Community Carrots and Social Sticks: Why the Poor Vote in a Dominant-Party System

by

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B.A., Georgetown University (2010)

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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at the

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Abstract

In dominant-party states, why do individuals vote in elections with foregone conclusions when they are neither bought nor coerced? It is especially curious in these cases why the rural poor decide to cast their ballots. I posit that communities that collectively rely on the government for public services foster social norms of voting to influence turnout. Motivated by the perception that regimes reward high turnout areas with public goods, communities use esteem “carrots” and social “sticks” to overcome free-rider incentives and increase the likelihood of receiving services. The norm is strongest in less politically-competitive areas, precisely where the puzzle of participation is most obvious. At the individual level, those who rely on their local community for non-material goods, such as information and kinship, are more likely to comply with the norm in order to secure their access to these social benefits. Findings from a lab-in-the-field voting experiment in rural Tanzania indicate a strong influence of the social norm of voting. In the experiment, when turnout is public to their neighbors, respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to vote, compared to when they are in private. The theory, which applies broadly to many patronage-based regimes, explains how communities sustain social norms of voting even when elections lack legitimacy, elucidating the paradox of high turnout in dominant-party systems.

Thesis Supervisor: Lily L. Tsai
Title: Associate Professor of Political Science
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I came to MIT to learn how to conduct research that will hopefully one day change the world. I have met many people with similar aspirations, but no one embodies this passion more than Lily Tsai. Lily has been an amazing advisor, generous with her time and knowledge. I have learned an incredible amount from her and am forever grateful for her encouragement and counsel throughout this entire journey.

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Leah R. Rosenzweig
Cambridge, May 3, 2018
Chapter 1

The Paradox of Voting in Elections with Predetermined Outcomes

Social scientists have long questioned the rationality of voting in competitive democracies (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Downs, 1957). The rationality of voting is even more dubious in contexts where elections have foregone conclusions and candidates’ policy positions are indistinguishable. This is the case in many dominant-party states, where a single party has ruled the country since independence in spite of multiparty elections. Although abstention offers citizens a low-cost tool to signal dissatisfaction with the state and increases the regime’s cost of maintaining the facade of popular support, a majority of citizens often choose to cast their ballots in non-competitive elections. Figure 1.1 displays turnout rates from the most recent national election for countries in Africa. Turnout is almost always above 50%, and average turnout is similar in competitive democracies and dominant-party systems where a single party retains control.

Why do citizens—especially the poor who often comprise a majority of the electorate—vote in non-competitive elections? This dissertation proposes a novel answer to this question:

1 Scholars also refer to these types of systems as “electoral authoritarian” (Linz, 2000) or “competitive authoritarian” regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Throughout the paper I use these terms interchangeably.
Figure 1.1: Turnout from recent elections in Africa for competitive democracies and dominant-party regimes

Note: Dotted lines indicate average turnout for each regime type: 63% for competitive democracies (left panel) and 64% for dominant-party states (right panel). (Source: www.idea.int)

A social norm of voting motivates turnout in poor rural communities, even in dominant-party states, and helps to explain this puzzle of participation. Inspired by the belief that elections present an opportunity to signal a desire for greater state resources, communities that collectively rely on government services (e.g., schools and clinics) nurture norms of voting to encourage turnout. Many patronage governments reward high turnout areas to incentivize this legitimacy-conferring behavior (Carlitz, 2016; Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013; Smith and Bueno de Mesquita, 2012). Yet, indivisible community rewards cannot explain individual turnout decisions. How do communities overcome free-rider incentives

---

2 A social norm is “a decentralized behavioral standard that individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow, for the esteem reasons...or because the obligation is internalized, or both” (McAdams, 1997, 381).

3 Patronage regimes are those in which government officials use state “resources and benefits that flow from public office” to gain political support (Hicken, 2011, 295).
and ensure voters turn out on Election Day?

I suggest that members monitor each other’s turnout behavior and individuals follow these norms because of their reliance on the community for information, kinship and other social benefits. These benefits, such as a neighbor to watch your children if you fall ill, have important consequences for citizens’ social and political lives. Citizens who depend on their local community in this way, I argue, vote to gain esteem and avoid social sanctions from their peers.

Conversations with rural Tanzanians indicate that the fear of social sanctions serves as a strong stimulus to turn out. A 27-year-old farmer from Mwasubi village in rural Mwanza district said that if his neighbors saw him sitting at home on Election Day they would “hate him.”

Others told me that communities isolate and look down upon citizens who do not vote. In Kijima village in Mwanza, a group of women referred to abstaining in elections as “not blending with the community.” To them, someone who does not vote is “stupid” because they are neither “uniting nor cooperating with the community.” These discussions suggest that rural Tanzanian citizens vote in elections to avoid being thought of negatively by their neighbors, mocked by their peers or isolated by their community.

This dissertation examines the influence of a social norm of voting in Tanzania, a dominant-party state in East Africa. The puzzle of participation is particularly acute in dominant-party systems where electoral outcomes are largely predetermined. Social norms of voting have not yet been seriously investigated in these contexts, which may be the least likely cases for a social norm to develop if citizens lack a shared sense of civic duty to the state.

---

5 “Hajichanganyi na jamii.” Female focus group discussion. Kijima village, Misungwi district, Mwanza, December 12, 2016.
6 “Ni mtu mjinga asiyeungana na asiyeshirikiana na jamii.” Female focus group discussion. Kijima village, Misungwi district, Mwanza, December 12, 2016.
1.1 Existing Models of Turnout

The prevailing answer in the literature to the question of why poor citizens vote is because they are mobilized. Whether through party-state coercion or material inducements, the poor are said to be the primary targets (Stokes, 2005; Blaydes, 2010). Regimes take an active role in ensuring high turnout in elections to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and the international community (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006), since high turnout is often (mis)interpreted as faith in the system. When the regime or electoral system lacks legitimacy and a sense of civic duty is absent, governments need to motivate turnout through other means. Clientelism and coercion strategies do not explain high turnout rates among poor citizens in countries where coercion is not feasible—due to state capacity or international pressure—and where clientelism is limited. Furthermore, these theories cannot account for variation in turnout among homogeneously poor communities and individuals.

This dissertation fills a notable gap in the literature by identifying the social motivations of turnout for citizens in semi-authoritarian states. Considering citizens' non-material interests that are shaped by the communities in which they live, I propose that a social norm of voting drives turnout. Resuscitating an older literature on peasant societies (Hydén, 1980; Scott, 1976), this dissertation expands upon empirical work in the US, and other consolidated democracies, by examining the social incentives of turnout in a dominant-party state, Tanzania. This research also highlights the significant role that local communities play in influencing individual political behavior, a factor that studies in political science and economics often fail to examine.

1.1.1 Limits of Coercion and Clientelism

Coercion and clientelism theories are insufficient to explain variation in turnout in contexts where coercion is not a viable state strategy and where resource-constrained parties are less
active in buying votes. Outright force is becoming an increasingly difficult strategy to employ to mobilize voters due to the ubiquity of social media, which allow news of malfeasance to spread quickly.\footnote{https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/in-central-africa-citizens-are-using-social-media-to-build-democracy-heres-how/?utm_term=.f0b02a8c0999} International election observers also put regimes on their best behavior. Regimes that seek to use elections as legitimacy-enhancing opportunities cannot rely on "naked repression" as it may ruin their reputation (Schedler, 2002, 36).\footnote{Elections in competitive-authoritarian regimes serve several purposes. They can deter defection to the opposition, create the semblance of democracy and legitimacy, allow the regime to identify stronghold, swing and defecting areas, and deter popular protest (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). For elections to serve their intended purpose, citizens must show up at the polls.} Blatant force is an unpopular option for regimes that rely heavily on foreign aid, for fear of jeopardizing this source of income. Finally, fraud, coercion and vote rigging have the potential to demoralize and demobilize voters, as happened in former communist states (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). For these reasons, regimes may prefer to avoid coercive activities that could compromise potential legitimacy gains attained through elections.

In addition to coercion, the poor are also said to be the primary targets of material-based mobilization strategies because they are willing to sell their vote at a cheaper price (Stokes, 2005). Clientelism, or contingency-based exchange, ranges from buying individual votes with cash to providing in-kind goods to groups of voters (Hicken, 2011). Different types of clientelist strategies might be more or less prevalent in different electoral contexts.

Theoretically, less competitive elections, like those in dominant-party states, should have lower levels of vote buying and clientelism than those in competitive party systems. When a single party has controlled the executive – and the associated national coffers – since independence, opposition parties have fewer resources to compete with ruling party handouts.\footnote{Hicken (2011) notes that the persistence of clientelism requires that public officials have access to state or other external resources. In the most recent national election in Tanzania in 2015 the main opposition party, CHADEMA, conducted a SMS-based donation campaign to encourage supporters to donate to their presidential candidate. The party also sold paraphernalia such as hats, T-shirts and lanyards near its headquarters in Dar es Salaam.} In turn, the ruling party need not extensively engage in these activities, diminishing the
market for votes.\textsuperscript{10}

In many developing democracies, parties not only lack resources to fund gift-giving strategies, but also cannot credibly monitor vote choice. In order for individual-level material exchanges to be successful, political parties must have the capacity \textit{and motivation} to monitor the electoral behavior of their clients. In the fifth round of the Afrobarometer survey, 82\% of respondents interviewed across sub-Saharan Africa report that it is “not at all” or “not very” likely that powerful people can know how they voted.

Less competitive elections and a weak market for votes make it unlikely that individual-level clientelism sufficiently explains why a majority of poor Tanzanians vote. Only 13\% of Tanzanian respondents from Afrobarometer report being offered a gift in exchange for their vote, which is quite small compared to its neighbors: 33\% of Kenyans and 41\% of Ugandans report being offered a gift (Afrobarometer, 2015). Notwithstanding social desirability bias concerns, there is likely another motivating force of turnout in Tanzania.

While clientelism may be ubiquitous, it cannot explain why citizens take an interest in their neighbors’ turnout behavior. Recent studies present evidence that citizens in developing democracies care whether or not their neighbors vote (Jung and Long, 2016; Banerjee, 2015). Group-based pork-barrel politics provide incentives for individuals to monitor their peers but fail to predict which individuals will vote, and who will free ride. Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2012) suggest that governments, mentioning the cases of Tanzania and India, reward geographic areas with the highest turnout. Voters are driven by a desire to be pivotal not in the outcome of the election but in the allocation of resources (what the authors term “prize pivotalness”), by providing sufficient electoral support to the winning candidate or party so that their group gets pork.

\textsuperscript{10}Jensen and Justesen (2014) find empirical support for this claim in sub-Saharan Africa, but propose an alternative reasoning: candidates in competitive elections have stronger incentives to resort to illicit tactics to mobilize support. They also find that the relationship between individual poverty and vote buying is attenuated in less competitive elections.
Rewarding high-participatory areas is not limited to dominant-party regimes. Politicians in competitive democracies also direct resources to high turnout areas (Fleck, 1999; Martin, 2003). This model of “contingent prize allocation” explains how regimes incentivize turnout, but does not address how the free-rider problem is overcome. My theory explains individual-level variation in turnout by examining variation in the desire to avoid social sanctions from fellow community members.

The comparative scholarship that looks beyond clientelism and coercion to explain turnout mainly adopts a macro-level approach. Scholars examine cross-national variation in turnout to explain the inverse correlation between socioeconomic status (SES) and turnout in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Kasara and Suryanarayanan, 2015; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010). Kasara and Suryanarayanan (2015) investigate the political preferences of the rich and suggest that when these preferences diverge from those of the poor and when state capacity for tax extraction is high, the rich will be motivated to turn out. This study may explain why and when the rich vote but does not speak to the incentives and consistent voting behavior of the poor.

Focusing specifically on poor rural citizens, this dissertation presents evidence that individuals care about how their peers behave during elections, and what their neighbors might think of them if they abstain. The results suggest that citizens turn out on Election Day not because they are loyal to the regime or accountable to elite mobilizers, but because individuals are accountable to their local community. I suggest that horizontal monitoring and social sanctioning can also encourage political participation.

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Both studies of US politics find that even after controlling for partisanship of the county turnout is a significant predictor of government resource allocation.
1.1.2 Non-Material Motivations to Vote

Few studies in comparative politics directly test the influence of social norms on political behavior. Instead, comparative politics scholars have largely studied the social influences of voting in the context of ethnic politics. Scholars debate whether ethnic voting is instrumental (Bates, 1983; Posner, 2005) or expressive (Horowitz, 1985), but focus exclusively on its influence on vote choice. In contexts with less- (or non-)competitive elections, we might be most interested in the decision to show up at the ballot booth in the first place. This paper broadens the scope of the types of groups that influence individual political behavior in the developing world. Similar to Ichino and Nathan (2013), I demonstrate that the local geographic community in which voters live matters, and in this case motivates turnout through a social norm of voting.

Social norms of voting have been documented in competitive democracies, but how these norms arise and endure in places where electoral systems lack legitimacy remains untested and under-theorized. Several empirical studies in western-consolidated democracies demonstrate that the threat of neighbors observing one’s voting or abstaining behavior motivates turnout (Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008; Panagopoulos, 2010; Sinclair, 2012; Funk, 2010). A shared sense of civic duty has been proposed as a solution to the turnout puzzle (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) and the stimulus for a social norm of voting (Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008). Survey evidence suggests that US citizens with a strong sense of civic duty are more likely to vote (Knack, 1992).

When citizens do not feel loyalty toward the state, why might a social norm of voting exist? For example, in China, despite state efforts to encourage a sense of civic duty, a norm of abstaining pervades (Shi, 1999). In competitive-authoritarian regimes, citizens often view the electoral process as fraudulent, likely undermining the standard stimulus for a social

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12 One important exception is McClendon (2012).
norm. Therefore, a new theory is required to explain how a social norm of voting arises in these least-likely contexts, that operates independently of a sense of civic duty to the state. This dissertation provides one such theory.

1.2 A New Theory of Social Voting

This dissertation provides a new answer to the puzzle of participation: citizens are motivated to vote on Election Day in order to demonstrate to their neighbors that they care about the community and are willing to incur a personal cost for the well-being of the group. Contrary to standard assumptions that the poor turn out because they are bought or coerced, my theory treats voters as active decision makers with agency. I propose that a social norm of voting motivates turnout in poor rural communities. The norm is driven by a shared desire to increase government resources distributed to the community, and is maintained by individuals’ desire to gain esteem in the eyes of their peers and to avoid social sanctions.

I argue that when citizens believe that governments reward communities that exhibit high turnout with more public goods, voters come to view elections as an opportunity to acquire government resources. Evidence from Tanzania, and other patronage systems, suggests that the government directs public services to communities with higher turnout. Carlitz (2016) demonstrates that turnout is a significant predictor of government allocation of water points. Another study finds that wards with higher turnout receive more Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) allocations per capita (Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013). In

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13 While the Afrobarometer survey does not specifically probe a sense of civic duty, it does ask respondents their opinions on whether they thought the previous national election was free and fair. In the most recent survey, less than half (44.1%) of Tanzanians thought the most recent national election, in 2010, was ‘completely free and fair’ (Afrobarometer, 2016). In her study of voters in Cameroon, an electoral authoritarian regime, (Letsa, 2017) finds that only ruling party supporters are motivated to vote out of a sense of civic duty.

14 The other side of the same coin is that citizens may fear being punished by the regime for low turnout. Depending on the type of regime, and level of authoritarian tactics, the regime might use the promise of material rewards or the threat of withholding or withdrawing such goods.
patronage systems, voting can come to be associated with helping the community benefit, materially. Elections enable communities to signal loyalty and commitment to the regime, through turnout rather than abstention.\(^{15}\)

I posit that local communities that rely on government-provided services (e.g., schools and clinics) will foster social norms of voting in order to increase turnout and the probability of gaining greater government resources. A community’s shared reliance on government services—what I term *economic dependency*—generates demand for a norm of voting. Since an individual’s decision to turn out has potential externalities for her neighbors, a social norm might evolve out of frequent and repeated interactions between individuals (Bicchieri, 1990; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977).\(^{16}\)

![Figure 1.2: A new theory of social voting](image)

To solve the collective action problem that elections pose, citizens enforce these evolutionary norms with status rewards and social sanctions. Individuals are motivated to show up on Election Day, complying with the social norm of voting, to demonstrate that they care about their local community and to avoid social sanctions from their peers. Individuals’

---

\(^{15}\)Citizens of different regimes may view elections as an opportunity to influence the flow of government resource allocation. In competitive democracies, the avenue for changing the allocation of resources is changing who is in power. In localities where ethnic politics determine which groups access resources, local communities will want to get their members to vote in order to elect their co-ethnic candidate who is most likely to allocate resources to them.

\(^{16}\)Unlike conventions, which are descriptive norms that solve coordination problems where individuals’ interests are aligned with the group’s interest, social norms usually exist in cases where individual self-interest and group interest conflict. Bicchieri (2005) goes as far as suggesting that compliance with a social norm can never be a strictly dominant strategy (in game theoretic terms), otherwise we would not care how others were behaving (p.22).
social dependency on their local community for non-material benefits—such as friendship, information and cooperation—drives norm compliance.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the theoretical logic. Community-level economic dependency on the government for public goods creates the impetus for a social norm of voting to encourage members to do their part to help the group. Extending beyond group-level patronage arguments that fail to account for the free rider problem, I explain how individual-level social dependency on the community motivates citizens to comply with the social norm of voting, to gain status and avoid sanctions.

As a discipline, we remain largely ignorant as to whether a social norm of voting operates in developing democracies. This study tests the presence of a social norm of voting among poor citizens in a single dominant-party regime and provides a rationale— independent of a shared sense of duty to the state—for why and how it can persist in these improbable contexts.

1.3 Empirical Strategy

This dissertation adopts a multi-method approach to test the existence and influence of a social norm of voting in rural Tanzania. First, I draw on several surveys to assess whether citizens hold norm-consistent attitudes and expectations. This is the critical first step to assess the existence of a social norm of voting and to distinguish it from convention.

Second, I designed a lab-in-the-field behavioral experiment to isolate and investigate the role that peer monitoring and an aversion to social sanctions might play in motivating turnout. The issue of social desirability bias—respondents over-reporting turnout behavior because they think it is the answer that the researcher wants to hear—makes relying solely on survey data, and self-reported turnout behavior, problematic. This experimental component gives me the opportunity to manipulate the salience of a social norm in a controlled
environment and test its influence on behavioral outcome measures.

Finally, I collected local level turnout data from polling stations used in the 2015 general election to examine whether the experimental findings are corroborated by observational correlations. I use the observational data to overcome the challenge of external validity and extrapolating experimental behavior to real-world phenomena. I also use administrative data on the provision of health and education services to investigate how reliance on the government for these services influences community-level norm enforcement.

Beginning in 2014, I traveled around rural Tanzania conducting focus groups and one-on-one interviews with citizens to understand how people think about voting and elections. At this time, I began to generate hypotheses about citizens’ motivations to vote. This qualitative fieldwork informed the design of the survey and experimental instruments. Follow-up interviews after quantitative data collection also allowed me to probe how social sanctions manifest in rural communities and contextualize the quantitative results. Table 1.1 lists the research design strategies and data sources that I use to test whether a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1: Research design and data sources</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test presence of a social norm of voting (H1) and who most likely to comply with norm (H3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test whether voting rewarded and abstaining sanctioned (H2) and norm-consistent expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test theoretical implications with observational data from 2015 general election (H1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 electoral results (2015-2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test whether economic dependency motivates a social norm of voting (H4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 electoral results (2015-2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform design of quantitative measurement; contextualize experimental results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Author” indicates an original data source that I collected. Twaweza is a regional NGO based in Dar es Salaam. “GoT” stands for the Government of Tanzania and “AB” is Afrobarometer.

Tanzania, a dominant-party regime in East Africa, serves as an appropriate test case for several reasons. First, 68% of the Tanzanian population lives in rural areas. It is in
these rural communities—which are extremely dependent on government services and where social cohesion is high—that my theory would predict that a social norm of voting influences turnout. Second, Tanzania, at least compared to its neighbors, seems to experience lower levels of vote buying. Though still present, the traditional theories of turnout might have less explanatory power here.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, in Tanzania, as in many developing democracies, the poor actually turn out at higher rates than the rich (Kasara and Suryanarayan, 2015).

Tanzania therefore presents an empirical puzzle, common to other dominant-party systems where elections have foregone conclusions.

1.4 Contributions

1.4.1 Understanding Turnout

Scholars have directed much attention toward analyzing how citizens cast their ballots—whether based on evaluations of the state of the economy (Posner and Simon, 2002), preference for in-group leaders (Dunning and Harrison, 2010), or valence issues (Bleck and Van de Walle, 2013). In dominant-party regimes—where the electoral outcome is largely predetermined—the choice of which party or candidate to support may not carry much information about underlying preferences and motivations. In these instances, the meaning of a vote is markedly different than in competitive democracies. Here, the decision to enter the ballot booth at all is, arguably, the more consequential question.

This study investigates this question and advances the literature on turnout and African politics in several ways. First, this project moves beyond conventional turnout paradigms to show that the interaction between group-level economic incentives and individual-level social motivations can explain subnational variation in the participation of poor rural voters in dominant-party regimes. While scholars have recently paid more attention to social

\textsuperscript{17}See Chapter 3 for a discussion of alternative explanations of high turnout in Tanzania.
incentives for political action, few theorize about the interaction between material and non-material incentives. Second, as a discipline, we remain largely ignorant as to whether a social norm of voting operates in developing democracies. This project empirically tests the existence of a social norm of voting in a semi-authoritarian regime and provides a rationale—

independent of a shared sense of duty to the state—for why and how it can persist in this improbable context. Third, this dissertation sets aside the emphasis on ethnic politics, or information heuristics, that explain vote choice in the African politics literature, to consider other explanations of the decision to turn out in a dominant-party state in sub-Saharan Africa.

The puzzle of high turnout in dominant-party systems, especially among the poor, deserves greater scholarly attention for several theoretical and practical reasons. The research presented here has important implications for how we develop theories of elections, regime stability and government accountability. While voter turnout is regarded as “an excellent indicator of democratic quality” (Lijphart, 1999, 284), it may actually reflect a different aspect of democracy than is typically assumed. In some cases, voting does not signal legitimacy of or faith in the regime; nor does it serve as a mode of government accountability. Rather, voting indicates horizontal accountability and a sense of duty to one’s local community. Recognizing the social-psychological influences of voting among the poor in developing democracies may alter current understanding of the meaning of a vote and provide insights into how semi-authoritarian systems endure. In practice, understanding why poor rural citizens decide to vote or abstain has implications for the endurance of regimes, given that the poor tend to turn out at higher rates than the rich (Kasara and Suryanarayan, 2015) and constitute the majority in many countries. This study also offers an answer for how authoritarian regimes can maintain power without relying on expensive strategies, like coercion and clientelism.
1.4.2 Explaining Authoritarian Endurance

Freedom House recently reported that the 21st century has witnessed a “resurgence of authoritarian rule.” This democratic “backsliding” increases the importance of understanding how citizens engage in this growing class of regimes, and their motivations for doing so. Often the poor comprise a majority of the population. In many developing democracies the median voter is a poor voter. Because elections serve as legitimacy-increasing opportunities for dominant-party regimes, these regimes care not only about winning, but also about maximizing electoral support (Magaloni, 2006). Poor citizens, thus have the numbers to grant the regime greater legitimacy by turning out, or reduce legitimacy by staying home.

Social norms can solve collective action problems, like voting, and also serve as mechanisms of social control (Bicchieri, 2005). The social norm of voting in rural Tanzania operates in tandem with the regime’s goal of encouraging turnout in elections. Below, I demonstrate how high turnout is sustained in one dominant-party regime without relying on campaigns of terror or clientelism. A self-enforcing norm of voting can render these more costly forms of state control and mobilization obsolete. Rather, the theory suggests that the top-down distribution of public goods may be all that is required to produce electoral participation, which can help sustain under-performing autocrats who point to high turnout, even in non-competitive in elections, as declarations of their mandate.

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20I adopt Tyler’s (2006) definition of legitimacy as a “psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just” (375).
1.5 Plan of the dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes my theory of social voting, which explains why the rural poor turn out on Election Day. Contrary to standard assumptions that the poor passively vote because they are mobilized, I provide an alternative view of rural voters that takes into account both their material and social strategic interests. I describe both the group-level economic motivations and individual-level social incentives that motivate citizens to vote, even in contexts where the outcome of the election is largely predetermined. I explain how a social norm of voting can arise in the least-likely scenarios where a shared sense of civic duty to the state may be absent.

Chapter 3 introduces the case of Tanzania. This chapter takes the reader to the immediate post-independence period to explain how the ruling party (TANU, which later became CCM) inculcated a norm of voting. The ruling party’s activities during the single-party era elucidate why Tanzanian citizens view elections as an opportunity to extract goods from the government. Why are rural Tanzanian communities dependent on the government for basic public services today? This chapter describes the socialist policies that help to explain how the Tanzanian government came to be the main provider of health and education services in the country. Despite Tanzania’s unique foray into socialism, its aid dependence and history of single-party elections is widespread across the African continent and beyond.

Chapter 4 answers the question, does a social norm motivate poor rural citizens to vote in Tanzania? While such norms have been documented in western democracies, this dissertation provides empirical evidence of a social norm of voting in a dominant-party regime. This chapter draws on survey, experimental and observational data to test the individual-level observable implications of the theory. I find that citizens expect to face social sanctions from other community members if they abstain and are motivated to vote out of a desire to avoid social ostracism. This chapter presents a comprehensive picture of how the social norm
of voting operates in rural communities in Tanzania and explores individual-level variation in norm compliance.

Chapter 5 turns to the community-level characteristics that correlate with the strength of the social norm of voting. Using case studies, I demonstrate the absence of a social norm of voting in urban Dar es Salaam. Using data on the location of government and non-government schools and clinics, I observe whether communities that are more economically dependent on the government for social services (i.e., have limited access to alternative service providers) also exhibit higher turnout. In addition, I test whether another community-level attribute—the degree of political competition—influences the strength of a social norm of voting.

Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the evidence presented. In addition to revisiting the scope conditions and proposing areas for future work, this chapter also underscores the importance of the social norm of voting. I discuss the implications of this study for how scholars interpret and understand elections in competitive authoritarian regimes, including voter motivations and accountability. Though some scholars have suggested that high turnout serves as a signal of democratic quality, my findings instead propose that turnout may be less about government accountability and more about horizontal accountability among peers in rural communities.
Chapter 2

A New Theory of Social Voting

This chapter offers a new theory to explain why the rural poor vote in developing democracies. Contrary to standard assumptions that the poor passively show up on Election Day because they are bought or coerced, I regard voters as active decision makers with agency. My theory takes into account citizens' material and social strategic interests and proposes that a social norm of voting motivates turnout.

There are many types of norms that "can be formal or informal, personal or collective, descriptive of what most people do, or prescriptive of behavior" (Bicchieri, 2005, 1). The focus here is on social norms. Social norms are prescriptive norms that involve "clusters of expectations" that individuals have about the behavior and beliefs of others (Bicchieri, 1990). Social norms involve two types of expectations; empirical (I expect others will behave in compliance with the norm) and normative (I expect others believe that I/we should obey the norm) (Bicchieri, 2005). Unlike conventions, which are descriptive norms that solve coordination problems where individuals’ interests are aligned with the group’s interest, social norms usually exist in cases where individual self-interest and group interest diverge.¹ Hence, we might expect social norms to arise as solutions to collective action problems, like

¹Bicchieri (2005) goes as far as suggesting that compliance with a social norm can never be a strictly dominant strategy (in game theoretic terms), otherwise we would not care how others were behaving (p.22).
that of voting where individual interests might dictate staying home on Election Day, while the group is in favor of everyone showing up to cast their ballots. Why would a group or community seek to overcome the collective action problem elections pose?

When citizens believe that governments reward communities that exhibit high turnout, voters come to view elections as an opportunity to acquire more government goods. In dominant-party regimes, non-competitive elections allow communities to signal loyalty and commitment to the regime, through turnout rather than abstention.\(^2\) Individuals may believe, due to propaganda, personal experience or otherwise, that high rates of turnout in the community will be rewarded. Indeed, there is evidence that patronage regimes in Tanzania reward high turnout areas with more services (Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013; Carlitz, 2016).

I propose that local communities that rely on government-provided services (e.g., schools and clinics) foster social norms of voting in order to increase turnout and the probability of gaining greater government resources. In many cases, especially where ordinary citizens lack alternative avenues for speaking to government, elections may come to be viewed as a rare opportunity to try to influence the distribution of goods. A community’s economic dependency, or reliance, on the government serves as the collective material incentive for a social norm of voting.

To solve the collective action problem that elections pose, I suggest that citizens enforce these evolutionary norms with status rewards and social sanctions. Individuals are motivated to show up on Election Day to demonstrate that they care about their local community, and to avoid social sanctions from their peers. Individual’s social dependency on their local community for non-material benefits—such as friendship, information and cooperation—drives

\(^2\)Citizens of different regimes may view elections as an opportunity to influence the flow of government resource allocation. In competitive democracies, the avenue for changing the allocation of resources is changing who is in power. In localities where ethnic politics determine which groups access resources, local communities will want to get their members to vote in order to elect their co-ethnic candidate who is most likely to allocate resources to them.
norm compliance. The theory (laid out in Figure 2.1) thus suggests that subnational variation in turnout is explained by two sources of variation in dependency; i) the local community's economic dependency on the government and ii) an individual's social dependency on their local community.

![Figure 2.1: My theory of social voting](image)

Social norms are local norms and are context specific to a particular group or society. The reference group for a social norm of voting is that which collectively relies on government goods and services. Since local, geographically-bounded, communities share and jointly benefit from government-provided public goods (Ichino and Nathan, 2013), members have a collective interest in obtaining, and maintaining, government services. I follow the logic of Ichino and Nathan (2013), who argue that politicians can target public goods to specific rural communities but cannot use the same strategy in dense urban areas. Therefore, I suggest that the social norm of voting that is stimulated by economic dependency is most likely to be present in rural areas. In rural areas, the local geographic community, which I refer to as "local community," is also the locale for much of political and social life. Elections are locally experienced to the extent that polling stations are placed in almost every village. Rural citizens, who infrequently move, also routinely interact with and heavily rely on other community members.

The following section lists the prerequisites for a social norm of voting and illustrates that these conditions are met in the case of Tanzania, and likely many other contexts. Then, I
discuss the observable implications of the theory and derive four testable hypotheses. Finally, I discuss the scope conditions of the theory.

2.1 Prerequisites for a Social Norm

Is it plausible that a social norm of voting could exist within poor rural communities in Tanzania today? Scholars suggest several necessary conditions for the existence of social norms. Three main preconditions proposed in the literature are consensus, observability and common knowledge (McAdams, 1997; Brennan and Pettit, 2004). I illustrate that these three prerequisites are met in the case of voting in Tanzania and are likely similarly satisfied in many other dominant-party regimes.

First, there must be a consensus among the group about whether the behavior deserves ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ esteem. In many contexts voting is seen as a good act, worthy of positive esteem. Usually the positive association of voting is said to be due to a shared sense of civic duty. I propose an alternative avenue for how voting comes to be seen as a ‘good’ action.

Evidence from Tanzania suggests that the government directs public services to communities with higher turnout. Carlitz (2016) demonstrates that turnout is a significant predictor of government allocation of water points. Another study finds that wards with higher turnout receive more Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) allocations per capita (Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013). In Tanzania, and other patronage systems, when government goods are distributed to the community, rather than to individuals, voting becomes associated with helping the community receive material benefits.

In the absence of other rationales, such as a sense of civic duty, for a consensus that voting is worthy of esteem, a community’s shared economic dependency and belief that high turnout might be rewarded can serve as the stimulus for the consensus. In Tanzania, among a sample
of 1200 randomly sampled rural respondents from a panel survey I conducted in three regions around the 2015 election, about 90% report that voting helps the community. In the same original survey, 30% of respondents specifically mention that voting brings development, while 59% say that voting brings “good leaders” who will help the community.

The belief that voting can lead to community-level rewards produces a consensus within the group that people who vote, and try to help the community get more government resources, are worthy of esteem and those who abstain deserve rebuke. Indeed, Tanzanian citizens seem to believe voting is good and that everyone should vote in elections. The latest round of Afrobarometer (2016) asked respondents whether a good citizen should vote in elections always, never or only if they choose to. A large majority (82%) of Tanzanians report that good citizens should always vote in elections.

The second condition for a social norm to exist is that it must be possible for others to detect whether an individual engages in the target behavior. While the secret ballot renders observing vote choice difficult, in many contexts turnout is quite visible. Local community members can monitor turnout behavior and “reward the compliant and punish the noncompliant,” to enforce a social norm of voting (Hechter, 1988).

There are three main circumstances that render turnout observable by one’s peers. First, in Tanzania, and other developing democracies, lists of registered voters are posted in public locations (on the wall of government offices or outside schools that serve as polling stations) weeks prior to the election. Citizens regularly come to check that their name appears on the registration list, which are not ordered alphabetically, prior to Election Day.³ When there is only one polling station, frequently located in the center of town, it is likely to be widely known which individuals voted. On the other hand, while still potentially observable

³It is with good reason that citizens want to verify that their names are on the list before Election Day. In the most recent 2015 general election in Tanzania, 27% of observers from 5770 polling stations across the country reported that voters’ names were missing from the registry list. Moreover, 22% of observers reported that 1-5 people at their polling station were not allowed to vote because their name did not appear on the registry, despite the fact that they had a valid voter’s ID card (http://mtega.com/category/politics/page/2/).
the presence of a second (or more) polling stations, introduces a level of uncertainty and anonymity which can be anticipated to reduce the ability of others to detect whether an individual engages in the target behavior.

Second, overburdened and disorganized polling stations mean that voting frequently involves standing in line for hours. Community members have ample opportunity to see each other queuing at polling stations commonly located within local communities. Third, citizens’ fingers are dipped in indelible ink after they vote to prevent them from voting again. Akin to the popular ‘I voted’ sticker used in the US, people often proudly show off inked fingers, while non-voters try to hide clean fingers from prying eyes (Ferree et al., 2015). As Ferree et al. (2015) note in Uganda, “An inked finger identifies a voter not just when she emerges from the polling station, but until the ink on her finger wears off, a process that can take days or weeks. During this time, her decision to vote is public...” (1). In India, Banerjee (2015) notes that inked fingers have become a “coveted badge of pride” that creates peer pressure to vote. These factors contribute to community members’ ability to monitor who among them participated.

Finally, the third condition is that the consensus and risk of detection are common knowledge. Individuals are aware that other local community members will see them behave in a particular way and expect these peers to react accordingly—with esteem or disesteem—given the existing consensus. This condition is likely satisfied in the case of voting because people often discuss politics around elections (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). Especially in small tight-knit communities where members regularly interact with each other, they are likely to vocalize their beliefs and expectations about voting behavior. After reaching the eligible voting age citizens come to understand the process and observe its public nature. Even prior to reaching this age, children are introduced to the

\footnote{Ferree et al. (2015) conducted an experiment around the 2011 general elections in Kampala, Uganda where they primed registered voters to think about the finger inking process. The authors generally find null effects, except for young uneducated Ugandans—those least likely to have this knowledge prior—but for}
observability of turnout when they go with their parents to cast their ballots. These three conditions for norm existence are likely satisfied in the case of turnout in many countries.

### 2.1.1 Norm emergence

Once the prerequisites are satisfied, how does a social norm of voting arise in these contexts? Economic dependency at the local community level creates the demand for a social norm of voting because an individual’s decision to vote is perceived to have positive externalities for all other members of the community. Coleman (1986) describes that a social norm may emerge “when an action by one actor imposes externalities on other actors. When the externalities are positive, the demand is for a prescriptive norm, to encourage or induce the target action” (57). Given this demand within local communities to encourage turnout, we might expect a social norm of voting to arise.

The evolutionary model of norm formation proposes that norms can arise spontaneously among individuals who are pursuing their independent interests in repeated interactions with others (Bicchieri, 1990; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977). In Tanzania, the nature of rural life dictates frequent interaction with neighbors. These relationships extend into the foreseeable future since emigrating to another area is infrequent outside of marriage. Frequent and repeated interactions mean that regularities of behavior quickly solidify as people come to believe that others are following a particular rule of behavior (Sugden, 1989). These rules, or conventions, are transformed into norms out of a desire for social approval from others (Sugden, 1989). As people interact and observe each other during elections, rural citizens

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5 Fabric rights are frequently cited as a classic example of spontaneous norm evolution, where equal division results in a Pareto efficient outcome for all actors who know that their interactions will be repeated (Knight, 1992; Sugden, 1989).

6 Describing norms of behavior among cattle herders in Shasta County, California, Robert Ellickson writes, “A fundamental feature of rural society makes this enforcement system feasible: Rural residents deal with one another on a large number of fronts, and most residents expect those interactions to continue far into the future” (emphasis in original) (Brinton and Nee, 1998, 60).
come to realize that voting is rewarded and abstention sanctioned by their peers. A norm of voting thus emerges through this social learning process and the human desire for esteem (McAdams, 1997).

While norm emergence can be “spontaneous” and decentralized (Knight, 1992), some individuals in the community may take a more active role in instigating a particular norm. In particular, “high-status individuals will have relatively more influence on the creation of new norms” (McAdams, 1997, 416). Strategic political actors may seek to determine the content of social norms that are a “by-product of strategic conflict over substantive social outcomes” (Knight, 1992, 126). This perspective makes sense in the case of many dominant-party regimes, where communities compete over access to limited government resources. Local party elites may try to produce a social norm of voting if they believe achieving high turnout in their constituency will benefit them, perhaps in recognition or rewards from the regime. Chapter 4 examines the (more limited) role local community elites have in propagating the norm in rural Tanzania.

An alternative view to the evolutionary model of norm emergence is that ruling regimes directly and purposefully attempt to inculcate a social norm of voting. Towards furthering their goal of high turnout in elections, governments – through the use of symbolic control, rhetoric and other social tools – may seek to inculcate a social norm of voting, especially during single-party rule. Specifically, regimes may make access to state resources contingent on political participation, inculcate the norm through civics education programs in school and have local level elites promote the idea that high turnout areas will be rewarded with public goods. Although political leaders may be involved in stimulating a norm, enforcement is most likely decentralized because the entire community stands to benefit from high compliance. The following section discusses how we would know if a social norm of voting exists.

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7The role of the ruling party in encouraging a social norm is discussed in greater detail for the case of Tanzania in Chapter 3.
2.2 Identifying a Social Norm of Voting

There are several observable implications of a social norm of voting. First, since social norms are defined as “clusters of expectations” Bicchieri (1990), there are two types of expectations individuals should hold: empirical and normative. Specifically, individuals should believe that most community members will vote in elections (empirical) and think that others believe everyone should vote (normative). These expectations are essential indicators of the existence of a social norm of voting as they distinguish it from convention or habit.

If voting in elections were mere habit, we would not expect individuals to have these expectations about others’ behavior, nor care whether others vote. Think, for instance, about the habit of wearing shoes outside. Some people wear shoes outside because it is in their own interest, regardless of how others behave. These people would probably not alter their decision to wear shoes even if they believed no one else wore shoes outside. Similarly, if voting was simply a habit or convention, individuals would not hold normative beliefs—such as, ‘voting is good’ and ‘everyone should vote’.

In general, the existence of a social norm means that many individuals will comply with the norm. Hence, I expect high turnout in elections in rural communities in Tanzania. Turnout should also be motivated by citizens’ desire for status and aversion to sanctions. Voters will be rewarded and, insofar as we observe off-the-equilibrium path behavior, we should expect individuals who do not comply with the norm to be socially sanctioned.

2.2.1 Status and sanctions

Second, in the presence of a social norm of voting, individuals will be motivated to turn out by a desire for status and aversion to social sanctions. Status and sanctions are the currency with which social norms operate. Social enforcement, especially through informal sanctions by group members, is key for the persistence of the norm (Coleman, 1990; Hechter, 1984).
Individuals can gain status by displaying that they are “a loyal and devoted group member who has the best interests of the group at heart and will occasionally sacrifice his or her personal interests for the benefit of the group or relationship” (Cheng, Tracy and Anderson, 2014, 167). The specific actions that indicate loyalty and willingness to sacrifice personal interest are inherently context specific. In this case, individuals signal care for the community and their “instrumental social value” by showing up to cast their ballot on Election Day.

The desire for status, or to be seen positively in the eyes of others, is widely believed to be a universal human desire (Anderson, Hildreth and Howland, 2015; Cheng, Tracy and Anderson, 2014). Being viewed positively by one’s peers is a psychological benefit in and of itself. Other benefits, such as power, wealth, and higher self-esteem also accrue to high-status individuals (Cheng, Tracy and Anderson, 2014). Higher status has also been shown to be associated with greater material resources (Willer, 2009). In India, Rao (2001) documents that families benefit from moving up the social ladder, they pay less for food, are more often invited to dine with other families and more people attend their funerals. In rural Tanzania, researchers find that high status is associated with greater access to credit and public services, while low status is associated with being uninformed and ignored (Lecoutere, D’Exelle and Van Campenhout, 2015). In many cases, these numerous status benefits may outweigh the cost of voting. While a desire for status can be a powerful motivator for some, for others it may not be enough to induce compliance with the norm.

Local communities can also use social sanctions to incentivize turnout. At a minimum, peers might look down upon or have negative attitudes toward norm defiers. At a maximum, non-compliers could be excluded from social benefits, gatherings or the local community altogether, denying them access to the community’s jointly produced goods (Hechter, 1988).

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8 For example, the Shuar people of Ecuador afford individuals higher social status the more they make helpful contributions to the community, such as, attending meetings and contributing labor to community projects (Price, 2003).
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) suggest that parents in Kenya who do not contribute to school fees might face social sanctions in the form of being excluded from ethnic networks that provide social benefits.

Under certain conditions, social sanctions will likely play a particularly important role in norm enforcement. In particular, as the proportion of group members complying with the social norm increases, the amount of esteem rewarded is said to decrease and "disesteem", or social sanctions, become more important (Brennan and Pettit, 2004, 128). In high compliance equilibria, where community-level turnout is high, I expect social sanctions from peers to be a strong motivator of turnout, compared to a desire for esteem.

**H1: A desire for status and aversion to social sanctions will motivate citizens to vote.**

A social norm dictates not only that individuals will be driven to vote out of a desire for status and aversion to sanctions, but also that other community members will enforce the norm by rewarding compliers and punishing non-compliers. Getting community members to vote means asking them to incur a personal cost for the benefit of the community. Since communities lack material inducements for citizens, they will tend to enforce social norms with the social resources at their disposal, bestowing status (i.e. esteem or respect) and social sanctions. Communities use the inducement of social approval and the threat of social sanctions to motivate adherence to the social norm of voting.

Social sanctions can be tangible or intangible. Tangible sanctions include gossiping about norm violators and ostracism (Brennan and Pettit, 2004). Intangible sanctions, such as social disapproval that occurs silently or even unconsciously, make observing the presence of...
social norms extremely difficult. Brennan and Pettit (2004) write that, “it will be sufficient for norms to exist that people manifestly approve or disapprove of relevant actions—that they manifestly form those attitudes and that their doing so causes agents to adjust their behavior accordingly” (276). In examining the existence of a social norm of voting, we can expect community members to bestow benefits and sanctions, perhaps in attitudes alone, upon individuals who comply with and deviate from the norm, respectively.

**H2:** Local community members will reward individuals who vote with status and socially sanction those who abstain.

Unlike in the case of laws, there is no central authority that determines and enforces social norms (Brennan et al., 2013). Norms are self-enforcing and do not require top-down, third-party enforcement. Regardless of how the social norm is initiated, unlike individual-level clientelism, it requires maintenance by the whole community. Social norms create horizontal accountability between individuals within the community rather than accountability to elites. A multitude of evidence exhibits that individuals are willing to incur the cost of sanctioning to punish norm defiers, even when they do not benefit individually (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In the case of social norms, sanctions need not be costly insofar as they can involve automatic attitude formation. Given these motivations for norm compliance and the enforcement mechanisms, we might wonder who is most likely to comply with a social norm of voting?

### 2.3 Individual-Level Variation: Social Dependency

In the study of democracy, who votes in elections is important for theoretical and practical reasons. On the one hand, there is evidence that the views of citizens who participate more are better represented (Gilens, 2012). Policy makers might want to know who is gaining voice in the system and who is being left behind. Practically, parties and politicians also
care about who votes in order to know where to focus different types of mobilization or persuasion strategies (Cruz, 2013; Hersh, 2015).

What explains variation in individual-level turnout within rural communities that exhibit social norms of voting? Though compliance with a social norm of voting may be high, it is never absolute and certain citizens may be more likely to adhere to the norm than others. Specifically, I argue that an individual's social dependency, reliance on other members of the community for non-material benefits, motivates turnout and compliance with the norm.

Local rural communities collectively produce many benefits, such as social ties, support networks and information. Individuals in these communities vary in how much they rely on others for such benefits. The nature of an individual's dependency on their local community is based on the exclusivity of access to these non-material benefits local communities produce and the availability of substitutes and alternatives (Hechter, 1988).11

The degree to which an individual can only obtain these non-material goods from the particular local community in which they live determines their degree of dependency on the group. This social dependency in turn influences their likelihood of complying with community norms. Hechter (1988) writes: “As exit costs approach prohibitive levels, dependence on the group increases” (46). For example, an old woman who grew up in the same village in which she currently resides with her entire family and has only rarely traveled outside of the village would experience high costs of exiting this group. For others, say a migrant worker who frequently interacts with different people, alternatives and substitutes for social connections are more readily available. The cost of exiting the community increases when an individual has no experience or social connections outside of their local community.

I propose that an individual’s motivation to comply with social norms will be a function of their social dependence on the community. Those who are more dependent on the community

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11Contrary to a local community’s economic dependency on the government, an individual’s social dependency on their community is likely to be distinct from that individual’s income level.
face a higher cost of social sanctions and will therefore be less likely to deviate from such norms.\footnote{Details on how I operationalize and measure social dependency are included in Chapter 4.}

\textbf{H3: Individuals who are more socially dependent on their local community will be more likely to vote.}

Unlike the predictions of individual-level clientelism that the poor will be the most frequently targeted and most willing to sell their vote, my theory predicts that it is not necessarily the poorest individuals but instead the more socially dependent that will be most likely to turn out. Wealthy and highly educated community members also rely on their local community for esteem and respect. As one resident of Kijima village in Mwanza, Tanzania told me, “There is no one in the community who doesn’t need the community”\footnote{Interview, Kijima, Mwanza, December 13, 2016.}

In Tanzania, villagers describe how wealthier individuals in the community are higher up on the social ladder. These individuals face the same risk of falling down rungs on the social ladder and losing respect. Even though they may have more flexibility and rely less on other community members than their poorer neighbors, wealthier community members still require cooperation from others when, for instance, their cattle are stolen or they have a problem with someone else in the community. In some (albeit fewer) ways, wealthy community members also depend on the non-material goods produced by the community.

Comparative scholars have studied dynamics related to this concept of social dependency in other contexts. For example, Wang (2008) finds in China that citizens with stronger ties to and more interest in the village are more likely to vote in elections. Kruks-Wisner (2011) finds that Indian citizens with ties that extend beyond the local community are better informed and connected to the state and its resources. These citizens may therefore rely on the community less and be able to access state benefits through alternative avenues, outside of voting in elections.
Other individual demographics might also correlate with social dependency and norm compliance. Since social norms are learned through socialization processes, older community members who have had more time to observe and absorb the norm may be more likely to comply than younger citizens. Gender differences in norm compliance might also exist.

In Tanzania, women are generally perceived as low status and are also the primary homemakers. For these reasons, women may be particularly reliant on the community. For example, a woman might rely on other community members to watch the kids if she travels, cook for her family when she is sick, offer advice on childrearing and even help during childbirth. Their dual status as central to the livelihood and care of the family but with fewer rights and lower levels of respect may render women acutely reliant on the community. As low status individuals who rely on the assistance of others in the community, women might be eager to comply with social norms to avoid further social ostracism.

2.4 Community-Level Variation: Economic Dependency

Not all local communities will equivalently foster and enforce social norms of voting. I argue that the degree to which communities maintain a reward and punishment system around voting behavior depends on the group’s level of economic dependency on the government. Scholars suggest that “norms are more likely to persist in a group to the extent that they result in the product of collective goods upon which the members of the group depend” (Brinton and Nee, 1998, 29). Local communities that have greater demand for government resources will more heavily encourage turnout to try and secure their access to state resources. By contrast, communities that are less dependent on government service provision (e.g., they can independently finance and maintain water, health, and education services or access private institutions) will be less likely to motivate political participation among their members in

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14Lecoutere, D’Exelle and Van Campenhout (2015) find in Mufindi district in Tanzania that women on average have significantly lower social status than men.
this way.\(^{15}\)

Often there are no alternatives to state-provided public services in rural areas. In some instances, substitutes exist but the cost of switching to an alternative provider are prohibitively high due to a lack of information or restricted access. It may be in the interest of ruling elites to maintain a large public sector and keep the peasantry dependent on the state, so that citizens are more responsive to state demands to secure their livelihoods Hydén (1980); Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009). For instance, (Magaloni, 2006) suggests that the PRI in Mexico “simultaneously put in place a series of policies and institutions that prevented peasants from rising out of poverty and made them systematically dependent on state patronage for their survival” (72).

Typically non-government alternatives are more expensive than state-provided services. This difference in price means that the communities that are most dependent on the government tend to also be the poorest.\(^{16}\) Economic dependency and poverty are therefore likely positively correlated at the community level.

Solidary groups are generally formed around shared interests. The greater the commonality of interest the greater the solidarity of the group (Hechter, 1988). In this case, the greater the local community’s collective economic dependency on government, the greater their common interest in securing resources through turnout. This implies that in a community with a private school where only some parents can afford to send their children, we should expect social norms of voting to be weaker for two reasons. First, the presence of private facilities reduces reliance on government services for at least a portion of community members. Second, due to the heterogeneity in reliance on government services the degree

\(^{15}\)This logic is somewhat similar to the finding by Bodea and LeBas (2016) in Nigeria that individuals who have access to community-provided goods that substitute for government-provided services are less likely to adopt pro-compliance norms towards taxation.

\(^{16}\)However, one can imagine a poor rural community that, due to the presence of a bilateral aid agency or NGO, has access to non-government-provided healthcare and education. In this instance, the community, although poor, is less dependent on the government.

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of shared interest is reduced. The greater the community’s economic dependency on the government, the greater demand among members for a social norm of voting because of their collective need for government resources. This leads to the final theoretical prediction, which is empirically tested in Chapter 5.

**H4:** Local communities that are more economically dependent on the government (have fewer non-government alternatives) will have stronger norms of voting and higher turnout in elections.

### 2.5 Scope Conditions

The theory is most likely to hold under three conditions—where elections are seen as an opportunity to access state resources, where communities heavily rely on these services and when turnout behavior is visible. Table 2.1 lists the three scope conditions, as well as likely and unlikely cases for the theory. First, the theory requires that citizens associate high turnout in elections with an increased probability of receiving government goods and services. This belief is most likely to exist in patronage regimes, where such allocation strategies occur.

**Table 2.1:** Scope conditions for the theory of social voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Why required</th>
<th>Likely cases</th>
<th>Unlikely cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-wide consensus that voting is rewarded by govt</td>
<td>Creates demand for social norm of voting</td>
<td>Patronage systems</td>
<td>Politically competitive (subnational) areas; cases where regimes use individual-level rewards or coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on state services</td>
<td>Stimulus for social norm of voting</td>
<td>States with large public sectors; poor communities</td>
<td>Subnational areas where primary service provider is non-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout visible</td>
<td>Social norm can only exist if behavior being prescribed is observable</td>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>Urban areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where governments reward high turnout areas, citizens are more likely to view elections as an opportunity to access state resources, thus building a consensus that voting is ‘good’. Where an individual’s turnout behavior has positive externalities for her neighbors, the
demand for a social norm of voting is likely to exist (Coleman, 1990). In semi-authoritarian regimes, inculcating a norm of voting is also in the interest of the ruling party and local elites. These regimes encourage turnout as a signal of support for and legitimacy of the electoral system (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). In these places vote buying and other top-down mobilization strategies may have less explanatory power with respect to the turnout puzzle than in competitive democracies (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). In these types of cases, a social norm of voting may be inculcating by ruling elites through the use of public good rewards for high turnout.

As elections become more competitive, ruling parties in dominant-party systems have to become more discerning in their resource allocation, rather than simply rewarding high turnout.\textsuperscript{17} Regardless of the actual rule governments use for resource allocation, all that is required for the theory is that citizens believe they will be rewarded if their community produces high levels of participation in elections. It may take time for citizens to update their priors about how regimes allocate resources. For regimes that are able to inculcate a civic duty norm or associate voting for a particular party as a good behavior, the social norm of voting may survive in an adapted version.\textsuperscript{18} The theory may also apply in particular areas of competitive democracies where citizens associate community-wide turnout with an increased probability of getting goods from the government (for example, in subnational units where electoral politics resemble those of single-party states). Eventually, however, we should expect the norm of voting to break down or adapt to be contingent on vote choice.

Second, since economic reliance on the government serves as the stimulus for a social norm of voting, the theory applies to countries in which the government is the primary service provider. Countries with a large public sector tend to be low economic performers and

\textsuperscript{17}Parties and candidates in competitive democracies, however, sometimes use similar strategies of rewarding high turnout areas. This can be a particularly successful strategy especially when applied to core constituencies.

\textsuperscript{18}For example, the ANC in South Africa.
often have a state-dominated economy, for example former communist or socialist countries. Although alternative (private) service providers may exist, they are not universal and only serve a minority of the population. In many developing democracies—due to socialist histories, authoritarian policies or simply lack of economic development—the state controls, owns or highly regulates the means of production. In these cases, the economy is state-dominated and there is minimal private sector presence. Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009, 412) suggest that, “Particularly when the state controls a vast public-sector and state-dependent private economy, citizens from all economic strata remain dependent on the state.” Examples of these kinds of states include Algeria, Iraq, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Although these countries receive significant amounts of foreign aid, often the majority of this aid is funneled through budgetary support. Countries in which aid flows directly to non-state actors (such as independent NGOs and IOs), who constitute a reasonable alternative to state-provided services, do not fall under this scope.\footnote{For example, Kenya.}

Third, since social norms require that the prescribed behavior is visible, turnout must be visible to ones peers. At the subnational level, rural communities are the most conducive areas for the creation of social norms of voting because turnout is highly visible. In rural communities, citizens live and vote in the same locale and sometimes there is only a single polling station in the village so everyone in the community gathers at the same spot on Election Day. In rural local communities there is frequent face-to-face interaction between members and individuals are easily recognizable. This identifiability and repeated interaction increases the ease of monitoring behavior, contributing to effective norms (Coleman, 1986).

By comparison, the density of polling stations in urban areas offers residents the opportunity to register outside their home neighborhoods, instead preferring stations near their workplace or wherever they discover a shorter line. Polling station density renders observing individual turnout behavior more challenging. Social connections within urban geographic
communities also tend to be weaker due to several factors. First, most people rent instead of own their homes and are more frequently on the move. Second, instead of strong connections with neighbors, urban citizens often favor religious, ethnic or work communities.

While this dissertation tests the theory in a dominant-party system, where the puzzle of participation is particularly acute, the theory broadly applies to other regime types. For instance, the theory is relevant to competitive democracies where citizens associate community-wide turnout with an increased probability of accessing government goods. The theory is also particularly applicable to subnational areas where electoral politics resemble those of single-party states. Eventually, in competitive democracies we should expect the norm of voting to adapt and become contingent on vote choice.\(^{20}\) I return to this idea of how a social norm of voting might begin to break down in the final chapter.

To summarize, this chapter has outlined a new theory for why poor rural citizens vote, even in elections with foregone conclusions—because local communities foster social norms of voting. In places where communities heavily rely on government services and elections are seen as a rare opportunity to influence the direction of valuable state resource flows, local communities cultivate social norms of voting to increase their chances of accessing state goods. Individuals who are socially dependent on the community (i.e., rely on community members for non-material, social goods) comply with the social norm of voting to avoid social sanctions. Rather than voting because they are paid or coerced, poor rural citizens vote to demonstrate to their local community that they care. Communities encourage turnout to signal their loyalty to the regime. The following chapter provides an overview of the political history of elections in Tanzania and describes why it is an appropriate test case for the theory.

\(^{20}\) Arguably this is similar to what exists in the US today. For example, I might not encourage or pressure a friend whom I know is a Republican to go and fulfill his civic duty and vote, but I might encourage and monitor my friends and family who are Democrats.
Chapter 3

Voting as Compliance in Tanzania

This chapter describes how a social norm of voting began in Tanzania.¹ Like many other countries on the continent, Tanzania began its post-independence political history as a single-party state, before introducing multiparty democracy in the mid-1990s, largely due to pressure from external (western) donors. This chapter discusses how Tanzanian elections should be viewed less as a mechanism for accountability, and more as a means for citizens to signal compliance with the regime by turning out. Section 3.2 describes the ruling party’s strategies for encouraging citizens to vote in elections, and proposes one rationale for doing so—to augment the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. By rewarding high turnout areas with public goods, the ruling party created the demand for a social norm of voting in local communities, because an individual’s decision to vote has positive externalities for her neighbors.² Section 3.3 explains how the ruling party secured a monopoly on state resources and how this monopoly was critical in inducing turnout, given

¹To remind the reader, social norms “have no reality other than our beliefs that others behave according to them and expect us to behave according to them” (Bicchieri, 2005, 22). A social norm of voting exists when members of a group expect others to abide by the norm (i.e., vote) and anticipate sanctions if they abstain.

²This chapter describes the state strategies that I argue led to the demand for a social norm of voting in local rural communities because citizens associate high turnout with community development. I leave the presentation of evidence that citizens associate voting in elections with helping the community gain access to state resources until Chapter 5.
rural communities' reliance on state services. Finally, in section 3.4, I defend the focus on
turnout and argue that turnout in Tanzania is poorly explained by existing theories.

3.1 Elections and Voting in Tanzania

This section examines how through single-party and multiparty elections, voting has re-
mained more of a mechanism to signal loyalty to and compliance with the state, than a
tool for citizen voice in Tanzania. Elections in Tanzania have historically been less about
government accountability than about lending legitimacy to the ruling party’s reign.

To begin, a brief political history of the country is necessary to understand the context
in which elections were instituted in newly independent Tanzania. Formerly known as Tan-
ganyika, Tanzania was a German colony from the 1880’s to 1919, when it came under British
rule until gaining independence in 1961. Unlike most of its neighbors, Tanzania’s break with
colonial authority was peaceful, largely due to major electoral victories won by the nation-
alist party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), in the pre-independence period.
After leading the country to independence, TANU simultaneously became the ruling party
and the government. To unify the newly independent nation, founding President Julius
Nyerere instituted single-party democracy to minimize ethnic and religious divisions, and
to promote peace and stability. Tanzania became a constitutionally-mandated single-party
state in 1965 (Baregu, 1994; Lofchie, 2014).

Despite introducing national multiparty elections in 1995, the same party that brought
the country independence maintains political control of the country today. Chama cha
Mapinduzi (CCM), the current ruling party, is the product of the merge between TANU and
the Zanzibar ruling party (Afro-Shirazi) in 1977. The government held six national elections
during the single-party era and has thus far had five national multiparty elections. Elections
help to enhance the regime’s legitimacy, as the following section describes.
3.1.1 Elections for legitimacy

Why would the Tanzanian leadership hold elections in a single-party state? Elections allow regimes to gather information about its popularity (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), deter opposition by forcing potential contenders to gain control of the executive by winning popular support (Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2006) and may even discourage revolution by providing citizens an outlet for their grievances (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Elections during the single-party era in Tanzania served several of these functions. They provided the pretense of popular participation to satisfy citizens and allowed the party to gather information about its supporters and dissenters. Elections were also a controlled venue in which the state could elicit citizens' preferences and give the semblance of citizen voice.

Elections can also enhance the regime's legitimacy (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). This function is significant in the case of Tanzania as well as other newly independent nations. Holding regular, non-competitive elections to augment the regime's reputation vis-a-vis its citizens is a common strategy for single-party, communist, and socialist states. For instance, in former communist regimes in Eastern Europe, elections “taught people to link regime legitimacy with the act of voting” (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 8). In the case of China, Shi (1999) argues that the role of plebiscitary elections was to “provide ritualized legitimacy for the regime” (1123). Using cross-national regressions for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Lindberg (2006) argues that elections themselves can enhance democracy and increase the legitimacy of subsequent elections.

In Tanzania, founding President Julius Nyerere emphasized the importance of elections. In his farewell speech to Parliament in 1985, Nyerere stated that voting, even a no vote against him, helped to strengthen Tanzania’s electoral system. “There have always been a few people who have exercised their democratic right and voted against my leadership; but they too have taken part in the building of our country...they used and thus consolidated the system we have established” (Nyerere, 1985). Elections in Tanzania likely enhanced the
ruling party's legitimacy both in the eyes of its citizens and the international community.

Tanzania's international reputation may have been a key driver of Nyerere's decision to hold elections immediately following independence because the Tanzanian government heavily relied on western aid at the time (Samoff, 1987).\(^3\) Despite minimal policy influence, single-party elections in Tanzania carried symbolic weight, to foster legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the international community (Liviga, 2009). As in other countries, non-competitive elections in Tanzania “served as a signal to domestic and international audiences that the regime is, or is in the process of becoming, based on popular will” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009, 406). While holding non-competitive elections granted the regime greater legitimacy—at least when compared to the alternative of not holding elections—the growing consensus in the international community in the 1990's that multiparty democracy was desirable, led international donors to advocate for increased democratic competition.

3.1.2 Top-down democratization

Due to mounting external pressure from donors, Tanzania introduced national multiparty elections in 1995.\(^4\) At the time of the introduction of multiparty elections, foreign aid comprised more than 30 percent of Tanzania's GDP (Hoffman and Robinson, 2009, 124).\(^5\) As part of the third wave of democracy, donors encouraged increased political competition in Tanzania. Norway, which at the time gave Tanzania nearly $10 million per year in aid, publicly stated that “future financial aid to Tanzania would depend on its human rights record and the introduction of multiparty democracy in the country” (Baregu, 1994, 169). President Nyerere commented that “one of the criteria for a nation being classified as among

\(^3\)The following section describes how, after independence, Tanzania came to heavily rely on external aid (Ewald, 2013; Shivji, 1976).

\(^4\)Multipartism was introduced with a 1992 constitutional reform. Tanzania held its first multiparty elections during Parliamentary by-elections in 1993 and 1994 due to the unexpected death of several members of Parliament.

\(^5\)The country's reliance on international donors is a recurring theme throughout Tanzania's history and a subject Section 3.3 discusses in depth.
the world’s 'deserving poor' came to be having 'good governance' as defined by the donor community...And in practice that phrase meant and means those countries having multi-party systems of democracy" (Nyerere, 1998). With such a large proportion of the state’s finances coming from donors, Tanzania was forced to introduce multiparty elections to remain competitive in the battle over scarce development resources.

Tanzania is a good example of what Levitsky and Way (2010) categorize as a high “leverage” state. Due to the country’s reliance on the West to fund a large portion of its budget, the Tanzanian government faced strong democratizing pressure during the era of conditional aid. Though the pressure to democratize was significant, a lack of “linkage” to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2010)—few economic, political and social ties—and the party’s strong organizational power, allowed CCM to maintain control even after the introduction of multiparty democracy. The “top-down” democratic transition in Tanzania (Hyden, 1999) allowed the ruling party to broaden electoral competition, while establishing “the primacy of democratic legitimation” (Schedler, 2006, 13).

The citizenry in Tanzania initially opposed multiparty democracy. Whitehead (2012) reports that “...a 1990 survey found that only 15% of the electorate favoured multiparty politics, while 69% favoured single-party rule. A year later, a government commission found that 77% of citizens surveyed were supportive of the continuation of one-party rule” (1090). This lack of enthusiasm was likely due in part to the popularity of the ruling party (and the lackluster support for nascent opposition parties), but also because citizens believed that national unity and peace relied on the single party system (Whitehead, 2012).

Citizens’ lack of support for multiparty democracy suggests that elections were not viewed as an avenue for preference articulation. If citizens saw elections in this light, they arguably would have welcomed growing competition as a greater opportunity for representation. The following section further articulates how turnout was a symbol of compliance with the regime, rather than an articulation of citizen preferences.
3.1.3 Turnout as compliance

Elections in Tanzania have been less a mechanism for government accountability or citizen voice, and more a tool of state control. The regime held elections and later allowed for multiparty competition because of international pressure to enhance its reputation at home and abroad. It also encouraged citizens to vote, to lend greater authority to these sometimes ritualistic elections. Thus, turnout became a signal of citizens’ willingness to comply with the regime’s goal of using elections as a legitimacy-enhancing tool.

Despite limited choice in single-party elections, citizens participated. During the single-party era, parliamentary elections involved choosing between two CCM-selected candidates (Samoff, 1987). When voting in Presidential elections, citizens would show up on Election Day to either vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for a single, party-chosen, candidate. In these elections, “The democratic character of the elections lay in popular participation, not in choices among alternative policies, or even significantly among alternative elites” (Samoff, 1987, 165).

In this context, Tanzanian citizens were also able to signal their dissatisfaction with the regime through abstention. Scholars have similarly found abstention to be a form of political protest in other countries. Banerjee (2015) finds that citizens in India use abstention as a political statement to demonstrate their anger with a party. In cases like Tanzania, where the regime encourages participation even in non-competitive elections, abstaining can be risky. For example, Shi (1999) suggests that “only those with a strong desire to express their discontent or challenge the legitimacy of the regime abstained from voting” in plebiscitary elections in China (1116). Abstaining in non- and semi-competitive electoral contexts serves as a sign of ‘no confidence’ and signals disillusionment with the regime and entire electoral

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6In the six single-party Presidential elections held from 1965-1990, average turnout was 78.7% of registered voters (Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut, 1999).

7In the 1965 elections, President Nyerere received 2.5 million ‘yes’ votes and 92,000 ‘no’ votes (Milnor, 1969, 160). Turnout as a percentage of registered voters was 83% (Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut, 1999).

8The following section explains why citizens would want to comply with the states desire to have mass participation in elections because they perceived the ability to enhance their community’s wellbeing through turning out in elections.

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Abstention and low turnout similarly jeopardized the Tanzanian government's reputation. Of particular concern was Tanzania's international reputation because of its aid dependency. "Election observers interpreted low turnout and 'no votes for presidential candidates as resistance to leadership action" (McHenry, 1994, p65-66). Tanzanian leadership relied on citizen participation in elections to achieve their goal of using elections to enhance their legitimacy. Voting and abstaining behavior are of particular interest in this study for several reasons outlined below.

3.1.4 Why turnout

This study focuses on turnout and leaves aside other forms of political participation in part because Tanzanian citizens infrequently participate in other (non-electoral) forms of political engagement. Figure 3.1 uses data from Afrobarometer (2016) to show that a majority of citizens engage in political activities that align with the regime's interests—mainly, voting and attending campaign rallies. A small minority of citizens participate in other, more contentious, forms of politics, such as contacting officials or protesting. Other scholars have similarly noted this pattern of engagement and suggest that compared to other African countries, Tanzanians are less active in 'self-mobilized' activities (Chaligha, 2002). These behavioral patterns makes sense because the activities that the regime actively encourages citizens to engage in are those that promote its own goals. Activities left for citizens to self-mobilize are often discouraged, or actively prevented, by the regime.

Interviews with Tanzanian citizens corroborate these nationally representative data. The weight that elections hold in Tanzanian society becomes clear when you ask people about the ways in which they are able to hold their leaders accountable. When asked about how they speak to the government and hold their leaders to account, citizens resoundingly focus on voting in elections. Respondents are at a loss when you press for any ways outside of
elections that citizens can hold leaders accountable. Some citizens feel powerless to even question their political representatives because “most villagers undervalue themselves” and do not believe that they are educated enough, compared to their leaders, to remove them from power.\(^9\) Citizens observe opposition leaders being harassed, arrested or even beaten for questioning the government and, unsurprisingly, think to themselves, how can I get the government to listen?\(^10\) Instead, citizens hope for the best outside of elections and wait to try and sanction leaders who do not deliver development at the polls in the next election.

The lack of citizen engagement outside of elections is further unsurprising given Tanzania’s political history. Since its rise to power, the ruling party in Tanzania has strongly encouraged some forms of political participation (voting), while discouraging and even prohibiting others. The ruling party “closely monitored and circumscribed” all public participation (Dill, 2013, 103). In particular, claim-making behaviors, such as demonstrations, protests, and public dissent, were limited. Although citizens were encouraged to attend public meetings, their active participation was limited as these were opportunities for state information dis-

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\(^9\)Interview, Mwasubi, Mwanza, December 10, 2016.
\(^10\)Interview, Dar es Salaam, February 28, 2015.
semination rather than citizen voice. If citizens began asking too many questions in these meetings, officials would threateningly ask if they were opposing TANU. Out of fear of being jailed by security forces, citizens would remain quiet (Fortmann, 1980). These meetings did not facilitate feedback “any more than did the public barazas [meetings] of the colonial era” (Maguire, 1969, 366).

In the early post-independence period, not only were individual citizens limited in their interactions with the state, but so too were NGOs. Common to many dominant-party states, a restricted civic space and limited room for civil society to operate exists in Tanzania. In Tanzania, NGO’s and CBO’s tend to complement the state’s development efforts, rather than criticize them, and have proved less willing and able to influence political culture in Tanzania (Dill, 2013; Shivji, 2004). Although Nyerere wanted communities to create self-help groups to provide their own services, he preferred that these services be channeled through state institutions. “Rather than bring about a significant increase in the participation of ordinary citizens in state institutions, the prevailing feature of Tanzanian politics was, by the late 1970’s, a culture of centralized control and conflict avoidance” (Dill, 2013, 106).

Many forms of political engagement and participation have been discouraged for decades and remain so today. It is therefore unsurprising that citizens view voting as the primary way to interact with the state.

Citizens’ lack of claim-making may be a deliberate strategy to avoid becoming dependent on the state. Hyden (1980) notes that peasants in Tanzania have a strategic interest in remaining quiet, “because the peasants do not want to initiate demands, which later can be held against them and lead to their subjugation” (139). Exit is a more popular form of resistance, or foot dragging, rather than voice in Tanzania. For this reason, government accountability remains weak and “citizens at the grassroots are still structurally and polit-

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11 There were reported incidents of citizens speaking rudely to a WEO who had them arrested (Mihyo, 2003, 83).
ically disempowered to hold their village government accountable” (Kabyemela, 2017, 54). Nonetheless, turnout in elections in Tanzania is high.

This section has articulated the Tanzanian government’s rationale for instituting single-party elections and the external forces that motivated a top-down transition to multiparty democracy. When citizens vote in elections they are contributing to the state’s goal of achieving high turnout. Rather than exercising the right to vote, abstention is the loudest form of voice and dissent that citizens use. With an understanding of why the regime sought, and still seeks, high turnout, the following section considers how the regime encourages citizens to vote. I describe how the regime uses material rewards to achieve high turnout in elections and stimulates a social norm of voting in the process.

### 3.2 Encouraging Turnout

As the previous section explained, holding elections was a tool to enhance the regime’s democratic reputation and legitimacy. Not only is holding elections important for the ruling party’s legitimacy, but high turnout in those elections is also critical. The legitimacy of a regime is much less likely to be called into question by international observers when it wins an election in which 70 percent of the voting-age population participated, compared to an election where only 30 percent voted. In Tanzania, TANU encouraged turnout even in non-competitive elections where representatives ran unopposed. Today, CCM still tries to maximize participation. As in many other dominant-party systems, CCM uses high turnout and large vote margins to signal its popularity, both domestically and abroad.

The ruling party uses three main strategies to mobilize citizens to vote. First, the party relies on mass organizations to reach the far corners of the country. Since the post-independence period, the party has organized, financed and coopted mass organizations—

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12 Author’s interview with the former Speaker of the National Assembly and former Vice Chairman of CCM, Pius Msekiwa, Dar es Salaam, January 28, 2017.
such as those for youth and women—to disseminate party propaganda and encourage turnout. Second, the party capitalizes on its access to state resources and selectively rewards areas with public goods to motivate turnout. Third, the party employs intermediaries to encourage citizen participation in elections. It is mainly through the second and third strategies—selective allocation of rewards through intermediaries—that the ruling party helped to inculcate and continues to nurture a social norm of voting.

By rewarding loyal areas with government goods and services, the party stimulated citizens’ belief that high turnout is rewarded. In local communities, high turnout is therefore perceived as “good” because it can help the community access greater resources.13 Through voting, local community members can demonstrate that they care for the community and are willing to incur an individual cost to try and help it develop. These incentives operate regardless of whether the ruling party intended to inculcate a norm of voting. Creating a norm is in the party’s strategic interest because in the presence of a social norm, monitoring and enforcement is decentralized. Decentralized norm enforcement means that the party need not solely rely on its agents and intermediaries to monitor and enforce compliance. Rather, the state more efficiently achieves compliance through peer encouragement, monitoring and sanctioning.

Though I do not have direct evidence that the party intended to create a social norm of voting, the social norms literature proposes that governments can foster norm creation. For instance, “when guilt and shame are the sanctions, the government can help to instill these in children and adults alike” (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999, 381). The Tanzanian government likely helped nurture a norm through state-led civics education curriculum (Whitehead, 2012). Samoff (1987) writes how, “Politicians expect the schools to reinforce legitimacy both through the expansion of schools themselves and through political education within

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13 Chapter 5 presents evidence that citizens have this association between voting and receiving government services.
Regardless of the party’s intent, I argue that its strategy of rewarding public goods to loyal communities stimulated a social norm of voting, which operates in tandem with its goal of achieving high turnout in elections.

There is evidence from the early post-independence period of the existence of social institutions that encouraged citizen engagement in party-sponsored activities. Citizens often took it upon themselves to enforce party loyalty. During public TANU meetings there was sometimes “customary derisive denunciation...of any persons who opposed or even failed to become members and actively support TANU” (Maguire, 1969, 369). “TANU was held in such high regard that anyone who then opposed TANU was likely to be regarded as a laughing stock, or ostracized and even fined by the community for not attending TANU meetings” (Maguire, 1969, 367). These kinds of tactics are intelligent ways for the government to propagate the idea that voting is good and a good citizen should vote in elections, without solely relying on message delivery from party agents. The party also made use of a network of mass organizations to promote its image and popularity.

3.2.1 Organizations for mass mobilization

Mass organizations have historically played a critical role in the ruling party’s extensive reach down to the most local and rural areas of the country. During the fight for independence, TANU elicited the help of organizations for youth, ethnic groups, elders, and women. By publicly serving the fight for independence, members of these organizations earned status and prestige from their peers (Maguire, 1969, 318). After independence, any and all centralized organizations were brought under TANU control and became mass organizations of the party (Makulilo, 2016). TANU established party-affiliated unions, in addition to youth, women’s and parent’s associations (Morse, 2014; Mmuya, 1998). Many of these organizations received funding from the party (Mmuya, 1998). When these groups gathered in shops, bicycle repair stands, and restaurants, the party would it as an opportunity to gather information and
to disseminate party propaganda (Mmuya, 1998, 164). CCM reached remote corners of the country using the women and youth leagues, in particular.

CCM has continued to use mass organizations to encourage participation in elections at the local level. Ahead of the first multiparty elections in 1995, CCM created the Committee for Mass Mobilization (Mmuya, 1998). CCM also uses these groups to connect to well respected local, informal, and religious leaders to garner support (Mmuya, 1998). In addition to using organizations for mass mobilization, the ruling party also strategically allocates public goods to encourage turnout.

### 3.2.2 Material group rewards

Often referred to as “pork”, targeting state resources to communities with high turnout allows ruling parties to create a market in which communities compete to demonstrate their support and loyalty to the regime (Smith and Bueno de Mesquita, 2012). Similar allocations of state resources to loyal and engaged communities have also been documented in Japan (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) and Malaysia (Pepinsky, 2007), among others. Some scholars posit that the survival of dominant parties depends upon their ability to “politicize public resources” (Greene, 2010).

In dominant-party states the regime often has unfettered control of state resources. Shivji (1991) refers to the Tanzanian regime as a “state-party” system because of the blurred line between the party and the state. The obscured boundary between these two entities allows the party to enjoy unrestricted access to state resources. The party’s monopoly of national resources allows it to “purchase societal support” at election time (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994, 21). During the single-party era, part of TANU’s attraction lay in its “control of public resource allocation” (Hyden, 2005, 12).

Continued control over the selective allocation of public resources allows CCM to maintain its electoral dominance. In her study of government allocation of water points in Tanzania,
Carlitz (2016) finds that wards that demonstrate higher turnout in elections receive more water points. She argues that CCM rewards areas with higher CCM vote share and higher turnout with more water points in order to encourage continued support and high turnout, to enhance the legitimacy of elections.

Other research provides additional evidence that the Tanzanian government rewards loyal areas with more resources. One study finds that wards with higher turnout receive more welfare allocations per capita through the Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) (Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013). Weinstein (2011) also shows that the Tanzanian government allocated more federal grants to their most loyal districts in the early 2000's. Rather than targeting 'swing' areas, the party allocates resources to the most loyal areas—encouraging turnout as well as political support.

Rewarding areas that comply with the regime's quest of high turnout is a logical strategy for dominant parties to employ. CCM can easily and consistently outbid disorganized and resource-constrained opposition parties for citizens' electoral support. Public goods at the disposal of the ruling party include health, education, and water infrastructure projects. The ruling party has a clear advantage in the area of material resources. Thus, it is strategic for the ruling party to compete with the opposition for voters' support on this dimension rather than ideology or policy. By offering group-level rewards, the party can stimulate competition between communities to prove that they are the most supportive and loyal group by voting in elections (Smith and Bueno de Mesquita, 2012). To carryout this prize allocation strategy and monitor community-level support, the state relies on a large network of intermediaries.

### 3.2.3 State-party intermediaries

The party takes advantage of a large network of intermediaries, that stretches down to the village level, to encourage participation in elections. After independence, the government set to work almost immediately to infiltrate the most local levels of associational life with
political agents to maintain social control and promote TANU policies. Adopting a system used in Imperial China, the party leadership divided households across the country into units called ‘cells’ consisting of ten households each (Ingle, 1972). By 1987, there were over 200,000 cells across the country (Tsubura, 2014). Each cell had a single leader, a balozi, or ‘ten-cell leader’, who was elected by the other ten household members to this voluntary position.\textsuperscript{14} Balozi encouraged participation among citizens, such as attending rallies and contributing to community improvement projects (e.g. building wells and roads) (O’Barr, 1972).

Balozi were also charged with registering voters and encouraging turnout (Morse, 2014). As embedded community members, balozi had intimate knowledge of their households and could monitoring participation (Morse, 2018). The balozi had sanctioning power and would fine members who refused to participate in self-help schemes (O’Barr, 1972). Balozi also acted as gatekeepers for the party. One Tanzanian political scientist reflected, “The ruling party was the way of life. You cannot get services if you don’t carry a party card. You cannot enroll in higher learning institutions unless you have a party card. In this system, the authorities were able to cross check. The ten cell leadership [balozi] was very strong then.”\textsuperscript{15}

Though balozi are still present, they lost much of their strength after the introduction of multiparty democracy. Today, the balozi’s role as party intermediary is now largely filled by state bureaucrats (Makulilo, 2016). It is not uncommon to find a balozi representing an opposition party and presiding over more than ten households. The primary function of the balozi nowadays is conflict resolution, related to land or domestic disputes. While still present, balozi are no longer officially recognized even by the village-level government.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}The plural of balozi, in kiswahili, is mabalozi but I use the term “balozi” to connote both the singular and plural for the reader’s convenience and ease of interpretation.

\textsuperscript{15}Interview, Dar es Salaam, February 3, 2017.

\textsuperscript{16}Many village chairmen and village executive officers would initially tell me and my research team that their village did not have any balozi. It was only through speaking with citizens that we came to identify balozi.
Though balozi's power may be circumscribed, they are still viewed by citizens as agents of the ruling party. For example, Croke (2016) finds that citizens are much less likely to admit that they support opposition parties when answering in the presence of a balozi.

Today, CCM relies less on balozi and draws on other government and party affiliates. The assistant to a high-ranking CCM party member told me, “Nowadays, we stopped depending on the balozi. Now we go to VEO [village executive officer] for that information and send teams out there.” Branch party workers also support the party’s electoral efforts. These workers are acutely aware that their future in the party is determined by how successful they are at encouraging high turnout and achieving large vote margins for the party. CCM has aligned incentives for these workers who are responsible for bringing citizens to rallies and securing their political support (Hoffman and Robinson, 2009, 131).

The party also relies on a cadre of local bureaucrats and government officials to actively encourage citizen participation in elections. Similar to other patronage regimes, Tanzanian government officials have significant discretion over the allocation of government resources. These agents face strong incentives to increase turnout and secure the electoral success of the ruling party, their employer. Like other semi-authoritarian regimes, CCM incentivizes office seekers to mobilize voters by rewarding party loyalty with resources (Lust-Okar, 2006; Geddes, 2005).

Multiple pieces of evidence suggest that state bureaucrats are incentivized to mobilize citizens during elections. A former Kigoma Regional Commissioner purportedly held several meetings with ward executive officers (WEO’s) urging them to mobilize citizens to register and vote for the party ‘which would guarantee them retention of their posts’ (TEMCO, 1997; Sulley, 2012; Makulilo, 2012). Similarly, before the 2005 general elections, district commissioners, regional commissioners, and WEOs in multiple regions across the country apparently warned citizens that if they attended opposition rallies the government “would

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stop development projects in their respective areas” (Sulley, 2012, 11000). One member of a CCM campaign team in Mbeya referred to the WEOs at the meeting as the “source of CCM’s victory” (Sulley, 2012). Evidently, CCM enjoys the use of state personnel to ensure its electoral success.

State bureaucrats are motivated to support the ruling party’s endeavors and to prolong its tenure, in order to secure their own employment. The professional trajectory of village-level civil servants depends on the continued electoral victory of the ruling party. Making civil servants acutely aware that their job security is closely tied to the regime’s success is a persuasive way to encourage compliance. Authority within the Tanzanian government is structured such that CCM has power over bureaucrats’ employment and geographic assignment. Both village and ward executive officers (referred to as “VEO” and “WEO”, respectively) are appointed by CCM-controlled councils. Their boss, the district executive director (DED), is directly appointed by the President, as is the District Commissioner (DC) and Regional Commissioner (RC) (Makulilo, 2012). Although they are expected to be impartial public servants, these bureaucrats “mobilize voters on behalf of the ruling party and in many different ways facilitate campaigns of candidates of the ruling party using state resources (vehicles, security personnel, etc.)” (Makulilo, 2016, 187). By offering material rewards to loyal supporters and devoted intermediaries working for the party since independence, the regime established social institutions to support the ruling party’s incumbency.

This section has described the main strategies the ruling party uses to encourage citizens to cast their ballots on Election Day. Dating back to the post-independence period, the use of material resources has been integral to the ruling party’s electoral success. The promise of public goods rewards made by politicians and local intermediaries for communities that demonstrate loyalty to the regime in the election is an integral piece of the emergence of a social norm of voting in rural Tanzania. The following section explains how the party came to monopolize state resources that it uses to reward loyal areas, and how local communities
came to rely on public goods from the state.

3.3 Dependency in Tanzania

This section explains how the state accumulated the resources that have been and continue to be integral to its strategy of rewarding supporters to encourage turnout. It also explains the process through which local communities became dependent on the state for public service provision. Explication of Tanzania’s reliance on foreign aid further elucidates why its international reputation has been a top priority for the ruling party. The following sections describe how the ruling party amassed material resources that it strategically allocates to communities to encourage turnout and why local communities remain dependent on the state for basic services.

To provide the newly independent nation with a unifying ideology, Nyerere experimented with socialism and a villagization process known as *ujamaa*. TANU used the same strategy of promising public goods to incentivize citizens to move to formal villages under the villagization policy. Government officials claimed that social services were more easily delivered to organized villages. While visiting a community, the Minister of Water Development and Power told citizens that the government “was in a better position to give them clean water if they lived together in Ujamaa villages” (McHenry, 1979, 128). Land was also made available to established *ujamaa* villages in Moshi district.

In addition to creating villages and encouraging cooperative farming, Nyerere also nationalized all of the country’s land and major industries with the hope of stimulating economic development and equal growth (Hydén, 1980). The state owned all natural resources in the country until the 1990’s. Hydén (1980) notes that, “after 1967 the public sector took the place of the private sector as the principal vehicle of modern development” (156). In contrast to other middle-income socialist states, for example in Eastern Europe, Tanzania did not
have ample development resources to service the entire country. For this reason and due to variation in the presence of alternative service providers, such as NGOs and faith-based organizations, there is geographic variation in community reliance on the state. Nyerere’s, largely unsuccessful, *ujamaa* policies had two main effects: first, communities became heavily dependent on the government for basic services, with few private alternatives, and second, the country became reliant on foreign aid.

### 3.3.1 Reliance on state services

In the post-independence period, the government introduced policies that gave it a monopoly on public service provision, which it has used to its political advantage. Under the pretense of directing more attention to care rather than profits, the government banned private health practices and private education institutions (McHenry, 1994, 83).\(^\text{18}\) Local self-help groups that had previously provided services that state governments were unable, or unwilling, to provide were also banned as the newly independent government sought to gain legitimacy by providing these services (Dill, 2013). Similarly, chiefs were removed from power to remove any “impediment to ruling party’s monopoly of political life” (Dill, 2013, 8).\(^\text{19}\) The ruling party sought to make the peasantry dependent on the state, to tighten its control.

It was not until a decade later that the government permitted private institutions. Private schools were reinstated in the mid 1980’s, when pressure from frustrated citizens mounted because there were not enough secondary schools to educate their children (Samoff, 1987).\(^\text{20}\) Although not funded by the central government, private education and health institutions are still heavily regulated by the state.

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\(^\text{18}\) Before nationalization, the majority of schools belonged to either the government, the church or the Tanzania Parents Association (TAPA). Some were also run by private or Muslim organizations, such as Aga Khan (Sitari, 1983).

\(^\text{19}\) The government also banned ethnic associations, labor unions, private capitalist agriculture, cooperatives and it co-opted religious organizations.

\(^\text{20}\) The government still owned the sole company that was permitted to supply education materials to schools (McHenry, 1994, 87).
Limiting private service provision has had a lasting impact on Tanzania. Today 94.5% of primary schools and 72.5% of health facilities in the country are owned by the government.\textsuperscript{21} The state monopoly on development in the post-independence period makes it unsurprising that alternatives to government service provision, such as private companies, NGO or faith-based providers, are rare in Tanzania today.

\subsection*{3.3.2 Reliance on foreign aid}

In order to provide basic services, the Tanzanian government has come to rely heavily on foreign aid. These funds are mostly channeled through budgetary support. After abolishing the once thriving self-help groups, voluntary associations and private institutions, the responsibility of service provision fell solely on the government. The newly independent government was adept at acquiring external resources to support the extension of state services. Beginning in 1977, and over the next three years, Tanzania received $448 million in overseas development assistance, the highest in Africa during this period (Dill, 2013). In the second half of 1970's, Tanzania was one of the most aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Lofchie, 2014, 105). The presence of external funding led to reduced demand for non-state service provision. As Dill (2013) notes, “Tanzania's bloated public sector came at the expense of the private and voluntary sectors, which rapidly declined during the first decades of independence” (69).

The fact that much of Tanzania's aid is funneled through budgetary support means that alternative service providers remain rare. For instance, rather than USAID setting up its own clinics, it provides the government with budgetary resources to improve health services. Tanzania receives nearly $3 billion annually in foreign direct assistance (FDA), which amounts to almost 13% of the country's gross national income. Until 2006, 45% of the state's budget was financed by aid (Ewald, 2013, 121). Tanzania is the world's third largest recipient of

\textsuperscript{21}Tanzania open government data (measured in 2015). \url{http://opendata.go.tz/dataset}. 

67
non-military development assistance, behind Iraq and Afghanistan (Lofchie, 2014, 199).

Tanzania’s continued reliance on foreign aid has perhaps dampened the leadership’s motivation to nurture entrepreneurship and development in the country. Thus, a thriving private sector has not yet been established. In the decades after independence the entire country was heavily dependent on international actors for financial support and so too were subnational units economically dependent on the center for survival. As a result of many of the policies implemented immediately following independence Tanzania created a multi-layered trap of dependency. The government relied on foreign funds and communities were economically dependent on the government for financial support and services.

3.3.3 Reliance on the center

Local governments in Tanzania rely on the central government for the vast majority of their budget. Most planning and budgeting decisions take place at the district level. Tanzania introduced local government reforms in 1996, aimed at increasing decentralization and devolution. Rather than increase the autonomy of the districts, these reforms amplified their reliance on financial transfers from the center (Pallotti, 2017, 555). Districts in Tanzania receive transfers from the Ministry of Finance, as well as bloc grants from line ministries directly to their health and education departments (Harrison, 2008, 175). Transfers make up about 85% of local government spending (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). While local governments may have minimal influence over their budgets, they do have discretion over the geographic targeting of those resources. In Tanzania, “rural communities are integrated into national society as dependents on the largesse of the centre and on the whims of wafadhili (donors)” (Green, 2014, 100-102).22 Having detailed the multi-layered web of dependency in Tanzania, the following section justifies why Tanzania serves as a good case for testing the

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22 The concluding chapter considers what the deterioration of state resources, for example in the presence of economic crisis, might mean for support for the system, the social norm of voting and turnout.
theory.

3.4 Why Study Turnout in Tanzania

Tanzania is an appropriate country to study citizens’ social motivations for participating in elections for several reasons. First, Tanzania is broadly representative of other electoral autocracies in Africa and across the developing world. Despite its somewhat unique experiment with socialism, many aspects of the Tanzanian case are present in other dominant-and single-party contexts. In particular, a ruling party seeking to unite a country post-independence, and wanting to garner electoral support to signal the regime’s legitimacy and maintain a guise of democracy were common challenges to regimes in the region.

The ruling party’s control over state resources is also common in other countries where “ruling elites exploit their control over state resources to stay in power. Particularly when the state controls a vast public-sector and state-dependent private economy, citizens from all economic strata remain dependent on the state” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009, 412). Zambia, Senegal, Mali all experimented with nationalizing industries and single-party rule. Though the explicit prohibition of private providers is unique to socialist and communist regimes, the party’s use of state rewards occurs in many electoral-authoritarian systems.

Second, there is within-country variation in how much Tanzanian communities rely on the state for public services. Private service providers are no longer outlawed, but are mainly concentrated in urban areas due to demand. In addition to important variation in my independent variable of interest, economic dependency, the high turnout that Tanzania has experienced since independence—despite low levels of competition and high poverty—makes it a particularly compelling puzzle. Especially given the fact that the poor turn out at higher rates than the rich.

Several other countries in Africa also experimented with socialism or communism, such as Mali, Senegal, Zambia and Ethiopia.
Third, Tanzania presents a good opportunity to test my theory of social voting because 68% of the population lives in rural areas. It is in the rural areas, where turnout is particularly visible, that a social norm likely provides strong motivation for citizens to vote. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order for a norm to exist the target action must be visible so that it can be monitored by one’s peers. While the ballot is secret, turnout in rural Tanzania is visible.\textsuperscript{24}

Finally, Tanzania is a puzzle because the high turnout that the regime has enjoyed since independence (on average, 78%\textsuperscript{25} in single-party elections and 69%\textsuperscript{26} in multiparty elections) is not well-explained by existing theories. Ethnicity is not particularly salient in Tanzania, for instance in relation to neighboring Kenya. Similarly, coercion and clientelism seem to be less prevalent in Tanzania, compared to other electoral-authoritarian regimes. The next section describes where existing theories fall short in explaining the high electoral turnout that Tanzania that experiences.

### 3.4.1 Possible Alternative Explanations to High Turnout

The final section of this chapter evaluates the two most common explanations for why poor, rural citizens cast their ballots on Election Day in dominant-party systems—either because they are forced or because they are bought. Below, I describe why coercion and clientelism do not fully explain high turnout in Tanzania. I also discuss two additional alternative arguments. The first is nationalism, which is often cited with particular reference to Tanzania. The second is political competition.

\textsuperscript{24}Refer back to Chapter 2 for an explanation of how turnout is visible in Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{25}\texttt{http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html}

\textsuperscript{26}\texttt{https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/291/40}
Coercion

Coercion is an often cited mechanism to explain how semi-authoritarian states exert control over the populace. Recently, Tanzania has become increasingly authoritarian.\textsuperscript{27} The focus of state power, however, has largely been targeted towards journalists, opposition parties and elites, rather than citizens. Existing research suggests that the ruling party in Tanzania does not rely on coercion to mobilize electoral participation. Scholars note the puzzle that Tanzania presents, given the endurance of the ruling party in the face of low levels of overt force during elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Whitehead, 2012; Morse, 2018) Analyzing human rights reports and survey data, Whitehead (2012) finds that CCM does not heavily rely on overt repression, coercion or manipulation of elections to maintain electoral support (1087). Comparing the cases of Tanzania and Cameroon, Morse (2018) argues that the latter has survived on the regime’s ability to leverage the state’s coercive capabilities, while CCM in Tanzania has not needed to rely on such tactics.

In Tanzania, the state’s coercive capacity is generally targeted toward elites. Opposition candidates are frequently barred from holding campaign rallies, are sometimes jailed and even shot.\textsuperscript{28} There have also been stipulations that the ruling party rigged election rosters and stuffed ballot boxes during the 2015 election in Zanzibar.\textsuperscript{29} However, “...Overt repression does not constitute the fundamental basis for the CCMs strong tenure on the Mainland at least” (Whitehead, 2012, 1103). CCM has maintained popular support through other means.

The fact that electoral turnout remains high even in the absence of state force, means that other explanations are required to understand the Tanzanian case. CCM’s legacy as the party of independence has likely supported its reign. Voter hesitation to back opposition

\textsuperscript{28}https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Tanzania-Tundu-Lissu-attack-assassination-attempt/1056-4252528-ufaa0a/index.html
\textsuperscript{29}https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-election/tanzania-opposition-calls-for-vote-recount-zanzibar-poll-nullified-idUSKCN0SM17320151028
parties out of fear that the country will descend into violence if an opposition candidate gains control of the executive also contributes to turnout and party loyalty. My theory of voting provides an alternative rationale for CCM’s endurance and electoral participation among the citizenry despite lower levels of coercion.

My theory accounts for why the state need not rely on coercive methods to encourage turnout. A social norm of voting that is locally enforced creates strong incentives for individuals to turn out, minimizing the need for the state to divert scarce resources to coercive tactics. It makes sense that the government would choose to use positive inducements, material carrots, to encourage citizen participation in elections, rather than coercive sticks.

The use of outright force to get voters to the polls is a risky strategy for any regime seeking to use elections to enhance its international reputation. This is particularly true since elections are times of intense international scrutiny. Using overt force might jeopardize donor funding on which the Tanzanian government relies. In contrast, neighboring countries that do not rely on aid—perhaps due to the abundance of natural resources—or cannot mobilize turnout with positive inducements, might favor coercive strategies. Another commonly articulated hypothesis for why poor rural voters cast their ballots in non-competitive elections is because they are given material goods prior to the election in exchange for their promised vote.

**Clientelism**

Clientelism—the exchange of cash or in-kind gifts to a voter prior to the election for her promised vote—is likely a universal phenomenon. I believe that the comparative literature has overstated the influence of such exchanges on citizens’, especially the poor’s, electoral behavior. Clientelism is likely less pervasive in Tanzania compared to places where different political parties have controlled, and benefited from, the national coffers. Opposition parties

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30This sentiment is something that the ruling party has propagated through the media and something that several, mostly older, interviewees expressed.
in Tanzania “have very limited resource bases, in terms of personnel, organizational and financial resources” (Ewald, 2013, 295). Such resource-poor opposition parties may weaken the market for votes. Tanzania also lacks high value rents from natural resources and its lower economic growth, mostly from small-holder production, make it unlikely that even the ruling party has much expendable resources with which to dole out rents (Whitehead, 2012, 1094).

![Figure 3.2: Clientelism in Tanzania and its East African neighbors (Round 5 Afrobarometer)](image)

Individual-level clientelism, specifically vote buying, seems to be a weak predictor of turnout in Tanzania. Survey evidence suggests that Tanzanians experience fewer offers of cash or in-kind gifts in exchange for their electoral support, compared to their neighbors (see Figure 3.2). On average, about 13% of Tanzanians report being offered a gift, compared to 33% of Kenyans and 41% of Ugandans.\(^{31}\) Obviously, survey data are problematic because social desirability bias makes it impossible to observe true levels of vote buying. It may be that reporting bias is stronger in Tanzania and produces lower levels of reporting. Offering gifts to voters, known as *takrima* in kiswahili, was legal in Tanzania between 2000 and

\(^{31}\)Round 5 Afrobarometer survey.
2006 (Ewald, 2013). During this time, when there should be lower levels of social desirability bias, a higher proportion of Tanzanians still reported never being offered a gift compared to Kenyans and Ugandans.

Although it is impossible to definitely prove that clientelism is not a strong motivator of turnout in Tanzania, it likely does not explain all of the variation in turnout—both at the community and individual levels. As previously discussed, when the ruling party can monitor turnout and vote choice at the group level (e.g., polling station or village), it is more efficient to use the promise of public goods to mobilize group-level participation compared to individual gifts.

The challenges of collecting reliable data on the presence of vote buying and clientelism make it onerous for researchers to back claims of its influence, or lack thereof, on turnout. Again using Afrobarometer survey data on whether respondents report that they were offered a gift prior to the election, I analyze the relationship between self-reported vote buying and actual turnout for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 3.3 shows the correlation between self-reported incidents of vote buying from the round 5 Afrobarometer survey and real turnout in the subsequent election for the 34 African countries in the sample. There is a weak positive relationship between vote buying and turnout in competitive democracies, on the left panel. For dominant-party regimes, on the right, there is no correlation between these two variables (keeping in mind the caveat of self-reported vote buying). Also noteworthy is the fact that Tanzania falls above the regression line—it experiences higher turnout than is predicted by levels of vote buying alone.

Having pointed out why coercion and clientelism may not be particularly compelling explanatory variables in the Tanzanian case, I now turn to the idea that nationalism produces high turnout in Tanzanian elections.
Figure 3.3: Reported vote buying experience and actual turnout in sub-Saharan Africa  
Note: This figure uses Round 5 Afrobarometer data because Round 6 did not ask about receipt of gifts before the election. Although the question asks about prior vote buying experiences in the last election, here I use real turnout figures from the next election (post-survey) to avoid any issues with prior turnout behavior instead influencing response to the question about receiving a gift. This relies on the assumption that vote buying levels are relatively constant across election years, which may not be valid, but I make this assumption for the sake of this illustrative purpose. When I instead use turnout figures from the most recent election prior to the survey collection, I find a strong negative correlation between vote buying prevalence and turnout for both democracies and dominant-party states.

Nationalism

A third alternative explanation, that might seem particularly appealing in the case of Tanzania, is nationalism. Turnout could be explained by citizens’ sense of duty or obligation to the state and their willingness to demonstrate their solidarity with the nation by exercising their right to vote. Nationalism surely motivates some Tanzanians to vote on Election Day, but its influence may be overstated in the aggregate.
Nationalism in Tanzania is closely tied to Nyerere and his legacy. During the period of forced villagization under Nyerere's leadership, citizens exhibited behaviors consistent with the idea that they had become disillusioned with the state. For example, university students protested state policy (Mihyo, 2003).

After being forced to move into government-organized villages in the early 1970's, citizens also demonstrated their disillusionment during elections. Scholars attribute the doubling of “no” votes for President Nyerere between the 1970 and 1975 elections to popular resentment of, or at least disappointment in, the regime (McHenry, 1979; Martin, 1978). When carrying out their orders, lower level government officials would often tell people they were being moved and their houses burned because of the President. “TANU and the CCM’s revolution from above and the military thrust with which it was carried out, created a lot of disenchantment among some sections of the population including the intended beneficiaries” (Mihyo, 2003, 80). Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the state’s policies, turnout actually rose from 72% in 1970 to 82% in the 1975 election.

In this case, turnout was not a good indicator of faith in the system or sense of duty to the nation because citizens were showing up to demonstrate their disaffection for the state. “By turning out to vote they manifested their participation. By voting less solidly for the president, they manifested their concern” (Samoff, 1987, 169). Rather than ‘national unity’, Tanzanian scholar Issa Shivji has suggested that the regime instead “managed successfully to suppress any organised expression of diversity and differences”, which led to what he refers to as “(imposed) unanimity” (Shivji, 1991, 5). The final alternative explanation this chapter considers is the increasing political competition in Tanzania.

Electoral Competition

Though CCM has maintained a majority of the seats in Parliament and the control of the Presidency since independence, Tanzanian politics are becoming increasingly competitive.
The October 2015 general elections produced the smallest presidential vote margin in the nation's history: John Magufuli (CCM) won the Presidency with 58% of the vote. Some might believe that this increasing competition serves as a stimulus for turnout.

Figure 3.4 plots voter turnout and the margin of victory for all Presidential elections held since the introduction of multiparty competition in 1995. If increasing competition was a strong motivator of turnout we would expect to see higher turnout in elections with smaller vote margins. However, there is no clear relationship between turnout and this measure of political competition. Furthermore, political competition in Tanzania is highest in the urban areas of Tanzania, but cannot similarly account for high levels of turnout in rural areas.

![Figure 3.4: Voter turnout and margin of victory across all multiparty elections in Tanzania](image)

The social theory of voting that I propose is most likely to motivate turnout in rural areas, which are precisely the places not accounted for in explanations grounded in increased political competition. For the most part, elections have become increasingly competitive in urban constituencies in Tanzania. For instance, in the 2015 elections, MPs from rural constituencies on mainland Tanzania won their seat with a winning margin of 31%, on aver-
age. By comparison, urban MPs on average won their constituencies with a margin of 15%. Similarly, another indicator of electoral competition, the number of candidates contesting, is significantly different between urban and rural constituencies. In urban areas on average there were seven MP candidates competing in 2015, compared to an average of four in rural constituencies. Despite the fact that levels of competition differ between urban and rural areas, turnout is not substantively (or statistically) different. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, 64% of urban voting-age citizens turned out and 60% of rural residents cast their ballots. Increasing political competition may alter patterns of resource allocation from the central government and eventually degrade a social norm of voting if high turnout areas are no longer rewarded. Currently, however, electoral competition, which is highest in urban areas does not pose a strong alternative explanation for the high turnout rural Tanzanians demonstrate in less competitive elections.

This chapter has provided the reader with important background for the argument presented in this dissertation. The ruling party in Tanzania held elections, and encouraged citizens to vote in these elections, to enhance its legitimacy. Its legitimacy as a ‘democratic’, or at least transitioning, state was critical for securing international aid that Tanzania still relies on today. In Tanzanian elections, turnout is less a tool for preference articulation or voice, but rather signals compliance with the state’s objectives. Through the use of public goods rewards, the regime incentivizes communities to demonstrate their loyalty through turnout. Economic policies introduced during the socialist period allowed the government to establish a monopoly on the use of state resources, and subsequently made local communities reliant on the center for basic public services. With this context of the Tanzanian situation, the next chapter presents data from a lab-in-the-field experiment designed to test the theory that a social norm of voting motivates turnout in rural Tanzania.

32I discuss this further in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 4

Evidence of a Social Norm of Voting

A conversation with a 32-year-old woman, let’s call her Rachel, in rural Misungwi district in Mwanza, Tanzania illustrates the expectations that Tanzanian citizens have around elections. Even a year later, Rachel remembered Election Day on October 25th 2015 vividly. She proudly described how she traveled with her four-day-old baby to the village chairman’s office to vote. She also recounted how her neighbor, who had no formal education, was nervous about having to answer ‘tough questions’ at the registration station. To avoid the embarrassment of not knowing her own birthday but to also avoid social disapproval, her neighbor went to the registration center after the deadline had already passed in order to be able to tell other community members that she tried to register, but was too late. Failing to vote due to circumstances that could be considered outside one’s own control, such as missing the registration deadline, might protect individuals from social ostracism that abstainers-by-choice experience in rural Tanzania.

Rachel revealed that many people in her community would criticize someone who abstains in elections. She said that community members believe that such individuals deserve to be thought of differently because “they are pushing back development”.

in Mwanza, in Kijima village, a 22-year-old woman similarly reported that residents in her community would speak badly about abstainers behind their back. For other rural villagers that I interviewed, it is utterly inconceivable that someone would choose to abstain. They insist that only illness would prevent someone in their community from showing up on Election Day. While anecdotal, these discussions are consistent with a social norm of voting because rural citizens seem to believe that abstaining in elections is rare and expect that abstainers will be socially sanctioned by their peers.

This chapter empirically tests the presence of a social norm of voting in poor rural communities in Tanzania. While a social norm of voting has been documented in western democracies, we might not anticipate it to exist in dominant-party systems where a prevailing sense of civic duty among the populace is less likely. Contrary to theories that presume citizens vote for individual material rewards, ethnic preferences or because they are mobilized, I propose that citizens enter the polling booth out of a desire for esteem and aversion to social sanctions. These social-psychological factors are typically neglected in the study of elections in developing democracies.

Here I briefly summarize the theory before explaining how I test the observable implications in this chapter. When citizens associate voting in elections with the possibility of getting public goods from the government, an individual’s decision to vote is perceived to have positive externalities for the entire community. Elections thus present a collective action problem, exactly the kind of challenge that social norms solve. The demand for a social norm arises from the desire to ensure community members’ cooperation, as everyone stands to benefit from high turnout on Election Day. A social norm emerges as individuals learn through strategic and repeated interactions to predict how others will behave and the normative attitudes they hold (Bicchieri, 1990). In this case, during election time discussions with neighbors and observing turnout behavior in the community allows individuals to learn

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2 Interview, Kijima, Mwanza, December 14, 2016.
that a norm exists—that community members are expected to vote.

While the entire community benefits from public goods rewards for high turnout, individuals also seek to benefit socially. Citizens in rural communities often live there for their entire lives.\(^3\) Though government services, such as schools and clinics, are essential for survival, the social goods produced by the community are similarly critical. For example, a neighbor willing to watch your kids when you travel, bring you food when you’re sick or just visit to exchange information, stories and advice are necessities of rural life.

This reliance on the community for social benefits is what I term social dependency. I propose that the degree to which an individual is socially dependent on the community influences the probability that she will comply with the norm. We might expect socially dependent individuals to be those who are heavily embedded in the community, who frequently see their neighbors (e.g., at church), work in the community and rely on the help of their neighbors (e.g., women).

This chapter tests the theoretical implications of my theory of social voting. The following section describes the experimental design I use to test the individual-level hypotheses derived from the theory. Below, I present experimental, survey and observational evidence that together indicate the existence of a social norm of voting in rural Tanzania.

### 4.1 Evaluating Norm Existence

It is possible to imagine several potential strategies to evaluate whether a social norm motivates turnout. The simplest approach might be to ask citizens directly why they vote in elections. We know, however, that people are bad at explaining their complex cognitive processes, such as why they did something (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Especially in the presence of weak stimuli—social norms often exist outside of the general discourse—

\(^3\)The 2012 census in Tanzania found that only 16.8% of the population was living outside of their region of birth.
individuals might be unable to recognize and attribute the role of these motivations when answering why they vote.

Another approach would be to look for 'natural experiments' or quasi-random manipulations of the independent variables of interest. We could look for exogenous variation in a community's level of economic dependency on the government to then observe the resulting effect on the presence of social norms and turnout. In addition to the challenge of finding such instances, another problem is that the researcher has little control and many variables are often simultaneously manipulated, resulting in a bundled treatment.

Social norms are particularly challenging to identify because they may "have no reality other than our beliefs that others behave according to them and expect us to behave according to them" (Bicchieri, 2005, 22). Attributing observed behavior to norm compliance is extremely difficult in the real world. While we might hope to identify norms by observing norm defiers being sanctioned by their peers, in high compliance equilibria we may never observe noncompliance.

For these reasons, I adopt a multi-method approach to test the theory. Using interview and survey data I investigate whether citizens have norm-consistent attitudes and expectations. I analyze how citizens view voters and abstainers. Relying solely on survey data, however, would be problematic given reporting bias issues. For this reason, I use a lab-in-the-field experiment to isolate the key variables of interest and identify the causal influence of a social norm of voting on individual behavior. In addition, this chapter draws on observational data on polling stations from the 2015 general election in Tanzania that I collected to determine whether the experimental results are corroborated in real electoral behavior. Before collecting any quantitative data, I first traveled throughout the country to gain greater qualitative insight into how citizens experience elections to inform the experimental measurement and design.
4.1.1 Qualitative data to inform the experiment

I began collecting qualitative data to inform the experimental design in Tanzania in 2014. Conversations with citizens and my own observations during the 2014 local elections helped me understand what voting looks like and how citizens experience elections. With a team of trained research assistants, we conducted interviews in peri-urban areas around Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Mwanza and Morogoro. I selected these locations due to their diversity in political affiliations and levels of political competition. Communities in these areas are less likely to enforce a social norm of voting due to the decreased visibility of turnout and lower levels of community cohesion in urban areas. While respondents were not randomly selected, we obtained a diverse sample based on age, sex, occupation and income. Spending time in these communities allowed me to better understand the types of social sanctions abstainers face and how to translate these interactions into an experimental treatment. Conducting extensive qualitative field research prior to implementing quantitative data collection helped me discern how to cue a social norm of voting in an experimental setting.

4.1.2 Quantitative sampling and selection

Informed by the qualitative data, I designed a lab-in-the-field voting experiment to test the theoretical predictions in rural communities in Tanzania by creating a context similar to real-world elections while isolating key variables – the desire for status and aversion to sanctions. In collaboration with Twaweza (a regional NGO) and MIT GOV/LAB, I implemented the experiment in conjunction with a two-wave panel survey of 1157 respondents living in rural villages in three regions in Tanzania (Kilimanjaro, Mwanza and Mbeya). These areas were purposively selected because of their variation in economic dependency and politically
affiliations, providing a harder test for the theory.\textsuperscript{4} I then conducted a three-stage sampling procedure where I randomly sampled three districts within each region, then randomly selected nine rural wards within each district and finally randomly sampled a single enumeration area (corresponding to a subvillage) within each ward.\textsuperscript{5} To select respondents, enumerators walked the perimeter of the subvillage with a local authority and then began a random walk towards the center of the village from different places along the periphery, sampling respondents along the way. Although the sample is not nationally representative it is likely fairly representative of rural Tanzania.

To capitalize on the timing of the 2015 general election in Tanzania, enumeration was conducted in October and November 2015. Given the salience of politics at this time, it was natural for neighbors to gather to discuss political candidates. The first wave of the panel took place one to two weeks before general elections were held in Tanzania on October 25, 2015.\textsuperscript{6} The second wave began two weeks after the election. Both waves followed the same structure.\textsuperscript{7} Each respondent was given a baseline survey, ‘played’ the lab-in-the-field experimental game and then was immediately given an endline survey. The surveys measured demographic variables, political and social attitudes and self-reported political behaviors. The close timing of the real elections and the fact that I conducted the experiment in the rural communities where citizens live help to enhance the realism of the experiment.

\textsuperscript{4}The theory is most likely to hold in less competitive homogeneous communities where political preferences are aligned. A social norm of voting—without reference to vote choice—is more likely in places where competition is low and community members only need to concern themselves with getting their neighbors to the polls, rather than wondering for whom they will vote. Kilimanjaro in particular serve as a hard test of the theory and allows me to analyze how the strength of the norm varies by level of political competition (see Chapter 5).

\textsuperscript{5}I have a sample of more than 81 (sub)villages due to (randomly) resampling after discarding pilot villages between waves and running into one pastoralist community where people were so suspicious of us that they all refused to participate.

\textsuperscript{6}Due to time restrictions not all of the same survey questions were asked in both waves. For each analysis I will note why data from a particular wave is presented in the event that data from both waves exists. Figure 4.1 highlights which treatments were conducted in which wave.

\textsuperscript{7}The panel structure is not of particular relevance for the theory or data presented here, but was important to understand questions of interest discussed in other work.
4.1.3 An experiment on voting norms

Studying norms in the laboratory requires activating the norm by signaling to subjects that the norm applies in that particular context. Salient cues for norm activation include a direct statement or reminder of the norm, observing others' behavior or the similarity of the present situation to others in which the norm is used (Bicchieri, 2005, 112). Applying this last technique, I frame a public goods game as a hypothetical election. If we are able to cue the relevant context in which the norm should apply, making norms salient should allow respondents to enter the lab with their norm-related expectations and beliefs.

The experimental 'game' involved a conjoint choice task (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) that presented respondents with hypothetical candidates, in order to closely mimic a real-world election. In the conjoint experiment, respondents could vote for either of two hypothetical candidates but also had the option to abstain. In order to avoid 'cheap talk'—respondents voting because it is easy and costless—voting in the experiment was costly. This cost was also designed to represent the cost of travel and time when voting in real elections. To begin, the enumerator explained the rules and gave respondents each 5,000 Tanzanian Shillings (about $2.50, equivalent to a day's wage in the average village in our sample) for their participation. We informed respondents that this was their money to keep but any money that they chose to spend on votes would be donated to public services in the community—either the school or the clinic. Similar to how citizens believe voting serves the group's interest, voting in the experiment was set up such that it would also materially benefit the community.

Though vote choice is not relevant to the theory, in order to mimic a real election I presented respondents with hypothetical candidates in order for them first to decide whether or not they wanted to vote.8 Respondents were told that these hypothetical candidates

8Having respondents play a standard public goods game would have been one approach to investigate social norms of voting and community-helping behaviors, but such a design would not directly relate to the specific act of voting and not cue the relevant social norm. An election-like setup was required to target the
Table 4.1: Attributes and levels of hypothetical candidates presented in the conjoint experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>Chagga</td>
<td>Sukuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Performance–Community</td>
<td>Gave community nothing</td>
<td>Gave community social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Performance–Individuals</td>
<td>Gave you nothing</td>
<td>Gave you money for social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promises</td>
<td>Has promises and a plan</td>
<td>Has promises but no plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were running for the Member of Parliament (MP) seat in their constituency. To make the experiment as realistic as possible, the hypothetical candidates displayed characteristics shared by real political candidates. Each respondent was presented with six pairs, or ‘rounds’, of hypothetical candidates. The candidate profiles randomly varied on the basis of six attributes: religion, tribe, party, past performance toward the community, past performance toward individuals and credibility of promises. Each of the six attributes could take on one of two values (see Table 4.1 below and Figure A1.3 in the appendix for how these attributes were illustrated with images).

4.1.4 Public versus private behavior

To attempt to isolate the effect of social norms on turnout, I had respondents conduct the conjoint choice task in two different settings; public and private. Since “publicity, understood as audience size, is the fuel of the economy of esteem” (Brennan and Pettit, 2004, 158), we should expect the desire for status to be positively correlated with the presence of an audience. If there is a norm of voting, we would expect the level of compliance to vary

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9 We used Sukuma and Chaggga as candidate tribes because they are the two largest tribes in Tanzania and hail from our sample regions. Members of these tribes are also from both Christian and Muslim faiths, rendering candidate attribute combinations plausible and realistic.

10 As is standard in conjoint experiments, the order of the candidate attributes and the value, or levels, each attribute took was randomly assigned.
according to the probability of being observed and the size of the audience (Brennan et al., 
2013). Specifically, in the presence of one’s peers, where there may be a social cost to 
abstaining, respondents will be more likely to comply with the norm, and vote.

Other studies investigating social norms use this mechanism of increasing or decreasing 
the observability of the target action to observe changes in behavior. In Switzerland, Funk 
(2010) uses the introduction of the mail-in ballot as a natural experiment to investigate 
a norm of voting, because it simultaneously lowered the cost to vote and also reduced the 
observability of voting in person. Looking at participation in contentious politics, McClendon 
(2014) similarly demonstrates that status and esteem incentives motivate participating in a 
LGBT rally in New Jersey. People are more willing to participate in the rally when they 
are told that their involvement will be publicized and that they will gain esteem from their 
peers for this action. These studies demonstrate that when norms are present, individuals 
are more likely to comply (defect) when their behavior is observable (secret). My research 
design uses a similar mechanism by manipulating the visibility of turnout.

It is human nature to care about what others think of us (Brennan et al., 2013). Hence, 
we often consider others’ expectations when deciding how to act in front of an audience. If 
participants think that their peers believe that everyone should vote in elections, they will 
be more likely to want to fulfill this expectation and vote, even when it comes at a cost, 
when others can observe them. In the public experimental condition respondents conducted 
the experiment with four other villagers. In the private condition, not even the enumerator 
was privy to the respondent’s behavior. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the 
public or private treatment condition.

In each village I convened two public groups. Public group respondents were recruited 
through a random walk and asked to gather at a central meeting place in the village. I 
randomly assigned each group to have a village elite participate as one of the five participants.
We recruited a teacher from the local government primary school\textsuperscript{11} and a balodzi (or ten-cell leader)\textsuperscript{12} and assigned them each to a group.\textsuperscript{13} These elites were incorporated into the public groups in order to examine what types of elites might be more likely to enforce a norm of voting — party leaders (balodzi) or formal sector, educated leaders (teachers).\textsuperscript{14}

The public group of five respondents sat together in a circle and were presented with the same hypothetical candidate profiles. After the enumerator described the candidates, the respondents had the opportunity to discuss the candidates amongst themselves—while the enumerator recorded aspects of their conversation.\textsuperscript{15} After a brief discourse, the enumerator would then ask the respondents to simultaneously hold up index cards to indicate whether they wanted to vote for candidate “A” or “B”. If the respondent wanted to abstain they would not hold up a card. All of the group participants could easily observe if and how everyone else voted.\textsuperscript{16} The enumerator would then collect money from all of the participants who voted in that round.

In the private condition instead of bringing respondents to a central location, they were surveyed alone, in their home and voted secretly using a paper ballot.\textsuperscript{17} After the enumerator explained the candidate profiles, and was satisfied that the respondent understood, the

\textsuperscript{11}If there was not a primary school in the village we selected one from the nearest school where villagers sent their children.

\textsuperscript{12}A balodzi has been traditionally a ruling party local agent but today come from opposition parties as well. More information about balodzi is provided in Section 4.2.4.

\textsuperscript{13}In order to sample these elites, I sent research assistants to the villages a few days ahead of the enumeration teams to meet with the village chairman and enumerate the possible balodzi and teachers. The enumerator would write these names down on paper, rip them apart, shuffle the crumpled pieces and then allow the village chairman to select one piece from the balodzi pile and one piece from the teacher pile at random.

\textsuperscript{14}Because the teachers and balodzi were not sampled with the same probability as the other group participants I remove them from the following analyses and instead focus on the behaviors of the randomly sampled villagers and the differences in how they behave in the presence of these elites.

\textsuperscript{15}For details on how exactly the conjoint setup worked offline using tablets and with paper surveys for the private condition see Meyer and Rosenzweig (2016).

\textsuperscript{16}Ideally, I would have made turnout public but vote choice secret in the public condition. However, the partner organization wanted to also understand how citizens evaluate candidates and deal with conflicting political preferences.

\textsuperscript{17}See Meyer and Rosenzweig (2016) for how we implemented this and open source tools to produce similar experimental designs.
enumerator would leave the room while the respondent indicated their voting or abstaining preference on the secret ballot. If the respondent decided to vote they would take money from their participation fee and insert it in an envelope with their marked secret ballot.

If a social norm of voting exists more people should vote in public condition compared to the private condition. In the presence of a social norm of voting, we should expect participants to be more willing to incur an individual financial cost to comply with the social norm (vote) when it is possible for others to observe their behavior (public condition). Participants may be more willing to deviate from the social norm, and abstain, when their peers are not privy to their actions (private condition). The cost of voting at times differed between the public and private conditions but the empirical results compare voting behavior in public and private when the cost is equivalent.\(^\text{18}\) There was no cost for abstaining.

In order to compare behavior in the public and private conditions we must account for the fact that the experimental treatment in the public condition changes after the first round.\(^\text{19}\) After the first round, a public group participant is simultaneously treated by the public treatment assignment \textit{and} the abstaining or voting behaviors of the other group members. Green and Tusicisny (2012) observe that in repeated laboratory games, “The players are randomly assigned to experimental conditions, but due to heterogeneity in subjects’ potential outcomes in round 1, the treatment is no longer fully under the control of the experimenter by round 3” (22). Subject’s unobserved heterogeneity can bias estimates of the average treatment effect (ATE) after the first round. Moreover, studies of norms suggest that when subjects

\(^\text{18}\)In the public condition voting cost 200 Tsh (about 4% of a day’s wage). In the private condition the cost of a vote was 100 Tsh. The difference in the cost of voting between conditions was to contextualize the public-ness of the public condition by having a higher cost to represent the cost of waiting in line at a crowded polling station. In the second wave of the survey, the costs of voting increased for the second half of the game (rounds 4 to 6). The cost of a vote increased from 200 Tsh to 500 Tsh in the public condition and from 100 Tsh to 200 Tsh in the private condition. I can therefore compare respondent behavior when the cost of voting is equivalent between the public and the private in the second wave.

\(^\text{19}\)In the experiment, respondents conducted six rounds of the conjoint experiment because I wanted to also investigate the role of \textit{norm entrepreneurs} who are able to shift their peer’s behavior in the public condition. We also included multiple rounds for a separate study on the influence of candidate characteristics on voter preferences.
immediately enter the lab they rely on the default social norms they deem appropriate to the
situation. After observing others' behavior subjects adjust their expectations about whether
the norm applies in the situation (Bicchieri, 2005). In order to obtain a causal estimate of
the ATE of the public condition (compared to the private) and to use the best measure of
the norms that subjects enter the experiment with, I compare public behavior in the first
round only to private behavior.20

![Figure 4.1: Wave II experimental design](image)

### 4.1.5 Social ostracism treatment

Norm-compliant behavior in the experiment—higher turnout in the public condition than
in the private—could be due to either a desire for esteem or an aversion to sanctions. The
literature, however, suggests that in contexts with high norm compliance, sanctions tend to
be more prevalent than esteem rewards (Brennan and Pettit, 2004). Rural Tanzania does
indeed seem to be a high compliance context, where nationally 67% of Tanzanians voted in

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20In the analysis below, any time I compare respondent behavior in the public and private treatment
conditions I will be using data from the second wave (when the cost of voting across conditions was equivalent)
for the first round of the public condition and rounds 4-6 in the private condition. As a robustness check I also
subset the data to the first comparable rounds for both public (round 1) and private (round 4) treatments.
2015 and the villages in my sample had 74\% turnout. For these reasons, I explicitly examine the role that social sanctions might play in norm enforcement by including an additional treatment condition within the public groups in the second wave.

Social sanctions can be immediate or long term and either tangible or intangible. In reality, neighbors likely change their attitudes about individuals who abstain and these opinions may have lasting effects on their interactions with that person. Long-term sanctions are difficult to manipulate in a momentary experimental setting. Similarly, intangible sanctions such as social disapproval that manifests as negative attitudes cannot be easily controlled in a laboratory. For these reasons, I designed the social ostracism treatment to target an immediate and tangible social sanction that a majority of Tanzanians expect to experience if they do not vote: prohibition from complaining.\(^{21}\)

As one elderly woman in Mwanza told me, “If you don’t participate [vote] people will think you don’t care...if you don’t vote you don’t have the right to ask questions.”\(^{22}\) Upon reflecting how his friends and family would react if they knew he did not vote in the election, a taxi driver in Arusha said: “They will behave in a way that you will see their anger. For example, if I complain of shortage of water they will sarcastically laugh at me and tell me if I knew I needed water why then didn’t I vote?”\(^{23}\) A motorcycle driver in Kilimanjaro suggested that if while drinking mbege (local beer) with friends, someone who he knew did not vote came to join, that person would be left without a drink.\(^{24}\)

To mimic this real-world social exclusion, some respondents in the public groups were randomly assigned to the *social ostracism* treatment. In this condition, respondents who abstained were prohibited from participating in the discussion about the candidates in the next round. During the discussion, the abstainers had to physically turn their chair and

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\(^{21}\)See Table 4.8.

\(^{22}\)Interview, Nyamagana, Mwanza, February 23, 2015.

\(^{23}\)Interview, Arusha, January 6, 2014.

\(^{24}\)Interview, Rombo, Kilimanjaro, August 23, 2015.
face away from the group. Although artificial, this treatment was designed to mirror actions community members report are taken toward abstainers. Analyzing respondent behavior in this condition compared to the control, no ostracism public groups, will indicate whether this type of social sanctioning influences individual behavior. The following section describes the results from the lab-in-the-field experiment just described.

4.2 Evidence of a Social Norm of Voting

Drawing on a panel survey, experiment and subsequently collected observational data, this section evaluates the first three hypotheses described in Chapter 2. First, I examine the differences in experimental voting behavior in the public and private conditions to test whether a desire for status and aversion to sanctions motivates turnout (H1). By manipulating the visibility of voting, I can discern whether a consideration of others’ perceptions and expectations incentivizes turnout. Second, while most studies of norms assume, or deliberately manipulate, how others react to individual’s actions, either awarding status or sanctions, I go a step further. Using a representative survey and interviews, I demonstrate that people think more highly of individuals who vote and less of those who abstain (H2). Supportive evidence of these first two hypotheses would be suggestive evidence of the existence of a social norm of voting.

Finally, I investigate individual-level variation in turnout and compliance with a norm of voting. Using questions on the panel survey about individual demographics and relations in the community, I observe which individual characteristics correlate with experimental voting behavior. The evidence is consistent with the theory and suggests that social dependency on the community is correlated with experimental voting (H3).
4.2.1 A desire for status and aversion to sanctions

To investigate whether individuals comply with voting norms because they desire status and want to avoid social sanctions (H1), I compare public and private voting in the experiment.\(^{25}\) In both conditions, a wealth-maximizing individual would abstain in all rounds, free-riding on the contributions of others to the public goods in the village. If voting behavior is motivated by a social norm of voting, we should expect respondents to be more willing to incur an individual cost in the public condition—where participants are being observed by their peers and their reputation is at stake—than in the private condition where they are acting in secret.

First, I use a simple t-test to analyze the difference in mean abstention rates between the public and private conditions in the first wave. Here, the cost of voting was double in the public condition (200 Tsh), compared to the private (100 Tsh). Despite the higher cost to vote in public, I find that public participants are still more likely to pay to vote than private participants. In the first round 87% of public participants vote, while 82% of private respondents vote across all rounds ($t(1305) = 4.499$, $p = 7.44e^{-06}$).\(^{26}\) It is also clear that a majority of participants, across both conditions, vote.

The fact that a majority of private respondents vote suggests that they have likely internalized the social norm. “Often we keep conforming to a norm even in situations of complete anonymity, where the probability of being caught transgressing is almost zero. In this case, fear of sanctions cannot be a motivating force. It is often argued that all cases of ‘spontaneous’ compliance with norms are the result of internalization (Scott 1971).” (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2014). Sanctions and status are irrelevant for individuals who have internalized the social norm and have therefore developed their own “internal sanctioning system” of guilt.

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\(^{25}\)Balance tables comparing respondents in different treatment conditions are provided in the appendix.

\(^{26}\)There is no difference between the first round for both public and private participants, where 87% of public participants and 88% of private participants vote ($t(1904) = 0.723$, $p = .47$).
and shame (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2014). Random assignment of the treatment ensures that the distribution of respondents who have internalized the norm is equivalent (in expectation) across treatment conditions. Any difference in voting rates across the public and private treatments can thus be attributed to respondents’ fear of external norm enforcement, mainly sanctions, in the public condition.

Next, I compare turnout rates between the public and private conditions in Wave II when the cost of voting is equivalent. Figure 4.2 presents turnout rates for private respondents (left bar) and public respondents (right bar). Evidently, there is a substantive and statistically significant difference in turnout between the two conditions. Specifically, the public treatment increases the probability that respondents will vote by about 11 percentage points, compared to the private ($t(1300) = 5.304, p = 1.329e^{-07}$).

![Comparing public and private turnout behavior](image)

**Figure 4.2:** Public and private turnout behavior (Wave II)

I corroborate the results using ordinary least squares (OLS) models with village and enu-
merator fixed effects to hold constant time-invariant specific enumerator and village characteristics. In all of the following public-private models, I cluster standard errors at the level of treatment assignment (the group for public respondents and the individual for private respondents) to account for correlation between respondents in the same public group and correlation within individual across rounds in the private condition. The results also hold when I include controls for common predictors of turnout, including age, sex, partisanship, and income. These OLS models are presented in Table 4.2 below. As discussed previously, to isolate the societal norms that participants enter the experiment with, the models include only the first round of the public game before norm entrepreneurs can shift group-level norms in the experiment.

All of the models in Table 4.2 present a consistent picture of the effect of the public treatment. In model 1, we see that the public condition increases the probability of voting by 10.7 percentage points. Although there is not the same challenge in estimating an unbundled ATE in the private condition, because there is no interactive learning that occurs in private, as a robustness check I subset the data to include only the first comparable round for both the private and public conditions in model 2. This analysis provides a quite similar result. Here, the public treatment increases the probability of voting by 12.5 percentage points. Model 3 reruns the same analysis as the first model, this time including standard demographic controls. Again, the public treatment increases the probability of voting by about 10 percentage points.

The results reveal a greater willingness among public participants to incur an individual cost to vote, in the presence of their peers, compared to when respondents are in private.28

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28 As a point of reference, in their canonical study of social pressure to vote in the US, Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) find that sending a mailer informing citizens that their neighbors will be able to observe their voting behavior increases the probability that citizens will vote by 4.8 percentage points. In my experiment, actual monitoring by neighbors—rather than the threat of observation—is even more powerful. While Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) are able to measure actual turnout behavior of their subjects, I observe behavior in a lab-in-the-field experiment.
These results provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis, that turnout is driven by a desire for status and aversion to sanctions. The data suggest that a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzanian communities. The following section dives deeper into understanding the mechanisms of compliance, by testing the influence that social sanctions have on individual behavior.
Table 4.2: Effect of public treatment compared to private condition on turnout (Wave II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_other</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_sukuma</td>
<td>0.265†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_muslim</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_none</td>
<td>0.360**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_other</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.673**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model 1 includes the first public round and all comparable private rounds (rounds 4-6). Model 2 includes only the first comparable round for each condition. Model 3 is the same as Model 1 but also includes standard demographic controls. The baseline category for religion is Catholic. The baseline category for ethnicity is Chagga. As with all models comparing public and private turnout behavior, standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment: the group in the public condition and the individual for the private.
Mechanisms of compliance

Having demonstrated experimentally that turnout is higher when it is public, compared to when individuals vote in secret, this section investigates the specific role that social sanctions play in enforcing the norm. In the second wave of the experiment, some public groups were randomly assigned to the social ostracism treatment. As a reminder, participants in those groups who abstained had to turn their back to the group and were prohibited from participating in the discussion in the next round. The ostracism treatment thus enhances the salience of a norm of voting through the automatic inducement of punishment for abstaining.

Although constructed, the social ostracism treatment mimics sanctions real-world abstainers might experience; exclusion from political discussion and prohibition from complaining about the government. As male focus group participants suggested, “when you don’t vote and the rest chose someone - you [the abstainer] may start to complain” and blame those who voted for the faults of the leaders. Other citizens expressed their belief that abstainers should be prohibited from complaining because they took no part in the process of selecting candidates.

If such social sanctions were inconsequential, respondents would not adjust their behavior in the experiment simply because they must turn their chair around and not participate in the discussion. On the other hand, if there is a norm of voting and individuals care about what their peers think of them and want to avoid social ostracism, then the social ostracism treatment should increase respondents’ probability of voting, compared to control. Figure 4.3 displays turnout levels for public group respondents in the second wave of the experiment who were assigned to control (left bar) and the social ostracism treatment (right bar).

Participants are more willing to pay a cost to vote in the experiment when they face tangible ostracism if they abstain. Linear regressions reveal that the social ostracism treatment increases the probability that respondents will vote by about 13 percentage points, compared to control (see Table A3.1 in the appendix). The results suggest that the social cost of not
Comparing public turnout behavior with and without ostracism

![Bar chart showing comparison between control and social ostracism treatments]

**Figure 4.3:** Effect of social ostracism treatment on public group turnout

**Note:** The difference in means is 11 percentage points ($t(4228) = 7.3058, p = 3.278e^{-13}$). These data include rounds 2-5 for public group respondents in the second wave of the survey, when the social ostracism treatment was introduced. The results are similar when I include all rounds (1-6). The rationale for including only rounds 2-5 is to ensure that respondents understood the treatment and had the opportunity to observe it in action (only possible in round 2 when someone would be prohibited from participating in the discussion if they abstained in round 1). Abstainers in the last round (6) face no repercussions and therefore this last round is omitted.

being allowed to participate and engage with peers outweighs the financial cost of voting in the experiment.

It makes sense that sanctions would be a powerful motivator in this context. If most people comply with a social norm most of the time, status awarding becomes a less powerful inducement for continued compliance. Brennan and Pettit (2004) explain that “as the number of compliers increases the amount of esteem rewarded for compliance decreases—and here the disesteem for noncompliance comes into operation” (127). For social norms that exhibit high compliance equilibria, complying individuals are less likely to be rewarded than non-compliers are to be sanctioned (Brennan and Pettit, 2004).
In the case of Tanzania, it appears that a high compliance equilibrium exists because a majority of citizens vote in elections and a majority of respondents vote in the experiment. Social sanctions seem to play a significant role in motivating turnout in rural Tanzania. Not only does social ostracism influence turnout behavior in the experiment, but it may also help to mitigate the deterring effects of high costs to voting.

Interestingly, social ostracism may also help to overcome high costs to voting. In the second wave of the experiment, the cost of voting increased between the third and fourth rounds of the game. For public respondents the cost increased from 200 TSH to 500 TSH in the fourth round. In the control public group, this change in cost induces an 11 percentage point decrease in turnout, from 60% turnout in round 3 to 49% in the fourth round. Interestingly, among respondents in the social ostracism condition the same increase in the cost of voting is associated with a much smaller, 6 percentage point, decrease in turnout (from 69% in round 3 to 63% in round 4). This difference suggests that social ostracism and other social sanctions carried out by one's peers may help to overcome costs of voting, such as traveling to the polling station and neglecting farming activities or other work, to motivate peers to turn out.

Evidently, social sanctions influence turnout in the experiment, which is indicative of a social norm of voting. Respondents are more willing to pay a cost to turn out when their decision is public to their peers and when they face social ostracism. Continuing to build the body of evidence in support of the theory, the next section explores the idea that variation in compliance with the norm corresponds to changes in the size of the audience observing turnout behavior.

**Audience size and turnout**

The literature suggests that compliance with social norms is also a function of audience size (Brennan and Pettit, 2004). If a social norm of voting is motivating respondents' behavior in
the experiment, then compliance with the norm (voting) will be more likely in larger groups.
Due to travel or illness, there was attrition in the public groups in the second wave of the panel. This attrition provides (nonrandom) variation in the size of the group.\textsuperscript{29} While not an exogenous source of variation in group size, attrition is likely orthogonal to the voting behavior of the remaining group members in the second wave.

![Figure 4.4: Experimental turnout by group size (Public condition, Wave II-Round 1)](image)

**Figure 4.4:** Experimental turnout by group size (Public condition, Wave II-Round 1)

*Note:* Data points are jittered. The plot includes mean group turnout rates with 95% confidence intervals for each group size. Density plots of turnout and group size are provided in the margins.

Figure 4.4 illustrates that there is a positive correlation between the size of the public group and turnout in that group. Specifically, looking at public group behavior in the first round of the second wave I find that moving from a group of 3 to a group of 5 participants is associated with a 16.5 percentage point increase in the group turnout (significant at the 5% level). As the audience size increases, participants are more likely to comply with the norm and vote. Though there is minimal change in group size, while playing the game a group of three felt much more intimate—because participants were seated closer to each

\textsuperscript{29}The enumerators were instructed to only proceed with groups that had at least three participants.
other and could more easily chat and interact amongst themselves—compared to a group of five, which felt crowded with a larger audience. Though purely correlational, these data hint that the size of the group may be related to turnout behavior in that group, indicative of a social norm of voting. Having explored the experimental data, the next section turns to observational data. Here, I test whether the experimental patterns—the more visible voting is, the more likely citizens are to turn out—are supported by real world turnout behavior in rural Tanzania.

Visibility of voting in the 2015 election

At this point, it is not entirely clear whether the experimental results are driven by a norm of voting. Perhaps, there is a social norm of contributing to public goods instead. Rather than turnout, the experiment may have been interpreted as contributing to public goods, directly, since the money spent on voting went to the village school or clinic.\(^3\) To address this concern and to gain leverage on external validity problems associated with the experiment, this section uses data on polling stations and turnout from the 2015 general election in Tanzania.

If a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzania, then real-world voting behavior should exhibit a similar pattern to the experimental results that show individuals are more likely to vote when they are being watched. To further test the theory and gain leverage on the external validity of the experiment, I organized and trained a team of enumerators to collect data on the polling stations in our sample villages. Enumerators collected the location of the polling station, the type of building, number of entrances and locals’ perceptions of the centrality of the polling station in the village, among other attributes. Since the National Electoral Commission (NEC) in Tanzania does not centrally collect polling station-level electoral results, and these were no longer available at most polling stations surveyed, I

\(^3\)To be clear, given the interviews I conducted, I do not think this is a particularly strong claim as the qualitative evidence very much suggests that there is a social norm of *voting* in rural Tanzania.
had to find an alternative route to obtaining this data. Working with contacts at the main opposition political party in Tanzania, Chadema, I traveled to their regional party offices to try and obtain this data, which they too do not systematically collect. Through their contacts, I was able to recover 2015 general election results for 96 polling stations across 45 villages in the sample.\textsuperscript{31}

If citizens vote to gain status and avoid sanctions, then we should observe higher turnout in villages where voting is more public. Based on my qualitative research and time spent in these villages, voting seems to be more public in villages that only have a single polling place. In these cases, everyone gathers at the same location on Election Day. In villages with multiple stations, the various voting locations means monitoring neighbors' behavior is more challenging. However, as the number of polling places increases in a village, conditional on village size and population, voting likely becomes easier through shorter distances to travel and shorter lines. If turnout is instead driven by ease of access then we should expect higher turnout in villages with more stations.

An important caveat is that villages with a single polling place are likely quite different from those with several stations. For example, these places likely differ in terms of population, density and terrain.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, there is a large difference in population between villages with a single polling station (2297 residents) and villages with more than two stations (4273 residents). Larger villages might also be more likely to be targeted by opposition campaigns that need to efficiently use their limited resources. There also may be political reasons why some villages have four stations and others only have one. For example, the number of stations may be correlated with the level of development in the village since polling stations

\textsuperscript{31}Please see appendix A6 for a discussion on missing data.

\textsuperscript{32}Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast rule to determine how many polling stations are allocated to each village. The number of citizens registered to a single polling station in my sample ranges from 111 to 1537 voters. While the government suggests that each polling station serve 500 registered voters, this is not followed in practice. See Figure A6.2 in the appendix, which demonstrates why a RDD or fuzzy RDD is not possible, because there seems to be a lot of manipulation (sorting).
are most frequently schools, clinics or other permanent structures.

For these reasons, I focus the analysis to villages that have either one and or two polling stations. While still different, these villages with one or two stations are probably more similar than villages with four stations. Moreover, with respect to reducing the ability for peers to observe turnout, we might be particularly interested in the change from a single polling place to more than one. Having at least two polling stations in the village allows individuals to plausibly convince others, or have their neighbors assume, that they voted at another station. Each additional station, after two, might not afford individuals any additional leverage in this respect. Therefore, social pressure motivations may be removed in places with two polling places but not any further reduced by additional stations.

Figure 4.5 plots the relationship between village-level turnout and the total number of polling stations in the village. Since a greater number of polling places increases access, it is unsurprising that, overall, turnout is positively correlated with the number of polling stations

\[ \text{Village Turnout} = \text{OLS regression line} \]

Note: Data points are plotted with an OLS regression line (red dashed) and loess line (blue solid).

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Note: Data points are plotted with an OLS regression line (red dashed) and loess line (blue solid).

\(^{33}\)There is not a substantive nor statistically significant difference in population between villages with a single station (2297 residents) and those with two (2496 residents).

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across all villages. However, focusing on the 28 villages that have one or two stations reveals a different relationship. Here, as the theory would predict, turnout in the 2015 election is 2.9 percentage points higher in villages with a single polling station, where it is easier to monitor citizen behavior, than villages with two polling stations. The tiny sample size makes it unsurprising that this difference is not statistically significant (p-value of .41).

Subsetting the data to villages with similar population sizes (between 1200 and 2800 people), I still find that places with a single station have higher turnout (on average 74%) compared to places with two polling stations (68%). This difference in turnout could be explained by varying distances to the polling station. Perhaps polling stations are much farther in villages that have two. Although I do not know the exact geographic area of the village, I do have population density from the 2012 government census. On average, villages with two polling stations have much higher population density than villages with only a single polling station, despite no difference in population sizes. The data therefore suggest that among places with similar populations, the villages with two polling stations are also smaller geographically. Thus, the distance to travel does not appear to be longer in villages with two polling stations. The lines should also not be any longer since these villages have similar populations to villages with a single station but have another location where citizens can vote.

As an additional probe, I analyze turnout patterns separately for large and small communities. Social norms are said to be stronger in smaller, tight-knit communities where members can better monitor behavior and punish free riders (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2014). Consistent with this idea is the fact that turnout is higher in villages with smaller populations for which I have data. Specifically, villages with populations larger than the 75th percentile (4,126 residents) had 69.3% turnout in the 2015 general election, whereas smaller villages with populations less than the 25th percentile (1,640 residents) had 73.8% turnout.

In smaller villages, where residents are more likely to interact and know each other well,
members likely have other mechanisms of knowing who votes and who abstains. For example, frequent interaction after Election Day may make observing others’ inked fingers more likely. The number of polling stations might not influence turnout in small villages that can rely on multiple mechanisms of monitoring turnout. Figure 4.6 displays turnout across the number of polling stations for small and large villages. In smaller villages (plotted as triangles and a dotted loess line), turnout remains fairly constant around 75% but turnout in larger villages (plotted as points with a solid loess line) drops dramatically between villages with one and two polling stations. These data from the 2015 general election corroborate the experimental results and support the idea that a social norm of voting motivates turnout, evidence by the fact that turnout is higher in places where voting is more easily monitored.

The lack of additional village-level data means that, at this point, I cannot attempt any causal identification. Instead, I present these associations in the data, simply to demonstrate that
the patterns align with the experimental results and theoretical expectations, but should be interpreted simply as preliminary correlations.

This section has presented evidence in support of the first hypothesis, that individuals will be motivated to vote out of a desire for status and aversion to sanctions. The results suggest that social sanctions are particularly influential in driving turnout. While the experiment provides causal estimates of the effect of observability and social ostracism on experimental turnout, observational data hint at similar real-world findings beyond the lab-in-the-field study. The next section moves to investigate the expectations and attitudes that Tanzanians have around elections, voting and abstaining.

4.2.2 Expectations and attitudes

This section examines whether citizens hold norm-consistent attitudes and expectations. Drawing on data from my original panel survey, Afrobarometer and a representative phone survey conducted in Tanzania just prior to the October 2015 general elections, I test the second observable implication of the theory—that citizens will reward voters and sanction abstainers. I find that Tanzanian citizens believe that a majority of their peers vote in elections, are reluctant to admit that they did not vote in the presence of their peers, reward voters with respect and anticipate social sanctions if they abstain.

Exploring citizens' attitudes and expectations around voting in elections is a critical first step toward verifying that the behavior observed in the lab-in-the-field experiment is due to a social norm of voting, rather than a social norm of something else. For example, a social norm of contributing to public goods, one could argue, may explain the experimental results. Moreover, normative attitudes toward voting in elections is precisely what distinguishes a social norm of voting from a coordination mechanism. The public condition of the experiment is consistent with decreasing coordination costs for group members by publicizing others' actions. If the observed experimental behavior is purely a result of coordination, citizens
would not necessarily hold normative attitudes about voting. Yet, they seem to.

There are two types of expectations that are present if a social norm exists—empirical and normative. In the presence of a social norm of voting, individuals should i) believe that many members of the community will vote in elections and ii) expect that other community members believe voting is good and everyone should do it. If a norm exists, individuals will hold these beliefs and be aware that others do as well.

To assess the presence of empirical expectations about others’ turnout behavior, I asked citizens to guess what percent of their community voted in the national election. Two weeks after the 2015 general election, in the second wave of the original survey of around 1200 respondents, I asked respondents what percentage of the community they think voted on Election Day. On average, respondents report that 85% of the community showed up. This estimate is higher than the national average (67%) and turnout in my sample rural villages (73.5%). The fact that 67% of registered voters and 64% of eligible citizens voted in the 2015 election, and turnout has been consistently above 50% (with the exception of the 2010 election) over the history of multiparty elections in the country, demonstrate that most citizens comply with the norm of voting most of the time. Despite actual turnout being above 50%, citizens expect that an even larger majority of the community votes in elections.

In the presence of a norm of voting, citizens will also think that their peers believe that everyone should vote in elections. As presented earlier, the latest round of Afrobarometer (2016) asked respondents whether a good citizen should vote in elections always, never or only if they choose to. A large majority (82%) of Tanzanians believe that good citizens should always vote in elections.

If citizens think that others believe that everyone should vote in elections, then they will

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34 Since the government does not centrally collect or report village-level electoral results I had to collect this data myself at these villages, the ward offices and regional offices of the leading opposition party. I was only able to obtain village level turnout data for 38 villages in the sample. Although our sample villages are not nationally representative, they are representative of rural villages in Tanzania.
be reluctant to admit that they did not vote in front of others. For example, if I think that my neighbors believe that we should all recycle, I will be unwilling to admit that I do not recycle in front of them. My reluctance may not necessarily be driven by fear of punishment, but instead due to a desire to avoid having my neighbors know that I acted against their normative expectations or to think less of me.

In the original survey, I asked respondents if they voted in the general election just two weeks prior. Only 6% of respondents admit that they did not vote, evidence in support of the theory. When asked why they abstained, most respondents answer that they or a family member were sick (39%) or traveled on Election Day (28%). Some respondents (25%) replied that they were not registered to vote or were registered in another location, rendering them ineligible. Only a single person, out of those who admitted to not voting, indicated that he chose to abstain. This 71-year-old man said that he did not believe in any of the candidates so he decided to abstain.

While it appears that most respondents are reluctant to admit that they abstained, we know that social desirability bias toward the enumerator is a major concern in survey data, especially with respect to self-reported voting behavior. Rather than because a norm of voting exists, respondents may instead be reluctant to admit if they abstained, or give the real rationale, out of fear of what the enumerator might think of them. If respondents believe that the enumerator thinks voting is good, they will be more likely to say that they voted.

The Afrobarometer survey asks respondents if they voted in the most recent election and also has enumerators note whether other members of the community were present during the interview. We can use this data to compare self-reported turnout rates when respondents are in presence of other community members, compared to when they are alone. This com-

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35 We replicated this experiment in Uganda just after the February 18, 2016 general election. In Uganda, 12% of the sample admitted that they did not vote in the recent election. Unfortunately, we did not ask Ugandan respondents why they abstained.

36 The respondent’s exact words were “Sikuwaamini wagombea wote kwa hiyo niliamua kutopiga kura.”

37 The question that Afrobarometer enumerators record is worded as: “Were there any other people
parison holds constant any social desirability bias driven by the enumerator and isolates the “social desirability bias”, or norm influence, driven by the presence of community members.

If there is a social norm of voting, respondents would be more likely to report that they voted in the last election when answering in the presence of others, compared to those who are alone. When asked in the presence of others whether they voted in the last election, 86.9% of Tanzanian respondents answer in the affirmative, while 83% of respondents who are alone report that they voted. While both percentages are high, the difference in means is significant at the 10% level with a p-value of .054. Although there may be other reasons why respondents would hesitate to admit that they abstained in the presence of their peers, this evidence is consistent with the existence of a social norm of voting. The data reveal that Tanzanian citizens hold beliefs that are consistent with the theory, which we would likely not observe if voting was instead driven by convention.

**Rewarding voters and sanctioning abstainers**

Evidently, citizens hold norm-consistent expectations and beliefs. To further substantiate the theory, this section tests whether local community members reward individuals who vote with social status and sanction those who abstain (H2). The presence of rewards and sanctions provides evidence of the very existence of the norm and serves as a compelling rationale for why individuals would comply with a social norm of voting.

Sanction punishments and esteem rewards can exist in attitudes alone. Social sanctions are not always blatant forms of ostracism. As a farmer in Mwanza told me, his peers would not necessarily display their true feelings toward him if he didn’t vote but instead, “would keep it at heart.” Why would intangible social rewards and sanctions that exist in attitudes

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39 Interview, Mwasubi, Mwanza, December 11, 2016.
alone influence individual’s behavior?

Scholars propose that people care about esteem because “Enjoying the esteem of others provides me with evidence, though of course only defeasible evidence, that I am living up to the ideals assumed in the background of evaluations” (Brennan and Pettit, 2004, 26). Even if my neighbors would never criticize me or act differently towards me, I might still want to recycle because I know that they view recycling positively, as something a responsible citizen would do. I might care about what my neighbors think of me purely because of the psychological desire for esteem, not for any downstream material consequences. Thus, the social approval or disapproval requisite for norm enforcement need not be behavioral.

To measure attitudes toward voters, I asked participants in the public condition to rate each of their fellow group participants in terms of how much they respect them and how much they think that person cares about helping their community in the endline survey. The results reveal that participants’ experimental abstention rates are negatively associated with ratings from their peers’ for respect and perceived care for the community. We should not make too much from these correlations because they are endogenous and may have more to do with prior interactions than experimental abstaining behavior. But it is also possible that experimental behavior may be consistent with prior actions in the community. These correlations could also be due to the fact that respondents were primed to think about voting and abstaining during the experiment.

To better understand attitudes toward voting and abstaining behavior, I directly asked respondents to share their opinions of abstainers in the endline survey. A majority (76.7%) of respondents hold negative opinions of abstainers. One respondent said that a person who abstains “is against development of the community because community development is a result of good leadership [obtained through elections].” Another said that a non-voter

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40 In the second wave of the panel survey following the 2015 general election, we asked the open-ended question “what do you think about someone who does not vote on Election Day?”

41 Nimpinga maendeleo ya jamii sababu maendeleo ya jamii yanakuja kutokana na wongozi bora.
“does not have a view on development”\textsuperscript{42} As one respondent candidly put it, “He/She must be mentally ill, the people we want development and he/she does not show cooperation.”\textsuperscript{43}

Many respondents also see abstaining as a personal affront to the community. One respondent stated, “I think that he/she does not like his/her community,”\textsuperscript{44} while another stated that an abstainer “does not care for his/her community.”\textsuperscript{45} These responses reveal that citizens associate voting in elections with bringing development to the community and hold negative opinions about individuals who do not contribute to that endeavor through voting. These sentiments, however, could be biased if the respondents thought, given that we just had them conduct a voting exercise, we were ardent supporters of turnout.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure4.7.png}
\caption{Mean level of respect Tanzanians award to community members who engage in the following activities (Sauti representative survey, October 2015)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{42}Hana mtazamo wa kimaendeleo.
\textsuperscript{43}Atakua hana akili vizuri watu tunataka maendeleo yege haoneshi ushirikiano.
\textsuperscript{44}Namfikiria kuwa haipendi jamii yake.
\textsuperscript{45}Hajali jamii yake.
To get around this issue, I included questions on a representative phone survey that Twaweza conducted immediately prior to the 2015 election. To investigate whether voting is rewarded, I asked this group of nationally representative respondents how much they would respect someone (on a 0-10 scale) who engaged in a variety of activities, including voting. Figure 4.7 displays the results. Unsurprisingly, ratings are consistently high as respect is a central tenet of many Tanzanians communities that I visited. It is noteworthy, however, that the mean respect afforded to someone who votes in elections is second highest and is statistically distinct from the amount of respect afforded to all other behaviors besides contributing to development projects (which immediately and directly helps the community).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4.7:** Displays the results. Unsurprisingly, ratings are consistently high as respect is a central tenet of many Tanzanians communities that I visited. It is noteworthy, however, that the mean respect afforded to someone who votes in elections is second highest and is statistically distinct from the amount of respect afforded to all other behaviors besides contributing to development projects (which immediately and directly helps the community).

In the same representative survey, I also probed how peers would react to someone who

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46 The order of the activities was randomized. More information about how the Sauti survey, including datasets, is available here: [http://www.twaweza.org/go/sauti-za-wananchi-english](http://www.twaweza.org/go/sauti-za-wananchi-english).
abstains. Specifically, I asked respondents, “Say you didn’t vote in the October 25 general election. If people in your community learned that you didn’t vote how would they react?” Respondents were read a list of six items, the order of which was randomized, and were asked to respond whether it was ‘true’ or ‘false’ for each item that people in their community would react that way. Figure 4.8 shows the percent of respondents who report ‘true’ for each item.

Interestingly, 78% of Tanzanians anticipate being asked why they abstained. This figure indicates that people believe that their neighbors take an interest in their voting behavior.47 The survey results also highlight that although 68% of Tanzanians report that their neighbors would still cooperate with them if they abstained, a majority also believe that their peers would hold negative opinions of them and lose respect for them. A majority of Tanzanians think that they would be prohibited from complaining about the government if they failed to vote.

Collectively, the survey data support the hypothesis that community members reward those who adhere to social norms of voting and socially sanction those who do not, even if only in attitudes. Having presented experimental, observational and survey evidence that a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzania, the next section addresses the question of who is most likely to comply with the social norm of voting?

4.2.3 Variation in norm compliance

In the study of democratization, it is important to know who votes. Understanding who makes up the electorate has important political implications because the interests of those who participate are often better represented (Gilens, 2012). This section tests the theoretical prediction that individuals who are more dependent on community-produced social goods will be more likely to comply with norms of voting (H3).

47 Just being asked if you voted can be a powerful motivator. DellaVigna et al. (2016) find in the US that the expectation of being asked about past voting behavior motivates turnout, if citizens derive pride from telling others that they voted or shame from admitting that they did not (signs of a social norm of voting).
Social dependency, or reliance on one’s community, is likely multidimensional and may not strongly correlate with a single variable. Rather than using an index of objective measures, such as how frequently one travels outside of the village or whether an individual has family outside of the village, I instead use a single subjective measure. Using a person’s own, subjective, perception of how much they need the community to measure social dependency makes more sense. It does not matter how I choose to define and measure social dependency, but what matters most for norm compliance is the degree to which individuals perceive themselves as relying on their neighbors and peers.

In the baseline survey, in the first wave, I asked participants how much they depend on their local community. Specifically, respondents were asked, *On a scale from 0-10 how much do you depend on other people in this community (village/subvillage)?* Zero means you’re not dependent at all and 10 means you’re completely dependent. In the overall sample this measure has a mean of 6.14 and a standard deviation of 3.19. After the quantitative data collection, I returned to a few villages and asked respondents how they interpreted this question. Many reported that they rely on others for cooperation, in farming activities for example, but also in helping to care for their children, as well as for advice and information. Table A4.2 in the appendix shows the correlates of social dependency. More socially dependent people in the community tend to be older, female, more educated and ruling party supporters.

If the theory is correct, there should be a positive correlation between social dependency, as measured by individuals’ subjective reports, and turnout in the experiment. This correlation should be mostly driven by respondents in the public condition, given that here is where reputation is at stake and social sanctions may be present. Figure 4.9 shows that the theoretical implications are borne out in the data.

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48 Indeed, principal component analysis confirms that objective measures such as having family outside of the village and frequency of travel outside load on several different dimensions and tend to be highly correlated with gender. More details on the correlates of social dependency are available in Appendix A4.
Figure 4.9: Social dependency and experimental turnout (Wave I, Round 1 - where cost of voting is double in public)

Note: Turnout in the public condition is slightly lower than in the private here because these data from Wave I when the cost of voting was double in the public compared to the private condition. The bars on the bottom of the panels show the distribution of social dependency for respondents in each treatment condition.

Figure 4.9 demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between social dependency and turnout in the experiment. This is true for both private respondents (left panel) and public participants (right panel). There is a difference—though not statistically significant—in the strength of this correlation across treatment conditions and there is a much stronger positive association in the public condition. This makes sense given that more socially dependent individuals will be most likely to vote in the presence of their peers, if social dependency operates through the social norm. The lack of a strong correlation between social dependency levels and turnout in the private condition also indicates that social dependency is distinct from a measure of pro-social personality, such as altruism. If what I refer to as ‘social dependency’ were instead a measure of a respondent’s propensity for pro-social behaviors, we would expect altruistic individuals to vote more even in the private condition, compared to those with weaker pro-social tendencies. While altruistic citizens would vote more regardless
of who is observing, socially dependent individuals are more likely to comply with the norm of voting only in the public condition when their reputation and status are at stake.

Given their varying propensities to comply with the norm of voting, individuals with high and low levels of reliance on the community might vary in their preferences for norm enforcement. Specifically, high socially dependent individuals who are most likely to comply with the norm themselves might favor harsher sanctions for norm violators to encourage others to also comply. To test this logic, I asked respondents in the endline survey in the second wave whether they prefer to ‘play’ the voting game with or without social sanctions the next time. High and low socially dependent respondents differ in opinion. The former prefer sanctions more than the latter. Socially dependent community members prefer the presence of sanctions to induce less dependent individuals to also comply, and curb free riding. This pattern holds, but is attenuated, when respondents are asked about their preferences for sanctions toward abstainers in real elections. This section has demonstrated that individuals vary in their likelihood of complying with the social norm of voting based on how much they rely on the community. Given that there are clear status hierarchies in Tanzania, where women generally fall to the bottom in most communities, the next section investigates whether men and women display distinct behavior in the experiment.

**Gender**

Studies find that women in Tanzania have significantly lower social status than men (Lecoutere, D’Exelle and Van Campenhout, 2015). As low status individuals, women may be eager to comply with community norms, including voting, to avoid further social ostracism. A quote from a 42-year-old widow in Kijima Village in Mwanza Tanzania also illustrates how women perceive their own dependency on the community. Declaring that she completely depends

49 A t-test between high (greater than or equal to the third quartile on the dependency measure 0-10) and low (less than or equal to the first quartile on the dependency measure) dependency respondents shows a .11 difference in means, with a p-value of .015.
on her community, she reasoned "because I am a woman and women don’t have power. [We] are not that strong." Given that Tanzanian women feel as if they are second class citizens and heavily dependent on their community, my theory predicts that women should be more likely to comply with the social norm of voting than men.

The experimental data suggest that women and men respond to the treatment substantively differently. Table 4.3 shows that the public treatment increases the probability that women will vote by about 15 percentage points, compared to women in the private condition. For men, the public treatment increases their probability of voting by 8 percentage points. Though substantively different, this difference in treatment effects is not statistically significant (see model 3 in Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Effect of the public treatment on turnout among women and men (Wave II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>0.147**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public:Female</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.736**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

These subgroup effects serve as a check on the theory about the influence of social depen-

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50 Interview, Kijima, Mwanza, December 14, 2016.
dency as well as its construct. It is unsurprising that women are particularly susceptible to the norm. For decades women who asserted themselves in public in Tanzania were sanctioned by men as well as other women (Fortmann, 1980). In many ways, women are still treated as second class citizens in Tanzania. The data reveal that individuals who self-identify as socially dependent on the community and low status groups, specifically women, are more likely to comply with the social norm of voting. Interestingly, in the 2015 general election women made up a majority (53%) of registered voters.\footnote{This may also be due to the fact that there are more women in Tanzania than men.}

This chapter has thus far presented evidence that a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzania, that social sanctions motivate turnout and that people who heavily rely on the community are most likely to comply with the norm. The following section concludes the discussion of the individual-level analysis with an exploration of who within the community enforces the social norm of voting.

4.2.4 Decentralized norm enforcement

The empirical results suggest that individuals are concerned about what their peers will think of them when deciding whether or not to vote in the presence of others. The results also indicate that community members form negative attitudes about abstainers and respect voters. If we interpret these results as suggestive evidence of the existence of a social norm of voting, we might then wonder: who enforces the norm?

Communities might place restrictions on who can punish norm violators. Social norm enforcement is sometimes relegated to those who have power or influence in the group (Simpson and Willer, 2015). Different types of leaders might be more or less effective at norm enforcement. Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) find that individuals who are elected by the group are more effective at encouraging pro-social behavior and monitoring norms than appointed leaders. Where community leaders exist, and are generated through legitimate processes,
centralized norm enforcement may be more efficient than distributed collective enforcement by community members (Simpson and Willer, 2015).

If norm enforcement is top-down and elite-led, then there should be a large and significant difference between the behavior of public respondents in the *balozi* and teacher groups. Specifically, public groups that include a balozi would have higher turnout given the presence of an informally elected party agent. Balozi are embedded community members who have been directly elected by their households since the early 1960's. Once a ruling-party instrument of control, today balozi have little *de jure* power and some represent opposition parties. Balozi may have greater sanctioning power by virtue of their elected political position in the community and their perceived connection to the government. Balozi may also take a particular interest in enforcing the norm of voting because it may benefit them materially—or emotionally if they think they are helping their party—or they may face pressure from party elites to enforce sanctions. If balozi are the primary norm enforcers, then we should observe significantly higher voting rates in the public balozi groups compared to the teacher groups.

Clientelism theories predict a similar pattern, since balozi are more likely to serve as mobilizing agents compared to teachers. In contrast to clientelist institutions, social norms tend to be horizontally enforced, where compliance is driven by community members themselves. If norm enforcement is decentralized across the entire group that seeks to benefit from norm compliance then there should not be a significant difference in respondents’ behavior in the presence of party elites, compared to non-political elites.

I test this implication by comparing the behavior of non-elite participants who were randomly assigned to either a balozi or teacher public group. Figure 4.10 shows turnout levels for private respondents and public respondents, disaggregated by group type—balozi or teacher. While it is clear that there is a large and statistically distinct difference in turnout between the two treatment conditions, there is not a substantively nor statistically significant difference in turnout between balozi and teacher groups. Table A5.1 shows this
more formally using regression analysis in the appendix.

To be sure that the lack of a significant difference between balozi and teacher groups is not due to the particular subset of data used in the public-private analysis, I examine the public data across both waves and all rounds. Figure 4.11 plots average turnout in balozi and teacher groups for waves I and II, for all rounds. Respondents behave similarly in the presence of balozi or a teacher.

The fact that participants do not significantly adjust their experimental voting behavior in the presence of the balozi, compared to the teacher, suggests that mobilization or fear of sanctions from the balozi is not driving experimental turnout. The absence of a difference between respondent behavior in the different types of public groups suggests that clientelism is not what is producing the experimental results. Ideally, I would also have a pure control group without any local elite present. This was not feasible, however, due to power and budget restrictions. It is unlikely, however, that teachers play a large role in turnout mobilization in rural Tanzania.
Additional evidence that elites are not the main enforcers of the norm comes from survey responses about citizens’ views of the balozi and the teacher. In the endline survey, I asked respondents to rate each of the other group members in terms of their influence on the group. On average, balozi rank no differently than non-elite group members. Teachers are reported to have more influence in the experiment and have more overall respect than average citizens, but not significantly more influence than the balozi.

In addition, I asked enumerators leading the public groups to note which participant, if any, other group members looked at most during the public experiment. This measure was designed to identify who was the most influential in the group, for instance who was speaking up the most during the discussion and whom others were paying attention to. Only in about half of the public groups (55%) was the elite, either teacher or balozi, looked at most during
the game. My enumerators also reported who they thought was influencing others in the public group. In most of the groups (70%), RAs did not identify a single person as directly influencing others in the group. Among the groups in which there was an individual who was influencing others, less than half of the time (40%) was it the balozi or the teacher trying to persuade others.

Enforcement of the social norm of voting in rural Tanzania seems to be decentralized. As is often the case with social norms, monitoring and enforcement does not fall to elites but instead involves the larger community. The evidence suggests that social norms are a mechanism of social control that communities can apply themselves. By establishing shared beliefs and expectations of how others will behave, community members can influence each other’s behavior (Bicchieri, 1990). The next section discusses some limitations of the evidence presented thus far and provides a few concluding thoughts before moving to an analysis of the community-level variables that influence the social norm of voting in Chapter 5.

4.3 Discussion

Taken together, the results presented in this chapter offer strong evidence that a social norm of voting exists in rural Tanzania. The experimental, survey and observational data paint a cohesive picture of voting in poor rural communities in Tanzania. Citizens are more likely to vote, despite the cost, when their turnout behavior is public to their peers and when they face social ostracism. Citizens have clear expectations of how others will behave during elections and how others will view someone who abstains. Voters gain respect from their peers and abstainers anticipate being sanctioned. Compliance with the norm is highest among those who most rely on their community.

There are a couple key limitations of this study that are worth highlighting. First, it is important to note that this study has not empirically tested what percentage of turnout
observed in Tanzania is due to a social norm, compared to clientelism or something else. The intent of the lab-in-the-field experimental design was not to refute clientelism, since clientelism and a social norm of voting can coexist. Instead, the experiment was structured to create a situation in which direct mobilization is absent. Clientelism does not influence the causal estimates of the experiment. Beyond the experiment, I cannot speak to how much variation in turnout is accounted for by elite-driven mobilization versus the social norm. If clientelism were largely responsible for turnout in Tanzania, however, citizens would be unlikely to hold normative attitudes toward voting and individuals would not socially sanction their peers for abstaining. This chapter has presented evidence that suggests there is another, understudied, mechanism that influences turnout.

Second, is the concern of external validity. A cause for concern with any experiment is how well the findings might replicate outside of the controlled laboratory environment. I hypothesize that the experiment actually underestimates the true strength of the social norm of voting in rural Tanzania, for several reasons. First, the audience size in the public group treatment is much smaller than real elections. In the experiment a group of only five participants observe each other, while in the real world a much larger proportion of the community is around on Election Day and can view inked fingers days after. As the experimental results reveal, audience size seems to matter. Second, I expect abstaining to be higher in the experiment than it would be in real life. In the experiment, vote choice is also public knowledge. Participants may have preferred to abstain in the public group, rather than be the only person voting for a different candidate. Thus, the difference in the probability of abstaining between the public and private conditions might have actually been greater if turnout was visible in the public condition but vote choice was secret. Though correlational and limited due to a lack of data, the observational results, using polling station

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52 In other work, I investigate how public groups coordinate their behaviors. It is extremely rare for only one person in the group chooses to select a candidate that differs from the others' preference.
and 2015 electoral data, operate in the same direction as the experimental results, which is encouraging.

Despite these limitations, I believe this lab-in-the-field design improves upon traditional lab experiments because it estimates the impact of social norms in the particular local communities of interest. Lab experiments sometimes struggle to emulate the conditions in which a social norm exists—mainly long lasting relationships. The fact that the experiment was conducted in the relevant local communities among neighbors improves upon studies relying on convenience samples. The next chapter analyzes group-level predictors of norm strength and tests the final hypothesis derived from the theory: more economically dependent communities will have stronger norms of voting.
Mwasubi village is an hour’s drive down a winding dirt road from the center of Misungwi district, forty minutes outside of Mwanza city in north-western Tanzania. A single dirt road traverses the center of the village, connecting its residents to the neighboring village in the next district. The houses in the village, most of which are constructed out of mud with thatched roofs, are separated by large farmland, which makes the village feel very rural. The majority of Mwasubi residents are farmers who grow maize and rice. A few wealthier villagers also have cows.

When the government forced people to move to Mwasubi during the ujamaa villagization process in the 1970’s, there were no public services available. In 1974, at a village meeting, residents decided to start their own primary school. Each family contributed 12,000 TSH (equivalent to about $5 today) to build the school.1 One resident donated the land where the school still stands, in the center of the village. Today the primary school has several blocks of classrooms. The current Misungwi member of parliament got the Tanzania Postal Bank

1 Interview with the first teacher of the primary school.
to sponsor the school. The bank has provided desks, which bear its logo, and reconstructed classroom blocks after the previous mud structure collapsed.

Despite the lack of electricity in the village, community members report that water is their biggest challenge. Currently, there is only a single functioning borehole that was constructed by the government in 2002. This single pump services all 300 households in the village.² There is no health clinic in the village. When in need of medical attention, villagers travel to the government health center six kilometers away. Since almost 40% of households in Mwasubi do not own even a bicycle, when a child is sick parents are forced to pay for transportation to the clinic or rely on the goodwill of others to help finance a motorcycle ride.³

Non-governmental services, such as NGO-sponsored or faith-based development projects, do not exist in Mwasubi. In an interview, the Village Chairman said it would be difficult to survive without the government because the village relies on the government to drill wells and build roads. “Villages cannot dig deep wells by themselves,” he stated.⁴

This sentiment is shared by rural citizens across the country, who emphasize in interviews that they rely on the government. For example, a 21-year-old woman said that “if it wasn’t for the government, then I would haven’t studied at all because it is the only school available here.”⁵ Others said that they need the government for water and because they bring their children to public dispensaries when they are sick. A 72-year-old man suggested that he depends on the government because he sends his sons to public primary school. He said, “there is no private school in our village, even though I couldn’t afford the cost of it, if it was here.”⁶ Local communities’ reliance on the government for basic services is what I term

²This population estimate was provided by the village chairman, but is similar to the reported population from the 2012 Tanzanian census, which was 1889 people.
³Estimate of households owning a bicycle was reported by village chairman in a survey.
⁴Interview, Mwasubi, Mwanza, December 10, 2016.
⁵Interview, Iziwa, Mbeya, February 28, 2017.
⁶Interview, Nsasa, Mbeya, February 14, 2017.
economic dependency and is the subject of this chapter.

This chapter examines the relationship between community-level reliance on government services and the strength of a social norm of voting. The following section describes how I conceptualize and define economic dependency. I discuss how I operationalize it, and list some observable implications that the following sections test. Using case studies of both rural and urban communities, I illustrate the variation in how communities rely on government services and experience the state. Survey data reveal that rural Tanzanian citizens associate voting in elections with an increased likelihood of gaining access to state resources. Combining experimental, observational and administrative data, I test the theoretical argument that social norms of voting are stronger in communities that more heavily rely on government services. The analyses, however, suffer from several data issues discussed below. Though the data do not suggest a particularly strong relationship between economic dependency and turnout in rural Tanzania, other community-level variables, such as the level of political competition, correlate with the strength of the norm. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations and challenges with the quantitative data analysis presented.

5.1 Economic Dependency

Chapter 3 detailed how the ruling party—first TANU and now CCM—uses the promise and delivery of community-level material rewards to encourage mass participation in non-competitive elections. This resource allocation strategy, I argue, helped to inculcate a norm of voting among citizens. Though perhaps initially instigated by the government, these norms persist due to local community maintenance and enforcement. The results presented in the previous chapter reveal that individuals within local rural communities urge their neighbors to vote, nurturing a social norm of voting. The experimental evidence suggests that voting is in part motivated out of a desire to be seen as a helping member of the community in
order to avoid social sanctions from peers. What creates the demand for a social norm of voting within local communities?

The theory proposes that economic dependency serves as the stimulus for a social norm of voting within local communities. As the left side of Figure 5.1 illustrates—and was explained in more detail in Chapter 2—economic dependency creates a consensus among community members that voting is good because high turnout will materially benefit the entire community. This belief creates demand for a social norm of voting because citizens perceive that their neighbor’s decision to vote has positive externalities on their own, and the entire community’s, wellbeing.

![Figure 5.1: Diagram of my theory of social voting](image)

This chapter explores how the strength of the social norm varies across local communities. The theory proposes that communities that are more economically dependent on the government will have stronger norms of voting because of their stronger shared reliance on public goods and demand for a norm. This variation in the strength of the norm makes sense given theories that posit that a greater commonality of individual interest, in line with group interest, will result in greater solidarity of the group (Hechter, 1988).

I conceptualize economic dependency as the reliance on government service provision based on the lack of alternative service providers. The theory suggests that these services, public goods, can stimulate a social norm of voting. If the government were instead handing out solar panels to individual households, a norm would be unlikely to coalesce given that I may increase my own chances of accessing these resources if I vote, but my neighbors would
have no interest in my voting behavior. Because public goods are allocated at the local community level, the local community is the relevant unit or 'group' for analysis.

I measure a community’s level of economic dependency based on the presence of non-government (e.g. private, NGO or faith-based) service providers. Communities that only have access to government schools and clinics are highly dependent on the state. By comparison, communities in which a private school or NGO-funded clinic operate are less reliant on government services due to the existence of these alternatives. The theory predicts that a social norm of voting will be stronger in the village that only has access to government services, compared to those that have access to non-state services.⁷

The more individual interests are in line with the group’s interest, the greater the resulting solidarity of the group. Solidary groups tend to form around common interests and individuals are incentivized to join such groups to access goods they cannot provide themselves (Hechter, 1987). The presence of alternatives to government services reduces community-level economic dependency and introduces heterogeneity within the group. Specifically, non-state service provision creates heterogeneity within the community in terms of how much families rely on the government.⁸ Private health and education services are often more expensive than those provided by the government. Higher prices mean that not everyone can access non-state services. As we will see in the case of Kijima village described below, communities are often divided between those who can afford to use non-state services and those who must rely on those provided by the government. This heterogeneity in the ability to

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⁷A community that completely lacks any access to services, I would characterize as highly dependent on the government because the demand for government services is arguably even greater in such places that are not reached by the state at all, compared to places where a government school exists but is of poor quality. In practice, in the data, there are very few cases of complete lack of services. This is in part due to the policy during ujamaa that every village should have a government primary school. With respect to health, however, in my sample villages 11 do not have any healthcare facility within 5 kilometers. In the following quantitative analyses, I exclude these places and compare only villages that have some access to services.

⁸Note, I am not suggesting that all kinds of heterogeneity within local communities would lead to weaker norms. Income inequality leading to inequality in ability to access private services is what is relevant for the theory. Ethnic heterogeneity or religious diversity should not matter for the strength of the norm of voting.
pay for and access non-government services reduces the group’s solidarity, or commonality of interest. Hence, the norm may begin to break down.

Several observable implications derive from this part of the theory. First, the government should reward loyal areas that demonstrate high turnout in elections with public goods. Second, community members should agree that voting is “good” and citizens will associate voting in elections with getting community-level benefits from the government. Finally, communities that lack alternatives to government services should have stronger norms of voting. Stronger norms of voting should manifest both in stronger preferences for sanctions against abstainers, as well as higher turnout in elections.

While existing studies of elections in developing democracies make similar arguments that individuals are incentivized to vote due to the promise of state resources, my theory extends these traditional pork-barrel politics arguments. In particular, I suggest that the variation in how much communities depend on the state influences the degree to which communities will collectively try to gain greater access to state resources by maximizing turnout. My theory accounts for subnational variation in turnout—based on community characteristics rather than elite strategies—that existing models of clientelism and pork-barrel politics do not. Before testing the hypotheses enumerated above, the following section provides the reader with a description of what economic dependency looks like in both rural and urban areas.

5.1.1 Reliance on Government in Rural and Urban Tanzania

This section illustrates how communities rely on the government for basic services in Tanzania. To give the reader a sense of the variation in economic dependency across the country, I include case studies of both rural and urban communities. At the beginning of this chapter, we got a glimpse of what economic dependency looks like in Mwasubi village, a rural community. Below, we will see another rural village that, due to the presence of faith-based and
NGO-provided services, is less economically dependent than Mwasubi. While the empirical analysis in this dissertation focuses on rural Tanzania, I include a description of urban citizens’ experiences and perspectives to demonstrate that not all communities try to maximize services they receive from the government. Some communities can mobilize their members to self-provide what the government fails to supply.

From November 2016 through February 2017, along with a team of local research assistants (RAs), I conducted 138 interviews with rural and urban Tanzanian citizens. To get a representative picture of rural Tanzania, I randomly sampled a district in Mwanza, and three random villages in that district that were part of my original experimental sample. I also traveled back to Mbeya in southern Tanzania, where the survey and experiment were conducted. Here, I trained a new team of RAs and sent them to villages that had not been previously part of my research activities. RAs conducted interviews in these new villages to examine whether citizens’ attitudes and expectations were similar to villages that were part of the original sample. These new RAs and respondents had no prior knowledge of the experiment.

In Mwanza, I returned to the three randomly sampled villages with my field supervisors to conduct follow up interviews almost a year after we completed the quantitative data collection and more than a year after the 2015 general election. I used this opportunity to spend several days in the same village—which was not possible given the tight timeline during the experimental fieldwork—to have in-depth conversations with community members and gain a better understanding of community life. In addition to conducting interviews and focus group discussions, I also shared the results of the experiment with respondents and got their feedback. For the interviews, I sampled village residents using random walk techniques as well as snowball sampling. Most of the interviews were conducted with individuals who did not participate in the survey and experiment the year before in order to ensure that interview responses were not conditioned on past experience with my research team.
To gain insight into the other (lower) end of the economic dependency spectrum, I collected data on urban residents' perspectives in Dar es Salaam. I selected Dar es Salaam because I had several elite contacts in the city whom I could interview and then ask for other contacts in their networks. I interviewed both middle-class and upper-class citizens as well as party and government officials. I also trained new research assistants, who were not part of the quantitative data collection, on interview techniques. These research assistants lived in the city and some were part of the middle-class communities where they conducted interviews. I gave RAs instructions on what types of interviewees to find and in what neighborhoods, but allowed them to sample based on their existing networks and recommendations from past respondents. This process does not provide a random sample of areas and respondents. Instead, I selected locations and interviewee types to obtain a diverse sample based on age, gender, and occupation. My RAs conducted 38 interviews with citizens in the city. These conversations provide a taste of how urban communities interact with the government, but are not necessarily representative. Rather, the goal of this process was to gain insights into the range of possible ways that citizens rely on, or substitute for, government services within their local community.

**Kijima Village**

While most rural villages in Tanzania heavily rely on government services, there is variation in the degree to which communities can only access government health and education services. The presence of non-state actors who provide these services creates (non-random) variation in how much communities rely on the state. As a point of comparison to Mwasubi village described in the introduction, this section describes Kijima village also located in Misungwi district in Mwanza.

Kijima village is one hour from the center of Misungwi district in the opposite direction as Mwasubi, away from Mwanza town and only 30 minutes off the main tarmac road. Turning
down the road that heads to Kijima, you are greeted by a billboard that reads: *This electricity is provided by the American People.* After arriving in the village center, immediately striking is the line of brick houses on either side of the road, many of which are connected to the electrical grid. Kijima village is large and has nine subvillages and 820 households.9 The subvillages on the periphery of the village are dominated by large farmlands and mud houses, and more closely resemble Mwasubi village than the center of Kijima.

A majority of Kijima residents are farmers and grow cassava. About 10% of households earn income from non-farming activities.10 An estimated 7% of households are connected to the electrical grid. These households lie along the main dirt road that runs through the center of the village and most are constructed out of brick and have tin roofs.11 About 70% of households own a mobile phone, 50% own a bicycle, and a few even have cars. Almost 90% of residents were born in the village and 60% sometimes travel outside of the village for work or pleasure. While this description may make it seem like Kijima is much wealthier than Mwasubi, poverty estimates suggest that in both villages about 80% of residents live on less than $1.25 per day.12

Similar to Mwasubi, the Kijima village chairman reports that water is the biggest problem facing the village. In March 2016, the government implemented a rural electrification project that was co-financed by the American government (USAID). There is a clinic in the village that is run by the Africa Inland Church (AIC). Kijima villagers were also recently compelled by the village government to contribute 13,800 TSH per household (about $6) to help construct a government dispensary in the neighboring village, which is not yet open.

There are two primary schools in the village, but only one is operating. The other is still

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9The 2012 Tanzanian census stated that Kijima village has a population of 4393.
10For example, I spoke to a 28-year-old son who lives in one of the brick houses with electricity in the center of the village, whose parents own a milling station to process cassava.
11The village chairman told me that many of the more educated villagers, who now have access to electricity in their cement houses with tin roofs, are former government employees or businessmen and have connections and relatives in Mwanza city.
being constructed. The schools are about two kilometers apart from each other. Though both primary schools are run by the government, their construction has been supported by NGO partners. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and CARE international helped to build classroom blocks at the schools.\textsuperscript{13} During the colonial era, the village was a missionary post and at the time the church ran a secondary school, but it was taken over by the government in 1974 when private schools were nationalized. The secondary school subsequently failed due to mismanagement.

A primary school teacher, who has worked in Kijima primary school for 11 years but is not originally from the village, said that the community does not rely on the government very much (“sio sana”). He said, referring to villagers, “they expect the government to provide water because it’s a big problem - but that’s the only thing they need the government for.” Villagers had the opportunity to directly ask the government for water services when the MP returned to the village in August 2016 to thank villagers for supporting him in the 2015 general election. When citizens asked him about the water he had promised to bring from Lake Victoria, he said that the government had stopped all funds and he could not say when the budget would be released. He again promised that he would bring them water. The village chairman suggested that most residents were satisfied with the MP’s response.\textsuperscript{14}

While it is likely the case that individuals and communities would like to maximize the resources they receive from the government, communities differ in how much they do this through nurturing and enforcing a social norm of voting. As discussed above, the demand for a norm of turnout may be diminished in places where the community is divided in terms of its reliance on the government. Kijima residents, for instance, are divided in terms of the degree to which they rely on government services.

Even before observing this division, I heard about it during my first interview in the

\textsuperscript{13}World Vision also provided different development projects to the village and FAO has also provided villagers with food aid.

\textsuperscript{14}Interview, Kijima, Mwanza, December 13, 2016.
village with the school teacher. He told me that there is a split between two groups in the village—the more educated residents who live in the center of the village along the dirt road (who are also wealthier) and the farmers who live on the outskirts of the village closer to their farms. Through conversations with residents in both areas of the village, this division became evident. Many of the poorer farmers reported that they try to avoid using the AIC clinic because it is “very expensive”. Many respondents said that they mostly use a government health center in another village, even though it is 9 kilometers away, because their services are cheaper. According to one respondent, giving birth in the AIC dispensary costs 25,000-30,000 TSH ($11-$13), while giving birth at the government health center in Misasi costs 3,000 TSH ($1). Given that approximately 80% of village residents live on less than $1.25 per day, the AIC clinic prices are unaffordable for most.\textsuperscript{15} A few wealthier residents, however, stated that they prefer the AIC clinic because it has better services, medicine is always available, and the prices are “very fair”.\textsuperscript{16} These divergent perspectives provide context for the theoretical argument that the presence of non-state services makes salient heterogeneity in community members’ ability to afford and access non-state services.

I cannot say whether or not the presence of non-state services creates or simply highlights this division in the community. Regardless, the fact that Kijima has a non-government clinic that some residents use means that there is heterogeneity in community members’ reliance on government services. While it may be in every citizens’ interest to increase government services in Kijima, some residents are less invested in this endeavor than others by nature of their ability to access alternatives.

While similarly rural, Mwasubi and Kijima differ in their degree of economic dependency. In Kijima, non-state services are available and accessible to some residents. The profiles of these two villages should give the reader a better sense of variation in economic dependency.

\textsuperscript{15}WorldPop Poverty Estimates. http://www.worldpop.org.uk/
\textsuperscript{16}Interview, Mwasubi, Mwanza, December 13, 2016.
within rural areas. Interestingly, from the lab-in-the-field experiment, village turnout was 100% in Mwasubi and 87.5% in Kijima, as we might expect given the higher degree of economic dependency in Mwasubi.17 Next, I discuss what economic dependency looks like in Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam.

**Dar es Salaam**

On the other end of the spectrum, an almost complete lack of reliance on government services exists in some wealthy urban communities in Tanzania, due to the plethora of private alternatives. The difference in the supply of non-governmental service provision is striking even when comparing across regions. In the greater Dar es Salaam area, with a population of around 4 million people, there are 600 health facilities, 60% of which are private and 13% are run by faith-based organizations. Comparatively, Mwanza region, which has a population of 2.8 million people mostly living in rural areas, has 362 health facilities, 19% of which are private and 7% are faith-based.18 Dar es Salaam residents clearly have greater access to non-governmental service provision based purely on the number of facilities operating.

Upper-class residents in Dar es Salaam often prefer private alternatives to dysfunctional or poor government services. For instance, urban residents have their own generators to power their houses and buy bottled water, rather than relying on government taps (Banerjee, Morella et al., 2011, 48). Private citizens sometimes even tackle major public infrastructure projects on their own, instead of relying on the government.

One woman who lives and works in Dar es Salaam described how her community deals with poor road conditions. She mentioned that there is a man in her neighborhood in Msasani—a wealthy community on the peninsula—who owns a construction company. Every so often, this man runs his own grader through the streets to level out the road instead of waiting for the government to do it.

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17 Phase 1, round 1 data.
18 Government of Tanzania health facility data. [http://www.opendata.go.tz/](http://www.opendata.go.tz/)
While interviewing city residents and reading through the reports from my research assistants, the first thing that struck me was the availability and ease of access to non-state services. Respondents who I would have initially assumed could not afford private services, often reported using them. Similar to the case of Kijima, the availability of non-government services in the area means that there will be heterogeneity in community members’ need for, reliance on, and willingness to nurture a social norm of voting to access government services.

One of my research assistants interviewed a 27-year-old declaration officer who lives in a large gated house in the Mbezi beach neighborhood in Dar. When asked about whether people in his neighborhood depend on the government in any way, he responded:

In our area we don’t depend on government at all, but we are just doing our own things together. Since from the local government we do not get any kind of cooperation. That is why when we have anything or problem, we just organize and contribute for ourselves to solve our own issues. For example, you have seen that road outside it was very rough and the government did nothing for that. Therefore we decided ourselves to contribute some money about 800,000 TSH [$350] from 20 households and we mobilize each other. Especially my father was very [active] on mobilizing others since we had to wait for a long period of time for the government to come and fix the problem. But unfortunately [the government] did not make it and we decided to do it on our own. [We rented] the caterpillar per day and we made it as you can see that road. It was our own power and contribution.

Evidently, in wealthier neighborhoods there are other ways, outside of elections, that communities come together to improve public services and infrastructure. When questioned about the presence of government and non-government services in his community, the same respondent replied:

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Most services, such as education and health services, in our area are non-government services. And most people in our area have health insurance. For example, there are two hospitals which are most [used] in our community, which are Masana hospital and Rabinisia hospital. And we have a private school, which is St Mary’s secondary school. Most people access services from [the] private sector because they have got quality services compared to government services. About 95% of our people in [the] community use non-government services and 5% of people use government services.

This respondent revealed that he did not vote in the 2015 general election. He said that he cannot envision another party besides CCM coming to power because CCM uses police force “to stop people who fight for their right.” He believed he knew the outcome of the election even before it happened, and saw voting as a waste of time.

A 23-year-old women, resident of the Masaki neighborhood in Dar es Salaam, described the lack of interaction between people in her neighborhood, where expatriates and Tanzanians live together. Most of the houses on her street are locked behind large gates, some with private security guards. She said that when she was growing up there were other kids in the area who she played with, but today she just stays inside her house or goes out to do her own business and then comes back. “People keep to themselves in this area.”

Similarly, she said that most people who can afford it prefer to use private schools and clinics. In her neighborhood, some parents send their kids to public schools, while others send their children to private ones. “It depends on your cash.” She went to public primary school and private secondary school. Her younger siblings went to private schools throughout. Her parents are government employees. Her father is an engineer and her mother is an accountant. When asked about whether this area depends on the government in any way, she replied, “This neighborhood does not depend on the government.” After some reflection,

19 Both hospitals are privately owned and operated.
she added, “Most parents are employed by government, so they depend on it for jobs but not services. People go to private clinics.” When asked about voting, she said “It’s someone’s own decision to go and vote, or not” and she indicated that no one would care if someone in this area stayed home on Election Day. The context of infrequent interaction with neighbors and a lack of reliance on government services make it improbable that a social norm of voting would exist in areas like this.

A conversation that I had with a young professional, working for a NGO in the city further demonstrates the lack of a social norm of voting in urban communities. She lives in a rented house in Sinza, a lower middle-class neighborhood in Dar es Salaam. She rarely interacts with her neighbors. Most of her friends are from university and said she doesn’t have a single friend in her neighborhood despite having lived there for six years. “People are renting...you can’t keep up with who is in or out,” she said. She said she only discusses politics with her friends when there is some sort of scandal. 2015 was her first time voting. Normally she does not bother to vote, and she said a week after the election none of her friends were talking about it. She guessed that about 86% of the people in her neighborhood send their children to private schools, because people think private schools provide a better education. Most of her neighbors are employed and have health insurance, so they use private clinics and hospitals.

While I am unable to quantify the differences in attitudes toward voting between rural and urban areas, the way in which urban residents discuss elections and voting is qualitatively different from how rural residents do. Urban respondents were much more open about saying that they did not vote in the 2015 election. When I probed, there did not appear to be any consequences for abstaining in most urban communities. It is also much more challenging to know whether your neighbors voted in urban areas due to the density of polling stations.

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21 Interview, Dar es Salaam, January 26, 2017.
and less frequent interactions, compared to the village setting.

A program officer for a national foundation summarized exactly what my theory proposes. He said rural citizens are motivated to vote to get services, while urban residents who are less reliant on government services think to themselves ‘the government does not give me anything, why should I queue for a long time to vote?’ 22 He said that urban citizens do not observe any improvements in their lives over time under the same party, and while some will show up to vote for the opposition, many believe that the opposition are just as corrupt. Those citizens decide not to ‘waste their time’ voting in elections. He also mentioned that because urban residents have access to private services, which are better than public services, they ask themselves ‘why should I vote for government services that are bad?’ Along similar lines, a respondent in Masaki suggested that rural citizens vote because their streets are not improved, because they lack access to clean water and electricity. 23 Rural citizens want development, so they vote. 24

Of course, within urban areas there are slums that may be similar to rural villages in terms of their inability to access non-state services. It is beyond the scope of the current project to investigate these areas. One potentially important distinction between urban slums and rural villages is that slums are often informal or illegal. Therefore, residents might not feel like they can make the same sorts of claims on the state that rural residents feel is their right, through voting. It is also possible that instead of allocating or promising public goods to these areas, politicians instead use vote buying strategies to mobilize turnout. Finally, in urban Tanzania, electoral politics is more competitive than in rural areas. My initial interviews with residents in slums in Dar es Salaam suggest that citizens are motivated to

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22 Interview, Dar es Salaam, February 3, 2017. He brought up this distinction between private and public service providers without prompting.
23 Within wealthy urban communities there are also poorer residents who cannot afford private schools and clinics. While these individuals would encourage and support a social norm of voting to increase government services in the area, they will be hard-pressed to achieve and enforce such a norm given a majority of community members do not share this sentiment.
turn out based on their perceptions of the closeness of the race. I leave a further investigation of norms within urban informal settlements to future work.

This section has provided qualitative interview evidence to demonstrate the variation in how rural and urban communities rely on the state for basic social services. The next section describes the ways in which the Tanzanian government has rewarded high turnout areas with public goods and presents more systematic survey evidence that citizens associate voting in elections with improving community development.

5.1.2 Government Rewards and Citizen Attitudes

Economic dependency is relevant for the theory of turnout in Tanzania because even today the government uses rural communities’ reliance on public services to its advantage. By selectively rewarding communities that display high turnout in elections with more public goods, the government continues to promote the idea that voting may result in group-level rewards. My original survey data and qualitative interviews indicate that this pattern of resource allocation is recognized by citizens who perceive an association between voting in elections and accessing government services.

Existing studies present evidence that suggests that the Tanzanian government rewards high turnout communities with resources. As previously explained in Chapter 3, scholars have found that CCM allocates more water points to high turnout areas (Carlitz, 2016), as well as more welfare funds per capita to high turnout communities (Baird, McIntosh and Özler, 2013). Different from turnout buying, CCM engages in loyalty buying by also allocating more federal grants to districts in which they win my large margins (Weinstein, 2011). Although studies have not documented the allocation of rewards of health and education facilities (the sectors I focus on in the quantitative analysis below), I have no reason to believe that these should be any different than water and welfare.

\footnote{For a full discussion please see Chapter 3.}
Interviews with citizens consistently corroborated findings from existing studies that government civil servants use the promise of resources to mobilize voters. One 33-year-old female farmer in Isuto village in Mbeya said that before the 2015 general election, “at my village people who were eligible to vote were mobilized under the influence of village executive officer who promised many gifts, including pembejoe [agricultural supplies] if the ruling party candidate won.”26 I argue that these kinds of interactions, in addition to observing the subsequent allocation of goods to high turnout areas, are what create citizens’ belief that voting in elections can bring benefits.

What other studies have not yet demonstrated is that Tanzanian citizens view elections as an opportunity to enhance their community’s welfare. To understand whether citizens associate voting in elections with accessing government goods, my research assistants and I probed these questions during in-depth interviews. These conversations complement survey evidence and provide additional insight into how rural villagers think about voting and elections.

While the nuances of financing development projects may be a mystery to the average citizen, the political game of rewards and punishments is clear. Evident from the way that Tanzanian citizens discuss democracy, development and elections is the fact that they view voting as serving the critical purpose of improving community development. When asked whether there are any social or economic benefits to voting, one elderly respondent replied that “public schools, clinics, water infrastructure and dispensary are results of the election.”27 Another woman from the same village said that, “we vote to select leaders who are the representatives of our problems like, shortage of water supply, poor roads, insufficient school classes, electricity problems”28 Another young female farmer said, “people vote in election so as to choose a leader they what whom they trust can rule them well and bring them

26 Interview, Isuto, Mbeya, February 13, 2017.
27 Interview, Nsasa, Mbeya, February 14, 2017.
28 Interview, Nsasa, Mbeya, February 14, 2017.
development” 29 Citizens believe that voting in elections will lead to “good” leaders being selected who will bring development to the community that supported them. As discussed in the previous chapter, further evidence that citizens associate voting and elections with greater government goods, is the fact that individuals who abstain are seen as “not a good person” and as someone who “doesn’t want the community to develop”. 30

To test this idea more systematically, I analyze responses from my original panel survey. When asked if voting helps the community in any way, overall 90% of respondents answer in the affirmative. 31 Before I asked this question in the endline survey, I primed a subset of respondents to think about how they depend on the government. The enumerator probed public respondents to consider and discuss the ways in which they need and rely on the government. This dependency discussion treatment was randomly assigned at the group level among respondents in the public condition. Not only is there a consensus in the aggregate that voting helps the community, but this belief becomes more salient when respondents first considered their reliance on the government. Specifically, 94% of respondents who participated in the dependency discussion report that voting helps the community, compared to 86% of control respondents. 32

After asking whether voting aids the community, I inquired as to how voting helps. In an open-ended question, 30% of respondents specifically mention that voting brings development. For example, one respondent said “It will help in development in terms schools, hospitals and roads”. Additionally, 59% of respondents report that voting helps by electing ‘good leaders’. Although these respondents do not specifically mention community development, my interviews suggest that citizens most often think of a ‘good leader’ as someone who provides services to the community. Other respondents said, “If you get a good leader,

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31 Source: Author’s original panel survey described in Chapter 4.
32 The difference in means is statistically significant at the 10% level.
you will get development,"\textsuperscript{33} and they vote “to gain education and medical development.”\textsuperscript{34}

The interview and survey data illustrate that citizens view voting as a way to improve community development by accessing state resources. Building on what other studies have shown—that the government rewards high turnout areas with state resources—I have demonstrated that this allocation strategy creates a consensus among community members that voting is good because it serves as a mechanism to materially help the community. The following section uses quantitative data to test the idea that variation in economic dependency is associated with variation in the strength of the social norm of voting.

5.1.3 Quantitative Analysis of Economic Dependency

This section tests whether turnout is higher in more economically dependent communities (i.e., those that rely more heavily on government services due to a lack of alternatives) compared to communities that are less reliant on the government due to the presence of alternative service providers. In addition, I test whether members of more economically dependent communities have stronger preferences for sanctioning abstainers. The following analysis is severely limited by data issues and, while the results are generally consistent with the theory, is not particularly compelling. I discuss the data issues and limitations of the analysis below.

In an ideal world, I would gain leverage on the question of whether economic dependency influences turnout by examining exogenous variation in how much communities rely on government services. My efforts to search for such an instance in Tanzania were unsuccessful. I spoke with one NGO that drills boreholes in communities that apply for and self-manage these water points. While there is some randomness as to whether the NGO is able to drill a borehole in a particular community, due to variation in soil suitability, there were not enough

\textsuperscript{33}The answer in kiswahili was, \textit{Ukipata kiongozi bora utapata maendeleo.}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Kupata maendeleo ya elimu na matibabu.}

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cases of drilling failures to warrant further exploration and data collection. In addition, I tried to use the historical ujamaa villagization process as a treatment, since the policy made villages completely reliant on government services. While others have tried to instrument for the villagization process (Osafo-Kwaako, 2011), this method proved problematic for my analysis since by 1978 almost 90% of the Tanzanian population lived in registered villages. In my sample villages, only four in Kilimanjaro were not registered villages by 1978. However, when I look at the intensity of villagization across districts in Tanzania I do find that districts that had more people living in registered villages have higher turnout in elections decades later. This correlation is consistent with the theory since villagization made communities completely reliant on government services, however this bivariate correlation is far from conclusive evidence. Osafo-Kwaako (2011) similarly found that villagization increased turnout in the 1970 election, but this finding is not statistically significant. Due to the lack of a viable identification strategy, the following analysis looks at the correlation between endogenous economic dependency and turnout.

To measure community-level economic dependency, I use the presence of health and education services. Despite the fact that water is a salient issue in rural communities, there is very minimal non-state provision of water. While I have data on the location and functionality of water points across the country, I do not have information on who provided the pumps. Other large infrastructure projects, such as roads and electricity are similarly largely provided by the government, or subcontractors. While private provision in the case of electricity exists in the form of personal generators, this is not a public good and would therefore not stimulate a social norm of voting. Health and education are important development sectors for which I have data and there is variation in service providers.

In the following analysis, I use a binary measure of economic dependency. I code villages as having high economic dependency when they are completely reliant on government services (i.e., when there are no private primary schools or non-government health facilities within
five kilometers of the village).\textsuperscript{35} Low economic dependency villages are those that have private, faith-based or other non-government service providers in the area. I prefer this binary measure to a continuous measure—the percentage of health and education facilities in the area operated by the government, for instance—because the presence of any non-government services highlights village-level heterogeneity in households’ abilities to pay for and access such services. This heterogeneity reduces the demand for and strength of a norm of voting due to the variation in individuals’ interests in using turnout to enhance access to government services. This intra-community division exists whether there is a single private school or more.

The government of Tanzania’s data on health facilities and primary schools indicate that the vast majority of these services are provided by the government. Of the 17,352 primary schools in the country, 93% are government-owned and only 7% are private. There are 7,071 health facilities in Tanzania, 73% of which are operated by the government, 13% are faith-based, and 14% are private. I have a sample of 85 rural villages, in which I conducted the panel survey and experiment, described in the previous chapter. In this sample there are 450 primary schools and 290 health facilities.

As we might expect, variation in economic dependency is geographically clustered and correlated with village-level poverty. While NGO services are sometimes targeted to the most needy areas, private schools and health facilities instead go where demand for such services is high, in wealthy, urban areas. As the case studies illustrate, citizens’ reliance on the government differs greatly in rural and urban areas. Rural areas are much more likely to only have access to state services, compared to urban areas. For example, on average 15% of health facilities in rural wards in Tanzania are not operated by the government. The same statistic in urban wards in Tanzania is 59%. Figure 5.2 displays the positive

\textsuperscript{35}I use the government of Tanzania’s data on the location and ownership of education and health facilities in the country. The data include the geolocation of these facilities in the country. There are 36 health facilities within my sample districts that are missing location information.
correlation between poverty—the percent of the ward population living on less than $2 per
day—and economic dependency, measured as the percent of health facilities in the ward that
are operated by the government.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.2.png}
\caption{Correlation between poverty and economic dependency—measured as the lack of non-
state service provision—for all of Tanzania}
\end{figure}

To check the validity of my binary measure of economic dependency, I test whether it is
correlated with citizens' own perceptions of how much their community relies on the govern-
ment. In the endline of the panel survey, I asked respondents to consider, “On a scale from
0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you think your community
relies on the central government for basic services?” In the full sample, respondents rate
their community’s reliance on the government at 7.3, on average. A correlation test reveals
that this subjective measure and my objective measure of economic dependency have a Pear-
son correlation coefficient of .27, which achieves statistical significance at the conventional
level. Respondents in villages with access to non-government health and education services
rate their community’s reliance on the government at 6.8 on the 0-10 scale. Those living in
villages that solely rely on government services rate their dependence on the government at

\textsuperscript{36}I use a continuous measure of economic dependency here simply for ease of visualizing the data.
7.5.37 This correspondence between the subjective survey measure of economic dependency and the facility data provides greater confidence that the objective measure is capturing the correct concept. Next, I observe whether electoral turnout varies for villages with high and low economic dependency.

**Experimental and observational turnout**

If the theorized relationship between economic dependency and turnout is correct, places that do not have any alternatives to state services should exhibit higher turnout. Figure 5.3 plots ward-level turnout in the 2015 general election for the wards in which my villages fall.38 Turnout is higher in places that rely more on government services (high economic dependency), as expected. Average turnout in the 2015 general election for ward councilor was 61% in high economic dependency wards, compared to 56% in low economic dependency wards that do not solely rely on government services. This difference in average turnout between high and low dependency wards is statistically significant at 5%.

Though a decent proxy, the ward level is not the correct unit for analysis based on the theory. The norm of voting is said to operate at the village level, since this is the unit within which turnout is most visible. The ward, however, is the lowest administrative unit recognized by the government. For the provision of basic services, wards matter a lot. Wards make up districts in Tanzania. The district councils are responsible for primary education, health, agricultural extension services and local road maintenance. These resources are funded and regulated by the central government but provided at the district level. On the district council, ward councilors must lobby on the behalf of their area to gain development resources. One can imagine that this task is easier in places that have demonstrated higher turnout. Ward councilors are also elected every five years during national elections and are

37 The difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level.
38 The ward is the smallest administrative unit in Tanzania. Turnout data below the ward level, for example polling station, is not centrally collected by the government.
largely evaluated based on their provision of services. Given that wards are the lowest level at which representatives have discretion over resource allocation, the ward is a suitable unit of analysis when looking at economic dependency. Ideally, I would be able to replicate these results using the village as the unit of observation.

Since the government does not centrally collect, or at least release, polling station-level turnout data, I organized a team of research assistants to do this. Collecting this data for the thousands of polling stations in the country was impossible given time and cost constraints. Therefore, I limited the data gathering activities to the villages in which I conducted the experiment. In the end, I was able to collect turnout data from the 2015 election for only 36 villages in my sample. The success of collecting polling station data was due to the presence of opposition candidates (I worked closely with the lead opposition party in Mbeya region to collate this data), as well as varying levels of enumerator connections and effort.

Figure 5.4 displays village-level turnout from the experiment (left panel) and the 2015 general election (right panel) for high and low economic dependency villages. These village-level data do not present strong evidence for the theory. In both panels, there is essentially
no difference in turnout between high and low economic dependency villages.

The lack of any clear difference in these data may be due to several factors. First, is the issue of data availability. Since I was only able to collect polling station-level turnout data for a little over a third of all the villages in my sample, the analysis suffers from a small number of observations. It is also possible that missingness in these data is correlated with economic dependency. Second, the administrative data that I use to assess the presence of health and education facilities is incomplete. Some facilities in the data are missing geographic location information and therefore get dropped from the analysis. When I verify the administrative data against the data I collected in a few study villages, however, the existing facilities do seem to be fairly accurate. Third, there is minimal variation in economic dependency in my sample rural villages. I would expect to find much stronger results had I conducted the experiment in urban and rural areas of Tanzania. However, I wanted to first focus on identifying the presence of a social norm of voting before exploring variation in its strength.
and for this reasons focused on rural areas. Finally, it is possible that in some places, or for certain types of facilities, it is challenging for citizens to identify whether health and education facilities are public or private. Often development projects are co-financed and implemented both by state and non-state actors, creating confusion as to who is responsible. If citizens are not able to identify private institutions as such, it would be unlikely that I would find a strong correlation between economic dependency and turnout.

**Preferences for social sanctions**

In addition to turnout, the preference for sanctions against abstainers serves as an additional indicator of norm strength. In the endline survey, I asked respondents to consider whether people who abstain in elections should face any consequence? In high economic dependency villages, 75% of individuals respond yes, that abstainers should face sanctions. In low economic dependency villages 57% of respondents prefer sanctions. The data suggest that there is a stronger preference for sanctions in places that more heavily rely on government services.

Due to data limitations and shortcomings of the analysis, I have not been able to present strong evidence in support of the idea that economic dependency influences the strength of the social norm of voting in rural Tanzania. The next section looks beyond economic dependency at other community-level variables that influence the strength of the norm—mainly, political competition.

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39 The question read, “Do you think people who do not vote should face any consequences?” and respondents answered “yes”, “no” or “don’t know”.

40 The difference in means is statistically significant at the 5% level.
5.2 Other Predictors of Norm Strength

This section examines another community-level variable that should correlate with the strength of a social norm of voting—the level of political competition. I selected the three regions of study specifically to be able to observe how variation in political competition corresponds to variation in the social norm of voting. Above, I suggested that a social norm of voting is most likely to exist in less competitive areas. In such contexts, neighbors need not be concerned with their neighbors’ vote choice, and can instead simply monitor turnout behavior. As elections become more competitive, at the subnational and national levels, the social norm of voting might shift to become a social norm of vote choice. I elaborate on this idea in the next chapter. Here, I examine how the strength of the norm varies by the levels of electoral competition at the ward level.

Within my sample of rural villages there is variation in the degree of electoral competition. Using data from the 2015 general election, I measure electoral competition using the margin of victory for ward councilors, the lowest level representative elected during national elections. This gives me the greatest amount of variation in my sample, since each of my sample villages is located in a different ward. In my sample, the margin of victory for ward councilors ranges from less than one percent to 80%.

Figure 5.5 displays experimental turnout for public and private respondents across levels of competition. As the margin of victory increases along the x-axis, competition decreases and the gap between public and private turnout increases. The data suggest that the social norm of voting is strongest—evident by the large gap between public and private voting—in the least competitive wards. The stronger effect of the public treatment condition in less competitive areas indicates that individuals may be more fearful of social sanctions in these places.41

41This relationship holds when controlling for the party of the winning ward councilor and including village and enumerator fixed effects (see Table A7.1 in the appendix).

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Figure 5.5: Experimental turnout across levels of political competition

Note: The histogram on the bottom indicates the distribution of the margin of victory for ward councilor elections in my sample villages. The jittered data rug at the top and bottom of the graph indicate the experimental voting data.

More concretely, in non-competitive places, with winning margins greater than 25% (the sample mean), the public treatment increases the probability of voting by 18 percentage points, compared to the private. In competitive villages, with vote margins less then 25%, the public treatment increases the probability of voting only by 6 percentage points. The results suggest, as expected, that a social norm of voting is stronger in less politically competitive communities in rural Tanzania. It is in these locales where peers can focus on monitoring turnout behavior and do not need to be concerned with how their neighbors will vote.

This chapter has explored community-level variables that influence the social norm of voting. Case studies of rural and urban communities illustrated how much variation there is in attitudes about whether voting helps the community access government resources. While there is a lack of a consensus in urban areas that voting is worthwhile, interviews and
survey data from rural Tanzania suggest that these citizens view elections as an opportunity to access state resources. Although the quantitative analysis of the correlation between economic dependency and turnout is inconclusive, I do find that communities that more heavily rely on government services prefer stronger sanctions against abstainers. I also find that the social norm of voting is strongest in non-competitive communities. The next chapter concludes by summarizing the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, discussing the contributions of this study and the broader implications it has for understanding voting and elections in developing democracies.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation has presented evidence of an important, yet understudied, solution to the puzzle of high turnout in elections with foregone conclusions—a social norm of voting. While it may not be surprising that a social norm of voting exists, this study has empirically documented its presence in a least-likely context—in poor rural communities in a semi-authoritarian state. Using Tanzania as the empirical test case, survey, experimental and observational data suggest that individuals are motivated to turn out on Election Day by a desire to avoid social sanctions from their peers. Citizens have clear expectations of how others will behave during elections and anticipate negative repercussions, like not being allowed to complain about the government, if they abstain. The desire to avoid social sanctions is a powerful motivator, especially among those most dependent on their local community.

This project advances the turnout literature by moving beyond conventional paradigms to show that the interaction between group-level economic incentives and individual-level social motivations can explain subnational variation in turnout among rural voters in dominant-party regimes. Traditional theories cannot explain why, nor predict when, community members monitor and sanction each other’s electoral behavior. My theory demonstrates how a
social norm of voting creates accountability between individuals, which helps to explain this observed behavior.

The purpose of this study was not to refute conventional explanations of turnout in developing democracies. Hence, the results I presented do not speak to the relative influence of social incentives versus individual material interest to vote. This project, however, demonstrates that we need to broaden our understanding of turnout beyond clientelism and coercion paradigms. The theory and evidence presented indicate that poor citizens are not merely passive receivers of gifts or threats, but have agency. Despite the plethora of reasons offered as to why citizens decide to cast their ballots on Election Day, social-psychological motivations have until recently been under-explored in developing democracies. A broader scholarly focus that incorporates citizens’ material and non-material incentives is, I believe, necessary to comprehend the motivations for political engagement.

My research also highlights the undeniable fact that citizens are social beings. Despite the tendency for political scientists and economists to conceptualize voting as an individual, private act, my research demonstrates that the communities in which citizens live exert a strong influence on individual turnout behavior. This study draws attention to the need to systematically account for how one’s local community affects individual political behavior. In addition to improving our understanding of why rural citizens vote in non-competitive elections, this dissertation also provides broader insights into democratic accountability, the endurance of authoritarian regimes and the implications of aid distribution in the developing world.

6.1 Horizontal Accountability and Civic Citizens

Elections are often viewed as the backbone of democracy because they provide a mechanism for citizens to hold their leaders accountable. Though rulers use high turnout to demonstrate
their electoral support and the legitimacy of their rule, these statistics can be deceiving. In reality, high turnout might instead signal a shared sense of civic duty to one’s local community, rather than to the state.

My research calls attention to a different facet of democratic accountability that elections can produce—interpersonal accountability. Though elections are considered to be a tool for ensuring government accountability, voting does not necessarily serve to sanction or select candidates. Similarly, high turnout does not necessarily signal legitimacy of or faith in the regime. Rather, voting indicates horizontal accountability within, and duty to, a local community.

Given this particular accountability relationship, voting in elections may serve as the training ground for a different kind of civic-minded democrat than we typically assume. Rather than breeding citizens with a sense of duty to the state, elections can instead produce locally-oriented, civic-minded citizens through the presence of social norms. Social norms, rather than elections per se, can produce socially accountable citizens. “When we become accountable to one another, we effect a normatively significant modification in our relations with each other...we are in a position to hold one another to account and to demand and expect things of one another” (Brennan et al., 2013, 37). When citizens circumscribe their own behavior based on local community norms, the regime’s cost of social control can be reduced as the next section articulates.

6.2 Authoritarian Stability

The local accountability network established by the social norm of voting also has implications for how we understand regime stability. In particular, in the presence of a social norm of voting, regimes may need not rely on campaigns of terror, clientelism or coercion to achieve social control and engender electoral turnout. Rather, driven by incentives of
pork distributed at the local level, communities nurture self-enforcing norms of voting to signal to the state their support and desire for goods. In such instances, “...the sanctioning power attached to breaches of local social norms may be considerable, while the reach of state institutions is often limited and their legitimacy poorly internalized” (Ensminger and Henrich, 2014, 32).

In the absence of the social norm of voting, the Tanzanian regime, for example, would perhaps have a harder time retaining control of the populace. At a minimum, the regime would need to engage in more costly forms of electoral mobilization to maintain high turnout in elections. Clientelism and coercion strategies not only come at a higher financial cost, but are also politically costly, as they can hurt the regime’s domestic or international reputation.

Where state control falls short, self-enforcing norms—such as those that I document in Tanzania—can help to prop up under-performing autocrats. States that know how to take advantage of such localized methods of social control can then abandon “more costly and dubiously effective policies of social control” (Bicchieri, 2005, 63). Autocrats might therefore be able to remain in power while exerting minimal effort. This study, therefore, highlights a low cost and low effort mechanism that semi-authoritarian states can use to survive. Future research should explore the pervasiveness of this method of social control in other regimes.

6.3 Aid in the Developing World

My theory also speaks to several issues related to the role of aid in developing democracies. Across the globe, billions of dollars have been spent on “democracy promotion”, often in the form of civic education that emphasize the right to vote, and processes to ensure free and fair electoral contests. This dissertation suggests that donors need to reevaluate the metrics they use to measure democratic performance and legitimacy. As the case of rural Tanzania illustrates, statistics such as turnout rates may not be capturing the kind of citizen-state
relations that donors claim to be promoting.

In addition, this study highlights the importance of considering local community dynamics and social incentives when seeking to promote political participation. Understanding local contexts and motivations are important for changing behavior. More importantly, donors should carefully consider the normative question of whether promoting turnout in elections in semi-authoritarian regimes is worthwhile, especially given the hefty price tag. Donors may believe that the act of voting is a critical experience that allows citizens to learn civic skills, which are important for democracy even when government accountability is weak. But it is worth examining whether turnout is the right behavior to target for democracy promotion, especially when it comes at the cost of ignoring other potentially important civic learning experiences—such as peaceful protest and direct claim-making.

In addition to money earmarked for democracy promotion, Tanzania and many other developing countries receive large amounts of aid for development. If economic dependency influences norm creation, as the theory posits, policy makers should carefully consider how resources are distributed. Donors' decisions about whether to channel funds through the state bureaucracy or give directly to projects on the ground, likely have implications for how citizens engage with the state. Specifically, as the theory suggests, if aid is sent directly to projects for on-the-ground implementation, donors may reduce local reliance on the government. It is an open question whether citizen reliance on state services is good or bad for democracy.

If increased non-state service provision contributes to lower voting rates, this also raises a host of normative questions. Should aid agencies give directly to communities even if it means decreased political participation? Again, is higher turnout in semi-authoritarian elections something to be encouraged? A growing literature investigates how aid blurs lines of accountability between citizens and the state, but these additional questions of whether bypass aid influences turnout, and political participation more broadly, are also important
to consider. The next section considers where else my social theory of voting applies.

6.4 Scope Conditions

This study has examined the influence of a social norm of voting in a single dominant-party
regime. The puzzle of high turnout in elections with foregone conclusions, especially among
the poor, made the case of Tanzania a compelling starting point. The theory, however,
applies more broadly to other contexts and regime types. Specifically, the theory also has
traction in competitive democracies.

The theory likely applies in the world’s largest democracy, India. Turnout is frequently
highest among the poor in India (Banerjee, 2015). These citizens, who are not currently
benefiting from the status quo, may lack a sense of obligation to the state. Yet, poor
citizens in India take pride in turning out on Election Day, checking each other’s fingers
to confirm they have been inked. Among some poor communities in India, only “severe
illness” legitimizes not showing up at the polls (Banerjee, 2007). Even in this competitive
democracy, “...such positive feelings toward group solidarity for voting were not always about
whom people were voting for but why they were voting at all” (Banerjee, 2015, 157).

Beyond the developing world, the theory should also resonate with American politics
scholars. Despite competitive elections, political campaigns often focus greater resources
on mobilization—to maximize turnout of their supporters—rather than persuasion (Hersh,
2015). Hersh (2015) describes how the data that campaigns have on voters, specifically
partisanship and race, are more useful for mobilization rather than persuasion strategies.
It is much harder, Hersh (2015) argues, to determine which voters are persuadable than
which party they support. Where individual-level data on voters are unavailable and where
partisanship is geographically concentrated, US political campaigns target local geographic
areas.
For instance, the Democratic party often targets cities with Get Out The Vote (GOTV) campaigns to try and maximize Presidential election turnout in places like Pittsburgh, Detroit and Philadelphia. The emphasis on increasing turnout, rather than persuading voters, could lead to local turnout norms depending on how the Democratic party tries to encourage voting. If Democrats employ strategies that induce voters to care about and monitor whether their neighbors vote, then a social norm like the one I document in Tanzania could be created.

While similar, my theory differs in the fact that it does not assume that society places a premium on democratic participation. Instead, the economic need of the community stimulates a norm which engenders individual social interests to comply with the norm and norm enforcement is decentralized among community members, rather than led by party elites.

One possible critique of the broad applicability of the theory is the concern that perhaps a social norm of voting simply exists everywhere? In other words, where is a social norm of voting absent? To this concern, I have two responses. First, although it may appear that a social norm of voting might be present across the globe—at least in countries holding elections without mandatory voting requirements—the type of social norm varies. The stimulus for the norm, either obligation to the state or to one's local community, produces two qualitatively different types of social norms with different implications for understanding elections, accountability and citizen-state relations.

Second, there are indeed places where we should not expect a social norm of voting to exist, regardless of the stimulus. In this dissertation, I provided qualitative evidence from wealthy urban communities in Dar es Salaam that citizens do not share a consensus that voting is good. The regime's questionable reputation, lower levels of competition and the lack of positive outcomes associated with voting result in the absence of civic duty to the state. In these areas, there is no consensus that voting is what good citizens do. I expect
other communities with comparable dynamics to similarly lack a social norm of voting.

In addition, countries where voting is required might also lack social norms. Where citizens can fulfill their duty by paying a fee for abstaining—similar to the logic found with parents who pay to pick up their children late from daycare (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000)—a norm may be absent. In future work, I hope to investigate how social norms and formal systems of enforcement interact to influence political behavior.

Finally, where voting is a largely private affair, for instance where a majority of citizens vote via mail-in ballots, it is unlikely that a social norm of voting will arise since others do not observe turnout. While the theory applies to both competitive and single-party democracies, there are important instances in which the social norm of voting will break down.

6.5 Norm Breakdown

There are two key circumstances that may cause the social norm of voting to break down in Tanzania and elsewhere. The first condition is when monitoring becomes too costly. Second, the norm will break down when there is no longer a consensus that voting is good and that high turnout will materially help the community.

If monitoring and enforcement become too costly, citizens might not find it worthwhile to maintain the norm (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Enforcement becomes more expensive when turnout becomes less visible. Mail-in ballot systems, online voting and other forms of voting from home could cause social norms of voting to disintegrate because neighbors will have a hard time monitoring and enforcing turnout behavior.

Also, the norm will likely break down, or shift, when voting is no longer expected to help the community. When the consensus that voting is “good” weakens, so too will the strength of the norm. Citizens’ beliefs about the benefits of voting shift if regimes fail to offer public good rewards at all, or if government allocation strategies become contingent upon political
support, rather than based on turnout.

If the regime fails to reward loyal areas with public goods, communities may no longer see voting in elections as a worthwhile endeavor. This failure might be due to a lack of resources or a shift in strategies from rewarding communities with public goods to private gift giving. We have seen bankrupted authoritarian states disintegrate due to a lack of resources for patronage and coercive strategies (Levitsky and Way, 2010). In a similar way, a social norm of voting grounded in collective material interest may be weaker than one driven by a shared sense of civic duty to the state.

Before failing to offer material rewards to communities, regimes might alter their resource allocation strategies. Specifically, as electoral politics become more competitive, regimes can no longer rely simply on rewarding high turnout. In these cases, we would expect state mobilization strategies to become more sophisticated and reward local communities that voted for them.

When the state redirects its resource allocation strategy to be contingent upon vote choice, the local community consensus will also shift. Rather than believing that voting helps the community, citizens will instead expect that voting for a particular person or party will materially help the community. Kenya serves as a good illustration of this point, where politicians often reward their home and coethnic areas with greater resources and, thus, citizens anticipate material rewards from coethnic politicians. In these communities, citizens believe that voting for their coethnic candidate or party will increase their chances of accessing material resources for the community, rather than just turning out in general.

In such circumstances with increased political competition, the social norm of turnout may transform into a social norm of choice. Although which candidate a citizen selects on her ballot is not public to her peers, there are other ways that an individual’s political preferences become known to others. Political discussion and other observable behaviors—such as attendance at rallies—may reveal preferences. It is easy to imagine that strict social
sanctions would ensue for an individual who does not comply with the norm of supporting the group’s favored candidate. For instance, a Kikuyu in Kenya might be socially sanctioned by his tribesmen if he publicly states a preference for Raila Odinga (a Luo) and his intent to support him in the next election.

As electoral politics become more competitive in Tanzania the regime will likely alter its resource allocation strategy. Though ethnic politics are not particularly salient in the country today, rewards may come to be contingent upon community-level party affiliation. Due to the stickiness of norms, however, shifts in group consensus may lag behind changes in regime strategies. The next section details existing limitations with the current study and suggests areas for future work.

6.6 Limitations and Future Work

While I have provided several pieces of evidence in support of the theory, there are a few key limitations of this study. First, I have not supplied concrete evidence of how the social norm of voting was established in rural Tanzania. In the future, I hope to search archival sources to gather data on the regime’s explicit intent in allocating public goods to local communities. In addition, I hope to gain insights into other ways in which the regime may have inculcated the norm—for example, through the design of civics education curriculum. Second, the strongest evidence provided in this dissertation comes from the lab-in-the-field experiment, where issues of external validity are of concern. One strategy to address this limitation would be to test the theoretical implications outside of an experimental setting. Specifically, evaluating the theory in a place where local level electoral data and the location of polling stations are readily available would allow for greater observational insights. Finally, identifying an instance of exogenous variation in economic dependency would serve as the best test of this part of the theory.
This was a study about turnout. There is no reason to believe, however, that turnout is unique in being subject to local social norms. I expect that a desire for status and aversion to social sanctions motivate a range of other political behaviors, both among citizens and elites. In future work, I hope to investigate the ways in which communities create shared expectations and use social norms to regulate other forms of political behavior.
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Appendix

A1 Experimental Details

Figure A1.1: Map of randomly sampled villages in Kilimanjaro, Mbeya and Mwanza
Table A1.1: Overview of experimental setup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Vote cost</th>
<th>Other conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave I</td>
<td>200 Tsh</td>
<td>Baloz / Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave II</td>
<td>200 Tsh (Rounds 1-3)</td>
<td>100 Tsh (Rounds 1-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 Tsh (Rounds 4-6)</td>
<td>200 Tsh (Rounds 4-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave II</td>
<td>Ostracism / No ostracism</td>
<td>Ostracism / No ostracism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Teacher and balozi group assignments were randomly assigned in the first wave. The same groups were maintained in the second wave. In wave II the ostracism treatment was randomized at the group level by the tablet enumerators used to conduct the experiment.

Figure A1.2: Private and public treatment photos
Balance Tables

Table A1.2: Balance across respondents in public and private treatment conditions (Wave I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private mean</th>
<th>Public mean</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>36.20</td>
<td>38.48</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A1.3: Balance across respondents in public and private treatment conditions (Wave II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private mean</th>
<th>Public mean</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>37.17</td>
<td>38.77</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voted in 2015 election</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CCM</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I believe the imbalance in partisanship across conditions is due to the fact that after the 2015 general election there was an increase in reported CCM partisanship (both means increased from Wave I), likely due to band-wagoning with the winning party. This was more pronounced among public participants who knew that they would be doing the experiment with their peers and may have been fearful of reporting that they still supported the opposition after the election.

Table A1.4: Balance across public group respondents with and without social ostracism treatment (Wave II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ostracism</th>
<th>No Ostracism</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>6.902</td>
<td>6.957</td>
<td>0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>40.420</td>
<td>37.418</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religiosity</td>
<td>3.079</td>
<td>3.104</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>3.460</td>
<td>3.357</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voted in 2015 election</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Age

Table A2.1: Effect of public treatment by age of respondent (Wave II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>0.262**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public:Age</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.504*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model 1 includes the first round of comparable data (R1 public, R3-6 private). Model 2 includes only the first rounds of comparable data for each condition (R1 public, R3 private).

Scholars posit that individuals come to learn about and comply with social norms through a process of socialization (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2014). In the case of Tanzania, citizens might learn about a social norm of voting around elections when families and friends discuss politics, cast their ballots on Election Day and perhaps even gossip about who was not present at the polls, after the election. Through the same process of socialization in which citizens learn about the existence of a norm, some may also internalize the norm. Bicchieri and Muldoon (2014) describe how long-term interactions and repeated socialization allow individuals to “internalize the common values embodied in the norms”. Thus, similar to learning about norms, internalizing norms similarly takes time (McAdams, 1997).

One implication of this view of norms is that older individuals will be more likely to comply with and have internalized the social norm of voting. I test this implication below by analyzing how the effect of the public treatment varies by respondent’s age. Table A2.1 and Figure A2.1 demonstrate that the treatment effect does significantly and substantively vary by age. Figure A2.1 plots the marginal effect of the public treatment (compared to the private) across different ages. Specifically, for a 20-year-old respondent, the public treatment
increases the probability of voting by about 20 percentage points. As age increases the public treatment effect diminishes and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero for middle-age citizens, at about 40-years-old.

The public treatment clearly has the strongest influence on turnout among younger participants. This result makes sense since older citizens have had more time to learn about and internalize the social norm of voting. Thus, the threat of sanctions (in the public condition) is less important for older individuals, but is necessary to encourage younger community members to vote.

To examine this relationship further, Figure A2.2 plots predicted experimental turnout levels across ages of respondent, separately for public and private respondents. Interestingly, average turnout in the public condition does not vary by age and is around 80% for all ages. We see that the varying effect of the public treatment by age, identified in Table A2.1, is driven by variation in turnout rates for private respondents. Younger respondents vote less in private, compared to older respondents. This result is again consistent with the logic that older respondents are more likely to have internalized the norm, because they choose to vote more than younger citizens when turnout is private. Making turnout behavior public diminishes the inequality in propensity to vote by inducing younger respondents to vote more—likely through external enforcement and the implicit threat of sanctions in the
public condition—but has little effect on older respondents who do not require additional motivation to vote because they have internalized the social norm.

Figure A2.2: Experimental turnout by respondent’s age (Wave II)

Note: The data include a single round for both public and private treatment conditions. The plot looks the same if all 3 comparable private treatment rounds are included.
A3 Social Ostracism Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable: Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Ostracism</td>
<td>0.108*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Elite:Teacher</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.015†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_Muslim</td>
<td>0.197***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_none</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_other</td>
<td>-0.105*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_other</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_sukuma</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.575**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Model 1 includes all rounds (1-6). Models 2 and 3 include rounds 2-5. The baseline reference category for religion is Christian and for Ethnicity is Chagga.
## A4 Social Dependency

### Table A4.1: Predicting subjective social dependency with objective measures

| Dependent variable: | Social Dependency | All   | Men   | Women | Difficult to leave village | 0.058 | 0.096 | 0.017 | (0.066) | (0.094) | (0.094) | Born in village | 0.058 | 0.407 | −0.226 | (0.216) | (0.321) | (0.293) | No income | −0.060 | −0.265 | 0.113 | (0.263) | (0.423) | (0.338) | Rarely travel outside | 0.121 | 0.209 | 0.059 | (0.109) | (0.157) | (0.154) | No relatives outside | −0.848 | −0.580 | −0.980 | (0.583) | (1.082) | (0.696) | Female | 0.230 | (0.217) | | Constant | 5.198** | 4.826** | 6.129** | (0.547) | (0.654) | (0.646) | Observations | 966 | 466 | 500 | R² | 0.006 | 0.011 | 0.005 | Adjusted R² | −0.001 | 0.001 | −0.005 | Note: | †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Table A4.2: Demographic correlates of social dependency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Dependency (0-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.079†</td>
<td>-0.075*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.399†</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has income</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-Muslim</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(0.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_none</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_other</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.868)</td>
<td>(0.692)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ethnicity_other</td>
<td>0.405</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_Sukuma</td>
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<td>1.339**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID_Opposition</td>
<td>-0.547*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.441**</td>
<td>6.369**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.276)</td>
<td>(1.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The baseline category for religion is Christian, for ethnicity is Chagga, and for partisanship (PID) is ruling party supporter. I include a second model without partisanship because it reduces the same size by 238 observations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rarely_travel_outside</th>
<th>no RELATIVES_outside</th>
<th>difficult_leave_village</th>
<th>no_income</th>
<th>social_dep</th>
<th>born_village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>social_dep</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>born_village</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure A4.1: Correlates of Social Dependency**

**Note:** “X” indicates the correlation coefficient between the two variables is not significant at the conventional 5% level. The correlation coefficient is displayed for those that are statistically significant. The color and shade relate to the direction of the correlation and the strength, respectively. Blue indicates positive correlation and red indicates negative. Darker colors indicate larger, stronger correlations.
Figure A4.2: Difference in turnout rates for high and low socially dependent respondents

Note: The three lines represent different ways of defining individuals as having either "high" or "low" social dependency levels. I categorize high (and low) social dependency as above (below) the mean, median, and 3rd (1st) quartile. Points represent the difference in average experimental turnout between high and low socially dependent respondents. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. All points are above zero, indicating high socially dependent individuals vote more than low socially dependent respondents in the experiment. However, the difference is only significant at conventional levels among public respondents (evidence by the lines that do not cross zero).
A5  Balozi and Teacher Group Behavior

Figure A5.1: Experimental turnout in balozi and teacher groups by region
Note: Turnout rates are calculated for all non-elite group participants for the first round in each wave.
Table A5.1: Treatment effects of the private condition and public teacher group compared to the public balozi group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Vote</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>-0.131**</td>
<td>-0.143**</td>
<td>-0.137**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public:Teacher</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.037$^t$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.142**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.060**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_Muslim</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_none</td>
<td>0.414***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion_other</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_other</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity_Sukuma</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID_Opposition</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.795**</td>
<td>0.879**</td>
<td>1.924**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R$^2$</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R$^2$</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $^tp<0.1; ~^*p<0.05; ~^{**}p<0.01$

Note: The baseline category for religion is Christian, for ethnicity is Chagga, and for partisanship (PID) is ruling party supporter.
A6 Polling Station Data and Figures

Polling station missing data discussion

While I did not expect to recover results for the entire sample of villages, I believe that missing data is mostly unrelated to variables that would influence a social norm of voting. Based on my experience, the success of enumerators in obtaining electoral results was largely due to their level of effort and elite connections. While working with Chadema to collect additional polling station-level results, we were similarly more successful where their party agents were better organized. We also obtained data from several of the constituencies where Chadema fielded a MP candidate in the election. (In one instance the MP candidate had traveled to the US but instructed his elderly father to travel four hours by bus to deliver the results to the regional party headquarters.) This would bias the selection of polling stations towards more competitive areas, which are less likely to demonstrate a norm of voting and would thus downward bias the likelihood of observing a norm of voting in these locations.

Polling stations and turnout

![Graph showing village turnout in the 2015 election for places with one or more polling stations.](image)

**Figure A6.1:** Village turnout in the 2015 election for places with one or more polling stations

**Note:** Data points are grouped by villages with more than one polling station and those with only one polling station, with separate linear regression lines.
Table A6.1: Correlation between the number of polling stations in the village and observational turnout (2015 election)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Village Turnout</th>
<th>All villages</th>
<th>Villages with 1-2 stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of polling stations</td>
<td>2.828†</td>
<td>−1.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.513)</td>
<td>(4.434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village population</td>
<td>−0.002*</td>
<td>−0.002†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village area (km²)</td>
<td>−0.022</td>
<td>−0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>73.380**</td>
<td>82.507**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.120)</td>
<td>(8.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Model 1 includes all villages for which I have data. Model 2 includes only villages with 1 or 2 polling stations.
Figure A6.2: Relationship between registered voters and the number of polling stations in a village

Note: The step function line shows the relationship we should observe between the number of registered voters and the number of polling stations in a village if the 500 voters per station rule was followed. The points represent the actual data I collected from 45 villages.
### Table A7.1: Effect of the public treatment (Wave II) by ward-level political competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of victory</td>
<td>-34.049** (10.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winner-CHADEMA</td>
<td>-19.893** (6.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winner-NCCR-MAGEUZI</td>
<td>-18.595** (5.687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public:Margin</td>
<td>0.480* (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerator FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>26.161*** (7.887)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations        | 1,770 |
| R²                  | 0.257 |
| Adjusted R²         | 0.210 |

**Note:** †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
## A8 Qualitative Interviews

**Table A8.1:** Interviews with Tanzanian citizens conducted December 2016-February 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old man</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 9, 2016</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male focus group</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 9, 2016</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young man</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Ikoromije subvillage</td>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mwasubi Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
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<td>December 10, 2016</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female focus group</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Middle-age man</td>
<td>Kijima Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 12, 2016</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>December 13, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Kijima Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 13, 2016</td>
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<td>Kijima Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 13, 2016</td>
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<td>Kijima Village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 13, 2016</td>
<td>RA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Author</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 16, 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-age woman</td>
<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-age man</td>
<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
<td>December 17, 2016</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<td>Ngeleka village, Misungwi, Mwanza</td>
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<td>December 17, 2016</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Oyster Bay, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>January 26, 2017</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-age woman</td>
<td>Oyster Bay, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>January 26, 2017</td>
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<tr>
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<td>January 28, 2017</td>
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<td>Masaki, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>January 29, 2017</td>
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<td>Kimanga, Ilala, Dar es Salaam</td>
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<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
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<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>February 2, 2017</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-age man</td>
<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>February 2, 2017</td>
<td>RA</td>
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<td>Middle-age woman</td>
<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>February 2, 2017</td>
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<td>Middle-age man</td>
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<td>Tabata, Ilala, Dar es Salaam</td>
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<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young woman</td>
<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>February 3, 2017</td>
<td>RA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-age man</td>
<td>Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>February 3, 2017</td>
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<tr>
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