. By the Spring of 1899, when many of the volunteers were becoming eligible for discharge, the cry to bring home the troops had mushroomed in the Northwest and South, while disaffection spread as well among the troops, with only about seven percent expected to reenlist. As U.S. troops became more and more mired in the war abroad, opposition at home continued to grow.\textsuperscript{14}

The Anti-Imperialist League now had about 40,000 members nationwide, and opposition spread even among former imperialists such as Senator Frye of Maine, who publicly said he felt "deceived" by the military's initial claims of easy victory, and General Frederick Funston, who saw, from the battlefield, no benefit

\textsuperscript{14}The information for this paragraph is from Schirmer (1972), a detailed account of the U.S. debates on Philippine policy and the role of the Anti-Imperialist League in these.
of the war save for "big syndicates and capitalists." Many blacks and their supporters linked war atrocities with the growing problem of lynchings and other racial violence in the U.S., while former abolitionists linked suppression of Filipino nationalism to the issues for which the Civil War had been fought just a few decades earlier. By October 1899, the League was a national organization with an eye toward the upcoming 1900 elections. Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan had earlier tried to focus primarily on the free silver issue, but now made opposition to the war in the Philippines a centerpiece of his presidential campaign, rallying labor, blacks, and others to the anti-imperialist cause.15

October 1899 also brought the fiercest battles of the war, as Otis launched an all-out effort to destroy Aguinaldo's army. On the main island of Luzon, Otis ordered one division to head south from Manila while another, led by General Arthur MacArthur, headed north. American soldiers then took Aguinaldo's newest capital on October 12, forcing the rebels to move once more. Days later, the Americans captured that capital, only to have Aguinaldo merely skip away yet again. Though the Americans prevailed in most battles, Otis conceded: "Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country...but (the American troops) would...again prey upon the inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feelings towards the American troops."16 Thus, American conduct fueled opposition both at home and in the Philippines, a problem which grew when the war took a new turn.

In November 1899, forced to concede that a conventional approach could only fail, Aguinaldo ordered his troops to scatter and adopt guerrilla tactics. In part Aguinaldo was playing for time, hoping, like his American anti-imperialist

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15 All of the above discussion on the anti-imperialist debates, the League, etc. are from Schirmer (1972). Discussion of Aguinaldo's calculations are from Constantino (1975).

16 The above information is from Brands, p. 52.
counterparts, that the 1900 U.S. presidential elections might usher in a new, Democratic administration open to peace and, perhaps, to an independent Philippines. Otherwise, he hoped to simply wear down the Americans through a war of attrition. Leading one of the larger groups, a contingent of twelve hundred, Aguinaldo fled into the mountains. Waging a guerrilla war had the advantage of keeping the Americans on the run, as Filipino forces easily blended in with the populace, making it difficult for the U.S. forces to distinguish friend from foe; but it had disadvantages as well. The military reversals of the past months had reduced the numbers as well as the appeal of Aguinaldo's campaign; yet now more than ever Aguinaldo's troops were dependent upon the masses of Filipinos for protection and support. At first, Aguinaldo revived the Katipunan as an agency to enforce revolutionary codes and punish collaborators. Soon, however, the Katipunan dispensed with trials for suspected collaborators, declaring it the policy of the revolution to simply "exterminate all traitors." 17 Meanwhile, U.S. forces used increasingly gruesome methods such as the "water cure" to force information from potential informants, who eventually included almost everyone in the countryside. Now Filipinos risked punishment from the Americans for keeping quiet and assassination by the revolutionaries for talking. Given that choice, most apparently found greater safety as well as prospective gains in the revolutionary cause, which remained strong, as ever more U.S. troops were needed to combat it. 18

At top levels, however, dissent among the revolution's leaders threatened the movement, as it had in the final phases of the uprising against Spain. Now, as then, the ilustrados and other Filipino elites grew concerned that their own social, political and economic interests might be threatened by the spreading rebellion in the countryside. Though Aguinaldo consistently favored the elites in the

17Brands, p. 55.

18Information for this paragraph is from Brands, pp. 39-60; Karna, pp. 139-167; and Linn, pp. 1-29.
countryside, allowing them to keep estates confiscated from the Spanish while granting them exclusive political rights, top ilustrados began defecting from the revolutionary movement, particularly after Aguinaldo switched from conventional to guerrilla warfare.

The Schurman Commission and the Emergence of Soft-Line Strategies

American soft-liners did their best to widen the rift by working on the political, as well as the military, front. As early as January 1899, following advice from Dewey, McKinley had established an official civilian Philippine Commission to study the situation and possibly avert warfare. McKinley had appointed avowed anti-imperialist Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, to head the commission, with conservative Democrat Charles Denby, and ornithologist Dean Worcester as members. The commission soon after traveled to Manila under McKinley's directive to "facilitate the most humane, pacific, and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants." Arriving in March, one month after the outbreak of hostilities, the Philippine Commission was too late for diplomacy, and Otis argued that the onset of fighting annulled the commission's authority. Though nominally a member, Otis first tried to effect the commission's recall and, when this failed, he boycotted the meetings, in protest of the commission's plans to eliminate the military government he had helped establish in the Philippines, in an early split

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19 As noted in chapter two, the Philippine constitution, written by the ilustrados, extended suffrage to a very small minority of affluent elites. When elections were held in late 1898 under Aguinaldo's newly declared administration, these elites added political power to their long-standing economic power in the countryside.

20 Information on the internal debates within the revolutionary movement is from Constantino (1975), pp. 204-237.

between hard-line and soft-line U.S. officials.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite such resistance from the American military authorities, the commissioners met daily with prominent Filipinos and foreigners at the Real Audiencia in Manila. There they discussed Filipino aspirations in order to carve out an appropriate form of government for the islands. By institutionalizing such consultations, the commission hoped to demonstrate, for their Philippine and American audiences, U.S. good will toward the Filipinos while allowing them a voice in their prospective governance. In fact, though, the commission never once ventured beyond Manila, and most of the sixty witnesses they heard from were American, British and other Western residents of Manila.\textsuperscript{23} The few Filipinos they did interview were ilustrados and defectors who had abandoned the independence movement as too radical. On April 4, after just one month of research, the commission published its initial findings, offering the revolutionaries a modicum of political autonomy under U.S. colonial rule, as well as public works projects, a revitalized judicial system, universal education, economic development programs, and other reforms. At the same time, the commission threatened that American "supremacy" would be "enforced" throughout the Philippines, and that those who resisted would "accomplish no end other than their own ruin."\textsuperscript{24} The revolutionary leadership publicly rejected the commission's offer, but quietly approached the Schurman commission to offer a ceasefire. Though Schurman urged U.S. officials to explore the peace bid, Otis, as he had at the war's outbreak, rebuffed the Filipino offer, and Denby and Worcester, and subsequently McKinley, concurred. Ha: d-line not soft-line strategies now prevailed.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22}The description of the Commission's efforts in the Philippines, and its conflicts with the U.S. military command, is from Brands, p. 51. and Karrow, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24}Karrow, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{25}Information on the commission's work is from its reports to the President. Information on the U.S. policy making process surrounding the commission's findings is from Karrow, pp. 139-167, and from Brands, pp. 39-60.
Otis did realize that force alone could not subdue the revolutionaries, however, and he continued the kinds of sanitation, education, and public works projects as well as food distribution programs and judicial reforms first launched a year earlier during the occupation of Manila, as described in chapter two. He also began organizing town councils comprised of the Filipino elites Aguinaldo had helped promote in the 1898 elections. This was done through limited suffrage, with U.S. officers in charge. At the same time, the Philippine Commission continued its work through the long rainy season, the worsening conditions of war, and the increasingly negative dispatches from the correspondents, which fed, in turn, debate back home. Though Schurman continued to press for diplomacy, Denby and Worcester argued for an intensification of the military campaign. Concurring with the hard-liners, McKinley ordered additional troops. By the summer of 1899, the U.S. troops numbered 60,000, straining levels set by Congress. Before leaving in September 1899, the commission issued a comprehensive report, recommending a degree of self-government under U.S. supervision. Under the plan, provinces and municipalities would be run by elected local officials with American guidance, and a national legislature would govern the islands, with a civilian U.S. governor exercising veto power over its decisions. Upon returning to the U.S., the commissioners continued to advise U.S. legislative and executive officials on policy towards the Philippines, urging soft-line not hard-line solutions. On January 31, 1900, the commission reported to McKinley:

The general substitution throughout the archipelago of civil for military government (though, of course, the retention of a strong military arm) would do more than any other single occurrence to reconcile the Filipinos to American sovereignty, which would then stand revealed, not merely as an irresistible power, but as an instrument for the preservation and development of the rights and

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Information on the U.S. military's role in the Philippines is from Gates, pp. 54-156 and from Karnow, p. 171.

Information on the number of troops sent to the Philippines and the general debates surrounding U.S. policy towards the Philippines at the time is from Karnow, p. 152.
liberties of the Filipinos and the promotion of their happiness and prosperity.28

The Taft Commission and the Emergence of U.S. Colonial Policy

Until now, McKinley had ruled the Philippines by executive fiat, acting in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to pass laws and regulations for the islands. With the end of hostilities nearing, however, the U.S. congress pressured McKinley to establish a permanent government in the Philippines while providing for a congressional role in overseeing it. McKinley consulted the Schurman study for guidance, and he enlisted Republican Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin to help expand the presidential war powers in order to allow for the implementation of colonial policies and institutions. Although Spooner had not ranked among the party's ardent imperialists, he defended America's right to annex overseas territories based on such precedents as U.S. control of the Louisiana territories. After studying the statutes that had enabled Jefferson to annex and then govern the Louisiana territories, Spooner approached Congress with a bill that would have given a second Philippine commission, appointed by the President, a virtually free hand to govern the colony.

While congress debated the bill,29 the Second Philippine Commission to develop a Filipino government was established, with William Howard Taft, a federal circuit judge from Ohio and, like Schurman, an avowed anti-imperialist, designated its leader. The Taft Commission arrived in Manila in June 1900, just a month after the increasingly despised General Otis resigned, giving over his post to MacArthur. As with the earlier conflict between Otis and the Schurman Commission, MacArthur argued that the civilians had no place in a war. He had

28 The quote is from Brands, p. 54.

29 For descriptions of the politics surrounding the Spooner Bill, see Frank Golay in Stanley, ed., "The Search for Revenues," p. 236; Brands, p. 60; Constantino (1975), pp. 296-299; and Kornow, p. 166.

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seen too many Filipinos die for their cause to believe they would easily lay down their arms for vague promises of autonomy from the likes of Taft. He also knew that his powers would be diminished with the presence of civilian authority. Thus we see the ripening of the conflict between U.S. hard-liners and soft-liners, as much for ideological reasons as for individual and institutional interests. Given the continuing uncertainty regarding U.S. leadership in the Philippines, MacArthur treated the Taft Commission with a measure of disdain. In fact, the U.S. reception upon the Taft Commission’s arrival in Manila was so cold that Taft later remarked that it "banished his perspiration," sparking an enmity Taft would later use as President to block MacArthur’s advancement. To further rile Taft, MacArthur maintained his residence in the Malacanang palace, relegating Taft to Manila’s suburbs.30

Despite the hostility from MacArthur, Taft’s team spent the summer collecting information, with Luke Wright, an attorney, focusing on the militia, the police and criminal codes; Dean Worcester, a hold-over from the Schurman Commission, studying agriculture, mining, and health; Henry Ide, a former Samoa judge, reviewing the courts, banking and currency; Bernard Moses, an historian, examining education; leaving Taft the toughest questions centering on the civil service, the disposition of public lands, and the status of the remaining Spanish friars. Like the Schurman Commission, however, they conferred with the same affluent Filipinos who continued to press for limited suffrage and the retention of social, economic, and political structures which protected their interests, while the gross inequities inherited from centuries of Spanish rule, and the source of ongoing rebellion in the countryside,31 were overlooked. By late August, the Taft Commission cabled its findings to Secretary of War Root. Contrary to the aims of MacArthur and his military colleagues, the commission recommended the

30Information on the formation, reception, and role of the Taft commission is from Karnow, pp. 168-177 and from Brands, pp. 60-85.

31From Constantino (1975), pp. 256-287.
establishment under civilian direction of a local constabulary, a new tax system, public works, judicial reforms, and universal education in English. The Taft report also urged passage of the Spooner Bill in order to institutionalize a colonial government empowered to pass laws, distribute public lands, grant mining claims, and pass other measures for luring U.S. investment.  

The Spooner Bill was rejected on September 1, 1900; but McKinley nevertheless granted the Taft Commission the responsibilities of a legislative body, with the authority to raise taxes, appropriate funds, fix tariffs and set up law courts. Taft and his colleagues could now enact laws and, by December, fifty-five acts had been passed, allotting over $3 million for public works, establishing a civil service system, courts, and a civil government. Moreover, Taft now controlled $2.5 million in funds collected by the U.S. Army from customs duties and other sources, thereby gaining considerable power vis-a-vis MacArthur, who continued to chafe at the civilian challenge to his authority, particularly since no formal delineation of colonial powers beyond executive fiat had as yet been established by congress. At the same time, elections in the U.S. brought McKinley to power again, despite the hard campaigning of Bryan, the Anti-Imperialist League and others who sought a change in administration and in U.S. foreign policy. Bryan had argued that the rise of militarism threatened those at home who challenged industry, as evidenced by the recent rise in police actions against strikers. Bryan also argued that the funds diverted to fight the war abroad were needed to fight poverty at home. In an early transnational strategy, representatives of Aguinaldo had approached the Democrats in October of 1900, offering to announce that they would lay down their arms should Bryan be elected

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22 Information for the paragraph is from Constantino (1975), p. 297 and from the reports of the Taft Philippine Commission, pp. 6, 34-35.

23 Karnow, p. 173.

24 Farkas (October-December 1978), p.36.

25 Ibid, and from Brands, pp. 74-76.
President. Fearing charges of treason, the Democrats rejected the offer; but already Filipinos were learning to work through American political channels in order to influence policy towards their country.\textsuperscript{35} McKinley won by a narrow margin, with much of the opposition centering on his Philippine policy; nevertheless, McKinley accepted victory as a sign of approval for his foreign policy and, one day after the elections, vowed to continue the war.\textsuperscript{37}

While MacArthur waged war on the military front, Taft reasoned that a credible moderate opposition would eviscerate Aguinaldo’s movement. As part of his "policy of attraction," designed to entice Filipinos into accepting U.S. rule, Taft cultivated a core group of elite Filipinos who were open to some form of power-sharing under U.S. colonial rule. Reluctant to ally with any U.S. administration until after the elections, however, the Filipinos working with Taft waited until December to formally organize.\textsuperscript{38} On December 23, 1900, with Taft’s guidance, a group of ilustrados formed the Federalista Party, which they formally launched on February 22, 1901, in commemoration of George Washington’s birthday. Comparing themselves with America’s founding fathers, the Federalistas sought to become a state of the U.S., as Rizal and earlier ilustrados had under Spain. The Federalista platform envisioned a preliminary period for the establishment of peace and the recognition of U.S. sovereignty. Throughout this period, municipal, provincial, and national governments would be initiated, while local self-government, separation of church and state, freedom of worship, public education for all children, and guarantees of individual rights and liberties would be institutionalized. A constitutional period was to follow, during which institutions for Philippine representation in the United States as well as U.S. rule in the Philippines would be established. Taft distributed money to one ilustrado, Pardo de Tavera, to help revive his failing newspaper \textit{La Democracia}, which had been

\textsuperscript{36}Schirmer, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{37}The description of the role of the Philippines in the elections is from Karnow, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{38}Farkas (October-December 1978), p. 37.
launched in May 1899 to encourage Filipinos to lay down their arms. Taft also granted the Federalistas a virtual monopoly on all government jobs reserved for Filipinos. With such tangible rewards to offer, the party rapidly recruited more than 200,000 supporters.

Aguinaldo had tried to balance moderate and revolutionary, elite and peasant factions of his movement; but the U.S. soft-liners better understood, or at least better capitalized on, what Spain had not. That is, the economic and social differences among the Filipinos created schisms which, if exploited, could seriously weaken the revolutionary movement. By working with the ilustrados, Taft had driven a wedge in Aguinaldo’s organization, isolating the moderates from the revolutionaries. Aguinaldo now faced a growing political challenge, as many from his ranks defected.

The U.S. continued to fight hard on the military front, as well. At the end of 1900, U.S. troop levels reached 70,000, about three quarters of the entire U.S. army. By late 1900, several of Aguinaldo’s best officers had either surrendered or had been captured and now swore allegiance to the U.S. A key goal for U.S. forces was now the capture of Aguinaldo. In February, 1901, the opportunity came. That month, a Filipino courier, with a coded letter from Aguinaldo requesting additional troops and describing his location, was captured. Using the information, General Funston, with MacArthur’s approval, devised a plan involving eighty Macabebe soldiers. On March 24, the Macabebes posed as partisans and, together with a group of Americans posing as their prisoners, entered Aguinaldo’s secret encampment. Once inside, the Macabebes and

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39Karnow, p. 176, and Gates, p. 94.  
40Information on the emergence and role of the Federalistas is from Farkas, op. cit.  
41From Constantino (1975), pp. 244-246, and Linn, pp. 163-170.  
42Constantino (1975), p. 247. See also Pomeroy.  
43Ibid.
Americans easily defeated Aguinaldo's inner network of supporters. They then captured Aguinaldo and brought him to MacArthur's headquarters at the Malacanang palace. There Aguinaldo swore allegiance to the U.S. and urged his followers to do the same, though he wore a black bow tie forever after until his death in 1964, a gesture of mourning for his lost republic. The resistance, though seriously weakened, nevertheless continued.\textsuperscript{44}

An Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove: Hard-Line and Soft-Line Institutions Form

In March 1901, a revised version of the Spooner Bill, now an amendment to a military appropriations bill, passed, empowering the President of the United States to continue to administer the Philippines until such time as congress enacted legislation establishing a permanent colonial government there.\textsuperscript{45} A few months later, on July 4, 1901, Taft, who had actively lobbied from the Philippines and in the U.S. for such an amendment, became governor of the Philippines, while MacArthur was replaced by Major General Adna R. Chaffee. The new division of authority granted Taft control of civil government in areas that had been pacified and Chaffee control of military government where the war still raged. Two weeks later, on July 18, the U.S. established the Insular Police Force to create a native organization capable of suppressing revolutionary opposition, as the transnational hard-line alliance with the Macabebes became institutionalized.\textsuperscript{46} Under the command of Captain Henry Allen, the force numbered 180 Americans reinforced by carefully-recruited Filipinos, notably

\textsuperscript{44}The description of the capture of Aguinaldo, also fictionally recreated on film by Thomas Edison, is from Karnow, pp. 182-188.

\textsuperscript{45}For information on the Spooner Amendment, which is surprisingly underplayed in the literature, see Brands, p.60; Constantino, pp. 296-7; Karnow, p. 166; Golay in Stanley, ed., pp. 236-7; 56th Congress, 1st Session, S. 2355; PL 118, 3/2/1901, 31 Stat. L. 895.

\textsuperscript{46}Constantino (1975), p. 247.
Macabebe. The Spooner Amendment was not to apply long to McKinley, however. In September, he was shot by presumed anarchist Leon F. Czolgosz. McKinley died eight days later, on September 14, and arch-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt, the man who had engineered the conquest of the Philippines, ascended to the Presidency. On November 4, Taft passed the Sedition Law, which imposed either the death sentence or a long prison term on anyone advocating independence, even by peaceful means, while allowing for severe fines and punishment for anyone uttering "seditious words or speech" against the U.S. government. All parties except the Federalistas were also banned.48

Even worse, on December 25, General Franklin Bell directed his commanders to set up reconcentration zones to closely monitor the comings and goings of the roughly 300,000 inhabitants of Batangas. All property outside the zones was confiscated, and the people were herded into the camps. It was a desperate attempt to isolate the insurgents from the general populace, but, with the hostile and unsanitary conditions which quickly resulted in the zones, the policy instead further fueled revolutionary opposition to the U.S. It also fueled opposition back home since the main impetus behind the war with Spain had allegedly been to undo Spain's harsh reconcentration policy in Cuba.49 How ironic that the U.S. should now be using the same strategy in another former Spanish colony.

The war was to drag on through the early months of 1902, with U.S. tactics becoming increasingly brutal. These tactics were effective in the Philippines, seriously weakening the revolutionary opposition there; but, as word spread to the U.S. public, via newspaper correspondents and letters home from soldiers at the front, domestic U.S. opposition exploded into a political and social crisis much


49For information on the reconcentrado policy and its impact in the Philippines, see Constantino (1975), p. 250. For its impact on U.S. debates, see Kornow, pp. 188-195.
like that experienced generations later over U.S. policy in Vietnam. One massacre on the island of Samar in late 1901 had gained particular notoriety, as the press ranked it with the Alamo and Custer's last stand as one of the worst tragedies in American military history. Congressional hearings were initiated in January 1902, under the direction of Senator Hoar. Confirming the worst fears of the anti-imperialists, one Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller revealed orders he had been given by Brigadier General Jacob Smith to kill everyone over the age of ten and to make the island of Samar a "howling wilderness." Smith was the only U.S. soldier to be disciplined for conduct in the Philippine war and, at that, was merely "admonished," yet the outrage expressed in the U.S. chastened American imperialists and shaped subsequent U.S. efforts to "Filipinize" the nascent government there. Resistance in the Philippines continued sporadically over the next months, and indeed would continue for the next decade before dying out then reemerging in various forms by the 1920's. Nevertheless, the war was brought to a formal conclusion on July 4, 1902, though 50,000 U.S. soldiers remained to suppress the on-going, albeit diffused resistance.

In all, 126,000 Americans took part in the war, with a toll of 4,234 dead, 2,818 wounded, thousands succumbing to disease once home, and some $600 million spent on the war effort. For Filipinos, the toll was much greater, with the number of deaths estimated at between 200,000 and 600,000, 90 percent of all carabaos -- a critical farm animal -- dead, the rice harvest down to one-fourth of normal production levels, and vast areas of the countryside in ruin. Despite

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80Ibid.
81Karnow, pp. 191-193.
84Karnow, p. 194.
the desperately fought bid for independence, the Filipinos were forced to cede control of their country to a new colonial power. In short, America’s first experience with international warfare in the service of overseas colonization was sobering. Not only had U.S. expansionists had to contend with a far more potent Filipino opposition than they had anticipated; they had also been constrained by domestic U.S. opposition which threatened political careers as well as the ability to mobilize a sizeable army without the benefit of conscription. While hard-line strategies, including the emergence of a transnational alliance with Macabebes and eventually an Insular Police Force, as well as the continued presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines, prevailed in efforts to conquer territories, soft-line strategies, including the emergence of a transnational alliance with ilustrados and eventually the Federalista Party, prevailed once territory had been won and needed to be controlled. At the formal conclusion of the war, the soft-liners took control of Philippine politics, though the on-going challenge from persistent revolutionary opposition in the countryside required as well a strong military designed more for domestic than for international conflict.

From Bullets to Ballots: 1902 - 1916

While hard-line strategies, and the early transnational alliance with the Macabebes, were responsible for the transition to civilian colonial rule from 1901 to 1902, soft-line strategies, and the transnational alliance with the ilustrados, now Federalistas, were crucial in the establishment of non-military institutions required to run the colony. Building upon the work done by the military during the war, the colonial regime instituted sanitation and sewage treatment facilities, hospitals, and vaccination programs to contain the spread of infectious diseases, virtually eradicating smallpox and cholera in the process.56

56Karnow, p. 211. While this figure is somewhat misleading given the war in 1900, the Americans did improve health substantially.
The colonial regime also mobilized cadres of young civilian Americans, men and women, to establish schools in the countryside. Known as "Thomasites" for the ship that brought an early batch of 500 to the Philippines in August 1901, the Americans spread out into rural areas to teach math, science, hygiene, vocational skills, English, and American history, while preparing native Filipinos to teach as well. As the first head of the program, Fred Atkinson promoted vocational education, despite the preference among Filipinos for broader training, and he distributed educational materials which were culturally inappropriate, depicting snow and other things alien to rural Filipinos. In late 1902, anthropologist David Barrows replaced Atkinson and introduced more culturally appropriate materials, while inaugurating a program in 1903 for young Filipinos to study in America, launching in the process Filipino migration to the U.S. By the time of his departure in 1909, Barrows had increased the number of elementary schools three-fold to roughly 4,000, doubled the number of students to 400,000, and tripled the size of the native teaching corps to 8,000. These figures were misleading, however, given that truancy was high and most of the native teachers had not gone past the sixth grade. Because of this, the U.S. returned to Atkinson's idea of vocational training, while stressing secondary education for the select few over primary education for the masses. The new policy also reassured the Filipino oligarchy, who had grown concerned about the political implications of mass education. Nevertheless, even remote Filipinos had now been exposed to American culture, as the "Thomasites," like the Catholic friars of the Spanish, helped unite the Philippines with its new colonial master.57

The economic system was also overhauled. First, currency, which still included Spanish gold coins, Mexican silver, and now U.S. dollars, was stabilized, fixed to U.S. currency, in order to stem wild fluctuations in exchange rates and reassure foreign bankers and merchants. Taft, followed by subsequent U.S.

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57Information on the U.S. role in Filipino education during the period is from Gates, especially pp. 136-139; Karnow, pp. 265-207; and Brands, p. 71.

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governors, then brought American government and private investment to infrastructural development projects, while raising as well Philippine taxes to cover the costs of building networks of roads and shipping lines, as well as wharves and warehouses, all needed to stimulate inter-island and, by extension, foreign trade. Railway development was more problematic, though U.S. rail magnates J.P. Morgan and E.H. Harriman agreed to subscribe should Congress underwrite the expenses and grant the companies freedom from supervision in the Philippines. A bill to this effect was approved in the House but stalled under opposition from Democrats and Republican reformers in the Senate, and Morgan and Harriman backed out. Two smaller syndicates did win the franchises and, though they floundered for lack of funds, were able to expand the rail system from a hundred miles to more than six hundred during the next decade. The infrastructure was needed to transport goods, notably raw materials, from the countryside to ports in exchange for imported goods, primarily manufactured products, and the U.S. targeted areas of the countryside where particularly important raw materials such as hemp were produced. At the same time, tobacco-growing regions were ignored, a nod to American tobacco farmers concerned about foreign competition. Taft also sought to encourage private U.S. investment, particularly in agriculture, logging and mining; but he failed in 1902 to win congressional approval for various proposals to grant U.S. investors the special concessions and protection they sought.

Moreover, Taft lost out to U.S. beet lobbyists as well as tobacco and other

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*For a complete description of the life and contributions of each U.S. governor in the Philippines during the colonial era, see Gleck (1986). Taft served from 1901 - 1903, when he was recalled to the U.S. to serve as Secretary of War, after Root resigned. Taft was followed by Luke Wright (1903-1906); Henry Clay Ide (1906); James Smith (1906-1909); W. Cameron Forbes (1909-1913); Francis B. Harrison (1913-1920); Leonard Wood (1921-1926); Henry L. Stimson (1928-1929); Dwight F. Davis (1929-1931); Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (1932-1933); Frank Murphy (1933-1935); J. Weldon Jones (1936-1940) acting High Commissioner on and off through tenure of Paul McNutt (1937-1938) and Francis B. Sayre (1939-1942).

*Karnow, pp. 218-219.

American farmers, who feared competition from the new colony, when Congress passed the Cooper, or Organic, Act in 1902. The Act formally established U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines as promised by the Spooner Amendment, with provisions for a bicameral legislature comprised of a Filipino-majority assembly of elected representatives in the lower chamber and an American-dominated commission and an American governor with veto power in the upper chamber. The commission and the governor were to be appointed by the U.S. president, subject to the approval of congress, thus allowing the American president to retain considerable control over colonial policy though with congressional oversight. In defining American economic rights in the colony, however, the Cooper Act prevented the expropriation of church lands by prohibiting private U.S. corporations from purchasing any of the roughly 422,000 acres of prime agricultural lands owned by the Spanish friars. Taft then opened negotiations with Pope Leo XIII to transfer the lands from the Vatican to the U.S. government. After protracted bargaining, the U.S. completed the negotiations in 1903 for $7.5 million,\(^{41}\) though the Vatican rejected Taft's demand that the friars be expelled, leaving them instead to simply die out gradually. With the Organic Act, Taft also lost in a bid to allow U.S. investors the right to buy tracts of 20,000 to 25,000 acres or more, especially needed in sugar production, where economies of scale were critical. Instead, the Cooper Act allowed individuals to purchase up to 40 acres while U.S. corporate landholdings were to be limited to just 2,500 acres.\(^{42}\)

American economic intervention through land ownership was thus limited as was, by extension, commercialization of Philippine agriculture. In the decade prior to 1913, Americans bought or leased only about 40,000 acres of public land, and later attempts to lift or circumvent the restrictions were deflected. Years later, when Taft was President, a scandal erupted when it was discovered that the largest of the friar estates had been transferred, illegally, to the family of

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\(^{41}\)Brands, p. 99.

\(^{42}\)Francisco and Fast, pp. 262-263.
American sugar magnate Henry Havemeyer;\textsuperscript{63} but for the most part the Organic Act helped limit direct U.S. investments in Philippine land.\textsuperscript{64} Meanwhile, Filipino elites were allowed unlimited access to the newly released church lands, further increasing their concentrated control of Philippine wealth and power. Far from addressing the roots of social unrest in the Philippines, which centered on the unequal land tenure patterns inherited from the Spanish colonial era, as described in chapter two, U.S. policies deepened these. Though statistics on such key economic indicators as the distribution of land or the amount of land devoted to cash versus food crops are unavailable for the period, a fact-finding survey in 1936, the first year of the commonwealth period, found the vast majority of rural Filipinos living in dire poverty, deprived of civil and political rights as well, with no formal right to vote due to property requirements.\textsuperscript{65} "The average tenant," the survey found, "...cannot openly join associations nor participate actively in any movement organized for his betterment without courting the displeasure of the land-owner and running the risk of being deprived of the piece of land he tills..."\textsuperscript{66} The land tenure question would remain an on-going source of peasant anger and revolution, as described in later chapters.

While elite Filipinos gained most from the new colonial policies in land tenure, American corporate strategy now turned to trade policy as an alternative route to profits.\textsuperscript{67} Under the terms of the Paris Treaty, the U.S. had agreed to

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64}Note that Constantino, pp. 303-305, says friar lands were not included in prohibitions against land ownership until 1914 when the Philippine assembly enacted a law which put these as public lands. Prior to that, the Sugar Trust bought San Jose Estate in 1910 by getting Forbes to amend the Friar Lands Act to allow the government to sell friar lands without acreage limitation. The Commission and the War Department cooperated and the sale pushed through. The Commission approved many other questionable deals, including approval to lease various estates to Americans.

\textsuperscript{65}Ofreneo, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67}Karnow, p. 221.

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allow Spain equal access to Philippine markets for ten years, with Spain paying the same duties as Americans. Given these conditions, Taft then endorsed, with Republican and corporate support back home, a "reciprocal free trade" arrangement. Anything but "free," it gave Philippine agricultural goods unlimited access to American markets, while allowing American manufactured goods an unrestricted market in the Philippines, as U.S. exporters gained a virtual monopoly in the archipelago. In 1909, with Taft now President, provisions under the Paris Treaty allowing for Spain's equal right to the Philippine market were to expire, and American manufacturers now pressed for elimination of the tariff. Since one of Taft's campaign promises had been tariff reform, he now called a special congressional session on tariffs, sparking a heated debate while creating a schism in the Republican party which would contribute to its loss in 1912 presidential elections. Nelson Aldrich, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and close ally of the Sugar Trust, worked with Sereno Payne, head of the House Ways and Means Committee, to resolve the question of tariff reform, with its implications far beyond trade with the Philippines. In the U.S., lobbyists fought hard on both sides of the debate, while the Filipino assembly passed a resolution against free trade on the grounds that quotas applied only to Filipino goods entering the U.S. and that the free entry of U.S. goods into the Philippines eliminated an important source of revenues. The Filipino resolution was swiftly vetoed by Governor Cameron Forbes, however, and the Payne-Aldrich Act was passed on August 5, 1909.

The act allowed all American goods to enter the Philippines free of duty and in unlimited quantities, while Philippine products were allowed to enter the U.S. duty-free, though with some quotas on sugar and tobacco, later lifted in 1913

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*Brands, p. 96.

*For a detailed discussion of the processes in the U.S. and the Philippines leading to the Payne-Aldrich Act, see Francisco and Fast, particularly chapters 3, 29, and 30.
with the passage of the Underwood-Simmons Act.\textsuperscript{70} The result was an expansion of Philippine land devoted to export production\textsuperscript{71} and a concomitant drop in land devoted to food production, as hostilities in the countryside simmered. At the same time, foreign commerce in the Philippines jumped between 1908 and 1910, quadrupling in dollar terms from 1908 to 1926. Yet the economic dependence of the Philippines on the U.S. also increased greatly. In 1908, exports to the U.S. accounted for 32 percent of total Philippine exports. By 1926, the figure had increased to 73 percent. The increase in imports was even greater. In 1908, imports from America comprised 17 percent of total Philippine imports. By 1926, these comprised 60 percent.\textsuperscript{72} What Taft had failed as Governor to accomplish with the Organic Act, he now accomplished more subtly with the Payne-Aldrich Act's clarion call to American investors and business leaders.

In politics, Taft had recommended eventual self-rule for Filipinos following a period of democratic tutelage under the U.S., during which time the Filipinos could prove themselves "worthy" of independence. Though Taft returned to the U.S. to serve as Secretary of War in 1903, the U.S. congress followed Taft's suggestion, which had Roosevelt's support, to lift a ban on pro-independence political parties in 1906 and allow Filipinos in 1907 to elect a legislative body. The body, however, was to function under the U.S.-appointed American Governor, who would retain veto powers. Moreover, suffrage was restricted to landowners, tax-payers and the literate,\textsuperscript{73} leaving just three percent of the population eligible to vote, though the spread of education stirred demand for

\textsuperscript{70}Oftreno, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{71}The amount of land devoted to export crops more than tripled, from 469,353 hectares, or about 1.2 million acres, in 1902 to 1.6 million hectares, about 4 million acres, by 1939. From Oftreno, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{72}All of the economic statistics are from Brands, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{73}The Election Law, Manila Bureau of Printing, 1907. From the National Archives in Maryland.
broader democratic participation. Discredited by their U.S. connections, the Federalistas had disbanded in 1905 and then reformulated as the Partido Progresista, which now favored independence. Several opposition cliques had also fused together five months before the elections into the Partido Nacionalista, which also favored independence. Competing more as rival clans than on ideological grounds, the Nacionalistas captured 58 of the 80 seats, and were to dominate Philippine politics for decades to come. Representatives from the legislature, one appointed by the U.S. Governor, the other by the Philippine assembly, were to hold seats as resident commissioners in the U.S. House of Representatives, where they would be allowed to speak but not to vote.

Until 1916, one of these representatives was Benito Legarda, a Taft ally who had supported statehood. The other was Manuel Quezon, who used his time in the U.S. to study the workings of the American system and to establish himself as the eventual leader of an independent Philippines, the prospects for which seemed to brighten in 1912 with the election of Woodrow Wilson.

Transnational Politics and the Opportunity for Change

Wilson's cabinet was, however, split between the isolationism of Bryan, now Secretary of State, and the imperialism of William Redfield, Secretary of Commerce, a split defined by contrasting ideological, political and economic interests. Moreover, Wilson was quickly distracted from Philippine issues by ongoing debates on tariff reform, revision of the banking system, and anti-trust legislation as well as the more immediate concerns raised by the Mexican


75 An estimated 10,000 Filipinos marched in celebration through the streets of Manila while roughly twice that number gathered in Manila's Luneta Park for ceremonies led by Quezon, Aguinaldo, and Osmeña commemorating the election. From Brands, p. 106. Information on the political role of the U.S. during the period was culled from Brands, pp. 60-84; Korn, pp. 227-256; and Farkas' article on the emergence and role of the Federalistas.
revolution and the growing threat of war in Europe. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, elected Filipinos increasingly resented the veto powers of the governor, which they argued made the Filipino assembly less a legislative body than a debating society. They also resented the large numbers of Americans in government posts. The problem was exacerbated after 1909, when Governor Forbes repeatedly vetoed attempts by the assembly to increase the number and authority of Filipinos in the colonial administration. Though the number of Filipino officials had actually doubled to roughly 6,000 by 1913, Wilson mediated the conflict, opting to replace Forbes as governor. Quezon, as a resident commissioner in the U.S., intervened in the selection of a candidate, urging New York Congressman Francis Harrison to go for the job. Harrison, a Democrat, had opposed imperialism, had promoted lower tariffs, and had eventually championed Philippine independence, all positions which Quezon appreciated. Harrison agreed to apply and Quezon then orchestrated the appointment in just four days, obtaining Bryan's endorsement, Wilson's nomination, and then support from key members of congress.

Unlike Taft, Wilson did not believe that Filipinos had to prove themselves worthy of self-government prior to being granted independence but rather that they might learn by doing, and he encouraged Harrison to promote policies toward this end. Speaking for the president, Harrison announced shortly after

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*76When Wilson first came to power in 1912, a military coup in Mexico had recently installed Victoriano Huerta as provisional president. Reluctant to embroil the U.S. in Mexican politics, Taft had sidestepped the issue; but Wilson threatened to withhold recognition until Huerta called a ceasefire and scheduled elections in which he would not participate. Wilson then called for an arms embargo and encouraged Europe to do the same. Under pressure from Republicans to take military action and seeing diplomacy faltering, Wilson staged an invasion of Vera Cruz, Mexico's second city. After a bloody invasion costing 100 U.S. and 500 Mexican lives, U.S. forces took the city but then did not know what to do with it. Only mediation from Argentina, Brazil and Chile allowed for a face-saving withdrawal of troops. The experience chastened Wilson regarding foreign intervention thereafter. From Combs, pp. 190-192.*

*77Karnow, pp. 244-245.*

*78For a detailed discussion of Wilson's approach to the Philippine question, see Farkas' article on the topic.*
his arrival in Manila in 1913 that the Wilson administration would immediately
give Filipinos a majority in the appointive commission, which until then had been
controlled by Americans. The governor would also no longer have veto powers.
Moreover, because Filipinos already held a majority, by law, in the elected
legislature, they now predominated in both the Upper and Lower Houses of the
Philippine government. In one bold stroke, the U.S. had essentially given Filipinos
a significant measure of self-government, though the U.S. retained responsibility
for the security of the islands and for its foreign policy. Harrison also made clear
his intentions of weeding out Americans from administrative posts and filling
these with Filipinos, as McKinley had first promised but as each successive
governor until Harrison had ignored. By the end of his first year in office,
Harrison had trimmed the American contingent in government by nearly 20
percent while raising Filipino representation by a comparable figure. In his
eight years as governor, Harrison Filipinized the American establishment,
shrinking the American corps from about 3,000 to about 600 while increasing the
number of Filipinos to more than 13,000. When U.S. interests in Manila
complained, Harrison threatened to audit their finances. The U.S. community
soon adapted and Harrison was to become one of the most revered Americans in
the Philippines of the century.

In addition to influencing the gubernatorial selection, Quezon worked with
Virginia Congressman William Atkinson Jones of the insular affairs committee to
write what was to become known as the Jones Act, which eventually passed in
1916. Part of the impetus behind Quezon’s actions had to do with politics back in
the Philippines, where a new independence-oriented party formed in 1914 by a
leftist faction led by Teodoro Sandiko, a well-known veteran of the revolution

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79 Brands, p. 109.

80 Karnow, p. 245.

81 For a full discussion of Harrison’s role as governor, see Glecek (1986), pp. 134-161; Brands, pp. 107-112; and Karnow, pp. 243-250.
with close ties to Aguinaldo, was posing an increasing challenge to Quezon’s Nacionalistas. This spurred Quezon to forge a moderate, soft-line alternative to the leftist challenge on the issue of Philippine sovereignty, with a timetable allowing for at least twenty more years of colonial rule by the U.S.,\textsuperscript{82} though Harrison together with various members of the U.S. congress sought a more immediate transfer of power in the Philippines. After consulting with Quezon on this, Wilson agreed to support legislation pledging that the United States would confer independence upon the Filipinos though at an unspecified point in the future. In August 1914, just as World War I was breaking out in Europe, Congressman Jones submitted the bill he had crafted with Quezon to redefine the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. Without actually offering any provision for independence, the bill’s preamble pledged a commitment to the cause and endorsed Wilson’s Philippine policy.\textsuperscript{83} The bill passed 212-60 in the House in October but languished in the Senate and then vanished in March until the new congress met several months later in December 1915.

Now the proponents of independence, almost entirely Democrats, were ambushed not by Republican retentionists but by Democratic Senator James Clarke of Arkansas, who proposed an amendment requiring a transfer to independence within four years. Quezon and his Nacionalista colleagues back home could not afford politically to oppose such an amendment, nor could they let the bill fail as they had invested too much in it. Likewise, Wilson had already gone on record as favoring independence and, distracted by the revolution in Mexico and the war in Europe, refused to openly oppose the Clarke amendment. While Wilson and his Nacionalista allies held their breaths, the U.S. Senate

\textsuperscript{82}Brands, p. 113. After consulting with Frank McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Quezon proposed an arrangement calling for a census in 1925 and every ten years thereafter until literacy rates in English among adult males reached 60 percent, or 75 percent in any language. At that time, he proposed that a referendum on independence be held. Should the vote favor independence, a constitutional convention would follow, leading to a transfer to sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{83}Brands, p. 114.
passed the bill with the Clarke Amendment's four-year timetable kept intact. The House, however, deleted the amendment, leaving Harrison and the Nacionalista leaders with whom he worked closely to worry that the bill might die altogether. Harrison lobbied from the Philippines for some form of the bill, preferably without a timetable but at the very least with some clear provisions, as the uncertainty had hampered progress in the Philippines. Quezon, too, discerned that any bill, even with the Clarke Amendment, was preferable to no bill, but he worried that the voices of retentionism in the U.S. were more powerful than those favoring independence. In a keen observation with on-going relevance, Quezon told Harrison "I have not the slightest doubt but that the American people in general are favorable to Philippine independence. The trouble is that the people at large are not interested enough to write their congressmen, and the only voice that is being heard is the voice of those who are interested in retention, who are, naturally, actively working to defeat the bill."

Fortunately for Harrison, the Nacionalistas and other proponents of the original Jones bill, the Senate eventually dropped its insistence on a timetable for independence and the resolution, minus the Clarke Amendment, passed. Quezon now returned to the Philippines to parlay his success into a political career, while the Jones Act, which Wilson signed into law on August 29, 1916, acknowledged Philippine sovereignty and established provisions for a gradual transfer of power. It also allowed for continued Filipino control of both houses of the Philippine legislature.

Conclusion

In sum, the key explanation for the 1916 Jones Act lies in the U.S., the locus of decision-making on the issue of independence throughout the colonial period, though Filipino nationalists such as Quezon learned enough about the

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84Brands, p. 116. From Bureau of Internal Affairs records of notes from Harrison papers.
American political system to lobby effectively at critical moments. The U.S. debates on the Philippine question were configured largely along partisan lines, with Republicans generally supporting U.S. colonialism there and Democrats generally opposing it. Though it was beyond the scope of this work to cover the complex machinations of these debates, the conflict was rooted in the broader economic struggles between populist small farmers and their Democratic allies versus increasingly powerful industrialists and their Republican allies. While the Democrats sought to protect small farmers from their Philippine competitors by keeping the latter outside tariff walls, the Republicans sought to protect the interests of industrialists and agricultural refiners, notably the Sugar Trust, by keeping the Philippines as a colony in order to bring Philippine goods within tariff walls. Though the Republicans succeeded in their efforts by making the Philippines a colony of the U.S. at the turn of the century, the debates would continue in various forms throughout the colonial period, as discussed further in the next chapter. When Republicans held the White House, they used the considerable power conferred on the office by congress under the Spooner Amendment and later the Cooper Act to appoint Republican governors to manage the Philippines and to establish political, economic, military, and social institutions in the service of U.S. colonial interests there.

When Democrats held the White House, however, Filipino nationalists and their allies in the U.S. congress capitalized on the opportunity for change. During the period covered here, the only Democratic administration was that of Wilson, and anti-imperialists in the Philippines and the U.S. capitalized on the opportunity for change. Soon after Wilson moved into the White House, Quezon began pressing first for a new governor for the Philippines who would promote the cause of independence. With Quezon's help, anti-imperialist New York congressman Francis Harrison was appointed governor and swiftly granted Filipinos a measure of autonomy. Quezon then worked closely with Congressman Jones of the House committee on insular affairs to revise American policy towards the Philippines. Quezon's efforts were, in part, a soft-line response to the growing radicalism of
renegade Philippine nationalists led by Teodoro Sandiko; while the efforts of U.S. Democrats stemmed from the recent tariff debates and from their success in the election of Wilson as President. Passage of the Jones Act in 1916 formally expressed the U.S. commitment to Philippine independence, though without a specified timetable. As the next chapter will show, this question of a timetable would then be set aside through the Republican eras of Harding, Coolidge and then Hoover, resurfacing only when the onset of the Depression ushered in the Roosevelt administration, with its ties to the large numbers of small farmers and others actively seeking to push Philippine agricultural products beyond the protection of tariff walls.

While U.S. forces are primarily responsible for the Jones Act, and the eventual transition to independence in 1946, as described in chapter four, neither purely international factors governed by the U.S. nor purely domestic politics within the Philippines fully explain it. Rather, the transnational lobbying efforts of Quezon, from his perch within the U.S. House of Representatives, helped establish a vital link between Filipino nationalists and American anti-imperialists. This link proved crucial in the selection of anti-imperialist New York Congressman Francis Harrison as governor of the Philippines, who helped establish Philippine capacity for independence. The link also proved crucial in pushing the Jones Act through congress.

The transnational politics and institutions which formed during the early colonial period in response to U.S., Philippine, and international pressures also hold important implications for the later transitions in 1972 and 1986, as described below. In particular, the period saw the emergence and evolution of transnational alliances of hard-liners and soft-liners, both comprised of Filipino elites and U.S. officials. While U.S. officials needed the Philippine elite to insure political stability and the production of raw materials, the Philippine elite needed the U.S. to protect them militarily from revolutionary opposition in the countryside, where roughly 70 percent of the population was landless, and for capital development for trade and finance. From the outset, the main threat to
both Filipino elites and U.S. colonialists was revolutionary opposition in the Philippines, which sought independence as well as structural economic and political change, particularly in land tenure. Though both the hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances sought to contain the kind of revolutionary opposition expressed so forcefully during the war of 1899-1902 and recurring thereafter, the hard-liners emphasized military repression while the soft-liners emphasized political attraction and incorporation. Working in tandem, the hard-liners allied with the Macabebes and created the Philippine Insular Police in 1901, later known as the Philippine Constabulary, while the soft-liners created public institutions to manage health, education, economic development, political change and other issues of central concern to the masses of Filipinos.

Just as Filipinos were poised for greater autonomy under the Jones Act, however, the combined lessons of the Mexican Revolution and World War I would reignite the debates in the U.S. between interventionists and isolationists, hard-liners and soft-liners, and in the Philippines among soft-liners, hard-liners, and revolutionaries. The Depression and World War II would then intensify these debates, as the economic, political and strategic interdependencies between the U.S. and the Philippines, all of which had become institutionalized during the colonial period, were reinforced by international events, with implications for the continued evolution of Philippine political, economic and military institutions as well as the prospects for independent democracy there, as described in the next chapter.
Chapter 4. Colonialism Amid Crises: Toward Independent Democracy, 1917-1946

Overview

This chapter follows the transnational processes which shaped Philippine political, economic and military institutions during the later colonial period, from 1917 through the international crises of World War I, the Depression, World War II and the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Just as the Jones Act of 1916 passed in the U.S., promising eventual independence for the Philippines, World War I reasserted the interdependencies between the archipelago and the U.S. For the U.S., the war increased dependence on the raw materials produced in the Philippines, particularly coconut oil, which was used in explosives. The war also exposed the vulnerability of U.S. investments and military installations in the Philippines, particularly to the growing threat of Japanese expansionism. Japan sided with the U.S.; but they might not have. Meanwhile, for the Philippines, the war increased its export-dependence on volatile commodities markets, which skyrocketed during the war and then collapsed when the war ended. The sharp drop in postwar prices shattered the Philippine economy, contributing to a resurgence of revolutionary agitation in the countryside as well as increased migration to the United States, particularly to the sugar plantations of Hawaii and the fruit farms of California. By the late 1920’s, the political activism of the Filipino farmworkers fueled racism against them, which deepened in the early 1930’s when the Depression brought new waves of white migrants to California from the dustbowl states. The Depression also revived protectionist arguments, as powerful farm lobbies pressed for Philippine independence. Under pressure from Filipino lobbyists as well, Roosevelt helped push through the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, which allowed for a commonwealth regime for ten years followed by a transition to full independence thereafter.

As with the Jones Act, however, just as the commonwealth regime was inaugurated, the growing external threat posed by Japan again reasserted the
interdependencies between the U.S. and the Philippines, as hard-liners rallied to strengthen military forces in the archipelago. General Douglas MacArthur led the effort to create a Philippine army, but U.S. and Philippine forces were swiftly overcome by a surprise attack by Japan in December 1941, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. When MacArthur fled for Australia a few months later, vowing "I shall return," many Filipinos collaborated with the new colonial regime, while others maintained a network of support for the U.S., including a shadow government as well as U.S.-trained military bands waging guerrilla warfare against Japan. Revolutionary forces which had reemerged in the Depression, coalescing under the Philippine Communist Party formed in 1931 with a military arm formed in 1942 known as the Huks, set aside their distaste for American colonialism and allied with U.S. forces to help defeat Japan, hoping in part that their demands for independence and structural change would be met should allied forces win the war. Following MacArthur's dramatic return to the Philippines in October 1944 and the subsequent Japanese withdrawal in 1945, however, these hopes were betrayed. U.S. and Filipino forces disarmed the Huks, leaving thousands to be killed or imprisoned by returning warlords and other long-time enemies. Soon, U.S.-backed forces would actively seek to suppress the Huks, as the Philippines became a laboratory for America's "containment" strategies, with the Cold War creating a new impetus for American intervention in the Philippines.

With the Philippines in shambles from the ravages of World War II and the U.S. alarmed by the perceived threat of spreading Communism, the chapter will conclude, the transition to independent democracy in 1946 was compromised from the moment of its inception by the rise of the transnational hard-line alliance, with implications for the post-war evolution of Philippine institutions and the eventual transition to authoritarian rule in 1972, to be described in chapter five.

U.S. Bases in the Philippines: Strategic Interests and Policy

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Although the Jones Act allowed for eventual independence for the Philippines, it also nodded to the hard-liners, with a provision allowing American military forces to remain in the Philippines for twenty more years, until 1936. By 1917, these forces included a small naval station at Subic Bay and an army fort at Clark Field, for which the U.S. congress had authorized funding in 1904 after protracted debates on the defensibility of the islands. Concerned that military bases in the Philippines might become the "Achilles heel" of the U.S., Theodore Roosevelt had warned while President in 1907 that it would be imprudent to retain the islands "without adequately fortifying them" from a rising Japanese threat, given Japan’s recent successes in wars with China and Russia.¹ Other strategists, however, had argued that the islands could be defended and, in any case, they predicted a war at sea with Japan, not on Philippine soil. Roosevelt dissented, arguing that Congress should either provide funds for military fortification or should vote to withdraw from its new colony. Instead, the issue languished, though in 1908, U.S. military strategists decided to base America’s Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, not Subic, due largely to concerns that the fleet would be overly exposed to Japan if based in the Philippines.

In 1910, the Naval War College devised a plan, code-named the Orange Plan, for a prospective war with Japan. Envisioning only a war at sea, the plan ordered the U.S. Garrison to secure Manila Bay until the American fleet had time to arrive to defeat the Japanese and reestablish U.S. control of the islands. Despite the improbability of such a plan, the U.S. forces in the Philippines were, nevertheless, to provide external security, while the Insular Police Force, renamed the Philippine Constabulary in 1917, was to provide internal security, largely from the recurring threat posed by revolutionary opposition. What the plan did not prepare for was a full-scale land and air war by Japan in the Philippines, despite Japan’s increasingly clear hegemonic ambitions in the region. Hostilities between the U.S. and Japan had also risen in 1913 when the California legislature passed a

¹Brands, p. 84.
measure excluding Japanese, and other immigrants, from owning land. Though the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 eased pressures by reducing the transit time between the Pacific and the Atlantic, the growing possibility of a two-ocean war sounded alarms in the U.S. Moreover, American involvement in the European war was becoming more and more likely. Despite Wilson's efforts to maintain American neutrality, such acts of apparent belligerence by Germany as the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 and the February 1917 announcement of German plans to sink all ships sailing in the war zone, including neutral ones, were pressing the U.S. toward war. The discovery of the Zimmerman telegram, in which Germany sought a Japanese as well as a Mexican alliance against the U.S. should the Americans join the war, was perhaps the final push which spurred Wilson to do just that.²

This time, Japan sided with the U.S. and a two-ocean war was averted. Nevertheless, just as passage of the Jones Act in 1916 offered the possibility of Philippine autonomy, the subsequent spectre of war with Japan exposed the vulnerability of U.S. military installations in the Philippines. The U.S. would have to decide whether to maintain a military presence there, in which case substantial investments would be needed, or the unfortified islands could still prove the "Achilles Heel" Theodore Roosevelt had warned against. The U.S. allowed the issue to again languish, however. World War I served less as a military warning regarding the U.S. role in the Philippines than as a spur to increased Philippine dependence on the U.S. economy. Not only had the war brought a huge global demand for raw materials which enriched the islands, but demand for coconut oil, used in explosives, skyrocketed.³ Forty new coconut oil factories sprung up throughout the Philippines during the war, amassing tremendous profits from the

²The above information on the debates surrounding the evolution of the Orange Plan, as well the various factors affecting U.S. relations with Japan is from Brands, pp. 116-118. See also Combs, pp. 194-223, for a concise description of the effects of the Zimmerman telegram and the Lusitania on Wilson's decision to enter World War I.

³Karnow, pp. 245-6, 225-6.
seemingly limitless demand. All collapsed after the war, when demand proved limited after all, though some resurfaced during the boom years of the roaring twenties. Moreover, the sharp drop in postwar prices shattered the Philippine economy, betraying the lopsided, export-dependent form it had taken in order to supply the United States. While sugar and coconut barons had grown rich, rice farmers and other basic foodstuff growers had fallen further and further behind, presaging a resurgence of revolutionary activity among the peasantry in the 1920's. Meanwhile, the recent events in Russia defied Marxist notions of industrial revolution, revealing the potential power of a mobilized peasantry while establishing as well an apparently vital alternative to capitalism.

The Revolutionary Resurgence: Domestic and Transnational Factors

It would be more than a decade following the Russian revolution before the Philippines would have a communist party, but a wave of religious-based revolutionary movements throughout the 1920's helped lay the foundation for this. Known collectively as Colorums, a corruption of the et saecula saeculorum used in Mass to end certain prayers, the movements were characterized by religious fanaticism and a common belief in messiahs as their path to redemption.⁴ Embedded in these beliefs was a desire for structural economic, political and social change, with a shared dream of a messiah who would confiscate and reapportion among Colorums all land in the Philippines. Members also typically believed that anting-anting, or amulets, would protect them from enemy bullets, which allowed for a level of militancy not necessarily commensurate with their numbers. Recruited from the peasantry and the urban poor, the Colorums lacked connections to Filipino elites, who were content for the most part with American rule, or to any intelligentsia which might have provided more ideological and strategic direction, as the ilustrados had done for the Katipunan. As a result, the

⁴The information below on Colorums is from Constantino, pp. 355-361, 139-141.
Colorums were often ideologically confused and poorly organized, groping blindly for solutions to profound socio-economic problems, and so were often dismissed by U.S. and Philippine officials as mere fanatics. Nevertheless, because of their capacity to enlist the support of the masses and their desire for structural change, however inadequately formulated, the movements warrant attention for their role in articulating and mobilizing peasant anger during the period.

The first major Colorum movement of the period formed in Surigao and then spread to other islands, leading to an uprising there in 1923 in which five Constabulary soldiers were killed. Colorums in Agusan, Samar, and Leyte then rose up too, forcing the government to dispatch an American warship and hundreds of Constabulary reinforcements to suppress the rebellion, which lasted until October 1924. To avenge the deaths of Philippine forces, the Constabulary then cracked down with full force, ordering one town burned while the corpses of Colorums were allowed to rot in the open in order to prove that they would not come back to life. One hundred peasants were killed, five hundred arrested, and the rest dispersed. Though the government acknowledged the economic and nationalistic aspirations of the Colorums while the campaign of suppression was underway, officials dismissed the uprising as mere fanaticism when it was over, and the Constabulary hailed its hard-line tactics. Undaunted, other Colorum organizations rose up elsewhere in the archipelago, including one organization with an estimated membership in 1924 of 12,000 in Nueva Ecija and another in 1927 in the Visayas with an estimated 26,000 members.

In 1929, an Ilocano named Pedro Calosa who had spent several years as a laborer in the sugar fields of Hawaii but was dismissed for trying to organize his co-workers, organized in Pangasinan the last major Colorum organization of the period. By January 1931, his movement attacked the prosperous town of Tayug with the vague notion that this would spark revolution throughout Luzon, leading to independence and an equal redistribution of land. As with the earlier uprisings, the superior weaponry of the Constabulary forced Calosa’s surrender after just one day of fighting. Following this, U.S. and Philippine officials
continued to ignore the roots of peasant discontent. Focusing on hard-line not soft-line strategies, they simply added 10,000 to the Constabulary while Quezon, now Senate President, and other leading Filipinos decried the ignorance and fanaticism behind the revolts. Yet something was happening which Filipino leaders failed to recognize. As exemplified in Calosa’s story, Filipino peasants were migrating in large numbers to the United States, particularly to the sugar fields of Hawaii and the fruit farms of California, which one author has termed "factories in the field." Though Filipinos had long been recruited for such work, the levels of Filipino migration to the U.S. rose sharply in the 1920’s, just as the Immigration Act of 1924 excluded new waves of immigrants to the U.S. Concerned that the act would curtail the supply of cheap armies of farm labor, upon which Hawaiian and Californian agriculture relied, growers sought refuge in the special immigrant status conferred on Filipinos because of the colonial relationship. American growers now actively recruited Filipino peasants and, in 1923, 2,426 entered California alone. Between 1920 and 1929, the net increase in the Filipino population in Hawaii and the U.S. mainland amounted to some 80,000.

The situation was fraught with conflict. The structural deflation in agricultural markets from 1925 to 1929, characterized by excess supply in world primary products, created tremendous uncertainty for growers. To control wages as well as the flow of labor between crop seasons, growers associations in California began using a single recruiting agency to contract laborers, significantly increasing their bargaining power vis-a-vis workers. The Mexicans, who now comprised the largest ethnic group of farm workers in California and had likely

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*ibid.

*Daniels, Roger, p. 15.

*Brands, p. 150.

had some exposure to peasant organizing during the Mexican revolution of 1910, responded in 1927 by forming the Confederation of Mexican Labor Unions and soon after by staging a cantaloupe pickers strike. When this turned violent, large numbers of Mexicans were arrested or deported and the strike failed. The Filipino farm workers, comprised largely of single male peasants from regions of the Philippines with rich revolutionary traditions and recent Colorum activity, brought their own ideas about peasant organizing, learning as well from the Mexican experience. They formed a type of guild system wherein a single contractor developed a wage scale with employers for organized bands of workers. The Filipinos then used their enhanced bargaining power to underbid other groups, notably the Mexicans, and then strike at critical moments to demand higher wages.

This soon undermined their attractiveness to employers, while creating friction between the Filipinos and the other farm labor groups. Though some of the friction resulted from competition, it was also used by growers as a divisive strategy. In January and February 1930, for instance, Mexican and Filipino farm workers joined forces to strike against lettuce growers in the Imperial Valley, with a total involvement of roughly 5,000. The Mexican strikers were issued a warning, however, that if they associated with Filipinos, they risked deportation. Over 100 organizers and strikers were then arrested, residences and meeting halls raided, and the strike ultimately failed, as tensions between Filipinos and Mexicans resurfaced. How ironic that these two groups, once linked by the galleon trade, should now be brought together again, competing for a meager existence in the land Urdaneta discovered.

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9For an interesting personal account of the immigrant experience of a Filipino farmworker, see Carlos Bulosan’s America is in the Heart.

10Daniels, Cletus, p. 117.

11The above information on Filipino labor organizing and relations with Mexican farmworkers, growers, and others in California is culled from the works of Bogardus, Cletus Daniels, Roger Daniels, and McWilliams.
But the 1930's were to bring in a new group of competitors who would ultimately reduce the relative importance of both Filipino and Mexican farm workers between 1930 and 1935. These new competitors were the displaced whites from the dustbowl of Oklahoma and Arkansas. Racism against Filipinos now escalated in California and elsewhere, as sympathy for the whites spread amid the uncertainty and mass anxiety created by the Depression. The sugar, coconut, and dairy lobbies used this to reignite debates on Philippine independence, arguing against the special colonial relationship which allowed Philippine agricultural products to compete with American ones. Though a few large American companies with investments in the Philippines together with importers of duty-free products and exporters with monopoly privileges in the Philippines worked to maintain colonial ties there, momentum for Philippine independence was building in the U.S. in the guise of protectionism and reduced overseas expenditures.

At the same time, the American Communist Party (CPUSA) had gained a deeper understanding of Philippine issues, in part through contact with Filipino farm workers and others in the U.S. In fact, the first documented visit to the Philippines by a communist was in 1924 when CPUSA leader Harrison George invited a Philippine delegation to a conference of Pacific transport workers to be held in Canton. A delegation from the Philippines did participate in the Canton conference later that year, and the contact with the CPUSA proved influential in the development of both Philippine communism at home and the transnational campaign for independence. The CPUSA now actively lobbied on behalf of Philippine independence while helping as well to establish the Philippine Communist Party (PKP), formed in 1930 with one of its main goals being independence. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria a year later further fueled

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12See in particular Bogardus' "American Attitudes Towards Filipinos" and Roger Daniels.

13For an excellent discussion of the CPUSA's role in the Philippines, see McLane.

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debate on U.S. policy in Asia.\textsuperscript{14} While President Hoover together with Secretary of State Stimson and then Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, Arthur's son, argued for an increased U.S. presence in the Philippines to deter the Japanese, those U.S. policy makers who sought to avoid foreign entanglements held sway when Democrat Franklin Roosevelt upset the Republican party's twelve-year hold on the presidency. Several independence bills proposing sovereignty for the Philippines had been defeated in Congress in the 1920's; but, by January 1933, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, providing for independence within ten years and retention of U.S. military bases, was passed by both the U.S. House and Senate.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Transnational Politics and the Transition to Commonwealth Status}

In 1930, Quezon had sent his rival Osmena together with another contender, Manuel Roxas, to Washington to lobby on the bill's behalf. The congressional debates centered more than ever on American interests, with opponents of independence citing the strategic importance of a U.S. military presence in the region, particularly vis-a-vis Japan, and supporters citing the impact on suffering American farmers of Philippine agricultural exports to the U.S., though the actual impact was relatively small. In the negotiations, Osmena and Roxas submitted to the provision allowing the U.S. to retain military bases in the Philippines without requiring Filipino consent. The bill passed in the Democrat-controlled House by April 1932 but Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg succeeded in shelving it in the Senate until late 1932, when Hoover lost in a landslide victory for Roosevelt. The Senate now approved the bill, Hoover vetoed it, but, in January 1933, congress overrode this, as the Hare-

\textsuperscript{14}Combs, p. 260.

\textsuperscript{15}Information on the U.S. debates on Philippine policy during the period of transition to Roosevelt and the processes leading to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act is culled from Combs, pp. 260-293; Karnow, pp. 253-256; and Brands, pp. 119-157.
Hawes-Cutting Act now needed only Philippine approval to become law.

Surprisingly, Quezon swiftly set about to block its passage in the Philippine legislature. Though many accused him of seeking to upstage his rivals and claim credit for independence for himself, Quezon argued that the bases provision violated Philippine sovereignty while economic provisions curtailing Philippine access to U.S. markets as well as Filipino migration to the U.S. would seriously undercut the U.S.-dependent Philippine economy. He was also concerned about Japanese militarism, and Philippine prospects for defending against this. To defeat the measure, he duplicitously assured radical nationalists that he could hasten independence from the ten-year period specified in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill, while promising the sugar barons that he could guarantee their U.S. market by delaying independence. Quezon’s efforts prevailed, and the Philippine legislature rejected the bill.\textsuperscript{16}

Quezon arrived in the U.S. in November 1933 to assemble a new bill. To assist him, Quezon hired Harry Hawes, one of the architects of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill and now out of the Senate, as a lobbyist. Together, Quezon and Hawes approached democratic Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, who chaired the Senate committee responsible for the islands, and Representative John McDuffie of Alabama to repackage essentially the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and resell it to Congress. There was one major difference, though. With the new bill, Franklin Roosevelt agreed to transfer U.S. Army property to Filipinos after independence, with the disposition of naval bases to be settled through negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} Unlike Hoover and Republican presidential predecessors who viewed the colony as a strategic and economic boon to the U.S., Roosevelt, like his Democratic predecessors, viewed the colony as a drain on U.S. resources, now more needed than ever at home due to the Depression. Speaking bluntly in a

\textsuperscript{16}The above description of the politics surrounding the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act is culled from Brands, pp. 149-156, and Karnow, pp. 253-256.

\textsuperscript{17}The information on the processes behind the new bill is from Karnow, p. 330.
confidential meeting with congressional leaders during negotiations for the act, Roosevelt said, "Let's get rid of the Philippines - that's the most important thing. Let's be frank about it."\textsuperscript{18}

Though not for the reasons Filipinos had hoped for, the Tydings-McDuffie bill nevertheless passed in the U.S. in March 1934 and Quezon returned to the Philippines where the bill was unanimously passed in the legislature. A Philippine convention now assembled to write a constitution for the nascent government. Drawing upon the U.S. and the Malolos constitutions, the convention called for a separation of executive and legislative powers, as well as regular elections for a unicameral legislature and a Commonwealth President. The Philippine president would hold extensive veto powers far greater than his American counterpart, while a U.S.-appointed High Commissioner would help manage the transition to self-rule for the ten years prior to independence.

Almost immediately, however, domestic conflict undermined the resolve of Philippine officials to relinquish ties to the U.S. Just after the new constitution was approved by Roosevelt and two weeks prior to a Filipino plebiscite on the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a revolutionary movement called the Sakdalistas, or " strikers," opposed the bill. With Quezon running for Commonwealth President, and suffrage now extended to men and women over the age of 21, though continued linguistic and property restrictions kept the proportion of eligible voters to less than 14 percent of the adult population,\textsuperscript{19} the Sakdalistas also opposed Quezon's bid for the presidency. Formed in 1930 and comprised primarily of peasants in central Luzon, the Sakdalistas were relatively overlooked until May Day 1935, when they stormed municipal offices, constabulary barracks and police stations. A bloody battle ensued, killing about 60, with 80 more casualties, and

\textsuperscript{18}Brands, p. 163, from a memo of Roosevelt meeting with House leaders, 5/1/34, in Morgenthau diary, Henry Morgenthau papers, Roosevelt library.

\textsuperscript{19}Kerkvliet (1994 - not to be quoted) says "all men and women over the age of 21, later dropped to 18" voted; but Anderson (undated paper - not to be cited also) says "as late as the eve of WWII, only about 14% of the adult population of the colony was entitled to vote."
500 arrests. The Sakdalistas were quickly subdued and, by September, Quezon was elected commonwealth President. The Sakdalista uprising was nevertheless better organized and more ideologically grounded than the Colorum uprisings had been, and tapped a reserve of peasant anger which deepened when the worldwide depression undermined the profitability of Filipino agricultural exports. Some U.S. and Filipino officials searched for New Deal remedies to alleviate the agrarian unrest under a well-publicized Social Justice Program, but their attempts to redistribute land failed to alter the existing social structure or property relations, though greater freedoms in collective bargaining and peasant organizing were established. Others, however, sought a hard-line, military solution. Their calls for a native Filipino army were reinforced by the growing external threat of rising Japanese militarism. In his inaugural address, Quezon stressed the urgent need to formulate an adequate defense plan for the Philippines during the ten years prior to independence. Quezon then requested the services of General Douglas MacArthur, head of the army's Philippine department since 1928, to help create a Philippine military.

MacArthur sailed for Manila in the autumn of 1935, just as the Commonwealth regime was being launched with Quezon installed as the new nation's first president. MacArthur then set to work devising a military strategy for the Philippines from his plush headquarters on the top floor of the Manila Hotel. Like his father, MacArthur enjoyed the trappings of power. Working with assistant Dwight Eisenhower, MacArthur used Swiss military policy, its army of citizen-soldiers, as a model for the Philippines. Under such a scheme, the Philippines would be divided into ten military districts, each responsible for

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20 Information on the Sakdalista organization and uprising is from Constantino (1975), pp. 373-380, and Karuow, pp. 273-274.


22 The information on MacArthur's relations with Quezon is from Brands, p. 166, and Karnow, pp. 258-276.
recruiting 4,000 men annually. After six months of training, these recruits would then return to civilian life. At the end of ten years, the plan envisioned a trained reserve force of 400,000. A small regular army of full-time officers and enlisted men would provide the leadership for the reserves, with a coast guard and an air force complementing the army. Budgetary constraints, however, impeded MacArthur's plans, so he adjusted the budget down to just 16 million pesos annually, though Eisenhower projected costs of 50 million pesos annually. MacArthur prevailed and, despite misgivings, Eisenhower complied. Quezon subsequently resisted MacArthur's proposal to shift resources to the army from the Philippine Constabulary, which was still needed for internal defense, and he undercut plans for a costly military build-up. Though the Constabulary was temporarily disbanded in 1936 as part of the reorganization, it was reactivated in 1938. When the Philippine assembly concurred with Quezon, control of the pace of build-up passed to Quezon, further increasing the Philippine president's hold on power while MacArthur's plans became even less tenable.

Meanwhile, a joint army-navy board of U.S. military strategists revisited the Orange Plan in 1935, under a Roosevelt directive to reconsider American strategy in the Pacific. Constrained by tight budgets and concerned that the Philippines were too distant and too exposed for anything short of an all-out defense, the U.S. chose to focus on a Pacific perimeter that ran from Alaska through Hawaii to Panama, while leaving the Philippines essentially open, with just 10,000 U.S. forces assisted by Filipino forces. The revised 1936 version of the Orange Plan did not envision holding even the region of Manila Bay, and called only for a concentration of defense on Corregidor island at the bay's entrance to deprive the Japanese access to the harbor. The plan also required an American relief mission to fight its way through to the Philippines, which could take two to three years.

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with no provision for reinforcements. U.S. and Filipino troops would simply have to fight as long as they could, then surrender or be killed. In short, the Philippines had been declared expendable. Now called the "mosquito fleet," MacArthur's forces could not hope to defend against a Japanese invasion. Moreover, Japanese fisherman, easily convertible to sailors, knew Philippine waters almost as well as native Filipinos did, contrary to MacArthur's claims regarding the strategic advantages afforded by the archipelago's complex coastal geography.

By 1937, Japan had launched a full-scale war against China, pressing south from Manchuria. When the U.S. chose not to "quarantine" Japan, as Britain and France had hoped, Quezon, in 1938, traveled to Japan where he allegedly sought an alliance with Japan in order to avoid conflict. When the Japanese reportedly rebuffed him, he sought immediate independence from the U.S. in order to claim neutrality. The U.S. denied Quezon this, and only then did Quezon pledge support of the U.S. should war with Japan break out. By the summer of 1941, just as legislative elections were being held in the Philippines, the Japanese advanced in Southeast Asia, edging ever closer to the archipelago. Thus, as the 1930's drew to a close, yet another international player had entered the Philippine drama.

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25 The information on the Orange Plan and the politics surrounding it is culled from Brands, pp. 174-178 and Kornow, pp. 264-283.

26 During this author's field research for another project in a rural fishing village in Bicol Province in 1986, one fisherman recounted his memories of Japanese fishermen serving as military scouts for Japan, hiding in coves, and leading forays into coastal villages during World War II.

27 Interestingly, the Japanese, like the Spanish and Americans before them, used domestic conflict in the Philippines to their own ends when they supported the Sakdalista leader, Benigno Ramos, who later collaborated with the Japanese during World War II.


29 For an excellent account of the Japanese role in the Philippines prior to and during the war, see Friend. In particular, Japan had direct as well as broader strategic interests in the Philippines by 1941. The number of resident Japanese in the Philippines had expanded substantially from a few hundred in 1905, when Japanese laborers were brought in by the U.S. to help build roads, to over 16,000 by the early 1930's, reaching 30,000 by the end of the decade. Japanese investments, totalling $32 million by the late 1930's were only a fraction of Chinese but they dominated abaca and nearly
After Pearl Harbor: The Outbreak of War in the Philippines

On December 8, 1941, just minutes after attacking Pearl Harbor, Japan struck in the Philippines, eliminating America’s air fleet at Clark Air Force Base and later seriously damaging the much smaller naval yard at Subic Bay. In the years since 1904 when the bases were first installed, Clark had, in fact, become America’s largest air armada anywhere overseas, with 36 P-40 fighters and 17 B-17 bombers. All but four of the P-40’s and three of the B-17’s were destroyed in the attack.\textsuperscript{30}

America was now at war with Japan and the Philippines had become central to the contest, as the Philippine army MacArthur had helped organize was now made part of the U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{31} MacArthur pleaded for an Asia-First strategy, despite the Orange Plan, but the only convoy of troops and supplies that was sent to him was diverted to Australia when U.S. Navy commanders refused to run Japan’s blockade of the archipelago. MacArthur then turned to a press strategy, as Otis had done earlier, using reporters from Associated Press and the New York Times to declare Japanese defeat in nonexistent battles. On December 22, however, roughly 43,000 Japanese troops landed in Lingayen Gulf in Northwest Luzon and undeniably belied MacArthur’s claims. Passing through one American defensive position after another, the Japanese moved steadily towards Manila, though heavy rains and U.S. destruction of bridges allowed American and Filipino troops enough time to stage a difficult, even brilliant, retreat to Bataan by mid-January 1942, with MacArthur establishing his base on nearby Corregidor Island. Quezon again requested independence so that he could declare neutrality and prevent what was fast becoming a brutal war. Again, the U.S. refused him.

\textsuperscript{30}Karnow, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibon Facts and Figures, #176, 1985. Also U.S. Department of the Army, No. 7557, p.1
By March 11, MacArthur left to wage a campaign against Japan in Australia, vowing to Filipinos via American reporters in a speech crafted in part by Philippine propagandist Carlos Romulo: "I shall return."32

Left on their own, without adequate troops or supplies and with none likely to come due to Japanese blockades, the Americans and Filipinos defended Bataan against continual onslaughts from the Japanese, who were similarly weakened and awaiting new troops and supplies. When these came, the Japanese staged one of their most effective campaigns in the Philippines on April 3, 1942, Good Friday. Indeed, the war would prove a crucifixion of sorts. By April 9, despite orders from MacArthur to continue fighting, the Americans in Bataan surrendered. Never before had so large a U.S. military force capitulated. The Japanese then pressed on towards Corregidor, bringing with them 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war. In what was to become known as the Bataan Death March, roughly 10,000 died from disease, malnutrition, and brutality. Of the survivors, an additional 2,000 Americans and 25,000 Filipinos were to die within three months of arrival at the inadequate internment center.33

Elsewhere, Filipinos left without external assistance against the Japanese reverted to traditional tactics. Although legislative elections had been held earlier in 1941, the body had not yet met when the Japanese invasion set the Philippines on a new course. The Japanese declared martial law on January 3, 1942, one day after their invasion of Manila, and then dissolved all political parties, rallying Nacionalista Party leaders to publicly support this action and announce that their party had ceased to exist. After conferring with prominent Filipinos, including several from the now defunct Nacionalista Party, the Japanese then designated Jose Laurel President of a pro-Japanese provisional regime run by Filipinos, while Nacionalista campaign manager Benigno Aquino was named director-general of a

32Information for this paragraph was culled from Brands, pp. 185-104; Karnow, pp. 287-322; and, in particular, Friend.

33The figures are from Karnow, pp. 302-305.
newly formed consortium of organizations, to replace political parties, called the Kalibapi. Even Aguinaldo, still clad in his black bow tie, allied with the Japanese, persuaded by their call for Asian nationalism. On the military front, Japanese collaborators included many in the U.S.-trained Philippine military, who, like the Spanish-trained Macabebes before them, quickly changed sides when one colonial power gave way to another. In addition, the Japanese had cultivated Sakdalista leader Benigno Ramos, who established a militant pro-Japanese organization, comprised largely of former Sakdalistas in 1939. Called the Ganaps, the group was later reorganized into the Kalibapi during the war and was to form a critical base of collaboration with the Japanese. Many from the economic elite, particularly those with Spanish heritage, also defected to the Japanese, surviving the loss of U.S. markets by capitalizing on Japan’s war-time shortages and much needed trade.

In yet another transnational twist, the Philippines had also developed a full-blown fascist movement in the Manila Falange, which had emerged during the Spanish Civil War and had an estimated membership of about 10,000 by 1940. Comprised primarily of Spanish and Spanish mestizo families, the Manila Falange recalled an earlier era of colonialism under Spain and had ties to Franco. The Manila Falange was most effective in its covert activities, infiltrating the Civilian Emergency Administration (CEA), which had been formed to defend against the Japanese. Working under cover, the Falange operated as an Axis fifth column within the CEA to disrupt its operations and spread demoralizing rumors, particularly after the first Japanese air raids over Manila. So effective, in fact,

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\[34\] Information on collaboration with the Japanese during the war is from Constantino (1978), particularly pp. 52-83; Brands, pp. 198-204; and Friend.

\[35\] For information on the role of the Sakdalistas in the Japanese campaign, see Constantino (1978), pp. 10-11.

\[36\] For a detailed discussion of the Japanese role in the Philippines during World War II, see Friend. For a description of the patterns of both collaboration and resistance, see Constantino (1978).
was the Manila Falange, that the Japanese government awarded it on January 5, 1942 in Granada, Spain for its "invaluable" assistance in the capture of Manila. Though the Falange was not active during the Japanese occupation, they enjoyed the protection and privileges accorded Axis allies, and they thrived economically through continued access to international trade. Far from being punished for their war-time activities, many families who joined the Falange -- the Sorianos, Ayalas, Zobels, and Elizaldes, to name a few -- continue today to rank among the wealthiest families in the Philippines.37

Other Filipinos, however, worked closely with the U.S., maintaining a shadow commonwealth regime during the war, with Quezon still President.38 Even some of the former Falangists, including Andres Soriano, Enrique Zobel, and Joaquin Elizalde, split their families' allegiance between Japan and the U.S. to serve in Quezon's government-in-exile, forming close personal and business relations with MacArthur in the process. Still other Filipinos waged effective guerrilla campaigns against the Japanese, including loyal U.S.-trained troops, Chinese in Manila with support from Chinese nationals,39 as well as revolutionaries. The most potent revolutionary guerrilla force was the "Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon" or "National Army Against Japan," which came to be known simply as the Huks.40 Comprised largely of poor sharecroppers and landless farm workers from central Luzon, the Huks built upon the earlier Katipunan, Colorum and Sakdalista revolutionary movements as well as labor and peasant unions, all of the same region. Except for the military commander, a socialist with peasant roots named Luis Taruc, however, the Huk leaders were

37Information on the role of Spanish and Spanish mestizo Filipinos in the Manila Falange, is from Constantino (1978), pp. 9-10.

38See Constantino (1978), pp. 27-83, for a detailed account of the various forms of political and armed resistance by Filipinos to Japanese rule during the war.


40See Kerkvliet (1977) and Lachica, for detailed descriptions of the Huks.
mainly urban intellectuals with links to the PKP. Heavily influenced by Soviet communism but receiving little financial or political support from the Soviet Union, the PKP had stronger ties with the CPUSA, which provided research, directives, and even leaders to the PKP. Shortly after forming in 1931, the PKP went underground but remained active until it resurfaced in 1938 when Quezon pardoned its leaders. As it resurfaced, the PKP, under the global direction of the Soviet Union, announced that Japanese aggression was the foremost threat to the Philippines, and stressed the need for an alliance with "democratic and progressive forces in the U.S." The PKP declared itself ready to cooperate with all political groups regardless of differences in order to present a unified front against the Japanese. In March 1942, the PKP and Socialist Party of the Philippines established the Hukas.

In Central Luzon, the primary area of Huk activity, all U.S.-linked guerrillas were against the Hukas, largely because of long-standing enmity between the U.S.-trained Philippine forces, with their links to the landed elite, and communist-led, militant peasants. Prior to war, the Philippine forces had frequently been called upon to help put down protest actions of peasants against landlords. When these peasants joined the Hukas during the war, armed clashes, kidnappings and executions between the Hukas and other guerrillas were common. After the outbreak of war, the Hukas sought American support, sending emissaries to MacArthur while he was still in Bataan. Though they failed to meet with MacArthur, they did meet with Major Claude Thorpe, the man in charge of organizing guerrilla activities. When the Americans wanted to integrate the Hukas into their political and military program, however, the Hukas demurred. Though they were willing to follow the Americans on military matters, they wanted to maintain their own political course. When the Americans then decided not to give material assistance to the Hukas, the Hukas offered to help establish a unified guerrilla command. The reactions of other guerrilla groups, however, ranged from hostile to indifferent. Nevertheless, the Hukas fought for the U.S. in the drive to liberate Luzon, free American prisoners of war, and, they hoped, eventually carve
out a role for themselves in a post-war Philippines.

At the same time, the Hucks launched a broad-based revolutionary campaign in the countryside of Central Luzon, laying the foundation for post-war peasant revolutionary activity, to be described in the next chapter. In particular, they distributed pamphlets edited by academics, trade unionists and others, with the leading publication, the Katubusan ng Bayan, or Redemption of the People, launched in 1942. They also held meetings to discuss pressing issues like land tenure and landlord-peasant relations. In addition, they established Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) in rural areas to help peasants protect themselves from the Japanese as well as from the many bandits who preyed on villages in the break-down of law and order. Each BUDC was governed by a people’s council elected by all residents over eighteen years of age. A chairman, vice-chairman, secretary-treasurer, and chief of police worked with directors of various areas such as communications and transportation. The council then collected food, supplies, money as well as intelligence, while serving as a governing body for territories controlled by the Hucks. The Hucks also established peasant-landlord committees to mediate conflicts and distribute harvests. Moreover, trial by jury was introduced, as peasants in Huk-controlled areas came to experience first-hand the kind of self-government and democracy which U.S. governors and Philippine officials had up to then only promised.41 With their platform of independence, land reform, and mass-based political participation, Huk ranks swelled. By 1944, the Hucks controlled large areas of the country, with 70,000 guerrillas active in four provinces.42

Like Aguinaldo’s troops in the Spanish-American War, however, the Hucks’ ambitions were thwarted soon after MacArthur’s dramatic return to the

41The above is culled from Kerkvliet (1977), Lachica, and Constantino (1978), pp. 138-139, 142-147.

42See McLane for a detailed account of the CPUSA’s role in the PKP and Huk movement of the Philippines. See also Kerkvliet (1977) and Lachica, as well as Constantino (1978) on the Hucks.
Philippines. Though some strategists had argued that U.S. troops should bypass the Philippines and head straight to Formosa enroute to Japan, MacArthur had fought hard in the U.S. debates, and in private discussions with Roosevelt, for a return to the Philippines, largely to uphold the promise he had made to the Filipino people after Bataan.\(^{43}\) Under pressure from MacArthur, Roosevelt relented and, on October 20, 1944, MacArthur, together with Osmeña, newly-appointed commonwealth president after Quezon’s recent death from natural causes, waded through the surf of Leyte Gulf, bullets from Japanese snipers whizzing overhead. Thus opened the American campaign to recapture the Philippines. By the end of December, American forces secured Leyte and began preparing to move toward Manila. The battle for Manila opened on February 4, 1945, the same day that U.S. soldier Willie Grayson had first exchanged shots with Filipinos half a century before. Two weeks later, Manila was recaptured for the allies, and, on February 27, MacArthur turned over Malacanang Palace to President Osmeña. Though the battle lasted just two weeks, it left the city all but destroyed. About 1,000 Americans and 16,000 Japanese died; but roughly 100,000 Filipinos, nearly all noncombatants, died as well. Cornered, the Japanese committed atrocities matched only by their pillage of Nanking in 1937, as Japanese fires and U.S. artillery barrages conspired to leave Manila smoldering. By the end of the siege, water, sewage, electrical, infrastructural, medical and other systems had all been destroyed.\(^{44}\)

The Huks had been preparing for the American return by setting up the provisional governments in the countryside and attempting to form an underground government in alliance with other guerrilla units. Throughout the war, the Huks had remained loyal to the commonwealth government, and expected a role in a post-war administration, with the centerpiece of their

\(^{43}\)Brands, pp. 205-206.

\(^{44}\)Brands, p. 209.
platform being reforms in land tenure and labor relations.\textsuperscript{45} Then the shock came. Far from rewarding the Huks, the American forces ordered them disarmed and then arrested several leaders, including Taruc, in late February 1945. Mass protests, and more arrests, followed, and the Huks, now unarmed, faced retribution at the hands of powerful warlords, many of whom had fled the countryside during the war and now began to return, much to the resentment of the peasant population who had stood alone during the war to defend the country against the Japanese. Additional Huk enemies included U.S.-backed guerrilla groups\textsuperscript{46} and others who viewed the Huk movement as a threat to vested interests.\textsuperscript{47} In May 1945, Senator Tydings of Maryland went to the Philippines to study the problem. Upon his return to the U.S. just days later, Tydings proposed to Congress a soft-line solution involving grants to cover war damages as well as a trade act to help revive the economy.\textsuperscript{48}

At the same time, Huk leaders displayed an openness to soft-line tactics, opting to participate in the political process, while recognizing Osmena as the legitimate President of the Commonwealth. In July 1945, Communists, Socialists, peasant unions and other leftist groups joined together to form the Democratic Alliance, in preparation for legislative elections scheduled for 1946. With the country in ruin, the economy shattered, and vested interests returning to the countryside, the Huk numbers continued to grow. Though the Huks openly stated that they opposed civil war, increasing repression by the returning warlords too often forced military conflict. Still, the Huks fought for a legitimate role in the campaign for legislative seats. Meanwhile, the Philippine armed forces relayed concerns to the U.S. army that they feared repercussions following the withdrawal

\textsuperscript{45}Constantino (1978), p. 155.

\textsuperscript{46}Except for the Huks, all guerrilla groups were adjuncts of the U.S. armed forces, as cited in Constantino (1978), p.153

\textsuperscript{47}The above information on the Huks is from Lachica, pp. 103-117.

\textsuperscript{48}Karnow, p. 333.
of U.S. forces. Later in September, however, U.S. Representative Jasper Bell, a conservative Missouri Democrat and head of the House Committee on Insular Affairs which oversaw U.S. policy toward the Philippines, introduced a companion to Tydings' plan designed to ease the prospective burden on U.S. taxpayers of rebuilding the archipelago. Bell's proposal sought to encourage private U.S. investment by granting American corporations special privileges in the Philippines. After much haggling in Washington, the act was to peg the peso to the dollar in order to protect against currency fluctuations while permitting free conversion of dollars to pesos and vice versa. As in the earlier "free trade" agreement at the turn of the century, U.S. exporters were also to be granted a monopoly in the Philippines while Filipinos would receive unrestricted access to U.S. markets.

Now, however, Americans were offered "parity" rights to own mines, forests and other resources, without the same privilege granted Filipinos in the U.S. The clause violated the Philippine constitution of 1935, which reserved majority share holdings to Filipinos and called for a nationwide referendum after ratification by the Philippine legislature on any such revisions. Because the bill was seen to favor Philippine agricultural products in U.S. markets, U.S. competitors, mainly from sugar- and dairy-producing states, opposed the bill, while consumers and prospective investors, mainly from industrial states, approved the concessions to American business. Other opponents included State Department officials who were then pressing Britain to open its former colonies to American trade. To insure the success of the bill, a House committee tied it as an amendment to a relief bill proposed by Tydings. After seven months of wrangling, the bill became law in the U.S. in April 1946, though it still needed to pass in the Philippines, where presidential and legislative elections now focused on the question. While the leading parties in the Philippines supported the Act, the Huks, still hoping to

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49 Secret Intelligence Report No. 109-1357, from the United States Army Pacific Command's Military Intelligence Section, December 22, 1945, from the National Security Archive collection. The report cites arsenals in Moro regions of the South, Huk activity in Luzon, as well as ethnic conflict between Filipinos and the Chinese minority.
participate in the electoral process, came out against the Act. Moreover, they
came out against plans for a continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines.
Given the continued strength of the Huks, these stands were apparently popular
among their constituents; yet they fed anti-Huk pressures among U.S. and Filipino
officials, due in part to local interests but also in part to emerging international
ones.

After Yalta: The Seeds of Cold War and the Impact on the Philippines

As Filipinos managed the delicate transition from war to peace, the seeds
of a new war were being planted at the small seaport town of Yalta on the
Crimean Sea, where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in February 1945 to
negotiate terms of governance for occupied territories in the post-war period.
Among other settlements, the so-called "Big Three" came to an agreement on the
question of East Asia, though this was kept secret because the Soviets were still
officially neutral in the Pacific war. Under the agreement, Stalin promised to
enter the war against Japan within three months of the end of war in Europe. He
also promised to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the Chinese
government and to press Mao to join a coalition with the Nationalists. In return,
Roosevelt promised to see that the USSR would regain territories, including the
southern Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles, lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905.50

Despite the Yalta agreements, subsequent negotiations stalled over various
disputes over political reorganization in Poland and Romania. When Allied
commanders met with representatives of the German commander in Italy to
negotiate a German surrender and refused Stalin's request for a Russian observer,
Stalin feared a separate peace was being made. Roosevelt, increasingly disturbed
by Stalin's actions in Poland and Romania, continued nevertheless to hope for a

50Information from this paragraph is from Combs, pp.305-315, and from Gaddis (1972).

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negotiated settlement to minimize post-war conflicts with the Soviets. It is possible, as some historians have argued, that Roosevelt might have been better able to reassure Stalin, to finesse Stalin's tendency to mix heavy-handed oppression with surprising moments of concession, and, perhaps ultimately, to have prevented the Cold War. Instead, Roosevelt died of a massive cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945, in the last days of the war in Europe, and the burden of negotiating the peace fell to his successor, Harry S. Truman, whose motto, "The buck stops here," proved particularly apt. Because Roosevelt had long skirted the State Department, relying instead on his own counsel or that of his military advisors, Truman did not know that Roosevelt had all but ceded to the Soviets control of Eastern Europe. Nor did he yet know that the U.S. was close to exploding the world's first atomic bomb.51

As a follow-up to Yalta, Truman, Stalin, and Churchill met in Potsdam to finalize the negotiations. In the midst of the conference, news of the first successful test explosion of an atomic bomb near Alamagordo, New Mexico reached Truman, who felt that the bomb could serve as a useful bargaining tool. Instead, tensions rose and Potsdam ended with many unresolved questions as well as much mutual suspicion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Having made little progress, Truman returned to the U.S. to make his historic decision on the question of the atomic bomb and the war in Japan. On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima experienced the world’s first war-time nuclear blast. Three days later, another blast hit Nagasaki. The face of warfare had officially entered a new era. Meanwhile, Russia launched an attack on the Japanese in Manchuria. A week later, Emperor Hirohito ordered his troops to surrender, and, on September 2, 1945, aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri at anchor in Tokyo Bay, General Douglas MacArthur presided over the formal surrender.

As the war in the Pacific came to an end, a debate erupted among U.S. policymakers over the continued secrecy surrounding the bomb, particularly with

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51Ibid
respect to the Soviet Union. Though Stalin had upheld his Yalta promise on China and signed a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek pledging him exclusive military aid, the competing expansionist aims of the U.S. and the USSR in the post-war period continued to sound alarms. While Secretary of War Henry Stimson had argued at Potsdam that a U.S. monopoly on the bomb would make the Soviets more compliant, he now grew concerned that it might intensify long-standing conflicts between the U.S. and the Soviets. Moreover, U.S. scientists estimated that the Soviets would likely have the bomb in one to five years, affording little long-term advantage to an American monopoly. Stimson urged Truman to share the technology with the Soviets for peaceful uses in order to build a post-war alliance; but Truman's new secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, rejected the scientific estimates regarding Soviet nuclear capability, estimating instead that it would take them fifteen to twenty years to build a bomb. Several members of the new Joint Commission on Atomic Energy concurred, as did U.S. public opinion, and Truman opted for continued secrecy, as the Cold War grew colder.52

The Philippines in the Aftermath of War

In the Philippines, the period surrounding the end of the war met with much celebration but the fighting had ravaged the countryside, the infrastructure, the populace, and the economy. Moreover, the continued conflict between Huks demanding a voice in post-war politics and officials seeking to repress them, now threatened to explode into civil war. Partly because of the post-war economic crisis and its impact on the peasantry but also because of long-standing peasant opposition to the landed elites and their American allies, the Huk ranks continued to swell in the period immediately following the war, despite the joint U.S. and Philippine hard-line tactics being used against them. Meanwhile the U.S., increasingly alarmed about the possibility of a communist revolution in the

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52 Combs, pp. 320-324 and Gaddis (1972).
Philippines and its implications for U.S. strategic interests in the emerging Cold War, supported the war against the Huks. In one incident, a rival guerrilla group, with the consent of U.S. officers, rounded up 100 Huks, had them dig their own graves, and then killed all of them. The U.S. then named the rival guerrilla group's leader mayor of the nearby town of Malolos, ironically the site of the republic Aguinaldo had established nearly half a century earlier, in defiance of American claims to the islands. The Huks waged battle through political processes under the aegis of the Democratic Alliance, which now comprised a diverse array of organizations running the gamut from liberal to revolutionary. If denied that avenue for reforms and for a role in national politics, the Huks were also prepared for civil war.33

Moreover, the U.S. military under the command of MacArthur, together with his hard-line associates in the Philippines, including many former Japanese collaborators as well as former Falangists, now gained control of Philippine politics during the period immediately preceding and following the conclusion of the war. Heir to his father's rivalry with Taft decades before, Douglas MacArthur revived the long-standing competition between U.S. military and political colonialists. Like his father, Douglas MacArthur believed in hard-line tactics as a means of suppressing domestic Philippine opposition. Also like his father, he believed civilians had no place in a theater of war, and he threatened to send home any civilian high commissioner appointed by Washington to Manila. Roosevelt had acquiesced, allowing MacArthur considerable freedom to shape Philippine political and military institutions. After April 1945, with Roosevelt gone and Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes lacking close contacts in the Philippines in the aftermath of war, the relatively inexperienced Truman was compelled to rely on MacArthur, who battled for control of Philippine politics with Ickes, a New Deal Democrat and long-time nemesis of the arch-conservative MacArthur. Despite numerous clashes, particularly with Ickes, MacArthur

prevailed. In a moment of candor, he told Professor Joseph Ralston Hayden, Civil Advisor and Consultant on Philippine Affairs, that he "intended to retain full authority and responsibility" over the commonwealth government.\textsuperscript{54} While Osmena was to help establish provincial governments, MacArthur saw himself as the man in charge of the country, and he regarded any efforts toward civilian control by the U.S. Department of Interior as dangerously meddlesome. Even Hayden was largely ignored, forgotten in Leyte when the army simply neglected to provide him transport to Manila until March 1945.

In fact, from his return to the Philippines on February 4, 1945 through the formal declaration of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, MacArthur left his imprint not only on Philippine internal military policy, notably towards the Huks, but also on electoral politics, with important implications for the post-war evolution of hard-line and soft-line as well as revolutionary forces in the Philippines. In particular, MacArthur had been a close personal friend of the flamboyant Quezon and he was now close to Quezon's long-time protege, the tense, workaholic Manuel Roxas; but MacArthur did not get on well with Osmena, whose serious, plodding style and physical frailty contrasted sharply with MacArthur. Following the Leyte landing in October 1944, MacArthur delayed the distribution of food, clothing, and other supplies to the destitute population, which blamed Osmena, and then administered relief in his own name in order to gain the credit for himself while eclipsing Osmena. MacArthur also forced Osmena to give Filipino army veterans the bad news that the U.S. would pay only eight pesos per month in back pay rather than the anticipated fifty. By the Spring of 1945, Osmena traveled to Washington to register his complaints with Roosevelt. Though the two did meet, Roosevelt died soon after and Truman proved a less sympathetic ear.\textsuperscript{55}

At the same time that he eclipsed Osmena, MacArthur promoted his friend


\textsuperscript{55}Karnow, p. 326.
Manuel Roxas, swiftly exonerating him in April 1945 of all charges of assisting the Japanese, leaving a cloud of uncertainty surrounding Roxas’ war-time record. In June, at MacArthur’s urging, Osmena summoned to Manila the commonwealth legislative body, which had been elected in 1941 but had never met because of the war. Though many of these elected officials had participated in Laurel’s pro-Japanese regime, Osmena hoped to incorporate the old oligarchy into the post-war regime. In so doing, Osmena spelled his own political doom. As MacArthur had hoped, Roxas was selected President of the Philippine senate\(^5\) and chairman of the powerful appointments committee. Roxas then maneuvered to dismiss two members of Osmena’s cabinet who had criticized his war-time role. In August, MacArthur freed 5,000 Japanese collaborators, despite his earlier promise to "run to earth every disloyal Filipino." As it turned out, many from the landed, entrepreneurial and political elite had been Japanese collaborators, in contrast to the peasant-based Huks. To purge the polity of Japanese collaborators would leave a political and economic chasm apparently too vast to bridge. Instead of trying Filipinos, MacArthur chose to prosecute as war criminals the Japanese officers who had served in the Philippines. Among these were Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was sentenced in September 1945 to hang.

That same month, Paul McNutt arrived in the Philippines as the new high commissioner. A Democrat and former governor of Indiana, McNutt had been appointed high commissioner to the Philippines ten years earlier by Roosevelt despite MacArthur’s best efforts to have himself named to the post. His return now reignited yet again the MacArthur family feud with civilian authority in the Philippines. McNutt expressed concern that "enemy collaborators" dominated the legislature and he urged Truman to delay independence until the issue could be investigated. Despite the subsequent findings of Deputy Attorney General Walter Hutchinson, who concluded that since nearly all of the collaborators had been

\(^{5}\)A 1940 amendment altered the Philippine political structure from a unicameral to a bicameral one. From Brands, p. 230.
known to U.S. intelligence officers, the problem should have been averted. He predicted that Roxas, if elected president in the elections scheduled for April 1946, would declare an amnesty, and that, to avoid this outcome, the U.S. should press for war crimes trials presided over by Filipino judges with U.S. aid. McNutt also raised concerns about the possibility of venality in Philippine elections, to which MacArthur replied that "the Filipinos will hold as honest an election as you ever had in the state of Indiana."\(^{57}\)

Instead, America's new drive to "contain" communism together with the momentum building behind Roxas, displaced the earlier pledges to punish war criminals. As the campaign for the presidency accelerated, Roxas used his newspaper empire to publicize his links to MacArthur as well as his anti-Huk stance, and to promote his newly-formed Liberal Party. Meanwhile, Osmeña miscalculated, opting not to campaign but to rely instead on local political bosses for support. He also refused to disavow the Huks, thereby alienating the U.S. Roxas scored a narrow victory against Osmeña's Nacionalista Party, winning just 54 percent of the nearly three million votes cast. The Liberals also took over the legislature. Significant too were the eleven legislative seats won by opponents of the Bell Trade Act, including all six of the Huks who ran for office. Though the Act had passed in the U.S. in April 1946, as described above, it still needed approval in the Philippines. Immediately following the elections, Roxas denied seats to the eleven opponents of the Act, including all of the Huk representatives, on trumped up charges of electoral fraud, which, even if true, would likely have disqualified many more than just the eleven. Roxas further called into question his motives when he seated his own supporters, though many were under indictment for collaborating with the Japanese. The expulsion of the Huks was seen by local authorities as a signal to subdue without mercy the Huks, who were arrested or killed in droves. The Huks now returned to the "boondocks," renaming themselves the "Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan" or roughly the "People's

\(^{57}\)Karnow, p. 329.
Liberation Army." In August 1946, the Huks would move from the political to the military front, waging full-scale civil war in central Luzon by 1948, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Even with the expulsion of the Act's most outspoken opponents, however, Roxas feared that the measure might not pass in the Philippine legislature. Though Truman wanted to delay agreement on the measure until after July 4 in order to avert charges that the U.S. was extorting favorable trade agreements as a condition of Philippine independence, Roxas opted for a pre-independence vote. This way he could claim that only a senate majority was needed, not the two-thirds which the Philippine supreme court might call for should the act be seen as a treaty between two sovereign nations. Roxas then drove his legislature into an all-night marathon to debate the issue, and, on July 2, 1946, the measure was approved. Two days later, despite World War II, the Japanese occupation, and the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. held true to the promises of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, granting the Philippines independence. After decades of debate, the U.S. voluntarily relinquished its colony, as crowds of Filipinos convened at Luneta Park, near a statue of Rizal, amid the bombed out remnants of Manila. McNutt lowered the American flag, and Roxas raised the Philippine flag, with its one red stripe, one blue, and golden sun with eight rays representing the provinces that had first risen up against Spain. The Philippine national anthem then played, as a warship fired a twenty-one gun salute and church bells pealed throughout the city. MacArthur flew in from his new posting in Japan to participate in the celebrations, claiming to a friend, "America buried imperialism here today." Such claims to the contrary, the festivities were to mark but a new era of U.S.-Philippine interdependency, as any prospects for independent democracy were swiftly compromised by the Huk uprising and its Cold War context. As chapter five will argue, the joint U.S.-Philippine response to the Huks lay the foundation for the 1972 transition to authoritarian rule.

^Karnow, p. 324.
Conclusion

As with the transition to U.S. colonialism and the Jones Act in 1916, neither purely international factors centered in the U.S. nor purely domestic factors centered in the Philippines account for the 1946 transition to independence. Again, transnational alliances between Filipino nationalists and American anti-imperialists as well as other transnational factors such as Filipino migration to the U.S., proved crucial to the transition. Though the key explanation for the 1946 transition to independence lies in the U.S., still the locus of decision-making on the issue of independence, as it was throughout the colonial period, Filipino nationalists such as Quezon, Osmena and Roxas had learned enough about the American political system during the colonial period covered in this chapter and in the previous one to lobby effectively in the U.S. for independence at critical moments.

The U.S. debates on the Philippine question were configured largely along partisan lines, with Republicans generally supporting U.S. colonialism there and Democrats generally opposing it. Though it was beyond the scope of this work to cover the complex machinations of these debates, the conflict was rooted in the broader economic struggles between populist small farmers and their Democratic allies versus increasingly powerful industrialists and their Republican allies. While the Democrats sought to protect small farmers from their Philippine competitors by keeping the latter outside tariff walls, the Republicans sought to protect the interests of industrialists and agricultural refiners, notably the Sugar Trust, by keeping the Philippines as a colony in order to bring Philippine goods within tariff walls. Though they succeeded in their efforts by making the Philippines a colony of the U.S. at the turn of the century, the debates would continue in various forms throughout the colonial period. When Republicans held the White House, they used the considerable power conferred on the office by congress under the Spooner Amendment and later the Cooper Act to appoint Republican governors to manage the Philippines and to establish political, economic, military, and social
institutions in the service of U.S. colonial interests there.

When Democrats held the White House, however, Filipino nationalists and their allies in the U.S. congress capitalized on the opportunity for change. As described in chapter three, soon after Wilson moved into the White House, Quezon began pressing for independence, working closely with Congressman Jones of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. Passage of the Jones Act in 1916 formally expressed the U.S. commitment to Philippine independence, though without a specified timetable. This question of a timetable was then set aside through the Republican eras of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, but resurfaced just as the onset of the Depression ushered in the Roosevelt administration, with its ties to the large numbers of small farmers and others actively seeking to push Philippine agricultural products beyond the protection of tariff walls. With effective lobbying by Quezon, Osmena and Roxas, together with domestic U.S. lobbyists, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was signed into law in 1934 and the commonwealth period was launched a year later in 1935, with full Philippine independence scheduled for 1945. The plans were disrupted by war, however, with a brief but significant period of Japanese rule from 1941 to 1945, though the Democratic administration of Truman held to its pre-war promise and granted the Philippines independence on July 4, 1946.

Neither the international role of the U.S. nor the domestic influence of nationalism within the Philippines can fully explain the 1946 transition to independence, nor the steps leading to it, including the 1916 Jones Act and the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act. While U.S. factors, centering on political and economic competition between Republicans and Democrats, contributed to the debates on the question of Philippine independence and created openings for this when Democrats held the White House, it was the transnational lobbying by Filipinos, including those actually seated in the U.S. House of Representatives, which pushed the issue toward a conclusion. Similarly, international factors such as World War I contributed to the subsequent collapse of Philippine agricultural markets, but it was the increased transnational exchanges as Filipinos migrated to
the U.S. which sparked antagonism from U.S. growers and displaced whites during the Depression, and revived U.S. debates on the question of independence. Finally, the international crisis of World War II exposed Philippine vulnerability to other colonial contenders, in this case the Japanese, while fostering as well the rise of new, more organized peasant revolutionary opposition led by the Soviet-inspired Huks. The combination of external and domestic threats to their bid for control of Philippine politics encouraged elite Filipinos to seek continued military support from the U.S. At the same time, the war intensified U.S. strategic ties to the Philippines. This interdependence rose further when the emerging Cold War established a link between the domestic Huk conflict and the international Soviet one. As a result, Philippine independence was compromised from the outset by U.S. intervention in the creation of a pro-U.S. post-colonial regime led by Roxas.

The transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances were now redesigned for the post-colonial era, as the hard-liners gained predominance. Moreover, the transnational politics and institutions which formed during the colonial period in response to U.S., Philippine, and international pressures hold important implications for the later transitions in 1972 and 1986, as described below. In particular, the period saw the emergence and evolution of transnational alliances of hard-liners and soft-liners, both comprised of Filipino elites and U.S. officials. While U.S. officials needed the Philippine elite to insure political stability and the production of raw materials, the Philippine elite needed the U.S. to protect them militarily from revolutionary opposition in the countryside, where roughly 70 percent of the population was landless, and for capital development for trade and finance. The main threat to both Filipino elites and U.S. colonialists was revolutionary opposition in the Philippines, which sought independence as well as structural economic and political change, particularly in land tenure. Though both the hard-line and soft-line transnational alliances sought to contain the kind of revolutionary opposition expressed so forcefully during the war of 1899-1902 and recurring thereafter, the hard-liners continued to emphasize military repression while the soft-liners emphasized political attraction and incorporation. The hard-
liners cultivated Philippine authoritarian institutions, targeted at internal security, while soft-liners cultivated public institutions to manage health, education, economic development, political change and other issues of concern to the masses of Filipinos.

In 1935, however, just as the Commonwealth regime was inaugurated, the Sakdalista uprising together with the growing external threat posed by Japan encouraged hard-liners to reassert their claims to Philippine politics and begin developing a Philippine military capable of international combat. General Douglas MacArthur led the effort to create such an army, but his "mosquito fleet" was swiftly overcome by a surprise attack by Japan in December 1941, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. When MacArthur fled for Australia a few months later, many Filipinos collaborated with the Japanese regime, though others maintained a shadow government linked to the U.S. while U.S.-trained military bands waged guerrilla warfare against Japan. Added to these guerrilla bands were Filipino revolutionary forces, notably a group which would come to be known as the Huks. Though the Huks had earlier called for independence from the U.S., they set aside their conflicts with the American colonialists and allied with U.S. forces to help defeat Japan. As Aguinaldo's forces had hoped to achieve independence by allying with the U.S. against their common enemy -- Spain, so the Huks hoped to achieve independence, and from there, structural economic and political reform, notably in land tenure, by allying with the U.S. against Japan. These hopes were quickly dashed, however, following MacArthur's dramatic return to the Philippines in October 1944 and the subsequent Japanese withdrawal in 1945. Far from rewarding the Huks for their wartime contributions, the U.S. ordered them disarmed, and then arrested several leaders, including Taruc, all part of an effort to contain the perceived threat of spreading international communism.

Thus, on the eve of Philippine independence, the Huk uprising together with the post-war economic crisis in the Philippines as well as the onset of the Cold War conspired to reinforce the interdependencies between the U.S. and the
Philippines, which had become institutionalized during the colonial period. This compromised Philippine independence from the moment of its inception. Moreover, under MacArthur, transnational hard-line strategies again reasserted control of Philippine politics, with implications for the post-war development of the new country's political, economic, and military institutions as well as its prospects for independent democracy, as described in the next chapter.

Overview

The shared sufferings of Bataan and the ensuing struggle against the Japanese left a lasting imprint on Philippine authoritarian institutions, as Filipinos and Americans forged military interdependencies which would greatly intensify during the Cold War. Under a 1947 agreement, the U.S. was granted a ninety-nine year lease on its Philippine bases and was to manage the external defense of the Philippines, while the Philippine armed forces were to manage the country's internal defense. Though Truman initially planned to scale back U.S. forces in the Philippines after World War II, by 1949, growing tensions with the Soviets, the "fall" of China that year, the outbreak of formerly anti-Japanese, Soviet-inspired Huk opposition in the Philippine countryside, and then the outbreak of war in Korea a year later, forced Truman to reconsider. By 1950, Truman approved a national security policy paper calling for international intervention to contain communism, NSC-68. In the process, the U.S. bases in the Philippines, notably Subic naval and Clark air bases, would emerge as vital components of the global U.S. force structure. This intensified after 1965, when Johnson escalated the Vietnam War and financed a massive build-up of the Philippine bases, just as a new Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, was moving in to the Malacanang Palace. While earlier Philippine presidents had used the bases to leverage aid from the U.S., Marcos was a particularly shrewd negotiator who understood the value of the bases, especially after 1966, when Johnson revealed to Marcos the presence of nuclear weapons there.

This chapter traces the rise of the transnational U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance and its role in the 1972 transition under Marcos to authoritarian rule. Although the evidence shows that the impetus for martial law came from Marcos, this chapter will demonstrate that the military capacity for, and political survival
of, the 1972 transition grew out of global Cold War politics and the rise in power of a transnational U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance after 1946. In short, the hard-liners sought to contain global, including domestic Philippine, communism through military repression and they succeeded after 1946 in building both Philippine and U.S. military capacity toward this end. In the process, the hard-liners greatly intensified the military interdependencies of Philippine domestic and U.S. international security, as the Philippine military burgeoned with substantial U.S. assistance, totalling $2.52 billion in economic and military aid from fiscal years 1946 through 1972.¹ Meanwhile, the U.S. relied increasingly upon good relations with the Philippine government to insure access to expanded American military facilities there, particularly at Clark and Subic.

In this interdependence and increased state interpenetration, Marcos saw an opportunity in 1972 to leverage U.S. support for martial law, granting himself unlimited control of the Philippines while promising the U.S. secure access to its Philippine bases. Thus, the chapter argues, the rise of the transnational hard-line alliance after 1946 gave Marcos both the domestic military capacity he needed to carry out martial law as well as the international support he would need thereafter to survive his widely unpopular authoritarian rule. The following traces the rise of the transnational hard-line alliance from 1946 through the transition to martial law in 1972, assessing as well the U.S., Philippine, and broader international politics which shaped its evolution.

"Mr. X" and the New Foreign Policy: Containment and its Implications for the Philippines

On the eve of Philippine independence, one war had just ended, but a new

colder one was beginning, and the archipelago would emerge, yet again, as a critical battleground. As in 1916 and then in 1935, the 1946 promise of independence was undermined from the outset by the threat of world war, which again prompted the U.S. to mold Philippine domestic politics to meet America's economic and strategic interests while prompting as well elite Filipinos to seek the shelter of the U.S. Now, it was the external threat to the U.S. posed by communism together with the domestic challenge posed by the communist-inspired Huks which reinforced the interdependencies between the new nation and its former colonial ruler. These interdependencies were then further reinforced by the emergence of a new U.S. foreign policy which would have global repercussions, in the Philippines and beyond. The new policy was introduced by George Kennan, until then a relatively obscure junior Foreign Service officer in Moscow, whom the State Department had asked to explain the increasingly alarming hostility of the Soviet Union toward the West. On February 22, 1946, Kennan dispatched a telegram which was to have an unprecedented impact on the entire structure of U.S. foreign policy. In the telegram, Kennan argued that the key explanation for Soviet hostility toward the West lay less in the actions, or inactions, of the West than in Stalin's domestic policies of intimidation and repression. "A hostile international environment," wrote Kennan, "is the breath of life for (the) prevailing internal system in this country." Foreign policy analysts in the U.S. were quickly persuaded, and U.S. policy shifted from its earlier quid pro quo stance toward one combining "patience with firmness."2

Where previously the U.S. might have tried to conceal disagreements with its former Soviet allies, U.S. officials now agreed to air these openly but non-provocatively. There would also be no more concessions made toward Soviet expansionism, though no challenge would be made against Soviet control of territories already held. Moreover, U.S. military strength would have to be reconstituted, with economic and military aid to U.S. allies a key part of the new

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2This paragraph is from Gaddis, prologue.
global strategy. The U.S. also agreed to continue its negotiations with the Soviets but only in order to register Soviet acceptance of American positions or to publicize Soviet intransigence. In this way, the U.S. hoped to stake its claim to the new international power structure, while wooing allies at home and abroad. U.S. strategists hoped the Soviets would exercise restraint in the face of American firmness, finding as well the possibility of a settlement in America's patience. The U.S. induced the Soviets to withdraw troops from Iran and to give up its demands for boundary concessions and base rights from Turkey. The U.S. also intervened in Greece to support the U.S.-allied government there from a communist insurgency, while installing the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. navy in local waters. In Asia, U.S. officials kept the Soviets from playing any substantive role in the reconstruction of Japan, while displaying as well U.S. determination to prevent the Soviets from extending southward from their occupied zone north of the 38th parallel in Korea. Though the new foreign policy had been evolving for months, it coalesced after Truman's March 12, 1947 proclamation that: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."

The doctrine said nothing about "free peoples" resisting U.S. incursions, however. Just two days after Truman's proclamation, on March 14, 1947, Philippine President Manuel Roxas signed an agreement granting the U.S. ninety-nine year leases on twenty-two military sites, including Clark and Subic. Since June 1946, U.S. and Filipino negotiators had tangled on the question of U.S. jurisdiction over American soldiers, sailors and civilian employees at the Philippine bases. The question was not just a theoretical one. Following the end of World War II, U.S. troops awaiting repatriation had been involved in numerous traffic incidents, bar-room brawls, and other conflicts with Filipinos. Racism, which was institutionalized in much of the U.S. through segregation and "Jim Crow" laws, was a factor as well. Trying the cases in American military courts,

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
Roxas had argued, would undermine Philippine sovereignty. U.S. agencies who were rivals of the military, including the State Department, likewise contended that such privileges for the U.S. might poison relations with the Filipinos while discouraging other nations from allowing U.S. bases on their soil. As the debate continued through late 1946, U.S. strategists reviewed alternative Asian sites in Guam, Korea, and Okinawa. Upon such review, the Philippines was given a low priority, particularly after Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, argued that U.S. troop removal from the Philippines would be preferable to chronic friction with Filipinos on the issue. By December 1946, former High Commissioner McNutt was sent to Manila to inform Roxas that U.S. forces in the Philippines would soon be reduced.4

Fearing a complete U.S. withdrawal, and the likely economic and strategic impact of this on the war-ravaged Philippines as well as on the capacity of his administration to suppress an emerging Huk challenge, Roxas acquiesced. On March 14, 1947, Roxas granted the U.S. the ninety-nine year leases as well as jurisdiction not just over American but also over Filipino base employees.5 The decision was an unpopular one and the U.S. now moved to secure the Roxas government from domestic opposition, but in the process increased Philippine military dependence on the U.S. On March 21, Roxas signed another agreement with the U.S., wherein the Philippines was to receive $19.7 million to rebuild, train and equip its 37,000 troops with assistance from U.S. navy, army and air force officers, all to be administered in the Philippines by the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG).6 Note that the term "joint" does not refer to both countries but to all branches of the U.S. forces.7 That same month, Roxas also

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4Information for this paragraph is from Constantino pp.189-225; Brands pp. 227-247; and Karnow pp.323-355.

5Constantino, ibid.

6Fact-Finding Committee, op. cit., p. 29.


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won for the Philippines a $25 million emergency loan from the U.S. congress. Though he had requested a long-term loan of $225 million, the emergency loan nevertheless seemed a reward for Filipino compliance on the bases. The loan was also an attempt, albeit a far weaker one than Roxas intended, to complement hard-line/military with soft-line/economic responses to the surging unrest in the countryside. In the end, while the bases would prove a key source of national revenue for the Philippines, drawing U.S. military and economic aid as well as investments, employment, and their multipliers, the bases would also prove, as Eisenhower predicted, an on-going source of conflict between Filipinos and Americans over questions of sovereignty, security, and access.

Now the Huks added opposition to the bases to their increasingly popular campaign for agrarian reform and national sovereignty, as JUSMAG prepared for war. Though the U.S. had been supporting anti-communist efforts worldwide, Truman's proclamation formally declared U.S. intentions to continue such support despite Britain's abrupt announcement at the same time of their plans to cease financial and military aid abroad to fight communism. Now the Truman administration sought congressional approval of aid to replace British supplies. In the post-war fatigue prevailing in the U.S., however, military expenditures were politically untenable, even more so with the 1946 election to congress of an economy-minded Republican majority. In fact, the rush toward military demobilization reduced U.S. forces from 12 million at the end of the war to 3 million by July 1946, reaching just 1.6 million by July 1947. Meanwhile defense expenditures fell from $81.6 billion, comprising 85.7 percent of total government expenditures, in 1945, to $44.7 billion, or 72.4 percent of total expenditures, in

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*Lachica, pp.118-136.
*Combs, pp. 316-346.
1946, down to just $13.1 billion, or 35.5 percent of total expenditures, by 1947.\textsuperscript{11} Still, between 1946 and 1948, U.S. economic and military assistance to the Philippines totalled $329.3 million, including $72.6 million in military aid and $256.7 million in economic aid, primarily as a tacit form of "rent" for the bases, as shown in Appendix I.\textsuperscript{12} The so-called Truman Doctrine, however, required the U.S. to focus on core U.S. economic, political, strategic, and territorial interests, forcing U.S. analysts to devise new strategies for projecting American power given the apparently global nature of the Soviet challenge.

Under the direction of George C. Marshall, the newly-appointed Secretary of State, a Policy Planning Staff was organized with Kennan its first director. Having defined the Soviet problem, Kennan now set to work to find its solution, and this he proffered in his famous essay, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in the Summer 1947 edition of \textit{Foreign Affairs}, under the mysterious pseudonym of "Mr. X."\textsuperscript{13} Here Kennan introduced the term "containment" to post-war foreign policy and, as Kissinger would note years later, "came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history."\textsuperscript{14} Though hastily written and not intended as the official pronouncement of Cold War strategy that it became, Kennan's article outlined the core objectives of U.S. foreign policy -- to protect the security of the nation from the interference or threat of interference from foreign powers and to advance the welfare of Americans by promoting a world order in which the U.S. might contribute to the peaceful development of other nations while deriving maximum benefits from their experiences and abilities. Given limited capabilities, however, Kennan saw

\textsuperscript{11}Military budgets cited are from Gaddis, which are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

\textsuperscript{12}From Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 1961-1988, Special Report Prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Office of Statistics and Reports, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development. Note that the figures include Export-Import Bank and other official loans.

\textsuperscript{13}Gaddis.

\textsuperscript{14}Gaddis, p. 26 from Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}.
that priorities would have to be set. Thus, to achieve the core objectives of U.S. foreign policy, Kennan argued that the U.S. should not try to restructure the international system but should simply try to maintain an equilibrium or balance of power within it such that no one country or group of countries could emerge predominant. The corollary to this was that the U.S. would have to define its core interests and sources of power in order to allocate scarce resources efficiently.  

Kennan's eventual list emphasized defense of the four centers of industrial and military power -- the U.S., U.K., central Europe, and Japan -- with just the Soviet center in unfriendly hands. He also defined broader interests covering Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Scandinavia, western Europe, the Iberian peninsula, Morocco, western Africa down to the bulge, South America from the bulge north, the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East as far east as, and including, Iran, as well as Japan and, last but not least, the Philippines. Without any apparent irony, the U.S. aim of supporting "free peoples" in the name of American interests now encompassed a breathtaking sweep of the world's population.  

What remained as yet unresolved was the extent to which the U.S. would intervene in the domestic politics of other states in order to protect its own interests. While Kennan argued in 1948 that the U.S. should refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, he added that intervention might be justifiable given a sufficiently powerful national interest as well as the means to carry it out successfully. That same year, the U.S. State Department predicted that Mao's Red Army would defeat Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and U.S. anti-communism now bloomed both at home and abroad. With the arrogance so emblematic of the period, American foreign policy analysts sought an explanation for the "loss" of China within the U.S. To these analysts, it

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15 Kennan.  
16 Gaddis, p.30.  
17 Combs, p.338.
mattered not that Mao had rallied millions of Chinese peasants; instead, the "blame" lay with Alger Hiss, among other American diplomats with communist sympathies, who had supposedly infiltrated the U.S. government and had then aided Mao in his bid for power by undermining the relative strength of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. In July 1948, just as the State Department's analyses on China were coming out, the House Committee on Un-American Activities began a series of hearings in which a number of former communists gave testimony concerning the "espionage activities" of American communists prior to and during World War II. The hearings were part of a strategy by the Republicans to recover from their loss to Truman in the 1948 presidential elections as well as by Chinese Americans lobbying for U.S. assistance to protect their extensive economic and political interests in China from Mao.

In the witch-hunt that ensued, led by a young congressman named Richard Nixon and later picked up by Senator Joseph McCarthy, Alger Hiss would be found guilty of perjury. Countless other Americans in government, academia, journalism, the arts, etc., would subsequently be tried for communist activities, as the frontline of the Cold War now extended not just to the broad sweep of "free peoples" listed by Kennan but to the American public as well. Meanwhile, many China experts were purged from official U.S. circles, notably the State Department, and from key "think-tanks." This undermined U.S. understanding of China's role in the region, with reverberations to be felt for years to come in U.S. policy toward Asia, including Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc. For now, the "lessons of Munich" -- that any threat should be met quickly and forcefully without appeasement -- tightened its hold on American foreign policy. In 1949, two events would reinforce this, increasing the perceived threat of spreading communism as well as the call for intervention in the domestic politics of other

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18 The State Department urged that diplomatic channels with the communists be kept open. See Combs, p. 338.

19 See Koen for an excellent description of the China lobby's influence on U.S. foreign policy.
countries. The first was the September 1949 detection by a U.S. plane of traces of radioactivity from a Soviet atomic explosion, just three years after the end of World War II, not the fifteen to twenty years previously forecast. Though Kennan now urged diplomacy, Truman opted for continued hard-line strategies centering on the development of a hydrogen bomb. The second event of 1949 was the "fall" of China on October 1, as Mao established the People's Republic of China, forcing Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist army out to the island of Taiwan. Though this had been expected for over a year, it nevertheless intensified U.S. fears of spreading communism, while buttressing the arguments of U.S. interventionists, including the powerful China lobby.20

From the Huks to Korea: A U.S. Policy of Intervention Emerges

During this same period, the Huk rebellion grew in Central Luzon, as the government of President Manuel Roxas required ever increasing amounts of U.S. assistance to combat it. Having been ousted from their six elected congressional posts in April 1946, the Huks had returned to the countryside to plot their next course. Amid the "seething cauldron" that was Central Luzon after the congressional ouster, Roxas tried to placate the peasants by commissioning Huk spokesmen, including Taruc as well as Mateo del Castillo and Juan Feleo, to intercede for them. On August 24, 1946, however, while returning to Manila from a peace-keeping mission in the countryside, Feleo and other peasant leaders were taken by uniformed men. A few weeks later, Feleo's headless body was found floating in the Pampanga River.21 Now the Huks changed their name to the "Hukbong Mapešlayang Bayan" or "People's Liberation Army," relinquished all hopes of a political solution, and dug up their World War II arms. The Huk message gained popularity and, on March 6, 1948, Roxas finally outlawed the


Huks and the Philippine Communist Party (PKP). A week later, he pardoned all Japanese collaborators, as full-scale civil war broke out in Central Luzon. Roxas died of a heart attack soon after and was succeeded by Elpidio Quirino who responded so brutally to the Huks that Taruc later claimed: "We couldn't have had a better recruiter." Quirino also shifted the tax burden to the poor while siphoning U.S. aid and funds for war veterans. U.S. officials grew concerned that Congress would refuse to continue granting aid to such an administration. Amid nationalist insurgencies in Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaya, as well as civil war in China, the U.S. worried that Quirino might fuel not quell revolution.

Nevertheless, in 1949, Quirino won the nomination as the Liberal Party's presidential candidate while Japanese collaborator Jose Laurel won the opposition Nacionalista slot. The CIA, just recently formed in 1947, accurately described Laurel as "bitterly anti-U.S." and predicted that a Laurel victory would encourage nationalists and anti-Americans; but apparently the CIA did not intervene in the elections. Predicting widespread electoral fraud, the Huks, whose strength was now estimated at nearly 10,000 armed cadres with a much broader base of support, boycotted the elections, partly because they had been outlawed, partly to help publicize the corruption of both the Liberal and the Nacionalista candidates. In the end, the elections proved the most corrupt on both sides to date, with the vote in two provinces exceeding the number of voters and in many others the population. As one witness recounted later, "Even the birds and the bees voted." An official study later estimated that at least one-fifth of the

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22Karnow, 345. Kerkvliet cites one resident of San Ricardo in Nueva Ecija he recalled that "civilian guards and the constabulary arrested anyone they wanted, burned houses, took food, and raped. These men," he continued, "were absolutely the worst." From Kerkvliet, p.159.

23Brands, p. 234.

24Brands, p. 240.

25Karnow, p. 344.
ballots cast had been fraudulent, largely in favor of Quirino. Still Quirino won by just a narrow margin, and U.S. Asian experts now debated policy toward him. While some, notably Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urged a withdrawal of U.S. aid, others, including Philippine desk officer John Melby, urged the continuation of U.S. aid in order to give Quirino "breathing space." Melby won. Quirino received U.S. aid and now knew, a State Department study concluded, that the U.S. would support him "no matter what he does." By 1950, however, the Philippine government had run through over a billion dollars in U.S. aid granted in the first four years of independence; yet the economy was as weak as it had been at the end of the war.

In fact, Quirino and his cronies had enriched themselves with the aid; meanwhile half of Philippine dollar earnings came from the U.S. treasury, while the other half was from exports, primarily copra, which was grossly inflated and likely to fall. The U.S. began to distance itself from Quirino while searching for a moderate alternative to his increasingly corrupt and ineffectual regime. Melby urged tighter controls of U.S. aid to prevent "economic chaos," while Acheson, who had recently lost political capital for pledging support for Hiss, stated publicly in early 1950 that "much of the (aid to the Philippines) has not been used as wisely as we wish it had." This argument was later substantiated by Daniel Bell, a private banker and former undersecretary of the treasury whom Truman sent to study the Philippine situation. Bell reported that businessmen and landed elites had grown richer since the war, while "the standard of living of most people is lower than before the war." Acheson now argued that Quirino

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26Brands, p. 235.

27Brands, pp. 234-235.

28Brands, 236.

29Karnow, p. 345. See also Appendix I for U.S. aid figures, and Brands, chapter 12, for an excellent description of the U.S. role in post-war Philippine economic and political development.

30Karnow, p. 345.
was not part of the solution to the Huk crisis but was, rather, a core part of the problem. The CIA broadened the attack to include "an irresponsible ruling class which exercises economic and political power almost exclusively in its own interests," somehow overlooking the role the U.S. had long played in cultivating this very group. An NSC report further cited the Chinese minority as a possible source of communist agitation. While hard-liners saw in the recent China debacle American failure to provide adequate support to Chiang Kai-shek and now urged greater support for Quirino, arguing as well that military intervention might be needed to prevent a communist takeover, soft-liners such as Acheson argued that America's blind support for Chiang's Nationalists had spurred communism. They urged moderation to prevent a similar outcome in the Philippines. That same year, debates also raged on broader issues of U.S. foreign policy and strategic planning. In early 1950, State and Defense Department officials led by Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff, drafted NSC-68, which urged containment not only in the four key industrial centers cited by Kennan but also along the entire perimeter, including the Philippines. Amid debates on the feasibility of this, particularly the estimated defense budget of between $30 billion and $50 billion, North Korea, probably with Soviet support, crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea in June of 1950. U.S. strategists felt the move threatened U.S. interests as well as the perception of U.S. power, and that it substantiated the views of NSC-68, which

31Brands, p. 236.

32NSC 84/2, p.5.

Non-Classified Policy Paper from the National Security Council to President Truman, November 9, 1950, from the National Security Archive collection. The report asserts that U.S. policy should stress reforms and the elimination of government corruption but urges the strengthening of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to defend U.S. military facilities from internal security threats posed by the Chinese minority and the Huks.

34Brands, p. 241.
was now approved. MacArthur had long argued that Asia, not Europe, would prove the
decisive battleground in the Cold War, and had wanted troops stationed at bases in the
Philippines and Japan in order to project American power from the periphery into the Asian
mainland. Now, the Korean war revived these arguments, presenting as well the first
serious possibility since World War II of an external threat to the Philippines and U.S. interests
there. Though Truman initially sent only supplies and air cover to South Korea, he soon committed
American troops to fend off the 150,000-strong North Korean forces. Soon Clark Air Base
came critical to the effort, home to an F-51 squadron as well as a logistics center for military
supplies and a stop-over point for U.N. troops headed to Korea, as the number of U.S. personnel
assigned to Clark rose from 5,445 in 1949 to 15,830 by 1953.

The Korean War quickly escalated when MacArthur engineered an amphibious invasion behind North Korean lines. With the North Koreans subsequently in retreat, Truman empowered MacArthur to conduct operations north of the 38th parallel to try to destroy North Korean forces and reunify Korea. This posed the threat of an expanded war with China and/or the Soviet Union, North Korea's allies; but MacArthur insisted this would not happen. The Chinese did enter the war in November 1950, however, whereupon MacArthur decided that the 200,000 Chinese troops were in Korea merely to protect a cordon sanitaire around their border. MacArthur ignored orders to send only Korean not American troops north to the Yalu River and did not stop even after his troops made contact with the Chinese. Splitting his attacking forces thinly through the North Korean mainland, MacArthur was easily repelled when the Chinese army began its offensive. U.S. troops reeled backwards, barely managing to stabilize a defensive line close to the 38th parallel. When MacArthur, a Republican, publicly

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36 Gaddis, p. 91.

37 Berry, p. 78.
criticized Truman's foreign policy, raging that the war should be extended beyond the Yalu into China with the aid of Chiang's troops, Truman fired the general in early 1951, thereby intensifying domestic tensions with Republicans on foreign policy. Truman then opened negotiations which would drag on, as would the fighting, for two more years before a tenuous truce ended the conflict. The decision to go north likely added three years to the war, costing as well 30,000 American lives and the South Koreans many more. U.S. defense expenditures also rose from less than $15 billion before Korea to $44 billion in 1952 and $50 billion in 1953.38 Driven by fear of U.S. Republicans perhaps equally as of Asian nationalists, Truman had now launched NSC-68.39

Meanwhile, U.S. commitments to the French in Indochina, formerly restrained, grew during the war, as did American aid to Chiang's forces in Taiwan. For the Philippines, Quirino learned from his Filipino aides in D.C. of American fears and growing concern regarding the Huk threat to U.S. political, economic, and military interests.40 Capitalizing on these concerns, Quirino cited a "pattern of communist aggression" not his own mismanagement as the source of Huk anger, and urged increased American support for the counter-insurgency campaign.41 However, given the level of American troop commitment in Korea together with the sensitivity of Philippine officials to American intervention, U.S. analysts argued that aid would have to be indirect, emphasizing the development of the Philippine military as well as economic and political stabilization strategies.42 In September 1950, General Leland Hobbes, chief of JUSMAG,

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38The description of the U.S. role in the Korean War is from Combs, pp. 340-345. Another classic account of the war is by Whiting. See also Rees, for a discussion of U.S. policy of the period, and Schlesinger, for the conflict between MacArthur and Truman.

39Brands, p. 241.

40Information on Quirino is from Karnow, pp. 344-345. Information on the U.S. position regarding the Huk is from NSC 84/2.

41Brands, p. 241.

42NSC 84/2.
urged Quirino to adopt a tougher line against the Huks and other leftist groups. By November, Truman approved an NSC paper defining U.S. policy on the Philippines, arguing that defeat of the Huks should be a top priority. As the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress poised to outlaw the American Communist Party while overriding Truman's veto of the ominous McCarran Internal Security Act, Quirino took his cue from D.C. and escalated the war against the Huks. To help him, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, a former advertising executive, was sent to the Philippines. Based at the super-secret Office of Policy Coordination, known for its "dirty tricks" and later absorbed into the CIA, Lansdale was later caricatured in Graham Greene's The Quiet American as Alden Pyle. "I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused," explained a Greene character of Pyle.

**The Huk Challenge and the Rise of the Transnational Hard-Line Alliance**

Lansdale's first task was to find an alternative to Quirino, and he found his man in Ramon Magsaysay. A member of a U.S.-allied guerrilla unit during World War II, Magsaysay had gained the respect of several American officers, such that the U.S. Army named him provincial military governor after the war. Magsaysay then parlayed this into a political career, as he used his access to U.S. relief supplies to win a seat in the national legislature in 1946 elections. Lansdale and Magsaysay met in early 1950, prior to the outbreak of war in Korea, when Magsaysay, as a member of the Philippine legislature, came to the U.S. seeking benefits for war veterans. Lansdale and his boss Frank Wisner discussed the Huk

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43 NSC 84/2.
44 Combs, p. 342.
45 Greene.
46 Karnow, pp. 347-348.

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insurgency with Magsaysay and both came away impressed. Magsaysay subsequently agreed to act as America's surrogate in exchange for U.S. support for his political career. Wisner then sent Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant to Quirino with an offer to increase U.S. military assistance should Magsaysay be appointed Defense Secretary. Despite the threat posed by Magsaysay to his own political career, Quirino accepted and Magsaysay became the new Secretary of National Defense in late 1950.47 Thus, U.S. devised post-colonial strategies for reshaping the domestic political landscape in the Philippines in response to the Huk challenge.

Soon after, Lansdale established an office in Magsaysay's new headquarters and set to work on two fronts to battle the Huks, supplementing hard-line strategies with soft-line ones, using U.S. assistance to do so. During the period from fiscal years 1949 to 1952, U.S. aid to the Philippines totalled $664.4 million, including $584.2 million in economic aid and $80.2 million in military aid, as shown in Appendix I.48 On the soft-line front, Lansdale sought to undercut Huk promises of land reform by helping Magsaysay establish credit banks, clinics, and agrarian courts, though these were soon dominated by local landed elites. Lansdale also sought to isolate the Huks from their bases of support, offering land on public tracts on the southernmost island of Mindanao, far from Central Luzon. To ensure that the homesteaders would not spread the rebellion to Mindanao, loyal ex-soldiers and civilians were to be stationed in the resettlement communities. The program was an economic disappointment, but a political success. Six years later, the land grants had benefitted fewer than a thousand families, about 5,000 people, only a fourth of these Huks, the majority Magsaysay's allies.49 Though the Huks tried to relay these facts to the peasants, the peasants nevertheless came to think of Magsaysay as their patron, a view still

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47The above information is from Karnow, pp. 346-348.

48See Appendix I.

prevalent in the countryside of Luzon some thirty years later. Magsaysay also used the military for infrastructural projects, education, medical care, and legal services in rural areas, and in the process created a political as well as a military role for the armed forces.

On the hard-line front, Magsaysay worked to refurbish the Philippine military, transferring the constabulary, a particularly ineffectual and corrupt organization, from the Department of the Interior to the Department of National Defense, under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, while reducing it from 17,000 in 1950 to 7,100 by the end of 1952. He then purged the army of its most corrupt officers while nearly doubling its size to 56,000 by 1952. Added to traditional military campaigns, Lansdale used skills he had developed in his earlier career in advertising for psychological warfare against the Huks, involving "talking" graves, deaths staged to resemble the work of Filipino folk creatures such as the vampire-like "asuang," and other weird but effective techniques for sapping Huk morale. While such tactics contributed to Huk losses, the Huks also erred in concentrating all of their forces in Central Luzon which made retreat and reorganization difficult. They erred further in concentrating their urban forces, the central nervous system of the campaign, in a Manila complex. In October 1950, military forces swept through the poorly-defended Huk base in Manila, comprised of 22 houses and apartments, and captured reams of documents, weapons, money, as well as 105 suspected Huks including six Huk leaders. The raid was a devastating blow to the Huks, further shattering morale

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80 Personal field research, 1984-1986.
81 Fact-Finding Report.
82 U.S. Department of the Army, No. 7557, pp. 1-2. Regarding the corruption, the report cites the use of PC forces to protect mines, property and other private economic interests of politically influential people with populated areas falling "easy prey to raiding Huks." It also cites the use of PC forces as a "political tool, especially in the intimidation of voters." Moreover, the report notes that "in many areas of the Philippines, the population lived more in fear of the Constabulary than of the Huks."
83 Karnow, p. 350.

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and encouraging surrender. 54

Lansdale did not, moreover, restrict his activities to the Huk insurgency, but intervened in electoral politics as well, devising post-colonial strategies for securing U.S. interests, notably the bases, in the Philippines. To shore up Magsaysay's chances in upcoming 1953 presidential elections, Lansdale worked with his CIA associate Gabriel Kaplan, who arrived in Manila in 1951 under the aegis of the Committee for Free Asia, later renamed the Asia Foundation. Kaplan soon helped establish a citizen's group, The National Committee for Free Elections (NAMFREL), to monitor 1951 legislative elections. On election day, NAMFREL volunteers, actually Filipinos on the CIA payroll,55 were mobilized to monitor vote-counting, as Magsaysay, with directives from Lansdale, supported NAMFREL by preventing the military from stealing ballot boxes and by stationing troops to prevent violence. When Quirino subsequently realized that the votes were not favorable, he ordered ballot boxes stuffed and loaded onto army planes for delivery to polling stations; but Magsaysay countermanded the order, as planes that had already taken off agreed to turn back while the others remained grounded. A record four million voters ignored Huk calls for a boycott, participating in the relatively honest balloting.56 A Huk analysis following the elections lamented the weakness of their boycott campaign, as Huk strength dropped further. Like their revolutionary successors in 1986, the Huks underestimated the Filipino faith in democratic processes, a legacy of the American colonial era. In the end, Magsaysay's efforts paid off. Truman lauded his achievement and Lansdale continued to cultivate him as the next Philippine president.57

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54Constantino, Continuing Past, pp. 236-237 and from Lansdale, pp. 61-63.

55Karnow, p. 351.

56Karnow, p. 351.

57Constantino, Continuing Past, pp.248-250.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, which reinforced the role of the Philippine military for internal security only, with U.S. forces bearing responsibility for external security. It also bound the two nations to defend each other in the event of an attack by a third party, as the U.S. and Philippine military became even more intertwined. In 1951, Huk losses included 2,000 killed and 2,500 captured. By 1952, many of the remaining Huks surrendered, and Magsaysay capitalized on this by having photos taken of himself with surrendering Huks handing him their weapons. Now Lansdale brought Magsaysay to the U.S. and arranged for him to meet with Truman, to be awarded a U.S. army medal as well as an honorary doctorate from Fordham University, all part of a campaign to promote Magsaysay as the next leader of the Philippines by building U.S. support. Lansdale also introduced Magsaysay to the U.S. press, which received him favorably. *Time*, for instance, dubbed Magsaysay the "Eisenhower of the Pacific" for his military prowess in combating the Huks while *Life* devoted eight pages with seven photographs to the "Honest Man With Guts."

Also in 1952, American policy in Asia would prove a central question in the U.S. presidential campaign. With U.S. troops mired in Korea amid growing hysteria surrounding communism, the "fall" of China, and the related hearings in the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Republican contender Eisenhower blamed the European-centered approach of Truman and Acheson for these crises and called for a new, more Asian outlook on foreign policy. Having served under MacArthur in the Philippines during World War II, Eisenhower understood Asian politics as well as the specific role of the Philippines in serving U.S. interests in the region. Campaigning on the promise to "go to Korea" and undo the mistakes of the Democrats, implying that he would end the increasingly

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**McLane**, pp. 417-432.

**Constantino**, pp. 256-257.
unpopular war, Eisenhower also pledged greater vigilance and competence in guarding U.S. interests in Asia. Nixon, who had gained notoriety for his anti-communist crusade in the Hiss case, was named to the Vice Presidential slot on Eisenhower's ticket, a further indication of the direction the Republicans intended to take U.S. foreign policy. Eisenhower also brought in John Foster Dulles, the party's leading expert on international affairs, to write his foreign policy platform. While a State Department advisor during the Truman administration, Dulles had urged greater attention to Asia, citing in 1950 a "comprehensive program (on the part of Moscow and Beijing) to eliminate all western influence" from Asia, including the Philippines. He had further cited the Huks as a key part of the program to "further the objectives of world communism." 61

American intelligence analysts concurred, though the peasant-based Huks, in fact, sought reform more than revolution and received virtually no assistance after World War II from the Soviet Union, China, or the CPUSA, as Taruc and other Huk leaders repeatedly complained. 62 Some American communists, notably William J. Pomeroy, did join the Huks, and, at a 1951 meeting of the CPUSA, speakers cited the "heroic liberation struggle of the Philippine people" but acknowledged far too little American support. 63 Even Pomeroy was captured in 1952 and was eventually deported home after ten years in prison. 64

Eisenhower's "New Look" and the "Magsaysay Mambo"

Eisenhower won the elections and, in 1953, his "new look" took hold of American foreign policy, gaining a quick boost in July 1953 when the Korean War

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61 Karnow, p. 336.
62 McLane, pp. 292-303.
63 McLane
64 Karnow, p. 351.
finally ended. Eisenhower had pledged in his campaign to cut defense spending. He had also studied Clausewitz, and felt that not only must the U.S. more clearly define its ends but that the means of Cold War strategy must also be commensurate with those ends, an issue Truman had not adequately addressed. Thus he saw a strong domestic economy as a requisite to strategic strength. Though Keynesian economic advisors argued that military expenditures and increased deficits could simultaneously boost the economy, Eisenhower sought to uphold his campaign promises. To guard against Third World communism, Eisenhower opted for a build-up of local forces of resistance. This helped him in his crusade to cut defense spending, while reflecting as well his conviction that "no Western power can go to Asia militarily, except as one of a concert of powers...includ(ing) local Asiatic peoples." To do otherwise, he reasoned, would raise charges of imperialism or, at the very least, "objectionable paternalism."65

The administration now emphasized military and economic aid to reliably anti-communist governments in South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines as well as South Vietnam after the 1954 installment of Ngo Dinh Diem.66 The administration's Asian policy faltered, however, when Dulles, now Secretary of State, caved in to pressures from McCarthyites and purged the State Department of many loyal officers including the "Old China Hands."67

Further, Eisenhower's administration allowed the CIA more latitude for covert activities than any administration before or since.68 To protect oil and other interests in the Middle East, for instance, the CIA helped replace Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1953. Ironically, on the

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65Gaddis, p. 179.

66Ibid.


68Brands, p. 250. Some examples of CIA intervention include plans to assassinate Cuba's Castro, the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, and to launch an armed revolt against Sukarno in 1958.
same day that Mossadegh left office, Magsaysay resigned as Defense Secretary and announced his candidacy as president. Magsaysay was the U.S. choice for the Philippine presidency and the CIA actively intervened on his behalf in elections held that year. CIA's Allen Dulles, John Foster's brother-in-law, gave Lansdale $1 million to back Magsaysay with additional funds provided by American corporations in the Philippines, including the Coca Cola franchise based there, despite Philippine laws prohibiting such intervention.\(^6^9\) CIA agents then wrote speeches for Magsaysay, advised him on campaign strategies, and planted articles and editorials in the Philippine and U.S. press to promote Magsaysay and smear Quirino. In addition, the CIA funded volunteers to revive NAMFREL, the implication being that Quirino was too corrupt to be trusted in the ballot-counting. Finally, the CIA helped set up the National Press Club in Manila and then encouraged the U.S. press to cover the elections in order to stimulate American interest and to ensure careful news coverage. In case Magsaysay were to lose, the CIA also smuggled guns into the Philippines and made contingency plans for a coup. As a further warning of U.S. intentions, a group of American warships arrived off Manila just before the elections, while American military advisors supervised the voting.

With his jazzy theme song, the "Magsaysay Mambo," and the backing of the U.S., Magsaysay buried Quirino in a two-to-one victory in the heaviest voting since independence.\(^7^0\) The magnitude of the win attests to Magsaysay's broad popularity more than just the machinations of the CIA; but it nevertheless raised questions in the Philippines and other parts of Asia about the U.S. role,\(^7^1\) as Lansdale earned the new sobriquet "Landslide."\(^7^2\) Magsaysay quickly earned

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\(^{6^9}\)Karnow, p. 352. See Brands p. 253 regarding Philippine laws, Lansdale's role, as well as Philippine sugar interests in backing Magsaysay.

\(^{7^0}\)CIA, OCI No. 1026, 20 November 1953.

\(^{7^1}\)Ibid.

\(^{7^2}\)Brands, p. 254.
political capital, however, when, in 1954, Luis Taruc surrendered. Amid growing contention within the Huk leadership and facing charges for his "excessive humanism," Taruc sent a secret message to Magsaysay's aide Manuel Manahan suggesting a meeting. With Magsaysay's approval, Manahan was preparing to meet with the Huk leader, when a Manila Times reporter named Benigno Aquino, Jr., then just twenty-one, sniffed out the story and won an invitation from Manahan to attend the meeting in exchange for remaining silent on the story through the talks. In January, Manahan and Aquino eluded an army cordon and met with Taruc in a small village north of Manila. Taruc requested a complete pardon, which Magsaysay subsequently refused, calling instead for Taruc's arrest. Aquino then pursued the talks alone and, as Taruc faced both Magsaysay's forces and the communists, who now planned to assassinate him, Taruc finally ceded to Magsaysay's terms. In May, he summoned Aquino and surrendered. Until then, Magsaysay had retained the defense portfolio, further merging political with military programs, including the use of the military in his socio-economic programs. Though Huk opposition sputtered in the countryside for years afterwards, it effectively ended with Taruc's surrender. Taruc was to spend the next fourteen and a half years in jail; but, for Aquino, who broke the story, a meteoric political career was launched.

For the U.S., half a billion dollars in economic and military aid had been spent on the Huk conflict between 1951 and 1955. The Philippines used much of what was left after siphoning by Quirino and others to build an arsenal of modern weapons and aircraft, all expressly targeted under the 1951 Mutual Defense

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73Constantino (1978), and a personal interview with Manahan, October 1983.

74The Aquino family plantation in Tarlac had long been a target of Huk opposition. In fact, Taruc was once imprisoned by Benigno Aquino, Sr. for organizing peasants on his plantation. From Komisar, pp. 29-20.

75From Karnow, p. 354, and from a personal interview with Manahan, October 1983.

76Fact Finding Report, p. 32.
Treaty at internal "threats" to security, primarily peasants who remained yoked to a grossly unequal land tenure system inherited from Spain. Having stabilized the Philippine countryside and ensured the sanctity of the status quo, the U.S. claimed victory and used the campaign against the Huks as a prototype for counter-insurgency programs elsewhere in its sphere of containment. The CIA also honed its transnational intervention strategies, applying skills developed in the Philippines to engineer in 1954 the ouster of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who had won 60 percent of the vote in 1950 elections as well as the support of the peasantry and the wrath of American investors for his sympathies with the workers' strikes plaguing the United Fruit Company. Personal interests, in addition to hard-line ideology, were involved as well, since John Foster Dulles and his brother-in-law Allen Dulles, head of State and CIA respectively, had been members of United Fruit's law firm and now worked with General Carlos Castillo Armas of Honduras to oust Arbenz. Meanwhile, the CIA sent Lansdale to Saigon in the hopes that the Magsaysay magic might be replicated with the unlikely Ngo Dinh Diem, as the U.S. role in Indochina rose following the 1954 Geneva Conference, described below.

America's Growing in Asia and the Impact on the Philippines

After 1950, responsibility for the defense of Indochina against communism turned increasingly to the U.S., which funded more and more of France's ultimately vain effort to stem the insurgency. In 1953, as the war in Korea wound to an end, Ho Chi Minh's forces overran France's in Dienbienphu, raising the specter of a new Asian conflict involving nationalist revolutionaries with communist ties. Initially, Eisenhower sought a solution involving the support of France, Great Britain, and the U.S. Congress; but the French refused to share

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77Karnew, p. 350.

control, Great Britain declined to participate, and the U.S. congress demurred. Finally, at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Russia and China pressed North Vietnam to accept a truce, involving division of the country into a northern communist state and a southern non-communist one. The division was to last only until 1956, when elections for a unified nation were to be held. Eisenhower and Dulles now set out to replace French with U.S. influence, while building a viable non-communist regime for the 1956 elections. Much work was needed; even Eisenhower admitted that the communists would win 80 percent of the vote were elections to be held in 1954. The U.S. supported Emperor Bao Dai's choice of Ngo Dinh Diem as the prime minister of the newly-created South Vietnam and, with Lansdale's help, funneled aid directly to him rather than through French channels.

To further secure the region, and to meet growing cries from the Philippines and others for a NATO-like security pact for Southeast Asia, the U.S. met with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines to form the Manila pact, later known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Although a condition of the Geneva agreement had prohibited South Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos from participating in an alliance, a SEATO protocol extended protection to Indochina. Despite its name, however, SEATO was not a multi-lateral defense treaty like NATO; it simply pledged resistance to communism with no automatic provisions for collective action nor for intervention in regional or other disputes.\(^7^9\) Moreover, it included no major power in the region like India or Indonesia. In fact, it turned out to be a rather blunt instrument, as Indochina continued to simmer.

Having established a toe-hold in Pacific security planning through SEATO, however, Magsaysay simultaneously renegotiated the Bell Trade Act, scheduled to expire in 1954. In August, Magsaysay sent a Philippine Economic Mission to the U.S. to press for revisions. Former Japanese collaborator, outspoken anti-

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\(^7^9\)Brands, pp. 257-259 and Combs pp. 366-369.
American and now Senator, Jose Laurel was named to head the mission. Once again, Laurel proved his flexibility. Working D.C. as though he had never uttered an anti-American word, Laurel wooed officials with gifts from the Philippines and hosted dinners and receptions in their honor. In a letter to Magsaysay, he explained his strategy; competing American factions, notably eastern industrialists versus the western farm bloc and southern cotton and oil interests, should be played against each other, as they had in the battle for the Jones Act and later the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Meanwhile, the Philippines should "cater to the interests which might favor our cause." Further, Laurel sought to limit congressional entanglements as much as possible to avoid lobbying from American businesses. With his American counterpart, James Langley, Laurel signed the Laurel-Langley Agreement in December 1954, winning for Philippine producers a deceleration in the rate at which Philippine exports to the United States would face American tariffs and an acceleration in the rate at which American exports to the Philippines would face Philippine restrictions. Whereas the Bell Trade Act had limited parity rights mainly to natural resources, however, Laurel-Langley opened the entire economy to U.S. corporations. The agreement passed quickly in the Philippines and then, though more slowly, in the American congress, and was signed in D.C. on September 6, 1955.

Though it passed quickly, the agreement received harsh criticism from nationalist corners of the Philippines, including one of its harshest critics -- Philippine nationalist Senator Claro Recto. Recto, though a Nacionalista like Magsaysay, had long criticized the Philippine president for his ties to Washington. He now openly broke with Magsaysay over the Laurel-Langley Act's opening to U.S. corporations, announcing in 1955 that he would not support Magsaysay's 1957 bid for the presidency. As the Philippine economy declined, following a

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Brands, p. 264.

boom in U.S. demand for Philippine products during the Korean War which collapsed after the 1953 armistice. Recto capitalized on this, building a nationalist platform which addressed American aid, land tenure, the U.S. bases, foreign investment, Vietnam, as well as Laurel-Langley. Amid the Quemoy-Matsu crisis triggered in 1955, when Communist Chinese bombed Chiang's island outposts off Taiwan, as the Philippine bases again proved crucial to the U.S., American officials grew concerned about Recto's campaign. Resorting once again to dirty tricks, the CIA launched a smear campaign, labeling Recto a Chinese communist, even going so far as to distribute pin-pricked condoms marked "Courtesy of Recto - the People's Friend." Through it all, Magsaysay remained a loyal champion of U.S. policies in the region, allowing Lansdale to recruit Filipinos for a CIA front in Vietnam called the Freedom Company, later renamed the Eastern Construction Company. The Filipinos, many with experience in the war against the Huks, helped train South Vietnam's police, draft the new constitution there, and usher anti-communist refugees, mainly landed elites and French colonists, from North to South Vietnam after the partition.

Nevertheless, Vietnam continued to slip. In 1955 elections in South Vietnam, Diem managed to garner 98 percent of the vote, making even "Landslide's" work with Magsaysay seem credible. Then, with support from Eisenhower, Diem blocked the Vietnam-wide elections and made clear his plans to further block reunification. Open rebellion broke out in the South Vietnamese countryside in 1957, where Vietminh villagers who had stayed behind for just such a contingency dug up the armaments they had buried after the 1954 Geneva accords. As in the Philippines, grossly unequal land tenure arrangements made

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83Brands, p. 267.
84Combs, p. 369.
85Smith, James Burkhoider, pp. 279-80.
the peasantry ripe for rebellion. Despite Diem's efforts at land reform, he actually undid the redistribution that had been carried out in areas formerly controlled by the Vietminh, leaving two percent of the population with 45 percent of the land, while 72 percent of the population had to survive on just 15 percent of the land. Moreover, his response to the uprising was increased repression, routing villagers from their homes and the graves of their ancestors to concentrate them in "agrovilles" where they could be more closely watched. The result was a rise, not a fall, in peasant anger and alienation, presaging later uprisings. As Cold War tensions flared in Vietnam, the U.S. again focused attention on elections in the Philippines, where Magsaysay had remained President until his recent death in a plane crash in March 1957, when he was succeeded by his Vice President Carlos Garcia. Speculations persist that Magsaysay's death may have been the result of foul play linked to the presidential elections scheduled for the fall of that year.

Garcia won the nomination of the Nacionalistas and defeated Liberal candidate Jose Yulo by 600,000 of the roughly five million cast; but Liberal vice presidential candidate Diosdado Macapagal, running in a separate race, defeated Nacionalista Laurel by 400,000 votes. Garcia quickly set up lucrative rackets in import licensing and the distribution of Japanese reparations, misruling to such an extent that the U.S. became concerned about a communist revival. This was all the more problematic since U.S. officials worried that the 1957 uprising in Vietnam presaged a communist sweep through Southeast Asia, sounding alarms at the Pentagon about U.S. security in the region, with an increased value now placed on the bases in the Philippines. By 1958, an analysis produced by the office of the American chief of naval operations for the joint chiefs of staff summarized the Pentagon's view that the Philippine bases had now become "an essential part of a worldwide base system designed to deter communism. Any

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87 Combs, p. 390.
88 Combs, p. 391.
89 Brands, p. 267.
reduction in this base system creates a point of weakness which invites communist aggression." Garcia tried to ingratiate himself with the U.S. by underscoring his anti-communist credentials, literally embracing Diem when the latter visited Manila in 1958. Garcia also initiated legislation, which the Philippine congress approved, making membership in the PKP illegal, going further than any of his predecessors to constrict the political space for communists. Garcia then used the threat of a Huk resurgence as a pretext for increased U.S. aid. With inside information channeled from Macapagal through the CIA, the U.S. knew that Garcia's corruption exceeded even Quirino's and sought an alternative. "Look for another Magsaysay," CIA agent Joseph Burkholder Smith was told.

The perceived threat of a communist takeover from internal not external sources in the Philippines was intensified a year later when a bearded rebel named Fidel Castro actually succeeded in his indigenously-based bid for control of Cuba in 1959. That communism could touch so close to U.S. shores sounded new alarms in D.C., as Cuban and Philippine domestic politics were again held hostage to the broader geopolitics of the era as they had been in their simultaneous uprisings against Spain in 1898. While the Soviets aligned with Castro, the U.S. considered various strategies, including a coup or an assassination, to oust Castro. Meanwhile in the Philippines, the U.S. prepared for 1959 legislative elections. Seeking "another Magsaysay," Smith assembled a "Grand Alliance" of six candidates, funneling $200,000 towards their campaigns. In the increasingly costly Philippine campaigns, such backing was quite low, though the political backing of the U.S. carried weight with voters. In the end, however, the "Grand Alliance"

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**Brands, p. 270. From CNO to JCS, 11/4/58 (JCS 1519/120) JCS Records.**

**Brands, p. 268.**

**Smith, James Burkholder.**

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candidates lost dramatically and a relative newcomer from the House who had declined offers to join the Grand Alliance finished an impressive first in a landslide victory. The newcomer's name was Ferdinand Marcos.

Two years later, in 1961 presidential elections, Marcos declined to run and the U.S. provided financial and strategic support to Macapagal in his race against Garcia. Philippine money, however, far exceeded that provided by the U.S., with candidates spending an amount equal to 13 percent of the national government's budget. Macapagal won but quickly lost U.S. backing when he deported an American businessman, Harry Stonehill, who had amassed an estimated $50 million from his Philippine enterprises. Macapagal also lost Filipino backing when his attempts at land reform alienated first the landed elites and then, when the attempts failed, the peasantry. Worse, he alienated the country's powerful Chinese community when he expelled many, even naturalized citizens, on spurious nationalist charges. He further sealed his fate when he denounced the political role of the military and terminated its civic action programs, as the armed forces returned to the barracks and the less rewarding regularity of military life. Prices and unemployment also rose during Macapagal's administration, and he was gradually abandoned by members of his own party, including Marcos who defected to the Nacionalistas.

U.S. Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Continuing Rise of the Hard-Liners

Meanwhile, the torch had been passed to a new president in the U.S. when

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*Marcos had a held a seat in the lower chamber as a representative of Ilocos Norte since 1949, having won in one of the dirtiest elections to date. Subsequently, as chairman of the committee supervising import controls, he took bribes for licenses from the tobacco kings of his region and from American entrepreneur Harry Stonehill, who had tobacco, real estate and other interests in the Philippines. From Karnow, p. 370.

*Brands, p. 277.

John F. Kennedy won a narrow victory for the Democrats against Richard Nixon. Just months after taking office, in April 1961, the Kennedy administration launched a disastrous invasion at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Hoping to oust Castro as they had Mossadegh and Arbenz years earlier, the CIA invaded the island but was quickly surrounded by Castro's forces. Kennedy took responsibility for the debacle but lost faith in his advisors and thereafter short-circuited official channels of foreign policy decision-making, arrogating more power to the presidency in the process. A year later, Kennedy would rely on his brother, father, and closest aides to finesse the brinkmanship with the Soviets which he felt the Berlin wall, and then the Cuban missile crises required.

Moreover, National Security Action Memorandum 182 of 24 concluded that subversive insurgency, with techniques learned from China, Cuba, and Algeria, had become the major communist threat in Third World countries, not overt Soviet aggression. To combat such a threat, similarly transnational strategies were needed, the report argued, to build indigenous forces capable of internal security, while addressing as well the economic, social, and political sources of rebellion. Although the report notes the success of insurgency movements against superior forces, it is nevertheless optimistic about U.S. prospects for helping "less developed societies ... to remain free...from communism or other totalitarian domination or control." In the next paragraph, however, it cites U.S. political, strategic, and military interests as the driving force behind the new "overseas internal defense policy." On August 24, 1962, the memo was signed as policy by McGeorge Bundy who wrote that the President had approved the report's "national counterinsurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency, and has directed its promulgation to serve as basic policy guidance to diplomatic missions, consular personnel, and military commands abroad; to government departments and agencies at home; and to the government educational system." The Philippine campaign against the Huks, "combining the use of force with reform" while blending "civil and military" actions, was to serve
as the "model of countering insurgency, and winning back the allegiance of the
domestic popular base."96

Now Vietnam emerged as the laboratory for the new policy. By the time
Kennedy took office, Diem's regime was near collapse from internal rebellion,
notably among peasants and Buddhists. Nevertheless, Kennedy chose to continue
to support Diem, hoping to revitalize military forces there by switching from
conventional to new, anti-guerrilla tactics. He established the Green Berets
toward this end and sent 16,000 "advisors" to Vietnam. Kennedy also urged Diem
to reform his government, tried to bring aid directly to the villages, and then set
up "strategic hamlets" in an effort to isolate the insurgents from the population.
Instead, revolutionary opposition swelled. The Buddhists spearheaded this,
immolating themselves on Saigon's streets in order to expose the abuses of Diem's
Catholic officials. In a statement reminiscent of Marie Antoinette, Diem's wife
Madame Nhu decried the "barbecues," as her brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, head of the
secret police, launched massive raids on Buddhist temples throughout South
Vietnam, ransacking pagodas and arresting roughly 1,400 people. Diem ignored
American advice to reform and, worse, publicly denounced U.S. efforts to
intervene as ignorant and arrogant. By August 1963, a group of Diem's generals
broached the subject of a coup with Kennedy, who did nothing to discourage them
nor to inform Diem. The coup failed; but it precipitated a reexamination of U.S.
policy toward Vietnam. On November 1, 1963, with Kennedy's tacit approval, a
revived junta brutally murdered Diem and overthrew his regime. Three weeks
later, Kennedy himself would be assassinated as the torch now passed to Lyndon

96 Interdepartmental Committee report, August 1962, and White House memo signed by
McGeorge Bundy, August 24, 1962, from the National Security Archive collection. A year later, a
symposium would be held at Rand to discuss lessons of the Huk insurgency and its applications for
Vietnam. Top U.S.-trained Filipinos from the Philippine campaign shared their recollections with
senior U.S. strategists. Report from a symposium on the role of firepower in counterinsurgency and
unconventional warfare at the Rand Corporation, July 1963, also from the National Security Archive
collection.
Johnson.97

If Kennedy had entertained any thoughts of a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, it was too late. Johnson had seen what the "fall" of China had done to the Democrats in 1949, did not want to be the first American president to lose a war, and, moreover, did not want a foreign policy debacle to spoil his Great Society program. Though the military junta in Vietnam was riddled with internal conflict, proving incapable of governing the country, as U.S. military advisors warned of a 50-50 chance the war would be lost in six months unless the regime operated more efficiently, Johnson thought he could stave off a loss and bring the crisis to the negotiating table. Without declaring a change in policy, he began to escalate the U.S. effort, throwing American backing behind General Nguyen Khanh after Khanh took power in another coup on January 19, 1964. Soon after, Johnson increased the number of U.S. advisor's to 23,000 and appointed General William Westmoreland to command these. He also initiated covert raids on North Vietnam. Meanwhile, U.S. official policy now declared the outcome of the Vietnamese conflict "vital" to the prevention of revolutions elsewhere, with U.S. military facilities in the region crucial to this new policy.98 When, in August 1964, the U.S. destroyer Maddox was apparently attacked in Tonkin Gulf waters off land recently vacated by South Vietnamese forces, Johnson ordered retaliatory attacks against North Vietnamese torpedo boats bases and then won congressional approval with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."99 In October, Johnson persuaded Macapagal to send sixty-eight medical/civic action teams to Vietnam and to try as well to procure Philippine

97Combs, pp. 390-393. See also Karrow's excellent history of Vietnam.

98In Confidential Airgram A-305 sent July 9, 1964 from the State Department to U.S. embassies worldwide, U.S. policy was defined as requiring a strong military capability in Asia and the western Pacific to deter communism. From the National Security Archive collection.

99Combs, p. 395.
congressional approval to send a 2,000-man engineer contingent there. Macapagal's efforts in congress failed, however, largely due to strident opposition led by Marcos, then Senate President.  

In the U.S. presidential campaign that year, Johnson defeated Goldwater in a landslide, and now saw the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as his mandate in Vietnam. Though some U.S. analysts argued that the Vietnamese revolt was targeted more at indigenous than global communist ends, with armaments coming more from captured U.S. weapons than from either China or the Soviet Union, a government White Paper nevertheless officially cited North Vietnamese aggression as the cause of war in the South. Still Johnson hoped to continue his campaign of limited warfare in an attempt at brinkmanship; but on February 6, 1965, an attack on U.S. barracks at Pleiku provided the provocation for a bombing program called Rolling Thunder. When this had no effect, Johnson extended the bombing northward, and authorized the use of napalm to defoliate the Vietnamese jungle. In March, he sent U.S. ground troops to guard the airfields needed for the bombing raids. A month later, he sent 40,000 more troops, and by July he sent an additional 100,000. Moreover, he now extended Westmorland's fiat from simply guarding U.S. enclaves to initiating "search and destroy" missions. Johnson refused to bomb North Vietnam but authorized B-52 saturation bombing of suspected enemy territory in South Vietnam. By mid-1965, U.S. policy in Vietnam had shifted dramatically, and without substantial consultation with congress.

The policy shift also entailed a massive build-up of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. Though actual figures of the build-up were not located, in July

100 Berry, p. 132.
101 Combs, pp. 395-396.
102 Several books on the bases, including Paez, Berry, Bonner, etc., cite the build-up but without figures. Defense budget analysts interviewed for this project note that overseas base build-up figures are often buried in budgets which may specify total overseas expenditures without citing figures for specific bases. This is done for international and domestic political reasons, since U.S. bases, and so any build-up of these, is often an explosive issue within the U.S. and in the host country.
1965, the U.S. State department warned the embassy in Manila to expect "greatly increased use" of the U.S. bases in the Philippines, while war strategists won the right from Macapagal to fly U.S. planes over the Philippines.\footnote{Brands, pp. 281-282.} Meanwhile, Macapagal renegotiated the bases agreement, reducing the U.S. lease of the bases from 99 years to 25.\footnote{Brands, p. 207.} Amid growing opposition at home, combined with the spreading Civil Rights movement, Johnson's "Great Society" was fast unraveling, as the U.S. became fully entangled in an ultimately unwinnable Southeast Asian war.\footnote{Combs, pp. 395-396.}

"A Mandate for Greatness": 1965 - 1969

Also in 1965, Philippine presidential elections would further change the face of Southeast Asia, with long-term implications for the U.S. role there. Hedging its bets, the U.S. allegedly supported both the Liberal incumbent Macapagal and his Nacionalista opponent Ferdinand Marcos. In the campaign, serious questions about Marcos were raised, notably his conviction for the 1935 murder of his father's opponent in local elections and his subsequent release from having to serve any of the sentence by Laurel, then a judge. Moreover, Marcos proclaimed himself the leader of an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement during World War II called the "Ang Mga Maharlika" or "Noble Ones," and brought forth numerous U.S. medals to substantiate the story; yet his father had collaborated with the Japanese and his own personal debt to Laurel, among the most notorious of the collaborators, cast doubt on these claims. Nevertheless, Marcos garnered support from the Chinese whom Macapagal had alienated, as well as the large numbers of Ilocano Filipinos in California and Hawaii. Imelda Marcos also made
a tearful plea to sugar baron Fernando Lopez to run for Vice President with Marcos. Lopez agreed and Imelda then secured his pledge to finance the campaign from the Lopez family's vast private wealth. Though Macapagal, the son of poor peasants, tried to paint the race as one of "good" versus "evil," a theme which would be replayed two decades later, he was no match for Marcos' energy or Imelda's beauty. Marcos won by a margin of over 600,000 votes of the eight million cast, with only about five percent of these estimated as having been rigged.\textsuperscript{106} Together, the two candidates had spent an estimated $100 million on advertising, festivals, and bribes, the currency of the all-important Filipino tradition of personal debt or \textit{utang na loob}.

On December 30, 1965, in inauguration ceremonies held in Luneta Park, Marcos declared that he had been given a "mandate for greatness" and vowed to end "every form of waste or conspicuous consumption and extravagance."\textsuperscript{107} Behind the scenes, however, Marcos had already begun building a personal and political network in the U.S. and in the Philippines which would eventually help him amass a fortune estimated at close to $100 billion.\textsuperscript{108} Like Magsaysay, Marcos held the defense portfolio for the first thirteen months of his term, and used this to secure the military's loyalty. One of his first steps was to launch the largest reshuffling in the history of the Philippine military, replacing most of the top echelon with family or friends from Ilocos Norte, his home province.\textsuperscript{109} Fourteen of 25 flag officers were forced to retire, including the AFP Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, Commanding General of the Army, Chief of PC, all four Constabulary zone commanders, and about one-third of the provincial commanders. Many key appointments were then given to officers from Marcos'
Ilocos Norte, with BGen Ernesto Mata named Chief of Staff, BGen Segundo Velasco named Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Fabian Ver named commander of the Presidential Security Command.\textsuperscript{110}

Fortuitously for Marcos, President Johnson had also, just a few days earlier, on Christmas Day 1965, ordered a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam in an attempt to achieve a negotiated peace. Johnson had then dispatched foreign advisors to world capitals with the mission of gaining support for the U.S. strategy, as part of a "More Flags" crusade to convince the American public that Vietnam was not just an American war. Philippine participation was seen as crucial in this crusade, and Hubert Humphrey was sent to the Manila inauguration to persuade Marcos to join. Marcos quickly sensed that Vietnam had raised the value to the U.S. of its Philippine bases, and he exploited this as a bargaining chip. Several U.S. visits later, after extensive negotiations, Marcos agreed to send the 2,000-man engineer battalion he had so fiercely opposed as Senate President, in exchange for an invitation for a state visit to the United States. Johnson agreed. In August 1966, the first of the Filipinos were sent to Vietnam, and a month later, Marcos headed to the U.S. for what turned out to be a widely publicized, highly successful state visit involving much favorable press coverage and a well-received address to Congress. In the address, Marcos effusively proclaimed Philippine support for the U.S. role in Vietnam, extolled anti-communism in the region, and gave credibility to the "More Flags" crusade, thus proving his worth to Johnson.\textsuperscript{111}

During the visit, Marcos agreed to send ten additional battalions, provided the U.S. financed these, at a cost of $7 million,\textsuperscript{112} and allowed Marcos to keep some in the Philippines for his own purposes. In addition, Marcos won a U.S. commitment of $45 million in economic assistance, $31 million to settle Philippine veterans' claims from World War II, and $3.5 million for Imelda Marcos to build

\textsuperscript{110}Fact Finding Report, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{111}Berry, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{112}Fact Finding Report, p. 37.
her Cultural Center. Upon his return to the Philippines, Marcos received another boost. Through a top secret message sent him from Johnson via U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William Blair, Marcos learned that the U.S. bases in the Philippines housed nuclear weapons, a fact Filipino presidents had long suspected but until then had not known for certain. Perhaps Johnson thought the information would deepen Marcos' bond to the U.S.; instead, Marcos realized he was in an even stronger bargaining position than he had suspected and he would use this trump card over and over again throughout his regime to secure U.S. aid and other support. For the Vietnam effort, Marcos ultimately sent no more than the token 2,000-man engineer battalion, and withdrew these in 1969 under pressure from Philippine opposition as well as implications by U.S. Senator Stuart Symington that the Philippine forces were nothing more than mercenary soldiers.113 Yet Marcos continued to use most of the U.S.-financed battalions for infrastructural projects and brought the military back in to "civic action" projects on an unprecedented scale, particularly in the construction of feeder roads which link rural communities with towns and cities.114 He also distributed much of the U.S. money, as well as the construction contracts, to a network of cronies who, unlike the traditional elites, had primary loyalty to Marcos.

Meanwhile, the Philippine bases were becoming ever more crucial to the U.S. campaign in Vietnam, as Olongapo, site of Subic Bay, expanded rapidly from a small town of 44,000 in 1966 to 200,000 a decade later.115 And as the bases grew, so too did U.S. concerns about the internal security of the Philippines. U.S. policy toward the Philippines now centered on the need to secure the bases and encourage the development of the Philippine armed forces military capability to

113Berry, p. 144.

114Fact Finding Report, pp. 40-41. Note that the 51st Engineer Battalion alone completed 13 major construction projects in 1966, more than 50% of Corps of Engineers in 12.5 years under previous administrations. AFP's contribution to feeder roads accounted for 30% of the total from 1966-1973.

118Bonner, p. 205.
defend against internal security threats to them, including a rise in anti-U.S. demonstrations protesting Philippine involvement in the Vietnam War. U.S. support for the Philippine armed forces was, moreover, viewed as a bargaining chip to secure Philippine engineer battalions for the U.S. effort in Vietnam. By 1967, U.S. expenditures on Vietnam had climbed to $2 billion a month. About 500,000 soldiers were fighting there and more bombs had already been dropped on Vietnam than in all of the World War II theaters. Yet the U.S. and South Vietnam were no closer to victory over the communists than they had been two years earlier, prior to the massive build-up. Amid rising U.S. casualties and extensive media coverage -- the first of its kind for American audiences who now witnessed the horrors of war from their livingrooms, opposition to the war escalated dramatically. While college students held sit-ins, formed the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and organized protest marches throughout the U.S., Civil Rights activists such as Martin Luther King denounced the war as not only unjust but also a diversion from pressing racial and economic issues at home, recalling the abolitionists who had made similar claims about the U.S. war in the Philippines more than half a century earlier. Debate spread within the administration as well, as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a chief architect of Johnson's policy who now felt the U.S. should scale back its intervention in Vietnam, resigned. As in 1899, news reports and letters from

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116Secret Action Memorandum, February 23, 1966. U.S. concerns regarding the anti-U.S. demonstrations are described in various airgrams from the embassy to the State Department, including Confidential Airgram A-707 sent March 2, 1966 and Confidential Airgram A-726 sent five days later, from the National Security Archive collection.

117A Secret Cable from the U.S. Pacific Command's Commander-in-Chief to the Department of Defense proposes that the U.S. request additional Philippine civic action group deployment in the Vietnamese conflict in exchange for aid to the Philippine armed forces, sent March 1, 1966. In a Secret Cable sent July 24, 1966, the decision was made to give Marcos military supplies in exchange for battalions. From the National Security Archive collection.

118Combs, p. 397.

119See Gitlin's excellent account of the role of the U.S. media in covering U.S. opposition to the Vietnam War.
soldiers at the front undermined the veracity of the administration's "body counts," undermining as well Johnson's credibility.

But the situation exploded in January 1968 during the Vietnamese lunar new year when the Vietcong together with North Vietnamese regulars launched a series of surprise attacks in thirty-six of South Vietnam's forty-four provincial capitals, five of its six major cities, sixty-four district capitals, and fifty villages, laying siege as well to the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Though the communists actually suffered an estimated 40,000 casualties, while U.S. and South Vietnamese forces suffered just 3,500 casualties, the so-called Tet Offensive horrified the American public, which looked on as Vietnamese women and children ran screaming from villages, while U.S. soldiers explained that they "had to destroy the village in order to save it." Like the Philippines before it, Vietnam was being turned into a "howling wilderness." Johnson's credibility plummeted, and on March 31, he ordered an end to the bombing of most of North Vietnam, announced plans for a new peace initiative, and withdrew from the race for reelection. Eugene McCarthy filled the Democrat's slot; but voters registered their desire for change and elected Richard Nixon, who, like Eisenhower with respect to Korea, campaigned on the promise of a "secret plan" for "peace with honor" in Vietnam. With the new administration came an opening for a shift in policy, as the lessons of Vietnam regarding the limits of intervention now challenged those of World War II regarding the risks of diplomacy and appeasement. Though U.S. hard-liners still pressed for all-out war in Vietnam, Nixon began a gradual withdrawal while pledging U.S. money and materiel, but not men, to support other non-nuclear nations fighting internal or external enemies of the United States.

A Different Kind of "Mandate": The Transition from Democratic to Authoritarian Rule

In this, Marcos saw yet another opportunity to leverage U.S. aid to his
regime, as the embers of Huk resistance reignited in the Philippine countryside. On December 26, 1968, in honor of Mao's birthday, eleven Filipinos led by Jose Marie Sison, a professor of English literature with a growing following of radical students, split from the PKP and set out for a remote village in Pangasinan province to form the new, Chinese-inspired Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The following March, Benigno Aquino, Jr., now a Senator and leader of the moderate opposition's Liberal Party, encouraged the radical opposition as well when he introduced Sison to the former Huk guerrilla leader from Aquino's native Tarlac Province, Dante Buscayno, who became head of the CPP's military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). With just a few hundred regulars and an arsenal of seventy weapons, the NPA, with the CPP's direction, turned from a Soviet focus on urban workers to a Maoist emphasis on the peasantry, who represented roughly 70 percent of the nation's population. At the same time, another insurgency led by Muslims in the South was emerging as well. By November 1969 presidential elections, opposition to Marcos had spread among moderates as well as revolutionaries, but Marcos mobilized his network of cronies and the military to help run what were to become the most corrupt Philippine elections to date. His subsequent 2,000,000-vote margin of victory profoundly challenged by the Philippine electorate, Marcos was quickly faced with a crisis of legitimacy when, in January 1970, 20,000 students, workers, and peasants staged a mass protest. Later known as the "First Quarter Storm" because it coincided with

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120 Sison had given a PKP member copies of CPP documents, as part of an effort to recruit from the older communist party. When the PKP member leaked the documents to a newspaper publisher, however, Sison was forced to delay the meeting until January 3, 1969. He also ceased attempts to recruit from the PKP. From Jones, p. 18.

121 Karnow, p. 378.

122 An econometric study by the Rand Corporation cited military repression as the primary source of revolutionary activity in Luzon, not rural dissatisfaction with social conditions. Memorandum RM-5757-ARPA, January 1969, from the National Security Archive collection.

123 See Noble's account of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines in Schirmer and Shalom, pp. 193-199.
the first quarter of university classes, the protest soon escalated into the worst peacetime riots the Philippines had yet seen. Only when a U.S. marine detachment was sent in was order restored; but opposition to Marcos continued to spread and organize.\textsuperscript{124}

As opposition spread, Marcos became increasingly concerned about 1971 congressional elections and the implications of these for presidential elections scheduled for 1973. Although Philippine law limited presidents to two terms, Marcos had hoped to continue his legacy either by choosing his successor, with Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile among his top choices, or by rewriting the constitution. In the summer of 1971, Marcos acted on both fronts, launching a constitutional convention to review its precepts\textsuperscript{125} while selecting and supporting several Nacionalista Party candidates. He also acted covertly. As the campaign opened on August 21, 1971, a Liberal Party rally at the Plaza Miranda with more than 10,000 in attendance was disrupted when two fragmentation grenades were thrown at the dais while other explosives were detonated beneath the stage, leaving six dead and over 100 seriously wounded.\textsuperscript{126} Violence erupted in the South as well, with much-publicized massacres of Muslims by Christian gangs, which caught the attention of the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{127} Marcos immediately suspended the writ of habeas corpus, charged the communists for the violence, and accused Aquino, who was not at the site, of aiding and abetting them.

\textsuperscript{124}The U.S. also sent riot control munitions, as noted in a secret cable sent February 10, 1970 from the U.S. Pacific Command to the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group. Note also that a review of U.S. assistance to Marcos now reported that U.S. officials had not controlled the use of payments provided for the Philippine civic action groups and so had likely contributed to the Marcos administration’s widespread corruption, as reported in Secret Report B-168501, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{125}A secret report completed May 7, 1971 by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department asserted that Marcos sought to use the constitutional convention to retain power. From the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{126}Karnow, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{127}Noble, op cit., p. 194.
Controversy about the incident continues to shroud the truth. CIA documents, corroborated by some CPP accounts, indicate that neither the CPP nor the NPA had the capability, the urban base, or the weaponry to carry out such an assault. Recently declassified U.S. documents based on evidence provided by a CIA mole in the Philippine military reveal that the assault was organized by Marcos or those close to him; yet a core group of former CPP cadres claim that Sison planned the attack in order to divide the "ruling class," to pit Nationalists against Liberals, pressing the former to move farther to the right and the latter farther to the left. These cadres argue that Sison needed a broader base of support to capitalize on arms shipments from China. Whatever the truth, Marcos had been scheming to prolong his rule prior to Plaza Miranda and would likely have declared martial law in any event. The bombing did, however, widen the chasm between Marcos and his opponents.

Marcos now attempted to stir anti-communist fears to increase his strong-arm Nacionalista Party's chances of victory at the polls; but the strategy backfired. Public opinion in the Philippines indicted Marcos for the Plaza Miranda incident, as the candidates chosen by Marcos lost badly, while the Liberals won six senatorial seats. It seemed likely now that the Liberals, led by Aquino, would win in the 1973 presidential elections. Moreover, the constitutional convention was providing a venue for Liberal delegates to press for such constitutional changes as banning U.S. military bases and restricting the activities of large American corporations in the Philippines. Far from using the convention to extend either presidential terms or the Marcos legacy, as Marcos had planned, the delegates used it as an opportunity to reevaluate the Philippine relationship with

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128 Confidential Memorandum from Theodore Eliot, Jr. at the State Department to Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council, August 23, 1971, from the National Security Archive collection cites Marcos as the instigator. See Jones, pp. 59-69 for information from former CPP cadres citing Sison as the instigator.

129 Limited Official Use Cable #11770 from the U.S. embassy in the Philippines to the State Department, sent December 28, 1971, from the National Security Archive.
the U.S., including the bases and U.S. investments. U.S. corporations were accused of pressuring delegates at the convention to perpetuate privileged U.S. access by opposing proposed economic reforms. U.S. officials also channeled money through the CIA to bribe the delegates from voting for such changes, though the convention continued for more than a year with often rancorous debate. In early 1972, Sergio Osmeña plotted with American "guns for hire" to assassinate Marcos. The plan was uncovered by Marcos spies, forcing Osmeña and the others to flee to the U.S.; but it was a somber warning to Marcos. Then a spate of bombings rocked Manila, with one in March, April, May, and June, and three in July. Marcos, again, blamed the bombings on the communists and, in early August, met with Enrile and a few other top advisers to plan for martial law. Marcos conferred frequently with U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade, who sought direction from Nixon while trying to dissuade Marcos from the plan. Nixon, consumed by Vietnam, Watergate and his own reelection concerns as well as his up-coming trips to China and the Soviet Union, requested a review of policy but was largely inattentive, leaving Marcos to believe that as long as a communist threat, or the appearance of one, loomed, the U.S. would back him. August saw seven more bombings, followed by five in early September.

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130 On the debate regarding the bases, see Confidential Airgram A-191, sent from the U.S. embassy to the State Department July 1, 1970, from the National Security Archive collection.

131 On the debate regarding U.S. investments and alleged U.S. corporate interference, see Limited Official Use Cable #01701 sent from the U.S. embassy in the Philippines to the State Department, February 24, 1972. From the National Security Archive.

132 Karnow, pp. 380-381.

133 Nixon’s request for the policy review is cited in a Secret National Security Study Memorandum from the National Security Council to the Defense Department, June 28, 1972. From the National Security Archive collection.

134 Information for this paragraph was taken from Bonner, pp. , and from Confidential Cable #08372 from Ambassador Henry Byroade to the U.S. State Department, September 6, 1972, and Secret Cable #08787 also from Byroade to the U.S. State Department, September 18, 1972, from the National Security Archive collection. In the latter cable, Byroade acknowledges that the Marcos administration was exploiting the bombings for his own advantage.
Marcos blamed the communists but the CIA learned that Marcos had been behind at least one of the bombings. On September 12, Aquino leaked information about the coup plans to U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade, who did not believe Aquino until a text of the martial law proclamation reached him from a high level Filipino on the CIA payroll. Byroade then tried to dissuade Marcos from the plan, on the grounds that it could ignite opposition in the U.S. Congress and the Philippines; but when neither the State Department nor the CIA sent Marcos a red light signal, Marcos considered implementing the plans. And he had the military capacity and backing to carry it out. The Philippine military now numbered 62,000. Most of the senior officers, a cadre of junior officers, and the troops who reported to them were loyal to Marcos, having gained considerable power vis-a-vis civilian institutions since 1965 as well as wealth from privileged access to construction contracts, U.S. aid, government funds, and promotions which circumvented standard procedures. Marcos had also provided training in civilian management for officers, initiating the first regular course at the National Defense College of the Philippines in February 1966, from which 93 graduated by 1972. In addition, 145 officers received training in the U.S. as part of the Military Assistance Program from 1966 to 1972. A notch down was the Command and General Staff College which opened in 1969 to train

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135Karnow, p. 359. See also Confidential Cable #08620 from Byroade to the State Department sent September 13, 1972, describing the discussion with Aquino, Byroade's reactions, and his analysis of the Filipino opposition to Marcos. From the National Security Archive collection.

136Karnow, p. 356. See also Secret Cable #168484 sent September 14, 1972 from the State Department to the U.S. embassy, requesting an assessment of Marcos' assertions regarding the security threat; Limited Official Use Cable #08738 sent a day later from Byroade to the State Department, wherein Aquino reveals Marcos' plans for martial law, which Marcos confirms; and, most significantly, Secret Cable #08787 sent September 18, 1972 from Byroade to the State Department, reporting that the Marcos administration was exploiting the communist threat for his own ends, that it was not in fact an immediate threat to Philippine security. In all of these documents, U.S. officials discuss Marcos' intentions but do not establish a formal policy to dissuade him from declaring martial law.

137Fact Finding Report, p. 35.

138Ibid, p. 34.
military personnel for "civilian leadership roles." While the military did establish health, education, legal, and other community service projects during Marcos' tenure, it also emerged as a highly politicized anti-insurgency force. In particular, a special Metropolitan Area Command launched in 1968 with just 300 police had increased to a force of 1,700, with training from the U.S. in crowd control techniques, a skill the U.S. had been honing with notorious results at places like Memphis, Chicago, and Kent State.

Fearing a bloodbath as well as the loss of U.S. support, Marcos vacillated but Enrile urged Marcos to respond swiftly. The final act came on September 22, 1972 when Enrile's car was strafed with bullets, though no one was harmed. Years later, Enrile acknowledged that he had ordered the attack himself to trigger the coup, and that Marcos had used it as a pretext to declare martial law, back-dating the decree to September 21 so that it would be divisible by seven, his lucky number. In what the U.S. State Department wryly termed his "one-man democracy," Marcos then arrested over six thousand, including Aquino as well as priests, nuns, students, journalists, publishers and others from both the moderate and the revolutionary opposition. Others fled the country, many to the U.S., as tanks and truckloads of troops rolled through Manila. Soon after, Congress was abolished, mass activities prohibited, political parties outlawed, civil and political rights suspended, and a curfew from midnight to 4:00 a.m. announced. With civilian institutions abolished and the judiciary severely weakened, the military was now the primary instrument of the national government outside of the presidency. Though Marcos announced that martial law was not a military takeover, twelve men, dubbed the "Twelve Apostles" or the "Rolex Twelve" for the watches Marcos reputedly gave them, had been in constant consultation regarding

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139 Fact Finding Report, p. 35. The report notes that it was not an expressed but merely an implicit function of the college to prepare military men for such roles.

the decision.\textsuperscript{141} They included Defense Minister Enrile, PC Chief Fidel Ramos, PSC Chief Fabian Ver, eight other senior military officers and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. who was recalled to active duty as a colonel. From within his cell at Fort Bonifacio, invoking an earlier era of resistance, Aquino would later recount his surprise, not with Marcos, but with the relative silence of his countrymen.

Days later, the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines informed the U.S. business community of its support for martial law.\textsuperscript{142} Still worried that U.S. disapproval might signal military opponents to undo martial law, however, Marcos sent a trusted aide, Alejandro Melchor, to the U.S. to gauge the official response. Upon arriving in D.C., Melchor met with John Holdridge of the NSC who needed only to be assured that U.S. business interests would not be threatened by martial law. Melchor then met with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer, who was actually enthusiastic about martial law. Melchor next elicited a promise from former Defense Secretary now World Bank Director Robert McNamara for a doubling of loans if Marcos promised to use his martial law powers to develop the Philippines. These loans would actually quadruple during the Marcos regime, though very little went to development projects. Melchor then met with Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield, with Marcos' friend Senator Daniel Inouye whose Hawaiian constituency included many Ilocano Marcos supporters, and with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright. In none of these meetings did Melchor find opposition to what Marcos had done. Even the elite U.S. press, with the exception of the \textit{Washington Post}, endorsed Marcos, with the \textit{New York Times} featuring him as their "Man in the News" for his "strength in a nation of uncertainty." Melchor returned to the Philippines with all of the assurances and

\textsuperscript{141}Fact Finding Report, p. 44, from a Marcos speech on "Loyalty Day" to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{142}Telegram from the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent September 27, 1972, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
support Marcos needed to begin a massive restructuring of Philippine society which was to supplant in less than a decade the established oligarchy, while greatly expanding the power of the military and a close circle of Marcos cronies, all with U.S. backing.

Marcos would retain U.S. backing for the next fourteen years of his regime, arguing essentially, like the American soldier in Vietnam, that he had to destroy democracy in order to save it. U.S. analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department understood this, wryly describing martial law as Marcos’ attempt at "one-man democracy." Moreover, a Rand Corporation study completed in November 1972 reported "considerable evidence" that martial law was carried out through U.S. collusion in order to advance U.S. objectives in the Philippines, notably the economic and strategic interests so recently threatened by the constitutional convention as well as the deeper, recurring threat posed by revolutionary opposition. Whether the U.S. was in direct collusion or not, however, the transnational hard-line alliance first established in 1898, then cultivated during the colonial era, through World War II, evolved in the post-colonial period, intensifying interdependencies between the U.S. and the Philippines as the Cold War linked internal Philippine security with the global concerns of the U.S.

Conclusion

From the moment that the Philippine flag replaced the American one in

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144 Rand Corporation Report to the U.S. Army Reserve 301st Civil Affairs Group, distributed November 1972, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. The report cites grants from Marcos to U.S. corporations for oil exploration rights following martial law, as well as safeguards to U.S. investments and property, including the military bases, and other concessions overturning Philippine Supreme Court decisions made prior to martial law which threatened $2-3 billion worth of U.S. investments.
Manila's Rizal Park on July 4, 1946 through the September 22, 1972 transition to martial law, global U.S. military strategy and Philippine domestic politics had become increasingly interdependent. This interdependence was outlined explicitly in a 1947 agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines, wherein the stated purpose of the Philippine military was internal security, while the U.S. was to provide external security. Toward this end, the U.S. won a ninety-nine year lease on its twenty-two military bases in the Philippines, and, as Cold War policies evolved, launched a military build-up which was to place Subic as America's largest overseas naval base with Clark among the top five largest overseas air bases by the end of the period. Meanwhile, Philippine officials used the bases as leverage for U.S. economic aid, totalling $1.85 billion from 1946 to 1972, and military aid, totalling $672.5 million during the same period, or about $2.52 billion in all, as shown in Appendix I.\textsuperscript{145} Though U.S. officials were loathe to describe any linkage between the aid and the bases, privately, successive administrations understood the aid to be a form of "rent."\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, despite periodic, albeit weak, calls from the U.S. for structural reforms such as land reform in order to curtail recurring threats from revolutionary opposition, most of the economic aid was pilfered by the landed oligarchy and presidential cronies who channeled the U.S. funds toward their own gain while the military aid was used to increase internal security forces from 37,000 in 1946 to 62,000 by 1972. As Cold War strategy evolved during the period, a transnational alliance of U.S. and Philippine hard-liners so intensified the military interdependence of the two countries as well as the strength of Philippine authoritarian institutions, as to subordinate soft-line strategies.

\textsuperscript{145} Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 1961-1988, Special Report Prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Office of Statistics and Reports, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development. Note that the figures include Export-Import Bank and other official loans.

\textsuperscript{146} See Brands, and Berry, in particular, for descriptions of the history of U.S. negotiations on the bases with successive Philippine administrations.
The post-war military interdependence of the U.S. and the Philippines was reinforced by the "lessons of Munich" during the Korean War, when Clark and Subic proved useful as a launch site for an F-51 squadron, as a logistics site, and as a stop-over point for U.N. troops. Filipinos then used the bases, as well as the growing Huk rebellion, to increase U.S. economic and military aid, and to build an effective armed forces explicitly designed for internal opposition. Later, in the Quemoy-Matsu crises of the mid- to late 1950's, the bases would again be used to project U.S. power in the region, and again Filipinos would leverage this to raise the level of U.S. aid. But it was not until the Vietnam War, particularly after 1965, that the bases would become vital to the regional, and global, projection of U.S. power and that Filipinos would learn to fully use the trump card they had been dealt. While Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda were moving into the Malacanang Palace, Johnson was dramatically escalating the war in Vietnam, increasing in just one year the U.S. military presence there from the 16,000 advisors sent by Kennedy to more than 23,000, followed by a rapid escalation in troop presence. Amid growing opposition at home and abroad as well as the increasingly real possibility that the war could not be won, Johnson clung to a "more flags" campaign to give the impression of international support for the war. A shrewd negotiator, Marcos used the U.S. need for Philippine support as well as the bases to procure ever higher levels of U.S. economic and military aid, including financing for ten battalions of troops. Marcos subsequently used much of the aid to establish a network of cronies and to cultivate the Philippine military as a viable instrument for repressing opposition.

Nevertheless, opposition spread, particularly after 1969 elections when his 2,000,000-vote margin of victory was profoundly challenged. Ever the boxer he had been in college, Marcos dodged and feinted, calling out the military as well as U.S. marines to restore order. Legislative elections in 1971, however, brought victory to the opposition, with an increasingly likely win for opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr., in up-coming 1973 presidential elections. Amid increasing attacks against his regime, a spate of bombings rocked Manila. Though Marcos
blamed a nascent communist insurgency, a mole in his regime notified the CIA that at least one of the bombs had been planted by Marcos. By 1972, his regime more threatened than ever, Marcos considered martial law. Given the heavy doses of U.S. technical and financial assistance to the Philippine military since 1945, together with the loyalty Marcos had won from the military, he had the capacity to carry it out. The U.S. position was vague; but Marcos gambled that as long as a communist threat loomed, the U.S. would back him. On September 22, after Defense Minister Enrile's car was reportedly strafed, Marcos declared martial law. Although the U.S. had not been involved in the transition to martial law, as it had been in Guatemala and Iran and as it would be in Chile the following year, the U.S. did back him, maintaining aid, trade, and other forms of crucial support largely to secure the U.S. bases.

In sum, though the impetus for the transition came from Marcos and his own personal ambitions, U.S. hard-line support since 1946 for the Philippine armed forces, which were designed expressly to counter domestic opposition, had established the capacity for authoritarian rule, enabling the U.S.-backed Philippine military to carry out martial law and to survive afterwards with U.S. support. Marcos then used this capacity for his own ends, using the leverage of the bases and other U.S. interests in the Philippines to secure U.S. support for his authoritarian regime. While purely domestic arguments would cite Marcos' ambitions and the political contingencies surrounding the 1972 transition as the primary reasons for the breakdown of democracy, such views do not adequately explain the capacity for the 1972 transition nor the Marcos regime's subsequent survival in its broader international context. Likewise, purely international explanations emphasizing U.S. interests, aid and military intervention from the end of World War II through 1972 would not capture the crucial role played by Marcos and the Philippine military institutions he cultivated in carrying out authoritarian rule. Instead, the transnational explanation presented here, tracing the evolution, strategies, and influence of the U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance following World War II, though with historical roots extending back to the
Spanish colonial era, offers the most useful approach to understanding the 1972 Philippine transition to authoritarian rule.

Over the next fourteen years, Marcos almost succeeded in his attempt to destroy democracy in order to save it; but, miraculously, it survived. The impact of martial law on Philippine society and the remarkable resurgence of electoral democracy in 1986 will be described in chapters six and seven.

Overview

Human rights violations and political assassinations, known in the peculiar lexicon of war as "salvagings," became rampant in the Philippines after 1972. This chapter examines the impact of martial law on Philippine society -- the gradual defection from hard-line support of Marcos to soft-line opposition among key members of the church, the military, and the business community, and the transnational strategies they used to challenge Marcos.\(^1\) The chapter then traces the simultaneous rise in the U.S. after 1972 of soft-line opposition to the hard-line strategies which had dominated foreign policy since 1946 and had helped create the military capacity for authoritarian rule in several allied countries, including the Philippines. As the Vietnam War wound to an end, then Watergate exploded, an activist congress elected by an activist public initiated hearings on human rights in 1973, wrote new laws linking human rights with U.S. foreign aid in 1974, and established in 1977 a human rights bureau within the State Department to monitor the issue and inform congress. With the institutionalization of the human rights approach to foreign policy, ideological and bureaucratic tensions arose between soft-liners and hard-liners in Congress, the State Department and with other centers of foreign policy, notably the Defense Department, the White House, and the CIA. Central to the debate was whether hard-line tactics of repression fueled or quelled opposition. After the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua and the threat of revolution in El Salvador, the debate intensified. The hard-liners retained control of foreign policy towards the Philippines and, in 1981, saw the ultra-hard-line Kirkpatrick doctrine gain the White House; but, on August

\(^1\)Although there was a vast Muslim separatist revolutionary opposition in the southern Philippines, with an estimated membership of 30,000 in the early 1970's, it did not play a key role in the 1986 transition, as the NPA/NDF did. Hence, it will be described but will not be the focus of the analysis of this period. Much has been written on the Muslims, however, including a number of articles by Lela Garner Noble (1980) as well as a more recent account by W.K. Che Man (1990).
21, 1983, the assassination of moderate opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. would create a political and economic crisis in the Philippines, spurring U.S. and Filipino soft-liners, in and out of government, to strengthen their alliance in order to oust Marcos.

The Impact of "One-Man Democracy"

The Philippine constitution and system of government were imported from the U.S.; but with one crucial difference. While both the U.S. and the Philippine presidents headed the armed forces, the Philippine president had the additional power to declare martial law. On September 22, 1972, Marcos exercised this power. Proclamation 1081, signed that day and announced to the Philippine public a day later, placed America's experiment in colonial democracy under authoritarian rule. In his address to the nation, Marcos justified the act, claiming that the nation was "imperilled by the danger of a violent overthrow, insurrection and rebellion." He cited the New People's Army (NPA) and other communist organizations, though these were, in fact, in their infancy. The U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) noted in a secret study underway in the summer of 1972 that the revolutionary movement's "military operations were at a low level and confined to remote areas." Contrary to Marcos' estimates of at least 8,000 NPA guerrillas, 10,000 active cadres and 100,000 supporters, INR put the total sum of these at fewer than 9,000.3 A study by the Rand Corporation in November 1972 presented much lower estimates placing NPA strength at just 1,000 regulars with perhaps an additional 5,000 to 6,000 armed supporters. In its own history, prepared years later, the NPA claimed just 350 armed guerrillas at the time of martial law. Whatever the actual figure, a

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3Staff Report prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, Committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, February 18, 1973.

3Bonner, p. 119. The final report was distributed December 11, 1973, with slightly higher figures, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
U.S. intelligence official involved in Philippine policy in 1972 says Marcos' claims about the NPA were "a joke."4 Instead, the real reason for martial law was quickly apparent; Marcos was not ready to leave office. As a secret cable sent September 18, 1972 from the U.S. embassy in Manila to the State Department concluded, Marcos was exploiting the threat of Communism for his own ends. Though the cable urged the U.S. to press for economic and political reform, hardline tactics claimed the day.5

Marcos immediately arrested much of the opposition, including Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. as well as journalists, students, and members of the church, most of whom belonged to a moderate opposition seeking a democratic transition from Marcos, not a communist revolution. A confidential cable from the U.S. embassy in Manila to the State Department revealed, for instance, that of 126 Philippine citizens named on an arrest list, members of Aquino's Liberal Party formed the majority, further indicating the real aims of martial law.6 U.S. officials were then told that martial law would serve American economic and strategic interests, by securing them from nationalist opposition.7 By treating moderates as revolutionaries, however, Marcos encouraged many to join the revolutionary movement, whose ranks would swell from the few hundred in 1972 to roughly twenty percent of the population by the end of the Marcos regime in 1986, as described in the next chapter. Others fled to exile, notably to the U.S., where they launched active lobbying campaigns to expose the human rights abuses

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4The above is from the Rand Corporation Report to the U.S. Army Reserve 301st Civil Affairs Group, distributed November 1972, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection, and cited in chapter five.

5Secret Cable #08787, September 18, 1972, from the National Security Archive collection. Another secret cable, #171335, sent September 20, 1972 from the State Department to the U.S. Embassy echoes the concern that Marcos might declare martial law to protect his political power, also reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

6Confidential Cable #09010, September 23, 1972, from the National Security Archive collection.

7Confidential Cable #09089, September 25, 1972, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
of the Marcos regime and to press for a withdrawal of U.S. support from Marcos. Among these was Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1957 and from 1961 to 1972 an opposition senator. In his exile in the U.S., Manglapus cultivated a network of well-placed American friends, wrote opinion pieces for the New York Times and other media outlets, frequently gave testimony before congress urging the U.S. to cut aid to Marcos, and spearheaded a mass-based campaign to undo martial law, founding in 1973 the Movement for a Free Philippines. This would gain adherents among the estimated one million Filipinos in the U.S. in the 1970's, including Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Based in California, Lopez saw much of his property confiscated by Marcos, his son imprisoned, and he now supported Manglapus, to whom he was related by marriage, offering publicity in the widely read, U.S.-based Philippine News, a newspaper for the Filipino community in the U.S.

The transnational influence of the church also played a crucial role, linking the anti-Marcos lobby with a growing human rights lobby. The growth of the human rights lobby in the U.S. is exemplified by the increase in membership in the U.S. section of Amnesty International from 3,000 to 50,000 between 1974 and

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*Note that Manglapus had initially tried to secure a fellowship during his exile at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., but was blocked when the State Department wrote to the center's board of directors urging them against the plan in order to avoid "ruffled feathers, surprises and publicity." From Confidential Cable #100074, May 14, 1974, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. A week later, the Wilson Center denied Manglapus the fellowship. The State Department's concern with such a matter indicates the kind of "clientitis" State Department officials now acknowledge, in interviews conducted December 1994, to be problematic in dealing with foreign leaders. This is just one small example of the foreign policy implications of U.S. government influence in non-governmental organizations.

*Manglapus, collection of letters, essays, congressional testimony, and speeches during his exile in the U.S.

*Thompson, p. 91.


*Thompson, op cit.
1976. Membership continued to expand thereafter, fostering as well the development of human rights organizations in countries under authoritarian rule. As one participant explained: "The human rights lobby was essentially a church lobby." In Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Philippines, etc., church leaders, particularly Catholics schooled in the liberation theology of Latin America as well as the new teachings of Vatican II, were being targeted by authoritarian regimes for their work with the poor. In the Philippine case, transnational opposition from an emerging cadre of politically active Catholics intensified when, immediately following martial law, four American priests were arrested. A month later, two more American priests were deported. This generated political activism among U.S. Catholic and other church groups who worked through the U.S. media and congress, with critical support from Congressman Father Robert Drinan (D-MA), in order to inform the American public and redirect U.S. support away from authoritarian regimes toward reform and democratization. Meanwhile, given that roughly 85 percent of the Philippine population belonged to the Roman Catholic Church at the time, such actions by the Marcos regime sparked widespread indignation. Moreover, with the elimination of most other forms of institutionalized opposition under martial law, the Catholic Church in the Philippines emerged after 1972 as one of the few organizations able to challenge Marcos and articulate the growing anger against his regime, led by moderates in the Catholic Bishops Conference of the

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15Personal interview with Bello, November 1993.

Philippines (CBCP), including the unfortunately-named Cardinal Sin of Manila.\textsuperscript{17}

It is important to note here that the church was, in fact, not united. One of the leading voices of the Philippine Catholic Church, the CBCP, for instance, was comprised of 76 Bishops, wherein about 15 advocated continued support for Marcos, between 13 and 24 advocated protest of martial law and exposure of the regime’s abuses, while the remaining majority of between 37 and 48 bishops sought moderate reforms. Led by Cardinal Sin, the moderates advocated "critical collaboration" with Marcos, but became increasingly radicalized against Marcos as repression, much of it targeted against the church, continued. This shift would prove crucial in the rise of the transnational soft-line alliance, leading to the eventual transition in 1986.\textsuperscript{18}

After attempting to silence his critics, Marcos next spent a fortune bribing the constitutional convention, which had been unable to agree on a new charter for over a year and now saw its most outspoken opposition leaders, including Manglapus, either exiled or jailed. At Marcos’ behest, the convention replaced the presidential with a parliamentary system, naming Marcos Prime Minister. They also established a uni-cameral Batasang Pambansa, or National Assembly. Moreover, Marcos was granted the right to rule for as long as he wanted, by decree if he chose, and with the authority to decide when the nation’s first parliamentary elections would be held. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy in Manila reported that the new constitution favored foreign investments in general and American investments in particular, unlike the pre-martial law drafts.\textsuperscript{19} All opposition newspapers, radio, and television stations were overtaken, and

\textsuperscript{17} From Robert Youngblood, "Church Opposition to Martial Law," in The Philippines Reader. See also Youngblood (1990) and Yu and Bolasco (1981) for more on the relationship between the Catholic church and the Marcos regime.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Confidential Cables #11157, #11160, and #11639 sent November 17, 18, and December 1, 1972, respectively. From the National Security Archive collection.
restrictions on assembly, speech, and debate imposed. To preserve the appearance of constitutionality, Marcos organized 36,000 Citizens’ Assemblies throughout the country to register their views. For six days in January 1973, the assemblies responded to questions without the benefit of secrecy, as soldiers, mayors, district captains and others, all owing their positions to Marcos, tallied the results. Not surprisingly, the assemblies overwhelmingly approved the new constitution, rejected plans for 1973 elections, and endorsed martial law. INR, however, saw through the charade, reporting to Nixon that "It seems almost inevitable that (Marcos) will have to devote an increasing proportion of his time and energy to putting down opponents." The report warned that this would polarize Philippine politics, jeopardizing U.S. interests there. It concluded: "Only the U.S. can provide the financial aid and appearance of political backing (Marcos) badly needs."\(^\text{20}\)

Far from heeding the warning, the U.S. nearly tripled military aid to Marcos from $18.4 million in 1972 to $50.4 million in 1973, while economic aid rose as well from $111.8 million in 1972 to $124 million in 1973. In fact, U.S. economic and military aid would greatly increase following the declaration of martial law, totalling close to $2 billion for the period from 1972 to the end of the Marcos era in 1986.\(^\text{21}\) After 1972, Marcos began a massive military build-up, as the Filipines amassed by 1977 a sophisticated arsenal of "Tiger II Fighters," "Huey" helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and C-47 transport planes. Moreover, the U.S. supplied special forces units to conduct counter-insurgency throughout the Philippines,\(^\text{22}\) while the U.S. State Department, under the

\(^\text{20}\)Information from this paragraph is from Bonner, p. 137. The text of the INR secret report distributed January 15, 1973 is from the National Security Archive collection.

\(^\text{21}\)From "Overseas Loans and Grants, 1961-1988," Special Report Prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Office of Statistics and Reports, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development. Note that the economic aid figures are on an obligation and loan authorization basis only and not on an expenditure basis, while the military aid figures represent the actual value of goods and services delivered.

Munitions Control Board, endorsed increases in commercial sales of weapons as well. From just 1972 to 1977, such sales totalled $8.5 million, a figure small by world standards but quite high for a small state like the Philippines. In fact, the figure was four times the value of all commercial sales from 1950 to 1972. Marcos also more than tripled the size of the Philippine military, still explicitly designed for internal security, from 62,000 in 1972 to 200,000 by the end of his regime, while increasing the military's annual budget from $82 million in 1972 to $1 billion by 1980. Marcos then further restructured the military to strengthen the power of his cadre of loyal officers. In exchange, he tolerated their smuggling and granted them illegal logging and mining concessions, while authorizing promotions on the basis of loyalty not competence, particularly to those from his province of Ilocos Norte. Finally, he expanded the political role of military leaders as some, notably Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos, emerged as powers in their own right. Corruption was rampant, however, and those in the military who were excluded from such privileges would provide another potent source of opposition to Marcos, as described in the next chapter.

While using a portion of the U.S. aid to finance the military build-up, Marcos also used it as a personal source of power, diverting money from government banks to take over private banks, hotels, factories, shopping centers, and other enterprises. In the process, Marcos disowned families to give his

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24Bonner, p. 364.
25See "Comments of the Military and Succession," Confidential Cable #14660, June 15, 1992 from the National Security Archive collection, wherein confidential Philippine military sources reveal crony capitalism within the military.
27As early as March 2, 1973, the U.S. General Accounting Office cited misappropriations of U.S. aid by the Marcos regime and recommended closer supervision. From an unclassified report reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
brother insurance, banking and real estate firms; his sister shipping concerns; and even his elderly mother tobacco, timber and food processing companies. He also helped drive a wedge in Aquino’s family by building an alliance with Corazon Aquino’s cousin Eduardo Cojuangco, helping him acquire a virtual monopoly on the Philippine coconut industry, which employed more people and earned more in exports than any other industry in the country, save perhaps for the martial law industry of "mining", as in, "That’s mine, and that’s mine..." Cojuangco would expand into real estate and banking, and would gain control of the country’s largest corporation, San Miguel, which brews beer and holds both the Coca Cola and Pepsi bottling plants. By 1985, Cojuangco’s private wealth was estimated at $4 billion. Meanwhile other "cronies" such as Herminio Disini, husband of one of Imelda’s cousins, cornered the cigarette filter market when Marcos exempted him from a levy on raw materials, enabling him to eradicate his competitors. And Americans profited as well. In one striking example, Marcos took more than $600 million in loans and guarantees from Export-Import Bank Chairman, later CIA Director, William Casey to build a nuclear power plant in an area of intense volcanic activity. The contract was first awarded to General Electric but was then given to Westinghouse, after the latter gave Disini about $80 million as a fee for "construction." To date, the plant remains inoperative, though Filipino taxpayers continue to pay off the debt.

Not only did Marcos alienate taxpayers. By confiscating property from the traditional oligarchy, Marcos created yet another potent, increasingly activist opposition. In one case, noted above, Marcos imprisoned Eugenio Lopez, Jr. for allegedly plotting against Marcos, though his uncle Fernando had once been Marcos’ Vice Presidential running mate, tearfully recruited by Imelda in 1965. By 1972, the Lopez family wealth from sugar, electric and other enterprises was

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**The above is from Karnow, pp. 383-384.**

**After the Three-Mile Island accident in March 1979, Marcos suspended work on the Philippine project, despite on-going pressure from Westinghouse and U.S. officials. From Bonner, pp. 270-271.**

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estimated at $400 million. Two months after Eugenio, Jr.'s arrest, Imelda's brother Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez spoke with the senior Eugenio, who was dying of cancer in California and was desperate to see his son, about transferring the Lopez family's electric company assets to the Marcoses. Led to believe that he would thus see his son, Eugenio, Sr. signed over the assets. He was to die in San Francisco soon after, though not before mobilizing support for Manglapus and other opposition leaders as described above, while his son languished in prison. Worse, at his funeral in Quezon City, heavily armed men entered the church, placed an ornate black chair near the front, as Imelda Marcos, in all black, seated herself in the chair amid gasps from American diplomats and others present.  

Eugenio Lopez, Jr. would eventually escape in 1977 to the U.S., where he was to play a significant role in the U.S. anti-Marcos campaign. Meanwhile, the Marcoses amassed a fortune estimated in the billions, a fortune made all the more controversial since neither Imelda nor Ferdinand came from wealth. While Imelda went on her now infamous shopping sprees, the traditional oligarchy saw their economic base erode, particularly after the 1983 assassination of Aquino, which led to massive street demonstrations against Marcos, a sharp drop in investor confidence, and the swift unraveling of the Philippine economy, as the next chapter will describe.

In the end, the Marcos regime's crackdown on dissidents and displacement of traditional sectors of elite society was so ruthless, expansive, and sustained, that it ultimately created activist opposition from within the church, the military, the oligarchy, as well as the broader population. Gradually, this activism would extend to the U.S. foreign policy establishment, as some argued for continued

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30 Bonner, pp. 146-147.

support of Marcos’ hard-line tactics to suppress the increasingly widespread opposition, while others argued that military abuses were encouraging moderate Filipinos to ally with the revolutionary opposition.

The Last Years of the Nixon Era: Another Man’s Democracy

Just months before Marcos declared martial law, in June 1972, a scandal which would come to be known as Watergate broke. Nixon tried to contain the subsequent investigations, but by September 15, just one week before Marcos declared martial law, a federal grand jury indicted seven men in the break-in. Five days later, two principal members of Nixon’s reelection committee were added to the list of defendants in the Democrats’ civil suit.\textsuperscript{32} Nixon won a landslide victory in November, with help from Philippine sugar interests,\textsuperscript{33} but, as the scandal unfolded, the Nixon administration became implicated at the highest levels in a campaign of domestic spying, involving wiretaps, black lists, break-ins, and an otherwise sweeping conspiracy against presumed opponents of Nixon in academia, the media, business, entertainment, and government. The scandal must be understood as a manifestation of the crisis in U.S. foreign policy, which undermined hard-line support not just for South Vietnam but also for authoritarian allies worldwide, including the Marcos regime. Not only did the Nixon administration spy on its own enemies; the F.B.I. also spied on anti-Marcos

\textsuperscript{32}Bonner, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{33}Note that Filipino sugar interests contributed $25,000 to the Richard Nixon Campaign Fund. Though Ramon Nolan, who collected and disbursed the funds, denied trying to influence U.S. policy toward the Philippines, it is likely that such funds were given to improve U.S. quotas on Philippine sugar. See the non-classified report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 7, 1973, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. In April 1974, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force would find the contributions illegal. See the non-classified memorandum filed April 4, 1974, also from the National Security Archive collection.
Filipinos in the U.S. As H.R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, later wrote, "without the Vietnam war there would have been no Watergate." In fact, the campaign started as early as May 1969, after New York Times correspondent William Beecher revealed secret U.S. bombings of suspected communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, a country whose neutrality the Nixon administration had professed to respect.

Enraged by the "leak," Nixon and Kissinger with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover placed wiretaps on the phones of four journalists and thirteen officials, including members of Kissinger's own staff. In March 1970, as U.S. and Vietnamese troops swept through Cambodia, anti-war protests exploded. And domestic spying spread, particularly after a June 13, 1971 edition of the New York Times printed lengthy excerpts from a study of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Directed by Leslie Gelb of the State Department, later the New York Times, the study was leaked to the press by Daniel Ellsberg. Nixon quickly sought an injunction against the Times to force it to cease coverage of the "Pentagon Papers"; but the Supreme Court voted against the president, and the coverage continued. Stymied, Nixon established a special unit to prevent other such leaks. Known as "the plumbers," the unit named some two hundred to an "enemies list" and otherwise sought to discredit Nixon's opponents. Nixon won the

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34 Confidential Report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York, NY printed July 5, 1974, from the National Security Archive collection.

35 Karnow, Vietnam, p. 577.

36 General Westmoreland's successor, General Creighton Abrams, had contended that no Cambodian civilians inhabited the sanctuaries, though classified documents published later disclosed that Abrams and other top U.S. officials knew otherwise, conceding that "some Cambodian casualties would be sustained in the operation." From Karnow, Vietnam, p. 591.

37 Ibid.

38 Combs, p. 412.

1972 elections, and Kissinger signed peace accords with North Vietnam soon after, on January 23, 1973; but the administration's credibility came under fire when congressional hearings on Watergate and the secret bombings in Cambodia began in the Spring.40

Congress had deferred to presidents on foreign policy throughout most of the period since World War II, but now became more activist. Human rights lay at the center of the renewed congressional concern for foreign policy, as opposition to the secret bombings spread to other areas of U.S. intervention overseas.41 Adding fuel to congressional anger, in April 1973, the U.S. General Accounting Office submitted reports to congress detailing U.S. commitments of security assistance and military equipment to the armed forces of the Philippines as well as Korea and Thailand; in exchange, the U.S. was granted access to U.S. military facilities and logistical support for troop deployments to Vietnam. The reports concluded that such commitments had been made without either State Department or congressional oversight, and pressed the soft-line view that U.S. interests might be better protected through economic assistance rather than militarization.42 And the implications for human rights were clear. In May, congress cut funds for further bombing of Cambodia, and forced Nixon a month later to cease military activities in all of Indochina by August. Donald Fraser (D-MN), as chair of the formerly obscure Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, later renamed the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, also held a series of hearings in 1973 on human rights. Undaunted, Nixon and Kissinger were hard at work in Chile, where a U.S.-backed military coup on

40Karnow, Vietnam, p. 634.

41Forsythe, p. 2, from Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy.

42Unclassified reports from the U.S. General Accounting Office sent to the U.S. Congress on April 24 and 27, 1973. From the National Security Archive collection.
September 11, 1973 ousted democratically-elected Salvador Allende Gossens. A congressional resolution subsequently requested the executive branch to pursue the subject of human rights with Chile's Pinochet regime; but was ignored.43

In another transnational twist, Walden Bello, a Filipino who had been in Chile writing a doctoral dissertation returned to the U.S. in 1973 after the Chilean coup and, impressed by the similarity of events there with those under Marcos, established with other Filipinos a lobbying group in D.C. to educate Congress on human rights abuses in the Philippines under Marcos. Chile, in fact, awakened human rights activists in congress and in non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, sparking new, more heated debate on the issue.44 Bello, with his Philippine background and Chilean experience, was well-positioned to link the debates on human rights in Chile with similar concerns in the Philippines. Working with a Philippine umbrella organization dealing with human rights under martial law, called the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties, Bello and his colleagues wrote a report on Marcos' abuses and distributed this to Fraser's committee.45 Congressional activism on foreign policy increased further in November 1973, when Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass the War Powers Act, requiring the president to notify congress within forty-eight hours of committing troops abroad and to withdraw those troops in sixty days unless congress authorized a longer stay.46 By December, Congress enacted legislation stating that it was the "sense of Congress" that the president "should" deny military assistance to any government that imprisoned people for political reasons.47 It

43Forsythe, p. 102.

44From interviews with Bello in November 1993 and with George Lister, the first Human Rights Officer appointed to the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and currently Senior Policy Advisor for the Bureau of Democratization, Human Rights and Labor, in December 1994.

45Personal interview with Bello, November 1993.

46Combs, p. 414.

47Bonner, p. 165.
also amended the Foreign Assistance Act, mandating a termination of U.S. aid through A.I.D.'s Office of Public Safety to overseas police forces and prisons.\textsuperscript{48}

Meanwhile, Nixon's control slipped, as most of his inner circle resigned. In August 1973, Kissinger replaced Secretary of State William Rogers, while retaining the portfolio as National Security Advisor, which further concentrated his powers. OPEC's impact on world oil prices further fed political discontent, as charges against Nixon multiplied. By May 9, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee formally opened impeachment hearings. On July 30, the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend impeachment. By August 9, his family at his side, Nixon announced his resignation. As Marcos would years later leave Malacanang, President Nixon and an entourage of his last remaining loyalists boarded a helicopter on August 10, 1974 and left the White House to Gerald Ford.

November legislative elections would usher in the so-called "New Democrats," as a new, more activist and liberal congress, elected by a more activist public, increased its efforts to influence foreign policy. In human rights, following the Fraser hearings, congress linked security assistance to human rights. Though it did not legally bind the president to maintain any human rights standards with allied regimes, it sent a political signal that more attention should be given to the issue in countries receiving U.S. security assistance. Moreover, congress established a legally binding provision, introduced by Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) in 1975 and endorsed by both human rights activists and those who sought to reduce foreign aid, that development assistance, as distinct from security assistance, be conditioned upon respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{49} In response to congressional concern for human rights, the State Department established a Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in April 1975. In June, an office for human

\textsuperscript{48}Limited Official Use Cable #005682, January 10, 1974, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{49}Forsythe, pp.9-10., and pp. 180-182.
rights was established; but resistance within the State Department to anything other than "quiet diplomacy" relegated the office to a weak position within the department. The primary role of the office came to be the management of refugee and migration affairs, with its human rights purpose less clearly defined. In addition, staffing of the office was carried out by a reallocation of existing staff, rather than the hiring of new staff knowledgeable about human rights.\footnote{Background statement of the evolution of human rights operations within the State Department provided by the State Department, and a personal interview with George Lister, December 1994.}

Throughout his regime, Nixon had steadily withdrawn U.S. troops from Vietnam and had launched a program of "Vietnamization" to build South Vietnam's capacity to fight alone. Nevertheless, by 1975, after all U.S. troops had been withdrawn, Vietnam fell to the Communists, and Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge, as the last Americans evacuated Saigon in April 1975. The war was over and Nixon was gone; but America's faith in government had been dramatically altered. As Munich had taught a generation of Americans about the risks of appeasement, Vietnam taught a new generation about the risks of intervention. Two main, and competing, interpretations, however, formed. Conservatives and hard-liners argued that the war could have been won had the military not been constrained, that, as General MacArthur once noted, there was "no substitute for victory." Liberals and soft-liners argued, on the contrary, that the U.S. should not have intervened militarily, that the roots of the war were political, centered on domestic Vietnamese politics; thus an appropriate response would have been diplomacy combined with economic, political, and social reforms. It was essentially a debate on strategy. What, U.S. officials debated, was the best U.S. response to revolutionary threats to allied regimes. Though the Cold War consensus to contain communism held, the means of achieving this end were under examination, and one critical aspect of the debate centered on human rights. In addition to the moral questions raised by military intervention, analysts questioned whether such intervention, in short, quelled mass-based internally-
generated insurgencies or fueled them.\textsuperscript{51}

"Ninoy" and the Transnational Human Rights Lobby

As the U.S. debate on foreign policy intensified, an anti-Marcos lobby, comprised primarily of ex-patriot Filipinos like Bello as well as Marcos opponents displaced by martial law, grew and mobilized, forming ties with the "New Democrats" and others in the U.S. sympathetic to their cause, in an effort to undermine U.S. support for the Marcos regime. A key person in this was Corazon Aquino, who maintained her imprisoned husband's contacts with foreign correspondents, inviting them to dinners where she would relay the views of her husband and others in the opposition. Given the tight controls Marcos exercised over the Philippine media as well as the suppression of dissident voices, the journalists came to appreciate Corazon Aquino's efforts and in return they kept Benigno informed, feeding him reports from the wire services and other sources.\textsuperscript{52}

Aquino's American friends also mobilized. Robert Trent Jones, Jr., son of the golf course designer and a family friend of the Aquinos, began a U.S. campaign to free his friend, who was languishing in a Philippine jail, held for long stretches in solitary confinement. In 1974, Jones wrote to James McLane, a classmate from Yale, then the deputy director of the Cost of Living Council. McLane forwarded Jones' letter to Winston Lord, another Yale classmate, at the State Department. Lord had worked at the National Security Council under Kissinger, had supported the secret bombing of Cambodia, and had been one of five to accompany Kissinger on his historic, secret trip to China. When Kissinger took over as Secretary of State in 1973, he appointed Lord director of the Policy Planning Staff. Lord was, thus, in a position to help Aquino and McLane knew

\begin{footnotes}
\item[51] For an excellent account of this debate, see Joseph's \textit{Cracks in the Empire}.
\item[52] Simons, p. 31.
\end{footnotes}
this. Lord contacted the U.S. embassy in Manila for a status report on the Aquino case and reviewed the charges. They included illegal possession of firearms; four counts of subversion; providing weapons, supplies, shelter and medical assistance to the NPA; and providing money to the NPA for 1969 rallies and a 1970 raid on the Philippine Military Academy. Lord concluded that the conditions of Aquino's detention appeared "reasonably humane," adding that "the interests of the United States would best be served if we did not attempt to comment on or characterize internal developments in the Philippines." Lord overlooked the fact that the charges, allegedly trumped up, had not been filed until August 23, 1973, a full eleven months after Aquino's arrest. Moreover, carrying firearms was commonplace in the Philippines, another indication that Aquino's real crime was the political threat he posed Marcos.

Scheduled for a court martial in March 1975, Aquino launched a hunger strike and rapidly lost forty pounds. Although Marcos released over 700 political detainees that same month, he remained as intransigent as ever on the Aquino case. By April, a U.S. congressional delegation led by human rights activist Fraser visited Aquino in prison. Aquino's sister Lupita wrote to President Ford begging for help. Philippine attorneys questioned the legality of Marcos' moves. And Corazon Aquino held a press conference pleading with Marcos for

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53 In fact, Aquino had allowed former Huk now NPA leader Bernabe "Commander Dante" Buscayno, to use Hacienda Luisita, the vast sugar plantation which Aquino ran for his wife's family, as a training ground and a base of organization. Aquino also supplied food and medicine to the guerrillas, who had murdered six mayors of one town in quick succession and were a tacit threat to Aquino. "Political hypocrisy aside," he told a friend, "can you name one Central Luzon politician who has not dealt with the NPA whether for sympathy or merely as an act of survival?" From Komisar, pp. 35-36.

54 Bonner, p. 149.

55 Confidential Cable #04240, April 5, 1975, from the National Security Archive collection.

56 Unclassified Airgram A-81, March 11, 1975, from the National Security Archive collection.

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her husband's release.\textsuperscript{57} Although Marcos was still unmoved, Aquino's closest allies were beginning to understand the political strategies they would need to use to help free him while cultivating as well a transnational network of supporters, mainly in the U.S. and the Philippines.

After her press conference failed to yield any results, Corazon sent out appeals to American journalists, officials, and others who might help, including Paul Kattenberg.\textsuperscript{58} A Foreign Service officer who had been critical of U.S. policy toward Vietnam as early as 1963, Kattenberg retired from the foreign service in 1972. Concerned about his friend, Kattenberg first wrote Muhammad Ali, who was scheduled to fight the "Thriller in Manila" in October 1975. Kattenberg described the Marcos regime's abuses against Muslims in the South,\textsuperscript{59} where opposition under the direction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had erupted in open warfare after martial law, leaving thousands dead, hundreds of thousands forced into exile, and more than a million displaced through the 1970's, as MNLF forces reached a peak of roughly 30,000 by 1975. In yet another piece of the transnational story, Malaysia's Sabah territory together with Libya provided arms, supplies, and money for the Philippine Muslims. Qaddafi also allowed the MNLF to use Libya as a base from which to lobby other Muslim countries, separately and through the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.\textsuperscript{60} Kattenberg argued that Aquino, if free, would help the Muslim

\textsuperscript{57}Confidential Cable #04275, April 7, 1975, describes the Fraser visit; the non-classified letter to Ford sent April 12, 1975 reveals Lupita's concern; Limited Official Use Cable #04736 describes the lawyers' efforts; and Confidential Cable #04812, April 16, 1975 describes Corazon's press conference. All from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{58}Karnow, p. 397.

\textsuperscript{59}Bonner, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{60}Lela Noble, from Schirmer and Shalom (1987), pp. 193-199. Formed in 1970, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), whose name recalled Spain's colonization and its own struggle against the "Moros", reached a height of about 30,000 in 1973, 1974, and probably the first half of 1975, with external arms and supplies from Sabah and money from Libya's Qaddafi. Far from Manila and often beyond the eye of journalists, it became a frontier war, with thousands killed, hundreds of thousands forced into exile, notably to nearby Sabah, and more than a million displaced

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cause. Nevertheless, Ali went ahead with the fight, defeated his opponent Frazier and publicly praised Marcos as "decent and simple." Ali then walked away with $4.5 million, leaving a legacy that survives today, a paean to consumerism called the Ali Shopping Mall.61

With Aquino still in jail, Kattenberg next wrote to the special assistant in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and to Philip Habib who was then assistant secretary of state for East Asia. He also joined forces with Jones, who learned from Corazon Aquino that the jailed opposition leader would accept exile. Via the embassy in Manila, Kattenberg asked for a letter to this effect from Aquino, then took the letter to the Australian National University to try to procure a position for his friend. Meanwhile, Habib spoke with Ambassador William Sullivan, who had helped conduct the secret war in Laos from 1965 to 1969 and now believed Aquino to be a communist. Together, Habib and Sullivan concluded that it was "not...the time to involve ourselves as mediaries in this case."62 Perhaps the real reason for such intransigence was Kissinger's concurrent desire to secure U.S. bases in the Philippines with a new agreement, a policy concern made urgent in 1975 by the "fall" of Vietnam and Cambodia, the loss of American military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and the normalization of Philippine relations with China.63 Since 1965, Marcos had threatened that he

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61Bonner, p. 152.


63Apparently seeking alternative allies while demonstrating independence from the U.S., Marcos was anxious to establish diplomatic relations with China before the U.S. did and so sent Imelda there to meet with Zhou Enlai in September 1974. China was equally anxious to secure official recognition from its neighbor, and wooed Imelda toward this end, as an unlikely friendship formed between Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and the Philippines' First Lady. For information on Imelda's
might abrogate the bases agreement signed by Macapagal, which allowed the U.S. a 25-year lease set to expire in 1991, unless the U.S. provided adequate compensation. Marcos had then pressed successive U.S. administrations for a new bases agreement, an issue which became more pressing for Marcos in mid-1975 when U.S. congressional hearings on his human rights record came under review, with implications for U.S. aid. U.S. debate on the issue deepened after a December visit by Amnesty International exposed widespread detention and torture of political prisoners.

By 1976, a National Security memorandum acknowledged that what Marcos wanted was more aid. That year, lame duck Kissinger and Carlos Romulo opened negotiations; but these stalled after Marcos rejected an offer of $1 billion over five years. Apparently, Marcos thought he might do better with the next administration. Meanwhile, Aquino abandoned his hunger strike in May 1975 and returned to political activism against Marcos from his jail cell, until he was put into solitary confinement by the end of 1976. For a man of Aquino’s gregarious temperament, such a measure was particularly cruel. Corazon Aquino later remarked that Marcos must have studied her husband well, for he chose

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China visit, see Bonner, pp. 156-160, as well as Limited Official Use Cable #10486, September 21, 1974, and Confidential Airgram A-363, November 7, 2974, both from the National Security Archive collection.

Note that U.S. State Department officials recommended that congressional testimony defend U.S. silence on martial law as a gesture of respect for Philippine sovereignty, somehow overlooking the U.S. role in sustaining the military machinery required to sustain martial law. Note also that Philippine citizens in the U.S. documented attempts by Marcos to prevent congressional testimony regarding his regime. See, in particular, Limited Official Use Cable #08332, June 18, 1975 and an affidavit of Philippine government attempts to bribe congressional witnesses, printed July 10, 1975, both from the National Security Archive collection.

Confidential Cable #17441, December 12, 1975, from the National Security Archive collection.


Karnow, p. 398.

Confidential Cable #06497, May 14, 1975, from the National Security Archive collection.
"exactly the right punishment for him."\textsuperscript{69} Although U.S. and Philippine hard-liners retained control during the first years of martial law, splits were beginning to surface on both sides of the Pacific. In the Philippines, Marcos openly split with General Fidel Ramos in October 1976, when the latter resisted Marcos' plan to lift martial law. In the U.S., losses in Indochina were fueling debates on foreign policy, as the soft-line position gained adherents. U.S. soft-liners had also had a few key successes, including the congressionally-mandated order in 1973 to terminate U.S. assistance to overseas police forces and prisons which began to take effect by 1976, while Philippine supporters of Aquino and other Marcos opponents began to establish ties with the U.S. soft-liners, as the transnational soft-line alliance, long dormant, resurfaced.

\textbf{Carter's Human Rights Agenda}

In 1976, the U.S. was primed for change, and Jimmy Carter, whose foreign policy platform emphasized human rights, was the victor in presidential elections. Though Carter was elected by a narrow margin, his views seemed in harmony with those on Capitol Hill. By the time Carter arrived in D.C., Congress had revised the Foreign Assistance Act, defining a "principal goal" as being human rights, and had created a provision requiring the State Department to submit a report each year on the human rights conditions in countries receiving aid from the U.S., though this was later changed to include all countries, so as not to single out U.S. allies. Congress also elevated the position of coordinator for human rights and humanitarian affairs within the State Department established in 1975 to an assistant secretary rank with a full, independent bureau in 1977. President Carter signed the legislation in August and the bureau was created in November. Moreover, congress defined the bureau's responsibilities, which included preparing human rights reports required by congress, making recommendations to the

\textsuperscript{69}Karnow, p. 397.
Secretary of State and the AID Administrator regarding compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, and performing other responsibilities to promote human rights worldwide. The State Department had fought against the proposal but congressional pressure forced the Department to give the human rights function sufficient staff and prestige to perform the new, more clearly defined functions. The institutionalization of human rights as an element of foreign policy was intended by congress to give human rights a bureaucratic advocate in Washington turf wars, and, though it has faced substantial opposition from older, more established sectors of the bureaucracy, it has nevertheless integrated concern for human rights into foreign policy debates.70

To fill the assistant secretary post, Carter named Patricia Derian, a white woman raised in Mississippi whose human rights training had been in the civil rights movement. Many of Carter's political appointees at State were initially on board with the human rights policy; but defected when the policy soon began to come under public as well as bureaucratic attack as naive and idealistic. The bureau's mission also ran counter to the regional bureaus' traditional policies of nonintervention in the internal affairs of foreign states.71 In the Philippine case, Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, began as an ally72 but became a particularly strident force of opposition. What the U.S. should focus on, the critics claimed, was realpolitik, centering on U.S.

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70 Personal interviews with Lister and Butcher, both of the State Department; Bonner, p. 183; background paper on the history and evolution of the human rights operations from the State Department; and Forsythe, pp. 119-125.

71 Ibid.

72 In Confidential Memorandum #00938, January 20, 1977, from the National Security Archive collection, Holbrooke wrote Warren Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and head of the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, that the time was opportune for the U.S. State Department to pursue human rights reform in the Philippines. Later in the year, however, Holbrooke went to South Korea and chastised John Salzberg, a Quaker staff member of a congressional delegation, for meeting with opponents of martial law there. In 1979, Salzberg was hired by Derian, but Holbrooke successfully lobbied to transfer him to the African section of the human rights bureau. (from Bonner, pp. 188-189)
interests and balance of power, not human rights and the internal politics of allied countries. Resistance grew within the State Department, as career Foreign Service officers and others chafed at the scope of conflict they would have to face worldwide if human rights were truly to become central to American foreign policy. Tenacious and outspoken, Derian brought in new staff, including some traditional foreign service and civil service personnel but also some non-traditional human rights advocates from private groups and congressional staffs. Under Derian’s leadership, the bureau served as an independent monitor of human rights, challenging other State Department bureaus as well as other departments notably Commerce, Defense and Treasury.\textsuperscript{73} Moreover, representatives from the bureau participated in the newly created interagency Arms Export Control Board, which prepared military aid budgets for congress.\textsuperscript{74} It also raised the level of the annual human rights reports from the perfunctory, superficial ones submitted by Kissinger in the last days of his tenure to the widely respected reference sources on human rights they remain today.\textsuperscript{75}

Despite substantial opposition, Derian succeeded in energizing her department, with one noteworthy success at the beginning of her term. In May 1977, Trinidad Herrera, a thirty-five year old organizer in one of Manila’s largest slums, was arrested without charges. Herrera’s work on behalf of the poor had made her well known in the Philippines and among U.S. human rights activists, including Congressman Fraser, who had met Herrera during a visit to the Philippines. A mid-level U.S. embassy official in Manila was informed of the arrest by a Philippine priest. The official then transmitted the information to D.C., which instructed him to follow up on the case. Soon after, he and another embassy official went to Bicutan Rehabilitation Center and found Herrera in a state of near shock, as she described the torture she had endured. When word of

\textsuperscript{73}The above is from Forsythe, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{74}Background paper from the State Department on its human rights operations.

\textsuperscript{75}Forsythe, p. 125.
Herrera's detention reached Fraser's office, he began to make inquiries about her at the State Department. A few days after the embassy officials visited her, Herrera was released. The success was widely heralded in the U.S. press and in subsequent analyses of the Carter administration, becoming a symbol of his human rights policy; but Derian's efforts were soon undermined. In early 1978, Derian attended a chiefs of missions meeting in Hong Kong, which was chaired by her nemesis Richard Holbrooke. It proved a bitter and revealing session, with Derian urging human rights while the ambassadors urged "smooth bi-lateral relations." Only when the venerable Mike Mansfield, then ambassador to Japan, stepped in to support her was a truce called at the meeting, though resistance to her views continued to spread in the diplomatic community.

From Hong Kong, Derian went to Manila. There she threatened Marcos, to the chagrin of Ambassador David Newsom, that the U.S. might register disapproval of human rights abuses by voting against loans from the international development banks. Marcos, usually self-controlled, lost his composure, responding angrily that he would not submit to "dollar diplomacy." Newsom, who had thirty years of experience in the Foreign Service, later claimed he had never witnessed such a heated exchange between an American official and a head of state. Derian next confronted Enrile, who had prepared a flashy presentation complete with slides and charts to be given by polished Philippine military officers. Derian quickly interrupted, posing questions about the thousands imprisoned without having been charged as well as the reports of torture. Enrile dissembled, commenting years later to a Reagan official that the Derian visit had been the only irritant the Marcos regime had ever encountered on the question of human rights. Still, Derian pressed the issue. At a formal embassy party for her, Derian left late in the evening with CIA station chief Herbert Natzke to visit Aquino in jail. Though Natzke railed against Aquino during the ride over, Derian was impressed by Aquino during the meeting, later citing him as "somebody of monumental stature." Derian also met with Carlos Romulo, who had coined MacArthur's "I shall return" proclamation and was now involved in the bases
negotiations. After the meeting, Romulo told reporters she reminded him of the durian, a Southeast Asian fruit with an odor so foul that it is actually banned from some public places. Now Patt Derian became Patt "Durian," as both U.S. and World Bank aid to Marcos remained high despite her threats.\textsuperscript{76}

In fact, World Bank and International Development Association (IDA) loans rose from $268 million in 1976 to $317.5 million a year later and then leaped to $526 million for 1978, see Appendix II.\textsuperscript{77} Secretary of State Cyrus Vance formally registered concern over the human rights violations, but nevertheless approved U.S. support for the World Bank loans.\textsuperscript{78} Though an interagency committee on human rights and foreign assistance continued to press the issue, leading various U.S. officials including Newsom to suggest strategies for improving human rights in the Philippines,\textsuperscript{79} the loans signalled continued U.S. support as well as Derian's weakness, particularly given U.S. influence over World Bank decisions.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76}Derian's itinerary and Philippine reactions to her visit are detailed in Confidential Cable #00719 and Limited Official Use Cable #00720, both sent January 13, 1978, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. See also Bonner, pp. 227-231.

\textsuperscript{77}For an intensive survey of the World Bank role in the Philippines, see Bello, Kinley and Elinson's work based on over 6,000 pages of secret documents leaked by disenchanted staff within the Bank. The loan figures are from World Bank documents the authors compiled, pp. 207-208.

\textsuperscript{78}Confidential Cable #027678, February 2, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{79}See, for example, Confidential Summary of a January 20, 1978 meeting of the interagency committee, followed by Confidential Cable #01301, January 25, 1978, from Newsom to the State Department, suggesting measures to improve human rights and reverse unfavorable U.S. votes on aid. Both are reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{80}For a comprehensive discussion of World Bank operations, see Payer. In brief, the United States is the largest shareholder with a voting power commensurate with its shares, roughly 30-35 percent of the IDA and over 20 percent of the IBRD in 1978. Moreover, as of 1978, although the World Bank was formally ruled by its Board of Governors representing each member nation, that body met only once a year. The day-to-day decisions were made by twenty executive directors, from a cross section of member nations, and the president, who was typically a U.S. citizen, a factor deemed necessary for retaining the confidence of the capital markets and the U.S. government. From 1968 to 1980, the World Bank President was Robert McNamara, who had served as Secretary of Defense under Kennedy and Johnson and emerged from his role in the Vietnam War a committed soft-liner, as described in Kornow (1984).
In an attempt to repair his image and appear to be conforming to the human rights challenges, Marcos declared legislative elections to be held April 7, 1978, the first since martial law.\textsuperscript{81} At stake were 165 seats, though, under new constitutional provisions, Marcos had absolute veto powers over the legislature as well as the authority to dissolve it at any moment, for any reason.\textsuperscript{82} Having been sentenced to death after a military, rather than civilian, trial in November 1977,\textsuperscript{83} Aquino was becoming a focal point of the human rights debate in the U.S. regarding the Marcos regime.\textsuperscript{84} Vance and other U.S. officials urged Marcos via Newsom to release Aquino for the elections.\textsuperscript{85} The Philippine Security Council deliberated but quickly declined to release Aquino, citing his alleged ties to both the CIA and the NPA as risks to national security.\textsuperscript{86} Undaunted, Aquino now campaigned effectively from his jail cell, via his wife Corazon and his young daughter Kris, as the leader of the Lakas ng Bayan Party, Tagalog for "People Power." Laban, as the party came to be known, means "fight"

\textsuperscript{81}The U.S. embassy urged an amendment to the State Department's human rights reports, citing increased political participation as well as "martial law respect for human rights and fair treatment of political prisoners" in Diplomatic Note, February 14, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{82}From Bonner, pp. 231-235.

\textsuperscript{83}On November 25, 1977, a military court sentenced Aquino to death by firing squad. Two days later, his mother filed a petition protesting that her son had not had the opportunity to present evidence. Marcos ordered that the trial be reopened. Though the death sentence still stood, the trial dragged on, granting Aquino, in the process, a stay of execution. From Simons, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{84}Many cables between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Manila throughout the period of Aquino's imprisonment follow the case closely, expressing concern over the issue, its implications for continued U.S. military aid to the Philippines, as well as Marcos' credibility as a leader. See, for example, a spate of cables transmitted during Aquino's trial in November 1977. Members of congress urged Carter to express "shock and outrage" at the decision, see non-classified letter December 1, 1977, but the administration remained quiet on the issue, continuing to work with Marcos to secure the U.S. bases, see Secret Cable #295479 December 10, 1977, all reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{85}Secret Cable #042011, February 17, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{86}Confidential Cable #03127, February 27, 1987 describes the Philippine NSC decision, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
in Tagalog and that was what the opponents of martial law did. They also forged
an alliance with the Manila-Rizal branch of the Communist Party, though the
party’s Central Committee later overruled this, opting instead to hibernate hoping
for greater power in the future.87 Despite Marcos’ control of the media, not to
mention the military, government, and economy, the opposition established such a
broad base of support that the U.S. embassy reported prior to the vote that the
elections would be decided "in the counting and not in the casting of votes."88

Anticipating fraud, Manila residents staged a "noise barrage" the night
before the elections, as church bells pealed, motorists honked horns, families
banged pots and pans, and thousands clogged the streets, to end their silence. As
expected, however, Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, or "New Society" Party,
swept the elections amid widespread allegations from the opposition and foreign
media of fraud. Two days later, several hundred people marched from St.
Theresa College to mass at the nearby Manila Cathedral. Led by priests carrying
a coffin symbolizing the death of democracy, the march was disbanded by
government troops, and over 500 Laban followers were arrested.89 The Marcos
regime did not, moreover, restrict its response to Filipinos. While the U.S.
congress expressed concern that alleged election "irregularities" might damage
U.S.- Philippine relations,90 Marcos used government-controlled Philippine
newspapers to attack "foreign meddling" in human rights and in the elections, and
he complained to U.S. embassy staff about "partisan" coverage from the U.S.

87Thompson, p. 136.

88Confidential Cable #05500, April 6, 1978, requests diplomatic instructions for handling the U.S.
response to the elections, in which massive fraud and manipulation on behalf of Marcos were
anticipated, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

89Confidential Cable # 05513, April 8, 1978, and Limited Official Use Cable #05515, April 10,
1978, describe the Philippine reaction to the elections and the subsequent crackdown by the Marcos
regime. Both are reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. See also Bonner, pp. 237-
239.

90Non-classified Letter, April 21, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.
media, which Marcos believed had favored his opponents.91 One journalist from the New York Times was even threatened with deportation for his reports of electoral fraud.92 U.S. embassy officials concurred, however, with assessments that Marcos had manipulated the vote-counting in order to secure his victory, and they now worried that he might strengthen martial law in response to the apparent groundswell of support for the opposition.93

Meanwhile, a handful of businessmen disadvantageously affected by cronyism together with Jesuit priests with some support from Cardinal Sin, social democrats, and opposition politicians, all key supporters of the still-imprisoned Aquino, had been meeting regularly since 1977 to devise an anti-Marcos strategy, and now began organizing a "third force" -- an alternative to both the communist forces and those of the Marcos regime. An emissary from the group, Eduardo Olaguer, traveled to the U.S. to raise funds from political exiles, including exiled opposition senator Manglapus, who supported the plan for a "third force." Out of this emerged a small, elite transnational organization dubbed the "Light A Fire Movement" for its campaign of non-lethal letter bombs, fires and other primarily symbolic acts of sabotage staged in the Philippines but designed to worry the U.S. government. According to one member, "We were trying to create enough stench here to waft to Washington," in order to press the U.S. to withdraw support from Marcos. Throughout 1979, the group lit a series of fires but received little attention from the censored press. By December 1979, the campaign ended when the Philippine military arrested Olaguer and sixteen others.94

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91 Confidential Cable #05723, April 12, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.
92 Confidential Cable #05513, April 8, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.
93 Secret Cable #05994, April 14, 1978, from the National Security Archive collection.
94 The information for this paragraph is from Thompson, pp. 108-130, which includes personal interviews with several participants of the Light A Fire Movement.
Carter's Unmet Promises

While Carter espoused a new, more moralistic approach to foreign policy, realpolitik challengers retained control, as the Carter administration proved no more willing than Nixon's had been to press Marcos on human rights. What mattered was the security of the U.S. bases, a question left open when Ford left office.\textsuperscript{95} After negotiations with Kissinger stalled in the final months of the Ford administration, the negotiations resumed in 1977. Rhetoric aside, Holbrooke and others at State worked to minimize congressional cuts in security assistance to the Philippines and reassure Marcos that the U.S. continued to back him.\textsuperscript{96} Further, despite Derian's findings, as well as the intense opposition displayed during the Philippine legislative elections, Vice President Walter Mondale agreed to meet with Marcos in Manila in May 1978, just one month after the legislative elections, as the bases issue dangled. While there, Mondale refused to meet with Benigno Aquino, Jr., then signed four aid agreements totalling some $41 million.\textsuperscript{97} Two months later, Imelda arrived in Washington, following a multi-million dollar shopping spree in New York,\textsuperscript{98} to lobby for more aid as part of the bases agreement. Grilled by liberal congressmen such as Father Drinan who asked about persecution of the church, Yvonne Burke (D-CA) who had been concerned \footnotetext{\textsuperscript{95}Secret Memorandum of a Policy Review Committee meeting at the National Security Council, February 22, 1978, discusses the importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines, the status of the negotiations, and strategies for working with congress to secure the bases despite the on-going human rights concerns, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.}

\footnotetext{\textsuperscript{96}For State Department efforts to stem congressional pressures, see Secret Cable \#225624, September 20, 1977. For Holbrooke's meetings with Marcos, see Secret Cables \#230439 and \#230521, both sent September 24, 1977. All reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.}

\footnotetext{\textsuperscript{97}Limited Official Use Briefing Book for the Mondale Visit, printed April 27, 1978, and Secret Briefing Paper, May 1978, both in the National Security Archive collection.}

\footnotetext{\textsuperscript{98}Bonner, pp. 244-250.}
by the Herrera case, Fortney Stark and Leo Ryan both from California districts with sizeable Philippine populations including exiled opposition leaders, and others, Imelda was appalled, later calling the congressmen "barbarians." In an effort to restore relations, Mondale with Holbrooke received Imelda at the White House, treating her as they might a head of state, though debate in D.C. continued to grow.

In fact, the State Department's 1977 human rights report had placed the Marcos regime near the bottom in East Asia, which created much media attention in the U.S. and made Marcos difficult to deal with. Much political wrangling within the State Department, notably between Derian and Holbrooke, attended the preparation of the 1978 report, with the realpolitik contingent urging that the report "commend Marcos" for the progress he was ostensibly making in human rights reform, such as the elections, in spite of the fraud, as well as attempts by Ramos and Enrile to tame the armed forces. Marcos raised the

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99 In Secret Cable #08040, May 25, 1977, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection, the U.S. Embassy advised the State Department that Burke had received reports that Philippine intelligence and military officers were involved in torturing political prisoners. This information was provided to her by the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines and by Friends of the Filipino People, a leftist American organization lobbying against the Marcos regime in the U.S.

100 Limited Official Use Cable #190511, July 27, 1978, and Secret Cable #192106, July 29, 1978, describe Mrs. Marcos' visit with congressional leaders, and U.S. concerns that this might hinder bases negotiations. Both are from the National Security Archive collection.

101 Brands, p. 309.

102 See, for example, Confidential Action Memorandum, June 5, 1978, written by both Derian and Holbrooke describing their failure to agree on military exports to the Philippines as well as munitions control policies. Note that corporations such as Gulf and Western weighed in against Derian, defending their plans to provide armaments to "friendly governments' armed forces." See, for example, Non-classified letter, June 8, 1978. Both are reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

103 See Confidential Cables #001392, January 4, 1978 and #001745, January 5, 1978, detailing Ambassador Newsom's suggested changes, and the subsequent debate with the State Department's Human Rights Bureau. See also Limited Official Use Cable #115030, May 5, 1978, describing a visit to the U.S. by Philippine military officers in which plans to improve human rights are discussed, and Limited Official Use Cable #07691, May 19, 1978, citing measures taken by Ramos and Enrile to enforce new armed forces gun control policies and other attempts to curb human rights violations.
stakes by signing a non-aggression pact with Vietnam, encouraging, as well, members of his government to criticize the bases. This served both to appease Filipino nationalists and to enhance Marcos' negotiating position. Marcos also cut tax-free exemptions for U.S. businesses. Further, the F.B.I. received a tip that General Ver and two other "Liquidator Generals" were plotting to carry out assassinations of Marcos opponents in the U.S., in flagrant violation not only of human rights but also of U.S. efforts to stem such abuses. In November 1978, Ambassador Richard Murphy warned that the bases talks were at a "particularly critical or delicate stage" such that a human rights report like the one prepared in 1977 could have "a serious impact on bases agreement prospects in both the U.S. and the Philippines." Not only might a bad report prompt Marcos to cut off talks, Murphy argued, but it might also dissolve U.S. support for the large aid package any deal would include.

Shortly before the deadline for the human rights report, and with the assistance of Senator Inouye, whose Hawaiian constituency included many Ilocano Filipinos, Marcos accepted $500 million in U.S. military aid over the next five years in exchange for U.S. rights to the bases until 1991. Though it was half what Kissinger had offered, it was the best Carter would offer and Marcos finally agreed. On Christmas Day, 1978, forty-two leaders of the Philippine opposition wrote and signed an open letter condemning Carter's handling of Marcos and the

All are reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.


*Secret Cable, July 14, 1978, from the F.B.I., Wisconsin to other F.B.I. stations nationwide, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.*

*Confidential Cable #19542, November 2, 1978, from Murphy to the State Department, which expresses concern that the State Department's up-coming human rights assessment might "jeopardize military facilities negotiations," reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. See also Brands, p. 309.*

*See Confidential Briefing Memorandum, January 18, 1979, in the National Security Archive collection for an overview of the agreement. See also Bonner, p. 253.*
bases agreement. The group included seven former senators, former President Macapagal, four nuns, two bishops, and others willing to risk imprisonment to voice their opposition. Carter also faced substantial opposition at home, led by Tony Hall (D-OH) who, as a member of the sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, was approached by priests and anti-Marcos Filipinos forced into exile. At their request, he introduced legislation in 1979 to cut $7.9 million in military assistance to Marcos.\textsuperscript{108} Despite the relatively minor cut, Carter and his senior foreign policy team lobbied hard, and successfully, to secure the aid package.\textsuperscript{109}

Realpolitik gained more ground when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance notified Carter in February 1979 that the human rights bureau had mismanaged funds. To remedy the situation, the bureau was reorganized, with the sizeable refugee programs consolidated under a separate office. The human rights bureau fought hard against this but lost in June when the new refugee office was created. This precipitated extensive bureaucratic infighting between the bureau and other segments of the State Department, notably the bureau of management, which now rejected staffing requests and prepared to shrink the human rights function.\textsuperscript{110}

Though realpolitik had won out against the human rights advocates, two events in 1979 were to reopen the debate on the "lessons" of Vietnam and the relative merits of hard-line versus soft-line strategies for addressing internal opposition against U.S. allies. The first was the overthrow of the shah in Iran by muslim fundamentalists led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, despite massive aid to the regime from the U.S. since 1953. Not only did a second oil crisis rock the U.S. economy, but, in November 1979, the U.S. embassy was captured and 53 Americans held hostage by followers of Khomeini.\textsuperscript{111} The second event was the

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\textsuperscript{108}The above is from Bonner, pp. 253-254, and pp. 283-284.

\textsuperscript{109}Brands, p. 311.

\textsuperscript{110}Background paper from the State Department on its human rights operations.

\textsuperscript{111}The above information on Iran is from Combs, pp. 450-453.
overthrow of the U.S.-backed Somoza regime in Nicaragua by the Sandinistas, comprised of moderates and leftists allied since the 1978 assassination of moderate oppositionist/newspaper publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. Carter quickly recognized the Sandinistas, but cut ties in 1980, when the Sandinistas supported guerrillas in El Salvador. The Sandinistas then did exactly as Carter feared, allying with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Meanwhile, the U.S.-backed military regime in El Salvador, in power since a 1977 military coup, was in jeopardy. Carter had cut aid after the coup but by 1979, as the Sandinistas took over Nicaragua and, as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, El Salvador was in crisis. Catholic clergy inspired by liberation theology had long encouraged resistance against the regime, and a revolutionary movement was, by early 1980, burgeconing. Still Carter sought a centrist solution, but all hopes of this ceased on March 24, 1980 when a death squad killed Archbishop Oscar Romero at the altar of his own cathedral, as the revolutionary opposition gained adherents from an outraged populace.\(^{112}\)

Another event in 1979 would, at the same time, intensify U.S. concerns regarding the military bases in the Philippines. When the People's Republic of China invaded Vietnam in February and March 1979, the Soviet Union sent assistance to the Vietnamese. In return, Hanoi allowed the Soviets to use the formerly American naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. This provided the Soviets with a critical link in their chain of support facilities and replenishment anchorages. By the early 1980's, Cam Ranh Bay was the Soviet Union's largest onshore facility beyond its borders, a major staging complex for Soviet Pacific fleet vessels, submarines, and aircraft outside Soviet Northeast Asia. The crucial counter-weight to the Soviet presence were the U.S. facilities in the Philippines, particularly Clark air and Subic naval bases.\(^{113}\)

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\(^{112}\) The above information on Nicaragua is from Combs, pp. 473-475.

\(^{113}\) Gregor and Aganon, pp. 10-32.

As Truman was blamed for the "loss" of China, so too was Carter blamed for the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, the growing threat of revolution in El Salvador, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis. In more liberal times, Carter and congress might have interpreted the overthrow of the shah and Somoza as cautionary tales regarding support of dictators. Instead, 1980 presidential elections saw the Republicans rally hard-liners to back Reagan, amid the continuing embarrassment to Carter of the hostage crisis. Reagan's foreign policy platform was built on the odd logic of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a hard-line anti-communist, former Democrat, and Georgetown professor who argued that "authoritarian" regimes such as Somoza's and the shah's should be supported by the U.S. because they were pro-American and could eventually democratize. "Totalitarian" regimes such as Castro's and the Sandinistas', however, were anti-American, would never yield to democracy, and so should be overthrown.\footnote{See in particular her "Dictatorships and Double Standards," \textit{Commentary}, November 1979.} She scolded Carter's human rights policies, as limited as they were, for leading to revolution in Iran and Nicaragua. Hard-liners in congress, journalism, and academia supported this view, while soft-liners such as Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) countered that "deals with the juntas and dictators and fascists throughout the world in the last thirty years" had failed,\footnote{Bonner, p. 296.} as the debate on the "lessons" of Vietnam and hard-line versus soft-line strategies reopened. Meanwhile, human rights activism accelerated, and this included a growing transnational effort by church organizations to draw international attention to the abuses of authoritarian regimes worldwide, abuses their own members were experiencing. Nevertheless, the hard-liners would soon score a major victory with the election of Reagan.

Carter would have one last success for human rights before leaving office,
however, when he helped secure the release of Ninoy Aquino from prison for heart by-pass surgery in the U.S. in May 1980, though the decision also came at the initiative of Marcos, who feared charges of human rights violations should Aquino die under his care. In an odd footnote to history, Imelda visited Aquino, whom she had once dated, and talked with him for two hours in the Philippine hospital where he was being treated. During the visit, Aquino gave Imelda a gold cross from around his neck, which he had worn throughout the more than seven years of his imprisonment. Subsequently, the cross would hang from the wrist of a statue of the Santo Nino at the Malacanang Palace.\textsuperscript{116} Aquino arrived in the U.S. soon after and underwent successful by-pass surgery. Although he had promised to return to the Philippines after recovering, the growing prospects of a Reagan victory caused him to reconsider, afraid he would again languish in prison or worse. Aquino's many American friends lobbied to secure a fellowship for him at Harvard, anticipating, correctly, that Marcos would yield under such pressure. Professor Samuel Huntington, once ostracized by Harvard students during the Vietnam War for his positions on "forced urbanization" and other hard-line policies, intervened. Now, as Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, he offered Aquino a fellowship, and the Aquinos soon after established residence in Newton, MA.\textsuperscript{117}

For the next three years, as a fellow at Harvard and later at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies, Aquino would broaden his base of support throughout the U.S., particularly in academia, congress, and journalism, as well as in the Filipino-American community. It was a time Corazon Aquino would remember as "three of our happiest years."\textsuperscript{118} Though Imelda warned him

\textsuperscript{116}Confidential Cable #09460, May 15, 1980 describes the Marcos-Aquino negotiations for Aquino's departure as well as the symbolic gift. The cable is reprinted in the National Security Archive collection. See also Bonner, p. 291.

\textsuperscript{117}Personal interview with Huntington, October 1991.

\textsuperscript{118}Personal interviews with Aquino, October 1992.
against political activism while in the U.S., Aquino spoke at the Asia Society in New York on August 4, 1980, and began his U.S. campaign against Marcos when he asked "Is the Filipino worth dying for?" Aquino answered in the affirmative. "Mr. Marcos," he said, "I will face death in the struggle for freedom if you do not heed the voice of conscience and moderation." Inevitably invoking MacArthur, he added, "I shall return." M.I.T. professor Lucian Pye remembers Aquino using his office to call Marcos. "I'd leave the office and come back to find Aquino shouting into the phone," Pye recalls, "but they seemed almost like friends other times." Aquino also strengthened his ties to Manglapus, other Filipinos, and the broader-based lobby seeking a redirection in U.S. policy. As part of this, Aquino, together with Manglapus and other exiles helped an American named Steve Psinakis, who was married to a daughter of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., organize a successor to the Light A Fire Movement. Called the April 6 Movement, for the noise barrages that had preceded the 1978 elections, the new movement launched a Manila bombing campaign to destabilize the Marcos government in August 1980, just months before the U.S. presidential elections. If the bombings had any effect at all, however, it was to raise concern among U.S. officials that the moderate opposition was indeed radical, as Marcos had long alleged. Moreover, the bombings provided Marcos with a new excuse for prolonging martial law and widening his arrests of moderate opposition figures.

Ultimately, Aquino's exile, though a minor nod by the U.S. government in the direction of human rights, would have an unprecedented impact on the Marcos regime, as will be described below. In 1980, however, the April 6

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119 Text of the speech is reprinted in Limited Official Use Cable #03061, August 6, 1980, from the National Security Archive collection. See also Karnow, p. 400.

120 Personal interview with Pye, August 1992.

121 Information on the April 6 Movement is from Thompson, pp. 108-130.

122 Confidential Cables #20592, October 21, 1980, and #20813, October 22, 1980, from the National Security Archive collection.
Movement's bombing campaign sounded alarms about the militancy of Aquino, Manglapus and the others, undermining as well the credibility of the moderate opposition within U.S. official circles. After the bombings, Marcos asked the Carter administration to introduce an extradition treaty so that he could have his opponents abroad extradited.\textsuperscript{123} Carter refused, but, the November elections ended the soft-line experiment, as limited as it was, ushering in one of the most hard-line U.S. administrations of the entire Cold War era, more ideological than purely strategic in its opposition to communism. In fact, just one month after the U.S. elections, in December 1980, three American nuns and a missionary were killed in El Salvador, an event which the Reagan administration would soon dismiss, alleging that the nuns had been aiding the communists, a charge known to be false.\textsuperscript{124} It was, indeed, a new day for dictators.

From Carter to Reagan: Human Rights Cedes to the Kirkpatrick Doctrine

On January 17, 1981, after much hype from the American press, Marcos officially lifted martial law, although eight years of martial law had institutionalized his control of the economy, the press, the military, and the political system. As one Filipino politician quipped, "Marcos has lifted everything else around here, so why not lift martial law." In fact, the announcement, which came just three days before Reagan's inauguration and one month before a visit from Pope John Paul II, did little for Philippine democracy. A few months prior to the announcement, Marcos had enacted legislation granting himself martial law powers even after lifting the decree. A U.S. embassy report acknowledged that "Marcos is tired of the martial law label and wants to rid himself of it - but not to

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124}Bonner. Note that Bonner was fired from the \textit{New York Times} for his reporting from El Salvador, deemed too biased for its depiction of El Salvadoran government human rights violations in the countryside. The conflict between Bonner and the \textit{New York Times} remains unresolved, and his by-line once again graces the paper periodically from far-flung locales.

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the extent of giving up essential powers." After lifting martial law, Marcos introduced new constitutional amendments providing for a six-year presidential term with the right of unlimited succession and presidential power to name a successor as well as to dissolve the legislature. He then held a constitutional plebiscite on April 7, for which he controlled all media coverage and electoral monitoring systems. Not surprisingly, his constitution achieved voter approval levels as high as 99 percent in some regions, 80 percent overall.\footnote{The text of the proclamation lifting martial law is in Unclassified Cable #01479, January 19, 1981, while the embassy assessment is in Confidential Cable #01316, January 16, 1981, both from the National Security Archive collection. See also Bonner, pp. 295-315.}

He then announced presidential elections for June, but the moderate opposition, anticipating fraud, refused to put up a candidate and allied with the leftist National Democratic Front in a nationwide boycott campaign.\footnote{Thompson, 137. Horacio Morales, leader of the National Democratic Front, was less Maoist than CPP founder Jose Maria Sison, and sought a coalition, or united front, with the moderates. The 1981 boycott campaign was the culmination of several months of united front organizing, according to Thompson, from David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines."} Due to extensive government manipulation of the elections, it is difficult to know how effective the boycott campaign was. One estimate, however, is that as many as 50 percent of Manila voters declined to cast ballots.\footnote{Wurfel, p. 252.} For the first time since martial law, politicians active in the opposition had abandoned electoral struggle and had allied with the left. It was a striking indication of the moderate opposition's growing radicalism and disillusionment both with Marcos and with the prospects for a democratic transition under his regime since the 1978 election sham. Even former Senator Salvador Laurel, son of Japanese collaborator Jose Laurel, had abandoned his hopes of working with Marcos after running for a parliamentary seat in 1978 on Marcos' KBL ticket, only to be nudged out by Marcos cronies running in the same region, also on the KBL ticket. In preparation for the 1981 presidential elections, Laurel had helped forge in August 1980 an alliance between the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties, with support from
the exiled Aquino, called the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); but when Marcos refused to accredit the party, Laurel too boycotted. Marcos nevertheless claimed voter turnout of 90 to 95 percent, and declared himself the victor. Despite the sham, Vice President Bush attended the inauguration ceremonies, which included a rendition of Handel's Messiah. "And He shall reign forever and ever." Bush even toasted Marcos for his "adherence...to the democratic processes," as the Reagan administration fully embraced Marcos. Again, concern for the bases was paramount, with a new round of negotiations scheduled for 1983 approaching.

The fissures within the U.S. policy establishment were, however, widening. Amid wholesale firings in State, Defense, and elsewhere, Reagan hoped to rid the bureaucracy of the so-called "Carterites." He also named Ernest Lefever as his nominee to head the human rights bureau, though Lefever had publicly advocated erasing human rights legislation from the books and was seen by many as wanting, like Kirkpatrick, to subsume all concerns for human rights under a simple anti-communist formula, arguing that to do otherwise was to "trivialize" human rights. Moreover, evidence surfaced indicating that Lefever had accepted money from the Republic of South Africa to circulate views favorable to that government. Under serious attack from human rights advocates in the State Department and outside of government, as well as from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which voted 13-4 against Lefever, the nomination was withdrawn. George Lister, a long-time human rights advocate within the State Department, described the Reagan administration's early attempts to undo the State Department's human rights

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128The original name was the United Democratic Organization (UDO) but was changed in 1982 to the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). From Thompson, pp. 143-144.

129Bonner, pp. 309-311.

130A Confidential Memorandum, May 26, 1981, from the State Department recommends high level U.S. participation at the inauguration in order to help prepare "the atmosphere" for the upcoming bases negotiations. This position is reiterated in a Secret Memorandum to Bush from the State Department, June 18, 1981, both reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

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operations; but, he concludes, "We won!"\textsuperscript{131}

Elliott Abrams, also from the far right, was named instead. Abrams helped to reinvigorate the bureau, which was "in the doldrums" when he arrived. Reaffirming human rights as an "essential" component of foreign policy, Abrams outlined a two-track implementation strategy involving a positive track to herald achievements by "friendly democratic" regimes and a negative track to respond to abuses by such regimes but only in the broader context of U.S. interests. In short, where human rights violations were a problem, U.S. interests would take priority. Under Abrams, the human rights bureau became less independent, more integrated into the broader Reagan-Kirkpatrick foreign policy, as Abrams endorsed the administration's support for the governments of El Salvador, South Africa, and others under attack from independent human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. Congressional human rights activist Donald Bonker complained that Abrams served less as a spokesman for human rights than as a spokesman for Reagan's hard-line, anti-communist foreign policy.\textsuperscript{132} Meanwhile, the "Carterites" and other human rights activists brought in not as political appointees but as civil servants during the Carter administration who remained during the Reagan years,\textsuperscript{133} together with human rights advocates and others in the bureaucracy concerned by the Manichaean simplicity of Reagan's hard-line anti-communism posed an on-going soft-line challenge centered on concern for human rights.

\textsuperscript{131}Personal interview with Lister, December 1994. Note that Butcher and others in regional bureaus refer derisively to the bureau by a rough acronym -- "drivel," exposing the on-going conflicts between the human rights bureau and the regional ones.

\textsuperscript{132}Information for this paragraph is from Forsythe, pp. 119-136, while the quote from Bonker is from Christopher Madison, "Foreign Policy: Human Rights - Again," \textit{National Journal} 18, May 1, 1982, pp. 763-66.

\textsuperscript{133}Although civil servants are ostensibly apolitical, those brought in under one administration and remain when that administration changes, may still have an ideological, professional, personal or other loyalty to the initial administration. This is a topic for future research; but it is hypothesized that such loyalty would be particularly true in emotionally-charged issues like human rights.

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Human Rights Violations under Marcos and Reagan's Foreign Policy

As fissures widened in the U.S., so too did Marcos face growing dissent from within his administration, particularly the military. There, Marcos had appointed his close ally and former chauffeur, now General, Fabian Ver, to serve as Armed Forces Chief of Staff in 1981, bypassing Philippine Constabulary head Fidel Ramos. Suspecting disloyalty, Marcos had also removed Defense Minister Enrile from the chain of command. Fearing assassination, Enrile then created a 200-man security force, essentially an army within the army, to defend himself against Ver, providing his troops with heavy artillery and extensive training by foreign mercenaries. Enrile’s forces would later form the core of a movement within the military seeking to professionalize the increasingly corrupt and ineffectual institution, one manifestation of which was a rise in human rights violations by undisciplined, "trigger happy" soldiers. Though Enrile had helped lead the country into martial law, had been a key force in maintaining it, and had profited personally, probably more than any other cabinet member, a fissure between Marcos and Enrile now formed.

When Pope John Paul II visited the Philippines in February 1981, he met with Muslim guerrilla leaders, and decried human rights violations but advised the clergy and religious leaders to avoid involvement in political and social issues. Despite the pope’s caution, the entourage of reporters following him on his travels throughout the Philippines spotlighted the poverty and human rights abuses in the countryside, leading Marcos to publicly denounce the Western

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134 Thompson, p. 149.
135 Simons, p. 29.
136 Confidential Cable #03687, February 13, 1981, from the National Security Archive collection.
137 Limited Official Use Cable #03753, February 18, 1981, from the National Security Archive collection.
press' attention to such issues. When confronted with human rights reports from the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International, Marcos simply claimed that the reports were not verifiable. On July 7, Cardinal Sin, until then circumspect about Marcos, publicly condemned the political violence and government corruption in an interview with UPI and Agence France Presse. Meanwhile, the Philippine left cited the church as being in the forefront of its campaigns. When a massacre on the island of Samar gained international attention from the media by October, the U.S. embassy acknowledged that the event lowered the credibility of the military while lending credence to the human rights reports Marcos had persistently challenged. The Philippine government alleged that the massacre was the work of defectors from the military. By the end of October, however, Secretary of State Alexander Haig notified the U.S. embassy in Manila that media coverage of the massacre had damaged U.S. public opinion, and that Marcos should be advised to expect congressional hearings on the issue.

Haig was right. In November, Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY) held hearings on the human rights abuses in the Philippines, and the implications for security assistance to the Philippine Constabulary. By the end of November, others in congress were urging that the U.S. deny law enforcement aid to the Philippines. Meanwhile, ex-patriot Filipino opponents of Marcos throughout the U.S. were banding together to raise American public awareness of Philippine


139 Personal interview with Lister, December 1994.

140 Guerrero, p. 114.

141 Confidential Cable #290942 sent October 31, 1981, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

142 Limited Official Use Cable #27704, November 23, 1981 describe State Department concerns regarding the Bonker/Solarz hearings and spreading congressional opposition to law enforcement aid to the Marcos regime, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
issues, to continue to challenge the Marcos regime despite the lifting of martial law, and to lobby for a change in U.S. policy toward Marcos. Moderates like Aquino and Manglapus now formed a tentative alliance with leftist groups such as the Philippine Solidarity Network and the Anti-Martial Law Coalition (Philippines). Moreover, the anti-Marcos Filipino lobby in the U.S. worked with disillusioned World Bank staffers who systematically leaked reams of documents on World Bank loans to the Philippines, exposing the corruption and ties to Marcos.\(^{143}\) When Aquino and the others held a press conference to release the information and discuss the lifting of martial law, Haig found the moderate-left alliance "bizarre."\(^{144}\) In an unclassified cable sent a week later, however, the Philippine News Agency reported that Aquino had been discomfited by issues raised by the leftists at the press conference, yet the continued repression by Marcos of both moderates and leftists encouraged their continued alliance.\(^{145}\) In fact, even exiled opponents of Marcos based in the U.S. were not safe from abuse, as new FBI reports disclosed in August and September 1981 that Marcos agents were scattered throughout the U.S., notably in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York City, where Filipino opposition was greatest.\(^{146}\)

An indication that tensions within the U.S. government were spreading came in April 1982 when a report written by Gilbert Sheinbaum, the political counselor at the Cebu consulate in the Philippines' Visayan islands, leaked to the press. Sent just one month prior to a scheduled state visit to the U.S. by the Marcoses, Sheinbaum painted a much darker portrait of Philippine conditions than either Marcos or Reagan admitted. Sheinbaum described one city where the

\(^{143}\) Bello, Kinley and Elinson (1982) and personal interview with Bello, November 1993.

\(^{144}\) Confidential Cable #019298, January 24, 1981, from the National Security Archive collection.

\(^{145}\) Unclassified Cable #02528, January 30, 1981, from the National Security Archive collection.

\(^{146}\) See for example Confidential Cable from the F.B.I. in Philadelphia to other branches nationwide, sent August 17, 1981, describing Philippine intelligence officers in the U.S. and their diplomatic covers, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
mayor was allowing gambling to "flourish" while the Philippine Constabulary was "benefitting financially." Elsewhere, a governor complained about the "crime and corruption" of the military. Even more damaging, Sheinbaum described how Marcos cronies forced sales to purchase vast tracts of land for their sugar and other enterprises. Sheinbaum also described a church leader threatened with deportation because of a confrontation over human rights abuses with Constabulary officers in the Mindanao province of Davao. Further, he described the link between the deteriorating economic, political, and human rights conditions with the growth of the New People's Army, and explicitly named the Constabulary and the military as key contributors to the human rights crisis. When the report leaked, the only major paper to cover it was the Washington Post, and the State Department reacted less to the corruption in the Philippines than to the leak of the information to the media. That it leaked at all, however, especially just one month prior to the Marcos visit, indicates that someone, probably in the State Department, broke ranks to get the story about the Marcos regime's venality out via the U.S. press, much to the ire of Marcos and Reagan.147

Creeping State Capitalism and Other Forms of Cronyism

By September 1982, the Marcoses arrived in the U.S. for their highly coveted state visit, the first since 1965. Though they initially complained about the Sheinbaum report to new Secretary of State George Shultz, after Haig resigned over conflicts with Philip Habib on Israeli policy toward Lebanon,148 U.S.

147 Confidential Airgram A-3, April 13, 1982, from the National Security Archive collection. See also Bonner, pp. 323-324.

148 The conflict centered on hard-line versus soft-line approaches to the growing crisis generated by the Palestine Liberation Organization's sanctuary in Beirut. While Habib urged the U.S. to support diplomatic and other soft-line efforts, Haig dissented, arguing that continued hard-line pressure was needed to encourage the PLO to negotiate. Haig's departure was a blow for the hardliners. (From Shultz, pp.14-15)
officials encouraged the Marcoses to focus instead on the clear support from Reagan that the visit signalled.\textsuperscript{149} Three months prior to the visit, Imelda's brother, Kokoy Romualdez, was named Ambassador to the U.S. to make all preparations. He hired public relations firms to cultivate U.S. journalists. He bought a restaurant in Georgetown and he bribed and bused in Filipinos to wave the Philippine flag at Andrews Air Force Base and on the mall as the Marcoses arrived. The visit, carefully scripted, was designed in part to strengthen ties with the Reagan administration and in part to show Filipinos how loved their leader was in the U.S. Even the Reagan administration took special precautions to ensure the visit's success, including the dispatch of officials to Aquino in Boston to warn him not to do anything that might embarrass Reagan or Marcos.\textsuperscript{150} Following the visit, Reagan nearly doubled Carter's aid package, granting Marcos $900 million over a five-year period, though Reagan, like his predecessors, would need to secure congressional support each year during the annual budget debates.\textsuperscript{151}

Still, opposition expanded in the Philippines and, while Reagan remained a Marcos ally, U.S. analysts began to warn of "creeping state capitalism," the title of a 1983 U.S. embassy report written by Ambassador Michael Armacost during a visit by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz. The report outlined Marcos' control of the steel, mining, and banking industries as well as the growing political opposition from the private sector. It detailed how the government owned or controlled over 300 companies, many formerly private, built with government funds, then taken over when they began to fail. For instance, Rodolfo Cuenca had built highways with the engineering equipment provided back in 1966 ostensibly for troops to Vietnam; but he was on the verge of bankruptcy by the early 1980's. Marcos ordered government banks to convert

\textsuperscript{149}Bonner, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{150}Simons, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{151}Karnow, p. 401.
Cuenca’s loans and loan guarantees, worth over $1 billion, into equity, and Cuenca thereafter thrived. In another case, a Chinese banker named Dewey Dee fled the Philippines in 1981, leaving a crumbling empire and some $80 to $100 million in debts. Manila banks, in a panic, refused to roll over short-term loans, and several Marcos cronies, including Disini and others, faced bankruptcy. To bail them out, Marcos spent some $3 billion by 1983 to sustain his cronies, while the general economy reeled. Moreover, the report noted, the government controlled 75 to 80 percent of all of the country’s financial assets, through government banks and banks run by such cronies as sugar baron Roberto Benedicto and Defense Minister Enrile. Meanwhile, the Ex-Im Bank supplied an additional $204.5 million for Westinghouse’s nuclear power project, now projected to cost $1.89 billion at the taxpayer’s expense.

Moreover, reports from the embassy in Manila increasingly cited human rights violations, the break-down of democratic institutions, corruption in the military, and the growing strength of the revolutionary opposition which was now drawing support from traditionally moderate sectors of society, including segments of the church, the military, and the oligarchy. The primary response remained, however, repression, as even foreign nationals, notably clergy from the U.S. as well as Australia and Europe, were targeted by the military. Though the embassy began urging economic and other reforms as an alternative response to revolutionary pressures, noting the link between human rights violations by the military and the growing militancy of the opposition, hard-liners still held

182 From Karnow, pp. 385-386, and Bonner, p. 328.

183 Limited Official Use Cable, #09092, April 14, 1983, from the National Security Archive collection.

184 Bonner, p. 328.

185 “Action Against Clergy Suspected of Radical Activities,” Confidential Cable #2570, October 15, 1982, from the National Security Archive collection.

186 See, for example, Confidential Cable #17127, July 14, 1982, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
sway. Of central concern, once again, was yet another round of bases negotiations scheduled for 1983. Within the U.S., hard-liners in the Reagan administration controlled U.S. foreign policy; but the human rights lobby, focused mainly on U.S. support for the contras in Nicaragua and military regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala with primarily ex-patriot Filipinos focusing on the Marcos regime’s abuses, helped draw attention to the moral concerns raised by hard-line policies. Recent revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, moreover, strengthened soft-line arguments that such policies were also strategically flawed. Aquino apparently sensed the growing U.S. concern for human rights, understanding as well the damage his involvement in the April 6 Movement’s bombing campaigns had done to his image in the U.S. Influenced by the movie Ghandi, Aquino now proclaimed his faith in non-violence, expressed his hopes that Marcos would step down voluntarily, and made preparations for a return from his three years in exile in the U.S., despite repeated attempts by the Marcoses to persuade him not to return.

Was Marcos, with U.S. assistance, going to make the same mistake that Spain had made in the 1890’s when, by punishing moderates and revolutionaries equally harshly, the two movements allied? The answer to this question was swift and brutal. On August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino arrived at the Manila airport, though he had been warned by Imelda, Enrile and others not to return to the Philippines. Aquino had shrewdly invited several foreign correspondents to accompany him. These included Ken Kashiwahara, who was married to Aquino’s

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157 Kline and Worthen.

158 Personal interview with Bello, November 1993.

159 Thompson.

160 Aquino managed to obtain a passport in early August then traveled to the Philippines, stopping enroute to meet with the sultan of Johore who was soon to become king of Malaysia. Aquino had become friends at Harvard with the sultan and now hoped to enlist his aid in settling the on-going Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao. Because the Marcos regime disputed Malaysia’s claim to the island of Sabah, Aquino’s visit was seen by Marcos as a Malaysian bid to undermine his regime. From Simons, p. 30.
sister Lupita and worked for ABC-TV in San Francisco; Jim Laurie, ABC correspondent in Tokyo; Max Vanzi of UPI; Sandra Burton, Time magazine correspondent in Hong Kong; Katsuo Ueda of Japan's Kyodo news agency; Togo Tajika of Tokyo Broadcasting System; and Kiyoshi Wakamiya, a free-lance journalist. Upon landing, low-ranking military officials rushed onto the plane to escort Aquino off, barring all others from exiting. A tape recorder captured the confusion that followed, as the escorts shouted, in rapid Tagalog, "Here he comes, I'll do it...let me shoot." Clad in white, Aquino had not yet stepped onto the tarmac, when he was shot in the head from behind, his body sprawling in a heap of white cloth and red blood. Some 30,000 fans waited outside the airport, waving yellow ribbons to cheer Aquino's return from the U.S. after "three long years." They were among the first to hear the news. Though reports of Marcos' human rights abuses had been reaching the U.S. for years, the Aquino assassination was widely covered in the U.S. and alerted his well-placed friends to the extent, and perhaps the reality, of the problem. It also threatened to bond the moderate with the revolutionary opposition, as Chamorro's death had in Nicaragua.

Conclusion

From the 1972 declaration of martial law through the 1983 assassination of Aquino, hard-liners in the U.S. retained control of policy towards the Philippines. This was due primarily to U.S. dependence upon Marcos for access to the U.S. military bases, a dependence which rose during the Vietnam war and, again, after the 1975 loss of Cam Ranh Bay and the subsequent transfer of these facilities in 1979 to the Soviets. Throughout his regime, Marcos used the bases to secure high levels of economic and military aid, and then used the aid to gain control of the

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161 Simons, pp. 31-34.

162 From the song "Tie a Yellow Ribbon." The idea for the ribbons is thought to have come from the American yellow ribbon campaign to bring home the American hostages held in Iran, from Simons, p. 44. The figure of 30,000 is from Komisar, p. 5.
economy and the political system, while expanding the capacity of the military as a hard-line instrument for containing opposition. Nevertheless, the human rights violations, "crony capitalism," and other manifestations of the Marcos regime's corruption created deep pockets of opposition within the military, church, oligarchy, and other traditional sources of Philippine power, as well as in the countryside, as both moderate and revolutionary opposition grew. Silenced at home, exiled opposition leaders such as Manglapus and Aquino also mobilized domestic U.S. opposition to Marcos, particularly among the roughly one million Filipinos in the U.S. and the even larger Filipino-American community. Following Watergate and the revolutions in Indochina, Iran and Nicaragua despite massive U.S. hard-line intervention, segments of the U.S. foreign policy establishment had become receptive to such opposition, as soft-liners gained a toehold vis-a-vis hard-liners, notably in congress and in the State Department. Thus, a combination of domestic Philippine, domestic U.S., international, and transnational forces contributed to the steady rise of U.S. and Philippine soft-liners, as well as the Filipino moderate and revolutionary opposition after 1972, despite the continued predominance until 1983 of the hard-liners.

All of these opponents of the Marcos regime gradually began to work together after 1972, using transnational strategies to undermine Marcos both at home and in the U.S. They operated trans nationally because U.S. support was crucial to Marcos' ability to sustain his authoritarian rule. After 1983, however, U.S. soft-liners grew concerned about the possibility of a moderate-left alliance. Working with Filipino soft-liners from within the Marcos administration as well as moderates displaced by martial law, U.S. soft-liners would now actively cultivate a transnational soft-line alliance in an effort to avert revolution through democratic rather than military means. As the next chapter will show, the transnational soft-liners would encourage military, economic, and political reforms within the Philippines, while helping to redirect U.S. support from Marcos to a nascent moderate alternative. In sum, the soft-line view within U.S. official circles that hard-line policies, and their attendant human rights violations, increased rather
than decreased the threat of revolution gained ground from 1972 to 1983. Concurrent defections from moderate Filipinos displaced by Marcos as well as by former hard-liners from within his administration created the possibility for a transnational soft-line alliance, a possibility which both U.S. officials and Filipinos, in the U.S. and in the Philippines, exploited. These soft-liners increasingly understood that a moderate, non-revolutionary solution to the Philippine crisis would come neither from purely domestic Philippine forces nor from purely U.S. forces, but, rather, would have to be transnational. As the next chapter will show, it was the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr. which catalyzed formerly disparate groups of soft-liners and moderate oppositionists in the U.S. and in the Philippines into a coordinated alliance actively seeking a non-revolutionary, democratic alternative to Marcos.

Overview

This chapter examines the transnational processes after 1983 which brought the Marcos regime to its dramatic conclusion on February 25, 1986. Why, the chapter asks, did the U.S. withdraw support from Marcos? What implications did this hold for Philippine prospects for a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule? Why, moreover, was the transition democratic, not authoritarian from the right or revolutionary from the left? The chapter argues that U.S. defectors from the hard-line foreign policy strategies which had predominated since World War II together with Philippine defectors from the Marcos regime, formed a transnational soft-line alliance following the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr. Seeking to contain both revolutionary opposition and rightist extremism through economic, military, and political reform, while isolating the moderate from the revolutionary opposition, the soft-liners unseated a similarly transnational alliance of hard-liners who were failing to contain revolution through repression. Far from quelling opposition, the repression, exemplified by the Aquino assassination, was radicalizing the moderates. Though Reagan and his inner circle of hard-liners in the U.S. argued until the last moments of the Marcos regime that the only alternative to Marcos was communism, that the only way to secure U.S. military bases and other U.S. interests in the Philippines was to continue to support Marcos, a growing cadre of soft-liners in the U.S. and in the Philippines disagreed. Together, they helped cultivate a moderate alternative to both, initially pressing Marcos to reform, then, when he did not comply, undermining his support in the U.S. while cultivating a moderate Filipino alternative and at the same time creating legitimate political space for them to lead a democratic transition in the Philippines.

The chapter first describes the Filipino response to the Aquino assassination, its political and economic impact, and the growth of both
revolutionary and moderate opposition to Marcos. The chapter then describes the
U.S. debates on policy toward the Philippines, and the growing concern among
U.S. soft-liners that Filipino moderates, if denied a democratic alternative to
Marcos, might ally with the revolutionaries, with the increasingly real possibility of
a Sandinista-like revolution. The chapter then describes the transnational
processes by which U.S. and Filipino soft-liners worked together to avert
revolution through political and economic reform rather than military repression.
Using transnational strategies to tilt the domestic balance of power within the
Philippines away from both leftist revolutionary and rightist authoritarian forces
toward moderate democrats, the soft-liners undermined Marcos' viability at home
as well as his crucial network of support within the U.S. In this way, the
transnational soft-liners forced the withdrawal of U.S. support from Marcos, which
had long sustained him through a brutal period of authoritarian rule, heralding
the end of the Marcos regime. As the chapter will demonstrate, though only a
few undid democracy in 1972, it took the ingenuity, courage and commitment of
many, working in the Philippines and in the U.S. for years, to reestablish it.

A Fallen Hero: The Philippine Response to the Aquino Assassination

Aquino, like Rizal before him, achieved instant martyrdom as thousands
lined up daily to pay their last respects at his wake. His mother chose not to
clean the blood from his face, so that all who saw him would understand the
brutality of the murder. Now, the three colors of the Philippine flag -- blue, yellow
and red -- exploded. While the Marcoses retained their retinue of "blue ladies,"
sycophants dressed in blue butterfly-sleeve dresses, Corazon Aquino returned
from the United States on August 24 and adopted yellow, for the yellow ribbons
that had greeted her husband at the airport, as the color of her mourning and a
symbol of moderate opposition. Meanwhile, revolutionary slogans scrawled in red
paint proliferated in the countryside and in the cities. On the day of the funeral,
even the business community expressed their indignation, unfurling a yellow and

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black banner from a Manila office building which read: Ninoy Aquino - Once a Name, Now a Legend. Massive crowds chanting "Ninoy, Ninoy" and "Hindi ka nagiisa," Tagalog for "You are not alone," accompanied the hearse on its seventy-five mile journey from Manila to Aquino's home province of Tarlac. The body was then transported back to Manila, where hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, joined the eighteen-mile funeral procession, singing "Ang Bayan Ko," or "My Country." Written during the revolution against Spain, the song describes a caged bird struggling to fly. At the funeral, attended by three thousand including U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost, Cardinal Sin eulogized Aquino and criticized the Marcos regime but also appealed to Filipinos for peace. With only a limited number of unarmed police in attendance, the crowds complied.

The man who had once been disappointed at the silence accompanying his arrest in 1972 now, in death, launched a wave of protest marches and public rallies, as the Manila middle class became politicized. The growing sense was, as one Filipino in the funeral procession said, "If this, this outright murder can happen to a man of the national and international status of Aquino, then what can happen to ordinary people...what about the rest of us?" Fearing harsh reprisals for even moderate opposition, moderates and revolutionaries began to ally. In the sea of yellow worn by those in the funeral procession were dots of red as well.¹ From 1969 when the NPA formed through 1985, it expanded from a few hundred to roughly 16,000 regulars, a million active supporters, and a broader base under the leftist umbrella group’s National Democratic Front (NDF) estimated at ten million nationwide, or roughly twenty percent of the population.²

¹The above information is a compilation from Simons, pp. 1-44, and from selected declassified U.S. Embassy cables from Manila to the State Department during the period surrounding the funeral, notably Secret Cable #22047, August 25; Confidential Cable #22655, August 30; hourly cables sent on the day of the funeral, August 31; and one describing Cardinal Sin’s eulogy criticizing the Marcos government, #22696, also sent August 31, 1983. See also Confidential Cable #21920 for Armacost’s decision to attend the funeral despite strong pressure not to from Marcos. All from the National Security Archive collection.

²Compiled from Ibon Data Bank figures.

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The movement sought removal of the U.S. bases, improved human rights, and a restructuring of the Philippine economy, involving land reform and restrictions on U.S. investments. The left's strength was greatest in the countryside where roughly 70% of all Filipinos lived in 1985. Inequality in land ownership, a longstanding source of conflict in the countryside, was a driving force in the left's rural popularity, with 1985 figures indicating that about 80 percent of the land belonged to only 20 percent of the population. Land reform was a key rallying cry for the left.

The left was also growing in response to human rights violations by the military. According to Stephen Bosworth, who succeeded Armacost as U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, serving from April 1984 to April 1987, longstanding hard-line strategies were increasingly seen as fueling not quelling revolutionary fervor, particularly in the countryside, since "the only effective presence the Philippine government had in many parts of the country was the military and the military's behavior was such that they were alienating people from the government." In fact, strategic hamletting programs and aerial bombings, both partially financed by the United States, were being conducted in remote regions of the country, leaving thousands homeless or dead. Though statistics from the countryside are both difficult to find and unreliable, after 1977, human rights violations were recorded, due in part to encouragement from the U.S. State Department's human rights bureau and the embassy in Manila as well as Amnesty International and other non-governmental international and

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\(^3\)From personal interviews in the Philippine countryside with peasants and NPA organizers, May 1984 to February 1986. See also Jones' excellent account of the NPA from the inside, as well as Chapman's and Kessler's.

\(^4\)From rough estimates made by the Philippine Department of Agrarian Reform as cited in Ibon Primer Series (1988:15).

\(^5\)From lectures by Jose Marie Sison, founder of the Philippine Communist Party, and Dante Buscayno, former head of the New People's Army, in April 1986 after their release from prison.

\(^6\)Personal interview with Bosworth, March 1989.
Philippine human rights organizations. According to the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a leading Philippine human rights organization sponsored by the Catholic church, over 21,000 people were arrested for political reasons from 1977 through 1985, while over 700 had disappeared since 1975 and more than 2,400 had died, also since 1975, in extrajudicial killings known as "salvagings."

Two leaders from the left later acknowledged the link between human rights violations by the military and the growth of the NPA.8

The political instability following the Aquino assassination, as well as the rampant crony capitalism, also deepened an emerging economic crisis, as investor confidence plummeted, leading to massive capital flight estimated at more than $10 billion,9 and a downward spiral in the economy.10 Under international scrutiny following the Aquino assassination, evidence surfaced in late 1983 that the Philippine Central Bank had been falsifying estimates of its foreign debt, overstating the country's foreign reserves in order to cover the Marcos regime's mismanagement. This revelation further eroded investor confidence. To restore his standing with the International Monetary Fund and foreign banks, Marcos was forced to impose rigid import controls. By October 1983, he also devalued the peso 21 percent against the dollar. Soon after, the Philippine government was forced to suspend principal payments on its foreign debt of over $25 billion. With inflation reaching 60 percent by early 1984,11 real GNP fell by 5.5 percent that

7From Kessler, p. 137, from Task Force Detainees of the Philippines.

8Personal conversations with Father Edicio de la Torre, Spring 1987, and Dante Buscayno, April 1986.

9The figure is a rough estimate for the period surrounding the assassination and is from Dr. Bernardo Villegas, a leading Philippine economist, as cited in Simons, p. 172.

10In Secret Cable #23099 sent from the U.S. Embassy in Manila to the State Department on September 6, 1983, a withdrawal of foreign investments from the Philippines was predicted. From the National Security Archive collection.

11Thompson, p. 166.
year and by an additional 4 percent in 1985.\textsuperscript{12} The Filipino business community was hard hit, as urban land prices, stock markets, and corporate profits tumbled. As the economic crisis hit the urban middle class, which had long been insulated from the economic concerns in the countryside, moderate opposition burgeoned. The anger of the business community exploded in a "confetti revolution" on September 14, 1983, when over 100,000 well-dressed office workers marched through Makati, Manila's Wall Street, as tons of shredded yellow paper fell from the windows of surrounding skyscrapers. This set the tone for subsequent weekly anti-Marcos rallies. Meanwhile, formerly pro-Marcos business leaders from Makati and from the Chinese community began secretly contributing funds to the opposition.\textsuperscript{13}

U.S. soft-liners, notably in the State Department, now saw analogies with Nicaragua and Iran and worried about the possibility of a moderate-left alliance, with the growing possibility of a leftist revolution. Would Marcos, and so U.S. interests in the Philippines, go the way of Somoza and the shah, both of whom had enjoyed substantial U.S. support but failed to avert revolution?\textsuperscript{14} Though State Department reports described the left as home-grown, non-aligned and seeking to remain so, the movement's opposition to the U.S. military bases sounded alarms in the U.S. \textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{The Response in the U.S.}

The State Department immediately called the assassination a "despicable

\textsuperscript{12}Kline and Worthen, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{13}According to Corazon Aquino, as quoted in Sandra Burton's \textit{Impossible Dream}, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{14}The analogies with Nicaragua and Iran are described in Shultz, p. 634.

\textsuperscript{15}Personal interview with Bosworth, March 1989.
act which the government condemns in the strongest possible terms,\textsuperscript{16} and then encouraged Reagan to cancel a scheduled trip to the Philippines for November.\textsuperscript{17} Rather than make the "strongest possible" statement against Marcos by canceling the trip only to Manila, however, Reagan opted to cancel all of his stops in Southeast Asia including the Philippines. Softening the message further, Bush publicly promised on October 6, 1983 that the United States would not "cut away from a person who, imperfect though he may be on human rights, has worked with us."\textsuperscript{18} Yet fissures were growing in the U.S., where the Filipino community mobilized a nationwide network of organizations to publicize their anger at Marcos and to lobby for a change in U.S. policy. These included the Ninoy Aquino Movement, the Movement for a Free Philippines formed by exiled opposition leader Raul Manglapus, and others. In addition, the long-standing efforts of the human rights lobby to expose the Marcos regime's venality now hit home, as Aquino's many friends from various sectors of elite society, from the media, academia, business, and politics, rallied against Marcos. Even Ambassador Armacost, who had hitherto enjoyed close relations with the Marcoses, attended Aquino's funeral and began to distance himself from Marcos. By April 1984, Armacost would return to the U.S. to serve under Shultz as undersecretary of political affairs, where he would give crucial testimony to congress and otherwise help redirect U.S. support from Marcos to Aquino.\textsuperscript{19}

Laying the groundwork for this policy shift, an inter-agency task force was established in late 1983 to monitor the situation, with the State Department

\textsuperscript{16}Shultz, pp. 610-611.

\textsuperscript{17}U.S. embassy officials in Manila urged Reagan to cancel his planned visit to the Philippines unless Marcos instituted political reforms and carried out a credible investigation of the Aquino assassination. When Marcos threatened that such a cancellation might undermine the security of the bases agreement, a debate within the U.S. executive ensued, leading to the decision to cancel Reagan's entire Southeast Asian itinerary. See Confidential Cable \#24646, sent September 20, 1983, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{18}Bonner, p. 355.

\textsuperscript{19}Kline and Worthen.
playing the lead role in this. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz brought together Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage, NSC Asian specialists Gaston Sigur and Richard Childress, and others, "all Asian specialists by proclivity" and Reagan appointees, except Childress who was a military officer, for weekly meetings on the Philippines. According to Armitage, "There was an unusual unanimity of views at the assistant secretary level." Although all were loyal to Reagan, Armitage acknowledges that "...we gave testimony to congress which was uncleared by anybody but ourselves."20 The congressional link would ultimately prove crucial in Marcos' downfall after the Aquino assassination, beginning in October 1983 when Solarz, a close personal friend of the Aquino family, shepherded through a "Sense of the House" resolution calling for a "thorough, independent, and impartial investigation of the Aquino assassination" as well as "genuine, free, and fair elections" to the Philippine National Assembly.21 Approved by a vote of 413 to 3 on October 24, 1983, the resolution sent a bipartisan signal to Marcos supporters in the U.S. and in the Philippines. Bowing to the pressures, Marcos named in November 1983 an independent panel, known as the Agrava Board for chairwoman Corazon Agrava, to investigate the Aquino assassination.22

This stab at liberalization raised U.S hopes that reforms could resolve the Philippine crisis while preserving the Marcos regime. In January 1984, there seemed to be agreement on a new State Department plan to seek a political solution to the instability, spurring Marcos toward reform. The approach, headed by Armacost, was designed to establish distance from Marcos, while pressuring

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20Armitage, as quoted in Kline and Worthen, pp. 12-13.


22For information on the Agrava Commission's formation and purpose, see Confidential Cables #29310, #29526, and #29919, from November 8, 9, and 15, 1983, respectively. From the National Security Archive collection.
him to initiate a limited power-sharing arrangement with the moderate opposition in order to stem its radicalization. As part of the strategy, State Department officials urged congress not to cut aid to Marcos, citing his achievements in managing the Aquino assassination trial, as a close dialogue between State and congress emerged. By April 1984, when Armacost was recalled to D.C., he was replaced by Stephen Bosworth. Where Armacost had been close to the Marcoses until the death of Aquino, Bosworth, more reserved and skeptical than his predecessor, never succumbed to the Marcos charm, often lavishly proffered. Maintaining his distance from the Marcoses, Bosworth now forged stronger ties with Cardinal Sin and with the moderate opposition, which the U.S. had side-lined since 1972 in deference to Marcos.

Bowing further to the pressures, Marcos announced plans for legislative elections to be held May 14, 1984. The Marcos administration then requested the presence of a U.S. observer delegation to monitor the elections, sparking a debate between congress and the State Department. A month before the elections, Congressman Solarz canceled his plans to participate. The State Department then exerted pressure on congress, though hopes of official U.S. participation dimmed. By early May, congress announced its final decision not to

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24See, for example, an unclassified memorandum from within the State Department to Shultz describing relations with congress, sent March 6, 1984, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.


26Martial law diplomacy had fostered too great a reliance on Marcos' assessments of his opposition, because U.S. officials were loath to offend Marcos by maintaining contacts with the opposition. As a response to this "clientitis", the Philippine opposition then sought out the U.S. media as an alternative channel to express their views and influence policy in the U.S., as well as to circumvent the Marcos-controlled Philippine media. From Bonner, pp. 369-371.

27Confidential Cable #108309, April 13, 1984, from the National Security Archive collection.

28Confidential Memorandum from Wolfowitz to Armacost, April 19, 1984, from the National Security Archive collection.
participate, in part because they did not want to help legitimize fraudulent elections.\textsuperscript{29} Anticipating fraud, the left called for a boycott hoping to ally again with the moderate opposition, as had been the case in the 1981 boycott. Instead, over 300,000 citizens revived the National Committee for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the independent citizen's watch group established with CIA assistance for 1951 elections. Moreover, 85 percent of registered voters participated in the elections, signalling a resurgent faith in democratic processes while limiting the prospects of a moderate-left alliance.\textsuperscript{30} The elections were, in fact, marred by fraud and violence as the boycott advocates projected; yet the opposition, led by UNIDO, nevertheless won 59 of the 183 eligible seats, nearly double the 30 seats the opposition had hoped to garner.\textsuperscript{31} "I would presume," Marcos acknowledged in a May 15, 1984 interview on CBS News, "that our instructions to our people to allow the opposition to win some seats might have been taken too literally." Shultz notes: "It was an incredible statement for Marcos to have made, but there it was."\textsuperscript{32}

\section*{Continuing Growth of the NPA}

Despite the liberalizations, a June 1984 report from the U.S. embassy sent a grave warning about the continuing growth of the NPA. James Nach, the report's author, held a Master's in international relations from Columbia and had been in Vietnam from 1970 to 1974. His wife was Vietnamese, and he had a special sensitivity to communist insurgencies. He had studied the insurgency from

\textsuperscript{29}See Limited Official Use Cable #129405 from Shultz to the U.S. Embassy in Manila, May 3, 1984, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{30}Lugar (1988).

\textsuperscript{31}Staff report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Carl Ford and Fred Brown, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{32}Shultz, p. 611.
the U.S. but when he arrived in Manila in August 1982, he found that very little attention had been given to the subject there. Nach traveled throughout the countryside and conducted extensive interviews to understand the insurgency, and finally concluded in his 1984 report that the Marcos regime's corruption, crony capitalism, and human rights violations made it incapable of instituting the kind of economic, social and other reforms needed to stem the insurgency. It was, if not the first at least the most influential, and documented, official U.S. soft-line argument about the insurgency since martial law had been declared in 1972. Moreover, Nach found that the insurgency, though Maoist, received little if any external support, particularly since Philippine communists had split from the Soviets in 1969 while Philippine government relations with China had normalized in 1975. The Philippine insurgents, Nach found, relied instead on a strategy of "agaw armas," or the stealing of arms from the Philippine military, most bought with U.S. aid. They also had an underground network of supporters in the U.S. who helped hide members, publish and distribute materials, and other relatively small scale assistance. Thus, Nach concluded, Marcos must be seen as part of the problem. Without "new directions from the top," Nach predicted further, there would be an eventual "Communist takeover" with grave implications for U.S. interests.

Nach's report was initially considered alarmist; but when Admiral William Crowe, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific and a top contender for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, weighed in on the subject after a visit to the Philippines soon after, concluding as Nach had that the NPA posed a serious threat to U.S.

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33 See, for example, Confidential Briefing Memorandum, October 14, 1981, U.S. Department of State, from the National Security Archive collection.

34 Secret Cable #15403, June 9, 1984 from the U.S. Embassy to the Department of State, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

35 See, for example, Secret Cable #262789 sent from Kissinger to Ambassador Sullivan and Sullivan's response in Secret Cable #16413, both sent October 22, 1976, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
interests in the Philippines, official Washington took notice. As he told journalist Stanley Karnow, Crowe believed "Things had to change. Marcos was not making the decisions that had to be made...and the country was sliding downhill. So, I felt, he had to go." Moreover, Crowe had spoken with military sources and learned that the Philippine armed forces had become corrupt and demoralized under Marcos' cronyism. Crowe concluded that the military was at the time incapable of fighting the insurgency effectively and needed to be both professionalized and depoliticized. Few top U.S. officials were prepared to defect from Marcos, and Crowe was unable to persuade Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, and others from Reagan's inner circle of foreign policy advisors. Shultz, though unprepared for such a drastic measure, nevertheless listened. Meanwhile, two Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers, Carl Ford and Frederick Brown, returned from two Philippine research trips in the spring and summer with the conclusion that a "disciplined, purposeful communist insurgency with sophisticated political infrastructure and growing military capability countrywide has become a major threat to the Philippine democracy." Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), as chair of the committee, took notice, and would play an increasingly central role in the drama.

As the first anniversary of the Aquino assassination approached, mass demonstrations strengthened the perception among U.S. officials of the Philippines as the new Nicaragua or Iran, ripe for revolution. According to a confidential cable from Bosworth to the State Department, between 100,000 and 500,000 Filipinos marked the anniversary on August 21, 1984 in street

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36Karnow, p. 407.

37Bonner, p. 361 and Shultz, p. 612.

38Karnow, p. 407.


40Kline and Worthen, pp. 11-12, and personal interviews with Lugar and Semmel, April 1993.

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demonstrations.\textsuperscript{41} Two days later, Reagan accepted his party's nomination to run for a second term, while Walter Mondale won the Democratic nomination, as the campaign promised to revive the ideological feud between the soft-line foreign policy of Carter with its emphasis on human rights and the hard-line anti-communism of Reagan. A particularly explosive aspect of the debate centered on U.S. policy towards Nicaragua, and nearly 75 percent of those polled worried that the U.S. role in Nicaragua might lead to another "Vietnam." To avoid public criticism, and to circumvent congressional obstructions, policy toward Nicaragua went covert, as evidence began to surface regarding CIA training and other U.S. support for the contras, despite an executive order Reagan had signed in 1981 prohibiting such tactics.\textsuperscript{42}

Meanwhile, the Agrava Commission issued two separate reports on the Aquino Assassination, with one, issued by Agrava, citing military involvement but excluding Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver, and the other majority report, citing him as well. When Marcos accepted the minority report, Corazon Aquino led the national outcry, condemning Marcos' treatment of her husband as well as his likely involvement in the assassination. While the moderate opposition rallied in protest, General Fidel Ramos formed a "special action committee" to review complaints of human rights violations by the military and to press military officers to strengthen relations with the church, as soft-line opposition from within the Marcos regime as well as the moderate opposition began to organize.\textsuperscript{43}

Nevertheless, in one presidential debate, when asked about the declining situation in the Philippines, Reagan held firm to the Kirkpatrick doctrine,

\textsuperscript{41}Confidential Cable #22776, August 21, 1984, from Ambassador Bosworth to the State Department, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{42}The above is from Mayer and McManus, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{43}Unclassified Cable #29301, October 25, 1984, reporting on Corazon Aquino's reaction and that of the moderate opposition, and Unclassified Cable #32195, November 23, 1984, reporting on Ramos' steps to curb military abuses, both reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
reasoning that although "there are things there...that do not look good to us from the standpoint...of democratic rights...what is the alternative? It is a large Communist movement to take over the Philippines." The moderate opposition in the Philippines was outraged by the remark, as moderate opposition leader Ramon Mitra, a former senator who was imprisoned during the first months of martial law in 1972, publicly stated that "Our alternative to Marcos is certainly not Communism. The alternative to Marcos is a democratic government. But if there is one thing that may lead to communism here, it is Marcos staying in power."

The State Department tried to repair the damage from Reagan's remark, issuing a statement to the Associated Press that "there is certainly recognition on everybody's part that there are other forces working for democratic change in the Philippines." U.S. analysts began to fear, however, that, unless a moderate opposition was allowed breathing space, Reagan might, in fact, prove to be right, particularly since the Philippine economy continued to plummet, with capital flight reaching an estimated $1 billion, foreign banks refusing to renew short-term credit, real GNP down by 7.1 percent in 1984, and unemployment at 25 percent.\textsuperscript{44} Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage noted that the Pentagon was seeking alternative sites for U.S. bases should revolution in the Philippines require that.\textsuperscript{45}

Though Reagan won a second term in a landslide, the State Department began formulating a new policy in November urging Marcos to reform. Drafted by John Maisto, a career foreign service officer who was married to a Filipina, had studied the Philippines closely for many years, and now headed the Philippine desk, the policy proposal urged a shift in policy to acknowledge the need for reform, viewing Marcos as "part of the problem," but also as "necessarily part of

\textsuperscript{44}The above is from Shultz, p. 611, and p. 16.

\textsuperscript{45}New York Times. April 21, 1985, describing debates on proposed military bases in Micronesia.
the solution." This position acknowledged the need to reform the Marcos regime in order to stem the threat of revolution, but remained loyal to Marcos, viewing him not only as capable of such reforms but also as the most reliable protector of U.S. interests in the Philippines.

A New Direction

U.S. officials agreed on the need to check the revolutionary movement's growth, but disagreed on whether Marcos was part of the solution or part of the problem. Reagan, together with Weinberger, Casey, and Chief of Staff Regan were among those most influential in arguing for continued support of Marcos. Mid-level analysts, particularly in the State Department, however, argued that hard-line tactics had alienated so many Filipinos that many former moderates were allying with the left, with the increasingly real possibility of a Sandinista-like revolution. Reports from the embassy supported this view, as Maisto, Nach, and other analysts, with the support of Armacost, Wolfowitz, and Armitage argued for moderate change in order to avert revolution. In January 1985, consensus formed around Maisto's policy proposal, which Reagan signed as a new National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) designed to pressure Marcos to institute political, economic, and military reforms. As Maisto's draft had done, the NSDD cited Marcos as "part of the problem" but also as a necessary part of any solution. In mid-January, the Marcos regime seemed to respond to the pressure when government prosecutors indicted General Ver, one of Marcos' closest allies, as well as 25 others in the plot to assassinate Aquino, a decision the New York Times hailed in an article titled "Democracy Gains Steam in the Philippines." Because Ver had become a symbol of the politicization and corruption in the

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46Bonner, p. 367.

47Bonner, p. 347.

military, his indictment was seen as the beginning of a trend toward military reform.

During a visit to Manila also in January, Wolfowitz hailed the indictments, publicly indicating that American aid programs for the Philippines would be aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging economic and social reforms to stem the "root causes" of the insurgency. \(^{49}\) To strengthen the message, he also met with human rights monitors as well as opposition leaders, something U.S. officials had typically refrained from doing in deference to Marcos. \(^{50}\) Wolfowitz then briefed Secretary of State George Shultz in preparation for a February 7 meeting with Bosworth on the current "quiet diplomacy" urging Marcos to reform while defining procedures for a Marcos succession and a restructuring of the foreign debt. \(^{51}\) Subsequently, Shultz brought together William Casey, Caspar Weinberger, William Crowe, and Robert McFarlane to discuss the Philippine crisis. Shultz describes how a "rough consensus" emerged from the meeting, as all agreed to strengthen Philippine political, military, business, and financial institutions, hoping that Marcos would join the efforts to reform his regime. Though Shultz acknowledged that "critical decisions would have to emerge from a Philippine process," he and the others believed that the U.S. could help. He proposed that the U.S support business leaders who could press for open elections and a more free market economy; Catholic leaders concerned with the revolutionary trends within the church as well as with the human rights situation; military professionals who wanted to depoliticize their institutions; and opposition leaders who, Bosworth believed, wanted to work "constructively" for democratic reforms. Shultz then notified

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Secret Cable #09564 sent April 1, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection, provides details of the Wolfowitz visit.

\(^{51}\) Secret Memorandum, from Wolfowitz to Shultz, February 6, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
Reagan, who agreed with the assessment but hoped as well that Marcos would "work with us" on reform.52

By February 22, just as witnesses were being called in the Aquino assassination trial in Manila,53 Wolfowitz publicly urged the Philippine government to hasten progress on political, economic and military issues, adding that a U.S. proposal for an additional $15 million in military assistance would be "premised on the full expectation that the incipient reforms we have seen will continue and expand."54 Later, covert assistance was supplied, just in case, to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) of the Philippine military,55 formed in March 1985 by reformist officers including two colonels from Enrile's security unit, who were concerned by the corruption, lack of professionalism, human rights violations, and low morale in a military where promotions were increasingly doled out on the basis of cronyism not merit. They also believed that corruption had helped usher in communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and hoped to avert such an event in the Philippines via reform, a classic soft-line formulation.56 According to Armitage, "the defense attache's office had very good contacts in the RAM group," though "US policy was to discourage the RAM from premature coups." He adds, "We were not so much disinclined to moving as we were about the timing." In short, the intelligence community believed that most senior Philippine military officers would back

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52Shultz, pp. 612-613. Bosworth's position on the moderate opposition is from a personal interview in March 1989 and from a Confidential Cable #05814 sent to the State Department following the meeting, on February 27, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

53Confidential Cable #05470 from Ambassador Bosworth to the U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.


55According to Bonner, based on confidential interviews, the U.S. also secretly channeled funds to RAM via other Philippine organizations. Bonner, p. 372.

56Cable #37446, December 2, 1985, from the U.S. Embassy in Manila to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency describes the RAM position, as outlined in a RAM newsletter. Both the cable and the newsletter are reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
Marcos in the event of a coup. Still, RAM leaders were brought to the U.S. to meet with State Department officials, members of Congress, journalists and others, both to discuss, and by their very existence, to demonstrate the prospects for military reform in the Philippines. It can also be seen as a transnational soft-line strategy for preparing for a post-Marcos era.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also initiated hearings on foreign assistance legislation to the Philippines in March, and both Wolfowitz and Armitage testified, focusing on the "indispensable role of the military bases in the Philippines, the dangers of the communist insurgency threat, the deficiencies of President Marcos and the Philippine army in meeting that threat, and the reforms being pressed by the United States with only small signs of progress." By May, the Senate, led by John Kerry (D-MA), passed 89 to 8 a foreign aid amendment to the 1986 foreign aid bill which expressed "the sense of the Senate" that the future of aid to the Philippines should be conditioned on progress toward political democracy and human rights. Moreover, the statement called for free elections as well as a fair trial in the Aquino assassination case. Further, congressional and State Department reports acknowledged the need for a loosening of media censorship as well as freer media access for the opposition. Toward this end, the U.S. also began secretly channeling funds to Radio Veritas, a Catholic radio station which would become the voice of the moderate opposition. Though State Department officials have denied such support, Filipino activist Walden Bello attended a session at the Foreign Service Institute where Armacost

67 Armitage quotes and intelligence assessment from Kline and Worthen, p. 20.

68 Personal interview with Butcher in December 1994, cited in the previous chapter. Butcher is currently the director of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau of the State Department, and participated in U.S. debates on policy toward the Philippines during the period of analysis. Information on RAM's U.S. relations is also from a personal interview with Lugar, April 1993, and from Bonner, p. 372.

69 Lugar, p. 103.

gave a press briefing intended to be off the record. There, Armacost told the audience that Radio Veritas received U.S. funds channeled through the Asia Foundation. Priests affiliated with Veritas and a senior officer of the Asia Foundation have privately confirmed this.61

Hidden Wealth and the Implications for U.S. Aid

Meanwhile, the Philippine business community now used transnational political strategies to undermine the credibility of the Marcos regime. In a particularly damaging July 1985 expose, the San Jose Mercury News ran a series of articles on Marcos’ hidden wealth and possible diversion of U.S. aid. Since Marcos himself had acknowledged in his earlier campaigns that he did not come from a wealthy family, his massive fortune, estimated in the billions, raised questions about its source. The allegations of U.S. aid diversion had been made before, but now Philippine business leaders, including critical sources from the displaced oligarchy and former Marcos cronies disillusioned by the political and economic crises following the Aquino assassination, fed new, more substantive information to journalists Pete Carey and Lew Simons. Because the San Jose Mercury News is located in an area of California densely populated with Filipinos, it is likely that the Filipino businessmen leaking the information to Simons and Carey hoped that the U.S. press coverage would ignite anti-Marcos activism among Filipinos in the U.S., while providing a non-censored channel for the information to flow back to the Philippines. In this, according to Carey, they also undoubtedly believed that it would thus have more credibility at home and would be more likely to be picked up in the heavily censored, Marcos-controlled Philippine press.62 In fact, the story was picked up in the Philippines and helped

61Personal interview with Bello and with an Asia Foundation officer as well as secondary interviews with priests conducted by Bonner, p. 524.

62The above is from a personal interview with Carey, November 1993.
feed opposition there, leading 56 of the 59 opposition members of the National Assembly who had won seats in 1984 to call for Marcos' impeachment. Though the motion, initiated in August, was swiftly rejected by a government panel, it was widely seen as an embarrassment and yet another spur which might lead Marcos to call elections.53

Amid such challenges to the Marcos regime's credibility, the U.S. continued to urge Marcos to institute economic, political, and military reforms as well as to hold a fair trial on the Aquino assassination. Toward this end, U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in the Philippines were encouraged to provide affidavits revealing an attempted aircraft interception on the day of the assassination, a fact which implicated the highest levels of the Philippine command including Ver and possibly Marcos.54 By mid-1985, however, the State Department's Philippine analyst for INR, Marjorie Niehaus, concluded that any notion of Marcos as reformer was an oxymoron. State's Philippine desk officer John Maisto agreed, as did Morton Abramowitz, head of INR. Analysts for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence visited the Philippines in August and concluded also that the Marcos government was unlikely to institute the reforms needed to stem the economic hemorrhaging and the insurgency's growth.55

That same month, over sixty foreign policy analysts and officials from Defense, State, CIA and the NSC as well as from academia gathered at the National War College in Washington to discuss the situation. Even Edward Lansdale was there, though his primary observation that the situation in 1985 was quite different from that in the 1950's did not help much. Also present was William Overholt, a vice president of Bankers Trust who had once worked on

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54Secret Cable #283732, September 15, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection, provides background on the as it emerged in mid-1985 and then evolved through the release of U.S. Air Force affidavits in September 1985.

55Kline ac-

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development projects in the Philippines and would soon be very active in Aquino's presidential campaign. Some, led by President Reagan, Chief of Staff Donald Regan, CIA Director William Casey, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, still argued that only Marcos could defeat the NPA, and that he could be counted on to initiate what they now agreed were needed reforms. Others, however, including Overholt, Niehaus and others, with apparent concurrence from Wolfowitz, Armitage, and Armacost, argued instead for continued pressure on Marcos to revive democratic processes, with covert U.S. assistance to be provided to organizations like NAMFREL, RAM and Radio Veritas, in order to cultivate a pro-U.S. alternative to Marcos.66

Still, Marcos understood the situation well enough to suggest on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour in August 1985 that a foreign leader needed two ambassadors in Washington: "one for Congress and another for the Executive Department." In fact, Marcos was right. Despite the pressures to reform, Marcos continued to enjoy the support of Reagan and his inner circle, notably Regan, Casey, and Weinberger. Commenting on the resulting tensions within the foreign policy community, Frederick Brown, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer who had visited the Philippines in 1984 and subsequently reported on the NPA's growth, said: "The people in the State Department were using us...to get their point across to the White House...We shifted our focus from the President of the Philippines to the President of the United States."67 From October 1985 to January 1986, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held three hearings to review U.S. policy on the Philippines. In testimony before the committee, Wolfowitz, Armitage, Armacost and others cited the "unmistakable clear" signals the U.S. had sent Marcos on the need for "dramatic progress toward fundamental reforms." The House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs led by Solarz further recommended that military sales credit be reduced from $50 million to

66The above is from Bonner, pp. 379-380.

67Karnow, p. 407.
$25 million and that economic aid be increased from the $95 million requested by the Reagan administration to $155 million. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then added an amendment to the foreign aid bill linking aid to the Philippines with progress by the Philippine government in guaranteeing democratic processes and in prosecuting the Aquino assassination case. These changes were intended to facilitate political, economic, and military reforms and to demonstrate to Filipinos that the aid was "not for the benefit of any particular leader or faction." 68

By October, U.S. officials acknowledged that in order for Marcos to take the message for reform seriously, it would have to come more directly from Reagan, not just from the bureaucracy. In mid-October, 1985, Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada), a close personal friend of Reagan, was sent to the Philippines to meet with Marcos, and brought with him a hand-written letter from Reagan expressing the U.S. president's belief in Marcos and in his ability to reform. When Marcos threw out the U.S. Air Force affidavits regarding unusual activity which implicated Ver in the Aquino assassination trial, 69 however, U.S. concerns about Marcos' credibility deepened. With pressure building in both the Philippines and the U.S., Marcos made a surprising decision.

On November 3, 1985, in an interview on David Brinkley's Sunday morning talk show, Marcos announced to the world that he would hold "snap" presidential elections. Marcos apparently assumed that the narrow time frame would prevent the deeply fragmented opposition from waging a successful campaign. That he made the announcement on U.S. television in the middle of the night in the Philippines, moreover, indicates that the elections were designed more for a U.S.

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68The above is from Kline and Worthen, p. 12.

69The U.S. Air Force affidavits described above revealed that two Philippine air force fighter planes were activated on the day of the assassination. Further, airport controllers observed a scrambling of information on the day Aquino's flight arrived in Manila, possibly for an interception of the aircraft. Only the highest level of military authorization could have accomplished this. From Secret Cable #283732, op. cit. The Philippine court's deliberations on the affidavits is described in Secret Cable #28419, September 13, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
than for a Philippine audience, as a State Department memo from Maisto to Wolfowitz acknowledged. U.S. officials grew concerned, however, that a Marcos victory won through election fraud might lead moderates to support the NPA. Marcos’ own "kitchen cabinet," including Enrile, were caught off-guard by the announcement and criticized the election plans as "reckless." Marcos countered that because of the U.S. television coverage, it was too late to reconsider. U.S. media attention to events in the Philippines and to the Marcos regime in particular did, in fact, increase. As the elections added new value to the Philippines, the hidden wealth and other issues were now picked up by the Village Voice, the Washington Post and the New York Times. With approval from State, Solarz, as Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, initiated hearings in December on the hidden wealth issue and its implications for U.S. aid. Solarz had seen the articles on the hidden wealth issue and was now determined to hold hearings on the subject prior to the Philippine elections. Solarz told a New York Times reporter that he "would not hang (his) head in shame" if the hearings affected the elections. Solarz also invited NAMFREL Chairman Jose Concepcion, Jr. to

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70 Secret Memorandum from Maisto to Wolfowitz, November 5, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

71 Secret Briefing Paper by INR, November 9, 1985, from the National Security Archive collection.

72 The account of the response from the "kitchen cabinet" is from Lugar (1988), based on his August 1986 discussions with Enrile, p. 108.

73 Personal interview with Hoge, March 1989.

74 One August 8, 1985 New York Times editorial discusses aid to the Philippines. It briefly refers to the recommendation by some in Congress to channel food aid through private groups due to the "problem of diversion" and "damaging charges of extensive overseas investments by senior Marcos officials."

75 Bonner, p. 394.

the U.S. in mid-November to meet with members of congress and State Department officials in order to win U.S. backing for independent electoral monitoring in the up-coming elections.\textsuperscript{77}

Together with Senator Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Solarz also drafted a letter to Marcos, which "received wide commendations from our colleagues and the administration," urging Marcos to hold free and fair elections. Moreover, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Philippines as well, as Armitage from Defense and State's Wolfowitz, Armacost, and Bosworth, in particular, advised that the survival of the U.S. bases was "ancillary" to the survival of democracy, that failure to reform the government now would mean the loss of the bases in five to ten years. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the D.C.-based Center for Democracy, headed by Boston University professor Allen Weinstein, to go to the Philippines to assess the preparations needed for the elections, a signal as well to the opposition that the U.S. Senate was committed to Philippine democracy.\textsuperscript{78} Five days before the team's departure, on December 2, all 26 accused in the Aquino assassination, including General Ver, were acquitted. During his October visit, Laxalt had warned Marcos that such an apparent miscarriage of justice would likely unleash a "firestorm" of protests from the U.S. Congress. Marcos' open defiance of Laxalt now indicated that he was not only unlikely to reform, he was also no longer reliable.\textsuperscript{79}

As Laxalt had predicted, congress was now inflamed against Marcos.

\textsuperscript{77}Confidential Cable #35525, November 14, 1985, from the National Security Archive collection describes the planned visit.


\textsuperscript{79}Shultz, p. 615. Also, Unclassified Cable #337854, November 3, 1985, from the National Security Archive collection, describes Laxalt's warning to Marcos regarding any plans to reinstate Ver.
While Reagan wanted 1985 aid to exceed that for 1984 and wanted about half to go to the military, congress now questioned the aid levels and offered just 30 percent to the military. Reagan and his closest aides worked to rebuild support for Marcos in congress and continued to hope that he would re-establish his legitimacy by holding fair elections. The acquittals, however, raised new concerns about Marcos among congressional leaders. By December 1985, following the Aquino assassination trial verdict, congress ordered a $15 million reduction in security assistance to the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Philippine left debated whether to boycott the elections in protest of anticipated fraud. The moderates, however skeptical of the outcome, opted to participate, struggling to unite behind a single candidate.

**The Moderate Challenge: Laban Unites Under Aquino**

By the time the team arrived in Manila, the acquittals had galvanized the hitherto fractious moderate opposition, comprised of an alphabet soup of cause-oriented groups with names like ATOM (August Twenty One Movement), ROAR (Running Organization for Aquino and Reconciliation, for joggers against Marcos) and even ACRONYM (Anti-Croneyism Movement), though these lacked both a coherent platform and leadership. On December 3, one day after the acquittals and after a month of fending off pressure from Filipino moderates to run, Corazon Aquino announced her candidacy. Cardinal Sin then helped to unite the moderates in the final hours before the deadline for the filing of slates, with Aquino in the presidential and Laurel in the vice presidential slots, both on Laurel's UNIDO ticket. This was a critical achievement, since a split opposition would likely have allowed a Marcos win. Soon after, Aquino granted *New York Times* reporter Seth Mydans, foreign editor Warren Hoge, and executive editor

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80 Secret Cable #39432, December 18, 1985, from Bosworth to the State Department, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
A.M. Rosenthal an exclusive interview; but Aquino mishandled several questions on the U.S. bases and the communists. Not only did she ramble, she also changed position on these key issues during the course of the interview, vacillating between opposition to and support for the U.S. bases, and likewise with respect to the communists. "Abe and I were pretty much stunned," Hoge notes, adding "Both of us walked out of there thinking we could not remember talking to a public figure more naive about the responsibilities and uses of power."\(^{81}\)

Aquino denies any attempt to subsequently refurbish her U.S. image, arguing that her campaign was solely for Filipinos;\(^{82}\) yet her American allies, concerned by the bad press, soon afterwards hired the Democratic public relations firm D.H. Sawyer & Associates to shape Aquino's image as strong, reliable, and pro-U.S, particularly on communism and the U.S. bases. The firm worked closely with Aquino to prepare her for the hordes of U.S. journalists arriving in the Philippines.\(^{83}\) Initially opposed to the bases and open to the possibility of talking with the communists, perhaps even admitting some into her prospective administration, as quoted at one point in the disastrous *New York Times* article, Aquino soon yielded to pressure from her U.S. advisors to publicly proclaim opposition to communism and support for the 1983 bases agreement, which allowed for the bases through 1991. In a speech just days later in Olongapo, site of the U.S. bases, Aquino did just that. This cost her backing from BAYAN, the political umbrella group for the Philippine left, which had offered to back her candidacy should she agree to call for a withdrawal of U.S. military facilities but threatened to boycott should she refuse to comply. The left, claiming roughly 20

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\(^{81}\) Personal interview, March 1989. See also Shultz on Rosenthal's influence among U.S. officials regarding Corazon Aquino, pp. 617 and 636.

\(^{82}\) Personal interviews with Aquino, October 1992.

\(^{83}\) Based upon secondary interview with D.H. Sawyer staff conducted by Boaner, cited p. 522; Karnow, p. 412; and from a personal interview with a confidential source from the firm, May 1993.
percent of the Philippine population's support, now called for a boycott.\textsuperscript{84}

Aquino's comments aside, that her campaign forfeited BAYAN's offer rather than oppose the bases reveals the relatively greater weight assigned to U.S. versus domestic Filipino concerns, particularly given her own initial opposition to the bases as well as that of many of her moderate supporters. Aquino's strategy worked, as Robert Trent Jones, Jr., a long-time friend of Corazon Aquino who had lobbied for her husband's release during his imprisonment, now lobbied his U.S. congressional friends such as Bill Bradley, Sam Nunn, and Alan Cranston to back Aquino's candidacy.\textsuperscript{85}

Meanwhile, the Center for Democracy team left on December 7 for the Philippines. On December 18, they reported their findings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with Wolfowitz and Armitage both present. In their report, which became an immediate best-seller in Manila,\textsuperscript{86} the team offered eight guidelines to insure free and fair elections. First, they urged accreditation by the Marcos-controlled electoral monitoring organization, COMELEC, of the independent, though implicitly oppositionist citizen's watch group NAMFREL. They also urged Marcos to appoint two additional members to COMELEC to join the 1986 election deliberations; to recognize the Aquino-Laurel UNIDO ticket as the "dominant opposition party" (DOP) with all poll-watching and other rights legally accorded such a party under the electoral code; enforceable guarantees of access to media for the DOP, including the allocation of substantial free radio and television time, with similar provisions for newspapers; enforceable guarantees of reasonable access to paid media; supervision of all military to assure that they not be used for partisan purposes prior to the elections, intimidation during the elections, or fraudulent vote-counting following the elections; the quickest possible

\textsuperscript{84}Information on the left's position and negotiations with Aquino is from Secret Cable #391261, December 26, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{85}Bonner, pp. 401-403; Karnow, p. 412.

counting of ballots throughout the country; and the establishment of a coordinated international observer process beginning in January 1986.\textsuperscript{87} When Senators John Kerry and Claiborne Pell expressed concerns that an observer team could not adequately monitor elections and might instead simply lend credibility to a fraudulent process, Weinstein responded that the opposition clearly wanted the observer team. He advised, however, that congress not agree to send an observer team until the other conditions had been met.\textsuperscript{88}

Following the hearing, congress would be in recess until January 20, just eighteen days before the elections. To chart the progress in the Philippines during the recess, Lugar and other members of the committee relied on information from the embassy as well as from the press. On December 24, COMELEC accredited NAMFREL, a positive sign that Marcos might comply with the Center for Democracy's conditions.\textsuperscript{89} At the same time, reports indicated a crescendo of support building for Aquino, as well as her new, more pro-U.S. positions on the key issues of communism and the bases. On December 26, for instance, Aquino held a rally in Olongapo, site of Subic Bay Naval Base, and there told thousands of cheering supporters her plans to allow the U.S. to use the bases through 1991, after which she would "keep all of our options open." This was not enough for U.S. hard-liners, who remained wary of Aquino, even as Marcos' credibility continued to fall. According to Shultz, when A.M. Rosenthal returned from the Philippines in mid-January, and reported to him, Reagan, Regan and others at an official White House dinner that Aquino was an "empty-headed housewife (with) no positions," his words made a "deep and lasting impact on them." Though Armacost countered that "Makati businessmen (were) advising

\textsuperscript{87}Center for Democracy report submitted to Congress, December 1985. The executive summary of the report is reprinted in Unclassified Cable #386766 from Shultz to the U.S. Embassies in the region, sent December 20, 1985, from the National Security Archive collection.


\textsuperscript{89}Confidential Cable #39879, December 24, 1985, from Bosworth to the State Department, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
Aquino, and they are sound," concerns about her viability remained, as the debate within the U.S. executive branch intensified. Adding a sense of urgency to the debate was an apocalyptic account of the NPA by journalist Ross Munro, which appeared in December and carried much weight in official circles.  

After a January 13, 1986 press statement, in which Bosworth announced that the U.S. could work with any democratically elected government there, a statement the U.S. press heralded with headlines like "State Department Assails Marcos," NSC adviser John Poindexter subsequently warned Shultz that Reagan did not want to see any more such coverage. Shultz argued that U.S. support for free elections should not be equated with opposition to Marcos. As debate continued regarding Aquino as well as on the narrower question of whether or not to send an observer team, Shultz urged political impartiality among INR staff.  

On January 22, just two weeks before the elections, the New York Times added another nail to the Marcos coffin, printing a front page article describing as fraudulent Marcos' World War II record as an anti-Japanese guerrilla. Although questioned for years, the war record had long given Marcos a measure of public credibility as a vital U.S. ally and military commander in the current fight against the NPA. The story was then picked up by several other influential papers, including the Washington Post. It was not just the exposure of fraud that harmed Marcos; it was the perception that once closely kept secrets were being leaked by former Marcos allies in the U.S. and the Philippines. Debate in the U.S. further intensified, with the Philippines now at the top of the CIA's "fever chart."

Meanwhile, on January 23, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with Pacifico Castro, acting foreign minister of the Philippines. Present again were

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*See Munro’s article "The New Khmer Rouge" in the December 1985 issue of Commentary. See also Bonner, pp. 397-398, for his account of the impact of the article on official views toward the Philippine situation and toward Aquino, in particular. Confidential Cable #002932 written by Shultz January 4, 1986, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection, describes U.S. Embassy endorsement of the article, as well as the heightened concern regarding the NPA among U.S. officials.

**The above is from Shultz, pp. 616-619.
Wolfowitz, Armitage and members of their staffs. The debate centered on whether the committee should participate as observers in the up-coming elections. When Castro revealed confidentially that he had with him a letter from Marcos to Reagan with a strong plea for an official observer team, Lugar considered this crucial information, and now pressed Castro for assurances, which were given, that such an observer team would have adequate access to the voting. Lugar then deliberated, concerned that the senate had "staked our prestige and credibility that if Philippine democracy was violated on February 7, the Marcos regime should no longer get U.S. moral or material support." Though not all of the pre-conditions for fair elections had been met, Lugar opted to support the process.

On January 24, Lugar publicly urged Reagan to send an official observer team, offering as well to participate. As late as January 26, Leslie Gelb, New York Times national security correspondent, wrote, however, that most U.S. officials "hoped that Marcos would win in elections that were not too unfair and then quickly step aside in favor of his running mate Arturo Tolentino." The article also outlined the efforts of U.S. officials, including Armacost, Bosworth, Abramowitz, Sigur, Armitage and Wolfowitz, to turn Reagan, Regan, Casey and Weinberger from continued support for Marcos. Gelb, who had served in the State Department and had also directed the Pentagon Papers study, now exposed the forces shaping U.S. policy towards the Philippines as well as the on-going debate between pro- and anti-Marcos factions within the U.S. The administration dismissed Gelb as trying to make not report policy, a charge he, in turn, dismisses as "baloney." Wolfowitz, a conservative, was particularly angered by the article, which presented him along with soft-liners and "Carterites" as attempting to tilt U.S. policy in a liberal direction. Gelb's story was, however, based on information leaked from State Department analysts to him and others, including

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92 The above is from Lugar (1988), pp. 117-118.
94 Bonner, p. 438.
Walden Bello, who wrote an article for the *World Policy Journal*. Bello believes that Gelb then condensed the *World Policy Journal* article for the January 26 *New York Times* article.95

Behind the scenes, Shultz maintained contact with Lugar, who assured him of his continued willingness to participate in an official observer delegation. Four days after Gelb’s article, on January 30, Reagan officially announced his decision to send an observer team, with the unexpected offer to significantly increase U.S. economic and military aid following the elections. Shultz then asked, at Lugar’s request, all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to participate; but only John Kerry of Massachusetts and Frank Murkowski of Alaska accepted. Lugar was named head of the bi-partisan, 20-member delegation, and worked closely with the State Department to plan the observation process. The team arrived in Manila on February 5, two days before the balloting, amid hordes of U.S. journalists arriving in Manila as well. As a Lugar aide noted of the American media, "They covered (the Philippine elections) almost like it was an American primary out in the hinterlands." In fact, U.S. media coverage was the most extensive ever accorded a foreign election, adding a crucial non-official observer presence to Lugar’s 20-member team. Cognizant of this, Marcos had hired, like Aquino, a U.S. public relations firm -- Manafort, Black & Stone (a Republican affiliate) -- to refurbish his U.S. image. The firm had encouraged Marcos to increase his U.S. public appearances; but the strategy was backfiring. On the night before the elections, Marcos appeared on Nightline but, under fire from Koppel, threatened to terminate his appearance mid-show should such hostile questioning continue. As the polls opened on February 7, the same day, ironically, that Baby Doc fled Haiti, U.S. journalists as well as the observer team fanned out across the country, together with 500,000 NAMFREL volunteers, and

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95Personal interview with Bello, November 1993, and his 1985-1986 article.
a team of RAM officers,\textsuperscript{96} to monitor the voting.

Though U.S. officials denied backing NAMFREL, in the months prior to the elections, the U.S. Agency for International Development had given a \$390,000 grant to the Asia Foundation,\textsuperscript{97} which then channeled the funds through the 100-odd groups comprising NAMFREL.\textsuperscript{98} During the elections, NAMFREL reported many incidents involving stolen ballot boxes, intimidation of voters and NAMFREL volunteers, and even killings. The U.S. observer team initially reported fraud but avoided sharp criticism. As the vote-counting proceeded, however, the observer team’s reports of fraud became more strident, while the embassy sent a steady stream of reports to the State Department substantiating the claims of fraud.\textsuperscript{99} The American Chamber of Commerce in Manila weighed in with the opinion that any attempt to whitewash the accounts of election fraud would "seriously damage American corporations and increase anti-Americanism in the Philippines," an opinion which increased U.S. vigilance in monitoring the elections.\textsuperscript{100}

State Department analysts acknowledged that participation among the more than 26 million registered voters had been spectacular, an overwhelming defeat for the left’s boycott campaign, and estimated that Aquino had actually

\textsuperscript{96}Cable #00327, January 6, 1986, describes RAM’s election activities under the aegis of its "Kamalayan 86" project, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{97}Secret Cable #38088, December 7, 1985, cited in Bonner, p. 523.

\textsuperscript{98}Bonner, p. 415. See also Secret Cable #38320 from Philip Kaplan to the State Department regarding the Asia Foundation’s support for communications systems and electoral monitoring for the Philippine elections, December 10, 1985, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{99}See coverage in the \textit{New York Times} during the period for evidence of the observer team’s increasingly strident reports, documented in Blitz (1990). See the National Security Archive’s collection during the period for evidence of the embassy’s efforts to convince their colleagues in the U.S. that the claims of fraud by Marcos were accurate.

\textsuperscript{100}Confidential Cable #04421, February 10, 1986, from Bosworth to the U.S. Pacific Commander-in-Chief, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
won sixty to seventy percent of the vote. Not only would Marcos have to cheat much more than in previous elections, he was also faced with greater barriers to cheating due to the presence of the observer teams and the international media. In fact, Marcos later conceded to New York Times reporter Seth Mydans that he had underestimated the role the U.S. media would play in the elections. As the vote-counting proceeded, evidence of fraud mounted. In one incident, on February 8, thirty computer technicians working for Marcos fled COMELEC headquarters for the refuge of a nearby church and told a gathering crowd, including many international journalists, that the figures showing Aquino in the lead were being discarded. This sounded alarms among U.S. officials. The New York Times and other U.S. media, reported widespread abuses in the election, as the U.S. observer team became more critical as well. In Marcos' continuing appearances on U.S. television, American journalists played straight man to Marcos' antics. On the Sunday after the elections, for instance, David Brinkley asked how Marcos had received over 13,000 votes in one town while Aquino had received zero. The voters were "probably my relatives," Marcos explained. Later, when George Will asked Marcos about his war record, Marcos urged Will to read Emperor Hirohito's memoirs. "They've not been published, sir!" Will replied. Will later called the White House to say their man was an "inveterate liar." Coming from a conservative like Will, such an assessment carried weight in the White House.

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102 Personal interview with Mydans, March 1989, based on his own personal conversation with Marcos after the events of 1986.

103 Confidential Cable #04422, February 10, 1986, from Bosworth to the State Department, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

104 The account of Will's call to the White House is from Bonner, p. 423.
The U.S. Debate Intensifies

On February 11, despite the evidence as well as the advice of Lugar, a State Department task force, and others, all of whom urged Reagan not to endorse a Marcos victory out of concern that violence, political unrest, and intensified anti-Americanism would result, Reagan held a rare televised news conference in which he praised the elections and indicated support for Marcos. While Reagan conceded to the "possibility of fraud," he asserted that "it could have been...occurring on both sides," implying further that the U.S. bases were more important to the U.S. than democracy. This unleashed a storm of protest in Manila as Aquino began preparing to take the election "to the streets." She also worked through Solarz' office to inform the White House that "wishy-washy" statements regarding election fraud would engender anti-Americanism. What she needed, she told her friends, was strong U.S. support in order to denounce election fraud and prevent further violence. At the same time, she fended off pressures to unite with BAYAN, which now reissued its offer of support; but Philippine analysts and U.S. officials worried that Aquino's position might soften if the Marcos regime were to be prolonged. "We thought

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105 Information on the advice to Reagan is from a personal interview with Lugar in April 1993 and from a Secret Memorandum sent February 10, 1986 from Wolfowitz to Shultz containing the text of a post-election briefing strategy for Reagan, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

106 Karnow, p. 414. Philippine reactions to Reagan's statement, particularly the concern that the U.S. cared more about its bases than about democracy, are summarized in a review of anti-American Philippine press coverage and editorials in Confidential Cable #05338, February 15, 1986, and in a letter from the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila to the State Department urging a shift in U.S. support from Marcos to Aquino, in Unclassified Cable #05341, February 15, 1986, both reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

107 Unclassified Cable #04878, February 12, 1986 describes Aquino's response to Reagan's statement. Confidential Cable #04680, February 11, 1986 describes Aquino's dealings with Solarz, both from the National Security Archive collection.

108 Confidential Cable #05064, February 13, 1986 describes official U.S. concerns. Secret Cable #05294, February 14, 1986 describes military fortifications underway to protect Marcos, and Confidential Cable #05296, February 14, 1986 describes growing pressures on the moderates to ally
(Reagan) was dead wrong," U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth now acknowledges, adding that there was concern among State Department analysts and others in the intelligence community that the moderate opposition, if robbed of its electoral victory, might ally with the left, with the increasingly real possibility of an anti-U.S. revolution.¹⁰⁹ That same day, a leading Aquino supporter, Evelio Javier, was gunned down and killed by six masked gunmen. Though human rights abuses had been rampant throughout the Marcos era, this incident, like the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino, alerted U.S. soft-liners to the lengths Marcos was willing to go to in order to retain power.

On February 12, the State Department went public with its disapproval of Reagan's statements, with strategically placed quotes appearing in leading U.S. newspapers including the New York Times, which cited State Department "anger," "embarrassment," "surprise," and efforts to "limit confusion and uncertainty." Lugar and others on the observer team, reacting in part to what they had seen and in part to their constituents' growing support for Aquino, returned to the U.S. and openly dismissed Reagan's allegations as "misinformed." Appearing on several talk shows, Lugar wanted to make sure that his "point of view was heard to frame the issues."¹¹⁰ In addition to intensifying anger among Philippine moderates led by Aquino, popular and elite U.S. opposition to Reagan's position were growing. Amid complaints from the U.S. business community in the Philippines that Reagan's statements were jeopardizing their interests¹¹¹ as well as charges from congress that aid to the Philippines would be terminated unless Aquino were accepted as the nation's new leader,¹¹² U.S. embassy officials in

with the left, all reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

¹⁰⁹Personal interview with Bosworth, March 1989.

¹¹⁰Personal interview with Lugar, April 1993.

¹¹¹Confidential Cable #05234, February 14, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

¹¹²Non-Classified Memorandum of letter from Senator Nunn as well as a Dole/Lugar/Nunn Action statement, February 13, 1986, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.
Manila cultivated close contact with members of the moderate opposition, urging them to avoid violence, anti-Americanism, and contacts with the left, in tacit exchange for immediate support and future recognition. At the same time, however, embassy officials devised plans to reduce personnel and destroy classified documents in preparation for anticipated anti-American demonstrations and possibly even a hostile transition from Marcos.

By February 15, Reagan recanted, publicly acknowledging that the "widespread fraud and violence" had been "perpetrated largely" by Marcos and his supporters. Lugar notes that "Once Reagan made a change in course, then the ball was in Marcos' court...Marcos was going to have to make a very tough decision as to how far he wanted to go to suppress the opposition." Hours after Reagan's statement, however, the Marcos-controlled National Assembly declared him the victor, as opposition members protested by walking out of the session. A hundred bishops from the relatively conservative Catholic Bishops Conference circulated a statement through the national and international media condemning Marcos and charging that his attempt to retain power had "no moral basis." Aquino then staged a massive rally in Luneta Park, near a statue of Rizal, invoking an earlier era of resistance, and urged her growing ranks of supporters to use civil disobedience to unseat Marcos. Estimates from the U.S. Embassy placed the number of Filipinos in attendance at more than a million. To shore up his U.S. support, Marcos sent a team of senior officials to D.C. by February 20 to

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113 Confidential Cable #05186, February 14, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

114 Secret Cable #048670, February 15, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

115 The text of Reagan's statement is reprinted in Unclassified Cable #049446, February 15, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

116 Personal interview with Lugar, April 1993.

117 Confidential Cable #05363, February 16, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

118 Confidential Cable #05323, February 15, 1986, and Confidential Cable #05362 a day later, both reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

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lobby for continued support from members of congress and the Reagan administration.\(^{119}\) Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department sent Philip Habib as a special envoy to "assess the situation." For six days, Habib interviewed over a hundred politicians, priests, educators, business leaders, and U.S. journalists. He also met with Cardinal Sin, Corazon Aquino, NAMFREL volunteers, American citizens and others.\(^{120}\) Before leaving on Saturday, February 22, Habib told one of these journalists, Stanley Karnow, that he was particularly impressed by Enrile, still Marcos' Minister of Defense, who "seemed to be distancing himself from Marcos" and might soon "reveal his hand." Habib also told a U.S. embassy officer to tell Bosworth, "Something's going to break." Bosworth reported "unusual military activity," citing the possibility of a coup or a counter-coup, as well as statements from Ramos and Enrile declaring RAM preparedness to defend against armed forces military actions coordinated by Ver.\(^{121}\)

Later that day, February 22 at 6:00 p.m., Enrile, together with Ramos and a few leading RAM officers holed up in a Manila military base called Camp Aguinaldo, invoking another hero from the earlier resistance to Spain, and told a gathering mob of reporters that they recognized Aquino as the country's new president. In fact, the defectors had been planning a coup since March 1985. Marcos' decision to hold presidential elections had surprised them, however, and they decided not to act unless the elections were fraudulent, lest they be seen as thwarting the democratic process. Marcos' election fraud finally spurred the plotters to schedule a coup for the early morning hours of February 23. On February 20, however, Marcos arrested four military rebels, who subsequently revealed the coup plan. Two days later, on February 22, RAM leader Colonel

\(^{119}\)Confidential Cable #05893, February 20, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

\(^{120}\)Secret Cable #05365, February 16, 1986, describes Habib's itinerary, reprinted in the National Security Archive collection.

\(^{121}\)Secret Cable #06192, February 22, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.
Gregorio Honasan learned of the arrests and warned against the coup. Swiftly revising plans, Ramos and Enrile decided instead to secure themselves within Camp Aguinaldo, the site of Enrile's Ministry of Defense, and appeal to others in the military to support them, including the 200-man force Enrile had begun cultivating in 1981, described in chapter six, which comprised the core of RAM's growing ranks.122

Whether or not the U.S. was directly involved in the RAM coup plot or subsequent defections, prior U.S. support for RAM and the discussions in U.S. official circles with RAM leaders as described above, as well as Habib's uncanny prescience all indicate at least a modicum of U.S. involvement. Further, the entire U.S. seventh fleet was in Manila Harbor during the period, in addition to air and naval forces at Subic and Clark. Without U.S. backing or at least a pledge from the U.S. not to intervene militarily in support of Marcos, the coup attempt would have been little more than a suicidal bid for power. Neither Ramos, a West Point-trained military professional who had risen steadily through the ranks of the Philippine armed forces, nor Enrile, a Harvard-trained lawyer with years of political and military experience, is liable to have acted without considering the post-coup prospects of survival, nor without some understanding of the U.S. position.

Why, however, did Ramos and Enrile, both long-time hard-liners and Marcos allies, defect? As described in the previous chapter, both Ramos and Enrile, like the RAM officers, were concerned by Marcos' growing tendency to promote within the military on the basis of loyalty to Marcos rather than on merit, as exemplified by the continuing presence of General Ver, a Marcos relative and former chauffeur who had circumvented all traditional paths to the top position in the Philippine military. While both Ramos and Enrile had enjoyed Marcos' backing in the early years of martial law and had emerged as political powers in

122The above is from Karnow, pp. 415-417 and from personal interviews with journalists and clergy present in the early hours of the so-called "People Power revolution."
their own right, they were both sidelined in 1981 when Marcos named Ver to serve as Armed Forces Chief of Staff, bypassing Ramos. Marcos later removed Enrile from the chain of command. Fearing assassination, Enrile then created his security force, essentially an army within the army, to defend himself against a suspected assault from Ver. 123 These forces later formed the core of RAM. Thus, the personal incentive for Ramos and Enrile to ally against Marcos emerged in 1981, gained strength and support from other disgruntled sectors of the military thereafter, reached organizational viability in the form of RAM by early 1985, and then began to acquire U.S. allies by March of that year, as the new NSDD calling for military and political reforms was being put into effect. In addition to the narrow personal incentives associated with promotions, Ramos and Enrile as well as the RAM troops had institutional incentives to secure a transition, given both the U.S. congressional decision to cut military aid to the Philippines unless Marcos launched meaningful reforms and Marcos' apparent inability to comply. In order to secure U.S. aid, then, a transition from Marcos was needed, as Philippine and U.S. soft-liners used transnational strategies to launch the transition.

All the King's Horses and All the King's Men

At 9:00 p.m., Cardinal Sin spoke on Radio Veritas, the U.S.-supported radio station of the Catholic Church which had been used by the moderate opposition during the campaign, and appealed to Filipinos to support "our two good friends," Enrile and Ramos. In the next few hours, nuns, priests, students, and other long-time opponents of the Marcos regime gathered at Camp Aguinaldo, holding an all-night vigil for a peaceful transition. 124

While Marcos and his remaining loyalists worked around the clock plotting

123 Thompson, p. 149.
their counter move, Aquino, with urging from Cardinal Sin, rallied her supporters to back the military defectors. By early Sunday morning, loyalist tanks moved toward Camp Aguinaldo where over 40,000 had gathered in a vivid expression of "people power" and the mass desire among Filipinos for political change. Later that afternoon, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos filed the streets, wielding rosary beads, giving flowers to soldiers, singing nationalist songs, and otherwise pressuring Marcos loyalists not to fire upon them.\textsuperscript{125} The U.S. White House urged Marcos not to use force, implying that he would lose subsequent U.S. support, with even Reagan's acceptance, should he did so.\textsuperscript{126} As the day wore on, more and more troops defected from Marcos. The U.S., meanwhile, allowed rebel helicopters to refuel at Clark Air base while transmitting intelligence to the rebels. Bosworth also urged Marcos repeatedly not to use force. Meanwhile, Radio Veritas, dodging from one frequency to another in order to stay on the air, played the jubilant "Magsaysay Mambo" which recalled an earlier era of U.S. involvement in Philippine elections. The radio station also encouraged people's power supporters, while allowing rebel troops to communicate helicopter landing instructions and other tactical information on air, as the nation listened.\textsuperscript{127} Nevertheless, Marcos ordered at least one pilot to fire upon the demonstrators; but after seeing the crowds in the streets below, the pilot turned around and defected to Enrile and Ramos. "Everybody," Lugar notes, "understood that this would not be played out on the basis of personal rapport. It was going to play out in public opinion, on who really had staying power."\textsuperscript{128}

In D.C., Secretary of State George Shultz called a special meeting at his home on Sunday morning, evening in Manila, to discuss a message from Bosworth.

\textsuperscript{125}Confidential Cable #06196, February 23, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection, and personal interviews with journalists and clergy who participated in the show of support.

\textsuperscript{126}Secret Cable #055988, February 23, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{127}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128}Personal interview with Lugar, April 1993.
concluding that Marcos would not leave unless Reagan put it to him directly.\textsuperscript{129} A surreal exchange on American television that same morning confirmed Bosworth's assertion, as the key players jousted, live, in the battle for public opinion. On "Meet the Press," Ramos vowed to defeat Marcos "by sheer numbers" while reported that he had been legally elected, adding, "I don't believe President Reagan would ask me to step down."\textsuperscript{130} It was a remarkably candid revelation. Apparently, Marcos was unprepared to resign as long as he felt he still enjoyed Reagan's support, regardless of the "people power" display, now climbing above an estimated two million,\textsuperscript{131} the defecting troops, or the disloyalty of his own senior staff. In fact, the message never did come directly from Reagan. Instead, the U.S. first issued a public statement via the media warning Marcos that he "would cause untold damage to the relationship between our two governments" if he used force. The U.S. also threatened to suspend Marcos' military aid unless he complied. The carefully crafted message sought to avoid two scenarios. One was that Marcos, in a last ditch effort to retain power, would hold to his televised statement to Philippine audiences to "fight to the last breath," with the possibility that he might attack rebel camps and the masses of civilians on world television. The other scenario was that the rebel troops might capture and murder Marcos and his family, as had happened in the earlier U.S.-backed coup against Diem in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{132} The Marcos lobbyists arriving in D.C. were given the same message, urged by Shultz to tell Marcos to depart gracefully.

Still Marcos remained. By Monday afternoon in D.C., evening in Manila, Reagan approved a public plea to Marcos to quit. "Attempts to prolong the life of the present regime by violence are futile," the statement read, adding, "A

\textsuperscript{129}\textsuperscript{}Shultz.

\textsuperscript{130}\textsuperscript{}"Meet the Press" transcript and interviews with Marvin Kalb, April 1989.

\textsuperscript{131}\textsuperscript{}Confidential Cable #06292, February 24, 1986, from the National Security Archive collection.

\textsuperscript{132}\textsuperscript{}Personal interview with Lugar, April 1993.
solution to this crisis can only be achieved through a peaceful transition to a new
government." After some debate, the statement included the word transition, so
that Marcos would have no doubt about U.S. intentions. Marcos received the
message at 3:00 a.m. Tuesday, February 25. Still Marcos wanted to speak directly
with Reagan. Marcos phoned Laxalt at the Capitol Building, interrupting a secret
briefing among Shultz, Habib, and thirty key members of congress, including
Lugar, Kerry, Inouye, Laxalt, and others, as well as Marcos' aide Melchor who
had gauged the official D.C. reaction to martial law fourteen years earlier and
now provided crucial advice. "Was the statement about a transition real or
another State Department ploy?" Marcos asked. Laxalt confirmed the
statement's veracity. Marcos then suggested several "power sharing" alternatives.
Laxalt agreed to present these to Reagan and call back. Reagan, however, agreed
with Shultz, who felt that the power sharing schemes were "impractical." At 5:00
a.m. Tuesday morning in Manila, Marcos answered the call he had been waiting
for from Laxalt. Laxalt, having been coached by Shultz, told Marcos that Reagan
had vetoed the power sharing suggestions but offered him asylum in the U.S. Still
Marcos wanted to know, did Reagan want him to resign. "Senator," Marcos
asked, "what do you think? Should I step down?" Laxalt responded, "I think you
should cut and cut cleanly. I think the time has come."134

Hours later, Marcos and his wife Imelda, stood on a balcony at
Malacanang Palace and, for a throng of their closest supporters, sang a duet of
the traditional Filipino love song "Dahil Sa Iyo," "Because of You." Soon after,
the Marcoses and their entourage fled by U.S. helicopter to Clark Air Base,
where they boarded a plane for an ignominious exile to Hawaii. Meanwhile,
Corazon Aquino, in her signature yellow, took the oath of office as the new

133Speakes.

134The above information is a compilation from accounts by Shultz, Speakes, Bonner, and
Karnow.
president of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{135} The conditions of the transition required
Aquino to form an uneasy pact with Ramos, Enrile, and large segments of the
military, including those like Enrile who had been among her husband’s
tormentors, a fact which would ultimately undermine her subsequent attempts to
consolidate the democratization process, with recurrent coup attempts by a still
politiciized military. For the moment, though, the transnational alliance of soft-
liners, working through U.S. and Philippine, official and societal, channels,
succeeded in ousting a similarly transnational alliance of hard-liners which had
too long supported Ferdinand Marcos. They did this largely by encouraging
growing segments of the transnational hard-line alliance to defect to thesoft-line
camp, as long-time hard-liners like Ramos and Enrile became soft-liners, until
Marcos was left too weak to stand. It was also a victory for the human rights
movement that Corazon Aquino, whose husband had long been a symbol of the
cause, should now replace Marcos. The U.S. congressional human rights caucus
cheered the occasion with a letter of congratulations to the new Philippine
president.\textsuperscript{136}

Conclusion

In short, neither domestic Philippine politics nor U.S. intervention alone
can explain the transition from Marcos to Aquino in 1986. While Philippine
domestic political actors tailored their strategies to the U.S. as with Aquino’s
increasingly pro-U.S. campaign stance, thus discounting purely domestic
explanations, likewise U.S. political actors relied upon a carefully constructed

\textsuperscript{135}As reported on CNN, among other Philippine and U.S. news outlets, February 1986. Note
that Walden Bello alleges that the Marcoses left armed, believing they were headed not into exile
but for a last stand in Marcos’ home province of Ilocos Norte. If this is so, and Marcos did not
choose to step down, then the U.S. played an even more crucial, leadership role in the transition.

\textsuperscript{136}Non-classified letter sent February 25, 1986, reprinted in the National Security Archive
collection.
moderate alternative from within the Philippine military, church, and traditional oligarchy, thus discounting a purely international explanation. Rather, the transition resulted from the interplay of domestic Philippine, domestic U.S., and transnational opposition to the Marcos regime, all of which had been building since 1972. By 1985, the opposition to Marcos had reached key political, economic, and military segments of U.S. and Philippine official circles, as soft-line arguments about the need for reform rather than repression to avert revolution gained adherents, culminating in February 1986 with the success of a transnational alliance of U.S. and Philippine soft-liners in redirecting U.S. support from Marcos to Aquino.

After the 1972 transition to martial law and particularly after the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., domestic Philippine politics, notably the rise of revolutionary opposition to Marcos, the growth of the moderate opposition, and the emerging possibility of a moderate-left alliance in response to hard-line pressures, combined to create the impetus for change by posing an increasingly serious threat to elite Philippine and U.S. interests. Exiled moderates in the U.S., and to a lesser extent revolutionaries, also launched transnational strategies to build opposition within the Filipino and Filipino-American community, and to establish broader alliances with U.S. congressmen, journalists, academics, and other opinion leaders. By early 1985, a cadre of Philippine officials, notably RAM officers in the military, and U.S. officials, notably in the State Department and congress, argued that the transnational hard-line tactics which had prevailed since Philippine independence in 1946, were fueling not quelling revolutionary opposition. They urged Marcos to reform, while covertly cultivating RAM and Radio Veritas; but by late 1985, it was clear that Marcos was not going to comply. Under pressure from the U.S., amid hearings on the hidden wealth issue and its implications for U.S. aid, Marcos announced "snap" presidential elections. Now, transnational soft-line pressures for fair elections intensified, as Filipino moderates united behind Corazon Aquino. To help secure U.S. support for her, Aquino's allies then reshaped her platform on the bases and the communists,
reorienting her toward a more pro-U.S. stance. Still, hard-liners withdrew support from Marcos only when other former hard-liners defected and demanded a redirection in U.S. support to Aquino, thus making "people power" possible.

To understand why the U.S. role proved so critical, it is essential to understand first the foundation upon which Marcos built his regime. As the previous two chapters have shown, Marcos enjoyed substantial U.S. technical, political, and economic support throughout his regime, primarily because of his reliability in protecting U.S. interests, notably the U.S. military bases. As U.S. investment in the Philippine bases increased, particularly during the Vietnam War and later after the loss of Cam Ranh Bay to the Soviets, so too did U.S. dependence on Marcos increase. At the same time, Marcos' dependence on U.S. support increased after his 1972 declaration of martial law. As opposition spread, in the form of both moderate and revolutionary movements, as well as soft-line opposition within his regime, particularly from within the military, Marcos relied upon U.S. military aid, using this to expand his armed forces from 60,000 in 1972 to over 200,000 by 1986. Far from silencing opposition, however, the repression fueled both revolutionary and moderate opposition, particularly after the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., an act for which many held Marcos or those close to him responsible. If such a violation could occur to someone as powerful as Aquino, many Filipinos reasoned, what might happen to anyone voicing even moderate opposition to Marcos. Church, business, military, political and other sectors of the established oligarchy began defecting from Marcos after 1972, as the previous chapter describes, but they defected in droves after 1983, as the political crisis spurred an economic crisis which further fed the political crisis in a vicious cycle.

Meanwhile, reports from congressional and embassy sources on the growth of the communist insurgency sparked concern in U.S. official circles in 1984. By early 1985, U.S. official policy in the form of the NSDD shifted from full support of Marcos to support conditioned upon his ability to reform the economic, military, and political systems, with the Marcos regime's corruption now seen as
contributing to the Philippine crisis. Amid growing pressures from the U.S.
executive, led by Armacost, Wolfowitz, and others at State, with support from
Armitage and others at Defense and from Sigur at the NSC, congress began
holding hearings on the Philippines, linking, by May, aid to Marcos with his efforts
to rebuild democracy. When opposition Filipino businessmen used a
transnational media strategy, leaking to U.S. reporters information on Marcos’
hidden wealth and alleged diversion of U.S. aid, the coverage, which began in
August 1985, further intensified congressional debates on aid, as Reagan and his
inner circle sought to refurbish Marcos’ image. Still, Marcos did not comply with
the pressures to reform, arguing on U.S. television that he believed the criticism
came from congress not from Reagan. By mid-October, Reagan sent Laxalt as his
personal emissary to Marcos, to assure the Philippine president that the message
for reform came from the White House as well as from the bureaucracy and
congress. Days later, Marcos apparently complied, calling for "snap" presidential
elections for early 1986. Now congress emerged as a central forum for U.S. critics
of Marcos from the executive, notably Wolfowitz and Armitage, while Lugar
eventually served a critical role as head of the bi-partisan official observer
delegation for the elections.

As evidence of electoral fraud mounted and Corazon Aquino threatened to
"take the elections to the streets," the debate in the U.S. intensified. Reagan,
Regan, Weinberger, Casey, and others in the president’s inner circle urged
continued support of Marcos; but Shultz, Bosworth, Armacost, Armitage and
others, mainly from State together with congressional foreign policy leaders such
as Lugar, Solarz, and Kerry, urged support for a democratic transition from
Marcos to Aquino. As Lugar acknowledged, by agreeing to participate as
observers in the elections, the congressional foreign policy leaders had staked
their reputations on "free and fair" Philippine elections and were now determined
to protect the democratic process there, as were their soft-line allies in the
executive, who were waging a more narrow political battle with Reagan and his
inner circle. By February 22, when Ramos and Enrile defected from Marcos,
bringing with them the U.S.-backed RAM officers, Cardinal Sin called to Aquino and her supporters to back the defectors, as the "people power" revolution erupted on the streets of Manila. In the midst of the crisis, Marcos still clung to power. Only when Reagan finally agreed to press Marcos, via Laxalt, to "cut and cut cleanly," offering as well asylum in the U.S., did Marcos leave. Clearly, it mattered less who had won the elections in the Philippines, than where the U.S. placed its support. Thus, while domestic Philippine revolutionary and moderate opposition created the impetus for change, soft-liners from within the Marcos regime together with those in the U.S. created the political space for a moderate alternative to both the left and the right to gain power by supporting RAM, NAMFREL, Radio Veritas, the election observer team, and other key actors in the transition.

Domestic Philippine politics then determined the nature of the transition. For instance, that the moderates united behind Aquino in the elections, that Ramos and Enrile backed her as president rather than seeking power for themselves, that Aquino's supporters heeded Cardinal Sin's call for non-violence, and, finally, that Marcos ultimately left peacefully, are all of the domestic Philippine contingencies which allowed for a moderate, non-violent transition from Marcos to Aquino. Even here, however, the prospects of U.S. support or opposition likely influenced the behavior of each of the actors. For instance, Marcos knew that without U.S. backing, his regime could not survive. Similarly, Enrile and Ramos might have lacked sufficient U.S. as well as Filipino popular and military backing had they attempted a coup, while a moderate-left revolution might not have had the capacity to withstand the likely opposition from the U.S., as the Sandinistas faced after 1979. Thus, domestic Philippine politics created the impetus for change by threatening U.S. and elite Philippine interests; while the transnational strategies used by Filipino moderates and soft-liners to first undermine Marcos, as in the hidden wealth story, and then, with U.S. soft-liners, to redirect U.S. support away from Marcos allowed for a moderate transition. These transnational strategies were led by neither U.S. nor Filipino members of
each alliance, but rather operated in a chain of interactive, mutually reinforcing actions and reactions on both sides of the Pacific. Philippine domestic politics, within the context of U.S. pressures, then determined the outcome and the contingencies, particularly Aquino’s uneasy alliance with the military, which would affect subsequent efforts to consolidate the archipelago’s resurgent democracy.
Chapter 8. Conclusion

Overview

We now return to the original questions posed in the introduction. First, what causes regime transition? Second, what are the international sources of regime transition? And finally, what determines the direction of change -- revolutionary, authoritarian, or democratic? This chapter summarizes the findings of each of the consecutive cases of regime transition in the Philippines, from the 1898 transition from Spanish colonial rule to U.S. occupation, through the period of U.S. colonial rule to the 1946 transition to independence, the 1972 transition to authoritarian rule under Marcos, and the 1986 transition from Marcos to Aquino, signalling the resurrection of democracy. The chapter then refines the theoretical model presented in chapter one, engaging the two main alternative explanations for regime transition which emphasize either purely domestic or purely international factors. The chapter concludes with suggestions for additional theoretical work, as well as some practical applications of the findings.

The Causes of Regime Transition: The 1898 Case

From the first armed conflict between the forces of Lapu Lapu and those of Humabon and Magellan, Filipinos have cultivated international alliances as a strategy for dealing with domestic conflict, while international political actors have cultivated alliances with Filipinos as a strategy of conquest. From 1565 through 1898, Spain cultivated a Filipino "cacique," granting them privileged access to land, international trade, and other economic resources. In exchange, the "caciques" carried out the colonial policies of Spain, extracting labor, taxes, church tributes and other resources from an increasingly restive peasant population, establishing as well a land tenure system which remains largely intact today. Because land has traditionally been the primary source of wealth and power in

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the Philippines, the inequalities in land tenure extend from the economic to the social and political realms. By the late 1500's, the peasants began to coordinate revolts, and, in response to both this and external conflict with Portugal, Holland, England, and others, Spain cultivated a transnational hard-line alliance with Filipinos in the fertile Pampangan plains near Manila centered in the town of Macabebe. Spain's dependence on the Macabebes for food as well as the Macabebes' military prowess explains the Spanish side of the alliance. For the Macabebes, privileged access to trade explains the early phase of their alliance with Spain. By the late 1600's, as the Macabebes themselves were targeted by peasant revolutionaries, it was also a strategy for survival. In addition, the church tried to address the revolutionary threat by withdrawing the military from the countryside, restricting the Spanish presence in areas outside Manila to clergy. Instead of reducing conflict, however, the friars carried out land expansion drives, as the church became the largest landowner in the Philippines by the end of Spanish rule, as well as a prime source of revolutionary anger.

The church did sometimes play a soft-line role as well in taming the threat of peasant revolution; but it was the rise of democracy in Europe as an alternative to monarchy, particularly with the revolution in France, which led to attempts to institutionalize soft-line approaches to peasant revolutionary opposition both within Spain and in the colonies. This soon contributed to growing schisms in Spain, leading to frequent changes in government throughout the 1800's, including a brief but important period of French occupation from 1808 to 1814. The governmental changes reverberated, in turn, throughout Spain's colonies. During the French period, with the link between Spanish colonialists and the peninsular monarchy broken for the first time since the dawn of the Age of Discovery in 1492, some Spanish colonists remained loyal to the Crown but others reveled in their sudden freedom from centuries of restrictive Spanish economic policies. As commerce spread, so too did the cry for independence, even after the Spanish monarchy was restored in 1815. A surge of revolts in the periphery left Spain with just Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by 1826, ushering in a hard-line
backlash, as the ultra-conservative regime of King Ferdinand VII stepped in to undo the liberalizations of his predecessors. Spanish officials periodically tried to reintroduce liberal policies to quell revolutionary opposition; but the hard-liners were able to thwart such changes, while extending restrictions to formerly privileged elites and colonial Spaniards or "criollos." Instead of quelling revolutionary fervor, the hard-line policies fueled a new wave of revolutionary agitation in the Philippines and Cuba, as elites and peasants, moderates and revolutionaries began to ally in a shared desire to overthrow Spain. In the Philippines, this alliance solidified after the 1896 execution of moderate opposition leader Jose Rizal.

By 1898, the U.S. had already acquired former Spanish colonies on the North American continent, including the Louisiana territory in 1803, which Napoleon had secretly forced Spain to retrocede to France; Spanish territory along the Gulf of Mexico known as West Florida in 1810; and all of Florida by 1819. After Mexican independence in 1821, the U.S. had faced down a new foe, acquiring by 1848 Texas and what are now New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada and the land Urdaneta discovered enroute from the Philippines so long ago -- California. Now, American expansionists saw in the Cuban and Filipino uprisings against Spain an opportunity for additional territory. Their aims were challenged, however, by anti-imperialists who opposed America's colonial ambitions for moral, economic, and political reasons. Following a heated debate between U.S. anti-imperialists and the expansionists, the Teller Amendment allowed for American intervention in Cuba to help liberate the revolutionaries from Spain but prohibited the taking of Cuba thereafter for the U.S. Pressing the expansionist cause regardless, arch-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, devised a plan to attack Spanish garrisons simultaneously in Cuba and in the Philippines. The plan did not make sense militarily, since the ships in Manila could not have been deployed rapidly to Cuba and, in any case, were outmoded relics of Spain's earlier grandeur. Nevertheless, the plan was launched while Roosevelt's less expansionist boss, Secretary of the Navy John
Long, was out sick one afternoon. While U.S. forces were helping to liberate the Cuban revolutionaries, they were conquering Manila. On May 1, 1898, Commodore Dewey sailed into Manila Harbor and routed Spanish forces.

The Spanish put up a better fight to hold the city of Manila from U.S. forces who allied with Filipino revolutionaries led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo and his forces understood from the Teller Amendment that the U.S. would not take the Philippines as a colony. When peace talks between the U.S. and Spain began, however, the Filipinos were excluded, as tensions between the U.S. and Filipino revolutionaries flared. On December 10, 1898, the U.S. acquired the right to purchase the Philippines from Spain under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty, which also granted Cuban independence as well as U.S. control of Guam and Puerto Rico. Now an intense debate broke out within the U.S., again between expansionists and anti-imperialists over whether or not to ratify the treaty. Although the anti-imperialists waged a bitter and effective battle, the expansionists won when, two days prior to the congressional voting, war broke out on February 4, 1899 between the Filipino revolutionaries and U.S. forces. Having stumbled into the Philippines without a plan, the U.S. forces quickly learned that seizing territory and holding it were two distinct enterprises, the former requiring merely military superiority, the latter requiring political capacity to control captive populations. Working on both fronts, U.S. forces established a transnational hard-line alliance with Macabebe soldiers, using them as the Spanish before them had, to militarily silence the Filipino revolutionaries. Meanwhile, non-military U.S. advisors worked in tandem to cultivate transnational alliances with moderate and elite factions of the Philippine opposition. This nascent transnational soft-line alliance set up health, education, and other public projects while laying the foundation for a post-conquest colonial regime involving essentially the same Filipinos who had earlier found it profitable to collaborate with Spain.

Thus, the causes of the transition from Spanish colonial rule to U.S. occupation are primarily international, centered in the broader, and long-standing
conflict between Spain and the U.S. for territory. Domestic opposition in the Philippines and Cuba, however, created the opportunity for U.S. intervention by weakening Spain's hold over its colonies. Further, domestic opposition within Spain towards liberal, soft-line approaches to revolutionary opposition forced Spain to pursue hard-line policies, even when it was clear that these policies were encouraging former "caciques," elites and moderates to ally with revolutionaries. Similarly, domestic opposition within the U.S. prevented American expansionists from taking Cuba and nearly prevented them from taking the Philippines as well. Still, neither domestic nor international explanations take into account the crucial role played by the transnational hard-line alliance comprised of U.S. forces and Macabebes, particularly since it was the latter who, posing as partisans, brought about the capture of Aguinaldo, an event which severely undermined the revolutionary cause. Moreover, the eventual transition from U.S. occupation to colonial rule required the involvement of Filipinos willing to collaborate in building the political, economic, and social institutions which would form the foundation of the new colonial regime. While a combination of international and domestic factors help explain the transition, emerging transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances were also essential during the war between Filipino nationalists and U.S. forces and were then crucial to the ultimate success of the transition following the war.

The Causes of the 1946 Transition from Colonial Rule to Independence

In the end, the war was to last until 1902, involving roughly 126,000 Americans, with a toll of over 4,000 American lives and as many as half a million Filipino lives while igniting a debate in the U.S. over foreign policy much like that experienced generations later over policy toward Vietnam. To address on-going resistance following the war, the U.S. maintained a troop presence of 50,000. A year before the formal conclusion of the war, the U.S. also established a Philippine Police Force, comprised largely of Macabebes, as the transnational
hard-line alliance became institutionalized. Meanwhile, U.S. officials debated the form the colonial government should take and eventually settled on a colonial government modeled after the one Jefferson had devised to rule the Louisiana territories. In this, a U.S. governor, appointed by the U.S. president, had veto power over an elected bicameral Philippine legislature. However, suffrage was restricted to landowners, tax-payers and the literate, leaving just three percent of the population eligible to vote, though the U.S. introduction of mass education would stir demand for broader democratic participation, eventually granted in 1935. In addition, two Filipinos, one appointed by the U.S. governor, the other by the Philippine assembly, were to sit in the U.S. House of Representatives, where they had the right to speak but not to vote. In the process of transition from military occupation to civilian rule, personal, institutional and strategic conflicts emerged between the U.S.-led transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances, as military commander Arthur MacArthur fought with the civilian commission directed by William Howard Taft for control of Philippine policy. During the last phase of the war, Taft won out, and the civilians gained colonial power over the archipelago.

Broader U.S. debates on the issue of Philippine sovereignty persisted, however, with Democrats generally pressing for independence and Republicans generally favoring continued colonial rule. The Democrats favored Philippine independence in part to protect U.S. beet sugar and other farmers, while the Republicans favored continued colonization as a cheap source of raw materials, particularly useful for industry. Throughout the early years of colonization, the Republicans held the White House. In 1912, however, the election of Woodrow Wilson created an opportunity for change which Philippine representative to the U.S. congress Manuel Quezon capitalized on. First, Quezon lobbied successfully to have anti-imperialist New York Congressman Francis Harrison named the new governor of the Philippines. Harrison quickly abolished the veto powers of the governor, granting Filipinos a substantial measure of self-government in just one bold stroke. He then reorganized the Philippine government, greatly reducing
over the course of the next eight years the number of Americans in administrative posts while increasing the number of Filipinos. Quezon next worked with Virginia Congressman William Atkinson Jones of the insular affairs committee to write an act pledging eventual independence for the Philippines. Quezon did this in part to stem the rise of a leftist political faction in the Philippines which was gaining support for its pro-independence platform. By 1916, the act passed in congress, though World War I soon reasserted U.S. dependence on the Philippines for raw materials as well as Philippine dependence on trade with the U.S. The war also exposed the threat to U.S. military facilities posed by Japan and other contenders for control of the Philippines, thereby strengthening the transnational hard-line alliance.

In the on-going U.S. debates, the issue of sovereignty languished through the Republican-dominated 1920's. In the Philippine countryside, however, a new era of peasant revolutionary opposition, in the form of religious fanaticism, was burgeoning amid the post-World War I collapse in agricultural markets. The collapse, together with new U.S. immigration laws which increased the attractiveness of Filipinos to U.S. employers, also led to a sudden spurt of Filipino migration to the U.S., notably to the labor-intensive sugar cane fields of Hawaii and fruit farms of California, as transnational U.S.-Philippine relations broadened. The Filipino farmworkers, many coming out of the recent religious, or Colorum, organizations, proved politically active, however, organizing strikes and other measures to leverage better wages and work conditions. By the late 1920's, such activism fueled racism against them, which deepened in the early 1930's when the Depression brought new waves of white migrants to California from the dustbowl states. The Depression also revived protectionist arguments, as powerful farm lobbies pressed for Philippine independence. These lobbies gained an ally in the White House with the 1932 election of Franklin Roosevelt. Under pressure from Filipino and U.S. lobbyists, Roosevelt helped push through the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, which allowed for a commonwealth regime for ten years followed by a transition to full independence thereafter. Just as the commonwealth regime was
inaugurated, however, the growing external threat posed by Japan, as well as a resurgence of domestic revolutionary opposition including a new Soviet-style Philippine Communist Party formed in 1931 with help from U.S. communists who had come to know immigrant Filipinos, again reasserted the interdependencies between the U.S. and the Philippines.

Despite the 1935 transition to commonwealth status, the transnational hard-line alliance rallied to strengthen military forces in the archipelago. General Douglas MacArthur, Arthur's son and heir to the civil-military conflict his father had fought, tried to create a Philippine army capable of defending against external as well as domestic threats, particularly to protect the increasingly important U.S. naval base at Subic and the air base at Clark, by then home of America's largest air armada anywhere overseas. U.S. and Philippine forces were, however, swiftly overcome by a surprise attack by Japan in December 1941, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. MacArthur fled soon after, vowing to return, as many elite Filipinos now collaborated with the Japanese occupation regime. Other Filipinos maintained a network of support for the U.S., including a shadow government as well as U.S.-trained military bands waging guerrilla warfare against Japanese forces. Revolutionary forces under the aegis of the Philippine Communist Party also formed a military arm in 1942 known as the Huks, and, following Soviet protocols, set aside their distaste for American colonialism and allied with U.S. forces to help defeat Japan, hoping in part that their demands for independence and structural change would be met should allied forces win the war. Following MacArthur's dramatic return in October 1944 and the subsequent Japanese withdrawal in 1945, however, these hopes were betrayed. U.S. and Filipino forces swiftly disarmed the Huks, leaving them to be killed or imprisoned by returning warlords and other long-time enemies. Still, the Huks opted to participate in elections scheduled for April 1946, hoping for a political solution to the crisis, though they prepared as well for civil war.

Meanwhile, MacArthur politically promoted his friend Manuel Roxas, exonerating him in April 1945 of all charges of assisting the Japanese, sideling
Sergio Osmeña, leader of the pro-U.S. shadow government throughout the Japanese occupation. In June, MacArthur summoned to Manila the commonwealth legislative body, which had been elected in 1941 but had never met because of the war. Many of the elected officials had participated in the pro-Japanese regime, and now selected Roxas as President of the Philippine senate and chairman of the powerful appointments committee. In August, MacArthur freed 5,000 Japanese collaborators, many from the landed, entrepreneurial and political elite. In September, the new U.S. high commissioner, a soft-line Democrat named Paul McNutt, arrived in the Philippines. His arrival reignited the hard-line feud with civilian authority, particularly when McNutt expressed concern that "enemy collaborators" dominated the legislature and then urged Truman to delay independence until the issue could be investigated. Instead, Roxas scored a narrow victory in April 1946 presidential elections, using his ties to the ever popular MacArthur as a key part of his platform. Roxas' Liberal Party also took over the legislature. At the same time, however, the Hukks won six legislative seats on a platform of land reform and opposition to the Bell Trade Act which was to preserve U.S. economic privileges in the Philippines after independence. An additional five seats were won by other opponents of the act, which had passed in the U.S. but still needed approval in the Philippines.

Immediately following the elections, Roxas denied seats to all eleven opponents of the act, then replaced these with his own supporters, which won him added approval from MacArthur. Still, Roxas feared that the measure might not pass in the Philippine legislature. Though Truman wanted to delay agreement on the measure until after July 4 in order to avert charges that the U.S. was extorting favorable trade agreements as a condition of Philippine independence, Roxas opted for a pre-independence vote. After intense debates, the measure was approved on July 2, 1946. Two days later, despite World War II, the Japanese occupation, and the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. held true to the promises of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, granting the Philippines independence. Amid the bombed out remnants of Manila, McNutt lowered the American flag, and Roxas
raised the Philippine flag, with its one red stripe, one blue, and yellow sun with eight rays representing the provinces that had first risen up against Spain. The expulsion of the Huks from the legislature had, however, signalled rural authorities that they could subdue without mercy the Huks, who were arrested or killed in droves. By August, just one month after independence, the Huks moved from the political to the military front, waging full-scale civil war in central Luzon by 1948.

As in 1898, neither purely international nor purely domestic factors can fully explain the 1946 transition to independence, nor the steps leading to it, including the 1916 Jones Act and the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act. While domestic U.S. factors, centering on political and economic competition between Republicans and Democrats, contributed to the debates on the question of Philippine independence and created openings for this when Democrats held the White House, it was the transnational lobbying by Filipinos, including those actually seated in the U.S. House of Representatives, which pushed the issue toward a conclusion. Similarly, international factors such as World War I contributed to the subsequent collapse of Philippine agricultural markets, with implications for domestic Philippine agitation, but it was the increased transnational exchanges as Filipinos migrated to the U.S., which sparked antagonism from U.S. growers and displaced whites during the Depression, and revived U.S. debates on the question of independence. Finally, the international crisis of World War II exposed Philippine vulnerability to other colonial contenders, in this case the Japanese, while fostering as well the rise of new, more organized peasant revolutionary opposition led by the Soviet-inspired Huks. The combination of external and domestic threats to their bid for control of Philippine politics encouraged elite Filipinos to seek continued military support from the U.S. At the same time, the war intensified U.S. strategic ties to the Philippines. This interdependence rose further when the emerging Cold War established a link between the domestic Huk conflict and the international Soviet one. As a result, Philippine independence was compromised from the outset by U.S. intervention in
the creation of a pro-U.S. post-colonial regime capable of protecting U.S. and elite Filipino interests.

The Causes of the 1972 Transition to Authoritarian Rule

The post-war military interdependence and state interpenetration between the U.S. and the Philippines was institutionalized with a 1947 agreement which committed the U.S. to provide the Philippines with external security while domestic Philippine forces were to provide for the new nation's internal security. The interdependence increased further during the Huk rebellion, as Cold War "containment" policies, formalized in 1950 with Truman's authorization of NSC-68, placed the Huk threat within the broader conflict with the Soviets. Seeking to use native rather than U.S. forces in order to avert domestic U.S. opposition, U.S. military advisors led by Colonel Edward Lansdale cultivated Philippine military as well as political and economic institutions in the service of silencing the Huk challenge. Though some transnational soft-line attempts were made to introduce reforms, notably in land tenure, these were a distant sideshow to the main transnational hard-line policies. As MacArthur had intervened on behalf of Roxas, Lansdale intervened on behalf of Ramon Magsaysay, promising increased aid to the corrupt regime of Elpidio Quirino in exchange for naming Magsaysay Defense Minister, which Quirino agreed to in 1950. Lansdale and Magsaysay then worked together to subdue the Huks. Lansdale also worked on the political front, helping the CIA to establish a citizen's group, the National Committee for Free Elections (NAMFREL), to monitor 1951 legislative elections. Magsaysay, with directives from Lansdale, supported NAMFREL by preventing the military from stealing ballot boxes and by stationing troops to prevent violence in what turned out to be relatively honest elections in which Quirino suffered heavy losses. Truman then applauded Magsaysay and, with continued U.S. backing, Magsaysay won by a huge margin in 1953 presidential elections, as Lansdale earned the new nickname "Landslide." That same year, the Huks formally surrendered, though
sporadic uprisings would continue for the next two decades.

In addition to the domestic Philippine Huk crisis and the rise of the transnational hard-line alliance it prompted, international events soon increased the value to the U.S. of its Philippine bases. During the Korean War, Clark and Subic proved strategically useful. The bases would be used again in the Quemoy-Matsu crises of the late 1950's; but it was not until the Vietnam War, particularly after the massive escalation in 1965, that the bases would become vital to the regional and global projection of U.S. power. Just as Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda were moving into Malacanang Palace, President Johnson increased in just one year the U.S. military presence in Vietnam from the 16,000 advisors sent by Kennedy to more than 23,000, followed by a rapid escalation in troop presence. Amid growing opposition at home and abroad, Johnson was desperate for a "more flags" campaign to give the impression of international support for the war. Marcos shrewdly used the U.S. need for Philippine support as well as the bases to procure ever higher levels of U.S. economic and military aid, including financing for ten battalions of troops. Earlier regimes had also used the bases to leverage U.S. aid but Marcos brought this to new heights, using much of the aid to establish a network of cronies and to cultivate the Philippine military as a viable instrument for repressing opposition to his regime. Opposition spread anyway, particularly after 1969 elections when Marcos' 2,000,000-vote margin of victory was profoundly challenged by rioting students and others in what was to become known as the "First Quarter Storm." Only with Philippine and U.S. military intervention was Marcos able to restore order.

Legislative elections in 1971, however, brought victory to the moderate opposition, with an increasingly likely win for opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr., in up-coming 1973 presidential elections. By 1972, his regime more threatened than ever, Marcos considered martial law. Given heavy doses of U.S. aid to the Philippines from 1946 to 1972, totalling about $1.85 billion in economic aid and about $672.5 million in military aid or over $2.5 billion in all, as shown in Appendix I, as well as the growth in the Philippine armed forces from 37,000 to
62,000 over the same period, Marcos had the capacity to carry it out. By doling out rewards to a network of cronies within the military, he also had their loyalty. The U.S. position was vague; but Marcos gambled that as long as a communist threat loomed, the U.S. would back him. A new Maoist insurgency had formed in 1969 on the foundations built by the Huks before them, but this insurgency, known as the New People’s Army (NPA) was, in fact, only in its infancy by 1972. U.S. officials knew this, but they went along with the Marcos charade, primarily because he promised to safeguard U.S. economic and strategic interests. It was also the Nixon-Kissinger era when realpolitik was taken to extremes. On September 22, 1972, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile’s car was reportedly strafed. Though Enrile later conceded that the event had been staged, Marcos used it as a pretext to declare martial law, undoing in a stroke of the pen decades of soft-line efforts to democratize the Philippines. Although the U.S. was not directly involved in the Marcos-led transition to martial law, the U.S. did back him, maintaining aid, trade, and other forms of crucial support up to the last moments of his regime in 1986.

In sum, the transnational hard-line and soft-line alliances were restructured in the post-colonial era, though a combination of domestic U.S., domestic Philippine, and international factors allowed the transnational hard-line alliance to gain predominance. In the process of "containing" the perceived communist threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines, Korea, and later Indochina, the transnational U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance greatly expanded the role of Philippine authoritarian institutions. Though this was done in the early post-war years to defend against the Huk challenge, by 1972, the authoritarian institutions had taken on a life of their own, with personal as well as institutional interests no longer tied to any actual revolutionary threat. Likewise, the U.S. military bases in the Philippines had become the lynch-pin of American global security, with Subic America’s largest overseas naval base and Clark among the top five largest overseas air bases by 1972. As such, Marcos was able to leverage U.S. backing for his authoritarian regime using hard-line arguments, despite the all but
nonexistent revolutionary threat. Although the impetus for the transition came from Marcos, his own personal ambitions, and the personal and institutional interests of key sectors of the military, U.S. hard-line cultivation of the Philippine armed forces since 1946 had established the capacity for authoritarian rule. At the same time, the U.S. bases had increased U.S. dependence on Marcos, which Marcos used to secure crucial U.S. backing for his widely unpopular authoritarian regime. Not only had the transnational hard-line alliance established the conditions for martial law; it also insured the survival thereafter of such a regime.

While domestic factors, notably Marcos' ambitions and the rise of the Philippine military as a political force, were immediate causes of the transition, they do not adequately account for the capacity for the 1972 transition nor the Marcos regime's subsequent survival. Likewise, international factors, notably U.S. interests, aid and military intervention from the end of World War II through 1972, do not capture the crucial role played by Marcos and the Philippine armed forces in carrying out authoritarian rule. Instead, the transnational explanation presented here, tracing the strategic interdependence and state interpenetration of the U.S.-Philippine hard-line alliance following World War II, though with roots in the Spanish and U.S. colonial eras, offers the most useful approach to understanding the 1972 Philippine transition to authoritarian rule.

**The Causes of the 1986 Transition from Marcos to Aquino**

Under authoritarian rule, political killings, which gained the chilling euphemism "salvagings," as well as torture, imprisonment and other human rights violations became so rampant in the Philippines after 1972 that even formerly moderate oppositionists, including members of the traditional oligarchy, were displaced. Marcos then supplanted much of the traditional elite with a network of his friends, family, and other cronies with primary loyalty not to any institution but to Marcos. These and other manifestations of the Marcos regime's corruption
created deep pockets of opposition within the military, church, oligarchy, and other traditional sources of Philippine power, as well as in the countryside, as both moderate and revolutionary opposition grew. Silenced at home, exiled opposition leaders mobilized domestic U.S. opposition to Marcos among the roughly one million Filipinos in the U.S., the even larger Filipino-American community, cultivating as well a network of anti-Marcos allies in U.S. official, business, academic, media and other elite circles. They used such strategies in part to circumvent Marcos' domestic restrictions on political expression, in part because of the crucial role played by the U.S. in sustaining the Marcos regime, and in part because of long-standing personal, professional, and institutional ties in the U.S. established since 1898. The transnational hard-liners nevertheless retained control, due to a combination of U.S. dependence on Marcos for access to the bases, a dependence which rose after the 1975 loss of Cam Ranh Bay, as well as Marcos' inventiveness in capitalizing on this dependence. Marcos secured ever more U.S. aid, and then used the aid to tighten his control of the economy and political structures, while expanding the military's capacity as a hard-line instrument for containing opposition to his increasingly unpopular regime.

At the same time, however, soft-line opposition to the hard-line strategies which had dominated U.S. foreign policy since 1946 and had helped create the military capacity for authoritarian rule in several allied countries, including the Philippines, was gaining ground in the U.S. in response to events in Indochina, Watergate, and other policies which fed American distaste for the hard-line approach. In 1973, congress initiated hearings on human rights in allied regimes, with implications for U.S. aid. In the process, attention to human rights gained an institutional base in U.S. foreign policy. In 1974, congress wrote new laws linking human rights with U.S. foreign aid and then established in 1977 a human rights bureau within the State Department to monitor the issue and inform congress, just as the most soft-line administration under President Carter won control of the executive. Ideological and bureaucratic tensions now arose between the increasingly powerful soft-liners and the hard-liners in Congress, the State
Department and other centers of foreign policy, notably the Defense Department, the White House, and the CIA, as well as non-official elites in business, academia, the media, etc. Central to the debate was whether hard-line tactics of repression fueled or quelled revolutionary threats to U.S. interests abroad. After the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua and the threat of revolution in El Salvador, the debate intensified. Even with Carter, the hard-liners retained control of foreign policy towards the Philippines and then in 1981, saw the ultra-hard-line Kirkpatrick doctrine under Reagan gain the White House.

One apparently minor concession to the soft-liners would soon, however, change that. Moderate opposition leader and pre-martial law senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., had been imprisoned since the early days of martial law, had been sentenced to death, but was released in May 1980 in order to travel to the U.S. for heart surgery. With subsequent fellowships from Harvard and M.I.T., he stayed on until August 1983. During his time in the U.S., Aquino established a broad network of powerful friends in the executive and legislative branches of government as well as in academia, business, the media, the U.S. Filipino community and other sectors where Filipino oppositionists had been building anti-Marcos allies. After much deliberation and negotiation with Marcos, Aquino decided to return to the Philippines on August 21, 1983. Moments after landing, Aquino was escorted off the plane by military men, and was then shot in the head from behind. Some 30,000 Aquino fans had gathered at the airport, waving yellow ribbons to cheer his return "after three long years." Now yellow became the symbol of moderate opposition, as the political crisis led to an economic crisis which fueled, in turn, the political crisis. Like Rizal before him, Aquino's martyrdom encouraged moderates and revolutionaries to ally. Meanwhile, in the U.S., Aquino's friends mobilized, as the extent of the Philippine human rights crisis suddenly became all too real. U.S. officials also grew concerned about the possibility of a moderate-left revolution and the implications of this for vital U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Philippines.

Amid intense debates over U.S. policy, formerly disparate groups of U.S.
soft-liners, Filipino moderates, soft-liners, and reformed hard-liners, in and out of government, coalesced into a coordinated alliance actively seeking a non-revolutionary, democratic alternative to Marcos. They urged economic, political, and military reforms, arguing that Marcos and his abusive hard-line tactics were part of the problem, not part of the solution. In fact, despite a U.S.-backed expansion of the Philippine armed forces from 60,000 in 1972 to over 200,000 by 1986, the revolutionary opposition had grown steadily from a few hundred at the outset of martial law to roughly 16,000 regulars, a million active supporters, and a broader base under the leftist umbrella group's National Democratic Front (NDF) estimated at ten million nationwide, or roughly twenty percent of the population. In the aftermath of the Aquino assassination, this burgeoned.

By early 1985, coordinated soft-line opposition emerged from within the Marcos regime, notably military officers in the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Together with the RAM officers, U.S. officials, notably in the State Department and congress, argued that the transnational hard-line tactics, and the associated abuses of human rights, which had prevailed since Philippine independence in 1946, were fueling revolutionary opposition. They urged Marcos to reform, while covertly supporting RAM and other moderate oppositionists. By late 1985, however, it was clear that Marcos was not going to comply. Meanwhile, by August 1985, Filipino elites circumvented the Marcos-controlled press, leaking to U.S. journalists information substantiating claims that Marcos had diverted U.S. aid for his own personal gain and that of his cronies. Aquino's friend Congressman Stephen Solarz soon after held hearings on the so-called "hidden wealth" issue, an issue of particular to concern to congress given its role in granting aid. Under growing pressure from the U.S., Marcos announced "snap" presidential elections on U.S. television. That the announcement came on U.S. television in the middle of the night in the Philippines is but one indication of its target audience.

Now, transnational soft-liners pressed for fair elections, as Filipino revolutionaries opted to boycott while moderates united behind Benigno Aquino's
widow Corazon. Aquino’s U.S. allies, including a U.S. public relations firm, then redirected her initially left-leaning platform on the bases and the communists toward a pro-U.S. stance. Congress sent political analysts to help Filipinos insure democratic procedures. Congress then agreed to Marcos’ request to send a bipartisan official observer delegation for the elections to be held February 7, 1986. The U.S. also helped revive NAMFREL to monitor the balloting. The international, notably U.S., media then descended on the Philippines, with U.S. coverage exceeding that for any foreign election up to that time. Election violence was sporadic, but accounts from the roughly 500,000 NAMFREL volunteers citing stolen ballot boxes, intimidation by the military of voters, and other violations, became more and more widespread during the voting. It was in the counting of votes, however, that evidence of electoral fraud mounted. When Reagan responded in a press conference that fraud might have occurred on both sides, Corazon Aquino threatened to "take the elections to the streets." Now, the debate in the U.S. intensified, as Reagan and others in the president’s inner circle urged continued support of Marcos, while soft-liners, mainly from the State Department together with congressional foreign policy leaders, urged support for a democratic transition from Marcos to Aquino. State Department estimates indicated that Aquino had won about sixty percent of the vote, such that massive fraud was required for Marcos to "win." Nevertheless, Marcos declared victory, while Aquino’s moderates began to take their votes to the streets, assembling by the thousands in Manila’s Rizal Park, recalling an earlier era of pitched moderate opposition.

RAM officers plotted a coup, but Marcos learned of the plan. By February 22, long-time Marcos allies, now soft-line RAM leaders General Fidel Ramos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile defected from Marcos, bringing with them the U.S.-backed RAM forces. Within hours, Cardinal Sin called to Aquino and her supporters to back the defectors using non-violence. When the moderates complied, the "people power" revolution burst onto the streets of Manila, as more and more Marcos troops joined the defectors over the next four days. Still
Marcos clung to power, placing panicky phone calls to his U.S. allies to gauge Reagan's reactions. In fact, only when Reagan finally agreed to press Marcos, via Senator Paul Laxalt, to "cut and cut cleanly," offering as well asylum in the U.S., did Marcos leave. Aquino, clad in the yellow of her mourning, took the oath of office, set aside her distaste for the military, and formed an uneasy pact with Ramos and Enrile, an arrangement which was to undermine subsequent attempts at democratization while posing a recurring threat to her regime of a military coup.

In those euphoric moments of February 1986, however, the transnational soft-liners within the Marcos regime together with those in the U.S. created the political space for a moderate alternative to both the left and the right to gain power. Domestic Philippine politics then determined the nature of the transition. For instance, that the moderates united behind Aquino, that Ramos and Enrile agreed to back her rather than seek power for themselves, that the moderates heeded Cardinal Sin's call for non-violence, and, finally, that Marcos ultimately left peacefully, are all of the domestic Philippine contingencies which allowed for a moderate, no.-violent transition. Even these contingencies, however, were likely influenced by the spectre of the U.S. For instance, without U.S. backing, Marcos knew he would not long survive. Similarly, Ramos and Enrile were savvy enough to understand that without U.S.-backing, their attempted coup, even had it been successful, would not likely have survived. Thus, domestic Philippine politics created the impetus for change by threatening U.S. and elite Philippine interests, and then determined the nature of change; while the international role of the U.S., conditioned by other international experiences in Indochina, Nicaragua, Iran, etc., played a crucial role by transferring support from Marcos to Aquino. As in the previous cases of regime change, however, neither purely domestic nor purely international explanations is complete. Instead, it was the long-standing efforts of transnational human rights activists, oppositionists, U.S. soft-liners in and out of government, and others, which led to the transnational soft-line alliance's success via RAM, NAMFREL, the observer team, the international, notably U.S., media
and other key players responsible for the transfer of power from Marcos to Aquino in February 1986.

Marcos nearly succeeded in his attempt to "salvage" democracy, indeed, the authoritarian legacy of his regime continues to threaten democratization, but the Filipino faith in democratic processes, nurtured throughout the U.S. colonial and post-colonial era, won out in the end. Nevertheless, the sources of revolutionary opposition persisted. Sidelined in the elections and in the subsequent "people power" uprising because of their decision to boycott, the revolutionary opposition was similarly sidelined by the Aquino administration, as their continuing calls for land reform and other structural changes, echoing centuries of peasant anger, went unanswered. As a result, the conditions for future revolutionary opposition persist.

Explaining the Direction of Regime Change

Having surveyed the sweep of history leading to the four consecutive transitions, and the causes of each of these, we now turn to the more difficult question -- what determines the direction of regime change? Certainly, a combination of international and domestic structural factors affects the relative strength of each of the competing forces, which affects, in turn, the direction of change. As Figure IV indicates, the 1898 and 1946 transitions suggest a correlation between international war involving Filipinos and the strength of revolutionary opposition. In both cases, revolutionary efforts to ally with U.S. hard-liners to oust their common enemies of first Spain and then Japan ended in direct conflict with the much stronger U.S. forces, pushing the revolutionaries back into the "boondocks" to regroup. Following the 1898 conflict, the soft-liners gained predominance as part of the effort to institutionalize U.S. colonial policy, but the hard-liners remained and gradually built up U.S. military facilities in the Philippines. To defend these as well as growing U.S. economic interests in the Philippines from internal threats, the hard-liners cultivated native authoritarian
Figure IV

Strength of Competing Alliances, 1898-1986

1898 1946 1972 1986

High

Med.

Low

- Soft-Liners
- Hard-Liners
- Revolutionaries
institutions. Prior to World War II, the hard-liners tried to establish a native military capable of defending against external threats as well, but this failed. In the immediate aftermath of war, the U.S. hard-liners were relatively weak compared with the soft-liners, given American distaste for continued fighting abroad, a factor which helps explain the transition to independence. Soon, however, this factor together with the Cold War and the rising Huk challenge led to the resurgence of the hard-liners, with a renewed emphasis on native authoritarian forces to combat internal threats and U.S. forces to combat external ones.

The post-colonial transnational hard-line alliance which emerged from this gained predominance thereafter, even when the revolutionary opposition was weak, as in 1972. What then accounts for the transition to authoritarian rule? Even though the revolutionary opposition was weak, the moderate threat to the hard-liners was high. Irrespective of any revolutionary threat justifying a hard-line crackdown, the individual interests of Marcos and his cronies as well as the institutional interests of the military created the incentive for the Philippine hard-liners to declare martial law. Because the U.S. hard-liners still dominated U.S. foreign policy, Marcos was able to secure U.S. backing for his authoritarian regime, a factor crucial to its survival. He did this by offering in exchange assurances that he would safeguard U.S. interests, notably the military bases, now the lynch-pin of the global U.S. force structure. By the 1983 assassination of Aquino, U.S. soft-liners, Philippine moderates, and revolutionaries were gaining ground vis-a-vis the hard-liners, as hard-line strategies threatened to go too far, encouraging moderates to ally with revolutionaries as they had in the final years of Spain's hard-line rule.

By 1986, the transnational hard-liners remained strong but the soft-liners had gained strength both within the U.S. and in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries were the strongest they had been since 1898, with a wide network of support spread throughout the geographic and social strata of the archipelago. Nevertheless, they were neither militarily nor politically capable of taking power.
alone. Had the moderates allied with the left rather than with RAM, however, a Sandinista-like revolution might have succeeded, as U.S. analysts had long argued. What then accounts for the transition to democracy? In this case, voluntarist factors centering on competing political strategies account for the direction of change. Although Gorbachev's presence was easing Cold War tensions, this international structural change had not yet altered U.S. concerns about its Philippine bases. Likewise, domestic structural factors such as the Philippine economic crisis attending the Aquino assassination help explain the rise in revolutionary opposition, but do not explain their failure to gain power. Instead, it was the success of the transnational soft-liners in isolating moderates from revolutionaries by offering them a non-revolutionary alternative to Marcos which accounts for the democratic nature of the transition. The soft-liners then pressed the moderates to forge a pact with existing hard-line forces, which helped stabilize the regime, though only for the moment. In this, the legacy of one regime for its successors becomes apparent, given the continuing presence of institutions either created or strengthened to sustain previous regimes, in this case the military, though democratic institutions from the colonial and post-colonial regimes were also key. Finally, though revolutionary opposition has failed in successive bids for power, it has played a critical role in each of the transitions, tempering hard-line imperialists in 1898, leading to the introduction of soft-line institutions thereafter, which allowed for the transition to independent democracy in 1946, and the return to it in 1986. The revolutionary opposition played a less direct role in the 1972 transition, wherein the Huk uprising from about 1948 through 1953 led to a greatly increased role for Philippine authoritarian forces, which Marcos would call upon in 1972 to sustain his power.

The Theoretical Model Revisited and Directions for Future Research

In conclusion, regime transitions in chronically contested states result from competition over time among revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces vying
for control of the state. While hard-liners and soft-liners agree on the need to prevent revolution, they diverge on whether repression or reform, in short, bullets or ballots, will stem revolutionary opposition. When hard-liners gain control of the political process, a transition to authoritarian rule results. When soft-liners gain control, a transition to democracy results. When neither has control, either revolution or state failure results, depending upon whether a viable revolutionary opposition exists or not. Once a transition occurs, moreover, it establishes new parameters for the on-going conflict among revolutionary, hard-line, and soft-line forces, which shapes subsequent transitions. For this reason, regime transitions must be understood in their historical contexts as linked outcomes of evolving political competition. Further, because political competition can affect regime type, which can, in turn, affect the international balance of power, foreign powers may use transnational strategies to influence the domestic balance of power. Likewise, domestic forces may seek external alliances to strengthen their position.

A foreign power vying to ally with the contested state may support revolutionary forces in a bid to improve its own international standing by creating a new ally, as the U.S. allied with Filipino revolutionaries during the 1898 war against Spain and again during the World War II Japanese occupation, or as the Soviets backed the Philippine Communist Party in the 1930's, China the NPA until the rapprochement with the Marcos regime in 1975, and Libya the Philippine Muslim insurgency in the 1970's. Likewise, an existing ally may back counter-insurgency forces in order to protect economic, political, strategic and/or other interests at stake in the event of revolution. Both the existing ally and the contested state may not behave as unitary actors, however, if their own officials dispute the use of repression versus reform. Coalitions of hard-liners and soft-liners may then form in the existing ally, forming alliances with similar coalitions in the contested state. A transnational hard-line alliance may then compete with a similarly transnational soft-line alliance, using transnational strategies to cultivate competing institutions and political actors both in the existing ally and in the contested state, with implications for regime type depending on the outcome.
of the political competition. Now, when transnational hard-liners gain power, an authoritarian transition results. When transnational soft-liners gain power, a democratic transition results. If neither has power, either state failure or revolution may result, though none of the cases examined here offers an example of this.

Finally, the relative strength of revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces during moments of regime change is determined by a complex interaction of domestic and international structural factors defining interests as well as transnational voluntarist factors defining strategies. If, for example, hard-liners in the foreign state are strengthened due to international conflict, as they were in the U.S. during the Spanish-American War and the Cold War, the strength of authoritarian forces in the contested state will likely grow. Similarly, if soft-liners in the foreign state are strengthened as they were following U.S. losses in Indochina and the hard-line crisis surrounding Watergate, moderate and soft-line forces in the contested state will likely grow, as they did in the Philippines, particularly after the Aquino assassination. Thus, when international conflict affects the balance of forces within the foreign power, this may then affect the balance of forces within the contested state. Regime change in the contested state then affects, in turn, international alliances, the global balance of power, and so the international system. It may also affect the balance of forces within the foreign power, particularly if the change is viewed as a loss to either hard-liners or soft-liners.

For future research, this thesis suggests an urgent need for an improved understanding of the transnational sources of regime change if we are to understand the recent wave of democratization, the conditions necessary for nascent democracies to survive, the international sources of civil conflict, and the best strategies for managing on-going challenges from both the left and the right. This thesis described the transnational processes leading to diverse outcomes in the Philippines, arguing that these processes centered on on-going conflict among revolutionary, hard-line and soft-line forces. Since no sustained effort has ever
been made in the Philippines to address the root causes of revolutionary opposition, notably the land tenure issue, future research might examine successful land reform programs in other states, the implications of this for regime type, and any relevant transnational insights associated with such programs. Similarly, examples of success in controlling military institutions during democratization would also be helpful. Future research might also address the historical transnational sources of democratic, authoritarian and revolutionary conflict within former Spanish colonies other than the Philippines, for instance in Cuba where the conditions up to 1898 were quite similar but the experience thereafter diverged, leading to an outcome never experienced in the Philippines -- revolution. Such research might also examine Latin American cases of regime change where a similar pattern of Spanish, then U.S. intervention shaped political, economic, military, and other institutions. Another tack would examine the historical transnational sources of regime change in former colonies of other democratic states such as France or England.

More research is also needed to examine other experiences in contested states allied with the U.S., focusing on the transnational role of U.S. hard-liners and soft-liners, their relative successes and failures, the explanations for such experiences, and the implications for regime type, particularly in countries like Nicaragua and Iran, where tactics similar to those used in the Philippines led to very different outcomes. In addition, future research might probe other transnational sources of U.S. foreign policy, for groups with much more as well as those with much less strength. For instance, such research might examine the Mexican lobby's role in the NAFTA negotiations, the Jewish lobby's role in the 1993 Palestinian accord, the Canadian lobby's role in the 1980's for acid rain legislation, etc. The influence on U.S. foreign policy of more broadly transnational church, human rights, business, and other organizations would also be instructive. This study suggests that transnational lobbying in the U.S. will be greatest when the U.S. role is significant. This is expected to increase further when "home" country politics restrict political participation and create large numbers of political
refugees. Of particular use would be research which identifies effective strategies transnational lobbyists have used, distinguishing as well between the role played by non-citizen immigrants versus those with voting privileges. Finally, more attention to the influence of the media on foreign policy is needed in order to understand the processes of the debate between U.S. hard-liners and soft-liners, and the media strategies they used to influence the outcome of the debate, particularly when such strategies appear to have influenced regime change abroad, as in the 1986 case.

In the end, however, whether a strategy of repression or reform, bullets or ballots, is used, contestation of the state will likely recur as long as structural inequality, and so the conditions for revolutionary opposition, persist.
APPENDIX I
U.S. AID, LOANS AND GRANTS TO THE PHILIPPINES
(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)
1946-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Year</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-War Relief Aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1948</td>
<td>$ 256.7</td>
<td>$ 72.6</td>
<td>$ 329.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marshall Plan Aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1952</td>
<td>$ 584.2</td>
<td>$ 80.2</td>
<td>$ 664.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual Security Act Aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1961</td>
<td>$ 422.5</td>
<td>$ 218.2</td>
<td>$ 640.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Assistance Act Aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1965 (Pre-Marcos)</td>
<td>$ 174.2</td>
<td>$ 109.6</td>
<td>$ 283.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>86.5</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>141.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>130.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total: 1946-1972</strong></td>
<td>$1,846.0</td>
<td>$ 672.5</td>
<td>$2,518.5</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign Assistance Act, Cont.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Period of Authoritarian Rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$ 124.0</td>
<td>$ 50.4</td>
<td>$ 174.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>63.6</td>
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<td>106.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>239.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>281.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total: 1973-1985</strong></td>
<td>$1,311.3</td>
<td>$ 592.2</td>
<td>$1,903.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AID: 1946-1985</strong></td>
<td>$3,157.3</td>
<td>$1,264.7</td>
<td>$4,422.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL LOANS, GRANTS: 1946-1985</strong></td>
<td>$2,721.7</td>
<td>$1,300.8</td>
<td>$4,022.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AID, LOANS, GRANTS: 1946-1985</strong></td>
<td>$5,879.0</td>
<td>$2,565.5</td>
<td>$8,444.5</td>
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APPENDIX II
WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION LOANS (IDA) TO THE PHILIPPINES
(1972-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in $U.S. Millions</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>$36.3</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>86.8</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>526.0</td>
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<td>307.5</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>311.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>533.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$2,653.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various World Bank documents, as compiled by Bello, Kinley, and Elinson in Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines, pp. 207-208.
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