Land Use Planning Innovations in the Midst of a ‘Migration Crisis’: Developing a Spatial Definition of Refugee Integration

by

Jessica Sadye Wolff

B.A. International Relations & Economics
Tufts University, 2013

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Signature of Author: ____________________________

Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Signature redacted

Certified by: ____________________________

Eran Ben-Joseph
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Advisor

Accepted by: ____________________________

Professor of Practice Ceasar McDowell
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning

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ABSTRACT

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 2016 Global Trends Report, global human displacement is at a record high and refugee crises are increasingly urban. Research on forced migration has historically focused on the obligations of the nation state, overshadowing the role of cities in urban displacement. Using the conceptual framework of a refugee’s ‘right to the city,’ this thesis seeks to contribute to literature on urban displacement by beginning to develop a spatial definition of refugee integration. A case study of state-provided refugee housing in Hamburg, Germany identifies innovations at the federal and state levels that outline a new model of how urban planning can contribute to refugee housing policy. This research provides an alternative to leading refugee housing models and highlights the importance of linking the historically segmented phases of emergency housing with long-term development and land use planning in cities experiencing rapid urbanization as a result of migration. Practices from this case study, as well as opportunities to refine the approach, provide insight into the development of refugee housing policy in land-constrained urban areas in the future.

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Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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1 Introduction

"Find out – and be surprised by – what architecture and urban development can contribute to the process of integration, what sound urban development should look like, and what good and often surprising solutions urban planners, architects, and landscape planners have to offer." – Dr. Barbara Hendricks, Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and Nuclear Safety; Introduction to Making Heimat, Germany: Arrival Country

The nature of human displacement is changing. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) 2016 Global Trends Report, global human displacement is at a record high and refugee crises are increasingly urban (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017). By the end of 2016, 60% of refugees were living in urban areas. Urban refugees and migrants face a particular set of vulnerabilities including harassment, discrimination, and inadequate shelter (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009). Recent literature originating from humanitarian organizations acknowledge that refugee crises should not be considered temporary situations which require only emergency responses, but rather as protracted situations that require durable solutions (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015).

Research on forced migration has historically focused on the “strong association between the notion of a refugee and the notion of states” (Nick Gill 2010, 626). There is a gap in the literature exploring sub-national policies and the role of city governments as ‘active’ agents in the management of forced migration (Jonathan Darling 2016). As refugees are increasingly settling in urban areas, rather than refugee camps, different spatial and legal considerations arise, particularly regarding interactions with formal and informal urban governance systems (Sanyal 2012). As a result, there is a need to supplement the ‘nation-state-centric’ approach to forced migration with a greater consideration of the “the city as a space of refugee politics” (Jonathan Darling 2016, 179). Furthermore, recent research reveals the role of sub-nation-state internal borders that govern refugees' mobility and recognition, resulting in further stratification of rights and access to services beyond a federal-level comparative approach (El-Kayed and Hamann 2018). For these reasons, among others, it is valuable to refocus research on refugee policy to the city level.

Examining sub-national refugee policy is even more important because the experience of integration is inherently defined at the local level. Opportunities and barriers to accessing education, employment and many other public services happen at the city level. Thus, the need to analyze the implementation of federal policies at the local level and the
impact they have on the integration experience is more urgent than ever, particularly as local governments find themselves responsible for service provision and rights protection for a displaced population. Refocusing the predominant level of analysis around forced migration to the city-scale may also enable comparisons across different types of governance systems (Jonathan Darling 2016).

Analyzing refugee housing policy from a perspective of urban planning adds a necessary foregrounding of spatial aspects of the integration experience. Federal, regional and local polices have a spatial embodiment, which are particularly visible through housing distribution and quality, as well as access to neighborhood amenities and city services. Thus far, the literature has failed to address "the complexities of dispersal as an experience as much as a government process" (Jonathan Darling 2016, 183).

1.1 Refugees’ and Asylum Seekers’ Differential Rights

Refugees and asylum seekers are granted a specific set of rights under international law, primarily governed by the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, both approved by the United Nations General Assembly. A refugee is defined as an individual who has left his or her country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return there because of a serious threat to his or her life or freedom (UN General Assembly 1951). Asylum seeker refers to an individual who is seeking protection and may have applied for refugee status in a particular country, but has not yet received approval (Frances Nicholson and Judith Kumin 2017). Every asylum seeker has the right to a formal case review, though not all applicants will be granted refugee status. The rights of refugees versus asylum seekers vary according to an individual’s legal status.

1 For the purposes of this paper, ‘asylum seeker’ includes those individuals who have registered in the federal asylum system and are in the process of applying for asylum. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis did not allow for an investigation of the impacts of these policies on individuals who are fleeing persecution, but have not registered in the federal system. Reports suggest that there are potentially 500,000 or more individuals who have not registered (RT International 2016). Thus, when referencing ‘refugees,’ this thesis is referring to those individuals who have received legal asylum status for residency.

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The underlying assumption behind refugees' rights, primarily as outlined in the 1951 Convention, is that a refugee gains more rights the longer he or she stays in the country of asylum (Frances Nicholson and Judith Kumin 2017). The time-contingent aspect differentiates refugees' rights from those of permanent residents or citizens. A first set of rights, regardless of the duration of stay, includes religious practice, access to legal assistance, and access to education. Those refugees who will be staying longer also gain the right to employment, housing and social security, among others. The 1951 Convention states that, over time, refugees should be able to enjoy more rights including integration in the country of asylum (UN General Assembly 1951). According to international law, states have the primary responsibility for the protection of refugees; however, as described earlier, the actual work of rights protection and service provision is most frequently carried out by local government.

1.2 Refugees' ‘Right to the City’?

This thesis draws upon an understanding of Henri Lefebvre's concept of the “Right to the City” (Lefebvre 1968). While Lefebvre initially used this notion to address inequitable access to services among social classes, his theory can also be a powerful framework to identify formal and informal barriers for urban displaced populations trying to access public services and to integrate in the local community (International Rescue Organization 2017). If the ‘right to the city’ is indeed established by residence (Mark Purcell 2003, 577), then the increasing trend of urban displacement prompts the question: what is a refugee’s ‘right to the city’? As discussed in the previous section, international law legalizes a differential status for refugees and asylum seekers at the state level; however, urban inhabitation and the resulting ‘right to the city’ garners an additional set of rights for urban refugees at the city level, presumably equivalent to those of other city residents including permanent residents and citizens.

Prioritizing refugees’ ‘right to the city’ is critical. Philosophers present arguments on moral obligations to provide asylum and resettlement policies as the actions and policies of nation states around the world contribute to widespread displacement (Serena Parekh 2015). At a more human scale, upon arriving in a new city, refugees can experience widespread prejudice, limited access to existing markets and services, and difficultly engaging with new systems of governance and culture. Particularly for individuals who have been
displaced from their home due to conflict and situations beyond their own control, providing both the opportunity and institutional support for refugees to establish themselves in a new community is necessary in the face of such systemic obstacles.

Using the conceptual framework of refugees' 'right to the city' illuminates the underpinnings of a rights-based discourse for urban humanitarian response, with the responsibility for rights provision and protection falling on local government. Parnell and Pieterse argue that the recent focus on "city government is part of a wider resurgence of interest in what the subnational state can do through better city scale planning for the poor in the achievement of a rights-based urban agenda" (Parnell, Susan and Pieterse, Edgar 2010, 159). In the context of urban displacement, this dialogue is advanced by questioning: what is the role of the local government, federal government and international institutions to protect refugees' rights? And how does full provision of and realization of these rights relate to a 'successful' integration experience?

The domains of 'successful' integration (elaborated in Chapter 4) overlap with indicators of refugees' 'right to the city,' thus beginning to suggest that a refugee's full realization of the 'right to the city' and 'successful' integration may be one and the same. These two phenomena inform and reinforce each other; visible indicators and language used to describe these idiosyncratic, yet loosely defined processes are overwhelmingly similar. Future research should continue exploring the alignment of integration indicators and refugees' 'right to the city,' as their affiliation may prove to be an informative method of evaluating refugee policy at the city level.

Documenting refugees' 'right to the city' could be a means of not only assessing opportunities for integration, but also for identifying spaces in which refugees' rights diverge from residents' rights thus pinpointing opportunities in which to improve urban humanitarian response practices. As this thesis will describe later, lack of engagement with housing site selection policies and decreasing accessibility to neighborhood amenities are just two ways in which refugees' 'right to the city' is undercut. Junctures at which the protection of certain rights and the ability of different population groups to engage with a city's urbanization vary accentuate a differential level of rights provision for refugees as compared to local residents and identify places to improve refugee policy.
1.3 Case Study: Hamburg, Germany

My thesis will begin to fill the literature gap around the experience of integration as defined by sub-national policies through a case study of Hamburg, Germany that identifies federal and sub-national innovations in refugee housing policy, analyzes the resultant spatial distribution of housing and studies the impact of these policies on the integration experience. This thesis is focused on Germany’s approach to refugee housing for the following reasons. Since the middle of 2014, the country has received more than 1.4 million asylum seekers, an unparalleled level of immigration that stressed existing urban systems and necessitated creative policy responses at the federal and local levels (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018a). In the midst of a prolonged national affordable housing shortage and a so called “migration crisis,” the federal government approved a land use policy enabling the temporary construction of refugee housing sites in areas previously zoned for non-residential uses. As I will argue, the unprecedented use of land use planning to create temporary and permanent refugee housing at the state level provides an alternative model to leading refugee housing policies by facilitating a greater connection between the historically segmented phases of emergency housing and long-term development.

In order to assess the implementation of this federal policy and its effects on refugee housing and the integration experience, I focused on Hamburg, a city-state in northern Germany with a population of 1.8 million people, which has received nearly 38,000 asylum seekers since the end of 2014 (“Daten Flüchtlinge Unterbringung Hamburg” 2018). Hamburg’s state government received widespread acknowledgement for its particularly innovative policies and demonstrated commitment to providing support for asylum seekers and refugees both within and outside of Germany. As I will discuss in later in Chapter 3, the

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2 The terms “migration crisis” and “refugee crisis” have been used extensively in the media to reference the rapid increase in immigration to Europe that began in mid-2104 and continued throughout 2015.
state government acted quickly and responsively to increasing needs of the refugee population by establishing a new streamlined government unit for refugee housing, an increasingly specified housing site selection procedure, and a new policy for permanent refugee housing.

Certain conditions in Germany, and more specifically in Hamburg, make these refugee housing policies possible. As a wealthy country with an extensive welfare program, Germany’s federal states have the financial means to invest in and to manage a comprehensive government-sponsored refugee housing program. Angela Merkel’s singular emphasis on providing support to refugees provided the necessary political buy-in at the highest level of government. Most importantly, Germany provides a path to citizenship for refugees who receive permanent residency for between six to eight years, passed a language test and completed an integration course which reflects a governmental vision towards longer term development and integration of refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018b).
In Hamburg, funding for refugee housing and integration programming came entirely from a budget surplus and did not impact the existing state budget (Anselm Sprandel 2018). As described later in Chapter 3, visionary leadership at the federal state level, particularly that of Anselm Sprandel, defined federal and state policy as related to refugee housing provision. Additionally, the institutional memory and capacity of Hamburg’s public social housing agency, Födern und Wohnen, enabled efficient scaling up of refugee housing operations. In terms of governmental authority, as a city-state, Hamburg is defined by combined federal state and local government; the Mayor of Hamburg is the head of both city and state government. Also, as a city-state with just under 300 square miles of territory and a population of 1.8 million, Hamburg has a significantly higher population density than other federal states and less available land for new construction which compounded housing construction pressures as high numbers of asylum seekers began to arrive. Finally, the state government of Hamburg formulated its refugee housing policy with the end goal of incorporating refugees into the private market, reflecting a long term vision for integration (Anselm Sprandel 2018).

1.4 Methodology

This research builds on an existing institutional relationship between MIT’s Media Lab and HafenCity University, Hamburg’s local architecture and planning school. At the request of Hamburg’s Mayor Olaf Scholz, these two groups collaborated to create an interactive physical model of Hamburg that simulates city statistics, such as number of residents and changes in traffic flows, stimulated by adding or eliminating buildings to the model. While this model was initially developed for a different purpose, it was ultimately used as a platform for community engagement on refugee housing sites. The research group at HafenCity University, FindingPlaces, hosted 34 workshops across all seven districts of Hamburg and, in collaboration with local residents, identified 160 potential refugee housing sites for review by using this model (Tobias Holtz 2017). The institutional connection between MIT, HafenCity University and Hamburg’s local government provided a solid foundation to build upon for this research.

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3 For the purposes of this paper, ‘state government’ will refer to the federal state responsibilities, while ‘local government’ will refer to the municipal responsibilities of each of Hamburg’s seven districts.
This thesis is the product of one month of fieldwork conducted in Hamburg, Germany in August 2017. I used a mixed methods assessment by incorporating qualitative research with geographic and quantitative data at the municipal level. This approach enables an analytical policy analysis at the local level, supplemented by anecdotal information regarding the experiences of refugees, residents and government officials in Hamburg as a result of national and sub-national policies.

I completed seventeen interviews with local government officials, urban planners, asylum seekers and refugees, camp management teams and local residents that were secured through email solicitation and snowballing. All interviews were conducted in English, though translation support was provided by a colleague of the interviewee for two interviews. Additional information was gathered through participant observation or contributed anonymously.

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<th>Local Government</th>
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*Figure 2. Interview Sampling Table.*

**Organizations of Key Informants**
- Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg Government
- Hamburg Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF)
- *Fördern und Wohnen*
- CityScienceLab, HafenCity University

*Figure 3. Organizations of Key Informants.*

Four interviews were particularly informative for this thesis. The first key interviewee, Mohamed⁴, is a refugee who traveled alone from Eritrea, making stops in several other countries before arriving in Germany in September 2015. He arrived with five other friends from Eritrea who he met along his migration route in Libya. We met while he was living at Jugendparkweg, a follow up housing site, after living in two different initial reception facilities. Mohamed’s fingerprints were initially taken in Italy, his first European destination, which

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⁴ Name has been changed for the purpose of anonymity.
complicated his asylum application process in Germany. At the time of our interview, his asylum application status had been pending for over two years; however, before I left Hamburg, I learned that his asylum application was approved and he received an initial residence permit for three years. Mohamed brings a unique perspective to this research as he traveled through several other transit countries with the intention of applying for asylum in Germany.

Another key interviewee, Ahmad\textsuperscript{5}, was born in Afghanistan but grew up as a refugee in Pakistan before returning to Afghanistan as a young adult. He initially arrived in Germany on a tourist visa to attend a family wedding in July 2016. Instead of returning to Afghanistan, he applied for asylum as he had experienced threats against his life by the Taliban on account of his prior employment with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and suspected allegiance to his work colleagues. I interviewed him at an initial reception facility where he was still waiting to hear about a decision on his asylum application. He does not want to stay in Germany and has explored opportunities for resettlement in the United States as he already speaks English. With his previous work experience in international development, Ahmad brings a critical perspective to service provision for refugees in Germany and a discussion of the difficulties of translating prior education and employment to job opportunities in a new country and new language.

My third key interviewee, Fouad Hamdan, the Officer of Citizen Participation at Hamburg's Central Coordination Unit for Refugees, provided critical contextual understanding and research support throughout my fieldwork. Fouad has extensive global experience with political movements and development programs. While in Hamburg, he was my main conduit for securing additional interviews with high ranking staff within his organization and with housing management staff at Födern und Wohnen. Throughout the past nine months of research, Fouad has continued to provide additional details and documentation which have been invaluable for this thesis.

The final key interviewee is Anissa Lucius who provides accommodation and social management support at Jugendparkweg, a follow up housing site in Hamburg-Nord. In this role, Anissa serves as a central source of information regarding refugee policy and gives individual support to the refugees housed at her site. During my tour of Jugendparkweg, the

\textsuperscript{5} Name has been changed for the purpose of anonymity.
strength of her connection with many of the refugees was reflected in refugees’ familiarity with and eagerness to speak to Anissa. Given her extensive engagement with the refugee housing system and knowledge of personal refugee cases, Anissa’s perspective provides a broader understanding of refugees’ experiences and engagement with Hamburg’s policies.

My research also included site visits to one initial reception facility and twenty follow up housing sites. At each site I conducted participant observation, documented site characteristics and housing typologies through photography, and mapped out surrounding amenities such as transit stops, grocery stores and schools. Two of these housing site visits were guided by housing site managers, while the other nineteen visits were unsupervised. These visits informed descriptive spatial and design analyses included in Chapter 4.

Perceived accessibility of these sites varied, impacting my site visit experience. My sense of exclusivity was roughly correlated with site size and its connectivity to the existing street grid. Visits to larger, more isolated housing sites (such as Am Aschenland II or Kirchenpauerstraße which are described later) located off main roads and far from other residential development made my visits as an outsider particularly obvious. Comparatively, housing sites that were embedded into the surrounding residential urban fabric (such as Hufnerstraße or Grandweg) were much more accessible and my presence did not appear to be such an obvious intrusion of private space. The question of whether these housing sites should or should not feel private and inaccessible, and whether that feeling is intentionally manufactured through design, is an important one to consider in future research.

Qualitative data gathered through interviews and site visits was complemented with a series of analyses using geographic information systems and spatial data to assess refugee housing development patterns across Hamburg over time and as related to land use regulations. Data about the follow up housing sites was provided by the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees. I geo-located the housing sites and cross referenced each site with additional information available online from Födern und Wohnen and publicly available district data regarding land use regulations and development plans.
1.5 Research Questions

This thesis explores the political, spatial and ethical implications of national and sub-national refugee housing policies in Germany and their effect on refugees’ integration experiences. This thesis is prompted by the following research questions:

- How do spatial aspects of policy innovations for refugee housing in Hamburg affect refugees’ integration experiences?
- Does the case study of Hamburg present a new land use planning model that can provide a transition between the historically segmented phases of emergency shelter provision and long-term development?

Through exploring these questions, this thesis aims to demonstrate what urban planning can contribute to the field of refugee policy. Using a case study of Hamburg, the following chapters will describe how urban planning policies and techniques can be a means of addressing the transition between initial housing provision and durable housing solutions, the devolution of national policy to sub-national implementation and the shift from emergency programming to long-term development and integration policies. Pursuing this research from the perspective of urban planning grounds written policy in its spatial materialization to assess effects on the urban fabric and, more importantly, on refugees’ integration experiences. To supplement existing definitions of integration in social, political, economic and legal dimensions, this thesis begins to outline a spatial definition of integration which can be captured and assessed through the lens of a refugee’s ‘right to the city.’ The case study of Hamburg provides an empirical basis from which we can begin to approximate an understanding of a refugee’s ‘right to the city.’ This method of analysis opens up possibilities for establishing specific spatial recommendations, particularly in the realm of refugee housing policy, to promote integration opportunities that will be valuable lessons for municipal authorities and international humanitarian organizations.
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides background information regarding Germany's immigration history and refugee policies. Chapter 3 describes specific policy innovations at both the federal and state levels as well as the resulting institutional and social challenges. Chapter 4 focuses on the specific challenges to integration experienced by refugees who are reliant on state-provided housing in Hamburg and the need to elevate considerations of spatial aspects for integration that have been under-acknowledged. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the research by highlighting important lessons learned from this case that could help inform refugee housing policy as well as future areas of research.
2 Background & Context

2.1 Overview of Immigration in Germany

Current refugee policy and local opinions on immigration in Germany are a result of prior phases of immigration. In the early 1990's, a wave of immigration to German cities primarily constituted of asylum seekers led policy makers to define national policies on integration and establish refugee housing stock while provoking prejudicial memories in German citizens that remain today. In three years, approximately 900,000 people from the former Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey sought asylum in Germany (Bruce Katz, Luise Noring, and Nantke Garrelts 2016). In 1992, 438,190 asylum applications were filed, roughly equivalent to the 441,800 applications filed in 2015. In response to this immigration pressure, the federal government modified Article 16 of the German Constitution, revoking a guarantee of the right to asylum (Ibid). Simultaneously, Germany experienced rapid in-migration as more than 3.7% of the population of East Germany (nearly 600,000 people) emigrated to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, primarily to urban areas (Frank Heiland 2004). During this time, state governments constructed designated refugee housing across the country.

![Migration Patterns in Germany, 1950 - 2015](image)

*Figure 4. Migration Patterns in Germany, 1950 - 2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).*
Twenty-five years later, during the current "migration crisis," only limited state-owned housing stock remained, as state governments sold off and demolished most of the existing refugee housing stock in the early 2000’s (Hauke Wendler 2017). Negative impressions of the asylum seekers who arrived in the 1990’s have significantly impacted local residents’ opinions of asylum seekers currently arriving in Germany. Interviews with life-long German citizens living in Hamburg revealed strong opinions that the prior group of asylum seekers, particularly the Turkish community, had established a somewhat parallel society in which they live isolated lives, spatially and socially, in prevention of complete integration.

The current wave of immigration in Germany differs from previous experiences in magnitude and diversity. The year 2016 had the greatest recorded number of asylum applications and the total number of people immigrating to Germany is the highest it has been since 1950. The current period of migration started in 2014 and consists primarily of asylum seekers. The graphs below show the distribution of asylum applications in Germany by country of origin in 2015 and 2016. The next chapter elaborates on how both federal and local governments responded to these pressures with the establishment of new policies, specifically regarding refugee housing.

![Asylum Applications by Country of Origin in Germany in 2015](image1)

![Asylum Applications by Country of Origin in Germany in 2016](image2)

*Figure 5. Asylum Applications by Country of Origin in Germany, 2015 and 2016. Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.*
There is an ongoing national debate about asylum policy in Germany in the social sphere. The opinions of German citizens vary from hospitable and supportive (reflective of the Willkommenskultur or ‘welcoming culture’ for which Germany received international praise) to discriminatory and aggressive. During an interview with a social management employee at an initial reception facility for asylum seekers, he expressed that the turning point on general perceptions of refugees was New Year’s Eve 2015 (Malte Schimpke 2017). A series of attacks took place on that date by individuals which news outlets provocatively labeled as ‘migrants,’ ‘refugees’ and ‘North African or Arabic in appearance’ (Eddy 2016). Hypotheses on motives and perpetrators’ origins abounded, fueling anxieties and further discrimination against refugees across Germany and Europe.

Mixed opinions on refugee policies are also reflected in the political sphere. Prime Minister Angela Merkel’s political party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany maintained the largest number of seats by winning 24.7% of seats in the fall 2017 national election. However, a far right wing party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 13.3% of seats in its first time running in an election (Clarke 2017). This result is widely acknowledged as a shift in national opinion against Angela Merkel’s asylum policies.

2.2 Asylum Process in Germany

While this paper will not elaborate on details of the asylum application process in Germany, it is essential to acknowledge that underlying the entire asylum seeker experience is the inherent uncertainty of the asylum process. Access to nearly all services is predicated on an approved asylum case. Without legal asylum status, asylum seekers cannot find work and cannot rent an apartment. While adults are allowed to attend German language classes and children can go to school during the application period, individuals are restricted from doing much else. Mohamed, a refugee from Eritrea, told me, “if you have a paper, you can do anything. You can work; you can find a better place; you can do anything... if you don’t have a paper, it’s not comfortable. For me, I’m not interested in the house or the living stuff like that.” Another asylum seeker, Ahmad, expressed similar sentiments when he said, “I should be happy here in Germany, but I am stressed and I got depression here. Why? I am still waiting for [asylum status] for fifteen months, no house, no job. It’s really hard.” He shared that he was experiencing extreme boredom that drove him to the point of depression that required medical attention.
Asylum policy in Germany is governed by a hierarchy of regulations ranging from multinational agreements within the European Union to regulations at the federal, state and municipal levels. Asylum policy across the European Union states is governed by the Dublin Regulation which assigns responsibility for asylum claims to the country of first arrival, placing undue burdens on coastal countries that were receiving substantial numbers of asylum seekers in 2014 and 2015 (Annapaola Ammirati 2015). Identifying herself as a leader with a strong commitment to refugees, Prime Minister Merkel distanced Germany from customary European Union refugee policies. As immigration pressures increased, particularly in coastal countries, Prime Minister Merkel suspended the Dublin Procedures for Syrian asylum seekers in August 2015, effectively opening Germany’s borders. This meant that Syrians who could get themselves to Germany could apply for asylum there rather than being sent back to their first country of arrival in the EU to process their case (Wesley Dockery 2017). While the Dublin Procedure was suspended only for Syrian asylum seekers, widespread perception of Germany’s openness to asylum seekers resulted in an influx of asylum seekers from many different countries. In 2015 alone, nearly 890,000 asylum seekers arrived in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018).

Asylum policy in Germany is managed by a quota system at the federal level to distribute asylum seekers across the country. The process for an individual seeking asylum begins when he or she registers in the federal asylum system, Erstverteilung der Easylsuchenden (Initial Distribution of Asylum Seekers; known as the EASY quota system) in whichever state he or she first arrived. Since the beginning of 2015, more than 1.4 million asylum seekers have registered in the EASY quota system (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018). Upon registration in the federal system, asylum seekers are assigned to live in one of the sixteen federal states according to a distribution system called the Königstein Key. This system is based on a formula that accounts for each state’s population and tax revenue as a percentage of the total (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2016). As a result, densely populated city-states that have greater populations and higher tax revenue, but which may also be more severely land constrained, receive disproportionately more refugees (Bruce Katz, Luise Noring, and Nantke Garrelts 2016).
Using data from 2015, the prior graph shows that the three city-states in Germany (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg) receive significantly more asylum seekers per square kilometer than other federal states. This is especially problematic as these city-states often also have the lowest availability of developable land and may already lack affordable housing stock.

The EASY quota system effectively creates a border control system within a nation-state, furthering the argument that sub-national refugee policies must be critically considered as they compound and further define the refugee experience beyond federal policies. Mandatory dispersed housing policies for refugees are often presented as a nation-state’s method of further restricting mobility. Hynes explains that this mandatory form of 'policy-imposed liminality' which designates where refugees must live can lead to difficulties establishing social networks and fostering trust in political institutions (Hynes 2009). Literature on forced migration has examined processes of dispersed resettlement programs for asylum seekers and refugees and the effects on integration in places including the United Kingdom (Phillips 2006; Zetter, Griffiths, and Sigona 2005) and Canada (Hyndman and McLean 2006).
In Germany, the distribution system is strictly followed, with little input from asylum seekers. For example, Ahmad had petitioned to change his state assignment from Hamburg because he could stay with a family member living in a different state. Given intense housing pressures, staying in a private home without government assistance would presumably be a preferential option. However, his request was denied. Since he had to live in Hamburg where he did not know anyone, he has subsequently been living in government-provided housing.

While asylum policy in Germany is managed federally through the EASY distribution system, housing, service provision and integration programming are the responsibility of the sixteen federal states. Specifically in regard to housing, federal law requires asylum seekers and refugees to be housed in shared accommodations (Asylgesetz 2013); however this regulation is interpreted differently in each federal state (Kay Wendel 2014). As this thesis will describe in the following chapter, refugees in Hamburg are housed in shared apartments and housing stock that has been primarily created through new construction. A staff member at Hamburg’s Central Coordination Unit for Refugees told me that he believes, on the whole, refugees assigned to Hamburg are very lucky because the refugee housing program is stronger and better organized (Fouad Hamdan 2017). Comparatively in Berlin, asylum seekers are given assistance to find their own apartment and the local government has focused on upgrading previously abandoned buildings to increase availability (Mary Dellenbaugh-Losse 2017). As demonstrated, while federal policies and funding mechanisms are established at the national level, housing provision varies significantly by federal state. Much of the literature on forced migration has highlighted a growing discrepancy of refugee rights across countries of refuge, but this political leeway and resulting variation across federal states in Germany suggests an increasing stratification of access to rights and services at a local level (El-Kayed and Hamann 2018), increasing the importance of examining the implementation and experience of sub-national refugee polices.¹ Since this thesis relies on a case study of one federal state, the following section outlines the housing policies used in Hamburg.

¹ For comparative examples of housing policies and refugees’ access to housing in Berlin and Dresden, see El-Kayed and Hamann 2018.
Federal state governments are responsible for financing their refugee housing programs. As Germany is a welfare state, government funding has been used for all necessary aspects of refugee housing. The following table outlines the expenditures made in Hamburg in 2016 and 2017. The state government of Hamburg anticipates that €147 million or 18.8% of their expenditures in 2017 will be reimbursed by the federal government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending Category</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Reception Facilities</td>
<td>€375 million euros</td>
<td>€231 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>€140 million euros</td>
<td>€184 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Benefits</td>
<td>€87 million euros</td>
<td>€65 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Unaccompanied Minors</td>
<td>€119 million euros</td>
<td>€92 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>€67 million euros</td>
<td>€44 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in Initial Reception Facilities</td>
<td>€75.9 million euros</td>
<td>€89 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration Programs &amp; Volunteers</td>
<td>€7.7 million euros</td>
<td>€20.7 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>€26 million euros</td>
<td>€37 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>€3 million euros</td>
<td>€3.5 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>€12.8 million euros</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>€899 million euros</td>
<td>€779 million euros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7. Expenses on Refugee Programs in Hamburg. Source: Department of Labor, Social Affairs, Family and Integration.*

2.3 Overview of Asylum Seeker Policies in Hamburg

Individuals who are assigned to Hamburg are first housed in an initial reception facility. The goal of Hamburg’s local government was to prevent homelessness among asylum seekers, even as the city was receiving more than 500 people per day at the immigration peak in November 2015 (Fouad Hamdan 2017). While housing type varies, all of these facilities have communal living arrangements with meals served at mandated hours in a cafeteria. During the peak of the “migration crisis” in mid-2015, many initial reception facilities experienced extreme overcrowding oftentimes housing as many as sixteen people in a room that was intended for seven or eight (Malte Schimpke 2017). Asylum seekers do not have access to a kitchen and therefore cannot cook for themselves. Throughout my interviews, I learned that lack of access to a kitchen and ability to cook one’s own food was a significant stressor and a main impediment to reestablishing a ‘normal’ lifestyle.
While in an initial reception facility, asylum seekers will begin the asylum application process. Prior to receiving asylum, asylum seekers cannot pursue employment, but do have access to language classes. Children are permitted to enroll in the local schools. During this phase, individuals receive €106 per month for incidental expenses as lodging and food are provided by the state.

A lack of higher income leads many asylum seekers to consider other means of supporting their families financially during in the application process. As individuals are not allowed to work and supplement this income prior to receiving asylum, many people pursue black market jobs in order to support family in Germany and in the origin country. Undocumented work puts asylum seekers in an especially vulnerable position as they have
few avenues of recourse should their employer withhold pay, and getting caught in a black market job would seriously threaten the application for asylum. During my interviews, I was told that many asylum seekers in Hamburg turn to black market jobs in small bakeries and construction labor positions. Some people work informally as translators to support other asylum seekers through the complicated asylum application process.

The federal government asserts that no individual will stay in an initial reception facility for more than six months, suggesting that no asylum application process should take longer than that amount of time for processing. However, the adjudication process has taken increasingly longer and many individuals stay in initial reception facilities far beyond six months because of a prolonged application timeline. The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) collects information on asylum procedures across Europe and tracked the average duration of asylum procedures in Germany during the past several years. In 2014 and 2016, the asylum application process took an average of 7.1 months, but only 5.2 months in 2015 when additional staff were hired to deal with the large number of applications (“Regular Procedure - Germany” 2018). Mohamed had been waiting on his asylum decision for more than twenty-six months.

An asylum seeker’s living conditions can change drastically after receiving approval for asylum. Depending on the country of origin and details of each specific case, individuals may receive an initial residence permit for between one to three years (before a reapplication is required). Upon receiving legal asylum, refugees are transferred to a follow up housing site and receive a greater monthly stipend (approximately €410 per month) because they become responsible for their own cooking (Anissa Lucius 2017). Additionally, refugees can search for their own employment opportunities. Now that they can work, it is the refugee’s responsibility to coordinate between a potential employer and the refugee Job Center which provides final working permit approval. This process is arduous and time consuming. Those I spoke with who had sought Job Center approval for a job prospect shared that the process had taken too long and forced them to forfeit employment opportunities.

Integration in an economic sense, understood as integration into the formal job market, is challenging for refugees in Germany. As of June 2017, only 17% of refugees in Germany were employed (Chazan 2017). The primary challenge for refugees looking for jobs is language skills, followed by education. Interviews with German citizens revealed a sense among local residents that a job should only be offered to a refugee if there is not a citizen
fit for the position. Even though Ahmad had a college degree and more than a decade of work experience, he felt he would never be able to get a job in Germany like the one he left behind in Afghanistan due to language limitations and widespread stereotypes of refugees.

Upon confirmation of asylum, individuals can move out of the initial facility. Those that can locate and afford to find their own accommodations do so, effectively bypassing the third phase of housing outlined in the figure below. Those who cannot afford a home on the private market are transferred to government run follow up housing sites for more permanent accommodation. Of the 37,949 asylum seekers who have been assigned to the state of Hamburg between January 2015 and January 2018, 16.5% of people found their own housing and 83.5% required follow up housing provision from the local government (“Dat- en Flüchtlinge Unterbringung Hamburg” 2018).

![Figure 8. Phases of Refugee Housing in Hamburg.](image)

Follow up housing sites are comprised of shared apartments with three two-person bedrooms, a kitchen and a bathroom. Depending on the site, these apartments can be established in living containers, an existing building or a new development. Chapter 4 elaborates on the range of housing sites and the influence that their spatial determinants have on integration experiences. So long as a refugee is not working, his or her rent is entirely covered by the local government’s welfare program. Rent allocation is €141 per month for an adult and €114 per month for a child (Anissa Lucius 2017). However, once a refugee begins working, he or she is obligated to contribute to rent. At the end of the residency term, individuals may reapply for a continuation. After living in Germany for more than five years under asylum protection, asylum seekers are able to begin the process of applying for permanent residency.
A publicly-owned company called *Fördern und Wohnen* manages all of Hamburg’s social housing programs, including the follow up housing process for refugees. Fouad Hamdan, the Officer of Citizen Participation in Hamburg’s Central Coordination Unit for Refugees, said that *Fördern und Wohnen* was “the secret weapon” for effective refugee housing policies in Hamburg. Contrary to other federal states which held competitive bidding processes for private companies to manage their refugee housing sites, Hamburg relied almost exclusively on *Fördern und Wohnen*, with the exception of a couple sites managed by the Red Cross. The state-owned company has managed various types of social housing for decades, including asylum seeker housing during the 1990’s. This expertise allowed the company to rapidly and effectively scale up their operations when needed, exemplifying the importance of institutional memory and continuity for social housing and urban planning capabilities in Hamburg.

Upon receiving asylum, refugees are assigned to a follow up site. As all existing sites are full, refugees are assigned to a site as units become available or when a new site is constructed. Given the demand, all available spaces need to be filled; a six-person apartment with only one kitchen and one bathroom could have six individuals or two parents, their
two children and another couple, for example. Thus, even though the living conditions are notably improved over the initial reception facilities, there remains a lack of privacy and a low sense of ownership over the space.

Due to the intense housing pressures, staff at *Födern und Wohnen* fill open spaces as quickly as possible while trying to ensure that all individuals within one apartment speak the same primary language, even if they come from different countries (Anissa Lucius 2017). Susanne Schwendtke, Head of Communications, described the organization’s approach to social considerations and integration in the follow up housing assignment process:

“It’s very important for us to have a mixture of inhabitants - men, women, children, older people, families, people who come alone, and people from different nations... We always mix it because it is important that the people always speak German to people who don’t understand their language. We don’t want these closed communities because it is a handicap for integration in the Hamburg society.”

*Kirchenpauerstrasse* Follow Up Housing Site. Photo credit: Jessica Wolff.
As follow up housing provision has proven to be particularly difficult, there are many “über-residents” who have been living in an initial reception facility for one year or longer even after their asylum case has been approved. As of January 2017, there were more than 6,300 refugees who had received asylum status but were still living in an initial reception facility exceeding the six-month timeline simply because there were not follow up housing spaces available. The government has since stated that decreasing the number of über-residents is a primary goal and just one year later, in December 2017, the number of über-residents had decreased to approximately 2,400 refugees (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2017).

Interaction between asylum seekers and local residents is a major component of integration, particularly to practice language skills, to learn about each other and to share cultural identities. Three of the refugees I spoke with said they had limited interaction with local Hamburg residents, with the exception of those that held administrative positions at the housing sites. Mohamed sometimes plays soccer near the city center and befriended some local residents that way. He enjoyed this opportunity because “in football, you meet a lot of people... They know me because I am the only refugee who plays with them... Sport has its own complications. You can understand each other even if you don’t speak. You can communicate in the sport way.” At an institutional level, the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees manages hundreds of volunteers who host a range of social programming, including sports teams and community groups, at the follow up housing sites. However, none of the refugees I interviewed mentioned participating in these programs.

Through both formal interviews and informal conversations with local residents of Hamburg, my general impression is that they are eager to support asylum seekers, in theory. In early 2015, a multitude of community organizations developed in order to promote refugee integration, to provide material goods, and to support language learning. One local resident who has been involved with media documentation of migration in Germany for decades believed that the local government missed an opportunity to capitalize on the local desire for engagement and to build on this momentum (Hauke Wendler 2017). Personal prejudices prevent some German citizens from interacting with asylum seekers, but, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the physical location and design of many follow-up housing sites do not facilitate spatial proximity or engender a welcoming atmosphere.
The final phase of refugee housing provision, and the final step in the local government’s perspective towards integration, is for refugees to find a job and become economically independent so that they can move out of government provided housing and afford monthly rent in the general housing market. However, the combination of a limited affordable housing market, prejudice from landlords and a federal regulation restricting refugees’ mobility have made it difficult for many refugees to move into their own apartment. These challenges are elaborated in Chapter 4.
This chapter will describe the innovations in refugee policy, enabled by relying on principles and tools of urban planning at both the federal and state levels, that facilitated refugee housing provision in Hamburg, Germany in the face of a "migration crisis." At the federal level, an innovative land use regulation was added to the Federal Building Code which allowed exclusive, temporary refugee housing sites to be built in non-residential areas. At the state level, there were three key innovations: 1) Hamburg's government consolidated dispersed responsibilities into a new unit to oversee all facets of refugee programming; 2) the state government created a new policy to provide permanent refugee housing while expanding the city's social housing stock; and 3) the housing site selection process underwent several iterations with the goal of establishing a more rationalized system. Combined, these policies begin to constitute a new model of land use regulation that can be used for housing provision in land-constrained urban areas in response to a rapid population increase. However, as will be described through the chapter, both institutional and social challenges to many of these policies remain.

3.1 New Federal Land Use Regulations for Rapid Refugee Housing Development

3.1.1 High Demand for Refugee Housing Cannot Be Accommodated with Existing Regulations

Across Germany, the number of asylum seekers exceeded the existing limited stock of designated refugee housing units. Germany's three city-states (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) especially struggled with housing provision due to limited availability of publicly owned residential land and, as outlined in Chapter 2, each of these states received disproportionately more asylum seekers per square kilometer through the EASY quota system. In Hamburg in December 2014, there were 64 existing follow up housing facilities that could accommodate a total of 11,329 people (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2017). One year later, in December 2015, a limited amount of new construction brought the total number of follow up housing sites up to 87 with 17,615 beds now available; an increase of approximately 50%, but still falling short of demand by nearly 10,000 places. That same month, there were 27,003 refugees who required follow up housing from the government.
As can be seen below, the number of asylum seekers and refugees in Hamburg that require follow up housing has been substantially greater than the number of available places since July 2015. Under existing regulations and institutional organization, the local government could not provide sufficient units to match the demand from the growing refugee population.

Prior to November 2014, new refugee housing sites were permitted under the Federal Building Code or under an emergency police law, but the scope and latitude of these policies were not nearly broad enough for the housing demand. The first permitting method used for new refugee housing was Section 31(2) of the German Federal Building Code (Baugesetzbuch; or BauGB), which states that an exception to the designated land use can be made when it is required for the public good and supports the existing land use regulation (Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Housing 1997). This policy was described as allowing for the construction of a small grocery store in a residential area, even if it was not specifically designated in the development plan, since it would be in the interest of the public good and support the neighborhood's overall land use. Under this regulation, some of the first refugee housing sites could be accommodated in existing residential neighborhoods as these sites fall under the overall land use. Additional refugee housing sites
were permitted under a police law called the Law for Protection of Public Safety and Order (Gesetz zum Schutz der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung or SOG) whose provisions can be enacted if there is acute homelessness or, in this case, to prevent such a situation from arising (Susanne Schwendtke 2017). The Hamburg Senate, in response to a public request for information, released documentation that there were twenty follow up housing sites permitted under SOG, including thirteen sites that opened or were expanded after the end of 2014 (Hamburg Senate 2015). These sites have a limited lifespan as they are not officially permitted through the BauGB, though the permitted duration varies by site.

3.1.2 Hamburg’s Mayor Proposes a New Land Use Regulation for Refugee Housing

The existing regulations were not sufficient to respond to the growing demand for refugee housing as immigration rates continued to increase. Olaf Scholz, the Mayor of Hamburg, proposed an amendment to the Federal Building Code, Section §246, which would provide a regulatory basis for the construction of temporary refugee accommodations in non-residential areas. This unprecedented land use policy was intended to accelerate the development of follow up housing for refugees. Research suggests that German cities frequently rely on urban planning tools, such as inclusionary zoning and centralized construction coordination centers, to achieve affordable housing construction goals (Anna Granath Hansson 2017). Thus it is not surprising that, when faced with a national affordable housing crisis exacerbated by an influx of asylum seekers, the German national government turned to land use regulations to allow new construction. Olaf Scholz personally convinced Angela Merkel of the necessity of this amendment (Katrin Stolle 2017). After only eight weeks of drafting and deliberation, the German Bundesrat passed the “Law on Measures of Building Planning Law to Facilitate the Housing of Refugees” in November 2014 (Gesetz Über Maßnahmen Im Bauplanungsrecht Zur Erleichterung Der Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen). The scope of Section §246 was expanded in October 2015 when a second law detailed in which non-residential land use areas refugee housing could be constructed (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz).

Section §246 permits the temporary construction of exclusively refugee housing sites in non-residential areas. It has been used for follow up housing sites and was not intended for initial reception facilities. Only sites that solely host refugees can be established under Section §246. This permitting mechanism cannot be used to permit a site that will have both refugee accommodations and social housing for residents at the same location.
Sites are given temporary permission ranging from three to five years. At the end of that designated timeframe, the housing must be removed and the site must return to its original use, including whatever site remediation may be necessary. This regulation can be used for new sites until December 2019, unless a continuance is approved at the federal level. The expansion of Section §246 in 2015 designated specific non-residential land use areas for refugee housing, including business or administrative buildings (§246 (8) BauGB), a site that is in the undesignated outlying area, but adjacent to built areas (§246 (9) BauGB), and industrial areas (§246 (10) BauGB). Additionally, an “emergency clause” was established in Section §246 (14) that effectively serves as a ‘catch-all’ clause allowing refugee accommodation to be built as needed, even if contrary to BauGB regulations, if housing cannot be otherwise provided in a timely manner. This policy demonstrates a substantial commitment on behalf of the federal government by going so far as asserting that refugee housing is in the interest of the public good and thus housing provision can be exempted from existing building regulations if absolutely necessary.

The only way buildings permitted under Section §246 can remain open past the defined timeframe is if the site is formally re-designated to a residential land use. To do that, the local government would have to go through the formal process of amending the city’s development plan, which typically takes two to three years. However, at the time of its establishment, the primary intention for this policy was construction of temporary housing sites. The local government of Hamburg later created a new policy to use this regulation to support construction of permanent refugee housing sites that would contribute to the city’s social housing stock (see: Partnering Temporary Construction Policy with Long Term Land Use Planning).
3.1.3 *Hamburg’s Implementation of Section §246 for New Refugee Housing*

In Hamburg, Mayor Scholz called upon city planners in the city’s seven local district governments to rely on this new regulation to select additional sites for refugee housing. The easiest development options, in terms of legal regulation, had already been exhausted for the reasons outlined previously, namely a limited number of already publicly owned residential sites and immense demand for refugee housing. With an expanded legal basis under Section §246 as of November 2014, city planners quickly shifted to non-residential sites for new construction opportunities. A significant consequence of this policy, locating refugee accommodations in non-residential areas, poses a challenge to integration, which is further discussed in Chapter 4.

There is no central public source of information regarding the permitting of follow up housing sites. The primary source of information regarding construction permitted under Section §246 is provided through a series of responses to public requests for information. The Senate of Hamburg is legally required to provide information in response to public requests that are submitted through a representative. However, the provision of information in this manner is extremely decentralized, sporadic and nonlinear. Information released in a response to a public request dated May 9, 2017 states there were 24 refugee housing sites constructed under Section §246 in Hamburg since the regulation was first instituted in 2014 (Hamburg Senate 2017). Between December 2014 and June 2017, a total of 48 new follow up sites opened in Hamburg (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2017), revealing that exactly half of all new refugee housing development that has happened in Hamburg during that timeframe occurred under Section §246.

The following maps document the geographic distribution of follow up refugee housing sites across Hamburg as they existed in December 2014 (64 sites with 11,329 total places) and as of June 2017 (112 sites with 28,748 total places). The icons are scaled to represent the number of total places per site.
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

December 2014
Total Sites: 64
Total Places: 11,329

Figure 10. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, December 2014. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

June 2017
Total Sites: 112
Total Places: 28,748

Figure 11. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, June 2017. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Under Section §246, city planners were afforded increased power, autonomy and responsibility in the refugee housing site selection process. Construction permitted under Section §246 is temporary; therefore, no change to the city’s development plan is required, eliminating a public review process (this new permitting process and its impacts on public participation are discussed later in this section). Without a public review, city planners are the selectors and primary evaluators of new follow up housing sites. While the final decision rests with a selection committee comprised of political representatives (see Section 3.4), city planners’ site suggestions frame the scope of the discussion. In this way, city planners have control over which sites are discussed, or never even considered, for new follow up housing sites. This increased authority brings with it a heightened responsibility to advocate for sites that would support the integration experience for refugees. In this way, city planners can strengthen refugees’ ‘right to the city’ by proposing sites that have access to neighborhood amenities equivalent to residential areas comprised of permanent residents.

The refugee housing site selection process is managed by Hamburg’s Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (see Section 3.2) and permits are granted by the local government in each of the seven districts within Hamburg. Once new sites are selected, the state-owned company that manages all public housing in Hamburg, Födern und Wohnen, will issue a public tender for a new construction project, to which public and private construction companies may respond. Construction oversight of all new refugee housing facilities is managed by public companies, but construction bids can be won by public or private companies (Fouad Hamdan 2017). Födern und Wohnen will select the winning bid and then construction of all refugee housing sites (including initial reception facilities, follow up housing sites and UPW sites) is managed by a state-owned company called Sprinkenhof GmbH.

3.1.4 Temporary, Non-Residential Sites under Section §246 Pose Future Challenges

While construction of 24 new follow up housing sites under Section §246 is significant and has created accommodation options for a large additional number of refugees (17,419 total new housing places through June 2017), the temporary nature of the sites poses ongoing challenges. The limited temporal nature of the sites permitted under Section §246 can be likened to that of a refugee camp, which are built as an impermanent solution with the intent of eventual closure.
Temporary accommodations for refugees effectively defer an inevitable housing crunch as the follow up buildings permitted under Section §246 have a delimited lifespan. The refugees initially housed in these sites will need to be relocated to alternative sites once that time period expires. While this was not told to me directly, I imagine that the rationale behind this time-delimited policy is that within three to five years the number of refugees requiring government provided housing will be much lower. Thus, when a follow up site has to close, the number of refugees that will need to be re-accommodated somewhere else will be lower. However, as of January 2018, only 16.5% of refugees assigned to Hamburg have found their own housing, which suggests that a large proportion of refugees may remain dependent on government provided housing in the near future when sites begin to reach their endpoint ("Daten Flüchtlinge Unterbringung Hamburg" 2018). Hopefully, this percentage will increase as more refugees can secure employment and choose to move out of the follow up housing sites (which is a highly desired option among the refugees I interviewed and discussed in Chapter 4). However, absorbing such a large group of people into an already undersupplied private housing market will be slow. As of early April 2018, a representative at ZKF shared that none of the housing sites whose permit ends in 2018 have closed yet, but that the state government acknowledges they will need to relocate those refugees who still require housing support to other follow up housing sites (Fouad Hamdan 2018). Relocation from one follow up housing site to another when permits expire is effectively a secondary displacement for refugees within the city who had begun to establish their lives and community in a given location.

Oftentimes temporary refugee housing programs ultimately become permanent fixtures. When asked if this could potentially occur in Hamburg, a city planner working in the district of Wandsbek indicated that if the city planning offices did not close the sites in a timely manner, nearby neighbors would be knocking on their doors one day after the permit expired. He elaborated by saying that there is local acceptance of these housing sites, but only to a certain extent. He believes Hamburg residents will be particularly insistent on the temporary nature of housing.
The temporary nature of refugee housing accommodation under Section §246 may, in fact, ease political rhetoric around providing refugee housing in Hamburg. Especially as the state government of Hamburg has been criticized for limited progress on affordable housing provision for its own residents, it may be more politically tenable to demonstrate that this large effort to provide government-subsidized housing for refugees is temporary, rather than permanent.

Another challenge to constructing temporary follow up sites is an economic argument regarding the buildings' material durability which outlasts the permitting period. During an interview, Katrin Stolle, the Assistant Director of the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees, told me that the closure of follow up housing sites “is a little bit stupid because they [the containers] last 10 years... in terms of economic aspects, it’s a waste of money [to close the sites]. I hope that we can have a prolongation of the contract in some areas.” In order to maximize economic value, Ms. Stolle explored opportunities to repurpose the living containers at a site near a university into student housing once the temporary use for refugees expired. However, upon broaching the topic with university staff, she was told that the living conditions were not good enough for their students. Certainly, this begs the question: if the conditions are not good enough for university students, why are they good enough for refugees? This was just one of several comments that raise awareness of a conscious stratification of housing standards for refugees, below that of German social housing standards.

Another challenge to this policy is an ethical question: if specific areas were not designated as appropriate locations for Hamburg residents under the city’s land use plan, why are they appropriate for refugees to live in? A city planner in Hamburg told me that these refugee housing sites are permitted in non-residential areas because they are not, in fact, residential developments. As these sites are collective living arrangements where refugees are housed in temporary, shared apartments, the developments are better characterized as ‘accommodations.’ As such, they can be temporarily allowed in a non-residential area because they are not traditional residential developments. While this technical clarification may be necessary for legal regulation, it raises additional concerns about the ways in which these housing sites are imagined and recognized. What does it mean that the local government is housing refugees in sites that are specified as ‘accommodation’ rather than ‘residential’? And to what extent does this impact the integration experience?
3.1.5 *Lack of Public Participation Challenges Development Under Section §246*

While it was a highly innovative response to a dire need, the approval of Section §246 effectively legalized temporary extra-judicial land planning practices by circumventing conventional public engagement processes for changing a site's land use. The Federal Building Code explicitly defines the legally required public engagement processes for changes or updates to local development plans in Germany, such as the designation of new residential areas (Elke Pahl-Weber and Dietrich Henckel 2008). As outlined on the left side of the following graphic, changes to a development plan require both an early phase of public participation and a one-month long formal participation feedback period. However, construction of refugee housing sites in non-residential areas permitted under Section §246 is treated as a temporary development. Thus, for follow up housing sites that are built in non-residential areas, there is no requirement to change to the underlying land use plan and therefore there is no mandated formal review period for the refugee housing sites that are selected. The local government essentially bypasses most of the typical public engagement procedures that would be required for a new residential development under the premise of the development’s impermanence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparing Public Participation in Hamburg Planning Processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Typical Local Planning Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run-Up Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- identify the need or purpose of the plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Preparation Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Public Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- learn about the plan's general goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- provide feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighing of Interests &amp; Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Plan Announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- share the place &amp; duration of the plan's public display</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one week beforehand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- one month to give recommendations or objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighing of Interests &amp; Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- if revisions are needed, the Public Display process begins again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Planning Process for Refugee Housing under §246             |
| Run-Up Phase                                                |
| Preparation:                                                |
| - identify the need or purpose of the plan                  |
| Plan Preparation Decision                                   |
| Early Public Participation                                  |
| Draft Plan Announcement                                      |
| - share plans of the proposed new housing site in the neighborhood and via news outlets |
| Informal Participation                                       |
| - residents raise objections to local officials without a designated public forum |
| Weighing of Interests & Decision                            |
| Draft Plan Announcement                                      |
| - share the place & duration of the plan's public display    |
| one week beforehand                                         |
| Formal Participation                                         |
| - one month to give recommendations or objections           |
| Weighing of Interests & Decision                            |
| - if revisions are needed, the Public Display process begins again |
| Judicial Review                                             |
| Public Participation                                        |


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Without a legally mandated public engagement period to serve as a system of checks and balances, undertaking refugee housing development using Section §246 endows great trust into the judgment of city planners as they select new non-residential sites for development. As illustrated on the right side of the diagram, public participation in planning for follow up housing is substantially more limited than in typical planning processes as there are no early or formal participation phases. While proposed development plans are posted in neighborhoods and publicized through the media ahead of construction at a new site, this is mostly a process for notifying local residents of impending construction, rather than gathering feedback. By bypassing appropriate avenues for public engagement, the local government eliminated a critical means of conversation with local residents regarding the refugee housing policy and opened themselves up to greater risk, and potential legal action, as a result of displeased residents later on.

Notably, the issue of resident concern over a lack of public participation was raised through a public request for information from the Hamburg Senate. A request made in October 2015 asked if changes made under Section §246 would affect citizen participation (Hamburg Senate 2015). The Senate responded that the regulations in the BauGB for public participation in planning processes had not changed. While the response is technically correct, it fails to clarify that the public participation process required for refugee housing permitted under Section §246 as temporary developments is not held to the same standard as typical development plan changes.

Without a mandatory period of Public Display for learning, feedback, and potentially amendments, local residents’ first formal opportunity to raise objections is through a lawsuit. Many neighborhoods created new resident organizations or mobilized existing groups to file lawsuits against the city (Klaus Schomaker 2017). Local feelings of ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) were disguised as legal claims asserting obscure nature reserve policies or the protection of specific tree species. For example, multiple lawsuits were filed on the grounds that temporary residential development would threaten particular tree species that are important to the surrounding ecosystem and could increase carbon dioxide emissions, effectively prioritizing natural factors over housing a particularly vulnerable population (Bernhard Heitz 2017). In many wealthy neighborhoods, residents who claimed to support the country’s acceptance of refugees at large, nonetheless exhibited NIMBY-ism and relied on archaic land use regulations to mount legal cases preventing new refugee housing construction in their own neighborhoods. Even though the city ultimately won almost all of
the forty lawsuits to date, these legal proceedings delayed construction for six to eighteen months at many sites, slowing the provision of much needed follow up housing accommodation (Katrin Stolle 2017). Given the housing demand mounted by new asylum seekers arriving in Hamburg daily, the government could not afford to wait for the legal proceedings to conclude in order to continue construction of the challenged sites.

Therefore, to prevent further delays in refugee housing stock provision, city planners shifted their focus and began choosing new sites in poorer neighborhoods where they anticipated fewer legal obstacles. A city planner in the district of Wandsbek acknowledged that, while it was wrong to do, Hamburg city planners started to purposefully locate more refugee housing sites in poorer neighborhoods with the expectation that local residents either could not or would not be willing to pursue a legal obstruction (Hauke Seeger 2017). Dispersal housing policies in urban areas often coincide with housing refugees in areas of existing social deprivation (Phillips 2006). Reliance on a system that houses refugees in seemingly less desirable neighborhoods creates the likelihood of further spatial and social marginalization for these communities.

Despite attempts to attain sub-district level income data to test inequitable housing distribution patterns, I was unable to find sufficiently granular data to prove this assertion empirically. However, sentiments of unequal allocation of housing across the city were echoed in interviews with the leader of a resident group that requested the creation of an intra-Hamburg distribution system to ensure more equitable distribution (see Challenges from Local Residents). On the basis of repeated comments to this same point, I expect that empirical evidence would support the claim that the site selection process was intentionally skewed towards poorer neighborhoods.

3.2 The Central Coordination Unit for Refugees & Housing Provision

Hamburg’s local government responded quickly and creatively as more than 500 asylum seekers were arriving in the city each day at the peak of the “migration crisis.” This strained existing municipal systems for refugee accommodation. In the German local government system, the Ministry of the Interior and Sports traditionally manages initial reception facilities, while the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Family and Integration manages follow up housing and integration activities. As these two phases of housing are inextricably linked, coordination between the Ministries at the height of the “migration crisis,” while
essential, proved complicated and time intensive. To facilitate a more streamlined housing and refugee support system, Anselm Spradel, who led the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Family and Integration at the time, envisioned a consolidated department which oversaw all facets of local refugee policy and convinced Mayor Olaf Scholz of its necessity and importance. The local government of Hamburg created the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees in October 2015 (Zentraler Koordinierungsstab Flüchtlinge in German, abbreviated as ZKF). Fouad Hamdan, the Officer of Citizen Participation at ZKF explained that, “the Central Coordination Unit is a creation of the crisis” (Fouad Hamdan 2017).

The staff of ZKF is tasked with managing all stages of asylum seeker and refugee accommodation, preliminary integration measures, and coordinating volunteer-run programming. ZKF sourced employees from both ministries and hired new staff. In the fall of 2017, the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees was formalized as a permanent government unit that will continue managing the city’s asylum seeker and refugee housing programs and will remain staffed in anticipation of future asylum seeker housing needs. Institutionalizing ZKF reflects the local government’s desire and commitment to be prepared for future migration crises. During our interview, Fouad Hamdan indicated that many people had believed this would be a temporary restructuring, “but that doesn’t make sense when you think about the threats of the future.” Throughout interviews with government staff and housing management staff, a consistent theme was using learning from this crisis to institutionalize systems for the future.
Hamburg is the only German state that created a new refugee housing authority in response to the increase in immigration (Fouad Hamdan 2017). The effectiveness of this model has been recognized by other government institutions across the country. In the spring of 2017, other federal states sent representatives to Hamburg to learn about the creation and responsibilities of ZKF to assess if a similar agency should be replicated in their own jurisdictions. ZKF's successful consolidation of responsibilities and streamlining of the housing process is advocated as a new model for effectively managing refugee policies and programming within German and across the EU.

3.3 Partnering Temporary Construction Policy with Long Term Land Use Planning

In October 2015, around the same time that the scope of Section §246 was expanded, the Hamburg state government announced a new policy to transition from a temporary refugee housing scheme to permanent options by incorporating refugee housing with social housing. By developing housing in a long-term perspective with equivalent quality to other social housing programs for permanent residents and citizens, the establishment of this policy moves Hamburg's refugee housing policy from a realm evocative of refugee camp temporalities and mentalities towards a permanent housing solution that increases refugees' 'right to the city.' The policy, called Unterkünfte mit der perspective wohnen (Accommodation with a housing perspective or UPW), partners temporary permitting to facilitate rapid construction under Section §246 with long term planning for new social housing sites. Each of the city-state's seven districts was required to identify one site that could house 3,000 refugees (Hauke Seeger 2017). In contrast to the follow up sites permitted under Section §246 that are intended to be temporary and close down, UPW sites are initially built under Section §246 to enable fast construction regardless of current zoning with the understanding that each district will amend its Bebauungsplan (Development Plan or B-Plan) to zone these sites as permanent residential locations. The B-plan for each of these sites must be updated before the temporary permit duration of Section §246 ends. This policy benefitted from a series of affordable housing construction tax breaks were approved to further incentivize rapid development of affordable housing, to benefit both Hamburg residents and refugees (Reuters 2015).
The policy is intended to promote integration by providing space for interaction between refugees and residents at the building level. Apartments in these large developments would be solely inhabited by refugees for the first fifteen years, after which time the units will be incorporated into the city’s social housing program for another fifteen to thirty years. As refugees move out, the newly available apartments will be open to refugees or Hamburg residents that receive social housing support. Future research should observe this transition to monitor how the apartments transition from exclusively refugee housing to social housing units. Thirty years after a site opens, the developer is free to sell the apartments in the private real estate housing market, which is a development model common to social housing in Hamburg. This strategy also addresses previously discussed concerns about the limited economic value of developing temporary refugee housing sites by increasing the lifespan for new construction.

As UPW buildings will eventually become social housing stock, the building standards are higher than temporary follow up housing sites reserved exclusively for refugees. The UPW buildings will be built to federal social housing standards which requires seven
square meters per person, compared to five square meters per person required at follow up sites that are used exclusively for refugees (Anissa Lucius 2017). This is a physical manifestation of differential rights awarded to refugees and local residents; while both groups have the right to housing, local residents have the right to better housing constructed to a higher living standard. Simply comparing the façades of the Raja-Illinauk-Strasse UPW site shown below with other temporary follow up housing sites, the difference in housing quality is visibly apparent. Moreover, since these sites will become permanent residential additions, greater attention was given to site planning which is evident in the site's connectivity with the surrounding road network and design characteristics that facilitate physical integration with the neighborhood. Visiting the Raja-Illinauk-Strasse site by foot and car was much easier than visiting some other follow up sites which are not always accessible by paved roads, nor are they integrated with the existing street grid.

As of September 2017, twelve UPW sites were planned throughout Hamburg. Once these sites are complete, there will be a total of 9,380 places reserved as refugee housing for the following fifteen years. The total number of places is far from the local government's initially stated goal of 21,000, but a series of challenges from local residents forced the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Apartments</th>
<th>Number of Places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Östlich Haferblöcken</td>
<td>Hamburg-Mitte</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eiffestraße</td>
<td>Hamburg-Mitte</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suurheid</td>
<td>Altona</td>
<td>Appx. 100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baurstraße</td>
<td>Altona</td>
<td>Appx. 35</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duvenacker</td>
<td>Eimsbüttel</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hörgensweg</td>
<td>Eimsbüttel</td>
<td>175 for refugees/175 for residents</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohkamp/Flughafenstraße</td>
<td>Hamburg-Nord</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am Rehagen</td>
<td>Wandsbek</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elfsaal</td>
<td>Wandsbek</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohlendieck/Poppenbüttler</td>
<td>Wandsbed</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mittlerer Landweg</td>
<td>Bergedorf</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashenland (Baugebiet Vogelkamp)</td>
<td>Harburg</td>
<td>Appx. 75</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14. UPW Sites in Hamburg as of May 2017. Source: Hamburg Senate 2017, 10168.
local government to decrease the number of refugees per site (see: Challenges from Local Residents to Larger, Permanent Refugee Housing Sites). In comparison to refugees living at follow up housing sites that have a limited lifespan, refugees who are assigned to these sites will not have to move out after just a couple of years. This longer timeframe for residency at these sites is perceived as an advantage. Three of these sites have already opened.

My qualitative research revealed that representatives in Hamburg’s local government were quick to reframe the “refugee (or migration) crisis” as a housing crisis, both to defuse residents’ concerns and to increase political will for new residential construction. A unique challenge for governments in cities experiencing urban displacement is the need to balance provision of aid to refugees with provision of similar benefits to the local population. Specifically, Hamburg has been experiencing an affordable housing shortage for several decades as new construction has not kept pace with the number of units leaving the social housing stock each year. The arrival of more than 55,000 refugees in Hamburg exacerbated the lack of affordable housing. As the Hamburg state government did with the UPW policy, reframing the institutional or economic stressors of a displacement crisis as a development opportunity that can benefit both the displaced population and local residents will increase political capital and a government’s ability to respond (Zetter, 2014). In June 2016, the state government updated the Hamburg Housing Alliance increasing the state’s goal for affordable housing construction to 10,000 units per year (Anna Granath Hansson 2017). Construction of the UPW sites will contribute towards this annual goal. The establishment of these permanent refugee housing sites that will be incorporated into the social housing stock was a means of aligning these political goals and demonstrating action to expand the overall residential housing stock.

3.3.1 Challenges from Local Residents to Larger, Permanent Refugee Housing Sites

There has been widespread pushback against the development of the UPW sites for two main reasons: 1) this policy effectively identifies non-residential sites that will convert to new residential areas in the future, bypassing traditional planning processes, and 2) many residents do not want a large development of refugees in their neighborhoods (which resident organizations define as more than 300 people per site).
By using Section §246 to allow the initial development instead of following traditional (and time intensive) processes to amend existing development plans, some residents believe that the local government is essentially coopting additional land for residential development without proper review. The initial phase of construction does not require a formal public engagement process (see: Lack of Public Participation Challenges Development Under Section §246), but changes to the development plan to make these sites permanent does require public engagement. Responsibility for locating these sites was given to the city planning offices in each of Hamburg’s seven districts; therefore, city planners chose the locations for the UPW sites and could proceed with construction under Section §246 without an extensive public review process. At this point, with construction inertia and money already invested in the buildings, changing the site’s underlying land use enters the sphere of public engagement to review a permanent change to the development plan. It would be very difficult to pose a challenge after such a substantial amount of public funding has already been invested in the site. In this way, there are concerns that city planners could use the UPW policy as a means of creating new residential sites that may have not otherwise been approved through the development plan review process.

Residents’ concerns regarding UPW site size ultimately required the local government to amend the initial policy for these larger housing sites, resulting in fewer refugees per site. A collection of thirteen neighborhood resident organizations mobilized to create a group called Hamburg für gute Integration (Hamburg for Better Integration). They petitioned the government to limit the number of refugees living at any one location. Leaders of the group assert that their pushback against the housing plan was not an affront to welcoming refugees; rather, it was a community organizing initiative in support of integration (Klaus Schomaker 2017). The leaders argued that placing 3,000 asylum seekers in a single building would not facilitate interactions with residents – a dynamic necessary to move towards integration – but rather it would allow the establishment of a separate, parallel community.

After failing to gain the attention of local politicians through formal meeting requests, Hamburg for Better Integration initiated the process to hold a local referendum on refugee housing. In a powerful message to government officials about local opinions, it took only four days in March 2016 to collect 26,000 resident signatures supporting a referendum vote for a more dispersed housing scheme (Klaus Schomaker 2017). Government officials wanted to avoid a referendum at all costs as such a vote had the potential to further
polarize opinions on refugee housing and integration in Hamburg. As Fouad Hamdan of ZKF describes: “a referendum would have polarized the society... It would not have been a referendum for smaller refugee camps. It would have been pro or contrary refugees.” At that point, negotiations between the local government and Hamburg for Better Integration began.

3.3.2 Unintended Consequences?

In June 2016, the parties reached an agreement on the future of geographic distribution and size of refugee housing sites in Hamburg (Committee on Social Affairs, Labor and Inclusion 2016). The agreement includes stipulations regarding a new site selection process to encourage a more even distribution of housing sites across wealthy and poor neighborhoods, and a future goal no more than 300 refugee housing sites total, with a maximum of 300 asylum seekers at a given site with at least 300 meters between sites (Klaus Schomaker 2017). During an interview with the spokeswoman for Födern und Wohnen, the housing management company, she explained that these restrictions only apply to the districts represented in Hamburg for Better Integration. This group is mostly comprised of resident organizations from wealthier neighborhoods, so she believed such restrictions may not apply in unrepresented neighborhoods. This could unintentionally cause even more refugee housing development in these locations unhindered by size restrictions. During my research, I was unable to discern if the stipulations resulting from this agreement only apply to those neighborhoods which are represented, or if they will apply across Hamburg. Further research is required to clarify this detail and discern how the stipulations will be implemented.

These stipulations, though not legally binding, will ultimately require more construction. As described in the prior section, most of the UPW sites that were already under construction at the time of this agreement were designed for 500-1,000 refugees. As a result of this agreement, the government will not be able to allocate all of the available places to refugees at these sites and the number of places that had been expected for the future will actually be lower than planned. Therefore, in order to reach the same level of accommodation capacity, additional housing construction at other sites will be necessary.
Another challenge arising from this agreement is the need to coordinate among the requirements of various land use regulations. As described previously, many UPW sites are initially permitted under Section §246, though when a building is permitted under this law, only refugees can inhabit the building. Sites that have spaces left vacant as a result of the agreement with Hamburg for Better Integration cannot be filled by other social housing residents until the building development plan is updated and the building is permitted as a permanent residential site. This process typically takes two to three years.

While this agreement has compromised existing development plans to accommodate refugees and will ultimately require construction of even more units of refugee housing, it may have been a blessing in disguise. Fouad Hamdan of ZKF explained that “these people who ran that campaign... forced us to be a bit more pragmatic and to compromise with conservative forces in the city, and that diffused all the tension between the right-wing and left-wing, the right and left, the anti and pro refugees and so on.” He further explained that, even though it was challenging, aligning political initiatives for refugee housing with residents’ sentiments was critical for the program to succeed. He said “the whole basis of what we have achieved here with housing and integration would not have been possible without that agreement.”

3.4 Standardization of the Site Selection Process

3.4.1 Evaluating Potential Sites – A Political Process

With salient housing pressures and a need for rapid construction, initial refugee housing site selection was haphazard. In the fall of 2014, there was a Steering Group that included representatives from several government ministries who met every three weeks to discuss new housing sites. Katrin Stolle, Assistant Director of ZKF, noted that there was often conflict among Ministers as they pursued political agendas in the site selection process. As demand for refugee housing continued to increase and site selection became more difficult, competition among the different ministries, reflecting their respective priorities, grew stronger. For example, tensions would arise between the Minister of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Minister of City Development and Environment when assessing if a neighborhood should contribute a public park or a vacant office building for an additional housing site.
In an attempt to standardize the process and to limit political influence, the Steering Group created a housing site checklist in 2015, a commonly relied upon tool in urban planning for justifying methods of land use development. This checklist required information for each prospective site including current land use regulations, information about the closest transit stops, and demographic data. Conceptually, this approach was intended to facilitate rational decision-making as the Steering Group would have a more comprehensive understanding of the opportunities and challenges presented by each potential site. From March 2014 to June 2017, the city-state's review team vetted 1,608 potential sites (Katrin Stolle 2017).

3.4.2 *Introducing Spatial Factors to Site Selection*

The site selection process was further defined as a result of the agreement with Hamburg für gute Integration (see: Challenges from Local Residents). In addition to the stipulations regarding site size, the agreement also included a distribution system for allocating refugee housing across Hamburg in, supposedly, a more equitable manner (Committee on Social Affairs, Labor and Inclusion 2016). The resulting system includes quantifying the following measures into an index:

- Population – total population of the district
- Land area – total land area of the district in kilometers
- Social monitoring
  - Status index – comprised of several indicators such as unemployment rate, education levels, number of residents with a migrant background, social welfare recipients and more
- Dynamic index – a measure of the development of the district from 2011 to 2014 compared to other districts

This index is framed as a system that balances a diverse set of housing needs, land use regulations imposed by the state and concerns of local residents regarding refugee housing distribution. By including land area, this distribution index introduces a spatial indicator that was not previously considered in housing location decisions, in an attempt to equalize housing distribution not only based on demographic characteristics, but spatial factors, too. Incorporating this spatial measure gives a sense of increased rationality to the

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1 During my fieldwork, I was not able to get a clear understanding of this measure of social monitoring. Additional research is needed to determine what this measure is assessing.
distribution system – to reach the apparent ‘perfect’ standard of dispersal based on land area. However, as designed, the distribution system appears to primarily benefit residents who feel their neighborhoods are disproportionately burdened by refugee housing sites. Without considering other spatial factors such as the amenities available, surrounding land uses or employment opportunities in each of these districts, this distribution system does not reflect a prioritization of spatial determinants that would promote refugee integration. In fact, the implementation of this index further restricts the follow up housing site selection process in a technocratic manner which may be used as a rationale to override other considerations important for refugee housing.

Notably, input from refugees themselves was not incorporated at any phase during the evolution of the site selection process. In this regard, there is very little evidence of the refugees’ ‘right to the city,’ or efforts of local government to support it. Given that refugees in Hamburg are assigned to a housing through a mandatory housing dispersal policy, they have no control over their housing location. As will be elaborated later in Chapter 5, incorporating specific spatial determinants that reflect refugees’ preferences for neighborhood characteristics and support the integration experience would further improve this system.

3.5 Measures of Success?

During nearly every interview, I asked the interviewee their definition of success and if Hamburg’s refugee housing policies were successful. The answers varied significantly given each person’s role and responsibility. I have included a sample of answers below to illustrate the range of responses.

Asylum Seekers & Refugees

“But compared to our countries, it’s way better because almost everything is free for us and the main thing is that we are safe. One and only thing is we are safe here. And the rest, I’m not enjoying here because I am missing everything back in my country. Because I had everything and I am zero here.” – Ahmad

“For me, no. Personally, I don’t think they are successful because I have a lot of problems with the passport [for his asylum application].” – Mohamed
State Government Employees

“One hundred percent success in the sense that nobody had to sleep in the streets. And everybody, when they were housed, were housed in a decent, really dignified way. Everybody had health care, food and a roof on top of his head... The biggest challenge, or success maybe, was to keep the social cohesion and to prevent a social political backlash against refugees.” – Fouad Hamdan, ZKF

“I think if you want to send a message like what do you need for success we will say - you need the right laws, and you need a good process, standards to check, and you need the communication and you need, what is one very important point, is the dialogue with all of the citizens around...It’s a very good idea to involve people and to make democracy living. For me this was a great success concerning democracy and participation; to have a subject which one can discuss with the citizens.” – Katrin Stolle, ZKF

“...They hope it will be a success, but only time will tell... Until now, [for] the refugees who’ve have come so far, the City of Hamburg managed to put them in apartments, so if you see that already as a success - but only time will show whether they can integrate into society, like work. So housing is just the start.” – Bernard Heitz, ZKF

Refugee Housing Management Staff

“I don’t think we can say it’s a success when people have to live in these kinds of camps without their own bathroom, without cooking, without private area. I don’t even think we can call it a success...Maybe we cannot do it better and it’s bad or it’s difficult for the people, but don’t call it a success.” – Initial Reception Facility Social Case Manager

Local Residents

“So in comparison to other European countries, I will say the housing program is Hamburg was a success. But, if I compare it to what we know about this crisis and from which point the administration could have been in preparation for these refugees coming to Germany, I think there are a large number of situations that could have been avoided.” – Lifelong Hamburg resident
Indicators of success ranged from explicit goals for personal space in housing arrangements to social goals of community cohesion and long-term goals of integration into the German society. Several responses gauged success in comparison to something else — other countries’ policies, the counterfactual of not providing housing to the refugees who were arriving, the experience of living at a different housing site. The broad range of how ‘success’ is described reflects not only each individual’s positionality and relationship to current refugee housing policies, but it also demonstrates just how challenging it will be to work towards a successful outcome for all, particularly as it may happen at vastly different scales and in different timeframes without a broadly agreed notion of what success actually is.
4 Building a Spatial Definition of Integration

“When they said ‘refugees are welcome,’ they have to work on it. They have to find solutions.” – Ahmad

This chapter seeks to complement the existing understandings of integration with a spatial perspective. Identifying spatial manifestations of refugee policy facilitates the assessment of refugees’ ‘right to the city’ through observable, and sometimes quantifiable, characteristics. By focusing on the spatial aspects of refugee housing, this chapter will foreground the impact of political choices on the integration experience. Decisions made at the federal, state, and local levels have a physical embodiment that can be observed through the distribution and spatial design of the refugee housing program. Isolating these indicators enables policy evaluation and emphasizes opportunities for improvement. Engaging a local-level analysis forms the basis of a comparative framework and provides an initial means to address the question: what is a refugee’s ‘right to the city’?

Working within this framework, this chapter will identify and assess spatial characteristics of refugee policy in Hamburg to begin to outline a spatial definition of integration. This chapter will focus on five dimensions which were derived from interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, site visits and spatial analysis: 1) proximity to residential neighborhoods; 2) size (number of places) of the housing site; 3) housing quality and temporality; 4) informal stratification in the housing assignment process and 5) residency requirement. This approach will yield specific, actionable planning recommendations to advance existing refugee housing policies in Hamburg and highlight opportunities for future research.

4.1 Definitions and Current Understandings of Integration

While frequently referenced by practitioners and academics alike, there is not a singular understanding or definition of integration. Robinson explains that “integration is a chaotic concept: a word used by many but understood differently by most” (Vaughan Robinson 1998). In an attempt to create a more analytical definition, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas define integration as “the process of becoming an accepted part of society” and specify three dimensions: the legal-political, the socio-economic and the cultural-religious (Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). These definitions all attempt to capture the intensely personal experience of integration into a new community which is complicated, multifaceted and varies depending not only on the individual and the country of asylum, but also on the specific location where he or she lives.
A leading understanding of integration is laid out by Alastair Ager and Alison Strand. They use a conceptual framework identifying ten domains of integration and categorizing them as a foundation, facilitators, social connections and markers and means “to provide a coherent conceptual structure for considering, from a normative perspective, what constitutes the key components of integration” (2008). Each of the ten domains, which span from rights and citizenship to education and health care, are further disaggregated with specific indicators to assess stages of integration. The domains laid out in this framework will serve as a foundation for a discussion on spatial aspects of integration.

![Figure 15. A Conceptual Framework Defining Core Domains of Integration. Source: Ager and Strand 2008.](image)

The Refugee Coordinator in Hamburg, Anselm Sprandel, closely links integration with housing provision. In a press conference, he said that “one of the biggest challenges in 2017 was the placement of refugees in follow-up accommodation. Above all, it was important for us to ensure a fair and integration-promoting relocation of first-time accommodation [to] follow up accommodation” (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2017b). Fouad Hamdan of ZKF also highlighted the importance of housing as a part of integration when he said the following:

“The ones who we know will stay here forever, or at least for a long period, we push them more into the integration process because housing is very important to help them
integrate. The moment they start having their own privacy, their own kitchen, from that moment their life changes automatically. Then, they can more concentrate on learning the language, a new job, and the whole thing...”

These quotes reveal that state government officials have an understanding of refugee integration that is primarily constructed around housing provision.

While housing is widely acknowledged as a ‘marker and means’ of integration and can be a visible representation of commitment to refugees, housing provision alone is insufficient to facilitate integration (Ager and Strang 2008). As shown in Ager & Strand’s conceptual framework, there are many domains beyond the provision of housing that constitute a ‘successful’ integration. The complex process of integration also requires access to other urban services and employment opportunities, extensive social connections and relationships, language and cultural knowledge, safety, and the ability to engage fully and equally in the local society.

Demonstrative of the interconnected nature of the domains of integration, the asylum seekers and refugees I interviewed were unable to or chose not to separate their opinions on follow up housing provision from the larger integration experience. While a greater sense of security and optimism for the future was present, complications in securing employment, experiences of prejudice and a lack of connection with local residents produced widespread disenchantment with the integration process among those interviewed. Therefore, considering housing provision in a vacuum, without acknowledging how its spatiality impacts other facets of integration, is inadequate.

When considering the process and domains of integration, place matters. An individual’s experience and exposure to a new culture, access to existing urban systems, education and economic opportunities are closely linked to the location where he or she lives. Ability to access or engage in each of the domains of integration can be affected by a housing site’s location and conditions. Recent research suggests that migrants’ experiences are most significantly affected by their local setting, rather than policies dictated at the regional or federal levels (Schiller, Nina Glick and Çağlar, Ayse 2011). The editors of Making Heimat, Germany: Arrival Country who documented the first innovations to refugee housing policy in Germany in 2016 explain:
"Integration takes place, first and foremost, at the neighborhood level. When immigrants arrive in a new city, they generally seek neighborhoods with affordable housing, access to economic opportunities, and networks of established migrants from the same country, region, or culture who can assist with settlement and integration." - Oliver Elser, Peter Cachola Schmal, and Anna Scheuermann; Making Heimat 2016 (24)

It is, therefore, ever more important to assess the local conditions and spatial dynamics at play in refugee housing policy in order to consider the impact on refugees' integration experiences.

In Hamburg, the spatial characteristics of refugee housing sites vary widely leading to great variation in integration experiences. The following examples of follow up and UPW housing sites in Hamburg demonstrate the range of housing location and quality that a refugee can be transferred to through the housing assignment process. Aerial imagery and photography demonstrate the range of spatial features and surrounding neighborhood characteristics that allow us to begin to appreciate how different it might feel to live at each of these sites and how that would impact integration experiences.

Note: Imagery and data sources for all site case studies: "Google Maps" 2018; Landesbetrieb Geoinformation und Vermessung 2016. Photo credit: Anissa Lucius (Jugendparkweg); Jessica Wolff (all others).

Figure 16. Locator Map for Example Follow Up and UPW Housing Sites.
Jugendparkweg is a follow up housing site as well as a social housing site for homeless individuals. A few of the follow up buildings existed from a prior period of migration and additional buildings were constructed in 2015 under the police law (SOG). According to the housing site managers, there is no delimited lifespan on this site as the city rents this land every five years and has been doing so for decades. The site is accessible from the neighboring residential area via a walking and biking path that starts at a bus stop on the closest road, winds through a forested area and passes by the site’s entrance.

Housing Type: Follow Up Housing & Social Housing
Number of Places: 363
Land Use (2016): Industrial
Permit Type: Some buildings permitted pre-2014, expansion areas permitted under SOG in 2015
This follow up housing site was located among several other multi-family residential units. Details on its permitting structure were not available and further research is necessary as the 2016 land use plan for Hamburg defined the site as an industrial land use. Neighborhood amenities, include small grocery stores and schools, were within a short walking radius. There were also multiple transit stops close by.
Am Aschenland II has two areas of housing, one that is a temporary follow up site permitted under Section §246 which will have to close at the end of 2019 and another that is permitted as a UPW site and will ultimately become a part of Hamburg's social housing stock. As seen in the satellite imagery, this site is surrounded by agricultural land and is physically separated from the opposite residential neighborhood by train tracks. In order to cross the tracks, one must walk about ten minutes to the train station to access an overpass. There was evidence of initial construction for a new residential development in an area about five minutes away from this site, but no one appeared to be living there. At the time my visit, there were no paved roads with access to this housing site.

Housing Type: Follow Up Housing & UPW
Number of Places: 700
Land Use (2016): Residential
Permit Type: Section §246
Details: 400 places to close 12/31/19, 300 places will remain as UPW site
Note: the most recent satellite imagery was taken before the site was constructed.
While this follow up housing site is located in an area that is zoned for residential land use, at the time of the site visit, there were no other buildings in a twenty-five-minute walking radius. This area was recently slated for new development and rezoned by the local government. Before widespread construction begins, living containers were located here for refugee housing. The site will close at the end of 2019 as redevelopment reaches this area. There were no urban amenities or services nearby. The surrounding area looked and felt like a construction site.

Housing Type: Follow Up Housing
Number of Places: 712
Land Use (2016): Residential
Permit Type: residential development
Details: Hamburg's entire HafenCity (Harbor Area) was rezoned for future development purposes; this site will close 12/31/2019
5. Raja-Illinauk-Strasse

This UPW site had two phases of construction. The first group of apartments was inhabited at the time of the site visit and the second group was in the final stages of construction. This site is completely integrated into the existing street grid. The surrounding neighborhood is comprised of single-family homes and a few small multi-family housing developments. During the site visit, there were people working on the landscaping. From the outside, the housing quality of the apartments at this site appears to be much higher than other sites.

Housing Type: UPW
Number of Places: 800
Land Use (2016): Residential
Permit Type: residential development
6. WS Transit Kanalplatz

This follow up housing site is actually a houseboat permanently anchored in a canal that runs through one of the city center's main commercial districts. While there are few residential developments in the surrounding area, a wide range of urban amenities and transit stops are easily accessible within a short walking distance.

Housing Type: Follow Up Housing
Number of Places: 216
Land Use (2016): Commercial
Permit Type: Section §246
4.2 Proximity to Residential Neighborhoods

The first aspect of refugee housing to consider for a spatial understanding of integration is proximity to residential neighborhoods. A site's proximity to a residential neighborhood is an indicator of access to existing urban amenities and opportunities for daily interaction with residents. These interactions are an important part of the integration experience particularly for language skills and cross-cultural exchange (Ager and Strang 2008). Moreover, if integration is to be assessed through the framework of the 'right to the city,' equitable access to neighborhood services and amenities among refugees and residents alike is foundational.

Information gained through interviews confirmed the impact of the increased distance between residential neighborhoods and follow up housing sites. Anissa Lucius, a housing site manager at Jugendparkweg, a site with 363 places for refugees and an additional 50 places for homeless individuals, explained that since this housing site is not contiguous to the residential area, local residents rarely pass through the area, limiting opportunities for interaction. While Jugendparkweg is less than two tenths of a mile away from the nearest residential neighborhood—a significantly closer proximity than most sites permitted under Section §246—the site manager expressed the challenges of even that distance of physical separation from local residents:

"I think it's a problem that they build many of these facilities far outside. Everybody in Germany is talking about integration, but they don't see it's a two-way street. It's not only what people have to do, but you also have to give someone the opportunity. And it's not something that cannot be forced. People will adapt automatically to their environment... If you build camps so far out of the city, then people have trouble getting into contact with people who live here."

In response to questions about housing site location, refugees also highlighted the difficulties in finding opportunities to interact with residents and challenges posed by being far away from the city center. Ahmed, who lived at Jugendparkweg during the time of his interview, mostly went to the city center for social outings. He said it took him more than 50 minutes to reach the city center and that he traveled directly between Jugendparkweg and downtown destinations. He didn't know any residents in the closest residential neighborhood, even though he had lived at that site for 13 months at the time of the interview.
While the broadened scope of Section §246 eased institutional pressures for housing provision, the resultant development poses challenges for integration. Refugee housing development permitted under Section §246 increased the number of sites in non-residential neighborhoods and decreased proximity of sites to such neighborhoods and their amenities, hindering refugees' ability to access other 'Markers and Means' of integration and to forge 'Social Connections' as identified by Ager and Strand. Specifically, the "emergency clause" established in Section §246 (14) allowed refugee accommodation to be built as needed despite BauGB regulations and broadened the range of available non-residential locations for construction beyond those areas adjacent to existing neighborhoods. Section §246 only permits the construction of accommodation facilities, so other desirable amenities that would be important in a residential setting such as schools or grocery stores cannot be constructed in areas with temporary follow up housing sites. As a result, follow up sites became increasingly far from existing residential neighborhoods. Access to urban amenities is one way of assessing the 'right to the city' (Henri Lefebvre 1968), so it follows that the further from urban amenities refugee housing sites are located, the weaker is a refugee’s 'right to the city.'

Comparing geographic data for the refugee housing sites over time with Hamburg’s land use plan enables a quantitative assessment of the impact of Section §246 on proximity to residential neighborhoods. As of December 2014, at the start of the current “migration crisis,” 64% of all places available in follow up housing sites were at sites in non-residential neighborhoods (Landesbetrieb Geoinformation und Vermessung 2016). Most of these sites were preexisting housing stock retained by the government from previous periods of migration. Further research regarding the specific building permitting processes for the refugee housing sites that existed in non-residential areas before the establishment of Section §246 is needed. Of those sites in non-residential areas, the furthest distance from a residential area was 526 meters, or 0.32 miles. The following map illustrates the dispersal of non-residential sites across Hamburg as of December 2014, at the start of the “migration crisis” and before construction permitted by Section §246 began.
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

As previously discussed in Section 3.1, half of the new sites built between December 2014 and June 2017 were permitted under Section §246 in non-residential areas. In June 2017, 79% of the total available places in follow up housing sites were in non-residential areas (Landesbetrieb Geoinformation und Vermessung 2016). The maximum distance from a residential land use nearly doubled to 918 meters, or 0.57 miles, moving refugee housing sites even further from neighborhood amenities.

Given the impact of proximity to residential neighborhoods on accessing neighborhood amenities and on other domains of integration such as language and cultural knowledge, priority should be given in the housing site selection process to sites that are the closest to residential areas. With this understanding, city planners working to increase refugees' 'right to the city' have the responsibility to select new follow up housing sites that are located close to existing residential neighborhoods. Specifically in Hamburg, as city planners were afforded greater power in the site selection process on account of reduced

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requirements for public review for sites permitted under Section §246 (described in Section 3.1), it is even more important that they have an understanding of a spatial definition for integration to promote sites that align with these considerations.

4.3 Refugee Housing Site Size

Housing site size is another spatial consideration that impacts refugees' integration experiences. Research on the benefits or impediments of dense immigrant communities yields conflicting results. Some research suggests that ethnic segregation may actually ease the integration process as individuals live in a familiar cultural community which reduces costs of assimilation (David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor 2008; W. Siebel 2016). Ethnic density may also enable a strong in-group network that increases access to employment opportunities and transportation (Patrick Bayer, Stephen L. Ross, and Giorgio Topa 2004). However, as ethnic enclaves are often located on the outskirts of
the central business district or in the suburbs, reduced transit accessibility and diminished provision of public goods can lead to lower rates of economic and cultural integration and lower future income (David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor 2008). Literature suggests that immigrants living in ethnic enclaves separated from other central destinations diminishes their economic outcomes (Jimy M. Sanders and Victor Nee 1987). At the supranational level, European Union policies simultaneously acknowledge the need for some level of ethnic enclaves and the importance of spatial integration in the local community (Hubert Kreiger 2009). While the debate on the impact of housing site size and density will continue, it nonetheless influences the housing and integration experience and is a spatial aspect of housing plans that deserves additional attention.

During interviews, references to site size were primarily made as an economic or design argument, rather than as a consideration for integration. At a follow up housing site, federal law requires one social worker per eighty refugees and one technical staff person per 160 refugees (Suzanne Schwendtke 2017). Thus, construction plans are designed to house multiples of eighty people, or as close as possible, to minimize total wages for social workers and technical staff. A city planner in Wandsbek shared that another, though lesser, consideration for housing site plans is the site’s physical massing in comparison to buildings in the surrounding neighborhood (Hauke Seeger 2017). When possible, some effort is made to make sites appear smaller than they are through design features to improve aesthetic qualities. Importantly, these deliberations for site size make no reference to an understanding of integration, but prioritize economic efficiency and external appearance instead. Such arguments emphasize the interests of the state and local residents, rather than the refugees who will be living at a given site.

As pressure for additional construction of refugee housing site in Hamburg continued, follow up sites not only became further from residential areas, but they became larger, as well. The following pie charts show the percentage of small (0-300 places), medium (300-600 places) and large (600-937 places) follow up sites initially in December 2014 and then again after additional construction through June 2017. The distribution skewed towards larger sites and the share of small sites declined by almost 25%.
City planners should be cognizant of the benefits and detriments associated with different sizes of refugee housing sites and consider these as a decision making factor in construction plans, rather than prioritizing minimal staff costs and local residents' perceptions. As housing site size has an impact on a neighborhood’s urban fabric, planners can use this argument in their favor to rationalize the construction of smaller sites to match the surrounding scale, if desired.

4.4 Housing Quality and Temporality

Housing quality and temporality further define our understanding of a spatial definition of integration. Under international law, refugees are guaranteed the right to housing without any specificity to housing quality or the duration of provision. Considering that the 'right to the city' is secured through urban inhabitation, refugees should presumably have housing equitable to other urban residents. Differences in (real or perceived) housing quality as dictated by refugee policy impact the integration experience by further ostracizing an already marginalized population. More importantly, a lower, less comfortable quality of living that prevents a sense of ownership may impact a refugee's overall ability to engage in other domains of integration. The temporary nature of refugee accommodations and the understanding that moving is inevitable can prevent full engagement in the surrounding community which impacts most domains of integration, particularly Social Connections and Facilitators.
There is a clear sense among refugees that there are ‘better’ follow up sites, a perception which is closely correlated with housing quality. When comparing his current site, Jugendparkweg, to other sites, Mohamed said it was a much better place to live because he had his own apartment shared with five other Eritreans. Anissa Lucius explained that sometimes when newly transferred refugees arrive at a site with a lesser standard of living, “they just see the container and then the argument starts – ‘I am not moving in a container’” (Anissa Lucius 2017).

Housing provision among refugees and urban residents provided social housing is not equitable in Hamburg, suggesting that refugees do not have an equivalent ‘right to the city.’ As the provision of refugee housing is managed and funded by state government, comparing refugee housing with state-managed social housing provides a basis for analyzing provision differences between refugees and residents. As previously discussed (in Section 3.1), refugees assigned to follow up housing sites permitted under Section §246 will eventually experience a secondary displacement within Hamburg when the site’s permit ends and they must be transferred again. This is a legal feature of housing provision for at least twenty-four sites, guaranteeing that refugees living at these sites will eventually be relocated to a new location and will have to reestablish their life in a place with entirely new and different spatial considerations for integration. Comparatively, permanent residents and citizens living in social housing units in Hamburg are able to stay indefinitely (Anissa Lucius 2017). Additionally, federal law in Germany dictates a differential standard of living for refugees as compared to residents in social housing: seven square meters of space per person in all social housing units, but only five square meters per person in follow up sites that will only be inhabited by refugees (Anissa Lucius 2017). This law legally enshrines a lesser spatial allocation for refugees.

The variability of housing quality for refugees in Hamburg increased as a result of legal procedures and the new policy on UPW buildings approved in 2015. After a lawsuit by a Hamburg resident regarding housing standards for follow up sites, the judicial system made a ruling that all follow up housing sites permitted under Section §246 must appear temporary (Hauke Seeger 2017). While the understanding of ‘temporary appearance’ is open for interpretation, key indicators include the use of shipping containers as living quarters (as they are not permanent construction) and a lack of landscaping. To appease residents’ concerns over the permanency of these housing sites, housing quality had to be visibly dimin-
ished at follow up sites, lowering the real and perceived standard of living for refugees at these sites. The very design components that would make a follow up housing site feel more comfortable were, in fact, prohibited. The new policy to provide permanent refugee housing in UPW buildings meant that some refugees would be assigned to sites built to the higher social housing living space allocation. As these UPW buildings are intended to ultimately join Hamburg’s social housing stock, they are built to federal social housing standards. As a result of legal differentiation in quality and temporality, and the establishment of the UPW policy, the range of follow up housing for refugees increased so drastically that, as of August 2017, an individual could be transferred to a site constituted of living containers, a houseboat, a retrofitted office building or a brand new shared apartment building with a potential living duration ranging from three to thirty years.

Initially, the local government in Hamburg pursued refugee housing policies that favored efficiency in the face of great housing demand and tried to minimize controversy among residents. Responding to those needs, the government tended to prioritize spatial factors that are contrary to those favored by refugees and those that promote integration. However, moving towards permanent housing provision with equivalent living standards for some refugees in UPW buildings began to reduce part of the differentiation between refugees and other urban residents requiring social assistance, moving towards a greater ‘right to the city’ for refugees.

Completing a comparative analysis of living quality and temporality between refugees and urban residents in social housing is a productive exercise for city planners. This approach facilitates a qualitative and quantitative assessment of refugees’ ‘right to the city’ and the impact of housing quality and temporality on integration. However, as social housing standards can vary, it is important that these standards not be considered the epitome of housing provision, but rather as a comparative tool to gauge progress towards equitable provision.
4.5 Informal Stratification in the Housing Assignment Process

The evolution of a spatial definition of integration is further defined by subjectivity in the housing assignment process. During my fieldwork, I learned that an informal process of stratification defines the housing assignment process in Hamburg. The individual discretion of housing management staff has a real influence on site assignment, which then determines the aforementioned spatial aspects of housing including location and access to urban amenities, housing size, and housing quality and temporality. This practice must be incorporated into our spatial understanding of integration as the housing assignment process defines refugees’ housing location, affecting their ability to access and engage in other domains of integration.

In an off-the-record interview, a local government staff member explained that there is a level of subjectivity in the housing assignment process. There are two groups of refugees who get preferential treatment and priority in housing assignment, resulting in what Morris would describe as informal stratification beyond that institutionalized by legal regulations at the federal and local levels (Lydia Morris 2006). Refugees who are believed to have a higher potential to receive asylum (due to his or her country of origin), to remain in Germany and to integrate into the community are given priority in housing assignments. The first group given preferential treatment in the housing process include individuals whom the government has identified as highly vulnerable, such as unaccompanied minors or young, single women. The second group includes that families with young children who housing members believe have a high propensity to integrate and stay in Germany as their children will begin learning German at a young age, increasing the likelihood of lingual fluency. These groups are transferred to follow up housing faster than others so that they can begin establishing themselves outside of an initial reception facility and begin the process of integration sooner. This process of providing subjectively ‘better’ housing options to those individuals whom housing managers believe will be more successful during the integration experience demonstrates a level of informal stratification within the broader categorization of refugees, beyond that institutionalized by legal regulations at the federal and state levels identified by El-Kayal and Hamman (2018).
It is important that city planners acknowledge when such overt stratification occurs as it will impact integration outcomes, differentiating the ‘right to the city’ even within the refugee experience. Decision-making power in this realm rests with housing management staff, rather than city planners, but identifying the pattern is important to address inequities within the housing provision system. Relegating specific demographic groups of refugees with a supposedly lower propensity to integrate to lesser quality housing locations is highly prejudicial and will compound the integration difficulties of these groups. Elimination of such subjectivity in the housing assignment process may not be entirely possible as it is a process managed by individuals wielding significant power; however, awareness of the influence of such partiality, namely the impacts on integration experiences, should incite reversal of such tactics.

4.6 Residency Requirement

A spatial understanding of integration is further defined by refugees’ freedom of mobility within a country. Traditional refugee housing programs, specifically refugee camps, imposed strict geographic boundaries to contain refugee populations and restrict their movement. Comparatively, urban refugees who have theoretically gained a ‘right to the city’ should have a greater freedom of movement, equivalent to that of their citizen counterparts. However, as refugee rights protection is the responsibility of the state, federal administrations often use the differentiated legal status of refugees to enforce subnational border restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement in an effort to control and effectively corral the refugee population. Such legal restrictions may be imposed in the name of national security or integration measures, or under the guise of easing social service provision. Regardless of the political rationale, subnational border regimes limit refugees’ ability to control their place of living and restrict their freedom of movement.

In May 2016, the German federal government approved a new law requiring refugees to live in the federal state they were assigned under the EASY asylum system for their first three years of residence in Germany (Deutsche Welle 2016). Refugees who do not show up to their assigned housing site, or move out of their assigned federal state, lose the right to receive any social welfare including housing provision and the monthly stipend. The stated goal of this policy is to “support sustainable integration” (Aufenthaltsgesetz 2016). The rationalization behind the policy is predictability of refugee numbers to ensure
an even distribution of social welfare financing across federal states and to facilitate easier local planning (El-Kayed and Hamann 2018). Restricting movement between states prevents a politically untenable situation where, with freedom of movement, large numbers of refugees would likely flock to preferred housing locations where they have greater social connections and more job opportunities, which would likely be Germany's major cities. Multiple interviews with refugees and asylum seekers confirmed that they would prefer to live in denser urban areas given the greater availability of housing, jobs, diversity of people, and existing social connections with friends or family. Revoking the freedom of movement limits refugees' ability to choose a living location that would maximize their own social capital to access and engage in other domains of integration.

Interviews with local government officials and refugees revealed that another understanding of successful integration is access to the private housing market, which is challenged by the establishment of this federal policy. Malte Schimpke, a housing site manager, explained that "for Hamburg [the residency requirement is] a disaster. It's a bad law because the market here is so bad... It's a very bad law for the city of Hamburg because the people are not allowed to find a flat in another smaller city, in another state maybe 50km from Hamburg" (2017). His assessment of this policy as a bad law particularly focuses on the limited affordable housing market in Hamburg, in comparison to smaller states nearby where refugees might be able to find a less expensive apartment to rent; however, they are not legally allowed to move elsewhere for three years. This residency restriction has further restricted refugees' 'right to the city' by preventing their mobility and ability to choose housing location on account of location preference, economic opportunity or other factors, effectively restricting housing market access across constructed internal borders for refugees (El-Kayed and Hamann 2018). For these reasons, it would be particularly informative to track in-migration patterns going forwards to learn where refugees choose to live once they regain the political freedom of movement – regaining aspects of their 'right to the city' – in the next two to three years.
Refugees shared with me that the greatest challenge of living at government-provided follow up housing sites is a lacking sense of ’home,’ specifically due to the mixing of people and family units within one apartment and the observance of strict regulations limiting what personal furniture or interior decoration is allowed. A housing site manager explained that these regulations are, in fact, intended to inspire refugees to move out of government provided sites to find a private rental that they can personalize. The lack of privacy and lack of control over their housing location inspired many refugees to seek their own housing in the private market, though a restricted geographic scope for locating private rentals is compounded by factors specific to Hamburg’s tight housing market.

In Hamburg, in addition to the lack of affordable housing in the city’s real estate market, refugees face great discrimination. As discussed earlier, Hamburg is lacking affordable housing units due to limited construction in recent decades. In interviews, refugees recounted experiences when landlords made direct and indirect references that clearly demonstrated their disinterest in renting an apartment to refugees, either due to concerns about their temporary residential status or more general prejudices. As a result, even though refugees may want to move out of follow up housing, few are able to secure a private apartment in the city’s housing market and thus most people remain at the follow up housing sites. Research in Dresden, Germany reiterates that “the combination of a limited housing market and the discriminatory practices of landlords results in a situation where refugees are overwhelmingly dependent” on government provided housing (El-Kayed and Hamann 2018, 142). In Hamburg, between January and November 2017, only 3,000 of more than 33,000 refugees living in follow up housing moved out to private accommodations (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2017b). Prejudice in the rental market compounds obstacles presented by the national residency requirement to hinder refugees’ integration in the private housing market.

As the residency requirement was implemented by the federal government, city planners do not have purview over changing that policy. However, city planners’ can ease housing pressures within the federal states where refugees are required to live. Their positioning empowerment them to affect change in two ways. First, planners can influence implementation of affordable housing stock. Promoting a more robust affordable housing stock overall is beneficial for residents and refugees alike and upholds a long-term development approach to refugee policy. Urban planning suggests many tools for doing so including
inclusionary zoning policies, development incentives such as construction tax credits and long-term strategic planning. Planners can advocate for the importance of equity by prioritizing affordable housing in a city’s land use plan. Additionally, there is an opportunity for city planners to ease prejudicial rental practices. For example, planners could organize a ‘rental day’ to bring together interested refugees and landlords with available units. City planners could lend support to the idea of renting units to refugees, thus socializing and encouraging landlords to do so. By advocating simultaneously for policy advancement and citizen engagement, city planners can increase the types of private rental opportunities available to refugees.
Key Findings & Future Research

In a period defined by high rates of global urban displacement, this thesis has begun to define a spatial definition of integration, building upon research that highlighted the need to further examine forced migration at the city level due to increasing sub-national stratification and local governments' role in service provision and rights protection. Using the conceptual framework of a refugee's 'right to the city,' this case study of Hamburg, Germany provides empirical support to demonstrate how urban planning, and more specifically city planners, can contribute to refugee policy.

5.1 A New Model for Refugee Housing Policy?

Policy innovations at the federal and state levels coalesced to suggest a new model of land use planning for refugee housing. The land use planning mechanism embodied in Section §246, in conjunction with the subsequent UPW policy, represents a new approach to urban planning, bridging the transition from emergency refugee housing provision to durable housing solutions and between federal policy and local implementation. Germany's federal government was particularly innovative as it established a temporary land use regulation to construct temporary refugee housing in non-residential areas during a transitional period before permanent housing solutions could be implemented. Building off of this permitting mechanism, the state government of Hamburg created a policy for permanent refugee housing (in UPW buildings) which would be initially permitted under this temporary regulation with the intention of changing the sites' legal status to permanent residential use. To facilitate such planning, these sites were embedded in a broader conversation around land use planning across Hamburg. Anticipating the transition of these buildings from exclusively refugee accommodation to mixed social housing units, both to support integration and to ease Hamburg's affordable housing shortage, helped the state government present an argument for rapid initial construction and likely averted widespread homelessness among refugees.

Additional policy innovations at the state level highlight the importance of government creativity and responsiveness when faced with high rates of urban displacement. As high numbers of asylum seekers arrived and overwhelmed existing city systems, Hamburg's local government established the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees and consolidated responsibilities for all aspects of refugee housing programming and policy. Additionally, the
refugee housing site selection process was continuously refined, initially through institutional organization of local government officials and then through a negotiated agreement with a prominent resident organization following a petition presenting residents’ concerns.

The transition from temporary to permanent housing policy, in addition to the negotiations between Hamburg for Better Integration and the state government, suggest a future policy innovation for refugee housing using a hybrid planning mechanism. During an initial phase of rapid immigration, the establishment of broad initial powers for urban planners to act quickly and locate housing under emergency measures is necessary. However, it is critical to simultaneously advance a public dialogue with local residents and refugees themselves to work towards a more durable, consensus-driven long-term solution. It is through the superimposition of these two concurrent processes that a sustainable housing policy that balances the needs of different stakeholders and regulatory processes will evolve.

Challenges for refugee housing in Hamburg are ongoing. The temporary nature of follow up housing sites creates potential for a secondary phase of displacement within the city as refugees who still require government housing at the end of a site’s legal lifespan will need to be relocated to another site. After over forty lawsuits against follow up housing sites, the state government needs to prioritize public engagement to advance a discussion on refugee housing and integration. Though the rate of immigration has slowed, Hamburg is still receiving between three and four hundred asylum seekers per month which leads to continuous demand for additional housing provision (Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 2018). Finally, the personal experience of integration is multifaceted, continuously evolving and enduring. Federal, state and local support for refugees in all domains of integration must be prioritized in the long-term.

5.2 Building Upon a Spatial Understanding of Integration

By focusing on the spatial aspects of refugee housing, this thesis demonstrated the physical realization of political choices and their impact on refugees’ integration experiences. A spatial definition of integration provides another way to consider integration and a refugee’s ‘right to the city,’ in addition to leading economic, social and political understandings. A broader understanding of integration that incorporates spatial aspects is valuable as it presents specific, actionable recommendations for city planners to positively influence the integration experience. While far from comprehensive, this research elicited five spatial
aspects of refugee housing that contribute to a spatial definition of integration: 1) proximity to residential neighborhoods; 2) housing site size; 3) housing site quality and temporality; 4) sub-local stratification in the housing assignment process, and 5) a subnational residency requirement. Each of these spatial aspects affect refugees' daily experience and their ability to access and to engage in other domains of integration.

If integration is the goal, the spatial understanding arising from the perspective of urban planning presents opportunities for city planners to incorporate these elements into the planning process for refugee housing, thus improving refugees' 'right to the city' and facilitating integration. City planners should prioritize refugee housing sites that are proximate to existing residential neighborhoods so that refugees can easily access neighborhood amenities and have opportunities for daily interactions with citizens. When deciding the size of each site, planners should consider how varying sizes of housing units affect the lived experience of the residents. Refugee housing quality should be assessed in comparison to social housing standards to evaluate if refugees are given an equal standard of living. City planners should prioritize the construction of more permanent housing sites, rather than cyclical construction and proliferation of temporary sites, to limit the number of times refugees will be forced to move within the city. City planners should try to minimize further stratification and preferential treatment within the refugee population. Finally, planners should support refugees' transition into the private rental market by promoting robust affordable housing construction and trying to reduce prejudicial rental practices among landlords.

Specifically in Hamburg, a city-state that employs a mandatory dispersal process and where city planners gained greater power under Section §246, city planners have an opportunity to positively impact integration by foregrounding spatial considerations for integration in the site selection process. Additionally, refugees' opinions should be included. As David Harvey explained, "the right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it...to reshape processes of urbanization" (David Harvey 2003). Thus, in order to improve refugees' 'right to the city,' it is imperative to incorporate their understanding of 'better' housing sites, and more specifically the spatial aspects that constitute that opinion, into the site selection process. With an understanding of neighborhood characteristics and spatial factors that can support integration, planners can prioritize sites that will best position refugees for integration.
5.3 Future Research

In working towards the development of a spatial definition of integration, future research should assess other important spatial considerations for refugee housing and how to incorporate them into the site selection process. Additional topics for future research include:

- The alignment of indicators for integration and refugees’ ‘right to the city’
- Design aspects of follow up housing sites and whether a feeling of inaccessibility is intentionally manufactured
- Monitoring UPW buildings in fifteen years as they transition from exclusively refugee housing to integrated refugee and resident social housing
- Tracking refugee population movement patterns in three years once the residency requirement ends to determine if ‘preferred’ locations in Germany arise

In comparison to other refugee housing programs around the globe, Germany’s use of urban planning regulations and neighborhood planning processes to provide refugee housing is exceptional. Their efforts, as documented by this research, suggest an alternative to leading refugee housing models relying on incremental construction and rental programs where the provision of emergency housing in a crisis of urban displacement is segmented from longer phases of development. Linking the historically segmented phases of emergency housing with long-term development and land use planning in cities experiencing rapid urbanization as a result of migration is critical to provide durable solutions and support the integration experience. Practices initiated in Germany, as well as opportunities to refine the approach by focusing on a spatial definition of integration in the site selection process, can provide insight into the contribution of urban planning for the development of refugee housing policy in urban areas in the future.
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7 Appendix

7.1 Time Series Maps of Refugee Housing Sites in Hamburg from December 2014 – June 2017
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

December 2014
Total Sites: 64
Total Places: 11,329

Figure 20. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, December 2014. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Figure 21. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, June 2015. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

December 2015
Total Sites: 87
Total Places: 17,615

Number of Places Per Follow Up Site
- 1 - 75
- 76 - 150
- 151 - 300
- 301 - 450
- 451 - 600
- 600 - 937

Residential Zoning
Opened in the last 6 month period

Figure 22. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, December 2015. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

June 2016
Total Sites: 102
Total Places: 22,310

Figure 23. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, June 2016. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

December 2016
Total Sites: 110
Total Places: 26,903

Figure 24. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, December 2016. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."
Follow Up Housing in Hamburg

June 2017
Total Sites: 112
Total Places: 28,748

Figure 25. Follow Up Housing in Hamburg, June 2017. Created by Jessica Wolff. Data source: Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), "Hamburg Initial and Follow Up Housing Sites."