The Formation of the National Security State:
The State and the Opposition in Military Brazil

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science on January 8, 1982 in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a historical study of the dialectical relationship between the State and the opposition in Brazil from 1964 to 1981. Although the civil-military coalition which took over State power in 1964 had a general blueprint and ideological grounding in the Doctrine of National Security and Development, the actual mechanisms for the control of civil society, of political organization and even of the military itself were developed through time as a result of the interplay of forces in a constant dialectical relation to an organized opposition.

Part I provides an introductory background of the nature of the alliances in the pre-coup period and an analysis of the Doctrine of National Security and Development as an ideology meant to serve the function of a blueprint for the new State. Subsequent chapters deal with the foundations of the National Security State, the first cycle of physical purges and coercion, the creation of the intelligence network of the security forces and the attempt to provide for longterm institutionalization in the Constitution of 1967. During this first stage the National Security State was concerned chiefly with the establishment of the first measures of the economic model and the foundations for complete institutionalization. From the point of view of the opposition, the early period was characterized by cycles of disarray, recovery and the ebb and flow of groups which were crushed and then reorganized to mount a major challenge to the National Security State in 1967 and 1968.

Part II, the second stage of institutionalization, analyzes the dialectic of violence of the period of the armed struggle. During this time period, the National Security State deepened the economic model of development -- in the "miracle years" -- and the Repressive Apparatus of the State. From the viewpoint of the opposition, this was a stage of armed confrontation, defeat, intimidation of the non-violent sectors through a widespread "culture of fear" and a later reassessment to allow a change of direction to different modes of political and social organization.
Chapter Eight, on the Anatomy of the State, provides a brief interlude for structural examination of the major mechanisms of social control and a detailed account of the actual machinery of the Repressive Apparatus. A more thorough critique of the economic model of development in the context of the Doctrine of National Security and Development is included in the general analysis.

Part III deals with the periods of the "decompression policy" under President Ernesto Geisel and of the "abertura policy" of President João Figueiredo. The period from 1974 to 1981 is understood as a third stage of institutionalization of the National Security State. The limits of the policies of liberalization are analyzed within the contradictions of the Doctrine of National Security which does not allow the policies to be considered an actual transition stage to democracy comprising a process of redemocratization of the country. Rather, the policies of "decompression" and of "abertura" are a coherent plan for the longterm institutionalization of the State through more flexible mechanisms of social control, selective physical coercion and electoral manipulation.

During these years, the dialectical relation between the State and the opposition intensified and became reflected in the various attempts to curb the electoral power of the opposition by drafting new electoral regulations. The opposition became more distinctly organized along the lines of engagement in formal politics — through the existent civil society institutions such as the Brazilian Bar Association, the Brazilian Press Association, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops and the official legal opposition party. At the same time, and particularly after 1977, the opposition organized in the informal political level by activity within the realm of grassroots or base-related politics. Considerable attention is given to the specific role of key elite opposition groups and the grassroots organization in secular neighborhood community groups, in the movements of the Catholic Church — particularly the Basic Christian Communities — and the new trade union movement. The nature of the alliances between various sectors of the opposition is examined through the description and political estimate of the strikes of 1978, 1979 and 1980.

Finally, the concluding chapter draws together the main theoretical arguments of the work so as to base a political analysis of the major tendencies and forces at play which shall become the parts of the totality in the continuing dialectic between the State and the organized opposition. This dialectic shall mould social and political events in Brazil for the next decade.

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Brian Smith.

Title: Assistant Professor of Political Science.
To the memory of my mother, Branca de Mello Franco Alves. Her faith and her unending devotion to the cause of justice has taught me to love the Living Church.

To my friends in the labor movement and the people of Nova Iguaçu and of São Bernardo do Campo. Knowing them has taught me the meaning of daily courage and devotion.

To those who have suffered and died for their conscience and love of others. Their sacrifice will continue to remind the living of their duty to resist.
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Many other people contributed anonymous valuable information on different aspects of the National Security State. Conversations with political leaders, religious leaders and members of the various opposition sectors were essential in allowing some insights into the various aspects of the dialectic between the State and the opposition. Although not all are mentioned in this final version I am grateful to all who gave me their time and the benefit of their experience by subjecting themselves to long conversations and interviews on sometimes difficult subjects. A special thanks to those within the military who helped me understand the difficult position of democratic-minded members of the military.

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THE FIRST STAGE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
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I. The Civil-Military Conspiracy and the Takeover of State Power

The civil-military conspiracy which toppled the Constitutional government of João Goulart in Brazil on the night of March 31 to April 1 of 1964 was the direct consequence of a number of circumstances, tendencies and contradictions which had been gathering force for the preceding years. The main features of this background may be summarized in four major points:

First, the growing penetration of international capital with an increasing pattern of interlocking and association with sectors of national capital. The associated-dependent capitalist model of economic development that took root particularly in the decade of the middle fifties to early sixties, would shape a specific class alliance of international capital, associated-dependent national capital and state-owned capital. This process, termed the "economic tripod" (tripé econômico), was already nascent in the years prior to 1964 and would be deepened or strengthened after the takeover of State power. In this tripod-economic model of capitalist development and within the foreign capital sector American capital held a clear predominance.

During the government of João Goulart (end of 1961 to April 1964) a series of restrictions on multinational investment were enacted. These ranged from negotiations for the nationalization of major foreign corporations—such as American Foreign Power, Hanna Mining Company and other smaller concerns of French capital origin— to
strict policies of control of profit remittance, payments for technological transfer and royalties and anti-trust legislation. In addition, the Goulart government emphasized a nationalist policy of support and direct subsidy to private national capital, mostly non-associated with foreign capital. Protective tariffs and easier credit facilities were geared to the strengthening of a Brazilian industrial park under the control of national sectors of capital. Hence, the policies of the Goulart government provided a direct threat to the power of the class alliance of multinational and associated-national capital.

Second, the years of the late 1950's and early 1960's saw an increase in the mobilization of hitherto excluded sectors of the population, in particular of urban workers and peasants who organized rural unions and the "Peasant Leagues". Urban workers organized both within the official trade union structure and in parallel networks of coordination between different job categories. The period of Goulart's government was fertile for the organization of the working class. A populist government which explicitly sought the support of working sectors of the population facilitated a climate of liberalization which allowed for deeper, more effective, forms of organization to develop both in the urban areas and in the countryside. In addition, the context of a strongly decentralized government gave states real autonomy in decision making within their territorial frontiers. Thus some states exercised the rights of control of multinational investment and encouraged the political participation of the population in the actual decision making process of local
government. This was the case especially of Pernambuco, under the administration of Miguel Arraes and of Rio Grande do Sul under the administration of Leonel Brizola. 8

The rapid organization of the working class and the peasantry frightened the upper classes which had not yet been forced to make even minimum concessions in terms of wages, working conditions or even trade union organization. The experience of Cuba added to the fear that the masses would revolt in Brazil and take over the control of the State. This was seen as a real threatening possibility which would bring about serious losses for national and multinational capital.

The contradictory elements within populist politics provided the third important background for the crisis leading to the military coup of 1964. With the increasing power and control of multinational capital associated to certain sectors of national capital on the one hand and a growing organized demand for participation and reform of the highly skewed structures of Brazilian society, the populist system which developed with the end of the Estado Novo in 1946 came to a deep crisis. The breakdown of the liberal structures organized in such a fragil balance between the traditional authoritarian control of the elites and the ascendancy of the working class and the peasantry became acute in the government of João Goulart. 9 Caught in the confrontation of a sharpening class struggle Goulart appealed directly to the workers and the people. His overtures to the working class and to lower members of the military in an attempt to gain massive support caused an institutional fear within the traditional sectors
of the military as an institution. In turn, this provided the necessary political climate for the development of a civil-military class conspiracy for the overthrow of the government.

Finally, the immediate antecedent of the takeover of State power was a well-orchestrated destabilization policy which involved multinational corporations, associated-dependent capital within Brazil, the United States government and the Brazilian military -- in particular the group of military officers of the Superior War College (ESG) which played a crucial role in the campaign to overthrow the elected government of João Goulart.

Previously secret or otherwise unavailable documentation now has based significant research projects into the activities of the United States government, through the CIA, in coordination with civilians and military officers for the planning of a destabilization program of the Goulart government. This conspiracy was instrumentalyzed through civil cover institutions, particularly the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática, IBAD) and the Institute for Research and Social Studies (Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais, IPES). In addition, the Superior War College (ESG) coordinated the action of the civilian and military conspirators.

The Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra - ESG) was founded with the help of French and American advisors in 1949. The stated legal purpose of the ESG, at that time, was the formation and
training of "high level personnel for the exercise of functions of direction and planning of national security". 14 At that time General Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias was appointed head of the committee which would establish the model of the ESG. In 1949 the role of the ESG was expanded to include the development of a "method of analysis and interpretation of political, economic, diplomatic and military factors that condition strategic conception and planning". 15 With the development of cold-war theories, an increasing attention to the problem of national security was required and the ESG's main focus became the systematization of "an analysis of the interpenetration of political, economic, psychosocial and military factors in order to formulate a policy of national security". 15 In the following years the ESG would increase its effectiveness in planning and in methodology. In fact, the ESG officers were so technically and intellectually trained that it became popularly known as the "Sorbonne" of the military establishment. Increasingly the military intellectuals were also trained in theory of development--in the conception of the ESG an inseparable part of national security.

The ESG, then, provided theoretical grounding and methodological training to develop a sophisticated body of military technicians of war and of economic development. The courses of the ESG were meant to train personnel in a "methodology which can lead to the formulation of and the efficient planning of a politics of national security and of development". 17
Alfred Stepan points out in his study that the ESG differed from its American counterpart in two principal ways: first the military in Brazil paid particular attention to the theory of "indirect attack" and the danger of subversive or revolutionary warfare. Second, the ESG included among its regular staff, visiting scholars, conference givers and student body not only military officers but also civilian members of the upper classes. In fact, the participation of civilians, as Stepan points out, tended to increase through the years: the first ESG class which graduated in 1950 was constituted of 62 students of which 16 were civilians. In the period between 1950 and 1967 the ESG graduated another 1,276 students of which 646 were civilians.

After the takeover of power this civil-military character of the ESG would increase. In addition, ESG graduates would occupy most important sectors of the political and economic structures of Brazilian society: graduates of the ESG provided 599 top military officers, 224 major industrialists, 200 top-level bureaucrats and Ministers of State, 97 heads of governmental agencies, 39 Congressmen, 23 federal and state judges and 107 technocratic professionals.

Some of the active participants of the ESG before the coup d'etat included such professionally trained civilians as Octávio Gouvea de Bulhões, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Mário Henrique Simonsen and Antônio Delfim Netto. The military and civilians who were members of the ESG also increasingly utilized the IPES/IBAD complex to develop projects, draft programs and directives for alternative governmental
policies. The planning of a distinct administration to supervise the general mechanisms of capitalist development was considered important by the ESG/IPES/IBAD membership. As we shall see in our analysis of the Doctrine of National Security and Development, the Brazilian military and allied technocracy specifically reject laissez-faire capitalism and espouse rather a combination model of Keynesian economics of regulatory measures and state capitalism. The ESG/IPES/IBAD complex, as is well documented in Dreifuss's detailed study, became in effect a "think tank" and an efficient parallel bureaucracy for the planning and programming of a new State.

Many of the projects and suggestions which were developed during the period between the middle 1950's and 1964 later took on the force of Law. For example, Alfred Stepan points out in his study that in the course of a conference at the ESG in 1959, David Carneiro suggested that the political parties which existed at that time were much too weak to provide a firm foundation for a coherent program of social and economic development. He proposed that a new law be elaborated so as to limit the number of parties and to provide for strict political fidelity of party members to the directives of the party top leadership.

As we shall see later, both of these measures became law and were incorporated into different legislation aimed at regulating political and party representation: in 1965, with the passing of Institutional Act Number Two, the proposals of David Carneiro to limit
the number of political parties and prohibit inter-party coalitions for electoral purposes were drafted into law. A latter bill provided strict measures for enforcement of party fidelity along the lines already layed out by the ESG civilian scholar. This bill, as will be discussed later, was called the Party Fidelity Bill (Lei de Fidelidade Partidária).

Another proposal developed in the years prior to 1964 dealt with the relative autonomy of the states of the federation. As has been pointed out, the civil-military elite was particularly concerned with the strongly nationalist and populist governments of Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes. The decentralization of State power, furthermore, was considered to weaken the ability of the central State to effectively run and plan a coherent program of capitalist economic development. During a conference in the ESG, given by Ildefonso Mascarenhas da Silva, this problem was discussed and the proposal set forth for measures of greater centralization of power in the Executive branch of the government. In fact, after the military takeover of the federal State, the centralization of power, of tax collection, of police and military control and even of legislative functions in the Executive branch became, as shall be pointed out, one of the main specific characteristics of the new State.

Perhaps the most important function of the ESG/IPES/IBAD complex during the years that preceded the actual takeover of State power was the careful planning and establishment of the first foundations of the network of information necessary to develop an efficiently
controlling and centralized federal State. This particular coordination group in the ESG/IPES complex was supervised directly by General Golbery do Couto e Silva. A number of military officers of the ESG were regular staff members of the IPES and worked fulltime with General Golbery in the planning of the security information network and the development of a sophisticated Doctrine of National Security and Development. In the years immediately preceding the actual takeover of State power, this group had already compiled a large dossier of complete and detailed information on over 400,000 Brazilian citizens.  

In addition to the planning of the structures of the new State, the ESG/IPES team conducted research studies on political, social and economic matters to provide the main guidelines for the entire conspiracy against the government of João Goulart. Dreifuss shows in his work how the information network of the ESG/IPES complex was extended to all sectors of civil and political society. Covert information agents worked among students, trade unions, peasants, the press, in cultural organizations, in the Catholic Church, in universities and even in middle class civil associations. These groups were responsible for gathering of information necessary for the main planning and coordinating network of the conspiracy, the "Informal High Command" (Estado Maior Informal) which was set up in the IPES and which was headed by General Humberto Castello Branco. The ESG/IPES complex was in close touch with American officials and was funded by many international and national corporations. It was the nerve center of the destabilization campaign against the government.
II. Theoretical Arguments of this Research

As shall be discussed, General Castello Branco was to be the first President of the new State. His cabinet was almost entirely composed of members and associates of the ESG/IPES/IBAD complex of organizations. In addition, most secondary administrative posts in the State structures were occupied by the staff and members of the class alliance institutionalized in the three main "think tanks". 29

Once the civil-military class alliance successfully completed the coup d'etat and took over the control of all levels of State power they proceeded to implement their planned blueprint and build a formidable State apparatus to support their monopoly of power. The question of how the State developed and what kind of a State was set up is still the matter of extensive investigation and research.

The literature on the post-1964 Brazilian State deals with such questions as the continuity of past structures of domination and authoritarianism, 30 with the influence of the military organized within the Superior War College, ESG, 31 and with the bureaucratic and authoritarian structures of the regime. 32 Some authors have paid close attention to the role played by the ideology of National Security and its reflection upon State structures. This line of investigation has been particularly prevalent in research conducted under the auspices of the Catholic Church in Brazil. 33 However, the interest and study of the National Security Doctrine and its interpenetration in the structures of the nascent Brazilian State has been confined to a secondary role in the
larger body of general authoritarian literature. The main focus of study has been concerned rather with the structural differentiation between authoritarianism, fascism and totalitarianism. Whenever theorists of authoritarianism considered more seriously the impact and content of the Doctrine of National Security the tendency has been to reject its function as an ideological basis for State power. 34

This is partly because the National Security Doctrine has not been sufficiently examined in its connection to the theory of economic development espoused by the political actors and taught in the ESG. The National Security Doctrine, clearly, must be understood in its entirety and not be separated from its inherent content in the doctrine of economic development. As it has been constructed theoretically in Brazil, the Doctrine of National Security and Development is an integrated body of thought which comprises a theory of war, a theory of internal subversion and revolution, a theory of Brazil's role in world politics and its geopolitical potential as a world power and a particular model of associated-dependent economic development which, as we have mentioned, is a combination of Keynesian economics and State capitalism.

The integrated Doctrine of National Security and Development has been used to justify the imposition of a system of control and oppression. Although it is true that its legitimating function does not elicit support of the masses, or particularly aims for it, nor does it contain a theory of racial supremacy and direct imperialist
domination as is the case with fascist ideology. Nonetheless, the Doctrine of National Security and Development is a theory which attempts to obtain a degree of legitimacy for the State on the basis of the need to develop a particular kind of economic-industrial model and to defend the nation from the threat of "internal enemies" and from "psychological warfare".

The effect of the political emphasis on the continuous threat to the nation from the hidden and unknown "internal enemies" has been to establish a climate of suspicion, of fear and division among the population such that it affords the regime sufficient maneuverability to conduct repressive campaigns of control through terror which would not otherwise be tolerated. As such it is an ideology of class domination and has been instrumental in justification for the most violent forms of class oppression.

The National Security Doctrine appeals for legitimacy on the basis of its justification of the danger of the "indirect action" of communism and the consequent presence of the "enemy within". In addition its legitimation is distinctly based on the connection between the concept of economic development and the maintenance of tight internal security. The governmental slogan "security with development" (Desenvolvimento e Segurança) thus integrates the concepts of associated-dependent capitalist development and internal national security against the enemy within.

This does not mean that the State has been successful either in completely carrying out its preliminary detailed blueprint or in
achieving political legitimacy and social support with the direct appeal to the ideology of national security. As shall be argued throughout this work the National Security State is in reality riddled by internal and external contradictions and is unable to achieve a stable basis of legitimate support. It is further argued that the reasons for the permanent legitimacy crisis of the State are rooted both in its dialectical relation to the opposition and to internal contradictions in the Doctrine of National Security and Development itself and the practice it imposes.

It is one of the main purposes of this work to examine the ways in which the Doctrine of National Security and Development has permeated the structures of the State, imposed specific controls upon civil society and attempted to provide a blueprint for the government of Brazil. In reality, the Doctrine of National Security and Development is a complete worldview (cosmovisão) or, as General Golbery do Couto e Silva stated, it is a Weltanschauung. This total character of the Doctrine leads to a practice that imposes the dynamic of absolute control, the search for absolute security. In the name of anti-communism the Doctrine of National Security, with the particular emphasis played on internal security, leads implacably to a state of abuse of power, arbitrary arrests, torture and the suppression of all freedom of expression. It tends to re-create a kind of State which Golbery has termed the new Leviathan, the super-State, the supreme Leviathan, the absolute owner of everything including of the human spirit.
The danger to freedom which is implicit in the practice imposed by the Doctrine of National Security has been recognized by the Catholic Church and denounced by the Brazilian bishops:

Placed above the needs of personal security and individual integrity, the ideology of National Security has become widespread and has been widely applied throughout the entire continent of Latin America. Inspired in this ideology the strong regimes -- in the name of anti-communism and for economic development -- have declared anti-subversive warfare against all who do not share in their authoritarian vision of the organization of the new society.

(...) Training for this "anti-subversive warfare" against communism in Latin America has led to the brutalization of the political agents and created a new kind of fanaticism, a climate of violence and of fear.

The freedoms of thought and of the press are readily sacrificed. Individual personal guarantees are suppressed. This Doctrine of National Security leads strong regimes to acquire the characteristics which they condemn in communist regimes: abuse of power of the State, arbitrary arrests, torture and the suppression of all freedom of expression. 37

The permeation of State structural formations by the ideology of National Security and Development has led to the transformation of Brazilian society in the course of the last eighteen years of military rule. It is the main purpose of this work, therefore, to understand the formation of the National Security State as it has developed in Brazil since 1964. The wider context of the research is an attempt to understand the totality of this type of capitalist State and the characteristics which have been imprinted upon the structures of the State and on civil society.

The main theoretical foundation of this work is the analysis of the dialectical relation between the State and the opposition in
Brazil. The main focus of study is, thus, the uncovering of how the State structures were built through time and developed largely in reaction to the constant and changing pressures of an organized opposition. Hence, it is a central thesis that the National Security State is dialectically related to the opposition.

Although the theoreticians and planners of the National Security State have a general blueprint of development and of State formation, the actual structures and mechanisms of control have taken a dynamic of their own. The very need to control the society as a whole -- which is implicit in the Doctrine of Internal Security -- creates a dialectic by which the structures and mechanisms of control must constantly be changed in order to bring about a new conformity.

This situation of constant shifting and building of new structures of coercion develops four different problematic contradictions for the National Security State which have characterized its organization:

First, the National Security State is prone to bureaucratic overgrowth in such a way that it loses the control of its own bureaucracy -- in particular of the Repressive Apparatus. We shall examine this point in different periods of crises throughout the rest of the chapters. For now it is sufficient to point out that successive Brazilian governments have been unable to control the Repressive Apparatus which has been built to maintain the necessarily high degree of coercion. In fact, the Repressive Apparatus has tended to become a parallel power base to that of the Executive power itself.
Second, the National Security State is unable to completely eliminate the opposition. In the very search for absolute internal security, the State targets specific sectors of the opposition for repression. In so doing it creates new opposition, for the very process of explicit physical coercion induces other sectors of civil society to engage in opposition activities. At the same time, the repression by itself is not sufficient to eliminate the original foci of dissent. Thus, the dialectical relation is formed whereby the use of explicit force transforms the opposition with the adherence of new and previously non-involved sectors of society. In turn these new groups of opposition become themselves targets for State repression in a circle of continuously escalating physical employment of force.

Third, the technique of conflict-resolution through physical force neglects the root of the dissent and does not deal with the real grievances expressed by the various organized sectors of the opposition. By handling conflict entirely with the application of force, the National Security State is unable to eliminate the dissent. It merely coerces it into temporary silence. The conflict is displaced from one sector of civil society to another, resulting in what shall be termed in this work a process of "displacement of contradictions" where the State displaces conflict from sector to sector of civil society.

Finally, because of this "displacement effect" the National Security State is inherently unstable and tends to become progressively
isolated in a circle closing in itself. In fact, the State has a long-range tendency to become the State of a small elite group which controls civil society and even its own ranks with increasing application of physical force. Without ever solving the causes of dissent, and unable to completely eliminate the opposition, the National Security State is haunted by internal and external contradictions which create a constant situation of institutional crisis. In addition, the shifting mechanisms of control and the application of physical violence creates a gap between the language of democracy and the reality of oppression. Ultimately, therefore, the State's instability derives from a deep crisis of legitimacy.

In addition to analyzing crucial factors that determine the actual formation of State structures and the relationship to the opposition, other issues of concern and theoretical importance will be examined in the course of this historical study. Some of the questions to be examined have not received sufficient emphasis in the literature on the post-1964 Brazilian State. These include:

1. To what extent the original blueprint of governmental rules which General Golbery do Couto e Silva called "the master plan" has been applied in forming the actual structures of the State and the mechanisms of social and political control?

2. How did the National Security State react to the challenges of the organized opposition sectors and what effect this relationship has had in the formation of the State itself?
3. On the other hand how did the changes in the State's mechanisms of control affect the opposition? Was the opposition eliminated? Did strategies and tactics of resistance change? Was the actual constituency of opposition groups affected? Did new groups join in or was the opposition limited to one ideological or class-based sector of civil society?

4. What are the basic concepts and principles of the Doctrine of National Security and Development and what impact has this ideology had upon State structures? To what extent did the basic premises contained in the Doctrine of National Security and Development permeate the thinking and practice of those in power so as to imprint a specific seal upon the actual practices of the State?

5. What is the connection between the basic concepts of the Doctrine of National Security and the State's reaction to challenges of opposition groups?

6. The Brazilian State has institutionalized a series of mechanisms of control and a complex administrative apparatus for the gathering of information. How does the Repressive Apparatus work, how much does it cost, what are the interconnections between the various organizations?

7. What kind of economic development is envisioned in the Doctrine of National Security and Development and what is the connection between this particular economic model and the system of control institutionalized by the State?
8. Finally, how stable is the National Security State? What are the weaknesses and contradictions both in the Doctrine of National Security and Development itself and within the State apparatus? How does it handle internal and external conflict? What is the process of transfer of power and what problems does it bring to the stability of the State? Upon what groups or issues does the National Security State base its power? How does it appeal to legitimacy necessary for stable institutionalization of State structures?

These questions are interwoven as primary and secondary theoretical arguments throughout the analysis of the structures of the National Security State, its economic, social and political history and its relationship to the opposition. They provide the background foundation for the analysis of the developing historical dimensions and the study of the interpenetration of the Doctrine of National Security and Development and the apparatuses of the State.

III. Methodology and Procedure

In order to understand these relationships it is necessary to first examine the ways in which the class coalition which took power in 1964 has reacted to the opposition and built a State shaped in accordance to the Doctrine of National Security and Development. This Doctrine provides the basic blueprint which the State attempted to impose upon civil and political society. It is the foundation for the particular brand of authoritarianism in Brazil since 1964.
1. Procedure.

Therefore, as a first introduction to the historical development of the dialectic of the State and the opposition in Brazil, our next chapter deals with the Doctrine of National Security and Development itself. Chapter Two examines the basic concepts of the ideology of National Security and Development, its theory of war, the theory of internal subversion and revolution, the theory of the geopolitical role of Brazil and, finally, the doctrine of the economic model of development.

The subsequent chapters deal with the dialectic of the State and the opposition as was historically developed throughout the years from 1964 to 1973. Chapter Three is an analysis of the first year of 1964, characterized by the offensive of the National Security State in an attempt to eliminate from the political arena all those immediately connected to the past government and social movements. The first year of the National Security State was also devoted to the laying of the first foundations of the new State structures, with the creation of the National Information Service (SNI) and the administrative reforms for the implementation of the economic model of development. Chapter Four contains an analysis of the first cycle of liberalization and the gubernatorial elections of 1965. The victory of opposition groups in key states of the federation caused a deep confrontation with the State and an internal crisis which defined the two major groups in the civil-military coalition in power: the hardliners and those concerned with long term institutionalization, mostly connected to the ESG/IPES complex.
Chapter Five is devoted to the examination of the Constitutional reform and the underpinnings of the structures of the new State which were drafted into the Constitution of 1967. The year of 1966 was also of importance in the refining of the economic model with the regulation of a series of wage control legislation and the creation of the Time of Service Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço-FGTS). This system effectively eliminated past agreements of compensation and job security of workers and played an important role in lowering wages.

Chapter Six deals with the growth of the organization of the opposition and the first signs of the "displacement effect". In reaction to unpopular political, social and economic measures of the State an increasing opposition developed sufficient force to provide a challenge to the power structure and the decision making apparatus of the State. By 1968 the National Security State was faced with two alternatives: to continue the policy of liberalization begun as a second cycle with the government of Costa e Silva in 1967 in such a way that more flexible structures of political representation could be developed or to institutionalize a Repressive Apparatus that would suffocate by force the growing social movement of dissent. Institutional Act Number Five, of December 1968, marked the de facto power of the hardline sectors and of those responsible for the maintenance of internal security. This period shall be analyzed in the context of the imprint of the crisis upon future developments of the dialectic between the State and the opposition.

Chapter Seven deals with the period 1969-1973 and the internal crisis
temporarily resolved by strengthening the power of the sectors of the State most intimately connected to the Repressive Apparatus. The opposition, after the impact and shock of the aftermath of violent repression with the enactment of Institutional Act Number Five, became divided into two distinct sectors: those groups and parties within the larger social movement which chose to fight the State with arms and other sectors of the opposition still searching for other non-violent forms of political action and resistance. In the developing dialectic of violence between the forces of security and the parties involved in the armed struggle against the State other sectors of the opposition -- and even much of the non-involved population -- were crushed and forced into a period of hopelessness, terror and silence. It is at this point that, we shall argue, the alternatives implemented and put forth by the Catholic Church served to change the direction of the opposition and shift the resistance to grassroots organization and non-violent techniques of opposition.

At this point in the historical-structural analysis of the dialectic between the State and the opposition we shall pause to examine the actual foundations of the National Security State which were largely completed by the end of 1973. The years that followed the most severely repressive period of State-opposition confrontation would be marked both by the existence of a fully developed apparatus of repression and by the implantation of the economic model of development which took root in the years 1968-1973 termed the period of the "economic miracle " of Brazil.
Hence Chapter Eight will particularly focus upon the anatomy of the State. The Repressive Apparatus itself shall be carefully examined to uncover all the interconnections between the various agencies of direct repression and the larger overall framework of information gathering, spying and political control both in civil society and in the military itself. In addition, this chapter deals with the specific mechanisms of control which were elaborated to handle particular areas of political and civil society: the controls of political representation; the controls of information in the institutions of learning, in the press, in cultural areas including theatre, cinema, music and literature; the controls of the military and, finally, the specific controls of trade unions.

The other part of the anatomy of the State deals with a critique and examination of the economic model of development both in light of the definitions contained in the Doctrine of National Security and Development and in retrospected analysis of the social costs and larger economic results of the model pursued. In this part we shall examine the effect which the particular model of development has had in economic control of production (the actuality of the tripod alliance of private associated national capital, multinational capital and state capital), in the escalation of the foreign debt, in inflationary policies and particularly in the distribution of income and fulfillment of the basic needs of the population. The centrality of the wage control policies, and its effect upon living standards, will be examined.
The study of the anatomy of the State is an essential background for comprehending the period of controlled liberalization which was begun in 1974, with the government of General Ernesto Geisel, and continued after 1978 under President João Batista Figueiredo. The limitations of the economic model implemented in accordance to the specific requirements of the Doctrine of National Security and Development added to the severe restrictions upon associative and participative rights of the population due to the existence of the vast apparatus of repression and control provide us with the framework in which to examine the social and political movement of the opposition in the years of limited liberalization.

Therefore, the pause for the study of the economic model and of the structures of repression allows us to understand the context in which the grassroots movements acted and the different strategies that were pursued by various opposition groups. Chapter Nine shall deal with the period of General Geisel's government, ultimately characterized by delicate negotiations with middle and upper class sectors of the opposition which engaged in the type of political activities that we have termed the realm of "formal politics". These dissenters made effective use of existent formal civil society institutions, such as the Brazilian Bar Association and the Brazilian Press Association to organize a sufficiently strong pressure group to wrest major liberal concessions from the National Security State. Some of the most crippling provisions in Institutional Act Number Five were eliminated after difficult negotiations with the government. The slow "decompression"
policy of the Geisel government aimed at the long range institutionalization of the National Security State, not at a transition to democracy. However, within such limitations, the opposition continued to organize now both at the "formal level" and at the "grassroot or base-related" level so as to amplify the political space and conquer real measures of participation in decisions of government. The period of General João Batista Figueiredo, beginning in 1978, marks a policy of "political opening" (abertura) where the National Security State attempted to deal with the growing pressure from the vast social movement from the bottom by granting limited social concessions and targeting the Repressive Apparatus more finely to a class-related policy of selective coercion.

Chapter Ten shall examine the development of the secular and Church-related grassroot movements, the birth of the "new trade union movement" and the interconnection between all of these base-related political organizations with other sectors of the opposition acting in the realm of "formal politics". This pattern of opposition intermingling surfaced in the political arena with the massive strikes of the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 which shall be the subject of detailed analysis in this chapter. Theoretically, we shall analyze both the policies of the State -- and the political reasons for them -- and the increasing force of the social movement of the opposition now multifaceted at both "grassroot" (secular and Church-related) and "formal" levels of politics. One of the arguments in this Chapter deals with the extent to which such a movement may push the State out
of its circle of isolation and begin, from the bottom up, a process of transformation of representative structures that will change the relationships between the opposition and the State, with the former imprinting its political definitions upon the latter.

Chapter Eleven, our concluding section, provides a theoretical analysis of the entire evolution of the National Security State in its dialectical relationship with the opposition. Certain analytical conclusions of the workings of such a State will be highlighted based on retrospective empirical evidence uncovered in the previous chapters. In addition, this part shall provide an assessment of the perspectives for the future, examining the developments of 1981 and the continuation of the dialectical relation between the opposition and the State. The potential for a transition to participatory democracy shall be analyzed in the light both of the limitations provided by the framework of the National Security State -- in particular the Repressive Apparatus and its parallel force to that of the Executive -- and of the growth of organization in the grassroot levels in alliance with the Catholic Church. The conclusions attempt to draw on past experiences to draft the possible course of the immediate future of Brazilian society.

2. Methodology

My method for analyzing the developments and dialectical relations between the State and the opposition utilizes a combination of approaches: 1) study of major documents, analyses and historical studies which have been published either in the press or by the Catholic Church, the Brazilian Bar Association, the Brazilian Press Association and researchers.
There is a wealth of information now available in Brazil under the form of personal memoirs of military leaders of the government as well as participants in the various forms of resistance -- including those who engaged in armed struggle. Other research of value has been conducted since 1974 based upon documentation which was previously secret and unavailable.

2) I have also examined in detail primary source materials, such as the Diário Oficial da União, the official governmental registers of all legislations and acts of the government, the various governmental statistical records, such as the Anuário Estatístico do Brasil and the electoral data of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral and the Annals of the National Congress. In addition, I have had access to military material, speeches and studies of the various branches of the Armed Forces including the invaluable complete textbook of the Superior War College used for the training of high-level officers and top civilian bureaucrats. For the study of the opposition I have relied on the extensive records in the Brazilian Bar Association, the Brazilian Press Association as well as documents, studies, leaflets, newspapers and other sources of printed material from the grassroot organizations (both secular and Church-related, such as the comunidades da base). The study of the trade union movement relied upon a wealth of documentation made available by the unions themselves, by their statistical and social studies department-- the DIEESE -- and by rank and file militants of the labor movement. In addition, the newspapers of the trade unions have been consulted widely. The study of the strikes made extensive use of the
wider press so as to follow closely the demands, results, and detailed events connected to each strike in the years of 1978, 1979 and 1980. These movements were the first massive strikes in Brazil in a period of ten years. Therefore, all of the strikes received headline coverage of most larger newspapers and allowed for a detailed gathering of information on the occurrences.

3) In addition I conducted—during a period of four years—extensive formal and informal interviews with: members of the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic lay organizers or participants in the variety of Church-related grassroot movements; members and leaders of the secular grassroot neighborhood organizations in the urban areas, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo; leaders of the "new trade union" movement (both rural and urban) as well as rank-and-file members of the unions or participants in the strike actions of the years 1978, 1979 and 1980; political party leaders of both the opposition party, the MDB, and the governmental party, the ARENA; finally, a series of individual and collective interviews were conducted with active duty military and retired military including those who had themselves been purged, arrested or otherwise punished by their opposition to the policies of the National Security State. In the course of the period I came into contact with artists, journalists, musicians and writers with whom I could discuss the problem of censorship and other controls of information imposed by the State.

4) Perhaps the most valuable source of information and of understanding of the vast social movement of opposition and its relationship to the
structures of the State comes from my position as a participant-observer as well as a unique placement within the broader framework of activities because of family contacts, relationships and direct involvement in the events which have been a mark of my own generation. Most of the student leaders of the period pre-1964 and immediately after the takeover of State power by the civil-military coalition were my colleagues and classmates or members of a general circle of relationship of the generation now known as "the generation of the Institutional Act Number Five". Thus, their experiences were witnessed, sometimes closely, from the very start of the National Security State. In addition, my own immediate family have individually played key roles in the development of this dialectic: My brother, Márcio Moreira Alves, was a political journalist in the Correio da Manhã in the immediate aftermath of the coup and became involved in the first campaign to end torture of political prisoners which that extinct newspaper had the dignity of spearheading to its own final demise. Later, in 1966, he was elected Congressman for the state of Guanabara and became, perhaps, the first victim of the conspiracy for the second coup d'etat with the passing of Institutional Act Number Five in 1968. My father was always a politician, from mayor of Petrópolis, to director of the important state-owned steel corporation in Volta Redonda, to Secretary of Finance in the opposition government of Negrão de Lima of the state of Guanabara in 1965. A "mineiro" politician he was friends with some of the main traditional civil leaders, including Juscelino Kubitschek, now Senator Tancredo Neves, Magalhães Pinto, Negrão de Lima, Roberto
Campos and many others who frequently shared the hospitality for which he is famous. My mother became an important organizer in the lay movement of the Catholic Church and, for ten years, she served in the collegial Council of Lay (Conselho dos Leigos) in the Vatican. Thus, our house was frequently the center of activities both of lay grassroot organizing and of visits of members of the top hierarchy of the progressive sectors of the Catholic Church.

This peculiar position has had disadvantages in terms of the research to be conducted for I had much more limited access to officers of the government than I could have had if my immediate family was not seen as an "opposition" group. Nonetheless, this was more than adequately made up by the public documents, speeches, and publications of the military and of the governmental officials which are available. In addition, I was not particularly interested in interviewing government officers themselves for the main focus of the research was rather upon the controls developed by the State to handle opposition sectors. At times the actual workings of such networks are much better known by those who suffer them than by those who are responsible for the general planning of the system. Public documented analyses now exist with extensive interviews of the members of the Repressive Apparatus and I have drawn considerably from them.

In terms of my own participation I have been closely working with the grassroot movements in the urban areas and particularly with the "new trade union movement" that has surfaced in the political arena after 1977. Thus, I have been able to observe meetings, debates, questioning sessions, conferences and congresses organized by the unions or those
other organizations aiding their efforts. In addition I have held inumerable long conversations with top and intermediary leaderships, some formalized as interviews but most conducted in deep analysis of the political moment and the correlation of forces. My participation as a volunteer during the strikes of 1978, 1979 and 1980 both in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo also allowed me to meet and discuss the events with strikers and rank-and-file of different job categories who conducted the strikes. The analysis contained in the relevant chapters of this book owe much to their comments, their consciousness, their courage and their clarity of purpose. I have learned more from these anonymous, suffering members of the oppressed population than could have been learned in any structured, in-depth interview format for statistical analysis.

Some of the names of those interviewed will be mentioned in the course of our subsequent discussions. Many shall remain anonymous so as to protect their identity and the possibility of retaliation against themselves or their families. It must be understood that the context for this research is a political climate of uncertainty and sometimes violent repression against those who express their dissenting views. Thus, the ultimate responsibility for whatever is contained in the analysis that follows is entirely my own.
1. The civil-military coup began on March 31 but was not victorious until April 1 of 1964 when President João Goulart left the country and a Military Junta installed in power. The actual military coup d'état was precipitated by the insurrection of General Olympio Mourão Filho who began to march upon Rio de Janeiro from the state of Minas Gerais. General Mourão Filho believed himself to be a participant of what he called the "greatest conspiracy in Latin America" and his enthusiasm led him to begin military operations before the planned date. This precipitation left other military and civilian conspirators no other choice but to adhere to the on-going coup d'état.

However, the military have officially proclaimed March 31 to be the date of the "Revolution". The opposition has made much of the fact that it was not consolidated until April 1 -- April Fool's Day. A political symbolism, they emphasize, for the nastiest joke which could ever have been played upon the Brazilian people.

For details on the military operations which led to the overthrow of President Goulart see General Olympio Mourão Filho's memoirs, Memórias: A Verdade de um Revolucionário (Rio de Janeiro: L&PM Editores, Ltda, 1978).

America (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1970);
Francisco Weffort, "Notas sobre la teoria de la dependencia:
teoría de clases o ideología nacional?" Mexico City: Asociación
de Becarios del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM,
DT-1; Luciano Martias (ed) Amérique Latine: Crise et D épendence
English is Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (eds.)
Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond.(New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1974) see particularly the article of Theotonio
dos Santos on Brazil "Brazil: the origins of a crisis" pp. 415-490.

3. For an analysis of the "economic tripod" alliance and dependent
capitalist development in Brazil see particularly Peter Evans, Depen-
dent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local
Capital in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1979). This work was translated into Portuguese as, Peter Evans,
A Tríplice Aliança: As Multinacionais, as Estatais e o Capital
Nacional no Desenvolvimento Dependente Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro:

4. An analysis of the "deepening "process of industrial development
is contained in Guillermo O'Donnell's work, Modernization and
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of
California, 1973); his "Reflections on the patterns of change in
the bureaucratic-Authoritarian State" in Latin American Research
Review 12, No. 1 (Winger 1973) pp.3-38; and "corporatism and the
Question of the State" in James M. Malloy (ed.) Authoritarianism
and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1977). Other discussions of O'Donnell's work and the
questioning of the strengthening of dependent capitalism within an
authoritarian context are included in a series of articles of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, David Collier, Julio Cotler, Albert O.
Hirschman, Robert R. Kaufman, James R. Kurth and José Serra in
David Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America

5. For information on the particular predominance of American capital
see, for example, the important study conducted for the Report to the
Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.
According to the report, already as early as 1930 one fourth of
all existent foreign capital in Brazil was of American origin. See,
S. Newfarmer and Willard F. Mueller, Multinational Corporations in
Brazil and Mexico: Structural Sources of Economic and non-Economic
1975). See also the study of Moniz Bandiera, Presença dos Estados
Unidos no Brasil: Dois Séculos de História (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Civilização Brasileira, 1973); J. Knippers Black, United States


For an important and comprehensive analysis of the corporatist nature of the working class trade unions in Brazil see, Kenneth Paul Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).


The administration of Leonel Brizola, although more provocative in some respects at that time, has not been so widely covered. The events in Rio Grande do Sul did not directly involve the participation of large amounts of the population in the actual organization of a new form of government with participatory input in the administrative apparatus. The importance of the role played by Brizola during this period lies in his confrontation with American capital in the episode of the nationalization of the electrical plants of the American Foreign Power Corporation in his state. It was the first time that a major American Corporation suffered a direct threat of outright nationalization in Latin America. For more information see: Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, op.cit. pages 200-83, 287-291; 228; 244; 247; 265-277; 233; 244-7; 210-15 and 255.

9. The penetration of international capital with the increasing hegemony of American capital, added to the growing organization of workers in industry and of the peasants in the countryside brought to the surface a crisis of the liberal democratic state of the period known as "populism. A great deal of research into the political, social and economic history of populist politics has been undertaken. See, for example, Maria Victoria de Mesquita Benevides, *O Governo Kubitschek: Desenvolvimento Economico e Estabilidade Politica 1956-1961* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1976); Juarez Brandão Lopes, *Desenvolvimento e Mudança Social: Formação de Sociedade Urbano Industrial no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, MEC, 1976); Francisco Weffort, "Populismo en la Política Brasileña" in Bernadet, Jean Claude et al (eds) *Brasil Hoy* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1968) pp 64-71;

10. This is a point which has been emphasized by Alfred Stepan in his The Military in Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), version in Portuguese Os Militares na Política: As Mudanças de Padrões na Vida Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Artenova, S.A. 1975.


12. The intervention of the United States government and its involvement with the conspiracy that led to the overthrow of the Goulart government is the first comprehensive application of the "destabilization policy" which was later applied to Chile in 1973. This policy has been the subject of various careful studies based on documentation at the John F. Kennedy Library, in Boston, Mass. and in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, in Austin, Texas. The archives contain official documentation of the government of the United States, the State Department and the American Embassy in Brazil. For complete information on this subject see, for example: Phyllis R. Parker,

13. On the coordination of the ESG/IBAD/IPES complex and the underlying class conspiracy which was instrumentalized by the three institutions for the overthrow of the government see in particular the important work of René Armand Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, Ação Política, Poder e Golpe de Classe, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda., 1981). Dreifuss's work is based on hitherto unpublished and unavailable documents of the archives of the IPES as well as extensive interviews with participants and members of the three organizations. It uncovers the planned actions for the disruption and destabilization of the Goulart government that was planned from the central command post of the IPES/ESG. The coordination between the ESG military and the IPES civilian members was entrusted to General Golbery do Couto e Silva who headed the IPES.

14. Article 1 of Law Number 735 of August 20, 1949 founding the Superior War College. Also commented in Alfred Stepan, the Military in Politics op.cit., chapter 8.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. See Alfred Stepan, Os Militares na Política, op.cit. page 129.

19. Ibid. page 130. See also Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, op.cit. pages 417 to 455. According to Dreifuss, the
"ESG functioned like a political and ideological filter for the promotion of personnel both in the hierarchy of the Army and in the administrative posts of the State."

20. All of the economists who participated in the ESG conferences as visiting lecturers or scholars were later appointed Ministers of State. See Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, op.cit. page 76.

21. See Dreifuss, Ibid. page 74.

22. Ibid. particularly pages 362 to 372.

23. See Alfred Stepan, Os Militares na Política, op.cit. pages 133-134. In his note number 27, on page 134, Stepan gives reference to this conference which took place prior to the coup d'etat of 1964. Stepan also relates his interview with General Golbery do Couto e Silva who stated that "the ESG believed that the political parties had no authority and wished to reduce their numbers".


25. See René Armand Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, op.cit. particularly pages 361 to 370. For a complete list of all the military officers who were regular members or were associates of the IPES see the list of names of officers in pages 365 to 368.

26. Ibid. For more information on the vast network in student, cultural, middle class, labor, peasant organizations in civil society as well as the role of the agents for counter-information and destabilization which was played in party structures, in the National Congress, in the Catholic Church and particular through the press see pages 281 to 337 and the chapter devoted to this subject, Chapter VII.

27. Ibid. Dreifuss describes the conspiracy in detail and analyzes the particular role which the "Informal High Command" played in the destabilization of the government. See pages 417 to 455 in particular.

28. On the funding of the ESG/IPES complex and its association with multinational corporations and with the United States see Dreifuss, Ibid. pages 199 to 204 "O financiamento para a elite orgânica". On the specific role which was played by false news which were purposefully "planted" in the press in order to create a climate of tension and of fear of an imminent takeover of communism see Dreifuss, particularly pages 244 to 252, "guerra psicológica através do rádio e da televisão" and "guerra psicológica através de cartuns e filmes".

29. The complete list of staff members or associates of the ESG/IPES
IBAD complex who took immediate high level positions in the government of Castello Branco is detailed and included in René Armand Dreifuss, Ibid. Chapter IX "O Complexo IPES/IBAD no Estado: A Ocupação dos Postos Estratégicos pela Elite Orgânica" pages 417 to 455.

30. Some of the authors who emphasize the continuity aspect of the state structures argue that authoritarianism and elitism is deeply embedded in traditional Brazilian society and state structures. See for example the works of Raymundo Paoro, Os Donos do Poder (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Globo, 1958); Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1972); Hélio Jaguaribe, "The Dynamics of Brazilian Nationalism" in Claudio Veliz (ed) Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

According to the debate on continuity versus rupture, there are strong elements of the past state formations which remain in the new military state. This is an important point to recognize in the analysis of the type of capitalist state which was built by the civil-military coalition after the takeover of power in 1964 and was utilized as an instrument of class domination. The military utilized much of the remnants of the corporative and conservative structures of past state formations. They were efficient users, in particular of the corporative measures of social control embedded in the Labor Code and of the remainders of clientelistic social relations. Nonetheless, one may argue still that there is a distinct type of new capitalist State which was formed after 1964. It is coherent with dialectical historical development that the totality of the new State is permeated by past State structural formations which become a part of the new totality.

31. The most influential and comprehensive work on the military in Brazil has been done by Alfred Stepan in his The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, op.cit. The work of Alexandre de Barros, the Brazilian Military: Professional Socialization, Political Performance and State Building, op.cit. builds upon the foundation of Stepan's work and is a detailed analysis of the ESG and the inner workings of the military.

32. The literature on authoritarianism, the economic structures which brought about the installation of this new form of state and the development of the system in Latin America is abundant. Some of the most important works may be found in James Malloy(ed) Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), Alfred Stepan (ed.) Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Peter Flynn,Brazil: A Political Analysis, op.cit.; Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (ed.) O Estado na América Latina (São Paulo: CEDEC/Paz e Terra,

33. Some of the books that deal specifically with the Doctrine of National Security and ideology as it has been developed in Brazil include, for example, Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, As Forças Armadas: Política e Ideologia no Brasil, 1964-1969 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, Ltda., 1976); Joseph Comblin "The National Security Doctrine" in The Repressive State: The Brazilian National Security Doctrine in Latin America, Toronto LARU, 1976; Joseph Comblin, A Ideologia da Segurança Nacional: O Poder Militar na America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1977); José Alfredo Amaral Gurgel; Segurança e Democracia (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1975). In addition, an important research and analysis
of the Doctrine of National Security was organized and conducted by Dom Cândido Padim, Bishop of Bauru in the state of São Paulo. This research contrasted the ideology of National Security to the teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church. The work based itself upon the writings of General Golbery do Couto e Silva and works of the Superior War College (ESG) as well as speeches of the Director of the Superior War College and speeches of President Castello Branco. The research also included a content analysis of the legislations of National Security that had been enacted at that time -- in 1960. The results were published in a smaller version by SEDOC (Serviço de Documentação) Volume 1, 1969 (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Vozes Ltda) under the title "A Doutrina de Segurança Nacional à Luz da Doutrina da Igreja".

34. Comment of Juan Linz in an interview to the Brazilian magazine Veja. Juan Linz stated that after careful examination of the Doctrine of National Security he had reached the conclusion that it was not a theory which was sufficiently valid to serve as an ideological base for the State. He added that at that time (1973) the only solid base for the State was the success of the economic model of development. See interview with Juan Linz in Veja, December 8, 1973, page 1. "páginas amarelas".

35. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, in Conjuntura Política etc. op.cit. page 106 of the section Geopolítica do Brasil. In this and following pages General Golbery do Couto e Silva discusses the Doctrine of National Security as a comprehensive body of theory which amounts to a cosmovisão, worldview or Weltanschauung.

36. Ibid. page 9. See Golbery's discussion of the insecurity which will lead to the awakening of the Leviathan just as during the times of Hobbes. The Absolute State rising from the fear of individuals who accept the only solution of handing over all power to the central State so as to escape the misery of their individual panic:

Leviathan awakens after having been asleep for many centuries. Awakened to the sounds of the new totalitarian mythologies, from the right and from the left, which incite and seduce humanity lost in an ominous fear. Within the framework of a world which no longer knows any frontiers that can separate the nations, we see the rise of a Universal State, as the solution that is cried for and proclaimed as the only possible solution to the insecurity (...) This State shall be the supreme Leviathan, the super-Leviathan, the uncontested owner of the planet Earth and of the human spirit.

In reality Golbery predicts that the National Security State shall be the type of state of the future, not only in Latin America but everywhere in the world. The Universal State created as a response to the universal concept of total and permanent war.
It should be of further note that this prediction has already come true in several countries of Latin America. With the election of Ronald Reagan and the onset of the right it may also come true in the United States. It is interesting to point out that a conservative organization in the United States, Public Research, Syndicated, has just come out with a bi-weekly publication which is entitled Grand Strategy: Countercurrents. The editor of this magazine, Patrick J. Garrity has written for the United States Naval Institute and the Naval War College Review. What is of remark is that the term Grand Strategy is, of course, the term used by the National Security Doctrine to refer to its control policy of internal security.

37. Document of the Brazilian Bishops of November 16, 1976. May be found in the archives of the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops (Conferência Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros, CNBB), Brasília.
CHAPTER TWO: THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Margaret Crahan's work on the origins of the national security ideology in Latin America traces the first expressions to as early as the nineteenth century in Brazil and the beginning of the twentieth century in Argentina and Chile.¹ The birth of the national security ideology is connected to theories of geopolitics, to prevalent anti-Marxism and to conservative Catholic social thought expressed in such organizations as the Opus Dei in Spain and Action Française in France.²

With the advent of cold war ideology, however, elements of the theory of total war and inevitable confrontation of the two superpowers were incorporated into the ideology of national security as it developed in Latin America. It should be noted that the peculiarity of the ideology of national security in Latin American derived from its concrete emphasis upon the problems involved in the maintenance of internal security because of the threat of "indirect action" of communism. While American national security theoreticians emphasized -- at the time of the cold war -- the element of totality and nuclear holocaust and the French, well into the colonialist Algerian war, emphasized the communist danger of limited warfare, the Latin Americans, concerned with the growth of the social movement of the working classes, emphasized rather the internal threat of subversion and of revolutionary warfare.

In addition, Latin American national security ideology -- particularly as it developed in Brazil -- is specifically concerned with economic development and its connection to internal and external national security.
As already mentioned, a series of works on the ideology of national security in Brazil are available. These works contain a general reference and place the ideology of national security developed in Brazil in a worldwide and Latin American context.

In this chapter we shall concentrate chiefly in the works of General Golbery do Couto e Silva, by far the most influential theorist of national security in the Brazilian context, and in the actual teachings of the Superior War College (ESG). A content analysis of the basic textbooks followed by the ESG is an important exercise in comprehending the Doctrine of National Security and Development in particular because it is the actual raw material for the professional and ideological training of the top-level military in Brazil and for highly placed civilian technocrats in the administrative bureaucracy of the State. Thus, an analysis of the actual Basic Textbook (Manual Básico) used by the ESG in all of its training courses will allow us to understand the formation of the thinking of those who now hold most of the positions of power in Brazilian society. In order to understand the development of the National Security State and the reactions of the power-holders to challenges of the opposition it is essential to analyze thoroughly the underlying formations and training which has been imposed on the top-level political actors.

The Doctrine of National Security and Development, in the context of Brazil, was formed in particular in the Brazilian Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra – ESG), founded in 1949.
We have already referred to the specific preferential treatment to method and analysis aimed at the development of an integrated body of thought for State planning and formation of policies of national security and development. In addition, we have discussed the important role played by the ESG in incorporating top level civilians both as students and in the actual faculty or as visiting scholars or consultants to the ESG. They provided for the training of military and civilian personnel for the administration of the National Security State.

Thus, the ESG was important in cementing a military-civilian network which institutionalized and disseminated the Doctrine of National Security and Development. The extended net of civilian and military graduates -- organized in the Association of Graduates of the Superior War College (Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra - ADESC) -- conducted conferences, study sessions, debates and courses throughout the nation. In this manner, the principles and the doctrines of the ESG can reach other sectors of the civilian and military upper levels who are active political actors.

In addition, the National Security Doctrine provides the basis for curriculum of the ESG and increasingly of all other military schools as well. Thus the influence of the ESG has extended beyond its immediate confines. Alfred Stepan points out that much of the doctrine of the ESG was incorporated into the curriculum of other
centers of military and civilian training, in particular of the Escola de Comando do Estado Maior - ECEME, which is the top level school of the military High Command. The influence of the ESG Doctrine of National Security and Development may be gathered by the following facts uncovered in Stepan's work: In 1956, the curriculum of the ECEME made no mention of conferences of counter-guerrilla strategies or of internal national security. By 1961, however, courses on national security became more influential. By 1968 the ECEME curriculum included a total of 222 class hours devoted exclusively to the discussion of the Doctrine of Internal Security and another 129 class hours for the analysis of the forms of non-classical war. Only 21 hours were devoted to the traditional military topics of territorial defense against external aggression to the nation. The importance of this widespread influence is that in order to be promoted to General or to have any command post an officer in Brazil must be a graduate of the ECEME. Therefore, as Stepan points out, most Brazilian high officers have been greatly subjected to the Doctrine of National Security and Development.

What exactly is included in this Doctrine of National Security and Development as it has been elaborated by the ESG -- and extended to other top centers of military-civilian training? According to the Manual Básico da Escola Superior de Guerra, the basic textbook utilized by the courses in the War College, the doctrine of the school advanced from a partial definition of internal and external national security to a more global vision of national security as
integrated with economic development. The regulations presently in effect determine that the ESG shall be concerned chiefly with the "Doctrine of Political National Security and Development." 6

It should be further noted that the Manual Básico da ESG establishes a clear division between what it defines as the formulation of a "political doctrine to be applied to the country as a whole" and the actual "military doctrine" as well as the "information doctrine." 7 The "political doctrine" is to be developed with exclusivity by the Superior War Courses (Curso Superior de Guerra) and the ESG claims complete autonomy to develop them in the manner believed to be most appropriate. Therefore, for the purposes of "political doctrine" the ESG may, by the regulations, exercise "absolute freedom in formulation and directives." 8

On the other hand, the "military doctrine" is to be elaborated chiefly under the direct supervision and responsibility of the High Command of the Armed Forces (EMFA) in its special Course of the High Command (Curso do Estado Maior e Comando das Forças Armadas). As to the "doctrine of information" the ESG claims no particular responsibility with the actual "production of information." This is to be carried out by the specific organizations developed for that purpose. The methodology of information gathering is to be entrusted to the National School of Information (Escola Nacional de Informações), which is connected to the SNI (Servico Nacional de Informações) and trains top-level information agents. 9
It is important to note this apparent "division of labor" of the various organizations for the development and gathering of information on matters of internal security. The ESG, although not directly involved in the actual "production of information", does deal with what it defines as the "doctrine of the utilization of information." This is explained in the Manual Básico as coming under the responsibility of the ESG because the use of information is "integrated into the larger context of the political doctrine which is a part of the autonomous concern of the research of the ESG." Consequently, in a sense, the ESG defines itself as the primordial "think tank" of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. It is in the ESG, therefore, that the actual policies of National Security and Development are formulated.

II. Basic Concepts of the Doctrine of National Security and Development.

The Doctrine of National Security and Development was formulated by the ESG -- with the integration of the IPES/IBAD complex -- over a period of 25 years. It is a comprehensive and coherent body of theory which contains both ideological elements and guidelines for networking, information gathering and political-economic planning for governmental policy. Clearly it is a theory developed to provide practical training as well as an ideological foundation for State administrative personnel -- both civilian and military. Hence, structural components of the State are predicted and periodic program development and policy-planning are established and evaluated.

The National Security Doctrine begins with a theory of war. The teachings of the ESG visualize different kinds of war: Total war, limited and localized war, subversive or revolutionary war and indirect or psychological war.

The theory of total war is based upon the cold war military strategy that defines modern-day war as total and absolute. Because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the inevitable growing confrontation of the two super powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- the theory concludes that war is no longer limited to the territory of the warring nations or to specific sectors of the economy or population. General Golbery do Couto e Silva thus states the concept:

"Today, the concept of war has been expanded (...) to the entire territorial space of the belligerent states, thus absorbing the enormity of the struggle and including the totality of the efforts of the nation -- economic, political, cultural and military. It rigidly integrates all activities to one single aim: victory and only victory. It confuses soldiers and civilians, men, women and children and places them in the same danger and demands identical sacrifices. They must all abdicate the secular liberties which had been gained and place them in the hands of the all-powerful State of War.

(...) Above all total war has eliminated the time scale, incorporating in itself the time of pre-war and post-war which are in fact now only attenuated circumstances of one sole and continuing State of War.

Thus, from the strictly limited military war we now have reached the total war, economic, financial, political, psychological and scientific. (...) From a total war we have reached a global war and from the global war we finally have the indivisible, the inescapable war and -- why not recognize it? -- to a permanent war. The "white war" of Hitler or the "cold war" of Stalin has substituted for peace so that, in truth, there is no longer a clear distinction of where peace is ended and war begins. 11
64

Because the United States and the Soviet Union are irremediably engaged in a total war which cannot be activated because of the possibility of complete destruction of both nations, contemporary war, according to this theory, has become subdivided into different kinds of wars: nuclear war (as opposed to the old-style of conventional war) which is the total and unlimited form of war. In addition to this actual potentiality of nuclear war there are limited and localized wars where the two super powers meet to test their strength for control of certain limited territories but fall short of the total nuclear war. Furthermore, politically, war has been divided into declared war and non-declared war. The latter are the forms specifically taken by the insurrectional and revolutionary types of warfare. 12

Classical, or conventional war, is politically declared and limited in nature. The principal characteristics of the classical war include its basic conception as a war of external aggression, or a war which is conducted between States and where a nation will declare war politically as a reaction against the external attack of another nation. Thus, in the case of conventional war, the total capacity of production and the support of the population is elicited to unite the nation in a fight against the threat of another nation. Up to World War II, this was the most common form of warfare. It is, by definition, a war of defense and offense, but of a common population united against a defined external enemy. 13

On the other hand, undeclared or non-classical warfare is a war of indirect aggression: "it may include the armed conflict in
the interior of a country and between parts of its population."

Non-classical warfare -- or undeclared warfare -- is defined in the ESG textbook as the war of "internal subversion". The concept used includes both insurrectional warfare and revolutionary warfare. These concepts are further defined as:

**Insurrectional Warfare:** Is an internal conflict in which part of a population attempts to depose a government by the force of arms.

**Revolutionary Warfare:** Is a conflict, normally internal, which is stimulated and aided materially or psychologically from the exterior of the nation, generally inspired upon an ideology. It attempts to gain State power by a progressive control of the nation.

In further comments included in the Manual Básico da ESG it becomes clear that the concept of *revolutionary warfare* does not necessarily include only the force of arms. In fact, any action which results from an organized opposition sufficiently strong to pressure and challenge the policies of the State is directly included in the definition of *revolutionary warfare*. In addition, revolutionary warfare is automatically linked to communist infiltration and to the indirect action of international communism controlled by the Soviet Union. It is here that the concept of "ideological frontiers" rather than "territorial frontiers" of warfare becomes a relevant element in the comprehension of the theory. For revolutionary warfare is a war of ideology which replaces the conventional inter-state wars within specific geographic frontiers of a nation's territory. This point is basic to the theory of the "internal enemy" and of indirect aggression. The ESG basic textbook states this concept thus:
Communist revolutionary war is of the second type in our definition of non-classical warfare. The communist nations, in the anxiousness to expand their domination of the world, avoid engaging themselves in a direct confrontation. Thus they apply a particular strategy -- one in which the psychological weapon is most utilized. They exploit the possibilities and the vulnerabilities of a democratic society by surepticiously and clandestinely acting to weaken them and to induce them to be submitted to their socio-political regime.

Communist revolutionary war has as a principal characteristic the involvement of the population of the target country in a gradual, slow action -- both progressive and continuous -- which aims at the conquering of minds. It encompasses all aspects from the exploitation of existent discontent and protest -- with the incitement of the population against the constituted authorities -- until the actual organization of dominated and controlled zones or territories. They may use the method of guerrilla warfare, of terrorism and other irregular tactics where persons who are nationals of the country itself are then turned into the combatants. It may also utilize devious, non-armed tactics. 17

Hence, revolutionary war acts mostly in psychological and indirect manners so as to avoid direct armed confrontations. Its strategy is to gain, as the ESG puts it, "the minds of the people" in a slow but conspicuous way until it has spread the seed of rebellion and is then in a position to incite the population against the constituted authorities. Since revolutionary war is an undeclared war, and is secretly conducted by external forces of international communism, it aims at gaining combatants who come from among the people of the "target nation" itself. Thus, by the very definition of the ESG interpretation, the entire people become suspect, become potential "internal enemies" and must be carefully controlled, sought after and uprooted.
The role of national security planning and particularly of
efficient production and gathering of information on the activities
of all sectors of political and civil society is crucial for the
proper defense of the nation itself. For, the theory of the ESG
emphasizes, the international communist forces orchestrate and
carefully plan campaigns of propaganda and of ideological manipulation
which are then secretly developed in the "target nation" so as to
gain the support of sectors of the population for the purpose of
dividing and weakening the potential for governmental reaction. This,
in sum, is the indirect action strategy of communism. 18

It is to be noted at this point that the ESG theory -- which is
also, as we have seen, widely disseminated in military and civilian
circles of top level State administration-- emphasizes the aspect
of revolutionary warfare rather than the possibility of a limited
war or a total war. According to the ESG Manual Básico, this is a
necessity in the Third World. The Soviet Union, according to the
theoreticians of the ESG, has understood that its own imperial destiny
depends upon the gaining of control of Third World countries:

In countries of weak national power, where the political
structures are unstable, the indirect action strategy of
aggression is much more effective for it may potentially
increase antagonisms and pressures inside the country.
Thus, it is also evident that the care with internal
national security must be a priority of importance,
especially where in addition to the conditions described
one also finds geographical conditions which reinforce this
aspect.

In nations with a low state of development, there can be
a climate of insecurity that may be exploited and may allow
the growth of influence or domination whether it be in the
political arena, or in economic, psychosocial or military areas.
The strategy of indirect action establishes different fronts to work among the population as well as a particular methodology of psychological propaganda and ideological control. The "target public" is, in the definition, of two kinds: the internal public that is defined as the active duty military personnel, or military in the reserve or civilians who work in Military Ministries in addition to the Military Police and other paramilitary forces. The external public which is defined as students, trade union leaders, the written and aired media, influential groups in society such as intellectuals, professionals, artists and members of the various religious orders as well as organized sectors of the civil and political society such as organizations of workers, students, peasants, associations such as clubs, neighborhood committees etc.

According to the Manual Básico da ESG the indirect strategy of communist infiltration aims at exploiting all the possibilities of dissent among civil and political groups and to gain control of leadership positions so as to impose an active climate of opposition to the nation's government. The psychological campaign aims at predisposing the population to engage in direct opposition, to be sympathetic with the claims of the opposition and eventually to incite revolt against the constituted authorities. The main problem for the State in attempting to defend the nation against the indirect strategy of communism is that there is no one defined enemy. Potentially the enemy may be everywhere.

Hence it follows that internal security is the top priority and main responsibility of those in power so as to defend an under-
developed nation against the hidden aggression of the primary enemy.

What, exactly, is considered to be internal security?

**Internal Security** involves aspects of National Security which have to do with internal manifestations or demonstrations of dissent, antagonism, pressures. It encompasses all actions which may be carried out by the State so as to preserve the constituted powers, law, order, and guarantee the threatened National Objectives. Therefore, internal security includes all and any measures which take place inside of the country to aim at eliminating the pressures and antagonisms of any origin, form or nature.

(...) **Internal Security** is integrated in the concept of National Security. Its specific field of action is with the antagonisms or pressures: whether they be external, internal or external-internal. It is not important to consider its nature: whether it be political, economic, psychosocial or military. Not even to consider the variety of forms the dissent may take: violence, subversion, corruption, traffic of influence, ideological infiltration, economic domination, social disaggregation, demonstrations and breach of sovereignty. Whenever any antagonisms or pressures are producing an effect in national frontiers, the responsibility to fight them, overcome them, neutralize them or reduce them is understood within the framework of the actions and the planned programs which we define as the Policy of Internal Security (*Política de Segurança Interna*). 21

Hence, the concept of Internal Security is integrated with the general concept of National Security as one and the same absolute responsibility of the State.

The theory of Internal Security when considered in its further definitions of what constitutes "antagonisms" and "pressures", allows the National Security State a widereaching justification for control and repression of the population in general. In fact, it may be said that it even provides a moral incentive, considered to be an actual "fulfillment of duty" to rigorously enforce Internal Security as an actual mission in the defense of the nation as if it was in reality under the occupation of a foreign army.
When no such overt foreign aggression exists, but it is all defined as undercover, clandestine, sureptitious, hidden, it is impossible to establish limitations for the repressive action of the State and military powers. It is the National Security State itself -- and often only those sectors intimately connected to the Repressive Apparatus -- that ultimately determines who may constitute the "enemy within" or the "internal enemy" of the nation who is to be searched for, controlled and uprooted. In addition, it is they as well who decide which activities of dissent, opposition and protest constitute "antagonisms" or "pressures" against the government which is, in itself, identified with the nation itself. Therefore, the military forces who have the responsibility for the control of subversive or revolutionary activities have practically unlimited power over the population of the country.

The implication of such a situation for human rights is serious indeed. When it is impossible to determine exactly who is to be considered an enemy of the State and what activities are defined as permissible or judged to be intolerable there are no longer any guarantees that may secure due process of law, the right of defense or freedom of expression and association. Even if such formal rights are kept in the Constitution, in practice they do not exist or exist only at the discretion of the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State. All citizens are suspect and are considered guilty until they can prove their innocence. Such a reversal is the root and cause of the serious abuse of power which occur in Brazil.
Another important point to emphasize here is that the theory of the "enemy within" requires that the government build two types of defensive structures: 1. the State must fund and create an Apparatus of Repression and armed control capable of enforcing the will of the State and coercing the population if need be. 2. the State must also create and fund a formidable network of political information so as to be able to efficiently engage in what the ESG textbook calls the "counter-offensive strategy" aimed at pinpointing the "enemies" and to find people, groups or sectors of the opposition that may have become infiltrated by the "communist indirect tactic". Such requirements, furthermore, clearly necessitate the centralization of State power in the hands of the federal Executive so as to be able to coordinate and control the vast apparatus of control of internal security. In addition, it follows that the sectors in power most intimately connected to the actual running of the information and repressive forces are the actual holders of de facto power within the general framework of the National Security State.

In order to clarify the main concepts of the Internal Security Doctrine, we should devote some attention to what has been called the "counter-offensive strategy" of the National Security State. Theoretically, the need for such a comprehensive strategy was already defended by General Golbery do Couto e Silva in his writings in the mid-1950's. In his writings, the planning of the network of information was defended as being a consequence of the inescapability of the total war, the
the permanent war and its corollary subversive or revolutionary war. An indirect strategy believed to be primarily employed by the enemy -- communism -- made privileged use of weapons of infiltration and of psychological warfare. These techniques took the form of "propaganda, counter-propaganda, of dissemination of tempting ideologies, of the suggestive slogans for internal and external use, of persuasion, of blackmail, of threats and even of terrorism." 22

The response of the counter-offensive strategy, therefore, had to be to change from a classical military strategy of war to new techniques of counter-information, counter-propaganda and the development of similar strategies of offensive action. The effort to create new strategies of war in the face of the "permanent cold war" led to a virtual "Policy of National Security". In such a manner, what General Golbery already at that time called the "Grand Strategy" was developed:

We have, in the highest levels of National Security, a strategy -- which has been called by many the Grand Strategy or the General Strategy. It is an art which is of the exclusive competence of the government and which must coordinate within a fundamental Strategic Concept all of the political, economic, psychosocial and military activities which may lead to the achievement of the Permanent National Objectives (ONP).

(...) To this Strategy are, thus, subordinated other strategies, whether they be the Military Strategy, or the Political, Economic, or Psychosocial Strategies. (...) The Great Strategy is like the war theory that provides its foundation: it is indivisible and total. 23

In this case, still according to General Golbery do Couto e Silva, a government must be organized to efficiently carry out the Grand Strategy.
Hence it follows that the central State needs to be absolutely powerful and effective in the organization of the necessary infrastructure for National Security and in particular to be able to guarantee the Internal Security. General Golbery do Couto e Silva theoretically developed the actual structures of government which ideally should perform this task by drawing the interconnections between the various State organizations entrusted with the carrying out of the crucial "Policy of National Security":

**CHART 2.1**

**NATIONAL SECURITY**

![Diagram](image)


We shall examine later how the Strategies for the Political, Economic, Military and Psychosocial areas were in reality applied by the State.
The application and building of the "ideal" structures envisioned theoretically by General Golbery do Couto e Silva in his early writings was entrusted to the network of information and repression in fact created after the takeover of power. Some twenty years after General Golbery delineated the basic outline of the Strategy or Policy of National Security, the concepts are repeated in the textbook of the ESG utilized as the basic curriculum training of those who were to run the apparatus. Thus it is useful to examine the definitions that are provided in the Manual Básico da ESG of the main concepts which Golbery already utilized in his theoretical development of the Grand Strategy:

**National Policy** is the global process that orients the government in order to achieve the primordial functions of the State. (...) In its widest expression, National Policy is the formulation of the Permanent National Objectives.

(...) **National Policy** may be subdivided into two aspects: Development Policy and Security Policy.

**National Development Policy** aims at the orientation of the government in the sense of strengthening the power in order to achieve the goals of the National economic Objectives.

**National Security Policy** is the art of advising the National Power so as to guarantee the conquest and the maintenance of the National Objectives. 24

Together, the Development Policy and the Security Policy constitute the National Policy, also elsewhere termed in the ESG textbook as the National Strategy. A further clarification of the general National Strategy is provided in a definition: it is
"the art of preparing and applying the national power of the State to counteract the existent or potential obstacles that impede the achievement or the maintenance of the objectives which are determined by the National Policy of the government." 25

In turn these "existent or potential obstacles" to the achievement of the goals of the National Policy come from a variety of sources. These range from lack of material resources, problems in the international markets, to unfavorable political circumstances which are a direct cause of internal "adverse factors", "antagonisms" and "pressures". The different levels and degrees of difficulties which are encountered by the State are carefully defined in the textbooks' discussion of the Grand Strategy:

**Obstacles (óbices):** Are obstacles of any kind -- material or spiritual -- which may arise from structural, conjunctural, natural conditions or be the result of the human will. They impede the attainment and the maintenance of the National Objectives.

**Adverse Factors (fatores adversos):** Are obstacles -- internal and external -- which are in opposition to the efforts of the national community in its desire to reach or maintain the National Objectives.

**Antagonisms (antagonismos):** Are obstacles of a peculiar form. They are the expression of a deliberate, intentional and otherwise dissenting activity. As such, they question the attainment or the maintenance of the National Objectives.

**Pressures (pressões):** Are obstacles of an extreme degree in which the dissenting and disputing will becomes manifested by its capacity to counteract the power of the government in an organized fashion. 26

Depending upon the analysis of the political conjuncture, the Grand Strategy must plan counter-offensive actions specifically targeted
to eliminate or neutralize the effects of each of the different levels or degrees of opposition activities. The actual techniques for the handling of each degree of opposition advised and analyzed in the Manual Básico vary. The counter-offensive techniques range from daily routine security measures, such as checking of documentation, following, and other methods of information gathering, to measures of emergency and total mobilization of the power of the Armed Forces in order to deal with situations that are defined in the extreme forms of actual "pressures", i.e. an organized and powerful challenge to the power of the government. As we shall see later, this helps to explain why the violent reaction of the State to the strikes of the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo in 1980 and the subsequent targeting of the social movements connected to the Catholic Church -- particularly in the countryside and through the comunidades de base. These specific movements have been defined as "pressures", of organized actions that are powerful enough to challenge the National Security State. Thus, they require the efforts of total mobilization in order to neutralize their effect and the danger to the National Policy.

It should be specifically noted at this point that the techniques of total mobilization to deal with situations of "pressure" may involve the establishment of "emergency areas" in order to enable the State to utilize its full power of coercion to dismantle the challenge of political action or to deal with natural disasters. According to the ESG textbook, situations of "pressure" that require "Actions of Emergency" are defined as those which result from "war or the imminence of war, internal
insurrections, civil disturbances, illegal strikes, floods, fires and other situations of public calamity." 27

The combination of the different counter-offensive actions to deal with the obstacles provide the main governmental directives -- they are the global orientation to the central apparatus of the State. In addition they are the specific strategies which are meant to deal with the different areas which may be involve in the organization of "antagonisms" or even "pressures". According to the Manual Básico these are: the political, the economic, the psychosocial and the military strategies.

The Political Strategy defines the State goals and directives for the neutralization of obstacles, antagonisms or pressures within the political sphere: i.e. the Executive itself, the Legislative, the Judiciary and all the political parties. 28

The Economic Strategy is concerned both with the private and the public sectors of the economy. This area is further subdivided into specific policies for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. In essence, the Economic Strategy is concerned with the basic compilation of information necessary for the planning of a coherent policy of economic development integrated into the policy of National Security. 29

The Psychosocial Strategy, for the purposes of the National Security Policy, is defined in the textbook as including the areas of civil society. They are subdivided into: the family, the schools and universities, the press and media, the trade unions, the Church
and the private enterprises. The counter-offensive Grand Strategy should predict and plan specific strategies for dealing with obstacles, antagonisms or pressures in each of these areas.

Finally, the Military Strategy is geared for control and effective preparation for the Navy, Army, Air Force and all the paramilitary units of Brazil's extensive military organization.

Since the policy of counter-offensive must deal with each one of these specific areas of possible opposition periodic conjunctural analyses and reports must be carried out so as to determine the specific policy needed and the proper target of the counter-offensive. Once the analyses have been made, the degree of coercion to be applied in the counter-offensive is planned to fit the degree of opposition which is encountered in each of the main components of society just described. Hence, before being able to delineate the proper measure of coercion for the military action, it is necessary to determine exactly the degree of "non-conformity which exists" (oposição or contestação). Thus the information report must determine if the particular action is to be considered simply "opposition" (oposição) or the more serious organized "pressure" defined as "contesting" (contestação).

The Manual Básico provides the main guidelines for the proper establishment of the level of dissent:

1. The smaller or greater number of non-conformed nuclei.
2. The intensity of their activity.
3. The quality and quantity of the people who belong to these nuclei.
4. The emotional repercussion which their activity manages to provoke among the population.
5. The proportion between the number of nuclei which are of direct challenge (contestação) to the nuclei of opposition.
6. The proportion of voters who are members of the party of the government or of the opposition parties.
7. The proportion between the number of votes which were obtained by the government's party or by the parties of the opposition.
8. The quantity, quality and degree of actual penetration of the opinions in the main currents of public opinion.

The higher the potential for organization and penetration of the opposition nuclei in public opinion, the graver the threat to the State. It is at such levels that the opposition is considered to be no longer simply "obstacles" or even "antagonistic" actions but reach the serious stage of "pressure" in which case it is automatically considered as contestação requiring higher degrees of coercion.

In short, the planning and running of the National Security State involves the development of governmental directives to determine policies and structures for the control of every area of political and civil society. In order to carry out the program, it was necessary to take full control of State power, centralize this power as much as possible in the Executive branch of the State and place those closest to the information network and the programming of Internal Security Policy in the key positions of government.

In our later chapters we shall see how this was put into practice and the specific controls for each of the specific areas of opposition were developed in constant dialectical relationship with the opposition.

2. Geopolitics: Brazil's role in the World Context.

The second important element of the Doctrine of National Security and Development is its understanding of the particular place of Brazil in the arena of world super-power confrontation. The key to this theory
may be found in the geopolitical studies, the most influential of which has been General Golbery do Couto e Silva's *Geopolítica do Brasil*. We shall summarize the arguments in this work:

According to the theory a nation's destiny is determined in large part by the geographical conditions. Not only does the power of the nation and its possibility to achieve full economic development depend on the amount of resources it has in its territory, but even the political and strategic alliances between nations are related to its geographical position in the world. Thus, the geographical proximity or accessibility of a nation to another, or to a complex of allied nations, determines the necessary political alliances that must be forged.

In the climate of total war and permanent war, there is no room for neutrality. The two superpowers are engaged in a life or death struggle and the fact that the modern world no longer has either a time constraint on war or a geographical frontier to divide nations makes it impossible to achieve full neutrality. All nations must take sides. Which side you take is, to a large extent, already geographically determined.

The Latin American Continent is clearly committed to the camp of the United States due to its geographical proximity and connection. Thus it is irremediably within its sphere of influence and control. The economic power of the United States, called by Golbery the Giant of the North, does not leave room to maneuver a position of complete neutrality for Latin American nations. Thus, it is the manifest destiny
of the nations of Latin America to join the United States in the
general defense of the West against the threat of the communist
expansion represented by the imperial ambitions of the Soviet Union.34

In the general framework of Western alliances, General Golbery
asserts, Latin America has a particularly important role to play and
a role which is also geographically determined. General Golbery do
Couto e Silva argues that, first of all, Latin America is of crucial
importance to the nations of the West -- and in particular to the
United States. Secondly, within the context of Latin America, Brazil
has the specific role of most important partner. In fact, it is believed
that Latin America is so important to the Western developed nations and
to the United States that "they cannot survive without the alliance
of the nations of Central and of South America". This is because:

1. The Latin American nations give a massive support,
sometimes even decisive support, in the deliberations
of the United Nations.

2. They provide crucial strategic materials that other
nations in areas of high instability may cease to provide
for they are more vulnerable to communist attack.

3. They are crucial for the control and protection of the
maritime traffic and constitute the only circulation area
which is sufficiently secure. In fact, it is an obligatory
alternative if there is a collapse in the Suez or in Panama.

4. It is the most direct and best route over the ocean to reach
Africa -- an immediate and vital bastion of European defense.

5. They must guarantee solid structure of an efficient system
of collective security for the entire Continent so as to
secure, in case of war, the inviolability of the key positions,
situated in the interior of the defensive apparatus of the
entire West.

6. Finally, they constitute a valuable demographic potential
for army conscripts in extra-Continental operations, whether
these be the simple work of policing neutral areas ... or the
reinforcement of the troops of the West in the case of a
prolongued war that engages the masses of the Soviet Union
and/or China. 35
Within the context of Latin America, clearly Brazil achieves a distinct position of superiority and importance. First of all, it commands the largest part of the Atlantic ocean, a long ocean line from South to North directly facing the Continent of Africa of strategic importance. Thus, its geographic position is unequaled because it virtually controls the South Atlantic.

Furthermore, Brazil commands the largest reserves of important natural resources and other material of strategic benefit for the West. The natural resources of Brazil are vast and untapped and may provide the West with the necessary crucial minerals for production and for warfare. Finally, Brazil's large population is of high potential in the case of a prolonged war. Hence, it is geographically determined that the defense strategy must be Continental and that within that strategy Brazil should play a leading role.

The geopolitical interpretation is ambitious and nationalist in the sense of appealing to the superiority of Brazil as a nation. In the context of acceptance of the alliance with the West and the United States in particular -- an alliance which is in any case believed to be unavoidable -- and even the acceptance of the subordination to the United States' greater economic power as the Giant of the North, nonetheless Golbery wishes to apply for bargaining rights and the position, so to speak, of a privileged ally. In arguing that Brazil should aim to get as high a price as possible for its privileged situation Golbery states that:
When we see that the United States negotiates, by the weight of dollars, immense amounts of aid so as to gain the support and the cooperation of undecided people or even frankly hostile nations of the Western Europe region, of the Middle East or of Asia -- it seems to us to be only just that we should also learn to bargain at high prices and to utilize the fact that we hold, as a nation, the trump card.

We should use this so as to obtain the necessary means to develop our land (...) and to carry out our mission. We may also invoke a "manifest destiny" theory, especially since it does not collide directly with that of our bigger and more powerful brother of the North. 36

This viewpoint is also largely shared by the military. It explains the fact that Brazil has followed an independent foreign policy and has come into some conflictual situations with the United States' government. The Brazilian military leaders believe that the highest price must be paid for the continuing support of Brazil and its integration in the general framework of Western Alliance. In addition, the military clearly have some sub-imperialist thoughts of their own, in particular as to the relationship between Brazil and the other Latin American nations. Thus they have followed an external policy along the lines of a "pragmatic approach to foreign relations". The military clearly believe in the "manifest destiny" of Brazil, its strategic position in the geographical map of the world and its potential to become another super power.

The military see themselves unavoidably tied to the United States both for geopolitical reasons and for ideological reasons. Nonetheless, Brazil should certainly make the developed nations pay a price for the cooperation and will utilize the "trump cards" of its geopolitical reality.

The third most important element of the National Security Doctrine is its economic development aspect. A content analysis of the writings of the ESG and theorists connected to the ESG, clarifies the type of economic model which is visualized in the Doctrine of National Security and Development.

First of all, the two concepts are integrated into a single totality. There can be no National Security without a high degree of economic development. A nation's security is, to a large part, dependent upon the productive resources it develops, upon growing industrialization, upon the efficient tapping of the natural resources, upon extensive networks of rail and surface communications to integrate a vast territory and upon the development and training of a skilled labor force with technical know-how. Thus, among the most important factors in the security of a nation is included its capability for the accumulation and absorption of capital, the quality of its labor force, the development of science and technology and the efficacy of its industrial sectors. 37

The ESG textbook defines the aim of economic development as the achievement of complete integration and complete national security. An underdeveloped nation, as has already been pointed out, is particularly vulnerable to the indirect action strategy of the principal enemy: communism. One of the counter-offensive strategies envisioned in the Doctrine of National Security is to achieve rapidly a take-off stage of economic development so as to gain the support of the population. Whereas this
is the aspect most emphasized in the classroom materials of the ESG. General Golbery's writings contain a slightly different aspect of economic development. In terms of overall Continental and national defense in the context of general Western defense strategy, economic development in Brazil and infrastructural improvements are essential so as to counteract the irregularities and the extreme vulnerability of the vast empty spaces of Brazil. The uninhabited and undeveloped expanses of land in Brazil are what General Golbery terms "paths of penetration". They must be effectively "plugged". Therefore, he argues not for an economic policy geared to the eliciting of support of the population but rather for an economic policy aimed at integration of the territory. This would follow three distinct phases:

First phase: To firmly establish the basis of our Continental prominence by binding the Northeast and the South to the Central nucleus of the nation while at the same time guaranteeing the inviolability of the vast expansion of the unpopulated interior by the effective plugging of all possible paths of penetration.

Second phase: To colonize the Northwest, starting from the basin of the central platform, in order to fully integrate the Center-West peninsula into the Brazilian whole.

Third phase: To flood the Amazon region with civilization, in particular the frontier areas, starting from the advanced basis which is to be constructed in the Center-West and following a coordinated and planned strategy of development along the large river.

The infrastructural improvements must include communication networks, highways and railways, which should cross the region. The rail services must first be removed from the control of subversives and carefully administrated. The nation should also develop greater navigational potential for its rivers and take care to ensure the security
of the oceanic ports. This is to be completed in the first phase of the economic development strategy. The second phase should involve the occupation of the "heartland" in the interior Central region, which includes the states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, Paraiba and the valley of the São Francisco River as well as the valleys of the large tributary rivers of the Amazon, especially the Araguaia and the Tocantins.

The third phase of development could then move from the interior "heartland" to the conquest of the Amazon region. Thus, the entire development-security effort must move from the firm control of the essential Central plains and from the pole of Manaus in such a way as to form a protective "concentrical area of maneuver". The integration and development of the interior plains and of the Amazon region is seen as necessary for all "maneuvers of National Security". Therefore, it is essential that particular attention should be paid to these areas which have been abandoned for too long and are vulnerable to "penetration".

In the Doctrine of National Security and Development, as presented in the writings of the analysts and the textbooks of the ESG, economic development is not understood in terms of fulfillment of basic needs of the population but rather in military defense terms. It is important to keep this point in mind for a proper understanding of the military's conception of economic development. The need to develop the vast expanses of the interior of Brazil and the Amazon, for example, is primarily important to "plug" up the possible paths of penetration and not to bring about improvements in the life of the population now there or
who might be brought in as settlers. This is particularly the case of developmental programs in the regions of the central plains (planalto central), along the margins of the great rivers of Araguaia and the Amazon. The main focus of the economic development model is, in general terms, the strengthening of the productive potential of Brazil so as to increase its bargaining power in the general global geopolitical arena.

It is a mistaken interpretation of the Doctrine of National Security and Development to believe that its primordial motivation is or should be industrial and economic development designed to meet basic needs or increase the standard of living of the majority of the population. This is of interest only insofar as misery creates greater vulnerability to the infiltration tactics of communism through its indirect strategy. However, the goals of economic development are not seen in the priorities of improvement of the quality of life.

Often, the integrated concept of Security and Development has been interpreted to mean that it is necessary to ensure a climate of absolute internal security and peace so as to allow for a rapid industrialization and economic development to occur. This justification implies that economic development is for the benefit of a higher standard of living and thus that the population will ultimately be the main beneficiaries of the process. In reality, this is only the secondary purpose of the need for security and development. Its primordial aim may be found in the geopolitical relationships and the view of Brazil's crucial position in the overall defense planning of the West against international communism.
In addition, it must be pointed out that it is particularly in the central interior region and in the Amazon that the greater mineral wealth of Brazil is to be found. Its importance lies in the fact that, as Golbery stated one of the significant elements of geopolitics in Latin America in terms of Western defense strategy is its richness in minerals which are necessary for the industrial production of the European and American capitalist economies.

In order to achieve this strategy of national security integrated with economic development it is necessary to increase the industrial production of the nation. Thus, the economic development model does include industrialization as a primary goal. A military-industrial complex is similarly to be aided and developed. The economic model which is explicitly considered to be most desirable as a form of producing this industrialization is the capitalist system.

However, the ESG textbook explicitly analyzes capitalist relations paying close attention to the contradictions and the problems which have been criticised by Marxist theory. It reaches the conclusion that Marx was mistaken mainly because he did not foresee the potential of the State's regulatory power, implicit in Keynesian economics, as a way of managing the capitalist system and eliminating the problems while conserving the beneficial characteristics. The theorists of National Security Doctrine, as it has been developed in Brazil, very explicitly reject the system of laissez-faire capitalism. They do not believe in the "magic of the market" and consider this interpretation to be an outmoded form of capitalist economic development, which is neither viable nor desirable for modern-day economies, especially in
the context of a developing nation. It is here that the Brazilian theoreticians seem to differ most strongly from their Chilean and Argentinian counterparts. For, rather than applying a rigorous \textit{laissez-faire} model of the "magic of the market" with no State regulation the Brazilian theoreticians argue for the necessity of a strong State which will apply a variety of fiscal incentives, tax inducements or penalties in order to regulate the model of economic development in an almost completely centrally-planned economy. It is a curious mixture of State capitalism, planned economics and Keynesian economics. Thus, in the conception of the ESG, the rejection of what it defines as "liberal capitalism" is complete:

The expression -- economic model -- which is here employed must be understood as a model which has its own specific characteristics. It comprises a system constituted by a complex planning totality of principles, norms, plans, programs of orientation of all activities in the economic area. This vast system of programming is to be periodically modified and reinforced by analysis of the conjuncture and will reflect a pragmatic economic doctrine.

(...) Although the model understands the economy as being comprised of a totality that includes the Public Sector as well as the Private Sector, it is a definite reality of the modern world that there is a growing participation of the State in the economic system. As time passes, the interpretation of the role of the State as passive, which is a recommendation of the \textit{laissez faire} theory, becomes ever more remote as a reality to be desired.

The State intervenes directly in the economic process. It encourages and aids specific economic activities, it discourages or even blocks others. The State buys an immense quantity of goods and services, it supervises and exploits certain major natural resources, it may conduct industrial projects
of its own and it will guide social services so as to provide for individual security for citizens.

(...) Beyond that, the State is equipped with a variety of efficient instruments of control of the economy such as: credit, salary legislation and controls, tax incentives and exchange incentives etc. 43

Modern day capitalism, the ESG claims, must pursue an economic model based on strong interference of the State both in the regulatory planning and programming of the national economy and in direct production or infrastructural investment which may be combined with direct State tapping of natural resources. Thus, the definition of the capitalist economic system is closer to a form of State capitalism than it is to liberal laissez-faire capitalism. "Liberal capitalism", in the analysis of the ESG, is a folly which will lead exactly to the kinds of problems that Marx studied. The basic error of the economic prediction in Marxist analysis, therefore, is that it did not understand the potential for the role of the State in regulating the capitalist economy in order to overcome the contradictions and weaknesses of the system and realize the full power of the development of the industrial capabilities of a nation. 44

The military have been fairly coherent with this analysis since 1964. The participation of the State in planning and regulating the economy of post-1964 reached unprecedented levels of centralization. Similarly, as we shall see, the engagement of the State both in direct production and in the exploitation of certain mineral resources through State-owned corporations has also dramatically increased. In sum, the economic model pursued may be summarized by some major aspects:
1. It is a capitalist model of development comprising an alliance of State, multinational and local capital. The ESG textbook explicitly considers the contribution of multinational corporations by and large as positive for the economic development of a nation. This in spite of the fact that it may generate considerable internal opposition as the ESG comments. 46

2. Security, as an element in the bi-slogan "development with security" implies the need to control the social and political environment so as to provide as attractive as possible a climate for multinational investment. In addition, the element of social peace is a necessary part of the need to achieve maximum rates of capital accumulation for rapid economic growth so as to reach a "take-off" stage of development. Finally, the element of "security" in the model of economic development further implies on the need to occupy the Central plains of the interior states bordering the Araguaia, the São Francisco and the Amazon rivers so as to achieve a maximum of frontier defense and effectively "plug up" (tamponar) the paths of penetration which may be vulnerable to communist aggression.

3. The economic development is not geared to basic needs and is not particularly concerned with the establishment of priorities that will achieve a rapid amelioration of the living standards of the majority of the population. The programs of education, according to the ESG, should be mainly concerned with training technicians to participate in the process of economic growth and industrialization. Other basic needs programs, such as low-cost housing, community health
and basic primary education are minor priorities. Ultimately, the economic model is designed to bring about Brazil's potential as a world power. For such primordial and important goals, the ESG textbook emphasizes, the sacrifices of an entire generation may be necessary and are accepted. 47


At this point we should focus attention on certain contradictions between the theory's stated objectives and values and the practice that is imposed by the needs of defense, internal security and the economic model.

The military civilian Doctrine of National Security and Development continuously emphasizes two specific types of national objectives: these are the Permanent National Objectives (Objetivos Nacionais Permanentes - ONP) and the Present National Objectives (Objetivos Nacionais Atuais-ONA) which are of a conjunctural nature.

The Permanent National Objectives (ONP) are defined by the ESG as "those National Objectives which represent the vital interests and the aspirations of the people and for that reason subsist throughout time and in history." 48 The Permanent National Objectives are further defined as including:

1. The Territorial Integrity: to preserve the national territory in its entire extension, maintaining the present frontiers.
2. National Integration: To consolidate the whole of the national community (language, moral behavior, miscigenation and suppression of social or regional discrimination and disequilibrium). This shall be accomplished by encouraging
the civil conduct and the solidarity among the members of the society, without prejudice of any nature, and with the active and conscious participation in the common effort to preserve the values which characterize the Brazilian personality which is traditionally Christian.

3. **Democracy:** To perfect the political regime taking as a foundation the democratic principles which are coherent with the Brazilian reality.

4. **Progress:** To achieve, in all fields of national activity, living standards compatible with those found in the best standards of the world. This will be based upon the resources available by the material and human wealth of the country.

5. **Social Peace:** To establish a system of life which is based upon harmony and solidarity. To solve all conflict of interests between individuals, groups or social classes within the strict confines of the Law, Social Justice and the Moral and Spiritual Values.

6. **Sovereignty:** To maintain the Nation untouched and to secure its right of self determination and its relations with other nations in terms of equality of rights and of opportunities.

Certain clarifications of the use of language are necessary before we can proceed with an analysis of the contradictions existent in the above declaration of principles. First of all, it must be understood that the ESG utilizes certain concepts in a manner different from common political or sociological interpretations. For example, democracy is defined as a system coherent with the Brazilian reality. This does not mean that the ESG accepts the definitions of liberal democracy, with balance of powers, Constitutional rule, regularized and free elections, freedom of association and of the press. Rather, in other places of the ESG textbook, democracy in the context of the Brazilian reality is explicitly defined as a strong regime which calls for certain limitations in the power of the Legislative, believing its function to be chiefly one of regulating laws rather than drafting
and molding the legislation. The Judiciary does not have as one of its primordial functions the guarding of the Constitution and the overseeing of the two other branches of government. Rather its function is seen as the mission to care for the execution of the laws, most of which are in fact elaborated by the Executive. For, in the context of the Brazilian reality, there is an essential need for a strong Executive so as to fulfill the achievement of the Permanent National Objectives. Therefore, the doctrine of separation of powers is not understood as the equal and mutually balancing power of the three branches of the State. The Executive has, by definition, almost absolute power of legislation, leaving for the Legislative branch the main task of regulation.

The concept of participation in a conscious and active manner also has a very particular definition. In the conception of the ESG theoreticians, participation of the population is thought of in terms of participation in the carrying out of policies of the government. The actual formulation of the policies and the participation in the decisions of government should be left to a properly prepared elite. It is explicit in the ESG textbook that only an elite, carefully and technically trained, is capable of drafting the policies which will best guide the country to the fulfillment of its ultimate goals. In fact, this is a mission to be undertaken by those who are devoting their lives to the service of the Nation. The Nation is itself identified with the State. This is an organic conception where the State achieves a life of its own and is viewed as the embodiment of
the organic structure of the Nation. Thus, an aggression, a pressure against the State is interpreted as an act of treason and a danger to the Nation itself. Power itself does not emanate from the consensus of the people which provides the legitimacy for the State but rather is dependent upon the possibility of a strong State to amass sufficient strength and cohesion so as to impose its will upon the people for the purpose of achieving the Permanent National Objectives. Thus, power emanates from the State to the people in a reversal understandable in light of the conception of the State as an organic unity which searches for social harmony by centralizing all power over individuals. In the form of the Leviathan the State must have absolute power to be able to secure social peace.

We shall see that these basic interpretations are the root of much misunderstanding between the opposition and the State. For example, when the various Presidents have promised to restore democracy the opposition has interpreted and expected the restoration of liberal democratic values. In fact, it would demand a free elections, a total balance of power between the branches of the State and no controls over the functioning of the Judiciary. When opposition leaders stated that power must come from the people the tendency of the government may be to consider them disrupters of the social harmony and dangerous to the organic unity of the Nation, as embodied in the State which must have absolute power. Finally, as we shall see, the demand for participation of the population is a constant in opposition organizing. The officers of the government will rather tend to interpret this demand
in the sense understood by the ESG. They are likely to respond: "Why don't they join the various social programs of the government, such as the Projeto Rondon and the MOBRAL?" This is because, as we have pointed out, the definition of participation in the Permanent National Objectives of the nation is participation in the execution of the determinations of government not participation of the population in the actual drafting of policies and in the decision-making apparatus of administration. The formulation of governmental policy is, in the conception of the ESG, strictly the responsibility of the elites. In fact, it is believed to be the burden of the elite.

This gap in the differing conceptions of democracy has been important in the dialectic of the State and the opposition. The traditions of liberal democracy are still a strong part of the social and political universe. When promises to restore democracy are not fulfilled -- at least not in the liberal democratic sense -- the government may suffer a considerable loss of legitimacy. We shall analyze this point in various crises when the question of the gap has contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the State.

The definitions and statement of principles of the Permanent National Objectives are antagonistic to other goals of the National Security Doctrine. Specifically, the theory of the internal enemy which is an explicit part of the Doctrine of Internal Security, as we have seen, calls for the establishment of a vast network of information and the implantation of a Repressive Apparatus capable of guaranteeing the elimination of the hidden enemies within the nation. This is, by
itself, contradictory to the stated goal of achieving a "spirit of solidarity" and fomenting a "climate of harmony" where all conflicts of interests are to be resolved in the "strict confines of the Law".

Rather, the theory of the internal enemy within the nation tends to provide incentives for a climate of suspicion, fear and mutual denunciation among the population. We shall examine later how the theory of the internal enemy was applied and the consequences of the search for absolute internal security for the increased level of violence in political and civil society. At this point it is sufficient to point out that the Repressive Apparatus which was built in order to control all aspects of the society cost, in 1978, over 2 billion dollars and includes an estimated 700,000 to one million active duty personnel.

In addition, we shall also examine how the network of political information was actually developed through the use of extra-legal set of Institutional Acts, Complementary Acts and Decree-Laws passed strictly by the Executive power, sometimes after the forced closing down of the Federal Congress. Thus, in order to implement in practice the premises of the Doctrine of Internal Security it was necessary to create a parallel legal system which almost completely by-passes the existent traditional "confines of the Law".

Finally, the economic model which has been pursued has not increased the standard of living of the population. Rather it has resulted in increased social injustice and has concentrated the income to such a degree that by 1977 the top one percent of the economically
active population increased their share of the total income from 11.9 percent to 18.3 percent. On the other hand, the share of total income attributable to the poorest 50 percent of the population fell from 17.4 percent to 13.1 percent by 1977. Thus, the top one percent of the population pyramid, in the period from 1960 to 1977 received more than the total which was attributable to the poorest 50 percent of the economically active population.  

Therefore, the economic model elsewhere espoused by the Doctrine of National Security and Development, once put into practice may be contradictory to the stated goals of achieving social peace in full acceptance of social justice and in a climate of solidarity and harmonious effort to solve conflicts of interest.

In fact, most of the stated principles of the Permanent National Objectives are antagonistic to both the theory of internal security and to the economic model of development as a whole. These latter two aspects of the Doctrine of National Security and Development -- in fact its very core and rationale -- have in reality forced the implantation of a State which is based upon repressive and coercive powers rather than consensus and harmonious conflict resolution. In addition, such a State may be forced to create its own framework of legality which stands side by side and is a parallel structure to the traditional "confines of the Law".

Nonetheless, a final remark should point out that the adherence to the principles defined in the Permanent National Objectives has prevented the military in Brazil from being able to implant a
completely totalitarian State. These principles are, so to speak, the limitations to the degree of control which the military-civilian coalition has been able to impose upon the society.

One would expect that given this theoretical contradiction in practice the military would not be able to entirely or permanently close down the Federal Congress. The same may be said for the branch of the Judiciary which, although controlled and intimidated, would not be forced out of existence. In addition, the legitimating power of periodic elections would force the military to engage in local, state and federal representational elections, albeit they most probably would institute an entire system of control so as to ensure governmental victories. As we shall see throughout the following chapters this is precisely what has occurred in Brazil.

Hence, although the necessity to maintain a hold of power has led the military to tamper with elections and control political parties and representation nonetheless the opposition could maintain a certain political maneuverability and space. Thus, the principles stated in the Permanent National Objectives are a source of contradiction for the State and a limitation to its absolute power of coercion. As a consequence of such limitations the political space of the opposition has been increased and the system, as a whole, made less rigid than it could otherwise become.

An interesting question to consider is whether or not this contradiction is entirely unavoidable for the Brazilian National Security State. Although aspects of the Doctrine of National
Security and Development logically lead to a State of absolute control, to the "State of War" and to complete internal domination, the justification for such actions is that the elite must guard the nation and the democratic ideals against the potential attack of totalitarianism.

The contradiction, ultimately, lies in the fact that the Doctrine of National Security and Development is built upon an explicit denunciation of totalitarian forms of State power and is a self-proclaimed defender of democracy for the attainment of the Permanent National Objectives.

Consequently, complete totalitarian control of political and civil society is made complex by the dynamic relationship which is established between the State and the forces of the organized opposition. This dialectic has been, in fact, the most important factor in the shaping of the structures of the State.

Which social forces were involved in the actual building of the structures of the National Security State and what is the history of the relationship between the State and the opposition shall be the main focus of this work.

IV. Conclusion.

It is one of the fundamental arguments of this work that the Doctrine of National Security and Development, with the various aspects contained in the general body of theory, has had a significant imprint both upon the thinking and the practice of the political actors
who have been in power since 1964. The basic concepts of this Doctrine have shaped and molded State structures in reaction to and as an attempt to control what has been variously defined as "adverse factors", "antagonisms" or "pressures" from opposition in political and civil society.

As such, the Doctrine of National Security and Development constitutes an ideology of class domination which has become instrumentalized in a State of National Security so as to enable a strong centralized government to impose a highly exploitative economic development model geared to the achievement of rapid capital accumulation.

Although the military were carefully trained and believed themselves to be the prepared "elite" with the mission and the burden to provide for the full development of Brazil -- in the manner which has already been described -- so as to bring about the manifest destiny of world power inherent in the geopolitical reality of the nation, they have encountered constant resistance and opposition to their plans. In the framework of the theoretical analysis of the indirect action and the internal enemy analyzed in this chapter, it is to be expected that the military should react with outrage, indignation and fury at the organized challenges to the policies of the State. The belief that the dissent was truly planned and coordinated from the Soviet Union, in its pursuit of the indirect action for imperialist control of Brazil, the military can be predicted to interpret dissent as actions of the "enemy within" and to strike
at the various sectors of the opposition with different doses of violence depending on whether their activities were judged to fall in the definitions of "simple opposition" or of actual "challenge" (contestação).

In the subsequent chapters we shall examine how the dialectic of the State and the opposition developed throughout the years and how the reaction of the military National Security State varied with each challenge of opposition sectors. In turn, we shall also pay considerable attention to the effect that such policies have had upon the population and the opposition groups themselves.
NOTES


2. Ibid. pages 19-22.

3. Some of the works which deal with the ideology of national security, as it was developed in Brazil, have already been cited. They include Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, As Forças Armadas: Política e Ideologia no Brasil, op.cit.; father Joseph Comblin, A Ideologia da Segurança Nacional: O Poder Militar na América Latina, op.cit.; and in particular the research carried out by the team supervised by Dom Cândido Padim.

4. On the influence of the ADESG and its extensive role in the dissemination of the ideology of national security and the conspiracy to overthrow the government of João Goulart see: René Armand Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, op.cit., page 456, note 8 and pages 73 to 82.

René Armand Dreifuss discusses in detail the extent to which the graduates of the ESG operated in the Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas e Sociais (IPES) and jointly military and civilians in the IPES and the ESG active in these two organizations were the occupants of most high level posts in the new State after the coup d'état of 1964. See René Armand Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, op.cit. pages 417 to 455.


8. Ibid. page 21.


10. Ibid. page 21.

12. Ibid. page 24.


14. These definitions are taken from the training basic manual of the Superior War College. See, Manual Básico da ESG, op.cit. particularly Section 1 dealing with contemporary warfare and entitled: "Seção 1: Guerra Contemporânea" pages 65 to 82. All of the definitions of warfare, unless otherwise explicitly stated, come from this section of the basic training text.

15. Ibid. pages 73-79.

16. Ibid. page 78.

17. Ibid. page 79.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., page 430. It should be added that the theory establishes that insurrectional war, also non-declared and non-conventional, is closer to the traditional concept of civil war: "It is a type of war where part of the population -- whether or not it is aided or reinforced from the exterior of the nation -- opposes the government in power and rebels with the aim of deposing the government or of imposing upon it certain conditions." (page 79). The wars of independence, according to the ESG, are to be considered in the category of insurrectional war. However, the ESG still maintains that because of the inescapable conditions of today's confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, most wars of independence or insurrectional wars will not remain neutral and will be contaminated by the "communist revolutionary war". (page 79). Thus it believes that wars of independence, rebellions against unjust and oppressive dictatorships or any other civil resistance to State power eventually become tainted by the cold war struggle and by the all-encompassing death fight between the two super-powers.

20. Ibid. page 431.
21. Ibid. page 431.

22. See General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Conjuntura Política Nacional... opcit. page 25 of the section Geopolítica do Brasil.

23. Ibid. I have maintained the capitalization of the main concepts utilized in the ideology of national security whenever they are so written in the original documents. The capitalization refers to a specific and defined set of doctrines, or policies or structures which are considered sufficiently important by the theorists of national security to merit capitalization.


25. Ibid. page 238.

26. Ibid. See the discussion of the obstacles (óbices) also included in pages 280-289. For an analysis of these obstacles and their relationship to the antagonisms, adverse factors and pressures see pages 276 to 280.

27. A full discussion of the war maneuvers to be conducted in order to counteract each of the different levels of disturbances that may result from situations tied to adverse factors, obstacles, antagonisms or pressures is found in the Manual Básico da ESG, pages 291 to 296. This particular citation is in page 293. In the rest of this work we shall follow the actual application of the counter-offensive strategy against the opposition in various periods since 1964.

28. A full discussion of the term "Political Expression" (Expressão Política) is contained in the Manual Básico da ESG, Section I, "Expressão Política do Poder Nacional - O Poder Político" pages 303 to 325. This particular mention of the four principle components of the political expression is in page 310.

29. The economic area, or the economic model, is carefully studied in Section II: "Expressão Econômica do Poder Nacional -- Poder Econômico" pages 329 to 351 of the Manual Básico da ESG. The concepts included in this section have not changed very much from the early writings of the ESG authors, the days prior to the takeover of State power.

30. The psychosocial area is discussed in Section III, "Expressão Psicosocial do Poder Nacional -- Poder Psicosocial". pages 355 to 371 of the Manual Básico da ESG.
31. The military area is handled in Section IV, "Expressão Militar do Poder Nacional -- Poder Militar" pages 375 to 410, in the Manual Básico da ESG. We shall discuss the military area more thoroughly in the analysis of the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State.

32. Manual Básico da ESG, page 319, "Inconformismo (Oposição e Contestação)."

33. Ibid.

34. This is a brief summary of an involved and complicated argument of General Golbery do Couto e Silva. For details, including maps, graphs and military strategy, problems and planning see: Golbery do Couto e Silva, Conjuntura Política Nacional... op.cit. section Geopolítica do Brasil pages 95 to 138 in particular.

35. Ibid. page 246.

36. Ibid. page 52.


39. Ibid. page 132.

40. Ibid. page 132.

41. Ibid. pages 132-133.

42. Ibid. page 133.


44. For a complete discussion of the various economic systems, including a critique of liberal capitalism and of Marxism, see Chapter IV of the Manual Básico da ESG entitled "Contemporary Economic Systems" in Chapter IV, Sistemas Econômicos Contemporâneos, Manual Básico da ESG, op.cit. pages 147 to 167.

45. This point shall be examined in more detail in later chapters. It is interesting to point out that such an economic interpretation has resulted in what has been called the Brazilian "economic tripod" (tripé econômico) which is comprised of an alliance between State capital, national private capital and multinational corporation capital. For an
analysis of this "economic tripod" in the post-1964 economy see the important study of Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). This work has also appeared in Portuguese as: Peter Evans, A Tripla Aliança: As Multinacionais, as Estatais e o Capital Nacional no Desenvolvimento Dependente Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1980).

46. See, for example, the analysis contained in the *Manual Básico da ESG*, on page 338, here reproduced:

One should make a special mention of the multinational corporations, which are unequaled examples of efficacy and economic efficiency. These corporations have great organizational flexibility and constitute powerful complexes which are capable of exerting large amounts of influence in the economy.

Although the present expansion of the multinationals has been the object of a growing preoccupation -- even in the more developed nations -- because of their potential to elicit protest there is a consensus of opinion that ultimately the contribution of multinational corporations are positive.

47. See, for example, the passage in the *Manual Básico da ESG*, on page 339 and here reproduced:

Nations that have achieved a rapid rate of development accumulated in the whole of their history considerable savings and an immense general effort. This effort may imply different degrees of sacrifice of successive generations for it is clear that all enforced savings must correspond to an enforced reduction in consumption.

When an economic-financial policy -- compatible to the Permanent National Objectives -- brings about a sacrifice of the population in the way just mentioned there is a certain degree of general consensus, if not ostensive at least admitted, although there is always the potential for desequilibrium in the actual distribution of this sacrifice among the population.

One should note that in reality the "general consensus "for the sacrifices to be imposed by the forced planned savings for capital accumulation in Brazil was much more dependent upon direct coercion than upon democratic consensus. As we shall point out at various points in this work, the military-civilian coalition in power after 1964 had to build a system of physical coercion to ensure the compliance of the population with the pattern of enforced savings for rapid capital accumulation designed into the economic model of development.
In addition, the distribution of the sacrifices among the population has been exceedingly unequal, as we shall argue in the critique of the economic model of a later chapter. Nonetheless it should be pointed out that the military recognize and expect a high degree of sacrifice from successive generations and in fact believe this to be unavoidable for the achievement of rapid economic development. In the long run, they believed, this should benefit the population as a whole. It is a Brazilian version of the "trickle down theory" of economic development.

48. A detailed account of the Permanent National Objectives and the Present National Objectives may be found in the ESG Manual Básico, in pages 222 - 244. These ONP and ONA are also discussed by General Golbery do Couto e Silva in his Conjuntura Política Nacional, op.cit. pages 74 to 94.


CHAPTER THREE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

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I. Introduction

By the early part of 1960 the organization of the working class had reached sufficient levels to be translated into greater electoral weight and political influence. The parties of the populist period most closely sensitive to the pressure groups in urban and rural trade unions, grassroot organizations and in the vast peasant social movement of the Peasant Leagues benefited by this increased popular participation. By 1962 the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB), which was formed by Getúlio Vargas in 1945 to work with the labor movement in a corporatist populist framework, was rapidly becoming one of the strongest of the 13 political parties in existence. In addition, the PTB often formed powerful electoral coalitions with the liberal-conservative Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, PSD). The latter had held most political offices since the beginning of the populist period at the end of the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas 's Estado Novo in 1945. The alliance of the PSD-PTB was responsible for the election of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) as President of Brazil and of Jânio Quadros in 1961. With Quadros' sudden resignation after only six months in office a serious institutional crisis developed due to military opposition to his Vice-President, João Goulart.

For the first decade and a half of the populist period the conservative National Democratic Union party (União Democrática Nacional, UDN) had been able to apply sufficient leverage in the Federal Congress to block most reforms even of the mildest forms.
By 1962, however, the PTB was almost of equal electoral strength to the largest PSD and far surpassed the UDN in voter preferences. Therefore, the coalition of the two prevented the UDN from fulfilling its primordial class representation role by setting the conservative tone in the National Congress.

As the pressure for basic structural reforms -- particularly agrarian reform -- augmented, the PTB-PSD alliance in Congress weakened. Some of the members of the more conservative PSD party coalesced with the UDN to block the program of João Goulart in an orchestrated Congressional filibuster that paralyzed the government. Dreifuss shows in his work that the Congressional campaign was programmed and directed from the ESG/IPES/IBAD complex as a part of the de-stabilization program prepared by the class conspiracy to overthrow the Constitutional government.

The institutional crisis was deepened by the growing foreign debt which, in 1963, had reached 2,9 billion dollars and a dwindling foreign reserves amounting to only 244 millions of dollars. In keeping with the programmed de-stabilization plan, international financial institutions refused to renegotiate the Brazilian foreign debt on the grounds that the Brazilian government lacked sufficient foreign credibility. Thus the nation was forced to the verge of international bankruptcy. In addition, Goulart had inherited the rising inflationary patterns established already in the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek and Jânio Quadros. His administration, under growing pressure from working class groups to increase salaries and social programs, issued new currency to pay for the reforms.
The resulting inflation rate of 78 percent added fuel to the social, political and economic crisis. Uncertain of future economic policies and effectively organized by the class conspiracy, many of the industrialists stopped investing. The campaign against João Goulart, charging the imminence of a communist takeover, became in particular strident from 1962 to 1963 and throughout that year. The result was that the economy practically stagnated under the impact of the de-stabilization program. In 1962 the industrial sector showed a growth rate of 7.8. By 1963 this had sharply dropped to 0.2.

The combination of the economic stagnation with high inflation levels added to the growing militancy of urban and rural working class sectors frightened middle class members who feared the threatening crisis. The well-orchestrated fear campaign of the government's ties to the Soviet Union, the possibility of the closing of the National Congress and the alleged conspiracy to open a "Soviet Branch Office" and install a República Sindicalista provided the last elements and moved public opinion to support a military coup aimed at preventing the takeover of control of the communist agents directed from Moscow who were infiltrated in the high echelons of the government.

The military-civilian coalition which coordinated the de-stabilization campaign emphasized in particular the preventive character of the conspiracy. The military would only intervene if it counted with the largescale support of the middle classes and would do so to restore democracy. This point of view was widespread in the legalista sectors
of the military who believed that the mission of the Armed Forces was to defend the Constitution and the Constitutional government. It was clear that this sector would only support an intervention if it could be convinced of the imminence of a coup. The documents circulated within the military circles and leaked to the press emphasized the theme of the "need to defend democracy".

One of the main documents, the rallying cry for the military conspiratorial movement was entitled "Lealdade ao Exército". This document emphasized that the movement was composed of:

(...), a large number of officers of the Armed Forces, consisting of military men of rigorously democratic background and convictions, free of any political party connections, equidistant from rightist and leftist radicalism, entirely dedicated to professional tasks and of proven experience, some of them in high posts of the hierarchy who have resolved, in view of the grave situation in which the nation is struggling, to coordinate the goals and efforts that have been observed in vast areas of the Armed Forces". 5

The document emphasized that the military conspirators were the defenders of democracy and of the Christian tradition threatened by the dangerous communist offensive undertaken in the nation.

The "Le-Ex" document which had been manufactured by the "Informal High Command" of the ESG/IPES, headed by General Humberto Castello Branco, set the tone for the campaign of "saving democracy" and caught the military in the rhetoric of their own appeal to legitimacy.

A semblance of legality, after the successful takeover, had to be maintained accordingly. Already the military conspirators themselves were divided between those who were directly connected to the ESG/IPES complex and closely allied to associated and international capital
who intended to build a long term stable State to serve the National Objectives as determined in the Doctrine of National Security and Development and the military connected to the extreme right who had partaken in rightwing revolts in the past but were, nonetheless, also connected to the conspiracy. This contradiction would cause innumerable problems to the ESG/IPES group.

One of the first overt manifestations of the differing styles was the debate over the succession of the deposed President. On the dawn of April 2, 1964, a special session of the National Congress was called to declare that the Presidency was vacant. According to the Constitution, in such a case, a new President had to be elected by the National Congress within 30 days. In the meantime, the Speaker of the House, Congressman Ranieri Mazzilli, had to assume office.

In reality, Congressman Ranieri Mazzilli was merely a figurehead and de facto power was headed by a Revolutionary Command which was composed by Generals Arthur da Costa e Silva, Admiral Rademaker and Brigadeer Correia de Melo. Of the three, it was clear that General Costa e Silva was the strongman. The composition of the Revolutionary Council did not entirely favor the ESG, “Sorbonne” group and a underground battle for power ensued. General Castelo Branco’s name was finally submitted as a compromise of positions. General Costa e Silva remained as War Minister and Admiral Rademaker and Brigadeer Correia de Melo as Navy and Air Force Ministers. The splits seemed temporarily healed. The main difference between the two groups was how much force should be applied against the opposition versus long-
term measures for the institutionalization of a new State. The Doctrine of National Security and Development, as we have seen, was not a matter of dispute for all sectors agreed with its basic principles and premises. One may say that the dispute was one of tactics versus long term strategy.

The first measures of the National Security State began still under the High Command of the Revolution, with the passing of Institutional Act Number One as a foundation of legality for the launching of the Grand Strategy of "cleansing" (operação limpeza) of all elements connected to the previous government, administrative or electoral representatives who were considered to be potential enemies of the new State. Operação Limpeza was coherent to the military strategy of the National Security Doctrine: it had the dual function of widespread and massive arrests to intimidate the population into accepting the will of the State and selective "cleansing" per area of the political and civil society according to the pre-established political, psychosocial and military strategies. This work was begun immediately upon the taking of the State still under the control of the Revolutionary High Command. We shall deal with it in this chapter.

President Castello Branco was entrusted with the more longterm strategy planning and the actual work of building the structures of the new State. In this chapter we shall analyze the first steps taken to secure the first foundations of the National Security State. In the area of information network-building, the crucial step was the founding of the National Information Service (Serviço Nacional de
Informações – SNI). The second area of State-building was the economic area where the first foundations for the economic model of development needed to be rapidly laid. Thus, in 1964, with the key administrative and planning posts occupied by members of the BSG/IPES/IBAD conspiracy class alliance the government conducted deep administrative reforms, formed the first cabinet-level planning organization and drafted the first policies which would provide the main basis for the economic model.

The victorious groups wasted no time and moved swiftly both to destroy by violent force the remains of a possible opposition and to set up the nascent structures of the new State. This chapter will be devoted to the examination of this first year of dismantling and institution-building activities.

II. Applying the Grand Strategy: The Clean Up Operation (Operação Limpeza).

The High Command of the Revolution issued a series of statements delineating the program of the victorious movement which had deposed President João Goulart. In essence the planned government aimed at the "restoration of legality", the reinforcement of the "threatened democratic institutions", the reestablishment of the "federative make-up of the country" by breaking up the excessive power of the Federal government and promise to eliminate "the danger of subversion and communism" as well as to punish those in the government who had become rich through corruption.

It must be pointed out here that the military-civilian coalition now in power was not necessarily misleading its middle class and
democratically-minded members of other classes who had supported the military intervention from a fear of a "dictatorship of the left". Within the integrated framework of the Doctrine of National Security and Development as an ideology, such a plan is understood by its coherence with the ultimate goals of the Permanent National Objectives.

The point of this analysis is to examine the contradictory nature of such goals and the means which were applied to attain them. These means were themselves required by the elements in the Doctrine of National Security which emphasize the aspect of internal security and lead to the search for absolute security.

However, the fact that these were the stated goals of the "Revolution of March" and that it was upon the basis of this program that the military-civilian coalition appealed for the support of the population and justified its actions has placed them in an unescapable bind. If they rejected the goals in an absolute and total manner in order to achieve complete internal security they would forfeit the goals of the Permanent National Objectives and lose credibility both with the "internal public" and the "external public". The system, nonetheless, would impose on those in power the choice. It is this contradiction which is the cause of the permanent crisis of legitimacy of the National Security State. Having been given, so to speak, a carte-blanche to depose President João Goulart and restore democracy, the civil-military coalition in power could not escape the original commitment.
1. Legal Foundation for the Clean-Up Operation: Institutional Act Number One and the Military-Police Inquiries (IPM)

The adherence to the Permanent National Objectives -- as the ultimate goals to be attained -- forced the military-civilian coalition in power to be particularly careful in establishing a legal foundation for the repressive actions planned under the military operations meant to ensure total internal security. This constant search for a legal basis for the extra-legal activities of the Repressive Apparatus (the legalista quality of the system) has been one of the main characteristics in the development of the National Security State in Brazil.

The first military operation was codenamed "Clean-Up Operation" (Operação Limpeza) for in accordance to the military strategy of counter-offensive periodic searches for the "enemies within" had to be conducted with different codenames. Also in accordance to the military strategy the Operação Limpeza followed two distinct but integrated programs: the first was the general overall "clean up" of all who were in any way connected to the previous governments or to the political areas and parties most identified with the populist regime. The second was specifically targeted according to the area: the political "clean up" strategy and the psychosocial strategy were most particularly emphasized.

In order to establish their first legal foundation, the military members of the Revolutionary Command asked Dr. Francisco Campos to aid in the preliminary drafting of the Institutional Act. Dr. Campos had
the necessary required previous experience for he was responsible for
the drafting of the authoritarian Constitution of 1937 which formed
the legal foundation of the Estado Novo. The Institutional Act had
no number for it was supposed to the the only required text.

It should be noted that the military-civilian coalition in power
did not have a complete version of the National Security State. They,
rather, had a stated Doctrine — an ideology — upon which their political
thinking was based and a cohesive class alliance supporting their mono-
poly of power. It was the dialectic with the opposition that developed
throughout the years that transformed the State and forced them to
continuously change their plans and extend the legal foundation of the
Repressive Apparatus.

Already at the mention of the preparation of an Institutional
Act the opposition in the press and in the Federal Congress gathered.
This opposition reached such alarming levels for the junta in power
that a special meeting was held to discuss counter-action steps.11
According to Luis Viana Filho Dr. Campos provided the solution to
the problem of legitimization for the Institutional Act. He pointed
out that this was an exceptional revolutionary situation — a State of
exception. As such, the three military chiefs who composed the High
Command of the Revolution exercised de facto power and could become
a Constituent Assembly drafting exceptional legislation which did not
necessitate the approval of Congress. 12 This was immediately
accepted as the solution to by-pass the growing Congressional opposition.
The Institutional Act was drafted in secret. On the afternoon of April 9, 1964 -- only eight days after the power takeover of the civil-military coalition -- it was published and made public. In its preamble the authors included the justification and intentions:

TO THE NATION

Today's Institutional Act could only have been drafted by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force who -- in the name of the victorious Revolution and with the support of the majority of the Nation -- now propose to begin a new government and to provide it with the indispensable Institutional framework with which to carry forth its mission of economic, financial, political and moral reconstruction of Brazil.

(...) The victorious Revolution needs to institutionalize itself. (...) Only the victorious Revolution may make the rules and regulations which will constitute the new government and provide it with the powers and juridical instruments which will ensure its effective power to rule in the interests of the country.

In order to demonstrate that we do not intend to radicalize the process of revolution, we have decided to maintain the Constitution of 1946. We have limited ourselves to amending it in the part which deals with the powers of the President of the Republic. (...) In order to further reduce the powers which rightfully belong to this victorious Revolution, we have equally decided to maintain the National Congress -- only establishing certain limitations to its power.

Thus, it should be clear that the Revolution does not intend to legitimate itself through Congress. On the contrary, it is Congress which is made legitimate by this Institutional Act, which could only result from the inherent and Revolutionary exercise of Constituent Power. 14

Although the military-civilian coalition did not have a fully-developed State the need to institutionalize a new apparatus to support the "Revolution" was clearly felt. Another point to consider
already in the Preamble of the Institutional Act Number One is the definition of power as not coming from the people but rather from the de facto exercise of control. The locality of such power is also clearly established in the Executive which "chooses" to maintain both the Constitution and the National Congress establishing important limitations in the power of both. The legitimacy of the power does not come from the people's elected representatives -- from Congress. Rather, it is Congress which draws its legitimacy, in fact its very survival, from the de facto power localized in the Executive. This is entirely consistent with the expressed beliefs in the Doctrine of National Security and Development.

Nonetheless, since the ideology was not widely known to the public at that time, the Institutional Act fell as a bomb placing those who had supported the military intervention out of a genuine belief that they intended to restore democracy in a state of shock. The reaction to the Act in the press of the time was strongly negative and almost unanimous. One can say, in reality, that the Institutional Act Number One ruptured the tacit support for the military-civilian coalition and started the dialectic of opposition and the State.

The controls and limits of the powers of the National Congress which were included in the Institutional Act Number One were severe. The Act indeed contained articles directed at the control of Congressional prerogatives established in a balance-of-powers Constitutional framework of representative democracy. Legislative power was in fact to a great
extent transferred to the Executive. The most important modifications were: Article 3: Which gave to the Executive the power to introduce amendments to the Constitution and allowed the Congress no more than 30 days in which to debate and consider the Executive amendments. This power was limited by the fact that Congress did reserve the right to reject the amendments within this period by vote of a majority of both Houses. Article 4: Created the legislative measure known as the decurso de prazo under which bills that are introduced by the Executive must be considered by Congress within 30 days after which period they are considered to be automatically approved. This measure has had immense significance for a simple governmental filibuster for the required period can guarantee the automatic approval of any bill urgently introduced by the Executive. Article 5: Transferred to the Executive the exclusive power to legislate on all matters of finance or budget. Article 6: Removed from the Congress the power to decree a State of Siege. The Executive would maintain the control of the initiative of declaring a State of Siege and Congress could only reject or approve the move within an allotted time period. Most important, the Act temporarily eliminated parliamentary immunity guarantees and allowed the Executive to summarily cancel the electoral mandates of representatives at any level of government (municipal, state and federal). This procedure became known as the cassação de mandato (cancelling of mandate) widely used for a variety of purposes as we shall see.

In fact, the Institutional Act contained other measures for the control of the Judiciary and for the suspension of individual
guarantees which would allow the freeplay of Operação Limpeza.

These provisions were, specifically: Article 7: suspended all Constitutional or legal guarantees of job tenure or job security for a period of six months. This is to enable the State, upon "summary investigation" and within the fixed period established by the Article, "to fire or dismiss, transfer or put in reserve or force an early retirement" of civil bureaucrats or military personnel. This Article, of course, was meant to allow for the "clean-up" of the State bureaucracy and to control the sectors of the military who disapproved of the measures or who were connected to the previous period.

The Article applied to all public employees -- civilian and military -- at municipal, state and federal levels. In addition, the last regulatory paragraph established that "judicial appreciation of the acts" leading to the punishment would be "limited to extraneous formality being considered prohibited the juridical appreciation of the facts". 19

Article 8: Established that there would be special inquiries into the activities of those considered to have committed a crime "against the State, its property, public or social order or engaged in acts of revolutionary war". Such special inquiries could be set up either for individual cases or for collective action. 20 This article was the basis for the Military-Police Inquiries (Inquéritos Policial-Militar-IPM) that tried thousands of people, as we shall see. The fact, however, that the article did not specifically exclude the potential of juridical appreciation of the facts (as in the cases of Article 7), allowed the Judiciary to play an important liberalizing role in this period.
Finally, Article 10 gave the specific right to cancel the electoral mandates of federal, state and municipal representatives as well as to cancel the political rights of any citizen for a period of 10 (ten) years. All citizens with cancelled political rights were expressly excluded from voting, from being voted for and prevented from participating in political party activities. 21

The Institutional Act Number One included a list of all who were to immediately lose their electoral mandates and have their political rights cancelled. This list was headed by the name of ex-President João Goulart. It included the names of other 40 members of the Federal Congress. In addition, Institutional Act Number one included the list of 100 people who lost their political rights for 10 years. 22

Besides reducing the Federal Congress to a rubber-stamp role and eliminating from the Judiciary -- for six months -- the Constitutional guarantees of job tenure and unremovability from office of judges, the Act contained a serious infringement of Constitutional rights of defense by prohibiting juridical appreciation of facts in cases under Article 7. In reality, the Institutional Act Number One layed the first important legal framework for the implementation of the National Security Doctrine. Indeed, the Institutional Act was considered of such importance as a juridical instrument for the institutionalization of the new State that Luis Viana, himself a member of the Castelo Branco government, could state: "Without it the civil-military movement of March could be considered a coup d'état or a
simple revolt to remove or substitute people in the command posts of the government." The fact that the Institutional Act Number One was passed shows the clear intention of institutionalizing a new State that could enforce the application of the Doctrine of National Security and Development in order to guarantee a monopoly of class power.

The Act included an early attempt to institutionalize the mechanism of transference of Executive Power. The first Electoral College to indirectly choose the President of Brazil was composed of a properly trimmed Federal Congress of 326 Congressmen and 62 Senators. General Castelo Branco received a total of 361 votes. President Humberto Castelo Branco replaced the Military Junta which had ruled as the Revolutionary High Command for the first month of the National Security State. He was inaugurated as President on April 15, 1964.

2. Institutionalizing the IPMs.

The general counter-offensive of the Grand Strategy was conducted in the framework of legality institutionalized in the IPMs. On April 27, 1964, the government of Castelo Branco passed an Executive Decree-Law which officially established the IPMs already predicted in the Institutional Act. Special Investigating Committees were set up at all levels of government, in all public Ministries, agencies, State corporations, Federal Universities and other autarchic organizations connected to the Federal government. The Military Political Inquiries
would investigate the activities of employees -- civil and military -- at municipal, state and federal levels. They were, furthermore, to investigate the state and federal universities and punish all employees or faculty members believed to be active in "subversive" activities. The IPMs, therefore, constituted the legal mechanism for the systematic search for the "enemy within" as a first step in the search for absolute internal security.

The IPMs were headed by military colonels appointed for the active duty of conducting the investigations. Once the Inquérito Policial-Militar (IPM) was completed the final conclusions and alleged factual involvement of the accused person or persons was examined by the chief of the department to which those accused were connected. The final decision of punishment was up to the President, the state governors or the mayors. Once the penalty was decided and resolved the Decree establishing the particular form of punishment had to be published in either the federal Diário Oficial da União or in the official registers of the states and the municipalities.

The IPMs became a source of de facto power for the group of colonels designated to head or coordinate the investigation. These comprised a first core of the nascent Repressive Apparatus and the beginning of a concerted group-pressure of hardline officers within the National Security State. Because of the fact that the decisions could be appreciated by the Judiciary, many of the alleged "facts" were considered null by the State and Federal Supreme Courts which often reversed the decisions of the IPM. This established a growing
confrontation between the established traditional legal structure and the parallel extra-legal "revolutionary" structure. The colonels of the IPMs became increasingly strident in their protest against the strong autonomous showing of the Judiciary and eventually forced the Executive to widen the measures of control over judges and over the Judiciary system itself.

Some of the IPMs became the instrument for local politicians to rise to power. In some cases, UDN politicians who consistently lost elections could take the ultimate recourse of accusing their political adversaries of "subversive" activities and include them in an ongoing IPM in such a way eliminating unwanted political competition. This was the case, for example, of the state of Goiás where Governor Mauro Borges, himself a colonel, was forcibly removed from office (cassado) and had his political rights cancelled for 10 years because of the unproven accusations of communist infiltration made by Irapuan Costa Júnior, who was then a professor but would soon himself become Governor of the state of Goiás. Since the proofs were not subject -- in the case of a cassação particularly -- to the stringent test of holding up in court and to a neutral jury's decision, such local power-conflicts became the norm.

The juridical basis of the IPMs lacked a particular concern with the establishment of factual proofs. Some colonels themselves established the legal precepts that would base their decision: the evidence of "public opinion" was sufficient, to some colonels, to prove subversive or revolutionary activity warranting punishment: "When the
fact is public and notorious it is independent of proof -- as is established in the general premises of Law which has abolished the system of 'legal certainty' thus freeing the judge from having a text prejudice."  

This explains some of the conclusions of the best-known IPMs of that time period. Professor Rodolfo da Costa e Silva, of Goiás, for example, was condemned because "he participated in various conferences promoted by the Academic Center where he talked about various political themes all strongly subversive, a fact which is related to us by the witness Dr. Irapuan Costa Jr." The Engineering professor Elder Rocha Lima was charged simply with "Being really communist, subversive and an agitator as is well known by public opinion." Another accused person, Maristela Duarte Mendes, a housewife, denied any participation in politics but was accused nonetheless and found guilty because "the reality of the facts denies her negation of her activities. She visited Russia and has friendly ties with people considered to be extremely communistic as is known in the gossip widespread through the city of Anápolis."  

If one's relatives were considered members of the Brazilian Communist Party one could be automatically found guilty, as happened, for example in two cases: Edson Germano de Brito, found guilty "of being notoriously subversive and a communist agitator as is the case with the entire family of the Germano de Brito in the state of Goiás" and in the case of the public employee Mauro Campos Neto who was considered a communist because "his father always was a militant of the Communist Party and taught him this as a child."
The IPM became the legal basis for widespread purges and intimidation. In 1964 alone there were hundreds installed for the investigation of the various public and administrative levels connected to the government. Their power may be perceived by the following considerations: Some of the IPMs involved multiple cases -- sometimes with as many as several hundred accused in a single IPM. This was the case, for example, of the IPM installed to investigate the activities of the Brazilian Communist Party in the state of Guanabara (now unified with Rio de Janeiro). 

This particular IPM, which was headed by colonel Ferdinando de Carvalho, included the names of some of the best-known liberal or even conservative politicians among them Juscelino Kubitschek, Francisco Negrao de Lima, the present Senator of São Paulo Franco Montoro, the present governor of Rio de Janeiro Chagas Freitas and even the present President of the government's own party -- the PDS -- Congressman José Sarney. Other names to be found in this IPM included religious figures such as Dom Hélder Câmara and writers Eduardo Portella (who was President João Figueiredo's Minister of Education), Otto Lara Rezende and Guerreiro Ramos, who is now a professor at the University of California.

The IPM of the Communist Party established categories of "types of communists" which still are widely shared by the military. These categories divide communists into six groups: 1) the "real" communists members of the Brazilian Communist Party. 2) the "cripto-
communists" who are also members of the Communist Party but are kept clandestine and secret. 3) the sympathizers and those who are open to "the communist objectives and theory". 4) those who are merely opportunistic and take advantage of the Party's organization. 5) the "useful innocent" (inocente útil) who are more likely to be freely manipulated by the Communist Party. 6) Finally, there are those who are not communist themselves but are allies who sometimes "ally themselves to the Communists for the attainment of certain objectives".

What must be pointed out here is that this categorization of the population according to the six established points is in keeping with the theory of internal security and of the "enemy within". If one recalls that the theory emphasizes the indirect strategy of infiltration, psychological warfare and of "winning the minds" of the population, it becomes understandable that those who are influential are suspect and that the field for potential accusation is ample indeed, almost unlimited. The IPM of Caderneta de Prestes is not so much a surprise but, rather, it is the logical consequence of the application of the theory of the "enemy within".

An aggravating circumstance is that the mere accusation in an IPM was sufficient to begin a series of persecutions which sometimes included imprisonment and torture. The number of people who were involved in the hundreds of IPM s is extremely difficult to establish. The data is dispersed in the Diário Oficial da União and the registers of the different states and municipalities. Considering that Brazil
had at that time 22 states and over 4,000 municipalities and that
the IPMs were installed in all governmental bureaucratic agencies
and departments, institutions of learning and autarchies as well
as in corporations directly or partly owned by the government, it
may be readily seen that the gathering of complete information is
practically impossible.

The extent of the purges, however, may be partially established
by an approximation of the number of people involved in the IPMs
and punished under Institutional Act Number one at the federal level.
In accordance to the data provided by a dossier compiled by the
Ministério da Aeronáutica which draws from Federal registers there
were a total of 3,459 people who were punished by Institutional
Act Number One. Of these, the great majority was punished in 1964
comprising a total of 3,453 people. In 1965 the dossier registered
only 6 punishments as directly resulting from the application of the
Institutional Act Number One. The number of those who were
included in the IPMs and because of this were investigated and
harrassed is, of course, much larger. The total actual punished was
kept down by the discretionary use of the Judiciary system which, as
has been pointed out, acted as a deterrent to the full application of
the purge strategy in 1964.

Operação Limpeza was not limited to the purges of the political
and bureaucratic areas. The most significant aspect of the "clean up
operation" was rather its direct military aspect. Military troops
began the "clean-up operation" immediately as soon as pressures for more direct repression of the population began to mount in military circles. Lists of those who should be expelled, purged and arrested were being compiled in the military barracks. Luis Viana recalls the episode thus:

Already on the fourth of April, in answer to a question, 14 officers of the **Escola de Comando do Estado Maior** sent their lists and suggestions to the military Commander of the School, considering it to be indispensable that the electoral mandates and the political right of all communist, nationalist and activist deputies be cancelled. It also urged the purging and arrest of all who were considered criminals or had committed acts "threatening to the democratic liberties and to the rights which are established by the Constitution." 35

These officers were integrated into the extreme right group of the "hardliners," who were not of the same longterm viewpoint of the ESG strategists, favored greater amounts of immediate force. The hardline sector congealed around the Minister of War, General Arthur da Costa e Silva, using him as an instrument of political pressure upon the government's decision.

**Operação Limpeza** was, in any case, within the plans of all sectors although perhaps they differed in the evaluation of the necessary force. Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of the military takeover of the State a vast coordinated campaign of search and arrest was launched throughout the nation. The Army, Navy and Airforce were mobilized according to the counteroffensive techniques to conduct the largescale operations of "fine comb sifting" and "fishnet."
The large-scale maneuvers set up roadblocks and conducted careful house to house searches for the names included in prepared lists. The aim was to "clean-up" all those connected either to the previous government, to political parties considered to be communist or highly infiltrated by communists and those connected to the social movements of the pre-1964 period. Particularly targeted were trade union leaders, peasant leaders, intellectuals, teachers, students and Catholic lay organizers of the Catholic movements in the universities and in the countryside.

During the first months after the takeover of power reports indicate that perhaps as many as 50,000 people were arrested in the country as a whole. A precise estimate is impossible to determine for the characteristic of search and arrest techniques -- the operations arrastão and pente fino -- included arresting anyone who could not prove he was not a suspect or who did not have valid identification documentation. In addition, part of the strategy of intimidation involved temporary arrest -- usually followed by beating or violent treatment for a few hours -- and quick release before an habeas corpus could be filed in the Judiciary. In this manner the military avoided the supervision of the legal system and could act almost without limitations to their power.

Some of the published reports in the press indicate the magnitude of Operação Limpeza in its search for the "enemy within". The magazine Time reported, for example, that during just one week at least 10,000
people were arrested -- 4,000 of those in the city of Rio de Janeiro alone. The Correio da Manhã published daily lists of names of people under arrest. Careful counting for the month of May alone reached the total of 1,655 prisoners listed. Other press reports listed the names of more than 6,000 other people in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and of Pernambuco. In fact, the press denounced that these states were in a situation of "virtual army occupation".

By the end of 1964 the violence and widespread nature of the repression of Operação Limpeza had become a matter of international concern. The International Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva and with representation of 90 different countries, issued a formal report in September of 1964 condemning the government for the continuing imprisonment of 8,000 people as well as for the imposition of censorship of the press and the cancelling of electoral mandates.

Prisoners were held in makeshift prisons. The large football stadium of Rio de Janeiro as well as a number of Navy ships -- such as the "Custódio de Mello" and the "Raul Soares" were turned into gigantic temporary prison camps. The prisoners were also kept in military barracks and the headquarters of the Military Police of the various states.

Slowly reports of the widespread use of torture leaked to the press spurring a large press campaign to force the government of Castelo Branco to investigate the allegations of torture of political
prisoners. The Correio da Manhã spearheaded a press campaign of denunciation of the widespread use of torture particularly in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Goiás. Journalist Márcio Moreira Alves of the Correio da Manhã was sent as a special correspondent to Recife to investigate the allegations of torture. He was smuggled into a prison where he was able to compile the testimony and be an eyewitness to the wounds inflicted to various prisoners.

As a result of his investigation articles were written with details of torture techniques as well as locality and the names of those primarily responsible for the torturing of political prisoners. A detailed account of the tortures in different states uncovered not only by his own investigation but by the independent investigation of other committees of lawyers and/or journalists was published in a careful documentary book, Torturas e Torturados. Eventually, General Castelo Branco became sufficiently impressed with the evidence of widespread torture of political prisoners to order an investigation which was headed by General Ernesto Geisel who was then Chief of Military Staff. Although the investigation itself concluded for "insufficient proof", torture was in fact temporarily controlled and significantly diminished.

The press campaign against torture in 1964 was the first example of an organized opposition human rights movement of public opinion sufficiently forceful to impose modifications in the strategies of the National Security State. It also served to alienate others from active support of the nascent repressive apparatus and State policies.
Torture, in fact, as will be argued later, has become a technique of rule, a method not only of eliciting and obtaining information that may lead to the discovery of the "enemy within" but of intimidation of the entire population through an established culture of fear elicited by the "demonstration effect" of the violence. This use of what amounts to a "strategy of terror" was evident from the first days of the National Security State. The governmental claim that torture is not a systematic part of the Apparatus of Repression but rather is the occasional deed of "sick minds" which exist in all police forces and becomes particularly prevalent in revolutionary situations does not explain both the longevity and the continuous systematic nature of torture for the past seventeen years.

The pressure of outraged public opinion succeeds in diminishing the number of reported cases of torture but it has never succeeded in completely abolishing the centers of torture or even in forcing the firing of or transferral of proven torturers. In addition, the increasing sophistication of the techniques and methodology of torture with the utilization of technological equipment utilizing temperature and sound control systems (such as the "icebox" which shall be discussed later) points to a well-funded and coordinated organization of torture.

The implantation of the Repressive Apparatus which began in the immediate aftermath of the coup d'etat with Operação Limpeza and culminated in the years between 1969 and 1974 institutionalized the use of torture as an intrinsic and inseparable part of the search for absolute internal security with the destruction of the "enemy within".
III. Specific Targets of the Grand Strategy:

It will be recalled that the military training of counter-offensive predicts specific targeting of particularly sensitive areas of political and civil society: the political, economic, psychosocial and military areas. The economic strategy, in reality, involved an entirely new planning and administrative coordination. This will be discussed in the next section. For this section deals with the specific purges and repressive actions of Operação Limpeza that were conducted against political, psychosocial and bureaucratic (both civilian and military) areas in accordance with the Grand Strategy.

1. The Political Strategy.

According to the military definition of the ESG the political strategy involves the study and control of political parties, the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Executive. In addition, it was necessary to "clean-up" the administrative civilian bureaucracies as well as the ranks of the military itself.

In this first initial stage, the Judiciary suffered much less direct interference than the other branches of government. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts for the trial of political crimes was maintained as a traditional right of defense. The IPMs, after the completion of the investigation, were ultimately turned over to the Judiciary for legal processing. In fact, the Judiciary, as we pointed out exercised its right of control over the Executive branch of government by maintaining a high degree of independence.
which included controversial grantings of **habeas corpus** to political prisoners of all political beliefs. The cases which caused most direct conflict with the fledgling Repressive Apparatus of the IPM colonels involved the granting of **habeas corpus** to Governor Miguel Arraes, of Pernambuco and Mauro Borges, of Goiás.

The **legalista** concern of the sector of the military-civilian coalition in power prevented a more outright move against the Judiciary. The need to institutionalize a legality with a minimum of legitimacy forced the Castelo Branco regime to tolerate the independence of the Judiciary to an extent which brought the two groups of ESG/IPES and the rightwing extremists connected with the Repressive Apparatus into direct conflict. As we shall see, the unwillingness to tamper with the Judiciary in any more extensive forms created severe problems for Castelo Branco who was finally forced to surrender to the pressures of the colonels. Even so, in 1964, a total of 49 judges were purged.

The Legislative and the political parties, however, did not escape the specific targeting of control of **Operação Limpeza**. The political representation within the Legislative branch of government was completely transformed through the selective action of the purges. Before the birth of the **cassação** and the cancelling of mandates the **Federal Congress** had the following composition of party representation: The three largest parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the National Democratic Union (UDN) and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) easily comprised the largest representation in the Congress. Other parties had a much smaller, almost insignificant number of representatives.
Table 3.1

Party Representation in the Brazilian Federal Chamber (1945 to 1962)
(by number of seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSD - Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(partido Social Democrático)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN - National Democratic Union</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(União Democrática Nacional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB - Brazilian Labor Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP - Social Progressive Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Social Progressista)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR - Republican Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Republicano)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC - Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Democrata Cristão)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTN - National Labor Party</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Trabalhista Nacional)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST - Social Labor Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Social Trabalhista)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - Liberation Party</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>(Partido Libertador)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP - Popular Representation Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido de Representação)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB - Brazilian Socialist Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Socialista Brasileiro)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT - Republican Labor Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Republicano Trabalhista)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR - Labor Reform Movement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Movimento Trabalhista Renovador)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB - Brazilian Communist Party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Comunista Brasileiro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without party or coalition</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of seats</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>409</td>
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</table>

Source: Adapted from Phylis Peterson, "Brazil, Political Parties: Forms, Organization, Leadership", pp. 356 ff.; Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, "Politics and Political Parties in Brazil", p. 276; and Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, January 1964, p. 9

Published in: United States Army, Area Handbook for Brazil, 1964, page 314
There were, since 1945, thirteen parties legally in existence. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), declared illegal in 1947, remained clandestine until the late fifties and surfaced to a situation of semi-legality in the early sixties, in particular during the government of João Goulart.

As may be seen in Table 3.1, the PSD and the PTB were by 1962 the two parties with the largest Federal Congress representation. The PTB increased its representation steadily in every election from 1945 on until it surpassed in strength the old conservative party of the UDN which, in fact, remained fairly stable both as a party conformation and in terms of political representation.

The coalitions and alliances formed by the PTB-PSD were unbeatable in elections and sufficiently strong to circumvent much of the stalemate in Congress over political and social reforms. In the early sixties, however, as the class struggle intensified and conservative groups rallied together the impact of the coalition between the two largest parties was dissolved by a great many defections from the ranks of the PSD which joined the UDN in some key Congressional votes of João Goulart's reform package. As we have seen, Dreifuss points out in his work that the break up of the coalition and the increasing conservative bent of the Federal Congress can be at least in part explained by the well-coordinated lobbying efforts of the ESG/IPES/IBAD complex. The growth of the PTB by itself was another element of fright which was effectively curbed by the severe purges and cancellation of electoral mandates of its members.
Out of the 40 members of Congress who lost their mandates in the first list which accompanied the Institutional Act Number One, 18 belonged to the PTB, 4 to the PSP, 3 to the PSD, 3 to the PSB, 3 to the PST and 3 to the PDC. The remainder had no party affiliation listed. Subsequent lists of cassações of members of Congress brought the total number of purges for 1964 in the Federal Congress to 50. In addition the PTB lost 4 alternate Congressmen and the PSD lost one Senator, Juscelino Kubitschek during that first year.

In the State Assemblies there was a similar tendency to target in particular those parties most identified with social movements of the past: the year of 1964 had a total of 43 State Congressmen who were cassado thus losing their mandates by force of Institutional Act Number One. Of this total 31 were of the PTB, 7 were affiliated to the PSD and the others had no party affiliation listed. Out of the total of 11 alternate State Congressmen who were cassado during the first year, 8 of them belonged to the PTB. At the municipal level, of a total of 10 aldermen cassados in the first year of the National Security State, 4 belonged to the PTB and 2 to the PSD.

The main target of attack was, predictably, João Goulart’s party, the PTB. However, the PSD also suffered a number of casualties in the attempt to break the strength of the Congressional representation of the coalition PTB-PSD and intimidate remaining liberal representatives into quiescence or quiet protest. The effect of the purges changed the composition in the Federal Congress and weakened its possibility of resistance to the legal initiatives of the Executive.
As we have seen in the analysis of Institutional Act Number One, the powers of the Legislative were considerably reduced with a large transference of legislative function to the Executive branch of the government. The severity of the purges intimidated Congress for the loss of parliamentary immunity guarantees -- with the possibility of losing the electoral mandate, becoming ineligible for 10 years and not having the right to appeal or defense -- produced a considerable insecurity among all members of the Legislative.

Thus the policy of cassação served an important double function: it intimidated Congress through the "demonstration effect" of what could happen to those who sidestepped the viewpoints of the military-civilian coalition in power and it significantly reduced the potential of legislative coalition between the two major parties, the PTB and the PDS. It should be noted that the UDN was completely spared of the purges. As an extremely conservative party it would provide the main Congressional basis of political support for the new State.

Perhaps one of the most significant aspect of the Operação Limpeza of the first year was the specific targeting strategy of purges in the civilian and military bureaucracy of the State. In the year of 1964 the National Security State conducted widespread "cleaning" among the military and in all levels of the Federal bureaucracy. Again it must be pointed out that the data available does not include the state and municipal bureaucratic apparatuses and should be understood as a limited but statistically significant sample of the total purges.
An analysis of the data included in Table 3.2 shows that the pattern of punishment was most severe in the year of 1964 with the full application of Operação Limpeza. The main exception was the increasing purges in the Ministry of Justice as the pressures of the hardline colonels to "clean-up" and deal with the independence of the Judiciary became more successful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Organization</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965-1967</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Mines &amp; Energy</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Relations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECOR (1)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTEL (2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Government of Brasília</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVACAP (3)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,408</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,530</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: (1) MECOR: Extraordinary Ministry of Coordination of Regional Programs.
(2) CONTEL: National Council of Telecommunications.
(3) NOVACAP: Urban Company of the New Capital of Brazil.

Source: Dossier do Ministério da Aeronáutica.
The need to purge the civilian bureaucracy with rapidity from those connected to the previous populist period or who might possibly provide a basis for internal opposition to the policies of the new State can be understood in the context of the overall emphasis on the need to plan and modify basic economic structures in favor of an increased rate of capital accumulation. It is interesting to note that the purges were most severe in the sectors of the bureaucratic apparatus of the State which could most directly influence policy -- in particular social and economic policy. By far the largest purges occurred in the Ministries of Public Works, of Labor and of Finance.

The purges of the civilian bureaucracy both eliminated opposition and opened up positions to be occupied by personnel more closely identified with the policy programs of the new State. With every new government there is a certain turnover of administrative posts. What was extraordinary about the changes of 1964 was the particular characteristic of "cleansing" of the administrative turnover and its intention of securing the necessary number of State posts.

Opposition in the civilian bureaucracy was further quieted by the "demonstration effect" of insecurity and fear. For every one person punished after inclusion in an IPM there were others who were also included but temporarily escaped the final hatchet. As was the case with the Legislative, this element of insecurity would suffice for a period -- to silence most protest.
The Armed Forces suffered severe purges in the first year of the National Security State. Control of the military has been one of the foremost priority concerns of the State, because, in accordance to the theory of the internal enemy the military are also subject to communist infiltration. Understandably, such a possibility is viewed as an utmost threat to the security of the State.

The purges of the Armed Forces in the first year had a dual function: to eliminate all military personnel who were closely connected or associated with the previous government and to establish the predominance of the sectors in alliance: the ESG and the extreme right wing. It was necessary to eliminate and purge from the Armed Forces the most representative members of the nationalist democratic sector of the military who might oppose effectively a policy greatly favoring multinational corporations. It must be recalled that the military-coalition in power was under strong influence of the United States and intimately integrated into a particular kind of class alliance of associated dependent capital and international capital.

The elimination of these two groups of the Armed Forces was essential and, by necessity, had to be rapidly accomplished. Thus, the largest number of purges occurred in 1964, as may be seen in Table 3.3 below. It is a further point of interest to note that of all the branches of the Armed Forces the most extensive purges occurred in the Army -- where the coalition of the ESG - rightwing elements of the military was the strongest influence.
The control of the military is an area of particular and specific interest to the National Security State. As we shall examine in more detail later, a whole series of mechanisms for control were created in order to limit political participation, political expression and enforce hierarchical standards severely so as to guarantee the predominance of the views of the sectors which had obtained State power. Not only did the purges reach mainly officers who could have some influence or command upon troops but it was concentrated against those who had resisted the conspiracy against João Goulart's government under the grounds that the Armed Forces were sworn to protect and defend the Constitution. These officers -- even if many disapproved of the policies of Goulart -- insisted that the transfer of Presidential power should be legal. They were known as the *legalistas*.
As the National Security State became more fully implanted dissent within the military grew stronger. Not only many officers disagreed with the policy of "open doors" to multinational corporations and the social costs of the economic model enforced by the power of the Repressive Apparatus but others in particular reacted against the violence of the repression itself -- particularly torture. It is significant that many of the original supporters of the coup d'état of 1964 joined the opposition in later years and were, accordingly, purged or punished in a variety of ways. The opposition movement in the military has gained force and established a clear sector known as the "democratic sectors".

The extent of the purges demonstrated in Table 3.3 must be understood in relation to the universe which is "cleansed" -- a limited number of people comprised of the officer corps of the three branches of the Armed Forces. The repression against the troops was severe and there are few precise figures to indicate the force of the action which was necessary to bring troops to full submission. An estimate may be gathered by the fact that in the first months of 1964 over 2,000 sailors were arrested. Sailors were a specific target of the counter-offensive for many participated in a revolt against their immediate officers during the period of João Goulart. Sargents, who also revolted against their conspiratorial superiors in the immediate events that preceded the coup were another sector severely repressed. There are, however, no immediate estimate of how many were imprisoned in the first year.
2. The Psychosocial Strategy

The psychosocial strategy of Operação Limpeza focused especially upon the social movements that had gained strength in the years prior to the military-civilian coup d'etat. These elicited strong military maneuvers of search and arrest in universities -- against both the faculty members and the student movement per se -- in the labor unions, against the Peasant Leagues and against Catholic lay organizers who participated in the Movimento de Educação de Base 's literacy campaign based on the literacy method of Paulo Freire as well as in the many Catholic movements of workers, peasants and students.

The repression against the universities included actual invasion of the premises with military troops to search and arrest faculty members and students. Not since the period of the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas, the Estado Novo, had universities been invaded and the autonomy of the university so strongly violated.

Conservatives and liberals who had originally supported the civil-military movement to overthrow João Goulart, became outspoken in their condemnation of the presence of military troops in the University and the persecution of ideas. It is a characteristic of the National Security State that "ideas" are feared for this is seen as the direct application of the communist tactic of "winning the minds" of the population. Therefore, throughout the last seventeen years, the Universities and centers of learning or culture have been specific targets of repression, censorship and control. All forms of cultural expression, art, theatre, music, cinema, literature are suspect.
It is useful to examine the experiences of three of the most important universities in the country by way of exemplifying a situation which was generalized. These are the Federal University of São Paulo (USP), the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRG).

In April of 1964, the Minister of Education, Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda, installed officially the special investigating committees establishing IPMs in all Brazilian universities. The Ministry of Education, for the first time since the Estado Novo, became directly involved in the hiring and firing process within the universities. Military authorities, through the Ministry of Education, insisted that the IPMs were necessary to root out the penetration of communist agents who utilized centers and institutions of learning to "win the minds" of the people in accordance to the indirect strategy of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, in each university was established a Special Investigation Committee (Comissão Especial de Investigação Sumária - CEIS) which were composed of professors, chancellors and other administrative personnel appointed by the authorities.

The actual implementation of the control policy varied in each university. The most widely affected was the University of Rio Grande do Sul where a campaign of "cultural terrorism" conducted by the CEIS investigated the majority of the professors and faculty members and finally, just in this first year, expelled summarily 34 professors.
The University of São Paulo was invaded by troops and the College of Philosophy almost completely destroyed causing a total damage which was estimated at that time in 10 million cruzeiros. The USP lost some of its best known social science professors and its renowned scientists. For example, among those expelled and/or arrested, were physicist Mário Schenberg, sociologists Florestan Fernandes, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Nuno Fidelino de Figueiredo. The Philosophy Faculty of Rio Preto, a part of the state University of São Paulo, was invaded by troops and professors and students who were present summarily arrested. However, the most severely affected area of the University of São Paulo is reported to have been the College of Medicine.

Accounts of personal participants and professors describe the situation in the University as one of "terror and fear". One of the professors of the University of São Paulo recalled the experience:

The university went through a thorough cleansing. (...) a letter was sent to the Army. No one knows in detail what this letter contained. It was anonymous. However, right after receiving this anonymous letter the Army took all necessary steps to "clean up" the University of São Paulo.

We were not the only ones to suffer.. The University of Brasília was invaded and completely destroyed by the troops. In the whole country similar actions happened. It seemed to me it was like the French Revolution.

It was not of the same class nature as the French Revolution for the events of 1964 had a clear intent to eliminate all independently thinking professors as well as to intimidate the university community with the brutal force of the repression. It is a mistaken interpreta-
tion to believe that the systematic invasion and destruction of universities by troops was the act of soldiers angry and out of control. In reality they were acting strictly under orders, under the direct command of officers and according to the detailed plans of a counter-offensive strategy of total mobilization which emphasizes the need to shock and disarm the enemy by applying sufficient force to create a feeling of impotence and de-moralization. It is revealing on this point, to read the instructions in the *Manual Básico da ESG* as to techniques of counter-psychological warfare and procedures of military mobilization. In this sense, *Operação Limpeza* can be considered a success, the systematic persecution and widespread use of seemingly unwarranted violence with invasion and depredation achieved its intent of spreading fear and a feeling of impotence.

The University of Minas Gerais had a more direct experience of governmental interference. It was put under direct military intervention and a military Chancellor was appointed to run the University for the entire first year. However, the protests became so loud that the Minister of Justice -- who was a citizen of Minas Gerais -- intervened to remove the interventor. The list which had already been elaborated for the purges to be conducted at the University included the names of over 400 professors and researchers. Internal opposition developed so strongly at the UFMG that the actual number of those purged immediately in *Operação Limpeza* was in fact much smaller. Faculty and students rallied to defend the autonomy of the University and were aided by local politicians who themselves were alumni of the University.
Perhaps the most serious case of interference in the Universities, however, was the case of the University of Brasília. During the government of João Goulart the University of Brasília had become a pioneer project of University Reform to integrate the curriculum to the needs of a developing society. This curriculum was considered to be subversive and communist-inspired by the military. Thus, the complete dismantling of the University of Brasília and its re-shaping was a primary goal of the groups which occupied power in 1964.

In the very next days of the military takeover of 1964 troops invaded the University of Brasília, arrested seventeen professors who were present and all members of the student organizations in the premises.

It must be emphasized that the first period of purges, investigations and military action against Universities were aimed at the removal of outspoken and influential members of the University who espoused ideas which were counter to those imposed upon the nation. It was not only communists who were purged and arrested but also liberals and anyone who took an active position in defense of individual rights and of the autonomy of the University from governmental interference. To defend the right of a University to remain aloof so as to be a true center of learning was to defend complete freedom of ideas and of expression, something which was considered by the military as a dangerous opening to the "enemy within". According to the psychosocial strategy, as we have seen, all areas had to be carefully controlled.
In addition to the desire to establish complete overall control and eliminate the "enemy within" there was clearly already a pattern of power maintenance fully at play. Major Universities were centers of intellectual exchange and as such could absorb much of the potential of cultural and critical analysis to the policies of the new National Security State. The installation of the CEIS as investigation committees which would draw up large lists of professors and include them in the internal trials coupled with occasional violent military operations of invasion of the premises and arrest of those present was a strategy to implant a climate of permanent tension and suspense -- a veritable culture of fear -- which should act as a deterrent to opposition and particularly to critical analysis. In reality, as we shall see, the very violence of the acts of physical invasion created new opposition and encouraged the critique of groups which had been previously supportive of the military takeover. Although the Universities were temporarily silenced, they would become increasingly centers of vocal opposition and critique of the repressive policies of the government and of the economic model itself.

Within the Universities, however, the most planned action of control was against the student movement. University students in Brazil have been nationally organized since 1910 and have exerted considerable influence in politics. The first National Congress of Students was held in 1910 in São Paulo. The National Union of Students
(União Nacional dos Estudantes – UNE) was founded in 1937 during the dictatorship period of the Estado Novo. The UNE played an important role in the resistance during that period and in the redemocratization campaign. Since the end of the Vargas dictatorship of the Estado Novo the UNE became the central organization of students and a political conduit for mobilization and participation. During the years of democratic governments of the populist period the UNE participated in all major national political mobilizations and activities. In fact, UNE leaders were known to meet and speak to top governmental politicians from a position of strength.

The UNE and the student movement in general became a traditional political "training school" of upper class politicians. Some of the most important political leaders of the country -- in fact almost all of them both in the left and in the right -- began their political careers and training in the student movement. Many of the present day politicians occupied electoral posts in the directorate of the UNE.

The military believed that the UNE had been taken over by the communists and as such was a major center of subversion to be completely eliminated. The groups in power after 1964 acted according to a philosophy according to which students should study in the University and not participate actively in national politics through a centralized national organization. The purpose of the UNE was believed to be a part of the indirect action of the Soviet Union and its goal to "agitate" in civil society so as to create civil disturbances.
The political importance of the UNE as an organization during the period of the government of João Goulart made it a primary target of the psychosocial strategy of Operação Limpeza. Student organizations should not be allowed to engage so deeply in politics but should be confined to the arrangement of recreational activities or of administrative concerns of student life. The UNE frontly contradicted such a position, serving primarily for the representation of students as a political pressure group vis-à-vis the government.

The repressive action of Operação Limpeza against the UNE was an immediate consequence of the civil-military takeover. On April 1st the historical UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro was burned down by military and para-military troops. Students were arrested by the hundreds in all universities and during the invasion and burning of the UNE headquarters as well as in the invasion of regional meetings and local-level Academic Centers. Thus, outright physical repression was the first step of the counter-offensive.

In June of 1964 the Minister of Education, Suplicy de Lacerda, made public the government's intention to dismantle the UNE, the student state organizations and the metropolitan organizations of students at university and secondary levels. The government drafted a law project to dismantle all representative structures of University and High School students and replace them with new representative organizations which should be placed under the control of the Ministry of Education. The new structure would be similar to the structure of organization of labor unions—corporative.
Opposition to the project of the Ministry of Education -- known as the Suplicy Law (Lei Suplicy) -- was immediate and intense. Students met in the universities across the nation to draft petitions and other requests to the President, protesting the intention of dismantling their representative organizations. In their communiqués the students defended their right to participate in the political activities of the nation and to contribute to the public debates on national policy so as to be a part of a common democratic search for solutions to underdevelopment. 57

The President of the UNE officially announced that the Lei Suplicy had been discussed at every level of student representation and that:

Students reject and repeal any attempt of tutelage on the part of the Minister of Education. the students believe that the student movement must remain authentic and independent. Demands and participation must originate with the students and aim to reach the highest levels of administration in the government, such as the Ministry of Education. Decisions should not simply come down from the closed quarters of the Minister's office and be imposed on the Universities. 58

Since the petitions and requests for dialogue and meetings were all denied the UNE announced a program of active opposition to the Lei Suplicy and other repressive measures: 1. To defeat in the Federal Congress the project of the Lei Suplicy. 2. To regain legal title to the building headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. 3. To hold as scheduled, in spite of official prohibition, the XXIV National Congress of Students in February of 1965. 59 This program would place the UNE in direct confrontation with the military government of the National Security State.
The students would be able to carry out only the third part of their program. In spite of the resistance of the student movement, an intimidated Congress passed the project of Lei Suplicy under the threat of the decurso de prazo automatic mechanism which even eliminates amendments. President Castelo Branco signed the law on November 9, 1964. The traditional organization of the students, the UNE, was dissolved. To replace the UNE the Lei Suplicy predicted a corporative system of organization: A National Union of Students, based in Brasília and directly connected to the Ministry of Education; state directories of Students (Diretório Estudantil Estadual - DEE) in each state and territory and Central Directories to replace the base-level organizations which had been the cell of the political life of the UNE. The Central Directories of Students (Diretório Central Estudantil - DCE) in each university or institution of higher learning were expressly prohibited from active participation in politics and were encouraged rather to organize recreational, cultural and other immediate events of student life.

The forceful passing of the Lei Suplicy marked the resurgence of the opposition within the student movement which was badly hurt by Operação Limpeza. The resistance to the new Law kept the movement alive and actively organizing the parallel underground or semi-underground structures of the UNE. The support of the student population for the UNE in fact increased after Lei Suplicy was passed dissolving the traditional organization. The repression and the banning of the UNE
served rather to reinforce the position of those within the student movement who were already in active opposition to the military in power. In the words of Jean Marc Von der Weid the strictness of the controls was beneficial to the groups of the opposition:

What legally existed was a Faculty Union and a University Union, but the state and the national union were now prohibited. This was because they created a new organization called the National Directory of Students. This organization was controlled by the Minister of Education who was the only one that could convene meetings and the meetings were held in the Ministry of Education in Brasília.

In reaction the banned UNE organized a national referendum to see if the students accepted the controls and restrictions or if they wished to support an illegal UNE. Approximately 98 percent of the students voted to support the illegal organization.

The other measure of the government that helped us was that voting became obligatory. The government forced all students to vote in the local level organizations for they wanted to bring out the "silent majority" which they assumed were against the leadership of the UNE. But this had the result of forcing students to participate and discuss the representation elections. Thus the programme of the government for the universities could be discussed and criticised so our position was enormously reinforced. 60

As we shall discuss in later chapters, the UNE re-organized a parallel structure of representation and held its meetings and Congresses clandestinely. It was instrumental in building a forceful student movement of direct opposition to the military which emerged to the surface of the political arena in 1967 and 1968.

The Suplicy Law's most important effect was the closing of legal participation for students, forcing them into underground
activity which would aid in the process of radicalization and the growth of the alternative of armed struggle. When legal paths of opposition became increasingly difficult, the opposition in the student movement turned to the theories of *foquismo* in a search for active confrontation with the military National Security State.

Another area of the *Operação Limpeza* within the psychosocial strategy were the labor unions and the Peasant Leagues. The former were structured in accordance to the Labor Code in a corporative organization copied from Mussolini's labor unions during fascist Italy. The latter were independent associations of peasants organized in particular to win title to land or other rural workers rights. They comprised a system of rural unions -- which also fought for agrarian reform and more equal distribution of land. The government was most particularly convinced of the communist infiltration of the Peasant Leagues.

The strategy was twofold: the Peasant Leagues were simply abolished and prohibited. The leadership and many of the members were arrested and included in IPMs. With the disbanding of the Peasant Leagues the structure of rural unions eventually was reshaped to include unions in the countryside in the overall legal organization of the Labor Code -- thus the independent rural movement was effectively submitted to the corporative control of the Ministry of Labor.

The Labor Code's control provisions -- a legacy of the *Estado Novo* period when the influence of fascism was strong -- were fully
applied. One of the mechanisms of control built into the Labor Code
allowed the Ministry of Labor to intervene in trade unions and remove
the elected officials by a simple Decree-Law, with no appeal. The
Decree-Law was published in the Diário Oficial da União and the
new officials appointed directly by the Ministry of Labor. In
addition, the Ministry of Labor had the power to annul elections,
cancel the candidacy of any particular union officer and to grant
recognition titles to the trade unions as well as to abolish them.

During the period of populism these mechanisms were not applied
with severity due to the electoral political cost for the governments.
The Labor Code’s union structure, nonetheless, remained intact and
was never reformed -- not even during the period of João Goulart’s
government. Thus, when the civil-military coalition took power in
April of 1964, they found a ready-made repressive legal framework for
the control of trade unions and effectively used its control measures.

Urban workers labor unions (the Code predicts also trade unions
of employers but these were untouched) suffered immediate and severe
repression with the start of Operação Limpeza. The military took care
both to eliminate all leadership which had exerted influence in the
past populist period and to appoint new trade union officials tied to
the mechanisms of clientelistic relations provided in the Labor Code
and under the direct influence of the government.

In 1964 there were 7 confederations, 107 federations and a total
of 1,948 urban workers trade unions in existence. The clean-up
operation intervened to remove the officials from office in 452 trade unions of urban workers, 43 federations and 3 confederations during the first year of the National Security State. This represented 40 percent of the federations, 42 percent of the confederations and 23 percent of the trade unions just for that first wave of "cleaning". In addition, other three unions suffered a disguised form of intervention (intervenção branca) in that the elected officials were removed from office without the publication of a specific Decree. One election was simply cancelled due to alleged subversive activities and the government dissolved one labor union entirely.

The preamble of the Decree Laws announcing the interventions in 1964 often justified the action for one of three different reasons: 1. That the leadership and directors of the union, federation or confederation had disappeared (estavam desaparecidos) and thus the Ministry of Labor would presume abandonment of office to declare the governmental intervention and appoint new officials to run the unions. 2. That the directors of the union were active subversives. 3. That the military Commander of the area had been forced to "occupy the premises of the trade unions to avoid subversive activities". Under military occupation a trade union could not perform its normal function and thus it required the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. In addition, interventions often simply ratified the de facto act of a local military commander or delegate of the Regional Labor Court. The leadership, according to testimony of political actors, were often arrested arbitrarily -- thus the "disappeared" allegations.
It must be emphasized that these numbers still under-represent the reality and scope of the first period of intervention in trade unions of urban workers and the dismantling of others. Not all of the military occupations and arrests were legally ratified by the Ministry of Labor in the first months of the confusion of Operação Limpeza. Some of the occupations and arrests of leadership were not reported to the Regional Delegate of the Labor Court and thus the legal process leading to the final ratification of the act by the Ministry of Labor was never initiated. Thus, in fact the military intervened in a greater number of local trade unions than was ever reported and published.

In her careful study Argélina Maria Cheibub Figueiredo points out that the Labor Ministry intervened selectively in the local unions: 70 percent of all unions with more than 5,000 members suffered intervention, 38 percent of trade unions with membership between 1,000 and 5,000 members and 19 percent of trade unions which were smaller and with fewer members.

Newspaper accounts provided further evidence of the reason for the "disappearances" and gave the names of those arrested and not accounted for by the police. A single list published the names of the Presidents of the following trade unions in São Paulo: the Petrochemicals of Cubatão, the Bakers of São Paulo, the Oil Workers Union, Port Workers, Urban Transport Union, Longshoremen, Employees in Port Administration, Metalworkers of São Paulo and Santos, Bankworkers of São Paulo, Journalists of São Paulo, Construction, Graphic and Maritimes.
In Minas Gerais, between April 1, and May 5, 1964, there were 28 interventions in urban workers trade unions and all were preceded by the occupation of the union headquarters by the Military Command of Belo Horizonte. The directors of the unions were either arrested or went underground.69

In Rio Grande do Sul the military occupied the unions to conduct a complete questioning of all directors as to their participation in the activities of the Central Command of the Workers (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores, CGT) the Union Central organization which had been set up as a parallel structure to the Labor Code in the years prior to 1964. 70

The situation in Rio de Janeiro was no less severe. Besides the Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro, the Naval Shipyard Workers union and the Bankworkers union were occupied by military troops. The Minister of Labor, Arnaldo Sussekind, determined the immediate intervention in no less than 40 trade unions in the state of Guanabara during the month of April of 1964. These interventions were for the purpose of discovering the ties between the trade union and the CGT which the military considered an organization of *liaison* with the indirect strategy of international communism. 71

Only two of the seven workers confederations in existence -- the Confederation of Commerce and the Confederation of Land Transportation did not suffer intervention or pressure and functioned normally throughout the year of 1964.
The National Confederation of Industrial Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria - CNTI) suffered strong purges in its secondary-level organization. All the members of the Representative Council of the CNTI were arrested and removed from office under the accusation of "political behavior". The government's appointed interventor announced that all of the directors of the CNTI would be expelled as well as their alternates and all the members of the International Department. The government-appointed officials to replace those expelled are still in power.

São Paulo, according to the reports of the press, was the worst hit state: by June of 1964 the military government had ordered the intervention in 270 workers organizations in the state, including unions and federations.

In 1963 the Labor Code was amended to allow the organization of rural unions as well as the independent Peasant Leagues. The military government, as we have seen, closed the Peasant Leagues and in addition intervened in 90 percent of the rural unions which had been organized in the year of 1963-1964, particularly in the rural state of Pernambuco.

Finally all the parallel inter-union organizations which had been organized outside of the control of the Labor Code were abolished by decree. Among those dissolved were the CGT (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores) and the Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers (Confederação Brasileira de Trabalhadores Cristãos (CBTC)).
The intent to utilize to the fullest the fascist structure of the Labor Code was underlined by a Decree Law passed in December, 1964, by the Ministry of Labor. This Decree-Law prohibited the formation of syndicalized organizations "which were not legally mentioned in the Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, CLT)". This regulation, in addition, expressly prohibited the participation of "any civil organization in the activities of trade unions". Civil associations were prevented from working "with trade unions which are legally recognized by the Ministry of Labor." The intention of such a prohibition was to prevent the formation of coalitions or alliances between civil associations outside of the control of the Labor Code and trade unions.

Although clearly such organizations as the Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers (CBTC) could not be considered to be under the direct control of the Soviet Union or a particular target of its indirect strategy of infiltration, its elimination, nonetheless, was still necessary. The National Security State could not afford to tolerate any autonomous organization of workers. In order to implement the wage control policies which were a necessary foundation of the economic model, the State had to keep all trade unions in absolute silence.

The full application of the mechanisms of control in the Labor Code highlight the characteristic of the National Security State of incorporating into itself old structures designed for control of civil society as well as the creation of any new structures whenever necessary.
IV. The First Foundations of the New State

The National Security State conducted not only a "cleaning" campaign to remove the remnants of the leadership of the past but proceeded rapidly to lay the foundations for the new State. The three most important early measures of this first year of the National Security State were the creation of the SNI, the Administrative Reforms with the first Program of Economic Action of the Government (Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo - PAEG) and the policies of wage control. Thus the building of the new State involved the institutionalization of the information network necessary to carry out the control and search of the "enemy within" and the laying down of the foundations of the economic model.

1. The Creation of the National Information Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações - SNI).

According to the Manual Básico da ESG, the purpose of information for Internal Security is the proper identification of the "antagonisms and pressures" which exist in the nation and the drafting of reports which may evaluate the forms of activity of the "agents and permit the government to take the necessary measures to identify, neutralize or annul" them. In reality, the training textbook emphasizes that all planning is conditioned to Internal Security and that, in turn, the entire process of Internal Security "is conditioned by the information on security (Informações de Segurança) which allow the complete knowledge of the reality." Therefore, the role of Security Information is essential to the government so as to enable the
precise information as to the reality of the political situation in the nation, the truth of the facts, the characteristic and intensity of the manifestations and the effects of antagonisms and pressures as well as the prediction of possible future events. A system of permanent organization of Security Information which is adequately structured and manned by especially trained personnel, constitutes one of the most essential instruments for the planning and execution of Internal Security. 79

In accordance with this belief in the importance of an effective system and network of information on Internal Security, one of the first institutionalization measures of the civil-military coalition in power was the creation of the National Information Service -- the SNI.

President Castelo Branco informed that the SNI was not meant to be a Secret Police but rather aimed at "improving the efficiency of the Executive, keeping it well informed on what is going on in the country so that it can act with confidence and with opportunity". And, he added, "the SNI has no resemblance to an agency of propaganda or of indoctrination. There is no reason to see in it the potential for an institution of terrorist spying." 80

In spite of the good intentions of the occupants of the Executive posts, the dynamic of the system and the search for absolute security did turn the SNI into an agency more concern with "spying" upon the citizens since it could never precisely establish the boundaries of the internal enemies of the State and all were suspect, at least in potential.

Formally, the SNI was born with Decree-Law Number 4,341 of June 13, 1964. 81 It was to be an advisory agency of the Executive
power, answerable not to the Federal Congress but to the National Security Council and the President. It is, organizationally, an agency of the Executive.

The law established explicitly that the SNI must cooperate with the National Security Council in "all subjects pertaining to National Security". The law stated that the main purpose of the SNI would be to "collect and analyze information pertinent to National Security to counter-information and to information on internal subversive affairs."

In fact, the SNI has become more than that. It is the locus of a de facto political power perhaps of even parallel force as that of the Executive itself. It is sufficient to point out that all of the heads of the SNI have been extremely powerful men within the National Security State and many have become President. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, its creator and first Chief, was one of the most powerful men behind the scenes often referred to as the "Gray Emminence" of the State. Generals Garrastazú Médici and João Batista Figueiredo -- who were also Chiefs of the SNI -- became the appointed Presidents of the National Security State. The occupant of the post is often believed to be the most probable successor in the Presidential chain.

Since 1964 the SNI has grown to be an effective agency of information and of political control. By law the SNI has one Central Agency located in Brasília as well as Regional Agencies in
each state and all territories. The regulatory law of December 10, 1964, 35 established the organizational structures of the SNI, regulated its budget and specified its mission. The SNI had the purpose of:

(...) the promotion and carrying out of the tasks of evaluation and integration of information (...) to distribute such information amongst the various branches of the government; to establish all necessary connections with state and municipal governments, with private and state owned enterprises and to draw up certain plans which must include:

1. The planning of strategic information.
2. The planning of Internal Security.
3. The planning of counter-intelligence. 36

By law the SNI is not required to publish any information or make public its organizational structure and format as well as the functioning of its agencies. The personnel and agents of the SNI may be drafted from other Ministries or departments of the government, from civil or military bureaucratic apparatuses, by a simple requisition from the Chief of the SNI. The Chief of the SNI has the status of a Minister of Government and is a member of the Cabinet. His appointment is made by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Federal Congress.

In addition, the Chief of the SNI may hire secret "gratuitous or paid service and collaboration of civilians, military personnel, public employees or any other person to carry out specific and special missions." 37 The military in service to the SNI are considered to be in a "special military mission" and have the right to special merit. Civilians in service to the SNI have the right to a special gratification which is to be annually established by the President of the Republic. 38
The budget of the SNI is the special responsibility of the General Secretary of the National Security Council and is established by the Ministry of Finance as a specific requirement. The law that created the SNI also provided the amount of its first budget: 200 million cruzeiros, which, at the exchange rate of the time, was the equivalent to approximately 440 million U.S. dollars. 89

The SNI by law is in no way accountable to public opinion or to the Federal Congress. Its sole responsibility is to the Presidency and it is, in reality, a reinforcement of the powers of the Executive branch and an implicit comparative weakening of the Judiciary and the Legislative which have no supervision powers over its operations. The SNI is as powerful an agency as the Executive branch of the government, for although in theory it is subjected to it in reality it has exerted considerable pressure upon the President at every crisis point in the last seventeen years.

What is of particular interest to emphasize at this point is the role of the SNI as an institution of the National Security State. The juridical framework of the State was first laid with the Institutional Act Number One. The creation of the SNI was the first legal application of the National Security Doctrine and laid the foundation for the eventual formation of the immense Repressive Apparatus of the State. In practice the SNI represented the distinct intention of the civil-military coalition in power to not be just "another coup d'etat" but rather to institutionalize structures for a new State.
2. The Economic Program as a Foundation of the Economic Model

One of the first measures of the Castelo Branco government's Administrative Reform was the creation of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination (Ministério de Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica) which, as Dreifuss points out "was a veritable reserve of the IPES." 90 The Ministry of Planning was the main instrument for the coordination and implementation of the economic model based on mechanisms to facilitate foreign investment and increase the rates of capital accumulation.

The first economic team of Castello Branco's government was composed of the Minister of Finance, Octávio de Bulhões -- an economist who had been trained in the Chicago School of Economics and was an active participant in the ESG/IPES conspiracy -- and Roberto de Oliveira Campos who had been Ambassador in Washington and had strong ties with multinational corporations based in the United States.

The first Economic Action Program of the Government (Programa de Ação Económica do Governo - PAEG) of 1964-1966 established as one of its main priorities the fight against inflation. Three strategies were considered for the accomplishment of this objective: 1. the imposition of a tight credit control policy for the private sector. 2. The reduction of governmental deficit and 3. a salary control policy.

In general the policies of the Bulhões-Campos economic team were an interaction of strong stabilization program to control inflation in accordance to a strict monetarist policy and a series of decisions which aimed at facilitating and attracting foreign investment -- including the strictly controlled labor costs. 92
The planning team theorized that there should be a natural elimination of inefficient capital and regular free capitalist market forces should be applied to concentrate capital on efficient corporations. Thus the government slashed credit to the private sector. Thomas Skidmore points out in a study that there was a reduction in the level of effective protection and an end to the frequent policy of providing publicly subsidized credit from the central banking system in times of liquidity crisis. As a result, Brazilian businesses went through several painful shake out phases, during which foreign firms, especially American, were able to acquire Brazilian companies that could no longer find sources of credit.

Multinational corporations are not dependent upon internal governmental sources of credit having immense capital resources to invest at will. At times of economic tightening, forced recession and high inflation, however, local capital which is unable to find sufficient operating cost loans must declare bankruptcy. They are then easily and cheaply purchased by multinational corporations in the process of de-nationalization of the economy that has been one characteristic of the economic model of Brazil. A further aggravating circumstance of this process is that foreign investment which comes into the country is not necessarily applied in the production of new corporations and factories but in the purchasing of existing ones. Thus the actual benefit to the country's economic development is much smaller than may be apparent from figures of the increase in foreign investment. A forced industrial recession thus benefits foreign investors and harms local capital which is more dependent upon credit.
Thus the Bulhões-Campos team applied a brand of corrective stabilization which was highly favorable to multinational corporations. Monetarist inflation-fighting techniques included the need to produce a temporary industrial recession coupled with the freeing of prices which had been kept artificially low by governmental subsidy during the years of Goulart: gasoline, rent, wheat and paper in particular were items which Roberto Campos decontrolled in order to further restrict the available money supply. 94

Roberto Campos defended other measures to attract foreign investment. In particular he appealed for an immediate and clear definition of the government in relation to the agricultural sector so as to quiet the fears of foreign investors on the question of agrarian reform. The agricultural sector should be planned to encourage the production of export crops, rather than cash crops for internal consumption. Luis Viana, himself a member of the government of Castelo Branco, points out that the governmental slogan "to export is our solution" (Exportar é a Solução) comes from this time. 95

In regards to regulations of foreign investment, Campos and Bulhões defended the need to eliminate all areas of tension between Brazil and the United States in particular by setting a priority for a solution to the cases of the American and Foreign Power Company (AMFORP) and the Mineração Novalimense (HANNA Corporation). Other pending nationalization cases, those of the American firms Brazilian Traction Corporation and the Companhia Telefônica Brasiliense and of the French
corporation Contencioso Francês should be immediately and satisfactorily resolved so as to set out "the new spirit of welcoming to foreign investment". A suitable and flexible program for the purchase of these corporations should be drafted and had to establish an acceptable price.

Purchasing of multinational corporations at advantageous prices was not the only measure taken by the economic team to reassure the foreign investors. The most important measure which was immediately taken in that first year was the repeal of the Profit Remittance Law -- Law Number 4,131 -- which had been passed by the Federal Congress in 1962. This law was originally introduced by the then President Jânio Quadros, in 1961, rewritten several times so as to close the loopholes used by multinationals to increase their margins of profit remittances. The law had been long and vigorously opposed by foreign investors and by the United States Embassy. Nonetheless it was passed by Congress and signed by President João Goulart in January of 1964 sealing the fate of the government and intensifying the conspiracy to overthrow him.

According to Luis Viana Filho, President Castello Branco wished to make the immediate mark of the new government's good will: "The decision of the President was to reach out with open arms for foreign investment which, if disciplined with justice, would aid the country." First the Federal Congress was extensively and carefully purged of its nationalist-minded members. Then the Profit Remittance Law was repealed.

Five months after the civil-military takeover of State power, a regulatory law for the remittance of profit and the registration of
foreign capital, investment and reinvestment and the regulation of interests, royalties and payments for technical assistance was forced through the Federal Congress under the mechanism of decurso de prazo.

Law Number 4,390, of August 29, 1964, placed no limitations on the percentage of registered capital that could be remitted as profit. The sole exception was an 8 percent limit for the profit remittance of capital invested in the production of goods and services for luxury consumption. There were no limitations for the repatriation of capital. Reinvestment of profits were also to be considered, for the purposes of the law, as original capital.

Other benefits for foreign capital were immediately put into effect: the income tax structure was reformed in the Administrative Reform and a system of fiscal incentives implemented. Under this program, foreign firms may deduct significant amounts from the tax owed to the Brazilian government:

Foreign firms pay a tax rate of 30 percent with regard to profits if the firm has adhered to the price stabilization programme (...) whether it is transferred to the mother company abroad or not. However, if the profits are set aside in a fund for reinvestment in industrial facilities, the tax withheld shall be reduced to 15 percent.

The system of fiscal incentives was further refined -- with the provision of a great number of additional tax deductions -- after 1968. For now it is sufficient to point out that the early measures were meant both to provide incentives for foreign capital and to eliminate curbs and restrictions that hampered profit rates and the remittance of profits.
Other measures meant to facilitate the investment reduced the restrictions on the exchange markets and financial transactions as well as establishing that imports and exports would be conducted at free market rates. Finally, the Central Bank (Banco Central) was authorized to allow imports without exchange cover. In addition, all machinery or equipment imported for utilization in projects which were considered of interest to the country's development were considered as direct foreign investment and were not taxed.101

The overall program of the economic team aimed at rationalizing the economic area by concentrating capital in the more efficient industries and encouraging the penetration of more efficient and modern multinational capital. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that it was the application of the Doctrine of National Security and Development's belief in the beneficial nature of multinational corporation investment and that the best chance for Brazil's development was to become a priority area for foreign investment.

3. The Control of Wages: Increasing the rate of Exploitation.

Two measures were implemented as a part of the economic model to be pursued: legislation for the control of strike activities and a first regulation of wage increases to be a step in an overall policy of strict wage control. The control of wages was a necessary item in the program aimed at attracting foreign investment. The Bulhões-Campos economic team argued that wages had to be controlled and the chaos in the labor front quieted if foreign investors were
to have any guarantee of a climate of stability for investment. Strong labor unions, frequent strikes and rising wages were considered to be disincentives to foreign investors.

A law limiting the right to strike — known as the Anti-Strike Law (Lei de Greve) — was passed on June 1, 1964. This Law amended the Constitution of 1946 which guaranteed the free right to strike. Law Number 4,330, the Lei de Greve, regulated the conditions under which a strike could be considered legal and the situations which definitely prohibited strikes.

First of all, public employees at federal, state and municipal governments or in state-owned corporations and agencies are explicitly prohibited from striking. Workers in areas considered to be essential are also forbidden from striking. These areas include services in water, energy, light, gas, sewage, communications, transportation, loading and unloading, funeral services, hospitals, maternities, sale and distribution of foodstuff, pharmacies and drugstores, hotels, basic industries and all other industries which are considered essential to the defense of the nation.

Certain particular kinds of strikes are also prohibited outright: strikes which are not for wages or for better working conditions but rather are considered to be of a "political, social, religious nature" or are in "solidarity with other striking workers or causes." The definition of what is political is up to the government to decide.
Strikes for "better working conditions or wages" are allowed but so bureaucratically conditioned as to make their legal realization practically impossible. Since 1964 most strikes which were considered legal by the Labor Courts involved corporations or enterprises that had not paid their workers for more than three months. Some of the bureaucratic conditions are time consuming, burdensome and expensive so that their fulfillment is practically beyond the reach of most unions.

Kenneth Mericle points out in his study of labor relations in Brazil that there are additional ways which the government can use to prevent strikes by strictly applying the bureaucratic conditions written in the Lei de Greve:

The public Attorney can request the intervention of the Regional Labor Court during the five day strike notice period required. Employers can also institute Court intervention 30 days before the previous Court decision or collective contract expires. (...) in practice, interest disputes over wages and working conditions are settled by Court decisions before strikes can occur. Strikes are authorized in only two situations, both of which involve violations of Court decisions or of labor agreements by employers: 1. strikes are allowed to gain back salaries when employers are behind in the payments and 2. strikes are permitted when employers are not paying the wages declared in a Court decision. 105

The Lei de Greve must be understood in its integration into the existent Labor Code. It is sufficient to point out that Article 723 of the Labor Code specifies that workers cannot strike under any circumstances (legal or illegal) without the prior authorization of a Regional Labor Court. Penalties for unauthorized strikes, under
the Labor Code, include suspension and firing of the striking workers without compensation, the removal of the union leadership from office and heavy fines for the union or even the outright cancellation of the union's registration.

Kenneth Erickson points out that the full application of the Lei de Greve used in combination with the Labor Code's regulations rendered practically all strikes in Brazil illegal. This point was demonstrated by the numbers of strikes which occurred before and after the implementation of the Lei de Greve. According to Erickson, in 1961 there were 180 strikes in Brazil. In 1962 there were a total of 154 strikes and in 1963 there were 302 strikes. By 1965, however, the total number of strikes had dropped to 25, in 1966 there were only 15 strikes, in 1970 twelve and in 1971 there were none. During the period between the years 1973 and 1977 there were only 34 strike actions or slowdown operations. The Lei de Greve was strongly challenged after the year of 1978 by the "new labor movement". It has, however, remained in effect to the present.

The salary control policy of "belt-tightening" (arrocho salarial) was first established with the Resolution Number 10 of the Finance Ministry. This resolution detailed the mechanisms to be applied in the calculation of salary levels. Under the regulations the size of the wage increase would depend on three factors: 1. The average real salary of the workers in the preceding 24 months to the increase.
2. The estimate of anticipated inflation (resíduo inflacionário) for the 12 months which followed the increase. 3. A factor based on an estimate of the annual increase in national productivity rates. The rate of increase of salary readjustments would be established according to this calculation.

Resolution Number 10 also established that salaries were to be readjusted at intervals of no less than 12 months -- thus once per year. The regulation was limited to public employees and employees of governmental agencies, autarchies and other parts of the bureaucracy. It established at the same time that state and municipal governments had to adhere to the same formula.

In July, 1964, Decree-Law Number 54,018 was passed and the salary policy was extended to the entire public sector of State owned corporations or corporations of mixed capital with a majority control of the State. The mechanism for salary calculation of Resolution Number 10 was formalized in a detailed formula for automatic mathematical figuring of salary increases. In September of 1964 a further regulatory measure, further refined the techniques for the obligatory calculation of the salary increases of the public sector.

The salary policy, throughout the years, has consistently underestimated the "inflationary residue" (resíduo inflacionário) as well as the rates of productivity so that salary levels were kept below the rates of inflation resulting in sharp real salary decreases.
V. Conclusion

The first year of the National Security State was characterized principally by a combination of measures aimed at removing from the political, economic and social arena any potential nuclei of opposition and at the same time rapidly proceeding to lay down the first coercive and economic foundations of the National Security State.

Operação Limpeza -- for which the Institutional Act Number One provided the legal foundation -- conducted thorough purges in the civilian and military bureaucracies and utilized the IPMs to root out any citizen whom the State believed might provide a basis for opposition to the policies being implemented. The cleaning operation was both general and specifically targeted in keeping with the strategies of the National Security Doctrine that divided society into different compartments to be individually controlled.

The measures of the economic model were likewise aimed at both removing impediments and providing the first foundations for the continuation of the development process along the lines established in the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Of these clearly the primary goals were the attraction of foreign multinational capital and the establishment of an effective wage control policy to maximize the rate of exploitation and therefore of profit on investment.

The force of the repression and the rapidity with which the strategists of the new State moved to implement policy threw the opposition into disarray. This, in turn, allowed the new State
a wide margin of political maneuverability for further measures
to deepen the organizational structure of the new State.

The creation of the SNI, for example, was an absolutely
crucial step for the formation of the Repressive Apparatus and
for the effective organization of the network of information
which must base the coercive measures of a State so primarily
concerned with Internal Security. The disarray of the Federal
Congress and of most other sectors of political opposition enabled
the government of Castello Branco to easily overcome the attempts
of resistance in the Congress and institutionalize this important
mechanism of political and social control.

By the end of the first year the government already counted
with a fledgling National Security State and had succeeded in
establishing the basis for the wider measures of control which
would become necessary in the following years.
NOTES


2. See, Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinacionals and Brazil: The Impact of Multinational Corporations in Contemporary Brazil (Toronto: Brazilian Studies/Latin America Research Unit - LARU, 1975) page 43.

3. See Table 3 in Appendix, "Inflation in Brazil (1960-1980)" for references to sources.

4. See Table 6 in Appendix, "GDP Growth Rates by Sector, Brazil (1960-1977)" for references to sources.


6. See the description of the viewpoints of the three sectors involved in the conspiracy in René Armand Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado op.cit. pages 369 to 373.

7. See the discussion of this point in Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1976) page 46.

8. For a discussion of President Castelo Branco's ascent to the highest office see John W. F. Dulles, Castello Branco, the Making of a Brazilian President, op.cit. pages 309 to 408.

9. Ibid. page 390. Although sympathetic with the government of Castelo Branco, John Dulles nonetheless also discusses the planning of the "operação limpeza" and its important centrality in the first programs of the government. He mentions the importance which the military in power attached to the launching of this "clean up operation" but does not examine its implementation or the results.

10. For a detailed account of these plans and statements see Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. pages 3 to 45.

11. This meeting was held with the presence of: Dr. Francisco Campos, the three members of the Revolutionary High Command, General Arthur da Costa e Silva, Francisco Correia de Melo and Augusto Heman Rademaker Grunewald. Luis Viana Filho was also present and the meeting and described the events in his O Governo Castelo Branco, page 56.
12. Ibid. pages 55-56.

13. Although the Institutional Act Number One did not have a number and was for a period referred simply as the Institutional Act, it would soon be followed, in 1965, by Institutional Act Number Two. In total, the military-civilian coalition in power have passed 17 Institutional Acts, 80 Complementary Acts and several hundred Decree-Laws.


16. The thirty-day period was later extended to forty days.

17. Articles are of the text of Institutional Act Number One, in Diário Oficial da União April 9 and April 11, 1964.

13. Article 7, in Ibid.
19. Article 7, Ibid.
20. Article 8, Ibid.
21. Article 10. Ibid.


23. Decree Law Number 53,897 of April 27, 1964. Passed by President Castello Branco this law regulated and established the Inquérito Policial Militar (IPM) and stipulated the levels of organization and the responsibility of the investigation committees.

24. One should note again the preoccupation with institutionalizing a legality -- a _legalista_ system -- that could establish a basis for organization and coordination of a repressive strategy of control and of purges. The defense was at first a mere formality within the departamental investigating committee. Eventually some of the decisions could be brought to appreciation of the Judiciary that tended to greatly limit the powers of the colonels and in many cases reverse the previous decisions.

25. See the extensive article on the IPM of Goiás, headed by Colonel Danilo Darcy de Sá Cunha Melo who investigated the public employees of the state of Goiás and ended up by filing for the removal of the governor of the state himself. According to Colonel Danilo Cunha Melo, Governor Mauro Borges was conspiring to install in the state a "communist paradise" and had surrounded himself and his administration with notorious communists. The IPM's proofs had remained a secret until recently. See the extensive article on the IPM of Goiás published in Isto É, April 4, 1979, page 30 "Goiás: A Incrível História do Expurgo de 1964: Os relatórios do Coronel Danilo, uma aula de arbitrio."

26. Ibid. page 30.
27. Ibid. page 31.
28. Ibid. page 31.
29. Ibid. page 31.
30. Ibid. page 31.

31. This was the most famous IPM and became known as the IPM of Luis Carlos Preste's telephone address book (Cadernetas de Prestes). This is because the Secretary General of the Brazilian Communist Party left his address book behind and the police accused all who were in it.
32. See the account in Márcio Moreira Alves "Lado de Lá" a political commentary daily column in Tribuna da Imprensa, June 19, 1981 and June 20, 1981. Journalist Márcio Moreira Alves comments on the accusations of the IPM Number 709 which was published by the Biblioteca do Exército in 1966.

33. These categories were written by colonels in charge of the IPM number 709 - the activities of the Communist Party. Cited by Márcio Moreira Alves in his column of Tribuna da Imprensa, June 20, 1981.

34. The wide dispersal of the data in the different official registers probably accounts for the slight discrepancies that can be seen in the figures which have been compiled by different researchers. My figures for this period are based both on the dossier of the Ministério da Aeronáutica which compiled the information on the number of Institutional Acts, Complementary Acts and the names of all who were punished, at the Federal level, from April 9, 1964 to March 1967. I have verified the data by careful daily searching in the Diário Oficial da União a painstaking work for which I am most grateful to my research assistant, Marcos Suzano.

35. For a detailed account of this already intense hardline pressure see the description in Luis Viana Filho, page 55.

36. René Armand Dreifuss calls the different sectors as the right wing extremists, the tradicionals and the ESG/IPES sector. Stepan prefers to term "hardliners" "authoritarian nationalists". In reality the nationalist ideology of the ESG and the hardline sector did not differ to a significant degree for both favored multinational investment and supported basically the same economic model. The nationalist sector of officers connected to the support of an economic policy geared for local capital and with strict control of multinational activities was eliminated and kept from achieving positions of power through successive purges. We shall discuss the question of the military, the different sectors and the specific controls which were imposed in Chapter 11. For a discussion of the above definitions of the sectors of the military see: René Armand Dreifuss 1964: A Conquista do Estado, pages 339 to 373 and Alfred Stepan Os Militares na Política, op.cit. pages 159 to 183.

37. "Fine-comb operations" (operação pente-fino) and "fishnet operations" (operação arrastão) are police-military terms for specific forms of largescale operations of search and arrest. They involve careful search of the population, installation of roadblocks in the streets, house to house searches and often the particular targeting of a zone or block for a finer, narrower search (thus the name "fine comb"). As is implied in the code name arrastão -- which is the fishing net used by fishermen in dragging behind the boat to trap vast numbers of fish--these operations result in hundreds or thousands of arrests. They have become common routine operation in Brazil.
38. This estimate was reached by cross-interviews with different political actors who dealt closely either with the lists of political prisoners which were reported to the press or with their immediate defense. Of particular value to me were the interviews with Antonio Callado -- who was editor of the Correio da Manhã at that time; Mário Moreira Alves -- then an active political journalist of the Correio da Manhã; Congressman Modesto da Silveira -- then a lawyer who defended political prisoners; historian Hélio Silva; General Pery Bevilacqua; General Euclides Zerbini and Catholic philosopher and journalist Alceu de Amoroso Lima.

A search through the archives of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil - OAB) decisively indicated that the greater part of the repression was concentrated in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco from which came the greatest numbers of denunciations of arbitrary arrests.


a situação dos prisioneiros políticos'; July 29, 1964, page 5
'sargento preso como refém'; August 9, 1964, page 30 '127 pessoas
presas em Santos'; August 20, 1964, page 14 'Número de pessoas
presas em São Paulo e no Rio cresce'; September 9, 1964, page
14 'Prisões em massa no estado do Rio de Janeiro: mais de 200
prisões nos últimos dias feitas pelo DOPS e pela PM'; November 20,
1964, page 16 'Prisões e Alerta no Rio Grande do Sul.'

41. In Ibid.

42. See: Report of the International Committee of Jurists,
published in Correio da Manhã, September 3, 1964, page 1

43. See reports in the issues of Correio da Manhã of the following
days: July 14, 1964, page 14; July 15, 1964, page 1; July 17, 1964,
page 3; July 17, 1964, page 5; August 11, 1964, page 2; September 15,
1964, page 16; September 15, 1964, page 32; September 1, 1964, page 16;
October 15, 1964, page 6, October 14, 1964 page 9 and October 9, 1964
page 14.

One should note that Brazil inaugurated the coordinated army-navy-
military police maneuvers of the types described. Thus it was a
pioneer for the techniques of widespread terror campaigns which
included the use of football stadiums, special prison camps and
makeshift prisons in navy ships. This tactic would be followed
by the military in other nations of Latin America, particularly
after the coup d'etat in Chile.

44. For a full report of the tortures, names of torturers, names
of victims and locality of the main torture centres see: Márcio
Moreira Alves, Torturas e Torturados (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Idade
together a variety of personal testimonies, reports of psychiatrists,
of the Regional Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, reprints
of articles of other journalists who witnessed particularly severe
cases and reports of investigation committees among which is an
important document of the "Civilian Investigation Committee"
composed of lawyers and judges and which conducted an independent
investigation into the torture of political prisoners in Recife
to be forwarded to General Lyra Tavares on the 8 of October, 1964.
See, Márcio Moreira Alves full reprint of the report of the committee
on Chapter 4 "O Relatório da Comissão Civil de Investigações" composed
of Adauto Maia, President of the Justice Tribunal of Pernambuco;
Felipe Coelho, State Assemblyman of Pernambuco and President of the
State House; Reinaldo Dornelas Câmara, President of the Press Associ-
ation of the state of Pernambuco; João Batista Guerra Barreto, Federal
Prosecutor of Pernambuco; Carlos Martins, President of the Brazilian Bar
Association and Monsignor Osvaldo Gomes Machado of the Archdiocese of
Olinda and Recife.
45. Data collected from the dossier of the Ministério da Aeronáutica (1964-1967). I have counted only those punished by the Institutional Act Number One for the year of 1964. The dossier does not provide the party affiliations of all those who lost their political mandate. The sample provided, however, is sufficient for an adequate analysis of the effect of the purges upon the political composition of the Federal Congress.

46. We shall deal only in passing with this important topic. The control of the military warrants specific and detailed examination which shall be done in Chapter 11.

47. The revolt of the sailors (revolta dos marinheiros) occasioned a deep crisis between the military and the President João Goulart after the President granted amnesty to the mutinous sailors. The military charged him with interfering in the Armed Forces and of fomenting indiscipline and breaks in the hierarchy. In reality, it is now known that the leader of these revolts, "cabo Anselmo" was a covert agent -- an agent provocateur -- who was explicitly order to incite the revolt that could deepen the crisis in order to facilitate the military coup d'etat.


49. The comments which follow are taken from a large research collectively undergone by professors in each of these three main universities and published in the forms of reports. See: O Livro Negro da USP: O Controle Ideológico da Universidade (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979); UFMG: Resistência e Protesto (Belo Horizonte: Editora Vega, S.A., 1979) and Universidade e Repressão: Os Expurgos na UFRGS (Porto Alegre: L & PM Editores, 1979).

50. See, Universidade e Repressão: Os Expurgos na UFRGS, op.cit. page 9. In fact, this first period encompasses up to 1968 but for our purposes it is interesting to examine what happened immediately during the force of the Operação Limpeza.

51. See O livro Negro da USP, op.cit. page 23.

52. See, Manual Básico da ESG, Chapter VI "Logística e Mobilização Nacionais" pages 591 to 619.

53. The Minister of Justice at that time was Milton Campos, a liberal and respected Jurist. He resigned from his post a little later in protest to a deliberate application of the cassação of the electoral mandates of State Assemblymen in Rio Grande do Sul only to maintain the majority of the governmental party in the local Legislature.
54. For details on the intervention and the resistance within the university see: UFMG: Resistência e Protesto, op.cit.

55. The UNE building was historical and had been a German center during World War II. After the war it was requested by the students from the government to be the headquarters of the UNE. When the UNE was made illegal the military reformed the building which had been partly burned down and rented it for a variety of purposes. Eventually it was sold to be torn down and make way for a highrise. Strong opposition to the tearing down of the UNE building developed, a judicial order restraining the construction was passed and ignored. A large demonstration was held in front of the building, in the Praia do Flamengo of Rio de Janeiro to protest the disobedience of the judicial order. The Military Police attacked the protestors and people were severely wounded. A State Depuhy, José Eudes, had to have several stiches to close a head wound. This was in 1980.


59. Ibid.

60. Jean Marc Von der Weid was elected President of the UNE in a secret clandestine Congress held in Ibiúna, São Paulo, in 1968. See his analysis of the student movement in the early years of the National Security State in: Jean Marc Von der Weid, Brazil: 1964 to the Present — A Political Analysis (Québec, Canada: Editions Latin America, 1972) page 17.


62. We shall deal in particular with the Labor Code and the control of trade unions in Chapter 11.

63. Data from the Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, Fundação IBGE, 1965. See also the tables on the total number of trade unions in Brazil and the total number of direct governmental interference in trade unions. Both in Chapter 11.
64. The complete data is contained in Table in Chapter 11. For more information see: Kenneth Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) and the Portuguese version Sindicalismo no Processo Político no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, soc. an., 1979); Argelina Maria Cheibub Figueiredo, Política Governamental e Funções Sindicais (Masters Thesis, University of São Paulo, 1975).

65. See the table on direct governmental interference in trade unions in Brazil included in Chapter Eight.

66. Modesto da Silveira, a prominent lawyer who defended political prisoners since the first days after the coup d'etat, told me in an interview that at least 80 percent of his clients in the early months or the first year were workers, peasants and leaders of trade unions. The composition and social background of his clientele changed somewhat in subsequent years, with liberal professionals and students taking a larger proportion of the number of clients.

One of the most dramatic invasions was that of the Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro. The leadership and a great many of the members were inside the building which was stormed in a veritable military maneuver and everyone present taken under arrest. Metalworkers who were participants or members of the union during that period told me the details of the destruction and ferocity of the attack in the night which is still referred to by union members as "the night of the boots".

67. See Argelina Maria Cheibub Figueiredo, Política Governamental e Funções Sindicais, Master Thesis, op.cit. pages 40 to 98. Her study was based upon data from 2,049 unions, federations and confederations.

68. See Correio da Manhã, May 13, 1964, page 9. In Minas Gerais, also between April 1 and May 5, 1964 there were further interventions and arrests reported in the Correio da Manhã of May 5, 1964, page 1.


70. Ibid.


74. See Kenneth Erickson "Brazil: Corporatism in Theory and Practice" in

75. See Correio da Manhã, May 19, 1964, page 2


77. See Manual Básico da ESG, page 438.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., page 439.

80. See Luis Viana Filho O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit., page 72. This was a direct citation from an interview of President Castelo Branco in May 4 of 1964, in order to reassure Congress.


82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. We shall discuss more thoroughly the interconnections between the SNI and the various organisms of the Repressive Apparatus in Chapter Eight.


86. Ibid.

87. Ibid. See also, Correio da Manhã, May 10, 1964, page 1 for an important analysis of the SNI and the provisions of its functioning.

88. Ibid.

89. See Decree-Law Number 4,341 of June 13, 1964, op.cit. Article 9 establishes the budget of the SNI. The exchange rate in 1964 was 2.20 cruzeiros per 1 U.S. dollar (See Table 1 on Rates of Exchange in the Appendix). Thus, the starting budget of the SNI was 440 million dollars in prices of the time.
90. See Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, Chapter IX. and note 20 on page 492 where he states that:

"(...) it was under the orientation of the Ministry of Planning that the reformulation of the productive and administrative structure of the State was conducted. (...) the Ministry of Planning transformed the State in a giant factor for the accumulation of capital which benefited the multinational and associated block."

91. See Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo (1964-1966) PAEG. Published by the Ministério de Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica, Brasília.


94. The discussions of the economic program were reported by Luis Viana Filho in his book O Governo Castelo Branco, op. cit. page 89.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. The opposition to this law is related by Thomas Skidmore in his article "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil" in Alfred Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil, op.cit. page 22.

98. See Luis Viana Filho O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. page 89.

99. See the account of this in Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinationals and Brazil: the Impact of Multinational Corporations in Contemporary Brazil (Toronto: Brazilian Studies, 1975) pages 62 to 64. Brazilian Studies is now LARU, Latin American Research Unit.
100. Ibid. page 64. For a more comprehensive analysis of the system of fiscal incentives see: Alvaro Melo Filho, Teoria e Prática dos Incentivos Fiscais, Introdução ao Direito Premial (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Eldorado Tijuca Ltda, 1976).

101. See Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso Multinationals and Brazil op. cit. page 64.


103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. For a complete analysis and study of the Lei de Greve and its effect upon employer-worker negotiations and wage contracts see: Kenneth S. Mericle, Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System, PhD Thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1974). The citation is in pages 130-131.

106. See Kenneth Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics, op. cit. page 159

107. Ibid..


109. The "new labor movement" and the strikes of 1978, 1979 and 1980 will be discussed in Chapter Ten.

110. Circular Número 10 do Ministério da Fazenda, June 19, 1964. This was the first regulation which was soon to be followed by others establishing the formula of calculation and other adjustments to the salary policy each designed to fit the economic and political needs of the time. There is, thus, a chronology of the salary policy of the National Security State which is as follows: 1) June 19, 1964: Circular Number 10 of the Ministry of Finance; 2) June 1964, Decree-Law Number 54,018; 3) September 1964 - Decree-Law Number 54,228; 4) July 1965 - Law Number 4,725; 5) January 1966 - Decree-Law Number 57,627; 6) July 1966 - Decree Law Number 15; 7) August 1966 - Decree Number 17; 8) July 1968 - Law Number 5,451; 9) November, 1974 - Law Number 6,147; 10) October 1979, the Six Month Readjustment Law. See on this DIEESE "10 Anos de Política Salarial" in Departamento Inter-Sindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos - DIEESE, Number 3 (São Paulo, August 1975).
III. For details of the calculation of the wages as established in Decree Law Number 54,013 of July of 1964 and of the regulatory law Decree Law Number 54,223 of September 1964 see DIEESE "10 Anos de Política Salarial" page 10.
CHAPTER FOUR: BUILDING OF NEW MECHANISMS OF CONTROL:

THE INSTITUTIONAL ACT NUMBER TWO

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I. Introduction

The year of 1965 was a year rich with the interchange of the dialectic between the nascent State and the yet weak but growing opposition. The very dynamic of the interrelationship highlighted the contradictions between the stated continuing commitment to the Permanent National Objectives which included social justice and representative democracy and the reality of repression made necessary by the doctrine of Internal Security.

According to the Constitution of 1946 -- by will of the civil-military coalition still in effect -- gubernatorial elections in eleven states should be held in October of 1965. The government of Castelo Branco had committed itself to the keeping of this electoral timetable so as to reassure public opinion as to the continuity of the democratic intentions of the government.

In addition, the government of Castelo Branco, with the approaching end of the extraordinary powers of the Institutional Act Number One, officially began a policy of "return to normality" (volta à normalidade) promising the end of the Operação Limpeza with its investigations in the framework of the IPMs as well as a gradual lessening of political pressures so that representative democracy and a full balance of powers between the three branches of the government could be restored. This policy emphasized the civil-military's role as the "savior of the democratic institutions" and specifically promised a controlled return to a more perfected democratic system.
The government moved forward with its economic program, removing other barriers to the free-flow of foreign investment by passing a Decree Law which established that "foreign capital invested in Brazil should enjoy the same legal treatment as that given to domestic capital."\(^2\) Foreign debt was still considered to be high, at 2.4 billion of dollars but the international lenders now gave Brazil a high credibility standing and were willing to renegotiate the foreign debt.

The stabilization policy created some problems and built up further antagonisms. Although the policy was successful in decreasing inflation from the 1964 high of 87.8 percent to 55.4 percent in 1965\(^3\) it was a highly controversial policy for it caused a deep recession -- which was shown by the negative growth rate of the industrial sector of minus 4.7 percent. The sector of Brazilian capital not associated with multinational capital felt the pinch most severely. The unavailability of credit and the tight monetarist policy of recession elicited strong opposition from the non-associated national capital sector which accused the government of favoring foreign investment and strangling the national private sector.

Moving forward with the economic program involved a second significant step in the wage policies of the government. New wage laws were passed extending to the private sector the regulations hitherto imposed upon the public sector. This was an unprecedented
step for a capitalist state to take. The regulation of the market relations of wage labor by the State amounted to the establishment of a *sui generis* model of State capitalism for the benefit not of national capital but rather of foreign capital.

In such a context, opposition began to build up sufficient force to threaten the Castello Branco government with a disastrous result in the elections of October 1965. The combination of continuing repression with recessionary policies and a negative industrial economic growth rates did not promise to encourage much population support for the Federal government. The mood of the population had considerably changed since the civil-military coalition took power in April of 1964. A public opinion poll conducted by MARPLAN -- a reputable polling firm -- in the state of Guanabara came up with an alarming result: When asked if they approved of and supported the policies of the new government 63 percent of the respondents answered "no". A further 18 percent had no opinion and only 19 percent were in favor.

The possibility of losing the elections in some of the key gubernatorial races of the modern industrial states combined with the increasing political activity of many of the people who had been included in the IPMs but were found not guilty by the civil courts. Some of the key politicians connected to the João Goulart government -- even past Ministers of State -- who had escaped the hatchet now promised to run for governor. This factor became the
seed for a military crisis within the National Security State. The sector of the military closely associated to the Repressive Apparatus, in alliance with those of the extreme right, organized a hardline pressure group coalesced around the leadership of General Arthur da Costa e Silva -- Minister of War -- and the group of colonels who were heads of the various Military - Police Investigations (IPM).

Therefore, the State was torn by the conflicting forces in its own ranks. Both of the groups appealed to the Doctrine of National Security and insisted in one of its premises: the group connected to the ESG/IPES complex, now in power, took a long term strategy view and intended to institutionalize a permanent State which had to be sufficiently flexible to play the political arena and thereby build at least a minimum base of support, consensus and legitimacy. The other group, responsible for the carrying out and implementation of the Doctrine of Internal Security, viewed only the continuing threat of communist infiltration with the aggravating circumstance of a possible return of many of the "agents of communism" to positions of political power. In the heart of the contradiction stood the Permanent National Objectives -- which both groups swore allegiance to and continued to publicly express as the ultimate goal to be reached. Democracy, for both, was the goal.

The elections of October 1965 -- in this economic and political context -- took on the color of a plebiscite for or against the economic, social and political policies of the new State. The struggle for
control of State power between the "hardline" group and the group of the Superior War College, the ESG, now also called the "Sorbonne Group", was so intense that almost to the last minute it was not clear if the elections would in fact be held. The group of Castello Branco was forced to make a series of important concessions to the hardline sector in order to conform to the Constitutional timetable of elections. The elections had a clear importance for the legitimacy of the State. However, the series of regulatory measures and electoral changes which were imposed by the hardline worked against the effort to establish legitimacy by exposing the partiality of the elections tampered so as to guarantee the victory of governmental candidates and prevent the running of opposition candidates.

In spite of the controls -- perhaps even because of them and the "backfire effect" of imposed regulations -- the government suffered what it considered to be a severe defeat in the elections of key states. Of particular concern were the states of Guanabara and Minas Gerais where opposition candidates won by large percentages. Once more the two groups within the National Security State clashed. This time the strength of the hardline pressure threatened to depose President Castello Branco if he insisted on the continuation of the "return to normality" policy which the hardliners believed led the country back to communism. A severe State crisis ensued solved only by the renewed application of the full power of the Repressive Apparatus with the passing of Institutional Act Number Two.
In this chapter we shall examine the major policy changes which formed the background of the political debate, the gubernatorial elections of October 3, 1965 and the resultant State crisis that led to the passing of Institutional Act Number two and the closing of this first cycle of political opening.

II. The Dialectic of State and Opposition

In 1965 the National Security State was clearly on the offensive in two fronts. Its the economic strategy called for the extension of the wage policy of *arrocho salarial* to further tighten the belt of the workers and increase the rate of capital accumulation which they believed would aid economic development. Secondly, the continuing activities of the Repressive Apparatus against the trade unions and the universities coexisted with the official policy of "return to normality".

The wage policy formulation was perhaps one of the most significant acts of the economic strategists during this period. Resolution Number 10 and the subsequent regulatory Decree-Laws were limited to the public sector. The private capitalist sector maintained market wage labor relations and salaries were decided according to the capitalist market forces but negotiated directly between trade unions and capital owners. Thus collective bargaining was still a reality and a right of workers.

From the point of view of the economic strategists, this was not a satisfactory situation for 1964 had not been sufficiently marked by
the sharp fall in salary levels which the economic team believed to be essential for the successful completion of a stringent stabilization program and a positive climate for investment.

On July 13, 1965, the government passed a law which significantly extended the salary policy of *arrocho salarial*. The preamble of this legislation contained a detailed explanation of the reasons which the government-planners believed justified the measure:

The anti-inflationary policy which the government has pursued is aimed at achieving a reasonable stability in prices by 1966. Its success depends on the development of a coherent and uniform salary policy both for the public sector of the economy and for the private sector.

The salary policy which has already been established was thoroughly observed in the public sector and in all enterprises subject to governmental control. In the private sector, however, although Labor Courts have accepted the salary raise required spacing of one year, the practice of the salary readjustments at the rate of inflation -- and sometimes even higher than inflation -- became the norm.

This situation developed because of a lack of appropriate legislation to regulate the private sector. Since experience has demonstrated that salary raises at the level of -- or superior to -- the rate of inflation are incompatible with an anti-inflationary program, it is now necessary to extend to the private sector of the economy the regulations which discipline and control the salary raises which have already been well applied to the public sector.

Law Number 4,725 of July 13, 1965 marked the actual beginning of a comprehensive salary control policy known as *arrocho salarial* which is still in effect. This legislation represented an unusual step for a capitalist State: that of direct intervention and control of the actual process of wage determination in the private sector.
The law itself proposed a formula of readjustment meant to establish the average real salary of the preceding 24 months. The formula's goal was to ensure that during the 12 months in which the new salary rate would be effective the new average real salary would be equal to the average salary of the previous 24 months plus the addition of the calculated percentage of the rate of productivity increase.

Six months after this main piece of legislation was passed another Decree-Law re-established the inflationary residue (resíduo inflacionário) into the calculation of the formula for salary raises. Finally, one year after the establishment of the wage control policy of arrocho salarial in the private sector as well as the public two complementary Decree Laws were passed in order to correct some of the loopholes which had been left in the Wage Law Number 4,725 of 1965 and had allowed some flexibility for the bargaining of wages. The Decrees Number 15 and 17, of 1966, established that the index for salary raise for the real average salary would be thenceforth decreed by the Executive Power. In addition, only the established Executive index could be used by the Labour Courts to determine the readjustment calculations of salary raises. Productivity rates of increase, however, were made flexible so as to change according to the productivity rate of the particular corporation.

Collective bargaining between labor unions and management was reduced to the discussion of fringe benefits, working conditions and the rate of productivity increase to be added to the official index.
According to the DIEESE study, the labor unions suffered severe restriction on their bargaining power since corporations tended to base themselves on this automatic wage settlement policy to refuse to discuss salary questions with the unions. "Thus", the DIEESE study concludes, "the bargaining sessions between industrialist associations and the labor unions became a dialogue of the deaf. When the workers representatives presented their salary demands, the corporations' representatives would simply say that they were forbidden by law to respond." 10

The wage policy of arrocho salarial clearly meant to eliminate the labor unions' role as a defender of the economic interests of the workers. This was demonstrated by the fact that "after Law 4,725 was passed the number of agreements between labor unions and corporations diminished and solutions were rather sought through collective bargaining suits in the Labor Courts (dissídio coletivo)." 11

It must be emphasized that the salary policy has proved to be an extremely useful instrument for the control of wages. Its effectiveness comes from the fact that it eliminates the pressure from the workers for a larger participation in the distribution of wages and income because the determination of wage raises becomes depersonalized into a technical calculation which is carried out not at the bargaining table but by impersonal and pressure-resistant State agencies, such as the National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional) and the Planning Secretariat (Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República – SEPLAN). 12
Finally, it should be noted that as wages decrease in real terms at the same time that productivity rates increase, the rate of capital accumulation also increases through the larger percentage of profit return for investment. Therefore, the salary policy fulfills a triple function: First it serves to control the rate of inflation by keeping wages down; second, it aids in the demobilization of labor by removing trade unions from the arena of collective bargaining; third, it considerably raises the rate of capital accumulation and profit.

In order to defuse the protest which was sure to come from the trade unions, the National Security State proceeded with the policy of intervention in urban workers trade unions. By the end of the year of 1965 the government had intervened in a total of 358 trade unions, had removed some of the union leaders of other six trade unions, had cancelled the elections in three unions and completely dissolved seven other labor unions. In the context of a policy of "return to normality" it was clear that the implementation of the economic model of development espoused in the Doctrine of National Security and Development was to be based upon a high rate of exploitation of the labor force which would require continuing and strong measures of repression and control of labor unions.

However, opposition groups began to slowly recover from the shock of the brutality of the repression -- particularly with the implementation of Operação Limpeza. In spite of the new interventions
the wage Law was not passed by the National Congress easily. Spurred by the seriousness of the measure, the labor movement gathered together a coalition which included the deeply purged Confederation of Workers in Industry (CNTI) and the Confederation of Workers in Education and Culture (CONTEC) to wage a joint campaign against the extension of the wage controls to the private sector. The trade unions together drafted a series of proposals and amendments to the original project of the Law Number 4,725 which were introduced in Congress for debate. Although the government retained a sufficient majority in the purged Federal Congress to block all of the proposed amendments to its original project, nonetheless, the effort united a fragmented labor movement and provided a first experience in working together with politicians of the opposition to draft alternative amendments to bills introduced by the Executive of the National Security State.

Another different area of conflict between the opposition and the State in 1965 involved the University of Brasília. The latent conflict which had begun with the first invasion of the University and the resulting investigations that suspended the Chancellor, vice-Chancellor and expelled a number of professors reached a climax in 1965. A series of successive purges of faculty were systematically carried out by the Ministry of Education. At one point 15 professors were suddenly expelled without notice or explanation. In response the entire faculty body of the University of Brasília went on strike as an act of protest against the arbitrary firings.
Students immediately declared a solidarity strike in support of the faculty members. At that point, the military Chancellor who had been appointed to run the University, called in the Military Police to occupy the campus and maintain order. Beatings and violent confrontations resulted in the sudden escalation of the conflict to the level of direct confrontation between the University faculty and students and the State. The military troops invaded the University and proceeded to carry out an "operation fine comb" (pente fino) with mass arrests. In the middle of 1965 the totality of the faculty of the University of Brasília -- two hundred professors -- submitted their collective resignations in protest against the violence of the repression. The University of Brasília was closed.  

The major conflict at the University of Brasília had deep repercussions not only within the Universities and intellectual circles but also in the Federal Congress. Leading intellectuals signed a joint "Open Letter to the Nation" calling attention to the curtailment of democratic guarantees of freedom of expression and explicitly denouncing the contradictions between Castelo Branco's stated "policy of return to normality" and professed democratic beliefs and the reality of repression and intolerance of ideas.

Congressmen and Senators condemned the use of force and blamed the government for the closing of one of Brazil's most reputable Universities. Thus the episode elicited conflicts in other Universities and served as a catalyst for a "movement of intellectuals" in defense of basic democratic guarantees of University autonomy and freedom of ideas.
The contradiction between the State's professed intention of saving democracy and the reality of ever more restricted and controlled social, economic and political environments created a crisis of legitimacy for the State.

All sectors which were specific targets of the strategy of Internal Security reacted to the repression and began to learn how to use what available political space remained. A dramatic episode of violent repression, such as the events of the University of Brasília, served to strengthen the opposition by convincing others that the government's professed democratic ideals were not a de facto reality. Thus, the very force of the repression served to increase and broaden the opposition.

The "policy of return to normality" -- in contradiction to the continuing search for absolute internal security -- attempted to gain some support in the Universities by calling for elections for the corporative-organizations of the Central Directories (Diretórios Centrais de Estudantes- DCE)

The clandestine UNE, however, called for a nationwide boycott of the elections and began to structure a parallel system of organization known as the Free Central Directories (Diretórios Centrais de Estudantes Livres - DCE-Livres) an underground network which would survive until the years of reorganization of the UNE in 1979-1980. The UNE, in addition, joined other sectors of the opposition in calling attention to the contradictory nature of the stated democratic goals of the National Security State and its reality of repression:
The climate of liberalization now being pursued by the government is false. They are the same ones who have caused the persecution and the violence which has fallen upon the Brazilian people since 1964. Now they talk about "engaging in dialogue with the opposition". (...) What they in fact are proposing to us is that we should forget the screams of our classmates who were tortured.

(...) What they are in fact proposing to us is that we forget the 3,000 University students who have been arrested since last year, who have been expelled, exiled and killed.

(...) They want us to forget Rui Guerra, director of the Student Union of Pernambuco, tortured in prison. They want us to ignore their barbaric acts, to forget the crushed hand of Ezequias Gomes tortured in a prison in Guanabara. They want us to abandon the UNE director, Heitor de Laola, imprisoned without charge for months in Ceará. They want to mould a new youth, to make it fascist, violent, corrupt and to transform this youth into the auxiliary force of the repressive State. They do not seek renovation.

(...) We will keep struggling for a real return to democracy and we join the intellectuals, today, so that together we may force a dialogue only when the violence has ceased, when we have accomplished amnesty for all and when human rights are again respected in our country. 16

The very violence of the repression -- made necessary by the Doctrine of Internal Security -- contradicted blatantly the stated goals of the Permanent National Objectives and the promises to return to normality and dialogue. Thus, the repression which is an intrinsic part of the ideology of the "enemy within" and required by the increased rate of exploitation of the economic model would serve to constantly deny the National Security State legitimacy for its actions. The opposition would always highlight this contradiction and uncover the real nature of the National Security State.

The students, intellectuals and labor leaders who experienced the reality of an oppressive situation channeled activities to the political parties most identified with opposition views. Since it was clear that other channels of dissent were severely limited the importance of the gubernatorial elections was considerably increased.

By curtailing possibilities of dissent channeled through established representative organisms, such as labor unions, student organizations and professional associations, the National Security State forced a pattern of dissent which has become characteristic in Brazil: elections cease to be a periodic mechanism for the choosing of representatives in Executive and Legislative branches of government and become an act of rebellion, taking on the political overtones of a challenge and a plebiscite against the policies of the State. Under such conditions, the parties which are most identified with anti-government positions clearly become the beneficiaries of discontent and are transformed into conduits of dissent.

In 1965 this plebiscital nature of the elections was already a fact. Thus, the very timetable of the electoral process as well as the normally bureaucratic process of party selection of candidates was transformed into a heated battle between the opposition and the hardline groups within the State. At a time of elections groups of opposition have increased political space for participation.
1. The Hardline Pressure for Electoral Controls: Power Struggles Within the State.

The military officers who were in charge of the Military-Police Investigations (IPMs) became the core of a growing hardline pressure for the continuation of the extraordinary powers of the Institutional Act Number One and for the postponement or cancelling of the gubernatorial elections of October, 1965.

The period of validity of the extraordinary powers of the Institutional Act Number One which had provided the legal framework for the Operação Limpeza and for the IPMs themselves was coming to an end. The government of Castelo Branco, in search of greater legitimacy, had committed itself to stop the wave of purges caused by the IPMs. This was greatly resented by the heads of the investigating committees who organized an effective pressure group within the State to pressure the government to take the following actions: 1. To institutionalize certain controls of the Judiciary system, particularly the Supreme Court, or to remove from its jurisdiction the legal control of crimes of civilians under charge in the IPMs. 2. To extend the discretionary powers of the Institutional Act Number One so that Operação Limpeza could be completed with the arrest of "subversives and corrupt people". 3. To cancel the elections of October.

If these more severe measures were not to be taken, then a negotiated settlement would have to be reached between the two groups in the State. The hardliners were particularly upset by the fact that there were no
explicit prohibitions against the candidacy of people who had been punished by Institutional Act Number One but did not have their political rights cancelled. Presumably, these people could therefore still vote and be voted and thus could participate in the elections. The hardliners pressured the government to enact comprehensive legislation which could permanently eliminate the undesirable opposition from participation in the elections at any level.

The pressure of the group of hardliners caused a serious political-military crisis within the State. Other officers protested the attempts to curb the freedom of the electoral process and publicly voiced their disapproval. Some resigned their Command Posts in protest. This was the case, for example of the head of the SUDEPE (Superintendência de Desenvolvimento da Pesca), General Mário Reis Pereira, who openly summarized the views of dissenters: "If the Revolution had followed its original purpose of getting the country out of anarchy, the government would not have to fear the judgement of the people as expressed in the electoral booth." 18

The basic contradiction between the stated goal of the Permanent National Objectives and the hardline pressure to tamper with elections was the actual reason for the political-military crisis. Castelo Branco finally made a firm commitment to hold the elections. In order to protest the decision and provide evidence to the internal dissent, the hardline IPM Colonels Pina, Osnelli and Martinelli resigned their posts charging that the government was not true to the commitments required by the needs of Internal Security.
It is not possible to know, in Brazil, just how many officers are part of the hardline sectors of the military. It is clear that those officers most directly connected to the Repressive Apparatus, and thus responsible for the implementation of the Doctrine of Internal Security, tend to be more prone to see the need for coercion in order to root out the "enemy within" which, according to their theoretical beliefs, are always present and could be anywhere. Naturally, they feel constrained in the proper carrying out of their mission by the limitations of the Judicial system and the legalista attitudes of other sectors who are more systematically concerned with legitimating and thereby making permanent the National Security State.

At the time of the elections of 1965 these hardline sectors were most intimately connected to the IPMs and were profoundly irritated by the potential of certain candidacies of people whom they judged to be "active communists". Thus, they applied the full pressure within the confines of the National Security State. In the words of a prominent political analyst and journalist:

The colonels, already irritated by the successive interventions of the Federal Supreme Court, which has protected from their reach people who, according to the prevailing laws, should be judged in special courts, are now afraid that all of their effort of revolutionary zeal will be lost in long judicial battles -- with even the possibility of seeing people benefit from the immunity of elective mandates or from their prestige in popular vote. (...)

there are strong indications that the larger group of military have deep reservations against the natural legal procedures of attributing to the Judiciary the power to implement laws. They would prefer, and are striving for, legislation which can be practically automatic.
There were three specific candidates for governor of states which were considered by the hardliners as "intolerable provocations". The first was the candidacy of Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, as the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) candidate for the state of Guanabara. Although a military, Lott was a nationalist who took a firm stand against the conspiracy to overthrow the government of João Goulart. The candidacy of Marshal Lott was easily declared illegal by making use of a new requirement of state residenceship which had been included in the Electoral Reform and Party Statute Package passed as an amendment to the Constitution of 1946. This required a candidate for governor, vice-governor, senator, federal or state congress to have four continuous years of residence in the state. Marshal Lott was a resident of Teresópolis, outside of the state of Guanabara and thus was eliminated from the race.

With the cancelation of his candidacy, however, the PTB chose as its candidate for the state of Guanabara Hélio de Almeida, who had been Minister of Transportation in the government of João Goulart. The IPM colonels had repeatedly attempted to condemn Hélio de Almeida to no avail. He was, however, an intolerable candidacy.

The third undesirable candidate was Sebastião Paes de Almeida a Congressman of the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) from Minas Gerais. Paes de Almeida was also considered "subversive" by the hardline sectors of the military. In his case there was one particularly aggravating circumstance: Public opinion polls in
the state of Minas Gerais predicted that Paes de Almeida would have "twenty percent more votes than the candidate who comes second in the state election for governor of Minas Gerais." His election was therefore practically assured as a candidate of the strong PSD party.

The hardline sectors forced a negotiation within the State. The gubernatorial elections could be held as scheduled if a strict law was drafted to prevent the candidacies of undesirable people. Luis Viana Filho, then Chief of the Civilian Household of the government, comments on the internal battle:

(...)

From the first moment of the struggles we could feel that the solution lay in an Ineligibility Law. Milton Campos, Minister of Justice, was entrusted with the drafting of such a legislation (...) which was introduced in Congress on June 22.

It was easy to get rid of Hélio de Almeida: all we needed was an Article in the Law which would make ineligible for any electoral post those who had been Ministers of State in the period between January 23 of 1963 and March 31 of 1964. We afterwards verified that the net had been made too narrow for with it we would also eliminate General Kruel. Thus a substitute was introduced to broaden the stipulation by excepting from this regulation those who had been in Military Ministry posts. This was the way we found to not see the ex-Minister Carvalho Pinto and General Kruel included in the law. They had both aided the civil military movement which deposed Goulart. The law also excluded from elections the ex-Secretaries of State of any governor who had his mandate suspended or cancelled. 23

The Lei de Ineligibilidades was thus carefully tailored-made.

It is not surprising that Hélio de Almeida was reported to have commented bitterly that the law had one particular and certain postal address: Avenida Vieira Souto 340, where he lived.
"Getting rid" of Paes the Almeida was more difficult. The Lei de Ineligibilidades had an Article which prohibited the candidacies "of people who are being accused of crimes against the democratic order; against public property and of abusing economic power during elections". According to Luis Viana Filho, the government had hoped to eliminate the candidacy of Sebastião Paes de Almeida by virtue of this article. Paes the Almeida, the PSD candidate who had the full support of Juscelino Kubitschek, had been accused by the military of using his vast fortune to finance his own candidacy. This plan failed for Congress was able to amend the law to stipulate clearly that only those who had been condemned for the use of economic power in elections could be considered ineligible.

With the plan foiled and the pressure of the hardline building up inside the State, President Castelo Branco finally simply applied his veto power to change and reapply the original format:

In order to stop the candidacy of Paes de Almeida (...) the first step was the partial veto of the letter "i" in Article 1 of the Law approved by Congress. Such article read that those ineligible would be all "who had been condemned for having compromised themselves directly or by using others in the exercise of abuse of their economic power in elections." The President simply vetoed the four words "had been condemned for". Without these words it was easy for us to get rid of the PSD candidate. 26

The tailor-made quality of both stipulations was no secret. The specific targetting of the Lei de Ineligibilidade became one of the major campaign items of the opposition parties of the time. In fact, this factor affected negatively public opinion and
contributed to the loss of legitimacy of the State. The Law of Inelegibility had been written in such a manner that, as Congressman Nelson Carneiro put it "every citizen could be considered incompatible with the exercise of electoral mandate." Thus it allowed ample room for the weeding out of those who were considered as part of the "enemy within". In addition it was also no secret that other Constitutional Amendments were meant to either target certain of the civilian opposition or to tamper with the Judiciary system so as to enable the Repressive Apparatus to have a freer hand with the completion of the mission of search for the "enemy within":

It is no secret that these Constitutional amendments are meant to placate the IPM colonels as much as the other amendments already introduced in Congress. One of these new amendments will restrict the right to special court and the immunity to the period in which the electoral mandate is actually being exercised. Once this amendment is approved, Mr. Miguel Arraes or Mr. Mauro Borges will be able to be arrested and the Supreme Court will be unable to help them.

The measures made public the basic and irreconcilable contradiction between the stated promise of "return to normality" and democracy of the Permanent National Objectives and the reality imposed by the requirements of the Doctrine of Internal Security. The actual election process would be influenced by this credibility gap and the ensuing crisis of legitimacy of the new State.

It should be emphasized here that these laws introduced a pattern of political crisis-management in the National Security State: legislation, particularly electoral legislation, was drafted and implemented to solve
particular political crises and to deal with specifically targeted problems, eliminate individual candidates or foci of opposition. Thus there is a certain ad hoc quality to the nature of the State-building institutionalizing measures taken by successive governments for they are designed to deal with the momentary opposition and yet become integrated into the larger context of legal structures of the State.

This pattern is an important analytical point because it shows that although the Doctrine of National Security and Development could provide a basis for a State program the civil-military coalition did not have a ready and complete blueprint for control when they seized power. The State mechanisms of control evolved gradually and in dialectical response to potential or actual opposition.

Furthermore, this immediate-problem-solving management of crises pattern which was followed as well in subsequent electoral legislation is one of the central causes for the lack of legitimacy and the inherent instability of the National Security State. It introduced into the State another contradiction: On the one hand, the State must continuously invoke the legitimation function of elections for this is tied to the ultimate goals of the Permanent National Objectives as well as the original justification for the power takeover. On the other hand, the State cannot risk losing elections -- at any level of political representation -- for it has given to elections a plebiscital nature necessary to justify its economic policies. Thus, it creates new electoral legislation to make sure that undesirable candidates are
eliminated and that the governmental party or candidates always win. The problem is that, in so doing it defeats the very legitimating purpose and function of the elections so that with every new electoral change the legitimacy of the State diminishes.


The elections were held on October 3, 1965 in the states of Pará, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Alagoas, Minas Gerais, Guanabara, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso and Goiás. These were the states with five-year Executive terms which were to have elections in accordance with the Constitution of 1946.

The voter turnout was high, reaching an attendance rate of 76.5 percent. In the state of Guanabara, with the elimination of the two candidacies of the PTB -- Marechal Teixeira Lott and Hélio de Almeida -- a party coalition between the PSD and the PTB was formed to support the candidacy of Francisco Negrão de Lima. Mr. Negrão de Lima was a close associate of ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek, and not particularly liked by the hardline sectors of the military. However, the colonels of the IPMs were unable to successfully impede his legal right to run for governor of the state of Guanabara. 29

The dissatisfaction with the government, already indicated in the public opinion polls of MARPLAN, was confirmed in the voting booths of the state of Guanabara. An unusually high turnout gave the PSD-PTB candidate, Francisco Negrão de Lima, a total of 582,000 votes, approximately 52 percent of the votes cast and sufficient for the absolute
majority requirement. Francisco Negrão de Lima received nearly 140,000 votes more than the next most voted candidate, Flexa Ribeiro of the União Democrática Nacional – UDN.  

With the elimination of Sebastião Paes de Almeida, the PSD in Minas Gerais chose as its candidate an associate of ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek, Israel Pinheiro, who was the first mayor of the new capital of Brasília during the Presidential term of Kubitschek. Israel Pinheiro received 355,000 votes as against 690,000 votes cast for the UDN candidate Roberto Resende who was supported by Magalhães Pinto – one of the main civilian leaders of the civil-military coalition that overthrew President Goulart.  

In Paraná, the government's candidate received nearly 52 percent of the vote cast thus obtaining a victory over the PSD-PTB candidate Munhoz da Rocha. However, in neighboring Santa Catarina, an opposition PSD candidate, Ivo Silveira, won easily over the government's UDN candidate. The PSD candidate, also considered of the opposition, won in the state of Mato Grosso with 53.3 percent of the votes over the UDN candidate, Ludio Coelho. In the other states the government candidates won the Executive offices.  

Thus, out of the eleven states, the opposition received an absolute majority of votes in the four most industrialized and important states: Guanabara, Minas Gerais, Santa Catarina and Mato Grosso. A fifth state, Alagoas, was an undecided race where no single candidate received an absolute majority of the votes cast. Under the law, in such a case, the Federal government appointed an interventor.
Although the government had won the majority of the states, they were the less politically significant rural states where votes are traditionally held in tight control by local bosses (caciques). In rural areas, where the latifundio, large plantations, dominate the economic system, rural peasants are often completely dependent upon the landowner. Their votes are captive and often even predetermined. A political vote-capturing system known as the "electoral corral" (curral eleitoral) has developed so that peasants are transported to the voting areas, are given free lunches, sometimes even bargain for the money price of their votes, and then are transported back to the farms. Thus, rural states have been more easily kept under the control of conservative local politicians who hold almost a monopoly of power in a particular region.

A pattern which was established in Brazil with the election of 1965 and became more pronounced throughout the years is that the National Security State was forced to rely upon the clientelistic vote-control system of the rural areas. The industrialized states, and in particular most capitals and cities of over 100,000 inhabitants were frequently strongholds of the opposition. As we shall see in later chapters this was a significant factor in future political developments and in the dialectic between the State and the opposition. 33

However, even in the rural states the elections for governor were hotly contested and the victory of the government-sponsored candidates tight. Since the government itself had emphasized the plebiscital nature of the elections it now was faced with a defeat in some of
the most important states for public opinion formation. The nature of the elections transformed them from a process of local state politics of choosing a governor to a major national issue of legitimacy for the Federal state itself and a plebiscite of the national political, economic and social policies of the federal government.

Of particular concern were the elections in Guanabara and in Minas Gerais where Kubitschek's electoral strength was shown by the wide margins of victory of his candidates. This factor could, potentially, upset the plans of the civil-military coalition for the influence of the ex-President, although himself unable to run for elections and stripped of his political rights for 10 years, was considerable. Within the National Security State the pressure of the hardline core of officers began once more to build up.

The hardline group insisted that Castelo Branco's government should intervene in the two states, appoint a governor and cancel the results of the elections. Francisco Negrão de Lima and Israel Pinheiro should not be allowed to take office. A political-military crisis ensued, temporarily solved by a compromise between the leaders of the opposition in the two states and the Federal government: the elected candidates would be allowed to take office, but the Federal government would have the right to appoint the state Security Secretary (Secretário de Segurança). The first pressure from the Federal government included the right to appoint the Treasurer (Secretário de Finanças) as well but this was finally not insisted upon.
The military-civilian coalition in power was well aware of the significant role which the local state security forces could play in a situation of national political crisis. The police forces of some states -- with as many as 20,000 men -- were a significant political trump card in the hands of governors of opposition. Magalhães Pinto, who in the pre-1964 conspiracy days was governor of the state of Minas Gerais, and Carlos Lacerda, who was equally an important civilian leader of the conspiracy against João Goulart's government and was governor of the state of Guanabara, had used their police forces very effectively to aid the military coup which overthrew the President in 1964. The lesson was not lost upon the military who did not wish to have it possibly, now, turned against themselves.

It should be pointed out here as well that the Military Police was subsequently put under the direct control of the Army and commanded always by an Army General. Thus the state police forces and the Military Police as well would be directly controlled by the Federal government in an increasingly centralized and repressive State.

The pressure of the hardliners was not lessened with the compromise reached. Although the two unwanted state governors did take office as programmed, within the State a military-political crisis reached serious proportions and threatened to overthrow the government of Castelo Branco. Observers and political actors within the State recognized that the hardline core of the military held de facto power. The President was faced with little choice but to comply with the pressures.
IV. Closing the Political Opening: Institutional Act Number Two

The government attempted to push through Congress a Constitutional Amendment which would provide for most of the measures required by the hardliners. However, this time, the usually quiescent Federal Congress rebelled and refused to accept the imposition of an amendment which would, among other things, considerably weaken the Judiciary system and further curb the powers of the Legislative branch itself.

According to Luis Viana Filho, the government applied immense pressure on the Federal Congress for the approval of this Constitutional Amendment. Within the circles of the National Security State, it was previously established that if Congress rejected the Amendment then Institutional Act Number Two would be passed by Decree of the Executive. A political crisis developed with the potential refusal of Congress to comply to its own demise. The hardline military pressure upon the President became intense:

(...) gradually, the Institutional Act became unavoidable, since, in spite of the pressure put on Congress for the approval of the governmental proposals, there was no guarantee that we would succeed in reaching our objectives. The last polls conducted in the Congress indicated that there would be only 174 votes in favour of the government's project. There were rumors that the opposition had decided it would "pay to see". At the same time, we had the clear awareness that if the President did not do something concrete to counter-balance the electoral defeat he would fall. 36

Clearly the prefered program of the more enlightened ESG/IPES group required a rubber stamp approval of the Federal Congress for essentially achieving the same purposes as would be accomplished by force -- but with a smaller loss of legitimacy for the State. Congress, however, refused to play the required role and forced the hand of repression.
Castelo Branco finally decided not to wait for the Congressional vote. The day before the plenary session was to be held on the Constitutional Amendment, Castelo Branco issued by Decree the Institutional Act Number Two. This time, there was to be not even the partial legitimating function of a Congressional approval.

Institutional Act Number Two, like its predecessor, began with a "Manifesto to the Nation". This Manifesto à Nação attempted to justify the Act itself. The civil-military movement which took power in 1964, the manifesto explained, was "an authentic revolution" which aimed at the "establishment of a new State". As such, the "Revolution could invest itself of Constituent power in the name of the people". Furthermore, the preamble promised that the "Revolution was not over and would continue". 37

The justification in the preamble made explicit reference to premises basic to the Doctrine of National Security -- particularly in reference to the danger of the "enemy within". The Institutional Act Number Two, it claimed, was required because there was danger to the nation and "subversives and agitators" were now attempting to "challenge the Revolutionary order itself". The activities of these "agitators", it continued, made it "impossible for the government to fulfill its original pledge of bringing an end to the economic chaos." The government was paralyzed because the activities of the subversive elements "made it impossible for the government to achieve the necessary order and stability with which to complete its program of economic development." 38
In fact, the entire preamble of the Manifesto à Nação was a clear statement of intentions: social tranquility defined as the total absence of opposition is essential for the implementation of the economic model of development. One could state that the governmental slogan "Development with Security" (Desenvolvimento e Segurança) was truly born with Institutional Act Number Two.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the Manifesto of Institutional Act Number Two changed the definition of who constitutes the "enemy within": The enemy now was considered to be not only all those who had been connected to the previous defeated government but also the concept was broadened to include all who "challenged the Revolutionary order itself", i.e. all members of any opposition.

The measures of control included in the Institutional Act Number Two may be divided into three categories: Those measures aimed at the control of the Federal Congress -- with the consequent strengthening of the Executive branch of the State. Secondly, those measures aimed particularly at the Judiciary branch of the State and, thirdly, the measures meant to control political representation.

The specific Articles which dealt with the control of Congress were:

**Article 2**: Reduced the necessary Congressional vote for approval of a Constitutional Amendment introduced by the Executive power from a two-third majority to a simple majority.\(^3^9\)  
**Article 4**: Transferring exclusive power to the Executive in matters dealing with budget and with the regulation of the Armed Forces.\(^4^0\)  
**Article 5**: Limited the period of Congressional discussion of all bills to 45 days and maintained the
mechanism of *decurso de prazo* by which Executive-initiated urgent bills must be considered within 30 days or be automatically approved.\(^{41}\) Article 13: Transfers to the exclusive prerogative of the Executive the right to decree a "State of Siege" and to extend its period of validity.\(^{42}\) Article 30: Gives the Executive the right to issue Compensatory Acts and other Decree Laws. Article 31: Gives the Executive the power to close the Federal Congress, State Assemblies and Municipal Chambers. During the period of Congressional forced recess the Executive would have the right to legislate in all matters.

The specific articles to limit the powers of the Judiciary included:

Article 6: Amended the Constitution in the following manner: a) the number of Supreme Court Justices was increased to sixteen judges who were be appointed by the President of the Republic. b) Federal Judges were also to be appointed by the President. c) political crimes against the State would only now be tried by the Supreme Court if they were not of the direct competence of the Military Courts.\(^{45}\) Article 8: provided that civilians tried for crimes against the National Security would be tried by the Military Courts. In addition, the special forum provided for governors and state secretaries would be eliminated and they would also be tried by the Military Supreme Court.\(^{46}\) Article 14: Suspended the special tenure, job security and non-transferability of judges as guaranteed in the Constitution.\(^{47}\) This, of course, opened the way for more purges in the Judiciary. Finally, Article 19 made all acts and decisions based upon the Institutional Act Number Two not subject to appeal or legal recourse by the Judiciary.
The increase in the number of the Supreme Court judges was meant to guarantee a favorable quorum in matters of interest to the Executive power. The fact that Federal Supreme Court Judges and all Federal Court judges would be appointed by the President plus the suspension of the Judiciary guarantees included in the Constitution allowed the Executive power to maintain a much greater degree of control over the decisions of the Judiciary branch.

In addition, the transference of political trials on questions of National Security to the Military Tribunals was a clear response to the pressures of the hardline group of colonels for it closed the openings which had enabled many of the accused in the IPMs to escape the final hatchet. Finally, as journalist Castelo Branco had predicted, the elimination of the special forum for governors and members of cabinets would allow the hardliners to arrest people like ex-governor Miguel Arraes and Mauro Borges whom the Federal Supreme Court had saved by granting them habeas corpus -- and enfuriating the IPM colonels.

Institutional Act Number Two contained important controls of political representation. First, Article 9 established that the President and Vice-Presidents would be indirectly elected by a special Electoral College composed of the Federal Congress and no longer chosen by direct popular vote. In addition, the process of election was to be open and nominal - eliminating secret balloting and increasing the military control over the delegates who chose the President.
**Article 15:** re-established the Executive's power to cancel the electoral mandates and political rights of citizens for 10 years. In addition, a complementary paragraph to Article 15 established that "there will be no substitution for the place of members of the federal, state or municipal Legislative who have lost their electoral mandates. The parliamentary quorum will be determined by the number of places effectively occupied."  

This article, it should be noted, changed the composition of the Federal Congress so that the Executive would be able to transform the Legislative (at all levels of political representation) both qualitatively -- by cancelling the electoral mandates of opposition members -- and quantitatively in such a way that the majority held by the government could always be maintained by a simple act of Executive cancelling of the necessary number of opposition members of Parliament. As we shall see, this was used in the some occasions to ensure the control of State Assemblies.

**Article 16:** Regulated the activities of the cassados and all others who had been or would be punished either by Institutional Act Number One or Number Two. It severely limited their rights: a) by cancelling the right to special forum as a prerogative of office. b) suspended their right to vote or to participate in elections of trade unions. c) prohibited comments on political matters or participation in any political activities. d) When considered necessary for National Security they would be forced to live in a predetermined
place, would have "limited freedom of movement" (liberdade vigiada) and would be prevented from going to certain places whenever the State found it inconvenient. This Article virtually included the requirements of a bill which had been introduced in Congress under pressure of the hardline sectors and had been rejected. It became known as the "Statute of the Cassados" (Estatuto dos Cassados). Its clear purpose was the elimination from political life or from trade union activities all those whom the National Security State considered to be a part of what was defined as the "enemy within".

Finally, Institutional Act Number Two, in its Article 18, abolished all existing political parties and cancelled their registration. New parties would have to be formed according to the stiff conditions laid out in the Party Statute Law, Law Number 4,740 of June 15, 1965 and to be regulated by subsequent Complementary Acts.

Institutional Act Number Two was signed on October 27, 1965 only twenty-four days after the gubernatorial elections. It was the price to be paid for the inauguration of Negrão de Lima in the government of Guanabara and Israel Pinheiro in Minas Gerais. However, as had been the case with Institutional Act Number One, the legal period of validity of Institutional Act Number Two was also limited. It was to be effective until March 15, 1967, i.e. until the end of the Presidential term of Castelo Branco. It would provide the legal framework to complete Operação Limpeza.
V. Conclusion.

The year of 1965 began in a climate of relative easing of the repressive pressures with the end of the legal validity of Institutional Act Number One. Although President Castelo Branco began an official policy of "return to normality", this policy was somewhat contradicted by the continuation of localized and specifically targeted repression. The interventions in the trade unions and in particular the violent conflict in the University of Brasília illuminated the antagonism which existed between the stated goal of a return to democracy and the reality of the requirements of the doctrine of Internal Security.

However, the liberalization gave the opposition some room in which to maneuver and this was effectively channeled to the political parties in the effort to win control of the Executive office of state governments.

The National Security State, in 1965, also moved forward with the economic model taking the most important step of extending the wage control policy to the private sector as well as the public. The policy of arrocho salarial would be the guarantee of "stability" which multinational capital required for a renewed surge of investment.

In the political and economic context of the time, the elections of October 1965 took on a plebiscital nature. This factor, as we have seen, created a legitimation pattern based upon the absolute need to win every major election. Consequently the State also felt the need to change electoral regulations in ad hoc fashion in order to
deal with the specific electoral interests of the moment. In so doing however, the State lost legitimacy and support increasing the ranks of its own opposition.

The closing of the liberal cycle (the fechadura) with the passing of Institutional Act Number Two points to a further characteristic of the National Security State. The State began to form a parallel power base within its own legal framework and legal structure of the Repressive Apparatus. Those sectors of the power coalition encharged with the maintenance of internal security saw their purpose and goals as contradictory to those of other sectors more concerned with the need to institutionalize the State on a more permanent basis of population consent. "Slaves do not make good combatants", General Golbery had once warned. The ESG/IPES sector was well aware that force alone is self-defeating as a basis for a stable State. However, this was antagonistic to the requirements of the need to implement the doctrine of internal security. This was the heart of the permanent inner State conflict between the two groups.

Finally, the year of 1965 was also important in terms of State institutionalization. The provisions of Institutional Act Number Two provided a framework in which to pursue the destruction of old State structures and the building of new ones. The end of the political parties would throw the opposition into considerable disarray and would enable the government of Castelo Branco to proceed to deepen measures aimed at long term institutionalization of the State.
NOTES

1. According to the electoral legislation still in existence at that time there should be gubernatorial elections in 11 states of the union which had a five-year term for the office of governor matching the Presidential elections. The other eleven states of the union had executive terms of four years. Elections for the governors of these latter states were held at the same time as elections for the Federal Congress. Thus, in 1965 there were scheduled elections for the eleven states which had five-year terms of office.

2. Decree-Law Number 55,762 which regulates the Foreign Investment Law. This Decree Law was passed in February 17, 1965. See on this Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinationals and Brazil, op. cit. page 59.

3. See Table 3 in the Appendix for the rates of inflation in Brazil for the years between 1960 and 1980.


6. The plebiscital nature of every election has become one of the main characteristics of the National Security State in Brazil. Forced to hold periodic elections because of its sworn allegiance to representative democracy as stated in the ultimate goals of the Permanent National Objectives the State, nonetheless, is torn by the continuing pressure of the hardline sector to not allow the opposition to acquire any real measure of political State power. Thus elections are times of crisis, inner conflict in the State itself as well as a time for the opposition groups to coalesce and vent political dissent by voting against the government.


8. Decree Law Number 57,627 regulated the inflationary residue as an element for the calculation of the percentage raises in salaries and established that if for any reason an increase was granted above the official rate than half of the inflationary residue had to be deducted from this anticipated raise. See DIEESE "Dez Anos de Política Salarial" op.cit. page 14.

10. Ibid. pages 16-17.

11. Ibid. pages 16 to 19.

12. Ibid. page 15.

13. Data compiled from Diário Oficial da União - daily issues for the year of 1965. See the table on governmental interference in trade unions in Chapter 11.

14. Information on the situation of the University of Brasília was widely reported in the press of the time. See also the complete report prepared by the Comité de Defense des Prisonniers Politiques Brésiliens, a human rights organization in Strasbourg: See, Brésil - Dossier Universitaire (Strasbourg, November 1971, mimeo)

This document was signed by over 100 of Brazil's best known writers, journalists, artists, architects, historians, movie directors, professors. It became known as the "Intellectual's Manifesto" (Manifesto dos intelectuais) and called upon the population to organize a vast movement of opposition for "individual and political rights, including the rights to opinion, association, meetings" and to fight for the end of the repression and of the "IPMs, the suspension of the interventions in the labor unions". The document ended with a plea for political amnesty to political prisoners and explicitly told the population to actively participate in the opposition parties and demonstrate their protest by voting against the government in the elections for governor of the states in October of 1965 and in 1966.

This document began an important strategy of opposition: to elicit the support of respected members of the community and address public opinion directly through "Open Letters" to be published in the press -- or when the press was too censored to be allowed to publish such documents -- to distribute and circulate mimeo copies through an underground network of opposition.


19. Ibid. Also commented by Marcus Figueiredo, Legitimidade e Coação no Brasil, op.cit. page 130


21. In April of 1965 an Electoral Code and a new Party Statute were introduced in Congress and passed by the decurso de prazo. This legislation contained many of the proposals made by David Carneiro in his conference at the ESG in 1959. The new electoral legislation was designed to reduce the number of political parties by sharply increasing the legal requirements for membership in the parties and the electoral support so that the smaller parties would be forced out of existence.

The new mechanisms in the Party Statute of 1965 were re-used in the Institutional Act Number Two and then practically rewritten in parts in the Party Reform Bill of 1979 - still in effect. See, for example: According to the Party Statute of 1965 a party to be registered in the Superior Electoral Court needed to file the by laws and program of the party -- signed by 101 sponsors and with the signatures of 3 percent of the voters distributed with a minimum of two percent in each of eleven states.

Next the party would have one year in which to form Diretórios Municipais (Municipal Directorates) in at least one fourth of the municipalities of a state and Diretórios Regionais (Regional Directorates) in at least eleven states.

After all that, the party's continued existence was subject to the constant referendum by the polls: all parties had to get at least 3 percent of the total votes cast in an election as well as having to elect at least 12 Federal Congressmen from a minimum of seven states. If they failed to meet these requirements in any election they would automatically cease to exist.

These modifications provide an interesting example of how plans of the past years before the takeover of power were re-used and re-written in slightly different ways as the needs to overcome the opposition required.

22. The poll was published by Carlos Castelo Branco in the Jornal do Brasil, June 20, 1965, page 2. Reprinted in his Os Militares no Poder, Volume I, page 266.

23. See Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. page 313. The last point included in the law meant to eliminate the secretaries of state of the governments of Miguel Arraes and Mauro Borges of Goiás as well as any member of the state government of Rio Grande do Sul under Leonel Brizola.

24. For a complete discussion of the background of the Lei de Ineligibilidade and its text see: Luis Viana Filho, Ibid. pages 304 to 340.

25. Commentary of Helio de Almeida reported to me by my brother, Mário Moreira Alves, who was then a political journalist in the Correio da Manhã and followed the events closely. Mário Moreira Alves commented that in fact Helio de Almeida was the only person who was affected by that law.

26. Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. page 315


29. The IPM colonels attempted to include Negrão de Lima in the IPM investigating the activities of the Communist Party by claiming that he had been elected mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro with support of the Communist Party. He was harrassed and repeatedly arraigned for questioning but the attempt nonetheless failed. It should be noted that Negrão de Lima was a close friend of President Castelo Branco and as such had the President's discrete support a factor which strengthened his position against the hardliners.

   It is interesting that although friends Castelo Branco was forced to publicly consider Negrão de Lima as an opposition foe due to the pressure of the sectors connected to the Repressive Apparatus.

30. In 1965 there were 8,591,064 registered voters but the actual voters were 6,574,226 for the elections of 1965. In Brazil, voting is required by law. However, due to migration and other causes there is always a certain percentage of voters who request exemption. The results of this election was reported in Brazil: Election Factbook Number 2, op.cit. page 90.
31. Brazil: Election Factbook Number 2, op.cit. page 90.

32. Ibid.

33. A relevant note here: This pattern may be in the process of undergoing a profound change due to the rapid rural union organization and the social movement in the countryside which is organized by the Catholic Church. In Chapters 9 & 10 this will be discussed in more detail and the importance of this organization for electoral changes will be analyzed.

It is a very strong possibility that in the next elections, 1982, we shall witness a surprising reversal of the traditional clientelistic relationships of captive votes in the rural areas. Although the curral eleitoral syndrome is certainly still the predominant reality of the backward rural areas, the effect of the social movement in the countryside may bring massive rural votes for the two opposition parties most closely connected to the rural movement: the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).

34. In fact, this appointment was more a matter of veto power which in practice has amounted to a direct appointment and control of the position of Secretário de Segurança in the states (all states now).

The fact that the governor did not have complete control of the security forces of his own state would be important in the demonstrations which were to follow, in 1967 and 1968, particularly in Rio de Janeiro. The police, under the command of the Federal government, shot at students and demonstrators in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Negrão de Lima, then the governor of the state of Guanabara (which was mainly the city of Rio de Janeiro) was widely blamed for this. The episode created a deep cabinet crisis in his own government as well as a considerable loss of prestige and support for his government. In reality, this measure, coupled with the administrative reforms and increasing centralization of budgetary controls in the hands of the federal government has impaired the federation and put states under the direct influence of the Executive of the federal government.

My own information on these episodes in the negotiations of this period comes from public documents, press articles and, in particular, a series of conversations with my father, Márcio de Mello Franco Alves, who was a main participant in the events and was appointed Finance Secretary in the government of Negrão de Lima. He resigned his post during the cabinet crisis which followed the shooting of the students in the streets of Rio de Janeiro in 1968.

35. See the description of the events leading to the AI 2 in Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. Chapter XV pages 332-355
36. Luis Viana Filho, Ibid. page 350.


38. Ibid. The citations are all from the Preamble of the Institutional Act Number Two entitled "Manifesto à Nação".

39. Ibid. Article 2, Paragraph 2.

40. Ibid. Article 4.

41. Ibid. Article 5.

42. Ibid. Article 13.

43. Ibid. Article 30.

44. Ibid. Article 31.

45. Ibid. Article 6.

46. Ibid. Article 8.

47. Ibid. Article 14.

48. Ibid. Article 19.

49. Ibid. Article 9.

50. Ibid. Article 15.

51. Ibid. Article 15, Paragraph (Artigo 15, Parágrafo Único).

52. Ibid. Article 16. Article 16 was later complemented and made more repressive with the issuing of Complementary Acts Numbers One and Three. Complementary Act Number 1 made it a crime to disobey the provisions of the Estatuto dos Cassados, punishable with prison terms from between three months and one year (See Complementary Act Number One, of October 26, 1965 in Diário Oficial da União, Ano CIII, Number 206, of Wednesday, October 26, 1965).

Complementary Act Number Three, established a formal system of public denunciation providing that all infractions of the Estatuto dos Cassados had to be reported by the Minister of Justice and "any person of the population (…) by written denunciation of the infraction". (See Complementary Act N. 3, of November 3, 1965 in Diário Oficial da União, Ano CIII, Number 206 of November 4, 1965.)

In keeping with the ideology of National Security, distrust and a system of denunciation was institutionalized.
53. Ibid. Article 18. We have already mentioned Law Number 4,740 and the strict requirements contained in it. It was the written version of the suggestion made during the ESG conference made by David Carneiro in 1959.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE STATE

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I. Introduction.

From the point of view of the opposition, the year of 1965 was a difficult period of confusion and disarray. The extinction of the political parties presented the opposition with a distinct challenge and took up not only the largest part of the organizational capabilities of opposition groups but, above all, fragmented the loose coalition which had been painfully built up for the elections of 1965. The opposition was consumed by internal debate in a search for new tactics or alternatives.

In addition, the State was clearly again on the offensive and Operação Limpeza, under the period of legal validity of the Institutional Act Number Two, was reiniciated to complete the purges interrupted in the time of liberalization. Thus once more the purges and the repression curbed political activities by force and intimidation.

From the point of view of the National Security State, this was the last period of the Castelo Branco government. The ESG/IPES group would experience successive confrontations with the hardline in a difficult process of transfer of power to Castelo Branco's successor. The probability of loss of immediate control of the directives of the State made it imperious that the successor inherit a system sufficiently founded and institutionalized to maintain the main structures of the governmental apparatus -- as the ESG group viewed it. Thus, the last period of the Castelo Branco government was strongly marked by the search for permanent institutionalization of the National Security State.
If a crisis within the State was to be avoided with the transference of power from one Executive to another there was need to lay down the final structures that would guide the State through the next years. In addition, the requirements of legitimacy advised the more stable incorporation of the extraordinary Institutional Acts into a body of Constitutional law.

Certain regulatory measures in the political arena would take some of the attention of State planners: the formation of the new political parties required complementary legislation as well as delicate political negotiations to avoid divisions in the ranks of the ruling sectors which had to be herded together into one party. More important, new electoral mechanisms of control needed to be introduced so as to avoid the periodic crisis of gubernatorial elections in the states. Institutional Act Number Three, as we shall see, provided the necessary controls.

The economic model was further refined in this last period with the passing of the new regulatory decrees of the wage policies and the drafting of a comprehensive program, the Time in Service Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servico - FGTS) designed to replace previous job security provisions and create a special fund to be used for capital accumulation.

Above all, however, the State searched for permanent institutionalization. Thus, the importance attached to the drafting of a new Constitution which could permanently incorporate many of the
measures taken temporarily in the Institutional Acts or Complementary Acts. Ideally, this new Constitution would be passed by the Federal Congress, but the mechanisms incorporated into the Constitution were such that Congress did not acquiesce. As a result, the National Security State was once more forced to use its main source of power: force.

II. The Extended Net: The Opposition in Disarray

The immediate aftermath of the Institutional Act Number Two provided the State with maneuverability on two fronts: First the extraordinary powers of the Act enabled the Repressive Apparatus to complete the "clean up" operation which had been interrupted by Castelo Branco's policy of normalization in 1965. Secondly, the extinction of all political parties and the strictness of the requirements for the organization of new ones, forced the opposition to concentrate all of its energies in the actual rebuilding of the political structures of representation. And thirdly, the increasing repression and imposition of electoral controls occasioned a debate as to the validity of organization within legally defined institutions.

1. The Second Cycle of Purges.

The passing of Institutional Act Number Two constituted a period which Marcus Figueiredo termed as "the second cycle of coercion". A series of new purges began immediately and would continue until the expiration date of the extraordinary powers of the Act Number Two. However, although every branch of the State and the bureaucracy suffered a new wave of purges, these were much less extensive than
in the course of the first cycle of repression. This fact demonstrates the intention of extending the net of Operação Limpeza in order to complete the process of removal of members of the opposition.

Institutional Act Number Two was used to cancel the electoral mandates of seven members of the Federal Congress, 36 members of the State Assemblies and only one member of the municipal chambers. The Executive posts of the states and municipalities suffered more severe interference, with the cancelation of the electoral mandates of four governors and vice governors, seven mayors and vice-mayors and two members of state cabinets.

In the civilian bureaucracy of the State, as we have seen in Table 3.2, by far the most affected branch was the Judiciary, with a total of 91 purges between the years of 1965 and 1967. Out of the total of 122 cassados of the period in the bureaucracy of the State, the largest purges were in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, followed by the Ministry of Education with 15 cassados. This was clearly a strong response to the independent stand of the judiciary system in the judging of habeas corpus petitions and in the cases of ex-governors Miguel Arraes and Mauro Borges. The growing conflict between the de facto ruling group of hardliners and the Judiciary system was resolved by the controls written into the Act followed by systematic purges of dissenters. The purges in the Ministry of Education, similarly, were a response to the challenge provided by the support to the faculty of the University of Brasília in its conflict with the State in 1965.
The sectors of the military that disagreed with the path which the National Security State was clearly choosing were also cleansed of its main leadership: Institutional Act Number Two was used to purge 28 officers of the Armed Forces. Five officers were removed from the Army, nine from the Navy and fourteen from the Air Force. The sector of civil society most deeply affected by the continuation of Operação Limpeza was the labor movement. By the end of 1967 there had been a total of 908 governmental interventions in trade unions of urban workers alone. This amounted to 79.8 percent of the urban workers trade unions then in existence. In addition, the government canceled union elections in 12 trade unions during the years 1966-1967 and dissolved 69 trade unions. The policy of strong intervention in trade unions -- coupled with dissolution of many -- was to be completed by the formation of new unions under direct governmental sponsorship. Thus, not only would the leadership of the labor unions be almost completely replaced by government-appointed officials (interventores) but entirely new unions would be organized to replace those destroyed. This policy would become a strong element of the government's handling of the labor movement through a combination of repression and active involvement in "ghost unionization".

In addition, the labor movement was weakened by the creation of the FGTS and the decrees which established the automatic wage policy and contributed to remove from unions most of their bargaining power thereby strengthening their purely corporative welfare structure.
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2. **Difficulties in Party Organization**

Complementary Act Number 4, passed on the 20th of November, 1965, provided for the regulation of the political parties and modified, in some parts, Law Number 4,740 -- the Party Statute. According to Complementary Act Number 4, the new parties would have to be formed by at least 120 Congressmen and 20 Senators within the period of 45 days after the passing of the Act. All members of Parliament, within 30 days, had to decide which party to belong to under penalty of being prevented from participating in Congressional Committees. The names and acronyms of the extinct parties could not be used in any way by the new parties.

In order to be able to accommodate all the different warring factions of its own support party, the Complementary Act Number 4 allowed for different slates for the same political post of the same party. Thus, in a state where the government's party counted with the support of a strong ex-UDN candidate as well as an ex-PSD party -- traditional rivals -- it could present two candidates for the posts of governor or senator of the state. The system of sublegenda was geared to the accommodation of the ruling groups within a single party. However, to present a candidate for the more important post of Senator or governor, a party had to have the backing of a minimum of five percent of the voters in the state who had voted in the last election. Other requirements were already included in the Party Statute Law of 1965.
As will be recalled, the Party Statute Law of 1965 had been specifically designed to reduce the number of political parties. Its mechanisms made it extremely difficult to organize and to maintain a legal party. A party of the opposition, not counting with the bureaucratic resources which the governmental party could rely upon, would be hard put to come up with the registration's requirement of signatures of 3 percent of the electorate distributed with a minimum of 2 percent in each of eleven states. The added requirement that parties organize within the period of one year municipal directories in at least one fourth of the municipalities of a state created a situation of near panic in the ranks of the opposition.

Furthermore, it was felt to be rather unlikely that the opposition party would find the required legal number of Congressmen and Senators courageous enough to risk their electoral mandates by joining a party regularly chopped by the hatchet of the cassações. Most would rather be eased into the comfortable sublegendas of the governmental party than risk being considered a potential enemy. Those who had, up to then, escaped the purges were understandably conscious of the need to preserve their electoral mandates. Joining the opposition party, at that time, was an act of temerity.

However, it was not in the interest of the National Security State to abolish all parties and become a one-party system. One must recall that the theoretical legitimation of the National Security
Doctrine was its opposition to one-party totalitarian systems. Therefore, for its own legitimacy, the State needed an opposition party -- but a controlled, purged, "responsible opposition party" which should provide only what the government termed to be "constructive criticism" to the policies of the State.

Therefore, in order to allow the opposition legal party to exist, the rules were softened. The new rules required only that the party unite as many members of parliament as it could in a single organization. Faced with the concrete problems of legally organizing a new party the major opposition parties banded together in one -- named Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB). The majority of the members of the new party came from the extinct PTB which had been the delegation in Congress most seriously damaged by the Institutional Acts Numbers One and Two. Other members came from the PSD, the PDC and the smaller minority parties.

The government's party, by far the majority, was named Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA) the National Alliance for Renovation. The name itself indicates the intention of changing the structures and the support base of the State. The ARENA had a total of 254 Congressmen and alternates and the MDB had 149 Congressmen. The main body of the ARENA came from the extinct UDN. However, it also included 50 Congressmen from the PSD, 33 from the PTB and 18 from the PSP. Sixteen of the 43 Senators of the ARENA were previously in the PSD and another 4 came from the PTB.
III. Playing the Electoral Game: The State on the Offensive

Three months after the gubernatorial elections and the passing of Institutional Act Number Two the National Security State came to terms with the problem of the elections for governor scheduled to be held in the remaining eleven states at the end of 1966. These, according to the Constitution of 1946 still then in effect, were to be held simultaneously with elections for Congress and for State Assemblies.

On February 5, 1966, Institutional Act Number 3 was issued: Its first Article established that gubernatorial elections would thenceforth be indirect. The State Assemblies of the states would elect the governors of the state by an absolute majority vote which would be nominal and open. The mayors of all capitals would be appointed by the governors of the states. Other mayors would be still elected directly by popular vote. 10

From the point of view of the State the Institutional Act Number Three was necessary for the control of the large and important states of the federation. The elections of 1965, as we have pointed out, showed that the military-civilian coalition in power could maintain control of the rural states, particularly in the Northeast, by making efficient use of vote control patterns and clientelistic relations. However, in the more advanced and industrialized states, the speed of information and the higher level of politization and education necessary to the very process of capitalist modernization
made it impossible to apply the same clientelistic practices. Thus, the mechanism of control had to involve more subtle electoral maneuvers.

The preamble of justification for the Institutional Act Number Three was clear in the intention of the State to maintain a high level of control of civil society in order to carry out the objectives which involved primarily the economic development and modernization of the society in ways described in the Doctrine of National Security and Development:

Considering the imperious need to adopt measures which will ensure that the objectives of this Revolution are not frustrated;

Considering the need to preserve tranquility, social and political harmony in the nation;

Considering that it is absolutely necessary to extend to the governors the indirect election method already applied to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency;

Considering, furthermore, that it is convenient for National Security to change the method of choosing the mayors of the capitals of the states...

The need to institutionalize control at every level of political power in order to carry out the objectives of the Doctrine of National Security was explicitly stated. Indirect elections by State Assemblies allowed for a strong measure of control of the Executive of the states without resulting in as much a cost for legitimacy as direct intervention would entail. State Assemblies could be kept under the majority control of the
federal government, if need be, by the selective use of cassações with the canceling of the electoral mandate of opposition members. Thus, although couched in an apparent covering of legality, the process of election of governors became an act of almost direct and clear appointment.

The process of selective cassação in order to ensure the governmental's majority was used in different occasions. For example, one of the most important incidents involved the gubernatorial elections of 1966. The opposition MDB party in Rio Grande do Sul had presented as its candidate for governor of the state a highly respected jurist, Rui Cirne Lima. Members of the government's own ARENA party joined with the MDB in order to elect Cirne Lima governor of the state and rejected the attempt to impose another candidate. Under threat of expulsion the ARENA State Assemblymen could be held in line. However, even in this case the government's majority was slim, with 27 votes of the MDB against 28 of the ARENA. In order to extend the margin of the government's majority in the State Assembly Castelo Branco cancelled the electoral mandates of 3 MDB State Assemblymen and one MDB alternate. 12

Political representation was continuously limited by the canceling of opposition electoral mandates. Once organized as a legal opposition Party, the MDB suffered during this period a series of further cassações: In 1966 it lost seven members of
of the Federal Congress and 38 members of the State Assemblies. In fact, the constant altering of the electoral legislation, coupled with the permanent purging of the party through the canceling of electoral mandates caused an intense internal debate within the MDB on the validity of its very existence. Some members of the party argued for self-dissolution as an ultimate protest against the arbitrary actions of the government and as a way of showing the de facto one party nature of the system.

The position which the MDB did take, however, was to continue to utilize whatever channels were still open for political participation and continuously counteract the government's appeal to legitimacy by pointing out the reality of oppression. As an example of this de-legitimizing tactic, when the Institutional Act Number Three was passed Senator Daniel Krieger, then the government's majority whip in the Senate, justified the legislation by explaining that "the elections brought a series of disturbances which the Revolution does not permit and does not desire, in its attempt to safeguard the democratic institutions. The government wanted to spare the country of the agitation of direct elections for the governors of the states." 13

The contradiction between the government's language of democracy and the actions which limited ever more strictly any political participation and representation in government was sharply pointed out by the opposition members of Parliament. The MDB Congressman
Josafá Marinho pointed out that although the "words of the government proclaim democracy, the facts establish a dictatorship". This could be shown by the reality which, according to MDB Congressman Franco Montoro, of São Paulo, had been one in which the government had "been traspasing the Constitution through Acts which abolish parties, suspend direct elections, suspend the secret ballot, eliminate the guarantees of the Judiciary and the Legislative and generally disrespect the laws."  

The arbitrary nature of the Complementary Acts and regulations passed by the Executive became more clearly evident in the period of mid-1966 as the government intensified the offensive to prepare for the coming elections. In the months of June and July alone the Executive issued a total of 18 Complementary Acts regulating the conditions of elections, of party registration of candidates, of loss of municipal mandate, intervening in one state and in municipalities and limiting the powers of the Federal Congress to legislate on matters of budget still further. During the entire life period of the Institutional Act Number Two President Castelo Branco would issue a total of 36 Complementary Acts. 

Significantly, just before the gubernatorial indirect elections, Complementary Act Number 19 was passed establishing a precept of party discipline which prevented any legislator to switch parties in cross-voting for the candidates of the opposing party in either Presidential or gubernatorial indirect elections.
In retaliation to the measures of Complementary Act Number 19 the MDB party took the official stand to abstain from voting in the indirect gubernatorial elections. The government counter-attacked by issuing a further Complementary Act providing for the automatic suspension of the political rights of any legislator who would not participate in indirect elections as well as making use of its power to cancel the mandates of several opposition members. Thus, the MDB was forced to participate in the process of indirect elections although it was not allowed to win any executive office.

In fact, the measures taken by the government intended to provide for an artificial bi-party system in which one party -- that of the "responsible opposition" -- was forever condemned to be opposition. It was not in the interest of the National Security State, however, to have a declaredly one-party system although in practice this was almost the complete reality of the political system imposed by the force of extra-legal Institutional and Complementary Acts.

The Congressional elections of 1966 were held in this climate and were further hampered by a campaign of intimidation of the Federal Congress and of the opposition party. The participation of the MDB party in the Congressional campaign was limited first by its inability to organize itself in all of the states and secondly by a large scale cancelling of the registration of candidates which the MDB opposition party did present. It will be recalled that the Ineligibility Law provided for the cancellation of the candidacy
of all who were either incompatible "with the objectives of the Revolution" or could be considered to infringe some of the other requirements of the Ineligibility Law. In the state of Guanabara alone twelve MDB candidates were denied the right to run for office on grounds of being "subversive". In the state of Rio de Janeiro, just before the final deadline for registration of candidates, the MDB confronted the problem of having six of its main candidates and 13 nominees challenged and threatened with impugnação (cancellation of the registration). In fact, according to a political analyst,

the officials of the Electoral Courts throughout the country set out on a violent offensive against the registration of candidates for the Federal Congress and the State Assemblies. Candidates were blocked even for the amazing reason of "having once, in public, called President Castelo Branco a gorila." 

The intimidation campaign had a double-function: it meant to weaken the MDB party and guarantee a complete victory for the governmental ARENA party. In addition it aimed at the establishment of a crisis atmosphere which would facilitate the government's negotiations of the new Constitution with a highly intimidated Federal Congress and opposition party. Thus it was, so to speak, the preparation of the ground for the sowing of a highly authoritarian Constitution meant to institutionalize the National Security State.

The rapid succession of Complementary Acts and Decree Laws combined with the attempts of the government to limit Congress's participation in the drafting of the Constitution occasioned a
veritable rebellion, rather than the acquiescence, of the Congress. The government's own party, the ARENA, joined ranks with the opposition in demanding the right to amend and draft proposals to the Constitution -- a demand which was systematically denied by the government. The conflict between the Executive power and the Legislative reached a climax on October 12 of 1966 when the President issued a Decree which cancelled the mandates of six Federal Congressmen.

Castelo Branco had publicly promised the President of the House of Representatives, ARENA Congressman Adauto Lúcio Cardoso, that the Federal Congress would not be intimidated by further rounds of cassações so that it could freely vote and discuss the Constitutional project. Politically embarrassed by this obvious lack of prestige the ARENA party rebelled. Congressman Adauto Cardoso refused to recognize the cassações and ruled that the purged Congressmen should rather continue to exercise their regular functions as Representatives. In fact, the President of the House opened the floor most particularly to the six cassado Congressmen to allow them the opportunity of defense. The crisis escalated to a breaking point when the power of the Executive was fully used against Congress:

The conflict between the Executive and the Legislative has been definitively installed. Yesterday, Congressman Adauto Cardoso, of the ARENA, officially stated the view of the Presidency of the House of Representatives that the cancellation of electoral mandates should be an issue of the exclusive "and inalienable competency" of the Congress.
The President of the House made clear also that he considers the six Congressmen purged to be in their full and rightful exercise of their prerogatives as Parliament members. (...) The response of the Executive was most immediate. It sent agents of the DOPS and arrested Congressman Doutel de Andrade. (...) However, with this action, the Executive called in the Judiciary into the crisis because the MDB leader Vieira de Melo immediately filed an habeas corpus to secure the parliamentary immunity of the arrested Congressman. 21

The explicit force of the Executive united the two parties. The MDB and the ARENA parties rallied in support of the action of the President of the House. Within a matter of hours, the crisis reached the Senate, whose President publicly expressed his full solidarity with the actions of the Presidency of the House. For the first time a major governmental party leader publicly expressed his rebellion against what he termed the "militarization" of the Executive power. His action, Congressman Adauto Cardoso emphasized, was the act of "defense of a civil power, the Legislative, against the coercion of a military power, the Executive". 22

The crisis brought with it further struggles between the main currents within the National Security State itself. Pressure from the hardline sectors insisted on new cassações and an exemplary treatment of the disobedience. For the second time in his short term in office Castelo Branco was forced to cave in: On October 20, 1966, the Executive retaliated by issuing Complementary Act Number 23: which decreed the closing of the Federal Congress for one month. In addition, the President would be empowered to
legislate at will during the period of enforced Congressional recess.

It is significant to point out that, once more, the preamble of the Complementary Act which closed Congress used the language of democracy to justify an act of explicit coercion:

"Considering that the Federal Congress now has a small group of counter-revolutionary elements who attempt to bring tumult to the workings of the House of Representatives and thereby harm the public order as well as the approaching Congressional elections of November 15.

(... and in order to prevent the loss of prestige and authority of the Legislative Power of government (...) the President decides to issue the following Complementary Act. (...)

It is to be noted that the concept of the "enemy within" has now been expanded to include almost the totality of the Federal Congress, including the members of the government's own party the ARENA. This points to a characteristic of the National Security State which does not allow it to completely eliminate opposition but rather "displaces" it from one sector of civil society to another, from one group to another thereby constantly enlarging or creating new opposition.

The lack of legitimacy of the acts of explicit coercion further enhance this displacement effect. The concept of National Security, used in such flexible contexts, to enable the application of full physical force of the State in the name of a defense of "democracy" highlight the basic contradiction at the core of the National Security State. In this episode
of the closing of Congress in 1966 this point was symbolically emphasized by the fact that at the very moment in which Castelo Branco was signing the Complementary Act of closing the Federal Congress in order "to prevent the loss of prestige and authority of the Legislative Power," the buildings of the Federal Congress were being surrounded by a strong military force armed with machine-guns and ready to force the rebellious members of Parliament physically out of the premises. 24

With the Federal Congress now closed, the government's full attention could be turned to the coming Congressional and State Assembly elections. The MDB, as was mentioned, was unable to participate in a number of places. In addition, its political campaigning was severely curtailed by the first direct and explicit acts of prior censorship of the media:

In the midst of all the anxiety and uncertainty, the government established a special censorship system in the radio and television programs against candidates who wished to comment on certain subjects which were prohibited -- including the Congressional forced recess. The situation became so serious that the Electoral Court judges, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul, protested that their activities had been taken over by the Secretaries of Security of the states. 25

Thus the opposition MDB party had to face threats of further cancellation of electoral mandates coupled with the cancelling of the registration of some of its main candidates and in addition to that, with prior censorship of the television and radio. The MDB had a third, and potentially even more significant problem: its own
lack of credibility among the various groups of opposition in civil society. The rigorous limitations upon political party organization and of the Legislative itself fueled a debate within the other sectors of the opposition -- in particular the student movement -- as to the wiseness of supporting the "official" opposition party. Many groups did not consider the MDB surviving members to be truly representative of the opposition for the successive purges had left for the most part those who could be considered "responsible and constructive." Therefore, the argument against supporting the MDB was similar to that made within the party itself: one should refuse to allow the government to maintain the appearance of a two-party system by unmasking its de facto condition of a totalitarian one party government.

In consequence, many opposition groups in 1966 made the conscious political decision to urge voters to void their votes or to vote in blank as a sign of protest. The student movement had begun to reorganize and its first clandestine Congress of the UNE was held in 1966. Students conducted silent protest marches and demonstrations in the main cities and engaged in growing confrontations with the Military Police.

In political terms, the student movement became divided in strategy: the sector connected to the organization Ação Popular, an offshoot of the Catholic movement of Popular Action, held a secret Congress in Uruguay and opted for armed struggle and deliberate
non-participation in the elections of 1966. They spearheaded the campaign for *voto nulo* (annulling the vote) which started with the Congressional and State Assembly elections of 1966 and acquired a growing importance in the electoral results of 1968 and 1970. However, other sectors of the student movement worked both in the clandestine underground organization of the parallel structures of the illegal UNE and in legal vehicles of opposition such as the MDB party. 27

The elections of 1966 were general for the Federal Congress, State Assemblies and municipal chambers. There were a total of 22,387,251 eligible voters in that year but only approximately 77.2 percent of actual voters, a total of 17,285,566. 28 The results of the election for the three major political levels of representation were as follows:

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<tr>
<td>FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL (for 1966)</td>
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<td>ARENA</td>
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<td>MDB</td>
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<td>VOID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seats won by ARENA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seats won by MDB</td>
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Source: Fundação IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (1967)
The government's ARENA party received, for the Federal Senate, 56.6 percent of the vote as against the MDB's 43.3 percent. In the Congressional and State Assembly elections the difference was larger for in those elections the impact of cancellation of registration of candidates, the non-participation in the election and the cassaçôes was more strongly felt. In the Congressional and State Assembly elections the Federal government was able to exercise tighter control. This was reflected in the results, with the ARENA receiving 63.9 percent of the votes and the MDB 36 percent for the House of Representatives. For the elections in the State Assemblies the ARENA received 64.1 percent of the votes and the MDB received 35.8 percent.

The impact of the campaign for voiding of votes (voto nulo) in protest could be observed and made a significant difference for the defeat of the "official" opposition party: In the important Senatorial elections, there were 11.6 percent of blank votes cast and a further 9.3 percent of annulled votes. In the elections for the House of Representatives this percentual difference was also increased, with 14 percent of blank votes and another 6 percent of void. The State Assemblies showed a similar trend: 12.1 percent of blank votes and 6.5 percent of void votes.

The actual voting process was conducted, in many places, in an atmosphere of military occupation. Troops occupied the cities in some of Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte and Rio Grande do Sul as well as being an ostensive presence in most capitals. In addition, there was widespread claims of corruption and vote-buying in the
rural areas. Even Congressman Francelino Pereira, just re-elected by the government's ARENA party was forced to comment that "what happened in the last election was shameful. We never heard or had news of such widespread electoral corruption in my state. The buying of votes was ostensibly and openly carried out without any shame." 30

The defeat of the MDB was caused by a combination of factors. Clearly the climate of intimidation and the weakening of candidates through the successive purges of impugnações which eliminated from the race the best politicians of the MDB as well as the clientelistic vote-buying habits in rural states had a significant role to play. However, two other factors are important to consider in the analysis of the electoral results of 1966: First the effect of the number of void and blank votes which were cast and secondly, the weakness of the opposition itself, which had been definitely forced into a defensive position having to reorganize the political arena from scratch in the face of extremely difficult and repressive circumstances.

IV. Institutionalizing the National Security State

The year of 1966 was concerned with three particular problems for the State: First of all there was the transference of power problem with the succession to President Castelo Branco whose term in office would expire in March of 1967. Second, the wage-policies of the State were not working appropriately due to the strong system of worker job security after a number of years in the company. Some
further refining of the economic model along those lines were clearly necessary. Third, it was crucial that Castelo Branco and the class coalition he represented leave the State in a minimally secure form of organization and institutionalization.

All the other changes, Complementary Acts and actions of the government were in reality secondary and mere adjustments to the basic model of State structure which had to still be built. Thereby the importance of total control of the drafting of the Constitution and the willingness of the Castelo Branco government to risk the enormous legitimacy cost of closing down Congress in order to force and impose its own version of a Constitution.

The underground intestinal war within the National Security State, connected to the transference of Executive power, would determine the pace of the reforms. The military-civilian sectors coalescing in the candidacy of General Arthur da Costa e Silva obtained significant support in the right and hardline sectors of the Armed Forces. General Costa e Silva was not the choice of President Castelo Branco or the ESG group. The basic strategical differences between the two groups made them engage in a continuous power struggle — in which the ESG group was clearly losing ground. Eventually, General Costa e Silva was in fact imposed upon President Castelo Branco. The ESG group was defeated in what, for them, was truly considered an internal war:

The defeat to the group connected to General Costa e Silva has become known by the significant designation of the First World War. In the course of the governments of Costa e Silva
and Garrastazu Médici, the Geisel group retired in order to meditate upon the causes of their defeat. Meditation, evaluation and future planning all occurred in the old building of the Petrobrás, in Rio de Janeiro. Once he got back in the government, Geisel and his team prepared themselves to launch the Second War.

One of the first consequences of recognition of defeat and planning for the future was the requirement to refine the economic model and draft a Constitution -- to be imposed by force upon the Federal Congress if necessary -- before transferring power to the other rival group in the National Security State. There was a clear need to "leave the stamp" upon the structures of the new State in such a way that it could be considered at least partially molded in accordance to the plans of the ESG/IPES group now in power.


The impact of the wage control legislation was lessened by the provisions of job security guarantees which had been established in the labor laws of pre-1966. The legislation in effect until 1966 established certain basic guarantees against the lay-off of workers: Workers with between one and ten years of service in the same company were legally entitled to indemnity payments when laid-off without just cause. This payment was equal to the equivalent of one month's salary per year of service in the company. These sums could amount to considerable quantities and therefore discouraged corporations from conducting any large scale lay offs. In addition, workers with more than 10 years of service in the same company achieved job "stability"
and could not be fired without a prior court procedure in which it was up to the employer to prove that the worker was guilty of serious misconduct and thus that discharge was justified. Workers with more than one year of service in the company, furthermore, were entitled to a 30-day notice of lay-off prior to dismissal and to a sum equal to one month's extra pay as indemnity. 32

If the employer attempted to discharge a worker with job "stability" and lost his case in court, he was by law forced to rehire the worker and cover all of his legal costs as well as to provide him with full back payment of wages. If it was agreeable to the worker, the employer could avoid rehiring by paying the worker twice the indemnity rate.

The efficacy of the job security legislation of the period prior to 1966 has been analyzed in its importance as a progressive program of worker employment guarantee. It avoided, to some extent, the problems of mass lay-offs and highly mobile capital flight such as is commonly found in the "run away shop" economic transfer of capital from one sector or area to another in search of higher profits.

The strict regulations in the system of job security were a source of much irritation to multinational corporations which required, in particular, the freedom of the market place to establish wage levels and to freely move investment capital to wherever labor costs were lower and therefore profits higher. The high cost of laying off one workforce in order to close the plant and move elsewhere limited the
complete free-flow of capital and its potential profitability. In addition, "job stability" meant a certain predetermined level of base-salary which could not be diminished by the automatic wage control legislation already put into effect and regulated to a simple index once per year.

Thus, from the point of view of multinational capital, the job stability system was a drain of capital and an undesirable impediment to the freedom of investment and the free-play of minimum-base salaries. It must be pointed out here that the wage-control system of the government established the maximum rate of index raise which could be given to a salaried worker in the space every 12 months. It did not, however, establish the minimum. The minimum salary was decreed separately periodically also by the Federal government. Negotiations between trade unions and employers often involved the question of the base-salary (salário base) or the minimum salary which should be payed to that particular professional grouping. With the system of job stability in effect it was difficult for employers to force "stable" workers to accept a smaller salary and they could not -- without incurring in considerable expenses -- fire them for that reason alone. A high rate of layoffs aids corporations in hiring workers for cheaper salaries since the reserve of those who are seeking employment establishes a climate of insecurity that forces workers to sell their labor-power cheaply. The job-security system had, thus, been a victory of the unions in the past years and limited the impact of the wage-control legislations.
In September of 1966 the government created the Time in Service Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço - FGTS) a program designed specifically to replace the job security provisions of the previous labor legislation. The most important features of the new program were: It did not recognize job stability status of any kind and it greatly reduced the immediate cost of discharging non-stable workers. The elimination of the job security status meant that now employers could fire a ten-year of house employee without a special court hearing, without just cause or having to prove any kind of offense on the part of the worker. Thus, the distinction in time of service between workers was eliminated. A worker who had served in the same company for 20 years or more had the same rights as a worker who had just been hired or had less than one year in the company.

The manner by which indemnity payments were made was also significantly altered. Under the new program of the FGTS employers must make deposits every month of eight percent of the wage of the worker to individual accounts which are kept in the worker's name. These deposits create a fund, which under the new law replaced the indemnity obligations of the employer. Therefore, when a worker is layed off now he removes the sum of the indemnity payment from his own account of the FGTS. This process eliminated the need for the employer to come up with large sums of indemnity payment at once in periods of mass layoff and largescale firings for contraction of investment or to close a plant and move capital elsewhere.
The simple process of "indemnity by installment" freed the employers to increase the rotation of the labor force — thereby keeping general wage-payments lower. The indemnity payments which made employers think twice before laying off a large number of workers all at once now did not have to be made at the time the worker was actually dismissed.

Theoretically, the FGTS is an optional program for workers who may, at the time of employment, choose to stay with the old program of stability. However, in practice workers are not hired if they do not sign their option for the FGTS.

The importance of the FGTS in making the wage control policies of arrocho salarial of the National Security State viable cannot be overestimated. In fact it may be stated that the wage control policies of the State were most effective because of their combined application with the general insecurity of the job market and the threat of mass layoffs made possible by the end of the stability system.

The new labor movement which surfaced to the forefront of the political arena in 1977 has been devoting increasing attention to the problem of the high turnover in the labor force and its impact upon the wages. Labor unions have consistently, however, denounced the FGTS which allows the practice of the corporations to circumvent wage contractual obligations by firing workers just prior to the legal contract date and hiring lower paid workers.
immediately following a contract. In this way, the agreed index raise will be applied to a lower base-salary. Union leaders often expressed the disapproval of the circular firing-hiring practice of corporations -- particularly in the automobile industry -- where workers who are fired by Volkswagen are then hired by Ford to do the same job with a lower salary (and vice-versa among all the different multinationals in the industry). 34

A study conducted by DIEESE measured the relationship between those workers who left voluntarily and those who were dismissed in the years of 1977, 1978 and 1979. The results showed an increasing proportion of workers dismissed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYEES DISMISSED AND THOSE WHO LEFT VOLUNTARILY</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VOLUNTARY LEAVING</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISMISSED</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIEESE, study of 1980
Published in Isto E, April 30, 1980, page 91

The situation of job insecurity has tended to become more severe in 1981 with the explicit recessionary policy of the government and the massive layoffs in the industrial sector of the economy. The problem of application of a strict monetarist policy with enforced
recession is, from the point of view of the State, considerably lessened by the removal of the impediments to the large-scale lay-offs which existed in the job security system of the years up to 1966.

The combination of the wage-control automatic raise salary and the FGTS have provided an ideal labor market for capital investment. When added to the positive incentives of fiscal and tax deductions they provide the foundation of the economic model of development based on high rates of exploitation of the labor force.

Another important function of the FGTS for the acceleration of capital accumulation has been its role as an actual source of investment loans to employers. The FGTS has been largely used as a bank which the State manipulates freely to grant loans to corporations for investment purposes. The monthly installments paid by the employers have raised a considerable fund which is channeled to the National Housing Bank in order to finance construction as well as to other projects which may be tapped by industries engaged in government-approved investment programs. The relationship between the amount of the fund which is withdrawn by fired workers and the amount which remains in deposit for capital loan to industries may be observed in the graph and data (see Graph 5.1) the FGTS fund has grown throughout the years and is a source of major capital for loans on investment. With the addition of the interest on the net fund plus the percentage for inflationary correction (correção monetária) the total amount, by 1975 was 48,407 millions of cruzeiros.
THE FUNDS OF THE FGTS (in Cr. $ millions)

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>2,706</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>5,586</td>
<td>7,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITHDRAWAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>6,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net Total: (including interest and inflationary correction) 48,407
Inflation correction (correção monetária): 19,003
Total Net: 26,392
Interest: 3,012
Total Withdrawal: 19,726

SOURCE: Veja, April 7, 1976, page 71 From Banco Nacional de Habitação.
The FGTS has served the dual purpose of capital accumulation through the lowering of wages and the availability of a subsidized fund for capital investment. Thus, as labor lawyer José Martins Catharino has emphasized in his work, the FGTS should not be considered as a labor-legislation but rather as a financial-economic law which was drafted by the Roberto Campos-Bulhões team in order to "extinguish job security, accumulate capital and make Brazil a more attractive country for multinational investment." 36

2. The Constitution of 1967: A Political Analysis

The victory of the ARENA, the closing of the Federal Congress and the weakening of the opposition allowed the National Security State a certain breathing space in which to forcefully enact the necessary institutionalization of the State.

The Constitution, it had already been decided, would in any case be imposed on the nation. However, if the Federal Congress could be intimidated into ratifying the text already written by the Executive power, it would save the State some loss of legitimacy particularly in view of the international image of the government.

In order to accomplish these goals certain basic conditions for the Congressional performance had to be established. Thus, Institutional Act Number 4 was decreed on December 7, 1966:

The Constitution has become absolutely necessary for the proper institutionalization of the ideals and the principles of the Revolution. (...) Only a new Constitution can give continuity to the revolutionary work. 37
The Institutional Act Number Four testified both to the intent to alter the existing framework of the State in search of permanent institutionalization and the requirement that this be done with the covering of legitimation of Congress -- albeit an intimidated body which had just suffered a severe blow to its independent status. Thus the Act reconvened Congress for an extraordinary session in order to discuss and ratify the Constitution which had already been elaborated. The procedures under which Congress was to discuss and vote on the Constitution were described in detail in the Act. They were highly restrictive.

It should be pointed out that the procedures inverted the regular legislative process: first the project needed to be accepted as a whole and only after that could it be fully discussed and amended. In addition, as opposition Congressmen were quick to point out, this was the first time that a Constituent Assembly would be convened by force of an absolute power and given a specific time frame in which to discuss a Constitution. In spite of the restrictions, Congress presented a total of 1,504 amendments. Due to the lack of time few were considered and even fewer were included in the original text. However, the weakness of the opposition in Congress was demonstrated by the fact that it did vote along the governmental lines: The Constitution -- almost in its original version -- was passed in the House of Representatives by 223 votes against 110. In the Senate there were 37 votes for, 17 against and 7 abstentions.
a) On the Separation of Powers.

For the purpose of political analysis we shall consider the areas of the Constitution which particularly deal with the prerogatives of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. The 1967 Constitution had a number of self-contradictory definitions. For example, it established the complete separation and independence of the three branches of the State "except in the cases which are defined in this Constitution." These exceptions were those which had been established in the Institutional Acts Numbers One and Two and later refined by a series of Complementary Acts.

The Legislative, as we have seen, was considerably weakened by the transference of prerogatives to the Executive and specific controls upon legislative procedures -- including the maintenance of the decurso de prazo technique of automatic Executive bill approval. The decurso de prazo was now extended to a period of 45 days for Congressional consideration of urgent Executive bills. In addition, a new measure was introduced: bills introduced by the Executive -- even if not urgent -- had to be considered in a special time limit of 60 days.

Perhaps the most important measure included into the Constitution was the Executive's exclusive right to legislate on all matters which involved "National Security and Public Finance". To Congress, in such cases, was reserved only the right of approval or rejection and not of amendment.
The controls of the Judiciary which had been established in Institutional Act Number Two were completely incorporated into the text of the Constitution. This included the transference of judicial handling for crimes against the National Security to the military courts.

The restrictions on the powers of the Legislative and the Judiciary, now with Constitutional force, were of such nature that it may be stated that the Constitution of 1967 implanted a State based almost exclusively upon Executive power. The role of the Legislative became secondary, reduced to essentially a function of amendment and improvements of Executive-introduced bills. The Judiciary's role, also made secondary for it removed many of the legal prerogatives of supervision of the two other powers, was essentially defined as that of supervising the regular application of the laws. But the sole and de facto political, legal and legislative power lay in the Executive.

The Executive power was further strengthened by the method of indirect elections of the President and Vice-President which was established by Institutional Act Number One and was now incorporated into the Constitutional text. The sole innovation was the extension of the Electoral College which now would be composed of the Federal Congress plus three delegates from each State Assembly. This, of course, should remove any possibility of opposition control of the Presidential Electoral College by majority in the Federal Congress.

Finally, at this point it should be emphasized that in the Constitution of 1946 the President did not hold the legislative initiative,
could not legislate by Decree Laws, could not appoint the mayors of municipalities considered to be of interest to National Security and did not have the exclusive prerrogative of total mobilization of the Armed Forces. 45

b) The Weakening of the Federation.

The centralized power of the Executive branch of the Federal State was reinforced by the Constitutional articles which decreased the power of the states. As such the Federation was considerably altered. The states' powers had already been limited by tributary measures, by regulation of election of governors and mayors of municipalities and by the appointment of the states' Secretary of Security and the inclusion of the Military Police in the Armed Forces.

All of the state-weakening measures were included into the Constitutional text. The tributary measures, perhaps of most practical control significance, maintained the collection of taxes within the jurisdiction of the Federal government which would then distribute the income to the various states and municipalities. This lack of fund-independence has been an important instrument of control of local state and municipal governments. If an opposition develops all that the Federal government needs to do is cut off funds. 46

The most important innovation of this section of the Constitution dealt with the conditions under which the Federal government may directly intervene in the states or in the municipalities: In the Constitution of 1946, intervention was allowed only in case of external
aggression and war. The Constitution of 1967 changed the wording so as to allow intervention "in cases of grave disturbances of the public order or the threat of possible occurrence of disturbances." This allows, in fact, Federal intervention in the states and municipalities practically whenever the government believes itself to be under threat or even a potential threat. In addition, and of significance for the institutionalizing of the Doctrine of National Security and Development, the Federal Executive was specifically permitted to intervene in states which refused to "adopt or comply with the economic program or the financial directives established by the Union." These measures give the Federal Executive ample power to militarily occupy any state of the federation.

Finally, all of these measures were equally applicable to the municipalities. The National Security Council, an agency of the Presidency of the Republic, was given exclusive prerogative of deciding which of the municipalities of the nation should be considered an area of interest to National Security. These municipalities (municípios de Segurança Nacional) have an appointed mayor and are strictly kept under the control of the Federal State. There are now in Brazil approximately 130 National Security municipalities. It should be recalled here as well that mayors of all capitals were to be equally appointed by the governor of the state and not directly elected by popular vote. It is to be noted, however, that the governors of the states were to be directly elected. Although
this measure was passed as an amendment to the original project and constituted a victory of the opposition in the Congress, it was later reversed by a further Constitutional Amendment which reinstated the indirect gubernatorial election method. 49

c) Institutionalizing the Economic Model

The Doctrine of National Security and Development, as has been discussed earlier, includes a specific conception of economic development. It is to be noted, at this point, the significance of the inclusion of elements dealing with the economic policies of government into the body of the Constitution. This aspect is perhaps most revealing of the State's intention to institutionalize the economic model.

Title III of the Constitution of 1967 transformed economic premises of government into a Constitutional matter. Certain basic regulations -- which should properly be a matter of governmental policy -- were now an intrinsic part of the text of the Constitution. Their inclusion would force every subsequent government to follow economic policies along the lines which had been established by the Castelo Branco government. A change of policy would require a Constitutional amendment, which is, naturally, much more difficult to accomplish than simply changing the economic policies of a government.

One of the provisions to strengthen the economic model was a particular emphasis upon the closing of potential loopholes that would allow states to maintain a certain flexibility in pursuing their own model
of development. The economic model espoused in the Doctrine of National
Security and Development was considerably reinforced by provisions
which forced all states and municipalities to conform to a central
directive planning of the Federal government. These measures instituted
a system of mixed planned economy which would facilitate the process
of capital accumulation and increase the attraction to multinational
investment. According to the new stipulations states could no longer
decide on matters of nationalization of foreign corporations in their
jurisdiction or even establish individual state controls over the
activities of multinationals. This, of course, was to eliminate the
possibility of a repeat of the controls which were implemented by
Leonel Brizola, when governor of Rio Grande do Sul, and Miguel Arraes
in his term in office in Pernambuco.

Other institutionalization measures of the economic model of
development in the National Security Doctrine were included into
the text of the Constitution. The special section on the economic
model regulated economic investment, the economic role of the State,
the rights of land tenure and of soil rich in minerals and the rights
of workers.

The Constitution defined the Brazilian economy as capitalist
but with reserved spaces for State capital investment. It was to
be an economy based on "freedom of initiative" with established
areas for the economic activities of private capital and the State.
Article 157, for example, provided that the State had the right
"and the implicit duty to engage in economic activities when it is
indispensable for reasons of National Security or in order to organize a sector which cannot be efficiently developed under the system of free competition and freedom of initiative". Thus, the State would invest in areas which were not profitable in short term basis but were required for infrastructural improvements which would aid the profits of private (both national and foreign) capital. This last point was emphasized in Article 163, which stated that the "State would engage in economic activities in order to supplement private initiative." In order to fully understand the significance of these regulations one needs to consider the conditions of investment in infrastructural improvements in an underdeveloped country. These are, in fact, considerable investments which are necessary for the profitability and even feasibility of other corporate activities. Projects such as the construction of railways, roads, ports, bridges, dams, commercial centers of deposit, etc. are unprofitable. These are the kinds of investments which are "suplementary to private initiative". The State took on the burden of these investments in order to allow the necessary infrastructural improvements for private initiative to carry forth other profitable investments. This burden has been, in part, responsible for the alarming escalation of the Brazilian foreign debt. Another important area of economic interest regulated in the body of the Constitution was the question of the property of soil
rich in mineral deposits. Article 161 of the Constitution provided that the mineral deposits, as well as other sources of potential hydraulic energy, were to be considered "property which is distinctly separate from the property of the soil itself." For the purpose of investment and development of mineral deposits the actual owner of the soil had rights only to the participation "in the results of the mining" which was further defined as "equal to the tax rate on the minerals mined". The actual mining could be undertaken only with authorization of the Federal government to be given to Brazilians "or to social organizations set up within the country".

The wealth of the mineral resources in Brazil, by 1967, was already fully established and mapped out. It included immense deposits of iron, bauxite, manganese, gold, uranium, aluminum, copper and other minerals of importance in industrial development. As has been previously mentioned, mining corporations had come under attack in past governments and specific restrictions to their access to the vast mineral resources of the nation had been included in corporate control legislations passed by Congress in the periods from the late 1950s to 1964. Hanna Mining corporation, in particular, had been the center of a crisis immediately preceding the fall of the government of João Goulart.

As far as multinational capital was concerned, one of the major stumbling blocks to proper access to mineral deposits lay in the definition of private title to land. If a private land owner refused
to sell his little farm plot rich in uranium, for example, or demanded a high price for his land, potential investment would be hampered. Thus the separation of soil property rights from sub-soil mineral wealth effectively removed such an obstacle. In addition, the words "or to social organizations set up in the country" allowed the government to provide multinational corporations with exclusive mining rights. All that Bethlehem Steel, Alcoa Aluminum or Hanna Mining corporation, to give just some of the examples of multinationals which are actively engaged in mining, needed to do to qualify for the governmental concessions -- which included tax advantages and deductions -- was to form a Brazilian subsidiary company.

The one mineral which was not of direct immediate interest to multinational capital was petroleum. The process of research and development is costly in a country which is apparently not rich in this particular resource. What is profitable, however, is the refining and the distribution of petroleum and petrochemical products. Prior to the Constitution of 1967, all research, exploration, refining and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products were legally under the monopoly control of the Brazilian State since the campaign that created the Petrobrás. Article 162 of the Constitution of 1967, significantly modified the wording of the previous Constitution so as to open the distribution and refining of petroleum and petroleum products to private enterprise. The same was true for the petrochemical industries. As we shall see later in our analysis
of the economic model of development in Chapter 9, these sectors have been the areas which have become almost one hundred percent under the control of multinational corporations.

Finally, the Constitution of 1967 regulated the labor force and the wage market. Article 157 included a specific prohibition of strikes in public service and in essential activities. The system of the FGTS was introduced into the text of the Constitution in Article 158. Finally, the legal minimum working age was reduced to the age of twelve years old -- institutionalizing a system of child labor which would be of importance for the lowering of the labor costs and would incur in significant social costs.


In the text of the Constitution of 1946 the concept of National Security was related to the concept of foreign aggression, the defense against external forces and the defense of territorial frontiers. The Constitution of 1967 changed this definition in order to adjust it to the requirements of the Doctrine of Internal Security with its theory of psychological warfare and the "enemy within" the nation. As we have been pointing out, this theory established great emphasis upon the internal enemy. The threat to national security was therefore defined as a threat of the ideological frontiers rather than that of the territorial frontiers. This is a specific point included both in the writings of General Golbery do Couto e Silva and in the ESG documents. This section of the Constitution incorporated this concept.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the Doctrine of Internal Security -- as an integral part of the Doctrine of National Security and Development -- significantly changed the traditional definition of National Security to include the conception of National Security as defined by ideological rather than territorial frontiers. Thus the enemy was specifically defined as those who may threaten the interests of the State "or the constituted authorities" from inside of the nation. The enemy is potentially internal, rather than by definition external to the nation. The logical consequence of the application of such a concept is the implantation of the Repressive Apparatus and the network of information for internal control in a definitive incursion into the area of civil society.

In addition, the duty to guard and carry out the necessary defensive measures of National Security was not only of the Armed Forces but was imposed upon the civil society as well: "Every individual and every juridical entity is directly responsible for National Security". Individuals and juridical entities were to be held responsible for the defense of National Security -- as defined in the concept of the Internal Security Doctrine. Potentially, individuals and organizations of civil society could be criminally held responsible for the failure of providing information on the activities of those whom the State considered to be a part of the "internal enemy". As is the case in totalitarian states, individuals are juridically turned into informants.

In order to carry out the proper implications of the defense of Internal Security, the Constitution provided for the creation of
the National Security Council. This would be an agency of the Presidency and should work closely with the organizations of information and security. Specifically, Article 91 of the Constitution of 1967 defined the duties of the National Security Council as "the study of problems related to the question of National Security in collaboration with the agencies of information and in order to prepare for national mobilization of the Armed Forces as well as other military operations." 60

In addition, the National Security Council was to make administrative and economic decisions in areas considered to be "of interest to National Security" including the granting of land, the control of transportation, of communication systems, the construction of bridges, roads and airfields and the establishment of industries of particular interest to National Security. The specification of which areas would be defined within the realm of "interest to National Security" was an exclusive prerogative of the National Security Council.

The creation of and inclusion into the Constitution of the National Security Council complemented the legal framework and foundation for the Repressive Apparatus. The SNI and the entire structural agencies which gathered information and applied the physical controls were to be ultimately and structurally tied to the National Security Council which, by definition of the Constitution, was answerable only to the Executive branch of the government.

The members of the National Security Council are: The President, all Ministers of State, all members of the High Command of the Armed
Forces (Estado Maior das Forças Armadas, EMFA) and the Chief of the Civilian Household (Chefe da Casa Civil). The powers granted to the National Security Council transform it into the heart and the brain of the National Security State: it is the ultimate power coordination team within the apparatus of the State.

e) Political and Individual Rights.

The political controls of elections and of the Legislative which had been established in Institutional Acts Numbers One and Two were included into the text of the Constitution of 1967. This was also extended to other complementary legislation such as the Ineligibility Law (Lei de Ineligibilidades) which took on a Constitutional force. Similarly, the regulations pertaining to political parties were already previously established in the Party Statute Laws and in the Complementary Acts already mentioned.

What should be mentioned in particular, at this point, is the significance that the Bill of Rights was included into the Constitution. From the point of view of the National Security Doctrine this was in compliance with the requirements set forth by the Permanent National Objectives which explicitly stated support for individual guarantees such as the right of habeas corpus, freedom from domicile invasion, the right to defense and trial by juri, the right of assembly and association and the right of freedom of expression. In addition, the Constitution also upheld the Legislative right to parliamentary immunity -- thus eliminating the automatic method of cancelling electoral mandates of members of the opposition parties. According to the Constitu-
tution of 1967, a member of the Federal Congress or State Assemblies could only lose his mandate -- or indeed even be tried for a crime against National Security -- after explicit permission from the Legislative body to which he belonged. 62

The securing of the Bill of Rights was a victory of those in the Federal Congress who struggled to amend the original project of the Executive. The matter occasioned heated debates in the floor and considerable political pressure from all sectors of the opposition was applied upon the Executive for the inclusion of the basic individual, associative and political rights into the text of the Constitution. It is interesting to note, in addition, that the arguments of members of the opposition for the inclusion of the Bill of Rights referred explicitly and directly to the stated goals of "democracy" in the Permanent National Objectives which the National Security State claimed to defend.63 The opposition was therefore able to hold those in power to the element in their theory which was in direct contradiction to their practice.

The maintenance of the basic individual and legal right guarantees and the prerrogative of parliamentary immunity was to be extremely important to the political developments of the next few years. Their inclusion allowed the opposition some space in which to organize politically to demand greater margins of participation in decisions of government and the full application of the rights themselves.
V. Conclusion.

The year of 1965 was the beginning of the dialectic of the State and the opposition. The continuation of Operação Limpeza and the force of the repression "displaced" opposition from one sector of civil society to another rather than eliminating the causes of opposition. The State, in 1965, learned to "play the electoral game", constantly changing the electoral legislation in order to adjust to its interest of majority control. On the other hand, the very actions of the State provoked changes in the opposition itself eliciting an internal debate as to the different strategies of resistance. The opposition, with the passing of Institutional Act Number Two, became divided into the groups which argued for the preparation of armed struggle in response to the increased violence of the State and those groups willing to make maximum use of whatever legal institutions existed.

The year was, however, characterized by an offensive of the State for weakening the opposition in order to impose further necessary measures of institutionalization. The major theme of the year, from the point of view of the State, was the search for permanent institutionalization of the economic model and the political structures of control required to implement a State model based on high rates of exploitation and specific advantages to foreign capital.

In order to accomplish the dual goals in structural building, the National Security State first conducted the purges, the intimida-
tion of the political parties and the Federal Congress so as to win sufficient breathing space to implement the major measures required before the transfer of power to Castelo Branco's successor: in the economic arena the creation of the FGTS, as we have seen, complemented the effects of the wage control policies and allowed for an ideal climate for capital investment with low labor costs.

The Constitution of 1967, as was discussed in the brief analysis, incorporated the most important mechanisms of control embodied in the two previous Institutional Acts and in a variety of Complementary Acts. All such measures were transferred to the Constitutional text. Thus, these mechanisms of control ceased to have a temporary force as a law of exception, based, as the Acts themselves had stated, upon Revolutionary power. They acquired, rather, the force of Constitutional power, and the State could now appeal to a legitimacy embedded into the Constitution itself. These measures altered the major structures of the State and institutionalized the Doctrine of National Security and Development.

Although the Constitution of 1967 was highly authoritarian in nature it also reflected the basic contradictions within the theory of National Security itself. One part of the Constitution was designed to control and to allow the application of the requirements implicit in the Doctrine of Internal Security and the internal enemy. The other part, which the opposition was able to impose in the amendment of the Bill of Rights, reflected the goals of the Permanent National Objectives.
As the dialectic between the State and the opposition developed more intensely in the years of 1967 and 1968, this basic contradiction would be at the root of the institutional crisis that culminated with the complete closing of the circle with the passing of Institutional Act Number Five.

The institutional crisis was rooted in the fact that the democratic element in the Constitution allowed the opposition some maneuverability in which to act by appealing to the ultimate goals of democracy and demanding greater participation of the population in the decisions of the government -- which was denied by the control mechanisms of the other parts of the Constitution. The climate of liberalization which would ensue with the effective date of the Constitution in March of 1967 would also allow labor to reorganize and protest the decline in the wages and living conditions caused by the economic measures of the government.

On the other hand, those sectors concerned with the search for absolute security and the maintenance of internal security would view the protests as acts of communist infiltration and possible paths of penetration in the context of the indirect strategy of international communism. Thus, they applied the other parts of the Constitution -- which guaranteed the National Security aspects in the defense of the specific model of development also written into the text. The result would be a confrontation the proportions of which will be discussed in the next chapter.
NOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. pages 151-159.

4. See Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 , page 131.

5. See Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 , for the purges of the military in the years between 1965-1967, page 134.

6. In 1966 there were a total of 1,158 urban workers trade unions in existence. In 1967 this number had slightly decreased to 1,137 due to the cancellation of the registration of some unions. See Table 8.12 in Chapter 8 for the total number of Confederations, Federations and trade unions in Brazil from 1964 to 1979.

7. The data on governmental interference in trade unions from 1964 to 1979 may be found in Table 8.14 in Chapter Eight.


See also, Diário Oficial da União, November 4, 1965 for the text of the Complementary Act Number 4, which was passed on November 20, 1965.

9. The PTB had lost in Congress 24 deputies, as compared to 7 lost from the PSD, 5 from the PST, 4 from the PSP, 3 from the PSB, 2 each from the PDC and the UDN and one from the PR.


11. Institutional Act Number 3, preamble, ibid.

12. The episode cost Castelo Branco a serious cabinet crisis. The Minister of Justice, Milton Campos, a jurist himself and a liberal, resigned his post in protest and refused to carry out the order to cancel the mandates of the State deputies. See the account of this crisis in Luis Viana Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco, op.cit. pages 400-406. See also the discussions of journalist Carlos Castelo Branco in Jornal do Brasil, June 12, 1966, page 2 and June 23, 1966, p.2.
13. See: Folha de São Paulo, February 5, 1979, page 4 "Há Treze Anos o AI-3 Marca a Via Indireta".

14. Ibid. The opposition Congressman was Josafá Marinho. The article of the Folha de São Paulo also quoted the reaction of the major newspapers of the time which stressed the contradiction between the language of democracy and the reality of repression. See for example the citations of the paper editorials: from the Diário de Notícias: "the worst policy is the one which expresses the government's fear of the people"; from the Correio da Manhã: "The AI-3 is one of the saddest documents of our history"; from the O Estado de São Paulo: "No one should now have illusions as to the significance of what the President of the Republic has been doing. The content of the AI-3 is aberrant"; from the Jornal do Brasil: "Public opinion is not indifferent to the changes and the results which all of these maneuvers will bring to our institutions. Public opinion awaits anxiously the return to a normal democratic process"

15. Franco Montoro, now a Senator for the party which has succeeded the MDB (the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - PMDB), was widely cited in the press. This statement was cited in the article of Folha de São Paulo, February 5, 1979, page 4.

16. See Complementary Acts Numbers: Complementary Act Number 10 of June 4, 1966; provides for the automatic cancellation of the electoral mandates of members of state, federal or municipal governments who have had their political rights cancelled; (in Diário Oficial, June 7, 1966); Complementary Act Number 11 of June 28, 1966, providing for Federal intervention in municipalities (Diário Oficial, June 30, 1966); Complementary Act Number 12, of June 30, 1966 declaring intervention in the State of Alagoas (Diário Oficial, June 30, 1966); Complementary Act Number 13, of June 28, 1966, changing an article in Complementary Act Number 9, (Diário Oficial, June 30, 1966); Complementary Act Number 14, of June 30, 1966 stipulating that there will be no substitution for members of state, municipal and federal legislature who resign their mandates (Diário Oficial, June 30, 1966); Complementary Act Number 15 of July 15, 1966, regulating municipalities (Diário Oficial, July 18, 1966); Complementary Act Number 16 of July 18, 1966, establishing a party discipline rule whereby if a legislator votes for the candidate of the opposing party his vote is considered void (Diário Oficial, July 20, 1966); Complementary Act Number 17 of July 29, 1966, with new party registration rules (Diário Oficial August 1, 1966); Complementary Act Number 18, limiting still further the legislative power of the Federal Congress on matters of budget (Diário Oficial of August 1, 1966).

17. See Complementary Act Number 19 of August 9, 1966, in Diário Oficial da União, August 9, 1966. This was to prevent ARENA dissent voting.
18. This was part of the conclusion of the Military-Police Inquiry (IPM) into the activities of the Communist Party in the nation. After two and one half years of investigations and repeated arraignments for questioning the IPM of the Communist Party finally was completed. It consisted of 157 volumes and annexed documents with an extensive list of almost one thousand people indicted. Important political names such as João Goulart, Juscelino Kubitschek, Francisco Negrão de Lima, Doutel de Andrade, Aarão Stenbruck, Lutero Vargas, Amaral Feixoto, Iara Vargas, Edna Lott, Rubem Cardoso, Marcio Moreira Alves, Cid Sampaio, Hermes Lima, José Sarney, Franco Montoro and dozens of names of professors, congressmen, mayors, aldermen, journalists, editors, documentarists, judges, artists, officers of the Armed Forces and priests. For more information see Última Hora, October 14, 1966. Also discussed in Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do Brasil de 1967 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967), page 329. The IPM do Partido Comunista was published by the Biblioteca do Exército Editora in four large volumes entitled O Inquérito Policial Militar Número 709.

19. See Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do Brasil de 1967, op.cit. page 330. A "gorilla" was the name used to describe rightwing military in power.

20. The six Congressmen who lost their mandates were important opposition MDB politicians: Deputies Doutel de Andrade, Sebastião Paes de Almeida, César Prieto, Abraão Moura, Humberto El Jaick and Adib Chamas. Castelo Branco had specifically denied rumors of new cassações aimed at obtaining Congress's acquiescence to the plans for the Constitution. Thus, he greatly embarrassed the ARENA's leadership by making a public pledge, which the politicians repeated on the floor of Congress to counter accusations of Executive pressure upon the Legislative made by opposition members, and later issuing the Decree cancelling the mandates without even bothering to inform the leadership of the ARENA. For a detailed account of this crisis between the Legislative and the Executive see Carlos Castelo Branco, Os Militares no Poder, Volume I, pages 579 to 582. See also, Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do Brasil de 1967, op.cit. pages 328-329.


22. Cited in Ibid.

24. For a vivid account of the military troop operation conducted against the Federal Congress on October 20 see the political columns of journalist Carlos Castelo Branco in the Jornal do Brasil and reprinted in his Os Militares no Poder, Volume I, pages 586-587. See also Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do Brasil de 1967, op.cit. pages 330-332.


26. For an account of the clandestine Congress of 1966 of the UNE, which was held in a convent in Belo Horizonte see: O Reporter, June 1978, page 79 "1966: a UNE realiza seu Primeiro Congresso Secreto". See also MEMOREX: Elementos para uma História da UNE (São Paulo, Edições Guaraná, DCE-Livre "Alexandre Vanuchi Leme" da Universidade de São Paulo, 1979). The MEMOREX gives the following summary of the Secret Congress:

"The UNE conducted its 28th National Congress of Students between the celebration of two masses. It was a forbidden meeting which had been prohibited by the Federal government and which provided the government with the pretext for conducting a large military search and arrest operation in the city of Belo Horizonte. The meeting itself was held in secret in the Convent of the Franciscan Monks. There, dozens of delegates met and spent up to 5 days in the Convent. They mixed in with the faithful in order to arrive during a mass, and then again in order to leave -- carrying in their minds the resolutions of the Congress which had been learnt by heart."

Because of the growing repression, the "displacement effect" of opposition was already clearly moving sectors of the Catholic Church to protect members of the opposition who were being persecuted and even facilitate the holding of secret meetings. Through later years, the Catholic Church, which had originally supported the military takeover, moved more firmly into the opposition and resistance to the military became definitely "displaced" into the Catholic Church as an institution.

27. For an account of the various strategies of the student movement during this period and of the underground political organizations and the secret meeting in Uruguay see: Jean Marc von Der Weid, Brazil: A Political Analysis ... op.cit. pages 13 to 26.

28. See Table 11 in Appendix, "The Brazilian National Electorate from 1960 to 1978".
29. See Table 9.2 in Chapter 9 for the complete information on elections from 1966 to 1978. Table "Federal and State Elections in Brazil From 1966 to 1978".


31. See: André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979) page 16. It is interesting account of the inner-battles within the State for the transference of power between the group of the ESG (Geisel, Golbery, João Batista Figueiredo, Heitor Aquino etc.) and the hardline sectors not connected to the ESG, who espoused a more drastic repressive strategy of institutionalization of the State. The authors trace back the succession struggle to the "First War" in the succession to Castelo Branco -- lost by the ESG group -- which was later won when General Ernesto Geisel took power in 1974 and managed to make his successor General João Batista Figueiredo, in the difficult and conflict-ridden process of power transfer which became known as the "Second War".

32. This description of the job stability program is based largely upon the work of Kenneth S. Mericle in his Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System, PhD Thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1974) pages 120 to 126.

33. The system of FGTS has been analyzed in the important work of Vera Lúcia B. Ferrante, FGTS: Ideologia e Repressão (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1978). Much of the discussion which follows is based upon this detailed account of the origins and effect of the forced savings fund system.

34. This policy has been documented by DIEESE in sectoral studies measuring the layoffs which occur in particular industries in periods immediately preceding wage-salary deadlines and immediately following. See the report in Isto É, April 30, 1980, page 91 for a summary of the DIEESE study of 1980. See also Veja, July 25, 1979, pages 100-101

35. The inflationary correction (correção monetária) was an innovative creation of the Campos-Bulhões team which allowed capital to not lose with inflation. A percentage increase according to the rate of inflation would be added to funds, deposits and other capital sources.

36. The Brazilian lawyer, specialist in labor law and professor of the University of Bahia, José Martins Catharino emphasizes that the system of FGTS was "not a choice but rather an act of coercion". In his experience there are very rare companies who will hire workers who have not opted for the system of FGTS. Veja, April 7, 1976, p. 71.

38. Institutional Act Number Four. Ibid. The Committee would have 72 hours in which to discuss and vote on the Constitution project in toto. Then the entire Congress, in a joint session, would have four days to discuss the project in plenary session. After this period the project would return to the Committee for consideration of the amendments for a period of 12 days. Finally, a joint plenary session of Congress would have to discuss all the amendments and vote as a block within a period of another 12 days.


40. Ibid. page 336.

41. The text of the Constitution of 1967 may be found in its totality in Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do Brasil de 1967, op.cit. page 364. This is a commented analysis of the legal implications of the major changes between the Constitutions of 1946 and the new Constitution of 1967. Osny Duarte Pereira highlights, by comparison of articles at each point, the authoritarian components of the Constitution of 1967 and the major modifications introduced by it. See page 364, Article 6.

42. In Ibid. See particularly Articles 34, on page 419, Article 36 on page 422, Article 64, on page 459, Article 61 on page 475 and Article 56 on page 445, and Article 50, page 435.

43. Article 57, page 445 and Article 58, page 446.

44. See: Article 106, page 492; Articles 111, 112, 113, 114 in pages 493 to 499; Article 116 regulating the Tribunais Federais de Recursos on page 499 and Articles 120, 121, and 122 regulating the Military Supreme Court, pages 505-506 particularly deal with the controls of the Judiciary and include many of the provisions of the extraordinary Institutional Acts.

45. Article 83, page 477.

46. The Constitution of 1967 includes a section entitled "Tax System" (Sistema Tributário). It includes Articles 18 to 28. These Articles establish the precise tax rights of the states and the exclusive rights of the Federal government. In his analysis of the measures in these Articles Osny Duarte Pereira states that "a way of weakening the Federative system has been the measure whereby the central government (a União) has the exclusive right of charging and collecting tax
tributes and then it is the Federal government which re-distributes the taxes among the states and the municipalities. Dependency is established by subordinating the states to the distributive power of the central government." See Ibid., page 409. Articles 18 to 28 are in pages 393 to 416. Article 28, in particular, deals with the actual distribution of taxes.

47. Ibid. Articles 10, 11 and 12 in pages 375 to 384.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid. See paragraph 2 of Item VII of Article 13: "The election for the governor and vice governors of a State shall be by universal suffrage and direct and secret vote." page 385. Of course, an amendment passed on the Constitution altered this article and included into the text the indirect system of gubernatorial elections.

50. Ibid. See Article 157, Item 8 in page 550.

51. Ibid. See Article 163, Items I, II and III in page 553.

52. Ibid. See Articles 161, pages 552-553 and Article 162, page 553.

53. Ibid. See Article 162, page 553.

54. Ibid.


56. Ibid. Article 158, Item XIII, page 551.

57. Ibid. Article 158, Item X, page 551. There has been an increasing tendency of corporations to replace adult labor with child labor for legally a minor receives a smaller minimum wage than an adult. The result in terms of social costs and increase in child labor in Brazil has been significant and dramatic. We shall discuss this aspect in detail in our analysis of the social costs of the economic model of development in Chapter 9.

58. Ibid. Section V: On National Security, pages 180 to 184. This section of the Constitution was entirely devoted to the concept of National Security and its effective structural implementation. In previous conceptions of national security it was defined as the defense of the territory of the nation against the aggression of other nations. The State had the explicit duty to guarantee the territorial integrity of the nation by means of defense of the territorial frontiers against possible invasion. This was the duty of the Armed Forces in traditional theory.
59. Ibid. Article 89, page 480.

60. Ibid. Article 91, page 481. The description of the measures, powers and members of the National Security Council which follow are all included in this Article of the Constitution of 1967.

61. Ibid. Article 148, page 527. These may be also found in Article 143, page 523 and Article 144, page 524.

62. Ibid. Chapter IV. "On Rights and Individual Guarantees". See particularly Article 150, Items 1 to 35 for the Bill of Rights, pages 532 to 536.

63. Ibid. Osny Duarte Pereira provides an interesting comparison of the Constitutional text as it was originally drafted by the Executive with the amended text passed eventually by the Federal Congress. The account of the Congressional debate on the question of the individual rights may be found in pages 536 to 542.
CHAPTER SIX: LIBERALIZATION, OPPOSITION AND STATE CRISIS:
THE MAKING OF INSTITUTIONAL ACT NUMBER FIVE

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I. Introduction.

The years of 1967 and 1968 were specifically characterized by the dynamics of the dialectic of the opposition and the State. The pattern of political liberalization following a period of severe repression was continued and deepened by the government of Costa e Silva. The legal validity of the extraordinary powers of Institutional Act Number Two ended in the early part of the new government allowing a new loosening of political tensions and built up pressures.

The National Security State, believing that the Constitution of 1967 served the foremost necessary purpose of longer-term institutionalization of the regime, slowly applied a "policy of relief" meant to defuse the growing opposition to the repressive tactics of the security forces and to coopt into the corporative system the new labor leaders installed officially in the unions after the massive purges were completed.

The opposition, on the other hand, utilized to the fullest the new political space made available for expression in the controlled "relief" policy of the new government. A climate of decreased repression allowed for more open forms of opposition organization and expression. Demonstrations were one of the formats which this opposition strategy took in order to mobilize the population and increase the awareness of public opinion as to the major goals of the opposition movement.
The contradictions existent between the policy of relief and controlled liberalization and the actual practice of repression of the security forces was latent in the period of 1967 and surfaced to a severe institutionalization crisis in 1968. As the opposition of students became increasingly manifested by large street demonstrations the Repressive Apparatus exercised its parallel power to physically repress political activity. The very violence of the street battles with unarmed demonstrators spurred the middle classes of the major cities into active support of the student movements -- most in reality children of the middle and upper classes who had originally supported the military takeover of State power in 1964.

Previous incubation of growing dissatisfaction with the actions of the National Security State suddenly crystallized around a particular single event -- the death of a young student -- the significance of which took on a symbolic great importance and triggered mass reactions in the middle classes. The size and widespread alliance character of the demonstrations against the State's policies steadily grew in emotional but spontaneous collective power.

The confrontation between the opposition groups and the forces of repression eventually found a sympathetic echo in the Federal Congress where individual parliament members acted to denounce the repression and protect the demonstrators. A serious internal State crisis developed within the core of the coalition in power. This crisis was resolved
only with the imposition of another act of arbitrary force: the passing of Institutional Act Number Five and the reinstallation of the complete and unabridged policy of direct physical repression and tight political control.

Four main points must be highlighted in the examination of this period of the dialectic between the State and the opposition: First, the National Security State inaugurates periods of "controlled liberalization" after it believes its power is institutionalized satisfactorily, that the repressive "clean up operations" have thrown the opposition into disarray and paralyzed its action. The policy of controlled liberalization -- named by Costa e Silva the política de alívio (policy of relief)-- serves the double function of decreasing built up pressure resultant from the overt repressive actions of the security forces and the regaining of a measure of legitimacy among some sectors of the population which condemned the repression but basically could support the other policies of the State. Costa e Silva's policy of relief was in reality the second cycle of liberalization, which followed the completion of the Operação Limpeza carried out in the wake of the Institutional Act Number Two's cycle of repression. Just as 1965 's policy of "return to normality" liberalized the political climate after the suffocating experience of the repression of 1964, now the National Security State returned to a controlled liberalization policy in the years of 1967 and 1968.
Second, the opposition takes advantage of such a liberalization period to mount resistance to long standing grievances against the economic and social policies of the governments and the repression itself. The more open political climate allows the expression of dissent, decreases the "deterrent effect" of fear and encourages greater participation in debates and political alternatives. Often the growth of the social movement of opposition is latent and comes suddenly and unexpectedly to the surface of the political arena with the occurrence of a dramatic and emotional event. In the case of 1968 this event was the death of Edson Luis, a young student of Rio de Janeiro, shot by the Military Police in a demonstration.

The dynamic growth of the opposition generates a strategic crisis within the State. The two parallel sources of *de facto* power are localized in the ESG/IPES group seeking long term institutionalization and flexible mechanisms of control and in the Repressive Apparatus entrusted with the practical need of physical repression made necessary by the continuing deepening of the economic model of development. Thus, the third theoretical point of interest: the closing of the cycle of liberalization and the beginning of a new stage of repressive power.

However, a fourth dynamic element surfaces: as the State attempts to deal with the opposition by explicit coercion it becomes further isolated from civil society bringing into the ranks of the opposition new groups which were previously non-involved. In addition, the very emphasis upon liberalization -- and its failure -- sharpens the contrast between the language of democracy and the reality of repression delegitimating the State.
II. The State: Second Cycle of Liberalization

Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva was elected President by a special Electoral College on October 3, 1966. Costa e Silva took office on March 15, 1967, explicitly promising to restore normal political representative processes and democratic rule.

The climax of the ceremonies of the swearing in of Costa e Silva in the Presidency of the Republic was reached when Senator Auro Moura Andrade emphasized that at that moment the nation rejoined a State of Law (Estado de Direito) and returned to the regular Constitutional order. A long ovation interrupted at that moment the speech of the President of the Congress, while Costa e Silva ran his eyes through the galleries as if he needed to be ascertained of the totality of the approval.

The commitment of the new President was to begin a liberalization policy which would slowly defuse tensions and bring the opposition into a dialogue with the government. The controlled policy of liberalization was known as "the policy of relief" (política de alívio) and was to be one of the main characteristics of the brief interlude of the Costa e Silva government.

Essentially the "policy of relief" constituted a liberal interpretation of the repressive legislation which had already been enacted and drafted into the Constitution of 1967. Programmed meetings with sectors of the opposition were held to find the major discordant notes. In addition, in the labor sector, the government pursued an active policy of trade union organization, official control and cooperation of the new leadership appointed to replace those purged. The government was distinctly prepared to agree to certain concessions to the opposition in exchange for limited support and increased legitimacy.
The question of a full restoration of the balance of powers, however, did not become a part of the programmed series of discussions between sectors of the opposition and the government. In addition, the wage policies and the full application of the FGTS to eliminate job security remained an integral -- in fact essential -- part of the economic policies pursued by the State. These areas were to remain apart from the policy of controlled liberalization actively implemented in other areas.

The years of 1967 and 1968 were characterized by a political climate of liberalization within the strict limits established by the structures of the National Security State and institutionalized in the Constitution of 1967. The Constitution of 1967 had defined an area of exclusive power to the Executive branch which was sufficiently broad so as to allow the policies of the new economic team to be conducted freely and unencumbered by the necessity of Congressional approval. The Constitution, as we have seen, formalized the modifications in the power structure and enforced the complete predominance of the Executive branch. The legislative function of Congress was considerably diminished so that its role was essentially reduced to the discussion of legislation introduced by the Executive.

The policy of controlled liberalization essentially maintained the structural controls embedded in the Constitution as well as the controls of universities and of the military. However, the government took the initiative in approaching politicians of the MDB party to begin
a process of negotiation. The possibility of modifying the Constitution was the signal for attracting the opposition consent for dialogue. This was carried out at the same time that the Military Police and other organizations of the Repressive Apparatus fought with demonstrators in the streets of the large cities and conducted massive searches and arrests in the major states. The conflict of the Repressive Apparatus with the sectors of the opposition reached a climax in 1968.

The moments of liberalization in the "policy of relief" of the period were caused by the need to defuse tension and regain a measure of legitimacy in public opinion. However, the relative climate of political opening allowed opposition sectors to utilize the amplified political space and to surface in a variety of forms: mass demonstrations, student activities, strikes, parliamentary resistance and aBroad Front movement (Frente Ampla) led by the most important civilian leaders of the military-civil coalition that had deposed João Goulart and institutionalized the National Security State. These leaders joined the opposition and rallied together other conservative sectors which had previously supported the military takeover.

The contradiction between the language of consensus and dialogue with the opposition in the implementation of the "policy of relief" and the growing practice of overt explicit coercion in the streets neutralized the legitimacy gained by the dialogue and the very aspect of liberalization. Furthermore, since the politics of relief depended upon a degree of consensus which could not be reached in conditions
of strong repression, the State quickly reached a situation of internal and external crisis. Part of causation of the institutional crisis and the continuing dialectic between the State and the opposition dealt with the social costs of the economic model in full implementation and development.

The economic policy of the government of Costa e Silva was entrusted to Minister Delfim Netto, Minister of Finance, and Hélio Beltrão, Minister of Planning. The former would soon assume a position of supremacy and virtual control of the economy. The new economic team was critical of the inflationary policies that were pursued by the previous government. The analysis of the causes of inflation was changed from the previously accepted view that the inflation was due to excessive demand -- thus the need for cooling -- to an interpretation that, on the contrary, the Brazilian inflationary process was rather due to the cost factor of production.

With the change in analytical conceptualization came an alternative inflationary policy: the government would stimulate industrial production to full capacity, increase the levels of consumption, reduce the cost of borrowing by lowering interest rates and sharply expand the money market. On the surface the new economic team explicitly accepted an inflation rate of about 20 percent per year. Thus the strict monetarist policy and the search for absolute price stability was officially abandoned during this period. Credit was made available to the private sector. The money supply was increased by 43 percent both in 1967 and in 1968.
Delfim Netto was primarily interested in increasing the pattern of consumption of the upper middle classes so as to promote the rapid growth of the durable goods sector of the economy. Thus, while salary levels were kept at the rate of inflation to lower production costs, tax advantages and fiscal incentives were granted to the upper stratum of the population so as to stimulate investment.5

It should be pointed out that these policies were not necessarily geared to defuse the building pressure of national capital. Rather, the policy aimed at the initiation of a new stage in the economic model of development. The strict credit policies of the Campos-Bulhões team in the period between 1964 and 1967 caused a series of bankruptcies and shakedowns in the Brazilian economy. The ending of protective tariffs for national corporations coupled with the unavailability of domestic credit caused widespread bankruptcies of Brazilian-owned corporations which could no longer find domestic sources of credit.

The adjustments of the model were made to benefit international capital, in control of the durable goods sectors of the economy, and encourage alliances with national corporations more closely associated both with multinational corporations and with international finance.6 Once the initial dismantling of non-associated national capital had run its course, the government eased credit and applied an intricate system of fiscal incentives and export subsidies so as to enable the upsurge of growth particularly in the more dynamic durable goods sectors of the economy.
In order to further stimulate the industrial growth the new economic team accelerated efforts to diversify exports through increased direct subsidies to goods produced for external consumption. The system of fiscal incentives included advantageous tax deductions, the possibility of deducting imported machinery from total tax owed, and direct subsidy for exported goods. With such policies, the rate of growth slowly resumed in 1967 — after the drastic negative growth of the industrial sector of minus 4.7 in 1965. The industrial sector, with eased credit and the advantage of fiscal tax incentives, recuperated a positive growth rate of 9.8 in 1966 and sharply increased to 13.3 in 1968.7

In response to the strongly pro-foreign investment climate multinational capital moved in quickly to take advantage of the fiscal incentive and wage control policies. In 1966 the total foreign investment in the country was 8.8 millions of dollars. In 1968, this amount was sharply increased to over 11 million dollars. Of the total foreign investment of all countries for the two-year period, American investment accounted for almost half — adding up to over 8.9 million dollars and establishing a clear predominance in the industrial sector. 9

The effect of the wage policies of the government added to the job rotation caused by the FGTS had, by 1967, a clear impact upon the income of the salaried population. Wages were sharply lowered so as to increase the attraction of cheap labor for foreign investment.
Taking 1964 as a base year, a DIEESE study showed that the real salaries dropped significantly in the years between 1965 and 1968. The DIEESE study found that the real salary most frequently received by the professional categories studied in the years of 1967 and 1968 suffered a severe decrease with a 26 percent loss in purchasing power. In fact, the study detailed the losses of the workers and showed that during the period between 10 and 29 percent of all the professional categories analyzed suffered a loss of real salary which was higher than 30 percent.\textsuperscript{10}

A comparative analysis indicated that during the course of the fiscal year of 1966-1967 workers lost 12 percent of their purchasing power. During the fiscal year of 1967-1968 the situation of the salaried population worsened to show a loss of 26 percent in buying power. Table 6.1 presents the results of the data compiled in the DIEESE salary study showing a continuing tendency for losses until 1974:

\textbf{TABLE 6.1}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{REAL SALARY LOSSES OVER 30 PERCENT} & \\
\hline
1965-1966 & base year \\
1966-1967 & 12 percent \\
1967-1968 & 26 percent \\
1968-1969 & 21 percent \\
1969-1970 & 17 percent \\
1970-1971 & 9 percent \\
1971-1972 & 7 percent \\
1972-1973 & 11 percent \\
1973-1974 & 29 percent \\
1974 & 46 percent \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Source: DIEESE, Divulgação "10 Anos de Política Salarial", p. 65.
The minimum salary levels showed a similar pattern of loss in purchasing power. Since 1959 the minimum salary levels are decreed by the federal government and published as a basic indication of the minimum wage received by workers. Although the number varies from region to region -- the Northeast having a lower minimum salary base than the South and Center-South -- the decreed minimum is still the measure of the wage levels of the population and one of the best indicators of purchasing power and income distribution.

A study conducted by DIEESE on the evolution of the minimum salary levels in Brazil since 1959 concluded that the index of the real minimum salary in Brazil after the military takeover showed a significant and constant decrease in real value. This is particularly true after the strict implementation of the wage control policies of the State. Table 6.2 presents the summary of the DIEESE data. As may be seen in the table, 1964 marks a sharp drop in the minimum salary levels, with only 42 percent of the purchasing power it had in 1959. There is a slight recuperation in the years of 1965 and 1966 and a further drop with the final completion of the wage control package of legislation. From 1967 on the minimum salary levels steadily decreases in real value until by 1976 it reaches only 31 percent of the value of 1959.

An indication of the deterioration of the wages may also be reached by studying the total number of hours which a worker needs to work in order to buy a minimum amount of food for survival. In 1965 a worker needed a total of 88 hours and 16 minutes to earn the monthly foodbasket. In 1968, to buy the same amount, he worked 101 hours and 35 minutes.
### TABLE 6.2

**EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM SALARY:**

*(1959 to 1976)*

Expressed in cruzeiros, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REAL MINIMUM</th>
<th>INDEX OF REAL SALARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1959</td>
<td>1,735.29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1960</td>
<td>1,204.03</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1961</td>
<td>1,475.00</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1962</td>
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Finally, one should note that the decrease in the purchasing power of wages and of the minimum salary occurred in spite of a sharp drop in the inflation rate which fell from its highest point of 87.8 in 1964 to 20.3 by 1969. Therefore, the decrease in the purchasing power of the salary cannot be accounted for by the effects of inflation. Rather, the decrease is due to the real effects of the wage control policies of the government that resulted in sharp fall of actual salaries earned by workers.

The wage control policies of the State, the job insecurity caused by the implementation of the FGTS plan and the overt repression in the streets spurred an upsurge of opposition which found an easier climate for political organizing and expression. Thus the years of 1967 and 1968 would be marked by strong demonstrations against the economic and social policies of the State and rapid reorganization in the major sectors of the civil society.

III. The Opposition: Moving to the Offensive

The opposition in Brazil is like a great forest:
Each tree in the forest lays down its own deep roots -- but they all join and intermingle with each other under the ground.

Alceu de Amoroso Lima. 12

The maturation of the economic model, coupled with the repressive policies of the governments since 1964 had the effect of cementing an informal alliance of various opposition sectors which began to take shape in 1967 and reached its climax in a vast mass movement in 1968. The main sectors of the opposition -- like the trees in the forest --
organized independently of each other. However, all of the separate organizations joined in the large demonstrations and protest marches of 1967 and particularly of 1968.

Three main opposition sectors reached sufficient force and coordination to deeply affect the political structures of the country: the student movement, the labor movement, and the Frente Ampla (Broad Front Alliance). These distinct opposition sectors had their views expressed both in street demonstrations, rallies and marches and in the National Congress through a group of opposition MDB members who had been elected to Congress in 1966. Together these groups exerted considerable pressure upon the State and forced it into an internal crisis for the definition of two alternative policies: further liberalization of the political, social and economic policies or a third and even more severely extensive repressive crackdown.

1. The Student Movement: Mass Demonstrations.

The student movement organized in opposition to the arbitrary firing of many professors, the restrictions on university autonomy with direct State control of university matters and the impediments to student organizing which were symbolized particularly by the forced extinction of the UNE and the Lei Suplicy. Increasingly in 1967 and 1968 the grievances of university students centered upon the largescale State-conducted university reforms which were being carried out in fulfillment of specific international agreements between the Brazilian Ministry of Education and the United States Agency for International Development.¹³
In terms of organization, the students had largely succeeded in establishing the parallel structures of representation embodied by the UNE -- at national, state and local university levels.  

In 1967 the UNE completed its XXIX National Congress of Students, held in secret in an underground meeting in São Paulo. This Congress elected the board of directors of the organization to outline the main priorities and concerns:

The Congress was held in São Paulo, as planned, in spite of the efforts of the dictatorship to prevent it. The first phase of the Congress to choose delegates had been already completed. With the presence of 400 representatives delegates from 18 states the Congress was held to discuss the program and elect a new board of directors of the UNE. The UNE, once more, frustrates the attempts of the dictatorship to crush the student movement. The UNE proves -- in practice -- that it has real strength based upon the force of an organization which counts with truly representative support.

In fact the UNE held the full support of the student body and increasingly succeeded in mobilizing large numbers for participation in the various activities which the organization promoted. The first tactic centered on the holding of fast small-scale rallies -- known as "lightening rallies" (comícios relâmpagos) aimed both at calling attention of the population to the existence of the movement and at avoiding direct confrontation with the security forces.

As the number of active militants increased the organizational tactics changed: the student movement began to conduct larger marches in the streets of the major cities, particularly of Rio de Janeiro. These aimed at eliciting the support of the wider population, middle class and office workers in the downtown areas of the major cities.
At the same time that the students conducted large demonstrations in the streets of the cities they continued to organize at local levels, concentrating upon grievances of particular relevance to individual universities or institutions of learning. One such localized effort involved the demand to improve the food available to poorer students in a subsidized restaurant in Rio de Janeiro, known as Calabouço. The government had removed the subsidies to the restaurant and placed its running in private enterprise control. With the deterioration of the food and the increase in the prices charged students began to protest. They attempted to negotiate the improvement of the restaurant and press for a meeting with the governmental authorities. In order to dramatize their grievances a small group of students staged local demonstrations in front of the restaurant. On March 28, 1968, during one such small gathering, a battalion of the Military Police (equivalent to the American National Guard) arrived and opened fire with machine guns against the students who were gathered in the square. Edson Luis, a poor 16-year-old secondary level student, died instantly of gunshot wounds.

As is often the case in historical and politically volatile moments of suppressed popular anger, the death of the young student catalyzed a mass movement which took on the proportions of outright social rebellion. Events succeeded each other in rapid order. Outraged colleagues carried the body of Edson Luis to the State Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro. There it lay in State under the watchful eyes of political representatives and student leaders. Word spread quickly and a large gathering in front of the Assembly building called
on the population to join the funeral services the next day. In the afternoon of March 29, 1968, the funeral march began:

At four thirty in the afternoon a multitude the size of which may only be compared to that which accompanied the funeral march of President Getúlio Vargas, after his suicide in August of 1954, gathered to follow Edson Luis de Lima Souto to his grave in the João Batista Cemetery.

Covered by the national flag the coffin of the poor student was carried down the steps of the State Legislature under the sound of the singing of the National Anthem enhanced by the visual impact of hundreds of thousands of white handkerchiefs waving a last farewell. From the top of the buildings came a rain of petals of flowers. Thousands raised black flags to demonstrate their feelings of mourning.

(...). When the body was lowered into the grave, the more than 50 thousand people who had managed to squeeze into the grounds of the cemetery then heard the solemn oath of thousands of young students: "In our time of mourning we now shall begin our battle". 17

The killing of Edson Luis strengthened the resolve of the students to resist what they now viewed as a totalitarian government. Sectors of the student movement began to seriously consider the alternative of armed struggle against the National Security State.

In addition, the death of the young and poor student emotionally touched the population and created a climate of tension and protest in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The circumstances of his death and the general brutality of the police against the population received ample attention in the press thus contributing to the feelings of outrage.

A funeral Mass was scheduled for the Cathedral of Rio de Janeiro, the Candelária, to be held in the morning of April 4, 1968. The Mass in memory of Edson Luis was attended by approximately 30,000 people. As the faithful left the Church they were violently attacked by mounted police:
The Armed Forces mobilized 20,000 men to suppress new student and popular manifestations. The DOPS and the Military Police carried out aggressive maneuvers in the downtown area of the city. With the Army, the Military Police and the Naval Fuzileers (Marines) occupying strategic areas since early dawn, the events began to happen a little after twelve noon when cavalry men of the Military Police waited for the end of the memory Mass in the Candelária. Then they attacked the unarmed population as they left the Church. Clubs and even swords were used to wound and suppress those who attended the Mass.

(...) Later that same afternoon, after a second memorial Mass was held in the Candelária, beatings and arrests were again conducted. The Bishop Dom José de Castro Pinto and fifteen other concelebrants of the Mass held hands with the clergy present to form a large circle around the Cathedral in order to protect people who were inside and prevent the attack of the mounted police with their swords in their hands.

The priests also escorted the population down the avenue in an effort to protect them from attacks but almost in front of the Jornal do Brasil we witnessed close to 1,000 people being beaten by a battalion of the cavalry who used swords and tear gas.

The violent repression of the memorial Masses brought the situation rapidly to a climax: the Catholic Church openly joined the opposition and publicly protested against the invasion of the Cathedral of Rio de Janeiro and the deliberate attack on unarmed priests and faithful during the course of a religious service. The firm position taken by the hierarchy against the attack cemented an informal alliance: students were now openly supported by the Catholic Church, the press and in general, the middle classes of the city who had once supported the military takeover in their fear of a communist dictatorship. The reality of oppression and violence neutralized the efforts of liberalization and de-legitimized the promises of democratic government.
Other states joined in the general organization of protest demonstrations and marches. All peaceful manifestations in the streets were met with explicit and violent repression. This, in turn, only served to increase the force of the popular opposition.

The effect of the death of Edson Luís upon the population must be comprehended in the context of the resentment against the economic, social and political policies of the National Security State and in particular against the explicit use of violent repressive power. His death became a symbol which sparked a spontaneous and non-organized mass movement the roots of which lay elsewhere. This element of outrage and spontaneity is clearly expressed in an editorial of the influential daily, the Correio da Manhã:

A young student died -- robbed of his time to live and to build his time to have rights. The life to which he had a right, and of which he was miserably robbed, suddenly was raised for the Nation to see -- as an immense and sacred Cathedral. Millions of voices then raised their cry of revolt. Suddenly his time became a time of History, a time for anger, a time for consciousness, a time to scream out: Enough!

(...) His death is our inheritance. The inheritance of the entire people of Brazil. And the energy freed by his death changed into passion for a people who now march, revolt, protest and face the repression in Belo Horizonte, in Porto Alegre, in Recife, in Curitiba and everywhere.

(...) The death of the young poor student, having thrown this country into convulsion, also surfaced political problems of great importance. Through his death the Brazilian people -- for the first time since the coup d'etat of March 31, 1964 -- has taken a profound and emotionally deep awareness of its own total rejection of the Military Power which oppresses us. The process of opposition has followed a molecular growth, made up of anonymous suffering, of non-formulated revolt, of thoughts without the expression of words. 19
The demonstrations increased in intensity. Other sectors of the population, now mobilized by the labor movement and the Frente Amplia, joined the protests which had begun just with students. On June 25, 1960, in the emotional wake of the death of Edson Luís, a large and now peaceful march was held through the downtown streets of Rio de Janeiro. The Military refrained from direct repression and did not interfere with the more than 100,000 who gathered for the anti-government rally in front of the Cathedral of the Candelária.

During this rally a special representative committee of the opposition groups was selected in order to negotiate liberalization measures with the federal government. The very composition of the "Committee of the 100,000" indicates the nature of the opposition alliance: One representative of professional sectors, two representatives of the students, one representative of the Mothers' Movement for Political Amnesty (Movimento das Mães pela Anistia) and one representative of the Catholic Church, a priest. It was a Committee of negotiation which represented the middle classes who were now openly in opposition to the military in power and fighting the police in the streets. The gradual isolation of the National Security State from civil society began to take on a predominant character. The circle of power began to close in a slow process of losing social support.

2. Labor in Opposition.

As already mentioned, one aspect of the "policy of relief" of the Costa e Silva government had ramifications for labor unions. The
Ministry of Labor officially started a State-controlled program of "union renovation" (renovação sindical) aimed at the bureaucratic transformation of the unions so that they could fulfill a more effective welfare role and take on the burdens of mediation between the State and the working class. Under the Labor Code trade unions are defined not as organizations for the defense of the economic interests of the workers but rather are meant to "collaborate with the central government". The Labor Code allows the Ministry of Labor to collect union dues in the form of a compulsory tax on salaries and redistribute the funds through all the unions. Percentages may be established on specific funding required by law. Thus the percentages of funds for dental, medical care and for continuing education programs was increased so as to force unions to take onto their own shoulders the social costs which the National Security State no longer wanted to fulfill.

Once the phase of replacement of top leadership in the trade unions had been practically completed the policy of the Ministry of Labor shifted its emphasis: the State began to strengthen the corporative structures of the trade union system by encouraging the bureaucratic "renovation" which should maximize the potential of corporative representation in the structures, train leadership to perform mediation roles between the working class and the State and increase the efficiency of welfare and assistential function of the labor unions.
In 1967 there were a total of 1,137 urban workers trade unions existent in Brazil. The military governments had already intervened to totally control the unions, eliminate key leaders, annul elections or dissolve in a total of 1,017 unions during the years from 1964 to 1967. The Peasant Leagues had been banned and persecuted out of existence. The rural unions which began to be organized legally after the military takeover numbered, in 1967, only 381 mostly weak and disrupted by the even more severe repression of the social movements in the countryside.

The policy of "trade union renovation" now engaged the State in an active policy of trade union organization. During the year 1967 to 1968 alone there were a total of 854 new urban workers unions formed and 464 rural trade unions organized legally under the official Labor Code structure. While some may have in fact been the result of the organized activity of the labor movement -- which began to reorganize itself in some areas -- most were directly set up by the State in order to establish a deeper corporative control of the local unions and especially the federations and the confederations. Since the representational structure of federations is highly unbalanced -- every local union has two representatives and only one vote independent of the size of its membership -- it was in the interest of the National Security State to reinforce the largescale organization of small unions with as few as 100 members. These "ghost unions" should guarantee complete governmental control of the federations, for they had the same
voting weight as the larger, more political and mobilized industrial unions of the dynamic centers. In addition to direct organization of small "ghost unions" the policy of the Ministry of Labor during this period began to pay particular attention to the training and education of the new trade union officials who they had appointed to run most trade unions. The officially-appointed leaders (interventores) could count with courses and vast resources to implement welfare programs and sharpen the collaborative role of unions with the State. The State machinery and immense funds compulsorily taxed from all salaries -- independent of whether or not the worker belonged to a trade union -- enabled the government officials in the controlled unions to increase their power and coopt intermediary leadership.

Of course the corporative structure of the trade unions was not new, having been essentially in existence since the Labor Code was finalized in 1943. What is important to note is that the National Security State utilized the mechanisms of control most thoroughly both to remove opposition trade union leaders from office and to sharpen the direct control of the State upon the labor unions as a whole. This policy of "trade union renovation" would continue through the entire period and last until the present days.

On the other hand, the very policy of liberalization and "trade union renovation" had the opposite effect of encouraging a more open climate for debate and participation of workers within the official union structure of the country. Thus the relative opening during the
government of Costa e Silva enabled a resurgence of political activity which had intense repercussions in the labor sector. Groups of trade union activists of the "union opposition" (oposições sindicais) worked within the more liberalized unions in order to win back the electoral offices now occupied by governmental officials. Electoral campaigns were regularly held so as to allow some flexibility and legitimacy to the corporative structures. The opposition worked within the limited environment to mobilize the workers at the time of electoral campaigns using the opportunity to increase the level of awareness and understanding of the deep social and economic problems that affected their salaries and their lives.

In 1967 the "union renovation" policy reached a bureaucratic stalemate which clearly showed the content limitations of the structure. In the elections of the Metalworkers Union of Contagem, Minas Gerais, the contradictions of the policy became manifested. The union opposition, based on factory-level representation, organized a slate to run against the official incumbents. The opposition program included an analysis of the internal democratization of the union structure and an explicit encouragement for rank and file direct participation in the daily running of the union. In addition the program contained strong criticisms of the wage policies of the government and the FGTS.

The opposition slate's presidential candidate, Enio Seabra, was a respected leader and a worker of Mannesman, the largest corporation in the industrial town. The groups of opposition engaged in an intensive rank and file campaign in all factories for a month. Just before
the elections the Regional Labor Board (Delegacia Regional do Trabalho) cancelled the electoral candidacy of Enio Seabra, eliminating him from the opposition slate. Nonetheless, the opposition won the elections. However, the cancellation of the President in the slate was not lifted by the Ministry of Labor.

Therefore, the opposition won mainly a half-victory, which would cost them serious limitations for the representativeness and strength of the new board of directors of the trade union. The campaign, however, was significant both to demonstrate the limitations of the government's "union renovation" program and to establish a climate of political and electoral organizing among the metalworkers that encouraged the movement leading to the strikes of April, 1968.

In Osasco, one of the most important industrial areas of São Paulo, the political and trade union context was different. Whereas in Contagem the political organizing was conducted strictly within the limits of the official trade union structure or in sectorial organization in the factories, Osasco experienced a combination of opposition activities: The activities of the Catholic Church, the activities of students in alliance with workers, the political work of parties engaged in an active municipal election which brought about an expressive victory to the opposition MDB party and, finally, the workers' own organizations in the factory committees.

The work of the Catholic Church was already of some significance in the area of Osasco by 1967. The National Labor Front (Frente Nacional
do Trabalho) had a fairly long experience in organizing groups of workers in factories. The main work of the Frente Nacional do Trabalho however, was the organization of two long strikes in the Perus Factory during the years of 1961 and 1962. In Osasco the organization stimulated workers to become active in the unions, forming opposition movements to the government-controlled board of directors.

Other organizations of the Catholic Church, connected to the Workers' Pastoral (Pastoral Operária) particularly encouraged the organization of rank and file workers in the factories. Coherent with the social views prevalent in the Catholic Church, these networks did not propose particular programs and political platforms but rather encouraged a form of democratic participation so as to stimulate the capacity for self-decision and consciousness-raising of workers. The factory committees developed from such a perspective and this basic work.

The first effective factory committee was formed in Cobrasma, an autopart manufacturer which employed at that time 10,000 workers. The Cobrasma Factory Committee was recognized by the corporation and became a legal civil association in 1965. Its board of directors were elected in the factory and benefited from job security which was guaranteed under a negotiated contract between the workers and the management.

José Ibrahim, a young worker-student of Cobrasma, was elected the first President of the Factory Committee. In 1967 he would take over the Presidency of the Metalworkers' Union of Osasco -- bringing
with him the background experience of the factory committee organization as well as the legitimacy and strength of his large organized base of the rank and file of Cobrasma. Once President of the Metalworkers' Union, José Ibrahim began to encourage the formation of other factory committees in Osasco, using the model of the Cobrasma.

In 1967 there were municipal elections in Brazil. The student movement, as a whole, continued to follow the electoral strategy of appealing to the annulment of votes (voto nulo) and attempted to exert considerable influence in the views of the workers of Osasco.

It should be emphasized at this point that one of the peculiar characteristics of Osasco was the large number of workers who were also secondary students and studied at night in the local high school. The President of the union himself was one such worker-student. Thus, the student movement as a whole had deep influence in the political thinking of the working class leaders in Osasco as well as a direct organizational tie to the union of the Metalworkers itself.

However, in spite of this influence, the workers in assemblies discussed the matter of the municipal elections and rejected the position of voiding their votes. The trade union, and the students of Osasco, chose to work within the MDB party so as to elect large numbers of aldermen (vereadores) and an opposition mayor. The local control of the City Council and the City Hall was deemed to constitute an important opportunity for affecting the policies at least at a municipal level.
Thus the students and workers campaigned strongly for the official opposition party, the MDB. There was a negotiated agreement that if elected the MDB mayor would take a worker and a student representative into his board of advisors and give them a measure of real power of action in policy development and implementation.

The MDB party achieved a significant victory: in Osasco the opposition elected 16 aldermen, as against 7 of the ARENA, as well as the mayor.24 The Student Center of Osasco (Centro Estudantil de Osasco) appointed a representative to work with the mayor as had been pledged in the campaign. The Metalworkers Union also elected a worker representative for the municipal council. Other students and workers were called in to collaborate in the administration of the city. Thus, many of those who had previously worked for the election of José Ibrahim for the presidency of the Metalworkers' Union of Osasco now occupied positions in the municipal government.

At a more national level, the repercussions of the middle class and student movement in Rio de Janeiro, echoed in other states. The opposition began to believe that its offensive was a preview of the fall of the National State. Such opinions were naturally reflected in the working class movement. In response to the "national question" trade unions organized an intra-union movement named Movement Against the Wage Laws (Movimento Intersindical Antiarrocho, MIA). The MIA was an attempt of opposition sectors to restructure the parallel labor structures which had existed prior to the coup d'etat of 1964.25 The actual lifespan of the MIA was limited and its effectiveness questionable
but it added to the climate of political organization on the surface and of euphoric anticipation of major concessions on the part of the National Security State.

In this general political context, and unexpectedly, a large strike movement began in the industrial area of Contagem, Minas Gerais. On April 16, 1968, a total of 1,700 workers of the factory of the Belgo-Mineira, the largest in Contagem, took their managers as hostages and declared themselves on strike. Within the period of one week there were a total of 15,000 workers on strike and most major industries in the area of Contagem were completely paralyzed. The workers demanded a 25 percent salary raise. The official wage index raise decreed by the government had been only 17 percent.

The Ministry of Labor was caught by surprise. In the context of the "union renovation" policy, the local metalworker union had a new and more active leadership. However, since the main and most representative leader had been purged from the ticket the union had lost much of its actual legitimacy and could not remain in touch with the base. It too was caught by surprise. The workers' movement in Contagem was entirely spontaneous. This fact, coupled with the reality that the main demand was limited and fit the plans of the Ministry of Labor to raise wages up to the level of the cost of living, enabled the government to take a more conciliatory tone and negotiate. Using the union as a mediator, the Labor Ministry offered 10 percent raise for all workers in Contagem. This offer was accepted and the workers voted to return to work on April 25.
The National Security State acted swiftly to curb the possibility of other workers following the example of Minas Gerais. In the wake of the victorious strike of Contagem, Decree-Law Number 5,451 -- of June 12, 1968 -- was enacted. 27 This Decree-Law extended the emergency raise of 10 percent to all salaried workers in the country. At the same time, however, the Decree-Law revoked the last paragraph of the Wage Control Bill (Law Number 4,725). This paragraph had legally limited the period of validity of the wage control legislations to three years. Therefore, the new Decree, while giving an immediate raise to placate angered workers, made the wage control policies of the State permanent. 28

This constitutes a clear example of how the dialectic of State and opposition has served to imprint its own logic and dynamic to the changing structures of control of the National Security State. One should, furthermore, note that this is entirely consistent with the basic orientation of the State: liberalization periods combined with selective repression and adjustments to the regulations of the economic model. However, in its attempt to solve contradictions and control conflict the National Security State further isolates itself from civil society. The Decree which made the wage control policies permanent added to the general discontent of the workers and fueled the strike movement of Osasco. The political temperature was considerably raised and the example of Contagem all the more appealing. In addition, unlike Contagem, the Osasco metalworkers union was the center of activities and actively promoted the organization of the workers.
The strike in Contagem had been largely spontaneous and the efforts of organization came after the actual beginning of the strike. In Osasco, on the other hand, ever since the election of José Ibrahim to the Presidency of the Metalworkers' Union, workers met in assemblies by factory and at the union headquarters to discuss their problems, priorities and organizational strategies.

The union itself became the headquarters of a variety of activities aimed at raising the political awareness of rank and file members so as to lay the groundwork for the networks of organization in the factory committees to be connected to the union itself.

Most factories in Osasco, by the middle of 1968, had already organized "groups of 10" -- seedling factory committees -- with strong participation of rank and file workers. Of the five largest factories, three already had legal Factory Committees, modeled on the Cobrasma Committee. These provided the base for the organization of the "Strike Command" which was composed of leaders elected by the factories. The strike was carefully organized and planned for November of 1968.

Although the leadership was against the precipitated beginning of the strike movement, workers forced it to go along by in practice initiating a strike action. In May of 1968 a spontaneous strike action took place in one factory. This set the framework for the movement which would erupt fullfledged in July. Pressure from the rank and file made it difficult for the leadership to hold out any longer. Thus they joined the movement to carefully plan the strike strategy:
(...) the rank and file told us: "you talked so much about strikes and now you are going back on your word." So we decided to go ahead and organize. The union took on all the necessary tasks and planned the strike carefully.

To give you an idea of the amount of organizing which was done, we got in touch with the UNE and the UEE and asked them what kind of help the students could give us if a strike should be declared in Osasco within a few days. The students should organize groups of support, should distribute notices and leaflets in the factory doors and in particular should collect funds for the strike support fund. They agreed.

On that same day we began to form groups for a variety of tasks. Three days before the strike we wrote the leaflet which announced the beginning of the strike movement and which included a detailed description of events which had not yet taken place: "At 8:45 a.m. the Cobrasma factory paralyzed the work and workers occupied the factory. The demands of the workers included the end of the wage laws of control. At 11:15 a.m. the Granada and the Barreto Kelly corporations joined the strike and the workers all left the plants together and marched on to the union. Two hours later Lonaflex stopped and declared its solidarity to the strike movement."

And, it all happened exactly that way. We had a solid confidence in our work at the base, within the factories.

In reality the events followed closely to the detailed plans, with one crucial exception: A mistaken analysis of the political context led the leaders to underestimate the reaction of the National Security State. One needs to remember that the influence of the events and the growing strength of the student movement had strong repercussions in a labor movement composed of worker-students. The analysis of the political correlation of forces of the student movement, and even of the opposition in general, allowed the conclusion that the fragility and social isolation of the State was evident and it would soon fall under the pressure of a growing mass movement of opposition.
As Roque Aparecido, one of the leaders of the Osasco movement, expressed in a later analysis, the workers of Osasco fully believed that the State was on the verge of collapse: "we aimed mainly at lighting the last match". It was not, at that time, clear to the opposition that the National Security State could count on large reserves of coercive power and that there was an apparent cohesion and readiness of the military forces to employ the full force of the Repressive Apparatus to the ultimate consequences.

In fact, a second coup d'etat was, at that very moment, already in the initial stages of preparation. The foundations of the National Security State had been sufficiently laid to enable those in power to curb the mass movements of protest and fully implement the mechanisms of force and coercion which were already to a great degree at their disposal.

The strike of Contagem had had the advantage of the element of surprise due to its very spontaneity. As Weffort pointed out in his study, even the local union ignored the strength of the movement which was taking root in the factories of Contagem. In addition, the new economic policies of the government did call for an increase in the wage levels. The emergency raise of 10 percent, therefore, conformed to the plan of the government. Negotiations could be conducted without risking the economic model. In the case of Osasco, a deeper threat of a movement organized from the base made it impossible for the government to tolerate it for any length of time. The element of
surprise was also not present. Although the union hoped to prevent intervention by claiming that the strike was spontaneous and that the union's role was simply the role of a mediator, it was clear from the start that this was not the case. The government had expected the attempt to follow the experience of Contagem and was ready to act with the full force at its disposal in order to crush the movement. The National Security State could not risk the wage policies and allow an organized strike movement to neutralize the effects of the anti-strike legislation.

On the very next day of the strike the Ministry of Labor declared the intervention of the union and removed all of the elected officials from office. José Ibrahim was persecuted, forced into hiding and later into exile so as to avoid imprisonment. The workers who occupied the factory of Cobrasma suffered severe physical repression. The factory was invaded by a force of 30 mounted police, 60 soldiers armed with machine guns and two armored vehicles with heavy weapons. In the immediate aftermath of the armed invasion 120 people were arrested, beaten and many tortured. Among those arrested were two priests who also worked in the factory as the Catholic "worker-priest" movement. The headquarters of the trade union was surrounded by a military force and occupied physically by troops. Without a place to meet workers retired to a local church. The church was equally invaded, severely damaged and all those present within it were arrested. The scenes of the repression of the Osasco strike would remain as a strong deterrent to any further attempt to break the strike laws for many years to come.
Without the leadership, the union, and with many of the members of the "Strike Command" included in a growing list of disappeared, the strike lost its network of organization and broke. It lasted for three days, some factories managing to continue the resistance movement for a further two days. It ended in total defeat. None of the demands were met and many of the rights which had been previously so patiently won were suppressed.

The tragedy of this defeat, followed by the severe repression in Osasco as a city, showed how far from an effective movement the workers were. The support of the other unions had been limited to letters of solidarity and mild attempts to convince the government not to intervene in the union. In fact, perhaps the most serious effect of the strike was to demonstrate the weakness of a movement which had seemed to be so deeply rooted -- stronger than it was in reality. In addition, the effectiveness of the repressive method proved that rapid coercive force was an efficient tool to cut at the start a potentially threatening challenge to the National Security State. The experience of Osasco left deep marks on the labor movement which was to learn from it and attempt to develop alternative organizational strategies for the next years.

3. The Frente Ampla: Former Supporters in the Opposition.

There were two former governors of states who played a particularly crucial role in the civil-military conspiracy that overthrew President João Goulart in 1964: Magalhães Pinto, then governor of Minas Gerais, and Carlos Lacerda, then governor of the state of Guanabara. They spear-
headed a political movement to unite all other governors of states against the Federal government of João Goulart. It was the Movement of Governors (Movimento dos Governadores) which provided the military with the political legitimacy to consummate the conspiracy to overthrow the elected President.

Soon after the military takeover of power in 1964, however, both civilian leaders began to move away from the policies of the government. As early as 1965 Carlos Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto openly criticized the restrictive policies of the government. It was felt, at that time, that both leaders had Presidential ambitions and believed that the military would act in the traditional style of previous Brazilian military coups: they would intervene, dismiss the President and then hand over power to the principal civilian leaders. Clearly Magalhães Pinto and Carlos Lacerda did not understand the real nature of the this military intervention, and the actual intention to formally set up a new kind of State. Once it became clear that power would not be turned over to civilian leaders they moved into the opposition camp.

Subsequent moves to restrict civilian political action, to control the National Congress and the Judiciary, further separated these civilian leadership from the military government. The two started an organized movement for "the defense of democracy" which exerted considerable influence in the middle classes of more conservative bent and within certain sectors of the military itself. Particularly Carlos Lacerda held significant penetration amongst the young officers who were his devoted followers.
In 1967 Magalhães Pinto and Carlos Lacerda articulated a political movement of a variety of political persuasions. The Broad Front Alliance (Frente Ampla) formally searched for allies among the traditional civil political sectors including conservative leadership. One of those approached for support was ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek. It will be recalled that Kubitschek had his political mandate cancelled and his political rights suspended for 10 years with the specific and public intent of eliminating him from any future Presidential race. His political prestige nonetheless was demonstrated in the electoral victories of candidates supported by him in the gubernatorial elections of 1965 and then again in the Congressional elections of 1966. The persecution of Kubitschek only enhanced this political prestige by turning him into a "political martyr" and increasing his appeal to the population. When Kubitschek formally joined the Frente Ampla the military government began to be seriously worried.

In September of 1967 the main leaders of the Frente Ampla movement met with exiled President João Goulart in Montevideo, Uruguay, in order to discuss opposition activities and come to an understanding of common aims. A formal agreement of cooperation was signed by the four main leaders, establishing the grounds for their alliance. This document, the Pact of Montevideo (Pacto de Montevideo) was the program of the Frente Ampla, which at that time began to take on the characteristics of a broadly based political party of opposition. The adherence of Kubitschek and Goulart gave the Frente Ampla both legitimacy in broader political circles and the active militancy of labor and trabalhista sectors.
The program of the Frente Ampla reflected the nature of the political alliance: it included a demand for the redemocratization of the country, the revoking of all legislation of control, the end of the wage policies, and a strong defense of the rights of laborers -- including the right to strike. Finally, the program called for immediate, direct, and free elections at all levels of political representation.

With the Pacto de Montevideo widespread negotiations and articulations between politicians and trade union and student leaders began to take shape. A series of street demonstrations and rallies were planned. The Frente Ampla may not have built the sufficiently strong network of organizational ties to allow it to become a political conduit of all dissent. It did, however, elicit the enthusiasm of much of the public opinion and politicians. Its appeal was so great that the vice-President of the MDB party, Congressman Osvaldo Lima Filho, remarked that "in one year in this country there will be only the Frente Ampla and the government." Its particular threat to the National Security State lay in the appeal it held to conservative members of middle and upper classes who had previously supported the military coup. In addition, the debate spurred by the Frente Ampla was reproduced dangerously within the military itself:

The Frente Ampla has produced many fruits -- far exceeding the expectations of its planners. Not only in the labor sector has the Frente Ampla caused an effervescent activity but its influence upon political debate and political events is becoming notorious. As is known, it has left in the wake of its discussions a
beginning of debate -- perhaps even of dissent -- among the military who were once participants of the March Revolution.

(...) Some of the episodes of this internal debate among the military are publicly known. However, whatever holds influence in matters of troop command is solidly behind the government and its system of security.

These Commanders do not hesitate to identify the Frente Ampla with counter-revolution. Especially after the meeting in Montevideo. And they warn that if the Frente Ampla does take to the streets in the course of the next year they shall be met with a threat: "if the Frente Ampla comes to the streets it shall be met there by the tanks." 34

Faced with demonstrations of students in the streets, with the growing militancy of the labor sector and with the deepening influence of the articulations of the Frente Ampla within more conservative sectors and even in the military itself, the National Security State decided, in the beginning of April of 1968, to move decisively: The Frente Ampla was banned by Decree Law. 35

Not only were the articulations of the movement expressly prohibited in the Decree law but all other activities promoted by the Frente Ampla were explicitly forbidden: it could not hold meetings, reunions, rallies, marches or make political commentary or issue publications of any kind. The Department of the Federal Police (Departamento de Polícia Federal, DPF) was ordered to arrest all and anyone who violated the wide prohibitions. In addition the DPF was to immediately proceed to apprehend books, magazines, periodicals or any other written material of the Frente Ampla. The National Security State wished to eliminate a social movement by the simple act of a Decree.
Once more we should note the consistency of the controlled policy of liberalization which is applied by the National Security State: relative opening coupled with selective and efficiently rapid use of physical force or coercive power. The government of Costa e Silva was caught in the contradiction of the parallel power of the Repressive Apparatus. In order to maintain the slow pace of liberalization, with intricate negotiations with certain opposition sectors, it was forced to give a free hand to the Repressive Apparatus and allow the localized removal of key members of the opposition who were defined as antagonistic. Thus, while attempting to deal with the pressure of the sectors connected to the defense of Internal Security the government conducted its talks with the opposition--largely through the auspices of Vice-President Pedro Aleixo--to reform the Constitution and provide it with more liberal underpinnings.

This contradiction is a direct consequence of the different goals and sectors of the power coalition and a result of the opposing conceptual references in the Doctrine of National Security itself. Although the Doctrine is explicitly meant to achieve the democratic National Permanent Objectives the requirements of the Internal Security enforce a totalitarian viewpoint which eliminates all dissent as intolerable.

Thus it is not surprising that the State became wrenched by deep internal conflict, that groups within it were already preparing a second coup d'état to bring about a third crackdown and that this situation would become clearly expressed in an Executive-Legislative confrontation of ultimately tragic proportions.
IV. Crisis: The End of the Policy of Relief and the Institutional Act Number Five.

It should be kept in mind that the Constitution of 1967 upheld the right to parliamentary immunity. A member of the Federal Congress could not be tried arbitrarily by the Executive which also no longer had the extraordinary powers to simply cancel the electoral mandate. According to the Constitution of 1967, then in effect with the end of the powers of Institutional Act Number Two, a Congressman or member of any legislative body could only be tried with the approval of the House to which he belonged.

The members of Congress, thus, had regained the necessary immunity to be able to take on a more independent and critical role of supervision of the Executive. Thus, they actively coordinated Parliamentary Investigating Committees to probe into such delicate matters as the FGTS, the effects of the wage laws upon the living standards of workers, the repression of students in the streets of Rio de Janeiro -- and in particular during a military invasion of the University of Brasília in 1968 when students were wounded and killed. An important topic of investigation was handled by the Parliamentary Investigating Committee dealing with land sale to foreign corporations (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito da Terra, CPI da Terra). At that time thousands of acres of land were being purchased by multinational corporations, particularly in the states of Mato Grosso, Pará, Maranhão, Goiás and Amazonas. The CPI da Terra probed into such matters causing much anger in military circles.
1. Congressional Crisis.

The Federal Congress became a magnifying mirror of the disturbances in civil society. In essence, the new opposition members elected in 1966 were responding to the political climate and made to act in support of the growing mass movement of protest both of the middle classes and of workers. Congress was now unable to fully exercise its power of legislating -- most matters of law had been transferred to the Executive branch. However, it now performed a role of denunciation of the repressive acts of the Executive. Members took turns on the floor to continuously denounce abuses and policies of the Executive branch and register the events in the registers of the Federal Congress.

A group of approximately 40 MDB politicians coordinated a strategy for parliamentarian action aimed at making full use of the rights to parliamentary immunity with its consequent greater freedom of expression from the floor of the Federal Congress. A smaller number of these parliament members of the opposition, immersed in the context of the political offensive of the time, believed that a confrontation was inevitable and that the role of radical opposition parliament members should be to use the floor of Congress not only to denounce the repression and the negative policies of the military government but also to provoke it into a crisis which would determine the correlation of forces. This, they believed, was necessary so that the oppressed could understand that armed struggle was their only alternative. It was firmly believed also, at that time, that the opposition forces would be victorious in eliciting the support of the population for armed combat once it was shown that other alternatives through Congress were closed.
Violence is a choice one makes when there is no other. This is especially true of the oppressed masses, with their historical memory of massacres whenever they staged a rebellion.

Therefore, we believed that only when it would become crystal clear to all that the system tolerated no dissent, that it would repress every bid for social justice or even for an elementary betterment of the masses' plight, would the possibility arise for organizing a revolutionary movement strong enough to represent an alternative to the present power structure. It followed that the legal façade the dictatorship had built -- of which the Congress was a part -- had to be brought down. In this perspective we considered it our duty to bring about a confrontation from which the surviving liberal institutions either would emerge strengthened -- a tactical victory -- or would go down for good.

In the context of such an analysis this group of parliament members engaged in a deliberate strategy of provocation. The tactic was implemented through the use of fiery speeches against the military from the floor of the House of Representatives. All parties, in the Congressional rules, have specific five-minute speech time periodically which is reserved for the party and then alternatively given to different members for use. During one such five-minute allotted period the MDB Congressman of Guanabara, Márcio Moreira Alves, called upon the population to boycott the Independence Day Military Parade and asked all Brazilian women to resist the military government by refusing to date officers who remained silent in the face of the repression or who took an active part in the violence of the State. As is the case with most short time speeches of the five-minute period, this one also went unnoticed by the press.
That this speech was pronounced at all in the first place may be understood in the context of the general political analysis common in opposition circles at that time. The fact that this particular speech was used by the military as the pretext for the launching of a major political crisis may be explained by its content.

First of all, it must be understood that the Military Day Parade is a symbolic and important part of the intimidation strategy of control. Every year, on Independence Day, the military have the unique opportunity to gather the population -- largely of the middle and working classes who mostly attend the parades -- and give them a show of force. Tanks and troops and a variety of weapons are then displayed for all to see. The population, by 1968, knew from their own experience that the force of the military was not used for the defense of the nation against foreign aggressors but rather could be -- and was frequently -- employed against themselves. Thus the impact of the military parade is to enhance the "deterrent effect" of fear. It is not a coincidence that all military and totalitarian governments pay such particular importance to military parades and to hardware displays. It is an element of the strategy of terror as a method of political and social control. Therefore, Márcio Moreira Alves's speech unwittingly hit at a crucial part of the general strategy of control of the military National Security State.

Secondly, the group of hardline officers connected to the Repressive Apparatus who were already actively planning a second coup d'état so as to have a freer hand in the defense of Internal Security found the speech
most useful: the calling for a boycott of the Independence Day Parade, coupled with the appeal to women to refuse to date military men was bound to elicit a gut emotional reaction in the barracks and set the stage -- provide the background ambiance -- which would give them widespread military support for new measures of explicit force.

That this was their intention is indicated by the fact that the hardline officers made thousands of reprints of the speech and had them distributed in all of the barracks of the country. Military officers -- hurt in their male chauvinism and their military patriotism at the same time -- reacted with anger and outrage to what they considered to be a serious offense to their dignity, their honor and their male prerogatives. The stage was set and the Military Ministers spearheading the coup conspiracy lost no time: they filed a petition in the Supreme Court asking for the court-martial of Congressman Márcio Moreira Alves who was accused of having gravely offended the honor and the dignity of the Armed Forces.

Since the Constitution of 1967 was still in effect, a Congressman could not be punished for a speech made from the floor of Congress. The proper procedures had to be followed. A petition was turned over to the House Judiciary Committee which could, by a two-third majority vote, reject it. If the Judiciary Committee did not reject it then the matter still had to be discussed by the whole of Congress and a vote on the question of lifting the Parliamentary Immunity had to be taken in a plenary joint session of both Houses of Congress. The members of Parliament had to give their explicit consent to
trial and lift the immunity of the accused member. Needless to say, the maintenance of Parliamentary Immunity was in the interest of all members of Congress. The memory of the purges was sufficiently vivid for this point to be painfully clear to all Parliament members. Thus the decision to lift the Parliamentary Immunity of a politically accused member so that he could be court-martialed for treason amounted to a direct threat and a clear death sentence for all the members of the Congress. This is a point which was fully analyzed and emphasized in the speeches made by Congressman Mário Moreira Alves in his defense.

Therefore, during an agitated joint session of Congress -- under the nervous eyes of a thousand spectators who filled the galleries -- each member of Congress raised his voice for the nominal vote. The result surprised the Executive: 216 against lifting the Parliamentary Immunity, 141 votes in favor. The difference of 75 votes gave a distinct victory to those who were against the lifting of a Parliament member's immunity. It also meant that many of the ARENA party had joined with the opposition MDB in protection of a larger common ideal. They had chosen to risk their own electoral mandate -- by defying the Party Fidelity rule which explicitly ruled that members who cross-voted with another party automatically lost their mandate.

All members of Congress and the spectators in the galleries burst into tears and spontaneous applause. One voice began to sing the National Anthem and was soon joined by all in a triumphant show of civic force. It was a moment of victory, a moment of glory.
In reality, it was a defeat which allowed those connected to the Repressive Apparatus to have a free hand and implement their plan. In retrospect recent evidence indicates that the Institutional Act Number Five had already been prepared and was ready since July 1968. It was drafted in response to the growing numbers of middle class people who joined the student demonstrations and, in particular, because of the militancy of the workers as demonstrated in the strikes of Contagem and of Osasco. This point is distinctly clarified by the speed with which the National Security State acted -- a speed that indicated careful advance preparations.

Less than 24 hours after the vote in the Federal Congress the media announced the text of the Institutional Act Number Five which was repeatedly read in television and radio. Congress was closed indefinitely. All Constitutional and individual guarantees were suspended. Throughout the country, the army already conducted a veritable occupation maneuver. Opposition members of all ideological persuasions were already being arrested by the several thousands.

2. Institutional Act Number Five: The End of the Second Cycle of Liberalization.

Institutional Act Number Five was officially decreed on December 13, 1968, one day after the Congressional vote. The text of the Act itself in many ways repeated provisions contained both in Institutional Acts Number One and Number Two. The main and important difference is that this time there was no limit of validity. The controls and the suspension of Constitutional guarantees were permanent.
In synthesis, the measures attributed to the Executive branch of the State were the following: 1) the power of the Executive to close Congress and state and municipal assemblies was reinstated. 2) the renewed right to cancel the electoral mandates of members of the legislative or executive power in federal, state or municipal levels. 3) the right to suspend the political rights of citizens for 10 years and the reinstatement of the Statute of the Cassados. 4) the right to dismiss, remove from office, transfer or retire employees of the bureaucratic apparatus of federal, state and municipal administrations. 5) the right to fire, dismiss or transfer judges and the removal of all judiciary guarantees of job tenure, non-transferability and salary maintenance levels. 6) the power to declare a State of Siege without any impediment such as had been drafted into the Constitution of 1967. 7) the right to confiscate private property for State use for the punishment of subversion or corruption. 8) The suspension of the right to habeas corpus in all cases of political crimes against the National Security. 9) the maintenance of military court trials for political crimes. 10) the right to legislate freely by Decree and issue any other Institutional Act or Complementary Act. 11) Finally, the prevention measure which explicitly kept the Judiciary from considering appeals from those charged under any of the provisions of the Institutional Act Number Five. Defendants would be judged by military courts without recourse to judicial appeal. All stipulations were permanent until the President signed a Decree to revoke the Institutional Act Number Five itself.
From the date it was issued until it was finally revoked under intense opposition pressure in 1979, the Institutional Act Number Five served as the legal foundation for the punishment of a total of 1,607 people. The extensive research conducted by Marcus Figueiredo includes data until 1974. During the period of the Geisel government another 74 citizens were punished by the Institutional Act Number Five, bringing the sum total to 1,607 people. Those punished included bureaucrats, military, politicians, professors, lawyers, architects, engineers and members of the Judiciary. 43

In addition, during its over ten years of existence, the Institutional Act Number Five was used to cancel the electoral mandates of 110 Federal Congressmen, six Senators, 161 State Deputies, 22 mayors and vice-mayors and 22 aldermen. If one were to add up all the votes which were received by those who arbitrarily lost their mandate by Executive decree because of Institutional Act Number Five, one would reach the total sum of six million and 353 thousand votes which were thus annulled by the Executive power. 44 Political representation, therefore, must be considered to have been seriously curtailed and both quantitatively and qualitatively transformed.

Perhaps, however, the most severe consequence of the Institutional Act Number Five was that it opened the way for the period of full implementation of the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State. The restrictions upon the Judiciary and the removal of all
rights to habeas corpus were of crucial importance for it enabled
the Repressive Apparatus to act without controls and individual
guarantees. The lack of habeas corpus added to the restrictions
upon the independence of judges prevented opposition lawyers and
others who defended political prisoners to enforce legal rights
and basic individual legal guarantees of just trial procedures. Thus
they were often unable to prevent serious abuses of power and violent
torture of political prisoners.

In addition, the fact that the Institutional Act Number Five
had no pre-determined time limitation to its extraordinary powers
meant that the Executive was permanently allowed to rule by Decree
and to pass other Institutional Acts and Complementary Acts. Thus
the ultimate isolation of the National Security State: a State which
became embodied and circumscribed to the Executive branch. The
Institutional Act Number Five gave birth to the Leviathan which
General Golbery do Couto e Silva had already predicted in his early
writings of the 1950's. It became now truly the Leviathan of the
time of Hobbes, a State which absorbed all power into itself:

In this way we see the awakening of the Leviathan,
for so many centuries having been asleep. It awakens
to the sound of new totalitarian mythologies, from the
right and from the left.

(...) It is reborn as the Universal State (...) it will
be the supreme Leviathan, the super-Leviathan, the absolute
owner of the planet Earth and the uncontested ruler of all
and even the human spirit. 45

The National Security State, implanted according to a blueprint but
continuously changing to control the opposition is this new Leviathan.
V. Conclusion

The Institutional Act Number Five marks the end of the first phase of the institutionalization of the National Security State. It was a stage of laying the foundations. The permanent character of the controls incorporated into the Institutional Act Number Five allowed for the beginning of a new period with the full implementation of the economic model of development and the rooting of the Repressive Apparatus so as to keep absolute Internal Security and prevent organized dissent against the economic and social policies carried out by the governments. Thus the Institutional Act Number Five would provide the legal framework within which the deep structural transformations could be conducted.

The contradictions within the National Security State and among the different sectors of the civil-military coalition were demonstrated in the period of 1967 and 1968. A limited policy of liberalization geared to enforcing corporative structures of control had to be sufficiently flexible to provide room for the cooptation of leadership and provide a basis for long-term stability of the State itself. This policy, however, is in direct contradiction to the necessity of maintaining absolute Internal Security. In turn, the need to repress is tied to the character of the highly exploitative economic and social policies of the economic model of development defended by the National Security State. Thus, there is a constant upsurge of opposition which brings a counter-offensive of the Repressive Apparatus.
The repression itself, however, is unable to eliminate the opposition altogether for it does not deal with the underlying causes of dissent which are based upon real grievances and suffering of those who are marginalized from the economic model. The force employed merely displaces the opposition without solving the initial contradiction. As coercive power is applied to subdue one sector of the opposition, other previously non-involved sectors of civil society become alarmed and outraged. They are then brought into the resistance becoming themselves -- in the eyes of the National Security State -- a part of the "enemy within". Therefore, the need to utilize ever escalating amounts of physical force to beat down an opposition enlarged by the adherence of new groups.

One may remember that 1967 began with a feeble attempt of student demonstrators to call attention to their localized problems. By 1968 this movement had been joined by large masses of people of different classes and ideological persuasions. The conflict had been displaced from the students to the middle classes, then to the workers and finally, with the force of the repression, it involved the Catholic Church itself. The original foci of opposition were not eliminated by the coercive power of the State. In fact, they were supported by the adherence of the other sectors and made more legitimate by the repercussions in the Federal Congress itself.

One final observation should be emphasized: the Executive-Legislative crisis which ended with the closing of the Federal Congress for an inde-
terminated period of time highlighted, once more, the deep contradiction between the National Security State's use of the language of democracy and the reality of repression and intolerant control. Being forced to use its ultimate source of power -- physical force -- the State suffered a further severe loss of legitimacy. In turn, its increasing lack of legitimacy and isolation gave it no other alternative but to continue to employ greater amounts of force.

The period which followed the passing of Institutional Act Number Five became characterized by a dialectic of violence. Some sectors of the opposition took up arms in the belief that there was no alternative but to fight the Leviathan with their swords and their ideals. The armed struggle, in turn, strengthened the sectors within the National Security State most intimately connected to the defense of Internal Security. They effectively used this space to fully implant a formidable apparatus of repression and to institutionalize the strategy of control by terror.

In this confrontation the other sectors of the opposition -- and much of the population which was non-involved -- were crushed by a brutal offensive of the security forces. What followed was a period of silence, of terror, of disarray and hopelessness. As we shall see, it was at this point that the alternatives suggested and implemented by the Catholic Church provided the crucial element to continue to organize for freedom: hope.
NOTES

1. Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva was elected by the National Congress in accordance with Article 9 of the Institutional Act Number Two of October 26, 1965 and of Article 5 of the Institutional Act Number Three, of February 5, 1966. He was inaugurated into office on March 15, 1967. Vice-President: Pedro Aleixo.

Marshal Costa e Silva was elected with a total of 295 votes divided in the Electoral College in the following way: 252 votes of ARENA Congressmen; 3 votes of MDB Congressmen and 40 votes of ARENA Senators.

The Electoral proceedings were mainly marked by loud protests of MDB Congressmen and Senators: Vice-Leader of the MDB, Congressman João Herculino dressed himself entirely in black to symbolize his mourning for the "death of democracy". Senator João Abraão, also of the MDB, caused an uproar by pointing out that the real Presidential candidate of the people, Juscelino Kubitschek, had been eliminated for 10 years by having his political rights cancelled. His protest was joined by others. The confusion was so great that the meeting of the Electoral College to choose the President of the Republic had to be cut off.


3. Ibid. page 47.


7. See Table 6 in Appendix: "GDP Growth by Sector: Brazil 1960 to 1977".

8. See Table 20 in Appendix: "Total Foreign Investment in Brazil by Country of Origin (1965 to 1976)."

9. Ibid.

10. See, "10 Anos de Política Salarial" in DIEESE, op.cit., page 64. See also Table 18 in Appendix for a reprint of the DIEESE table on the average real salaries from 1964 to 1973.

11. See Table 8.3 in Chapter 8 "Minimum Salary and Minimum Monthly Food Ration: Work Time Necessary to Purchase the Minimum Food Ration (As Defined by Decree-Law 399 of April 30, 1930)". The Decree-Law 399 established the minimum amount which a worker should earn in order to be able to purchase a sufficient amount of food for survival of himself and of his family. The DIEESE calculations all utilize this legal base as its minimum.

12. Interview with the author, May 20, 1978. Alceu de Amoroso Lima was responding to my question as to whether one could consider the opposition to be a united and well orchestrated social movement or if it was composed of fragmented and isolated groups.

13. These agreements were signed in 1966 between the MEC (Ministério da Educação e Cultura) and the US AID. They became known as the MEC-USAID agreements. The agreements aimed at a complete reform of all the university system in Brazil in order to privatize the institutions of learning. The University Reform would be carried out under the coordination and the direction of planning committees set up in accordance to the terms of the agreement. The committees were mostly constituted by North-American technicians and was to give the guidelines for all policies of education, for agricultural teaching and for the publication of textbooks. The reforms would completely transform the entire university system in Brazil, bringing it closer to a model generally used in American Universities. The agreements were a source of much protest for they were considered to be a threat

14. The national organization is the board of directors and the Political Council. State organizations are the State student Unions (União Estadual de Estudantes - UEE). Local university organizations of the students are the Central Directories (Diretório Central dos Estudantes - DCE) and the Academic Centers (Centro Acadêmico - CA). These forms of the organizational network of the UNE remained as parallel underground organizations. At the same time, however, the students increasingly organized to take over the legal official structures of representation which had been set up by the Lei Suplicy. In fact they had a dual system of representation -- one legal and one illegal.

It is interesting to note that in this matter the students followed the same resistance tactic as the workers who chose to be active within the official trade union structure -- independent of its connection and control by the State -- in order to take over the major electoral posts and utilize the organization for the consciousness raising of the membership.

15. For an account of the secret National Congress of Students in 1967 see Folha de São Paulo, August 11, 1967. See also MEMOREX, op.cit. page 15. The program approved in the Congress established the points of priority. It included the struggle against imperialism and an agreement to resist the implementation of the MEC-USAID University Reform.

16. For an account of the student tactics of organization at that time see: Jean Marc Von der Weid, Brazil 1964 to the Present: A Political Analysis, op.cit.; Luiz Henrique Romagnoli and Tânia Gonçalves, A Volta da UNE in História Imediata (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1979); and Alfredo Syrkis, Os Carbonários: Memórias da Guerrilha Perdida (São Paulo: Global Editora e Distribuidora Ltda, 1980).

17. A description of the events connected to the student demonstrations of this period may be found in the press of the time. See particularly, Jornal do Brasil, April 5, 1968, reporting on the Mass of the Candelária. For the riot and street battle which is
referred to as "Bloody Friday" (Sexta-Feira Sangrenta) see the extensive coverage in Correio da Manhã, June 22, 1968 and in Jornal do Brasil June 22, 1968. The demonstration in Rio de Janeiro popularly known as the "March of the 100,000" (A Passeata dos Cem Mil) was reported in Jornal do Brasil, Correio da Manhã and Última Hora of June 25 and June 26, 1968.

Of course these were all headline stories so most of the press of the period covered the events extensively.

The mourning and battle cry of the students (Nessa hora de luto começamos a nossa luta) prefaced the actual beginning of the armed struggle which engaged many of the students who had been present at the funeral of Edson Luís. This was reported in Correio da Manhã of March 30, 1968.


20. The "March of the 100,000" was preceded by violent street battles in downtown Rio de Janeiro which involved thousands of people in direct confrontation with the military. As the students demonstrated peacefully they were attacked by the Military Police. Office workers and construction workers who witnessed the attack came down to help the students. This developed in an all out street battle including the raising of barricades which lasted for over six hours. The damage done and the number of wounded from this street battle earned it the name of "Bloody Friday" (Sexta-Feira Sangrenta). The American Consulate was severely damaged in the fighting. See the account of this in Correio da Manhã, June 22, 1968.

As a result of the popular protest against the violence of the police attack upon the unarmed demonstrators, however, the government finally removed the military from the streets and the "March of the 100,000" could be conducted without further interference and peacefully. For an account of the Passeata dos Cem Mil see Jornal do Brasil, June 26, 1968 and Correio da Manhã, June 25, 1968. See also the personal testimony of the members of the "Committee of the 100,000" published in Flagrante of March-April, 1978. The negotiations with the government reached a rapid stalemate.

21. Data on number of trade unions may be found in Chapter Seven, dealing with the specific controls of trade unions in Brazil.

22. Ibid. It should be noted that the number of unions in the urban industrial areas which existed up to 1967 was modified both
quantitatively and qualitatively. This was done by cancelling or dissolving the unions which were most combative, in some cases, or by the large scale founding of new unions -- which the workers called "ghost unions". Qualitatively, the labor movement was similarly transformed by the number of trade union leaders who were removed from office and substituted by government-appointed officials.

23. Information on the Factory Committee of the Cobrasma is based on interview with Roque Aparecido da Silva (interview with the author, August 5, 1979) and José Ibrahim (interview of November 3, 1979). See also the interview with José Ibrahim in Véia, April 12, 1978.

Both José Ibrahim and Roque Aparecido da Silva were leaders in the Cobrasma Factory Committee. They both were forced to spend long years in exile. José Ibrahim, in addition, was in prison for a period and finally banished from Brazil, in 1969, as one of the prisoners exchanged for the American Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick, who was kidnapped by participants of the armed opposition.

The Cobrasma Factory Committee began as organized "Groups of 10" within each sector of the factory. The basic model of organization followed a molecular process. Workers would set up groups in their own section to discuss the problems of the factory. They would then elect their own sector leaders. These in turn coordinated and elected representatives for a larger group for the coordination work of all sections of the factory.

In 1965 the management of the Cobrasma accepted the legality of the Committee which until then existed semi-officially. It was established that the Committee would be composed of one effective representative and one alternate for each section of the factory. These would be directly elected by their fellow workers in their own section. The Cobrasma Factory Committee was constituted of 38 people from the 19 different sections of the factory.

24. Ibid.

25. For information on the MIA see: DIEESE "10 Anos de Política Salarial", op.cit. page 17; See also Francisco Weffort "Participação e Conflito Industrial; Contagem e Osasco, 1960" op.cit. pages 26 and 34-35.

For information on the parallel structures see Francisco Weffort, Partidos, Sindicatos e Democracia: Algumas Questões para A História do Período 1945-1964, unpublished manuscript, M.A. Thesis

There are also articles in Flagrante, March-April 1976, page 14 and Reporter, number 4, March 1978, pages 22-23.


28. For a discussion of this particular Decree see DIEESE, "10 Anos de Política Salarial", op.cit. pages 17 to 19.

29. Information on the strike of Osasco comes from interviews with leaders and participants of the strike as well as from Francisco Weffort, "Participação e Conflito Industrial: Contagem e Osasco, 1968" op.cit.


31. The first real demonstration that indicated the government's worry about the activities of the Frente Ampla came with an order which prohibited all the media from publishing or even mentioning any of the activities organized by the Frente Ampla. A strict censorship was enforced on the public media which could not mention the rallies, meetings or publish the program of the Frente Ampla.

For more information on this movement see: Marcus Figueiredo in Legitimidade e Coação no Brasil pós-1964, op.cit. pages 135 to 137. See also the daily political commentary of Carlos Castello Branco reprinted in his Os Militares no Poder, Volume II, particularly pages 15 and 16. For a reprint of the program of the Frente Ampla and articles of September and October of 1967 until April of 1968 see Carlos Lacerda, Depoimento (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978).

32. See the commentary of Carlos Castelo Branco in his Os Militares no Poder, Volume II page 183. Also see his column of political analysis in Jornal do Brasil, October 12, 1967.


34. See Carlos Castelo Branco, Os Militares no Poder, Vol. II op. cit. page 189. See also his column in Jornal do Brasil, October 22, 1967.
35. Marcus Figueiredo in *Legitimidade e Coacção no Brasil pós-64*, op. cit. pages 137-138

36. For an insider's account of this period and the efforts of Pedro Aleixo and other more liberal members of the Costa e Silva government to continue the liberalization program and draft a new Constitution see: Carlos Chagas, *113 Dias de Angústia: Impedimento e Morte de Um Presidente* (Rio Grande do Sul: L&PM Editores, Ltda, 1979).

37. See Márcio Moreira Alves, *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Press, 1973), pages 14 to 25. This provides the account of the tactic and the analysis which a group of opposition Congressmen at that time made of the political conjuncture and the correlation of forces.

38. See Ibid. pages 16-17.

39. This five minute special speech period is known as the "fire drip" speech time (*pinga-fogo*) for it is often used by party members to attack a particularly sensitive issue.

40. Information in this crisis may be found in Márcio Moreira Alves's own account in *A Grain of Mustard Seed* and in the press of the time which covered the episode extensively as an important headline issue. My own information comes, as well, from a number of long conversations and political analysis with Márcio, who is my brother. The attitude of provocation which this small group of radical parliament members took is placed in the context of the time, the euphoric feeling of opposition offensive and the actual belief that not only would armed struggle be the sole alternative but that the population was ready to rise up against the National Security State. It was even believed, in many opposition circles of the time, that the military would become divided and dissidents would distribute their arms to the people — as had just happened in the Dominican Republic.

Márcio Moreira Alves, himself, paid for his mistaken analysis with eleven years of exile. He would be forced to leave the country to escape a massive vindictive manhunt and would not return until after political amnesty was finally partially won in August of 1979.


43. See Marcus Figueiredo in *Legitimidade e Coaçaõ no Brasil pós-1964* op.cit.

44. This data was reported in the *Jornal do Brasil* of December 13, 1977, page 8. Also included in an analysis in *Isto É* of December 7, 1977, page 9-10.

PART II

THE SECOND STAGE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
CHAPTER SEVEN: ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE ROOTING
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

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I. Introduction

In this chapter we shall analyze the political and economic context of the armed struggle and the dialectic of violence between the revolutionary forces and the National Security State. Some major points need to be specifically considered:

1. The background and theoretical perspectives of the political parties which were engaged in the armed struggle.

2. The disarray and political repression against other opposition forces which espoused non-violent techniques of political resistance, including the widespread nature of the new purges and interventions.

3. The nature of the economic model of development which took root in this period of the "economic miracle".

4. The power-struggles within the State itself and the difficulty with the transference of power.

5. Finally, the deepening of the Repressive Apparatus and its framework of legality.

Theoretically, the period between 1969 and 1973 has left profound marks upon Brazilian civil and political society. It was a period of deepening and consolidation of the apparatus of repression which in turn solidified the power of the sectors within the military most intimately tied to the Doctrine of Internal Security and the containment of the "enemy within". The Repressive Apparatus became a de facto power which ruled from the background at times challenging the actual legal power of the Executive of the National Security State.
itself. The Repressive Apparatus was implanted during a period of violence and its activities were explicitly justified by the military as necessary to defend the nation from the threat of the armed enemies within the country. However, it was highly useful as a method of extensive terror against the population at large which ensured a climate of fear that acted as a deterrent against the participation in any form of political or social activities. This, in turn, allowed the free play of the economic forces to implant an economic model based on a high rate of exploitation of the working class.

From the point of view of the opposition, the period of 1969 to 1973 marks a change of directions. The defeat of the armed struggle deeply affected the course of the opposition social movement, forced a complete reassessment which, after a period of confusion and disarray, would result in a change of tactics under the leadership of other social forces not connected to or directed by the student movement or the underground parties of the left which had engaged in the actual armed confrontation with the National Security State.

In the end of this chapter we shall discuss the events which led the non-violent sectors of the opposition to overcome the hopelessness, fear and disarray caused by the violence of the repression and set forth upon new paths of opposition which would slowly recuperate a position of offensive against the major doctrines of the National Security State. The year of 1973 marks a new phase both for the opposition and for the State which would seek a different format of institutionalization less dependent upon the explicit use of physical coercion.
II. The Political And Economic Context

Institutional Act Number Five marked the end of the first phase of institutionalization of the National Security State. Both political parties were severely weakened by successive purges, though clearly the MDB party suffered most losses. ARENA members who had voted with the MDB were also summarily dismissed from their electoral posts and placed in the camp of those defined as the internal enemy.

The student movement was disbanded after the arrest of the top 800 leaders in an underground Congress held in Ibiúna, São Paulo, at the end of 1968. Labor unions suffered new interventions and severe repression, with the events which followed the passing of Institutional Act Number Five. In general terms, the sectors of the opposition which adhered to a strategy of internal reform and of peaceful resistance became greatly weakened and experienced a period of disarray and of hopelessness.

It should be noted at this point that although the period after Institutional Act Number Five represented the third distinct cycle of widespread repression it also expressed the growing isolation of the National Security State and the widening circle of groups and classes now included in the definition of the "enemy within" the nation. The first cycle of repression, in 1964, meant chiefly to annihilate the possibility of any resistance to the takeover of power of the civil-military coalition. The purges concentrated on people politically tied to the governments of the populist period, in particular that of João Goulart. The direct physical repression was specifically
directed against workers and peasants, a class-based strategy designed to inhibit any possibility of resistance from these sectors of the population. The second cycle of purges (1965-1966), after the passing of Institutional Act Number Two, was not accompanied by direct widespread physical violence. It was more politically targeted so as to complete the purging process of the State bureaucracy and the various levels of electoral and representational political office.

However, with the passing of Institutional Act Number Five, a third repressive cycle (1969-1974) would take place. This was characterized both by extensive purges of political representation, of universities, of informational networks and of the bureaucratic apparatus of the State and by largescale military maneuvers utilizing physical violence indiscriminately among all classes. Because the middle classes, and in particular the student movement, had actively challenged the State, the forces of repression concluded that severe areas of "pressure" existed in all classes. Therefore, the necessity to maintain internal security now forced the military to seek the uprooting of the"enemy within" among previously untouched sectors of the population. In reaction to the adherence of new groups to the opposition, the forces of repression mounted nationwide search and arrest campaigns which no longer spared the middle classes from the direct consequences of the apparatus of repression.

The purges were severe and rapid. During the period between 1969 and 1973 a total of 1,533 people were punished by Institutional
Act Number Five. Among those punished were included members of the military and civilian elite, members of the Judiciary, the Legislative, as well as political leaders, union leaders and university professors. The punishments ranged from compulsory retirement to summary dismissals, expulsions and the cancellation of political office and political rights. The student movement, which had taken on a major role in the previous immediate period, was practically eliminated. The parallel organizations of the UNE were dismantled through the severe repression which followed the arrest of the 800 top leaders of the student's organization in the secret Congress of the UNE in Ibiúna at the end of 1968. The subsequent repression reached the universities in other ways for it was added to new legislation of specific control of the student movement and of the faculty members. Following the Doctrine of Internal Security, the forces of repression designed mechanisms for control of learning, included in the definition of the specific strategy for the "psycho-social area".

Decrees Numbers 288 and 477 were enacted to allow the National Security State to exercise full control over the political activities of university professors and students. According to these decree laws, a university professor found guilty or suspected of engagement in activities considered "subversive" or antagonistic to the State could be summarily expelled and prohibited from teaching in any institution of learning for a period of three years. A student suspected of similar activities could also be expelled and would be unable to study for a period up to five years. These punishments were to be
applied in addition to punishments provided for under the National Security Law, also passed during this period. Hence, the traditional legal precepts establishing the rule that a person "may not be punished twice for the same crime" ceased to be applicable in Brazil.

Political representation, during this period, also suffered new and severe restrictions. In the time between 1969 and 1971, the Institutional Act Number Five would be used to purge a total of 105 members of the Federal Congress, 173 members of the State Legislatures and 36 aldermen. In addition, another 30 mayors and vice-mayors lost their political mandates and their rights. Table 7.1 provides a summary of the purges conducted in this period by Institutional Act Number Five. As can be seen, the process of cassação was greatly intensified when compared to the first and second cycles of repression and political purges:

Table 7.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Cycle 1964</th>
<th>2nd Cycle 1965-66</th>
<th>3rd Cycle 1968-71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Congress</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislatures</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldermen</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors &amp; Vice-Governors</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayors &amp; Vice-Mayors</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers and Executive members</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union leaders</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Political leadership</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the political participation of those who were *cassado* was further inhibited by the enactment of Institutional Acts Numbers 6 and 10. Institutional Act Number 6, for example, established that the limitations upon political activity of those purged should be *retroactively* applied to all who had been punished also by Institutional Acts Numbers One and Two. In addition, it provided for the automatic suspension of the political rights of all punished as well as preventing them from participating in union elections or in any political activity whatsoever. To such restrictions were added the provisions of Institutional Act Number 10 which provided that the *cassado* would also be electorally barred from all federal, state or municipal posts and could not be hired by state-owned corporations, companies under governmental contracts, companies in public utilities, governmental agencies, autarchies or foundations as well as federal universities or other institutions of learning.

The combination of all the legislations enacted by the State during this period resulted in complete elimination from activities in political and civil society of those directly considered as the enemy and punished by the three major Institutional Acts. In addition to such stringent measures of control, the National Security State, during this third cycle of repression, curbed the functions of Congress still more strictly. Perhaps the most important of the new provisions for diminishing the power of the Federal Congress was the
elimination of the secret ballot for consideration of Presidential vetos. Votes would have to be open and nominal, thus allowing the Executive to tightly control the legislative process and intimidate members of Congress who might dare to overturn an Executive veto. Although the Federal Congress had already lost a considerable part of its legislative function, the new mechanisms of control imposed during this period -- the "leadership vote", the "open and nominal vote" and the "party fidelity vote" -- would reduce it for all practical purposes to a rubber-stamp role. The centralization of State power upon the Executive branch of the government was completed so as to enable the National Security Doctrine to be fully implemented without the interference of the Federal Congress.

Finally, the Federal Congress was closed from December, 1968, until October 30, 1969. During this time the Executive remained exclusively under the control of those groups within the civil-military coalition most directly connected to the implementation of the Doctrine of Internal Security, i.e. the members of the Repressive Apparatus. With the recess of the Federal Congress plus of seven state and municipal Legislative Assemblies, the Executive branch of the National Security State was the full embodiment of the State itself. The Executive therefore freely ruled by decree. In the period of the recess of the Federal Congress, the Executive branch passed a total of 13 Institutional Acts, 40 Complementary Acts and 20 Decree-Laws. These were aimed specifically at the institutionalization of the controls of the psychosocial area in
accordance with the counter-offensive strategy already mentioned in chapter two. Specific controls were enacted for the activities of the press -- with the establishment of direct and physically present censorship -- of universities and other centers of learning and a series of general legislation to prevent civil society from organizing political activities. Of the latter, as we shall see in this chapter, the most important was the National Security Law.

In addition, the period of Congressional recess was fully used to enact decree-laws regulating the economy and providing a complete system of fiscal incentives which could facilitate the implementation of the economic model of development. By the end of 1969 the legal framework for the "economic miracle" years had been developed and completed.

In such a political context, the sectors of the opposition which had been arguing for the necessity of armed struggle gained distinct predominance. As shall be discussed in this chapter, the strategy of armed rebellion against the National Security State had been in the process of discussion since the early sixties, in particular since 1967. However, the strategy of armed struggle only gained stronger support among opposition sectors after the violence of the passing of Institutional Act Number Five. The year of 1969, therefore, marks the actual beginning of the urban and rural dialectic of violence which would tear the country for the next five years.

It should be noted that the armed struggle which occurred was fundamentally concentrated in the urban areas and involved primarily
organizations whose militants were drawn largely from the student movement. The main rural guerrilla warfare was concentrated in the region of Araguaia and organized by a splinter party of the Brazilian Communist Party. The question of why so many young middle class students, some of them teenagers, took up arms without prior theoretical or military experience is still the subject of investigation of political analysis.

The students who had participated actively in the upsurge of the opposition after the coup d'état of 1964 were very deeply influenced by the prevailing theoretical perspectives of revolutionary warfare. The experience of Cuba and of Che Guevara in Bolivia had marked a generation and led them to adhere to a revolutionary strategy which was advocated by some political parties of the underground left. Régis Debray's book, Revolution in the Revolution provided a romantic note to the actual experience of Cuba. Hence, the theory of foguismo, according to which revolution in Latin America may be sparked by the isolated action of a small group of decidedly committed individuals, took root among the young and idealistic students.

The violence of the Institutional Act Number Five, which established no self-limitation period for its own validity, convinced many young people that the dictatorship was implanted and could only be brought down by the force of arms. It was, therefore, the final argument which pushed many middle class people into armed struggle organized by the clandestine party organizations then already in existence. The stage was set for the ensuing dialectic of violence between the opposition and the National Security State.
1) Political Parties and Revolutionary Strategy.

As a background to the armed struggle it is necessary to engage in a brief analysis of the different organizations and theoretical perspectives. The social activities of the Catholic Church remained by and large committed to non-violence and organization at the grass-root among workers and peasants. A group which had originated in the social movements of the Catholic Church however, the *Ação Popular*, had already made the option of armed struggle in its clandestine Congress held in Uruguay in 1966 and, as we mentioned earlier, espoused the theory of *foquismo*. The AP was particularly strong in the student movement, having won most important electoral posts of the UNE and the state organizations during the post-1964 phase.

The other alternatives and parties came from the left and were splinter groups of the Brazilian Communist Party. (PCB). The PCB was founded in 1922. It had a brief period of legal existence but has been illegal since 1947. The Communist Party had strong influence in the labor unions and achieved a situation of semi-legality during the government of João Goulart. Prior to the military takeover of 1964, the PCB also was active in the student movement and among the peasants, although it was quickly losing membership and influence to the AP.

The Brazilian Communist Party has had a long history of acceptance of the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism. The party program is explicit on this issue and rejects armed struggle. This insistence on the peaceful transition led to major splits in the party: Such a
split occurred in 1962, leading to the formation of the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil - PC do B) which argued for the necessity of armed struggle. In late 1967 a second major split in the PCB occurred: Carlos Marighela, a member of the Executive Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), attended the OLAS conference in Havana in August of 1967 and publicly broke with the party by advocating urban guerrilla warfare as a main revolutionary strategy. Carlos Marighela founded the Alliance for National Liberation (Aliança de Liberação Nacional, ALN). The ALN of Carlos Marighela, unlike most other armed struggle organizations, had substantial support among workers who had previously been active militants of the Communist Party. The program of the ALN essentially was a modification of Debray's theory of *foquismo* so as to adapt it to a situation of urban guerrilla warfare rather than the traditional rural guerrilla espoused by other parties of the underground left.

Further fragmentation of the left continued well into the period of armed struggle with other splinter groups and organizations being formed so as to defend a variety of subtle interpretations of the revolutionary theory of *foquismo*. These included: The Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário, PCBR), the National Liberation Commando (Comando da Libertação Nacional, COLINA), the Revolutionary Movement of October Eight (Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro, MR-8), the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária, VPR) and the Armed Revolutionary Vanguard Palmares (Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares, VAR-Palmares).
Although militarily and strategically all of these groups had little or no coordination and acted in an isolated or even competitive manner with each other, they all had in common the theoretical influence of *foquismo* with the belief that small groups of armed revolutionaries could, in complete isolation from the social movements, spark an armed rebellion in a country of 100 million people.

The Brazilian Communist Party argued against the other tendencies of the left which espoused armed struggle and worked to solidify other legal and even non-Communist oriented opposition sectors which espoused non-violent resistance, including the MDB party. The organizations which broke with this strategy accused the PCB of reformism and warned that it would pursue a path which would immobilize the working class. With the military coup of 1964, followed by increasing repression and the subsequent measures for the institutionalization of the National Security State, these armed tendencies gained predominance within the left. It was argued that the PCB had led the popular forces into defeat. It was necessary to provide the workers with an alternative which would light the spark of a rural and urban *foco* and flame the uprising of the workers and allow them to break free of the system of increasing exploitation to which they were submitted. By 1968 the clandestine organizations were ready for armed action.

With the exception of the ALN, that espoused urban guerrilla warfare, the other organizations in the armed struggle intended their urban activities to be mainly a base of support of the main effort of preparation and launching of a rural *foco* that would lead to rural
guerrilla. Hence, their actions in the cities were aimed at securing funds and arms to send to the militants who were to prepare the field of battle in the rural areas. However, because most of the organizations never really even achieved the complete stage of rural guerrilla warfare, the armed struggle period would become characterized mostly by urban battles.

A small rural guerrilla action had attempted to establish itself in the mountains of Caparaó (Serra do Caparaó in Brazil's South) but had been quickly eliminated by the military forces in April of 1967. In October of 1967 the first armed bank robberies occurred in São Paulo. Most were carried out by the ALN and the VPR.

The armed actions were intensified in the year of 1968 and though not clearly defined as yet were sufficient to strengthen the resolve of hardline sectors of the military to pass the Institutional Act Number Five. The dialectic of violence was beginning: In February of 1968, a dynamite bomb was hurled against the American Consulate in São Paulo. In June a masked and heavily armed group invaded the Military Hospital in Cambuci, São Paulo, and stole all of the weapons in the premises. The Commanding General of the Second Army, based in São Paulo, challenged the revolutionaries by stating that they dared attack a hospital but would never dare confront the military directly. The following week a van, loaded with explosives, was thrown against the main entrance to the Second Army Headquarters in São Paulo. This last action convinced the military that they were dealing with well-trained militants.
Although these actions certainly increased the influence of the hardline sectors within the military and aided them in the conspiracy to pass Institutional Act Number Five, in fact they represented only the small beginning of a larger armed struggle that would take root after 1969. These activities mainly fulfilled a dialectic of violence. The violence of the National Security State, in turn, convinced other groups to join the clandestine parties and launch a process of armed rebellion. On the other hand, the armed actions, justified further the Doctrine of Internal Security and the threat of the "enemy within" allowing the hardline sectors to gain supremacy and a free hand in implanting a Repressive Apparatus sufficiently strong to crush the armed revolutionary bands.

Although the armed struggle itself ended in 1974, the Repressive Apparatus has remained as the de facto power base of the National Security State and stands as a parallel power to that of the Executive branch of the governments. It has, furthermore, been widely and efficiently used against the associative and organizational efforts of the working class to regain a measure of the salary power they had in 1964. In addition, it consolidated the aspect of the Doctrine of National Security and Development which analyzed the indirect strategy of international communism and the consequent need for control of the internal enemy. This would have lingering and serious consequences in future developments.

2) Power Struggles Within the State

In August of 1969 President Costa e Silva suffered a severe stroke which paralyzed and eventually killed him. As a consequence an intensive
power struggle developed within the State. According to the 1967 Constitution then in effect, the vice President Pedro Aleixo should immediately succeed the President in the event of death or impediment. However, Pedro Aleixo had openly opposed the Institutional Act Number Five. Since in the political context it was necessary for the National Security State to give full freedom to those closely connected to the Repressive Apparatus the Institutional Act Number Five was essential as a guarantee of absolute power to implement the policies of repression inherent in the Doctrine of Internal Security. Thus, Pedro Aleixo did not serve the purposes of the forces in control of the State.  

A special meeting of the High Command of the Armed Forces conducted in secret and with extraordinary powers concluded that "the Constitutional solution was not viable" and decided that the Presidency of the Republic would be exercised by a military junta composed of the three Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force.  

The solution of temporary rule of the military junta merely lengthened the period of power struggle within the military. A more permanent Executive had to be found among the military itself. Hence the next months would be filled with internal dissent.  

The crisis of the selection of the new President in 1969 consolidated an informal method of transference of power which is, to some extent, still in use. In order to select among the many potential military candidates, an unofficial "electoral college" composed of 104 generals was made responsible for collecting suggestions from officers of the Armed Forces. The names submitted to this electoral college were then
examined by a smaller electoral college composed of 10 other generals which reduced the possibilities to a list of three potential names. The final selection of the President was made by an even more diminute group of 7 generals. In this manner the name of General Emílio Garrastazú Médici was chosen for President. The vice President was General Augusto Hamann Rademaker Grunewald, one of the members of the ruling military junta.

Although the selection method was supposed to bring about a compromise between the warring factions of the military it clearly failed to do so. First of all, the military composition of the electoral college was definitely slanted towards the Army thereby establishing its clear predominance in the power coalition within the National Security State. This fact elicited protests and caused resentment in the other branches of the Armed Forces. In fact, dissent within the military was fueled rather than subdued as was indicated by a letter sent to the High Command of the Armed Forces and signed by General Albuquerque Lima:

For the first time in the history of this country the Armed Forces have taken on themselves the exclusive responsibility for the selection of the President.

This was done in an electoral college composed of 104 generals who reached a result which was then submitted to the arbitrary judgement of 10 other generals who reduced the list down to three names -- all of which were only generals of the army. Then an electoral college, even smaller, now of only 7 generals reached the selection of the name for President.

These seven generals may momentarily be occupants of high military posts but they do not necessarily represent the opinions of their fellows.
One should remark on the fragility of the National Security State's own efforts at institutionalization and transference of power. The Constitution of 1967 was barely one and one half years old and had been considered not viable. In reality, it must be pointed out that it was not the entire Constitution which was unsuited for the purposes of the State but only the sections guaranteeing individual rights and providing for a legal transference of power in the case of death or impediment of the President.

The crisis caused by Costa e Silva's illness dramatizes the fragility and instability inherent to the National Security State. The State lacks an automatic strong regulatory system for political power transference. Thus, it is subjected to deep crises at each point of transference of Executive power. The succession problem is in fact one of the most fundamental contradictions of the National Security State: although the regular Constitutional political framework of succession is not practicable for it cannot subsist side by side with the parallel legality of the "State of exception", the lack of such regular Constitutional mechanisms brings political struggle and dissent into the military and the State itself.

From the time of Costa e Silva's impediment to the present, the National Security State has been unable to avoid being torn apart by internal dissent at each juncture in the transfer of Executive power. In fact, each Presidential succession has brought with it crises of ever larger proportions. At each succession crisis the State is made internally weak because of the political struggle which divides its main social base of power: the military.
3) **The Economic Miracle.**

The period of industrial growth between 1968 and 1973 has become known as the "economic miracle" of Brazil. As may be seen in Table 7.2 below, during these years Brazil experienced two-digit economic growth as measured strictly by GDP growth rates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GDP GROWTH RATES BY SECTOR (in percentages)</th>
<th>GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT VARIATION (in percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the same time that the economy grew the inflation rate was held down to an average of 20 percent during the period. The economic growth experienced at that time was largely due to the growth rates prevalent in the industrial sector for the agricultural sector continued largely stagnant with the exception of a surge in 1971 due to investments in the central plains region and the Amazon.
It is to be remarked that the increase in the growth rate during the period was also due to the increase in total foreign investment coming into the country as well as extensive State initiated investments from application of funds acquired abroad in international and financial institutions. This policy resulted in a dramatic increase in the foreign debt which jumped from a total of 3.9 billion dollars in 1968 to over 12.5 billion dollars by 1973. Although such a high escalation of the debt should provide a basis of considerable worry for governmental planners, the prevalent perception at that time is that the debt was a matter of secondary importance for it could be continuously negotiated and the servicing easily paid for by the increase in the export of domestically manufactured goods.

In accordance to the development perspectives already commonly consensual in the Doctrine of National Security and Development, it was necessary to increase the overall levels of investment so as to reach a rapid rate of capital accumulation for the take-off stage of development. For such purposes multinational corporation investment was deemed of primordial importance for the nation's objective developmental goals. These were considered to be the most efficiently run corporations hence best able to handle the needs of rapid growth.

During this period of the economic miracle Antônio Delfim Netto emerged as the main economic planner of the National Security State. Using his absolute power, and in order to attract foreign investment, he established a complete system of fiscal incentives by decree-laws
that provided a comprehensive package of advantages for foreign investment: tax deductions or even tax-exempt status for investment carried out in areas which the government considered of primordial importance in the overall economic development plan: particularly the investments in the Amazon region, in the Northeast, in the central plains. In addition, tax-subsidies would be provided for all exports in order to encourage production for export and considerably lower the costs of production of manufactured goods so as to provide a highly competitive price for Brazilian products in the world market. A financial package encouraged the gathering of loans abroad by keeping internal interest rates higher than external interest rates available in the international financial system or in international private banks. Furthermore, used machinery could be imported and deducted from taxes as necessary investment capital. Perhaps the most beneficial of the fiscal incentives provided for tax deductions on capital gains at the stockmarket. This measure was officially justified by the need to increase the capitalization of industries within Brazil and strengthen the stockmarket facilities.

The economic model carefully pursued by the government followed a tendency defined as "productivist". According to this policy, an underdeveloped country needs to create the best possible conditions for investment, particularly foreign investment, so as to accumulate sufficient capital to reach the "take-off" stage of economic growth. The governmental planners argued against the economists whom they described as "distributivists" -- for their particular concern with the distribution of income aspect of economic development. 16
The "productivist" interpretation of economic development is understandable in the context of the Doctrine of National Security and Development: development is primarily important so as to increase the overall industrial productive capacity of Brazil, develop the vast expanses of the interior and the Amazon so as to "plug up" the paths of penetration and work towards the ultimate objectives of reaching Brazil's full potential as a future world power. Development is not geared to the immediate increase in the living standards of the majority of the population and is not directed at the fulfillment of basic needs. In fact, as we have already mentioned, it was explicitly accepted that the sacrifice of successive generations would be a necessary and unavoidable price to pay for Brazil's rapid capital accumulation process.

The "productivist" economists argued in strict accordance to this theory and a "trickle down" theory of distribution of benefits. Hence, they argued that it was first necessary to increase production so as to reach higher levels of industrial growth and provide a minimum base of industrial economic power. This "take-off" stage would set off a continuous pattern of economic growth, as had happened in developed countries. At that point it would be possible to gear economic policies directly to a more "distributivist" line, be concerned with a more equal distribution of income and with basic needs. One could not distribute poverty and the benefits of the economic growth would eventually "trickle down" to the lower sectors of the population.
Before worrying about distribution, the "productivists" argued, it was necessary to increase the overall size of the pie. For that purpose two main policies were necessary: policy plans which could gain the confidence of investors, particularly foreign investors and the maintenance of an absolute climate of political and social stability, i.e. an absence of dissent. Thus the slogan "development with security" was in practice implemented during the period of the economic miracle. Mário Henrique Simonsen, one of the most influential of the "productivists" economists clearly stated these two primordial objectives of the model of economic development:

The excellent performance and growth of the Brazilian economy in the period from 1968 to 1973 -- which was a higher rate than that of any other previous period -- elicits investigations into the conditions that caused this surge of economic growth. These are not only economic but also social and political conditions. Brazil was underdeveloped primarily because of a lack of political stability. This defect was successfully overcome with the military takeover of 1964 which instituted (...) a political regime which some political scientists have described as a 'modernizing authoritarianism'. Such a regime allows for differentiated subsystems -- including political parties and interest groups -- but keeps their autonomy temporarily limited. 17

The limitation of the autonomy of the subsystems was justified as necessary for the maintenance of the political stability which would allow the government planners to carry forth economic policies which would lead the country into development. The policies pursued were, therefore, termed to be "pragmatic" and to provide a realistic and technical assessment of the economic, social and political situation of Brazil.

In reality, the "pragmatic" approach to economic development
specifically provided for a pattern of income concentration. Income concentration was technically justified by the need to ensure an internal market for the industrial products. The most advanced sectors of the economy were the durable goods sectors. The production of durable consumer goods for the limited, but increasingly richer internal market, would ensure a rapid rate of industrial growth that would allow for the reaching of the "take-off" stage of economic development.

The durable goods sectors were considered by the planners to be the most desirable and easily modernized through multinational corporation investment and control. Thus a deliberate policy of fomenting investment in these areas was concomitantly carried out. As an example, Brazil is one of the few countries in the world that has deliberately removed thousands of miles of railway lines so as to foment and aid the development of the automobile industry.

The question of foreign investment and multinational capital control of the Brazilian economy was seen in similarly pragmatic lines. Thus, in response to growing concern with the denationalization of the economy, the exceedingly high foreign debt and the over-emphasis upon exports, Simonsen retorted simply that such arguments are "entirely unsubstantiated." In fact he maintained that the contribution of foreign capital had been important and showed "extremely positive results".

In reality, the response to the policies of the government was impressive. Foreign investment in Brazil, as may be seen in Table 7.3, jumped from a total of 11.4 million to over 4 billion dollars in 1973:
Table 7.3

TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1968-1973)

(in Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>252,780</td>
<td>331,418</td>
<td>331,418</td>
<td>530,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>260,303</td>
<td>294,241</td>
<td>294,241</td>
<td>360,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7,059</td>
<td>2,301</td>
<td>986,389</td>
<td>1,096,469</td>
<td>1,096,469</td>
<td>1,717,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>34,323</td>
<td>129,941</td>
<td>129,941</td>
<td>205,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>32,053</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>207,815</td>
<td>273,089</td>
<td>273,089</td>
<td>324,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>39,401</td>
<td>57,731</td>
<td>73,208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>182,279</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>191,055</td>
<td>357,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>105,066</td>
<td>124,871</td>
<td>124,871</td>
<td>318,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>65,951</td>
<td>80,084</td>
<td>80,084</td>
<td>132,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>58,526</td>
<td>75,173</td>
<td>209,765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>45,594</td>
<td>53,677</td>
<td>61,127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>126,525</td>
<td>202,986</td>
<td>299,538</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,445</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>2,347,005</td>
<td>2,719,680</td>
<td>2,911,535</td>
<td>4,589,209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: --- Data not published in the Anuário Estatístico for this year.

Of the total foreign investment during this period, the United States maintained a clear predominance, followed by West Germany. Other European capitalist nations also increased their investment considerably. The same was true for Japan, which, in fact, would become in later years the third largest foreign investor in Brazil.

The distribution of foreign investment by sector of industry showed a continuing concentration upon the durable goods sector, which was receiving a special promotion advantageous to foreign corporations. Fernando Fajnzylber, in his study of 377 of the largest industrial...
enterprises in Brazil according to their capital plus reserves reached the following distribution between foreign corporations, private national corporations and state-owned companies:

Table 7.4
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY - BRAZIL, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>FOREIGN</th>
<th>NAT. PRIVATE</th>
<th>STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Durable</td>
<td>Textile, clothing, pharmaceutical,</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumer goods</td>
<td>printing, food.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable</td>
<td>Electrical, auto-parts, vehicles,</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumer goods</td>
<td>electro-domestic.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods'</td>
<td>equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>Mining, steel, petroleum.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Chemical, paper &amp; cellulose, rubber,</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods</td>
<td>metallurgical, wood, construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>materials, plastics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: The list includes 377 of the largest industrial enterprises, according to capital plus reserves.

(1) Participation in capital plus reserves of the sector.
It may be readily observed that in 1970, foreign corporations controlled 83 percent of the durable goods sector, where it had a clear predominance with private national capital controlling only 17 percent of the industry. In the capital goods sector the control of foreign corporations was also maintained, though more evenly divided with private national corporations. The reverse holds true for the intermediate goods sector, where private national capital controlled 56 percent of production against 43 percent foreign and the non-durable consumer goods sector, where private national capital controlled a total of 52 percent against 46 percent foreign.

It is of interest to note that at that time the investment of the state corporations was limited mostly to basic industry, with heavy investments in mining, steel and petroleum where state corporations achieved a clear predominance with 71 percent of control over the sector.

In accordance with the distribution of control per sector of industry, it becomes relevant to note that the direct subsidy and tax policies of the National Security State geared to fomenting and facilitating investment in the durable goods sector of industry would benefit in particular multinational corporations which held such a distinct predominance in that particular sector of the economy.

The policy of income concentration to enlarge the internal market for production of durable goods would equally benefit foreign investors to a greater degree. Such a policy would result in a dramatic increase
in the total share of the national product of the 5 percent richest sector of the economically active population: from 27.6 percent in 1960, to 34.8 percent in 1970 and further increasing to a total of 39 percent of GNP by 1976. The reverse resulted for the 50 percent poorest sector of the economically active population. Their share of GNP decreased from 17.7 percent in 1960 to 14.9 percent in 1970 and suffered a further sharp fall to 11.6 percent by 1976. The distribution of income pattern may be observed in Table 7.5 below:

Table 7.5
INCOME CONCENTRATION IN BRAZIL (1960-1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economically Active Population</th>
<th>GNP SHARE 1960</th>
<th>GNP SHARE 1970</th>
<th>GNP SHARE 1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50% poorest</td>
<td>17.71%</td>
<td>14.91%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% next poorest</td>
<td>27.92%</td>
<td>22.85%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15% middle</td>
<td>26.60%</td>
<td>27.38%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% richest</td>
<td>27.69%</td>
<td>34.86%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Isto É, August 9, 1979, page 65.

It is important, at this point, to emphasize that the middle sectors, comprised of approximately 15 percent of the population of the country, received a measure of gain in their proportionate share of the total GNP per year, increasing slightly from 26.6 percent in 1960 to 27.3 percent in 1970 to 28 percent by 1976. Therefore, their standard of living was increased for they were included in the sectors for whom the durable goods were destined as an internal market. The fact that
INCOME CONCENTRATION IN BRAZIL (1960 - 1976)

In Percentages of GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pop. Eco. Active</th>
<th>GNP share per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% poorest</td>
<td>17.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% next poorest</td>
<td>27.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15% middle</td>
<td>26.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% richest</td>
<td>27.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Isto É, August 9, 1979, page 65.
this economic benefit was due to a transference of income from the poorest sector and not from the upper 5 percent of the population could not properly be assimilated by the population at large. This explains the relative enthusiasm which the middle sectors began to show for the economic model of the government.

The government of Médici made extensive use of political propaganda emphasizing the economic growth of the nation and its consequent arrival at its manifest destiny of a great power (O Brasil Grande). Development programs in the Amazon and in the interior received a great deal of attention. This, combined with the now recent availability of durable consumer goods in the market which the middle sectors could buy through the enlarged system of consumer credit elicited a new kind of legitimacy for the National Security State: the legitimacy based on continuous and accelerated economic growth.

Since the country undeniably was experiencing a period of growth, the workers were apparently quiet, or at least not loudly protesting, and the government effectively justified the repression by claiming that communist terrorists were threatening the entire nation and the very process of economic development, there was little reason for the middle classes to risk their skins and their economic benefit in the opposition to the government's policies. Thus, the middle sectors were by and large willing to acquiesce with the repression.

During the period between 1969 and 1973, the Médici government enjoyed a measure of legitimacy greater than the previous governments. Based upon the "economic miracle" and the fear elicited by the armed
and violent confrontation between the armed opposition and the forces of security, this process of legitimation would allow the National Security State more political space in which to act to implant the economic model of development and the Repressive Apparatus.

The fact that the armed struggle occurred not in a moment of crisis for capitalism, but on the contrary, in a period of economic growth which peaked during these years played a significant role in justifying the strong repression against the internal enemies of the nation who were threatening the pattern of successful development acclaimed as the "economic miracle" of Brazil. When added to the very real personal risks which an opposition stance entailed at that time -- even a non-violent opposition activity -- the economic legitimation and fear would be the strong deterrents to any political participation.

III. The Dialectic of Violence

We do not believe in the possibility of a peaceful solution. There is nothing artificial about the conditions of violence now existing in Brazil. They have been in existence ever since the dictatorship used force to take control.

Violence against violence. The only solution is what we are now doing: using violence against those who used it first to attack the people and the nation.

Carlos Marighela. 23

1) Improvements in the Legal Framework: Repression and Armed Struggle.

The organizations involved in the armed struggle had become increasingly audacious in the year of 1969. In January, 1969, Carlos Lamarca, an officer of the IV Infantry Regiment based in Quitaúna,
São Paulo, commanded a group of officers and soldiers in a raid of the arsenal deposit of the IV Infantry Regiment. The group escaped in an Army truck loaded with heavy weapons and ammunition. They were clandestine members of the VPR.

In June, 1969, a well organized group of armed men conducted a mass escape of political prisoners from the high security prison of Lemos de Brito in Rio de Janeiro.

Multiple bank assaults occurred to provide for the financial support of the guerrilla groups. Ambushes to acquire weapons from the military became more frequent as the year progressed. And, if there was any doubt left as to the political meaning of the assaults, in August of 1969 Carlos Marighela attacked and occupied the Rádio Nacional in São Paulo to read over the radio a revolutionary message.

For a brief period the various forces within the National Security State were paralyzed by their own internal dissent and power struggle. This internal debate dealt also with the question of which further legal measures should be taken so as to curb the growing armed challenge. In the context of the Doctrine of Internal Security, the armed groups were indeed taken seriously. The military in addition probably over-estimated the number of militants involved in the various armed organizations of the left.

On September 4, 1969, only a few days after the military junta had taken office, the ALN and the MR-8 jointly conducted their most spectacular action: At two o'clock in the afternoon, in a quiet street
of Rio de Janeiro, a commando of the two organizations kidnapped Charles Burke Elbrick, United States Ambassador to Brazil.

It was the first time that a member of the Diplomatic Corps had been kidnapped by armed guerrillas and the news rapidly spread around the world bringing the armed struggle in Brazil to front page headlines. The text of the revolutionary document left in the car of the kidnapped Ambassador had to be read in all aired media as well as published in the written press. It was one of the conditions established for the release of the Ambassador. It read, in part:

To the Brazilian People:

Revolutionary groups today have arrested Mr. Elbrick, taking him to a secure spot somewhere in the country. This is not an isolated action. It is one of the innumerable revolutionary actions which have already been conducted: bank assaults, where funds for the revolution are acquired, taking from the bankers what they have taken from the people; attacks against army headquarters, barracks and police stations so as to obtain weapons and ammunition to carry out our revolution aimed at the overthrow of the dictatorship; attacks on the prisons where our revolutionary companions are kept so as to free them; the bombings of buildings which are connected to the oppression; execution of torturers. In reality, the kidnapping of the Ambassador is just one more act of war in this revolutionary warfare which every day grows and which has begun, this year, its rural phase.

With the kidnapping of the Ambassador we wish to demonstrate that it is possible to overthrow the dictatorship. We act where the enemy least expects and then we immediately disappear. In this way we weaken the dictatorship, terrorize the exploiters and bring hope of victory to those who are exploited.

The note was jointly signed by the ALN and the MR-8 and the list of prisoners to be exchanged for the life of the American Ambassador included the names of student leaders arrested at the Congress of
Ibiúna in 1968 as well as those of working class leaders, such as José Ibrahim, of the metalworkers of Osasco.

The kidnapping of the United States Ambassador deeply impressed the Military Junta and confirmed the theories of Internal Security of the Doctrine of National Security. Thus, the National Security State reacted in two ways: first it immediately began negotiations with the revolutionary guerrillas to meet all of their conditions. This aspect of the policy accepted the considerable pressure which was brought to bear upon the Brazilian government by the government of the United States. Secondly, it passed two Institutional Acts of importance for the strengthening of the legal framework of the Repressive Apparatus. Institutional Acts Numbers 13 and 14 were both enacted on September 5, 1969, one day after the United States' Ambassador was kidnapped.

Institutional Act Number 13 established the penalty of banishment from the Brazilian territory of all political prisoners who were exchanged for kidnapped dignitaries. The Act, in fact, gave the Executive branch the power to banish from Brazil for life all those whom the Executive considered to be "inconvenient, harmful or dangerous to the National Security".

Institutional Act Number 14, an amendment to the Constitution of 1967, stated the precepts of the Doctrine of National Security in its preamble. In it we can see the reinforcement of the theory of the internal enemy, the use of the language of psychological warfare and the first clear intention to regulate mechanisms of more explicit coercion:
Considering that acts of psychological warfare or of revolutionary and subversive warfare are presently disturbing the life of the nation and maintaining a climate of tension and of social agitation.... they must be met with the most severe repression.

Considering also that the juridical tradition in Brazil, although contrary to capital punishment or to life imprisonment, accepts these in case of external war that will threaten the nation's rights under the Constitution, but that it does not yet regulate this matter when it comes to the consideration of crimes due to internal, psychological, revolutionary or subversive warfare, and, considering that such acts in fact affect the National Security of the nation much more profoundly ... We resolve to enact the following Institutional Act....

Article 1: Paragraph 11 of Article 150 of the Constitution of 1967 shall read as follows:

Paragraph 11: There will be no death penalty, no life imprisonment and no banishment or confiscation of property, except in case of External War or in case of Adverse Psychological, Revolutionary or Subversive Warfare.

Article 2: All Institutional Acts, Complementary Acts or Decree-Laws ... continue in effect.

Article 3: There shall be no juridical hearing for acts practiced in obedience to this Institutional Act and to Complementary Acts which may follow it. 26

As may be remarked in the preamble this Institutional Act was a legal application of the Doctrine of Internal Security as an integral part of the ideology of National Security. The Constitution of 1967 had failed to legalize the penalties for those who were considered to be the internal enemies, the "enemy within". The Institutional Act meant to correct this oversight.

One of the main factors that allows the laws of the repression to be such effective mechanisms of control is the vagueness of the definition
of what constitutes "psychological, revolutionary or subversive warfare". As we have discussed previously, this definition is not limited to those who take up arms against the State but is broadly interpreted to encompass all sectors of the opposition considered to be "antagonistic" and particularly the organized interest groups, defined as "pressures" which are sufficiently coherent to provide a challenge to the policies of the National Security State.

Hence the definition must be necessarily vague for the theory of the indirect and psychological warfare of international communism implies that all citizens are suspect until it can be proven otherwise. Thus, the concepts are purposefully left undefined for it is legally impossible to determine all the categories which may fall in the camp of the "enemy within". The force of the legal framework of the Repressive Apparatus lies exactly on the fact that potentially everyone is an enemy of the State and is, therefore, subject to all the penalties predicted in the repressive State's legality.

The National Security State enacted two other measures of importance in the wake of the reaction to the kidnapping of the United States Ambassador to Brazil: The first was the passing of the National Security Law of September 29, 1969. The second was the Constitution of 1969, also enacted by decree during the period of Congressional recess under the form of Amendment Number One of October 17, 1969.

The National Security Law of September 29, 1969, is perhaps the most important of the legal applications of the National Security Doctrine. The Manual Básico da ESG provides the following explanation of National
Security in accordance to the concepts of the War College:

National Security is the degree of guarantee which the State shall provide to the nation at any given time. This is to be carried out through specific political, economic, psychosocial and military actions so as to maintain the defined objectives in spite of antagonisms or pressures whether in actual existence or potential.

If the antagonisms or pressures are exercised upon the State from an external origin then the matter must be handled according to the concept of External National Security. If, on the other hand, the antagonisms or pressures -- of whatever origin -- are manifested in the country or otherwise produce a negative effect within the country, then the problem is to be handled by Internal National Security.

The National Security Law defined and legalized the concept of Internal Security as an integral part of National Security. The terms and concepts remained sufficiently broad so as to allow the State to exercise complete discretion in the selection of what may constitute a crime against National Security. The Law itself is a practical application of the theoretical arguments in the ideology of National Security as discussed earlier:

Article 1: Every person or juridical entity is responsible for National Security, as defined in the law.

Article 2: National Security is the guarantee of the maintenance of the National Objectives against opposition, either external or internal.

Article 3: National Security, essentially, are the policies which preserve internal and external security. This includes the prevention of and the repression of any adverse psychological war or of subversive or revolutionary war.

Paragraph 1: Internal Security is an integral part of National Security. By this is meant that any threat from opposition pressures -- of whatever origin -- which is either manifested in the country or produce an effect in the country is a matter of internal National Security.
Paragraph 2: Adverse psychological warfare is the use of propaganda, counter-propaganda and political, economic, psychosocial or military action which is conducted in order to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of foreign groups against the attainment of our national objectives.

Paragraph 3: Revolutionary warfare is the internal conflict, usually inspired by an ideology or aided from the outside of the country, that attempts to gain power by progressively controlling the nation. 29

One must take into consideration the National Security Law's conceptual reference to the ideology of National Security and Development. In effect, the law incorporates the definitions of what may constitute the "enemy within" in the theory of Internal Security. It is meant to provide the legal framework for the repression of all those who might oppose the policies of the National Security State, so as to hinder the attainment of the national objectives of development as defined by the concepts discussed in Chapter Two.

One may note that the definition of "adverse psychological warfare" remains vague so as to leave sufficient flexibility for the punishment of practically any opposition activity. It is the State, ultimately, which defines exactly what kind of political, economic, social or psychosocial action is to be considered a crime.

Articles 8 through 16 of the National Security Law deal with the traditional juridical concepts of National Security pertaining to the protection of the nation against external aggression. Thus the articles provide specific penalties against espionage, sabotage etc. 30

Other Articles in the law are particularly designed to prevent and repress armed acts of military revolutionary war. 31 Since the National Security State was specifically reacting to the violence
of the armed confrontations it is not surprising to find that these articles established penalties for such acts as the "promotion of armed insurrection", to "assault, steel or vandalize establishments of credit or finance" or to "kill a person who is in a position of authority or a foreigner living in Brazil at the explicit invitation of the Brazilian government or in the service of his own country."  

One of the main purposes of the National Security Law, however, is the control of the "enemy within". Therefore, the majority of the articles deal with the prevention of strikes, the control of the media and other information networks, the prohibitions of specific political parties and other limitations to associative rights.

The legal impediments to strike activities, defined in the psychosocial area, are specifically handled in three articles: Article 29 provides a penalty of 8 to 20 years in prison for those who may "obstruct or hamper the regular functioning of essential services which are administered by the State or through the State's permission". Article 38, with a prison term of 4 to 10 years, prohibits the "promotion of a strike or lock out so as to paralyze essential services or public services." Article 40 providing a prison term from 8 months to 1 year, prohibits all strikes of public employees.

The press, public information and the general media are also subjected to specific and stringent controls in the law.
The controls of the media and information are an aggravating circumstance of punishments provided in the National Security Law for crimes which may be charged to different opposition activities. Thus the press controls are in the form of paragraphs added to articles of prevention of antagonisms or pressures. The power of the controls on the media stems from the fact that the editor, newspaper owner or journalist is personally held responsible and criminally liable for publication of events or opinions of others who may have infringed one of the general articles of control. The State may also apprehend entire numbers of magazines or newspapers and cancel the registration, prevent the distribution or close the enterprises which violate the measures of the National Security Law. 38

The most important mechanisms of control included in the National Security Law are:

Article 16: To divulge, in any media of communication, news which are slanted or a true fact slanted in such a way as to dispose the population against the constituted authorities. Penalty: 6 months to 2 years.

Article 34: To morally offend a person of authority for political or social motivation of non-conformity. Penalty: prison from 2 to 4 years.

Article 36: To offend the honor and dignity of the President, the Vice-President, the presidents of the Federal Senate, the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court and all Ministers of State, governors of states or territories and the mayor of the Federal District. Penalty: from 2 to 6 years in prison.

Paragraph 1: If the crime is committed through the press, the radio or television the penalty shall be raised by half...
Article 39: To incite:
   I. War or subversion of the socio-political order.
   II. The collective disobedience of the laws.
   III. The animosity between the branches of the Armed Forces. Or between the Armed Forces and social classes or civilian institutions.
   IV. To violent struggle between social classes.
   V. To paralyze public services or essential activities.
   VI. To incite hatred or racial discrimination.

Penalty: between 10 and 20 years.
Paragraph 1: If the crimes predicted in points I and IV are committed through the press, radio or television the penalty should be from 15 to 30 years.

Article 41: To disturb through threats, noise or tumult Legislative sessions, juridical trials or international conferences. Penalty: 6 months to 2 years.

Article 43: To attempt to organize or reorganize (...) a political party or association which has been dissolved by law or by judicial decision or which may have activities considered dangerous or prejudicial to National Security. Penalty: from 2 to 5 years.

Article 45: To distribute subversive propaganda by:
   I. Using any means of communication such as: newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, bulletins, pamphlets, radio, television, cinema, theatre and such other vehicles of propaganda and adverse psychological warfare or of subversive revolutionary warfare.
   II. To entice people in work places or in places of study to join in activities.
   III. To organize a rally, public meeting, demonstration or parade.
   IV. To carry out a prohibited and illegal strike.
   V. To offend, defame or slander a public institution or a person or officer of a government institution because of his duties.
   VI. To demonstrate solidarity with any of the acts mentioned in the above points.

Penalty: from 1 to 3 years in prison.

Article 47: To incite the occurrence of any of the crimes included in this law or to defend the author of any such a crime. Penalty: 2 to 5 years.
   Paragraph 1: the penalty shall be raised by half if the incitement, publicity or defense is conducted through the written press, radio or television.
Article 53: If the responsibility for subversive propaganda is of a director or person responsible for a newspaper, magazine, or periodical the judge may, when he receives the denunciation, suspend the circulation for up to 30 days in addition to the other penalties imposed by the Law. Paragraph 1: If this occurs in a radio or television station, the suspension shall be carried out by the President of the National Council of Telecommunications.

Article 54: In the crimes defined in Articles 16, 34, 35, 39, 45 and 47, the Minister of Justice, in addition to the penalties already predicted in this Decree-Law, may also determine the apprehension of the newspaper, magazine, book or any other printed media, or its suspension, prevention of circulation, distribution or sale in the Brazilian territory. If it is a television or radio station the Minister of Communications shall suspend its permission to function. Paragraph 1: If there is a second infringement of this law the Minister of Justice may cancel the registration or cancel the permission to function.

With the National Security Law of 1969, in effect, freedom of association and freedom of the press ceased to exist in Brazil. As may be seen in the above text of the law, it is the most comprehensive framework for the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State. The prohibitions included constitute the main tool of political repression and is, thus, the foundation of the power of the State itself. The flexibility of the terms of the law, in addition, allows the State ample political maneuverability so as to punish opposition members with more or with less severity depending on the social, political and economic context and upon the convenience of the State.

The second important measure passed in the wake of the kidnapping of the Ambassador of the United States was Amendment Number One to the Constitution of 1967. As was the case with the National Security Law, this Amendment to the Constitution was also enacted by decree during the
period of forced Congressional recess. The National Security State therefore profited from a momentary serious crisis to enact legislation that could institutionalize the system of repression needed for the continuation and deepening of the exploitative economic model of development.

Amendment Number One essentially maintained the main body of the Constitution of 1967 in its institutional validity for the State. The major changes occurred in what is concerned with internal national security. The Constitution of 1969, as it became officially recognized, established that the responsibility for the maintenance of national security was of every person and juridical organization. Thus, citizens were legally and Constitutionally forced into the position of informants of the State or they would themselves be criminally liable. It should be recalled that this amendment was enacted one month after the passing of the National Security Law.

Other modifications of importance included: 1. The definition of the National Security Council as the organization ultimately responsible for the formulation and execution of the Policy of National Security. 2. The exclusive right of the Executive to handle crimes against the internal security of the nation. 3. The ample juridical competence of the National Security Council to decide upon certain territorial uses for purposes of National Security. 4. The conceptual inclusion of the Armed Forces as essential mechanisms for the carrying out of the policy of National Security as integrated with internal security. 5. The prerogative of the Executive power to declare a state of siege with suspension of rights.
In essence, Amendment Number One of October 17, 1969, eliminated the liberal elements of the otherwise authoritarian structure of the Constitution of 1967. The power of the Executive branch was enhanced and the measures providing for extraordinary powers to allow the carrying out of the Policy of National Security were incorporated into the body of the Constitution. Although Institutional Act Number Five was maintained for it empowered the Executive to an even greater measure, it was also in part incorporated into the text of the Constitution of 1969 itself.

The framework of legality for the Repressive Apparatus in the process of consolidation necessitated, in addition to the general mechanisms of control, some more specific measures for dealing with the psychosocial and the military areas. Within what is defined as the psychosocial area, the National Security State devised specific legislation of controls for the press, the Press Law (Lei de Imprensa) and for the universities. The latter was subjected to specific Decree Laws, Decrees 288 and 477 which allowed the government to summarily expel students and professors from the universities and other centers of learning. In our next chapter we shall discuss the specific mechanisms of control in greater detail.

Finally, and perhaps most significant, in November 11, 1971, the government enacted a Decree-Law which gave the Executive branch of the State the power to pass any number of secret decree laws. These secret laws are not published in any of the official registers or in the Diário Oficial da União. Only the numbers of the decrees are published: the text of the law is entirely ommitted. Hence, the legal framework of
the Repressive Apparatus which was passed during the period from 1969 to 1973 provided the base for the arrest of a person who may have infringed a law of which he is totally ignorant.

It should be remarked that the later period of liberalization after 1974 did not revoke any of the provisions of the National Security Law, of the Constitution of 1969, of the Press Law or even the Secret Decree Law. These are all presently still in effect. In fact, the liberalization period provided concessions but did not touch the very foundations of the Repressive Apparatus or its framework of legality. We shall discuss these matters further in later chapters.


The years of 1969 through the end of 1973 were characterized by a growing dialectic of violence between the armed organizations and the repressive forces of the State.

On November 4, 1969, the revolutionary leader and founder of the ALN, Carlos Marighela, was machinegunned in an ambush in the streets of São Paulo. His death had been preceded by an escalation of police and military repression in an operation which involved the arrests of several hundred people in both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The climax of the "circling operation" was the invasion of a Dominican convent in São Paulo and the torture of Dominican monks accused of aiding the underground organization.

During this period new armed groups had begun to operate in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The MR-8's first overt military action had been the kidnapping of the American Ambassador. Other groups
began armed operations against the State, in particular the VAR- Palmares, the Revolutionary Labor Party (PRT), the Democratic Resistance (REDE), the Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement (MRT) and the Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário, PCBR) which was itself a splinter group of the maoist Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). 45

The revolutionary organizations concentrated upon spectacular actions which necessitated little coordination between the groups -- split and fragmented ideologically and unable to join for coherent armed actions -- and would call the attention of the population and the world at large upon the armed struggle in Brazil. Thus, the actual guerrilla struggle became characterized by the kidnapping of foreign diplomats in exchange for the liberation of captured members of the underground organizations. These actions were more of a defensive than an offensive nature.

The forces of repression decimated the ranks of the underground organizations through the extensive and violent use of torture to obtain information that could lead to the arrest of others and the dismantling of the networks of support of the guerrilla groups. The underground organizations counter-acted by kidnapping three more diplomats so as to free key militants: In March of 1970 the VPR kidnapped the General Consul of Japan, in São Paulo. The Japanese Nobuo Okuchi was exchanged for five political prisoners. In June of 1970 a joint commando of the ALN and the VPR kidnapped the West German Ambassador to Brazil, Ehrenfried von Holleben. He was exchanged for 40 political prisoners.
Finally, on December of 1970 the Swiss Ambassador to Brazil, Giovanni Enrico Bucher, was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro. This time the National Security State was no longer willing to make many concessions to the revolutionary guerrillas for the repression was well on the way and caused severe losses in the ranks of the armed groups. Eventually, however, after three months of difficult negotiations, the Swiss Ambassador was exchanged for 70 political prisoners who were flown to Chile. This was the last attempt to kidnap a diplomat in Brazil.

In spite of the theoretical emphasis upon rural guerrilla foco the armed struggle period was focused essentially in the cities. The only two attempts to set up an actual rural foco were conducted by Carlos Lamarca, of the VPR, who began to train a small band of 9 guerrillas in a region of São Paulo known as Vale da Ribeira and by the PC do B in the region of the Araguaia. In both cases the forces of the State were utilized in full to repress the small band of guerrillas and, more significantly, to terrorize the peasant population in the area.

In spite of the spectacular bank robberies and kidnappings of diplomats, the general support of the population for the guerrilla organizations cannot be considered large. It is difficult to reach an exact estimate of the number of militants who in fact participated in the different organizations throughout the armed struggle. A cross-check of testimonies and interviews with participants, however, allows one to estimate their numbers at no more than 6,000 throughout the entire period. Considering that Brazil had at that time a population
of almost one hundred million people, this is hardly a situation which could be accurately described as "civil war". Nonetheless, the National Security State used the justification of civil war to unleash the most violent period of State repression that has been recorded in Brazilian history. As shall be discussed in this section, this largescale operation involved not only the institutionalization of torture as a technique of interrogation and of political control, but also the development of pacification programs, blitzes, and the implantation of a vast network of police machinery to carry out the measures of the Repressive Apparatus.

2.1. Pacification Programs.

The National Security State carried out regular largescale campaigns of intimidation and arrests. These operations against an unarmed population were conducted in the form of blitzes that involved large numbers of police and military personnel. The blitz is a military operation which was widely used by the German occupying armies during World War II. It involves the military occupation of an area so as to conduct house to house searches. A form of blitz frequently used in Brazil (known popularly as the batida) involves the setting up of roadblocks so as to check pedestrians and vehicles. The military will search houses, cars and people looking for proper documentation. The lack of documents is considered a criminal offense and the person is generally regarded as a potential suspect. The consequence is often arrest, for in keeping with the theory of the "enemy within" a person is considered guilty and threatening until it can be proven otherwise. Such operations are still common in Brazil.
During the period from 1969 to 1974, however, such large scale operations were more frequent and resulted in mass arrests, beatings and general intimidation. Although under strict censorship -- which included the physical presence of a "censor" in the premises of all media -- nonetheless the press often reported that as many as 300 or 500 people were arrested during one such blitz operation regularly conducted in the urban areas. At times the operations involving total army mobilization were conducted in citywide or even nationally. For example, on June 16, 1969, the weekend before Nelson Rockefeller's visit to Brazil as President Nixon's emissary, as many as 6,000 people were "preventively detained" in the city of Rio de Janeiro. A national blitz -- codenamed "Operation Birdcage" -- was carried out during the days which immediately preceded the Congressional elections of 1970. During this particular operation the press reported that a total of over 10,000 people -- many of them candidates of the MDB opposition party -- were arrested throughout the country by the military. This particular campaign had the clear purpose of intimidation so as to guarantee an electoral victory for the governmental party, the ARENA.

Campaigns of terror were similarly conducted in the countryside. The operation of encirclement of Carlos Lamarca and his band of 9 rural guerrillas of the VPR in the Vale da Ribeira involved a total of 10,000 soldiers who surrounded the entire area and arrested the peasants whom they considered to be potential suspects. Perhaps
the most serious occurrence of largescale repression against an
unarmed population took place in the region of Araguaia, between the
years 1972 and 1975. A short background is needed to place the events
of the Araguaia in a context of political and economic interests.

In 1952, a mutual assistance agreement was signed between Brazil
and the United States. The agreement provided for a Joint Military
Commission to prepare topographic maps and air charts of Brazil and
conduct aerophotographic surveys to provide astronomic and geodesic
data. This was to be conducted in particular in the region of the
Amazon and meant to chart in detail the mineral wealth of the region.
Strong opposition in the Federal Congress in the years prior to the
1964 takeover prevented ratification of this agreement. However,
three months after the military coup d'état of 1964, this survey
of the Amazon region began to collect systematic data which would
precisely locate the deposits.

Once the aerophotogrametric surveys were completed and the
deposits effectively mapped, the entire region became the object of
intense land speculation. The extent of the process may be surmised
by the conclusions of a Parliamentary Investigating Committee which
in 1968 examined the problem of land purchase by foreign multinational
corporations in the Amazon region. The Committee established that
over 50 million acres of land in the states of Bahia, Goiás, Minas
Gerais, Maranhão, Pará, Amazonas and in the territory of Amapá were
in the direct control of foreign multinational corporations. These
included: in the state of Goiás approximately 3.5 percent of the total territory was owned by the North American corporations Universal Overseas Holding, World Land Co.; Stanley Amos Sellig and Henry Fuller. In the state of Pará, one million acres were owned by the Georgia Pacific. In addition, other large foreign owners included the National Bulk Carriers, D. K. Ludwig Corporation, R. H. MacGlowen, Ed Key Properties and Mission Bay Corporation. In the territory of Amapá the single largest landowner was Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 52

The multinational corporations were benefited by the system of tax incentives provided under a special program for the development of the Amazon basin under the coordination of the Superintendency of Amazon Development (SUDAM) and financed by the special governmental Bank of the Amazon. In addition, the government of Médici provided the necessary investments for infrastructural improvements in the area so as to allow the mining, forestry and largescale agricultural projects to be activated. In 1970 the government began a specific program to allow access to the mineral wealth of the region. Close to 150 million dollars were spent in the construction of the Transamazon Highway and the Belém-Brasília Highway which cut through the entire Amazon basin. In addition to these benefits and tax incentives, the corporations involved in mining were provided with the added incentive of a special tax system which provided them with a 20 percent mineral depletion allowance. 53

The mineral deposits in the area are to be found in the Amazon and in the Araguaia region bordering the river that gives it its name.
In between the Araguaia and the Tocantins rivers one finds a large mountain chain, the Serra dos Carajás, where the mineral wealth is most concentrated. In 1980, for example, what is to be one of the world's largest deposit of gold has been found in these mountains and is to be developed by a consortium of Brazilian state-owned corporations and multinationals. The entire region of the developmental program encompass parts of four states of Brazil: Mato Grosso, Goiás, Pará and Maranhão. The program has had enormous success: since 1969, corporations involved in the area increased by more than 100 percent the production of iron ore, manganese, nickel, chromite, zinc, uranium and other minerals.

However, this wealthy region has been traditionally inhabited by indians and by peasant families who carried out subsistence farming. The development projects of the SUDAM brought to the region such an intense land speculation that violent conflicts resulted. Corporations which gain access to land title by decision of the National Security Council must then rely on the State's repressive forces to evict the peasant families from the land. The land conflict has also been extended to the reservations of the indian population.

In this region the PC do B in 1970 was beginning the preparation of a rural foco. The underground organization moved in families and couples who began to till the soil and provide technical assistance to the local peasants. The entire guerrilla group never numbered more than a total of 69 militants of the PC do B party. They worked among
the peasants, helped them build a school, provided some health care and gave agronomy lessons. At night they trained in the jungle. They were known as the "paulistas" for they were believed to have come from the state of São Paulo. The peasants and other residents of the area were completely unaware of their clandestine jungle activities. In 1972 the National Information Service (SNI) discovered the foco. Immediately the Army began a veritable military occupation maneuver in the area which involved three separate military campaigns in the years between 1972 and 1975 and employed a total of 20,000 men. According to General Viana Moog, one of the Commanders of the Army troops, "it was the biggest troop mobilization which the Army has conducted. In fact, it was similar to the mobilization of the FEB (Brazilian Special Force) that fought fascism in Europe during the Second World War." The operations which were conducted during those years were of a very particular nature. First of all, the entire region was declared to be a National Security priority zone. The military turned the area into a war camp and set up five different Army Headquarters in the towns of Marabá, Altamira, Itaituba, Humaitá and Imperatriz. Roads were built in the area so that the troops could easily be moved. An airport and a heliport were also built near the larger towns. Identification cards were distributed to the local population. Anyone who was caught without an identification card was arrested and sent to areas around the barracks which served as prison camps. Testimony
of local residents, of Church leaders and even from the military participants themselves indicate that torture of the peasants and other inhabitants of the region was a tool of widespread use. Special teams of interrogation connected to the Repressive Apparatus had been moved into the region. They suspected that the peasants supported the guerrillas. Repression was particularly focused against the lay pastoral agents of the Catholic Church and even against the hierarchy of the Church in the area. Dom Pedro Casaldáliga, Bishop of São Félix do Araguaia provided the following account:

(...)

The press was strictly silenced through a strongly enforced prior censorship and was unable to publish accounts of the Army maneuvers in the region. The only article published on the events in the Araguaia region appeared in the O Estado de São Paulo in September of 1972. The episode remained largely unknown until 1979 when journalists were able to publish the documents and interviews which had been collected throughout all the previous years. Officially, the repression of the population of the Araguaia which was conducted under the justification of the need to fight the "guerrilla warfare" of 69 militants is still considered a State secret. The military refuse to provide information or even an official explanation of the events connected to the Araguaia.
Such a large scale Army maneuver may be partly accounted for by the ideology of National Security which establishes the premise of the danger of "multiplying effects" of a foco because of the infiltration technique of the internal enemy. In this case, the potential enemy were the peasants and the indians who were the traditional inhabitants of the region. In addition, the maneuver meant to "plug" the possible paths of penetration of international communism. It must be remembered that the central plains region -- which is the area between the Araguaia and the Tocantins rivers -- was considered by the military as an essential zone for the further control and development of the Amazon basin as a whole.

A further explanation, therefore, may be found in the economic development strategy of the National Security State. Considering the analysis of development as particularly important to achieve Brazil's manifest destiny as a world power the region of the central plains and the Amazon are a key element in geopolitical planning. The particular region in which the small PC do B foco was implanted is of crucial importance to the military and developmental plans of the State. The growing land speculation and mining activities escalated the level of conflict in the region with the massive evacuation of the peasants from the land. It would be necessary to control the area for the purpose of efficient occupation and development of the mineral wealth. The foco was probably a useful justification for the military takeover of the region to allow the removal by force of the population. The forces of the Army have played since a "stabilizing" role in maintaining
the peasant and Indian populations under strict control. This point is made particularly relevant when one considers that, in spite of the complete elimination of the 69 guerrilla militants by 1975, the secretiveness has remained. In addition, the region is now under the permanent control of two Infantry Battalions which are located in the towns of Marabá and Imperatriz. The battalion of Marabá alone has 1,500 permanently stationed men and is armed with heavy military equipment. 64

Furthermore, the military maneuvers of intimidation and pacification of the peasant population have continued. In fact, they have escalated to alarming and dramatic proportions. Throughout the entire region encompassing the center plain states and the Amazon basin as well as the valley of the São Francisco river the conflicts over land have become one of the most severe social and political problems of Brazil. A study of the Catholic Church's National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) conducted in 1981 concluded that "between 1977 and July of 1981 there were 916 land conflicts which affected a total of 251,891 families and involved a total of 1,972,989 people". 65 In addition, between 1977 and 1981 there have been 45 murders of rural trade union leaders and of pastoral agents working with peasants being thrown out of their land. 66 Not one of these murders has been investigated by the police.

Hence, the focos were used by the National Security State to justify the implementation of a vast social and political control plan which was based on military occupation of the region, large troop mobilization and
general violent intimidation campaigns against the population in areas of crucial economic interest. The maneuvers conducted in both the Vale da Ribeira and in Araguaia to that extent bear a striking resemblance to the regular military maneuvers of population control which the United States Army conducted in Vietnam under the name of "pacification programs". This was particularly true of the region of the Araguaia where large numbers of peasants were moved to the prison camps surrounding the towns where they could be kept under surveillance.

2.2. The Institutionalization of Torture.

Torture is the physical abuse of prisoners which is perpetrated by employees, military or civilian, who act under the command and with the cover of higher authorities. The torture of a prisoner, perpetrated by a constituted authority, is an extremely grave fact, for all that is carried out by a collective institution ultimately must be referred to the responsibility of the Head of the organization.

Amnesty International. 67

In general, largescale campaigns are a political tool of control through terror. People arrested are sometimes roughly treated, beaten or even tortured and are later released without charges. The period between 1969 and 1974 was a time when international religious and human rights organizations received evidence of the existence of secret centers of torture in Brazil where prisoners were taken and where they sometimes disappeared. 68 Allegations of the torture of political prisoners continued to be received by such organizations during the entire period. 69 At that time, the International Commission
of Jurists reported that there were "at least 12,000 political prisoners in Brazil." Personal testimonies of victims are included in the dossiers elaborated by the Organization of American States (OAS), by the World Council of Churches, by the United States National Council of Churches and even in the Vatican. In Brazil, testimonies of hundreds of victims are in the files of the Brazilian Bar Association and in the archives of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB).

One such testimony may speak for all:

(... I was taken from the Tiradentes Prison to the Operação Bandeirantes (OB, Army Police) on February 17 at two o'clock. Captain Maurício, who with two other policemen had come to fetch me, said: "Now you are going to intimately know the branch of Hell."

(... When I arrived I was taken to an interrogation room. Captain Maurício's team confronted me with some people there. They wanted to know about the Congress of the UNE in Ibiúna in October of 1968... they took me to the parrot's perch. Hanging there, naked, with my feet and hands tied, I received electric shocks in the tendons of my feet and on my head. There were 6 torturers who were commanded by captain Maurício. They gave me telephone blows and I screamed. This lasted for one hour. When I left the room my body was marked by hematoma, my face was swollen, the head expanded and painful. A soldier carried me to my cell.

(... On Thursday three policemen woke me up at the same time as the previous day. (... I went to the interrogation room. A captain, surrounded by an interrogation team, began the same questions. They sat me on the dragon's chair and they gave shocks in the hands, feet, ears and mouth. Two wires were attached to my hands and one to my left ear. At each electrical charge my body shook and shivered, as if the organism was about to crumble. From the shock session they took me to the parrot's perch. There I received more shocks, blows with a stick on the chest and legs. One hour later, with the body covered with blood I fainted. They untied me and brought me back to consciousness. (...) they returned to the questions and the blows, hitting my hands with wood palmatórias. (...) it was impossible to know which part of my body hurt more. Even if I wanted I could no longer answer the questions for I could no longer think.

Frei Tito de Alencar Lima, 24 years old, a Dominican monk.
The letter of Frei Tito is one example among thousands. Torture techniques were developed and refined in Brazil as a method of political control through a strategy of terror. Some of the more common torture methods have acquired their own popular names, which are mentioned in the testimony of the Dominican monk. These by the definitions of the Amnesty International reports include:

1. **The Parrot's perch:** This is a bar, from which the victim is hung naked by the hands and feet which are tied together. In this position, he undergoes electric shocks and a variety of blows. These electric shocks are given by rudimentary machines the leads of which are quite simply plugged into the municipal current. Where there is no current, such as in the interior, often campaign Army telephones are used to provide the necessary electricity. The shocks are administered to the fingers, tongue, breasts, anus, ears, and genital organs. Sometimes the victim's body is moistened to increase the force of the shock. The blows are generally given with wet material (so no traces are left) or with clubsticks. Sometimes the torturers resort to direct blows with the fists or with the feet.

2. **Telephone blows:** So called because they describe blows which are simultaneously given to both ears. The ears are hit with the two hands, palms open. It often results in the rupture of the eardrum.

3. **The Dragon's Chair:** Really an electric chair. It is a chair covered with electric wires so as to be able to give electric shocks to the entire body at once. It is commonly used during interrogations by both the military and the police forces.

4. **Paimatórias:** Instruments of torture made of flat pieces of iron or wood which are used to apply violent blows to the victim's body and particularly to the hands.

Torture is institutionalized as a method of interrogation and of political control. One evidence of the sophistication of the techniques of this process is the technological "icebox". This
is a cage entirely insulated and soundproof. The temperature may be electrically controlled to vary from sub-zero to extremely hot temperatures. A variety of sounds of differing pitches are electronically introduced into the cell. Alternative uses of bright lights and total darkness complete the stage setting for the complete psychological and physical dismantling of the prisoner. Such an elaborate mechanism requires considerable investment and could hardly be kept secret from higher authorities.

Institutionalized torture is efficient to breakdown a prisoner's will and to obtain information. The information thus obtained will lead to the arrest of others and the dismantling of networks of resistance.

However, the most important effect of institutionalized torture by the State is its invaluable use as an efficient method of political control. First of all, the widespread and institutionalized use of torture increases the "demonstration effect" that intimidates others and inhibits political participation. It is difficult to meet a Brazilian who has not come into personal direct or indirect contact with a victim of torture. Either he or she has been a victim or someone in the immediate or extended family or the circle of friends or acquaintances has been a victim of torture. After eighteen years of the National Security State's use of torture in an institutionalized manner (somewhat decreased after the opposition campaign in 1965 and then resumed after 1968) the stories of violence which are told become a part of the very
political culture of the nation. This creates a culture of fear whereby political participation is equated with the actual risk of arrest and consequent torture. The experiences of people victimized by torture are a "demonstration effect" to others who would consider participation in any opposition to the policies of the State. In turn, this political culture of fear acts as a powerful deterrent to political practice and participation.

The "deterrent effect" of the culture of fear is made all the more powerful by its connection to the National Security Law. As we have seen, the National Security Law is sufficiently flexible so as to allow for the incorporation of practically any opposition activity. In addition, the juridical text of the National Security Law allows the "preventive arrest" of suspects for a period of up to twenty days. 73 During this time a prisoner may be held without charges and incommunicado. Torture is generally carried out during the first days or hours of arrest for the interrogators may not have any formal charge to file against the prisoner and wish to elicit from him as much information as possible before they must release him. Because the National Security Law is so broad in its interpretative potential of what constitutes a crime against National Security, and since the political culture of the nation has connected the two concepts of arrest and torture, the fear of political arrest is intense. For, presumably most political activities could be subject to the National Security Law and expose the person to arrest with a grave risk of torture.
The widespread use of torture elicits a culture of fear which results in contradictory political behavior. For although the repression itself angers the population and turns previously uninvolved groups or sectors against the governmental authorities, nonetheless the fear of torture may prevent the actual participation in political activities. Thus, although the power of the "deterrent effect" may be limited in the long run, it remains an important tool for political control.

Even during the period of liberalization after 1976 in particular, when torture was not so widely used against political prisoners but remained a reality among the working population its power of intimidation is manifestly present. This point was dramatically demonstrated during a meeting held by the Partido dos Trabalhadores in May of 1981. The President of the party, metalworker leader Luis Inácio da Silva, remarked in a talk to the workers assembled there: "We must stop being afraid. What are we afraid of? Are we afraid of being arrested?" A worker, from the back of the room, shouted back at him: "We are afraid of being tortured! I was tortured!" There was a moment of distinct and uncomfortable silence in the crowd, finally broken by Lula's answer to the worker: "yes, my friend. We are afraid of being tortured. But we must stop being afraid of torture. There is no worst torture than to see your child crying for a plate of food or a glass of milk and know that your salary is not sufficient for you to buy it." Although the crowd responded with applause, the
fear nonetheless remained as an almost palpable presence. The reality of the political culture of fear had taught the workers assembled in that room that participation in a legal political party could, at times, be considered a direct challenge to the State and result in arrest and torture.

One should, however, note that the "deterrent effect" to political participation may have its long run limitations. The very fact that torture became a tool used regularly by the National Security State also provides a limit to its effectiveness for political control through terror. Although in the short run the use of widespread and institutionalized torture has a powerful effect, as the years go by this fear may diminish. After almost eighteen years of contact with torture, a new political culture seems to be evolving in Brazil.

The very fact that so many people have experienced torture and have survived, both physically and emotionally, allows them to view it, in 1981, with less panic than they experienced in 1964 or even in 1969. An example of this was apparent in an interview which I conducted with a woman worker, a union militant who had herself been tortured and had witnessed the torture of her family. I asked her how she managed to have the courage to go on with her union organizing. She reflected on the question for a moment and answered:

Afraid of torture? Yes, I guess that I am afraid. But really, when you think of it, it is no worse than having babies. And one does have babies, and then one has other babies, doesn't one? We suffer a lot of pain for a while. But then the pain stops and you forget it.
Once the pain of torture stops what is left is the anger against the institutionalization of such pain and terror. In addition, the reality of the oppression of the population, both socio-economic and political, is a stronger stimulant to political participation than fear is a deterrent. It is the most oppressed sectors of the population in Brazil, in urban and in rural areas, who have suffered the strongest repression and are in closest contact with institutionalized torture. It is there, nonetheless, that one finds the most vibrant forms of alternative organizations for the defense of working rights, the demand for free unionization, for higher wages, for better living conditions. It is among the poorest that the comunidades de base of the Catholic Church would take root. They have little to lose. The pain of the everyday oppression is, in the long run, stronger than the pain of torture.

A number of militants of the opposition have been violently and brutally tortured, some of them several times. Nonetheless they are still actively organizing against the social and political policies of the National Security State. Some of the best known leaders of peasant and working class movements already mentioned, such as Roque Aparecido da Silva, José Ibrahim and Manoel da Conceição were saved by international campaigns on their behalf. They lived in exile and have returned to Brazil where they are now back with the people involved in the organization of rural and urban unions or in political parties. I interviewed a leader of an urban grassroot movement who had been arrested and tortured 32 times since 1964. His fear, he commented, became less strong with each subsequent arrest.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the institutionalization of torture and the pacification programs has been the actual involvement of the Armed Forces in the events connected to repression since 1964. There is no doubt about the extensive involvement of sectors of the Army in the process of political torture, particularly since the creation of the DOI-CODI networks during the period after 1969. In the earlier phases of repression, the Navy's CENIMAR were often denounced in international documents as a center of torture. There is much less evidence of direct involvement of the Air Force. In fact, the center of torture seemed to have become more definitely connected to the Army's Operação Bandeirantes (OBAN) which later was transformed into the various DOI-CODI centers operating in the states. We shall discuss the actual machinery of the Repressive Apparatus in our next chapter.

For now it is important to point out that this is the first time in the history of the country that the Armed Forces have become so deeply involved in the carrying out of torture of political prisoners and have been used to conduct military operations for the repression of the internal population. From a force traditionally built and respected for its role in the defense of the nation against external aggression, the Armed Forces risk being identified as an army of occupation which is primarily engaged in the social and political control of the internal population. Thus, there is in reality now a serious institutional threat to the Armed Forces and its image.
The reasons for this involvement may be comprehended by the following considerations: 1. The teaching of the Doctrine of National Security and Development to military officers, personnel and draftees. The process of learning to see a potential enemy among the people of the same nation has serious implications for the subsequent involvement in the direct repression of the population. 2. The fact that the National Security State, in its search for absolute internal security, utilized the techniques of largescale population control and institutionalized torture for political control of a population of close to one hundred million people meant that the Armed Forces had to be used for this purpose. There was, so to speak, an infrastructural need for the utilization of the Armed Forces, particularly the army, in the actual process of repression and torture. 3. Finally, there is a political advantage to personally involving officers in the repression. The officer who is made to participate in the torture sessions, even if not as direct participant but as observer, is organically connected to the system and becomes so personally entangled with the torture process that he is likely to be unable to extricate himself from the implications thus shall have to defend the system as a whole that has made him a participant. Since he is made to become a cog in the general machinery of repression and torture, he fears the consequences of the dismantling of the system and the possibility of answering to the crimes he witnessed or participated in. Thus, this is a method of control of the military itself.
IV. Changing Directions: A Conclusion

By the middle of 1973 both the opposition and the State were in a position of reassessment of strategies and change of directions. From the point of view of the State this period was characterized primarily by: 1. An inner struggle within the civil-military coalition in power between the sectors most intimately connected to the Repressive Apparatus -- which gained predominance in the period by the need to crush the armed revolutionaries and implant the apparatus of repression itself -- and the sectors most concerned with long term institutionalization of the National Security State. 2. The very conditions of repression and overtly explicit use of force in the context of economic growth led the National Security State to seek increased legitimacy through its economic and administrative successes. Thus there was a de-emphasis on previous legitimation concerns which appealed to democratic commitments and a stronger reliance upon economic development rapid growth. 3. The continued difficulty with the process of transfer of power and the search for mechanisms which would minimize the internal dissent by formalizing a regular process of Executive choice and transferal. The fragility of the National Security State's power turnover system was demonstrated in the struggle of succession from Costa e Silva to the military junta and from them to Médici.

By the middle of 1973, when the question of transfer of power came to the forefront of State political decisions, the economic miracle was beginning to encounter serious difficulties. Although economic growth remained high, the agricultural sector was stagnant at a modest
3.5 percent rate of growth. The problem created by the growing foreign
debt which in 1973 had reached over 12 billion dollars indicated a
growing bottleneck in the economic model of development. In addition,
inflation rates were climbing faster than was publicly recognized by the government.

The social costs of the economic model resultant from the inequality and the income concentrating policies of the economic miracle years reached rather alarming proportions by 1973. A study which was conducted by the government's statistical department, the IBGE, showed that percent of the population earned less than the equivalent of one minimum salary and another 29 percent earned between one and two minimum salaries. Hence, a total of 72.3 percent of the population, in 1973, earned up to two minimum salaries or an amount then equivalent to \$71.94 U.S. dollars per month.

Although social protest and opposition to the economic policies of the State was kept silent by the continuation of the full application of the repressive forces of control, it was becoming clearer that changes were in order so as to prevent a violent explosion of the exploited and disadvantaged majority. The debates on the social costs of the economic model and the pressures within the society that turned it into a "pressure cooker" elicited a response within the Armed Forces allowing for a compromise between the various sectors. Clearly, at that time, the sectors most intimately connected to the repressive forces, the hardliners, were in control for the duration of the armed confrontation. However, by
the middle of 1973 the armed revolutionaries had been defeated and
the social costs of the model were increasing the pressures from
other sectors of the society. In addition, it was necessary to seek
long term institutionalization of the National Security State so as
to regularize the mechanisms of transfer of power.

The tendency within the National Security State connected to the
IPES/ESG complex -- the Sorbonne group -- espoused a model of develop-
ment which would be more gradual and closely connected to political
flexibility. General Ernesto Geisel, the leader of this faction in
1973, reversed the governmental slogan "development with security"
to provide more emphasis upon a policy of institutionalization. The
new goals of the State, it was argued, should rather be development
in "continuity and without immobility". This model of slow decompression
of the society would involve a renewed effort of controlled liberalization
with negotiations between the State and key opposition elite groups so
as to defuse the tensions which were building up after 3 years of violent
repression and strongly umbalanced economic growth. Thus, the position
of the group argued for the development of new mechanisms that would
enable the formation of longlasting structures of representation to base
the power of the National Security State. 81

In fact, General Ernesto Geisel was to be the first President
chosen according to formulations which attempted to institutionalize
a mechanism of smooth transfer of power. Such rules meant to avoid the
direct involvement of the Armed Forces in the succession process so as
to limit the power struggles of the transfer periods.
Although the Armed Forces clearly maintained the ultimate choice of the Presidential candidate, he was then to be "elected" by an electoral college composed of three delegates of each State Assembly and one more delegate per 500,000 voters registered in the state. The voting would not be secret and the session would be public. Hence, the Presidential electoral college was increased in size so as to broaden its representational potential. In 1973, the Presidential electoral college would be composed of a total of 503 members, of which 127 were delegates from the State Assemblies, 66 were Senators and 310 were Federal Congressmen.

Both parties could, presumably, present candidates so long as they were chosen in party National Conventions held prior to the November 15 Presidential elections. Though clearly such a system lacked the representational legitimacy of direct popular Presidential elections it was nonetheless hoped that it would provide the National Security State's Executive office with a higher degree of legitimacy. The representational legitimation was based on the possibility of the opposition party presumable ability to win power.

In the general context of the State's change of direction for a renewed period of liberalization and controlled decompression of the society, the opposition was also engaged in a process of reassessment and analysis. The defeated parties of the armed opposition were in disarray and undergoing a reconsideration of the strategy of armed struggle. As for the non-violent sectors of the opposition, a definitive
change of directions was to occur.

The MDB party—as a consequence of a combination of the repression, the actual economic increase in the standard of living of the middle classes and of the continuing campaign of voiding of votes—had suffered severe losses both in the Congressional elections of 1970 and in the municipal elections of 1972. Thus, by 1973 the MDB conducted an internal debate on alternative policies. Three main possibilities were considered: 1. self-dissolution as an ultimate protest. 2. a firm and strong opposition stance centering demands and the next political campaign upon the repression, torture and the social costs and inequality of the economic model. 3. negotiations with the new government of controlled liberalization.

The first alternative clearly was not realistic. Few members of the opposition party were willing to commit such a collective suicide. Although the third alternative could not become the sole platform of the opposition party, it could, nonetheless be combined with the second. This combination of limited negotiations for the achievement of certain key concessions— in particular the right of habeas corpus and the end of the Institutional Act Number Five itself— would in fact be one of the primary goals of the opposition party in the next period. This was to be combined with a firm opposition stance so as to break out of the paralyzing position of fear and isolation which the non-violent sectors of the opposition had been immersed in as a consequence of the strong repressive action of the National Security State. The first chance was provided by the process of transferal of Executive power.
Since both parties had the right to present candidates to the electoral college which was to choose the next President, the MDB was quick to underline the de facto reality of its inability to achieve power in such a process of indirect elections. In order to best highlight the limited representational value of the system the MDB launched a symbolic Presidential campaign.

Ulysses Guimarães, President of the MDB party, was chosen as its Presidential candidate. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, a respected writer and journalist representing the Brazilian Press Association, was chosen as the Vice-Presidential candidate. The opposition party then organized a campaign in the best populist tradition of its old PTB and PSD heritage. Rallies, public meetings and civic marches were set up throughout the country in a great show of civic mobilization and political action.

On September 23, 1973, The MDB's National Convention chose the two candidates for the Presidential indirect elections of November. In his acceptance speech, Ulysses Guimarães emphasized the issues which would provide the background of the campaign and was to break the silence which had up to then been imposed upon the opposition party by the fear of the repression:

The non-viability of the opposition candidacy shall be a testimony to the nation and to the world that the system is not democratic. Because, as long as the system remains, the present holders of State power shall always be in the government -- an eternity of power which would be impossible if the vote was direct, popular as well as universal and secret. Only in the latter case does the actual possibility of rotation of power become a reality -- as is the
case in civilized nations. It is not the candidate of
the MDB party who shall travel throughout this nation.

Rather, it is the anti-candidate. The anti-candidate
who shall denounce the anti-elections, imposed on us by
an anti-Constitution which is now the refuge of the
Institutional Act Number Five and which submits the
Legislative and the Judiciary branches of government
to the Executive power and which allows for the arrest
without recourse to habeas corpus, for condemnations
without defense, and which violates the privacy of
homes and businesses by secret listening devices and
silences all voices of dissent by imposing censorship
in the press, radio, television, theatre and cinema. 84

The purpose of the symbolic anti-candidacy of the MDB party
was to demonstrate to the nation the gap between the language of
democracy and the reality of political control. Throughout the
ninety days of duration of the "anti-candidacy campaign" the two
anti-candidatos of the opposition party held the attention of
crowds with fiery speeches which discussed such forbidden subjects
as the repression, the censorship, the injustice of the economic
model, the need for political amnesty and for the revoking of the
National Security Law and the Institutional Act Number Five.

According to Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, the symbolic political
impact of the campaign was significant:

When we ended our speeches during the rallies
or meetings, people would enthusiastically
applaud and, sometimes, they would shout at
us: "I shall vote for you!"

At that point we would begin to explain that
they in fact were not allowed to vote and that
the Presidential elections were not by direct
popular vote but would be conducted by a limited
electoral college whose vote was not secret and
was therefore liable to power influence. The
silence which would then descend upon the crowd
gave us an estimate of the impact of such an
explanation. It was important to show to the
population that the process of choosing the
President was not representational, not legitimate
and that they, as a people, were not allowed to
actively participate in the choice. 85

The campaign not only succeeded in denying legitimacy to the
indirect Presidential electoral process but it achieved an even
more important function: that of renewing hopes and decreasing
the paralyzing fear and isolation caused by the repression. In
his speeches, Ulysses Guimarães often confronted the issue of
fear directly, encouraging people to not lose hope and to continue
to strive and organize for political freedom. The slogan of the
anticandidatura campaign -- Navegar é Preciso: Viver não é Preciso
(it is necessary to navigate, it is not necessary to live)-- was
explicitly directed at the culture of fear and was meant to counter-
act it by encouraging resistance.

The campaign also encouraged the large press to defy censorship
rules and give the opposition anti-candidates widespread coverage.
This aided in pushing for the beginning of what would become a large-
scale press campaign for the end of censorship and freedom of expression.
According to an official MDB document, "the press made public the
ideas of the anti-candidatos to the degree of increasing the total
available press space for the opposition by 3.500 percent." 86

In addition, the anti-candidacy campaign awakened a repressed
protest among the electorate and showed that in fact the official
opposition MDB party could be an important vehicle for the organization
of opposition. Participation in the party and in the electoral campaigns for the Congress in 1974 was greatly enhanced. The actual discontent of the electorate would become manifested, as we shall see later, in an impressive victory of the opposition party over the ARENA, in a complete reversal of the trends of the past elections conducted in fear and hopelessness.

In general, the changing role of the MDB party was characterized in the symbolic Presidential campaign of 1973. This anticandidatura thus marks the beginning of the stage of opposition use of the officially recognized opposition party. A lesson for effective engagement in the level of formal politics was provided and would be deepened in the elections of 1974, 1976 and 1978.

Another important indication of changing directions of the opposition is evidenced by the transformation of the Catholic Church and its position vis-à-vis the National Security State. As has been pointed out, the Catholic Church, as a sociological institution, played a role in the period prior to the 1964 takeover and supported the military intervention. Soon thereafter, however, the Catholic Church began to slowly move into the opposition as the repression increased and eventually reached deep into its own ranks. Although the hierarchy was not firmly committed to opposing the policies of the State in the first period this began to change in the years between 1969 and 1974. The Church's political importance in the bleak period of extensive and violent repression was threefold: 1. as an institution, the Catholic Church could provide an alternative information
network to break the isolation and the silence imposed upon the larger media, in particular on aspects connected to torture and repression. 2. the position of the Church was to encourage hope, to keep alive "the voice of those who do not have a voice". This aspect had an important symbolic power in breaking the effects of the political culture of fear. 3. finally, the Catholic Church provided an umbrella and an encouragement for the legitimate grassroot organization of the poor in defense of better working conditions, of higher wages, of improvements in the immediate living surroundings and in the defense of the land. Above all, the social activities of the Catholic Church in the grassroot encouraged a self-awareness of human rights and the individual's importance, no matter how poor and dispossessed, in the society. Self-respect would be a key to political participation and breaking of fear.

In the period of most violent repression perhaps the denunciation aspect of the activities of the Catholic Church was the most important contribution to breaking of the culture of fear. The documents which the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops (CNBB) regularly produced denouncing torture and calling for the end of the repression played a crucial role in denying legitimation for the State and in breaking the feeling of isolation of those who were persecuted. Already in mid-1969 the CNBB 's official document stated that "The Church maintains a position of alertness and vigilance and is firmly against all attacks perpetrated against the dignity of the human person." 37
In addition, the CNBB published documents and other research works to document information as to the political, social and economic realities of the nation. Thus it provided an alternative publication network when the regular channels of expression were kept under direct, prior and physically present censorship. When the Catholic Church's own press and network of formal information was also put under direct censorship, other alternative means of breaking the enforced silence were found: the Catholic Church developed a system of oral communication which was transmitted through the grassroot organizations of the Church and the regular system of parishes and Church-connected institutions.

For example, when Father Giulio Vicini and a social worker were arrested and tortured because of their work in a slum area of São Paulo, on February 7, 1971, Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, Archbishop of São Paulo, wrote a detailed account of the arrest and the torture and had it distributed and affixed to every door of all the parishes and churches of São Paulo. The immediate reaction of the population was one of fear:

When I first had the notice put up of a case of torture, the next Sunday the faithful did not come to Church. They were afraid. Eventually people began to be less afraid. In time the priests would openly denounce the torture cases from the podium and people would meet in the churches to read the documents, discuss the information and organize help for the families of those who were persecuted. 88

The role of the Catholic Church in breaking the paralyzing effect of fear of torture would be reflected in practical matters as well. Under
the protective umbrella of its vast institutional framework, human rights groups began to participate in the work of defense of political prisoners. The first organizations for human rights were centered on the defense of those indicted under the National Security Law. They were called "Collective Action for Justice", the precursors of the Justice and Peace Committees constituted of well known lawyers, members of the family of persecuted people and others who were willing to provide some sort of assistance.

The human rights movement which would characterize the next years can be considered a direct consequence of the violence of the repression unleashed by the National Security State during the period between 1969 and 1974. It was the first change of direction under the guidance of the Catholic Church's non-violent techniques of resistance in reaction to the violence of the State.

The second change of direction, which began during this period also in the work of the Catholic Church was the emphasis upon grassroot organization in neighborhoods, in the Basic Christian Communities and in the countryside movements for the defense of agricultural laborers and of small farmers. Although the full-fledged grassroot movement would not surface until the period after 1977-79, the beginning may be found in the slow work, from the "bottom up" to set up Mothers' Clubs, Neighborhood Associations, comunidades de base, discussion groups and committees for the defense of peasants and indians' lands. Thus, this change of direction aimed at organizing people wherever they
lived or worked so that they could collectively demand respect for their human rights and press for a more equal distribution of the benefits of the economic growth and developmental process of the nation.

In conclusion, the change of directions of the opposition groups involved both a critical assessment of the entire experience of armed struggle and a new commitment to non-violent but active organization of the population at all levels. This process in the years which followed would take the form of two distinct but integrated social movements: the grassroot movements in the cities and in the countryside and the human rights movement which was started with the defense of tortured political prisoners in the period of most severe repression.

Hence, the opposition learned, by the end of 1973, to utilize formal channels of political participation -- wherever they might still exist and in whatever manner -- so as to increase the efficacy of opposition in the formal political levels. In addition, the opposition began, in alliance with the Catholic Church and under its guidance, to organize a vast social movement at the grassroot for the defense of human rights and of basic economic and social rights. This composed the area of what we shall define as the level of base-related or grassroot politics which would surface to the primacy of the political arena particularly after 1977.
NOTES


4. See Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (New York: Grove Press, Inc. 1967). Régis Debray's book provided an assessment of the situation in Latin America and was virtually a handbook for guerrilla warfare organization. He was highly critical of the political strategy of peaceful transition to socialism which had been espoused by the Moscow-oriented Communist Parties in Latin America. Régis Debray fought side by side with Che Guevara in Bolivia and was serving, at that time, a period in prison in Bolivia for his advocacy of guerrilla war. He is considered to be one of the main theoreticians of *foquismo* which is explicitly described in his writing. Of course, lately Régis Debray no longer support his earlier theories of armed struggle as the only path to socialism.


7. This attempt was organized by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionário, MNR) which was a group composed of ex-soldiers and sailors who had been expelled from the Armed Forces after the coup of 1964. It was influenced by Leonel Brizola's writings and his manifesto to the nation calling for armed rebellion and organization in groups of eleven people so as to resist the military coup d'état. The survivors of the Caparaô struggle later joined urban guerrilla organizations in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Their failure was analyzed by other groups and they reached the conclusion that it had lacked an urban network of support. This led other underground organizations to concentrate stronger efforts upon the acquisition of money and infrastructural support (such as clandestine apartments, houses, weapons, medicine etc.) in the urban regions in order to support a future effort of establishment of rural focos.

8. For a general account of these actions and other less important ones of this period see João Quartim, Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil, op.cit. pages 163 to 176. Antonio Caso, in his A Esquerda Armada no Brasil (1967-1971) interviews some of the main commanders and participants in the armed actions. A further testimony and personal account is contained in Alfredo Syrkis, Os Carbonários: Memórias da Guerrilha Perdida (São Paulo: Global Editora e Distribuidora, Ltda, 1960).

9. For a general account of this period see the work of General Costa e Silva's press secretary, Carlos Chagas in 113 Dias de Angústia: Impedimento e Morte de um Presidente (Rio Grande do Sul: L & PM Editores, Ltda., 1979). A daily report on this period and the power struggle may also be found in the political commentary column of Carlos Castello Branco in Jornal do Brasil. These have been collected in: Carlos Castello Branco, Os Militares on Poder: O Baile das Solteironas, Volume III (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, S.A. 1979)

10. See the account of this meeting in Carlos Chagas, 113 Dias de Antústia: Impedimento e Morte de um Presidente, op.cit. pages 65-67.

The Brazilian military show an unending devotion to legal formalities. Thus, the succession problem was first resolved by the issuing of an Institutional Act (Number 12) which installed the military junta in power. Another Institutional Act (Number 16) reopened Congress so as to ratify the choice of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici. The texts of both of these Institutional Acts may be found in the Appendix of Carlos Chagas' book, 113 Dias de Angústia: Impedimento e Morte de um Presidente, or in the Diário Oficial da União, Ato Institucional Numero 12, of August 31, 1969 and Ato Institucional Numero 16 of October 14, 1969.

11. A detailed account of the dissent and bitter struggle in the military for the succession of President Costa e Silva is found in Carlos Chagas, 113 Dias de Angústia, op.cit. pages 76 to 173.
12. This electoral college was composed of: 16 generals of the First Army; 11 generals of the Second Army; 12 generals of the Third Army; 7 generals of the Fourth Army; 14 generals of the Army's General Provisions Department; 5 generals of the Army's Personnel Department; 10 generals of the Army's Department of Construction; 7 generals of the High Command of the Army; 10 generals of the Superior War College (ESG); 4 generals of the High Command of the Armed Forces (EMFA) and, finally, 8 generals from the staff of the Minister of the Army.

As may be seen, the power structure was entirely slanted towards the army with the eclipsing of the influence of the other two branches of the Armed Forces. This would fuel the internal dissent and rivalry further.

13. In general, one can divide the military into at least three tendencies: 1. the "nationalist" tendency, which at that time was centered around the candidacy of General Afonso Albuquerque Lima who had influence amongst the young officers. This sector was later gathered around General Euler Bentes Monteiro. 2. the "hardliners" comprised of those more intimately connected to the Doctrine of Internal Security and in charge of the Repressive Apparatus. At that time they supported the candidacy of General Antonio Carlos Murici who was Chief of the Army's High Command. 3. the "Castelistas" or the "Sorbonne group" so called because of their roots in the ESG and their admiration for General Humberto Castelo Branco. They are considered the "intellectuals" of the military and include, among others, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, General Orlando Geisel, General Ernesto Geisel and General João Batista Figueiredo. They defend a long term perspective aimed at the full institutionalization of the National Security State along authoritarian but not so explicitly repressive lines.

14. General Albuquerque Lima, cited in Carlos Chagas, 113 Dias de Anxstia... op.cit. page 159.

15. For statistical information on foreign debt and reserves of Brazil for the years 1964 to 1980 see Table seven in Appendix.


19. These, of course, were times of cheaper oil rates and gasoline prices. The "oil crisis" has demonstrated the folly of such a policy and the government, as a belated effort, is now making some attempts to restore the railways of the past.


22. Ibid. page 77.

24. The note is cited in its entirety in Antonio Caso's book *A Esquerda Armada no Brasil (1967 a 1971)* op. cit. pages 201 to 204. This work also includes a complete list of the prisoners who were exchanged for Charles Elbrick. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that the first list, and all subsequent lists of prisoners exchanged for kidnapped diplomats, observed certain criteria of the revolutionaries: they meant to free some of the main leaders of the opposition movements since 1964, dividing the list among the various organizations and giving priority to those reported to be in worst physical condition due to torture. Gregório Bezerra, for example, who was the first name in the list was a 60 year old Communist leader who had been barbarously tortured in public view in the streets of Recife. The prisoners list also showed the attempt to balance names of militants of the various organizations in the armed struggle.


Note: The first National Security Law was passed as Decree Law Number 314 on March 13, 1967 and was regulated by Decree Law 510 of March 20, 1969. These were specifically revoked by the 1969 National Security Law known as the Decree Law 898. The latter piece of legislation greatly extended the repressive force of the previous, more timid efforts of control.

On December 17, 1978 President Ernesto Geisel modified the National Security Law. As we shall see later, the text however remained the same as that of the National Security Law of 1969. The main modifications concerned decreased prison terms for it was felt that the law as it stood was too stringent to be effectively applied as a mechanism of control.

30. Decree Law Number 898, National Security Law of 1969, Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.

31. Ibid. Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42 and 46.

32. Ibid. Article 24. Article 25 is also of relevance.

33. Ibid. Article 25 refers specifically to financial agencies. Article 28 is broader and includes "acts of massacre, sabotage or terrorism".

34. Ibid. Article 32. See Also Articles 33, 35 and 37.

35. Ibid. Article 29.

36. Ibid. Article 38.

37. Ibid. Article 40.

38. I refer here to the Press Law (Lei de Imprensa) and to direct prior censorship. This shall be discussed later in a chapter on specific controls for the psychosocial area. As may be seen the National Security Law also has specific articles for punishment for press infringements which are in Articles 16, 34, 36, 39, 47, 53 and 54.

39. Decree Law Number 898, Ibid. Articles are mentioned in text.

40. In fact the National Security Law, with the text as it was written in 1969, is the very heart of the legal apparatus of the National Security State. It is so important that its repressive power was not modified in the period of liberalization under Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo. We shall argue that in fact the redemocratization of the country is dependent upon the revoking of the National Security Law. Only its elimination would allow the dismantling of the physical network of the Repressive Apparatus and allow social pressures to become politically expressed in such a way that the economic model itself would equally be modified.
41. The Manual Básico da ESG provides an excellent summary of the most important mechanisms which were changed through Amendment Number One to the Constitution of 1967. See pages 410 to 420.

42. The Press Law and the specific controls of universities shall be the subject of further discussion in Chapter Eight.

43. The Secret Decree Law, as it is popularly called, is Decree-Law Number 69,534 passed in November 11 of 1971. See Diário Oficial da União, November 11, 1971. This Decree Law is still in effect. I have counted a total of 10 secret decrees which have been published only by their numbers since 1971. It is interesting to note that the greater number, a total of 7, were passed in the government of General Figueiredo and 3 of Médici. In Movimento 6-12 of April, 1981, page 9.

44. Comment of Decree Law as the "Prohibited Law" the magazine Veja of November 24, 1971 had a conclusion and a citation of reactions:
"Finding himself surrounded by other Congressmen who were anxious for explanations, the leader of the MDB, Oscar Pedroso Horta, had only this remark to offer:
'To my mind, Decree Law Number 69,534 is a unique piece of legislation in Brazilian juridical tradition. I cannot understand how one can possibly obey a law, a decree, or even a regulation of which one is totally ignorant."

45. See Antonio Caso, A Esquerda Armada no Brasil, op.cit. page 324.

46. See the accounts, for example, in Jornal do Brasil, October 22, 1971 and Jornal do Brasil, September 17, 1971.

47. See A Report to Senator John Tunney, Democrat Senator of California, for information on this occurrence and the mass arrests in Rio de Janeiro prior to Nelson Rockefeller's visit to Brazil. United States Senate, January 1972, page 5.

48. Ibid. Also reported in Carlos Castelo Branco, Os Militares no Poder, Volume III, op.cit. pages 709 to 718.

49. The military operation which was carried out in the Vale da Ribeira intended to surround and catch a group of nine men led by Captain Carlos Lamarca who were forming a foco in the area. Carlos Lamarca and seven of his men managed to break out of the encirclement and flee, using the uniforms of the military and an army truck which they captured in an ambush. Lamarca was later killed after a long and largescale military campaign of pacification in the interior of the state of Bahia in 1971.

The operation of the Vale da Ribeira is described in detail in a well-documented article based on reports of the Army. This article,
was written by Osmar Trindade and Elmar Bones and published in the Coojornal of February 1980, pages 15 to 24.

The newspaper Coojornal is a publication of the Cooperative of Journalists of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.

A detailed book-length account of the campaigns of Vale da Ribeira and later the pacification program held in Bahia to capture and kill Carlos Lamarca in 1971 is described in Emiliano José and Oldack Miranda, Lamarca, O Capitão da Guerrilha (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1980).

50. For further details on this agreement and how the surveys of the Amazon region were conducted see: Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinationals and Brazil: the Impact of Multinational Corporations in Contemporary Brazil, op.cit. pages 79 to 85.

51. The full report of the Parliamentary Committee investigating land purchase (CPI da Terra, 1968) may be obtained from the press and documentation department of the House of Representatives, in Brasília. It was also published in Jornal do Brasil, of July 5, 1970. See also Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinationals and Brazil, op.cit. pages 85-86.

52. In Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Ibid. page 86. One of the largest landowners now is D. K. Ludwig Corporation in the Jari Project of the Amazon region. For a report on this project see the well documented account written by Congressman Modesto da Silveira, a member of the Parliamentary Committee investigating the Jari Project in Modesto da Silveira, Ludwig, O Imperador do Jari (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1980).

53. See Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso, Multinationals and Brazil, Ibid. page 173.

54. The Amazon area contains, among other minerals: zinc, nickel, chromite, bauxite, manganese, aluminum, iron, tin, copper, uranium, precious stones, diamonds and gold.

The mountains of Carajás contain one of Brazil's richest mineral deposits including what is believed to be one of the world's largest deposits of gold. The Project Carajás developed in the present government of João Batista Figueiredo, involves the towns of Marabá, Barsarena, Paragominas (Pará) and São Luís do Maranhão. The corporations which are currently exploiting the minerals in the region are: the Brazilian state-owned Vale do Rio Doce mining company in association with U.S. Steel Corporation; ALCOA -- Aluminum Corporation of America -- which mines aluminum in the mountains; Kennecot Corporation which mines bauxite,
Kaiser and Reynolds Corporations which mine bauxite and aluminum, and more recently the Utah Corporation which has bought the manganese mining rights from United States Steel Corporation.

In 1981 the Brazilian government signed a contract with a consortium of 32 Japanese companies which are to come into the area in order to mine aluminum. The new corporation has been named Albras/Alunorte. The Projeto Carajás is to include specific grants for multinational corporations to mine the vast gold deposits.

For full details on the Project Carajás and the corporations involved see: Bulletin Number 6 of May 10, 1981 of the Anthropology Resource Center, Boston, Massachusetts.

55. See the account of Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Afonso in Multinationals and Brazil, op.cit. page 173.

56. The problem of indian land, speculation and conflict in the area is well handled in Shelton H. Davis, Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil, op.cit. Extensive documentation on land conflicts which have resulted from the land speculation and corporation takeover of Indian land may be found in the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB). The data has been carefully gathered through the years by the Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI) an organization tied to the CNBB and responsible for work with the Indians.

Note: The method of illicit influence peddling and land purchase from squatters who have a traditional land right is known in Brazil by the term grilagem. A corporation, or rich individual, may purchase large amounts of land by agreement of the National Security Council. Sometimes this may involve as much as one million acres, as is the case of the Jari Project and the Volkswagen projects in the Amazon region. Peasants who have lived in the area over 10 years have legal squatter's rights but most of the time do not possess a paper title to the land. The forceful eviction of the peasant families has been the source of the conflicts in the region and has become so violent that it eventually has involved priests, lay pastoral agents and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in attempts to defend the peasants from armed eviction.

Bulletin Number 6, of May 10, 1981 of the Anthropology Resource Center of Boston, Mass. provides a detailed account of a new project which is to be developed and which shall increase enormously the land speculation and violence in the area: According to this research, the government of Figueiredo has begun a forest project which covers approximately 2.4 million hectares of land and will be used for coal and for lumber exploitation. In addition, the government has also plans for a large agricultural project to plant soya beans, sugarcane and
manioc. This agricultural project is to cover another 7 million hectares of land. It is to be developed by 10,000 Japanese immigrant families who are being especially brought into the country for the purpose.

At the present time there are an estimated one hundred thousand Indian and peasant families who live on this land. They are to be removed from the area and dispossessed of their land. In fact, the government is applying in full the methodology of the American military in Vietnam: to replace entirely the population of an area so as to bring it into complete control.

More information may be obtained from the Anthropology Resource Center, 59 Temple Place, suite 44, Boston, Massachusetts 02111.

57. For information on the guerrilla of the Araguaia as well as on the three different military campaigns conducted in the area see: Fernando Portela, Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1979); Palmério Dória, Sérgio Buarque, Vincente Carelli and Jaime Sautchuk, A Guerrilha do Araguaia in História Imediata, Number 1, (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, Ltda, 1979); Clóvis Moura, Diário da Guerrilha do Araguaia (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, Ltda, 1979) and the articles in Movimento, July 17, 1978, page 5 "A Guerrilha do Araguaia: Uma História Secreta que Começa a Ser Revelada".

58. The interviews which were conducted with the people of the region showed that the "paulistas" were well liked by the population because they provided technical assistance and medical care. It also was clear that the residents only became aware of the underground and clandestine activities of the "paulistas" when the Army moved in and occupied the area in an ostensive search for the guerrillas. These interviews are published in the works mentioned in note 57.

59. Cited in Palmério Dória et al, A Guerrilha do Araguaia, op.cit. page 5. Another colonel who was interviewed stated that the war which was carried out in the region was a "dirty, secret, disgusting and undeclared war where the rules of the Geneva Convention were never obeyed". These interviews and others with military commanders and military participants in the struggle are to be found also in Fernando Portela, Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil, op.cit. pages 27-29 in particular.

60. Documents with personal testimony of residents in the area or of Catholic Church pastoral agents, priests or bishops are in the archives of the CNBB. Fernando Portela, in his work Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil: Informações Novas, Documentos Inéditos e na Íntegra, provides extensive evidence and interviews of victims of torture in the area.


63. Only the justification for the military operations has been made public. Officially, the military justified the maneuvers by claiming to be fighting a large-scale civil war in the area. The need to maintain a complete and strict censorship of the press about the events in Araguaia was justified by Colonel, and ex-Minister, Jarbas Passarinho who is now a Senator for the governmental party, the PDS, as necessary so as to avoid the "multiplying effect" and provide an example of rural guerrilla foco. See interview with Jarbas Passarinho in Palmério Dória et al. A Guerrilha do Araguaia pages 21 to 27. See also Fernando Portela, Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil, particularly chapter XV "O Governo em silêncio" pages 39 to 95.

64. See in particular, Fernando Portela's extensive account of the situation in the region today in Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil, op.cit. particularly part II "A Região Hoje".


in Brazil which Reveals a Consistent Pattern of Violations of Human
Rights: Official Version, March 19, 1971; The Bertrand Russell
Tribunal Session in Brussels, Belgium, On Repression in Brazil,
Chile and Latin America (The Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation, Ltd.

Other documentation of torture in this period may be obtained
in the archives of the United States Catholic Conference of Bishops
Documentation is also available in the LADOC, publication of the Docu-
tmentation Service of the Latin America Bureau of the United States
Catholic Conference, in the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos
Advogados do Brasil, OAB) and in the National Conference of Brazilian
Bishops (CNBB) in Brasília.

Articles and personal testimonies are also now available. See,
for example, Ralph Della Cava's review of the period in his "Torture
in Brazil" in Commonweal of April 24, 1970, page 135. Personal
documents include: Esquerda Armada: Testemunho dos Presos Políticos
do Presídio Milton Dias Moreira, no Rio de Janeiro, (Vitória, Espírito
Santo: Edições do Leitor Ltda, 1979); Dos Presos Políticos Brasileiros:
Acerca da Repressão Fascista no Brasil (Lisbon, Portugal: Edições Maria
da Fonte, 1976); Antonio Carlos Fon, Tortura: A História da Repressão
Política no Brasil, (São Paulo: Global Editora e Distribuidora, Ltda,
1979); Cristina Pinheiro Machado, Os Exilados: Cinco Mil Brasileiros
À Espera da Anistia (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1979); Reinaldo
Cabral e Ronaldo Lapa (eds) Desaparecidos Políticos: Prisões, Sequestros
e Assassinatos, (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Opção, Comitê Brasileiro pela
Anistia-R.J., 1979); José Ignacio Ferreira, Anistia: Caminho e Solução,
(Vitória, Espírito Santo: JANC Editora e Publicidade Ltda, 1979); testi-
monies in Pedro Celso Uchôa Cavalcanti and Jovelino Ramos (eds.) Memórias
do Exílio, Brasil, 1964-19?? : De Muitos Caminhos (Lisbon, Portugal:
Editoras Arcádia, S.A.R. L. 1976) and Albertina de Oliveira Costa,
Maria Teresa Porciúncula Moraes, Norma Marzola, Valentina Rocha Lima
e Terra, 1960).

69. Ibid. See the international documents mentioned above.

70. In International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, Switzerland,
Report on Police Repression and Tortures Inflicted Upon Political
Opponents and Prisoners in Brazil, July 22, 1970.

It is impossible to estimate exactly the total numbers of people
who went in and out of the prison and torture chambers in Brazil during
that period. The regular carrying out of massive blitz and pacification
campaigns can give an idea of the largescale turnover of prisoners. A
cross-check of documentation provided by a group of 70 prisoners who
based their estimate on the numbers of prisoners whom they actually saw
reached the total of 200,000 people between the years 1964 and 1970.
71. The complete text of Frei Tito’s letter is included in the Appendix of Pedro Celso Uchoa Cavalcanti and Jovelino Ramos (eds) Memórias do Exílio: Brasil 1964-19??, op.cit.

72. Amnesty International, various documents with definitions of torture terms and techniques.

73. The Law allows for the detention of up to ten days, which may be extended after for another ten days.

74. This episode was filmed and taped by a team of documentarists who accompanied American folk singer Joan Baez in her trip to Brazil in May of 1981. The meeting took place in São Paulo and is to be included in a documentary movie on Latin America being produced by Humanitas International, Menlo Park, California.

75. This interview was conducted in April of 1979, during a major strike of the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema.

76. It should be emphasized here that not all of the military are involved in torture or directly in the Repressive Apparatus. In fact, many have actively opposed such deeds and have been a part of the various movements of opposition within the military.

The sectors known as the "democratic military" have themselves been subjected to a variety of controls, arrests, and punishments. The National Security State, so as to force the silence within the ranks of the military, was careful to institutionalize an entire mechanism for repression and control of what is called in the Doctrine of National Security "the internal public". We shall discuss this aspect in more detail in the next chapter.

77. For the rates of growth by sector in Brazil for the years 1960 to 1977 see Table "GDP Growth Rates by Sector: Brazil 1960-1977" in Appendix. For the total amounts of the foreign debt and the reserves of Brazil for the years 1964-1980 see Table "Brazil (1964-1980) Foreign Debt and Reserves" in Appendix.

78. According to the World Bank Country Study, Brazil: Human Resources: Special Report of October 1979, the official rates of inflation during this period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>27.8 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>20.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>18.2 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>17.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17.4 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>20.5 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the rates of inflation have been a matter of intense debate amongst the economists in Brazil and one is apt to find a variety of
different indices, particularly during this period of the "economic miracle".

In 1977, the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema filed a suit against the Federal government claiming that the inflation rates of the period of the "economic miracle" had been purposely distorted and that the statistics had been doctored in order to further decrease the salaries of the workers. It will be recalled that the inflationary residue is part of the formula which is used by the government to calculate the official salary index of raise for the year.

A Study of the DIEESE showed that the government's own official coefficients of the Cost of Living Variation were higher than the legally enacted residue which was used to calculate salaries. If one would compare the Cost of Living Variations which were reached by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, the government's official inflation index and the conclusions of the Cost of Living Variations of the DIEESE then this difference would be even higher, as may be seen in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Government residue</th>
<th>Cost of Living Variation by DIEESE</th>
<th>Cost of Living Variation by FGV</th>
<th>Cost of Living Variation from Official Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 67/Jul 68</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24.45</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>18.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 68/Jul 69</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23.93</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>24.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 69/Jul 70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>22.05</td>
<td>20.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 70/Jul 71</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 71/Jul 72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17.52</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td>19.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 72/Jul 73</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.60</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>14.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIEESE: *10 Anos de Política Salarial*, op.cit. page 28.

As one may note, even these indices of the government and of the FGV are different from the ones recognized by the World Bank Study. In whatever calculations, however, the government's official inflationary residue index for the purpose of calculation of salary raises were well below the inflation.


80. Based on calculations from data of the PNAD-1973, study conducted by the IBGE. See Table in Appendix "Distribution of Income (By Minimum Salary) in Brazil (1970-1979)" for more details and comparative data.

The figures are based on cruzeiros of 1979 and the equivalent dollar exchange rate of that year. Exchange rates for the years from 1964 to 1981 may be found in the Appendix, Table "Exchange Rates (1960-1981)".
81. For a complete account of the succession of General Médici, of General Ernesto Geisel's commitment to the "decompression" and also for the intention of making General João Batista Figueiredo his successor so as to guarantee the "continuity" see the excellent documentary work of André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra: A Sucessão de Geisel (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, S.A., 1979) pages 18 to 27.

82. The Electoral College was established in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 74 of the Constitution of 1969 as regulated by the Complementary Law Number 15, of October 13, 1973. President Geisel took office on March 15, 1974. His Vice-President was Adalberto Pereira dos Santos. Data on the composition of the Electoral College published in André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho, Ibid.

83. In the elections for Senate, the House of Representatives and the State Assemblies of 1970 the final results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SENATE</th>
<th>HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES</th>
<th>STATE ASSEMBLIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>9,898,694</td>
<td>10,867,814</td>
<td>11,442,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>6,224,525</td>
<td>4,777,927</td>
<td>4,940,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank Votes</td>
<td>4,955,167</td>
<td>4,690,952</td>
<td>4,129,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Void Votes</td>
<td>1,328,238</td>
<td>2,047,084</td>
<td>1,893,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won: ARENA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won by MDB</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As may be noted above, the total numbers of blank and void votes almost equalled the total votes cast for the MDB party. The effect of the campaign of annulment of votes was clearly demonstrated in the extensive protest voting of this election. The MDB was not, at that time, recognized as a possible conduit for opposition voting.

Note: I am grateful to David Fletcher, of the University of Brasília, who was so kind as to provide me with a correct analysis of the various discrepancies which existed in the data of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral(1973). The complete data for elections are to be found in the Appendix "Federal and State Elections in Brazil from 1966 to 1978".

The municipal elections of 1972 showed a similar pattern of defeat for the MDB party. By 1972 the "economic miracle" was well established and the middle classes who were benefiting from the surge of economic growth were willing to support the government's economic policies at the local level. Elections for mayor and aldermen were held that year in 3,968 municipalities not considered to be of "National Security zone" -- which have appointed mayors. Out of all those municipalities the ARENA won a total of 3,349 mayors and 29,331 aldermen. The MDB, on the other hand, elected only 436 mayors and 5,936 aldermen. See Veja, October 20, 1976, page 20.


Citation of an official note of the Comissão Central da CNBB, September 21, 1969. Also published in: *O Relatório da Verdade: Síntese e Comentário dos Acontecimentos que Envolveram os Dominicanos e outros padres no Caso Marighela*. CNBB archives, Brasília.

This conversation with Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns with the author took place in New York, April 21, 1981.

This episode is also related by Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns in an interview with journalists Getulio Bittencourt and Paulo Sérgio Markum, published in their *Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns: O Cardeal do Povo, História Imediata, Number 4*, (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1979) particularly pages 60-61.

The Catholic Church had undergone a deep transformation by this time which began, theologically, with Vatican II and was strengthened in the Episcopal Conference of 1963, held in Medellín, Colombia from August 26 to September 6. This Episcopal Conference was held with the presence of Pope Paul VI. It was one of the most important meetings of the Latin American bishops held in a number of years. The conclusions of the meeting reinforced the social commitment of the Church and developed the pastoral position of the "preferential option for the poor". This Episcopal Conference was followed, in 1979, by a second Episcopal Conference of Latin American bishops held in Puebla, Mexico, from January 27 to February 13, 1979. Puebla was the Third General Conference of Latin American Bishops. For the conclusions and commentary on these conferences see: *A Igreja na Atual Transformação da América Latina à Luz do Concílio* by Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, published in 1977 by the Editora Vozes Ltda, Rio de Janeiro. For commentary on
the Episcopal Conference of Puebla, Mexico, see Frei Betto: Puebla para o Povo, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, Ltda., 1979).

For more complete information on the transformation of the Catholic Church in Brazil and its history and theological foundations see, for example: "Igreja e Política: Subsídios Teológicos" in Estudos da CNBB Number 2 (São Paulo: Edições Paulinas, 1974); "Por Uma Sociedade Superando as Dominâncias" in Estudos da CNBB, Number 19 (São Paulo: Edições Paulinas, 1970). Some of the most important documents of the CNBB during the period 1964-1977 were published in "Os Documentos da CNBB: Igreja e Governo" in Realidade Brasileira, Number 3, February 1977 (São Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977). See also "Marginalização de um Povo: Grito das Igrejas" in Documento dos Bispos do Centro-Oeste (Goiânia, May 6, 1973).


CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ANATOMY OF THE STATE

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   The External Public....................... page 501

   1.1. Political Representation............ page 501

   1.2. Control of the Judiciary.......... page 508

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        Church............................... page 533

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   The Internal Public...................... page 539
I. Introduction.

In order to understand both the vitality and the limitations of the social movements which have characterized the relationship between the opposition and the State after 1974, it is first necessary to examine the economic, social and political environment in which these movements have been inserted. Hence, before continuing the analysis of the dialectical history of the opposition and the State, it is relevant to pause so as to consider the structural determinants of the contextual framework of the years of longterm State institutionalization in a climate of controlled liberalization.

This chapter aims at providing a summary of the anatomy of the National Security State upon the completion of its second phase of institutionalization. The first part of the analysis considers the social consequences of the type of economic development which was implemented during the period of the economic miracle. The difficulties of the majority of the salaried population within a context of economic growth and high profits for an increasingly de-nationalized industrial sector would provide the background and fuel of the social movements of dissent and grassroot organization.

The second part of this chapter is specifically concerned with the general mechanisms of control provided by the institutionalized legal framework of the repression and the actual machinery composing the Repressive Apparatus. Such a structural analysis establishes the limitations for the activities of opposition groups -- whether engaged in the level of formal political organization or in the grassroots.
Finally, the third part of the anatomy of the State shall deal with the application of the Doctrine of Internal Security and the specific controls of areas it defines as the "external public", i.e., the psychosocial area, and the "internal public", i.e., the civilian bureaucracy and the military.

In its concern with the controls of the "external public" the National Security State has developed careful mechanisms for each component of civil society. Thus, specific controls were established for political representation, for the judiciary, for the universities and other centers of learning, for the information network and media, for cultural activities (theatre, cinema, music, literature, art), for trade unions and working class associations and even for the Catholic Church.

In addition, the National Security State was particularly concerned with the enforcement of obedience within its own ranks. Thus, the civilian bureaucracy was put under tight controls and the military -- the important "internal public" -- was severely curtailed, restrained and put under constant surveillance. We shall examine the specific mechanisms for the control of the military which were devised and implemented by the State in the first two stages of institutionalization.

Hence, the analysis of each element in the anatomy of the State should allow a deeper understanding of the environment of political opposition both in the context of the structural limitations and in the impetus to resist and break the mould forced upon civil society.
II. The Economic Model: Capital Accumulation and Exploitation.

As we have seen the Doctrine of National Security and Development espouses a particular kind of capitalist model of economic development which is not geared towards the increase in the standard of living of the majority of the population or designed for the fulfillment of basic needs of housing, education, health and nutrition. Rather, the economic model searches for rapid accumulation of capital so as to reach the "take-off" stage of economic development that can best guarantee a continuing process of growth to enable Brazil to become a world power. Hence, the economic model of development should best be comprehended in its geopolitical primordial goal of achieving the nation's "manifest destiny" as a junior member of the block of powerful nations.

The particular kind of economic model, based on the "triple alliance" of private associated national capital, multinational capital and state capital, reached a limit in 1974 and has been plagued by contradictions ever since. The growing problems of the foreign debt, of the internationalization of the economy, of the multinational control of land, shall be the subject of further analysis in our concluding chapter so as to provide a framework for an assessment of the perspectives for the future. For now, it is relevant to concentrate attention upon the social costs of the economic miracle in the context of economic growth. This is the crucial aspect which has fueled the social movements of the post-miracle years.
Although the salary policies of the government established that a certain percentage rate equivalent to the increase in labor productivity should be included in the calculations of the salary index raises, during the entire period of the economic miracle this was not complied with. Senator Franco Montoro, in an analysis of the period compiled the following information in Table 8.1:

Table 8.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index of real Productivity</th>
<th>Index for calculations of salary raises</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, the inflationary residue, another element in the official formula for the calculation of the salary raises, was also consistently estimated well below the actual rate of inflation. This point was already emphasized in our discussion of the discrepancies between the government's admitted rate of inflation and the actual rate of inflation according to the calculations of the DIEESE. These two crucial elements in the formula for the calculation of the official index had the consequent effect of further reducing the wages of workers.
During the year between 1970/1971, President Médici allowed an emergency raise which benefited the workers and decreased the percentage of professional groups suffering salary losses above 30 percent. After 1971, however, the effects of the wage policy became more severe until in 1973 almost half of all the job categories suffered losses over 30 percent.  

The evolution of the minimum salary is a second measure commonly utilized in Brazil to consider the economic conditions of salaried economically active population. In Brazil the minimum salary is decreed by the Federal government and varies both in time and between regions. For statistical purposes the highest minimum salary is always considered when comparing distribution of income or the effects of inflation and/or wage policies upon the wages of workers.

A study conducted by DIEESE on the evolution of the minimum salary in the years between 1959 and 1976 showed the effect of the wage policies upon the income of workers. As was seen in Table 6.2, the minimum salary in Brazil, by March of 1976, had only 31 percent of the purchasing power it had in 1959. Taking 1959 as the base year, the data of the DIEESE study demonstrated that the index of real minimum salary in Brazil dropped consistently. It is significant that 1964 marks a sharp change which becomes a downward trend until 1976. In addition, once the wage policies were fully implemented this pattern was continued. This is in spite of the reduction in the overall rate of inflation due to the deflationary policies of the government.
Thus, the sharp drop in the evolution of the real minimum salary in the years after 1964 must be considered a direct consequence of the "squeezing" policy of the government meant to increase the total rate of profit for rapid capital accumulation.

An analysis of the index rate of the real minimum salary is an important indicator of overall distribution of income because of the large percentages of the total economically active population who earn either less than the equivalent to one minimum salary or between one and two per month. In 1970, for example, 50.2 percent of the total economically active population earned less than one minimum salary per month and another 28.6 percent of the economically active population earned between one and two minimum salaries. Thus, a total of 78.8 percent of the population earned up to two minimum salaries at that time. Table 8.2 shows the effect of the wage compression policies of the government during the period of the "economic miracle":

Table 8.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY PER MONTH (Total number of minimum salaries received)</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 and 2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 and 3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 3 and 7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 7 and 10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Paulo Singer "Mais Pobres e Mais Ricos" in Opinião, N. 116 of January 24, 1975
Note: The minimum salary in 1970 was Cr$ 2,050.39 or U.S. $ 41.77.
In 1972, in the full bloom of the economic miracle, the total percentage of the economically active population who earned less than the equivalent to one minimum salary per month had risen to 52.5 percent. The next poorest, who earned between one and two minimum salaries, had slightly decreased to 22.8 percent of the economically active population. It should be noted that the middle classes were slightly increased in the overall distribution of the salary income rate. This was in keeping with the provision of enlarging the market for consumer durable goods. The economic model transferred a share of the economic gains to the middle classes both in terms of real salary income and in percentage share of gross national product, as has been mentioned before.

The loss of economic buying power of the salaries and wages had deep consequences upon the living conditions of workers. Some indications of the severe plight of large sectors of the salaried population, by 1974, may be gathered by the following facts: First of all, in order to buy the food basket for a month a worker in 1965 had to work a total of 88 hours and 16 minutes. In 1968, in order to buy the same amount of goods, a worker had to work a total of 101 hours and 35 minutes. By 1976, as may be seen in Table 8.3, the same food basket for a month cost a worker a total of 157 hours and 29 minutes of work.

In 1938 the federal government passed a decree law which established a minimum legal amount of food considered to be necessary for the survival of a worker and his family. This minimum amount should be the basis for calculation of the minimum salary level. The DIEESE, in 1979, made a study which compared the number of hours needed so as to purchase this food:
Table 8.3
MINIMUM SALARY AND MINIMUM MONTHLY FOOD RATION: WORK TIME NECESSARY TO PURCHASE THE MINIMUM FOOD RATION (AS DEFINED BY DECREE-LAW 399 OF APRIL 30, 1938) MEDIUM PER YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>WORK TIME NEEDED</th>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>65 hours and 05 minutes</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>81 hours and 30 minutes</td>
<td>125.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>71 hours and 34 minutes</td>
<td>110.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>94 hours and 48 minutes</td>
<td>145.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>98 hours and 20 minutes</td>
<td>151.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>88 hours and 16 minutes</td>
<td>135.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>109 hours and 16 minutes</td>
<td>167.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>105 hours and 16 minutes</td>
<td>161.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>101 hours and 35 minutes</td>
<td>156.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>110 hours and 23 minutes</td>
<td>169.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>105 hours and 13 minutes</td>
<td>161.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>111 hours and 47 minutes</td>
<td>171.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>119 hours and 08 minutes</td>
<td>183.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>147 hours and 04 minutes</td>
<td>225.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>163 hours and 32 minutes</td>
<td>251.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>149 hours and 40 minutes</td>
<td>229.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>157 hours and 29 minutes</td>
<td>241.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>141 hours and 49 minutes</td>
<td>217.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>137 hours and 37 minutes</td>
<td>211.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: In the entire period there were two moments in which the value of the minimum salary reached its peak in purchasing power: in July of 1956 and in January 1959. If one should calculate the minimum salary of July 1956 in 1979 currency the minimum salary of 1956 would be, in 1979 money, Cr$ 4,963.00, three times the value of the minimum salary of 1979.

One can obtain a measure of the purchasing power of the minimum salary also by calculating the cost of purchasing the minimum daily essential foodstuff for one month.

As the minimum salary lost its purchasing power, the worker had to work more hours to earn enough to purchase the same food basket. In 1959 the median monthly number of work hours necessary to purchase the minimum foodbasket was 65 hours and 5 minutes. By 1978 this same foodbasket cost the worker a total of 137 hours and 37 minutes of work time.
Therefore, in real terms a worker in 1976 and 1978 was worse off than he was in 1959. This becomes particularly true with the implementation of the wage-control legislation in 1966, which, in spite of the declining rate of inflation, continued to show an increase in the number of total hours needed to purchase the minimum amount of food necessary for survival. This explains why the average working day in Brazil is 12 to 14 hours.

Since the salary, working so many hours, was sufficient mainly to purchase the minimum necessary food basket for the month, working class families suffered a severe fall in their living standards. Four major indicators allow us to assess the degree of absolute poverty to which the majority of the population was reduced. First of all, although the federal government had a well-publicized overall plan for construction of low-cost housing through the National Housing Bank (BNH), in fact the funds of this bank were utilized for financing industrial development and the construction of high cost housing. Senator Franco Montoro commented that "of the 35 billion cruzeiros in the BNH until December 31, 1973, less than 10 percent were used for financing low cost housing for workers. That is as much as 90 percent was used for a different purpose".5

The population who could not afford housing moved into the slum settlements in the periphery of the cities, the favelas. That this process of settlement in shacks was the only alternative to poor working class family is demonstrated by the growth of the slums in the major cities. As an example, Table 8.4 indicates the growth of the slums in Rio de Janeiro and the total number of inhabitants from 1960 to 1978:
473

Table 8.4

THE FALELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF FAVELAS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INHABITANTS OF FAVELAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>565,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>771,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Hence, the total number of favelas in Rio de Janeiro more than doubled and the inhabitants of these settlements more than quadrupled during the period. It should be pointed out that the favelas are not urbanized, i.e. do not have running water or sewage facilities and often no electricity. The living conditions are such as to create drastic health dangers for the population.

In São Paulo the same process occurred in spite of the fact that it is the richest state in the country and that workers tend to be the highest paid of the laboring population. A study conducted under the auspices of the Archdiocese of São Paulo examined the situation of the poor working population. Although, as the study points out, there are no complete statistical information for the number of shanty towns and dwellers in São Paulo, they are numerous particularly in certain
municipalities which concentrate the largest population of industrial workers: Guarulhos, Osasco, Diadema, São Bernardo do Campo and the capital of São Paulo itself. These towns comprise the industrial heart of Brazil where the highest paid industrial "labor aristocracy" is concentrated. According to the study:

The latest data provided by the PNAD (National Household Sample Survey) indicate the existence in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo of 54,739 shacks with 255,977 residents in the last quarter of 1971, and of 70,920 shacks with 318,285 residents at the end of 1972. Projecting the same rate of growth into more recent years, by the last quarter of 1975 there would have been 590,000 inhabitants of Greater São Paulo living in shacks. (...) in the Capital, São Paulo, the shanty-town population in 1975 was estimated at 130,000 people, which represents 80 percent more than in the last survey carried out in 1973 by the municipal authorities.

If the situation in the two richest cities in the nation was so desperate, statistical information of the situation in the poorer Northeast and the interior should show an even bleaker living condition for the majority of the population.

A second major indicator of the plight of the population is the statistical information on infant mortality rates. Infant mortality rates are considered to be firm overall indicators of the general health of the population. A high rate of infant mortality per 1,000 live births is directly related to income. A study conducted by the World Bank, comparing data on income, income distribution, total fertility rate, crude birth rates, crude death rates and infant mortality rates in Brazil for the year of 1970 showed the clear relationship between family income and the general health indicated by death rates and by infant mortality rates. Table 8.5 presents the summary of the data:
## STATE DATA ON INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION FERTILITY AND INFANT MORTALITY - BRAZIL, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>TF</th>
<th>IM</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>CDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piauí</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>124.9</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraíba</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceará</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>150.1</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio G. Norte</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergipe</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>140.7</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alagoas</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>153.0</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará (1)*</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goiás*</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>163.0</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso*</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espírito Sto.</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas (2)*</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sta. Catarina</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Jan.</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio G. do Sul</td>
<td>2047</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>3385</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanabara</td>
<td>4229</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Symbols: y, income per capita, in 1970 Cr.$ per year; s, income share of the bottom 40 percent of the (income earning) labor force; TF, total fertility rate; IM, infant mortality; CBR, crude birth rate; and CDR, crude death rate, both per 10⁴.

Sources: Demographic Census, 1970, was used for population by state; Conjuntura Econômica, July 1977 p. 102, for value added by state in 1970; Langoni (1973), p. 161, for s, by regions. (States are assigned the value for s of the region to which they belong). TF, IM, CBR, and CDR were kindly provided by T. Merrick.

(1) It includes Amapá

(2) It includes Rondónia, Acre and Roraima. Frontier states are marked by an asterisk. The Federal District is not included.


NOTE: The state of Guanabara has been incorporated into the state of Rio de Janeiro.
A third indication of the absolute poverty of the majority of the population is provided by a thorough study conducted by the Parliamentary Investigating Committee (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Menor - CPI do Menor) on the overall situation of Brazilian children in 1975. Although the Parliamentary Investigation Committee of the Minor officially reached the estimate that there existed in Brazil a total of 15 million abandoned and needy children, it concluded that the correct number of children without the most minimal basic needs (a condition defined as absolute poverty) approached the total of 25 million children. The Parliamentary Investigation Committee also concluded that the cause of the abandonment of the children is the extreme misery of the population with has been a result of the concentration of income in the country which, according to the data of the CPI do Menor in 1975, provided that 50 percent of the poorest received 11.8 percent of the total income and 5 percent of the richest part of the population in Brazil had a total of up to 39 percent of the national income. Table 8.6 summarizes the conclusions:

Table 8.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>ABANDONED</th>
<th>NEEDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>58,284</td>
<td>536,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>776,200</td>
<td>5,104,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>854,849</td>
<td>5,052,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centerwest</td>
<td>157,178</td>
<td>2,353,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>63,095</td>
<td>495,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL (Total)</td>
<td>1,909,370</td>
<td>13,542,508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Menor - Brasília, Câmara Federal. (CPI do Menor, Câmara dos Deputados, 1975)
Because of the situation of absolute poverty, a working class family must make up for its lost income by having more members of the family work either full or part time. This aspect is most particularly demonstrated by the total amount of children between the ages of ten and fourteen years old who must work between 29 hours and more than 40 hours per week so as to supplement the family's total income.

A study conducted under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro analyzed the overall situation of children in Brazil and specifically in the city of Rio de Janeiro. This research, conducted by a team of social scientists at the request of the Catholic Church, based its investigation on governmental data of the National Household Survey of 1976 (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem Domiciliar, PNAD -1976).

An important element of this research, as may be seen in Table 8.7 below, was to analyze the total number of children who must work either part time or full time so as to contribute to the family's income. In the country as a whole the research concluded that a total of 1,714,272 children, or as much as 68 percent of all the children studied, had to work more than 40 hours per week. In general terms over two million children needed to work at least part time so as to supplement the family's income.

For the city of Rio de Janeiro the situation of children was even more severe. In this city a total of 32 percent of the total 51,883 working children had to work more than 40 hours per week in order to allow the family to increase the basic income. The conclusions follow:
### Table 8.7
CHILD LABOR IN BRAZIL AND RIO DE JANEIRO
(10 to 14 years)
1976

#### BRAZIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours per week</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 29 hours</td>
<td>74,045</td>
<td>282,345</td>
<td>356,390</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30 to 39</td>
<td>80,756</td>
<td>381,704</td>
<td>462,460</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 40</td>
<td>542,641</td>
<td>1,171,631</td>
<td>1,714,272</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>697,442</td>
<td>1,835,680</td>
<td>2,533,122 (1)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours per week</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 29 hours</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>4,746</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30 to 39</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>4,514</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 40</td>
<td>25,578</td>
<td>17,045</td>
<td>42,623</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31,908</td>
<td>19,975</td>
<td>51,883</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNAD-1976. Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem Domiciliar of Fundação IBGE.

Published in: A Situação da Criança no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Edições Muro, 1979) page 24.

Note: (1) This total number of laboring children in Brazil represents 18.5 percent of the total population aged 10 to 14 years old.
That the economic development model pursued by the National Security State is decidedly not concerned with the fulfillment of basic needs of the population is made clear by the percentages of total budget which are spent for health and education in particular. The total budget allotted to the Ministry of Education (MEC) in 1973 amounted to 5.21 percent of the total national budget (orçamento nacional). The Ministry of Health received, in the same year of growth of the economic miracle, only 1.09 percent of the national budget. By comparison, the Ministry of Transport — which was constructing the important roads for access to mineral deposits in the Amazon basin — received a total of 12.54 percent of the budget and the Military Ministries (Army, Navy and Air Force) together had a total of 17.96 percent of the national budget. In addition, the tendency to spend less for health and education became more pronounced in the years after the implantation of the National Security State, as Table 8.8 shows:

Table 8.8
TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL BUDGET ALLOTTED TO MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION FOR YEARS 1965-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HEALTH Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EDUCATION Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>11.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Senator Franco Montoro, Da "Democracia" que Temos Para a Democracia que Queremos (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1974) pages 6-7
The funds which the National Security State spends on education is geared primarily for the upper levels so as to train the necessary number of technicians who will run the industries and provide for the economic development which will turn Brazil into a world power. In addition, we have already noted that since the Constitution of 1967, the federation was greatly weakened and all budgetary matters of importance, including the collection of taxes, was centralized in the federal government. However, the running of primary school programs was left to the states to deal with. The resulting gap between the vastness of the state's responsibilities and the lack of funds created a chaotic situation in all states for primary level education. This would not only cause the increase in number of children out of school but would fuel the major teacher's strikes of the years after 1977.

That the states were unable to fulfill the requirements of primary education was admitted by the Minister of Education in testimony before the Education Committee of the House of Representatives in 1973:

It has been demonstrated that the states and municipalities, only with their own resources, have not been able to fulfill the requirements of the basic primary education of the people (...) the reality is that only very slowly are we lowering the rate of illiteracy in the country. In the same manner the rate of school dropout (evacação escolar) in the primary grades continue to be extremely high. There are states of the federation in which the dropout rate is as high as 90 percent of the initial registration. This explains the large number of semi-illiterate people in the country. 9

This factor explains the high number of primary grade children who do not attend school in Brazil. The high rate of children out of school in Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro is shown in Table 8.9 below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN</th>
<th>CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 to 9 years</td>
<td>10 to 14 years</td>
<td>5 to 9 years</td>
<td>10 to 14 years</td>
<td>5 to 9 years</td>
<td>10 to 14 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>13,741,629</td>
<td>13,748,646</td>
<td>8,681,958</td>
<td>3,856,283</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>1,151,639</td>
<td>1,249,158</td>
<td>154,086</td>
<td>154,086</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNAD-1976. Fundação IBGE.

Published in: A Situação da Criança no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Edições Muro 1979), page 20.
It must be emphasized at this point that the overall picture of income concentration, poor housing conditions, high infant mortality, lack of education and increasing child labor which was a characteristic of the period of the economic miracle is in fact an intrinsic part of the type of model of economic development espoused by the National Security State. As we shall see in later analysis, the process of impoverishment and concentration of income did not diminish with the end of the "economic miracle" years but rather continued to increase.

Similarly, the tendency to spend less and less for basic needs and a higher percentage of total national budget for defense needs and for programs connected to the primordial goal of achieving Brazil's "manifest destiny" of a great power, has been enhanced. It is sufficient to point out here that the government of Figueiredo has moved ahead with the two most expensive programs in the history of the nation: the construction of up to 3 nuclear plants under an agreement with Germany and the construction of the giant hydroelectric plant -- the fourth largest in the world -- in the middle of the Amazon forest. In the latter case the Tucurú Plant is to form a lake covering 2,160 kilometers and shall dispossess the indian and peasant populations of the area.10

The question which remains for us to consider is who benefits from this particular model of economic development? If even during the period where Brazil maintained an average yearly growth of 10 percent the population was reduced to a situation of absolute misery even while productivity grew, where did the profits go? Which groups control the economy and make the highest profits per sector is shown in Table 8.10:
Table 8.10

PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN AND LOCALLY CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN BRAZIL

(1974 percentage basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>GC*</th>
<th>MNC</th>
<th>PNC+</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>MNC</th>
<th>PNC</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>MNC</th>
<th>PNC</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>MNC</th>
<th>PNC</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>MNC</th>
<th>PNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Industrial Raw Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ferrous Metals</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp &amp; Paper</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chem. &amp; Petrochemical</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizers</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petro. Extr. &amp; Refin.</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Equipment</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec. &amp; Comm. Equipment</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Bodies &amp; Parts</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Craft &amp; Other Vehicles</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Government company
+Private National company

It should be noted in Table 8.10 that the control of multinational corporations of sectors traditionally in the hands of the State -- such as mining -- increased. Indeed, the multinational corporations hold of the most important sectors of the Brazilian economy showed a substantial growth during this period. This tendency, as we shall see later, has been a characteristic of the model of economic development pursued by the National Security State.

In addition, multinational corporations show a consistently higher rate of profit than private national corporations in most sectors. The same holds true if one compares the net profits of multinational corporations (MNC) and state-owned corporations. Only in mining, production of steel, and oil and refinery which are areas supposed to be reserved exclusively for state corporations did the multinationals' profit show a lower rate than the state-owned companies. The conclusion must be drawn that multinational corporations are the greater beneficiaries of the type of economic model implanted during the years of the National Security State.

III. The Repressive Apparatus.

In order to implement and deepen a model of economic development geared to a high rate of capital accumulation it is necessary to increase the overall rate of exploitation of workers so as to generate surplus and profits. We have analyzed the process of development pursued. In this section we shall examine the mechanisms of control which are needed in order to keep dissent and protest of those excluded from the benefits of growth to a minimum level.
We have analyzed in the previous chapters the general mechanisms of control that were established by the National Security State. So as to silence those excluded from the benefits of the economic model of development in the process of implantation, the National Security State designed and enacted by decree a series of Institutional Acts, Complementary Acts, decree laws and one Constitution in 1967, itself amended one and a half years later so as to remove the elements of liberalism which remained in it and allowed the opposition organization of dissent. We have also examined the processes of purges and the variety of punishments imposed on those who opposed the policies of the National Security State.

In the previous chapter we have analyzed the strategy of terror, through the largescale campaigns of blitz in the cities and the pacification programs in the countryside. We have also dealt with the question of institutionalization of torture as a technique of rule through fear and intimidation.

In this section we shall provide a schematic summary of the machinery of the Repressive Apparatus. Which are the organizations that actually carry out the policies of repression, how are they connected, how many men are involved in the total machinery of repression and what is the estimated budget of the necessary organizations of the strategy of terror? How are the cell units of the Repressive Apparatus connected to the network of information and to the Executive branch of government? Chart 8.1 shows some of the interconnections:
The Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State is composed of three distinct but integrated elements: The first is the vast network of intelligence and political information. The second are the agencies and organizations directly responsible for the carrying out of the repressive actions at the local levels. The third is composed of the apparatuses of the Armed Forces, which, as we have already seen, have been used for internal political control.

Although the Executive branch of the National Security State is the ultimate estuary to which all information flows, through its agency of the Presidency, the National Security Council, in reality the intelligence network possesses a great deal of individual power and independence.

As may be seen in Chart 8.1, the National Information Service (SNI) concentrates all of the information directly, before it ever reaches the Executive branch. Thus, the SNI, in essence, sifts through and selects whatever information is to be made accessible both to the National Security Council and to the Executive itself. This is the secret of its power and its condition as a de facto source of parallel governmental decisions.

The National Information Service itself was created by General Golbery do Couto e Silva, planned already in the period of the conspiracy against the government of João Goulart and formalized officially by a Decree Law passed on June 13 of 1964. Although the budget of the SNI is a secret and, by law, the government does not need to declare it,
in 1981 officially it was allotted directly 701 million cruzeiros (approximately 7 million dollars) for the use of its own agencies. The entire apparatus of intelligence received an official budget of 1.2 billion cruzeiros, which is believed to be considerably lower than the actual costs.\textsuperscript{11} The total costs can be surmised by the fact that the intelligence networks (SNI plus other agencies of information) employ an estimated 200,000 people officially. If one includes the occasional informants who regularly work for the comunidade de informações this number is believed to be closer to one million people.\textsuperscript{12}

The SNI itself has a Central Agency in Brasília, state agencies in each state and territory of the nation and municipal agencies in all major cities. Its political power has been manifested by the extraordinary influence of those who have been its directors. The first head of the SNI, General Colbery do Couto e Silva, has been the most powerful man behind the scenes -- the Gray Eminence -- since the actual takeover of power. The second chief of the SNI, General Emílio Garrastazú Médici, succeeded General Costa e Silva as President in 1969. The third head of the SNI, General Carlos Alberto Fontoura lost his bid for the Presidency in 1973 in the power struggle that resulted in the compromise choosing of General Ernesto Geisel so as to proceed with the controlled policy of liberalization meant to provide for the longterm institutionalization of the State. However, the fourth chief of the SNI, General João Batista Figueiredo, effectively used the political power of the agency to defeat his military rivals and rise to
the Presidency in 1979. The present head of the SNI, General Octávio Medeiros is already a candidate for President. His actual power has been demonstrated in the internal struggle resultant from a bomb attack and which led to the fall of the SNI's own creator, General Golbery do Couto e Silva.13

Directly connected to the SNI are the Divisions of Information and Security (Divisão de Segurança e Informação, DSI) which are connected to all ministries of the Executive branch of the State. The DSI are charged with the specific mission of controlling the internal bureaucratic apparatus of the ministry to which it is connected as well as to watch over the specific psychosocial area of its general territory. Hence, not only do the DSI have veto power over the actual appointment of top level and secondary level members of the bureaucracy of the National Security State but its power extends over the entire area of responsibility of the ministry. For example, the DSI of the Ministry of Education compiles careful dossiers (levantamento de dados biográficos) on the past life of candidates for the bureaucracy of the ministry as well as on faculty and candidates for administrative positions in federal universities and other centers of learning. The same holds true for all other ministries.

Also directly tied and subordinated to the SNI are the Security and Information Assistance departments (Assessoria de Segurança e Informação, ASI) which operate in all non-military ministries as well as in state corporations, state agencies and autarchies, including companies which work under contract with the federal government.
Each of the branches of the Armed Forces have their own network of information. This apparatus is twofold: The Centers of Information, which operate both internally and externally, and the Secret Services -- with their Second Section -- which are meant exclusively for the internal control of the branch to which it is organically attached. It should be noted at this point that the Second Sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force operate both in larger regiment level and down to the lower level of each individual battalion and units. This is so as to ensure maximum control and information on the individual members of the Armed Forces and their political opinions, attitudes or practices.

As may be seen in Chart 8.1, the three Centers of Information of the Armed Forces are: the Army Center of Information (Centro de Informações do Exército, CIXE), the Navy Center of Information (Centro de Informações da Marinha, CENIMAR) and the Air Force Center of Information (Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica, CISA). Although officially attached to the organic structure of the SNI, these three Centers of Information have considerable independence of action. They work both in an integrated manner for the collection of information on military and civilian citizens and in a certain tension and rivalry. This rivalry has become manifested particularly at times of transfer of Executive power. The Centers of Information are directly responsible to the Military Minister of the specific branch of the Armed Forces. Thus, in essence, they provide a de facto locus of political power for the military ministers which are also usually Presidential candidates.
The Secret Services of each of the three branches of the Armed Forces are simply referred to as the E-2 (Army), the M-2 (Navy) and the A-2 (Air Force). Their specific mission is the control of the "internal public" through the departments called Second Section. Each Secret Service is attached to a specific major Command. For example, each of the four major divisions of the Army (located in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco) have a Secret Service division directly attached to the particular High Command of the First, Second, Third or Fourth Armies. The Second Section of each Secret Service is made responsible for the control of the members of all regiments, battalions and units in the territory under the Command.

Although the Second Sections and Secret Services of the Armed Forces are supposed to be specifically for the control of the "internal public," in fact they also act for the political surveillance and even the direct physical repression of the "external public". This is particularly the case of the Navy's Center of Information, the CENIMAR, and of the Secret Service of the Army which is engaged in the direct physical repression and even torture of the population through the action of the Center of Internal Defense Operations (Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna - CODI) and its Department of Information and Operations (Destacamento de Operações e Informações - DOI).

Until 1967 the responsibility for the direct carrying out of physical repression was left to the CENIMAR and the regular state police departments through the State Police of Public Security.
The SESP coordinated the action of the State Headquarters of Public Order (Departamento de Ordem Política e Social- DOPS, or DEOPS) which in turn activated the local level municipal police departments (DM) as may be seen in the extreme left side of the Chart 8.1.

With the growing strength of the armed struggle groups the National Security State began to design other organisms particularly trained and encharged with the physical process of obtaining of information. The first organization of direct violent repression was the Operação Bandeirantes (OBAN) which was financed by local and multinational industrialists and operated, in 1969, particularly in connection to the Second Army based in São Paulo. With the growth of the dialectic of violence the OBAN was extended to other states but was most operative in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. 15

Only in 1970 was the first Center of Internal Defense Operations (CODI) organized, based in São Paulo and directly connected to the OBAN. Eventually the CODI and its executive branch, the DOI, were set up in other states of the country. Presently it has been organized and is in operative conditions in: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco and Ceará. 16

It should be noted that in the international documents dealing with the question of torture and political repression in Brazil the most often-cited organizations involved in torture are the CODI-DOI, the DOPS and the Navy's CENTIMAR. These seem to be the agencies which are responsible for the physical extraction of information and for terror.
In addition to all the organizations and agencies mentioned above, the Executive branch of the National Security State makes use of the Department of Federal Police (Departamento de Policia Federal - DPF) which is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The DPF steps in to coordinate the overall political repression at times of national mobilization for internal security and specifically deals with questions related to censorship and control of information. It is to the DPF that the entire bureaucracy of censorship is directly attached.

The third important element of the official structure of the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State are the military and paramilitary forces. These are composed of the three branches of the Armed Forces plus the Military Police based in each state. It should be pointed out that the Military Police (roughly equivalent to the National Guard) were created as independent forces of each state. Thus they were directly answerable to the governors and had their own command units. The National Security State was sensitive to their potential challenging power and thus have directly subordinated all the various state Military Police units to the command of the Army appointing always an Army general to the highest command post. The Military Police have also been endowed with their own Second Section divisions which maintain tight internal security and gather information on the political opinions of all members. Although officially independent of the Army, the State Police forces are under the control of the Secretary of Public Security (Secretário Estadual de Segurança Pública) who is
Table 8.11
DEFENSE BUDGET AND TOTAL NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE MEN IN ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES IN BRAZIL (1963 to 1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>PARAMILITARY</th>
<th>DEFENSE BUDGET US Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9,655</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19,275</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>214,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>37,554</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>40,049</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>798,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>44,350</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>559,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>43,050</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>599,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>44,350</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>1,660,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>45,800</td>
<td>41,400</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,283,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>42,800</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,548,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>182,750</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>42,800</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>2,088,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Some of the data is not published in any of the available sources.

appointed by the Federal government and is the head of the SESP. Thus the State Police Forces are also, in essence, centrally controlled by the federal government neutralizing in this manner the political power of governors.

As may be seen in Table 8.11, it is the paramilitary forces which have most dramatically increased in size. This is due to their importance in the day to day activities of repression of demonstrations of dissent. Altogether the military and paramilitary forces number a
total of 457,550 active duty men. The defense budget in 1978 reached a total of over 2 billion U.S. dollars. These numbers, of course, do not include either the budget -- partly secret -- or the total of employees of the network of intelligence and political information which comprise the comunidade de informações. If we should add the two numbers we would reach an estimate of almost one million and a half men in some manner connected to the Repressive Apparatus of the National Security State.

The analysis above is limited to the official structures of the Repressive Apparatus. However, the State has developed an entirely separate and clandestine system of repression which amounts to a parallel underground repressive force. Groups directly connected to the official structure of repression have established alliances with extreme rightwing elements to form vigilante organizations such as the Commando to Hunt Communists (Comando Caça Comunistas, CCC), the Anti-Communist Movement (Movimento Anti-Comunista - MAC) and the Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (Aliança Anti-Comunista - AAB). In addition, other groups of the extreme right, including the Catholic Tradition, Family and Property (Tradição, Família e Propriedade - TFP), are instrumental in fueling the underground network of repression. 18

Since 1968 these groups have been directly or indirectly involved in a number of serious terrorist activities, bomb attacks, kidnappings and other acts of violence. In 1968 there were a reported 9 bomb attacks against six theatres, two schools, the publisher Civilização Brasileira, all of the opposition. In at least two of the theatres
the press identified 47 members of the CCC. In 1976 the AAB took responsibility for the majority of the total of ten bomb attacks which occurred throughout the year. In at least two of them there was distinct evidence that the members of the Security apparatus were directly involved. The Secretary of Public Security of the state of São Paulo at that time, Colonel Erasmo Dias, openly admitted that he knew who had put the bomb which exploded in the CEBRAP, a well-known research institute in São Paulo. In another incident, of the year, the kidnapping of the bishop of Nova Iguaçu (Rio de Janeiro) Dom Adriano Hypólito the victims were made to wear a hood in the manner which is utilized by the torture teams of the CODI-DOI.

In 1977, the underground rightwing organizations conducted six terrorist attacks. In 1978 the attacks were localized particularly in the state of Minas Gerais: of the total of 15 terrorist attacks of the year thirteen were in that state. In 1979 two highly explosive bombs destroyed the newspaper *Fm Tempo*, in Minas Gerais and the car of the President of the Metalworkers' Union of João Monlevade in Minas Gerais, João Paulo Pires Vasconcelos. In addition, at the end of 1979 the bishop of Nova Iguaçu, Dom Adriano Hypólito received a renewed surge of threats until just before Christmas a bomb exploded under the main altar of the Cathedral of Nova Iguaçu. None of the above actions were seriously investigated and there have been no convictions or even suspects. Such a situation of complete impunity, naturally, allowed the parallel forces of repression ample room for continued action.
In 1980 there was a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks from the underground rightwing forces. The year ended with a total of 46 acts of terrorism. These included the kidnapping and knifing of Jurist Dalmo Dallari, member of the Justice and Peace Committee of São Paulo, and two bomb attacks in Rio de Janeiro in September of 1980 with serious consequences: Lyda Monteiro da Silva, secretary to the President of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) was torn apart by a high explosive letter bomb addressed to the President of the OAB, Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes. That same day a second bomb exploded in the Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro, in the office of alderman Antonio Carlos de Carvalho and seriously maimed and blinded his uncle.

The underground rightwing attacks culminated with the bombs that exploded in the convention center Riocentro during the night of April 30, 1981. There were at least two bombs involved in this incident, though much early evidence indicated the presence of another two undetonated bombs in the car. The first bomb exploded inside a car occupied by an Army sergeant and an Army captain, both of whom were later revealed to be acting under orders of the Command of the First Army and to work for the Rio de Janeiro's CODI-DOI. The bomb, by most evidence, was placed upon the lap of the sergeant and killed him while seriously injuring the driver of the car. The second bomb exploded shortly afterwards in the power house. It was meant to cut energy in the Riocentro concert hall where 20,000 young people listened to a concert of opposition groups. This event had interesting ramifications:

1. It demonstrated the direct involvement of the actual official structures of the Repressive Apparatus in acts of terrorism. 2. It
strongly divided the military among those who were directly connected to the physical repression -- and therefore feared any investigation or punishment for acts of violence and illegal terrorism -- and those who disapprove and worry about the increasingly bad image of the Armed Forces as an institution. 3. The efforts to conduct serious investigations to lead to the guilty and punish all involved followed a bouncing trajectory between the severely fractured groups of the military and eventually was permanently put to rest. This led directly to the crisis in the State, the resignation of General Golbery do Couto e Silva, and the public definitions of who is who within the military and the National Security State itself. 4. Finally, the events connected to the Riocentro demonstrated that the comunidade de informação is in reality the locality of real power, superceding that of the Executive itself and imposing its own will upon all other sectors of the National Security State. For, it insisted that the investigation be shelved, be officially forgotten, that no one ever connected to the repression or other acts of terrorism be brought to trial, and it won.

The work of the underground extreme right organizations is closely connected to the official structure of repression and to the Death Squadron. The Death Squadron (Esquadro da Morte) is a rightwing paramilitary organization which is reputed to have off-duty members of the repressive forces. It is most active in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro but there have also been extensive reports of its activities in Espírito Santo, Maranhão and other parts of the Northeast. The most prominent member of the official structures of repression, officer Sârgio Fleury,
was believed to be one of the heads of the organization and certainly its chief in the state of São Paulo. He was sufficiently powerful within the structure of the National Security State to warrant the passing of a specific legislation for his benefit (the Lei Fleury) establishing that first-time defendants could await appeals in freedom.

The press grants the Death Squadron extensive coverage. It is rare when the press does not mention the discovery of a new corpse carrying the unmistakable signs of a Death Squadron execution: the victims are always bound, show the signs of violent torture, are sometimes hanged and have a number of bullets in their bodies. Often a picture of a skull with two crossed bones is found on the body or carved into the body. It is the emblem of the Death Squadron.

The extent of the activities of this paramilitary execution squad may be estimated by the following facts: Using data reported by the police the Jornal do Brasil reached the conclusion that in the poorest area of Rio de Janeiro -- the Baixada Fluminense -- alone the Death Squadron had executed over two thousand people. A lawyer who has devoted a lifetime to investigating the underground organization has documented another 20,000 cases of criminal action of the Death Squadron in his own state of Espírito Santo. The only consequence of such a denunciation was that the lawyer himself was indicted in the National Security Law and served a term of six months in prison.

The victims of the Death Squadron are supossedly only common prisoners. In reality however they have also included trade union
leaders, students, journalists, artists, militants of grassroots organizations and opposition members in general.\textsuperscript{25} As of January 1980 a second Death Squadron has begun to operate mainly in the city of Rio de Janeiro. It is called the White Hand (Mão Branca). From January to June of 1980 the press of Rio de Janeiro reported a total of 764 executions of the Mão Branca mostly in the poor Baixada Fluminense region.

I have spent some time analyzing the various underground terrorist forces because they have played an important role in the overall strategy of terror. Indeed, it may be argued that as the National Security State was forced to liberalize and grant certain key concessions and guarantees of individual rights, it found that the unofficial parallel forces were increasingly useful. The State, from 1976 on was increasingly unable to utilize overtly its power of official repression due to the force of the human rights movement of opposition. As may be seen in the description of underground terrorist activities, this is exactly the period in which the total number of bomb attacks, burning of opposition newspapers, bombing of newstands which sold opposition material and other acts of overt repressive intimidation were conducted under the cover of clandestinity. Officially, the National Security State could disclaim these acts, promise to investigate and punish those guilty and maintain the overall appearance of liberalization. In effect however, the underground forces serve the purpose of continuing the strategy of terror in practice even while it is theoretically condemned by all the leaders of the National Security State.
Of course the risk of such a policy is that the centralized comunidade de informações, legally established, will lose control of the clandestine forces of security. Brazil has, as General Golbery do Couto e Silva put it, created a monster. It may turn upon the State itself if it feels itself to be sufficiently threatened. Hence a situation of dual power in reality now exists in Brazil that could develop and escalate to the kinds of problems faced by the people of El Salvador.

IV. Specific Mechanisms of Control.

The National Security State devised specific control mechanisms for what is defined in the National Security Doctrine as the psycho-social area -- comprising essentially all the "external public" -- and the military area -- composed of the "internal public". In this section we shall present the major controls for each area.

1. The Psychosocial Area: Controlling the External Public.

This particular area, as has been seen in the analysis of the Doctrine of National Security, includes political representation, press and information media, the universities, cultural activities, trade unions and the Catholic Church's social movements. In accordance with the overall Counteroffensive Strategy, the National Security State establish specific controls for each.

1.1. Political Representation

I here define political representation to include controls of the National Congress, of state and municipal assemblies as well as controls of political parties and of the electoral system. Impediments
in any of these areas prevent the free-flow of political representation and of forms of government which are an integral part of representative or participatory democracy. These specific controls have been many, as we have seen, and have varied with the needs of the political conjuncture. Some major modifications of the electoral system were devised during the period of controlled liberalization (1974-1981) and will be handled in the appropriate chapters.

One of the principal controls of political representation has been the utilization of the mechanism of purging -- the cassação -- widely made use of to maintain the necessary Congressional majorities or change the political composition of the Legislative branches. We have seen in previous chapters how this particular control was beneficial for the State but brought also increasing delegitimation.

In all of the political purges the majority was against the official party of the opposition, the MDB. I counted only a total of 28 Congressmen of the ARENA party who were punished by the Institutional Acts. Most of the ARENA representatives punished had sided with the opposition in the key vote against the lifting of Congressman Mário Moreira Alves's parliamentary immunity in 1968. In addition, according to Marcus Figueiredo, only 1.7 percent of those who were cassado did not also lose their political rights for ten years.27 The great majority was thus effectively removed from all political activities and submitted to the Estatuto dos Cassados which prohibited them from voting, being voted, expressing political opinions, joining political parties or engaging in any political activity for ten years. Chart 8.2 presents the total number of political purges by governmental period:
CHART 8.2

CONTROL OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

BREAKDOWN BY GOVERNMENTAL PERIOD
(Elected Representatives, Mayors and State Governors purged)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL CONGRESS</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE ASSEMBLIES</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDERMEN</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE GOVERNORS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAYORS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Diário Oficial da União, (April 1964 to December 1979)

Note: There is some overlap in the dates for the Military Junta period was mostly until the end of 1969. It is significant that the largest number of purges occurred in the immediate aftermath of the AI-5 and in the period of the rule of the Military Junta.

The study conducted by Marcus Figueiredo analyzes the cycles of repression until 1974. It does not include the period of Geisel. See Marcus Figueiredo, Legitimidade e Coação no Brasil pós-1964 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1978).
The mechanism of *cassação* was an effective way of controlling the political representation of the opposition and limit its influence in governmental decisions. Without the complete delegitimation which would have been inherent in a total cancellation of political parties and permanent closing of the Federal Congress.

Furthermore, as we have seen in previous chapters, the Institutional Acts were utilized to ensure majority control of the ARENA party. At least in one documented occasion (Rio Grande do Sul in 1967 in the face of a possible victory of the opposition in the indirect gubernatorial elections) three State Congressmen lost their electoral mandates only to ensure that the ARENA would retain a sufficient majority to guarantee the election of the governor. At times the mechanism of *cassação* was used to remove specific opposition politicians who were considered to be an actual or potential threat to the National Security State. This was the case, for example, of the *cassação* of three ex-Presidents -- João Goulart, Jânio Quadros and Juscelino Kubitschek. Carlos Lacerda, ex-governor of the state of Guanabara (now incorporated into Rio de Janeiro) lost his political rights for the same reasons. Some opposition politicians were *cassado* so as to keep them from becoming a candidate for a local or state election or to deny them office after an electoral victory.

The Legislative branch of the State was specifically put under severe controls. Some were institutionalized in the various Institutional Acts and later incorporated in the Constitutions of 1967 and 1969. The
most important modifications in the exclusive role of fiscalization and legislation of the Federal Congress may be summarized in Chart 8.3 below, which compares the major reductions of the prerogatives of the Congress from the Constitutions of 1946, 1967 and then 1969:

**A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Immunity</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament have immunity in mandate for opinions, words or votes.</td>
<td>not changed</td>
<td>Electoral mandates may be cancelled in cases of crime against National Security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decurso de Prazo (special time frame for automatic approval of Executive urgent legislation)</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not exist.</td>
<td>Provided for automatic approval of gov. projects after 40 days in cases of urgency</td>
<td>Not Changed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decree-Laws</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Executive may issue decree laws in cases of National Security and during recess of Congress.</td>
<td>&quot;In cases of urgency or of public interest considered to be relevant&quot;, the Executive may legislate National Sec. public finance.</td>
<td>Maintains the dispositions of 1967 and authorizes the Executive to create new posts and establish budget and salaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Vetos</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret ballot by the Federal Congress.</td>
<td>Not Changed.</td>
<td>Public and open nominal vote by Congress within 45 days.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Federal Congress also has lost to the Executive most important legislative functions on budgetary matters. In addition, the fiscalization purpose of the Legislative branch of the State has been nullified by a limitation imposed on the number of Parliamentary Investigating Committees which may be established per session. Congress cannot hold more than five Congressional Investigations for any one period. This limits the Legislative's power to counterbalance the Executive branch and carry out investigations into its activities if parliament members believe there has been an abuse of power. In addition, the CPIs which may be held are limited in their budget by law and tightly restricted in other expenses. Members of the Committee must pay for their traveling expenses if investigations carry them outside of Brasília. Most importantly, the Congressional Investigation Committees have limited powers to enforce the request that members of the government provide testimony before the Committee. As an example, recently the CPI which investigated the German-Brazilian Nuclear Treaty petitioned for a Colonel, member of the comunidades de informações to testify before the Committee. The simple reply was that he would not come and that only the Minister of Planning would be made available for testimony before Congress. The head of the SNI's Central Agency, General Newton de Oliveira, explained to journalists that the Federal Congress was asking too much: "they take a colonel now. Then they will ask for a general. They will end up calling Octávio Medeiros, Chief of the SNI." This event of July 1980 shows not only the power of the comunidade de informações but the powerlessness of Congress.
Political representation has also been specifically limited by the application of electoral modifications at the discretion of the Executive. The nature of the changes, some of which have already been discussed, varied in time and were dependent upon the final analysis of the political conjunctures carried out by the information network and the National Security Council. In fact the electoral system was most strongly and constantly modified during the period of controlled liberalization for it is a key element in the strategy for longterm institutionalization of the National Security State. The regulations varied with the electoral needs of maintaining a monopoly of power and were specifically designed to defeat the official opposition party in each periodic election. This process shall be described in the next two chapters dealing with the 'dialectic of the electoral system.

Finally, the Executive branch of the State clearly has the power to abolish political parties, create new ones, and elaborate party regulations for the formation of new parties in complete conformance to the perceived needs of guaranteeing internal security. Institutional Act Number Two, for example, abolished all thirteen parties then in existence and created the ARENA and the MDB. The Executive imposed, furthermore, a Party Statute Law (Lei Orgânica dos Partidos) which subjects political parties to a system of almost absolute control of the State apparatuses. Even national and regional party conventions are regulated by law as to representational qualifications of delegates, time and place of gathering. The entire life of the party is determined by law and subjected to controls of the State.
1.2. Control of the Judiciary.

The first direct intervention in the Judiciary by the military Executive took place in 1965 with Institutional Act Number Two. This Act enlarged the total number of Supreme Court Ministers so as to provide a favorable weight for the views of the civil-military coalition in power. In addition to increasing the size of the Highest Court the Act also provided a special forum for trials of political conscience. Until 1965 military personnel were judged by the special system of military tribunals with the topmost court being the Military Supreme Court (STM). All civilians were under the jurisdiction of civil tribunals. Since the hardline, as we have pointed out, believed the civilian Federal Supreme Court to be too lenient in its habeas corpus decisions it was established that all crimes against National Security should be judged by the military courts. The Supreme Military Court itself was also enlarged to provide a point of view in favor of the National Security State and diminish the influence of more liberal-minded members.

With Institutional Act Number Five the controls over the Judiciary were extended for an indefinite period. Although the two previous Institutional Acts had suspended judicial guarantees temporarily so that the Judiciary could be purged these were controls limited in time. After the AI-5 there was no time limit. The Institutional Act Number 5 not only suspended the legal individual guarantees against abuse of power provided by habeas corpus in all cases of indictments against
National Security but the Constitutional guarantees for the autonomy and independence of the Judiciary and of judges were indefinitely suspended.

There are three principal Constitutional measures which protect the Judiciary and judges from pressure and interference of the Executive branch or even of those who temporarily may occupy positions of power.

1. Job tenure for life (Vitaliciedade). This means that a judge "may only lose his post by a judicial sentence passed by a very high quorum of a tribunal with a two-third majority." This means that a judge may not be dismissed by power of the Executive branch or fired because of an opposition vote.

2. Non-transferability (inamobilidade). This means that a judge may not be transferred from his post without his consent. "This in practice means that a judge may not be moved from, say Rio de Janeiro to the Amazon, or even to Nova Iguacu without his consent. He may even refuse a promotion. His post is sacred. He may not be moved." Such a guarantee, clearly, also protects the independence of judges for it limits the threatening potential of those in power.

3. Irreducibility (irredutibilidade). This Constitutional guarantee for the autonomy and independence of judges prevents the Executive power from reducing the salary of members of the Judiciary. Again, this is meant to prevent abuse of power and provide judges with an added protection so as to encourage independence of judicial decisions.

With the AI-5 all these were suspended. In essence the result was that, in the words of the President of the Brazilian Bar Association
Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes, "when these guarantees were suspended any judge could then be dismissed, retired, transferred, have his salary cut and be otherwise liable to a series of threats and pressures. Thus we have had 3 Supreme Court Ministers who were substituted by their alternates. Many others were substituted in countless other lower courts of states and municipalities. The magistrates were put under the power and at the discretion of the administrator." 32

Clearly, as Dr. Seabra Fagundes emphasized, it is impossible for the Judiciary to remain as an independent and equal power to the Executive once it is so trampled and interfered with. The three topmost Constitutional guarantees are essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system. Not only do they ensure fair trials by protecting judges from the abuse of power but they are also essential for the maintenance of an uncorrupted judicial system. What has been observed in Brazil is that judges are often punished and/or threatened if they refuse to acquiesce with the will of the powerful in political suits as well as in regular civil suits. This fact has greatly affected the independence of the Judiciary system and has undermined the Constitutional balance of power between the branches of the State.

As we shall analyze in our next chapter, the Brazilian Bar Association conducted a largescale campaign of opposition which eventually won back to judges these guarantees with the cancellation of the Institutional Act Number 5 in 1978. However, the National Security State would substitute other measures of control of the Judiciary which shall be discussed in more detail at the appropriate moment.
1. 3. The Control of Information.

The control of information must be considered in its three forms:
a) The control of information and learning -- which involves control of teaching, faculty in the universities as well as students. b) The control of the press, radio and television. c) The control of cultural expressions and of information transmitted through theatre, literature, cinema and music.

a) The universities, as we have seen, have come under severe and strict surveillance by the network of information. Those centers of learning and Federal Universities directly connected to the federal government have the additional element of specific ASI to provide information on political views and activities of both students and faculty members. The administration is appointed by the governor or even by the federal central State. The centralization of control goes so far as to interfere with the choosing of departamental heads and the hiring and firing of faculty members.

One of the most pernicious requirements of candidates for teaching positions is the provision of an "ideological document" (atestado ideológico), a statement of "ideological purity" given by the Federal Police which testify that the bearer is not subversive, or revolutionary, or unsympathetic with the policies of the State. Only with such a document, during a number of years, could a person even apply for a position in universities and other centers of learning. The same was true for schools at all levels. Hence, before even entering the institutions of learning, a candidate went through a sieve.
In addition, all faculty members and administrators could be summarily dismissed or retired by force. The mechanism of cassação in this area also was extremely useful for the National Security State. All opposition could be easily eliminated. More important perhaps were the controls established under Articles 477 and 288 passed in 1969. These decree laws established that faculty members accused of non-conformity or subversion could be expelled and prohibited from teaching in any institution of learning (private or public) for a period of up to five years. Students found guilty of offenses against National Security could also be expelled and prevented from registering in any school for a period of three years. These articles were passed under the aegis of the Institutional Act Number 5, ruled the institutions of learning until the revoking of the Act itself. However, many of the most stringent measures of control had been, by then, incorporated into the internal regulations of each university (regimento interno) and thus remained in effect.

Finally, decisions were closely tied to the Ministry of Education which also determined the basic structural makeup of the student's organizations. As we have seen the UNE and all other forms of free student associations were banned and prohibited by law. Only the official structure under the control of the State remained in effect.

b) The control of the press, of radio and of television has been extremely important in the overall logic of the National Security State. One of the primordial conditions of a repressive State is to limit the flow of information available to the population, hide the abuses of power
and impose a silence which will not only limit the opposition to the policies of repression but increase the sense of isolation and fear necessary for the proper impact of the strategy of rule through terror.

Hence, censorship has been -- and still is -- widely used to maintain social control and keep large sectors of the population uninformed and, therefore, unable to participate politically in effective ways. Censorship in Brazil is carried out in two forms: _a priori_ censorship in which orders are transmitted to the media directly by the police network of the Repressive Apparatus prohibiting the publication or airing of certain subjects, events or opinions of people and _a posteriori_ censorship which involves the prohibition of the sale of newspapers, magazines or the transmission of taped programs in television and radio.

_A priori_ censorship (censura prévia) usually takes four different forms: 1. The physical presence of a censor in the premises of the media who oversees all materials, reads, edits and cuts out any parts considered offensive. The censor is a bureaucrat, usually of the Ministry of Justice. 2. Publishers, newspapers, magazines, etc... are forced to send all finished materials -- texts of books, stories, newspaper articles, facts, illustrations, films, tapes, photographs etc. -- to a governmental department (usually within the Ministry of Justice or in the Department of Federal Police) in the same city or even in Brasília itself. The material which is not approved, or "liberated" (liberado) cannot be published or aired. This process, needless to say, involves considerable financial burden for the
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corporations involved and has caused, at times, the economic death of an enterprise which is particularly targeted by the government. This was the case, for example, of the traditional large newspaper *Correio da Manhã* and of the weekly newspaper *Opinião*. They were killed economically by a campaign organized by the government in retaliation to their strong opposition stance. 37

3. The National Security State also has the power to close down a corporation entirely, cancel the registration, the permission to function or suspend it temporarily as a punishment for infringement of the censorship rules. 4. Other legal restraints include the possibility of criminal indictment of journalists, editors or even owners of newspapers. 38 These controls are contained in the National Security Law and in a special legislation known as the Press Law (*Lei de Imprensa*). 39 The articles contained in these laws prohibit the publication of material deemed subversive, offensive, slanted or threatening to the interests of National Security or of the constituted authorities. As we have seen, journalists, editors and media owners are personally liable for the news in their media of information. Many have been, in fact, indicted and arrested for a variety of infringements of the censorship laws.

*A posteriori* censorship tends to take the following forms: 1) the seizure of an entire edition of the printed media or the outright prohibition from airing a program. A systematic implementation of such a control will without question mean the economic death of the company. The government may also just close down operations either temporarily or permanently after an act of disobedience to an *a priori* order has
been established. 2) Part of an edition or a program may be apprehended or "requisitioned" by the Federal government for examination in Brasília. 3) Finally, indictment, arrest and other punishments may occur even after the material has undergone prior censorship and passed the test of the strict physically present censors. The text may irritate a member of the Federal government who will then file an a posteriori petition against the publisher or the journalist, editor or owner responsible. Of course these direct forms of censorship are considera-

ably reinforced by a self-censorship which is imposed through fear of retaliation.

After 1976, and because of a largescale press campaign against prior censorship, a progressive easing of direct censorship in the written media became a part of the controlled liberalization program. Censors were eventually removed from two of the country's major newspapers, the Estado de São Paulo and the Folha de São Paulo. They, at first, remained in all other newspapers but were to be gradually removed from even the smaller opposition papers.

In 1977, press Secretary Toledo Carmargo established the govern-
ment's new policy, one which is presently in effect: the written media would not be subjected to direct censorship -- although the controls in the National Security Law remained active. However, radio and television would continue to be subjected to both a priori and a posteriori censorship methods. This is because the largest newspapers in the country have at most 300,000 daily copies. Radio, on the other hand, reaches an estimated 85 million people and television reaches an
estimated 45 million people. This is to be compared to all of the written press which does not reach more than a total of 20 million. For, in a country where 40 percent of the population is still illiterate and, of the literate population, only a small number can afford to purchase written press media, it is clear that the power of radio and television is comparatively much more politically significant.

Hence, not only did the prior and direct forms of censorship remain active for the radio and television but the period of liberalization would see other forms of controls of information, specifically related to electoral and party program propaganda, imposed on the aired media. In addition, as we shall see in the subsequent analysis, other underground and clandestine forms of intimidation developed through direct terrorist attacks upon the premises of newspapers and newspaper stands.

c) Theatre, literature, cinema and music are all considered to be important transmitters of the "psychological warfare" and have therefore been subjected to strict censorship controls. Plays and theatre are under both a priori censorship -- with censure reading and cutting out material which is considered to be undesirable -- and a posteriori. Censors must be present in the performance and may suspend or close down a play at any time if they feel it is not conforming to the censored text. All cultural performances (this includes concerts as well) must provide the censorship bureaucracy with four free tickets so they can attend the show and physically testify to its conformity to established regulations. Songs, likewise, must be cleared by the Federal Police prior to presentation.
in a cultural performance, show or recording. If the Department of Federal Police does not approve of the words of the song then it can no longer be sung out -- the words are censored -- only the music may be played. This shows the extent to which the National Security State is concerned with the total control of information to be transmitted to the public. The same regulations and rules apply to literature, art and cinema -- particularly the latter which is considered to be the most dangerous media of "psychological propaganda" of the opposition. Entire books and works of literature have been prohibited from publication in Brazil, sometimes for as long as ten years.

In 1977, in the midst of the controlled liberalization program, an additional control upon information was enacted. Minister of Justice Armando Falcão passed a Decree-Law whereby books, magazines, newspapers or journals received from foreign countries must be also subjected to censorship. In conclusion, cultural expression of any form has been identified with the activities of the "internal enemy" and are automatically considered to be suspect and dangerous to the interests of the constituted authorities.

It is to be emphasized that censorship in Brazil -- though eased in the written press -- has presently by no means been abolished. In fact, it has become a part of an immense regular bureaucracy of censorship which is ultimately directly tied to the Repressive Apparatus through the SNI and organically to the Department of the Federal Police. The culture of fear depends on controlled information and upon the isolation and blockage created by an enforced "culture of silence".
1.4. The Control of Trade Unions and associations

When the civil-military coalition took power in 1964 they found built into the State important mechanisms for the social and political control of labor unions. Hence, the past State formations already in existence became incorporated into the totality of the new nascent National Security State.

The Brazilian Labor Code, included in the general labor legislation as Section V of the Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho) tightly regulates the formation, registration and general functioning of labor unions. The Section V of the Brazilian Labor Code is inspired in the fascist legislation of Mussolini, in particular the Carta del Lavoro. Passed in a period of dictatorship in 1943, this body of legislation remained unchanged throughout all the years of progressive redemocratization. It served the ruling classes well even during the periods of more democratic governments. In terms of control over activities of workers, the structure of the labor unions could serve the State's interests in whatever shade of political ideology was in power. During the period of more liberal democratic governments the most severe measures of control and punishments were not applicable for governments dependent upon popular vote could not afford the strict adherence to unpopular mechanisms of fascist domination. However, they were not eliminated and revoked.

The military left the Labor Code largely intact making mainly some minor changes to increase its overall effectiveness for the purposes of the National Security State. One such change stipulated
that a labor union may have its registration license suspended or even
cancelled entirely if the leaders make comments which are critical to
the government's economic policies. 44 Other changes included:

1. **Article 530**, which deals with the ineligibility regulations.
   It was changed on February 28, 1967 to include the prohibition of
   the candidacy of those who had lost their political rights and of
   all "who publicly defend the program or ideas of an abolished
   political party or belong to an association or an organization
   which has been considered to be against the national interest".45
   In addition, those who were removed from an administrative office
   or from their trade union post are also considered ineligible.46
   The additions to this article began the policy of requiring of
   labor union potential candidates the provision of a document of
   "ideological purity" (testado ideológico) given by the Federal
   Police. Its power was meant to cut out from the union activities
   any budding new leadership that could challenge the policies of the
   National Security State.

2. **Article 549**. Dealing with budgetary controls of labor unions.
   In 1976 a line was added to it establishing that the "budget of
   labor unions, federations and confederations must be spent exactly
   as established in the annual report". This was so as to emphasize
   the requirement both to present a detailed annual report of union
   funds and spending to the Ministry of Labor and to conform to the
   legally stipulated percentages which must be spent for medical and
   dental care as well as for continuing education programs.
3. **Article 553.** Which establishes penalties for infractions to the regulations of the Labor Code (ranging from fines to the suspension of the leadership for up to 30 days or even permanently or for the dissolution of the union). Decree Law- Number 925, of October 10, 1969 added two paragraphs to this Article: The first provided that the personal penalties applied to the directors did not impede the punishment of the union itself (or vice versa). The second stated that officials of a union could be removed from office as a *preventive* measure as soon as a formal charge of subversive activities was filed in the Ministry of Labor. ⁴⁷

Apart from these modifications, of course, the National Security State also devised the series of anti-strike legislations and the wage-control policies that eliminated the right to collective bargaining. These have already been examined at length. The Labor Code itself, however, included no other major changes. It was simply applied to the fullest limit of its coercive power.

One of the most important features of the Labor Code is the structural organization of the labor unions so as to prevent any form of horizontal organization. The State has the right to establish the professional makeup of a union (*enquadramento sindical*). It is the Ministry of Labor which determines which professions shall be included in one union and the territorial boundaries of jurisdiction of that union. Once this is determined then only that one union has legal right to represent the workers in that territory (*sindicato único*). This Article has been widely used by the military governments to break up a trade union
which was highly organized and divide it into two or more professional
unions thus weakening the strength of the organization. Sometimes
the opposite may be done, with the similar purpose of diluting the overall
strength of a small but well-organized and effective union. This was
the case, for example with the Naval Workers Union of Niterói which
was included into the larger Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro
so as to dilute its combative stance of prior to 1964.

The actual structure of trade union organization is established
in Articles 533 and 539 of the Labor Code's Title V. It follows a
corporative pattern: Trade unions are to include not only labor unions
of urban and rural workers but also of professional white collar job
categories and even of employers. They are established by job category
at a pre-determined territorial boundary. The various local unions of
the same job category may form a Federation of their particular profession
at a state level. The state Federations of all categories in a particular
section then form a Confederation. Thus, for example, the Confederation
of Workers in Industry (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na
Indústria - CNTI) gathers all labor unions of workers in industry.

The control of the Ministry of Labor is guaranteed by the following
precepts: rank and file workers, in the regular election for the local
union, also elect in the slate two representatives for their state
federation. However, the union has only the right to one vote at the
Federation level. All of the local unions, independently of the
number of members represented by the union, have the right to two
representatives and only one vote at the Federative level. In practice
this works as follows: The Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro, for example, which has over 40,000 members, has the same voting voice in the Federation as other metalworkers unions, which may represent less than 1,000 workers or have as few as 100 members. It is here that the government's ability to recognize unions and form them as it sees fit allows it to create "ghost unions" so as to keep a tight control over the Federation level of trade union organization. As we have seen, it was a distinct part of Costa e Silva's governmental union program to create a large number of "ghost unions" so as to control the higher levels of union representation.

Furthermore, since it is the Federations which elect the board of directors of the Confederations, the governmental control is enhanced and made stronger at the highest level of inter-union organization. Thus, it is indeed rare that one will find in Brazil a Federation union official (and especially a Confederation union official) who in fact represents the workers or even who represent the viewpoint of the largest and most influential trade unions. For, in spite of the largescale organizing at the local union level which has taken place particularly since the mid-seventies, it has proven to be extremely difficult to win a majority vote at the Federation and the Confederation levels for the voice of the unions in the "new union movement" is curbed by the immense number of government-controlled small unions with the same voting rights. In fact, some of the Federation and Confederation officials have held their posts for as many as 30 years and are practically immune to pressure from below.
The structure of organization of unions is pyramidal so as to prevent collective organization across professional categories in a horizontal fashion. The Labor Code explicitly prohibits the formation of inter-union formal coordination at the local level. Thus, a metal-worker local may not coordinate activities (formally and legally) with a bankworker union, or an urban transport union or any other job category. It may meet only with other members of its own job category and at the Federation level. Only at the top, through the Confederation, do all job categories of the same sector of the economy meet in a formal sense. Chart 8.4 shows the pyramidal nature of the union structure. Chart 8.5 graphically underlines the representational impediments to horizontal organization.

Chart 8.4
THE PYRAMID OF THE LABOR UNIONS

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{MINISTRY OF LABOR} \\
\text{CONFEDERATIONS} \\
\text{Confederations of Professionals} \quad \text{Workers Confederations} \quad \text{Employers' Confederations} \\
\text{FEDERATIONS} \\
\text{Federations of Professionals} \quad \text{Workers Federations} \quad \text{Employers' Federations} \\
\text{UNIONS} \\
\text{Unions of Professionals} \quad \text{Workers Unions} \quad \text{Employers' Unions}
\end{array}
\]

Notes: The Confederation, the Federations and the particular local unions are only examples to indicate the nature of the legal representational ties. The letters at the local union level symbolize the particular local union of the category: M: for Metalworkers unions of São Paulo; T: for Textile Workers Unions of Rio de Janeiro; C: for Chemical Workers Unions of Minas Gerais; P: for Paper and Pulp Unions of Bahia.

The lines indicate representation levels. As one can see in the above chart, no horizontal connection between the various professional job categories is legally allowed. The entire organizational structure is vertical so as to ensure maximum degree of centralization at the Federation and the Confederation levels.

In addition to the important overall control of the government over the labor unions which is inherent in the very structure of the labor organizations, there are other provisions for securing Ministry of Labor control over activities of labor unions. The most important are:

1. First the right of the State to intervene directly in a union to remove elected officials from office simply by a Ministerial decision.
2. The permanent ineligibility of a trade union official who has been removed from office by act of the Ministry of Labor. An official thus removed may not hold any elected office post in labor unions, at any level, for life. This is why, metalworker leader Luis Inácio da Silva, "Lula", told me that this article is essentially the "AI-5 of the workers". An intervention in a union amounts to a cassação of the officials involved who are permanently eliminated from participation.

3. The right of the government to have the final say on the legal recognition of trade unions and its ability to create trade unions of its own, the so-called "ghost unions". In addition, the right of the government to cancel and dissolve trade unions has also become a strong impediment to free trade union activity.

4. An important mechanism of control is the budgetary regulations which are established by the Ministry of Labor, i.e. by the State itself. The budget of all unions in Brazil comes from an automatic deduction in the salary of all Brazilian workers (whether unionized or not) equivalent to one day's salary per year. This fund is collected in the paychecks by the corporations and directly transferred to the Federal government. It is a tax known as the "union tax" (imposto sindical). This fund is redistributed by governmental institutions and the Banco do Brasil to Confederations, Federations and local unions -- with the two higher levels having discretion power over how the local unions will receive their share of the budget. In addition, the unions must draw up a detailed "spending report" on how they shall utilize their funds. The
Labor Code itself stipulates certain provisions and percentages which must be spent for medical care, for dental care, for cooperatives and for continuing education programs for the members of local unions. Spending for political participation, political campaigns or parties is prohibited by law. Utilization of union funds -- of whatever nature -- for the purpose of strike funds is also prohibited by law. 49

In fact, trade unions have been transformed into organizations of social welfare which perform the functions of a Welfare State and release the central government from social obligations to a great degree. At the same time, the burden of such a role prevents unions from exerting their inherent function: that of representing the economic interests of workers.

Perhaps an even more severe restriction upon the freedom of organization is the legal stipulation that all unions must deposit all of their income -- from salary tax, from union dues, from grants, benefits or any other source -- into one particular bank account in the Caixa Econômica, a governmental financial institution. This bank account may be blocked by the government when it sees fit, for example, when the Ministry of Labor decides that some of the budgetary rules or percentages have been violated or during a strike considered illegal.

5. A fifth important mechanism of labor union control is the legal impediment for labor unions to affiliate to international trade union organizations without prior governmental approval. Thus, since 1964, it has been difficult for the opposition unions to affiliate to networks of international union organizations which could provide support and aid.
To what extent have these controls been exercised by the military governments since 1964? An indication has already been provided in our earlier discussion. At this point we should consider data on the number of unions which exist in the country (urban, rural, professional and employers' unions) as well as the total membership of unions. This data provides a context for the number and variety of governmental acts of direct intervention in the trade unions.

**Table 8.12** presents the total number of confederations, federations and local trade unions in Brazil from 1964 to 1979. As may be seen, these include professional and employers' organizations as well as unions of urban and rural workers. These are all part of the pyramidal structure tied directly to the National Security State through the Ministry of Labor. Some additional factors should be noticed in the data: First, the number of confederations and of federations has remained fairly stable during the years of the National Security State. Second, the total number of workers local unions has oscillated up and down depending on how many unions were formed or dissolved by a governmental decree act. Third, the employers' unions remained much more stable in the same period of time. Indeed, I have found that there was no case of direct State intervention in the organizations of employers to dismiss officials or dissolve a union on political grounds. A fourth point of interest concerns the organization of the rural unions.

The rural organization, until 1964, was both in rural unions and in the independent organizations of the Peasant Leagues. In 1964 the latter were dissolved by the military government upon its
Table 8.12
TOTAL NUMBER OF CONFEDERATIONS, FEDERATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS IN BRAZIL
(1964-1979)

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NOTE: Where indicated by * there is no data for rural unions.

Sources: Coordenadoria de Informática– Inquérito Estatístico Sindical. Brasilia, Camara Federal.
### Table 8.13
MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE UnIONS IN BRAZIL

**(1964-1968)**

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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: --- Data not available.


<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1,952,752</td>
<td>2,132,086</td>
<td>2,317,775</td>
<td>2,488,208</td>
<td>2,720,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>211,478</td>
<td>235,118</td>
<td>257,197</td>
<td>280,339</td>
<td>304,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>68,172</td>
<td>72,989</td>
<td>92,867</td>
<td>99,043</td>
<td>102,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,232,402</td>
<td>2,440,173</td>
<td>2,667,839</td>
<td>2,867,590</td>
<td>3,127,907</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Workers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Employers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fundação IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (years 1970 to 1974).

Note: --- Data not available.

**(1974-1980)**

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>2,930,672</td>
<td>3,224,425</td>
<td>3,509,915</td>
<td>4,271,450</td>
<td>5,139,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>320,310</td>
<td>340,579</td>
<td>359,205</td>
<td>415,550</td>
<td>455,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>109,441</td>
<td>118,866</td>
<td>125,241</td>
<td>147,307</td>
<td>157,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,360,463</td>
<td>3,683,870</td>
<td>3,994,361</td>
<td>4,834,307</td>
<td>5,752,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Workers</td>
<td>3,008,943</td>
<td>3,425,995</td>
<td>4,033,122</td>
<td>4,578,412</td>
<td>5,098,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Employers</td>
<td>496,396</td>
<td>555,373</td>
<td>573,303</td>
<td>619,427</td>
<td>678,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,505,339</td>
<td>3,981,368</td>
<td>4,606,425</td>
<td>5,187,839</td>
<td>5,776,647</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fundação IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (years 1975 to 1980).

Source for rural unions: Confederação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG) and Coordenadoria de Informática da Câmara Federal, Brasília.
takeover of power. The situation in the countryside for the first two years of the National Security State was so chaotic that no statistical information was compiled until 1966 when slowly the rural unions, mostly officially tolerated by the military, could begin to be organized. The repression in the countryside was even more severe than in the urban areas.

It should be emphasized at this point, however, that the strong growth shown by the rural organization of unions has not been due (for the most part) to a governmental program of creation of "ghost unions" but has rather been due to the active opposition activities of peasants in alliance with the social movements of the Catholic Church in the countryside. Although perhaps still a large number of rural unions are under the direct control of government employees (known as pelegos) it is in the rural unions that we find the most vibrant forms of alternative organizations in the years of the National Security State.

The above comments apply as well to the data presented in Table 8.13 with the total membership of unions from 1964 to 1979. The chaotic situation in the countryside prevented an actual compilation of data on the membership of unions until 1974 when the Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), itself an important opposition organization, began to gather systematic information independent of governmental statistics.

Finally, Table 8.14 presents data on the total number of governmental acts of interference in trade unions from 1964 to 1979. I have been particularly concerned, in the compilation of this data, with information on urban and rural labor unions as well as professional
white collar organizations. These were the areas of particular targeting by the National Security State. In addition, the data on interference in trade unions refers to all levels, local unions as well as federations and confederations. A point of explanation should be further emphasized: I counted not only direct intervention in a union, federation or confederation but also an extension of this intervention beyond the Labor Code's stipulated 90 days. An act of extension of the period of intervention was, therefore, counted as a second act of governmental interference in the union. This is a relevant point because some unions remained under intervention for, in some cases, as long as seven years through the constant extensions of the interventionist power of the government.

In many of the cases in the early part of the National Security State, the Ministry of Labor would simply ratify the act of a Regional Labor Delegate or a de facto occupation of the union by military forces. It should be noted, furthermore, that the justification for the intervention in the unions, at that time, was not always in accordance to the articles of the Labor Code but many times for two subsequent reasons: First, because the leaders or officials of the union were not to be found and thus were considered to have "disappeared" and left the post vacant. Secondly, because the union was under military occupation of troops and obviously required a governmental intervention to return to its activities. These justifications are published in the preambles of the decrees of intervention, in particular during the year of 1964. They indicate the degree and extent of violent repression in the labor unions.
Table 8.14
GOVERNMENTAL DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN TRADE UNIONS - 1964 TO 1979
Data gathered from Diário Oficial (1964-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interference</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal from Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
(1) Intervention is here defined as a governmental act based on the Labor Code (Consolidation of Labor Laws) which either directly intervenes in a union, removing the elected officials from office and appointing governmental administrators, or officially extends the period of intervention decreed by a local Regional Labor Delegate.
(2) Removal from office is an official act of the Ministry of Labor and most frequently means the removal of one, two or three members of a board of directors. In only 25 cases did it remove all of the members of a board of directors.
(3) Interference in elections can be either to annul the results of an election or to prohibit the candidacy of one or more people on political grounds.
(4) I have counted only those cases of trade union dissolution justified by one of four reasons: (a) that the trade union did not present its budget to the Ministry of Labor; (b) that the leadership was disappeared or that the delegate declared the directory vacant; (c) that the union did not conform to the "unified statute" required by the Labor Code; (d) dissolution to break up the profession and/or include the union in another trade union.

Source: Diário Oficial da União, daily issues from 1964 to the end of 1979.
1.5. The Controls of the Catholic Church

The Church is considered as a part of the psychosocial area and one which has been of particular concern for the National Security State. Although the State at first counted with the support of the major part of the hierarchical structure of the Brazilian Catholic Church we have seen how this support was eroded in time and the attitude of the Church vis à vis the State became one of opposition in defense of human rights.

However, because of the very nature of the institution of the Catholic Church and its deep influence upon a population which, at least nominally, is considered to be approximately 98 percent Catholic, it was difficult for the State to develop proper mechanisms of control of the activities of the Church. Not until the enactment of the Foreigners' Bill of August 1980 (Lei dos Estrangeiros) did the State come up with a reasonable body of legal controls for the Church as an institution. The seriousness of the Foreigners' Bill is in the fact that two of its clauses directly control the activities of Church priests, members of the hierarchy or missionaries: The first is the stipulation that only those of interest to National Security may be allowed to come into the country. The second is that those who do come into the country are subjected to the control of the immigration department which may establish even where they may live and work. Since the Catholic Church is highly dependent upon foreign missionaries, priests and even top members of the hierarchy (approximately 40 percent of the total Catholic manpower) this law had a serious impact on the Church's activities.
For the most part, however, the National Security State has dealt with the social activities of the Catholic Church through a combination of negotiation with the hierarchy and outright violent repression. In fact, the two approaches have tended to be alternate forms of political behavior comprising, so to speak, a cyclical relationship of repression and liberalization.

A comprehensive study of the State repression against the Catholic Church has been conducted by a statistical organization of the Church, the Ecumenical Center for Documentation and Information (Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação - CEDI). This document provides evidence for the following acts of aggression against the Church as an institution or members of the Church: a) defamatory attacks; b) invasions of schools, universities, churches, offices, residences, convents by armed police or military troops; c) surveillance, spying, search and seizure without warrants or judicial orders; d) summons for interrogation at police headquarters; e) arrests; f) indictments in the National Security Law; g) deportation from the country of foreign members of the Church; h) banishments from the territory of Brazil of Brazilian citizens members of the Church; i) censorship of Church media; j) prohibitions against or other impediments to the exercise of pastoral ministries or services; k) falsification of letters, Church documents and publications and news media.

There were 26 documented cases of government-organized slander campaigns of defamation against members of the Church hierarchy, in particular of Dom Helder Câmara and of Dom Pedro Casaldáliga.
A great number of priests, bishops, seminarians and nuns were arrested particularly in the years between 1968 and 1978. During this period the document provides detailed evidence for 122 cases of arrests. Among these there were 9 bishops, 84 priests, 13 seminarians and 6 nuns. In addition 10 were lay pastoral agents. The justifications for the arrests were, for example, the preaching of a sermon which displeased the authorities; the participation in a Labor Day demonstration; the participation in student rallies; the celebration of a Mass in mourning for the anniversary of the enactment of the Institutional Act Number Five; hiding or aiding a person considered "subversive" by the authorities; denouncing arbitrary actions against indians, sharecroppers, peasants, workers and other persons; being physically present in a place invaded by the police and finally, being considered "suspect of engagement in activities of subversion".

Other evidence was gathered for the arrest of 273 other lay pastoral agents or Catholic social organizers working among the poor or in the youth movements of the Catholic Church. In addition, the document provides factual evidence on the violent torture of 34 priests or seminarians. In at least one case, that of Frei Tito, the torture led to death by suicide. During this same period there were 7 priests who were murdered either by the official repressive forces or by the Death Squadron.

There were at least 15 documented threats of death against bishops and priests during this period. Indeed, bishops and priests...
have been kidnapped and beaten, tortured and made to submit to kidnappers which included the Commando to Hunt Communists (CCC).  

The forces of repression also conducted several IPMs against Church personnel, bishops and priests. The Military Police Investigations totaled 21 and involved members of a variety of social movements of the Catholic Church as well as the research institutes IBRADE and FASE. The IPMs gathered information and interrogated approximately 160 people.

One of the most disrupting and effective means of repression against the activities of the Catholic Church has been the direct prior censorship of Church media, the confiscation of documents and the actual closing down of Church radio stations. The newspaper O São Paulo, of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, was under direct prior censorship -- with the physical presence of a censor -- from 1972 until 1978. It was one of the last newspapers to be freed of prior censorship. The radio station of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, Rádio 9 de Julho de São Paulo was permanently closed down without explanation in 1974. The Rádio 13 de Maio, of the Diocese of Goiás, was also permanently closed in 1974. The Rádio Educadora, of the Diocese of Maranhão, was suspended for 8 days in 1969. Finally, the Rádio Assunção de Jales, was put under direct control of the police which vetoed its programs in 1977.

More seriously, the study documents the violation of the correspondence of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) and of the private correspondence of bishops and even cardinals of the progressive sector of the Catholic Church. There was strong and
widespread censorship of Church documents, research, books, publications and even baggage inspections as well as censorship of the diplomatic pouch between the Vatican and the Brazilian Catholic Church.

Another method of dealing with the Church's network of communication was the falsification of letters, communications, documents and even of Diocesan newspapers. The false material provided confusing and contradictory information as well as untrue accusations. Sometimes they were reproduced to imitate its counterpart exactly, as was the case with the Diocesan newspaper of Nova Iguaçu, the Folha de Nova Iguaçu which was exactly reproduced and distributed so as to give false information.

The above description provides mainly examples of the extent of governmental repression against the Catholic Church during the years of the National Security State. The document cautions that the reality is much more severe than it portrays for the research limited itself only to documented and published cases of repression. It is to be understood, the researchers emphasize, as a sample of the situation of State retaliation against the sectors of the Catholic Church which have most firmly defended human rights.

Table 8.15 summarizes the main documented aspects of the various acts of governmental interference and repression against the activities of the Catholic Church as an institution and its membership. It is clear in the presentation of the data, that the National Security State did not shrink from applying to the Church the same methods of direct physical repression and informational control it applied to other sectors of the psychosocial area:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC ACTION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Invasions of Churches, of Cathedrals, and CNBB offices by military and police</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Invasions of residences of Bishops and of convents by military and police</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Invasions of parochial houses, parishes, parochial offices; activity centers, parochial mission areas by military and police</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Invasions of headquarters and offices of Church social movements (JUC; ACO; JOC; etc.) by police</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Invasion of Catholic Universities by police/military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Invasion of Church Service Centers by police/military</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Invasion of meetings of the Church by police/military</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Murders</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Arrests of Priests</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Arrests of lay pastoral agents or Catholic organizers</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kidnappings</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Torture cases (documented only)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Banishment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Arraignments for questioning in IPMs</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Deportations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Trials under the National Security Law of priests</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Censorship of Church publications and radios</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Bishops who have suffered personal repression</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Since this document was completed other events of repression against the Church have taken place in an alarming escalation. These included the kidnaping of Jurist Dalmo Dallari, of the Justice and Peace Committee of São Paulo in 1979, the deportation of one priest in 1980 arrest of two priests in 1981 and the trial of one priest under the National Security Law in 1981. In addition, churches were invaded and destroyed during the strike of the metalworkers of São Paulo in 1979, and the Cathedral of Nova Iguaçu was bombed. The repression of priests and pastoral agents in the countryside has been aggravated from 1977 to 1981 because of the Church's defense of the land rights of peasant squatters and of Indians.
2. **The Military Area: Controlling the Internal Public.**

As has been mentioned earlier, the military did not escape the general network of control established by the National Security State. Marcus Figueiredo points out in his work that the military actually suffered more punishments from the Institutional Acts than did the civilian bureaucrats. The National Security State has had to mount a vast apparatus for the control of the "internal public" of the military personnel.

Military personnel on active duty are prohibited from expressing any dissent or making any public political statement by the strict internal regulations established in a special code for the military. In addition, the members of the military, military police forces and naval fuzileers have been indicted, arrested, punished, retired, transferred or threatened in a variety of ways. Although it is difficult to gather complete information on the total number of military personnel who have been in some manner punished by the National Security State because of their dissent either against the economic policies of the State or sometimes against the repression itself.

It should be emphasized that this data is merely indicative of the total number of cases, for it is based only on cases published in the press or personally known to the military participants whom I interviewed and who collected the information. Most of the cases, however, are not either published or known publicly.
Table 8.16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES</th>
<th>EXPELLED &amp; FIRED</th>
<th>PUT ON RESERVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. ARMY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. NAVY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Sailors</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>228</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. AIR FORCE:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Sailors</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>314</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. NAVAL FUZILIERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Sailors</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. MILITARY POLICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMBER OF MILITARY PUNISHED BY INSTITUTIONAL ACTS: 1,805**


As may be seen in Table 8.16 above, the National Security State was forced to engage in a significant number of purges throughout all the years since the power takeover in 1964. Table 8.17, in addition, presents the evidence of other punishment inflicted upon the military for the purpose of a "deterrent effect" so as to establish a tight control of the "internal public". It should be
Table 8.17
OTHER PUNISHMENT - INCLUDING DISCIPLINARY ARRESTS AND SUSPENSION
CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PUBLISHED CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. ARMY:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. NAVY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Sailors</td>
<td>4,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. AIR FORCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. NAVAL FUZILIERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. MILITARY POLICE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Officers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Sargents &amp; Lower Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals &amp; Soldiers</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PUNISHED</td>
<td>4,787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Source: Data based on interviews and on research on Veja, Isto É, Journal do Brasil, Movimento, Tribuna da Imprensa, O Globo, Folha de São Paulo e O Estado de São Paulo: As well as on data gathered by the Associação Brasileira pela Defesa dos Atingidos Pelos Atos Institucionais. It should be pointed out that it is incomplete data, based only on what is published or known to political actors. It is only a sample of the extent of the repression.
remarked that the corporals and sailors have been subjected to a particular persecution. This is because of the history of struggle of these groups in the years prior to the 1964 coup d'etat.

During the course of the interviews which I conducted with members of the military, one of the most common remarks was to emphasize the significance of the number of officers who were purged. Such a high proportion of punished officers indicated the divisions among the military and that not all were silently acquiescent to the policies of exploitation and repression carried out by the National Security State after 1964. It is another point of interest to note that many top-level officers who had originally participated in the conspiracy for the overthrow of the government of João Goulart eventually withdrew their support, joined the ranks of the opposition and suffered a variety of punishments as a result. This was also explained in the interviews as being a consequence of two factors which influence the political behavior of the military: they are members of the middle classes -- and therefore sensitive to the prevailing opinion of their own class -- and they are, for the most part, Catholic. The slow but firm transformation of the position of the Catholic Church vis à vis the National Security State had deep repercussions within the officer corps of the military.

As more military officers withdrew their support for the policies of the National Security State the network of control of the "internal public" had to be enlarged. Thus, as we have seen in our discussion of
the Repressive Apparatus, the intelligence and repressive network had to be extended down to every regiment and every battalion so as to maintain a tight screen of political surveillance over the members of the military forces and the military police.

The mechanism of cassação was utilized against the officers of the "internal public" with one aggravating circumstance: When a military is punished by any of the Institutional Acts or by their Complementary Acts (cassado), he is declared to be legally "dead". This, essentially, means that he loses all the military benefits which he had acquired in the course of his career -- such as pensions, retirement benefits, promotion pay, health and education benefits, aid to children etc. The wife of a "dead" military receives a governmental "widow's pension" and is qualified to the regular aid to widows with dependent children. Clearly, for a married couple, this means considerable loss of income for the "widow's pension" is much smaller than the actual pay of the career officer. In addition, for those officers who are separated this meant that he was left with no source of income at all. For when a military man is cassado and "dead" it is extremely difficult to find a job -- especially when one considers the impediments provided by the requirements of an "ideological document" (atestado ideológico) of political purity.

According to a General who was cassado, the limitations are indeed so severe that just about the only legal remaining right is that of paying taxes on income. In the interview, he added, smiling, that for 16 years he insisted on writing on his income tax form: "I am
dead." It should be remarked that this bizarre punishment increases the overall effect of the culture of fear among the military and thus extends the political control power provided by the "deterrent effect" of stories of persecution and punishment. Therefore, this exotic mechanism of control of the military is a powerful deterrent factor to opposition within the Armed Forces.

In addition, the military are ruled by a special Military Code which establishes the legal structure and the penalties for crimes tried by military courts. Besides the regulations in the Military Code, the members of the "internal public" are subjected to the Internal Disciplinary Regulations (Regimento Disciplinar Interno) in each of the separate branches of the Armed Forces and in the Military Police forces. These are statutes which control the political activities of the members by prohibiting, among other things, public statements of political opinion.

Finally, it should be noted that President João Figueiredo has found it necessary, in 1979, to extend to the officers in the reserve the same rules which apply in the Regimento Disciplinar Interno to military in active duty. This decree was enacted in response to a growing number of political dissenters who publicly voiced their opinions as soon as they were in the reserve. The fact that it was a necessary measure is an indication of the internal divisions among the military and the inherent instability of the National Security State itself.
NOTES

1. See, DIEESE, _10 Anos de Política Salarial_, op.cit. pages 64-66.

2. See Chapter Six for Table 6.1, on page 300.

3. See Table in Appendix: "Minimum Salary in Brazil (1940 to 1979), Nominal Value, Decree Number Establishing Value, Date of Decree, Date it Became Effective". For the dollar equivalency of the minimum salaries see Table in Appendix "Evolution of Minimum Salary in Brazil (1960 to 1979) in cruzeiros and in dollars of 1979".

4. See Chapter Six, for Table 6.2 , page 302.


8. See Senator Franco Montoro, _Da "Democracia" que temos Para a Democracia que Queremos_, op.cit. page 144.


10. The Hydroelectric Plant of Tucuruí is to be completed in 1983 and constructed by a consortium of Japanese multinationals. It is to cover a region of the Amazon comprising 2,160 kilometers and drowning approximately 2.8 million trees. The Hydroelectric Plant is required for the mining of the wealth of the Carajás mountains and to provide electricity for the totally electrical railway which shall connect the aluminum mines of Alcoa and Albrás Corporations to the Port of Itaqui which is 900 kilometers away from the mining region. See the extensive article on Tucuruí in _Veja_, August 12, 1981, pages 64-75. The total budget of the nuclear agreements is expected to cost US 36 billion. See _Isto É_, October 7, 1981, page 76 "A Bomba Financeira".
11. See, Latin America Regional Reports, Brazil. RB-31-09, of October 16, 1981, page 5.

12. Ibid.

13. It is ironic that the creator of the SNI, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, has been deposed from power by his own agency of intelligence and political information. General Golbery's fall from power, even by his own account, was largely due to the influence of the present head of the SNI, General Octávio Medeiros. In reference to his overthrow by the SNI, General Golbery do Couto e Silva was quoted as exclaiming: "I have created a monster. Things cannot continue like this." In fact, he created the Leviathan which he had at one time theoretically defended as the kind of State necessary to obtain the security of the nation. See, on this, Latin America Regional Reports, Brazil, of October 16, 1981, page 1.

14. This is particularly true of the Center of Information of the Army, the CIEX. At the time of the transfer of Executive power to succeed President Geisel the rivalry between the CIEX and the SNI was manifested in the struggle between the candidacies of General Frota, Minister of the Army and therefore head of the CIEX, and General João Batista Figueiredo, then head of the SNI. The intestinal fight was sufficiently severe for the CIEX to orchestrate an attempted coup d'etat to bring General Frota to power. This was efficiently dismantled by President Geisel and eventually the SNI won the nomination. We shall discuss this more thoroughly in a later chapter.

15. Detailed information on the agencies of repression, the machinery of the Repressive Apparatus, may be found in the international documents of Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the World Council of Churches. However, specific works on the repressive forces are also available. See, for example: Ettore Biocca, Estratégia do Terror: A Face Oculta e Repressiva do Brasil (Lisbon, Portugal: Inciativas Editoriais, 1974); Antonio Carlos Fon, Tortura: A História da Repressão Política no Brasil (São Paulo: Global Editora e Distribuidora Ltda, 1979); and Reinaldo Cabral and Ronaldo Lapa (eds.) Os Desaparecidos Políticos: Prisões, Sequestros, Assassinatos, organized by the Comitê Brasileiro pela Anistia-R.J. and published by Edições Opção in 1979. Two collective works of political prisoners also contain detailed information of the workings of the various agencies and organizations in the Repressive Apparatus. See on this A Esquerda Armada: A Luta Continua (Testemunho dos Presos Políticos do Presídio Milton Dias Moreira, no Rio de Janeiro) (Vitória, Espírito Santo: Edições do Leitor Ltda, 1979) and Dos Presos Políticos Brasileiros: Acerca da Repressão Fascista no Brasil (Lisbon, Portugal: Edições Maria da Fonte, 1976).
In addition to these sources the recent press in Brazil has published a number of articles detailing the intricacies of the organizations of the repression, the thinking and methodology of work and the secret listening devices and other highly technological equipment utilized. The most important of these were: Isto É, March 3, 1978, pages 9 to 15 "A Policia: Socorro!"; Veja, May 17, 1978 pages 44 to 55 "O Brasil Secreto: O SNI no Contra-Ataque"; De Fato, Ano II, Number 23, June 1978, pages 24 to 31 "Basta! Pelo Fim dos Orgãos de Repressão"; Veja, September 13, 1978, pages 20 to 26 "O peso da Segurança"; Isto É, February 14, 1979, pages 26 to 34 "Repressão: Tortura Tipo Exportação"; Isto É, April 4, 1979, pages 44 to 46 "O SNI Não Discute - Veta"; Em Tempo, May 12 to 24, 1979, Number 64, pages 5 to 8 "Presos Políticos Acusam: Figueiredo Mantém a Máquina de Tortura em Funcionamento"; Veja, May 14, 1980, pages 16 to 22 "A Serviço da Segurança: A Greve de São Bernardo tirou o General Octávio Medeiros do Silêncio e deu uma Visão do Equipamento Policial da Abertura"; Veja, June 25, 1980, pages 20 to 30 "A Comunidade ganhou: Os Serviços de Informações mostraram à Oposição e ao País que, por enquanto, a Abertura Não tem a Chave de seus gordos arquivos secretos"; Isto É, June 25, 1980 pages 12 to 18 "O Mundo das Fichas: O Caso do General que Não foi Depor na CPI do Senado Revela Mais uma Ponta do enorme Sistema de Informações que se vem dedicando a vigiar Brasileiros". Finally, the system of information gathering of the SNI and the agencies, including the various sections in which the SNI is divided and the definitions of terms commonly used in the intelligence reports is part of the analysis of Walder de Góes in his O Brasil do General Geisel (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, S.A., 1978) pages 51 to 60 "A Produção de Informações do Governo".


17. The Military Police of the various states, prior to 1969 were not directly engaged in the repression of popular dissent. In fact the Military Police were civil guards who patrolled the streets and were respected by the population. In 1969, the Military Junta signed a decree which re-organized all of the Military Police in the nation. Decree Number 667, of July 2, 1969 centralized the operational control of the Military Police of all states in the Army as well as changing its objective to that of keeping "internal security". The PM itself is most resentful of this decree law which is known among the military police rank and file dissidents as the Institutional Act Number 5 of the Military Police (AI-5 da PM). See, on this point the articles in Movimento, April 6 to 12, 1981, page 7 "Como os Estados perderam a autonomia policial". For the resentment in the PM see the excellent interview conducted with a top Military Police official in Reporter Number 18, June 1979, pages 3 to 10 "Oficial Acusa: O Exército é Responsável Pela Crise na PM". This resentment caused already a strike in Rio de Janeiro and in Bahia, Movimento March 29, 1981.
18. See Isto É, September 5, 1979, pages 4 to 14 "As Dúvidas da Direita", for an account of these groups and their changing ideas and organizations. See also the accounts of the bomb attacks against the home of Congressman Marcelo Cerqueira, PMDB-RJ, of the publisher Gráfica Americana -- whose owner had himself been kidnapped and tortured and had just published a testimony of his experiences and of the newspaper Tribuna da Imprensa in Veja, April 8, 1981 pages 20 to 21 "As Bombas de Abril". An account of the bombs in the OAB and the City Hall is in Veja, September 3, 1980 pages 15 to 24 "As bombas na OAB".

19. Veja, September 3, 1980 pages 16 to 24 contain a detailed account of all the terrorist and bomb attacks which occurred and which had strong evidence of connection to extreme right groups. See in particular the analysis per year on pages 20 and 21 "A História dos Atentados e da Negligência Policial: A Polícia Matou as Pistas do Terror".


21. A number of documented works have been written on the activities of the Death Squadron. See, for example, the work journalist Ewerton Montenegro Guimarães, A Chancela do Crime: A Verdadeira História do Esquadrão da Morte (Rio de Janeiro: Ambito Cultural, 1976) which follows the cases of execution in São Paulo and Espírito Santo. See also


An irony of life should be noted here. It was this same law, passed to benefit a member of the Death Squadron, which was used by lawyers of defense to allow the defendants in the trade union trials of 1981 -- metalworkers on trial because of the 1980 strike -- to remain out of prison while awaiting the appeal. It is a good example of the efficacy of the opposition lawyers in utilizing the National Security State's own framework of repressive legislation.


26. The press in Rio de Janeiro gave widespread coverage to the new Mão Branca organization. In reality, accounts show a striking resemblance to the Death Squadron and it is probably an offshoot of this group. I did the counting of the cases reported in the general press during this period.

27. See Marcus Figueiredo, Legitimidade e Coação no Brasil pós-1964, op.cit. page 175.


29. Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes, President of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil - OAB). Interview with the author. February 8, 1980.
30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. The *atestado ideológico* is in fact a document which provides the greenlight of the security forces establishing that the bearer is not sympathetic to any groups considered subversive. Thus teachers are subjected to investigation even before applying for a job. After the professor is teaching he/she is subjected to further surveillance including the physical presence of agents in the classrooms and the investigations of the ASI of the university. Many university professors -- a total of 312 since 1964 -- were summarily dismissed or retired by force of the Institutional Acts Numbers One, Two and Five. This comprised the regular process known as *cassação*. In addition, innumerable others were summarily dismissed without explanation or were refused entrance into a university even after having won a competition for the post. This latter process has become known as the "white cancelation" or the *cassação branca*, which is an undocumented, non-registered and non-published purge.

In spite of the military's love of the framework of exceptional legality, most cases of purging in universities were of the type of *cassação branca* against which there is not even the defense of notoriety and publicity. It is impossible to now the total number.

It should be noted, furthermore, that the process of cassação branca has been increasing since the granting of political amnesty and the return of exiles in 1979. Documentation is available from research conducted by the Feminine Movement for Amnesty (R.J.) and from the Brazilian Bar Association. See in particular the document compiled by the Committee for Human Rights of the Bar Association "Cassações Brancas" and the document of the Movimento Feminino Pela Anistia-R.J. "Uma Reflexão Sobre a Anistia: As Cassações Brancas" both of 1980.

34. For detailed information on the controls of University activities and the day to day practice of implementation of political control of the type of information transmitted through teaching see in particular the detailed studies of three universities in: *O Livro Negro da USP: O Controle Ideológico na Universidade* (Associação dos Docentes da Universidade de São Paulo - ADUSP) (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979); *UFMG: Resistência e Protesto* (Minas Gerais: Editora Vega, 1979) and *Universidade e Repressão: Os Expurgos na UFRGS*, (Associação dos Docentes da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul) (Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul: Editores L & PM, 1979). For an important account of the purges of scientists in the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Instituto Oswaldo Cruz) also known as Manguinhos, see the documentation in Herman Lent, *O Massacre de Manguinhos* (Rio de Janeiro: Avenir Editora, Coleção Depoimentos, 1970).


35. The following analysis on _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ forms of censorship is based on the excellent study of journalist Perseu Abramo prepared for the Committee for the Defense of Freedom of the Press and presented at the National Congress of Brazilian Journalists in 1976. I am grateful for the help of David Moraes, President of the Journalists Union of São Paulo for making this paper and other documentation on censorship of the press available to me. I have also utilized, in this section, data compiled by the Congressional Investigating Committee on Censorship of the House of Representatives (CPI da Censura), material made available to me by Rio de Janeiro's Congressman Modesto da Silveira for whose immense help in this and other areas of information I am most grateful.

By all accounts it is clear that the intention of the National Security State was to prevent information on dissenting activities, strikes, demonstrations, repression, deaths by torture, or even of situations of emergency such as a condition of short supply of food items of necessity such as sugar or black beans. Often the orders would include prohibitions against comments or statements of members of the Church hierarchy (Dom Hélder Câmara had a blanket censorship for all of these years) or members of the opposition party. An indication of this is provided by some of the orders received by the Jornal do Brasil: October 6, 1972:"no news may be published on the presidential succession process"; November 8, 1972:"no reference, either for or against, Bishop Dom Hélder Câmara"; March 28, 1972: "No reference may be made on the death in São Paulo of the student Alexandre Vannucchi Leite"; April 10, 1972:"It is prohibited to give notice of the death, arrest or detention or any activity of elements considered subversive"; May 8, 1972:"It is prohibited to publish the document of the Bishops of the Northeast entitled "I have heard the Cry of my People""; May 9, 1972:"It is prohibited to publish comments on the reason for the firing of Minister Cirne e Lima"; May 19, 1972: "It is prohibited to publish news of the explosion of a bomb in the American Consulate of São Paulo"; June 18, 1972:"No criticism of the system of choice of the new President of the Republic may be published"; January 25, 1974:"It is prohibited to publish any news as to the torture of political prisoners as well as any reference to the death of Olavo Hansen"; April 23, 1974:"The press may not publish any analysis of the economic recession"; May 2, 1974:"No publication of the events connected to the strike of the bus drivers in São Paulo"; May 7, 1974:"It is strictly forbidden to publish criticisms of the policies of the government particularly in reference to the indians."

The above are only examples of a practice which was a part of the daily life of all the press, written and aired. With the lifting of the direct censorship of the written press, such orders are still the rule in television and radio. It is usually transmitted by phone.

It is interesting to note that often the press would know of an event mainly through the prohibition to publish it. In this manner many of the deaths of people who had "disappeared" became known. In the same manner events which were not officially recognized by the government -- such as the recession of 1974 -- became an admitted fact through the prohibition of economic analyses. Furthermore, the prohibitions often tipped off the opposition as to the impending start of a new repressive policy, as was the case, for example, with the strict prohibition from publishing news on the government's policies towards the indian population. Such news would immediately be transmitted through the grapevine of informal communication networks of the opposition and defensive action could begin to be prepared. Thus, censorship, although it did prevent the information of the public, also backfired by an official recognition of illegal acts of the State.
37. The death of the *Opinião* because of a particular targeting of
the censorship bureaucracy is described in J.A. Pinheiro Machado,
*Opinião Versus Censura: Momentos da Luta de um Jornal pela Liberdade*
*Correio da Manhã* was economically strangled by the removal of
advertisement as well as a systematic campaign of censorship and
intimidation of the journalists, editors and even the owner, Niomar
Bittencourt who was incarcerated for her refusal to comply with the
censorship rules. Other newspapers suffered severe economic losses:
*Movimento* accumulated 80 large storage boxes of censored material
and had a monetary loss of 18 million cruzeiros (by 1978). The
*Tribuna da Imprensa* estimated its losses due to censorship at between
300 and 400 million cruzeiros. (See a report on this point in *Visão*,

38. Reference to the National Security Law of 1969, already
discussed. For further analysis of the relationship between this
law and censorship see: Guido Fidelis, *Lei de Segurança Nacional*
*e Censura: Comentários* (São Paulo: Sugestões Literárias S/A, 1979)
and Heleno Claudio Fragoso, *Lei de Segurança Nacional: Uma Experiência
Antidemocrática* (Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul: Sergio Antonio
Fabris Editor, 1980)

39. There are two important pieces of legislation which control
and regulate the activities of the press. The first, Law Number
5,250 of February 9, 1967, "Regulates freedom of thought and of
information" and was passed by General Castelo Branco. The second
enacted as Decree Law Number 972, of October 17, 1969 "regulates
the profession of journalism". See: *Lei N. 5,250 - de 9 de fevereiro de 1967: Regula a liberdade de manifestação do pensamento e informação" published in the *Diário Oficial da União* of February 10, 1967 and corrected in the *Diário Oficial da União* of March 10, 1967. See also Decreto-Lei N. 972 - de 17 de outubro de 1969:
*Dispõe Sobre o Exercício da profissão de Jornalista.* Published in

40. See the report on censorship in the radio and television
presented at the National Congress of Brazilian Journalists (Curitiba,
Santa Catarina, 1976). This report was collectively written by:
Décio Nitrini, Eurenides Pereira, Gabriel Romeiro, Márcio Guedes,
Mônica Teixeira, Odair Redondo, Sérgio Leal Maia and Vera Artaxo.
It is to be obtained from the Union of Professional Journalists of
São Paulo or from the Brazilian Press Association archives.
Other information may be obtained from *Index on Censorship: Brazil*, Volume 8, Number 4, July-August 1979 (London: Oxford University
Press- Journals) 1979 or directly from Index on Censorship, 205 East
42nd Street, New York.
41. In 1979, while helping to organize a benefit concert for the strike fund of the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo, I had a first-hand experience of what constitutes the daily life of artists. I was forced to spend exactly 10 full days going through the labyrinths of the censorship bureaucracy of Rio de Janeiro. In order to have the show "cleared" (liberado) for presentation in the Metalworkers' Union of Rio de Janeiro I had to go to the Federal Police where they gave me a whole package of forms to be filled out. Each song had not only to be individually cleared with the police but the form had to be signed personally by the artist/author himself! It took me many hours to track down and pursue the several well-known composers and singers who were to perform, sometimes waiting for them to leave special recording sessions just to get their signatures. Finally, upon returning to the Federal Police, after 8 days of pursuit of the artists, I found that some of the songs could not be "cleared" even with all the forms and the correct signatures. They had been approved in out-of-state police departments and, thus, according to the censorship bureaucracy, could only be sung in the states in which they were approved. I had to begin again my search so that the singers would choose songs which they had already cleared through the censorship department of the Federal Police of Rio de Janeiro.

Indeed, the censorship bureaucracy has become so immense that they have created a new profession: that of a "dispatcher" of censorship (despachante de censura) who does nothing else but handle the kind of quagmires I innocently became involved in.

42. See a report on this specific legislation, including the text, in Jornal do Brasil, July 30, 1977, page 13.


44. Article 555 reads that a trade union may be closed if it "does not comply with an order of the President or if it creates an obstacle to the carrying out of the government's economic policy". This line was added to Article 555 which already existed and dealt with the conditions under which the government may cancel the registration of a labor union and dissolve it. See Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho: Atualizada para 1978 (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Auriverde Ltda. 1978) page 118.

45. Article 530 in Ibid. page 109.

46. Ibid. It had been previously established by Decree-Law Number 925 of October 10, 1969 and then incorporated into Article 530.

47. Article 549 and Article 553 in Ibid. pages 115 and 117, respectively.
48. Interview with Luís Inácio da Silva, then President of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema. São Paulo, September 6, 1978.

49. The regulations are established in Articles 548 to 557. See, Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, op.cit., pages 114 to 118.

50. In the southern states of Brazil, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul, the gaúcho cowboys use a sheepskin over their saddles so as to soften the impact of the trot of their horses. The sheepskin is called the pelegra. The term has become the popular expression for a trade union official who is connected to the government and acts as a controlling element of the working class. Since his role is one of mediation between the State and the working class labor unions, the comparison to the sheepskin emphasizes his activity of softening the impact of the class struggle.

51. We shall discuss the growth of the movements in the countryside and the importance of the rural unions more thoroughly in Chapter 10.

52. The Foreigner's Bill (Lei dos Estrangeiros) was passed under the decreto de prazo on August 4, 1980. It was widely recognized that one of its primordial functions was to control the entrance of Catholic missionaries and especially their localization within Brazil. It is to be remarked that, particularly in the Amazon basin region, there are approximately 70 percent of foreign Catholic missionaries. They have taken firm positions in support of peasant and Indian's land rights and this has been a cause of a severe Church-State conflict. The final results of the Lei dos Estrangeiros has by no means been established. The CNBB conducted long and painful negotiations with the government to soften the impact of the legislation and reached an agreement in September of 1981. An amendment to change the law and eliminate its worst repressive elements was introduced into the Federal Congress but it has not yet been voted on. The outcome of this process will indicate the power of the National Security State in establishing legal controls even upon the religious and social activities of the Catholic Church.

53. See, Repressão Contra a Igreja no Brasil (1968-1978). Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação (CEDI), 1978. This document may be obtained from the CEDI, located in Rua Cosme Velho 96, Fundos, Cosme Velho, Rio de Janeiro. It was also translated into English as: The Repression Against the Catholic Church in Brazil (1968-1978) by the United States Catholic Conference of Bishops, Washington, D.C.

54. During this period there were 7 priests murdered either by the repressive forces or by the underground organizations of the
right and the Death Squadron. These were: Father Henrique Pereira Neto, who worked with Dom Hélder Câmara. Father Henrique was found tortured, shot and hung in 1969; the seminarian student Waltair Bolzan, assassinated in a shootout between the police and political fugitives from a prison; Father Francisco Soares, a JOC assistant in São Paulo killed in 1976; Father Alberto Pierobon, who disappeared and was later found tortured and dead in Tamandaré, in 1976; Father Rudolf Lukembein, shot to death by the police while defending the Indian Simão (also killed) when the Church's Meruri Mission was invaded by ranchers and military in 1976; Father João Bosco Penido Burnier, killed with two bullets in his head in the headquarters of the police of Ribeirão Bonito, Mato Grosso, in 1976. Father João Bosco Penido Burnier had gone to the police station in the company of bishop Dom Pedro Casaldáliga to try to convince the police officers to stop torturing two older women of the town whose screams had alarmed residents who went to plead for the help of the Church. The cold-blooded killing of the priest sparked a town rebellion which ended with the burning down of the police station and the expulsion of the police officers from town; Friar Tito de Alencar, a Dominican monk, arrested and violently tortured by Sérgio Fleury - the leader of the Death Squadron. Friar Tito de Alencar later committed suicide in 1974 as a result of the mental anguish caused by his experience in the torture cells of the OBAN in 1969.

55. These threats included the "establishment of a price for the head" of a Church member. In addition, bishops, priests and other Church personnel were abducted and beaten: the document reports a total of 14 cases among which is the kidnapping of Bishop Dom Adriano Hypólito (in 1976) by members of the Death Squadron and the abduction and torture of one nun and one priest kidnapped by the rightwing paramilitary group Commando to Hunt Communists (CCC) in 1977.

56. It is interesting to note here, that the closing down of the Archdiocesan Rádio 9 de Julho de São Paulo in 1974 is reputed to have aided the windfall victory of the opposition party, the MDB, in the state of São Paulo. Angered by the arbitrary action against the Catholic Church, the faithful went from house to house informing the population about the persecution against the Church and the closing down of the radio station and telling them to protest by voting against the party of the government, the ARENA.

57. Some of the false copies of the newspaper Folha de Nova Iguacú were recognized by faithful who brought it over to Bishop Dom Adriano Hypólito so he could take notice of what was going on in his Diocese. Dom Adriano showed me one of these copies and we compared it to the real newspaper of the Diocese. Except for the content, it was very difficult to tell the two copies apart. They were identical to the details of the symbol of the Diocese and the kind of paper used.
58. See Marcus Figueiredo, *Legitimidade e Coação no Brasil pós-1964*, op.cit. page 162. For a breakdown of political punishment through the Institutional Acts Numbers One, Two and Three according to professional categories see page 180 for table "Political Punishment through Institutional Acts Numbers One, Two and Five by 'Non-Political' Occupation in Cycles".

59. UBRASPEFA, União Brasileira pela Defesa dos Atingidos nas Forças Armadas. It is one of the various associations which have been organized by the military who were purged or punished by the different mechanisms of internal control. These organizations provide for mutual support and compile extensive data on the total numbers of punishments of military personnel. I am most grateful for the help provided by the military associations and especially for their discussions which allowed me to understand the problems and the repression encountered by those within the military who dare dissent and oppose the repression and/or the economic policies of the National Security State. As they emphasized to me in the interviews, the democratic military show that the problems are not simply to be reduced to a matter of civilian versus military government. The system which has been built has been the fruit of a civil-military alliance and the dissenter within the military have been persecuted as well as the civilian members of the opposition.

60. Because of the high level of repression among the military, these interviews must remain anonymous. It should be recalled that members of the military may be arrested simply for expressing their political opinions publicly. This is true both of active duty military personnel and those in the reserve.
PART III

THE THIRD STAGE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
CHAPTER NINE: THE GOVERNMENT OF GEISEL AND DECOMPRESSION:
A TIGHTENING DIALECTIC OF STATE AND OPPOSITION

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I. Introduction.

The period of the Geisel government marks the beginning of a third stage of State institutionalization. The first phase of institutionalization encompassed the governments of Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva and layed the first foundations of the National Security State embodied in the authoritarian Constitution of 1967. The second stage of State institutionalization, between 1969 and 1973, developed the economic model and implanted the Repressive Apparatus by extending both the legal framework for the repression and the actual machinery of coercion and physical violence. The governments of Geisel and João Batista Figueiredo form the subsequent third phase of State institutionalization where more permanent and flexible structures were the focus of concern of State planners.

From the point of view of the National Security State, 1973-1974 represented a turning point. The considerable emphasis upon legitimation based upon the success of the economic model of development fully implemented in the period 1969-1973 now haunted the State. With the growing difficulties experienced in the economic arena as a result of contradictions inherent in the model itself, the National Security State became concerned with the establishment of different mechanisms to develop social and political support. A new basis for legitimacy needed to be found more closely connected to corporative institutions sufficiently flexible to provide efficient clientelistic modes of support-gathering. The "decompression" theory intended to provide for this decrease in social-political tension combined with increased
levels of controlled participation so as to build elastic representational mechanisms which could coopt portions of the opposition.

A second concern of the new institutionalization stage was the control of the Repressive Apparatus itself -- centralizing the activities so that it served exclusively the purposes of the State and could not be utilized by interest pressure groups within the intelligence and repressive community itself. The permanent institutionalization of the National Security State was viewed as connected to the ability to bring the Repressive Apparatus into coherent action with the Executive and curb its tendency to act as a de facto parallel political force.

Therefore, the action of the State, particularly in the period of Geisel, was aimed at the slow dismantling of the more explicit mechanisms of legal coercion -- symbolized in the Institutional Act Number Five -- so as to disarm the opposition while at the same time incorporating extraordinary powers into the Constitution. In addition, specific attention would be paid to the electoral system in order to allow sufficient flexibility for an apparently freer electoral process and yet maintain and guarantee the permanent electoral victory of the governmental party, the ARENA.

From the point of view of the opposition sectors, the period of Geisel was particularly characterized by the learning process of engagement in the levels of formal politics\(^1\) and the search for
paths out of the culture of fear. For, as has been pointed out in the previous two chapters, the opposition acted in the context of intensive repression, political vigilance and economic oppression. The combination of economic exploitation, physical violence, political control and strict censorship established the basis for the culture of fear which acted as a strong political deterrent for participation in any community, union or opposition activities.

The culture of fear was maintained by the interaction of three important psychological elements which furthered the effects of discouraging political participation: First, the silence which was imposed upon society through the combination of the censorship of all media and of other information channels such as universities, theatre, culture, literature, art, music, cinema. The effects of the economic policies of the government and the reality of the violent repression were thereby kept from reaching large sectors of the population. Second, the enforced silence resulted in an increased and magnified sense of isolation of those who were the direct victims of the repression and/or the economic exploitation of the system. Large sectors of the population were thus marginalized and isolated in their suffering from other segments which potentially could offer aid. Third, and as a consequence of the above two effects of the culture of fear, the belief that all opposition channels were closed, that no action could have actual effective results: a feeling of hopelessness which, above all else, maintained the climate of withdrawal and separation from any opposition activity.
In its dynamic and dialectical relationship to the State, the opposition learned in time the paths which would allow it to break these three fundamental elements of the culture of fear. The activity in the realm of formal politics, here defined as the ability of the opposition to utilize whatever institutional channels still remained in existence within the general context of repression, enabled the opposition to counteract the disabling psychological effects of the three main components of the culture of fear.

As we shall see in this chapter, the opposition activities within the realm of formal politics would take on a variety of forms. First, the different sectors of the opposition learned to utilize the legal conduit of political organization— the MDB party. Thus it forced the State into an escalating dialectic of the electoral system with a series of modifications meant to maintain its monopoly of power which corroded its search for political legitimation. Second, the opposition utilized all channels available, in particular alliance with the Catholic Church, for the increase in pressure in defense of human rights. Third, the opposition learned to utilize corporative and associative organizations, such as the Brazilian Bar Association and the Brazilian Press Association, to break the silence imposed by strict prior censorship and the isolation resultant both from this silence and the inability to find aid. By concentrating upon freedom of expression the Press Association countered the silence. By defending those who were persecuted, tortured, kidnapped or abused in their rights, the Bar Association countered the fear of isolation.
II. The Theory of Decompression: Geisel's Rise to the Presidency.

The "decompression", also known as the policy of "distension" (distensão), was a program of careful and controlled liberalization measures defined within the context of the governmental slogan "continuity without imobility" (continuidade sem imobilidade). The "continuity" aspect translated into a policy of faithful keeping to the guidelines of the established economic model of development and the theoretical precepts of the National Security Doctrine. Thus, "continuity" maintained both the main aspects of the model and the Repressive Apparatus machinery. The aspect of "without imobility" was embodied in the reform plan of the government which purported to be a movement forwards in progressive liberalization for a return to democracy.

The "decompression" of the society would be achieved in carefully planned stages: First there would be the partial lifting of prior censorship, followed by negotiations with the Catholic Church and the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil -OAB) in order to establish the parameters in the handling of human rights. Second, there would be electoral reforms so as to increase the level of political representation. Third, the possible revoking of the most explicitly coercive measures of the Institutional Act Number Five, provided that the National Security State could incorporate other mechanisms of defense of its monopoly of power.
The overall goal of the policy of "decompression" was to perfect the institutionalization of the National Security State and provide for more flexible political representation so as to decrease the levels of dissent and tension which had built up "pressure" to dangerous levels. The final framework of the political system to be developed should constitute what President Geisel termed "relative democracy" or "strong democracy". In this model of relative democracy the State would be armed with sufficient safeguards and emergency extraordinary repressive powers in the Constitution to allow it to suspend individual rights and guarantees whenever it was put under the direct threat from an organized challenge. However, the political institutions would be designed with sufficient flexibility to provide for a limited participation and sharing in the decision making, thus diminishing the overall level of political tension. It was a program which heeded to General Golbery's early warning that unlimited repression in an absolute search for security would ultimately lead to an actual undermining of the national security sought for.

The Geisel government maintained in the planned program of "decompression" the right to utilize the extraordinary powers of the Institutional Act Number Five, whenever necessary to curb rising expectations and inopportune political, economic or social demands. For it was also necessary to accommodate or placate the sectors of the military coalition which remained unconvinced as to the final utility or efficacy of the entire liberalization plan of control.
The "theory of decompression" and the policies which derived from the analysis were, in essence, an ultimate search for State legitimation. It attempted to incorporate some of the dialectical pressures and contradictions between the State and sectors of the opposition while providing for the control of civil society by the selective application of coercive power.

One of the characteristic foundations of the decompressed stage of State institutionalization was the search for increased legitimacy through electoral victory and the strengthening of the governmental ARENA party. The political and economic conjuncture allowed such a perception to have a concrete basis of analysis. On the one hand, the continuation of legitimation based upon the success of the model of development presented the State with increasing contradictions. The economic miracle was now running into a bottleneck, with a rising inflation rate that in 1974 already reached 31.5 percent and an alarming foreign debt already at 17.6 billion dollars. On the other hand, the heavy political defeat of the MDB party in the 1970 Congressional elections suggested to political planners that the ARENA could indeed achieve major victories in the 1974 legislative elections. In fact, few observers doubted that the ARENA would come out with a landslide victory over the opposition in 1974.

In the opinion of the governmental strategists, a free election with access to television, radio and an explicit withdrawal of coercion would only increase the legitimacy of the government's electoral victory. Thus, the State engaged in a dialectic of elections with the opposition.
III. The Dialectic of the Electoral System.

The more politically sophisticated sector of the civil-military coalition, now again in power, realized that the electoral system was intrinsically related to legitimacy. The main problem consisted in balancing the two contradictory needs of the National Security State: To gain legitimacy through the electoral victory of the government's party and yet to maintain exclusive control of executive posts in states as well as a constant and large majority in the Federal Congress sufficient to ensure the easy passing of legislation of interest to the Executive.

The latter point was clearly needed if the State was to successfully push through the legal and structural reforms of the third phase of institutionalization. It could not afford the chance that the opposition could curb its monopoly of power by achieving majority control either in the House or in the Senate. Otherwise, the opposition would presumably be able to block the crucial transformations meant to ensure the permanent institutionalization of the National Security State.


The government expressed its full confidence by allowing the MDB party to have full access to television and radio and to conduct without repression a lively political campaign for the legislative elections of 1974. The MDB began its campaign in a mood of hopelessness with few candidates believing in the potential of organization within the party. This mood began to change in Rio Grande do Sul,
where the MDB candidate Paulo Brossard engaged in heated verbal debates with the ARENA rival candidate Nestor Jost. By early August the two candidates agreed to a televised debate: the first such experience since the days prior to the Institutional Act Number Five.

This debate received a high audience rate and had intense political repercussions throughout the nation. Other MDB candidates were then encouraged to take on a more aggressive political stance and to utilize the available media -- in particular television and radio. The population responded with more enthusiasm and volunteers flocked to the MDB political campaign offices to aid in the campaigns of the opposition candidates. Suddenly the MDB militants discovered that electoral periods could be usefully used both for the transmitting of information and for political mobilization of the population which in other times was considered to be a dangerous activity. In this climate of liberalization, the rallies and meetings of the opposition party filled and enabled the MDB militants to reach other sectors of the population. "During the Legislative period I have no instruments with which to reach the people," exclaimed Senator Marcos Freire of the MDB, "now, in an electoral period, I am able to speak to great numbers." In this manner the MDB began to learn to struggle against its own hopelessness so it could encourage others to hope as well.

The MDB party concentrated on issues of repression, injustice and the inequality of the economic model. Opposition candidates spoke on radio and television about such previously prohibited subjects
as the National Security Law, the repression, the need to revoke the Institutional Act Number Five and the wage-control legislations so as to raise salaries. They denounced the purchase of land by foreign multinational corporations and questioned the growing denationalization process of the economy. In fact, the campaign emphasized two aspects: First that it was necessary to hope and to resist. "As long as there is one man alive, there is always hope," was the party campaign slogan. Second, it was necessary to move forwards and progressively push for reforms in a political strategy defined by the opposition as the "occupation of all available political space". 10

Therefore, psychologically, the campaign of 1974 served to break the silence and the isolation and to encourage hope in an alternative path to change. Politically, the campaign taught new sectors of the population to participate in the level of formal politics by eliciting their aid in the actual organization of the various political campaigns of the opposition party.

The results of the legislative elections of 1974 surprised political analysts for they indicated a massive upsurge of electoral support for the opposition program in a reversal of the previous pattern which had been established by the results of the elections of 1966 and 1970. The MDB achieved its largest victory in the Senate elections of 1974, receiving over 4 million more votes than the government's ARENA party. For the first time since the birth of the two
parties the opposition party had the largest percentage of the electorate in a Senatorial contest which is considered one of the most important indicators of voter preference. Table 9.1 presents data:

| ELECTORAL RESULTS IN FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTIONS: 1966; 1970 and 1974 |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| FEDERAL SENATE                  | 1966     | 1970     | 1974     |
| Total Votes for ARENA           | 7,719,382| 9,898,964| 10,068,810|
| Total Votes for MDB             | 5,911,361| 6,224,525| 14,579,372|
| % valid for ARENA               | 56.63    | 61.4     | 41.0     |
| % valid for MDB                 | 43.36    | 38.6     | 59.3     |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES        |          |          |          |
| Total Votes for ARENA           | 8,731,638| 10,867,814| 11,866,482|
| Total Votes for MDB             | 4,915,470| 4,777,927| 10,954,440|
| % valid for ARENA               | 63.9     | 69.4     | 51.9     |
| % valid for MDB                 | 36.0     | 30.5     | 48.0     |
| STATE ASSEMBLIES                |          |          |          |
| Total Votes for ARENA           | 9,005,278| 11,442,894| 12,184,240|
| Total Votes for MDB             | 5,038,761| 4,940,072| 11,209,023|
| % valid for ARENA               | 64.1     | 69.8     | 52.0     |
| % valid for MDB                 | 35.8     | 30.1     | 47.9     |

Sources: Fundação IBGE: Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (data for 1966)
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Departamento de Imprensa Nacional,
1973, Dados Estatísticos, Volume 9: Eleições Federais e Estaduais
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Departamento de Imprensa Nacional,
1977, Dados Estatísticos, Volume 11: Eleições Federais e Estaduais

Two points are immediately apparent in the comparative data: First, that the percentage of valid votes for the MDB party as a whole steadily
increased from 1966 to the elections of 1974. This pattern reflects the change in the strategy of the opposition sectors which began to support electorally the "official" opposition party and use it as a conduit of protest opposition vote. The campaign for voiding the votes as a sign of protest against the biased nature of the electoral system lost much of its significance, although, in 1974, it still had a greater impact upon the elections. Indeed, it is impressive that the percentage of valid votes for the MDB increased while the percentage of valid votes for the ARENA decreased.

The second point to note is the clear predominance of opposition votes for the Senatorial elections, where the MDB party received over than 4 million votes more than the ARENA party. In the other two levels of representation, where clientelistic patterns of vote gathering and control are more relevant, the government's party maintained its majority of votes, although in both of these electoral results the MDB showed also an impressive growth almost doubling the total votes it had in the previous elections. In the elections for the House of Representatives and for the State Assemblies in 1974, the percentage of valid votes for the MDB party was much lower than for the Senatorial elections -- a fact which influenced its narrow margin, giving the government's party a majority.

The MDB, therefore, significantly increased its representation in the Federal Congress. In 1970 the MDB won 87 seats against 233 for the ARENA party in the House of Representatives. In 1974 the MDB
won 161 seats in the House of Representatives and the ARENA lost some of its seats and now held only 203 seats. In the State Assemblies the opposition party won 45 seats out of the 70 seats in the state of São Paulo, 65 seats out of the 94 in the state of Rio de Janeiro and complete control of the important State Assemblies of the states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. In accordance to the regulations of indirect elections for governors, then, the opposition party would now presumably be in the position of electing the governors of these states for it now had a majority in the local legislatives which composed the Electoral Colleges.

For most political analysts -- as well as for members of the MDB party -- the victory of the opposition and its sudden growth constituted a complete reversal of electoral patterns and a surprise. The electorate had reversed its previous strong support of the ARENA and given the "official" opposition party a vote of confidence. The elections were mostly considered to have been the equivalent to a plebiscite in which voters voted against the government and not necessarily for the opposition.

From the viewpoint of the MDB, the elections presented a new problem. President Ulysses Guimarães, upon learning of the stupendous electoral victory in the Senate, exclaimed: "Now we must be worthy of this victory". The MDB engaged in a new internal debate to digest the results of the elections and trace its newfound role as a "real" opposition party. One of the conclusions indicated that voters had deposited considerable hope in the party expecting change.
2. **Legislation of Electoral Control: The Lei Falcão.**

While the MDB digested its new role as the "real" opposition party, the government's intelligence network studied the results of the elections. The Central Agency of the National Information Service (SNI) conducted a detailed research which included electoral maps, information state by state, voting records of each member of the MDB and the ARENA, patterns of voter behavior and surveys of public opinion. The sophisticated technical study compiled a large dossier on the elections and all the MDB candidates. The research payed particular attention to all the municipalities in the nation for it should provide the basis for further political action on the part of the National Security State. The SNI thereafter would not only guide the ARENA candidates but it would also be influential in developing new measures of electoral control.

The counter-attack of the National Security State began in 1976 through a renewed use of the cassação power of the Executive under the Institutional Act Number Five. Just prior to the municipal elections of 1976, President Geisel cancelled the electoral mandates and the political rights of four important Federal Congressmen of the MDB party and of one state representative of São Paulo. The liberalization policy was temporarily abandoned in favor of the more immediately effective curbing power of direct intimidation just prior to municipal elections. In addition, other electoral control mechanisms would be developed by suggestion of the SNI studies of voter behavior.
The SNI study of the elections indicated that the victory of the MDB in the 1974 elections had been facilitated by the access to television and radio. The mass media provided an important instrument to the opposition party and allowed its views to be broadcast to the most remote corners of the nation. The MDB had eloquent candidates who made effective use of the aired media. If such a situation continued, the SNI analysis concluded, the MDB would certainly win a large number of new posts in the 1976 municipal elections as well as win majority control of the Federal Congress and many other State Assemblies in the 1978 elections. In addition, if that came to pass, the entire system of control of Executive posts through indirect elections by the state Electoral Colleges would be endangered.

The most immediate problem was the elections of 1976. Thus, four and one half months before the municipal elections the government of Geisel enacted another Decree-Law. Law Number 6,639 of July 1, 1976, was signed by the Minister of Justice, Armando Falcão, and established that during the period of electoral campaigns for the municipal elections the parties could use television and radio only to mention the party's name and the candidates' *curriculum vitae*, slate register number--against a background of a still photograph of the candidate. This propaganda control legislation became thereafter known as the "Falcão Law" (*Lei Falcão*) in honor of its main signer and creator.
From then on, at municipal election periods, the radio and television would be unavailable for the expression of the political views of the candidates or the party's platform. A de facto blank censorship was applied so as to prevent opposition criticism to the policies of the government having major influence upon the electorate. The particular effectiveness of this blank censorship over the aired media is highlighted by recalling that the largest newspapers in the country have at most 300,000 daily copies and reach an estimated 20 million people. By contrast, radio reaches as many as 85 million people and television approximately 45 million people. 16

The campaign propaganda lost the power to hold high rates of audience. It became a monotonous process of the airing of names, numbers, curriculum vitae and still photographs of hundreds of candidates of both parties. In addition, under pressure from the Geisel government, the Superior Electoral Tribunal prohibited candidates from attaching other electoral propaganda materials in any spot "to which the public may have access". Therefore, the municipal campaign of 1976 was conducted in almost virtual silence.

The Lei Falcão denied the opposition access to its main resource: debate and argumentation against the policies of the government. It was hoped that this law in itself would be sufficient to reverse the pattern of plebiscital vote by confusing the electorate with the profusion of names, numbers and irrelevant vitae information. Discussions of programs, alternatives and -- above all -- critiques
of the economic model, the wage-control legislation and the repression would be effectively kept from reaching the vast majority of the voting population in a nation which is spread over three million square miles and had, at that time, approximately 106 million people.


The question of electoral control of municipal posts became increasingly important for it is the cell-base of political power. The ARENA could count with a variety of significant resources: First of all, the study of the SNI had pinpointed the most important municipalities and guided the electoral strategy of the governmental party's candidates. In addition, the entire bureaucracy of the central State and of the federations states with governments under the control of the centralized Executive were all put at the disposal of the ARENA's electoral interests. Roads were built mostly in the municipalities under the control of the ARENA. In some cases, funds were cut off from municipalities under the control of the MDB. The financial resources of the central State were put at the municipal candidates' disposition. They had the use of official cars, gasoline, bureaucrats for working in their campaigns, mimeographs, paper etc. The candidates themselves were not allowed to speak on television or radio but nothing prevented governors, Ministers of State or the President himself from doing so in their behalf. Above all, the explicit threat that the liberalization policy was contingent upon the municipal electoral victory of the ARENA party meant to convince voters that if they voted for the MDB the repression would return.
On the other hand, the MDB had little financial resources to enable the candidates to reach all of the distant municipalities. In a country with over 4,000 municipalities, spread throughout an immense territory of difficult access, the MDB conducted much of its campaigns in the interior literally on the backs of donkeys and on foot. Thus, the MDB was physically unable to reach a large majority of the municipalities.

It seems clear that the inability to debate with the ARENA candidates on television and radio hurt the MDB party and succeeded in curbing its pattern of electoral growth. Silence had once more been imposed magnifying the sense of isolation. In addition, the free-flow of information was effectively impeded so the electorate could not know of the critiques of the system imposed upon the population.

In spite of the unequal advantages of the two parties, the ARENA's total votes during the municipal elections of 1976 did not show the expected largescale majorities. The ARENA received a total of 15,200,000 votes and the MDB received 12,700,000 votes. Thus, the percentage total support for the ARENA was equivalent to 35 percent of the electorate as against the MDB's 30 percent. The victory of the ARENA was by a narrow margin and indicated that the study of the SNI had reached the correct conclusions that without the new propaganda controls the MDB would have received a majority support particularly in the largest cities and more industrialized states.
The ARENA was able to elect 83 percent of the mayors and the MDB party only 17 percent. Thus, it held that the control of the local executive offices by the government's parties was strong. In the municipal chambers the MDB showed more favorable results: it won control of eleven out of the 24 capitals of the states, including the municipal chamber majority control in the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre and Salvador.

Further studies indicated that the same local electoral strength of the opposition party was shown in the 100 largest cities of the country. The ARENA's influence was most concentrated in smaller cities and in the interior regions of the country. In the largest cities, the MDB received over two million more votes than the ARENA. Out of the 100 largest cities in Brazil the MDB elected the mayor and gained majority control of the municipal council in a total of 59 -- compared to only 31 in 1972. Furthermore, if one took into consideration the 15 cities with over half a million inhabitants, the MDB won in 1976 a total of 67 percent of them. Thus, although the ARENA maintained the political control of the municipalities -- in particular of the interior and the smaller cities -- the opposition party still showed an impressive electoral growth even at the local level.


The SNI studies conducted after 1976 indicated that the MDB's political strength was particularly concentrated in the urban areas. In spite of the enforced silence of the media, the 1976 elections
confirmed the previous pattern of voting behavior. In addition, political analysis of the elections of 1976 showed that the strength of the MDB layed in the largest cities and in particular in the center and center-south of the country. Electoral analysis of the federal and state elections of 1974 provided further evidence that the opposition strongholds were in the most advanced states, in the most industrialised regions and in the largest cities. In the Senate elections of 1974 the MDB had won in almost all of the cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. A detailed study of the electoral map of the Senatorial elections of 1974 showed that out of the 90 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in Brazil the MDB had won the elections in 79 and the ARENA carried majority only in eleven. Furthermore, the eleven cities in which the ARENA held a strong influence were all in the northeast states of the nation.

Such a conclusion of the political studies would have remarkable implications for the policy-planners of the National Security State: If the MDB continued to grow -- in spite of the Lei Falcão which then applied only to municipal elections -- it would certainly win the majority of the Senate by carrying all the large urban areas. In addition, its Congressional strength was likely to reduce the margin of majority held by the ARENA to insignificant proportions. There was, even, the possibility of an MDB majority control of the House of Representatives. Such an occurrence would endanger the entire plan of "decompression" which had to be pushed through a government-controlled Congress.
Lingering problems were negotiated between the different sectors of the military coalition in power. The decompression policy of institutionalization of the State established the flexible principle of limited political representation. However, in spite of the different mechanisms of control established, the MDB party threatened to win significant local and state power positions as well as increasing its strength in the Federal Congress to the point that the government risked seeing its projects defeated. Pressure from the hardline sectors became manifested in a series of debates on possible mechanisms of electoral controls which were drafted as a law project and later imposed in the form of a decree law.

In addition, the hardline discontent with the liberal opinions of the Judiciary and its role in maintaining a position of relative autonomy, once again surfaced as a strong pressure within the National Security State to impose some form of further Judiciary controls. The President introduced a sweeping judicial reform package into Congress under the form of a project for Constitutional Amendment. Some of the innovations of the judiciary project contained elements of control which were unacceptable to the Brazilian Bar Association which voiced its disapproval and applied full pressure upon the opposition MDB party to modify or entirely reject it if the government held to the original version.

Since the Judiciary Reform project had been introduced as a Constitutional Amendment, it required the votes of two-thirds of
the members of the House and the Senate in order to be approved. Thus, it would be necessary to engage in negotiations with the MDB party -- whose one-third hold in the House of Representatives could block the approval of the project as it stood. ARENA's Senator Accioly Filho drafted a substitute project which met with the approval of the MDB party. However, the government applied full pressure upon the ARENA party to reject its own member's substitute and force the acceptance of the original version as it had been elaborated exclusively by the Executive. The situation rapidly reached the proportion of a major political crisis and a stalemate: the MDB closed question on the subject and held all of its members to the position of total rejection of the project. 25

On March 30, 1977, the Judiciary Reform project came to the floor for a joint Senate and House vote, as required for a Constitutional Amendment. The result of the voting, 241 votes in favor of the original version of the governmental project and 156 votes against did not reach the required two-third majority for approval. The Executive Judiciary Reform package was rejected. 26

On April 1, 1977 President Ernesto Geisel closed the National Congress for the third time since the coup d'etat of 1964. 27 Once again the extraordinary powers of the Executive given by Institutional Act Number Five were used to decree the forced recess of the Federal Congress so that the President could rule by decree in the intermediary period. With the closing of the Congress the Executive could now legislate at will and pass the reforms which had been rejected.
For the next twelve days President Geisel debated with a small number of advisors who composed a *sui generis* Constituent Assembly: Minister Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geisel's private secretary Heitor Ferreira, Senator Petrônio Portella and the then chief of the SNI, General João Batista Figueiredo. Finally, on April 13, 1977, Geisel signed the *Constitutional Amendment Number 7*, which contained in reality the original version of the Judiciary Reform package just rejected by both Houses of Congress. The next day he signed *Constitutional Amendment Number 8*, of April 14, 1977, which established fiscal amendments and a series of important electoral modifications in the Constitution of 1969. These became collectively known as the regulations of the "April Package Laws" (*Pacote de Abril* ) which would set the exact limits of the continuing process of State institutionalization of the decompression.

For our purposes we shall concentrate upon the reforms introduced into the electoral system by *Amendment Number 8* of April 14. These were, principally, the following:

1. *Article 13* reformed the 1969 Constitution so as to establish the permanence of the indirect process of choosing state governors. To strengthen the control of the government in the Electoral College it was extended to include members of each respective State Assembly plus delegates of the municipal chambers in the state chosen one for each 200,000 inhabitants in the municipality. Thus the government would again
change the rules of the electoral game so as to benefit its own interests and maintain its exclusive monopoly of power eliminating the principle of rotation of power even at the local levels of government. 31

2. As I have mentioned earlier, the analysis of the 1974 electoral results indicated that the MDB opposition party could well win a majority in the House of Representatives of the Federal Congress. Amendment Number 8 included a subtle measure of electoral control which would greatly benefit the government's ARENA party but do so in a sufficiently sophisticated manner so that most of the electorate would not be necessarily aware of its political import. The Constitutions of 1967 and 1969 established the representation of each state in the House of Representatives in the following manner: each state would have its number of representatives determined in accordance to the proportion of voters registered in the state. Up to 100,000 voters the state would have right to 3 Congressmen. From 100,000 to 3 million voters the state would have the right to one more Congressman per group of 100,000 voters. From 3 to 6 million voters the state would have one more Congressman per group of 300,000 voters. After 6 million voters there would be one additional Congressman per group of 500,000 voters. Thus, the states with the largest number of voters had many more Congressmen than the smaller states with fewer voters.

Because in Brazil illiterate persons are not eligible to vote states with high literacy rates had more representatives in the House --
in proportion to their total population -- than states with low rates of literacy. This circumstance was favorable to the opposition MDB party insofar as its areas of greatest strength were the nine southern and central-south states with the largest cities and with a much higher rate of literacy than the states of the north and northeast which were controlled by the ARENA.

On the other hand, it was not in the interest of the government to extend the vote to illiterate people. It should be pointed out that at that time industrial workers in the cities -- many of whom were illiterate -- and peasants were in a process of rapid reorganization in the secular and Church-related grassroot movements and could end up voting for the MDB party. Therefore, the National Security State took a different tactic: Article 39 of the Constitution of 1969, which regulates the number of seats in the House of Representatives, was slightly modified. The new regulations established that the number of seats in the House of Representatives allotted for each state would thenceforth be determined according to criteria of proportionality to the total population of the state rather than the number of voters registered in the state.32

This simple procedure decreased the number of seats available to states such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina, with the highest literacy rates proportionate to their population -- and which were most closely connected to the opposition and the MDB party.
On the other hand, the north and northeast states -- controlled by the ARENA -- had all extremely high illiteracy rates but the highest proportion of total population. Thus their large total populations increased the number of seats held by the states. In one stroke the measure increased the Congressional representation of the government while at the same time significantly reducing the representation of the opposition.

Although such measures of electoral self-interest damaged the credibility of the government nonetheless they served the purpose of securing the necessary ARENA majority control in the House. In addition, as pointed out, the intricateness of such controls escaped the grasp of the majority of the electorate. Thus, on the surface, the process of slow decompression was resumed. Congress was re-opened and elections were held as scheduled. Thus, for the purposes of power maintenance with a minimum loss of legitimacy this particular measure was successful as a sophisticated mechanism of control by avoiding an act of explicit repression.

3) The question of control of the Senate was of particular crucial importance for the government. This is easily understood by considering that even if the MDB gained a majority in the House of Representatives as long as the government secured its control of the Senate it could stop all MDB-introduced bills in the higher level. Thus, by controlling the Senate, the government could block most inopportune measures of the opposition and its party.
In the elections of November 1978 the MDB would have to win an expected 17 out of the total of 46 seats which would be up for election in that year. With only seventeen more Senators, thus, the opposition could win control of the Federal Senate. Furthermore, if one assumed a continuous pattern of electoral growth -- an indication supported by all analyses of voter behavior -- the MDB would have little difficulty in electing those seventeen new Senators. A drastic measure was clearly necessary so as to ensure the ARENA's control of the Senate and allow the government to push through the reforms which it believed to be necessary to achieve the longterm institutionalization of the National Security State.

Thus, Constitutional Amendment Number 8 changed the composition of the Federal Senate by modifying Article 41 of the Constitution of 1969. The Constitution of 1969 established that each state would have the right to three Senators with mandates of eight years. The Senatorial elections would be held every 4 years to elect, alternately, two-thirds and then one-third of the Senate. The elections for the Senate were to be by direct, universal and secret popular vote of all eligible registered voters.

The April Package Law changed this in the following manner: The elections for replacing of one-third of the Senate would maintain the direct, secret and universal popular ballot stipulation. However, in the elections for replacing of two-thirds of the Senate, only one of the two available state seats would be by direct vote. The
other seat would be filled by indirect electoral process in the same manner and by the same Electoral College which was to choose the indirect governors of the states.\textsuperscript{34}

Therefore, every four years, in the elections for the replacement of two-thirds of the Senate, one of the Senators would be chosen by the indirect Electoral College already changed to include delegates of municipal chambers so as to strengthen the control of the government.\textsuperscript{35} This amounted to 33 percent of the Senate.

The effectiveness of the measure was demonstrated in the indirect elections of 1978 by the Electoral Colleges which were almost all under the control of the ARENA. With the exception of the state of Rio de Janeiro, where in spite of the modification of adding delegates from the municipal chambers the MDB still had a majority, all other Electoral Colleges were brought under the control of the government and elected both the governors and the senators chosen by the ARENA as its candidates. Thus the ARENA kept a strong hold of the states' Executive posts and of the Federal Senate in a process which was of virtual appointment by the government.

The indirect Senators became popularly known in political parlance as the "bionic Senators". The pejorative expression elaborated by the opposition humorists meant to highlight the idea that they were in fact "invincible and artificially made". By the stroke of a pen the government had artificially created one-third of the new Senate to be elected in 1978.
4. A further electoral modification meant to ensure the monopoly over the post of President. As has been pointed out, Geisel himself was chosen by an Electoral College composed of members of the Federal Congress plus delegates from each State Assembly. In order to decrease the weight of the state delegation and increase the control of the government's delegates of the House of Representatives and the Senate the Electoral College for election of the indirect President was reduced. Article 74 of the 1969 Constitution was changed to limit the number of delegates from the State Assemblies in the Electoral College. The demographic proportion was reduced from one delegate for each 500,000 inhabitants of the state to one delegate for each one million inhabitants. With a House of Representatives and a Senate rigged to benefit the control of the ARENA party it was in the interest of the government to decrease the influence of the state delegates. In addition, the term of the President was increased to six years.

5. Fifthly, Constitutional Amendment Number 8 included a measure which should guarantee that mishaps such as the Congressional rejection of the Judiciary Reform Constitutional project would no longer happen. The changes made it more difficult for the opposition itself to introduce new proposals for Constitutional Amendments while facilitating the process of enactment and approval of those which the Executive introduced into Congress. Prior to the April Package Laws, the Legislative-introduced proposals for Constitutional Amendments
required the signatures of one-third of the members of either the House of Representatives or the Senate. A modification of Article 47 of the 1969 Constitution established that a proposal for Constitutional Amendment could only be introduced required a one-third support of the members of the House of Representatives plus one-third of the members of the Senate. 39

When one takes into consideration the other alterations already described to guarantee the control of the House and the Senate, it becomes clear that mostly the ARENA would be in a position to gather sufficient signatures in both Houses so as to introduce a Constitutional Amendment. The MDB was thus safely kept from being able to fulfill the new requirements by the fact that already 22% of the Senate was to be "bionic".

On the other hand, since the government was interested in the approval of subsequent Constitutional Amendments it was necessary to make sure that these could be passed without the need for negotiations with the opposition party. Thus, the required quorum for the approval of Constitutional Amendments was reduced from the previous two-third majority vote of the members of both Houses in a joint session to the requirement of only an absolute majority of the members. 40

6. A final important clause in the April Package Laws extended the regulations of the electoral propaganda on television and radio (the Lei Falcão) to state and federal elections as well as municipal. The silence was to be expanded to include all elections and deny the opposition the opportunity to debate and critique the State's policies.
From the viewpoint of the interests of the National Security State, the measures included in the April Package were of mixed benefit. On the one hand, it is clear that the intricateness of the controls established by the electoral legislation guaranteed political power with a minimum loss of legitimacy insofar as the actual schedule of elections could be maintained and the Congress reopened. The apparent nature of political representation would give the government of Geisel more credibility than would have been the case with a continuation of the explicit method of physical coercion.

On the other hand, the actual closing down of Congress -- even if temporarily -- greatly damaged the legitimation purpose of the measures and of the decompression policy itself. In addition, the not-so-subtle maneuver for the control of the Senate, with the creation of the indirectly elected Senator, allowed ample room for the opposition sectors to disclaim the purported democratic intentions of the government.

The opposition was adroit in pointing out the unrepresentative nature of the indirectly elected Senator and of bringing out the contradictions between the measures of control and the stated objectives of achieving a democratic form of government. The publicity given to the term "bionic" would cover both the figure and the office of the indirectly elected Senator with ridicule and public rejection. Therefore, by constantly referring to the indirectly elected Senators, governors, mayors and the President as the "bionic" representatives the
opposition succeeded in undermining the legitimacy which the National Security State had hoped to achieve with intricate hidden electoral maneuvers.

The humor of the term "bionic" aided in its ample use in the regular press coverage of Congressional events. Indirect representatives were always simply referred to as "bionic". Thus, public opinion was informed that the "bionic" representative was not altogether legitimate. It was, perhaps, difficult to know just why but the fact remained that a pejorative quality was implanted into the post and office.

Thus, one must conclude that the April Package Laws, while they solved some of the problems of the National Security State, would fuel others and develop new contradictions which were added to the totality and magnified the difficulties of the State's attempt to institutionalize itself upon a base of legitimate and popular support.

5. The Elections of 1978: The Changing Role of the MDB Party

By 1978 the MDB party had become the "real" opposition party and formed an alliance of a broad range of political opinions -- from conservative to socialist -- within a unified structure. The main point of unity in the party's platform was the opposition to the repressive legislation and the pressure for a return to democracy. With the advent of the Pacote de Abril, the MDB party -- as a whole -- took on an aggressive opposition stance. The strategy aimed at the
highlighting of the unrepresentative nature of the reforms and inform public opinion sufficiently to deny the government a claim of legitimacy. The tone of the MDB public opinion campaign against the reforms of the Pacote de Abril was set by Congressman Alencar Furtado, the opposition leader in the House of Representatives:

After 13 years have passed... the Constitution remains under the arbitrary extraordinary power of the Institutional Acts and personal security is put under the threat of arbitrary abuse of power.

After 13 years have passed, and in spite of the principles of democracy which are constantly mentioned by those in the government, the secret, universal and direct ballot continues to be violated according to the conveniences of the powerful of today.

Once more they have defaced our Constitution. They deformed it to fit their interests and defeat the voters who, already unable to vote for President or for the mayors of the state capitals, were slowly conquering the right to elect the governors of the states. The people, once more, have been prohibited from voting, from elections and from participation. Even the Senate has been removed from their choice.

A small group has become absolute owners of Brazil and impose their arbitrary will. They mould the institutions as they see fit, they tear the Constitutional principles to fit their domestic reasons of their own group; they close the National Congress so they may practice such abuses. They legislate without the Legislative in order to fulfill their electoral interests. These are grave facts. The nation may suffer them but shall never forget.

The theme of contrasting the promises of democracy to the reality of repression and manipulation for group interests became the central focus of the MDB political campaigns of public opinion formation. Although the Lei Falcão had now been extended to the federal and state elections, imposing a silence at election periods, it did not prevent the opposition party from utilizing
television in periods in-between elections. The MDB party organized in June of 1977 a radio and television program in which four of the most prominent opposition leaders developed the party's position on four main issues: First, the economic model of development. Second, the salary and living condition of the workers. Thirdly, the arbitrary electoral reforms and controls of the Pacote de Abril. And finally, the question of political amnesty.

The day after the MDB program was aired on national television and radio, a study conducted by the Jornal do Brasil concluded that approximately 70 percent of the population in all major cities had watched the televised address of the MDB party. In addition, of those who did watch, the survey found that 69 percent expressed "complete and strong" approval for the viewpoints of the opposition party. The repercussion of the televised address throughout the nation was intense, with an audience of 21 million people.

The government of Geisel reacted with violence. On the first of July, President Geisel cancelled the electoral mandate and the political rights of the MDB leader in the House of Representatives, Congressman Alencar Furtado. In addition, the government indicted the President of the opposition party, Ulysses Guimarães, under Article 347 of the Electoral Code, carrying a prison term between 3 months and one year. In the course of the same week the government indicted two other members of the MDB under the National Security Law.
The final counter-attack of the National Security State came with the enactment of yet another Complementary Act which closed the MDB's access to television and radio. The contradictions of the controlled liberalization policy became evident. Even as censorship was progressively being lifted from the larger written press it was tightened on television and radio. The limits of the decompression were drawn at moments where the opposition could reach large sectors of the population with its message and, thus, provide a challenge to the National Security State.

However, the repressive actions of the government were a politically inapt move. The first effects of the liberalization period had been to encourage political participation and raise the expectations of the population for a return to democracy. The combination of the closing down of Congress, the forceful enactment of the April Package Laws and the persecution of the top leadership of the opposition party cut the credibility and legitimation which the National Security State had hoped to accomplish under its "controlled liberalization" program.

In addition, the persecution of the MDB party allowed the opposition leaders to reach a climax of legitimacy among the population. The MDB, as a result, increasingly took on the coloring of a "front of opposition", became recognized as a party which represented the views of a variety of sectors engaged in organizing resistance and as the real conduit of an increasing upsurge of "protest" vote against the policies of the National Security State itself.
Two important aspects of the 1978 campaign should be highlighted: First of all, the importance of the influence of the forced silence imposed by the Lei Falcão. Secondly, the aspect of the protest vote against the National Security State's policies in the social, economic and political areas.

By 1978, as we shall see, there was a growing human rights movement which coordinated action with a variety of grassroot organizations in the neighborhoods, in associations, in Church-related institutions and in a new trade union movement. The students, since 1977, were also rapidly reorganizing for the rebirth of the UNE.

The fact that the Lei Falcão prevented the MDB candidates in the federal and state elections of 1978 from having access to television and radio forced them to seek support in this vibrant grassroot and popular network of human rights, union rights and associative or political rights. The persecution of the MDB, on the other hand, succeeded in providing the party with sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the population for this support to be readily offered. For the first time since 1966, the strategy of voiding the vote (voto nulo) was officially abandoned and all sectors of the opposition joined in the campaigns of the MDB candidates. Thus, the political campaigns in almost all states were conducted by a loose network of militants in the diverse opposition groups in civil society: students, trade union organizers, party militants, Church
social activists, members of the movements for political amnesty, for women rights, members of the black civil rights movement and for freedom of expression. All sectors joined forces in the actual work for MDB candidates in an almost door to door campaign across the nation. With little access to financial resources, the candidates of the MDB could tap the wealth of the growing grassroot movements and establish an informal oral communication network at the base.

Thus, the unexpected result of the Lei Falcão in 1978 was the joining of the party with the grassroot movements — bridging the gap between the levels of formal politics and grassroot or base-related politics. The experience of the 1978 elections would serve as a valuable lesson for the future development of intermediary links between party organization and the grassroot organizations.

The second important aspect of the elections of 1978 was the element of plebiscite, of protest vote. All campaigns were organized to emphasize the aspect of a plebiscital vote against the National Security State. The "front characteristic" of the MDB party, on the one hand, made it difficult to develop a coherent party platform to guide the elections. On the other hand, it was clear that the major factor which could enlist the full support of the population for the MDB was its opposition to the government. Thus, for the elections of 1978 it was sufficient to unite all sectors of the opposition around a common platform of protest vote against the government. The results are presented in Table 9.2 below:
### Table 9.2
FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL FROM 1966 to 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>1966 Total Number of Votes</th>
<th>1970 Total Number of Votes</th>
<th>1974 Total Number of Votes</th>
<th>1978 Total Number of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Senate</td>
<td>17,259,598</td>
<td>22,406,624</td>
<td>28,925,792</td>
<td>37,601,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Votes for ARENA</td>
<td>13,630,743</td>
<td>16,123,219</td>
<td>24,544,678</td>
<td>30,770,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Votes for MDB</td>
<td>3,911,361</td>
<td>6,224,525</td>
<td>14,579,372</td>
<td>17,831,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats Won by ARENA</td>
<td>1,614,276</td>
<td>1,328,238</td>
<td>1,705,296</td>
<td>1,3,98,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats Won by MDB</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| House of Representatives | 17,285,556 | 22,435,521 | 28,981,015 | 37,553,882 |
| Total Number of Votes | 13,647,108 | 15,645,741 | 22,820,958 | 29,792,217 |
| Total Votes for ARENA | 8,731,638  | 10,867,814 | 11,866,482 | 15,024,298 |
| Total Votes for MDB | 5,915,470  | 4,777,927 | 10,954,440 | 14,767,919 |
| Seats Won by ARENA | 1,176,925  | 2,098,828  | 2,047,084  | 2,718,710  |
| Seats Won by MDB | 132         | 233         | 203         | 231         |

| State Assembly | 17,260,382 | 22,406,624 | 28,867,300 | 37,447,839 |
| Total Number of Votes | 14,044,039 | 16,382,966 | 23,393,263 | 30,222,386 |
| Total Votes for ARENA | 9,005,278  | 11,442,894 | 12,184,240 | 15,410,073 |
| Total Votes for MDB | 5,038,761  | 4,940,072  | 11,209,023 | 14,812,313 |
| Seats Won by ARENA | 2,088,927  | 1,299,832  | 1,298,901  | 1,502,804  |
| Seats Won by MDB | 132         | 493         | 487         | 492         |

**NOTES:** (1) Percentages are of total valid votes for the ARENA and MDB parties (without blank & void). (2) Percentages of blank and void votes are of total votes.

In the Senate, as had been the pattern, the MDB showed its continuing electoral strength. For the election of the seats available in the direct electoral process, the MDB received a total of 17,530,620 votes and the ARENA received 13,239,418 votes. Thus the MDB had a majority, receiving almost 4.3 million votes more than the governmental party. \(^{48}\) In the House of Representatives the ARENA continued to have a majority, although the difference between the two parties narrowed further: the MDB received 14,767,919 votes and the ARENA 15,024,298 votes, a difference of slightly over 256 thousand votes. The same pattern held for the elections at the State Assembly level, where the MDB received 14,812,313 votes and the ARENA 15,410,073 votes. \(^{49}\)

In terms of actual seats won by each party, especially for the House and the Senate, the discrepancy was evident. Although the MDB party had almost 4.3 million votes more than the ARENA and had received a total of 56.9 percent of the valid votes, it won only 9 seats in the Senate. The ARENA, with fewer votes on the other hand, won a total of 36 seats in the Senate. How? This is where the reforms of the April Package Laws showed the results for maintenance of political power: Out of the total 36 seats in the Senate won by the ARENA party, 21 seats were won in the indirect elections of the expanded Electoral Colleges of the states which had been strengthened by the inclusion of delegates from government-controlled municipalities. The ARENA
elected 15 direct Senators and 21 indirect, while the MDB elected 8 direct Senators and only one indirect, of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The new regulations for proportionate distribution of the seats in the House of Representatives which had been included in the April Package Laws also favored the ARENA party. The government's party received a total of 50.4 percent of the valid votes. The MDB party received 49.5 percent of the valid votes. In spite of such a small percentual difference, however, the distribution arrangement of seats available per state allowed the ARENA to control a total of 231 seats in the House of Representatives and the MDB to win only 189 seats. In the State Assemblies the MDB increased its representation and won an almost equal number of seats as the ARENA: 353 seats for the opposition party and 492 seats for the government's party.

In general, the pattern of MDB strength particularly in the more developed areas and the southern and center-south states was confirmed. The ARENA maintained a strong hold of the smaller northeast and northern states where the local bosses and the bureaucratic influence could develop a clientelistic political patronage system.

Although the forced enactment of the April Package Laws caused serious losses for the credibility of the decompression program, one may say that the measures, particularly in the Senate and the House, were successful in curbing the electoral strength in terms of actual representation of the opposition. The artificial changing of the rules guaranteed the majority of the ARENA in both the Houses of Congress. This monopoly of power was an essential element of decompression.
IV. The Dialectic of Human Rights

The period of the government of Geisel was characterized by the contradictions between an official policy of liberalization and the lingering reality of political repression. On the one hand, the official decompression policy allowed the sectors of the opposition more space for organization and greater encouragement of success. On the other hand, the actual process of coordinating pressure for improvements of living conditions, for the end of censorship of the press and for the revoking of the major legislation of repression brought with it the magnifying of the fears of the sectors most closely connected to the Doctrine of Internal Security.

Thus, as the human rights movement grew in strength so did the internal pressures and contradictions within the National Security State on policies of repression. As a consequence, the period was one of deep uncertainty where one day political action was permitted and the next sectors of the Repressive Apparatus would be unleashed in mass maneuvers of search and arrest. It is in this context that the activities of the Catholic Church surfaced to protect and encourage the organization of a resistance in defense of human rights.

1. Human Rights and the Catholic Church

As has been commented earlier, the Catholic Church was involved in the protection of political prisoners and the denunciation of State violence prior to 1974. During the period of most severe repression -- 1969-1973 -- the Catholic Church moved firmly to the defense of those who were in danger or were victims of persecution.
By 1973 the Catholic Church's hierarchy was conducting internal debates and discussions of the process of political repression and institutionalized torture as a method of political control through the systematic use of terror. In the beginning only a small group of members of the Church hierarchy were firmly convinced of the need to denounce the violence of the State and defend the victims of the repression. Once other bishops began to see the connection between torture and the strategy of terror, the CNBB took definite steps in the organization of a human rights consciousness-raising program of action.52 The first consequence of this position was the launching of a nationwide program of study and analysis of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which Brazil had signed and ratified. The Church reprinted thousands of copies of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and organized study groups of faithful, of all classes, to reflect upon those rights and the reality of the Brazilian society. In addition, it must be pointed out that the Church's analysis of human rights included not only civil and political rights but also social and economic rights. Thus, the action of the Catholic Church would follow closely a coherent program to pursue the organization for the achievement of all human rights.

Perhaps, politically, the greatest significance of the work of the Catholic Church lies in its ability to bridge the gap between the realms of "formal politics" and "grassroot or base-related politics". Since all activities of the Church are organized in
a formal institutional framework but descend to the level of the
grassroot organization by a widespread network of committees,
sub-committees and group activities, the Church is the only
institution which provides the people with experience at both
levels of political participation.

The real of "formal politics" within the Catholic Church
is defined in the work of the CNBB-- which is the organization
that acts socially and politically in applying the conclusions
reached in all the periodic synods of bishops.

Through its regional offices, its committees and organizations
the Brazilian National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferência
Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros - CNBB) acts directly at an
institutional level to organize the population for self-help
projects and for political coordination in group-pressure tactics
so as to challenge authorities to take action or alternatively hold
the State responsible for omission. This work may be conducted in
the form of official CNBB documents providing evidence and extensive
research of a particular area of violation of human rights or in
direct grassroot activities among the population.

The CNBB is subdivided into regional offices and local Diocesan
branches. Each level of institutional coordination elaborates a two-
year pastoral plan for religious and political priorities of work.
These priorities have become increasingly concerned with basic rights
and civil-political rights as defined in the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights.
The actual work is coordinated by the national and local pastorais which, sociologically, are institutional organizations for social and political action. Each pastoral is an organism of social work around a particular issue which is already defined by its very title. For example, there is the work conducted by the pastorais of: land, of urban problems, of the Church and the world, of the family, of the periphery and slum areas of the cities, of the marginalized, of the migrants, of the favelas, of the world of work, of peasants and agricultural day-laborers, of children and abandoned minors, of prisoners, of the rights of black people and of indians, and finally of human rights in general.

The national Pastoral coordinate the work around the issue defined by its title at a national level -- integrating all the regional committees and pastorais which are responsible for the regional organization of the population for the goal of achieving full rights in its particular issue of concern. In turn, the regional pastorais coordinate the action of the various local-level committees which are directly tied and structured by the local diocesan levels of Church organization.

For example, the Archdiocese of São Paulo, under the authority of Archbishop Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, has created a number of local pastorais under the general coordination of five auxiliary Bishops. These pastorais deal with the different problems of the population of São Paulo itself. Thus, for example, Dom Luciano
Mendes may work both in the national Pastoral do Menor (problems of needy and abandoned children) and in the local São Paulo area committee of the Archdiocesan Pastoral do Menor.

Each pastoral at the local level establishes its own network of groups for collective work, for committees, sub-committees and work in Basic Christian Communities. For example, the city of São Paulo was divided in the Archdiocesan plan of action in 50 different sectors. Each sector has 10 comunidades and each comunidad may subsequently establish its own committees and groups for the implementation of specific programs, projects and work. The main objective of such an organizational structure is to both stimulate individual participation and to share in all levels of responsibility, action and experience. 55

The structural organization of the political and social work of the Catholic Church demonstrates clearly how it bridges the gap of "formal politics" and "grassroot or base-related politics". It effectively involves the participation of the population in all levels of organization and social work. In addition, the format of organization allows the Church to establish a widespread network of local level groups, in a myriad of small cell-like units involving thousands of people all working in the same area. For example, the pastoral of human rights would involve work in all 500 comunidades set up in the 50 sectors of the Archdiocese of São Paulo and spread through the local-level groups in the parishes, in the neighborhoods and factories.
This wide network of organization provides experience to the population which enables them to acquire confidence in political and social participation, builds self-respect and competence and discovers leadership among the people. In addition, this myriad of organizations allows the population to quickly establish a mass movement in support of certain targeted issues. This was the case, for example, with the mobilization of the Movement Against the Cost of Living (Movimento Contra o Custo da Vida) which in 1978 spent three months collecting signatures for a petition asking the federal government to freeze the prices of basic foodstuff. In the short time of 3 months the Movement Against the Cost of Living had gathered the names of one and a half million people in the various periphery areas of the city of São Paulo.56

In addition, this network is the secret both of the strength of the social and political influence of the Catholic Church and of its ability to provide fast and efficient aid and/or information to the population -- even during the periods of strict press censorship and severe repression. Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns emphasized this point in our interview by symbolically comparing the network of oral communication of the Catholic Church in São Paulo as his "Arabian telephone" system. This myriad of communication between the small groups of the people worked so well, he commented, that if a person was arrested anywhere in his Archdiocese the vast grassroot network pipeline could transmit the information to him in a matter of hours.57
Once the news of the arrest arrives, the Church may act in one of several manners: The CNBB or the regional conference of Bishops may write an official and formal document of denunciation of the occurrence. The Bishop or Archbishop in charge may take personal action to intercede with a person in an authority position and use his influence on behalf of the victim. If those two measures fail, the Church may move to request international solidarity so as to protect the prisoner from further danger. Above all, the Church immediately moves to inform public opinion either through the press, or if that is impossible due to censorship, through the alternative communications available to the Catholic Church or even through the grassroots pipeline and through the various parishes.

These activities have been crucial in breaking the three most important integral elements of the culture of fear: the silence, the isolation of the victim from an effective structure of aid, and the hopelessness and disbelief in the efficacy of any action.

In conclusion, from a conservative or neutral stance, the Catholic hierarchy in Brazil has moved to a firm position of defense of human rights and of opposition to the State's social, political and economic policies. When Cardinal Arns was asked if there was a Church-State conflict in Brazil he answered simply that what did exist in the country was a Church which was close to the people and a State which was increasingly isolated and acted against the people. "The Catholic Church", Cardinal Arns emphasized, "may not be considered to be a power structure — not even one which is parallel to that of the State."
The Catholic Church is an instrument to speak to the conscience of
the people. It is the voice of those who do not have a voice." 58

2. An Example of Non-Violent Resistance: The Catholic Church

Just how, in practice, the Catholic Church acts as the "voice
of those who do not have a voice" in moments of extreme tension
and repression may be understood by a brief examination of the
events connected to the wave of political violence unleashed
in the nation, and particularly severe in the state of São Paulo,
during the years of 1975 and 1976.

During the period comprising the years of 1975 and 1976, the
forces of repression conducted another national blitz campaign for
the search and arrest particularly of militants of the Brazilian
Communist Party (PCB) and the Communist Party of Brazil (the maoist
party PC do B). Although the first wave of arrests were centered
in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, it quickly spread to
other states such as Bahia, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Goiás, Sergipe
and Pernambuco. As was the case with other largescale blitz operations
the military arrested not only the militants of the clandestine parties
but also hundreds of members of all opposition sectors.

During that period Amnesty International reported that about
2,000 people were detained throughout Brazil. Of all those who
were arrested, approximately 700 remained in custody and 240 were
subsequently officially "adopted" by Amnesty International. 59
In addition, the report of Amnesty International also stated that during the eighteen month period it had received numerous allegations of torture, all substantiated by physical affidavits. These reports had been received about victims in Recife, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, Florianópolis but particularly from São Paulo. Thus, Amnesty International reached the conclusion that systematic use of torture of political prisoners continued to be practiced in Brazil. Indeed, the situation was sufficiently grave to warrant Amnesty International's launching of an urgent appeal action on behalf of 200 cases of torture victims in Brazil. 60

In early 1975 the repression became most brutally localized in São Paulo. One of the most dangerous centers of torture was reported to be the headquarters of the Second Army, where the DOI-CODI of São Paulo operated with impunity. The security forces of São Paulo also attempted to crush the growing human rights movement in the grassroot organizations of the state. In addition, during that same year, the military forces had conducted a purge within the São Paulo Military Police and had arrested and tortured members who were believed to be dissidents of the opposition. In fact, the first reported known death under torture of that period was of an officer of the São Paulo Military Police: Lieutenant José Ferreira de Almeida. His death was officially explained as a case of suicide by hanging while in prison. 61

With the wave of repression the Archdiocese of São Paulo became a center for humanitarian aid to the families of people who had been
arrested and/or disappeared. The Archdiocese, with the full encouragement of Cardinal Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, founded the Diocesan Justice and Peace Committee which was composed of some of the most respected jurists in that state. The Justice and Peace Committee was entrusted with the defense of those who were persecuted and with the initiation of civil suits against the authorities for damages in the proven cases of torture.

Cardinal Arns' main objective was to encourage people to resist the violent repression and not to give in to feelings of despair, isolation and hopelessness. He would gather the people in Church services and discuss the violence in the city, urging the people to hope and to act upon such hope:

The people of São Paulo should not allow themselves to be crushed under the weight of the horrible facts which have been occurring in our state. For, when a society so clearly perceives that things cannot remain the way they are at present, then civil society itself can prove that there are alternatives available and that there exist opportunities to change things.

The people should not become depressed when faced with such facts of violence. Rather, the people should be strengthened in their resolution to fight such acts, and take courage from the very violence and react against it as a community and as a people. 62

In September of 1975 the security forces of São Paulo, led by Colonel Erasmo Dias, launched a military operation which was codenamed "Operation Djakarta". Vladimir Herzog, a news editor of the educational television of São Paulo -- the TV Cultura -- was one of the victims caught in the web of the military repressive maneuvers.
On October 24 of 1975 Vladimir Herzog was called to the DOI-CODI for a police investigation. He voluntarily presented himself to the headquarters for his interrogation session in the Second Army division. That same afternoon he was dead in the premises of the São Paulo DOI-CODI. Although the official explanation was that he had committed suicide in his cell by hanging himself with his own necktie, his body was returned to his widow without further explanations in a sealed coffin. She was threatened and warned not to open the coffin. The burial services were conducted under military armed guard.

The state of São Paulo was gripped by a sudden massive popular reaction of anger against the brutality of the death of a well-known and liked television news editor. The widow, Clarice Herzog, with the aid of lawyers of the Brazilian Bar Association and of the Archdiocesan Justice and Peace Committee, challenged the suicide version given by the security forces and filed a civil suit against the federal government charging it with responsibility for the death of her husband.

The case enlisted the support of journalists across the nation. The press conducted a thorough parallel investigation which disclaimed the conclusions of the official version of suicide and proved that in fact Vladimir Herzog had been killed under violent torture in the premises of the DOI-CODI of the Second Army of São Paulo. The Brazilian Press Association organized a petition for investigation into the activities of the DOI-CODI which was signed by the top 1,000 journalists in the nation. 63
Cardinal Arns, on the day following the death of Vladimir Herzog, officially appealed for the support of the other Bishops present at the Regional Bishops Conference in Itaici, São Paulo. The Regional Conference of Bishops issued a formal statement, with detailed analysis of all the events of repression in São Paulo and denouncing the violent death of Vladimir Herzog:

There is a flagrant and open lack of respect for the human person and this is in violation of the image of God the Creator. This violation is characterized by arbitrary arrests and by the renewal of torture, which is sometimes followed by the death of the prisoner.

(...)

The violations take the form of public and private threats which are not simply stated but in fact are carried out by the authorities. 64

In conclusion the Bishops stated their complete "solidarity with the suffering of the victims", denounced the continuing suspension of the right to habeas corpus as a major violation of human rights and called upon the Christian population to act in solidarity with the victims and the families of the persecuted by "meeting in all the Cathedrals and the churches of São Paulo for the religious services in memory of all those who have disappeared, those who are still suffering in the prisons and those who have died as victims of the violence". 65

The words were followed with action. The memorial mass for Vladimir Herzog was held in the Cathedral of São Paulo and con-celebrated by both Jewish and Catholic ministers. The day of the memorial service the city of São Paulo awakened under military occupation. The area around the Cathedral of the Praga da Sé was blocked by army troops and
Military Police. In spite of such a show of force, over eight thousand people filled the Cathedral and thirty thousand more spilled onto the surrounding square.

Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, followed by the two Rabbies who con-celebrated the religious ceremony, asked for a minute of silence in respect for the victims of persecution and violence. Then, in a Church silenced by pain and by fear of the surrounding military forces, the voice of the Cardinal was raised in an appeal for the people to remain peaceful and non-violent, but to take courage, to cherish their hope and to react:

This House belongs to God and to all the people who accept the path of Justice and of Truth. Let us purify our hearts from all hatred. We shall be brothers and we shall reject all acts of terrorism, of any kind, no matter where it comes from.

(...) No one may touch a man with impunity. A human being, born from the heart of God, is to be a source of love for all other human beings. God has constantly communicated to all mankind that he who spills the blood of his fellow human being is to be cursed.

(...) Human liberty was given to us to be preserved as a priority mission which we all must carry forth together. We are all responsible for freedom. Individually and collectively we are responsible for the life of our brother.

Thou Shalt Not Kill. Whoever kills allows himself to be judged not only by history but by the Lord. He shall not only be cursed in the memory of mankind but shall also be damned in the judgement of God.

I appeal to justice. I appeal to your commitment. I appeal to a justice which may become enforced by laws but that above all must come from the interior force of every person who must find the courage now to say to himself and to others: Enough!
Enough! It is time to unite all who wish to dwell in the light that brings truth and that undermines falsehood. Hope is to be found in solidarity. In a solidarity which is capable of sacrificing individual egoism in the altar of the nation, in the altar of one state, in the altar of one city.

In this moment, the God of Hope calls for your solidarity. The God of Hope calls on you to engage in a peaceful fight -- but with persistent and courageous fighting spirit -- in favor of an entire generation which shall have as its symbols the children of Vladimir Herzog, his wife and his mother. 66

Like the funeral of Edson Luis in 1968 and the religious services in his memory, the mass in the memory of Vladimir Herzog catalyzed the repressed anger of a city and an entire nation. Like the death of the young student in the streets of Rio de Janeiro almost ten years before, the torture death of the journalist became the symbol of a human rights movement in an effort to put an end to the violence of the State.

The outcry against the repression and the death under torture of journalist Vladimir Herzog strengthened the determination of the population of São Paulo to organize a mass reaction strong enough to pressure the state authorities and the federal government to put an end to the repression. All efforts, however, would be insufficient to prevent another death under torture. On January 17, 1976, only a few months after the death of Vladimir Herzog, a metalworker, Manoel Fiel Filho, was found dead in his cell of the São Paulo DOI-CODI. The official version: suicide by hanging. The circumstances surrounding his death were identical to those of Lieutenant José Ferreira de Almeida and of Vladimir Herzog.
The death of Manoel Fiel Filho caused a deep crisis within the National Security State. The government of Geisel was put under intense pressure to stop the repressive actions of the security forces of São Paulo under the command of Second Army Commander Ednardo D'Avila and of Colonel Erasmo Dias both of them members of the hardline sectors of the military and who opposed the policy of controlled "decompression" of society. It was felt that the actions in São Paulo amounted to the exercise of a parallel power which could threaten the authority of the central Executive of the National Security State itself.

President Geisel acted swiftly to ensure his complete control of the situation and bring the Repressive Apparatus in closer touch with the new policies of the State: Two days after the death of metalworker Manoel Fiel Filho was reported President Geisel issued an official note communicating the dismissal of the Commanding General of the Second Army, General Ednardo D'Avila Mello and his substitution by General Dilermando Gomes Monteiro. General Ednardo D'Avila was transferred to the reserve. This quick action of President Geisel not only succeeded in undoing what was believed to be the beginnings of an attempted actual challenge to his authority in the National Security State, but also quieted the worst effects of the repression in São Paulo.

Although General Dilermando Gomes Monteiro, considered to be a member of the "liberal military", kept his promise to put an end to the torture in the São Paulo DOI-CODI, he was unable to prevent
further acts of repression in São Paulo -- this time directed against the young university students who were attempting to reorganize the banned UNE.

The actual process of reorganization of the UNE began in 1977 with a series of demonstrations and marches in São Paulo at first and later throughout the nation. The silent demonstrations of the students in the streets of São Paulo were met with the violent repression of the police forces commanded by Colonel Erasmo Dias.

On the September 22, 1977, the students held a secret meeting in the Catholic University of São Paulo so as to elect the representative committee which would be encharged with the work of underground reorganization of the UNE. When the secret meeting ended, the students planned a large open celebration in the evening to be held in the auditorium of the Catholic University.

That evening, under the command of Colonel Erasmo Dias, the Military Police invaded the Catholic University, vandalized and destroyed the physical premises -- causing a damage estimated at over 10 million cruzeiros -- and herded three thousand students, faculty members and all the employees of the University into the parking lot. They were harrassed and threatened, beaten and tear gased. Five young women, students of the Catholic University, were severely burned by police chemical bombs later believed to have been napalm. A total of 41 university students were later tried under the National Security Law for collective disobedience.
If the year of 1977 was primarily marked by the resurgence of the street marches, demonstrations and violent confrontations of students and police, the years of 1978 and 1979 would be rather more characterized by the determined effort to organize the parallel structures of the free central directories (DCE-livres) and the free regional and statewide student unions. These were the foundation for the final reorganization of the UNE itself.

For the purpose of the reorganization of the UNE students conducted fund raising campaigns and carefully solicited the support of other sectors of the opposition: the MDB party, the OAB, the ABI and the Catholic Church. They were also careful to not personalize the leadership and to hold collective guidance organizational meetings rather than relying on a few well know leaders. This avoided a specific identification which could facilitate the repression. After 1978 several organizational meetings were held which no longer encountered any direct repression from the National Security State.

By 1978 and 1979 the working class had taken on the predominant role both within the opposition and for the strategy of State control and repression. The students were allowed to organize the UNE under threats but with no actual physical repression.

In May 29, 1979, the student delegates elected at the university assemblies met in Salvador, Bahia, for the 31st National Congress of the UNE. Over ten thousand people were present for the rebirth of the students organization. Many of the old Presidents and leaders were also present. Indeed, the Congress was officially opened by
José Serra, who had been the UNE's President in the period 1963-1964 and watched the headquarters of the UNE burn on April 1, 1964.\textsuperscript{72} The significance of the UNE's rebirth is particularly that it demonstrated that the National Security State was unable to completely destroy the traditions and the roots of civil society organizations. In spite of the repression, including the arrest of the 800 top leaders of the UNE in the Ibiúna Congress of 1968, the organization of the students came back to life with the force of increased representation and with a student body of close to one million students.

In addition, the process of "displacement of opposition" in 1977 became evident through the struggle of the students to set up their organizational structures anew. Once again, the silent and peaceful marches and meetings of the students were met in the streets by the high levels of physical violence of the police forces. The middle and upper class members of São Paulo, parents of most of the students attacked by the police, were forced to deal with their fear and take action in support of their children and to protect them.

The student's movement thus, became intertwined with the events following the repression of 1975 and 1976, the death of Vladimir Herzog, to fuel the human rights movement among the middle and upper classes of the richest state of the nation. Hence, the appeals of the Catholic Church on behalf of the persecuted found sympathetic ears among the parents of university students in confrontation with the police. Lawyers and parents joined the Church in demanding an end to the violence.
The active organization of the human rights movement included not only the mobilization of the grassroot networks but the formal initiation of civil suits against the federal government. The Justice and Peace Committee of the Archdiocese of São Paulo filed three main suits in the civil courts so as to break a legal path by establishing an important precedent for holding the federal government responsible for repressive actions.

One of these suits involved the invasion of the Catholic University of São Paulo and demanded repayment for the damages to the physical premises of the university itself as well as making the government responsible for the serious burning of the five students and filing for coverage of medical care and damages. The other two civil actions were taken by the families of Vladimir Herzog and Manoel Fiel Filho, with the encouragement of the Archdiocese and entrusted to the lawyers of the Justice and Peace Committee.

In 1978 Clarice Herzog and her children succeeded in winning a pathbreaking judicial decision: three years after the death of Vladimir Herzog in the premises of the DOI-CODI of São Paulo, the São Paulo State Supreme Court ruled in favor of the family and held the federal government responsible for the death of Vladimir Herzog. The suit filed by the family of Manoel Fiel Filho has not yet received a decision but the precedent established should hold. These civil actions are an example of another method of encouraging the peaceful resistance of the people to a situation of violence of the State.
V. The Opposition and the State: Formal Politics.

Formal politics has up to here included the activities of the Church within the realm of interest-group organizing for the defense of human rights. We have also discussed the changing role of the MDB party and the learning process of opposition utilization of the officially tolerated legal opposition party to press for further measures of liberalization and to express public protest against the policies of the government by voting for the opposition party.

In addition, as has been variously pointed out throughout this work, the judicial system was an effective medium of pressing for democratic reforms, or countering the most severe effects of the State violence. The defense of political prisoners, the judiciary's restraint in judgement of cases and its recurrent independence from the Executive in spite of purges and other mechanisms of control all played a crucial part in forcing the progressive opening to regain some of the most important civil and judicial guarantees. The general judicial strategy of filing suits to break new grounds for the defense of others and against the arbitrary abuse of power was carefully implemented under the protective umbrella of the Catholic Church and of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil - OAB). In this way, the OAB's actions in the judicial arena served to slowly remove the barriers of fear caused by the isolation of the victims and their disbelief that effective legal protection could be provided.

1. The Role of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB)

In this section we shall briefly examine the role which the lawyers
have played in the process of resistance to the repressive legislation and the acts of abuse of power.

The legal profession in Brazil is rooted in a profound liberal tradition which goes back to 1843. Lawyers were prime defenders of the abolition of slavery and have played an important role in the resistance to the Estado Novo and the redemocratization process with the Constitution of 1946. With the advent of the National Security State, lawyers, as a professional group, were put in a difficult position: To accept all the parallel structure of extraordinary legality, Institutional Acts, Complementary Acts and Decree Laws or to resist such a situation, protest, demand a return to normal rule of law and risk repression.

In essence, the National Security State moved lawyers, in large numbers, to the opposition principally due to two factors: 1. Its concern with the establishment of a myriad of laws to justify its own actions in time formed an entirely parallel body of extraordinary laws which are both enacted and revoked simply by an Executive decree. This parallel legal system has been termed by the Brazilian Bar Association the illegitimate legal system which now exists side by side with the traditional body of laws supported by the Constitution. 2. This dual structure has made it difficult for lawyers to function professionally. Indeed, as lawyer Antonio Modesto da Silveira expressed to me, "a lawyer had to wake up and read the Diário Oficial da União before he could get up and go to work to see if there were any new laws promulgated
during the night or any others revoked by decree. In fact, there were so many laws, regulations, legislations regulating or revoking other laws that the life of a lawyer was immersed in what Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes termed "a legal nightmare". In addition, lawyers who defended political prisoners or dare investigate the activities of the Repressive Apparatus often became the targets of repression themselves. There were hundreds of lawyers who were arrested, threatened and persecuted since 1964 because of their role in defense. The best publicized cases of physical violence were suffered by such respected jurists in Brazil as Heleno Fragoso, Sussekind, Sobral Pinto, Dalmo Dallari, Hélio Bicudo, Modesto da Silveira and others who defended those targeted as the "enemy within".

Thus, lawyers began to utilize their professional organization to press the federal government to return to a state of law and revoke the entire parallel structure of arbitrary illegitimate legislation. The Brazilian Bar Association is particularly suited for the role of influential defender of human and legal rights. As the first professional association created in Brazil (1930) it carries the authority of a connection to the past history of legitimacy. In addition, the OAB differs in one fundamental way from other professional associations: it is completely independent and autonomous from the State. Thus, now the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil is regulated by a specific legislation which exempts it from the control of the State. Dr. Seabra Fagundes explained the structure of organization of the OAB:
The Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB) is a part of the indirect administration, as an autarchy, but it has specific "sui generis" organization which is embodied in its perfect and integral descentralization.

This decentralization aims to protect the dignity and the independence of the Ordem, for its main mission is not limited to the activities in administration, but rather, is meant to defend the juridical harmony and the Federal Constitution.

Thus, the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil is protected by a specific legislation (Law Number 4.215, article 139) which determines that "Regulations and legal dispositions which refer to autarchies and other self-governing agencies of the State shall not be applied to the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil."77

Thus, the OAB is not a professional association limited to the concern with and the defense of the interests of the membership. Rather it is a legal body whose mission is the overseeing of the application of the Constitution and the maintenance of juridical harmony. By law, all lawyers must go through a training period with the OAB and all must be affiliated to it in order to practice. Hence the power and extent of the influence of the Bar Association is akin to an organism of supervision of the balance of powers between the 3 branches of the State. This independence and authority allowed lawyers to play a crucial role in limiting the cases of abuses of power and in guaranteeing the continuing independence of the Judiciary in spite of the controls, purges and repressive actions of the State.

It should be noted that with the advent of the "decompression", the Bar Association was targeted by the Geisel government with a special new type of pressure. In May and in July of 1974 -- just
after taking office, President Geisel issued two decrees which submitted the Brazilian Bar Association to the supervision, regulation and control of the Ministry of Labor. The argumentation of the decrees justified the measure by its professional association characteristic -- therefore it should be properly included into the structure of the Labor Code just as any other professional association or trade union. This measure would effectively curb the independent attitudes of the OAB, open its budget to control measures and impose all of the restrictions which we have already analyzed as applying to organizations in the Labor Code. 78

The OAB, however, did not take this measure as a forceful and legitimate piece of legislation. Rather, the Bar Association launched a major campaign to fight for its independence and its autonomy from the State, by filing a series of civil suits against the imposition of controls, proving its exceptional status as the organism of intermediary supervision. In addition, it disclaimed the right of the federal government to rule in such a manner and refused, for the period of the legal decisions, to comply with the stipulations and the controls of the Ministry of Labor. Eventually, in 1978 President Geisel accepted the opinion argued by the OAB and annulled the two decrees. 79 The independent status of the OAB was then guaranteed.

As an institution engaged in resistance against arbitrary laws, the OAB's activities may be summarized by the following areas: 1. The establishment of the boundaries between legitimate juridical framework
and illegitimate juridical systems. 2. The defense of human rights with the consequent action for the repeal of the legislation of the Repressive Apparatus. 3. the elucidation and public education on issues of juridical concerns and legal rights.

The first phase of the opposition work of the OAB centered upon the defense of political prisoners and in denunciations of acts of arbitrary arrests and/or torture of political prisoners. Most of the years from 1964 to 1974 were characterized by defensive action.

With the Fifth National Conference of the OAB, in 1974, the priority of concern became more broadly defined to include the defense of human rights -- which was the theme of the Conference itself. Hence the OAB moved in the same direction as other sectors of the opposition, to enforce the respect for political, civil, social and economic human rights:

The theme of this Conference, Human Rights, is important to all citizens and not only to the profession of lawyers. We are meeting in the year where we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and a year in which we are witnessing a violence that grows in our nation, and is reaching alarming proportions. Thus, it became essential that we should have human rights be our central theme of concern.

It is essential that our conclusions and studies should be published so we may educate the nation and the public opinion that it is not enough to sign and ratify international documents. It is necessary to obey them and the Constitutional guarantees which should be untouchable.

The work of education of public opinion was carried out in published interviews with the officers and the members of the OAB as well as the reprinting of the various studies conducted under the
auspices of the Bar Association. Slowly public opinion became informed as to the importance of the legal guarantees against arbitrary arrest, to curb abuse of power of governmental authorities and of respect of individual security above the security of the State.

Although the concerns with the defense of legal, civil and basic human rights remained a constant, the OAB, in 1976, began to pay a specific attention to the question of its own autonomy and independence from the State. Not only was the OAB in the midst of its legal battle for freedom from the Ministry of Labor, but the government of Geisel had begun the sweeping judicial reforms included in the Judiciary Reform project which elaborated new controls over judges in a manner unacceptable to the Bar Association. According to Dr. Seabra Fagundes, the opposition to the National Council of Judges (Conselho Nacional da Magistratura) created in the project, stemmed from its infringement upon the independence of judges:

This particular body was very opposed by the OAB. At that time it was even referred to as the Institutional Act Number Five of the lawyers and judges. This was because the Conselho Nacional da Magistratura, was a system of internal discipline of the judges, where the council was composed of jurists of the Federal Supreme Court who could discipline judges in the entire nation. Thus it not only broke the independence of the states of the federation, but the very independence of judges. For a Supreme Court member may at any moment apply a severe penalty to state and federal judges. 82

Hence, the priority of work of the OAB reflected the concern with its freedom of action expressed in the theme of the VI National Conference of the OAB: "The Independence and Autonomy of the Lawyers and the Reform of the Judiciary and Positive Law." 83 The OAB concentrated
its work in fighting the Judiciary Reform and applying pressure to revoke the two decree-laws of 1974 which tied it to the Ministry of Labor. It lost the first battle with the passing of Amendment Number 7, as we have seen, in 1977 under the April Package Laws.

With the VII National Conference of the OAB in May of 1978, a synthesis of concerns was developed. In addition to the concerns over legal and civil guarantees of the human rights movement more generally, the OAB drafted a consensus of opinion documenting the position of the Brazilian lawyers on matters of State power. The Declaration of Brazilian Lawyers, published and widely distributed, established a new aggressive phase of opposition activities of the Bar Association. The new President of the OAB, Raymundo Faoro, became a leading spokesman of opposition views and applied considerable pressure upon the State to revoke the Institutional Act Number Five and, above all, to reinstate the right of habeas corpus for political crimes.

For the next period the OAB concentrated almost exclusively upon the need to abolish the AI-5 and reinstate the right to habeas corpus. It is at this point that the educational role of the OAB was most evident. The publicity campaign of the lawyers organization succeeded in clarifying the juridical concept of habeas corpus sufficiently to turn it into one of the most prescient political issues of the period.

With the revoking of the Institutional Act the OAB turned its attention to other legal guarantees which remained to be regained.
Hence, its focus of political organization since 1979 has become increasingly centered on the question of the revoking of the National Security Law and the need to elect a free and representative Constituent Assembly to draft a legitimate Constitution.

As may be seen in this brief history of the opposition activities of the OAB, its political importance encompasses the neutralizing of the three elements in the culture of fear: The defense of political prisoners countered both the isolation and the hopelessness. The education campaigns of the OAB were efficient tools against the forced and imposed silence.

Perhaps, however, the most politically important contribution of the OAB has been its questioning of the legitimacy of the legal framework of the National Security State. The Bar Association and respected jurists established a clear boundary between legitimate framework of legality — defined by the juridical tradition of Brazil and by the OAB as a "State of Law" (Estado de Direito) — and the illegitimate framework of legality — defined as a "State of Exception" (Estado de Exceção).

This theme and clarity of definitions denied the National Security State the legitimation it sought in the constant concern with creating decree laws and Institutional or Complementary Acts to justify all of its arbitrary actions. An important juridical and political document, known as the "Letter to Brazilians" (Carta aos Brasileiros) clearly expressed the jurists'position on the matter of legitimate legality:
We affirm that there is a legitimate juridical order and an illegitimate juridical order. An order which is imposed by force, from the top down, is an illegitimate order. It is illegitimate because its very origin is illegitimate. Only a legal order which is born and rooted in the people through the Legislative representatives freely elected may be considered to be a legitimate juridical order.

(...) A just, legitimate social order cannot come from the pretensions of power of a temporary government. The genuine source of legitimate juridical order is not force but rather it is the power of persuasion.

(...) We warn that the exercise of Constituent Power by any authority other than the authority of the people as represented in their freely elected Constituent Assembly is, in any democratic state, an unlawful encroachment of political power.

As lawyers we vehemently deny the possibility of any coexistence -- within one single country -- of two Constitutional orders: one legitimate and the other illegitimate.

(...) We proclaim that the legitimate State is the State of Law. This is the Constitutional State, based upon the legitimate order that comes from the people in a free Constituent Assembly. The other States are those where the Executive power has taken on a Constituent power. These are the States which are obsessed by their own security, their own survival and continuity. They are the oppressor States. (...) They are what we have termed the States of Exception.

The legitimacy and independence of the OAB allowed it to question the legitimization claim of the National Security State and the value of the framework of legality created by exclusive power of the Executive branch of government. Hence, the OAB countered the State's appeal to juridical legitimation in a public, consistent and effective campaign of clarification and information. It kept alive the notion of a democratic legitimate legality based upon consensus, rather than physical violence.
2. The Role of the Brazilian Press Association (Associação Brasileira de Imprensa - ABI)

Although the ABI does not benefit from a specific legal framework which guarantees its autonomy vis à vis the State, it did, in practice act as an independent institution in relation to the authorities of the National Security State. However, like their counterparts in the legal profession, journalists in Brazil pride themselves in the common legacy of political participation in the movement for the abolition of slavery, for the independence of Brazil, for the installation of the Republic and, above all, in the constant defense of freedom of expression during the period of the Estado Novo. Hence, the ABI was built upon a foundation of this liberal tradition.

Founded in 1931, the ABI resulted from a fusion of all press associations then in existence in the country. It is a coherent and unified body which speaks for the press — the actual enterprises as well as the professional journalists, editors, newspaper owners. The internal organization of the ABI follows a parliamentary format where an Administrative Council of 45 members elected by the membership serves the function of governing the Association. This political framework allows for flexibility and participation in the decisions of the Association.

During the first phase of institutionalization of the National Security State, the role of the ABI was limited to the coordination of the activities of journalists, the defense of threatened professionals and the promotion of educational debates, conferences and study sessions.
Since until 1969 the press was not subjected to direct prior censorship the role of the ABI was primordially educational:

During that time, in the ABI, we used to organize conferences, meetings and courses on some of the basic aspects and issues that concerned not only journalists but the society at large. I believe that one of the chiefly important roles which the ABI has played in that period was the printing and the dissemination of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.

We prepared several editions within the Press Association for it was fundamental that all should know them. People talked a lot of human rights but few really knew the U.N. Declaration.

We were a great university in which people could openly discuss matters of elections, controls, representation, and freedom of expression. The ABI was a center for debate and freedom to express different viewpoints. 88

The educational role of the ABI both provided for an alternative informal network of communication and allowed a constant exchange of ideas and encouragement of airing views on matters of concern.

During the period of the Castelo Branco government the press played an important role in uncovering, proving and campaigning against torture of political prisoners. As we have seen, this was particularly spearheaded by the Correio da Manhã and effectively pressured the government to put an end to the consistent and systematic torture of political prisoners for that time period.

With the enactment of the Institutional Act Number Five the role of the press was smothered in prior censorship and stringent controls. The reaction came in two forms: First the creation of
inumerable alternative small weekly newspapers or tabloids of the opposition which expressed more freely critiques of the government's repressive and economic policies. Secondly, the slow articulation of symbolic campaigns of resistance to the censorship itself.

The smaller press, with a much smaller investment, could afford to be in an aggressive opposition stance. The censorship to the small opposition papers, such as Opinião, was at times particularly severe but this very severity aided in the encouragement of a resistance and organization for the acquisition of freedom of expression. The symbolic campaign was conducted either by printing information in an oblique and disguised manner -- so the reader could read between the lines -- or directly by providing evidence of the censorship.

Newspapers and magazines utilized a variety of techniques for shocking the public with the extent of the prior censorship and the number of lines or articles cut from their pages by the censors. In some there would simply be an empty square where the censored lines had been cut. Others would print a black square with the advertisement of the paper or magazine urging people to support it and read it. One of the most imaginative symbolic campaigns was conducted by the conservative establishment large newspaper O Estado do São Paulo. This respected paper would alternate poems with food recipes or photographs of zoo animals wherever lines or parts of articles were cut by the censors.

The impact of such a campaign upon the population was profound for the extent and force of the censorship could be pictorially demonstrated
and its continued existence undermined the legitimacy of the State. The press would analyze the activities of the government, emphasize the need for freedom of expression and demonstrate by the checkered nature of its printed pages that such a basic democratic right did not in reality exist in the country.

The ABI then continued its educational role, more deeply connected not only to the discussion of freedom of expression. In addition it provided an umbrella for the organization of numerous committees and groups working to counter censorship in the press, in the radio, in television, in the theatre, cinema, art, music and literature. The ABI, with the force and authority of its tradition, could provide the legitimacy for the work of a variety of groups that could not survive outside of its protection. Hence, after the period of 1969 the ABI increasingly became a forum for the expression of dissent against the controls on opinions and on thought.

As such the ABI served to coordinate the activities of opposition groups concerned with freedom of expression and channel their activities to the realm of formal politics so as to provide direct pressure upon the State. The combined pressure of the activities of the Association of the press and the symbolic campaign of the major newspapers forced President Geisel to eliminate direct censorship from the large newspapers in 1975 and eventually even direct prior censorship from the smaller more aggressive opposition press in 1978. However, direct censorship in radio and in television remained a reality.
With the lifting of prior physical censorship the press took on a major role in enlarging the timid liberalization process. Major articles of critique of the economic model and denunciations of the corruption of high government officials appeared in the larger media. Most important, however, was the effect of breaking the culture of fear by eliminating the silence: whenever cases of torture were reported the press gave them widespread coverage, demanding the investigations and end of the violence.

Acting each in their own area of influence, the press, the lawyers, the Catholic Church and the MDB party corroded slowly the panic caused by the violence of the repression. Once people began to feel that they were not alone, they were not helpless and they were not unknown if they were persecuted political participation was encouraged and the culture of fear diminished its paralyzing effects.

Furthermore, the resultant social mobilization in support of the activities of the four most visible channels of formal politics (the CNBB, the OAB, the ABI and the MDB party) secured a base of legitimation which would allow the opposition to apply effective pressure upon the National Security State and move ahead with a qualitatively important step in the direction to greater freedom. It should be noted that although the government of Geisel was intent upon a controlled and slow process of "decompression" of Brazilian society its primary aim was longterm institutionalization and
not the reinstatement of liberal democracy. The activities of the opposition in the realm of formal politics forced the liberalization process to proceed -- in spite of the obstacles developed by the State-- to achieve gains which amplified the political space for organization of the grassroots.

3. State Reforms and Dialogue with the Opposition.

The combined pressure of the realm of formal politics forced the State to engage in a political dialogue with the main symbols of the organized opposition to negotiate measures of liberalization. By 1978, in the wake of the growing civil and human rights movement, the government of Geisel, through the Minister of Justice Petrônio Portella, began a series of meetings with leaders of the MDB and later with the OAB, the ABI and the CNBB representatives. The "Portella Mission" was to arrange a minimum timetable of reforms and negotiate with the opposition a program of liberalization which could be "sold" to the hardline sectors. The point was to sift through the spectrum of opposition demands and concentrate on the most crucial issues. The results of the negotiations, from the viewpoint of the opposition, were mixed.

On the one hand, the Reform Package prepared by the government and introduced into Congress in the form of Constitutional Amendment Number 11, contained significant improvements:

1. The revoking of Article 182 of the Constitution of 1969 which had been enacted by the military junta on October of 1969. This particular act in fact revoked the Institutional Act Number Five and all
the other Institutional Acts and Complementary Acts enacted upon
the basis of the extraordinary power of the AI-5 if they became
contradictory with the new text. Thus, the revoking of the Article
182 of the 1969 Constitution meant that many of the Complementary
Acts (there were at that time 150 of them) could be revoked but that
those which dealt with the economic decisions were still in effect.91

The revoking of the Article 182 allowed the restoration of the
most fundamental legal rights: the right of habeas corpus for political
crimes, the restoration of the three fundamental judiciary Constitu-
tional guarantees of job tenure, non-transferability and non-reduction
of salary and the right to job tenure for public employees.

2. A dubious measure which had mixed benefits for the opposition
eliminated the regulation of party fidelity.92 New parties could be
organized and politicians were free to exchange parties at will for
the period of one year. A new party could be founded provided it had
the support of 10 percent of the House and the Senate.93 To remain
legal the new parties, at all subsequent elections would have to obtain
5 percent of the total votes distributed with a minimum of 10 states.
If this is not obtained the votes shall be considered annulled. But
the party shall not be dissolved although it will lose its representatives
in the Federal Congress.94

3. A third improvement in the Reform Package was the elimination
of some of the extraordinary powers of the Executive over the
Legislative branch of government. The Executive lost the power to suspend
and/or close down the Federal Congress and the State Assemblies. In addition, the Executive lost the power to cancel the electoral mandates of political representatives by simple decree without any explanation, defense or recourse to appeal.

4. Finally, other severe penalties imposed in the form of subsequent Institutional Acts were revoked: thus, for example, the death penalty for certain political crimes and the penalty of banishment were automatically revoked with the provision eliminating Article 182 of the Constitution of 1969.

One may say, in essence, that the opposition pressure succeeded in achieving a status quo ante and returning to many of the provisions established in the Constitution of 1967, prior to the modifications included by the Institutional Act Number Five. This does not mean that that Constitution returned to be the effective regulatory mechanism of the political system for many of the other measures enacted in the Constitution of 1969 remained in effect.

The problems for the opposition in the Reform Package were of two kinds: First of all, the inclusion of new mechanisms of control of the security of the National Security State -- the so-called safeguards (salvaguardas). Second of all, the clear omissions of the project and the limited nature of the reforms.

The omissions were clear: First, the right to absolute parliamentary immunity which protects the Legislative branch from infringements and from the control of the Executive or the Judiciary
was only partly gained. Under the new regulations, an accused representative could be tried by the Federal Supreme Court without the prior approval of the House to which he belonged. This measure aimed at avoiding the need to seek Congressional approval for the trial of members of Congress and therefore avoid the type of confrontation over the case of Congressman Márcio Moreira Alves in 1968. Hence, the control over the Legislative branch became divided between the Executive branch and the Judiciary. A partial and contradictory situation and guarantee as may be readily perceived. For, once a Congressman becomes subject to trial and suspension of mandate for his political comments on the floor of Congress the right to effective parliamentary immunity becomes more abstract than real. In addition, the important separation of powers continues to not be the reality of the political system. The Legislative is subjected to the power of the other two branches and severely limited in its independence.

A second crucial omission was the refusal to deal with any of the matters pertaining to the economic model, to the wage-control system and to the control of trade unions and other associations of civil society. In spite of the effort of the "new trade union movement" to have their suggestions and alternatives included in the project the government remained firm, refused to negotiate these matters either with union representatives or with the MDB party and eventually had the Reform Package approved by an absolute majority of the members of both Houses over the loud protests of the MDB opposition party and of representatives of the new labor movement present at the session.
With the inclusion of the special "safeguards" for the State (salvaguardas) the Reform Package of the Geisel government provided the basis for a new form of strong regime and the institutionalization of the National Security State.

The most significant innovation was the concept of a state of emergency which, in addition to a state of siege protection, should provide the Executive branch with extraordinary powers to be exercised in "case of external war, of danger to the State or of internal upheaval". By the Constitution's Article 155, the state of siege, the Executive was allowed to declare an extraordinary situation giving it extra powers for a period of six months. However, a state of siege can only be declared with the expressed authorization of the Federal Congress. The Reform Package's "safeguards" provided an addition to this Article of the Constitution of 1969 establishing the right of the Executive branch to declare a state of emergency -- apart from a state of siege -- which could be applied without the approval of Congress for a period of 90 days and be extended for a period of another 90 days. The only right remaining for the Legislative was that of being informed within 48 hours of declaration of a state of emergency.

Perhaps even graver was the fact that the prerogatives of the Executive, for the period of duration of the state of emergency, were profoundly increased in power: The Executive may specify the
areas of the country which would be put under "a state of emergency". The Executive can lay out the precise regulations which would then apply to those specific areas. Only the Executive branch would now have power to appoint the governors and other administrative officers of the areas under a "state of emergency". The Executive, again, may have exclusive power in overseeing the implementation of the rules of control which it itself established. In addition, if the Executive considers that the State itself is in serious danger and that the National Security is under threat, it may declare whatever other measures are believed to be necessary. 

In addition, some immediate regulations for population control may be immediately enforced: people may be forced to reside in a specific area of control; the government is allowed to take over buildings for the purpose of temporary keeping of prisoners; the authorities have complete freedom in search and arrest maneuvers in private residences; freedom of association and of assembly are automatically suspended once a "state of emergency" is declared; explicit authorization of censorship of correspondence, press, telecommunications and all recreational activities are granted to the Executive; all guarantees of job tenure are suspended. Finally, the Executive, during a "state of emergency" may take over the property of autarchies, state corporations and even private corporations under contract of work with the government. Clearly, such a sweeping reform of the Constitution gave the Executive 180 days of practically AI-5 powers.
The government openly defended the need to maintain the special "safeguards" so as to defend the National Security State from direct challenge. It was necessary to maintain some specific mechanisms of control in order to ensure proper maintenance of political balance in the system so as to "safeguard the interests of National Security". Hence the Reform Package was drafted within the strict limitations of the National Security Doctrine still the largest influence upon the military government.

Indeed, the opposition accused the government of attempting to hide an illegitimate legality in a Constitutional framework thus giving it the appearance of a more legitimate legality of a process of liberalization when it reserved for itself -- without the prior approval of elected representatives -- such sweeping and dangerous powers of political control and repression.

The OAB severely criticized the "safeguards" in the Reform Package included in the measures of the state of emergency. In fact, the negative reaction of all the sectors of the opposition and of the press was sufficiently strong to indicate that the universe of demands from civil society had far surpassed the tight limitations imposed by the ideology of National Security and Development.

Nonetheless, the Reform Package and the end of the Institutional Act Number Five would be crucial for the maintenance of the status quo of negotiated liberalization as well as open political space which would allow for the inter-relationships between the levels of formal and base-related politics. It was, hence, a compromise victory for both sides.
VI. Conclusion: An Assessment

If one considers the situation in 1973 for the opposition the overall conclusion is that it was generally demobilized, weakened and in disarray. The beginning of a change of direction, a ray of hope, was felt in the anti-candidatura campaign of the MDB party and the activities of the CNBB.

However, in examining the period 1974-1979, one finds the situation largely reversed, although yet contradictory and uncertain. Large sectors of the elite groups had moved into the opposition and actively engaged in direct pressure-group tactical maneuvers to force the State into a liberalization framework. In spite of the fear of the renewed repression, particularly in São Paulo, the middle and upper classes took a predominant position both in the organization and strengthening of civil society institutions and in the actual negotiations with the State for definite steps forwards in the process of liberalization.

In addition, the opposition organized in civil society vertically and utilized the existent corporative and associative structures. In this period the OAB and the ABI, as we have seen, played a crucial role in expressing the opinions of key elite sectors and in providing the institutional framework for further organization. Furthermore, it was through the activities of the top Catholic Church hierarchy and in the CNBB, that the institution of the Church became an active part of civil society and pushed the State for further liberalization measures.
Some immediate questions come to mind: Why did elite sectors in civil society withdraw their support from the State and move so firmly in the direction of organized and effective political resistance? Which groups of the opposition played the key roles in this period for the achievement of significant measures of liberalization? Finally, how did these sectors organize and which channels were most effectively utilized for the building of pressure and for the development of inter-relationships between the different groups in civil society?

The first question, why did elite sectors move into the opposition, is answered by a combination of three different factors: First, key elite groups felt professionally threatened by the continuation of the tight repressive controls and the centralization of power. Secondly, key elite sectors also felt themselves to be personally threatened by the violence of the repression. Finally, key elite groups came to view the State itself as not necessary for the protection of their own interests and, indeed, more of a hindrance than a support.

Professionally speaking, lawyers could not survive in the quagmire of the dual legality, the chaos of hundreds of decree-laws, of Institutional Acts and of Complementary Acts. Practicing the legal profession on a day to day basis became, for most lawyers, either a "legal nightmare" or in the very least a difficult slow process of unravelling the chaotic bureaucracy of the dual legal system. Thus they moved, through their professional organization, to protect their interests.
Professionally, journalists could not survive under the tight system of prior and direct censorship of the press which had been added to the controls of the press established in the Press Law and in the National Security Law. Journalists and news editors could not professionally function without the freedom to research, write and have the material published without the direct and physical presence of the State. Newspaper and communication media owners, similarly, could not survive. We have seen the grave effects of the censorship upon the communication enterprises. The financial burden of dealing with the extensive censorship bureaucracy was unbearable for most published or even aired media. Particularly the written press lost considerable investments with the periodic apprehension and prohibition of sale of entire editions, with the heavy penalties for infringements of tight censorship commands or through the acts of revenge of the State upon too independent-minded enterprises. Some, in fact, succumbed financially to the burden — as was the case with the Correio da Manhã and would be with the Opinião.

Writers, artists, actors, musicians and other intellectual elite members could not survive professionally due to the same strict methods of direct and prior censorship. Publishers had to present the books to the censors and could see themselves prohibited from marketing a book for years after the initial investment had already been completed. All of the sectors affected by censorship organized in the general umbrella of the ABI around the unifying theme of "freedom of expression."
Finally, some key industrial and capital owners began to believe that their economic and professional interests were also threatened. It should be noted that the period of 1976-1977 saw the emergence of an outspoken group of businessmen (empresários) in the key industries of the national private sector. It is clear that the empresários, although in partnership often with both the State and the multinational corporations, did no longer believe that a highly centralized State was essential for their economic interests. Indeed, the opinion which became in time predominant was that the State had become isolated and they, as a class, no longer had direct access to the decision-making apparatus which affected their economic survival. The hundreds of economic decrees, counter-decrees, regulations and plans emanating from the Planning Ministry was not altogether accessible to participation from the private sector. Decisions were made in isolation, by bureaucrats, and had, at times, disastrous effects upon the economic health of a corporation. In addition, as we have pointed out, this was a period of the "end of the miracle" and key business sectors began to gravely doubt the path being followed by the centralized technocratic apparatus of the State. 100

Furthermore, the violence of the repression was a personal threat to all members of civil society. We have analyzed the nature of the repressive system, the interpenetration of the intelligence network and the actual repression in all levels of civil society and the fine
lines which could separate what was considered by the Repressive Apparatus to be "tolerable and responsible opposition" or "pressure and contesting opposition" (contestação). Those in charge of the enforcement of internal security were guided by the framework of the Doctrine of Internal Security -- with the resultant theory of the "enemy within". This internal enemy could be found everywhere, in all classes and all sectors of political and civil society. One was no longer protected simply for being a member of a key elite group. In fact, after the enactment of the Institutional Act Number Five, the middle and upper classes became severely affected by the violence of the repression.

The attacks upon the middle and upper class university students in the streets of São Paulo in 1977 combined with the reaction to the death under torture of an important journalist to clearly show all groups that the reality of repression was not, necessarily, class-based. Therefore, in reaction to a reality imposed by a State which a priori considered every citizen to be potentially suspect and an enemy, elite sectors moved to at least enforce clearer limitations upon the pervasive power of the Repressive Apparatus. At this point, the OAB, the ABI and the CNBB -- with the support of the top hierarchy of the Catholic Church -- intertwined in the defense of civil, political, legal and human rights.

The organization of elite sectors in the protection of their personal and professional interests was, therefore, through the
activation of their own professional and corporative institutions. Although the OAB and the ABI were the most important political institutions and key actors during this period, other professional groups organized within their own institutional frameworks: artists and musicians in freedom of expression groups within the cultural associations; engineers, architects, doctors and other professional middle and upper class groups similarly utilized the channels available to their profession. Hence, the framework of organization was vertical with leaders having authority to be the spokesmen of the membership.

In the actual process of confronting the repressive State and the application of group-pressure techniques to influence decisions the various separate institutions found the points of connections. Inter-relationships between the groups in civil society became a dialectical process of actual engagement in opposition activities. The opposition, hence, learned to organize vertically and to find support in each others' institutional resources.

The separate struggle of each sector was the subject of wide and ample coverage of the press -- in a process which not only aided and encouraged the activities of the groups involved but also strengthened the resolve of the media itself to enforce its own position of independence of the censorship rules of the State. In addition, whenever the State reacted with physical repression, the OAB stepped in, morally supported by the statements of the Church's CNBB, to protect the right of expression, the right of association, the right of assembly.
The National Security State during this period was under the direct pressure of loss of support of key elite sectors and of serious internal divisions within the military and civilian ranks.

The process of transference of power from President Geisel to his successor created the most severe crisis in the National Security State's institutional history. Without a mechanism for conflict resolution, the State's periodic power struggles layed bare its underlying institutional fragility. 101

Within the military itself the three main currents fought over the political power of the Executive post. General Sylvio Frota, Army Minister of the Geisel government, became a candidate in 1977. Frota was a member of the military hardline sector connected to the security apparatus of the army, the Center for Information of the Army (Centro de Informações do Exército, CIEX). General João Batista Figueiredo, chief of the SNI, was Geisel's choice as successor and the underground "official" candidate. 102 The struggle between the two candidates for Presidential office spilled over into their respective intelligence base of power in the comunidade de informações. 103

In reality, the struggle for the succession of General Geisel between Frota and Figueiredo indicated a deeper conflict for power within the larger framework of the Repressive Apparatus of the State itself. 104 One should note that the comunidade de informações has been the de facto source of State power since the first period of the National Security State. Within the complex structure of the
Repressive Apparatus, sectors of the military maintain a lively power competition. The two main *loci* of power have been the CIEX and the SNI.

Frota made no secret about this dispute for power and utilized the extensive network of the CIEX for building his own base in a campaign for President and, eventually, for conspiring to overthrow the Geisel government. Geisel's *castellista* group, on the other hand, utilized the equally extensive network of the SNI to uncover and counter the conspiratorial plans of the Minister of the Army and fire him. 105

In addition, the nationalist and democratic sectors of the military supported the candidacy of General Euler Bentes Monteiro officially sponsored by the MDB party. For the first time, then, the conflicts between the major forces within the military became an open battle and sectors sought the official support of the key elite opposition groups. 106

The ARENA party was equally torn by internal divisions as groups within the official party organized support for one of the candidacies. In addition, Senator Magalhães Pinto set off on his own pursuit of the Presidency, basing his claim upon his original important support during the conspiracy period against Goulart and his authority as a leading political figure in Minas Gerais. The specter of the *Frente Ampla* of the late sixties was raised in the resurgence of a united opposition front — led by Senator Magalhães Pinto. 107
The National Security State, therefore, torn by the contradictions within the coalition in power, was limited in its ability to react to the challenge coming from key elite opposition sectors organized in the press, in the lawyers' association, in the Church and channeled to the enlarging human rights movement.

The most successful actions of the "decompression" period in terms of longrange institutionalization were the measures for the regulation of electoral controls to ensure a governmental majority in most important representational levels. A concluding analysis suggests that the combination of the measures undertaken in the three main Constitutional Amendments passed by Geisel -- Amendment Number 7, which reformed the Judiciary; Amendment Number 8 which included the electoral modifications and Amendment Number 11, known as the Reform Package constitute the framework of the new "decompressed" National Security State.

Although the dialectical relation between the State and the opposition combined with the internal conflicts to paralyze the reaction power of initiative of State planners -- thus extending liberalization measures beyond original plans -- by and large the National Security State pushed through important modifications which allowed its permanence in power in spite of the significant loss of legitimacy and support. Hence, the period of "decompression" remained within the strict limitations of the National Security Doctrine and was characterized by a further cycle of liberalization and not by a transition into a democratic phase.
NOTES

1. The activities of the opposition sectors in civil society after the period of 1969-1973 may be divided into two modes of organization: formal politics and grassroot, or base related politics. Formal politics is the ability of the opposition to utilize institutional frameworks as they are given. Grassroot or base-related politics is defined as those political activities particularly concerned with the organization of working class, peasant and marginalized groups in civil society. Although grassroot political organization also took place in the period after 1974 (even during the repression, in fact, when basic community groups were already in the process of organization) its political potential as a specific actor did not surface in the political arena until after the period of 1977-1978. This will be the subject of our next chapter.


3. President Ernesto Geisel's speech during the first meeting of his Cabinet on March 19, 1974. Published in Opinião, September 2, 1974, page 3.

4. President Ernesto Geisel's speech during a meeting of ARENA leaders in August 30, 1974. Published in Opinião, Ibid.


6. For comparative information on inflation rates from 1964 to 1980 see table in the appendix on rates of inflation in Brazil.

7. For data on the foreign debt and foreign reserves see the table in the appendix on the total foreign debt and reserves 1964-1980.
8. Virtually all articles in the press prior to the elections of 1974 expected a complete victory of the ARENA party. Politicians of both parties interviewed expected the MDB to win the Senate posts only in 3 states: Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. For an analysis of this point see: "O Congresso: Um Ano de Bastidores" in Opinião, January 3, 1975, page 12. In fact, the MDB itself was surprised by the extent of its victory in the Senatorial election of November 1974.


10. Ibid.

11. See data: "Eleições: A Redescoberta da Política" in Visão, November 18, 1974, pages 20 to 27; "Eleições: E Agora?" in Opinião, Number 106, November 29, 1974, pages 4-5. See in particular Veja of November 27, 1974 for the complete breakdown of the election results at the state levels.


13. The study of the Agência Central of the SNI was conducted right after the elections and included a series of carefully detailed electoral maps of each municipality in the nation. See the extensive article on this study in Veja, November 10, 1976, page 22.

14. The Federal Congressmen who lost their political mandates were: Marcelo Gato of São Paulo, Nadyr Rossetti and Amaury Muller of Rio Grande do Sul and Lysâneas Maciel of Guanabara, (now Rio de Janeiro). The state representative of São Paulo was Fabiano Sobrinho.

15. This law became popularly known by the name of the Minister of Justice and is referred to simply as the Lei Falcão. For a complete information on the text of the law and an analysis of its effect on the electorate see: Veja, November 17, 1976, "Sessenta Dias Sob a Lei do Silêncio", page 24. See also Veja, November 10, 1976, "A Campanha Secreta", page 23.


17. Detailed information on the campaign of the ARENA party and the MDB party in 1976 may be found in the press of the period. See, for example: Veja, May 26, 1976 "Eleições: Campanha sem rádio e TV", page 21; Veja, July 28, 1976 "O ABC das Reformas", page 22; Veja, October 20, 1976 "A Campanha de Porta em Porta", pages 20-26;
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Veja, November 17, 1976 "Nas Urnas Começa o Debate", pages 20-58; 
Opinião, August 16, 1975 "Mais Obstáculos à Oposição", page 3; 
Opinião, May 2, 1975 "O Futuro Incerto da Oposição", page 3; 
Opinião, March 26, 1976, page 3 "O Significado das Eleições 
Municipais"; Opinião, July 2, 1976, "Que posição Ganhou ou 
Perdeu?" pages 3-4; Opinião, December 3, 1976 "A Arena Gaúcha:Os 
Vitoriosos e os Perplexos", page 8; Opinião, November 12, 1976 
"MDB: Projeto e Campanha", pages 3-5. See also the publication 
of the Instituto Universitário do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ) Dados 
Number 14, 1977, in particular the article of Wanderley Guilherme 
dos Santos "As Eleições e a Dinâmica do Processo Político 
Brasileiro" and of Simon Schwartzman, Fábio Wanderley Reis and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso,"As Eleições e o Problema Institucional".

18. This was described in Latin America Political Report, December 

e suas Faces".


21. Study conducted by Veja and analyzed in Veja, January 7, 1976, 
pages 19-28 "A Atração do Ano Novo". See, in particular the map 
on page 23 which includes details of the names of the cities which 
were under the control of the ARENA and theMDB.

22. Ibid.

23. There is strong evidence that the entire crisis of the 
Judiciary Reform Constitutional Amendment was prefabricated by 
the government of Geisel, forcing the MDB to reject the project 
in toto so as to give the government the pretext to close down 
Congress and enact a series of new electoral reforms which would 
guarantee the continuation of political control and monopoly of 
the ARENA. For information on this point see, in particular the 
testimony provided by the then Chief of Military Staff, General 
Hugo Abreu in his O Outro Lado do Poder, op.cit. pages 68 to 73 
most specially. See also: André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira 
Filho, A Segunda Guerra: A Sucessão de Geisel, (São Paulo: Editora 
Brasiliense, 1979), pages 111 to 122 and Walder de Góes, O Brasil 
do General Geisel, op.cit. pages 105-112. See also the articles 
in Veja, April 6, 1977, pages 28-30 "Reforma Por Decreto" and 
Veja, April 20, 1977, pages 19-25 "O Futuro foi Adiado".

24. For more information on this aspect and the OAB's position 
on the matter of the project see Veja, April 6, 1977, pages 28-30 
and Veja, April 20, 1977, pages 19-25. The Judiciary Reform was
enacted eventually by decree as Amendment Number 7 to the Constitution of 1969. When the government closed Congress and passed the electoral reforms it also enacted the Constitutional Amendment which contained the project as it was originally introduced in the Congress. The OAB particularly opposed the controls which were established over the judiciary under the form of a National Council of Judges, which should be a regulating body of the judiciary and the judges. The OAB considered this to be an infringement upon the Constitutional principle of the federation since it would be a national interference into the judicial system of the states with the power to condemn state judges through a centralized organism at the federal level. See, on this point also the work of B. Cahleiros Bomfim, *A Reforma do Judiciário, Projeto do Executivo - Exposição de Motivos, Substitutivo Accioly Filho - Emenda Constitucional N. 7 - Comentários* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Trabalhistas S.A., 1977).

25. President Geisel would later claim that the position of the MDB of total rejection of the project was what forced him to close down the Federal Congress so as to enact by decree the April Package Laws. However, as mentioned, the evidence provided by the press and by members of the government, such as General Hugo Abreu, suggest, on the contrary that the Geisel government forced the ARENA not to accept the substitute compromise drafted by one of its own members, Senator Accioly Filho. This substitute had the complete approval of the MDB and the OAB, meeting the requirements and the desires of the judiciary. The intransigent position adopted by the government, refusing any negotiations even within the ARENA party itself, indicates the prior intention of creating a stalemate and a crisis. An Executive-Legislative confrontation was created in a manner reminiscent to the events of 1968, a point which was not lost in the press's analyses.


27. The first time the Federal Congress was closed was in 1966 in a maneuver of intimidation to force the passing of the regulations which would determine the process of approval of the Constitution of 1967 in the manner desired by the government of Castelo Branco. The second time -- and its longest period of recess -- was in December 13, 1968, with the passing of Institutional Act Number Five. At that time Congress would only be reopened at the end of 1969 so as to vote in ratification of the choice for President. The third time was in April 1, 1977, as the culmination of the "crisis of the Judiciary Reform" and which allowed Geisel to pass the series of changes known as the "April Package Laws". The Federal Congress was closed by Complementary Act Number 102, of April 1, 1977, published in the *Diário Oficial da União* of April 2, 1977.
28. For an account of the twelve days of discussion and the drafting of the final version of Constitutional Amendments Numbers 7 and 8 see: General Hugo Abreu, O Outro Lado do Poder, op.cit., pages 68 to 71, and André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho in A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel, op.cit., page 117.

General Hugo Abreu claimed that the actual team that participated in the final drafting of the "package" included President Geisel, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Justice Minister Armando Falcão, Senator Petrônio Portella, Congressmen Marco Maciel and Francelino Pereira of the ARENA and Geisel's private secretary, Heitor Aquino. General Figueiredo, according to Hugo Abreu, had a more limited participation. However, the other authors mentioned maintain that basically only Golbery, Geisel, Heitor Ferreira, Petrônio Portella and General Figueiredo participated. Whatever the case it remains evident that the Constitutional Amendments had extremely limited representational significance in a country of over 30 million voters.

29. See the texts of both Amendments to the Constitution of 1969 in: A Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Promulgada em 17 de outubro de 1969 Contendo Emendas de Números 1 a 12 (Rio de Janeiro: Kennedy Editora e Distribuidora, Ltda, 1980), pages 99 (for Amendment Number 7) and 107 (for Amendment Number 8.)

An analytical study of the text of the amendments with commentary may be found in Paulino Jacques, As Emendas Constitucionais Números 7, 8 e 9: Explicadas (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Forense, 1977)

30. The Constitutions of 1967 and 1969 had maintained the principle of direct popular elections for the governors of the states. In 1972, however, the government of Médici became worried about the elections for governors in 1974 and enacted a specific Constitutional Amendment which would extend the indirect election process for governors of states for that election only. This was Constitutional Amendment Number Two to the Constitution of 1969, published in the Diário Oficial da União of May 11, 1972, regulating the elections of governors and vice-governors of the states in 1974.

The modification of Article 13 extended this measure to make it a permanent aspect of the Constitution.

31. In reality, the system of indirect elections of state governors was first introduced in Brazil after the victory of the opposition candidates in Minas Gerais and Guanabara in the elections of 1965. By April of 1977, as we have seen, the electoral growth of the MDB threatened to undermine the monopoly of power which the ARENA held and which allowed for almost virtual appointment of the governors by the federal Executive branch. Thus, the reforms of the April Package Laws were meant to strengthen the control of the ARENA over the process of choosing of governors.

The fact that indirect elections are used in different countries of Europe and the United States does not provide legitimacy to the
governments which will change the electoral rules by decree so as to maintain the *status quo* composition of power and openly justify such measures by the need to keep an opposition party from ever winning electoral posts even at state levels. It is both the manner or process of enactment of legislation and its expressed political intention that may provide it or deny it legitimacy.


33. For an analysis of this point see the article in *Véja*, April 6, 1977, page 29 "Os Riscos do Recesso".


35. This particular amendment also established the extension of the system of *sublegenda* for Senatorial elections which would allow each party to run up to three candidates for the same seat. The votes of all the candidates of the same party would add for the party. The party with most votes would win. And within the victorious party, the candidate with most votes would get the seat, the second most voted becoming the alternate.

This additional modification meant to calm the divisions within the ARENA party which would now be able to present several candidates representing different currents in each state. In fact it had some strange effects. For example, in the Senatorial elections of Pernambuco, in 1978, the MDB candidate, Jarbas Vasconcelos alone had almost as many votes as the two candidates of the ARENA added together. Yet, he lost the Senate seat for the addition of the two ARENA candidates gave the party the victory in the elections. The most voted ARENA candidate became the Senator although he had only a little more than half of the total votes received by the MDB candidate Jarbas Vasconcelos.

36. The addition of delegates from the municipal chambers to the Electoral College which should choose the governors, vice-governors and the one indirect Senator of each state strengthened the hold of the ARENA party and guaranteed a majority for the government in almost all states. Thus, in the indirect elections of September of 1978, the ARENA won the indirect seats of Senators and made the governors and vice-governors of 21 states. The MDB was able to maintain a majority control only in one state: Rio de Janeiro.

It should be noted that there were elections in 22 states only. Mato Grosso do Sul, which had just been made Brazil's 23rd state, was being organized and had a government appointed governor. See on this election *Jornal do Brasil*, August 31, 1978, page 3 "Arena faz 21 governadores amanhã e o MDB só elege um."

38. A modification of Article 75 of the Constitution of 1969 provided for the extension of the Presidential mandate to six years. See Ibid. page 71.

   It should be emphasized that the political importance of this extension of the Presidential term is that now President João Figueiredo shall be able to appoint almost all of the Ministers of the Federal Supreme Court and virtually all of the top commanders of the Army by the end of his term. This measure meant to guarantee the power of the present civil-military coalition even in the case of a possible opposition successor to President Figueiredo.


40. This measure was introduced as a modification of Article 48 of the Constitution of 1969 dealing with the voting process required for Constitutional Amendments to pass. See Paulino Jacques, Ibid. pages 69-70.


42. The main leaders of the opposition party, Senator Franco Montoro of São Paulo, Congressman Alceu Collares of Rio Grande do Sul, Congressman Alencar Furtado, the leader in the House and the President of the party, Ulysses Guimarães were the participants in this program. The program reached an estimated 21 million people. See the report in Veja, July 6, 1977, pages 25 to 28 "Um Sucesso de Público: Na Hora das Novelas a Voz e Imagem do MDB para 21 milhões".


45. Ibid. The state congressmen indicted were Dalton Canabrava and Aroldo Lopes da Costa, both of Minas Gerais. All in all, President
Geisel would use the Institutional Act Number 5 a total of twelve times during his term to cancel the political rights and the mandates of representatives. In only two cases were the mandates cancelled for reasons of corruption — and both of them involved members of the ARENA party.


In addition, President Geisel used the AI-5 to close down the State Assembly of Acre, in 1975, and to close the Federal Congress in 1977 so as to pass the April Package Laws.

46. Complementary Act Number 104. An account of this may be found in Veja, November 2, 1977, page 24 "MDB: Duchas Frias".

47. This element of emphasis in the MDB campaigns upon the plebiscital nature of the vote could be seen in the slogans used by opposition candidates. These included for example, the urge to fight with the ballot "The vote is your only weapon, put the vote in your hands" (O voto é sua única arma: ponha teu voto na mão) and "Vote against the government, vote MDB". Other slogans emphasized aspects of the government's repressive policies or economic policies: "Vote against torture"; "Vote Against the Wage Squeeze" (Vote contra o Arrocho).

The plebiscital nature of the elections was recognized also by ARENA candidates who found the party's name to be a disadvantage. One could often see campaign propaganda material of the candidates of the ARENA, emphasizing in large letters the name of the candidate and in extremely small print the name of the party. An account of this may be found in the article of Isto É, August 23, 1978, "ARENA-R.J.: Ninguém Quer Carregar Essa Legenda Pesada".

Other information on the campaigns of 1978 may be found in the press of the period. See, for example, Isto É, November 22, 1978, pages 4 to 22 "Os Efeitos do Casuísmo: O Governo Sobrevive a mais uma Avalanche do MDB. Isso é Vitória?; Isto É, August 23, 1978, pages 15 to 17; Veja, September 13, 1978, page 31 "Eleições Pena e Prazo" and Veja, November 8, 1978, pages 19-36 "O MDB em ascensão."


49. Results of the elections and analysis may be found in the following


50. See Jornal do Brasil September 1, 1978, page 4 "Menos de Dez Mil Votos Elegem 22 Senadores".

The ARENA was also favored in this election by the system of sublegenda which as we have seen was extended from municipal elections to app. y also for the one directly elected Senatorial seat.

51. For electoral analysis for each state see: As Eleições Nacionais de 1978, Volume I (Brasília, D.F.: Fundação Milton Campos, 1979) of various authors. See also, of various authors, As Eleições Nacionais de 1978, Volume II (Brasília, D. F.: Fundação Milton Campos, 1979). A detailed analysis of each state and each candidate may be found in Mário Moreira Alves and Artur Batista "As Eleições de 1978 no Brasil" in Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, n. 3., op. cit.

An article which questions the amount of political "renovation" in both parties is: David Fleischer "Os Eleitos à Câmara Federal- 1978: Renovação ou Imobilismo?" in As Eleições Nacionais de 1978, Volume I, Ibid. pages 59 to 73.

52. There was originally only a small group of Bishops who worked within the hierarchy to document the evidence of the reality of the repression and convince others that the occurrences of torture were not isolated acts but were systematic mechanisms of control. The Bishops established a "network" and met to study documentation and publish internal memos for discussion. Slowly others joined the original group in a process of consciousness raising by learning the facts of the oppressive reality. This process was related to me by a variety of sources, my own mother, Branca de Mello Franco Alves, followed the transformation of the Catholic Church closely and was an active participant in the process. Conversations with Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, Dom Hélder Câmara and Marina Bandeira confirm this view. Dom Paulo Arns commented specifically that even those most directly involved in the defense of political prisoners did not entirely perceive the strategy of control through the systematic use of torture until approximately the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973. The government denied the existence of torture.
When confronted with the proofs, the government claimed it was the act of isolated individual sadists, and that they would be stopped. Only in time did the hierarchy of the Church perceive the connection between the actual agencies of the Repressive Apparatus and the consistent denunciations of torture of prisoners. The strength of the evidence that torture was indeed systematic as a strategy of rule by fear moved the Church from a defensive position to one of offensive opposition to the violations of human rights. This last point may be seen in the tone which the official CNBB documents acquired progressively, in ever more open denunciations. See, for example, the following documents: Testemunho da Paz (Witness of Peace, message from Bródosqui, São Paulo), the first São Paulo document firmly opposing the widespread use of torture in 1972. Marginalização de um Povo (the Marginalizing of a People), message from the Bishops of the Northeast and the Center-West about the problems of land speculation, poverty and repression of the population in the area, 1973. Eu Ouvi os Clamores do Meu Povo (I have heard the Cry of my People) a statement of denunciation of the oppression of the people and the repressive forces in the Northeast of Brazil. Written collectively by all the Bishops of the Northeast in 1973. Finally, also of that time period, O Índio, Aquele que Deve Morrer (The Indian, He who Must Die), a document written by the Bishops of the states of Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Goiás, and Paraná in 1973. This document analyzed the situation of the Brazilian indian and the massacres which were occurring so as to occupy by force indian land. These documents may all be found in the archives of the CNBB. They have also been published in a collection of CNBB documents in Realidade Brasileira: Extra, Ano I, Number 3, February, 1977 (São Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977).

53. The official names of the organizations are: Pastoral da Terra; Pastoral Urbana; Pastoral da Igreja no Mundo; Pastoral da Família; Pastoral da Periferia; Pastoral dos Marginalizados; Pastoral da Favela; Pastoral do Mundo do Trabalho; Pastoral Operária; Pastoral do Negro; Pastoral do Menor and Pastoral dos Direitos Humanos. The work with the indian population is done through another agency of the CNBB, the Missionary Indian Council (Conselho Indigenista Missioná rio-CIMI).

The national plans of the CNBB also change every two years so that different Pastoral works have priorities in different times, depending upon the results of the studies, debates and discussions which are held throughout the nation to establish the areas of most immediate concern for targeting of work. These studies are discussed in the yearly Assembly of Brazilian Bishops in Itaici, São Paulo, which establishes the official guidelines of the work of the CNBB. At these assemblies, the position of the Church on various issues is publicly established in documents, pastoral letters and other informative materials.

Work with minors and abandoned children, for example may be done in coordination with either of these different pastorais but most particularly with the pastoral of human rights and the marginalized and the pastoral in the periphery poor areas.

55. Interview with Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns with the author, September 3, 1979. This interview was particularly focused on how the Archdiocese is organized and the different levels of coordination.

56. The Movement Against the Cost of Living, known either as Movimento Contra o Custo de Vida or Movimento Contra a Carestia began in 1973 but reached its climax in 1978. Thereafter the actual Catholic Church involvement has diminished in it. In 1978 the organizers of the movement set about making a petition to be taken to President Geisel. When the 3 months elapsed they organized an immense rally in the large square in front of the Cathedral of São Paulo with a religious service celebrated by Cardinal Arns. The police occupied the area and beat those who were around the Church.

A committee of representatives from the grassroot groups was elected to go to Brasília for an interview with the President to hand the petition with one and a half million names. They were not received. See the account of this episode in: Em Tempo, November 6 to 12, 1978, page 6. See also, for an account of the mass in the Cathedral and the repression, Isto É, March 22, 1978, pages 3 to 12. The history of the Movement Against the Cost of Living is detailed in the article in Caderno do CEAS, Number 57, September/October, 1978 "Cresce o Movimento Contra a Carestia" pages 20 to 33.

57. Interview with Cardinal Arns with the author, September 3, 1979.


60. Ibid. pages 90 to 91.

61. Ibid. page 91.


64. Excerpts from document approved in the Regional Assembly of the Bishops of the São Paulo area, held in Itaici from the 26 to the 30 of October, 1975. Não Oprimas Teu Irmão (Do not Oppress your Brother). In Secretariado da Comissão Episcopal Regional Sul-1. Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil – CNBB.

65. Ibid.

66. Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns. Sermon in the Cathedral of São Paulo, Catedral da Sé, during the religious service in memory of the death of journalist Vladimir Herzog. Quoted in: Fernando Jordão, Dossiê Herzog- Prisão, Tortura e Morte no Brasil (São Paulo: Global Editora e Distribuidora, Ltda, 1979). Fernando Jordão's detailed work contains an important account of the events preceding and following the death of Vladimir Herzog which includes the military investigations which eventually reached the official version of suicide.

67. The case of Manoel Fiel Filho is described in detail in the book of Fernando Jordão, just mentioned and also warranted a special Amnesty International report. See Amnesty International Newsletter of February, 1976. Of course the press of the period gave it headline coverage.

68. The swift measures taken by President Geisel are described in General Hugo Abreu's book, O Outro Lado do Poder, op.cit. See also the article in Opinião, January 23, 1976, page 3 "A Troca de Comando em São Paulo."

69. See the report of Luiz Henrique Romagnoli and Tânia Gonçalves A Volta da UNE in História Imediata, Number 5 (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega 1979).

Information on the reorganization period in 1977 and the repression of the students may be found in the press. See:

70. In História Imediata, Number 5, A Volta da UNE, op.cit.


73. See the report on this suit in Em Tempo, 3/9 July, 1978, page 3-5 and in Isto É, October 1, 1980, reporting the decision that the women will be paid damages and medical care.
74. The entire case and the sentence was reported in the study of the suit against the government, "Clarice, Ivo e André Herzog contra a União". Published in: Caso Herzog: A sentença: Integra do Processo Movido por Clarice, Ivo e André Herzog Contra a União (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Salamandra, 1978) with a preface of the then OAB President Raymundo Faoro. See also the articles in Em Tempo, June 26 to July 2, 1978, page 11, "O Outro Lado do Caso Herzog: Quase Tres Anos Depois, a Família do Jornalista Herzog consegue levar o Governo ao Banco dos Réus sob a acusaçao de Assassinato Político".

75. Interview with Antonio Modesto da Silveira, March 10, 1978. Modesto da Silveira has been one of the main lawyers who defended political prisoners since the civil-military takeover of State power in the coup d'état of 1964. He is at present a Congressman of the PMDB party for the state of Rio de Janeiro.

76. Interview with Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes, President of the OAB in 1980. Interview conducted on February 8, 1980.

See also the commentary of the Jornal do Brasil, February 2, 1979: "Novo Presidente da OAB-R.J diz que classe cansou dos muitos e confusos decretos."

77. Interview with Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes, February 8, 1980.

78. The Decree Laws tying the OAB to the administrative control of the Ministry of Labor were enacted as: Decree Law 7,400 of May 1, 1974 and Decree Law 74,296 of July 16, 1974. Both were signed by President Ernesto Geisel. See the analysis of the revoking of the decrees in Jornal do Brasil of February 15, 1978, page 9 "OAB Recupera Autonomia ao se Desvincular do Governo".


80. All of the papers presented at the annual meeting of the Bar Association, plus the minutes of the meetings, the resolutions, major addresses and conclusions are included in: Anais da V Conferência Nacional da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Federal da OAB, de 11 a 16 de agosto de 1974).
81. Ibid. citation from page 13.

82. Interview with Dr. Eduardo Seabra Fagundes, February 8, 1980.


84. For the publications of the works presented at the VII National Conference of the OAB, the Declaration of the Lawyers and the resolutions of the annual meeting see: Anais da VII Conferência Nacional da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, Curitiba, Paraná, 7 a 12 de maio de 1978. (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Federal da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, 1978). Most of the works dealt with the discussions of human rights, the right to habeas corpus, the Constitutional guarantees and the "State of Law" (Estado de Direito).

85 See, for example, the articles in: Folha de São Paulo, February 2, 1979, "Anistia e Constituinte são as Esperanças do Novo Conselho da OAB-SP" and Jornal do Brasil, April 2, 1979, "Seabra Fagundes Assume a OAB e Reclama Novas Reformas."

More detailed information on the different positions and the priorities of emphasis of the OAB throughout the years may be obtained in the newspaper of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, A Tribuna do Advogado, in the headquarters of the Conselho Federal da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro. The various regional departments of the OAB also publish newspapers and magazines. See, for example, the magazine of the Rio de Janeiro branch Revista OAB-Rio de Janeiro.


90. For details on the measures included in Amendment Number 11, also known as the "Reform Package", see: Jornal do Brasil, September

91. See all the articles which are mentioned above.

92. The measure of regulation of party fidelity forced all political representatives to remain in the same party under penalty of loss of electoral mandate. In addition, the regulation for party discipline forced members of a party to vote according to the decision of the leadership whenever an issue was considered by the party to be a matter "of closed question" (questão fechada). The penalty for infringing this rule and voting with the other party was also loss of mandate. Thus, the elimination of this regulation was beneficial for it allowed a freer interchange of ideas and cross-voting between the two parties.

93. On the other hand, the MDB suspected that the lifting of the regulation and the new modifications for the formation of new parties were meant to divide the opposition and end the plebiscital aspect of protest vote against the government's party. In addition, the new party rules were so stringent that in reality a freedom of party organization did not exist. All parties were held hostage to all elections and could lose their present representation if they did not meet the large percentage of votes required. This would afterwards be slightly reduced, as we shall see, in the Party Reform Bill of 1979. See on this particular measure, the article of Veja, June 21, 1978, page 24 "O Pacote e os Acertos na Constituição".


95. Thus it became clear that the modification of the quorum necessary to enact a Constitutional Amendment, reducing it from a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress to a simple majority, was a crucial measure that allowed the National Security State to negotiate only the areas which it believed could reduce political tension without really harming the main economic interests or modifying the economic model. The change of the quorum, it will be recalled, was introduced with the April Package Laws in 1977.

96. See the excellent article in the 0 Estado de São Paulo, February 26, 1978, page 5 "Segurança Nacional: O Limite da Reforma". See also Jornal do Brasil, May 17, 1978, page 3 "O Projeto para a Emergência" for details on the different aspects of the state of emergency.

98. The question of the "state of emergency" and the measures which are allowed to the Executive during its period of effective validity (which may be up to 180 days) is carefully analyzed by the jurist Goffredo da Silva Telles Junior in a paper presented at the VII National Conference of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, in Curitiba, Paraná, from the 7 to the 12 of May of 1978. See, Goffredo da Silva Telles Junior "O Estado de Sítio e as outras Salvaguardas" in **Anais da VII Conferência Nacional da OAB, Curitiba, Paraná, 7 a 12 de maio de 1978** (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Federal da OAB).

An important book of jurist Oscar Dias Correa thoroughly discusses all the measures available as extraordinary power to the Executive in the "state of emergency" clause of the Constitution. See: Oscar Dias Correa, **A Defesa do Estado de Direito e a Emergência Constitucional** (Rio de Janeiro: Presença Edições, 1980).


100. This analysis is based upon formal interviews and/or conversations with key members of the industrial elite particularly in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo. These included Severo Gomes, José Mindlin, Bardella, Einor Kock. The activities of the empresários was widely covered by the press of the period.

101. The successor of Geisel would be chosen according to certain procedures: the two political parties in existence would select their candidate by secret ballot in a National Convention. Then, on October 15, 1978, the Electoral College would meet to elect the President, in accordance to the rules stipulated in the Constitution of 1969 and amended in the Pacote de Abril to include not only the
Federal Congress and State Assemblies but also the delegates from the municipal chambers. Thus, the Electoral College composition would be the following: Federal Congressmen: 357 (203 of the ARENA and 154 of the MDB). Senators: 64 (44 of the ARENA and 20 of the MDB). With the addition of delegates of the municipal chambers and State Assemblies the total composition of the Electoral College which would elect the successor to President Geisel (and is also to elect the successor to President João Figueiredo in 1984) would be well controlled by the government. In 1978 this Electoral College totalled 589 delegates from the Congress and the states and municipalities.

The composition of the Electoral College is established by Paragraphs 1 and 2, of Article 74 of the Constitution as regulated by Complementary Law Number 15, of October 13, 1973, and as further altered by Decree-Law Number 1,539, of April 14, 1977. The President and the vice President are elected in the same slate by open and nominal votes of all the delegates.

102. For an account of Figueiredo's choice as the successor of Geisel already in the early days of 1974 see: André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel, op.cit.

103. The conflict between the SNI and the CIEX is described in the works of General Hugo Abreu, O Outro Lado do Poder and Tempo de Crise, op.cit. Specific discussions may also be found in: Latin America Political Report, November 18, 1977, Volume XI, Number 45, page 357 "Brazil: Spying scapegoats". André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho in their A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel discuss the matter on pages 126 through 133. See also the detailed account in Walder de Gêes' book, O Brasil do General Geisel,op.cit., in particular pages 75 to 101.

104. On this point see the description of the behind-the-scenes power struggles and use of the networks of the SNI and the CIEX in General Hugo Abreu's detailed discussions in O Outro Lado do Poder, op.cit. pages 77 to 166.

105. The dismissal of General Sylvio Frota was the most serious crisis of the Geisel government and received ample coverage in the press. Accounts of the episode are also found in: General Hugo Abreu, O Outro Lado do Poder, op.cit. Chater V " A Crise Militar de Outubro de 1977" pages 125 to 151; André Gustavo Stumpf and Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel, op.cit. chapter "A Queda de Frota" pages 125 to 138 and Walder de Gêes, O Brasil do General Geisel, op.cit. chapter III "A Demissão do General Frota", pages 73 to 101.
106. For more information on the alternative opposition candidacy of General Euler Bentes Monteiro by the MDB party in the Electoral College of 1978 see the complete account of the organization of the candidacy, the negotiations within the military and the contacts with the MDB party so as to launch the opposition candidate against Figueiredo in General Hugo Abreu: *Tempo de Crise*, op.cit. The entire book, practically, deals with the candidatura of General Euler Bentes Monteiro, of which General Hugo Abreu was one of the principal organizers.


CHAPTER TEN: THE PERIOD OF THE ABERTURA AND THE POPULAR MOVEMENT:
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I. Introduction.

The period of the government of General João Batista Figueiredo officially established a policy of abertura -- political opening. The period of abertura is here understood as a policy of liberalization marking the continuity of the third stage of institutionalization of the National Security State which began with President Geisel's policy of "decompression" in 1974. President Geisel's government was characterized by a policy of liberalization interrupted by the violent wave of repressive action in 1975 and 1976, a second time with the closing of the Federal Congress and the enactment by decree of the April Package Laws and resumed after 1977. President Figueiredo's term in government became characterized in an enlargement of the policy of liberalization within the strict parameters established by the concept of "strong democracy" layed out in the combination of measures passed by Geisel. Hence, just as his predecessors had done, General Figueiredo began his term in office with a promise to restore full democratic rights to the country and inaugurated a fourth phase of liberalization.

The abertura policy -- as was the case with the "decompression" -- established a distinct program of planned stages of liberalization which were carefully controlled by the major political strategists of the State. It was to be a policy of limited opening of political space sufficient to defuse elite opposition sectors, reach a new social pact with the organized elite opposition groups and, thus, provide the National Security State with greater stability and wider support base.
During this phase of the institutionalization of the National Security State, the policies were characterized by several principal concerns. Under the guidance of General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who became the foremost political strategist of the State, the policy of abertura should achieve some primary goals:

1. The abertura was definitely a policy of continuity of the "decompression". The government of General Figueiredo inherited a framework suitable for a "strong democracy". The parameters of this "relative democracy" had been carefully established by the Constitutional Amendments numbers 7 (judiciary controls), number 8 (electoral controls), number 11 (the Reform Package and the "state of emergency" safeguard) as well as by the electoral period silence of the Lei Falcão, the prohibition of cassados from participating in elections, the press controls under the Lei de Imprensa and last, but not least, the powers of intimidation in the National Security Law which in 1978 was reformed by Geisel mainly to decrease penalty terms — therefore making it in fact more applicable and flexible.

2. The abertura policy, however, would attempt to curb the growth of the bureaucracy necessary for the maintenance of strict controls and thus would search for stability based not on constant coercion but upon a new social pact with key elite groups of the opposition. Thus the State would aim at a certain de-centralization of power to allow for greater participation in decision making of the private industrialists and an effort to coopt important elite sectors of the opposition by offering limited sharing of power.
3. The new social pact should characterize a quest for stability based upon a continuing search for legitimation through the electoral process with an expanded social-political base of support for the State.

In the process of attempting to deal with the new challenges presented by its dialectical relationship with the opposition the contradictions within the National Security State were greatly enhanced during the period of government of General João Figueiredo. This would become manifested by a growing struggle for power between the groups most intimately connected to the Doctrine of Internal Security -- the comunidade de informações, which now formed a virtual parallel power group -- and the sectors committed to the policy of abertura itself.

Hence, the contradictions between the Permanent National Objectives of perfecting a "strong democracy" with certain liberal guarantees and the requirements of the Doctrine of Internal Security would surface and, in time, paralyze the State with the duality of purposes and power.

This contradiction was reflected in the differing reactions of the State to the various opposition groups: At the same time that the National Security State planners negotiated with the opposition for political amnesty and for greater freedoms in party organization, the State utilized the full power of the Repressive Apparatus against the nascent social movement manifested in the wave of strikes, in the organization in the neighborhoods, in the peripheries of the cities and in the countryside. Repression, thus, became selective and class-based.
The National Security State, therefore, would clearly define both the parameters and limits of the kind of democratic system envisioned by those in power. The Permanent National Objectives, as had been earlier understood in liberal democratic terms, were revised within the stricter framework of the "strong democracy" meant to limit the participation of hitherto excluded sectors of the population. In addition, the National Security State would define the boundaries of acceptable and non-tolerable opposition. Groups connected to the working class and peasant social movements -- secular or Church-related -- met with continued and systematic repression. Other sectors which were not believed to be sufficiently organized to reach the defined level of "antagonism" or "pressure" and provide a challenge to the State, as defined in the National Security Doctrine, were allowed to reorganize and were offered participation in the government decisions. This comprised the policy of the "extended hand" which General João Figueiredo continuously emphasized.

From the point of view of the opposition, this was also a rich period of learning to cope with new challenges. Four main aspects of the opposition during the liberalization period should be highlighted: First, the elite groups of opposition, of the CNBB, the OAB, the ABI and the groups organized in the MDB party played a crucial role both during the Geisel and the Figueiredo governments. Their importance was that they opened political space by confronting the State
from their position of authority in civil society and by questioning the very legitimacy which the National Security State sought. It was the elite groups which, at that point, could best pressure the State for steps towards significant liberalization measures and political civil guarantees.

Secondly, the elite organized opposition sectors served the function of constantly blocking the attempts of the State to reinstate measures of coercion. The experience of elite groups engaged in the levels of formal politics provided obstacles to the realization of the new social pact by refusing the parameters of the "strong democracy" and thereby extending the universe of demands to the dismantling of the Repressive Apparatus, the drafting of a representative new Constitution and the modification of the economic model itself. It is a point of importance that the liberal sectors of the national bourgeoisie joined in this latter effort by demanding more participation in the economic policies of the government.

The third significant aspect of this period was the surfacing to the political arena of the popular movement composed of an alliance between the Church-related *comunidades de base*, the secular grassroot groups and the new labor union movement both in the countryside and in the urban areas. The activities in the formal level, by blocking the State's attempts of limitation, amplified the political space available to all opposition groups. With the end of Institutional Act Number Five there were new legal possibilities for the organization
in the grassroot. The popular movement would then surface as a key actor in the political process.

It should be pointed out that the organization at the base was a constant effort which never ceased even during the most violent periods of repression. The union opposition movements began as early as 1965, both in the rural and in the urban areas. It gained significant force by 1968, suffered a severe setback with the Institutional Act Number Five but changed directions and proceeded to reorganize slowly in the neighborhoods, in the factories, in the rural areas, and in the Basic Christian Communities. By 1975, for example, there were already an estimated 50,000 comunidades de base in existence throughout the nation. During the more liberalized period of President Geisel's government, the popular movement found paths to the surface and exploded in the political arena with the giant strike of the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema in 1978. Thus, the grassroot, base-related politics and the formal political levels ran a parallel course in the developing resistance to the National Security State.

The fourth significant aspect of the abertura period was the learning process of overlapping the two levels of formal and base-related politics. The popular social movement that became a predominant force in the political arena provided a challenge to the economic model of development by increasingly putting forth the question of extending the universe of political participation in the decisions of government to excluded sectors of civil society.
In the process of confrontation between the growing social movement of the marginalized sectors of the society and the State, the points of coordination and mutual interests between elite sectors engaged in the formal level and the vital social movement at the grassroot began to be found. The dynamic process of struggle and confrontation with the repression of the State established an inter-dialectic between the opposition groups and sectors themselves, forcing an interplay in self-defense which changed the positions and views of each of the sectors -- thus developing the network of connection.

The grassroot movements, the new labor union movement, the peasant networks, the rural unions and the base groups of the Catholic Church would find in the level of formal politics a support in periods of crisis. The inter-relationship between the sectors of the opposition provided new challenges and modified both the opposition itself and the National Security State. In this chapter we shall examine in particular the development of the grassroot and base-related opposition and the inter-connections between the various opposition sectors in their dialectical relationship to the policies of the new institutionalized "strong democracy" National Security State.

II. The Controlled Plan of the Abertura.

General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the main political strategist of the government's abertura policy, analyzed the contradictions of the State and outlined his "master plan " for the continuation of this third phase of State institutionalization.
According to General Golbery there were three primary problems of concern for the State: 1. The tendency of all decisions, both administrative and political, to become increasingly centralized in the Executive power. The bureaucratic entanglements of such a situation became a growing problem for the State for when decisions are so alarmingly concentrated in just one branch matters of small importance anywhere in the vast nation tend to become a State concern. The result is an expanding and inefficient bureaucracy which, in fact, could become difficult to bring under control.

We marched, unconsciously, to a maximum of centralization, side by side with a maximum of inefficiency, in a concentration process which could be -- in its final extreme -- compared to the phenomenon of the "black holes" which have been detected by modern astronomy and where even the light of the star itself cannot escape the growing gravitational force." 2

Hence, it was absolutely necessary to decentralize and share power and decisions not only with states and municipalities but with other groups in civil society. 2. The extreme centralization of the networks of intelligence and the security forces caused by a "rigidity in the system of social control" contributed to the tendency for centralizing decisions of power and to the danger of loss of control. This resulted in the further possibility of a rupture of the "social structure which became subjected to intolerable pressures caught as it were in the limits of centralization-decentralization of the State." 3

This pressure in the social structure threatened the credibility of the State. Thus, it was necessary to continue the liberalization policy.
Clearly, General Golbery was keenly aware of the legitimation problems of the National Security State and sought to develop more flexible social control mechanisms which would restore a measure of credibility and thus ensure the longevity of the system itself. On the other hand, he wished to avoid over-extending the parameters of the "strong democracy" and not allow for the inclusion of excluded sectors whose very participation would force a complete structural modification of the State and of the economic model. These points were expressed in his remarks that a point of equilibrium should be sought: "in order to avoid permissiveness", but, nonetheless, that it was crucial that the social system be made more open:

The social system must be made more flexible so as to win back, in spite of the inevitable periods of renewed force of coercion, a measure of credibility as to the intentions of the government and the future of the liberalization process itself."

Hence the parameters of the system were established: renewed periods of coercion so as to curb "permissiveness" -- particularly curb the growing social movement which demanded a transformation of the model and of the State itself -- combined with more flexible mechanisms to coopt the elite organized sectors of the opposition.

3. The third crucial institutional blockage to the State's definite institutionalization, Golbery stated, was the bi-polar extremes of confrontation of "government versus opposition". By definition the groups in power were the institutionalized government. The rest was the opposition. Although, as he recognized, there were strong currents within the opposition and a heterogeneity which should
naturally keep all groups apart, the bi-polar character of the centralized
State would neutralize the differences in the opposition and concretize
the unity within a variety of viewpoints. This was not in the interests
of the State. Thus, the State should attempt to break this alarming
opposition unity:

The strategy would recommend us, in fact would even
require us, to proceed with a liberalization in order
to achieve the disarticulation of the opposition system
and allow the birth of different and multiple fronts ... the heterogeneity which is inherent in the opposition
should facilitate such an objective. In political terms,
this is the proposition of a policy for a plurality of
parties. 5

In addition, Golbery recognized that the MDB was a conglomerate
of diverse opposition groups which acted politically through the only
legal channel for the expression of viewpoints. Such non-political
groups included cultural associations, professional associations,
trade unions and religious organizations. These played a political
role mainly because there were no other available political channels
and they entered the vacuum leaving their normal functions in society.
Politically, their only organization was within the MDB party. Thus
it was in the interest of the National Security State’s longterm
institutionalization to dissociate all such organizations from the
opposition front and allow them to return to their specific concerns.
The end of the MDB should accomplish such a purpose.

As a final warning, General Golbery told his colleagues of the
Superior War College that, if the liberalization policy did not
proceed and the level of coercion continued high, "the negative
pressures, which today are so strong as to be almost unbearable, would again accumulate in an increasingly rapid rate and would eventually risk the end of the entire system." 6

Thus, a careful "master plan" of continued decompression should open the political system sufficiently to allow the steam of the "pressure cooker" to escape. There was a careful timetable:

1. In 1979 there would be a partial political amnesty. This would have to be restricted and reciprocal -- to include all the military who were directly involved in the repression and the torture. Such a measure should placate the hardline sectors of the military.

2. After the political amnesty was granted in 1979, a Party Reform Bill would be forced through the Federal Congress. This bill would extinguish both the MDB and the ARENA, thereby eliminating the bi-polar characteristic of the plebiscite vote. In addition, the bill should set strict limitations for the formation of new political parties so that they could be controlled from the onset and avoid the birth of mass political popular parties.

3. The scheduled municipal elections of 1980 would have to be postponed so as to allow the strengthening of the governental position.

4. In 1981 the government would begin discussion of an electoral reform which would prohibit party coalitions, change the regulations of the sublegendas, of the propaganda in radio and in television as well as devise a system of district voting.

5. In 1982 there would be direct elections for senators, governors,
congressmen and mayors. The "bionic" senator would be eliminated for now it was a factor of credibility harm to the government. Not, however, until the present term in office of the "bionics" of 1978 was ended in 1986. This should guarantee the governmental majority in the Senate until then as well as in the Electoral College which would choose Figueiredo's successor.

6. In 1983, finally, the government would send to the Congress a project for a Constitutional Reform. This would not be a Constituent Assembly, freely elected for the purpose, but rather would repeat the process conducted by President Castello Branco for the Constitution of 1967. The Constitution needed to be revised to eliminate a multitude of divergent and contradictory amendments.

The National Security State attempted to follow this careful "master plan" devised by General Golbery do Couto e Silva. However, its dialectical relationship to the opposition would not allow the total success of the legitimation program, in many places backfiring against the State and accumulating new contradictions. In the next sections we shall examine the dynamics of the process of implementation of the "master plan".

1. Political Amnesty (1979)

Political amnesty had been one of the lingering and strongest demands of the opposition since the very early days of Institutional Act Number One. It had been a strong point in the program of the Frente Ampla in the period 1967-1968, was defended by the student movement of that period and after the reorganization of the UNE and
one of the major organizational issues of the Catholic Church and the family members of all the persecuted people. In 1975 the issue of political amnesty surfaced more strongly in the political arena with the organization of the Feminine Movement For Amnesty (*Movimento Feminino pela Anistia*). Led by Thereza Zerbini, the wife of a *cassado* General, this movement grew and united the wives, mothers, daughters and sisters of all who had been in some manner under the effect of the repressive forces of the State. Hence it was a powerful emotional and political pressure movement. Finally, in 1978, with the collaboration of some of the early civilian and military supporters of the National Security State, including former Military Supreme Court Minister General Pery Bevilacqua, the Brazilian Committee for Amnesty was formed (*Comitê Brasileiro pela Anistia*). In connection with the previously existent amnesty group, the CBA coordinated the activities of pro-political amnesty sectors in every major state of the union.

The strength of the pro-political amnesty had become so definite that the issue of political amnesty, by 1978, could no longer be ignored by the National Security State. The two main movements for political amnesty had conducted debates, organized large marches, demonstrations, street rallies and lobbied effectively in the National Congress for a bill which would provide political amnesty for all prisoners and for those who had been in any manner purged or persecuted by virtue of the three principal Institutional Acts and their followers. The fact that the Acts themselves were in the process of being revoked made it difficult to continue to deny the granting of amnesty.
However, the contradictions in the National Security State were particularly pertinent to this issue. The hardline sectors most closely associated with the Repressive Apparatus and responsible for the enforcement of the Doctrine of Internal Security, applied extremely high levels of pressure upon the government of Figueiredo. Two points had to be granted to them: amnesty should not include any opposition members who had taken up arms against the State and amnesty should definitely include those military personnel who had participated in the repression of the armed rebellion, who were present members of the security forces and the Repressive Apparatus, and were being accused of torturing political prisoners.

A restrictive Amnesty Bill was introduced in Congress and voted under the threat of the decurso de prazo regulation of automatic approval of the original version. The bill did not grant amnesty for those who were involved in the armed struggle, charged with having committed what the government defined as "crimes of blood". In addition, those political prisoners who had been sentenced for attempting to reorganize an illegal party (under the National Security Law) could only request political amnesty. Their cases could then be individually considered. Members of the armed forces who had been purged and dismissed for political reasons would not be allowed to return to their jobs but would receive full retirement pay instead of their partial pensions. Public employees, diplomatic personnel, university professors and members of the judiciary would be allowed
to return to their jobs after a period of special investigation to be carried out by a special committee which would be set up for that purpose. Political leaders would be allowed to regain their political rights. All exiles would be allowed to return to the country.

The matter of the eligibility of the cassados, however, was left not entirely decided for under Article 185 of the Constitution of 1969 those punished by the Institutional Acts, plus trade unionists removed from their posts, cannot run for elections. It was promised that this Article of the Constitution would be revoked but, to the present, this has not happened.

The Amnesty bill was the product of intense negotiations with the opposition. Now it had become clear that the opposition held such strength that the National Security State was forced to deal with it under more equal conditions and negotiate. Although a distinct compromise between the pressures of the opposition and those of the sectors of the military involved in the Doctrine of Internal Security and the control of the "enemy within" the Amnesty Bill must be considered a victory after the opposition's fifteen years of lobbying and political organization.

On the other hand, of course, the continued existence of the National Security Law to some extent dimmed the actual effect and the spirit of the Amnesty Bill. For the effect of amnesty was only retroactive and there were left, of course, open possibilities for new trials, new arrests, new sentences and new exiles. In this
respect, the Amnesty Bill of 1979 served to wipe out the past
teen years -- including the blanket pardon for all who were
accused of actual torture and repression of the population -- but
would not defuse the continuation of the pressures for amnesty
and for political freedom. There were now new prisoners who would
appeal to the support of opposition groups. Hence, the pressure of
the hardliners prevented the National Security State from being able
to accomplish its primordial goal in the passing of the Amnesty Bill:
the defusing of opposition and dismembering of the amnesty movement.

The legitimacy which could have been gained by the enactment
of a complete, total and unrestricted Amnesty Bill was undermined
by the inclusion of the blanket pardon to torturers. The law elimi-
nated the possibility of criminal indictment of those accused of
torturing. This is a serious setback for not only does the impunity
of torture criminals encourage the continuation of the practice of
torture (of common prisoners and even suspects now) but the blanket
pardon prevents the examination and elucidation of the activities of
the Repressive Apparatus itself.


The Party Reform Bill of 1979 was in careful consistency to
the "master plan" of the abertura. The MDB party resisted the clear
effort to cancel its existence and registration. The official opposition
party threatened to appear and be reborn from its ashes "like a
Phoenix which is reborn". In the background, however, the opposition
members knew that they did not hold sufficient majority in the Congress to prevent the enactment of the bill which would self-destruct the two parties. The ARENA members, as we have pointed out, did not particularly wish to continue to carry the weight of such an unpopular party name. They would much rather change the name of their party and disconnect themselves from a party name so closely identified with the unpopular policies of the State. The opposition party, by itself, would not gather sufficient votes to defeat the project.

Hence, in the backstage, the opposition was busily organizing alternative political parties -- even while openly resisting the destruction of the MDB. The largest sector of the coalition of liberal to socialist members of the MDB planned to recreate the exact same party "like the Phoenix from its ashes" including the maintenance of the name. Another sector of the opposition party, led by ex-governor Leonel Brizola, was intent upon the re-organization of the extinct PTB so as to benefit from the trabalhista tradition of the populist period. In addition, by the mid-1979, a new party was in the process of formation in the grassroots movements and in part of the labor movement: the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) which did not quite fit into the plan of the National Security State's strategists.

From the viewpoint of the State, the party law had to accomplish several major goals of the "master plan" of permanent institutionalization:

1. The MDB had to be abolished and broken up into different parties.
2. The group which remained coalesced and resurfaced "from the ashes"
could not be allowed to use the name of the MDB because of the strong electoral appeal and the tendency of the electorate to vote for the party rather than for the personal candidates. 3. The PTB, on the other hand should be encouraged -- though not under the control of Leonel Brizola who had to be removed from the scene. The PTB could potentially establish a strong center party which would electorally compete with the new MDB and the more ideologically defined PT. This could be done under the guidance of Ivete Vargas, Brizola's competitor for control of the party and a close friend of General Golbery do Couto e Silva. 4. Finally, the organizational framework of political parties had to be made extremely difficult so as to prevent the organization of mass-based political parties that could present a severe challenge to the National Security State's repressive policies for the continuation of the economic model of development.

The final Party Reform Law of 1979 attempted to accomplish all the major goals of the government. The principal regulations were:

1. The parties which were created by Complementary Act Number 4 of November 20, 1965 (MDB and ARENA) were officially extinguished. 11

2. All parties to be formed had, by force of Article 5 of the Party Reform Bill, to include the word "party" in its name. This was meant to prevent the MDB from utilizing its old name -- Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. 12 The party which was reborn from the ashes of the MDB "Phoenix" adroitly circumvented this stipulation simply by adding the word "Party" to the front of its name: Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - PMDB). In addition, so as to highlight the
continuity of the old MDB party, the propaganda material of the PMDB usually prints the "P" in light colors and the "MDB" in strong dark contrasting colors.

3. Article 5 also attempted to prevent the legal organization of the nascent Workers' Party (PT). Item III explicitly prohibited "the use of a term which elicits an affiliation by appealing to religious beliefs or feeling of class or of race." It was hoped that the Superior Electoral Tribunal would refuse to grant the registration of the Workers' Party with the claim that it was a class-based party. This particular attempt of social control of the State was defeated by the PT which argued successfully in the Superior Eleitoral that it could not be considered strictly a "class party" since it included members from peasant and working class backgrounds as well as many members of the middle professional classes, students and intellectuals -- indeed its appeal was not particularly to one class but rather to those who agreed with its program.

4. The clause which should keep the Brazilian Communist Party illegal was more successful. The bill simply maintained the regulations which had existed in all previous party bills and utilized to prevent the legality of the PCB.

5. The measures which were to make organization of parties difficult were of mixed benefit for the National Security State. On the one hand, the complicated mechanism for temporary registration which had to be fulfilled in the period of 12 months indeed presented difficulties to
all the opposition parties. To get a permanent registration, in addition, a party had to carry out Regional Conventions in at least nine states and municipal conventions in at least $\frac{1}{5}$ of the total municipalities in each of the 9 different states.

Furthermore, another rule of the Party Reform Bill established that parties could only hold municipal conventions in municipalities where they already had affiliated a minimum number of people. This minimum number was calculated according to a complex formula which favored the organization of small municipalities.

Governmental political analysts believed that this requirement would favor the organization of the new replacement party of the government, now named Social Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Social PDS). For the PDS would be able to use the vast resources of the federal State and the bureaucratic apparatuses of all the different states so as to quickly organize the necessary number of municipalities in the states which had numerous small towns and were thus more open to clientelistic relations. On the other hand, the states with large municipalities -- the traditional strongholds of the opposition -- would have a larger minimum membership requirement and thus it would be much more difficult to set up conventions in a sufficient number of municipalities ($\frac{1}{5}$ of those in the state) to be able to have Regional Conventions in 9 states.

The members of political parties and potential candidates for office were allowed to freely exchange parties for a definite period.
This exchange period ended on November 15, 1981 one year prior to the scheduled federal, state, and municipal elections of 1982. After this period ended the members of the parties could no longer switch or vote against the leadership rule. The regulation of fidelidade partidária would thereby return to the political universe. 18

Coalitions between the various parties for the elections for the House of Representatives, the State Assemblies and the municipal chambers were explicitly prohibited by the Party Reform Law's Article 19. However, nothing was mentioned about alliances for the elections for governors and senators. This would be a matter for later negotiations. 19 Other electoral reforms would also be negotiated in 1981 and 1982. These would include the extension of the sublegenda system for the gubernatorial direct elections of 1982 a measure that would benefit the governmental party (by allowing groups to remain together) and further divide the opposition. 20

The results of these stipulations, from the point of view of the opposition was mixed. On the one hand, the prohibition of party coalitions for the House, State and municipal assemblies was a blow which would divide the opposition's strength by forcing the parties to compete with each other in more local level elections. The possibility of a similar prohibition for the elections for senators and governors loomed threatening. These measures would prevent the parties from uniting at times of election and organizing independent interests in other periods. This would endanger even the present mandates of many ex-MDB members who had been elected in 1978 and would be up for reelection.
On the other hand, the harsh conditions for the legal registration of a political party forced the various sectors of the opposition to actively engage in the organization at the formal and grassroot levels in order to complete all the intricate requirements in the short time allotted to the parties. Thus the years of 1979, 1980 and 1981 would be characterized by the dynamic activity of thousands of militants who busily went about the business of party organization in local levels.

Such a situation not only developed deeper ties between the levels of formal and informal politics, but also brought to the grassroot the discussions of political alternatives, of party organization, of party programs, of representative mechanisms and of democratic participation within the opposition parties. Although the competition at electoral periods indeed may loom as a real danger for the parties of the opposition, nonetheless it remains true that the political debate which was forced by the strict State regulations became a rich process which has contributed to the future political organization of the grassroot sectors previously non-involved in party participation and in the level of formal politics.

As such the Party Reform Bill may in the long run backfire by accomplishing the very politicization of the associations, unions and organizations of civil society which Golbery wished to "drive back to their normal roles" and out of politics. Once more, the desire to control political and civil society unleashed new opposition energy in manners unexpected and unplanned by the State. In addition, the opposition parties all managed to complete all the requirements in time for the temporary registration, as seen in Table 10.1:
### Table 10.1

#### NUMBER OF DIRECTORIES FORMED BY THE NEW PARTIES IN COMPARISON TO THE TOTAL NUMBER FORMED BY THE OLD PARTIES - MDB AND ARENA

(October of 1980)

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<th>STATE</th>
<th>ARENA</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>MDB</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>PTB</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>Number of Municipal</th>
<th>20% of Municipal</th>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>3,066</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>3,959</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
1) The column 20% of the municipalities refers to the minimum number of directories which the parties must form in each state in order to obtain the registration. They have to have this minimum in at least 9 states. 2) The territories were not included because they are of little electoral importance. 3) The directories of the ARENA and MBD in the present states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Mato Grosso do Norte have been added together (MS) for the state was only one then. 4) The number of provisional committees of each small party is what was presented for temporary registration. 5) We did not include the presidential vote of the PTB which permitted it to obtain the minimum number in the law for Rio de Janeiro and for Rio Grande do Sul.

**SOURCE:** Movimento, November 3 to 9, 1980, page 4.
Table 10.1 presents the number of directories which had been formed by October of 1980 by the new parties and in comparison to the total number of directories organized by the ARENA and the MDB in their entire 14 years of existence.

The PMDB was able to fulfill this requirement in virtually all states of the nation in the short period from the end of 1979 to October of 1980. In fact the PMDB did rise "from its ashes like a Phoenix" and, within one year, had already organized regional and municipal offices in almost as many localities as the old MDB party had been able to set up in its entire fourteen years of existence.

The second largest opposition party, the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) had fulfilled the requirements in 11 states. The PP is the party of the center, a conservative opposition party which has the support of the members of the national bourgeoisie and national bankers who oppose the policies of the isolated National Security State.

The position of the PT as the third largest opposition party was, perhaps the most surprising. It too was able to fulfill the requirements within one year and had organized at least 20 percent of the municipalities in 12 different states. Brizola maintained the traditionally trabalhista regions of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina and divided almost equally with Ivete Vargas the remainder of the trabalhista tradition. Although Brizola had suffered a severe blow when he lost the name PTB to his rival Ivete Vargas, his new party,
the Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, PDT) managed to retain considerable influence in spite of the loss of the name.

The total number of directories which were organized by all five different opposition parties by October of 1980 was 4,513. It should be noted at this point that the old MDB party, in its entire fourteen years of existence, had been able to organize only 2,979 directories. Thus, the combined force of the 5 opposition parties almost doubled the number of politically active local offices in the short period of one year.

In terms of Congressional representation, the opposition parties left the government with a scant majority control of the House of Representatives. However, all the "bionic" senators went to the governmental party -- the PDS -- and allowed the government to maintain a comfortable majority in the Senate. Together, in October of 1980, the 5 opposition parties had a total of 199 Federal Congressmen and the PDS' had 213. This difference would diminish in 1981 when many of the PDS members changed parties and joined either the PP or the PMDB. In the Senate, the majority hold of the government also became smaller than in the past arrangements: The PDS had a total of 37 Senators and the five opposition parties together had 28 Senators. 22

The unforeseen result of the alliance of the grassroot movements with the level of formal politics creates another challenge to the
"master plan" controlled *abertura*. The timetable electoral plan of the government called for sweeping electoral reforms in 1981 and 1982 to benefit the PDS and harm the electoral chances of the various opposition parties. However, it becomes increasingly difficult to devise mechanisms of electoral control which benefit only the government's party and weakens the opposition. For example, one such reform which was planned was the establishment of a district system of voting. With deeper analysis it was discovered that such a system may benefit some opposition parties as well as the PDS—in particular the PMDB and the PT which have developed strong local ties with neighborhood organizations, *comunidades de base* and cell like networks with unions in urban and rural areas. A party such as the PT, largely based on units of small local organization (the *núcleos*) might greatly benefit from the more localized system of district representation. The system of *sublegenda*, planned to weaken the opposition and keep the PDS together has encountered strong opposition in the government's own party, for it diminishes the exclusive power of the local state bosses.

The one catch which may indeed benefit the government and weaken all the opposition parties is the minimum voting requirement for the Legislative elections. According to the Party Reform Bill, a party which does not receive at least 5 percent of the support of the electorate in a Congressional election—distributed in at least 9 different states with a minimum of 3 percent of the votes in each
state shall lose the right to representation in the Federal Senate, in the House of Representatives and in the State Assemblies. In addition, all the votes which are given to the candidates of such a party will be considered void and the party will have to try again.\textsuperscript{23}

It will be difficult for such a party to survive for the demoralization caused by the loss of all representation might discourage political activity and diminish the influence of the party upon affiliates. In addition, the real catch is that parties which are close to the grassroot -- in particular the PMDB and the PT -- are in such a manner forced to compete with each other for their independent survival. Their division may not only confuse the population and the militants of the grassroot organizations but may have an effect of mutual cancellation where they both lose significant representation. The problem will be greatly magnified in the elections of 1982 if two other aspects come into play: 1. The government still has the power to pass further regulations prohibiting coalitions for the gubernatorial and the senate posts. That would force all opposition parties to present candidates in all levels and may well hand over state power to the government's PDS. 2. The government may, alternatively, extend the minimum percentage voting requirement to the elections for the State Assemblies, the municipal chambers and for governors. Thus, every party will have to win 5 percent of the support in 9 different states (with a minimum of 3 percent in each) at all levels. This would be extremely difficult to accomplish. The opposition thus, has risked losing membership in representative chambers.
III. The Grassroot Movements: Informal Politics.

In order to understand the implications of political channeling of participation represented by the new political parties it is now opportune to consider the growth of the movements which are related to the realm of politics termed "grassroot or base-related politics".

The term base is here used in the sociological meaning of political activities of an associative, syndicalist or pressure-group nature within working class, peasant or marginalized sectors of the population. In addition, within the discussion of the trade union movement (rural and urban) the term base then refers to rank-and-file as opposed to leadership levels of organization.

The grassroot movements in Brazil, as mentioned, developed in time and almost in a parallel nature to the level of formal politics. They comprise the universe of the variety of struggles within the official trade union structure to win back leadership of unions under intervention or to activate "dead" or "ghost" unions. In addition, the grassroot movements comprise the vast peasant and rural union activities in the countryside, for the defense of land or for the defense of working rights. The third element of the grassroot movements is comprised of the secular organizations in the neighborhoods to press for immediate improvement of the district. Finally, within the larger universe of the grassroot movements, there are the Church-related levels which are both independent of the secular organizations and organically connected to them in the particular issues.
Indeed, many of the organizations have existed prior to the 1964 takeover of the State and have been activated by groups of militant opposition members at the base level in response to the conditions of growing oppression, inequality and poverty. At the grassroot levels, as in the elite formal politics levels, the opposition was able to utilize existent structural organizations for the purpose of organization and mobilization of the population to press for the participation in the social and economic decisions of government.

This activation of the grassroot began to take place slowly during the years of the military regimes and became stronger with the advent of the "economic miracle" with its resultant policy of income concentration and inequality. Hence, they represent a direct popular response in self-defense against the brutality of the living conditions imposed upon the majority of the working population.

By 1978-1979, the process of capitalist development which occurred in Brazil had resulted in a radical transformation of both the character of the working class itself and in the living conditions of workers. Preliminary research, first of all, indicates that the total number of industrial workers raised from one million and six hundred thousand in 1960 to almost 5 million by 1976. Table 10.2 refers to the percentage raise of the working class in the years between 1950 and 1976.

Of the industrial workers, 70 percent are located in the southeast region of Brazil, 16.92 percent are in the south, 9.95 percent are in the northeast, 1.43 percent in the northern part and 1.12 percent in
# Table 10.2

**Research on the Working Class in Brazil**

## The Weight of the Working Class in Brazilian Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>Workers in Industry</th>
<th>Rural Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage raise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>23% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>61% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>90% more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE, Census and Anuário Estatístico; INCRA; Estatísticas Cadastrais.

From: Research on the Working Class in Brazil, (CIPES, Centro de Intercâmbio de Pesquisas Económicas e Sociais) in São Paulo.

Published in Movimento, April 28 to May 5, 1980, pages 11-18

Note: 70 percent of the working class is located in the southeast, 16.92 in the south, 9.95 in the northeast, 1.43 in the north and 1.12 in centerwest.

In 1976, 49 percent were between 18 and 30 years old, 6.42 percent less than 16 years of age, 23.79 percent between 30 and 40 years old, 19.22 percent between 40 and 60 years old and 1.57 more than 60 years old.

## Distribution of the Working Class in Industries -- data of 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Percentage over the total number of industrial workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metallic Minerals</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Material</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Material</td>
<td>6.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and cardboard</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and Furs</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfumes and Cosmetics</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment and Shoes</td>
<td>7.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuff</td>
<td>11.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinks</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing and Graphic</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From: Research on the Working Class in Brazil (CIPES, Centro de Intercâmbio de Pesquisas Económicas e Sociais) in São Paulo.
the centerwest. Thus, the concentration of labor in the industrialized south and southeast, in the most dynamic sectors of metallurgical, mechanical, electric, electronic and transport sectors of industry, transformed the character of the working class populations in these areas of industrial growth. A few large multinational corporations of the automobile sector concentrated large numbers of workers. For example, Volkswagen alone in 1978 employed close to 20,000 workers. Ford employed in São Bernardo do Campo a total of 9,000 workers in one plant.

Another point of interest which may be observed in the preliminary research on the working class is the youth of the new industrial workers. According to the research, in 1976 a total of 49 percent of industrial workers were between 18 and 30 years of age and 6.42 percent were less than 18 years old. This is a point worthy of notice for the majority of the workers in the industrial belt regions of the south and southeast could hardly remember the military takeover of 1964. It is a generation of workers brought up under the National Security State, subjected to harsh conditions of exploitation, frozen wages and repression.

A factor which must be understood is the extent of the situation of oppression in which the generation of workers grew. We have analyzed the consequences of the economic model upon the living conditions and the wages of workers. By 1978 the purchasing power of the minimum salary was less than it was in 1940, when it was first decreed. According to a study of DIEESE, if the government wished to raise the minimum
salary to the level of purchasing power it would have had in 1940, it would have to increase its value by 117.06 percent. This study of DIEESE was based on data on the rise in the cost of living, of the gross national product and in the legislation that establish the minimum quantity of food ration necessary for survival. In the sum total of its calculations the DIEESE study found that the minimum salary of 1978 should have been the equivalent to 2,401.53 cruzeiros just to be sufficient to purchase enough food for the survival of a worker and his family (two children). If one were to include other necessary basic expenses, such as housing, clothing and transportation, then the minimum salary should have been 4,233.37. In reality, the decreed minimum salary for that year was only 1,560 cruzeiros in April 28 of 1978. As one can readily see, the minimum salary was not even sufficient to purchase the foodbasket for the month necessary for a workers' survival.

Furthermore, according to the DIEESE study, by the government's own stipulations, the minimum salary should include a percentile raise equivalent to the increase in the productivity rate -- i.e. the rate of growth so that workers could benefit from the development of the nation as a whole. If this had been in fact complied with, DIEESE pointed out, then the minimum salary in 1978 should have been the equivalent of 10,051.12 cruzeiros, almost ten times more than it was in reality. Far from benefiting from the development of the economic miracle years, workers had suffered considerable losses and did not earn enough to buy food for one month for the family.
According to the data of a research conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1979, almost half of the total salaried population -- a total of 49.5 percent -- earned up to two minimum salaries and had up to 17.6 percent of the total salary income of the nation. Those above 30 minimum salaries represented only 0.6 percent of the total number of salaried workers and received 6.1 percent of the total salary income. Hence, the pattern of distribution of income in 1979 was still very badly distributed, as may be observed by the data of Table 10.3 which presents a summary of the findings of the research of the Ministry of Labor.

This general worsening trend of income concentration was later demonstrated in the IBGE census of 1980. Indeed, a comparative analysis of the data of total distribution of the national income reveals the increased accumulation of income from the census of 1970 and the census of 1980. As may be seen by the Graph 10.1, the division of the national income between 1970 and 1980, both or rural income and of urban income, became even more unequally divided.

A situation in which almost half of the salaried population earn just enough to buy food necessary for his family survival is what led to the growth of child labor, raise of infant mortality rates and the deteriorating health and housing conditions of the majority of the working population. It was this very real condition of exploitation that fueled social crisis, conflict and pushed the peasant and industrial workers to break the barriers of fear of the repression and proceed with the organization at the grassroot level in an attempt to regain a measure of their previous purchasing power.
### Table 10.3

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN BRAZIL (December 31, 1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY (in minimum salary)</th>
<th>SALARIED WORKERS</th>
<th>TOTAL SALARY INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number in Thousands</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1</td>
<td>1,760.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>3,516.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1.5 &amp; 2</td>
<td>2,292.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 &amp; 2.5</td>
<td>1,616.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2.5 &amp; 3</td>
<td>1,146.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 3 &amp; 5</td>
<td>2,434.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 7</td>
<td>979.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 7 &amp; 10</td>
<td>650.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 10 &amp; 15</td>
<td>451.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 15 &amp; 20</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 20 &amp; 30</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 30</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,298.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** RAIS - 1979 (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, Ministério de Trabalho, Brasília)

Published in Isto E: (December 17, 1980)

**Note:**
- The December 1979 minimum salary was equivalent to 2,166 cruzeiros.
- The December 1979 exchange rate was 52 cruzeiros per dollar.
RURAL INCOME

1970-1980
Poorest 20%
Poorest 50%
Richest 10%
Richest 5%
Richest 1%

1970-1980
Poorest 20%
Poorest 50%
Richest 10%
Richest 5%
Richest 1%

URBAN INCOME

1970-1980
Poorest 20%
Poorest 50%
Richest 10%
Richest 5%
Richest 1%

Source: Latin America Regional Reports Brazil RB-81-09, October 16, 1981, page 4

Note: Data from IBGE 1970 and 1980 censuses.
1. Secular Grassroot Organizations.

The grassroot movements in Brazil are of two kinds: secular and related to the Catholic Church. Secular grassroot organizations are civil associations, autonomous from the State, independent of direct financial or administrative control. Data on the existent associations of São Paulo, for example, indicate that 96 percent are juridical civil organizations registered in the civil registry without any characteristics which may tie them to the administration either municipally or of the state. 28

The grassroot organizations have a variety of names: Neighborhood Associations (Associações de Moradores de Bairros); Societies of Friends of the District (Sociedades de Amigos do Bairro, SAB); Associations of the Favelas (Associações de Moradores de Favelas); Associations of Freinds of the Neighborhood (Associações de Amigos de Bairro) or even simply Community Associations (Associações Comunitárias).

There is no complete national studies of the various organizations of the neighborhood to provide an indication of the exact numbers which exist throughout the nation. 29 Some approximation of the scale of the neighborhood movements may be surmised by the available information: In Rio de Janeiro there are at least 110 associations of the favelas which are coordinated by the Federation of the Favela Associations (Federação das Associações de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro—FAFERJ). In the poor periphery district of greater Rio de Janeiro -- the Baixada Fluminense -- there are over 350 neighborhood associations, approximately
80 of which are formally coordinated by the Movement of Friends of
the District of Nova Iguaçu (Movimento de Amigos do Bairro de Nova
Iguaçu - MAB). The Federation of the Associations of Neighborhoods
of the state of Rio de Janeiro has at least 40 different associations
affiliated to its network.

According to the Coordination Council of the Societies of Friends
of the city of São Paulo (Conselho de Coordenação das Sociedades),
there are a total of 1,300 Societies of Friends of the District (SABs)
in the state of São Paulo. Of those, approximately 800 are located
in the region of greater São Paulo and 500 are in the city of São
Paulo itself.

The growth of the neighborhood organizations became particularly
rapid in the liberalization period of Geisel and Figueiredo. The
blocking action of the elite opposition groups permitted maneuverability
space for the organization at the base. In 1978 President Geisel was
forced to concentrate most of the attention of the National Security
State in the negotiations with the OAB, the CNBB, the ABI for the
Reform Package and in attempting to stop the measures which the MDB
party introduced in Congress to amplify the universe of civil and
political liberties. In addition, the National Security State was
torn apart by the internal struggle for power -- with the attempted
coup d'etat of General Sylvio Frota -- and was forced to deal with
the challenge presented by the candidacies of Magalhães Pinto and
General Euler Bento Monteiro.
In the larger context of political opposition, the grassroot movements rapidly multiplied. In the year of 1980, for example, only in the state of Rio de Janeiro, it was reported that one organization of the neighborhood was founded every week.  
A similar pattern of rapid development of associations at the grass-root are known to have become widespread also in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Bahia, Maranhão, Amazonas, Pará, Goiás, Espírito Santo, Santa Catarina and Paraná.

There are some common characteristics to the variety of secular forms of grassroot organizations in the neighborhood districts:

1. They are primarily organizations in urban areas and most particularly located in the poor periphery districts.

2. The neighborhood organizations were in large part initiated in the years of populist politics, sometimes directly stimulated by politicians who sought to organize electoral committees. In São Paulo, for example, a study of José Alvaro Moisés traced the origin of the SABs to as early as 1945/46 but most particularly in the period of 1953 with the advent of janismo in São Paulo. Hence their roots may be found in clientelistic functions of mediation.

3. The associations of the neighborhood and of the favelas mobilize the population for pressure-group political organization. Politically they serve the function of demand-channeling for local and state authorities as well as the associative functions of organization of courses, mothers' clubs, recreational centers, health clinics etc.
4. The associations were born in a period of modernization in a capitalist process of rapid industrialization with capital concentration in the cities and resultant high degrees of migration from rural areas to urban centers.

5. The rapid expansion of the grassroots neighborhood organizations and their increasingly aggressive demands for social, political and economic participation in the decision of government (local, state and federal) is a direct result of the highly unequal distribution of income and the high rate of exploitation of the working population which becomes concentrated in the poor periphery areas of the cities or in the favelas (shantytowns).

6. Finally, the associations of the neighborhood and of the favelas tend to form central levels of coordination in the form of federations or confederations. These provide the necessary networking connection at municipal, state and regional levels which allow for the formation of mass-based social movements to press for specific improvements of interest to all (such as a freeze of foodstuff, the movement to gain legal access to urban land, improvements in sewage and health facilities, for daycare centers, for education etc...).

Although perhaps still a large number of the existing neighborhood associations serve a clientelistic function of mediation between the local population and governmental or administrative structures, nonetheless there is a growing tendency to autonomy and base-rooted modes of political action. The independence of the neighborhood associations vis à vis
the efforts of municipal, state and federal authorities to bring them under control has been evidenced by their refusal to comply with regulations established by the administrative authorities. The structural organization of the associations active in the opposition is highly democratic, often with intermediate representation levels -- the street representative councils -- which have a real degree of participatory influence. In the opinion of César Campos, president of the Federation of Associations of Residents of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ),

The structural organization of the associations are meant to establish a guarantee of internal democratic participation. This avoids the problem of becoming controlled by any particular group or even coming to serve the interests of a particular political or corporative organization.

Indeed, the highest level of authority in many of these associations is the "Street Council" which is a committee elected by the residents of each street. This council has, in some associations, veto power over the decisions of the board of directors of the association.

Within the existing structure of the neighborhood and favela associations, the opposition groups have endeavored to either politically activate the organization or to take control of the electoral posts. Whenever there is an area where an association does not exist, the groups of the opposition in the grassroot have attempted to form one. Whenever the association is in the hands of directors connected to the government, or tied to clientelistic patterns of political behavior, an opposition group may organize in it and
participate in the electoral process so as to win control. The strategy has been, consistently, to increase the levels of political activity of the association itself and the democratic participation within it of the membership. 38

Neighborhood and favela associations concentrate much of their work in mobilizing the population to achieve improvements in the neighborhood. They are popularly-rooted formal organizations for the channelling of pressure upon local and state authorities. The organizations of the neighborhood have a particular political orientation: they see governmental structures as ultimately responsible for the conditions in their immediate neighborhood. Thus, they demand responsible and effective action to solve problems which are understood as the proper concern of government: transportation, housing, sewage, water, schools, garbage collection, electricity, pavement of the streets, daycare centers and urban street cleaning. 39

In order to achieve their goals the associations utilize a variety of techniques: petitions, meetings, public rallies and assemblies, marches on City Hall, sit-ins in administrative offices and even -- in the most extreme cases of serious conflict with the authorities -- the setting up of street barricades until the demands are met. 40

The associative role of the organizations may include self-help collective projects which mobilize the entire neighborhood. Hence, many associations set up their own day care centers, health clinics, community centers, mothers' clubs, film clubs and organize courses and
recreation activities. The actual work is often conducted through the collective strength of the community in joint labor projects known as mutirões. Group work, therefore, is utilized to fill in the vacuum left by unresponsive governmental structures. The group work may be organized to solve immediate problems such as cleaning of valleys, garbage removal, construction of sewage or for collective home renovation and improvements or for the establishment of food cooperatives. 41

The neighborhood and favela organizations during the period of the National Security State have played a crucial role in the grassroots organization of the population. With the localized cell-units of organization, the population has learned to coordinate larger, even statewide or national campaigns for pressuring the federal government. An example was the Movement against the Cost of Living which, as we mentioned, began in 1973 with the meetings of the mothers in a Church in São Paulo. By 1978 it was a national movement of sufficient strength to call for a governmental price freeze of basic foodstuff, collect one million and 3 hundred thousand signatures in 3 months and set up a rally with an attendance of over 10,000 people. 42

Although such movements are generally initiated by the associations and the federations in the grassroot sometimes it is the Federal or local government which sets off a major campaign which mobilizes thousands of residents. This was the case, for example, of the
events in Nova Iguaçu in 1979. The National Housing Bank (BNH) began a forced eviction of 16,000 families from 23 immense low-cost housing complexes which the Bank owned in Nova Iguaçu, Rio de Janeiro. Extremely poor residents, living with salaries which were raised only once a year at below-inflation rates, could not meet the mortgage payments set up by the Bank and which were periodically raised at inflation or even higher-than-inflation rates. The National Housing Bank officials claimed that the majority of the residents were either in default of payment or were "invaders" who had no legal rights to the property irrespective of payments which they might have made.

Each of the 23 housing complexes had its own Association of Residents. These were coordinated by the Movement of the Friends of the District of Nova Iguaçu (MAB). The associations conducted a detailed research project and discovered that besides those who could not meet the increasing mortgages there were residents who payed but in fact did not have a legal title to their apartment. Some had purchased years before a paper right which they believed to be legal but which in fact was not a property title. The Bank officials refused, at first, to consider their cases. Thus the MAB organized a series of meetings, assemblies, rallies, marches and built such a support among the local population that the Federal government was forced to intervene and order the National Housing Bank to negotiate new terms of payment and the matter of the property titles. The local associations and the MAB elected a negotiating committee -- which
included the bishop of Nova Iguaçu, Dom Adriano Hypólito -- and conducted a successful negotiation over a period of several months. The matter was finally satisfactorily resolved.45

The grassroot strength of the neighborhood and favela associations is due, in part, to an opposition reaction to the neglect of the authorities and the concentration of the resources in the rich areas of the urban zones in a situation of extreme centralization of authoritarian local power. Mayors of capitals are not directly elected by popular vote but are rather, as we have seen, appointed by the indirectly elected governors. Thus, as leaders in the grassroot put it, they are all "twice bionic". They are not accountable to popular vote and act as an official representative of the Federal government. The resources available tend to be concentrated in highly speculative projects of urban construction in the rich areas. The periphery parts of the largest cities -- where the working population lives -- are almost totally abandoned.

In the Baixada Fluminense, for example, where almost half of the population of the city of Rio de Janeiro lives, there is literally no complete citywide sewage system or running water in most areas. Many streets are not even paved and the accumulation of garbage and sewage in open valleys provide a calamitous health hazard for a population of two and a half million people. The situation in the slum areas -- the favelas -- is even more drastic. The favelas have no sewage, often no electricity, no running water and many do not even have streets.
Hence, spurred by the subhuman conditions in which they are forced to live, the population of these areas are learning to collectively unite for the achievement of particular goals and for the application of unbearable pressure to force local or state administrations to have greater responsibility for the abandoned areas.

2. Church-Related Grassroot Organizations.

Church-related grassroot organizations, as here defined, are those which are actively organized by the institutional network of the Catholic Church. Although most popular movements in Brazil intermingle with the Catholic Church and are, in some way, related to its activities, there are those which are organically tied to the Church as a sociological institution.

The Brazilian Catholic Church has undergone deep and radical transformations. This process began with the changes in the Universal Catholic Church during the life of Pope John XXIII (1958-1963) and the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). The social and political significance of this period lays in the change of the role which the Catholic Church believed it should play in the temporal, material world. The seeds of the Church's increased involvement on behalf of the poor and persecuted were laid in the Vatican II's interpretation of the Bible as demanding an active participation of all Christians in the worldly problems of injustice and violence. In Brazil, the Catholic Church's "preferential option for the poor" was enhanced
by the Latin American Bishops' Conferences of Medellin (Colombia) in 1968 and then in Puebla (Mexico) in 1979. 46

The theologians of the Catholic Church in Brazil define the term base to underline the work which is to be done for the restoration of lost rights. The base, thus, "is understood as the part of the population in a society which is deprived of the rights to have power, have property and to have knowledge". 47 At a social-economic level, those in the base produce the riches of the society but may not either participate in the organization or in the distribution of their own work and products. In the political level they have no say in the decisions of State which have a direct effect upon their lives. At the cultural level, they are given a culture which is meant to protect the privileges of those who deprive them of their rights. The preferential option for the poor -- the base -- therefore has as a primordial goal the liberation of this segment of society by restoring to them the rights which are naturally theirs. Hence the work of the Catholic Church is meant to restore to the base the rights to know, to own, to participate in political life, in decisions of the nation and of the workplace which affect the organization and distribution of the products which they themselves create.

Apart from the grassroots work of the Catholic Church which is institutionally channeled through the organizations of the CNBB and the different pastorais already mentioned, there has been a growing movement within the roots of the Catholic Church itself,
intrinsically and organically tied to it as a sociological entity. These are the Basic Christian Communities (Comunidades Eclesiais de Base - CEB). The CEBs are small groups of local people who organize around an urban or a rural parish. Many, in fact, are organized in distant areas where the population has no access to a chapel or to regular religious services. The pastoral agents, community organizers (animadores de comunidade) and more traditional deacons (díaconos) priests or members of religious orders usually are the initiators of a CEB. The non-traditional lay agents may perform many of the religious functions and services which would not be available to the population on a regular basis because of the insufficient number of available priests.

Studies conducted by the CNBB and the CERIS in 1973 indicated that there were already 117 ordained deacons in Brazil who performed services which ranged from orientation of social works of the Church to catechism, presiding over liturgies where there were no priests, orientation of Bible courses, ministers of the Eucharist, visits to dying and sick, baptism, chrism. 48 The CEBs are clearly religious organizations, eclesiastical in name, in origin and in the actual performance of religious services.

Some authors place the origins of the CEBs in the early experience of the groups organized in the Movimento de Educação de Base in the Diocese of Natal in 1960. 49 Others trace their beginning to an even earlier time, with the missionary work of the Diocese of Barra do Piraí
in Rio de Janeiro in 1956. It is a general consensus, however, that the CEBs began to be seriously organized in the period after the violent repression of 1969. In 1975, a National Meeting of Christian Basic Communities was held in Vitória, Espírito Santo so as to evaluate the experiences of the CEBs and coordinate plans for future growth. At that time it was established that there were already 50,000 comunidades de base in existence throughout the nation. In 1981 their number has been estimated at approximately 80,000 -- in particular in the rural areas and in the poor periphery districts of the cities. These CEBs had the double function of performing religious services and Gospel study and organizing liberating work and communitarian action.

A study of the CNBB defined the characteristics which all CEBs must have and which is implicit in their name:

1. **Comunidade**: They must have the characteristic of a primary social group. Personal knowledge of each other and a personal relationship among the members. They must, in addition, have common objectives and interests. The number must be limited so as to enable personal relationships to develop.

2. **Base**: They must be formed by the people and be born from the people. Wherever they live, work, meet, relate to each other. The criteria are varied: geographic, professional residential etc.

3. **Ecclesiastical**: They must include: a) An open reception of the Word of God -- which is the starting point of conversion. b) Conversion which is to be further translated into: 1. An open relation with himself as a person. 2. An open relation to others. 3. An open relation to the social reality around them. They are to be the leaven of the masses, the embodiment of a personal, migrant, alive, liberating and prophetic Church.
4. They must have a communion with the visible Church, local, particular and universal.

5. They must be a celebration of the life of Christ, through the sacraments, prayers, liturgy etc.... 52

The study of the CNBB also remarked that the CEBs are most frequently born from the concrete experiences of the community itself. They are the "Church which is born from the people" and in reaction to one of the following events: 1. Personal relationships. 2. Meetings in order to pray, celebrate the liturgy, sacraments etc... 3. An actual understanding of the deeper meaning of the Gospel and its message to the concrete existence in the community and the world. 4. A reflection upon the social and economic reality, utilizing the pedagogical method of "seeing, judging and acting". 5. A concrete programming and organization of the action, with the distribution of tasks and services to all individual members. 6. The communitarian carrying out of the activities chosen so as to benefit the community as a whole or the collective engagement in an evangelical action. 53

Most studies of the CEBs organizational structure conclude that they undergo distinct stages of growth, organization and development of critical consciousness. These stages are summarized in Chart 10.1. As one may see in Chart 10.1, each step in the development of a CEB is carefully planned, evaluated, and integrated with the members so as to achieve maximum participation of each individual person. The division into separate nuclei facilitates the process of personal integration,
I. PREPARATION: 1. Knowledge of the community. 2. Revision of the concrete situation in discussion with community pastorais, groups and teams of work. 3. Motivation for a community work. 4. Choice of "community stimulators" (animadores comunitários). 5. Training and program of the team. 6. Formation of the community.

II. TRAINING: 1. Training of the leaders and of the community stimulators. 2. Group dynamics. 3. Community work. 4. Methodology and stages for the development of the community work. 5. Self-help projects. 6. Community pastoral. 7. Basic Community.

III. FORMATION OF NUCLEI: 1. Observation of the area. 2. Study of the nuclei or basic communities. 3. Division of the area into 3 or 4 nuclei. 4. Discovery of the "poles of attraction". 5. Formation of a team of "stimulation" and coordination of the nuclei.

IV. SELECTION OF LEADERS FOR NUCLEUS: 1. Choice of leaders. 2. Personal invitation. 3. Motivation for work. 4. Global and participative work. 5. First meeting of the nucleus. 6. Central meeting of the various community nuclei.

V. MEETING OF NUCLEUS: 1. First meeting of nucleus. 2. Presentation of work and function of group. 3. Invitation of more leaders. Intensive training of groups. 4. After studying the problems and lacks in the community, establish priorities and program the activities with the participation of all members.

VI. IMPLANTATION: 1. Implantation of the work which is communitarian and of all groups. 2. Reflection and study of effectiveness. 3. Participation. 4. Integration of other community resources. 5. Projects and programs for the different sectors for central coordination. 6. Self-help projects.

VII. STRUCTURE: 1. Autonomy of the basic communities. 2. Consolidation of the leadership. 3. Stimulation in each nucleus and communitarian coordination. 4. Election of the Council of the Community. 5. General meeting of all nuclei to discuss and debate the following issues: a) the pastoral plan, b) the work, services, programs, c) the cult services, d) activities and teams.

VIII. INTEGRATION OF THE COMMUNITY AND EVALUATION: 1. Integration in nucleus. 2. Contacts with other groups. 3. Common services. 4. Participation in the common activity of all. 5. Interchange of the different nuclei. 6. Common programming of community projects. 7. Community Assemblies.

learning and participation. The people who have been denied rights of participation become less afraid to speak out, to make themselves heard, to share in opinions, in the evaluation of work, in the actual programming, organization and carrying out of activities and of self-help projects and in the sharing of the responsibilities involved. Only after the implantation is more firmly established do the groups meet together to elect a Central Coordination -- a Council of the Community -- and thereafter engage in more collective assemblies and work.

The development of the CEBs also follow different rhythms of critical consciousness, depending on the confidence level which is gained by each of the members. The main organizational characteristic is the care in studying the problems, acting upon the results of the analysis, reflecting on the action and increasing the integration of all members and thereby enhancing a democratic participation within nuclei and in the comunidade itself.

The chief concerns of the CEBs are related to the experiences of the comunidade itself. The questionnaire which was used to prepare for the regional meetings of the CEBs (in preparation for the Fourth National Meeting of the Basic Christian Communities in São Paulo) indicate some of the areas of work of the CEBs. The questionnaire was divided into six areas with questions which were to be discussed by the different CEBs prior to the regional preparatory meeting. These questions of debate were the following:
1. **The Reality in Which the CEB is immersed.**

Questions to reflect upon: Where do you live? In the city or countryside? Where do you work? In the fields, factory, autonomous, migrant workers etc... How much do most of you earn? Is there jobs for all? Are there sufficient schools? People study until what grade? Are there many who cannot read or write? Do people own the place where they live? Do they have any title to their land or home? What are the biggest housing problems? Are there many sick people? Are there any hospitals? Can you afford the medicines?

2. **The Organization of your CEB.**

Questions to reflect upon: How is your community organized (in teams, groups etc.)? Is there a coordination in the community? How is it done? How was the coordination elected and how do you think it is working? In your CEB do you have sufficient meetings? How are the community decisions taken? Are they done with enough participation of all members? What is the participation of the women in your community? How is the religious liturgy celebration organized? Are there priests and nuns? What do they do in the community?

3. **In the Face of Oppression, What does your CEB do?**

Questions to reflect upon: Which are the oppressions which the people suffer? Why are there these oppressions? In the face of the injustice to which the people are submitted, is the community doing anything? What? What difficulties did your community find in the organization? How did it overcome such difficulties?

4. **Does the Community have a Connection to Other CEBs?**

How is this connection? Do you meet together? For what? Are there actions which you do together?

5. **Does the CEB participate in or organize with other groups?**

Questions to reflect upon: Which groups do you work with (favela, neighborhood associations, popular movements, the Movement Against the Cost of Living, trade unions, political parties, the many pastorais, such as the Pastoral da Terra, the CIMI, or which others? Is this connection helpful or does it make your work more difficult? Why?
6. **What Connection does the Word of God has with the Community?**

Questions to reflect upon: Is it possible that the liberation which Christ seeks may come without a connection to the liberating popular movements, the political parties, the trade unions etc.? Why?

Such questions are debated, discussed in the nuclei of organization and then in the general meetings of the different nuclei finally to be brought to the assembly of the different local CEBs. When a consensus is reached the CEBs draft a report to be read, studied and debated further in the preparatory meetings. All of the documents are later analyzed and discussed by the CEB delegates who are elected to go to the National Meeting. Finally, the results are then returned to the base for evaluation, reflection and decisions upon the best manner of coordinating and acting. In this way, the method "see, judge, act" becomes a constant and intrinsic part of the very life and the organic structure of the CEBs and allows for a maximum of flexibility and individual participation in the thinking, discussion, evaluation and carrying out of all decisions and projects.

Most nuclei of the CEBs have between 20 and 50 people, with the larger community congregating approximately 100 people. This cell-like unit of organization is characteristic of the activities of the base and is meant to ensure responsible participation and confidence-building. This is what I have meant by stating that self-respect would be the primary foundation of the political consciousness of the people which would allow for the breaking of the barriers of fear and oppression.
The political and social importance of the CEBs lies in their capacity to awaken the critical consciousness of the condition of oppression and to stimulate self-respect, hope and effective action for change. In the last few years, the CEBs have followed certain stages of political growth. All of the stages are interwoven and interconnected in a dialectical process of rising political consciousness.

According to Frei Betto, the first stage "is the establishment of the comunidade itself." This stage is particularly centered around the religious motivation and the deep search in the Gospel for the directives of life. The second stage is reached with the participation of the militants of the CEBs in the popular movements, side by side with people who may not share their faith but share the concern for the oppressed and the persecuted. The third stage is the actual strengthening of the working class movement itself. Frei Betto considers this to be the stage which is most directly politically conscious, when the members of the CEBs in the cities and rural areas participate in the opposition within the trade unions to gain electoral control of the institutions of the working class. A fourth stage has now been reached, as a result of the Party Reform Bill of 1979: it is the stage of political debate of action within the new political parties which have emerged. Thus, the Party Reform Bill of 1979, with the dissolution of the MDB and the ARENA, encouraged political debate in the base and, contradictorily, fostered the militancy of political participation within the nascent opposition parties.
The consciousness-raising political role of the CEBs has contributed to a significant increase in the strength of the popular movements of grassroots. They perform two important functions in the overall social movement: The first is the encouragement of effective organization. The second is the deep connection to internal democratic participation that values each human being and brings forth his or hers full potential as a historical agent of change.

Therefore, the comunidades de base have been the schools and the seedbeds of participatory democracy. The experience of collective and democratic leadership gained in the comunidades is transmitted to the larger social movements through the action of members of the CEBs. In this way, they have influenced the very manner and structural characteristics of neighborhood associations, rural unions, trade unions, and even the political parties of the opposition. Their concern with participatory democracy within their organizations, their effort to de-centralize, to share in responsibility among the members and to emphasize the individual's importance as a participant agent is one of the main characteristics of the CEBs. This has been, perhaps, their most valuable and lasting contribution to the Brazilian social movements.

In conclusion, the activities of the grassroots, both secular and Church-related have been fundamental in denying the National Security Stage legitimation, in structurally organizing resistance to the unjust social policies. Eventually, the deep democratic structure of the organizations themselves provide an alternative vision of the kind of
democracy which is increasingly demanded by the majority of the population and which stands in stark contrast to the model of the third stage of institutionalization of the National Security State. As such, in a dialectical process, the very process of resistance is developing, from the grassroot, the seeds of the alternative model which will corrode from the womb the authoritarian structures of the State to present the beginning of the path to participatory forms of democracy.


The union movement in Brazil -- both rural and urban -- is conditioned by two major factors: First it is limited by the strict control mechanisms drafted into the Labor Code which, as we have examined, has been in effect since 1943. The National Security State made full use of the powers of intervention in the trade unions, to remove elected officials from office, annul elections, cancel certain candidacies and strictly control the budgets of the trade unions so as to constrict their effectiveness as working class organizations. The trade unions, by and large, have been forced to serve the purpose of welfare servicing and of mediation between the State and the working class and are prevented from defending the economic interests of the workers.

The second important factor which condition the labor movement is that it is immersed in the context of the National Security State.
Hence, the new union movement is both a part of the larger opposition movement and specifically concerned with the direct controls which the State has over the organization of trade unions.

As a segment of the general democratic opposition, the new trade union movement has a platform of demands which comprise their consensual political commitments to democracy and to freedom of organization: 1. The end of the repressive legislation of the State and the return to democratic forms of government. 2. Direct popular elections for all levels of political representation. 3. The participation of representatives of the working population in the decisions and management of special funds set up for programs such as the PIS-PASEP, the FGTS and the National Housing Bank (BNH). 4. The end of the wage-control policies and the right to engage in collective contracts and bargaining. 5. The right to strike. 6. The right to organize unions without the interference of the State -- union autonomy -- with the necessary modifications in the Labor Code to eliminate the specific mechanisms of control in Section V.

The "new union movement" which surfaced as a major political actor in 1977 is in reality the blossoming of the years of struggle to regain the control of trade unions under intervention -- in both the rural and the urban areas -- organize others, activate "ghost" unions and tighten the structural organization in the base and within the factories, places of employment, and farms. The actual universe of demands, as we have seen throughout this work, is in fact the same as
in the years of reorganization from 1965 to 1969. The major difference is that, by 1977, the movement in the labor area had reached sufficient strength and political consciousness to have a real impact upon the State and begin to push for actual structural transformations.

Together, the main demands of the labor unions mean that the National Security State, as it presently exists, must be eliminated so as to transform the economic development model itself and allow mechanisms of political participation to be developed in a more flexible framework responsive to popular participation in the political, social and economic decisions of government. Hence, this area of opposition organization is considered to provide the ultimate challenge to the National Security State itself. Its force is defined as intolerable "pressure" and framed in the context of the Doctrine of Internal Security -- being placed squarely in the camp of a dangerous internal enemy. One would expect that the State would repress such organization with violence.

In May, 1981, there were a total of 2,146 trade unions of workers in industry, 2,279 trade unions of rural workers, 43 trade unions of independently-employed workers (autônomos) and 203 trade unions of the white collar classes (engineers, architects, doctors, nurses, health professionals, artists, professors, social workers etc.).

The rural trade unions have shown the largest growth in the period of the National Security State and have been, by and large, the most successfully organized by the opposition in close associated work
with the Catholic Church's institutional framework for the defense of landless peasants, of the rights of squatters to their land (posseiros) and the rural comunidades de base. In addition, the rural union organizers have been more successful than their urban counterparts in achieving greater democratization within the official union structure. Indeed, unlike the urban area, within the rural trade union organization one finds a significant number of federations which have performed an important combative role in the defense of farmworkers' rights and for the right to land. Finally, and most significantly in contrast to the situation of urban unions, the rural organizers have won control of the Confederation of Agricultural Laborers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura- CONTAG) with the election of José Francisco da Silva for President of the CONTAG already back in 1968. He was reelected in 1971, in 1974, in 1977 and finally again in 1980.

Under the leadership of José Francisco da Silva the CONTAG has moved decisively to aid the organization of representative federations and local rural unions throughout the nation. Their strength was demonstrated in 1973 -- during the worst period of repression -- when the farmworkers were able to carry out a large national meeting, the II National Congress of Rural Workers, in Brasília and in spite of the direct opposition and threats from the Minister of Labor.

In May of 1979 the CONTAG organized the III National Congress of Rural Workers, once more in Brasília, where 1,500 rural union officials met to discuss the new strategies of the movement and decided to
alter their center of concern with the individual defense of the rural worker and the teaching of the principles of free trade unionism and pay closer attention to all forms of collective organization in the countryside. This new role of the CONTAG reflected the growth of the land conflicts, the movement of the landless peasants to gain the right to land, of the squatter peasants for their rights and of the migrant farmworkers (bóias-frias).

It is of significance that the opposition work in the rural unions and in the countryside more generally had been able to organize within the coordination of the CONTAG almost 60 percent of the total estimated rural economically active population of eleven and one half million families. In 1980 the CONTAG officially represented 21 federations of rural workers, one territorial branch (in Acre, Rondônia) and a total of 2,500 local rural unions. Altogether, the total membership of the CONTAG reached over 6,800,000 families.

In 1980 there were in Brazil 4,271,450 members of the urban industrial workers unions. Professional trade unions of white collar employees numbered approximately 146,307. Government employees and civil servants are not allowed to form trade unions in the official structure and have separate associations, not always legally recognized. Thus, including only industrial urban workers, professional workers and rural or agricultural workers there were over 11,316,044 members in the union movement out of an estimated economically active population of 40 million people.
It should be pointed out that not all of the rural, urban and professional workers unions just mentioned may be considered to be active in what is known as the "new labor union movement". A more approximate estimate of the total number may be determined by consideration of the presence of urban and rural unions in the first Conference of the Working Class (Primeira Conferência das Classes Trabalhadoras, CONCLAT) which was held in São Paulo in August of 1981.

The CONCLAT was organized by the new labor movement specifically to discuss matters of concern, draft a common program of action, a list of specific demands to present to the government and, above all, elect the executive committee encharged with the organization of the second national meeting of workers which shall officially form a central union organization -- outside the scope of the Labor Code and autonomous. There were a total of 1,126 unions present in the first CONCLAT, of which 384 were rural unions and 480 were urban. There were more than 5,247 delegates at the Congress, elected in urban and rural areas. The "official" trade union structure tied to the government boycotted the meeting.

Considering, therefore, that altogether Brazil had in 1981 4,671 unions of urban industrial workers, autonomous independent workers, professionals and rural workers, the total representation in the CONCLAT indicated the active participation of approximately 24 percent of the total unions in the new union movement.
The active resurgence of the labor movement dates from two symbolic episodes, in 1977 and in 1978. In August of 1977 the government made a startling disclosure that revealed the manipulation of official inflation statistics for the years of 1973 and 1974. Since the wage increases are in part based upon the calculation of the inflationary residue, this resulted in a 34.1 percent real wage loss for workers during the period. 62

The Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo organized a campaign to force the government to pay back the workers' past wage losses. This was the "campaign of the 34.1 percent" which cemented an alliance of work of many years and a variety of groups. The campaign of 34.1 percent served both as an important information alternative to public opinion and as a symbolic test for the effectiveness of the organizational structure of the union. As such, it may be considered as a foundation for the strike actions that were to follow in 1978, 1979 and 1980. 63

In terms of more general coordination of urban unions, the landmark episode for the resurgence of the labor movement was the Congress of Industrial Workers held in Rio de Janeiro, under the control of the government through the Confederation of Workers in Industry (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria—CNTI). 64 This meeting brought into the open the sharp conflict between the union bureaucrats -- the pelegos -- and the new leadership which was emerging in the urban union movement. 65
the conference of the CNTI was also a meeting ground for the different unions in the opposition. It allowed discussions and the elaboration of the first document of common principles of organization of the new urban union movement. In reality, the Carta de Principios drafted at that time may be considered a basic program of action which has been subsequently re-stated in a series of joint statements meant to sift through the variety of issues so as to find the points of consensual agreement. The most important points in the document were summarized in the concerns expressed below:

1. National Problems: a) The right to elect political representatives by direct popular vote: including senators, governors and the President. b) The revoking of the legislation of exception. c) The guarantees of freedom of press and of expression. d) Freedom of association without controls or restrictions. e) Revoking of the emergency measures and the safeguards. f) Political amnesty. g) Respect for human rights. h) Return to a State of Law.

2. National Development Policy: a) The end of the wage policies of arrocho salarial with a redistribution of income and a just salary which is to be freely negotiated in collective bargaining with employers. b) Agrarian reform. c) Controls of activities of multinational corporations. d) Adoption of regional development policy with emphasis upon labor intensive investments. e) Minimum salary of levels sufficient to provide for the support of a worker and his family.

3. On Trade Union Activity and Organization: a) Modification of the Labor Code to provide for union autonomy from controls of the State. b) the right to strike and the revoking of all the restrictive legislation. c) The right to collective bargaining and the end of the individual contracting of workers. d) Recognition of trade union shopstewards (delegados sindicais) for in-the-factory representation with job security guarantees. e) Freedom to associate with international trade union organizations without governmental authorization.
As the major points in the consensual programme demonstrate, the new labor union movement is particularly concerned with the repressive nature of the National Security State, the low wages, the distribution of income and the limitations placed upon unions by the different mechanisms of State control.

Historically, the labor movement surfaced as a major power in the political arena with the metalworkers strike of 1978. Within the general context of low wages and difficult working conditions, the metalworkers, in 1978, were among the best-paid workers in the country. In spite of such a privileged position, the hourly wage of an autoworker in Brazil was only 60 U.S. cents compared to 8 dollars and 65 cents which were paid for the workers in the United States and in Canada. The wage differentials may be seen on Table 10.4 which is based on data from the International Metalworkers Federation and provides comparative information on the wages of the automobile industry workers of 15 different nations.

The metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema had a keen awareness of their strength and privileged position in the productive system of Brazil. One should note here that the autoworkers in Brazil do not adhere to the consciousness which has been imputed to a "labor aristocracy". In fact, conversations with workers in São Bernardo often centered upon their concern for other workers. There is an awareness of their power to, as they often put it, "stop the country". At that time, workers felt a deep responsibility
### TABLE 10.4

**SALARY-HOUR IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY**
(in U.S. dollars)

1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Salary/hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From data of the International Metalworkers Federation.
to use their limited advantage for the benefit of others. Because of their particular importance in production they could take initiatives which were impossible for other unions to achieve.

As we have seen, workers had been discussing the Labor Code, the strike Law, the wage policies and the paths of opposition for a number of years. Debates with the rank-and-file and with leadership on the past experience of opposition led to certain conclusions: The strikes of Osasco and Contagem of 1968 had failed principally due to a lack of organization and consciousness to keep a strike going with sufficient number of participants and rapidity to force a negotiation. In addition, an analysis of the strike legislation could lead to the conclusion that nothing in the law itself indicated that workers who went to work but did not turn on the machines were on strike. Furthermore, the metalworkers were not included in the categories who are considered "essential" and outright prohibited from striking under the National Security Law. From analysis, debate, discussions and preparations came the action.

After 10 years of apparent complete silence, 100 workers of the Saab-Scania factory, a producer of buses and trucks in São Bernardo do Campo, went to work, punched in their cards, sat in front of their machines and crossed their arms. Within one week all workers of Saab-Scania plus workers of 23 other corporations had joined the strike. By the second week, there were a total of 77,950 workers on strike in the towns of São Bernardo, Santo André
São Caetano and Diadema — the ABCD cities of the industrial heart of Brazil. In all cases the workers punched in their cards, sat in front of their machines and crossed their arms in silence. The demands included a 20 percent raise over the government's official index and the mediation of their union.69

The impact of the strike caught the military government by surprise. They were temporarily stunned into inaction. The industrialists, on the other hand, pressed into direct negotiations with the metalworkers' union by their heavy daily losses soon began a de facto collective bargaining process. A settlement was reached. On May 31 the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema signed an agreement with the employers' representatives for parcelled out wage raises. Workers would begin to receive their adjustments in June. In August of the same year their total readjustments would reach 10 percent over the salaries of April for hourly workers. By October this would be raised 15.5 percent and in December by 20 percent. By February of 1979 all the readjustments should add up to 24.5 percent over the salaries of April of 1978. This was considered "the very first significant victory of the working class, which was obtained because of the unity and maturity of the workers." 70

In the subsequent debates and analyses of the strikes, the workers could consider that they had achieved some other important steps forwards: 1. The wage policy had been broken by a de facto
reality which the National Security State could not stop. 2. The old union demand to have readjustments every three months so as to be able to have salaries keep up with the inflation rate was becoming a reality. 3. The strike movement had proved that the strike legislation could be by-passed by strong unified action of workers. 4. Workers found that when they acted together they could force the government to take their demands into consideration. 5. In addition, workers also found that they were able to force the corporations to negotiate and carry out collective bargaining in a successful and independent manner.

What had happened? According to Luis Inácio da Silva, President of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, what had happened was the direct consequence of a mature organization of a class from the base. The role of the union was limited to the "coordination of the activities of the base, always according to the discussion and the proposals which are born from the workers themselves." The workers had discovered that it was much easier to negotiate when "all the machines had stopped" and they intended to recuperate in fact their main weapon for bargaining: the strike. The fact that the military government considered that illegal does not mean that it is illegitimate:

We cannot consider what happened to have been abnormal. The strike was perfectly normal. It was a manifestation of the working class, which only wished to show that it does in fact exist and is a living part of the nation. As such, it must be respected and considered.
The strike was legitimate. Perhaps, from lack of habit, many people believed that the strike was abnormal, was fantastic. In reality, it was only the legitimate use of a bargaining weapon of a class. The fact that it was judged illegal has no value for the worker made strikes legal from the moment that so many practiced their actual human right. 73

In fact, other industrial workers were quick to see the potential and to follow the initiatives of the São Bernardo autoworkers. Within a period of 9 weeks, as may be seen in Table 10.5, the state of São Paulo had a total of 245,935 industrial workers on strike in nine different cities. From São Paulo the strike movements spread to other states. From the metalworkers to other categories of jobs and professions.

It is important to point out that middle class and white collar workers in Brazil suffered a similar process of wage squeeze and compression as blue collar workers and manual laborers. For example, the teachers in 1978, in the most prosperous states of São Paulo and Paraná, earned only the equivalent to U.S. 266 dollars per month. Doctors fared no better and were health employees of the state health system and contracted private clinics, often earning a monthly average salary in the 300 dollar bracket. 74 Most significant is the situation of bankworkers, 57.36 percent of whom earned in 1978 up to 3,922 cruzeiros (1978 exchange rate was 20.9 cruzeiros per one dollar). 75 Thus, the middle class white collar workers by the end of the year began to organize in unions and associations and to strike for collective bargaining and better working conditions.
TABLE 10.5

METALLURGICAL STRIKES IN SÃO PAULO

(From May 12, to July 13, 1978 - A SUMMARY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From May 12 to July 13</th>
<th>Number of Factories on strike</th>
<th>Number of Workers on strike (per week)</th>
<th>Number of Towns affected (1)</th>
<th>Total Workers on Strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Week</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60,500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Week</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17,450</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Week</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17,990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Week</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29,470</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>125,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Week</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39,694</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>165,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Week</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22,967</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>188,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Week</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23,441</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>211,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Week</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19,803</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>231,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Week</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14,620</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>245,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>245,935</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>245,935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES: (1) 1st and 2nd weeks: Santo André, São Bernardo and São Caetano.
            Third week: The first three plus São Paulo and Osasco.
            Fourth week and up: The above mentioned towns plus Jandira,
            Taboão da Serra, Cotia and Campinas.

(2) Data obtained from newspapers O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de
            São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil.
By the end of the year of 1978, as may be seen in Table 10.6, there had been a total of 539,037 workers on strike and the job categories included middle class, white collar, manual workers and agricultural workers.

An analysis of the data which is contained in the summaries of the demands, the results and the reaction of the government to the strike actions of 1978, presented in Tables 10.7, leads to the following conclusions: 1. Strikers were primarily concerned with economic improvements of wage levels. 2. Most strikes achieved less than the initial demand of the workers, but, nonetheless, attained some measure of improvement for the professional grouping. 3. In the case of the Port workers of Santos, the slowdown operation never really got off the ground. The dockworkers are in the "essential" bracket and were faced with the most severe repression of the year. The movement was defeated by military troops which surrounded the union and intimidated the workers back to work. 4. In most other cases, faced with a rising number of strikers which cut across class lines, and caught by surprise, the position was of neutrality on the part of the government which chose not to interfere directly in the negotiations. Police force was used to break up picket lines, however. 5. In the case of the public employees (health workers and primary and secondary teachers) the government reacted with immediate and severe coercion. The forces of repression of the states intimidated and threatened the civil servants and unions or teacher's associations were threatened with
### TABLE 10.6

**SUMMARY**

**STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STRIKES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>357,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankworkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary &amp; secondary teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>138,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. professors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>539,037</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Involved the following states: São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul and Brasília (Distrito Federal).

**SOURCES:** O Globo, Jornal do Brasil, Folha de São Paulo, Última Hora, Movimento, Veja, Isto É, Em Tempo, ABCD Jornal and union newspapers and pamphlets.

**Note:** The actual number of strikes, per factory is much greater. It is to be noted that in Brazil a union calls a general strike for its territory. It may involve anywhere from 13,000 factories (in São Paulo) to 4,000 (as in Rio de Janeiro). A general strike of teachers, public employees or bankworkers will reach all or the greater part of the municipalities in a state. I have counted general strikes as one strike for it is called by a union.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS</th>
<th>STRIKES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC-Sao Bernardo Sto. Andre and S. Caetano, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>76,843</td>
<td>20% raise above official index, 24.5% raise above official index</td>
<td>No interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sao Paulo, Osasco and Guarulhos, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70% to 74% raise official index, 58% raise above official index</td>
<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20% raise above official index</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC-Sao Bernardo Sto. Andre and S. Caetano, (Sao Paulo)</td>
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<td>No interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defeated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20% raise above official index</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>76,843</td>
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<td>No interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sao Paulo, Osasco and Guarulhos, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70% to 74% raise official index, 58% raise above official index</td>
<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20% raise above official index</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC-Sao Bernardo Sto. Andre and S. Caetano, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>76,843</td>
<td>20% raise above official index, 24.5% raise above official index</td>
<td>No interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sao Paulo, Osasco and Guarulhos, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70% to 74% raise official index, 58% raise above official index</td>
<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20% raise above official index</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC-Sao Bernardo Sto. Andre and S. Caetano, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>76,843</td>
<td>20% raise above official index, 24.5% raise above official index</td>
<td>No interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sao Paulo, Osasco and Guarulhos, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70% to 74% raise official index, 58% raise above official index</td>
<td>Recognition of the Factory Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALLURGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOBACCO WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>20% raise above official index.</td>
<td>20% raise over official index.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLASS WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>30% raise above official index.</td>
<td>Between 11.5% and 15% raise over official index.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CERAMICS WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itu. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>34% raise over official index and better working conditions.</td>
<td>15% raise over official index and working contract.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabreuva. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TEXTILE WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bras. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>5,390</td>
<td>25% raise over official index and better working conditions.</td>
<td>20% raise over official index and partial improvements.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabrica de Alpargatas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHEMICAL WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goyana, and Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>25% raise over official index.</td>
<td>20% raise over official index.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Strikes of the Year 1978 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RURAL WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms Banaurea, Mambu Sao Pedro and Bariqui. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>60% raise. Tools for work; food; work contract; accident insurance; back pay of wages.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BANK WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>65% raise above official index.</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td>(1) Threat of intervention in union. (2) Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>100% raise over official index</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>(1) Threat of Intervention. (2) Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All municipalities of: Bahia, Sao Paulo and Parana.</td>
<td>138,634</td>
<td>Regulation of bill Statute of Teachers; and raises between 27% and 38% over official index.</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>(1) Threat to the management associations of the teachers. (2) Severe police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIVERSITY WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>20% raise over official index.</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strikes of the Year 1978 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo), Rio de Janeiro, (RJ), Belo Horizonte, (MG), Porto Alegre, (RGS), Brasilia (DF) Parana.</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>5 minimum salaries pay and work contract in accordance with Labor Code. (CLT)</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Jornal do Brasil, Folha de Sao Paulo, Isto E, Veja, Movimento, O Trabalho, O Globo. Union newspapers and documents issued by the strikers during assemblies and meetings.

**Note:** The total number of workers on strike in 1978 was: 539,037
The approximate total number of strikes in 1978 was: 24. It is to be noted that in Brazil a union calls a general strike for its territory. Thus, in Sao Bernardo for example, one general strike involved strikes in 125 different corporations. One general strike in the metalworkers' union of Rio de Janeiro may involve 4,000 factories. In the general territory of the Metalworkers' Union of Sao Paulo there are 13,000 industries which may be affected by a strike. Thus, the total number of strikes, per factory, is greater than demonstrated by this table.
intervention. However, no interventions were in fact carried out in 1978 because of the strike actions.

Finally, the bankworkers received a specific treatment: they were not only repressed severely but were made the target of a new piece of legislation of strike control aimed against them. In August 4, 1978, shortly after the strike of the bankworkers, the government of Geisel passed Decree Law Number 1,632. This law extended to the bankworkers the outright prohibition from striking by including the professional grouping into the categories defined as "essential activities". The Decree Law Number 1,632 also increased the penalties for the infringement of the "essential activity" strike legislation: penalties included a 30 day suspension which could be followed by dismissal with just cause -- meaning the total loss of rights of social security for fired workers. These penalties were to be applied in addition to indictment in the National Security Law for a crime which could carry jail sentences of up to 20 years. This was the first attempt of the National Security State to deal with the strikers in a more general manner. It had, as we shall see, little effect upon the strike movements.

The year of 1979 was characterized by one of the most widespread strike movements in Brazil's labor history. Over three million workers participated in the strike actions of that year. In addition, as may be seen in the summary of the strikes for 1979 in Table 10.8, the strikes spread throughout the nation reaching 15 different states:
### TABLE 10. 8

**SUMMARY OF STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STRIKES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>958,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Transport</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>443,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>303,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Mills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravediggers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankworkers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>752,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Professors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Employees</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>387,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,207,994</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The strikes involved the following states: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Pernambuco, Paraíba, Espírito Santo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Minas Gerais, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul and Brasília (Distrito Federal).

**SOURCES:** O Globo; Jornal do Brasil; Folha de São Paulo; O Estado de São Paulo; Última Hora; Movimento: Veja; Isto É; Em Tempo; ABCD Jornal and union newspapers.
The field and range of the demands of the workers was significantly expanded. Virtually all categories of workers or middle class salaried professionals continued to be primarily interested in wage improvements or better working conditions. In addition to the basic demands, however, some groups showed specific interest in pressuring the Congress for approval of regulatory legislation: The teachers continued to demand the approval of the regulation of the Statute of the Teachers; the doctors wished to be included in the general framework of the labor legislation (CLT) to have social benefits and work under regular contract; Fiat workers went on strike against layoffs, and later conducted a second strike so as to force the corporation to re-hire one of their main leaders of the base in sectoral organization of the factory, Giannini, as well as to grant the factory committee a job security guarantee.

The list of concerns of the workers, in fact, became increasingly sensitive to the limitations of the Labor Code and the trade union structure. Many of the categories of workers included in their priority list of demands the question of job security, job tenure guarantees for factory committee members and the right to have in-the-factory representation of shopstewards (delegado sindical) with legally recognized union prerogatives of representation.

One should further note that the employers, in most cases, were willing to engage in discussions as to wage levels and working conditions but in no case were they even willing to negotiate matters of union representation or job security. See Table 10.9:
### Table 10.9

STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>METALLURGICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCD, Sao Bernardo, S. Caetano, Santo Andre, Diadema (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>70% raise on 78 salaries, shop-stewards, tri-monthly adjustments, base salary of 3 min. sal.</td>
<td>63% raise for those who earn up to 10 m.s. 44% above that.</td>
<td>(1) Intervention in the 3 unions involved. Later returned to elected officials. (2) Police repression of picket lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Jose dos Campos, Jacarei, Cacapava. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>78% raise over last salary.</td>
<td>67% raise over last in installments.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campinas. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>78% raise over last 78 salary.</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo) &quot;Industria Siam-Utul&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Back pay for 3 months.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference. Legal strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, Osasco and Guarulhos. (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>83% salary raise. Base salary of Cr. 7,200.</td>
<td>67% salary raise in 3 installments.</td>
<td>Strong police repression of picket lines. Resulted in death of one leader. (Santo Dias da Silva).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niteroi. (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>35% extra for dangerous work. Salaries from 4,680 to 13,000 cruzeros, 40 hour week.</td>
<td>69% raise for those who earn less and 50% raise for others. 30% in addition for dangerous work.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (whole state general strike). The strike affected a total of nearly 4,000 metallurgical factories in the state. (out of 5,000 factories)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>83% raise. Salary base of 6,114 cruzeiros. Job security for one year. Right of union delegates in factories.</td>
<td>75% raise plus 30% anticipated to be deducted from next raise.</td>
<td>(1) Threat of union intervention, (2) Military occupation of grounds around union, (3) Repression of picket lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) &quot;Fiat&quot; First Strike:</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>1st Strike: end of the layoffs. 2nd Strike: rehiring of leader Giannini, 90% salary raise and job security for shop-representatives.</td>
<td>Rehiring of the leader Luis Paulo Giannini, job security for the representatives and 53% raise for those who earn between 1 and 3 m.s.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem, (Minas Gerais) &quot;Toshiba&quot;</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>50% raise and free uniforms.</td>
<td>Fixed raise of 7,000 cruzeiros and free uniforms.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem, (Minas Gerais) &quot;Mannesmann&quot;</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20% salary raise. End of system of work by turns, extra hour pay and job security for Salary Committee members.</td>
<td>40% raise for those who earn less and 20% for others. Change in the system of work turns.</td>
<td>Repression of the picket lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) &quot;Macife&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>35% salary raise pay for dangerous work and one month extra salary.</td>
<td>15% raise and 5% anticipation. Extra pay for dangerous work.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strikes of the Year 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers of Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metallurgical Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) &quot;Nansem&quot;</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>30% raise, two year job security for members of Salary Committee.</td>
<td>20% salary raise and six months job security for Salary Committee.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouro Branco (Minas Gerais) &quot;AcoMinas&quot;</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>Base salary of 4,000 cruzeiros for non-skilled 9,000 for skilled and 18,000 for Work Chiefs.</td>
<td>Base salary of 3,600 for non-skilled, 6,500 for skilled and 12,000 for Work Chiefs.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itauna, (Minas Gerais) &quot;Cimetal&quot;</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>80% raise and base salary of 3,600 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>30% salary raise and base salary of 3,300 pay for strike days.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) &quot;Brafer&quot;</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>80% salary raise.</td>
<td>For two months raises between 10 and 35. After that raises of 53%.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caetes (Minas Gerais) &quot;Cia. Ferro Brasileiro&quot;</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Raises between 50% and 80%.</td>
<td>Raises between 44 and 60% and after 8 months raises of 80%. Base salary of 5,150 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divinopolis (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>80% salary raise.</td>
<td>Salary anticipation of 1,000.</td>
<td>Government blocked the union bank account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URBAN TRANSPORT WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>Raise of 80% to have salaries equal to interstate drivers.</td>
<td>Raises of 41%. Ticket collectors had only a bonus of 4,000.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Niterói Duque de Caxias, Nova Iguaçu. General strike in 10 municipalities.</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>Salary raise to equal the pay of interstate bus drivers.</td>
<td>Salaries were raised from 5,350 to 7,200 for the drivers. From 2,264 to 4,110 to ticket collectors.</td>
<td>Government threat of union interventions. Police repression of strikers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>80% salary raise.</td>
<td>60% salary raise</td>
<td>Repression of strikers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundial (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>20% anticipation.</td>
<td>20% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campinas (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>20% salary raise.</td>
<td>10% raise and 10% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Jose dos Campos (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30% salary raise.</td>
<td>20% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Salary of 7,500 for drivers and 3,700 for ticket collectors.</td>
<td>Salary of 7,000 for drivers and 2,500 for ticket collectors.</td>
<td>Strong police repression of the pickets and strikers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitoria (Espirito Santo)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>100% raise and pay for overtime, 1 hour for meals and free uniforms.</td>
<td>60% raise, reduction of daily hours from 13 to 8 hours and re-admission of 13 fired workers.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima (Minas Gerais) &quot;Mineracao Morro Velho&quot;</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Non-skilled base salary of 8,000 and skilled between 9,000 and 12,000.</td>
<td>Defeated.</td>
<td>Police repression of strikers and of picket lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacos (Minas Gerais) &quot;AcoMinas&quot;</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>80% salary raise.</td>
<td>63% raise for those who earn up to 3 m.s.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), Contagem (MG)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>80% raise and base salary of 8,000.</td>
<td>Salary raise of 65%.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pains, Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) &quot;Cia Siderurgica Pain&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>40% salary raise.</td>
<td>30% salary raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem and Betim (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>80% salary raise, base salary of 8,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>64% salary raise and 4,000 cruzeiros base salary.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joao Monlevade (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Raise of 4,000 cruzeiros and base salary of 8,144.</td>
<td>Salary raise of 2,700 cruzeiros and base of 5,200.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza (Ceara)</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>75% salary raise.</td>
<td>70% salary raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruciuma (Santa Catarina)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>30% raise and base salary of 2,339 cruzeiros</td>
<td>16% salary raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URBAN TRANSPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife (Pernambuco)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>80% raise, overtime pay and extra pay at night.</td>
<td>75% raise for drivers and 50% for ticket collectors.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza (Ceara)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Base salary of 4 minimum salaries and four free days per month.</td>
<td>All demands were agreed to but are not being in fact carried out.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joao Pessoa (Paraiba)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>40% raise.</td>
<td>25% raise</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador (Bahia)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Salaries of 7,000 for drivers and 4,000 for collectors. 8 hour day.</td>
<td>Salaries of 6,000 for drivers and 3,000 for ticket collectors.</td>
<td>Police repression, injuries and one death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>Salaries of 8,400 for drivers and 6,350 for collectors. Right of shop stewards.</td>
<td>Salaries of 7,200 for drivers and 6,000 for ticket collectors. Recognition of union delegates.</td>
<td>Police repression of picket lines,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelotas (Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>30% raise.</td>
<td>20% raise.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TAXI DRIVERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General strike in major capitals (involving a total of 18 cities.)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Reaction to the rise in gasoline 40% raise.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTRUCTION WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Raises between 25 and 80%.</td>
<td>Anticipation of 22.5 to 70%. No punishment for the 90 day strike and job security for strike leaders.</td>
<td>Police repression in approximately 70 construction sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitoria (Espirito Santo)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Salary base from 3,600 8,400.</td>
<td>Raise of 6% per month for 4 month and between 50 and 70% of salaries of carpenters and masters.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta Redonda, (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>70% raise.</td>
<td>Raise from 16.20 to 17.80 per hour.</td>
<td>Police repression of street riots of strikers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curitiba, (Santa Catarina)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>80% raise and base salary of 4,016 cruzeiros</td>
<td>50% salary raise.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais &quot;Acominas&quot;</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>60% raise.</td>
<td>30% raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHEAT MILL WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos, (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>70% raise.</td>
<td>66.23% raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TEXTILE WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte, (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Base salary of 5,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strikes of the Year 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textile Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) &quot;De Millus&quot;</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>50% raise and end of frisking system of theft control.</td>
<td>25% anticipation. End of frisking.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bakers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) &quot;Pullman&quot;</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>63% raise. Base salary: Cr. 5,000.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in &quot;Swift Armour&quot;</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>10% raise and 15% anticipation.</td>
<td>10% raise.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, (Sao Paulo) Jockey Club Employees.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>54% raise.</td>
<td>54% raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ceramics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) &quot;Klabin&quot;</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>80% raise and better working conditions.</td>
<td>70% raise and partial improvement in working conditions.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gasoline Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAVEDIGGERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>58% salary raise.</td>
<td>43% salary raise.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAS WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Minimum salary between 8,000 and 9,000 cruzellos.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPER AND CARDBOARD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>62% salary raise</td>
<td>57% raise.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARBAGE COLLECTORS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>Minimum base of 4,680 cruzeiro. Raise of 1,577 cruzellos, 8 hour day</td>
<td>Victorious. Total of 165% salary raise.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasilia (Distrito Federal)</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>Salaries between 4,300 and 7,200.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>70% salary raise.</td>
<td>40% salary raise.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Salary of 6,000 cruzellos.</td>
<td>Salary of 4,500 cruzellos.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MINERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Catarina (coal workers), Towns of Lauro Muller, Urussanga, Sideropolis, Rio Marina and Criciuma.</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>100% salary raise and minimum base salary 4,014.</td>
<td>17% raise and 15% anticipation.</td>
<td>Police repression of pickets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouro Velho (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>Salary between 8 and 12,000.</td>
<td>25% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MINING</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouro de Morro Velho (Minas Gerais) - gold.</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>Salaries between 8 and 12,000.</td>
<td>25% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouro Branco (Minas Gerais) &quot;AcoMinas&quot;</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>20% raise.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECTRICAL WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife and Sao Francisco (Pernambuco) &quot;Celpe - Cia Hidrelétrica de Pernambuco.&quot;</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Readmission of 5 strike leaders fired. Rises between 53% and 81%. Job security for leaders.</td>
<td>Victorious, including job security demand.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORKERS IN COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>100% raise in sale commission.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strikes of the Year 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) reaching 204 health centers.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>At first demand of 70% raise and 2,000 fixed. Then lowered to 43% raise and 2,000</td>
<td>30% raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bankworkers</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) General of all banks in state.</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>70% raise and added 3,000.</td>
<td>5% raise over the official government index.</td>
<td>(1) Intervention in union and removal of President Arlindo Ramos. (2) Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul). General strike also involved 11 other municipalities, &amp; 22 other local unions total of 28,000 workers.</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>75% raise and union delegate.</td>
<td>Raises of 15% and after two months 5% above official index.</td>
<td>(1) Intervention in the union with the removal of the whole board of directors. Arrest of President Olivio Dutra. (2) Strong police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>50% raise plus 3,000 fixed.</td>
<td>Raises between 8 and 18% above official index.</td>
<td>(1) Union intervention and removal of 3 directors of union. (2) Police repression, 300 arrests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>50% raise and 3,000 fixed.</td>
<td>Raise between 5 and 15% above official index.</td>
<td>(1) Union intervention and removal of board of directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Guards</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Min. salary of 6,000, insurance of 400,000 &amp; work week of 5 days. Free uniforms</td>
<td>Min. salary of 5,000, insurance of 250,000, Rehiring of fired workers, Payment of strike days.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Strikes of the Year 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truck Drivers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) Drivers of coal.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Raise in the rent price of 71%</td>
<td>71% raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais, Parana, Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul.</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Raise in the rent price of 25% to 50%</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo, ABCD region (Sao Paulo) Autotransport truck drivers.</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>70% rise in the price paid by corporations.</td>
<td>70% rise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parana (Parana state) Wheat drivers.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50% raise in the price.</td>
<td>50% raise in the price.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Salaries between 5,000 and 8,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>Salaries between 6,500 and 3,600.</td>
<td>Government official running the union was expelled by workers. Police repression and one death. With intervention of Lula gov, agreed to cease repression and distribute food to assembled men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goiania and Anapolis (Goias)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>100% raise. Salary base of 6,000 to 20,000.</td>
<td>Raise of 30% for those who earn less.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasilia (Distrito Federal)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Base salaries between 5,000 and 20,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>Base salaries of 2,600 and 3,900. 25% raise for up to 5 minimum salary.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Strikes of the Year 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>100% raise, overtime pay and min. salary of 7,000.</td>
<td>Raise between 10% and 47%. Salary base of 4,000. Job security for leaders.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8 hour day. Base minimum salary of 5,000.</td>
<td>Minimum Salary of 4,413, free uniforms and 200,000 insurance.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>70% raise plus a fixed 2,000.</td>
<td>A fixed 2,000 paid irregularly.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia. Private schools.</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>100% raise and reduction of teacher/student ratio.</td>
<td>60% raise and a promise of reduction of teacher/student ratio.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco. Private schools</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Raises of 65%, 75% and 85%.</td>
<td>Acceptance of 22 other points and promise to pay raise in installments.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State in ( ).</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Norte. Public schools.</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>200% raise.</td>
<td>10% raise over raise of public employees.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goias. Public schools.</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>Raises between 202% &amp; 313%. Min. salaries between 5,000 and 19,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>65% raise after May 1979 and 50% after February 1980.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul. Public schools.</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>Base minimum of 3 min. sal. and 70% raise.</td>
<td>Base salary of 4,000 and 70% raise.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Brasilia, (Distrito Federal) | 11,000 | Base salary of 4 min. salaries and 65% raise. | Defeated. | (1) Intervention in union and removal of directors.  
(2) Police repression.  
(3) Part of agreement was to hold union elections in 90 days. |
| Rio de Janeiro (RJ) SENAI professors. | 400 | 40% anticipation | 43% raise after Dec. 1979. | No interference. |
| Rio de Janeiro (RJ). Private schools. | 20,000 | 60% raise, 5 week month and 100% raise in base salary. | Raise according to official index and month of 4.5 and base salary raise of 75%. | No interference. |
STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (RJ). Public schools. First strike.</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>Base salary of from 4 to 6 min. salaries, 30% raise &amp; other 10% for areas of difficult access.</td>
<td>Promises of resolution in 1980. Niteroi teachers received 97 to 139% raise.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (RJ). Public schools. Second strike.</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>Same for the agreements were not fulfilled.</td>
<td>30% raise on all salaries. Reconsideration of the cases of fired strikers.</td>
<td>(1) Intervention and dissolution of Teachers Association (CEP-Centro Estadual de Professores). Arrest of leaders. (2) Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais. Public schools.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Min. Salary base of 8,000.</td>
<td>Min. salary base of 6,000.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso. Public schools.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>100% raise.</td>
<td>60% after July 1979 &amp; 40% after Jan. 1980.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (SP) *USP, UNICAMP, and UNESP.</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>70% raise plus 2,000</td>
<td>2,000 extra paid irregularly.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) PUC (Pontificia Universidade Catolica)</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Raising of 12 &amp; 20% over March's official index.</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>No Interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*USP - Universidade; UNICAMP - Universidade de Campinas; UNESP - Universidade Estadual de Sao Paulo de S.Paulo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador (Bahia) PUC</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>Payment of the agreed wages of March 1978.</td>
<td>Payment in two installments.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (RJ) UERJ (Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>60% raise in the salary &amp; 100% raise in minimum base salary.</td>
<td>50% raise.</td>
<td>The TRT (Tribunal Regional do Trabalho) judged strike legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC EMPLOYEES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) general strike.</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>70% salary raise plus 2,000</td>
<td>See results by sector.</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) Municipal employees.</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>70% raise plus 2,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>17% raise which added to the 20% received in 1978 gave raise of 37%</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) Employees of education and health departments.</td>
<td>63,800</td>
<td>70% raise plus 2,000 cruzeiros.</td>
<td>2,000 added to salary paid with irregularity</td>
<td>Police repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte, (Minas Gerais)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>Min. Salary of 7,031.</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) Junta Comercial and City Hall employees.</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>Min. Salary of 7,031</td>
<td>Victorious.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1979 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOCTORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) Hospital das Clinicas</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Minimum salary equal salaries and work contract</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOURNALISTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>25% salary raise.</td>
<td>16% anticipation.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RURAL WORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife (Pernambuco) sugar cane workers</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>100% salary raise.</td>
<td>52% salary raise.</td>
<td>No interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo) Fazenda Barigui and Fazenda Banaurea in Itanhaem.</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Enforcement of contract.</td>
<td>Court enforced contact.</td>
<td>Second strike in 8 months. Declared to be legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco - General strike. 24 unions*</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>100% salary raise.</td>
<td>100% raise.</td>
<td>Legal strike. No interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strike involved the following municipalities: S. Lourenco da Mata, Pandalho, Moreno, Alianca Carpina, Condado, Ferreiros, Itaquitinga, Macaparana, Nazare da Mata, Timbauba, Vicencia, Barreiros, Cabo, Gameleira, Ipojuca, Jaboatao, Ponte dos Carvalhos, Rio Formoso, Sao Jose da Coora Grande, Serinhaem, Vitoria de Santo Antao, Canhotinho and Camutanga.

Sources: O Globo, Jornal do Brasil, Folha de Sao Paulo, O Estado de Sao Paulo, Ultima Hora, Movimento, Veja, Isto E, Em Tempo, ABCD Jornal and union newspapers and bulletins.

Note: The total number of workers on strike for the year of 1979 was: 3,207,994. The total number of strikes per factory is greater than depicted in this chart. In Brazil a union calls a general strike for its territory which may be statewide. Thus, a general strike of metalworkers in Rio de Janeiro may involve 4,000 factories and in Sao Paulo, for example, it may involve as many as 13,000 factories.
In 1979 the conditions of organization for the workers were becoming increasingly difficult. First of all, employers -- backed by the coercive force of the National Security State -- refused to negotiate any matters related to either job security or freedom of trade union organization. In addition, they utilized their ability to fire workers easily to undermine the organizational structure of the industrial workers. This was particularly true of the automobile industry.

The turnover rate of employees in the industry of São Paulo had reached rather alarming proportions in 1979. Industrialists fired leaders of the strike actions and engaged in a salary manipulation policy of worker rotation. Under this management policy workers would be fired in large numbers before a new contract was to come into effect and then new workers were hired at a lower starting salary (salário-base).

Union leaders frequently had already denounced such practices by multinational corporations in the past. Their protests against the hiring-firing techniques of lowering wages was supported by research of DIEESE (see Graph 10.2 and Graph 10.3) which showed that in 1979 almost 75 percent of workers who left their jobs were dismissed and had not left voluntarily as the corporations claimed. The question of job security would thus become foremost in the concerns of workers. As Lula pointed out, there was no point in negotiating better contracts with higher indexes for the workers as long as the corporations could
RELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYEES DISMISSED AND THOSE WHO LEFT VOLUNTARILY (in percentage of the year's total)

Source: Isto É. April 30, 1980, page 91
From: DIEESE. 1980.

RELATION BETWEEN DISMISSALS AND VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS IN THE CITY OF SÃO PAULO (1978-1979)

Source: DIEESE. Published in Veja, July 25, 1979, pages 100-101
Note: The relation between the dismissals & the voluntary resignations from the job, shows how many people were fired by the corporations for each person who left voluntarily.
circumvent any agreement simply by increasing the rate of turnover of the work force. A worker who was dismissed by Ford would then be hired by Volkswagen or another automobile corporation to do the same job he did at Ford but at a lower pay level. 78

It should be emphasized here that the destruction of the job security system and the implantation of the FGTS had allowed the corporations to effectively curb the rise in wages -- in spite of the strike actions and real gains that the workers achieved in 1979. Hence the FGTS became a matter of increasing concern for workers who pointed out the negative effects of the work insecurity upon their real income. 79 Capitalist relations of wage-labor benefit capital when there is a high increase in unemployment and in the turnover of the workforce. The high number of job-seekers will fatten the industrial reserve army which keeps the price of wages down. This problem would become increasingly severe in 1980 and reach critical levels with the deep State-imposed recession of 1981 and the mass firing of industrial workers.

The reaction of the National Security State to the strikes of 1979 were varied and the repressive actions highly selective. The metalworkers were the principal targets of explicit military coercion. The other categories which were severely repressed included the bank-workers -- who had defied the new Decree law prohibiting their strikes -- and the various levels of primary and secondary teachers who as state employees were also considered "essential".
Early in the year, during the strike of the São Bernardo do Campo metalworkers the government moved in military force but concentrated the repression particularly on the picket lines. In addition the Ministry of Labor intervened in the 3 unions involved in the strike: the Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, the union of Santo André and the union of São Caetano. But, after a period of intense pressure, the unions were returned to the elected officials.

It should be noted that during the crisis periods of 1979 the interconnection between the elite opposition groups and the strikers became evident. The lawyers and congressmen of the opposition played a crucial role in protecting strikers, defending their rights in court and intervening with the federal government to force the return of the unions to the elected officials. The combined pressure of the vast social movement of protest against the interventions and the elite sectors' open defense of the strikers forced the National Security State, at that time, to back down and return the unions.

In September of 1979, during the metalworkers strike of São Paulo, the violence of the repression was manifested by police and military action against the picket lines. There was, however, no threat of intervention for the union was under the control of members of the pro-governmental sectors. The strike had been largely against the will of the President of the union. The violence of the repression
against the pickets caused the shooting death of a Catholic union organizer, Santo Dias da Silva. His death brought the Catholic Church right into the middle of the conflicts and strengthened its firm position of defense and support of the strikers against the violence of the National Security State.

In Belo Horizonte, during the strike of the construction workers the repression also caused the death of one worker during a street demonstration of the strikers. The bankworkers, perhaps, were those most consistently and firmly suppressed. The Ministry of Labor intervened in the bankworkers' unions of three cities (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre) and removed some of the elected officials of 24 other bankworkers unions, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul and in Minas Gerais. In addition, the president of the Bankworkers' Union of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Olivio Dutra, was arrested for over two weeks.

From the point of view of the National Security State, 1979 defined the limits of the abertura policy. At the same time that the government negotiated with political parties and civil institutions of the elite sectors engaged in the formal politics level to grant political amnesty it also made clear that the liberalization should not reach the working class. Repression became refined and class-based. Strikes would no longer be tolerated and the full power of the Repressive Apparatus would be used to stop challenges to the wage policies and the strike legislation. In addition, the repression of the posseiros
and landless peasants in the rural areas of land conflict increased. With the justification of elimination of criminals, the police and death squadrons in the cities intensified the searches and the campaigns of *blitzes* (*batidas*) in the poor districts. The limits of the "strong democracy" were traced strictly within the boundaries of the Doctrine of National Security: certain organized sectors which challenged the model of development for geopolitical grandeur rather than for basic needs would not be tolerated. They were "pressure" points to be dealt with in the manner consistent with the dictates of the doctrine of the internal enemy.

On the other hand, however, the government recognized the reality of the socially explosive tension. The collective and sometimes spontaneously violent character of some strike actions frightened the planners of the National Security State to a considerable degree. Hence the government sanctioned Law Number 6,708, by which the amount of wages would be readjusted every six months according to the consumer price index as opposed to only once per year. This would allow a certain relief for the workers. In addition, trade unions would be now allowed to engage in direct negotiations with employers over an added percentage raise based upon calculated "productivity rates".

The most important innovation introduced in the new wage law, was the differential increases for different wage brackets. Only low-paid workers -- those who earned up to 3 times the minimum salary --
would have wage raises at rates higher than the increase in the cost of living. Workers who earned between 3 and 10 times the minimum salary would have their wages adjusted at a par with the cost of living index. The remainder 4 percent of salaried workers would get progressively lower increases.

Although the government claimed that this legislation would effect an important redistribution of income and was the backbone of the abertura's social policy, opposition economists -- in particular the DIEESE -- argued that in effect it had only a limited "Robin Hood effect". The legal stipulations took some benefits from higher-paid workers to give to lower-paid workers. In no way did the legislation effect capital or profit rates.

Indeed, it amounted to a redistribution of income from the middle classes to the lower classes without ever touching the highest income groups owners of capital. This piece of legislation would backfire against the National Security State by enhancing the already difficult position of the middle class professionals and spurring them to further strong strike activities in 1980. In the immediate future, however, the law lessened the explosive tension of the lowest-paid brackets and diminished the number of working class strikes in 1980.

From the point of view of the opposition in the labor movement, 1979 was also a decisive year. First of all, the working class discovered its power. In addition, the working network of alliance
between the grassroot organizations, the Church's social movements -- including the CEBs -- and the labor unions was developed in the efforts to support the strikers. To this alliance was added the blockage role which other elite sectors of the opposition could play in protecting the strikers and interfering to confront the Federal government so as to prevent repression or reverse the worst measures.

The Catholic Church gave decisive support to the São Bernardo, Santo André, São Caetano and Diadema metalworkers in April and May of 1979 even allowing them to use the Cathedral of São Bernardo do Campo as "an alternative union headquarters" when their own unions were under intervention and military occupation. In September of 1979, Catholic militants of the base and of the oposição sindical practically organized and carried out the strike of the metalworkers of São Paulo against the explicit wishes of the president of the union, Joaquim dos Santos Andrade. Workers meetings were held in the hundreds of small parishes across the city of São Paulo. The coming together of the grassroot organizations was, therefore, a discovery of strength.

On the other hand, for the opposition, the year of 1979 also pointed to some of the lingering problem areas for the labor movement as a whole: 1. The strikes which had been organized with union support had been much too dependent upon the top leadership. There was a clear need to develop intermediary levels of representation and alternative strike commands. 2. Most strikes, in reality, had
been organized against the wishes of the *pelego* trade union officials or had been the result of spontaneous revolts which sometimes broke into violent riots and street battles with the police. The strong constraints imposed by the trade union structure became all the more evident. In addition, spontaneous strikes did not, necessarily, indicate any level of political consciousness on the part of the workers involved. Rather they could reflect the liberation of highly compressed tensions caused by the low wages and the extreme conditions of exploitation to which workers had been subjected for 15 years. 4. The spontaneity of the strikes indicated a lack of effective leadership and organizational network. In many cases, after a *de facto* spontaneous strike was well on the way the small group of "authentic" union leaders would be quickly called in to help set up emergency organizational frameworks and conduct on-the-spot leadership training. This was the case, for example, with the violent events connected to the strike of the construction workers in Belo Horizonte, when Lula, Jacó Bittar and other union leaders from different states had to quickly set up an alternative framework of organization after workers had expelled their *pelego* union president.

Finally, there was the problem of the lack of job security. In São Bernardo do Campo alone the corporations in 1979 fired over 1,000 workers in retaliation against the strikes of 1978 and 1979. Most were leaders of the *base* within the factories and were summarily dismissed right after agreements were signed promising no retaliation.
The conclusions which were drawn from the experiences of 1979 in the joint meetings of trade union leaders and in discussions for evaluation in assemblies was that it was necessary to develop stronger interconnections between the leadership and the rank-and-file. The question of intermediary levels of leadership became one of the foremost organizational concerns -- in particular in São Bernardo do Campo where it was felt that the personal leadership of Lula and the handful of union directors could weaken the overall coordination and allow the dismantling of the movement by a simple act of arrest of a few leaders. 83

Hence, the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo decided both to push for further changes in the structural relations to the State and to deepen its own network of organization. The year of 1979 was largely taken by the careful preparation of the intermediate levels of leadership, the training of the different levels of strike commands and the raising of the workers' consciousness so as to allow the next phase to be conducted without such a dependence on the primary leadership and without the picket lines vulnerable to repression.

The demand for job stability became one of the top priorities of the metalworkers. The right to in-the-factory representation through union shopstewards (delegado sindical) was reintroduced as a second strong priority. In preparation for the action, the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo organized meetings per factory, assemblies in the factories and in the union, study sessions and debates so as to
reach a consensus on the major issues and to elect the representatives of the various intermediary levels of organizations. The actual structure of organization of the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, set up in 1979 and which would lead the strike of 1980 is presented in the Chart below:

**ORGANIZATION OF THE METALWORKERS OF SÃO BERNARDO DO CAMPO & DIADEMA**

- **BOARD OF DIRECTORS**
  (20 members elected by all the union members)

- **DIRECTORS OF THE BASE**
  (13 members elected in an open union assembly - de facto union shopstewards in the factories)

- **COMMITTEE OF SALARY AND OF MOBILIZATION**
  (16 members elected in assemblies of all factories. Eventual substitutes of two higher levels. Were the Strike Command)

- **COMMITTEE OF THE 450**
  (450 members elected in meetings per factory)
  They coordinated factory activities.

- **INTERMEDIARY LEADERSHIP**
  (20,000 to 30,000 metalworkers elected per sector of each factory to coordinate the strikes)

- **BASE**
  (120,000 metalworkers)

Note: Arrows indicate information flow, interconnections and leadership.

**SOURCE:** CooJornal, June, 1980, page 21.
When in March 30, 1980 negotiations broke down and the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo, Santo André, São Caetano and Diadema once more decided to strike, the alternative strategy was applied. It was the intermediary leadership, the Comissão dos 450 and the Comissão de Salários e Mobilização which ran the strike and organized the necessary framework for the six-week period that followed. These different levels of organization ensured that even in spite of new threats, of a new governmental intervention in the unions and the imprisonment of the top leaders, the movement continued and did not diminish in strength.

As had already been the case in 1979 the general strike assemblies were held at first daily in the local football stadium, the Estádio Vila Euclides. There the 200,000 metalworkers from São Bernardo and other towns in the vicinities met to discuss the on-going strike and to vote matters concerned with the planning and continuation of the movement. When the stadium was surrounded and occupied by military troops, when the government intervened in the union and moved Military Police and dogs into the headquarters, the Catholic Church again offered the churches for the meetings. As in 1979, the São Bernardo union headquarters moved to the backyard of the Cathedral of São Bernardo do Campo.

The reaction of the National Security State this time was quick and decisive. The decision had already been previously made to move in with the full force of the Repressive Apparatus. The government
had already labeled the metalworkers as a "pressure" group of the internal enemy which should be dismantled and destroyed. This was made clear by the fact that the government prohibited any negotiations with the strikers to the extent of threatening corporations that defied the order with the withholding of governmental credit and tax deduction benefits. The lines had been drawn: This was not considered by the National Security State as a strike for better wages, working conditions and freedom of union organization. Rather, in accordance with the Doctrine of Internal Security, such events were seen as an organized threat of the "enemy within" under communist infiltration and directed from the outside.

The limitations of the "political opening" became evident with the metalworkers strike of 1980. Any organized deeply-rooted popular manifestation to pressure for participation in decisions of government is not tolerated when it provides a threat to the economic model of development envisioned in the Doctrine of National Security and Development. The focus of the theory is sufficiently narrow to not allow for the acceptance of legitimate economic and social grievances even those which result from a reaction to extreme situations of inequality and economic pressure. A society defined within the strict boundaries of the Doctrine of National Security and Development is one in which any manifestation of social and economic grievances is an unacceptable "pressure" from non-elite sectors. The more organized and supported by the population the action is the more it is considered a threat to be crushed.
In coherence with the Doctrine of Internal Security, São Paulo was placed in the direct command of the Second Army division. The Commanding General became a virtual governor-administrator during this period. In reality, the "state of emergency" became effective although it was not declared as such. Military troops occupied the cities affected by the strike and a large part of the greater São Paulo area. The maneuvers were jointly carried out by the state police forces, the Military Police and the army troops all under the direct command of the Second Army. The procedures followed the guidelines outlined in the ESG and the ECEME training manuals: total army mobilization, occupation of strategic sites, joint attack on crowds and a veritable kidnapping operation of the top leadership wherever they were to be found. They were picked from the meetings in the churches, dragged from inside of the car of the mayor of São Bernardo and taken from the automobiles of Congressmen and Senators of the opposition who came to São Bernardo to offer a measure of protection with their own parliamentary immunity. The repressive forces even went so far as to arrest without warrant the President of the Justice and Peace Committee of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, José Carlos Dias and another member of the Committee, jurist Dalmo Dallari.

The full scale military blitz against the striking metalworkers employed heavy weapons, armored vehicles and army helicopters in a military maneuver of support of infantry troops and Military Police. The leaders were kept in prison and for a while were held incommunicado.
In reaction to the violence of the State, the resistance of the workers was organized and non-violent. "The violence belongs to the State. The workers are organizing for a just cause and are peaceful." This resistance drastically demonstrated to the population the illegitimacy of the actions of the government and discredited the National Security State's argumentation of the movement's inherent "subversive" character.

The Catholic Church publicly supported the legitimate nature of the strike and questioned the legitimacy of the National Security State's legislation of exception and of political control. In 1980 the commitment of the Catholic Church to the metalworkers was deeply rooted. The hierarchy represented by Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, bishops Mauro Morelli and Claudio Hummes supported the legitimacy of the strikers basic demands. Their action was strengthened by solidarity notes of the CNBB in the name of the conference of all bishops.

In addition, the interconnections of the various levels of grassroot and formal elite opposition became effective. With the encouragement of the Catholic hierarchy, Catholic militants in the comunidades de base, the various grassroot pastorais coordinated a vast network with other opposition groups -- including Congressmen and Senators of the opposition parties, members of the OAB and other institutions of civil society. A strike fund was set up with volunteers so as to gather material support for the striking families.
The Strike Fund set up its headquarters in the Cathedral of São Bernardo do Campo. In the Igreja da Matriz, workers, Catholic militants and other volunteers wrapped foodstuff in packages that were calculated to support a family for the period of one week. The packages varied in size to fit the number of children in a family. The money and foodstuff was collected throughout the nation and sent to São Paulo. Metalworkers formed a long line around the Church so as to collect their weekly packages. In this manner the Strike Fund was able to distribute an estimated six tons of food per week for the six-week period of duration of the strike. In spite of such efforts, however, the quantity proved to be largely insufficient. The Strike Fund was able to take care only of approximately 30,000 families out of the total 120,000 striking families. Nonetheless, it is true that the solidarity effort was significant and crucial for the maintenance of the strike. Above all, it cemented the alliance of all the opposition sectors in support of the labor movement.

The effectiveness of the alliance between the grassroot secular and Church-related organizations also became evident during this strike. This was dramatically demonstrated by the blockades which were set up in all the neighborhoods so as to stop "scabs" from ever leaving their homes for the factories. This is the element which enabled the strike to be entirely carried out without picket lines. The community as a whole collectively rallied support for the striking families.
As the year of 1980 progressed, the alliance of the grassroots organizations, the Church, the labor movements and the opposition sectors engaged in formal politics became more firmly established. This was particularly significant in the strikes of primary and secondary teachers in the Northeast and in Minas Gerais. Towards the end of 1980 the power of the grassroots alliance was demonstrated in the strike of the sugarcane plantation workers in Pernambuco.

This particular strike involved approximately 240,000 sugarcane workers who were spread throughout hundreds of local farms in different municipalities of the state and were totally unprotected and vulnerable to threats of unemployment and repression. The inherent difficulties in organizing such a large number of rural workers forced a carefully interconnected planning which took the form of a coalition between 42 different rural trade unions and the Church's rural comunidades de base and the Pastoral da Terra. The network proved its efficiency by beginning the strike exactly on the day and hour planned in advance and ending it also according to the schedule. It was an impressive collective action which could not have been carried out without the previous long and patient organizational work conducted by the rural unions, the CONTAG, the comunidades de base and the Pastoral da Terra.

In general, the year of 1980 demonstrated several significant aspects: 1. First of all, there was a sharp drop in the total number of workers on strike. This was due to a combination of the effects of the violent repression enhanced by the larger fear of unemployment
due to the growing recession of the economy and the increased practice of firing striking workers employed by the corporations. In addition, the new wage policy passed in 1979, with increases every six months, diminished the desperate plight of the working population and discouraged strikes in conditions of adversity. 2. There was an increased involvement of the middle class sectors in the strike activities for both better salaries and improved working conditions. 3. The field of demands of the strikers was widened to include union rights, job security, higher budgets of the federal government for health and for education and regularization of the professions of teachers and of the doctors. 4. The reaction of the government, as may be seen in Table 10.10 which presents the major strikes, demands, results and government reactions of 1980, was more consistently one of repression, threats, intervention, arrests and indictments. The Doctrine of Internal Security was applied in full. Only in six of the strike cases did the government choose a neutral position of non-interference in the negotiations between the strikers and the employers. One should note that in these six cases matters were resolved with greater ease and did not escalate into a State-striker confrontation.

The strikes of 1980 had a significantly distinctive character. They were less strictly concerned with economic issues and took on a definite political importance because of the violence of the reaction of the National Security State. The careful preparation of the participants in the strikes was reflected in a greater emphasis upon
### Table 10.10

**STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>METALWORKERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| ABCD region: SãO Bernardo, SãO Caetano, Santo André, and Diadema (São Paulo) | 240,000 | (1) Minimum salary base of 12,000.  
(2) 15% raise over official index.  
(3) that those hired after 1975 receive the same raise as others.  
(4) readjustments every 3 months.  
(5) 100% pay for overtime work.  
(6) 40 hour week.  
(7) job security and firing criteria.  
(8) Right of the access to factory for union heads.  
(9) Recognition of union delegates and guarantee of job security for them. | (1) Minimum salary of 5,904.  
(2) 7% raise over official index.  
(3) accepted.  
(4) refused.  
(5) accepted only 5% .  
(6) refused.  
(7) some negotiated firing criteria but no job security.  
(8) Refused.  
(9) Refused. | (1) Intervention in the union of SãO Bernardo do Campo and appointment of government representative to run it.  
(2) arrests of up to a total of 64 leaders. Arrest, for some houn of Church lawyers of the São Paulo Justice and Peace Committee who served the strike.  
(3) Indictment under the National Security Law of 13 leaders.  
(4) Trial of the leaders and condemnation of 11 to prison terms between 2 and 3 and a half years. Annulled by SMT, retried.  
(5) Strong and violent repression with use of Military Police and even army helicopters.  
(6) Invasion of Church where strikers met. |
| **Belo Horizonte, (Minas Gerais) "Belgo Mineira"** | 4,500 | (1) raise of 5,700 cruzados as productivity.  
(2) 40 hour week. | (1) Accepted.  
(2) Refused. | No interference. |
## Strikes of the Year 1980 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality/Region</th>
<th>Number of Workers on Strike</th>
<th>Demands (Primary)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Government Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Port Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos, (São Paulo) Companhia Docas de Santos. Port of Santos</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>Raise of 3,300 for each worker to count as a productivity 15% raise over index.</td>
<td>Raise of 10% over official index.</td>
<td>Government took a conciliatory tone and participated in the negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil and Refinery</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cubatão, (São Paulo) Refinaria Presidente Bernardes in Cubatao &quot;Petrobras&quot;.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20% raise over official index.</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Sector is considered as essential and thus strikes are strictly prohibited by special law. But this was not a real strike but a slowdown operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vitória (Espírito Santo).</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>(1) Enforcement of agreement of 1979. (2) that companies stop substituting workers for minor without contract.</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>(1) violent repression by Military Police. (2) Annulment of union elections in which the leaders of the 1979 strike had won impressive victory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary and Secondary School Teachers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais. General strike of the entire state.</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>(1) 104.1% raise (2) Work contract for 73,000 substitute teachers. (3) Minimum salary base of 12,217.</td>
<td>Defeated after 3 and a half weeks of strike.</td>
<td>(1) Arrest of 7 leaders. (2) Indictment of 1 leader in the National Security Law. (3) Severe and violent Military Police repression. (4) Refusal to even meet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY/REGION</td>
<td>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</td>
<td>DEMANDS (Primary)</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT REACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Goiás - General strike of entire state. | 30,000 | Enforcement of contract agreed to in 1979. | Defeated | (1) Government enforced the law against strikes in "essential activities."
| | | | | (2) Military Police repression of strikers. |
| UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS | | | | |
| Salvador, (Bahia) PUC - Pontificia Universidade Católica. | 1,000 | (1) Higher salary. (2) Consideration of study made by professors on the crisis of PUC. | Resolved | No Interference. |
| Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) Universidade Santa Úrsula, PUC-Rio, Univ. Candido Mendes, Univ. Helio Alonso and Centro Unificado Profissional (CUP). | 2,000 | (1) Minimum salary base of 18,000 cruzellos. (2) 20 hour week. | Resolved only partially. | No interference. |
| Campinas, (São Paulo) UNICAMP-Universidade de Campinas. | 1,200 | Protest for the firing of 8 leaders. | Inconclusive. | No Interference. |
STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1980 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities of Goiás, Minas Gerais, Juiz de Fora, Para Alagoas, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, Paraíba, Bahia, Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Espírito Santo, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Santa Maria and Rio Grande do Sul. Plus 8 other establishments of learning of the Ministry of Education (MEC).</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>(1) Enforcement of 1979. (2) Raise of 46% after March. (3) Increase in Federal Union's percentage allocated for education from 4% of total budget to 12% budget. (4) Repeal of Law Number 6,733. (5) Approval of MEC's draft project for regularization of profession of university teachers.</td>
<td>Partial. Professors got raises averaging 117% which was still below the inflation and the request of 48% over official index. (2) Project of regularization the profession not totally approved and included a clause which takes from University autonomy by having all hiring and promotions be in a joint committee of MEC-DASP-SEPLAN</td>
<td>(1) Minister of Education, Eduardo Portella, was at first sympathetic and began negotiations. (2) The Resistance from other areas of the government caused a cabinet crisis and the subsequent firing to the Minister of Education. An Army Colonel (Colonel Ludwig) was then appointed as Minister of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESIDENT DOCTORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 states. The strike was general in state hospitals.</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>(1) Regularization of medical profession. (2) Inclusion of Resident Doctors in regular Labor Laws subject to work contract and salaries.</td>
<td>Inconclusive.</td>
<td>Negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRIKES OF THE YEAR OF 1980 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY/REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS ON STRIKE</th>
<th>DEMANDS (Primary)</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RURAL WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Lourenço and Pandalho (Pernambuco) Strike involved 42 rural unions.</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>There were 26 items in question but the most important were: (1) Right to two acres around house for planting. (2) Raise of 4% over official index as productivity. (3) Same rate of pay for hourly and monthly workers. (4) Salary raise from 3,599 to 6,899. (5) Right to union representation.</td>
<td>Most items were accepted in the agreement of 1979. They were accepted again but enforcement is only partial implementation.</td>
<td>Repression of strike using civil police and Military police.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Jornal do Brasil, Folha de Sao Paulo, Isto É, Veja, Movimento, O Trabalho, O Globo, ABCD Jornal. Union newspapers and documents issued by the strikers during assemblies and meetings.

Notes: The total number of workers on strike in 1980 was: 664,700.
The total number of strikes per factory is greater than depicted in this chart. In Brazil a union calls a general strike for its territory which may be statewide. Thus, a general strike of metalworkers in Rio de Janeiro may involve 4,000 factories, in Sao Paulo it may involve as many as 13,000 factories.
Table 10.11
SUMMARY: STRIKES OF THE YEAR 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STRIKES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>244,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; Refinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Secondary Teachers (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Professors (3)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Doctors (4)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Workers (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>664,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: O Globo, Jornal do Brasil, Folha de São Paulo, Última Hora, Movimento, Veja, Isto É, Em Tempo, ABCD Jornal, union newspapers and leaflets.

NOTES: 1. General strike on region of the ABCD in São Paulo, involved three towns and approximately 150 corporations.

2. General strikes of the primary and secondary teachers in three different states. They affected most schools in all the municipalities in the states.

3. The strike in Rio de Janeiro affected five different universities. The general strike of university professors of federal universities affected 19 different universities in 15 states plus eight other establishments of learning connected to the Ministry of Education.

4. The strike of the resident doctors affected 15 states and most of the state hospitals in each state.

5. The strike of the rural workers was among sugar plantation workers primarily in the state of Pernambuco. It was organized by a coalition of 42 rural unions, the Church's Pastoral da Terra and the rural comunidades de base.

Note: I have counted as one a strike action which is called by a union either for a general strike or for a particular establishment or factory. Thus, the metallurgical strike of the ABCD region has been counted as one — although it affected a large area and a number of factories. On the other hand, the doctors' strikes were individually called by different unions and counted individually.
matters of legal rights: enforcement of contracts agreed upon in 1979, the right to a 40-hour work week, the end of the regular practice of substitution of adult workers for children with lower pay and an increase in the rate of productivity granted. This indicates a higher level of political awareness of the participants who no longer engaged in violent spontaneous or desperate explosions. The summary of all the strikes of 1980 is presented in Table 10.11.

V. Conclusion: The Challenges of the Abertura

The period of the abertura was a learning process for the opposition sectors. Several important aspects of the dialectic between the opposition and the National Security State became evident in the dynamic process of confrontation during the liberalization period.

First of all, the limitations of the nature of the institutionalized "flexible" decompressed National Security State were tightly drawn within the general framework of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Accordingly, the opposition was divided into tolerated and non-tolerable groups the latter of which continued to meet systematic physical repression. Within the larger field of the Doctrine of National Security, which groups would be considered intolerable "pressure" points was determined by the confines of the economic development model. Those whose demands were connected to the transformation of the model to allow greater distribution of income and power in decision making were to be eliminated and crushed.

In spite of such limitations, the period was characterized by the
strong resurgence of the labor and popular sectors -- which the State had believed to have crushed and which had been silent in the political arena for ten years. After 1977 increasingly these were the voices which were raised demanding to be heard and pushing the door of the society to force their entry. They were no longer to be marginalized. The strength of the grassroot movements, the labor unions and the peasants was demonstrated in the success of their strategies of pushing for \textit{de facto} transformation in spite of the overwhelming odds and the myriad of repressive legislation continuously drafted to attempt to bring them under control.

In turn, the demands and questions raised from the base dialectically affected the elite opposition sectors already engaged in confrontation with the State at the formal politics level. Hence, the influence of the voice from the marginalized modified the universe of demands of the elite groups which negotiated measures of liberalization with the National Security State. In this manner, the appeal to the elite sectors -- the extended hand offered for a new social pact which would exclude the majority -- remained non-realized. The elite sectors, in their connection to the grassroot, themselves changed and increased the universe of demands. Now all opposition sectors demanded the participation of the majority in political, social and economic decisions, freedom of union organization, the end of the wage-control policies and the transformation of the economic model itself. The point of connection between the levels
of formal politics and grassroot-base related politics was found in the very process of dynamic struggle against the efforts of the State to negotiate with some sectors and isolate and repress others. The State's reaction with violence against the strikers forced the elite opposition sectors to engage in their defense and thereby increased the contact between the two groups, dialectically transforming both. The new totality of the opposition had a greater measure of connection between the two levels of political participation.

Finally, the period was rich in alternative models to the one presented by the National Security State. In the process of demanding participation, in organizing and mobilizing to force their voices to be heard, the grassroot movements and the rural and urban labor movement demonstrated a vision of the new society, of the form of participatory democracy which they envisioned, demanded and, in fact, practiced within their own organizations. In this manner, the seed of participatory democracy is contained in those movements at the grassroot. The alternative model of political, social and economic development is being formed in the womb of the repressive National Security State. It is a model which is born from a repudiation of the model imposed upon the society for eighteen years and which has been forged in the long process of learning inherent in the actual engagement in opposition activities. The new economic model may be found in the premises stated in the Carta de Princípios and other union documents, in the resolutions of the rural workers Congress and in the documents of the CEBs and other community organizations. They are the consensus of the organized people.
From the point of the National Security State, the period of the *abertura* showed the exhaustion of the system. Physical repression must be selective and limited. No longer may the State operate with impunity in large-scale repressive campaigns. Indeed, selective repression meets with growing opposition as well blocking the repressive paths available to the National Security State.

On the other hand, the search for legitimation in the "opening", for a new social pact and for the legitimacy of the elections has been countered by the explicit acts of tampering with the electoral system and changing the rules of the game before every election period to maintain the monopoly of State power in the hands of a few. The search for legitimation has been carried through a path which excludes consensus and attempts to bring stability through sophisticated mechanisms of electoral control. It has brought with it its own negation in a system caught in the relationship to the opposition.

The economy of the post-miracle years, with inflation rates which, in 1981 had reached a historical record of 117.3 percent \(^{87}\) and a skyrocketing foreign debt which reaches almost 60 billion dollars \(^{88}\) and costs the nation 65 percent of total export earnings per year just for the servicing of the debt, has increased the isolation of the National Security State. Brazil has become a hostage of international finance capital. Economic development decisions are no longer made according to the precepts of the internal needs but rather in order to fulfill the requirements of bankers whose profits in the period from 1969 to 1977 increased by 2,584 percent. \(^{89}\)
The limits of the model of the Doctrine of National Security and Development have become clearer: Development which is not geared to the fulfillment of basic needs and concentrate increasingly the national income in the hands of 10 percent of the population breeds social conflict, tension and social violence which are the result of the increasing misery of large sectors of the marginalized population. On the other hand, the early dream of the "Brasil Grande" has also become severely threatened in the post-miracle years. 90

The isolation of the State and its failure to accomplish a "new social pact" with organized sectors of the elite opposition has hampered its ability to find longterm institutionalization and stability. The State lacks a minimum social base of consensus and legitimacy due to the contradictions of the system itself which have accumulated and become evident in the phase of the abertura.

In the next chapter, our concluding chapter, we shall examine the contradictions of the National Security State and the major aspects of the dialectical relationship to the opposition since 1964. Some of the main questions to be examined have been discussed throughout this work. We shall mainly highlight the issues, prospects for the future, possibilities for alternatives to the model and the prospects of Brazilian society to transcend the dialectic between the opposition and the State by transforming the National Security State itself.
NOTES

1. The speech of General Golbery do Couto e Silva at the Superior War College (ESG) was at first secret but leaked to the press. The conference, entitled "The National Political Conjuncture and the Executive Power" was partly published by Veja, September 10, 1980, pages 3 to 6.

General Golbery do Couto e Silva later gave his permission and the full text was included in the compendium of his writings, Conjuntura Política Nacional, O Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1981).

My references are to the Veja article of September 10, 1980.


3. Ibid. page 4.

4. Ibid. page 5.

5. Ibid. page 5.

6. Ibid. page 6. See also the article on Golbery's "master plan" in Isto É, January 16, 1980 "O General Golbery e o Plano Mestre", pages 3 to 11.

7. For more information and details on the programmed reforms for the period of abertura see: Isto É, March 12, 1980, pages 4 to 7 "Oposições e Eleições: 1982 Está mais Perto". In this article it is of particular relevance the detailed timeplan of the governmental program from 1980 to 1983 included in the chart "O cronograma do governo". See also Isto É, March 9, 1980 "Abertura: Ackel atropela Lobão: O governo opta pelas diretas e define a estratégia de 1980"; Jornal do Brasil, July 4, 1980, page 2 "Golbery diz à ESG que a abertura não vai parar"; and Veja, May 30, 1979 "O Jogo está aberto: O governo vai mostrando suas cartas e define a anistia, partidos, eleições de 1982".

8. For information on the movements for political amnesty see the special issue Anistia: A História das Nossas Anistias, Os exemplos Internacionais, a Campanha de Hoje: A quem vai Beneficiar (São Paulo: Edição, S.A., 1978). See also the various issues of the publication of the Feminine Movement for Amnesty, Maria Quitéria and the issues of the newspaper of the Brazilian Committee for Amnesty (CBA) called Anistia. The President of the Movimento Feminino pela Anistia, Thereza Godoy Zerbine, recently published a complete history of the movement. See: Therezinha Godoy Zerbine, Anistia: Semente da Liberdade (São Paulo, 1979), published by the MFA. This book presents all the important documents, the organizational network and the political values of the women who comprised the vast movement for political amnesty. The campaign for political amnesty increased after 1978 and received


The newspaper *Última Hora* of August 23, 1979, page 5, published the full text of the Amnesty Law. See also *Jornal do Brasil* of August 23, 1979, page 4 which narrated the process of the Congressional vote on the bill. For an excellent analytical article on the voting of the Amnesty Bill see *Isto É* of August 29, 1979, page 9 "Anistia Parcial: A Batalha no Congresso."


For an account of the voting process of the Party Reform Bill see, for example: *Jornal do Brasil*, November 22, 1979, page 8 "ARENA e dois emedebistas aprovam extinção dos Partidos"; *Isto É*, November 28, 1979, page 15 "O Tancredoemedeb chega ao fim"; *Isto É*, November 28, 1979, page 10 "Depois da Extinção: Um susto que o governo levou: Por algumas horas parecia que o MDB não ia morrer"; *Veja*, November 28, 1979, page 20 "A Partida dos Partidos". See also, Latin America Political Report of October 26, 1979, Volume XIII, Number 42 "Brasil: the Party's Over".
11. Articles 2 and 3 were added by the President after he vetoed the version which had been approved. Article 2 extinguished the MDB and the ARENA. Article 3 provided that the present Legislature should organize itself in Parliamentary blocks until the parties had a chance to receive the final registration from the Superior Electoral Tribunal.

This latter stipulation repeated the process which occurred in 1966 after Institutional Act Number Two extinguished the 13 political parties which existed at that time and created the bi-party system of the MDB and the ARENA. Temporarily the parties formed "blocks" in parliament to allow a reorganization period.

12. Article 5, Item II, Paragraph 1: "The name of the party must, by obligation, have the word "party" included".

13. Article 5, Item III, Paragraph 3: "The party's name must not use the term and/or elicit the affiliation based upon an appeal to religious beliefs or feelings of class or race".

14. Article 2. "Political parties (...) must pledge allegiance to a democratic system". This article was used to maintain the PCB in illegality in most legislation regulating political parties in Brazil since 1947. Since the PCB defends the "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is considered to be a party that does not defend the democratic system as defined by the governments.

15. Article Number 9: "The Superior Electoral Tribunal shall establish a period of 12 months in which parties must be organized."

16. Article 12: "The party which, in the period of 12 months from the decision of the Superior Electoral Tribunal has not conducted Conventions in at least 9 states and in 1/5 of the respective municipalities of each state shall have its preliminary registration automatically cancelled."

17. Article 35. This was regulated by the Superior Electoral Tribunal in Article 58, Items I, II, III, IV and V which reads as follows:

   Item I: Two percent of the electorate in municipalities of up to 1,000 voters.
   Item II: The twenty mentioned in Item I, plus 5 for each 1,000 voters in municipalities of up to 50,000 voters.
   Item III: The 270 of the previous item plus 2 for each one thousand voters in municipalities of up to 200,000 voters.
   Item IV: The 670 of the previous Item plus one for each
1,000 voters in municipalities of up to 500,000 voters.

Item V. The 1,170 of the previous Item plus 1 for each 2,000 voters in municipalities of more than 500,000 voters.

18. Article 72 of the Party Reform Bill: "The senator, federal congressman, state representative or alderman who opposes by his vote the directive of the party (...) or who leaves his party in order to join another (...) shall lose his electoral mandate."

Note: This regulation, known as the fidelidade partidária, had existed previously. As we mentioned, it was lifted in the April Package Laws so as to allow the preparation of new parties leading to the final demise of the MDB and the ARENA. It would be resumed after the period of party organization was considered to be over, i.e. in November of 1981. See Isto É, Nov. 13, 1981 "O Prazo Vencido".

19. Article 19, Item IV of the Party Reform Bill, Ibid. page 7: "it is prohibited to form coalitions with other parties for the elections for the House of Representatives, the State Assemblies and the Municipal Chambers".

20. According to the Latin America Regional Report on Brazil of July 3, 1981 - RB-81-06, the PDS's main proposals which would be considered during the planned stages of the electoral reform would include:

1. Electoral alliances between parties to be banned. The objectives would be to stop the smaller opposition parties from banding together to confront the PDS.
2. The lifting of the legal obligation to vote. This would favour the PDS as it has by far the most efficient party machine, particularly in rural areas.
3. An increase in the number of deputies from 420 to 500. On the basis of obscure (and ingenious) demographic criteria, most of the new seats would be allocated to the northeast, the stronghold of the PDS.
4. Free electoral propaganda on TV and radio to be limited to one hour a day (not two as before the Lei Falcão) and to 20 days before the elections, not 90 days as before. Moreover, the time may be distributed proportionately, depending on the party's strength in congress. This would give the PDS more than half the time available.
5. The sublegenda which is already in force for the election for senators and prefeitos (mayors) to be extended to elections for state governors. Under this arrangement, the candidate on the party legenda (slate) who wins the most votes automatically receives the votes given to defeated candidates from the same party. Although this regulation may operate against the interests
of the government in a few states it is considered on balance the best means of maximising votes for the PDS in the numerous states where the party is seriously divided.

Note: We should recall that the sublegenda system was most useful to defeat the extremely strong MDB candidate of Pernambuco for the senate post of 1978. Jarbas Vasconcelos, of the MDB, was defeated by a slight difference due to the added votes of the two ARENA candidates who ran on the sublegenda system. However, in a key vote in November of 1981, the sublegenda project of the government which meant to extend the system to the gubernatorial elections of 1982 was defeated in Congress. This was the first important vote in which PDS members joined the opposition to defeat a governmental project during the government of Figueiredo.

21. The PMDB, by October of 1980 had already organized a minimum of 20 percent of the municipalities of all states. The PP had the following states: Bahia, Ceará, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paráiba, Paraná, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte and Rio Grande do Sul.

The PDT had the following states: Espírito Santo, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.

The PTB also had 10 states: Alagoas, Amazonas, Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

The PT had the following states: Acre, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo.

The PDS, like the PMDB, had also organized in all states.

22. See: Latin America Weekly Report WR - 80-25, June 27, 1980, page 9. The representation of each party, in October of 1980 was as follows:

PDS (Partido Democrático Social): 213 deputies and 37 senators.
PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) 98 deputies and 19 senators.
PP (Partido Popular): 69 deputies and 3 senators.
PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores): 8 deputies and one senator.
PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista): 23 deputies.
PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro): 1 deputy.

23. Article 16 and Article 17 of the Party Reform Bill, Ibid. page 6. "A party which does not gain at least 5 percent of the support of the electorate in a Congressional Election, distributed in at least 9 states with a minimum of 3 percent of the votes in each state, shall lose the right to representation in the Federal Senate, in the House
of Representatives and in the State Assemblies" (Article 16).

(...), "the votes given to the candidates of such a party shall be declared void by the Electoral Courts. The party itself will be able to preserve its organizational framework so as to join another election -- as long as it maintains its directional board in accordance with the law". (Article 17).

24. An excellent summary of the variety of movements in the grass-root which exist in Brazil (in this case particularly in São Paulo) is provided by the collective work edited by Paul Singer and Vinicius Caldeira Brant, São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda. co-edited by CEBRAP, 1981). This book contains important articles of Candido Procópio Ferreira de Camargo, Beatriz Muniz de Souza, Antonio Flávio de Oliveira Pierucci, Clovis Moura, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and is divided into 8 parts: the emergence of the popular movements in São Paulo; the trade unions; the comunidades eclesiais de base; the neighborhood movements; the feminine and feminist movement; the black rights organizations; the political parties and finally the general analysis of the dynamic relationship between all these groups in São Paulo.

25. This study was reproduced in the newspaper of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema -- Tribuna Metalúrgica, Ano VIII, Number 46, of June, 1978, page 11.

26. See Table 17 in Appendix for "Minimum Salary in Brazil (1940-1978): Nominal Value, Decree Number Establishing the value, date of decree, date it became effective".


29. José Alvaro Moisés coordinated a research of the SABs in São Paulo gathered under the title "Classes Populares, Participação Política e Protesto Urbano na Região da Grande São Paulo". José Alvaro Moisés also conducted a particular neighborhood movement study of Osasco and Pirituba, São Paulo, "Classes Populares, Participação Política e Protesto Urbano em Osasco e Pirituba", mimeo, CEBRAP, 1974. Other studies are included in the edited study São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento, op.cit. A large research study of the neighborhood movements in the state of Rio de Janeiro is being conducted by the IUPERJ (Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro) under the direction of Renato Borschi. It should be completed in 1981.
30. This number is an approximation which was given by the coordinator of the Movement of the Friends of the District of Nova Iguacu, (Movimento de Amigos de Bairro de Nova Iguacu, MAB) in a conversation with the author.

31. The information as to the number of associations affiliated to the Federation of Residents of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) was provided by Cesar Campos, President of the FAMERJ in a conversation with the author.

32. See, Jose Alvare Moises, "Experiencia de Mobilizacion Popular em Sao Paulo", op.cit. page 80, note 30.

33. See, O Globo, April 6, 1980, page 12 "Associações de Bairro estão Voltando: A Cada Semana surge uma".


35. Janio Quadros was elected President in 1960 with 5,636,623 votes one of the highest total number of votes ever given to a Presidential candidate. He was the last directly elected President of Brazil. He resigned six months after taking office, on the 25th of August of 1961 and was replaced, after a great deal of opposition by the military, by his vice-President, Joao Goulart. Joao Goulart had been a Presidential candidate in 1960 and was the second most voted in the elections, receiving 4,547,010 votes. According to the Constitution of 1947, then in effect, the first most voted candidate became the President and the second most voted candidate was to become the vice-President.

36. For an account of the events connected to the attempt of the mayor of Sao Paulo, Olavo Setubal to apply clientelistic pressures upon the associations of the district and their refusal to become connected in any manner to the administration see the article of Jose Alvare Moises, "SABS Uma Nova Forca" in Opiniao, July 25, 1975, page 5.

37. Cesar Campos, President of the FAMERJ. Cited in O Globo, April 6, 1980, page 12.

38. For a detailed analysis of their democratic participation and the strategies for activation of the associations see the articles in Sao Paulo: O Povo em Movimento, op.cit.

39. See, Jose Alvare Moises, op.cit. Most neighborhood organizations, whenever there is any available financial resource, print their own small newspapers which contain the information on the most important
issues of the neighborhood. These are alternative sources of information for the local population and provide their knowledge of the reality in their area. A content analysis of a variety of newspapers of the local associations in Rio de Janeiro with which I had personal contact indicated the particular concern with the bad conditions of transportation, of the urban system of sewage and garbage removal, of lack of electricity, lack of adequate health facilities and lack of schools and daycare centers. In other words, the most present needs of the population, in every case, were in the areas of basic needs.

José Álvaro Moisés, in his "Experiência da Mobilização Popular em São Paulo" cites a study conducted by the mayor's office of São Paulo in 1970. This research found that 61.8 percent of the SABs existent in the state of São Paulo in 1970 concentrated their work exclusively upon the mobilization of pressure-groups for improvements in: 1. social equipment, i.e. schools, day care centers, health clinics, playgrounds etc. 2. urban equipment, i.e., light, water, pavement, public transportation etc. 3. public services, i.e., security, police, fire and cleaning.

40. A serious conflict developed in Belem (Pará) in November of 1977 between the local authorities and the organizations of the neighborhood which had been asking for many years to have the streets paved because of violent dust storms which were a serious health hazard to the local population. Faced with the total lack of concern of the mayor and unable even to schedule a meeting for discussion of the problems, the residents set up barricades in all the streets that lacked pavement so no traffic could go through. The conflict developed with violence due to the employment of troops and military police against the guardians of the barricades. See the accounts in O Liberal, of November 1, 1977; O Liberal, Nov. 2, 1977 and O Liberal, November 30 1977. The problem was finally resolved with the intervention of the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops (CNBB) and other political organizations of Belém. The mayor eventually released funds for the pavement of the streets.

41. See, the Archdiocesan newspaper O São Paulo of May 30 to June 5, 1980, page 5 for an extensive article on the work of the neighborhood organizations to set up and run day care centers. The article narrates the process of development of the association. After applying pressure on the local authorities for more than 7 years the districts collectively built their own. For other accounts of collective work of the residents of poor districts and slums see, for example: Veja, August 9, 1978 on the effort of the 145,000 inhabitants of the largest slum in Rio de Janeiro, the Rocinha to clean the valleys and open sewage. See also, Jornal do Brasil, March 20, 1978, "Rocinha de pâ e Picaretta faz Trabalho do Governo e Limpa sujeira das valas". For other works see, Movimento, January

An excellent account of the collective work of an association to establish a food cooperative is provided by Pedro Porfirio in his O Poder da Rua (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, Ltda. 1981).

42. The Movimento contra o custo de vida (or Movimento contra a Carestia) was organized under the protective umbrella of the Catholic Church. It began in meetings of the "mothers' clubs" in the poor periphery areas of São Paulo. The housewives conducted a preliminary research in their own neighborhoods, to discover how many hours of work the workers had to work (husband and/or wife) to buy the food which they needed to have for survival of a family of four for a month. They discovered that the hours had increased, in their neighborhood, from a total of 87 hours and 20 minutes in 1965 to a total of 182 hours and 11 minutes. Then the results of this discovery were analyzed and debated by the local housewives and workers. The Movimento do Custo de Vida was born from these debates and the effect of the salary policy of the government upon their wages. The participants brought in their families and neighbors to join the discussions about the low salaries and the high food prices. Progressively the local meetings became bigger and bigger until by 1978 the movement was sufficiently large to organize the petition and collect one and a half million signatures in 3 months just in their own neighborhoods. From the state of São Paulo, the movement against the cost of living spread to Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Bahia. However, in no other place did it reach the level of sophistication and organization which it has in São Paulo.

For an account of the movement's history see: Isto E, March 22, 1978, page 8, "A Periferia Começa a Erguer a Voz". See also, Cadernos do CEAS, Number 56, July/August, 1978. Jornal do Brasil of August 28, 1978, page 3 describes the rally which was organized in the square around the São Paulo Cathedral, Catedral da Sé, as the formal end of the petition campaign. This movement is also described in the book São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento, op.cit.

43. The Movimento de Amigos de Bairro de Nova Iguaçu coordinates the work of different associations of neighborhoods. Its highly democratic internal organization and effective political mobilization has earned it support among the population of the area estimated at one and a half million inhabitants. The MAB began in the late sixties with discussion groups over problems of health and developed in coordination with the work of the Pastoral da Terra, the Justice and Peace Committee of the diocese of Nova Iguaçu and the local secular organizations already existent in the area.

In essence, the problem sometimes lies in the fact that people in a highly mobile and migrant area often purchase what they believe to be a legal title to someone else's apartment. Thereafter they continue to pay monthly installments to the BNH fully believing themselves to be the proprietors. Although the Bank accepted payments it took the position that these people were "invaders" and had no legal rights to the property they had been paying for. This was one of the points in the negotiations of the events connected to the attempted forced eviction of the 16,000 families in Nova Iguaçu.

I was able to observe this episode and the work of the associations, the MAB and the diocesan Justice and Peace Committee together with Bishop Dom Adriano Hêpólito of Nova Iguaçu. Their example of organization and effective action has inspired other neighborhood associations of the area to come over to learn from that particular experience.

The problem of access to urban housing and urban land has become one of the most serious aspects of the real estate speculation in the large cities over the past ten years. In fact, it has become severe enough to warrant the decision of a priority area of work for the Catholic Church. Some group activities to acquire the legal title to collective land have met with success. For example, through the joint work of the secular associations and the Catholic Church, many areas have been granted legal titles to urban property of land. This was the case of the Favela do Vidigal in Rio de Janeiro which fought collectively against forced eviction since 1975. The Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro, under the guidance of Dom Eugénio Salles, helped to organize legal defense and collective action. The visit of the Pope to that particular favela allowed for the negotiation of a sweeping collective land grant to the inhabitants of the area. The experience of another favela of Rio de Janeiro, the Chapéu Mangueira of Leme was interesting. The Association of Chapéu Mangueira won collective title to the area which is owned jointly by all residents. The land is owned by the Association, the marking of plots discussed and decided in democratic assemblies and there is the stipulation that sales have to be made with a priority choice of the Association. On some of these experiences see the articles in: *Em Tempo,* 29 to 4 of August 1978, page 12 "Aprendendo a Brigar: Participantes da Comissão de Bairro do Parque América Descrevem a Experiência pela Legalização do Loteamento de sua Região*; *Movimento,* January 26 to February 1, 1981, page 17.
"Movimento de Favelados: A Lei que os Próprios Favelados Fizeram para Garantir seus Barracos"; Movimento, January 6, 1978 "A Luta no Vidigal"; Mário Moreira Alves, Tribuna da Imprensa, November 26, 1980 "Os Ruis Barrosas do Morro". See also the analysis of the problem of land in urban areas in Movimento, 14 to 20 of September, 1981, "Cidades: Quem Dirigirá os Que Querem Justiça?" and "Os Invasores de São Paulo: 0 que está por trás das invasões de lotes urbanos em todo o Brasil, um povo pobre que não tem recursos nem mesmo para alugar um barraco numa favela".

The Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro organized an extensive research of the urban housing problems in the city published as in 1978 under the title "O Problema Habitacional do Rio de Janeiro".


47. The definition of the term base as referring to those who are deprived of property, power and knowledge (ter, poder e saber) is in Almir Ribeiro Guimarães, O.F.M., Comunidades de Base no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda., 1980), page 92.


49. Information on the origin and the history of the CEBs in Brazil may be found in: Álvaro Barreiro, Comunidades Eclesiais de Base e Evangelização dos Pobres (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1977); Clóvis Boff, O.S.M., Comunidade Eclesial, Comunidade Política: Ensaios de Eclesiologia Política (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda., 1978); Comunidades Eclesiais de Base no Brasil, in Estudos da CNBB, Number 23; Padre Affonso Gregory and Maria A. Ghisleni, Chances e Desafios das Comunidades Eclesiais de Base, Cadernos de Teologia e Pastoral Number 13, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda, 1979); Uma Igreja que Nasce do Povo: Comunidades Eclesiais de Base: O Encontro de Vitória, Espírito Santo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, Ltda, 1975); Mariano

50. This is the viewpoint of Almir Ribeiro Guimarães in his Comunidades de Base no Brasil: A Nova Maneira de Ser da Igreja, op.cit. pages 18-19.


52. Comunidades Eclesiais de Base no Brasil of Estudos da CNBB, Number 23, pages 22-23.

53. Ibid.

54. This questionnaire of preparation for the meetings of the comunidades de base was published in the newspaper of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, O São Paulo, of 5 to 10 of July, 1930, page 6.

55. See the description in Frei Betto, O Que É Comunidade de Base? op.cit. pages 24-25.

56. See, Isto É, of August 26, 1981, page 71, "A Geografia dos Sindicatos". This article provides the number of trade unions (industrial workers, rural workers, professional and independent autonomous workers) which existed between 1974 and 1981. It also provides a useful chart with a breakdown state by state. It should be noted that the data given by Isto É shows an increase in the number of unions when compared to my own data which ends in 1980.

57. The data on the rural unions comes from a study conducted by the Juridical Department of the Confederation of Agricultural Laborers, (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, CONTAG) for the years up to 1980. I am grateful to Rio de Janeiro's Congressman Modesto da Silveira for his aid in getting this information for my research.

Information on the rural union movement is also found in two CONTAG publications, O Trabalhador Rural, Ano 13, Número Especial, January/
February 1981 and the other issues. This is the newspaper of the CONTAG which may be obtained from Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, MSW - Conjunto 502 - lte 02 - Núcleo Bandeirante - Brasília, D.F. - CEP. 71,700. The minutes of the meeting and the debates of the Third National Congress of Rural Workers was also published by CONTAG as Terceiro Congresso Nacional dos Trabalhadores Rurais: Anais: 21 a 25 de Maio de 1979, Brasília. In addition, the president of the CONTAG, José Francisco da Silva edited a book on the various struggles in 1980. See, As Lutas Camponesas no Brasil: 1980 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Marco Zero Ltda, 1981).

Another account of the history of the land problems is found in the edited interview of Ana Maria Galano with Manuel da Conceição. See Manuel da Conceição: Essa Terra É Nossa: Depoimento sobre a vida e as lutas de camponeses no Estado do Maranhão (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda, 1980).


58. Data from study of the Juridical Department of the CONTAG. See tables in Chapter Eight. See also the introduction to the book edited by José Francisco da Silva, As Lutas Camponesas no Brasil: 1980.

59. Ibid. Data is from tables on rural and urban unions, federations and confederations in Chapter Eight.

60. There were a series of meetings for preparation of the first National Congress of the Working Class (Primeiro Congresso Nacional das Classes Trabalhadoras - CONCLAT) held at regional and local levels. The actual Congress finally took place in São Paulo between the days 21 and 23 of August of 1981. One of the purposes of the meeting was to elect the special committee which shall organize the founding Congress of formation of the Central Union of Workers (Central Única dos Trabalhadores - CUT) to be held in August of 1982.

61. See the account in Movimento, August 30 to September 9, 1981, page 11 "Falam os Trabalhadores". The number of unions present was officially announced by the organization committee during the CONCLAT.

62. For a description of the events connected to the campaign of the 34.1 percent and an analysis of its meaning see: José Álvaro Mieses "Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil" in Latin American Perspectives, Issue 23, Volume VI, Number 4, Fall, 1979, pages 51-70. See also the interview with Luis Inácio da Silva, "Lula" in the same issue.
63. Interview with Luis Inácio da Silva (Lula), President of the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema. In Latin American Perspectives, Issue 23, Volume VI, Number 4, Fall, 1979, pages 90-100. This interview first appeared in the journal Cara a Cara (Campinas: São Paulo, July-December, 1978).

64. For an account of the National Congress of Industrial Workers (Congresso Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Industria - CNTI) in Rio de Janeiro and its importance for the emergence of the "new union movement" see the book written by metalworker leaders of Niterói, Rio de Janeiro: Abdias José dos Santos and Ercy Rocha Chaves, Consciência Operária e Luta Sindical: Metalúrgicos de Niterói no Movimento Sindical Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes Ltda., 1980). Chapter Seven particularly deals with the CNTI Congress and its impact for the development of the movement. This evidence has been strengthened in conversations which I have had with Lula and with other members of the "new union movement".

65. Pelego: Literally, the term is a a cowboy expression of the gaúchos of Rio Grande do Sul which refers to the lambskin that is placed on the saddle so as to cushion the impact of the horse's trot. Since the pelego lambskin is used to protect the rider from the hard bounces of the horse's gait, the workers have applied it to describe the activities of trade union officials who serve as intermediaries of the State's interest and in this manner "cushion" the impact of the demands of the workers and neutralize their hardest efforts.

66. See the Carta de Principios. A document published during the V National Congress of Workers in Industry (CNTI) in Rio de Janeiro on June 29, 1978. Other consensual points included suggestions for projects of education and nourishment and a call for a price freeze on articles of basic need. The document also called for increased emphasis on public education, housing, public health and more access to legal services. Many of the points were refined in subsequent meetings to discuss matters of primordial concern. These began with the First National Conference of Trade Union Officials (Primeiro Encontro Nacional de Dirigentes Sindicais) sponsored by the Centro Brasil Democrático and held in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro in August of 1979. Each union conducted separate national meetings to discuss programs of action and there were the several preparatory regional meetings for the CONCLAT. In each of these meetings there were lively debates, divisions and struggles so as to reach the final points which may in fact be considered the consensus of the unified movement as a whole. Some of the more sticky issues -- such as what to do with the forced "union tax" and if it is best to keep the structure of the sindicato único -- were dropped from the common program for they were points of division rather than unity.
67. **Carta de Princípios**, an alternative document of the CNTI. In archives of the author. May be obtained from the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema.

68. This point was emphasized by John Humphrey in his article and his previous works. See, for example, John Humphrey "Auto Workers and the Working Class in Brazil" in *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 23, Volume VI, Number 4, Fall, 1979, pages 71-90. Although it is true that the autoworkers in Brazil earn higher salaries than other categories of workers, particularly of states other than São Paulo, nonetheless, as we have seen, they are extremely underpaid and often are forced to live in the periphery slum areas of the industrial towns. Table 10.4 presents their low wages.

69. See Table 10.5 "Strikes in São Paulo from May 12 to July 13, 1978" on page 726.

70. The text of the agreement was published in an official note of the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema which was reproduced in *Isto É*, June 7, 1978, page 64.

71. The analysis of the strike was published in the newspaper of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo, *Tribuna Metalúrgica*, Ano VIII, Number 46 of June 1978 "Greve: O Primeiro Teste Foi Positivo."


73. Ibid.


77. See *Latin America Economic Report*, August 18, 1978, Volume VI, Number 32, page 256 for a report on this new decree-law and its non-exclusion of additional punishments under the National Security Law. Strikers therefore, are subjected to double punishment for the same crime.

78. Interview with Luís Inácio da Silva with the author, September 8, 1979.
In fact the comparative wage disadvantage of the metalworkers in the automobile industry between Brazil and other nations has increased in the years between 1978 and 1980. More recent information from the International Metalworkers' Federation indicates that by 1980 workers in Argentina were comparatively better paid than the Brazilian workers as may be seen in the graph presented below dealing with workers of Ford corporation:

**AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES FOR FORD WORKERS**

(U.S. $ per hour) (1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. &amp; CANADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXICO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENEZUELA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Due to the different grading systems and other benefits, the figures are a rough guide only.


The firing policy of corporations has become aggravated with the recession caused by the new tight economic policies of the government in 1981. The IBGE calculates that only in the first months of 1981 over 900,000 workers were fired in the principal metropolitan industrial cities in Brazil. For information on this see the article in Isto É, August 26, 1981, page 70.


82. See the analysis of DIEESE of the effect of the new legislation upon the wages of middle class professional job categories in *Divulgação* Number 1/1979, "Reajustes e Aumentos Salariais: Análise da Proposta Governamental".

83. This analysis is based upon numerous conversations with the leadership and direct observation of the assemblies, debates, meetings and discussions of analysis of the experiences of the strike of 1979.

84. Comment of Lula in one of the assemblies in the Estádio Vila Euclides in 1979. Fieldnotes of the author. The point of non-violence was stressed during the strike of 1980 which meant to avoid the use of pickets that could give the military troops any justification for physical repression of the workers.

85. The figure of the number of families which benefited from the strike fund was mainly an approximation reached by those responsible for the organization and distribution of the foodstuff and by the Archdiocese of São Paulo. The figure for the total amount of food distributed per week is also an estimate of the Archdiocese and was based on purchasing and distribution figures.

86. For an account of this strike see José Francisco da Silva *As Lutas Camponesas no Brasil: 1980*, op.cit. Chapter "Pernambuco: A Greve dos 240 mil" pages 33 to 41.


88. See the Table "Foreign Debt and Reserves" in the Appendix.

89. Movimento of September 11, 1978 provided an analysis of a DIEESE study on the profits of banks in comparison to the salary rates of the bankworkers. The table below of the DIEESE study provides information on the profits of the bankers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>VALUE (1)</th>
<th>RAISE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>34 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>54 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,631</td>
<td>28 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6,812</td>
<td>47 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11,762</td>
<td>73 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>17,443</td>
<td>48 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>30,569</td>
<td>76 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>46,943</td>
<td>53 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation</td>
<td>2,584 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) In millions of cruzeiros.

An important critique of the multinational corporation investment process during these years and the resulting growing control of the economy is in Ricardo Bueno, *O ABC do Entreguismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, Ltda. 1981). This latter work provides important evidence of the purchasing of largescale land by foreign corporations in the Amazon region to a total of 2.6 million hectares of land, or the equivalent of the entire territory of the states of Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo combined. In addition, the work lists the corporations which are most active in the region and the process by which they manage to acquire such huge land areas with the benefit of tax deductions. The table below summarizes the landholdings of the ten principal ones:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORPORATION</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>% of Foreign capital</th>
<th>Total area (hectares)</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jari Florestal</td>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>1,004,593</td>
<td>AP/PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agropecuária</td>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>540,613</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agroindustrial do Amapá</td>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>429,940</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cia. Amazonas Madeira e Laminados</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lancashire</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>164,601</td>
<td>RS/SP/RJ/MT/MG/GO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Investment Company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazenda Xavantina</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>109,922</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Land Corporation</td>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>104,108</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superfine Madeiras</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agropecuária</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Telles Pires</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98,459</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cia. Rio do Peixe Sudoeste</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>78,920</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novos Horizontes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agropecuária</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>54,350</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE OPPOSITION AND THE STATE IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

I. The Doctrine of National Security and Development: The Interpenetration of the State and of civil society...................... page 816

II. The Dialectic of the State and the Opposition.................................. page 825

III. The State: The Search for Stability....................................... page 839

IV. The Continuing Dialectic: New Dilemmas and Challenges.................... page 849
In this chapter we shall examine the State and the opposition in theoretical perspective so as to highlight the major characteristics of the dynamic development of both. The discussion will be centered on five main areas: 1. The penetration of the military in the apparatus of the State and the influence of the Doctrine of National Security and Development in the moulding of State decisions and in shaping relations with civil society. 2. The dialectical relationship between the State and the opposition. 3. The constant search for stability and legitimation of the National Security State. 4. The main characteristics of the opposition, the potential for providing alternative models to that of the National Security State and the developing dilemmas within the opposition itself. 5. Finally, we shall summarize the major tendencies both in the State and the opposition so as to trace the possible paths of the continuation of the dialectic of State and opposition in the near future.

I. The Doctrine of National Security and Development: The Interpenetration of the State and of civil society.

To what degree is the Doctrine of National Security and Development a marking characteristic of the State? In what manner does the ideology shape the relationships between the State and civil society? To what extent has it penetrated and moulded civil society itself? What are the contradictions and what are the possible sequential developments of the society as seen from the viewpoint of the Doctrine of National Security and Development?
Two aspects should be highlighted in our consideration of all these questions. First of all, we must emphasize the penetration of the ideology of National Security and development within the military itself. The three major components of the Doctrine — the Doctrine of Internal Security, the specific model of economic development it envisions and the actual application of the permanent national objectives which are now defined in the context of "strong democracy"— comprise the overall framework of training in the ESG, in the ECEME and in particular in the School of Intelligence. Together these form the "system" of the community of information, as we have seen in Chapter Two.

The second important aspect to be considered is the extent of the militarization of the State apparatus itself and of the control of the state corporations by the military. In the administrative apparatus of the National Security State this is evidenced by the following facts: The post of President, since 1964 has been occupied by five military (generals, marshals and one military junta) members. According to a recent research conducted by Movimento the militarization of the administrative apparatus of the State is deeper:

The federal administration has slightly over 1,000 top posts. (... ) of these over 200, the key posts, are occupied by military. That is, one out of every 5 important administrators in the nation are military. This number does not include the "retired" military who are passed as civilians.

In the top ministerial posts of the Executive itself 13 out of 26 Ministers of State or top advisors are military.
Of the ministerial posts one of the most important is that of the Minister of the Interior, which has always been in the control of a member of the military since 1964. The Ministry of the Interior is directly responsible for the key agencies which administer the programs of the economic development model of junior world power: the regional superintendency agencies (such as the SUDENE, the SUDAM etc.), the National Housing Bank (BNH), the Bank of the Amazon, the Bank of the Northeast, the special funds (PIS, PASEP etc) and the Foundation for the Indian (FUNAI).

The control of the state-corporations by the military is most evident in the corporations connected to the military-industrial complex or to the control of strategic materials. Thus, among the corporations controlled by the military, is the Itaipu, now constructing the large Itaipu electric dam, and is headed by General Costa Cavalcanti. The Petrobrás, Brazil's largest enterprise, has almost always been headed by military since 1964. Among the presidents of the Petrobrás was General Ernesto Geisel who left the post to become President in 1974. 2

In addition, retired military are hired by private corporations and multinational companies to top executive positions. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, for example, has been for many years a top director (and one point President) of Dow Chemical Corporation's Brazilian subsidiary. Hence, not only is the top administration of the State militarized but this process extends to the economy itself.
In legislative terms, the influence of the military in shaping and moulding civil society has been demonstrated by the consistent ability of the "hardline" sectors to impose their viewpoints in moments of crisis. At every crossroad, the imposition of the view of those most clearly connected to the defense of internal security -- in accordance to the Doctrine of Internal Security -- forced the enactment of legislation which shaped the relations of civil society. In fact, the research of the Movimento concludes that the group of generals most closely involved in the actual running of the State were the authors of "eighty percent of the laws passed since 1964":

In the period between April of 1964 and December 11, 1980, a total of 2,572 laws were signed by the President of the Republic. Of these, a total of 1,956 were written by the Executive power itself and only 590 originated in the Legislative branch & a further 26 in the Judiciary.

(...) in addition, a more relevant aspect is the number of decree-laws issued by the Executive without any input or power of the Legislative branch: (...) from 1964 to March 9 of 1981 the Executive issued 1,866 decree-laws of which 186 were during the present government of João Figueiredo. During the period of Congressional recess between December 6 and February 28 of 1981 Figueiredo issued exactly fifty decree laws. 3

Hence, the Doctrine of National Security and Development, absorbed by the military in control of key posts, has become the framework of legality within which civil society must operate. In essence, Brazilian society has been transformed profoundly to fit into the basic premises espoused by the ideology of National Security.
Throughout this work -- and in particular in the analysis of the anatomy of the State -- we have seen how the Doctrine of National Security has defined the various parts of society according to the premises of the enemy within imbedded into the Doctrine of Internal Security. Civil society, from the viewpoint of the Doctrine of National Security, is to be carefully planned and controlled both through general mechanisms of control and through the specific acts and legislations aimed at each part of the totality of civil society. As such it is considered an extension of the State to be brought under the framework of the ideology of National Security.

The economic model espoused by the Doctrine of National Security and development as defined in the slogan "development with security" has been an intrinsic and consistent part of the policies of the State and has, as such, also moulded the relationships in civil society. The specific economic policies pursued by the State were logically related to the precepts of the theory of economic development in the Doctrine. Development, as we have seen, for the purpose of achieving a status of world power and not necessarily for the fulfillment of the basic needs of the majority of the population. The latter aspect would be automatically dealt with in time, as a consequence of the "trickle down" of developmental growth, even if it required the sacrifice "of successive generations".

Hence, the basic economic policies were a matter of political choice:

The model of capital accumulation based upon a high rate of exploita-
tion of the working population and the influence of multinational capital -- considered more efficiently prepared for the rapid rate of economic growth desired by those in power -- is a logical result of the geopolitical considerations of Brazil's manifest destiny as a junior world power. The policies of the State in controlling the major state corporations connected to strategic resources and to the industrial-military complex and in pursuing costly programs of development of the Amazon basin and of energy (both nuclear and hidroelectric) can be understood in the general framework of the impetus to reach the stage of development which would force Brazil's inclusion into the worldwide system of nation-powers as an intermediary force.

However, the particular political choices taken in pursuing the model of Brasil Grande have brought with them increasing contradictions that now haunt the State and threaten the accomplishment even of the primordial goal of achieving a junior power status. First of all, the de-nationalization of the economy makes it difficult to plan a coherent policy of development because key decisions are made outside of Brazil. Thus, the goal of a centralized planned economy, efficiently run by a technocracy with a "mission", has been countered by the excessive emphasis placed on the role of foreign capital. It should be remembered that the State loss of control of key sectors of the economy -- which have been transferred to the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada and other smaller investors -- makes it impossible to
efficiently plan the periods of development. In addition, the
growth of the foreign debt — and the increasing cost of the debt
servicing — has enhanced this aspect of loss of control of important
economic decisions. The economy has been put at the service of the
payment of the foreign debt. The economic model of development,
based upon foreign borrowing and a high rate of industrial imports,
has forced the economy to become export-oriented so as to be able
to pay the increased costs of debt servicing. A decision to enforce
a protective tariff against cheaper and subsidized Brazilian products
costs the country several billion dollars. Furthermore, a decision
of foreign bankers to increase the prime rates of interest may
mean the loss of further billions of dollars for Brazil.

The economy organized in an export-oriented model at first
was dependent upon manufactured products which were directly
subsidized by the government through the fiscal incentive system.
Since other capitalist countries became threatened by the flow of
cheaper Brazilian products, tariffs were raised in protection of
internal industries. Brazil was then forced to turn increasingly to
the export of agricultural products so as to maintain a limited
balance of payment deficit and earn dollars for the payment of the
debt. The resulting emphasis upon largescale capitalist cash
crops radically transformed the Brazilian countryside. The
change to largescale capitalist industry for the planting of export
crops such as soya beans, sugarcane, alcohol, coffee increased the
overall concentration of land, encouraged the purchase of land by foreign multinational corporations and exacerbated the conflicts over land in all of the interior regions of the nation. One of the consequences has been the dramatic rise in the rate of rural-urban migration. Peasants who are thrown out of their land come to the cities. There they swell the ranks of the impoverished slum dwellers, the unemployed and the underemployed of the peripheries. The violence of the living conditions in the cities foment the rising rates of crime in the accumulation of contradictions in the urban regions.

Another early political choice of the economic model -- that of fomenting the sector of durable goods by concentrating income and privileging the automobile sector -- has also increasingly haunted the State. The choice of providing special benefits for the automobile has had two important consequences: First of all, the alternative systems of mass transportation in the cities and of railway transportation were neglected. With the advent of the oil crisis, the increase in the price of imported oil, this has become a major problem for the economy. Secondly, the exhaustion of the possibilities of the concentrated internal market coupled with the oil crisis has brought a crisis to the automobile industry sector itself. Since the economy had become so intrinsically dependent upon the health and growth of the automotive sector this crisis has had deep recessionist repercussions throughout the economy in the chain reaction of crises in all the industries of "linkage".
Finally, the inequality of the social distribution of income breeds internal dissent, social conflict and an increasingly explosive pressure from the socio-economic grievances of the majority of the population which has been excluded from the benefits of economic growth. The reality of the misery of the majority requires urgent measures which amount to a complete transformation of the structure of the economic model and a drastic redistribution of the national urban and rural income.

In conclusion, the economic model pursued in coherence with the ideology of National Security and Development has reached a bottleneck through the progressive accumulation of contradictions resultant from particular political choices of economic policies. Brazil, at present, is in danger not only of not achieving its dream of "world power" -- being forced to sell its land and mineral resources to pay for the foreign debt -- but may in addition be torn by the explosion of the over-suppressed sectors of the population which have been kept as marginals of the society and of the process of economic growth.

In addition, since the Doctrine of National Security -- with the theory of the enemy within -- is the foundation of the societal analysis of those in power, the urgent grievances of the majority of the population is not sufficiently recognized. Explosions of violence -- such as recently occurred in the 8 day riots in Bahia over the increase in transportation fares -- tend to be seen
through the mirror of the "internal enemy". The National Security State defines such events as the work of communist infiltrators engaged in the indirect strategy of subversive rebellion and not as resultant from the legitimate social and economic grievances of a population which can no longer bear the burdens of the model.

This is the viewpoint which has also been applied to the strike episodes, in particular to justify the repression and the trial of the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo, charged under the National Security Law with "collective incitement to disobedience". The land conflicts in the rural areas are understood from the same perspective -- causing the deepening confrontation of the Catholic Church and the National Security State which has expelled and tried priests for crimes in the National Security Law. In fact, all of the society -- political and economic -- is seen in the light of the Doctrine of Internal Security. Civil society is penetrated by this perception insofar as all organization must be conducted within such a framework and in reaction to the real application of the theoretical constructs of the ideology.

II. The Dialectic of State and Opposition.

Although the civil-military coalition which took over state power in the coup d'état of 1964 had a general blueprint for the organization of political, civil and economic areas of society, the actual application of the plans was constantly met with resistance and opposition.
The Doctrine of National Security and Development provided the general framework within which those in power wished to organize the totality of Brazilian society. Such efforts, however, were blocked, hampered or otherwise modified by the constant resurgence of opposition. As a result, the actual formation of the National Security State was not accomplished according to the militarized blueprint but was rather responsive to a dialectical relation between the State and the opposition.

We have examined how specific legislation of control -- for all areas of civil and political society -- had to be drafted in reaction to new challenges provided by resurging opposition groups. This was true of the sectors of civil society, of the Judiciary, of the Legislative and even of the "internal public" of the military itself. In addition, the National Security State was strongly challenged by periodic upsurges of resistance when various sectors of the opposition united to form a vast social movement of protest.

One of the main characteristics of the dialectical relationship between the State and the organized opposition throughout the years of the National Security State has been the State's inability to completely crush or eliminate opposition and resistance to its policies and to itself. The very act of physical coercion of a particularly targeted opposition sector tended to bring support from previously non-involved groups in the society and thereby increase the overall strength of the opposition. Furthermore, the originally targeted
opposition group would not be eliminated but only temporarily disbanded to resurface again later in a more coherently organized and experienced totality.

This "displacement effect" of the State's attempt to crush the opposition may be seen in the following considerations: The first period of opposition activities was characterized by a defensive posture against the "excesses" of the purges in 1964 and the denunciations of maltreatment and torture of the political prisoners. The National Security State's attempt of establishing the foundations for its parallel legal system alienated the Judiciary which resisted the acts of encroachment by exerting its independence in the actual judgement of those indicted by the IPMs.

With the elections of 1965 and the passing of Institutional Act Number Two, the opposition was "displaced" from small sectors concerned with the abuses of physical coercion and became strengthened by the adherence of new groups politically and judicially offended by the repressive action of abolishment of the political parties and the further encroachments upon the Legislative and the Judiciary. The very first beginnings of dissent among elite sectors may be traced to that particular period.

In 1966, the National Security State took a position of offensive, laying the foundations of the economic model by passing a series of laws for the control of wages and of incentives to multinationals. Furthermore, the specific acts of aggression against the autonomy of
the universities and against the organizations of the students fueled the resistance in those areas. The continuing interventionist policy in the trade union sector at first dismantled the organizations of the workers but would also bring with it the increase in the efforts to organize and win back the trade unions.

Hence the contradictions of the dialectic developed. A trade union official whom I interviewed commented that the period of intervention in his union was "one where we found most active participation of the workers and increased mobilization at every level with the goal of winning back the union. We have never been able to reach such levels of political participation as we had in the period of State intervention."° The same held for the student movement which was fueled by the anger and the new involvement of students in defense of their threatened organizations.

The period of 1967 and 1968 would see the "displacement effect" from sector to sector until the accumulated complaints against the policies of the State exploded in a social movement joined momentarily and emotionally in reaction to the death of Edson Luis and the violence of the repression against the students and workers. To the early groups was now added the support of middle class members and of the Catholic Church -- still limited to defending the rights of others to protest and not actually involved in organization of opposition themselves.

The period of armed struggle was dominated by the dialectical relationship of violence between the armed opposition groups and the
security forces of the National Security State. Although the State
did succeed in eliminating the challenge of the armed revolutionaries,
it "displaced" opposition increasingly to the middle sectors, the
Catholic Church and elite groups concerned with torture, violence,
the disappeared and the severe violations of human rights.

The foundation for the period of "formal politics" after
1974 was laid in the physical violence with which the State crushed
the armed challenge. As we have seen, the next period would be
particularly characterized by the active political involvement of
elite sectors through traditional civil society organizations such
as the OAB, the ABI and the CNBB.* Hence, now the opposition had
been "displaced" from the students -- who mostly provided the manpower
of the armed period -- to the middle and upper groups united around
the issues of freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom
of association and for civil, political and human rights.

Finally, the period of the "decompression" and the "abertura"
would increasingly also be characterized by the strong resurgence
of the students -- who reorganized the UNE -- and of the popular
sectors both of the urban industrial workers and of peasants. The
opposition at that point was an inter-class movement of resistance
to the overall framework of the National Security State, its parallel
system of legality, the mechanisms of control imposed upon civil society
and the severe restrictions of its economic model. The "displacement"
effect had been completed to include sectors of all classes joined only
by their common opposition to the State.
Each stage of the dialectic where there was a liberalization led to unforeseen and ingenious ways for the opposition to play the formal politics and use the same institutions which already existed and even those which the military themselves had set up against the opposition. Therefore, the military were forced to change the rules of the game. Once they began to change the rules of the game, especially by overtly tampering with the electoral legislation, legitimacy was decreased and popular support eroded. In addition, the acts of changing the rules of the game drove the opposition to seek linkages -- as was the case with the MDB party and with the protective role that the OAB and the members of parliament played during the strikes.

The April Package Laws of 1977 may have been effective in terms of keeping State control of the Congress but it was such a sham that the people would laugh at it destroying with the term "bionic" any legitimacy which the government could have hoped to acquire. In addition, the unforeseen consequence of the Lei Falcão was that it drove the MDB party to the base. Thence one had the Catholic Church, the OAB, the ABI and the MDB beginning to connect and establish linkages to the base and among the opposition. It was not foreseen by the State nor was it predicted by the opposition. This resulted from the dialectical relationship between the two forces. In addition, not only did the April Package Laws show the sham of the elections, but two other major institutions which deal with
legitimacy came strongly into the opposition to deny support to the State: the Church and the legal profession. The Church largely because of political, civil and economic human rights. The lawyers because of a commitment to a traditional legality, opposition to the dual parallel system of legality and their professional difficulties.

Hence, at the end of the Geisel period the State had been denied political legitimacy (Congress), moral legitimacy (Church and the press) and legal legitimacy (lawyers). Furthermore, the growing difficulties of the economic model, the rising inflation and the skyrocketing foreign debt brought into the opposition substantial groups of the national bourgeoisie who demanded increased levels of participation in the economic decisions of the government. At that point the State began to have economic legitimacy also denied.

The _abertura_ policy in accordance with Golbery was necessary to avoid the "black hole" syndrome of over-centralization of power. The State was isolated, was economically in trouble with the growth of the foreign debt and the inflation, was concerned over the parallel power of the security forces and the overall inefficiency of an over-centralized bureaucratic apparatus. It needed, for its own institutional concerns, to de-centralize and become more flexible. For its own legitimacy it needed to continue with liberalization and attempt to gain back some base of support. However, by this time the grassroot movement provided the ultimate challenge by increasing the field of demands to require the transformation of the economic model itself.

The last period of the dialectic shows the built-in tensions of the model.
Unlike Chile, Uruguay or Argentina, the Brazilian generals used the language of democracy to in practice implant a dictatorial system. This gap between the language of democracy and the reality of repression has had two important consequences: 1. First it has forced the military governments to seek legitimacy based on consensus through formal political representation mechanisms. Hence, they have not been able to completely abolish and destroy such formal political representation bodies as the Federal Congress, the state and the municipal assemblies and all political party activity. Although elections were tampered with and severely manipulated, they were, nonetheless, periodically held for they continued to be necessary in order to maintain a minimum of legitimate support. The judiciary was controlled but also was able to maintain a degree of autonomy which was exercised with varying force in the different periods.

2. Secondly, this fact allowed the opposition some room in which to maneuver, organize and even negotiate within the strict confines of the controlled representative system. The opposition used this political space to force further liberalizing concessions as well, as to organize the grassroot movement to comprise a vast social movement.

The dialectical relationship with an opposition movement which could not be destroyed but which would become changed and transformed in its relationship to the State forced the National Security State to constantly incorporate in itself the demands of the opposition sectors.
Affected by the force of the opposition, the National Security State had to incorporate some of the demands and liberalize so as to maintain a minimum base of support. Hence, after each period of repression imposed by the viewpoints of those most directly connected to the Doctrine of Internal Security, the National Security State would implement a policy of gradual liberalization so as to diminish the level of tension which had been created by the violence of the Repressive Apparatus. A brief analysis of the formation years of the National Security State, from 1964 to 1981, allows us to recognize the following characteristics:

**Chart 11.1**

**Cycles of Repression and Cycles of Liberalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycles of Repression</th>
<th>Cycles of Liberalization</th>
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<tr>
<td>1964: First wave of repression to eliminate those connected to past political and social movements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-1967: Completion of political purges after the Institutional Act Number Two.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-1973: Comprehensive and most severe cycle of repression to deal both with the armed rebellion and to implant the Repressive Apparatus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-1976: Repression most localized in the state of São Paulo so as to deal with opposition there.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979-1981: Repression now more specifically class-based and targeted to destroy the social movements of workers and of peasants.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1965: Castello Branco's policy of &quot;return to normalcy&quot; after the Institutional Act Number One.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967-1968: Costa e Silva's &quot;policy of relief&quot; (alivio) which included negotiations with opposition sectors.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-1976: Geisel's &quot;policy of decompression&quot; which was ended with the issuing of the April Package Laws.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-1979: Geisel's &quot;policy of distension&quot; resumed and the negotiations with the opposition for the Reforms and the end of Institutional Act Number Five.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979-1981: Figueiredo's policy of &quot;political opening&quot;, or abertura. It includes wider negotiations with elite opposition sectors and the Church.</td>
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Because of the characteristics of strong inequality of the model of economic development the periods of repression were necessary so as to smother protest from those excluded from the benefits of economic growth and eliminate the most organized "pressure points" of opposition. Hence they were a requirement of social control made necessary because of the application of the premises of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. On the other hand, the periods of liberalization sought to defuse the pressure of growing dissent -- caused by the very force of the previous repressive period -- and to regain a minimum of consent for the State.

Some points may be observed in Chart 11.1:

1. First of all, almost every President since 1964 -- with the exception of General Médici -- began a period of liberalization following a violent policy of repression or renewal of legislative control mechanisms. All of the Presidents -- including General Médici -- began their terms with a specific promise to return to democratic methods of government by the end of their term in office. In fact all were forced to apply the full strength of the Repressive Apparatus at some point. In addition, none in reality returned to democracy in fulfillment of the promise.

2. Secondly, the strategy of the Repressive Apparatus changed in the different periods. In 1964 the first sweep of repression meant to destroy all political connection to the past government and to the past social movements. Hence the repression was implemented on
large scale throughout the nation and across class boundaries. The criteria of definition of the "internal enemy" was limited to those who had been tied to the past governments and to populist movements. Although of the upper and middle classes, the politicians who were identified with the past elected governments became primary targets of the repression. The same held for working class and peasant leaderships and militants and those members of the Catholic social movements which supported the organizations of the poor in the pre-1964 period.

In the period of 1966-1967, the repression mostly took the form of completion of the political purges which had not been accomplished to the satisfaction of the guardians of internal national security. Fewer arrests were made and the purges were extended to affect those who had, in some cases, been saved from the guillotine by the independent stance of the Judiciary and the civil courts.

In the period after the Institutional Act Number Five, 1969-1973, the situation had changed and the State was now challenged with armed opposition as well as a growing discontent in the middle classes which was manifest particularly in 1968. This was the time of full application of the premises of the "internal enemy". All citizens were considered suspect until they could prove otherwise. The repression was, once more, large scale reaching all groups and not discriminating between classes or direct political affiliation.
During the period of the early "decompression" of General Geisel, the strategy of repression was twofold: First of all, a large-scale nationwide repressive action of the armed forces particularly targeted at the destruction of the organizational framework of two clandestine but surviving parties: the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and the Maoist Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). Secondly, the repression in 1975 and 1976 became specifically targeted and concentrated in the state of São Paulo, where the social movements of human rights and in the grassroots rapidly organized to challenge the very legitimacy of the National Security State.

Finally, in the years of the abertura policy of President Figueiredo, the strategy of repression would become increasingly class-based. The growth of the grassroots movements, the labor movement and their alliances with the social movements of the Catholic Church challenged the very nature of the abertura policy: To build an institutional framework flexible enough so as to provide the State with a "new social pact" with an enlarged base of support in middle and upper class sectors and yet not sufficiently open so as to allow for actual alternative policies in the social, economic and political spheres. The government of Figueiredo would, therefore, be most concerned with establishing the boundaries of acceptable opposition and non-tolerated opposition. Groups connected to the working class and peasant social movements were distinctly not tolerable to the National Security State for they undermined the continuation of the
liberalization policy aimed at flexible mechanisms of social control to allow the permanence of the economic model of development.

3. A third point of interest shown in the summary provided by Chart 11.1 on the cycles of repression and liberalization is their placement in time. It should be noted that until the start of the decompression policy in 1974 the cycles of liberalization chronologically followed the cycles of repression. With the beginning of the third stage of State institutionalization, characteristic of the governments of General Ernesto Geisel and of General João Batista Figueiredo, this no longer held true. The repression, because of its more selective character, was conducted simultaneously with the periods of liberalization. One may conclude that the difference between the policies of liberalization and repression in the third stage of institutionalization became dimmed with activities of selective coercion simultaneously conducted with increased political liberalization and negotiations with key elite opposition sectors. This aspect would, in fact, be one of the major elements of the overall policy of gradual elimination of the strong elite pressure points with the view of obtaining long term stability without losing political and economic control.

4. Finally, and perhaps of strongest present significance, the period of abertura has been marked by the increased utilization of paramilitary and clandestine forms of repression. As we have seen, the growth of undercover terrorist activities against key opposition
groups went so far as to place bombs in the headquarters of the OAB, in the ABI, in the municipal chamber of Rio de Janeiro, in the Cathedral of Nova Iguaçu, in dozens of newspaper stands which sold opposition material and, finally, in the attempt to bomb a major concert of the opposition where 20,000 young people were gathered. 9

Furthermore, an increase in the underground activities of the Death Squadron and the newly-formed organization of the *Mão Branca* could point to the possible effort to decentralize the repression and rely more strongly upon undercover actions which go unrecognized by the official authorities of the National Security State but serve to maintain the climate of terror necessary for the effective political control of the marginalized populations. Such centralized organizations of repression as the DOI-CODI and the SNI may become a disadvantage for a State now concerned with the elimination of obvious targets of the opposition and of internal and international public opinion. They are highly visible agencies directly connected to the central State apparatus of repression and, thus, point to an immediate involvement of the authorities of the National Security State in the activities of the repression.

Hence, the actual dismantling of the DOI-CODI and the SNI should not, necessarily, be seen as a certain step forwards to the improvement of the situation of human rights. This has already been done in Chile with the dismantling of the DINA and its substitution by more decentralized and hidden mechanisms of physical repression. In fact,
there are indications that the strategy of repression may become more similar to the decentralized and independently operative structure of the Repressive Apparatus of Argentina which was both more efficient in dealing with widespread and defuse social movements of protest and less visible as a direct target of internal and international public opinion. The Argentinian "doctrine of war" is a possible model of repressive action which those who are concerned with human rights should be keenly aware of so as to avoid its actual implementation in Brazil.  

The actual dismantling of the machinery of the Repressive Apparatus in Brazil will only constitute a definite step towards democracy when it is conducted within a context of shared political, economic and social power and with the actual transition out of the limited boundaries of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Indeed, the dismantling of the Repressive Apparatus must be accomplished simultaneously with the end of the National Security State itself as it now exists. The path of decentralized repression would lead Brazil into a continuing trap of violence which could well escalate into undeclared social and political civil war.

III. The State: The Search for Stability.

The National Security State in Brazil has been marked by a constant search for institutional stability. The development of the institutional framework of the State has followed three distinct stages of structural institutionalization. The first
stage moved rapidly to apply the blueprint of formalization and lay the foundations of a lasting State structure. President Castello Branco took care to not only lay the first foundations of the economic model of development to be pursued under the guidance and control of the apparatus of the State, but to attempt to institutionalize the political, social and economic modifications in a new Constitution.

However, the developing contradictions inherent in the dialectical relation between the State and the opposition -- as well as within the State itself -- made it impossible to follow the original plans. The resultant institutional crisis in 1968 was resolved, temporarily, by the takeover of control of the forces most closely connected to the Doctrine of Internal Security and to the Repressive Apparatus. The combination of the contradictions in the economic model, within the State and in the confrontation with both the armed and the non-violent opposition forced the State to seek new forms of stability. The National Security State at that point abandoned the effort to reach longterm institutionalization based upon a wider social base of support and more flexible mechanisms of representation and enforced stability through the explicit use of coercion.

The second stage of institutionalization, which began with the passing of Institutional Act Number Five in 1969, was concerned with the full implantation of the security apparatus so as to maintain high levels of coercion in the suppression of internal dissent.
During this stage stability would be increasingly sought by a combination strategy of terror and the legitimation function of a successful capitalist economic model of development. Hence, the attempt to combine longterm institutionalization and explicit coercion would be dependent upon a continued high rate of economic growth. As we have seen, this dependency upon the legitimation function of the economic model led the State into a deep crisis as soon as the first signs of economic troubles began to appear. Stability, it was recognized, could not be reached simply by the application of force.

The third stage of institutionalization of the National Security State began in 1974 with the government of General Ernesto Geisel and the policy of "decompression". One may state that the National Security State, at that point, returned to the previous effort to find a balance between selective repression and more flexible representative mechanisms which could allow it to extend its social base of support among middle and upper class groups now disaffected by the violence of the generalized repression. During the third stage of institutionalization the National Security State would be increasingly concerned with the establishment of a wider consensual support based on measures aimed at legitimation. The search for legitimacy would be the major characteristic of the periods of Geisel and of João Batista Figueiredo. The planners of the State recognized that stability must be based on some legitimacy.
The period of the abertura after 1979, under the government of General João Batista Figueiredo, is understood here not as a transition stage to democracy but rather as a continuation of the policy of controlled "decompression" of society in search of longterm institutionalization of the National Security State. The major goal of the abertura policy, as we have seen, was the building of an institutional framework flexible enough to increase legitimacy, extend the social base of support and reach a "new social pact" with the organized sectors of key elite opposition. The policy remained under the tight framework of the Doctrine of National Security and Development so as to not be sufficiently open to allow the participation of the marginalized sectors of the population whose demands required substantial modification of the model of economic development.

The abertura cannot be comprehended as a stage of transition to democracy. It is not a program for the redemocratization of Brazilian society but rather it is the continuation of the third stage of institutionalization of the National Security State. The policy of abertura must be considered in its dialectical relation with the opposition. The continuation of a search for stability through greater political consensus became necessary to the very survival of the National Security State partly because of the deep legitimacy crisis and the lack of a larger foundation base of support for the policies of the State.
The constant search for stability and long-term institutionalization indicates the actual inherent fragility of the National Security State. This fragility is caused by a combination of three principal elements: First, the National Security State has been subject to a continuing failure to achieve legitimacy with a resultant progressive isolation from civil society. Secondly, the National Security State has been unable to develop automatically stable mechanisms for the transfer of power. Finally, the National Security State has been torn by internal contradictions and dissent among its major support base: the military.

The legitimacy crisis which periodically assails the State has been due to the gap between the language of democracy and the reality of repression. Although during the period of electoral manipulation the different mechanisms of control were subdued, nonetheless, as we have seen, the opposition was able to constantly clarify the lack of representation of the system and undermine the plea for legitimacy on the part of the National Security State. Here one should emphasize the importance of the role which the ABI, the OAB and the Catholic Church played in challenging the State's claim of legitimate representation thereby denying it the alternative of an increased social base of support.

In addition, the continuing double influence of the inequality of the model of economic development and the selective application of physical coercion undermined the efforts to achieve stability
through more flexible mechanisms of representation during the third stage of institutionalization. The attempt to widen the field of negotiations with key elite sectors of the opposition while denying even limited participation to other sectors had the result of increasing the lack of legitimacy of the National Security State and backfired by isolating it from civil society as a whole.

Furthermore, the inherent instability of the National Security State is made more profound by the divisions within the military itself. The causes of division within the military may be briefly summarized in five major points: 1. As we have seen, the National Security State has been unable to develop lasting mechanisms for the transfer of Executive power. The limited representative nature of the method of Presidential election has moved into the armed forces the political struggle for the top Executive Post. Increasingly the National Security State has been torn apart by bitter inner fights for the control of the powerful centralized post of President. Indeed, the problematic of the power transfer may be said to constitute the Achilles heel of the National Security State.

2. The second most powerful *de facto* basis of political power is within the area of the Repressive Apparatus. In fact, we have seen that the power of the comunidades de informações is such that it constitutes almost a parallel source of political power to that of the Executive post itself. The enhancement of the power
of the organizations of the Repressive Apparatus -- in particular the SNI and the CIEx-- has increased the tendency to a rivalry between agencies of repression. The control of the top posts in the Repressive Apparatus is, therefore, a second basis of political power and causes equally serious divisions within the military.

3. A third point of division of the military has been the actual control of political posts by the army. There is a growing resentment among members of the navy and the airforce of the extraordinarily large influence of the army within the general coalition of the National Security State. This rivalry between the three branches of the armed forces was evident during the struggle for the succession of Costa e Silva -- when the electoral college was composed of an inordinate number of army generals, as I have pointed out. Furthermore, this rivalry has become manifested in the transfer of power from Geisel to Figueiredo and particularly since the indications of increased involvement of the army's DOI-CODI in the terrorist activities of the Riocentro bombing incident. Although the three military ministers came out publicly to condemn those who wished to bring the armed forces to trial for responsibility in acts of torture since the events connected to the Riocentro the dissent and rivalry between the three branches has become more open.

4. A fourth point of division in the military is concerned with the actual implantation of a democratic system of government. At this point we should emphasize three elements which encourage
the formation of a "democratic current" of thought within the military: the influence of the opinions prevalent in the middle classes, the influence of the Catholic Church and the actual inherent contradictory nature of the theory of National Security and Development itself.

We have discussed in Chapter Eight the influence which middle class opposition opinion has in the military who themselves are members of the middle classes. We have also commented that the transformation of the Catholic Church has had an impact within the military -- who are also themselves mostly Catholic. This last aspect has been particularly true in respect to the dissenting views on the application of physical force, coercion and torture by other members of the military. The third important aspect is the belief which some sectors still hold in the legitimacy of the Permanent National Objectives which, as they are stated in the Doctrine of National Security and Development itself, have as primary goals the achievement of social, economic and political harmony within a broadly democratic framework. The explicit rejection of totalitarianism in the Doctrine has brought to the military the debate of the gap between the language of democracy and the reality of the implantation of a dictatorial system. This has been a common observation in my interviews with members of the "democratic sectors" of the military dissidence.

Hence the "democratic sectors" feel betrayed by a "Revolution which has gone astray" and feel that the institution of the Armed Forces is itself threatened by the negative image of guardians of privilege and perpetrators of severe violations of human rights.
5. Finally, the fifth element of discord within the military is the progressive denationalization of the economy and in particular the selling of land to foreign capital and the alienation of Brazil's most crucial mineral resources in payment of the foreign debt. Again, one should note that the actual policies of the National Security State have gone against the theoretical constructs of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. The selling of Brazil's major mineral resources and land in the Amazon basin -- considered in the geopolitical theory as primordial for the attainment of the manifest destiny of world power -- has alienated members of the military who are not, necessarily, a part of the "democratic sectors". These could be referred to simply as the "nationalist sectors" which resent and protest against the control of foreign capital of strategic areas. Many members of this sector of the military are also considered "hard-liners" in other respects though they oppose the policies of benefiting multinational corporations and accuse the primary group in power of corruption in detriment of the nation. The prime example of this group would be that connected to General Sylvio Frota himself, who opposed General Geisel in the struggle for transfer of power and openly accused the rival group of a combination of non-nationalist, corrupt and "soft on communism" practices.

Although originally moved by his sympathetic feelings towards this latter group General Hugo Abreu later became an ally of the "democratic sectors" and coordinated the alternative campaign of General Euler Bentes Monteiro for President against Figueiredo.
We should caution that the divisions within the military are counterbalanced by a combination of other forces for unity. One is the "deterrent effect" of fear of the mechanisms of control of the military which we described in Chapter Eight. Another element is the actual economic benefit which many military have had with their involvement in the production system, in the running of state corporations or employment in private national and multinational firms. It will be difficult to convince the military, as a group, to abandon its secondary role as an entrepreneurial class. Finally, and perhaps even more difficult to overcome, is the fact that so many members of the military have been, in some measure at least, personally connected to the actual carrying out of the physical repression in particular during the most violent period between 1969 and 1974. Their panic of possibility of trial for crimes conducted during the period of the National Security State has been evidenced by the demand to include a blanket amnesty for all "connected crimes" of the period of armed struggle and by the violent reaction against what the military officers term "revengeful" (revanchismo) actions of opposition members whenever there is an attempt to investigate activities of torture. All of these elements, combined with a strong sense of "corporate spirit", are powerful inducements to military unity and to continuing support for the National Security State. The groups which would like to end the system of the National Security State are systematically repressed and purged. Other sectors may find the benefits more personally meaningful than their dissent.
IV. A Continuing Dialectic: New dilemmas and challenges.

The economic model has imposed excruciating burdens upon the majority of the population and increasingly upon the middle classes as well. In addition, the economic model has failed both in terms of achievement of distribution of income and fulfillment of basic needs but even to the extent of trouble to the dream of "Brasil Grande". The problem of the foreign debt -- which during the time of the economic miracle Minister Delfim Netto optimistically layed aside as unimportant -- is now the major bottleneck which has turned the economy into a hostage of foreign bankers. As opposition economists have pointed out, the "tail of the foreign debt is wagging the dog of the Brazilian economy".

The State is cornered in its alternatives because of its isolation from civil society, a lack of firm support base, internal divisions within the military plus the real constraints which are now imposed upon it by the failure of the economic model of development. Hence, at the end of 1981 a circle has closed around the government in a total isolation and an opposition actively engaged in formal politics, in the grassroot and with increased economic demands which, because of the contradictions in the model, cannot be met by the government without a radical transformation of the very structure of the State and of the economic model itself.

The National Security State, in the continuing dialectical relation to the opposition, has 3 alternatives: Increased levels
of physical repression and political coercion, a renewed attempt to increase its support base by playing the game of the opposition at the grassroot or a combination of different measures aimed at partial cooptation, selective repression and new electoral manipulation.

The first alternative would have significant consequences which may limit its longterm feasibility: A renewed policy of political physical repression, at this stage and against such a well-organized opposition, could bring the country into chaos and the brink of civil war. It is unlikely that the government could risk policies of renewed nationwide military mobilization for violent repression. The stakes of such a policy are now too high. The military would have to be prepared to extend the violent net to include key sectors of the elite opposition in the Bar Association, in the Press Association, in the liberal and conservative opposition parties, in the business community itself and -- above all -- in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The support which the Catholic hierarchy has given to opposition activities has become now so firmly established that an overall policy of violent physical repression would have to begin, as Cardinal Arns put it, "by sending a paddy wagon to the headquarters of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) and arresting at least some two dozen bishops and cardinals". Such a situation would have extremely serious international repercussions.

In addition, one must recall that the opposition is now entirely organized along non-violent movements of resistance and therefore the State would be denied the limited legitimation of engagement in a war.
Finally, it is difficult to predict just how sectors of the military itself would react to a plan that would have to include such widespread physical repression against elite and unarmed groups of the population. The divisions within the military as to policies of repression became evident in the episode of the Riocentro bombings when the tension among the navy, the airforce and the army grew almost to unbearable proportions. A deep purge of the military would have to precede any attempt to widespread repression.

It is, nonetheless, a possible repressive alternative to decentralize the Repressive Apparatus and engage in undercover acts of terrorism and random executions in a strategy of terror resembling the situation of Argentina. The activities of the special groups within the Military Police -- especially the NuCOE and the ROTA of São Paulo -- added to the hidden participation in the various underground organizations like the Death Squadron indicate a path of alternative for the National Security State. In that case, the situation would be one of undeclared war against the civil population which has the danger of becoming a parallel structure out of the immediate control of the central government. A policy of extermination such as that of El Salvador, or of "forced disappearances" such as the situation of Argentina, would have worldwide implications in a country of over 120 million inhabitants. Hence, although more possible in the short term, such a policy is a longterm suicide for the State.
The second alternative for the National Security State is that of, in a way, "playing the game of the opposition" by engaging in the level of base-related grassroot politics. There are strong signs that in fact currents within the National Security State are pleading for the development of exactly such a policy. In that case, the State would utilize the power of the bureaucratic apparatus, combined with its centralization of economic monetary resources, to engage in competition with the opposition for control of the neighborhood organizations, collectives, peasant associations, trade unions and even comunidades de base tied to the structure of the governmental party -- the PDS.

The social policy of the State would utilize clientelistic and patronage relations to induce the grassroot into greater support for the policies of the State. Some indications that this is a path to be followed have been provided by the plans of utilization of the MOBRAL (literacy department) structure in fomenting neighborhood organizations, community centers etc.... In addition, there are reports that at least in some places the PDS is organizing its own comunidades de base to compete with the movement of the Catholic Church. The struggle for the control of trade unions has also been greatly intensified and government trade union officials can count on large economic benefits provided by such agencies as the National Housing Bank to develop housing programs for the membership in a direct attempt to coopt support. Such policies would have perhaps greater success in broadening the support base of the National Security State.
On the other hand, the State is limited by the real economic constraints of the crisis. How much economic resources it would have available for the cooptation of the grassroot movement is a matter of debate. In fact, there are indications that to the contrary the State will be forced to take back economic concessions it had given to the workers and middle class salaried population during the peak of the strike period. For example, the semi-annual salary increase law which was passed in 1979 as a response to the wave of strikes may now be reversed. A reversal to a salary policy of once per year raises in the context of an inflation rate still wavering around the 100 percent mark would be completely intolerable to the majority of the population already submitted to extremely harsh living conditions. Hence, the State is caught in the contradictions of its own system.

A third option would be a combination of policies in a continuing dialectic between the State and the opposition which would include a number of different elements: 1. First, a policy of selective and/or underground repression. 2. A policy of at least partly widening the social base with the inclusion of limited social policies to develop more flexible patterns of clientelistic and patronage controls. 3. A sharing of power and negotiations with certain opposition groups -- at least at municipal or local state level. 4. A continuing control of the electoral process with renewed mechanisms -- amounting to an entire new "April Package" -- so as to guarantee the victory of the
government's PDS party in the major state and federal elections of 1982.

5. Another series of "packaged laws" to ensure the control of the process of Constitutional Reform, one of which may be the transformation of the present Congress into a Constituent Assembly by extending the present mandates of the members of Congress (while the government maintains a majority control) or by passing electoral manipulative regulations which will ensure a majority control of the government's PDS in the next Congress to be elected in November of 1982. It should be noted that in either case, the government probably will retain the majority because of the continuation of the "bionic" senators who were chosen in 1978 and benefit from an eight year term of office.

6. Finally, the National Security State will attempt to gain longer life by keeping the indirect Presidential method and controlling the Electoral College which shall choose the successor of President Figueiredo in 1984.

It should be pointed out that none of these measures are likely to succeed in providing longlasting stability for the National Security State. As we have seen in the dialectical development of the past, such combination of policies -- with a renewal of explicit electoral controls of manipulation to ensure a PDS victory -- will probably further reduce the levels of credibility and legitimacy of the State and isolate it further from civil society. They nonetheless will buy it time. In addition, it should also be emphasized that the National Security State, though isolated and illegitimate, still maintains high degrees of coercive power which enables it to take on the initiatives either of physical repression or of manipulative mechanisms of electoral controls.
In spite of the fact that the opposition has made immense strides in the organization of formal and informal political networks it is still divided and lacks sufficiently developed intermediary channels of linkage. The political parties are nascent, fragile and subjected to the sudden disbanding power of the State. Even if the National Security State does not directly act to abolish the parties through another Institutional Act or postpone and/or cancel the elections of 1982 it still holds in its hands the ultimate power of coercion. Thus it can enforce electoral control mechanisms already established or draft new ones aimed at ensuring the victory of the PDS or preventing the actual viability of opposition parties after the election period.

Therefore, the opposition must maneuver within the strict limitations of the National Security Doctrine. Ultimately the initiative remains on the hands of the State which maintains a high degree of coercive power and has not been significantly structurally transformed by the liberalization concessions it was forced to grant to the opposition. It holds the power to change the rules of the game and the opposition is still, to a large extent, in a reactive and defensive posture.

Although, of course in the long run every change in the electoral rules of the game must be paid for by the State with decreased levels of legitimacy and credibility, nonetheless the military in power can buy themselves time. In the short run, the military-civilian coalition which is benefiting politically and economically from its position of power can maintain the status quo with limited physical repression to avoid high levels of international pressure.
The dialectic between the opposition and the State may continue well into the 1980's although there is increasing danger that the build up of economic and social pressures may become intolerable and explode in social upheaval which will escape the control of both the organized opposition and the National Security State.

The continued refusal to increase political participation, to develop programs sensitive to basic needs, to redistribute the national income may have tragic consequences the outcome of which is difficult to predict. The benefits of economic growth cannot be indefinitely denied to the majority of the population without serious consequences.

Brazilian society must find a path out of the militarization of civil society — now imprisoned within the framework of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Mechanisms of social and political participation in the decisions of the State must be developed to allow the transformation of the economic model in such a way that it becomes responsive to the needs of the population.

Stability cannot be achieved without the consent of the governed and cannot be permanently maintained through coercion, physical violence and electoral manipulation. The stable government is the legitimate government which is based on participation that builds social and political consensus. The illegitimate government, increasingly isolated, is fundamentally dependent upon force. Hence it is fragile and vulnerable to constant opposition, protest and rebellions. In the next years Brazil must find the path to legitimate government based upon the consent of the majority of the population.
NOTES

1. See the special issue of Movimento with the results of the extensive research conducted by the newspaper on the militarization of the Brazilian State apparatus and the control of the state corporations by the military. In Movimento, April 6/12, 1981, Especial "O Estado Militar". Quote is from page 3.

The top posts of the Executive which are occupied by military members, in April of 1981 were:

1. President: General João Batista Figueiredo
3. Private Secretary to the President: Major Heitor Aquino.
4. Head of Civilian Household: General Golbery do Couto e Silva (Golbery has since been replaced by a civilian, Leitão de Abreu).
5. Head of the SNI: General Octávio Medeiros
7. Minister of the Army: General Walter Pires
8. Minister of the Navy: General Maximiano
10. Minister of Mines and Energy: César Cals (Major).
11. Minister of Communications: General Mattos.
12. Minister of Education: General Ludwig.

The civilian posts have all been occupied by members of the inner circle of confidence to the military in power. Some have in fact been members of the successive military governments since 1964. These are:

1. Vice President: Aureliano Chaves, had been appointed governor of the important state of Minas Gerais and was chosen for the post in 1978 because of the complete "trust of military sectors".
2. Minister of Justice: Ibrahim Abi-Ackel, previously a congressman of the governmental party ARENA.
3. Minister of Planning: Delfim Netto. Had already been a member of the team of Médici at the time of the "economic miracle".
4. Minister of Foreign Relations: Saraiva Guerreiro. The most independent-minded civilian who is suited for the role of following Brazil's foreign policy in coherence with the self-defined role as emerging world power.
5. Minister of Transportation: Resende.
6. Minister of Labor: Murilo Macedo
8. Minister of Industry and Commerce: Camilo Pena.
11. Minister of Health: Arcoverde.
12. Minister of de-bureaucratization: Hélio Beltrão.

It should be remarked that the civilian Ministerial posts are all of much smaller importance. The Ministry of De-bureaucratization is a bizarre manufacture of the government of João Figueiredo. It was decided that the bureaucracy was totally out of control and in order to de-regulate and de-bureaucratize the system the State created an entire new bureaucratic apparatus, with a ministerial post and all the accompanying advising staff.

2. The research of Movimento reached the conclusion that the "militarization of the state corporations was according to two premises: First the fulfillment of the requirements of the ideology of National Security -- the military took over posts in the economic areas considered strategic: steel, petroleum, petrochemical, data processing, production of arms and airplanes, nuclear energy, fertilizers, public utilities and transportation, especially maritime and rail. (...) Secondly, the military intervention in the state corporations intended to change their organization and impose the "organization of a private enterprise".

The military in command of the top enterprises include:

COSIPA: General Flávio F. da Silva (67 to 72)
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional: General Pinto da Veiga (1964-1966)
Eletrobrás: General Albuquerque Lima (1964)
Petrobrás: General Albino Silva and Marshal Osvino Alves (1964)
Marshal Ademar de Queiroz (64-66); General Candal Fonseca (67-69)
Marshal Valdemar L. Cardoso and General Ernesto Geisel (1969-1973)
General Araken de Oliveira (1974-1979)
SUDAM: General Mário B. Cavalcanti (1967-1968); Colonel João V. Andrade (70-72); General Bandeira Coelho (70-72); Colonel Milton C. Sena (73-74).

The tendency has been to increase the military control of the corporations during the phase of implantation of the National Security State. In some cases the top posts are returned to trusted civilians and interspersed with periods of military and civilian rule. Movimento, op.cit. page 13.

4. Peter Knight provides the following analysis of the foreign debt situation:

   "In 1980 net debt service (interest on the debt, minus interest received on foreign exchange reserves plus amortization) absorbed 61 percent of export earnings. Since over two-thirds of the debt is subject to variable interest rates, recent sharp fluctuations in interest rates have added a new element of uncertainty to the balance of payments. Given the trend towards heavy reliance on monetary policy to fight inflation in the industrialized countries, positive real interest rates may become the rule rather than the exception over the next few years.

(...) even with continued very rapid export growth and a reduction in the rate of growth of the Brazilian economy to 5 or 6 percent per year (probably insufficient to absorb the new entrants to the labor force, which will be growing at 2.3 percent per year in the 1980's if the recent style of growth is maintained), the bill for debt service plus petroleum imports could approximate or exceed export earnings for the next three years at least."


Márcio Moreira Alves, in his column "Lado de Lá" of the Tribuna da Imprensa, May 19, 1981, estimates that Brazil is having to pay a total of 41 million dollars per day for the servicing of the foreign debt.

For an excellent overall analysis of the problem of the foreign debt, how it was acquired and the effects of its cost upon both the economy and the daily life of the people see the special issue of *Movimento*: Issue Number 323, September 7 to 13, 1981 "O Atoleiro da Dívida Externa: O Regime Militar Afundou a Economia Nacional". See also *Movimento*, Number 327, October 5 to 11, 1981, pages 11 to 14 "Veja Como Você Paga a Dívida Externa". A complete list of all the articles which *Movimento* published on the subject of the foreign debt, from 1975 to its last edition in November of 1981 is in: *Movimento", "Última Edição" November 23 to 30, 1981, page 10 "Dívida Externa: Extensa Cobertura, com matérias profundas e didáticas sobre a dívida e suas consequências." Already in 1975 the *Movimento* article pointed out that the economy was deeply affected by the debt which already then was equivalent to one fourth of the Gross National Product. See *Movimento*, Sept. 1, 1975, N. 9.
5. The concept of "displacement of contradictions" in capitalist society refers to the inability of providing a solution to developing contradictions so that they are displaced from sector to sector and accumulate within the totality. I have applied this concept to the particular analysis of the dialectic between the State and the opposition in Brazil.


7. Comparative research of the particular mechanisms of repression and the machinery of the repressive apparatuses of Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Brazil is an urgent need. There has been a lack of comparative research dealing specifically with the interconnections and the learning processes between the different intelligence networks of the Southern Cone. Recently, the Social Science Research Council has begun a special project which brings together researchers from the various countries. This seminar, entitled "The Culture of Fear" is coordinated by Juan Corradi and Patricia Fagen. The purpose of the collective work shall be to develop the comparative aspects of the systems of repression in the different countries.

8. This specific targeting of the state of São Paulo was not entirely according to a central plan, however, for the contradictions within the National Security State caused a growing competition for power between elements connected to the Repressive Apparatus and the government of General Ernesto Geisel. This power struggle played an important role in the events leading to the deaths of Herzog and of Manoel Fiel Filho.

9. I refer here to the waves of terrorist activities which culminated with the bombing of the Riocentro. We have discussed this point in our analysis of the Repressive Apparatus in Chapter Eight, "The Anatomy of the State".

10. For an excellent analysis of the Argentinian "doctrine of war" and the actual workings of the decentralized Repressive Apparatus in Argentina see the article of Emilio Mignone, "Desapariciones forzadas: Elemento Básico de una política" in *Punto Final*, Suplemento de la edición N. 174, June, 1981.

There are indications that the Brazilian and Argentinian networks of intelligence have begun to cooperate more closely in discussing
alternative strategies of repression. There is evidence that
meetings were held in which the Argentinians pointed out to the
Brazilians their mistake in over-centralizing the machinery of the
Repressive Apparatus thus providing an easy target for the opposition
and for international protest. General Golbery do Couto e Silva's
fall from power would be connected to a possible change of directions
of the overall strategy of the comunidade de informações in Brazil.

Another indication of growing cooperation between the Argentinians
and their Brazilian counterparts has been the consulting role which
Martinez de Hoz has played since late 1980 in advising Minister of
Planning Delfim Netto of Brazil. It is interesting to note that the
policy applied by the Brazilian government since the end of 1980
resembles the Argentinian de-industrialization policy planned by
Martinez de Hoz. One should further note that the process of rapidly
breaking the growth of industry -- particularly since that time -- has
had the effect of demobilizing the trade union movement spearheaded
by the industrial workers of the automobile industry. This, again,
was a policy applied in Argentina to demobilize and control the strong
peronist trade union movement entirely based on industrial workers.

An actual account of the new organizations which are being
created in connection to the various state-based Military Police
is provided by the articles in Movimento, July 13 to 19, 1981
"Polícia Militar: Os Misteriosos NuCOE: Além do DOI a PM do Rio
já conta com o NuCoe". See also the extensive coverage of the
organizations of special operations which are being developed
around the country in an article of José Argolo, Márcio Bueno,
Otto Filgueiras and Tânia Coelho, "Brasília e sua PM de Choque:
Há Inúmeros sinais de que tropas de choque das PMs preparam-se
para a repressão de massa, sob comando de generais do Planalto."
In Movimento, August 3 to 9, 1981.

The special battalions are being created and trained for
"military-police operations of a non-conventional nature, for
missions of counter-guerrilla -- urban or rural -- and in the
carrying out of operations which require specially trained
personnel and employment of special weapons". (from Movimento,
July 13 to 19, 1981, page 5). These are to be termed the NuCOE (Núcleo
-Companhia de Operações Especiais) which shall in the future be
encharged with difficult cases of social upheaval. Hence, all
indications point to the development of a new strategy of repression
based on specially trained units disconnected from the more centralized
SNI and the army and utilizing special units of paramilitary forces.

11. Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, conversation with the author, May 21
1981.
12. On November 25, 1981 President João Batista Figueiredo announced the governmental electoral reforms which are to be included in a project to be introduced in the *decurso de prazo* urgent method. It has been decided in addition that the government shall instruct the leadership of the PDS to "close question" on the voting of this new "electoral package of reforms". In such a case, according to the party fidelity regulation, a member of the PDS who votes against the project shall automatically lose his electoral mandate. This should guarantee that the few dissidents who voted in the last two key votes with the opposition (for the question of the sublegenda and for a reform of the social security system) will be effectively kept in line.

The "electoral package" is tailored to ensure a PDS victory in the Executive posts of the states. This was believed necessary because a study of the SNI indicated that the government PDS party would win the gubernatorial elections of 1982 in only four states: Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia and Maranhão. Under the framework of the Doctrine of National Security, this is an intolerable situation for it requires actual rotation of power with the opposition parties — which the sectors of the military connected to the comunidades de informações shall not tolerate. Since they hold a parallel power to that of the Executive they continue to impose their views.

The reforms include: 1. A prohibition of coalitions. 2. A system whereby the voter is forced to vote on candidates of the same party for every level of representation — from governor down to the aldermen (*voto vinculado*). In the past this applied already for the Senator and the Federal Congressman. The main purpose is to increase the number of void votes — which by the rules count for the party with the majority in Congress, i.e. the governmental party. One could therefore have a situation where the PDS could claim victory although a large percentage of its votes are due to blank or void votes. 3. The forcing of all parties to present candidates for every post — in effect preventing the inter-opposition alliances which were already developing for significant posts such as senator or governor. 4. A regulation which maintains that a candidate can only resign his candidacy at the same time that the party issues a resignation. Such a rule will make it difficult for candidates to desist and hand over their support to another opposition candidate.

A full account of the episode and the new electoral reforms is in *Isto É*, December 2, 1981, pages 22 to 29, "Eleições: Pacote para o PDS. Com Ele o partido poderá vencer em 1982. Mas o preço será alto."

This package has reversed the electoral expectations: Now it is believed that the opposition will win the gubernatorial elections only in Rio de Janeiro, Pará and Goiás. It shall perhaps even lose São Paulo where the four opposition parties have strong candidates and will be prevented from forming alliances. The division of opposition votes in four may give a victory to the government's party.
First Part: General information.

Table 1. "Exchange Rates (1960-1981)"
Table 2. "Brazil: Infant Mortality Rates (1960-1978)"
Table 3. "Inflation in Brazil (1960-1980)"
Table 4. "Growth Rate: Gross Domestic Product (1964-1980)"
Table 5. "Industrial Growth by Sectors: Brazil (1977-1979)"
Table 6. "GDP Growth Rates By Sector: Brazil 1960-1977"
Table 7. "Brazil (1964-1980) Foreign Debt and Reserves"
Table 8. "Brazil: Foreign Debt Servicing (1976-1980)"
Table 10. "Ratio of Net Foreign debt to exports"
Table 11. "The Brazilian National Electorate (1960-1978)"

Second Part: Income Distribution and Inequality

Table 12. "Income Inequality in Brazil: Comparison with Other countries in Latin America"
Table 13. "Income Distribution Among Economically Active Population in Brazil (1960-1977)"
Table 14. "Distribution of Income (By minimum salary) in Brazil (1979)"
Table 15. "The Division of National Income (1970-1980)"
APPENDIX

Third Part: Minimum Salary in Brazil

Table 17: "Minimum Salary in Brazil (1940-1978): Nominal Value, Decree Number Establishing the value, Date of Decree, Date it became Effective".

Table 18: "Evolution of Minimum Salary in Brazil (1959-1976)"

Table 19: "What the Minimum Salary Should Be".

Fourth Part: Foreign Investment in Brazil

Table 20: "Total Foreign Investment in Brazil by Country of Origin (1965-1976)"

Table 21: "The Role of Private National, Multinational and State Firms in the Various Sectors of the Brazilian Economy, 1978"

Table 22: "Direct Private Investment in Brazil, 1929-78"
"Direct Foreign Investment in Brazil by Country of Origin"

Table 23: "Transnational Companies in Brazil, January 1965–July 1975"

Table 24: "Nationality of the 100 largest Foreign Enterprises in Brazil, 1973".

Table 25: "Property of the 31 Largest Enterprises in the Country, by Net Assets and Net Profits (1978)"
APPENDIX: Table 1

EXCHANGE RATES
(1960-1981)

Cruzeiros and One U.S. Dollar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1960</td>
<td>Cr$ 18.92 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1961</td>
<td>Cr$ 18.92 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1962</td>
<td>Cr$ 5.70 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1963</td>
<td>Cr$ 1.73 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1964</td>
<td>Cr$ 2.20 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1965</td>
<td>Cr$ 2.20 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1966</td>
<td>Cr$ 2.20 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1967</td>
<td>Cr$ 2.70 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1968</td>
<td>Cr$ 3.80 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1969</td>
<td>Cr$ 4.32 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>Cr$ 4.95 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1971</td>
<td>Cr$ 5.63 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1972</td>
<td>Cr$ 6.21 per 1 dollar</td>
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<td>December 1973</td>
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<td>December 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1975</td>
<td>Cr$ 9.07 per 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1976</td>
<td>Cr$ 12.34 per 1 dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1977</td>
<td>Cr$ 16.04 per 1 dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1978</td>
<td>Cr$ 20.9 per 1 dollar</td>
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<td>December 1979</td>
<td>Cr$ 42.5 per 1 dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1980</td>
<td>Cr$ 61.25 per 1 dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1981</td>
<td>Cr$ 73.0 per 1 dollar</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>62.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>64.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>69.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>67.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>69.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>73.80</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>74.31</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>93.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>94.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>85.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>86.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>70.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>69.72</td>
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</tbody>
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APPENDIX: Table 3

INFLATION IN BRAZIL
(1960–1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>41.9</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>110.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


APPENDIX: Table 4

BRAZIL

GROWTH RATE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(1964-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GDP VARIATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2.9 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.7 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.8 percent</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>4.8 percent</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>11.2 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>10.0 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.8 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>11.7 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14.0 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>9.8 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.6 percent</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>4.7 percent</td>
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<td>6.0 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6.4 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8.5 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### APPENDIX: Table 5

**INDUSTRIAL GROWTH BY SECTORS**

**BRAZIL (1977-1979)**

(Percent Change Over Previous Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANUFACTURING</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metallic minerals</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal-working</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical &amp; Communications Material</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Material</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper &amp; Cardboard</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfumes, Soaps, Candles</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, Footwear &amp; Fabrics</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Fundação IBGE. Published in Latin America Regional Reports Brazil RB-80-03, 14 March 1980, page 7.
APPENDIX: Table 6

GDP GROWTH RATES BY SECTOR

BRAZIL 1960-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AGRICULTURE</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DEBT (in millions)</th>
<th>RESERVES (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,942</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,917</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,295</td>
<td>1,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6,622</td>
<td>1,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9,521</td>
<td>4,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12,572</td>
<td>6,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>5,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>4,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>25,985</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>58,500</td>
<td>6,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX: Table 8

BRAZIL

FOREIGN DEBT SERVICING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DEBT SERVICING AMOUNT (in U.S. millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX: Table 9


(in U.S. Millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Products</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processed goods</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured goods</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: Carteira de Comércio Exterior (CACEX).

Published in Latin America Regional Reports Brazil RB - 80-03, 14 of March 1980, page 8.

APPENDIX: Table 10

RATIO OF NET FOREIGN DEBT TO EXPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Banco Central.

Published in Latin America Regional Reports Brazil RB - 80-03, 14 of March 1980, page 3.
APPENDIX: Table 11

THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL ELECTORATE
(1960-1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TYPE OF ELECTION</th>
<th>REGISTERED VOTERS</th>
<th>ACTUAL VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Federal, State &amp; Municipal</td>
<td>15,543,332</td>
<td>12,586,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Federal, State &amp; Municipal</td>
<td>18,528,847</td>
<td>14,747,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>8,591,064</td>
<td>6,574,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Federal, State &amp; Municipal</td>
<td>22,387,251</td>
<td>17,285,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>24,903,261</td>
<td>22,435,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>25,741,173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>32,873,297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Federal &amp; State</td>
<td>35,810,715</td>
<td>28,982,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>42,218,102</td>
<td>34,993,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Federal &amp; State</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
<td>37,601,641</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GINI COEFFICIENT</th>
<th>PER CAPITA INCOME (1965) US $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (1970)</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (1964)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1961)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama (1970)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica (1958)</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (1968)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (1965)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (1963)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica (1969)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados (1952)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (1968)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico (1963)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (1961)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (1962)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equador (1968)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam (1962)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


INCOME DISTRIBUTION AMONG ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN BRAZIL (1960 - 1977)

1960 1970 1977

------------- :-9-----------------0

Richest 1% of population  Remaining 90% of population

Next richest 9% of the population

NOTE: The share of national income attributable to the poorest 50% of the population fell from 17.4% in 1960 to 13.1% in 1977.

The richest 9% of the population took their share from 39.6% to 51% by 1977.

The top of the population pyramid, 1% of the economically active population increased their share of the total income from 11.9 percent to 18.3%, thus receiving more than the total attributable to the poorest 50% of the economically active population.

SOURCE: Data from study of IERJ (Institutos dos Economistas do Rio de Janeiro) from unpublished data from the IBGE statistical department.

APPENDIX: Table 14

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (BY MINIMUM SALARY) IN BRAZIL (1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY PER MONTH</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 and 2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 and 3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 3 and 7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 7 and 10</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 minimum salary in 1979 was Cr$ 2,166. The exchange rate in December, 1979 was Cr$ 52 per U.S. 1 dollar.

Also published in Isto É December 17, 1980.
APPENDIX: Table 15

RURAL INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poorest 20%</th>
<th>Poorest 50%</th>
<th>Richest 10%</th>
<th>Richest 5%</th>
<th>Richest 1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

URBAN INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poorest 20%</th>
<th>Poorest 50%</th>
<th>Richest 10%</th>
<th>Richest 5%</th>
<th>Richest 1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latin America Regional Reports Brazil RB-31-09, October 16, 1981, page 4

Note: Data from IBGE 1970 and 1980 censuses.
APPENDIX: Table 16

SALARY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
BRAZIL - 1976-1978
(Comparison of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY (in minimum salaries)</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 and 2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 and 5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Salary</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


published in Isto É, June 18, 1980, page 86.

NOTE: The minimum salary in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo area in 1978 was Cr$ 1,805.04 then equivalent to U.S. 36.77 dollars. (calculations to minimum salary done in 1979 prices and exchange rate according to Table on Appendix).
**APPENDIX: Table 17**

MINIMUM SALARY IN BRAZIL (1940 to 1978) NOMINAL VALUE, DECREE NUMBER ESTABLISHING THE VALUE, DATE OF DECREE DATE IT BECAME EFFECTIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date it Became Effective</th>
<th>Nominal Value</th>
<th>Number of Decree</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1940</td>
<td>220.00</td>
<td>2.162</td>
<td>May 1, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17, 1943</td>
<td>275.00</td>
<td>5.670</td>
<td>July 15, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1943</td>
<td>360.00</td>
<td>5.977</td>
<td>November 10, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1952</td>
<td>1.190.00</td>
<td>30.342</td>
<td>December 24, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1954</td>
<td>2.300.00</td>
<td>35.450</td>
<td>May 1, 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 1956</td>
<td>3.700.00</td>
<td>39.604</td>
<td>July 14, 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1959</td>
<td>5.900.00</td>
<td>45.106</td>
<td>December 24, 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 1960</td>
<td>9.440.00</td>
<td>49.119</td>
<td>October 15, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 1961</td>
<td>13.216.00</td>
<td>51.336</td>
<td>October 13, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1963</td>
<td>21.000.00</td>
<td>51.613</td>
<td>December 3, 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24, 1964</td>
<td>42.000.00</td>
<td>53.578</td>
<td>February 21, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1965</td>
<td>66.000.00</td>
<td>55.803</td>
<td>February 26, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1967</td>
<td>84.000.00</td>
<td>57.900</td>
<td>March 2, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1967</td>
<td>105.00</td>
<td>60.231</td>
<td>February 16, 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 26, 1968</td>
<td>129.00</td>
<td>62.461</td>
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<td>May 1, 1969</td>
<td>156.00</td>
<td>64.442</td>
<td>May 1, 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1, 1970</td>
<td>187.20</td>
<td>66.523</td>
<td>April 30, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1971</td>
<td>225.60</td>
<td>68.576</td>
<td>April 30, 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1, 1972</td>
<td>268.80</td>
<td>70.465</td>
<td>April 27, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1973</td>
<td>312.00</td>
<td>72.148</td>
<td>April 30, 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1, 1974</td>
<td>376.80</td>
<td>73.995</td>
<td>April 29, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1974</td>
<td>415.20</td>
<td>6.174</td>
<td>November 29, 1974</td>
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<td>May 1, 1975</td>
<td>532.80</td>
<td>75.995</td>
<td>April 29, 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1, 1976</td>
<td>768.00</td>
<td>77.510</td>
<td>April 29, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1977</td>
<td>1.106.40</td>
<td>79.610</td>
<td>April 28, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1978</td>
<td>1.560.00</td>
<td>81.615</td>
<td>April 28, 1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1) The value of the salary is expressed in currency of the time it was issued.
APPENDIX: Table 18

EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM SALARY IN BRAZIL
(1959 to 1976)
Cruzeiros of 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REAL MINIMUM SALARY</th>
<th>INDEX OF REAL SALARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1959</td>
<td>1,735.29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1960</td>
<td>1,204.03</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1961</td>
<td>1,475.00</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1962</td>
<td>1,406.38</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1963</td>
<td>1,304.35</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1964</td>
<td>724.14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1965</td>
<td>840.00</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1966</td>
<td>849.00</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1967</td>
<td>744.02</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1968</td>
<td>737.88</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1969</td>
<td>732.62</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>724.91</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>723.90</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1972</td>
<td>690.96</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1973</td>
<td>691.37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1974</td>
<td>623.63</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1975</td>
<td>600.35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1976</td>
<td>590.49</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1976</td>
<td>532.80</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DISEESE, Divulgação Number 1/76 of April 19, 1976, page 10.
(Departamento Inter-Sindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos - DISEESE).

Note: Exchange rate of dollar and cruzeiro in 1976: 12.34 cruzeiros per U.S. 1.00 dollar.
Decree-Law n. 45.106-A (December 24, 1958) established that the minimum salary should be corrected by the increase in the cost of living. Based on the existing law, we calculate what the minimum salary in São Paulo should be if it was in accordance with the law:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>DECREED MINIMUM SALARIES</th>
<th>MINIMUM SALARY CORRECTED WITH ADDITION OF COST OF LIVING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1, 1959</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1, 1963</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>27.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 24, 1964</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>53.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1965</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>99.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1966</td>
<td>84.00</td>
<td>147.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1967</td>
<td>105.00</td>
<td>207.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1968</td>
<td>129.60</td>
<td>254.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1969</td>
<td>156.00</td>
<td>334.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1970</td>
<td>187.20</td>
<td>389.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1971</td>
<td>225.60</td>
<td>494.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1972</td>
<td>268.13</td>
<td>587.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1973</td>
<td>312.00</td>
<td>758.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1974</td>
<td>376.80</td>
<td>1,024.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1, 1974</td>
<td>415.20</td>
<td>1,162.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1975</td>
<td>532.80</td>
<td>1,285.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3, 1976</td>
<td>532.80</td>
<td>1,722.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: calculations in index of cost of living of the period.

## Appendix: Table 20

**TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1965–1976)**

* (in Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>6,245</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>3,366</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>252,780</td>
<td>331,418</td>
<td>331,418</td>
<td>530,776</td>
<td>709,769</td>
<td>871,352</td>
<td>1,118,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>260,303</td>
<td>294,241</td>
<td>294,241</td>
<td>360,152</td>
<td>401,362</td>
<td>430,252</td>
<td>482,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7,938</td>
<td>5,072</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>7,059</td>
<td>2,301</td>
<td>986,389</td>
<td>1,096,469</td>
<td>1,096,469</td>
<td>1,717,387</td>
<td>2,022,477</td>
<td>2,395,222</td>
<td>2,901,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>34,323</td>
<td>129,941</td>
<td>129,941</td>
<td>205,467</td>
<td>241,942</td>
<td>245,110</td>
<td>326,261</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>32,053</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>207,815</td>
<td>273,089</td>
<td>273,089</td>
<td>324,477</td>
<td>401,088</td>
<td>300,066</td>
<td>420,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>39,401</td>
<td>57,731</td>
<td>57,731</td>
<td>73,208</td>
<td>118,903</td>
<td>144,910</td>
<td>220,215</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>132,279</td>
<td>191,855</td>
<td>191,855</td>
<td>357,049</td>
<td>559,621</td>
<td>410,839</td>
<td>980,729</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>124,871</td>
<td>124,871</td>
<td>318,260</td>
<td>598,024</td>
<td>735,509</td>
<td>1,005,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>65,951</td>
<td>80,084</td>
<td>80,084</td>
<td>132,003</td>
<td>187,044</td>
<td>184,952</td>
<td>275,176</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>58,526</td>
<td>75,173</td>
<td>75,173</td>
<td>209,765</td>
<td>131,902</td>
<td>144,910</td>
<td>191,750</td>
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<td>Holland</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>45,594</td>
<td>53,677</td>
<td>53,677</td>
<td>61,127</td>
<td>198,060</td>
<td>217,547</td>
<td>357,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>34,344</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>299,538</td>
<td>303,474</td>
<td>369,380</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>126,525</td>
<td>202,986</td>
<td>202,986</td>
<td>299,538</td>
<td>303,474</td>
<td>369,380</td>
<td>492,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>8,836</td>
<td>11,445</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>2,347,005</td>
<td>2,719,680</td>
<td>2,911,535</td>
<td>4,589,209</td>
<td>6,027,362</td>
<td>6,657,315</td>
<td>9,005,113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *ANUARIO ESTATISTICO DO BRASIL - 1965 to 1977*

* Data not published in Anuario Estatistico for this year.
### APPENDIX: Table 21

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE NATIONAL, MULTINATIONAL, AND STATE Firms in the Various Sectors of the Brazilian Economy, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Predominantly National</th>
<th>Predominantly Foreign</th>
<th>Predominantly State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private National (%)</td>
<td>Multi-national (%)</td>
<td>State (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil construction</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supermarkets</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, shoes</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail business</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy construction</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing &amp; Publishing</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp &amp; Paper</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetallic minerals</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale business</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation equipment</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy vehicles</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum distribution</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning products</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics &amp; Rubber</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages &amp; Tobacco</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Office equipment</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Melhores e Maiores," Exame (Edição especial, September 1979), page 125. These figures refer to the sales of the twenty largest firms in each sector.

APPENDIX: Table 22
DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL, 1929-78

(1) United States Direct Private Investment in Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>US$ Book Value at the End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>1,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>2,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5,936</td>
<td>3,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>4,684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Direct Foreign Investment in Brazil by Country of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) Survey of Current Business, August issue, various years. (2) Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim, various issues.

APPENDIX: Table 23

TRANSMATIONAL COMPANIES IN BRAZIL, January 1965–July 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>(1) Total Capital brought into Brazil including years before 1965</th>
<th>(2) Reinvestment</th>
<th>(3) Profits and dividends remitted abroad</th>
<th>(4) Remittances in payment for technology</th>
<th>(5) Total Remittances abroad (3+4)</th>
<th>(6) Surplus generated in Brazil (2+3+4)</th>
<th>(7) Ratio of Surplus generated in Brazil to capital brought into Brazil (6:1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
<td>119.5</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>208.5</td>
<td>279.1</td>
<td>351.9</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodia</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>108.7</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>169.3</td>
<td>11.84</td>
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<td>Exxon</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>62.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirelli</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>102.7</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firestone</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souza Cruz</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>129.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>211.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>32.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Light</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>115.3</td>
<td>201.7</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>298.8</td>
<td>693.0</td>
<td>502.4</td>
<td>272.1</td>
<td>774.5</td>
<td>1467.7</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Minority Report of the Parliamentary Investigation (CPI) into MNCs in Brazil in 1975, Published in Diario de Congresso Nacional, July 1, 1976, No. 79 (supplement).

APPENDIX: Table 24

NATIONALITY OF THE 100 LARGEST FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
IN BRAZIL 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST GERMANY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBURG</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLLAND</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIECHTENSTEIN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIXED</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX: Table 25

**PROPERTY OF THE 31 LARGEST ENTERPRISES IN THE COUNTRY, BY NET ASSETS AND NET PROFITS**

(1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Enterprises</th>
<th>Net Assets</th>
<th>Net Profits 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Enterprises</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (National)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Gazeta Mercantil. Balanço Anual, Setembro, Ano II No. 2*

(1) National with foreign participation.