Meditations in an Emergency:
Social Scientists and the Problem of Conflict in Cold War America

by

Marie Elizabeth Burks

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Signature of Author: _____ Signature redacted _____

History, Anthropology, and Science, Technology and Society
July 24, 2017

Certified by: _____ Signature redacted_

Christopher Capozzola
Associate Professor of History
Thesis Supervisor

Certified by: _____ Signature redacted

David Kaiser
Germeshausen Professor of the History of Science
Professor of Physics
Thesis Committee Member

Certified by: _____

_____
Jennifer S. Light
Professor of Science, Technology, and Society
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Committee Member

Accepted by: _____

Harriet Ritvo
Arthur J. Conner Professor of History
Director of Graduate Studies, History, Anthropology, and STS

Accepted by: _____

_____
Jennifer S. Light
Professor of Science, Technology, and Society
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Department Head, Program in Science, Technology, & Society

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ABSTRACT

Through the mode of conceptual history, this dissertation examines some of the forms dissent could take within academic social science in the United States from roughly 1945-1970. The concept in question is "conflict." There are many stories one could tell about this concept and its transformations in postwar American social science, but in this dissertation I focus on one in particular: how certain social scientists sought to frame conflict as a problem of knowledge, by stretching the concept to fit the global proportions of the bipolar world that seemed to have emerged from World War II, and then using that conceptualization to oppose the Cold War. The dissertation first considers a specific moment of conceptual change, when some social scientists sought to redefine "conflict" in the immediate aftermath of World War II, so that it would be capacious enough to describe conflict at all levels of analysis, from the intrapersonal to the international. From there, it follows a cadre of social scientists who used that novel conceptualization to build an intellectual movement around a new journal and research center starting in the mid-1950s. The scholars who participated in that movement, known as "peace research" or "conflict resolution," endeavored to construct a "general theory of conflict," which they would then employ to challenge the notion that the Cold War was inevitable. The language of midcentury social science was the idiom in which they expressed their dissent. Although this was to become an international movement, this dissertation focuses on its American incarnation, which came to fruition at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor beginning around 1957. The dissertation then looks closely at how two of the leading theorists of that movement modeled conflict in the early 1960s, and considers the ethical and political impulses that animated their work, demonstrating that it was possible for some intellectuals to inhabit the dual role of academic social scientist and social critic in the early 1960s. It concludes with a brief set of reflections on the United States Institute of Peace, an independent federal institute established in 1984 to embody the dream of "conflict resolution."

Thesis Supervisor: Christopher Capozzola
Title: Associate Professor of History

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Cold Warriors and Critics

In a six-page essay published in the July 1950 issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*, the American sociologist Jessie Bernard took her fellow social scientists to task for having neglected "the scientific study of conflict." "Where," she asked, "are the American sociological analyses and scientific measures of sabotage, boring from within, the use of 'fronts,' the Trojan horse technique, the manipulation of parliamentary debate, the use of *agents provocateurs*, the war of nerves, espionage, fifth columns, deceit, fraud?" Bernard was concerned that American sociologists were not doing their part in the fight against Communism. "Did the sociologists have anything creative to offer in the cold war?" she wondered.[1]

American sociologists had not always ignored conflict, Bernard explained. An earlier generation, exemplified by the likes of Albion Small, Robert Park, and Edward A. Ross, had developed the theory of conflict, drawing in part upon the work of the German sociologist Georg Simmel to do so.[2] Marxist sociologists in America too had attended to conflict, but they had "added little to the original Marxian formulations."[3] Consequently, American scholars were, "as compared with Communists or Nazis, mere babes in the wood with respect to the theory of modern conflict." If Americans had turned a blind eye to conflict, Russians could not see anything but conflict, which, Bernard argued, thoroughly pervaded their worldview: "Presented with a social situation to analyze, the

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[1] Jessie Bernard, "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" *American Journal of Sociology* 56, no. 1 (July 1950): 11.

[2] For more on the influence of German sociologists of conflict on American sociology, see James Alfred Aho, *German Realpolitik and American Sociology: An Inquiry into the Sources and Political Significance of the Sociology of Conflict* (London: Associated University Presses, 1975).

[3] Bernard, "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" 11.

conflict pattern of their thinking determines what they will emphasize, what ignore."[4]

(And to support this point, Bernard compared the frequency with which "conflict" and

related terms appeared in the writings of Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt; she

counted 42 references in a sample of 10 pages for Stalin, compared to Roosevelt's 13.)

Why were sociologists in America ignoring conflict? Bernard offered several

hypotheses. First, there was a basic "cultural" explanation: "It could be argued that our

by-passing of the theory of conflict reflects our cultural disapproval of aggressive

conflict."[5] In this case, inattention to the theory of conflict might simply reflect American

values. Second, sociologists harbored a "quite understandable fear—inherited from the

nineteenth century—of being identified with socialists." (And here Bernard noted that

while the "Marxian formulation of the theory of conflict" was "imperfect," at least it

correctly emphasized "the importance of conflict in social life.") Third, there was the

"fear that, if one studies conflict, he is aggravating or advocating it or that at least he

approves of it." A national "policy of hush-hush with reference to many conflicts" had

led to a climate in which "even to mention certain controversial subjects in textbooks has

become taboo." There was also the possibility that powerful parties to conflicts had an

interest in keeping conflict techniques secret. Here Bernard offered the example of the

"Mohawk Valley formula," a strikebreaking technique developed during the steel strikes

of the mid-to-late 1930s to, as Noam Chomsky describes its purpose, "mobilize the

community against the strikers and the union activists." This had technique worked,

Bernard pointed out, "until unions publicized it." Perhaps, she surmised, "the wielders of

power do not want a science of power developed," unless such a science were developed

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[4] Ibid., 12.
[5] Ibid., 13.

exclusively for their own use.[6] Or, it could be that sociologists did not wish to acknowledge the existence of conflict—and here Bernard agreed with several other critics who accused human relations experts of denying the existence of a conflict of interest between employer and employee.

The scientific study of the sociology of conflict as envisaged by Jessie Bernard would draw its sources from "the files of the FBI; minutes of union meetings, of boards of directors, of lobbying agencies; reports of public relations counsels, of the American Arbitration Association, of the United States Conciliation Service, of the NAACP; secret dossiers in the State Department files." Gaining access to such sources, however, would likely prove difficult if not impossible. Recognizing that "[t]he direction which research takes cannot of course be determined by individual fiat," Bernard imagined "an Institute of Conflict Analysis which would do for the major conflicts of today what the prewar Institute for Propaganda Analysis did for propaganda." Bernard's proposed institute would assemble "[a] corps of social scientists whose sole function it would be not to serve as a mere fact-finding body but to analyze conflict situations in all kinds of areas and to create instruments for the measurement of conflict, to work out techniques for determining whether conflict really exists or whether the situation is one of mere understanding." Such an institute might "give us cues for the most creative handling of conflict situations from the local to the international level."[7]

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[6] Ibid., 16. And Noam Chomsky, "Propaganda and Control of the Public Mind," February 1997, in *Chomsky on Democracy and Education*, ed. C.P. Otero (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2003), 229-231.

[7] Bernard, "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" 16. Clyde Miller established the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc.—an antipropaganda institute that sprang from progressive impulses—in 1937 in response to Edward A. Filene's concern that American public opinion was being manipulated by propaganda. For more on this history, see J. Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 5: Propaganda Analysis Incorporated, pp. 129-177.

The subject of Bernard's essay is conflict theory, but its arguments concern the responsibility of social scientists to society. As the political scientist Frederic Charles Schaffer argues, there is always a "politics of concept use," which is to say that social scientists deploy concepts in the pursuit of goals and interests, or to affirm or challenge power.[8] Bernard speaks in two voices: that of the cold warrior, calling upon her fellow sociologists to help America fight and win the Cold War, and that of the social critic, articulating concerns about the effects of a conservative political culture on sociological research, and suggesting that this politics of consensus had blinded sociologists to vital aspects of the social world before them. There is a dissonance between these two voices, that of the cold warrior and that of the critic. The fact that Bernard uses both voices in the same article attests to the duality of American social science during the Cold War. While many social scientists dutifully and even eagerly served the expanding national security state, critical impulses continued to animate the work of some intellectuals in a period best remembered for conformity. The standard narrative in the history of postwar American social science easily accommodates Bernard the cold warrior, but not Bernard the social critic.

"Cold War Social Science"

The social sciences in postwar America have attracted more and more attention from historians of science in the past two decades. Much of this scholarship emphasizes how social scientists working in the United States after World War II, most of them in universities, enjoyed unprecedented authority and prestige, largely as a result of their

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[8] Frederic Charles Schaffer, *Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist Guide* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 9.

wartime work. After the war, those social scientists are said to have redoubled their

professional commitments to value-neutrality and objectivity, donning these

epistemological virtues as a kind of armor against being branded socialist or communist,

and in order to appeal to their new patrons, most especially the U.S. military. They

embraced scientism—which here included the conviction that the social sciences should

be strictly modeled after the natural sciences—and willingly served the national security

state, all the while assuming a stance of moral and political detachment.[9] Yet historians

have shown how, in fields including communications studies, modernization theory,

experimental psychology, cognitive science, systems analysis, and rational choice theory,

purportedly apolitical knowledge was in fact deeply ideological.[10]

Subsequent studies of social science practice in this era have questioned whether

the category of "Cold War social science" might in fact obscure more than it illuminates.

It is perhaps more appropriate, some have suggested, to speak of "social science in the

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[9] This interpretation of the contours of postwar American social science is most fully articulated in Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (Newark: Rutgers University Press, 2013). For an account of how social scientists' service during World War II shaped trends in the postwar social sciences, see Peter Buck, "Adjusting to Military Life: The Social Sciences Go to War, 1941-1950," in *Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience*, ed. Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), 203-252.

[10] On communications studies, see Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research & Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). On modernization theory, see Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 'Nation Building' in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); and Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). On experimental psychology, see Ellen Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1996) and Rebecca Lemov, *World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005). On cognitive psychology, see Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996) and Jamie Cohen-Cole, *The Open Mind: Cold War Politics and the Sciences of Human Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). On systems analysis, see Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Hunter Heyck, *Age of System: Understanding the Development of Modern Social Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015). On rational choice theory, see S. M. Amadae, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

Cold War."[11] While the national security state certainly loomed large for social scientists

in this period, it did not always determine the character of their research. The historian

David Engerman has shown, for example, how social scientists working on government

research projects such as those conducted at Harvard's Russian Research Center retained

a considerable degree of autonomy.[12] Joy Rohde argues that, even within the national

security state, there was a "gray area" in which social scientists grappled with the

dilemmas presented by military-sponsored research.[13] And one of the editors of a recent

volume titled *Cold War Social Science*, suggests, after questioning the appropriateness of

the label, that "anti-Cold War social science" might be a helpful notion for thinking about

"scholarly efforts that emerged as an explicit alternative to previous social science work

judged problematic because it seemed slanted in favor of American Cold War

objectives."[14]

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[11] David Engerman makes this suggestion in his review essay, "Social Science in the Cold War," *Isis* 101 (2010): 393-400. Here, he writes that scholars wishing to add more nuance to the debate over "Cold War social science" have shown how postwar social science was embedded in older intellectual traditions and in institutional configurations that took shape during World War II, and how government research projects did not always reflect the views of their patrons. Engerman points out that "following the money" gets us only so far. "[S]weeping condemnations of academic-government relations" that "highlight secret CIA ties to university programs like MIT's Center for International Studies and Harvard's Russian Research Center" together paint a picture of "an American academy saturated with government funds that distorted all aspects of thought within it. These accounts [...] have discovered (to use the title of one such critical account) 'who paid the piper,' but devote little if any space to what the piper actually bought." Ibid., 398.

[12] David Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[13] Joy Rohde, *Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

[14] Mark Solovey, "Cold War Social Science: Specter, Reality, or Useful Concept?" in *Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 18. The debate is also taken up in another recent edited volume: Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, eds., *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). See especially Philip Mirowski, "A History Best Served Cold," pp. 61-74. Historians of science have also suggested that there is something distinctive about social science during the Cold War, and that is its "rationality." But they too avoid Cold War determinism, arguing that this rationality was not a fixed, predetermined outcome of the Cold War, but rather something that was hotly debated. Debates over rationality, then, characterized social science during the Cold War. "What looks in retrospect like a loose and somewhat motley conglomerate of game theory, nuclear strategy, operations research, Bayesian decision theory, systems analysis, rational choice theory, and experimental social

However, these qualifications about social science in the Cold War leave mostly

intact the overarching narrative historians have produced about postwar social science.[15]

As the historian Mark Solovey writes, "despite some notable exceptions on the left like

C. Wright Mills, [...] midcentury American social scientists commonly emphasized

technical rigor rather than critical analysis, the stability of American democracy and the

productivity of American capitalism rather than their limitations, the extent and virtues of

social consensus rather than the sources of legitimate social conflict, professional service

by scholars to the national-security state rather than independent assessment of its

unseemly dimensions."[16] The intellectual historian Andrew Jewett has questioned "the

longstanding assumption that scientism and a technocratic, managerial liberalism were

hegemonic in the mid-twentieth century," pointing out that "it is easy to miss the ethical

and political impulses that animated so many figures" in the social sciences in this period.

And yet Jewett himself accepts this account when it comes to *postwar* social science; that

era's conservative political culture, he writes, muted voices of opposition and "blunted

the critical edge" of what might have been a more politically engaged social science.

"The immense and practically unchallengeable national projects that dominated

American politics in the middle decades of the twentieth century—first saving the nation

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psychology then defined the field of contestation about what rationality should be under the radically altered conditions of the Cold War." In Paul Erickson et al. eds., *How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 4.

[15] Accounts of postwar American intellectual life more broadly align for the most part with this narrative, describing the chilling effects of domestic anticommunism on the university, the waning of Marxism and other strains of radicalism among American intellectuals, and the decline of social criticism and the "public intellectual" with the postwar expansion of the university and its attendant "academicization" of intellectual life. Under these conditions, dissent is said to have all but disappeared. See Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Alan M. Wald, *The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987); and Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

[16] Mark Solovey, "Riding Natural Scientists' Coattails onto the Endless Frontier: The SSRC and the Quest for Scientific Legitimacy," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 40 (2004), 416-417.

from economic ruin, then defeating fascism, and lastly fending off the Soviet threat—gradually integrated science into the state apparatus." This resulted in what Jewett calls "the irony—many would say the tragedy—of Cold War science: the massive enlistment of ostensibly neutral expertise for clearly normative purposes that so riled a new generation of radicals in the 1960s."[17] Jewett, then, joins other historians of postwar social science in bolstering this narrative of accommodation.

This dissertation examines some of the forms dissent could take within American social science during the Cold War from roughly 1945-1970. It is an investigation into the "critical edge" of postwar American social science. The intellectual historian Howard Brick offers several examples of the persistence of this critical edge. His characterization of the mood of midcentury intellectual life leaves room for the possibility of dissent, especially beginning in the mid-1950s, when "[i]ntellectuals and activists then approached the coming decade of the 1960s as a chance to realize far-reaching goals of social progress." These people "posed challenges to the American status quo almost as revolutionary as any leftist of the 1930s and 1940s might have imagined"; the main difference was that they believed their goals did not require revolution but were "achievable within the progressive framework of a modern society." The earlier generation of radicals had looked to the working class and organized labor to drive social change; the midcentury intellectuals lacked a clear strategy. And in the "deceptive ease with which reformers thought great change could be achieved" lay a great contradiction of the age: "that kind of confidence fostered dramatic aspirations for a new society but failed to recognize or nurture the social and political means that could bring change

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[17] Andrew Jewett, *Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4-5.

about."[18] Brick puts his finger on another contradiction: "Although holding to an enormously optimistic view of future possibilities, reformers were haunted by two dark undercurrents of pessimism: a sense, lingering from the conservative mood of the 1950s, that the American status quo was after all stolid and immovable, and the fear, stemming from the atrocities of the past war and the threat of nuclear weaponry, of an apocalyptic end of things."[19] This is a particularly apt description of midcentury social scientists.

The Politics of "Conflict" in Postwar America

In her 1950 essay, Bernard asserted that conflict, as an object of social inquiry, deserved more attention than it was getting. She made a case for the salience of the concept, and she did so with particular ends in mind: to make sociological knowledge and expertise relevant to the fight against Communism, and to call attention to the distorting effect of American political culture on social scientific knowledge production. When Bernard wrote, conflict was taking on new meanings as a keyword in American political discourse. Policymakers were busy shaping an increasingly militaristic foreign policy. Concerned about the Soviets acquiring the atomic bomb and the Communists' rise to power in China in October 1949, President Truman had requested a briefing from the State Department's Policy Planning staff. The resulting memorandum, NSC-68,

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[18] Howard Brick, *Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 1960s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), xii.

[19] Ibid., xiii. Brick also contributed an essay to the edited volume *Cold War Social Science*. There, he writes about certain American anthropologists whose work went against the grain of standard modernization theory, which other historians have described "as having a near monopoly on social thought after World War II." Brick finds a "counternarrative," or "alternative current of thought in and outside the American academy," that had implications not only for academic anthropology but also "fostered a sharp critique of U.S. Cold War policy even before Vietnam and the antiwar movement compelled a wholesale reassessment of liberal orthodoxy." In Howard Brick, "Neo-Evolutionist Anthropology, the Cold War, and the Beginnings of the World Turn in U.S. Scholarship," in *Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature*, eds., Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 156.

characterizes that moment in world history as one of unprecedented conflict. Before

World War II, no state had been able to achieve global hegemony. The war had changed

that. "Power has increasingly gravitated to" the United States and the Soviet Union, the

memorandum said. It cast the Soviet Union as an unprecedented aggressor: "[U]nlike

previous aspirants to power, [it] is animated by a new fanatical faith, antithetical to our

own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has,

therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or

non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency." The stakes could not

have been higher: "With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass

destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the

conflict enter the phase of total war."[20]

More apparent to many Americans at that time than the escalating conflict with

the Soviet Union would have been the social strife within the nation in the years

immediately following World War II—for example, a nationwide wave of strikes and

new demands for racial and gender equality, and the accompanying backlash. As the

historian Masuda Hajimu writes, "the moment when diverse social conflicts became

visible and a massive backlash developed was also when the term the 'American Way,'

often in capital letters, came into vogue among a large portion of the population."[21]

Hajimu joins other historians in arguing that domestic anticommunism developed in part

as a reaction to these internal conflicts, a way of "containing elements of 'disturbance' in

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[20] "A Report to the National Security Council – NSC 68," April 12, 1950, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, accessed August 24, 2017, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.
[21] Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 22.

order to recover an orderly and harmonious society."[22] That process would only intensify

as the "cold war" became the "Cold War." In the late 1940s, "consensus over the reality

of the Cold War written and conceived in capital letters as an obvious historical epoch

did not exist" yet.[23] The Cold War, Hajimu contends, only became a social reality on

June 25, 1950, the day the Korean War began. That conflict "provided a logic of global

war that local people could use to end various social struggles and culture wars in many

places of the world under the imagined reality of the Cold War."[24] Hajimu goes on to

argue that, in addition to world leaders and policy makers, ordinary people too

contributed to the construction of this imagined reality. In order for the "discourse" of the

Cold War to become "reality," he writes, there had to be widespread "social acceptance

and participation."[25] In this dissertation, I suggest that many social scientists too helped

make the Cold War a reality, even if they intended to do the opposite.

The publication of Bernard's essay coincided with the start of the Korean War

and, if we accept Hajimu's argument, with the start of the Cold War as well. In this

context, her anticommunist sentiments and desire for an instrumentalized sociological

knowledge with which to wage the Cold War is not surprising. By the end of that year,

Truman had declared a national emergency, citing "the war in Korea as "a grave threat to

the peace of the world," and asserting that "world conquest by Communist imperialism is

the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world."[26] It is not

surprising that many social scientists turned their attention to the analysis of conflict in

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[22] Ibid., 24.
[23] Ibid., 25.
[24] Ibid., 56.
[25] Ibid., 3.
[26] Harry S. Truman, "Proclamation 2914—Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, December 16, 1950," American Presidency Project, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13684.

these years. What is more interesting is that the logic Hajimu describes, by which the global conflict that was the Cold War was used to dampen internal conflicts, gave critical social scientists two fronts on which to challenge this so-called postwar liberal consensus: the promotion of the ideology of harmony at home and an aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union abroad. Some social scientists chose to take on the former, and called attention to the persistence of conflicts within the nation. Others chose the latter, arguing against the purported inevitability of the Cold War and opposing the militaristic foreign policy that went along with it. As they practiced their science, and formulated their dissent within the narrow space available for it in universities during the 1950s and early 1960s, these social scientists wrestled with the tension between "advocacy and objectivity," a tension that did not end with the professionalization of the social sciences.[27] Lingering questions about the responsibility of the social sciences and social scientists to society animated their work.[28]

Conceptual history is the mode through which this dissertation investigates the critical edge of social science during the Cold War. The concept in question is "conflict." There are many stories one could tell about the concept of conflict and its transformations in postwar American social science, but in this dissertation I focus on one in particular: how certain midcentury social scientists stretched the concept to fit the global proportions of the bipolar world that seemed to have emerged from World War II, and then used that conceptualization to oppose the Cold War. That project, known as the "peace research" or "conflict resolution" movement, found a group of social scientists, most of them either

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[27] This framing comes from Mary Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905* (New York: Routledge, 2017 [1975]).
[28] These were the sorts of questions posed by the sociologist Robert Lynd just as World War II was beginning. See Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What: The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).

pacifists or with pacifist leanings, endeavoring to construct a "general theory of conflict," which they would then employ to challenge the notion that the Cold War was inevitable. And they opposed militarism and war more generally, at home and abroad. Although this was to become an international movement, this dissertation focuses on its American incarnation, which came to fruition at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor beginning around 1957.

The peace research movement had built into it the politics Hajimu describes, predicated as it was on the assumption that internal conflict had been largely institutionalized, and that that kind of control could be extended to the international arena. It was also an example of precisely the sort of "liberal rationality" the University of Chicago political theorist Hans Morgenthau bemoaned in his midcentury writings. Toward the end of World War II, Morgenthau started to criticize a certain tendency he observed in liberal reformers to attempt to transform political problems into "problem[s] of knowledge" or "'technical' problems."[29] He warned against this particular manifestation of "the modern confidence in the redeeming powers of science."[30] Social problems, Morgenthau said, were not like the problems with which the natural sciences dealt. "Social problems, such as marriage, education, poverty, freedom, authority, peace, are of a different type," he wrote. Stemming from the wickedness of human nature, these problems could have only "temporary and ever-precarious" solutions. The end of World War I had marked the beginning of "the age of the scientific approach to international affairs," an approach adopted by governments trying to solve international problems

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[29] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Scientific Solution of Social Conflict," in *Approaches to National Unity: Fifth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion*, eds. Lymon Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robert MacIver (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1945), 434.
[30] Ibid., 436.

using scientific methods. Morgenthau contended that "[t]he problem of world peace [...] does not present itself, as many believe, on a universal, global scale to be solved in one gigantic effort once and for all, but is subject to the conditions of time and space and must be solved, if at all, in the everyday relations of concrete nations." For Morgenthau, the search for a scientific solution to the problem of social conflict was a particularly egregious manifestation of liberal rationality. It constituted nothing short of "the repudiation of politics."[31] As far as he was concerned, man was a political animal, and conflict "the primordial social fact."[32] Conflict was not a problem to be solved, but rather the defining feature of the human condition. He objected most strenuously to the application of liberal rationality to the realm of international affairs, which, he insisted, could never be reduced to a problem of knowledge, could never be "solved" once and for all. Yet he predicted that, misguided as it was, this tendency would persist after World War II. And it did, most notably in the form of the conflict resolution movement.

A Note on Methods

Intellectual historians and historians of science both study the history of the social sciences, but they do so rather differently. Broadly speaking, intellectual historians have been most interested in ideas—understood in terms of texts and their contexts—and historians of science, in patronage, institutions, and practices.[33] Of course, there is much

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[31] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). 75.

[32] Ibid., 218.

[33] Recent accounts of postwar American social science have emphasized the importance of the institutional contexts in which new intellectual trends developed. These studies highlight the effects of new institutional arrangements on modes of social scientific inquiry as well as on the forms and character of social scientific knowledge during and after World War II. Scholars have considered the consequences of new patronage systems for the social sciences, including the consolidation of "scientism"—the conviction that the social sciences ought to be modeled after the natural sciences—as a response to public and private

overlap between the two.[34] I draw on the methods of conceptual history as a way of

bringing ideas, institutions, and practices together. Historians of science have thought

productively about concepts as "scientific objects," defining a scientific object as

something "that can be observed and manipulated, that is capable of theoretical

ramifications and empirical surprises, and that coheres, at least for a time, as an

ontological entity." Scientific objects, then, are understood to be things with histories, or

"biographies."[35] The "Cambridge School" of intellectual historians tracks the history of

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patrons' demands for "value-free," "objective" research. (See for example Peter Buck, "Adjusting to Military Life: The Social Sciences Go to War, 1941-1950," in *Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience*, ed. Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985): 203-252 and Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (Newark: Rutgers University Press, 2013). Some historians of the social sciences have followed the lead of historians of the physical sciences in placing at the center of their analyses not only the institutional configurations but also the tools, techniques, and practices by which disciplines are built and theories made to circulate, leading to reinterpretations of the postwar social sciences. (See for example Rebecca Lemov, *World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005) and Joel Isaac, "The Human Sciences in Cold War America," *The Historical Journal* 50, 3 (2007): 725-746.) Recent studies have also highlighted the problem-centered, interdisciplinary character of social research in this period, even suggesting that interdisciplinarity was elevated to an epistemic virtue in postwar America (See Jamie Cohen-Cole, *The Open Mind: Cold War Politics and the Sciences of Human Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).) Another conclusion reached by these studies is that the social sciences in this period were shaped primarily by their *tools*, and not by ideological or philosophical divides (e.g., scientism vs. humanism, positivism vs. interpretivism). Rebecca Lemov has labeled this "tool-based social science," emphasizing enthusiasm for methodological experimentation and the wholehearted embrace of a "social-engineering" perspective among postwar behavioral scientists, enabled by new sources of funding and research alliances. In Rebecca Lemov, "'Hypothetical Machines': The Science Fiction Dreams of Cold War Social Science," *Isis* 101, 2 (June 2010): 401-411. Joel Isaac takes this claim about tool-based social science further, arguing that the new tools that proliferated throughout the social sciences in the late 1940s and 1950s engendered a novel epistemology, which Isaac describes as "a species of reflexivity that emerged as practitioners of those disciplines struggled to make sense of the dizzying expansion of their tool kits." In Joel Isaac, "Tool Shock: Technique and Epistemology in the Postwar Social Sciences," *History of Political Economy* 42 (2010), 135.

[34] In his study of the human sciences at Harvard at midcentury, Joel Isaac has proposed the concept of "deflationary epistemology" to suggest that the "scientific philosophy" that developed at Harvard—encompassing the intellectual programs of Parsons, Skinner, Quine, and Kuhn—was thoroughly grounded in the training regimes and research practices that took root in Harvard's "interstitial academy," or the institutional spaces between more established disciplines and programs. Isaac attends to the practical, local manifestations of complex theoretical ideas, bridging the traditional questions and methods of intellectual history with the concerns and insights of STS scholars and historians of science, who emphasize the specific institutional contexts and quotidian activities in which ideas develop and through which they disperse. Joel Isaac, *Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[35] In Lorraine Daston, ed., *Biographies of Scientific Objects* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 5.

concepts through their use. As Quentin Skinner writes, "When we trace the genealogy of a concept, we uncover the different ways in which it may have been used in earlier times. We thereby equip ourselves with a means of reflecting critically on how it is currently understood."[36] Similarly, the political scientist James Farr writes that conceptual histories, which trace relationships between concepts, beliefs, actions, and practices, are "the narrative form appropriate to understanding conceptual change."[37] Farr insists that "conceptual histories must *explain* the emergence and transformation of concepts as outcomes of actors using them for political purposes. That is, political concepts do not have any agency of their own or a life apart from the political actors who use and change them; and conceptual histories have a commensurate project to explain why these actors used and changed them as it did."[38]

The political scientist Frederic Charles Schaffer has applied the conceptual history approach specifically to social science concepts. He argues that social scientific tools and analyses are always entangled with larger political projects. Concepts bear traces of past struggles, or "the marks of value judgments and interpretations rooted in the politics of

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[36] In Quentin Skinner, "A Genealogy of the Modern State," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 162 (2009), 325. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For an incisive examination of conceptual transformation and historiographic shifts, see Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: the Career of a Concept," *The Journal of American History* 79 (1992): 11-38. For an alternative approach to conceptual history, see Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2002). "Conflict" might also be understood as a "keyword," which Raymond Williams defines as "significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought." In Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983 [1976]), 15. The keyword approach has been fruitfully applied to reveal taken-for-granted scientific concepts as historical things capable of acquiring shifting, contested meanings through time, as in Stefan Helmreich and Sophia Roosth, "Life Forms: A Keyword Entry," *Representations* 112 (Fall 2010): 27-53.

[37] James Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically," in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, eds. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 25.

[38] Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically," 38.

days past."[39] Concepts, then, are not "timeless representations of things-in-the-world," but "artifacts left behind by previous generations of scholars"; understood this way, they "become amenable to historical investigation."[40] According to Schaffer, the concepts whose genealogies are most worth interrogating are those whose meanings appear to be given. "Scholars may argue about how best to define 'peasant, classify 'emotions,' or specify the content of 'sexuality,'" he writes, "but the timeless existence of peasants, emotions, and sexuality—however conceived—goes unquestioned." And if the aim of this investigation is indeed to destabilize taken-for-granted categories of social analysis, the concept should also be chosen for its "theoretical significance"—it should be "central to social scientific explanation." As Schaffer points out, "[t]o denaturalize 'the economy' is to destabilize entire edifices of theorizing."[41] This dissertation treats the concept of conflict as an artifact left behind by previous generations of scholars, and investigates how those scholars understood the concept by tracking their use of the word. "Conflict"—"an ostensibly objective analytic concept"—was in fact an artifact of the early Cold War, "shaped by the contestation-in-the-world that the concept was crafted to describe."[42]

Farr offers some useful methodological prescriptions for writing conceptual histories. He argues for a contextual understanding of the meaning of political concepts, "in terms of the contexts within which actors put them to use; and tracing conceptual change over time will require studying changes of context and use. Relevant contexts are

[39] Ido Oren, "Political Science as History: A Reflexive Approach," in *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, 2nd edition, ed. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 320, as quoted in Schaffer, *Elucidating Social Science Concepts*, 86.
[40] Ibid., 84.
[41] Ibid., 83.
[42] Ibid., 85.

always both linguistic and political at the same time; and conceptual historians must attend to speakers and hearers, writers and readers."[43] So, following Farr, this dissertation constructs a conceptual history of conflict by attending to speakers and hearers, writers and readers, finding them in a range of sources such as published writings (books, journal articles, conference proceedings, op-eds); institutional records (memoranda, applications and reports to public and private patrons); letters; and oral histories. It is interested in the production of knowledge, but also in its reception within and—insofar as it is possible to get at this—*beyond* the academy.

The Conflict Resolution Movement: Individuals, Ideas, and Institutions

Chroniclers and interpreters of the "peace research" or "conflict resolution" movement include those who led and participated in the movement and their

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[43] Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically," 41. Intellectuals think not as isolated actors, but as members of communities. Their shared concepts are social things. For this reason, it is perhaps useful to add to the conceptual historian's toolkit Ludwik Fleck's notion of the "thought collective," defined as a group of people who exchange ideas. Thought communities have their own "styles of thought" and "collective moods." In Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, trans. Frederick Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979). There are two recent models in the history of science and intellectual history for writing about intellectual communities. Joel Isaac's *Working Knowledge*, mentioned above, is one. Another is Paul Erickson et al.'s *How Reason Almost Lost its Mind,* also mentioned above—here, the authors emphasize that the social scientists they write about "were part of a community of sorts, reading and citing each other's publications, attending the same conferences, worrying the same bones of contention. Their multiple, sustained interaction mapped the terrain on which Cold War rationality was attacked and defended. [...] Theirs was a world of conferences [...], but it was also a world of stable nodes, institutions where these individuals met face-to-face, conversed, and argued" (pp. 13-14). A classic approach of intellectual historians to the intellectual community is the group biography. Louis Menand's *The Metaphysical Club* is one example. Menand tells the story of how Americans struggled after the Civil War "to find a set of ideas, and a way of thinking, that would help people cope with the conditions of modern life" "through the lives of" four thinkers: Oliver Wendell Holmes, William James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey. Menand presents his biographical approach to intellectual history as an attempt "to see ideas as always soaked through by the personal and social situations in which we find them." Menand is interested in the work of these philosophers insofar as it reflects broader changes in American culture, society, and politics. "It describes a change in American life by looking at a change in its intellectual assumptions." In Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), x, xii. Leon Fink too offers an example, presenting biographical portraits of American thinkers who wrestled with questions of how intellectuals ought to engage with democratic politics; see Leon Fink, *Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

biographers.[44] Other historians who have written about the movement have done so from

multiple angles and with different emphases.[45] Historians of science have brought new

perspectives to bear on the story of peace research or conflict resolution by viewing it

through multiple historiographic lenses, including the history of systems thinking, the

history of the discipline of psychology, the history of interdisciplinary social science, the

history of economics, and the history of game theory. This dissertation draws heavily

from these rich and nuanced accounts, which raise intriguing questions and suggest

fruitful lines of inquiry. Debora Hammond's comprehensive history of midcentury

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[44] Elise Boulding wrote about the movement's emphasis on conflict in the late 1960s. A special issue of the *Journal of Conflict* Resolution published in December 1968 took stock of the journal's twelve-year history, with a preface by Kenneth Boulding and a lengthy review by Elizabeth Converse, the journal's managing editor at the time. See Elise Boulding, "The Study of Conflict and Community in the International System: Summary and Challenges to Research," *Journal of Social Issues* 23 (1967): 23-24; Kenneth E. Boulding, "Preface to a Special Issue," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 4 (December 1968): 409-411; and Elizabeth Converse, "The War of All Against All: A Review of *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1957-1968," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 4 (December 1968): 471-532. These were followed in subsequent years by several firsthand accounts of the movement, including: Elise Boulding, "Peace Research: Dialectics and Development," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 4 (1972): 469-475; Kenneth E. Boulding, "Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (1978): 342-354; Herbert C. Kelman, "Reflections on the History and Status of Peace Research," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 5 (1981): 95-110; and Louis Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution," in *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009): 15-32. Scholars at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University have made an invaluable collection of oral history interviews with peace research and conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. See "Parents of the Field," George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, accessed August 24, 2017, http://activity.scar.gmu.edu/parents. Intellectual biographies of Kenneth and Elise Boulding contextualize the movement with respect to the lives and times of these key participants. See Cynthia Kerman, "Kenneth Boulding and the Peace Research Movement," *American Studies* 13 (1972): 149-165; Cynthia Kerman, *Creative Tension: Life and Thought of Kenneth Boulding* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974); and Mary Lee Morrison, *Elise Boulding: A Life in the Cause of Peace* (Jefferson, NC: McFarlan & Company, Inc., 2005).

[45] The philosopher Martha Harty and the historian John Modell wrote a history of the movement from its origins in the early 1950s to its dissolution in the early 1970s, observing that its main goal was to develop a general theory of conflict. But, largely through quantitative analysis of the authors, articles, and citations in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Harty and Modell understand the movement primarily as a failed attempt at professionalization. As they tell it, the first conflict resolution movement dissolved in 1971 with the closing of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. A second conflict resolution movement had flourished after the death of the first, replacing its quest for "an abstract interdisciplinary theory of conflict and formal methods of analysis" with a focus on "the discovery, application, and dissemination of practical techniques for resolving conflicts, at every level and in many different real world contexts." Martha Harty and John Modell, "The First Conflict Resolution Movement, 1956-1971: An Attempt to Institutionalize Applied Interdisciplinary Social Science," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1991), 755.

systems theory and its architects elucidates the theoretical framework upon which the

peace research or conflict resolution movement was built.[46] Philippe Fontaine has shown

how Kenneth Boulding's efforts to integrate the social sciences mirrored his visions for

the integration of both American society and the international system.[47] Paul Erickson

illuminates in satisfying detail the role of game theory in the movement, its institutional

underpinnings at the University of Michigan, and Anatol Rapoport's psychological

experiments with game theory.[48] Teresa Tomás Rangil's account of the movement, which

emphasizes the role of psychology, ends with the keen insight that peace researchers

"provide a rich starting point for a reflexion [sic] on the role of morality in science during

the Cold War from a perspective which has been little exploited by historians who

usually focus on more belligerent scholars."[49] This insight was a point of departure for

my own study, as was Philip Mirowksi's formulation of the paradox of the Center for

Research on Conflict Resolution, which, as he put it, "became known as the 'peaceniks'

RAND,' providing a counterweight to the perceived hawkish tendencies and military

allegiances of the denizens of Santa Monica, all the while conducting their research

within essentially the same idiom."[50] My aim in this dissertation is to build upon this

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[46] Debora Hammond, *The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems Theory* (Boulder: The University Press of Colorado, 2003).

[47] Philippe Fontaine, "Stabilizing American Society: Kenneth Boulding and the Integration of the Social Sciences, 1943-1980," *Science in Context* 23, no. 2 (2010): 221-265; Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

[48] Paul Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015). For another take on the role of game theory in conflict resolution, see Gerd Korman and Michael Klapper, "Game Theory's Wartime Connections and the Study of Industrial Conflict," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 32 (1978): 24-39.

[49] Teresa Tomás Rangil, "Finding Patrons for Peace Psychology: The Foundations of the Conflict Resolution Movement at the University of Michigan, 1951-1971," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 48, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 91-114.

[50] Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 317-318.

literature and understand the conflict resolution movement as a critical episode in the conceptual history of "conflict."

This dissertation begins with some social scientists' efforts to redefine the concept in the immediate aftermath of World War II. From there, it follows another group of social scientists who used that novel conceptualization to build an intellectual movement around a new journal and research center starting in the mid-1950s. It then looks closely at how two of the leading theorists of that movement modeled conflict in the early 1960s, and considers the ethical and political impulses that animated that work. It concludes with brief reflections on the creation of a federal institution designed to embody the concept. Broadly speaking, it oscillates between ideas and institutions, though of course the two are inextricably intertwined.

Chapter 1, "Conflict Per Se: Transformations of a Concept," focuses on a specific moment of conceptual change, investigating how conflict came to be "intensely theorized" in some corners of the social sciences by the 1950s.[51] Some of these theorists of conflict were sociologists who, like Jessie Bernard, charged that their discipline was ignoring, or even denying the existence of, social conflict in America. At the same time, other social scientists argued that social conflict within the nation was tractable, and that the techniques used to control it might also apply to conflict between nations. Exchanging ideas in books, journals, and at conferences, these social scientists struggled to come to

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[51] I have borrowed the phrase "intensely theorized" from the historian Jan Goldstein, who has written about how, in early nineteenth century France after the Revolution, amidst frustrated attempts to restore political stability to the nation, a group of intellectuals embarked upon a project to define a new politics of selfhood and a new kind of self. Goldstein describes a "heightened, almost obsessive attention paid to" the self as a scientific object. Goldstein's work is helpful for thinking about how certain scientific objects come to be "intensely theorized" in certain times and places by actors pursuing particular goals. In Jan Goldstein, "Mutations of the Self in Old Regime and Post-Revolutionary France: From Ame to Moi to Le Moi," in *Biographies of Scientific Objects*, ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 91.

grips with "conflict" on a global scale amid their intensifying fears of nuclear war. The chapter concludes with a symposium that brought many of these social scientists together in an attempt to stabilize the concept across interdisciplinary lines, ultimately with an ambiguous result.

Chapter 2, "The Peacemongers: Peace Research and the Origins of 'Conflict Resolution,'" follows a group of behavioral scientists based at the University of Michigan who in the late 1950s began developing a new science built around this capacious conceptualization of "conflict." They called their movement "peace research" or "conflict resolution," and they argued that conflict, international or otherwise, could be framed as a problem for science to solve. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was *the* conflict with respect to which the conflict resolution movement defined itself, and in that sense, the social scientists engaged in the project accepted the reality of the Cold War. However, as I argue in this chapter, they did so in order to *challenge* that reality. The conflict resolution movement, led by social scientists with pacifist inclinations, was a protest against the Cold War, at a time when such protest could be dangerous. The language of midcentury social science was the idiom in which these social scientists expressed their dissent. They used the new resources of postwar social science—the large private foundations, especially the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation; new interdisciplinary research centers such as the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; conferences; and the language of "systems"—to develop their new science of peace. They combined varieties of pacifism and social science in order to challenge the notion that militarism and war were inevitable.

Chapter 3, "Addicted to Theory, Devoted to Peace: Anatol Rapoport and Kenneth Boulding on Conflict," is a study of texts and their contexts. It offers a close reading of two theoretical works on conflict by two leading theorists of the conflict resolution movement: the mathematician Anatol Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates* (1960) and the economist Kenneth Boulding's *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (1962). The chapter considers Rapoport and Boulding as both academic social scientists and social critics, arguing that it was possible for some to inhabit both roles in the early 1960s. The chapter examines the relationship between their theoretical work (in the idiom of systems analysis, shared with defense intellectuals) and their political engagement (opposed to the defense establishment), attending especially to the roles these theorists imagined for themselves as political actors. It follows them from the early 1960s, when they were theorizing about conflict with nuclear war in mind, to the late 1960s, when in response to the escalation of the fighting in Vietnam they set their conflict models aside and embraced other modes of dissent. The epilogue, "Peace Building," discusses the United States Institute of Peace—an independent federal institute established in 1984 to promote a world without violent conflict—and the legacy of the peace research movement.

Whose Meditations, Whose Emergency?

Most of the recent scholarship on "Cold War rationality" leaves largely unexamined the fact that this rationality, even if it was actively and constantly contested, was often the exclusive domain of well-established white male academics. When these historical accounts of Cold War rationality do occasionally touch upon matters of gender and race, they leave them mostly unanalyzed. An exception is Hunter Heyck's *Age of*

System, in which he points out that "one of the underlying assumptions of high modernists was that there was a 'universal man' (they included women within this category) about whom one could construct a truly universal human science."[52] Heyck suggests that "one could tell the story of the social sciences between 1925 and 1975 as the story of the rise and demise of the universal man, with all its attendant implications to racial and gender issues."[53] This is a necessary intervention, but it is not, however, the story he goes on to tell.

It is especially interesting to think about the work of Anatol Rapoport and Kenneth Boulding in these terms. Even though they spoke the "language" of RAND analysts and aspired to construct a universal human science, they also argued that science could never be "value-neutral" or "objective," and therefore did not abide by any gendered demarcation line separating the "scientific" from the "nonscientific."[54] They were committed to the peace movement, and made no secret of this in their scholarship. They sought to imbue systems analysis and game theory with pacifist values. Another way of looking at this, however, is that they couched their pacifist arguments in the language of systems theory, transmuting their advocacy into an acceptable form of Cold War rationality. "They had a special language," as Elise Boulding, sociologist, Quaker,

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[52] Heyck, *Age of System*, 3.

[53] Ibid., 8.

[54] This notion of the demarcation line comes from Deirdre N. McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998 [1982]), 42. The historian Teresa Tomás Rangil has recognized that the peace research movement disrupted traditional dichotomies of Western thought, writing that the Michigan group "challenged the modernist distinction between rationality and emotions by insisting on the importance of love, faith, and virtue for an individual to be truly rational and they also moved beyond the Western philosophical distinction between individuals and society by focusing on the importance of collective values and collective rationality in the formation of human decisions. By doing so, they were actually reintroducing the question of morality in science that the dominant value-free discourse in the early Cold War denigrated and rejected." From Rangil, "Finding Patrons for Peace Psychology," 112.

peace activist, and wife of Kenneth Boulding, put it.[55] While the abstractions of the likes

of Kenneth Boulding and Anatol Rapoport certainly helped to define the peace research

movement, without Elise Boulding's own hidden and uncompensated labor for the Center

for Research on Conflict Resolution in its early years—taking notes at meetings,

retrieving mail from the wastebasket that would have otherwise gone unanswered,

establishing an international peace research newsletter, making connections between the

Center and the peace organizations in which she was active, inviting student activists into

the Boulding home, to cite just a few examples—there likely would have been no

movement to speak of.[56]

Jessie Bernard had been drawn to this "special language" herself. She was among

the first sociologists to recognize the relevance of game theory for sociology. When she

wrote "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" in 1949, she had not yet

encountered John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and*

Economic Behavior (1947). "My attention was called to it shortly thereafter, however,

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[55] Elise Boulding oral history interview, with Dr. Christopher Mitchell, Medford, Massachusetts, August 2004, George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Parents of the Field Project, accessed August 24, 2017, https://activity.scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/PoF/Elise_Boulding.pdf.

[56] Too many histories of peace research and conflict resolution tend to downplay or omit the contributions of the movement's women scholars. For example, Elise Boulding appears just once in the main text of Paul Erickson's account of conflict resolution at Michigan, and not even by name, but as Kenneth Boulding's wife. Erickson writes, "With its wide appeal, the center proved to be the first of many such research organizations focused on peace, and something of an institutional template that would be copied internationally. By 1963, when Boulding and his wife began publishing an 'International Newsletter on Peace Research,' they could list a number of research centers devoted to conflict resolution or peace research." Elise is named only in an endnote, where she is correctly identified as the newsletter's editor. Elise's biographer Mary Lee Morrison writes that Elise played a critical role in the founding of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in her capacity there as "Research Development Secretary." Her duties included clerical work and running the research development seminar. Recognizing all the international mail to the Center that went unanswered and ended up in the office wastebasket, Elise started the International Peace Research newsletter to connect peace researchers all over the world. According to Morrison, the Center would not fund the newsletter because it worried it would not be sufficiently academic, and so Elise secured funding for the early issues from the International Consultative Committee on the Peace Research of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. In *Elise Boulding: A Life in the Cause of Peace* (2005), Morrison writes extensively on Elise's activism and academic work and the connections she forged between them.

and it seemed to be in many respects an answer to the question I had raised." Once she

recognized this, she immersed herself in the study of game theory and its applications to

"sociological conflict situations."[57] "At midcentury I was enormously attracted to the

game theorists," she would write many years later. "They seemed to be the wittiest

among all the social science communities. They wrote with a sense of humor. The games

they concocted for their players were fascinating. They were mean people. They were

always trying to do one another in." She became more adventurous in her applications of

game theory, using it to analyze marriage and family dynamics, which she made her area

of expertise beginning in the later 1960s. But eventually, she gave up on game theory. "I

carried on a minor correspondence with several of their stars and audited a faculty

seminar on my own campus on the subject, but I knew I was far beyond my depth."[58]

(The reception of her work by her contemporaries, however, suggests otherwise.) Bernard

became more and more outspoken in her feminism.[59] She formally retired in 1964, but in

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[57] Jessie Bernard, "The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict," *The American Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 5 (March 1954): 411.

[58] Jessie Bernard, "A Woman's Twentieth Century," in *Authors of Their Own Lives*, ed. Bennett M. Berger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 331-332. Jessie Bernard was one of the first sociologists to recognize the applicability of game theory to social sciences other than economics, even before the publication of R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa's book *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey* (1957). Though Luce and Raiffa did not acknowledge her work in their book, Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling did mention her in a footnote in his book *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960). Bernard appears nowhere in Erickson's intellectual history of game theory, not even in the endnotes. Nor does she figure in other recent histories of game theory such as S.M. Amadae's *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (2003) or her more recent *Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[59] Bernard was trapped in an abusive marriage to the sociologist Luther Lee Bernard. Robert Bannister writes extensively about the marriage and the evolution of Jessie Bernard's sociology and feminism in *Jessie Bernard: The Making of a Feminist* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991). The sociologist Craig Calhoun describes Luther Lee Bernard as "a volatile, often angry individualist who vehemently praised objectivism as the standard for sociology. He was a critic of the 'new woman' (and a notorious philanderer) who married and collaborated with one of sociology's most important early feminists, Jessie Bernard." In Craig Calhoun, "Sociology in America: An Introduction," in *Sociology in America: A History* ed. Craig Calhoun (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 31.

the next decade wrote a spate of books that earned her a reputation "as a premier scholar of the women's movement."[60]

She may not have called herself a feminist until the late 1960s, but there had been a critical edge to Bernard's scholarship all along. Even though her 1950 article expressed strong anticommunist sentiments, she was also a defender of academic freedom against McCarthyism.[61] And she was attuned from the outset to the politics of concept use. Although she had issued the first call for what might be understood as a general theory of conflict, she came to see how such a conceptualization might obscure more than it illuminated. She recognized how "conflict" capaciously defined could be used to gloss over or even mask questions of power. Consistent with her growing interest in gender roles in marriage and family, she seemed to have concluded by 1957 that it was unwise to subsume so many disparate phenomena under the concept, writing in an article that it had perhaps "outlived its usefulness," having "no clear-cut referent, being emotion-fraught, value-laden, fuzzy, and equivocal."[62]

Bernard became increasingly interested in the sociology of knowledge after reading Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). In 1965, she suggested that conflict theory was a good object lesson in the sociology of knowledge; her conclusion about that neatly summarizes the conceptual history of conflict in postwar American social science: "[T]he attraction of different models of conflict for different kinds of people may lie not so much in the validity of the model as in the predilections of

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[60] Robert McG. Thomas Jr., "Jessie Bernard, 93; Ideas Inspired Feminists," *New York Times*, October 11, 1996. These books included *The Sex Game* (1968), *The Female World* (1981), *The Future of Marriage* (1972), and *The Future of Motherhood* (1974).

[61] See Bannister, *Jessie Bernard: The Making of a Feminist* (1991).

[62] Jessie Bernard, "Parties and Issues in Conflict," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 111.

the theorists themselves."[63] While the work of theorists like Rapoport and Boulding may have been radical in its opposition to the Cold War, built into these abstract models were assumptions about the growing harmony of American society that were sharply at odds with the social realities of marginalized groups. The Cold War was the conflict that most preoccupied them, and in their eyes and in their models, it eclipsed what were for others urgent struggles for equality.

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[63] Jessie Bernard, "Some Current Conceptualizations in the Field of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology* 70, no. 4 (January 1965): 454.

CHAPTER 2

Conflict Per Se: Transformations of a Concept

In 1948, Donald Young, president of the Social Science Research Council, and Charles

Dollard, president of the Carnegie Corporation, commissioned the social critic Stuart

Chase to conduct a survey of the social sciences. In the resulting book, titled *The Proper*

Study of Mankind, Chase wrote that he had brought to the project "a lifelong interest in

social problems and especially in applying the scientific method to human affairs" and "a

growing anxiety about the state of the world and the dilemmas of the atomic age."[1] He

related his official inquiry to his own personal "deep and fundamental quest for

certainty": "Where, I kept wondering, were the handholds to the problems of day-by-day

living [...]? What had anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, to tell us about such

problems that was in any way comparable to what the physicists and the medical men had

to tell us about thermodynamics and filterable viruses—law and principles and

techniques which a man could rely on?"[2]

At a moment when many Americans feared the possibility of a third world war

fought with nuclear weapons, Chase looked to the social sciences as a balm for frayed

nerves. He believed the social sciences were capable of achieving great things. Indeed, no

characterization of midcentury American social science would be complete without some

attempt to capture social scientists' belief in the promise of that science, a sentiment that

one historian of science has described as "[a]n almost giddy sense of possibility." Social

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[1] Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Inquiry into the Science of Human Relations* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), xv.
[2] Ibid., xv.

scientists experienced the three decades after World War II as "a 'golden age' in which

new capabilities and new concepts were matched by new prominence in public life."[3]

Many were hopeful that the achievements of the social sciences would come to match –

and help to control the effects of – those of the physical sciences. The sociologist Talcott

Parsons looked forward to the day when the combined might of the social sciences would

enable the "splitting of the social atom."[4] By many measures, American social science

had reached its "highest point of self-confidence and of intellectual and popular authority

in the United States and around the world."[5]

Chase thought that the last best hope for abolishing war lay with the social

sciences. "[I]f war is to go," he wrote, "it is probable that only the scientific method can

hasten its going. The diplomats, the philosophers, priests, poets, and sages have not found

the answer."[6] He pursued this subject in greater depth in his subsequent book *Roads to

Agreement: Successful Methods in the Science of Human Relations* (1951), a companion

to *The Proper Study of Mankind*. As in the earlier book, Chase expressed his own unease

about world affairs. "I suppose the most compelling reason for undertaking this study was

the natural anxiety of a citizen, watching the spiraling disagreements of the 'cold war,'

with two stockpiles of fissionable material rising in the background," he wrote.

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[3] Hunter Heyck, *Age of System: Understanding the Development of Modern Social Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 55.

[4] Paul Erickson et al., *How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 115.

[5] Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., *The Cambridge History of Science: Volume 7, The Modern Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 230. Porter and Ross elaborate: "The liberal Enlightenment vision of a progressive modern society guided by science gained energy and urgency from the defeat of fascism, the disintegration of colonial empires, and the threat of communism. University systems expanded and democratized, providing a vibrant academic base for the social science disciplines, and the market for social science services, cultivated by wartime government, grew during postwar reconstruction. As the strongest power to emerge from the war and a society that had escaped fascism and communism, the United States promoted its ideologies and cultural products around the world."

[6] Ibid., 273.

"Collecting techniques of agreement seemed to relieve the anxiety a little, even if the direct applicability in international relations was not always clear. One has to begin somewhere."[7]

Chase was proposing here that homegrown human relations techniques—such as those developed by the National Training Laboratories in Bethel, Maine, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and various corporations—might be applicable to international relations, even if these techniques had "not yet progressed" to the "global proportions" of the Cold War.[8] The techniques with which Chase was most familiar came from the arena of labor relations. He had previously conducted an independent examination of practices in the refineries of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, which had gone three decades without a strike. This period of industrial harmony was the puzzle with which Chase began the book. During the summer of 1915, Bayonne had seen "pitched battles in the streets, with strikers throwing bricks and stones, police and guards shooting revolvers." Oil, merchandise, and the company pump house were set ablaze. There were numerous casualties, including the death of a striker. And then in 1917, the violence ceased, ushering in a strike-free period at the Bayonne refinery and all the company's plants. If lasting peace were possible at Standard Oil, Chase reasoned, then it should be possible everywhere. "What men and management did at Bayonne needs to be done all over the country in situations of every scale. What they did in a small way needs to be done by Homo sapiens in a big way," he wrote. "There are something over two billion of us on the planet, faced not only with labor

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[7] Stuart Chase, *Roads to Agreement: Successful Methods in the Science of Human Relations* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), xi.
[8] Ibid., xii.

battles but with more serious conflicts between East and West, between nations, cultures, races, ideologies, religions."[9]

At midcentury, Chase looked out on a world that seemed to him to be suffused with conflict, even during "peacetime."[10] The second chapter of the book, "Levels of Conflict," begins with a list of headlines from the New York *Herald Tribune* for May 4, 1950. Among them: "Reds Tighten Berlin Controls," "Loss of Hainan by Chiang Confirmed," "Lucas Cries Liar in Clash on McCarthy," "Union Sues Oil Company," "Ohio Court Bans Racial Bias at Pools," and "Policeman Shot to Death in Subway." Chase suggested a metaphor with which to make sense of this world of strife: the "skyscraper of conflict," an 18-story building with two people on the ground floor and two billion on the top, and "a fight on every floor." Community, labor, racial, religious, and international conflict were all sandwiched, in ascending order, between personal quarrels (such as those between husband and wife or employer and servant) on the first floor and the clash of civilizations—"East versus West"—on the top floor.[11] In the remainder of the book, Chase examined the dynamics of various kinds of groups—a Quaker meeting, a symphony orchestra, air force squadrons, and the family—and used them to discuss obstacles and paths to accord. Overall the book was relatively optimistic; Chase was, after all, suggesting that techniques developed for managing interpersonal and intergroup conflicts within the nation might be deployed on a grander scale to manage conflicts between nations. The "science of human relations," operating on the assumption that fights between, say, husband and wife, employee and employer, and the

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[9] Ibid., 2.
[10] Ibid., 12.
[11] Ibid., 16.

United States and the Soviet Union were fundamentally similar and therefore analogous, might extinguish the conflagration that had enveloped the skyscraper.

If Chase was a popularizer of the idea that science could "solve" social conflicts, the political scientist Hans Morgenthau was its critic.[12] "That social conflicts might be solved peacefully and justly or even be completely eliminated from social life is one of the great visions of the human race. Christian as well as Marxian eschatology anticipates a final state of humanity in which conflict between nations, classes, and other social groups will have disappeared," Morgenthau wrote in a paper delivered at Columbia University's fifth Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, held in 1944 on the theme of "approaches to national unity." "It is quite another matter to believe, as our civilization does, that we have already, here and now, at our disposal the instrumentalities through which this end can be achieved and that education and moral exhortation will, in a not too distant future, persuade mankind to make use of these instrumentalities already at hand. This belief is a particular manifestation of the modern confidence in the redeeming powers of science."[13] Following World War I, this confidence in the redeeming powers of science had marked the beginning of "the age of the scientific

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[12] The idea was not, however, was not confined to academic social science. Another example of efforts to bring labor mediation techniques to bear on problems of international conflict, not discussed by Chase: In the early 1950s, the American Friends Service Committee—the service branch of the Religious Society of Friends—and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored a series of meetings between experienced mediators in labor relations and international relations. The conveners hoped that the insights and practices of labor mediators might inform United Nations efforts toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The prevailing assumption here was that the institutionalization of labor relations had more or less eliminated class conflict in the United States. International conflict, however, remained untamed. In his 1952 account of the meetings, Elmore Jackson, director of the Quaker program at the United Nations, noted that "[a]s yet very little systematic attention has been given to the techniques and procedures which have been used in attempts to get agreement in difficult and emotionally charged international disputes." And the threat of nuclear war had dramatically raised the stakes of these disputes, making research on mediation all the more urgent, as far as Jackson was concerned. Elmore Jackson, *Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace Through Mediation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), xvii.

[13] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Scientific Solution of Social Conflict," in *Approaches to National Unity: Fifth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion*, eds. Lymon Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robert MacIver (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1945), 434.

approach to international affairs," which found governments "now embarked on a program of feverish activity with the purpose of solving all international problems through scientific methods." Morgenthau predicted that this "modern intellectual trend" would continue after World War II.[14]

In his 1946 book *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Morgenthau extended this critique of "liberal rationality." "Our civilization assumes that the social world is susceptible to rational control conceived after the model of the natural sciences, while the experiences, domestic and international, of the age contradict this assumption," he wrote, drawing a conclusion opposite to the one Chase would reach a few years later. Chase remained optimistic even in the face of the skyscraper of conflict; in contrast, Morgenthau thought that the limitations of the rationalist philosophy of the eighteenth century would eventually be revealed, for "man" "would not forever accept as true the essentially harmonious constitution of human existence when his inner and outer life bears the marks of constant conflict and strife."[15] As far as he was concerned, conflict was not a problem to be solved, but "the primordial social fact."[16] But for the time being, the "scientific element" had "become the dominating mode of political thought in the Western world," and under this paradigm social scientists were the bearers of reason, called upon to tame the social world. "Where, in times past, the irrational lust for power pursued its violent game, now reason would reign supreme through the medium of the political scientist, the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, etc."[17]

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[14] Ibid., 436.
[15] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). 8.
[16] Ibid., 218.
[17] Ibid., 32.

Morgenthau was especially critical of the liberal "conception of a world [...] which contained in itself all the elements necessary for the harmonious cooperation of all mankind," elements to be discovered "under the surface of apparent conflict."[18] Morgenthau thought that in its faith in the power of negotiation and compromise in international relations, liberalism had been "led astray by generalizing its domestic experience." Seemingly tractable domestic conflicts—"among merchants, employers, employees, professional men, politicians, and the like"—made poor models for international relations. For these conflicts "arose within the framework of the liberal society and the liberal state," and therefore none of them "challenged the existence of the liberal order itself; the permanence of the liberal framework was taken for granted." In other words, "[t]he disputants could not fail to realize that what they had in common was more important than what they were fighting about. They met, indeed, on the common ground of liberal rationality." And liberal rationality had worked out the "instrumentalities" by which to settle these kinds of disputes.[19] Morgenthau concluded that "[i]n this confusion of the domestic conflicts of the liberal era with the great controversies of nations lies one of the decisive weaknesses of liberal foreign policy."[20] He argued that international relations was the domain of the statesman, not the scientist.

The tension between the philosophies of Chase and Morgenthau and their respective attitudes toward the desirability or possibility of a science of conflict ran throughout midcentury social science. Chase's postwar books put him squarely among those American "pundits and scholars" who, in the two decades after World War II, worked deliberately to shape what the historian Wendy Wall describes as "an illusory

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[18] Ibid., 75.
[19] Ibid., 107.
[20] Ibid., 108.

national consensus."[21] Government officials and private elites "used the language of consensus to promote *civility* across class, racial, ethnic, and religious lines. Denying or minimizing economic and power imbalances, they stressed the harmony of interests among various groups in American society and sought to short up the status quo."[22] Some social scientists were certainly involved in this project. But as this chapter shows, through a series of close readings and contextualization of key texts that addressed the question of social conflict as an object of social scientific inquiry, some social scientists were in fact critical of what Wall calls the "politics of consensus."

This chapter focuses on a specific moment of conceptual change, investigating how conflict came to be "intensely theorized" in some corners of the social sciences by the 1950s.[23] Some of these theorists of conflict were sociologists who, like Jessie Bernard, charged that their discipline was ignoring, or even denying the existence of, social conflict in America. At the same time, other social scientists argued that social conflict within the nation was tractable, and that the techniques used to control it might also apply to conflict between nations. To borrow Hans Morgenthau's phrasing, they generalized their domestic experience to the international arena. Exchanging ideas in books, journals, and at conferences, these social scientists struggled to come to grips with "conflict" on a global scale amid their intensifying fears of nuclear war. The chapter

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[21] Wendy Wall, *Inventing the American Way: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12. "Consensus" she defines as "a fundamental agreement of values."

[22] Ibid., 8.

[23] I have borrowed the phrase "intensely theorized" from the historian Jan Goldstein, who has written about how, in early nineteenth century France after the Revolution, amidst frustrated attempts to restore political stability to the nation, a group of intellectuals embarked upon a project to define a new politics of selfhood and a new kind of self. Goldstein describes a "heightened, almost obsessive attention paid to" the self as a scientific object. Goldstein's work is helpful for thinking about how certain scientific objects come to be "intensely theorized" in certain times and places by actors pursuing particular goals. In Jan Goldstein, "Mutations of the Self in Old Regime and Post-Revolutionary France: From Ame to Moi to Le Moi," in *Biographies of Scientific Objects*, ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 91.

concludes with a symposium that brought many of these social scientists together in an attempt to stabilize the concept across interdisciplinary lines, ultimately with an ambiguous result.

The Sociology of Conflict in the Age of "Consensus"

Robert Lynd's *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* appeared on bookshelves just as World War II was beginning in the autumn of 1939. Against the looming threat of fascism, Lynd wrote, "A world floundering disastrously because of its inability to make its institutions work is asking the social sciences: What do you know? What do you propose?"[24] In this book the author of the bestselling Middletown studies called attention to the predicament in which American social scientists now found themselves. As college and university professors, they were "hired by businessmen trustees," who had an interest in maintaining "the status quo." "The social scientist finds himself caught, therefore, between the rival demands for straight, incisive, and, if need be, radically divergent thinking, and the growingly insistent demand that his thinking shall not be subversive." Lynd urged social scientists to rise to the occasion, which for him meant taking on a more critical role vis-à-vis American culture. The social scientist "accept[s] tacitly the inclusive value-judgment of the culture as to the rightness of the 'American way' and the need for only minor remedial changes. Whether and at what points this optimistic value-judgment is warranted should be a subject of inquiry by science, rather than a thing taken for granted."[25] Lynd registered his

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[24] Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 7.
[25] Ibid., 185.

concern that the pressure to avoid subversive subjects had already had a profound

distorting effect on social scientists' representations of social reality:

> Current social science plays down the omnipresent fact of class antagonisms and conflicts in the living all about us. It studies industrial strikes and analyzes wage differentials and the operation of trade and industrial unions and the machinery for collective bargaining. But it is careful, in the main, to keep the word 'class' out of its analysis and to avoid the issue of the possibility of the existence of fundamental cleavages which may not be remediable within our type of economy. Social science does this because the concepts of 'class' and 'class struggle' lead straight into highly inflammable issues. It is helped in so doing by the tradition that class divisions are un-American and that such differences as exist are transitory and will be eliminated by a rising standard of living and 'the general movement of Progress.' But such exculpating assumptions may not be justified. There is more than a little basis for assuming, on the contrary, that class divisions are endemic in our type of economy.[26]

Mainstream social science denied the fact of class conflict in America, Lynd asserted,

and insisted that there were no fundamental cleavages, only temporary tensions and

frictions that would disappear as industrial society advanced toward its ultimate state of

harmony.

The idea that "class divisions" might be inherent to American capitalism was

subversive insofar as it assumed these divisions threatened to disrupt the social order. The

historian Dorothy Ross wrote that for earlier sociologists of the Progressive Era, conflict

was indeed "an inevitable feature of the development of modern society, but it was the

conflict of economic, racial, and ethnic groups," and not *class* conflict per se. "In

America conflict was not and would not become class conflict in any meaningful sense,"

Ross wrote. Conflict was only a temporary byproduct of the transition from pre-industrial

society to the coming industrial one, which, the sociologists maintained, would tend

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[26] Ibid., 227. Lynd spoke from personal experience here: The publisher criticized early drafts of the *Middletown* manuscript for drawing too sharp a line between business and working classes—the middle class seemed to be missing. From Mark C. Smith, *Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918-1941* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).

"toward liberal harmony: an increasingly peaceable, rational, and ethical adjustment of interests."[27] Many Progressive Era sociologists subscribed to a "technocratic conception of social control," or the idea that their science would confer upon them the ability to predict and control society.[28] Sociologists would discover the "harmonizing processes imbedded in society itself" and use that knowledge to "direct progressive reforms."[29] Ross characterized these aspirants to technocratic social control as professionally ambitious and dangerously naïve: "The ideology of harmony often blinded them to the concrete historical reality and the difficulty of their task. In their desire for social unity, they often glossed over the divisions within capitalist society and human nature."[30]

Before World War I, within the discipline of sociology, an emphasis on conflict and agency had characterized the work of sociologists at the University of Chicago. In the urban ecology of Robert Park, for example, conflict was one of the stages in the process of assimilation (contact, conflict, accommodation, assimilation). Park and his students understood racial conflict not as a pathological condition of society, but as "an engine of social change and [...] an essential component of American democracy."[31] Park's approach fell out of favor in the 1930s, however. Marxist currents surfaced in the work of some sociologists who analyzed race in terms of labor, inequality, and class. Black sociologists, for example, often Chicago-trained, were among the small number of sociologists, most of them pushed to the margins of the discipline, who addressed race and class in their work in this period.

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[27] Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 254.
[28] Ibid., 251.
[29] Ibid., 248.
[30] Ibid., 254.
[31] Howard Winant, "The Dark Side of the Force: One Hundred Years of the Sociology of Race," in *Sociology in America: A History*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 555.

An important example of this is *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (1945), a detailed sociological analysis of the black community of Chicago's South Side from the 1840s through the 1930s by the anthropologist St. Clair Drake and the sociologist Horace Cayton. Drake and Cayton's book was the outcome of work begun in the 1930s for the Works Progress Administration, and was "in many respects the last hurrah of the Chicago sociology of race."[32] Presenting their results toward the end of World War II, they were much less optimistic about the prospects for racial progress in American than the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal had been in *An American Dilemma*, his Carnegie Corporation-sponsored study of race relations published the year before. "It is conceivable that the Negro question—given the moral flabbiness of America—is incapable of solution," they wrote. "Indeed it is only in America that one finds the imperative to assume that all social problems *can* be solved without conflict. To feel that a social problem cannot be solved peacefully is considered almost immoral. Americans are required to appear cheerful and optimistic about a solution, regardless of evidence to the contrary."[33] The Chicago of *Black Metropolis* was a city "in which change is taking place most rapidly and where in the next decade friction, and even conflict, between capital and labor, Negroes and white, will probably reach its most intense form, and where a new pattern of race relations is most likely to evolve."[34]

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[32] Ibid., 556.
[33] St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1945]), 766.
[34] Ibid., 756.

That emphasis on conflict and agency clashed with "the political and cultural unity demanded by wartime conditions."[35] Structural functionalism was on the rise at Harvard and Columbia, and eventually eclipsed the Chicago version of sociology; it brought with it an understanding of society as a self-regulating system and an interest in the mechanisms and institutions that promote social integration. In the parlance of structural functionalism, racial "conflict" had become race "relations."[36] Winant notes that "Chicago's successors in Cambridge and Morningside Heights were considerably more sanguine about racial progress" than their Hyde Park colleagues, and that the structural-functionalist paradigm "generally stressed the unifying role of culture, and particularly American values, in regulating and resolving conflicts."[37] Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (1944) "converged" with this orientation.[38] It argued that the realities of race relations in America had not caught up with the ideals of American democracy, but that in due time equality would prevail. "[R]ather than presenting his 'dilemma' as something endemic and foundational in U.S. society and culture," Winant writes, Myrdal "framed racism (a word he did not use) as an aberration, a retardation and obstacle besetting the higher virtues of U.S. democracy."[39] The structural-functionalist framework could not account for "[d]eep-seated conflicts." However, "[o]nce properly reconceptualized as symptoms of the tensions inherent in societal self-regulation, [...] racial matters could be understood as amenable to reform."[40]

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[35] Winant, "The Dark Side of the Force," 557.
[36] Ibid., 558.
[37] Ibid., 558.
[38] Ibid., 559.
[39] Ibid., 560.
[40] Ibid., 561.

That understanding of conflict informed the Social Science Research Council's

Committee on Techniques for Reducing Group Hostility, established in 1945 and

comprised of the sociologist Leonard S. Cottrell, the psychologist Carl L. Hovland, and

the Carnegie Corporation's Charles Dollard.[41] The committee members perceived "a

world seething with tensions and open conflicts among all kinds of racial, cultural,

economic and political groups."[42] The very fate of democracy seemed to be at stake in

these conflicts, which threatened to destabilize society if left uncontrolled. The task of the

committee was to investigate "nonviolent means" of resolving conflicts and keeping

"intergroup hostilities…below the point where the basic consensus of the society is

threatened."[43] In their eyes, recent efforts at the national, regional, state, and local levels

to reduce hostility and resolve conflicts "among racial, cultural, and class groups" were

not *scientific* enough, leaving basic assumptions largely unexamined and deploying

untested methods and techniques.[44] Here was "an unprecedented opportunity and

challenge" for the social sciences: "systematic analysis and experimentation" could boost

the "effectiveness of practical action" and "yield rich returns in basic knowledge in the

field of human relations."[45] Members of the Committee on Techniques for Reducing

Group hostility did acknowledge existence of "open conflicts" of all kinds, even among

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[41] The Social Science Research Council was established in 1923 with the participation of representatives from the American Political Science Association, the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Statistical Society. The SSRC sought to make disinterested knowledge available to policymakers, who would use that knowledge to remedy social and political problems. The historian Jamie Cohen-Cole writes that "[b]y the end of 1939, the SSRC and social scientists it supported were absolutely convinced that the best way to proceed in social science was to frame a problem and then attack it from multiple directions using the techniques of several disciplines." From Jamie Cohen-Cole, *The Open Mind: Cold War Politics and the Sciences of Human Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 77.

[42] Charles Dollard, Carl I. Hovland and Leonard S. Cottrell, "Foreword," in Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), vii.

[43] Ibid., vii.

[44] Ibid., vii.

[45] Ibid., viii.

"class groups." But this acknowledgement also served to justify their undertaking, which was fundamentally one of technocratic social control. The guiding assumption of that undertaking was that social science could improve techniques for preventing these conflicts from disrupting the purported "basic consensus of the society."

The committee appointed Robin M. Williams, then a young sociology professor at Cornell, to execute the study. Williams had worked as a statistician and research analyst with the Special Services Division of the War Department during World War II on the project that would become *The American Soldier* (1949). His assignment now for the SSRC was to survey the "techniques and procedures" used by "agencies of social engineering" and to suggest directions for future research.[46] However, his ambivalence toward the guiding assumption of this SSRC project—that it was possible to develop and apply scientific techniques to keep conflicts in check—surfaced in his introduction to the resulting report, *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* (1947). Williams challenged the very premise of the study, pointing out that even if it were possible to develop such techniques, reducing tension might not always be a desirable goal: "[F]rom the standpoint of certain principles and values, a measure of intergroup hostility and conflict may sometimes be unavoidable, if not on occasion actually a means to the attainment of highly valued purposes."[47]

The image of a conflict-ridden world—plagued in the past two decades alone by two world wars, a number of revolutions, race riots, and strikes—looms large in Williams's report. Williams suspected that his version of social reality would be unacceptable to many Americans, because "serious problems of internal conflict"

[46] Robin M., Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), 8.
[47] Ibid., 5.

threatened "a pervasive strain of optimism, belief in progress, and faith in the perfectibility of human society which have deep roots in American culture." Their violent past notwithstanding, Americans retained the impulse "to face social ills as problems and to say, 'Let's do something about it.'"[48] Williams suggested that what some might see as "[s]poradic outbreaks of open violence" could in fact be symptomatic "of deeper, more widespread, and persistent hostilities and conflicts" arising "from relatively permanent features of our society such as the type of economic system."[49] Williams's suggestion that certain conflicts might be intractable contradicted the technocratic optimism of the SSRC committee members and went against the grain of mainstream social science, which grew even more committed to affirming the rightness of "the American way" after World War II.

In July 1950, the same month American troops arrived in South Korea from occupied Tokyo, Jessie Bernard, a sociologist at Pennsylvania State College, had registered a deep concern for the state of "the scientific study of conflict" in the pages of the *American Journal of Sociology*. Bernard suggested that a preoccupation with other concepts, such as "culture" and "class," had led to the eclipse of a more urgent matter, namely, the development of a theory of conflict.[50] This put Americans at a perilous disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviets: "Instead of a more or less snobbish preoccupation with the theory of class structure—which they long ago mastered—they have asked science how to fight."[51] Bernard wanted Americans to do the same. "We have excellent

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[48] Ibid., 3.
[49] Ibid., 5.
[50] Jessie Bernard, "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" *American Journal of Sociology* 56, no. 1 (July 1950): 11.
[51] Ibid., 13.

descriptions and analyses of lynchings, strikes, riots, and war. But the most important

modern conflicts are not necessarily fought on the level of overt violence."[52]

Why had American sociologists turned a blind eye to conflict? Bernard had a few

hunches. Perhaps they had shied away from it because it was a keyword in the Marxist

lexicon—many American sociologists were anxious about being associated with

socialism. It was certainly possible that some sociologists simply refused to acknowledge

the reality of social conflict. Whatever the reason, sociologists by and large had come to

favor a more static image of society "emphasizing what people have in common rather

than what they have in conflict."[53] While Bernard's article certainly contained elements

of criticism, particularly of the dampening effect on scholarly inquiry of a distinctly

American tendency to "let sleeping dogs lie,"[54] what seemed most urgent to her was the

development of a "systematic theory of conflict" with which America could wage the

Cold War, against an enemy highly skilled in the science of conflict.[55]

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[52] Ibid., 11.

[53] Ibid, 15.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., 11. The sociologist Lewis Coser would join Bernard in challenging the emphasis on integration and stability in the structural-functionalist framework in his 1956 book *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Here, drawing upon the earlier work of the sociologist Georg Simmel, Coser argued that conflict is not only a basic social process, but also often a *functional* social process. In other words, not all conflict is bad. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict: An Examination of the Concept of Social Conflict and Its Use in Empirical Sociological Research* (The Free Press, 1956). Gary Jaworski has suggested that Coser's *Functions* was a reaction to the waning of Marxism in the postwar years, writing of Coser that "he was one of those intellectuals of the 1950s, too numerous to mention, who maintained their commitment to socialism and radical politics; who attempted to salvage the remnants of progressive thought; and who tried to foster the creative efflorescence of radicalism during that inhospitable decade. These commitments find an expression in *Functions*." In Gary D. Jaworski, *Georg Simmel and the American Prospect*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, 81. Three years later, in *The Sociological Imagination* (1959), C. Wright Mills would echo Coser's point, writing that in the terms of Parsonian "grand theory," "the idea of conflict cannot effectively be formulated. Structural antagonisms, large-scale revolts, revolutions—they cannot be imagined. In fact, it is assumed that 'the system,' once established, is not only stable but intrinsically harmonious," he wrote. "The idea of the normative order set forth leads us to assume a sort of harmony of interests as the natural feature of any society." This amounted to "[t]he magical elimination of conflict, and the wondrous achievement of harmony." C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 42.

Debating the "Nature" of Conflict

Bernard had concluded her 1950 article with a suggestion for how the production of social scientific knowledge about conflict might best be organized, imagining an "Institute of Conflict Analysis," staffed by "[a] corps of social scientists whose job it would be it would be to analyze conflict situations "from the local to the international level."[56] Bernard's vision for a team of social scientists—not only sociologists—dedicated to the analysis of conflict at all levels of analysis prefigured efforts to organize the interdisciplinary study of conflict in the years to come.

Similarly, the University of Chicago political scientist Quincy Wright published an article in the *Western Political Quarterly* (the journal of the Western Political Science Association) in 1951 in which he attempted a general analysis of "conflict." Titled, "The Nature of Conflict," the piece began with a bold assertion: "War is a species of conflict; consequently, by understanding conflict we may learn about the probable characteristics of war under different conditions and the methods most suitable for regulating, preventing, and winning wars." War was Wright's area of expertise. As the historian Trygve Throntveit writes, Wright was an esteemed "theorist of international law, founder of the discipline of international relations, adviser to the Roosevelt administration, and unreconstructed Wilsonian," and he "dominated the era's academic discourse over world political and international organization."[57] A Wilsonian internationalist who emphasized the interdependence of nations, throughout his career Wright favored the establishment of an international organization that would "supersed[e] the balance of power as the basic

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[56] Bernard, "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" 16.

[57] Trygve Throntveit, "A Strange Fate: Quincy Wright and the Trans-War Trajectory of Wilsonian Internationalism," *White House Studies* 10 (2011), 362.

guaranty of state security."[58] His commitment to that notion of peace informed his 1942 tome *A Study of War*, a two-volume book summarizing almost two decades' worth of research at the University of Chicago. He noted that he had begun this ambitious study "in the hopeful atmosphere of Locarno and completed it in the midst of general war," and remained convinced as he penned the book's foreword that war was preventable.[59] It was true, he asserted, that conflicts had become "more frequent, more difficult to resolve, and more likely to spread," and so finding a way to control them was imperative to maintaining the stability of the "world community."

Wright believed in the power of knowledge to shape the world. It was possible, he insisted, to arrive at a less violent world through "[c]ontinuous thought and study, closely integrated with practical effort by our own and successive generations."[60] While he defined war as "the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force," he drew upon eclectic materials from a range of intellectual traditions and disciplines in order to understand it more broadly as a form of conflict and as a form of behavior.[61] His conviction that war was tractable flowed from this understanding, for, he wrote, "very few of the essential conditions affecting human behavior are entirely beyond human control given sufficient time." Conflict was not an

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[58] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War Volume II* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), 772, quoted in Throntveit, "A Strange Fate," 373.

[59] Ibid., viii.

[60] Ibid., ix.

[61] Ibid., 13. He articulated his expansive conceptualization as follows: "War is thus at the same time an exceptional legal condition, a phenomenon of intergroup social psychology, a species of conflict, and a species of violence. While each of these aspects of war suggests an approach to its study, war must not be identified with any one of them." Ibid., 700.

"unchangeable condition" constraining human agency, but rather a modifiable form of behavior.[62] (And this was the position against which Hans Morgenthau would argue.[63])

Presumably Wright's 1951 essay was addressed to an audience of political scientists, but Wright built his argument and analysis around conflict "[i]n the sociological sense." Whereas Bernard had begun with conflict in the sociological sense and expanded it to international relations, Wright began with international relations and moved from there to a more sociological understanding of conflict. "The street fight of two small boys, the forensic contention in a law court, the military suppression of mob violence in the state, the collision of two automobiles, and the combat of two stags are not war; but they are conflict," he wrote.[64] To define conflict, Wright invoked not only example, but also etymology, noting that the word "is derived from the Latin word *confligere* meaning to strike together." It had both "physical" and "moral" connotations. Conflict in the physical sense meant "two or more different things moving to occupy the same space at the same time," such as two billiard balls that cannot logically be in the same place at the same time and consequently roll to different positions.

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[62] Ibid., 13. And here Wright was drawing upon the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, writing in a footnote that Dewey "emphasizes the modifiability of human nature and of institutions, including war and competitive economy." Ibid., 13n14.

[63] Morgenthau saw international relations as the domain of the statesman and not the scientist; Wright saw it as the domain of the scientist and not the statesman—for him, in the battle of Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Scientific Man would emerge triumphant. Wright explained that "[t]he journalist, military man, and diplomat are so absorbed by the requirements of time- and space-limited situation in which they are interested observers or workers that they cannot get outside of it to discover the handle which might, if properly tuned, change that situation. Valuable as is internal acquaintance with the situation, for keeping it going and locating one's self within in, it is only by getting outside of the situation, either in fact or in thought, that one can understand it as a whole, perceive the possibilities of fundamental change and identify factors, the manipulation of which might bring such change about. The journalistic and practical levels of analysis are guides for handling particular situations as they arise, but guides the object of which can never transcend that of preserving the fundamental nature of war and society as it has been" (15). The scientific view enabled one to view the world from the outside, as an object of inquiry and control.

[64] Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," *The Western Political Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (June 1951), 193.

Wright suggested that any analysis of conflict should limit the meaning of the word "conflict" "to situations where there is an actual or potential process for solving the inconsistency," like the two billiard balls moving to different positions. "Where there is no such process, conflict does not seem to be the proper word." According to Wright's definition, then, any conflict properly named contained the seeds of its own resolution. There could be no intractable conflict, because by Wright's definition conflict was now defined by its tractability. "If used to describe mere differences or inconsistencies in societies or value systems, it may induce the belief that peaceful coexistence is impossible."[65] And that belief could precipitate unnecessary violent conflict, as in religious war. Muslims and Christians fought each other throughout the Middle Ages, but "[t]oday Christian and Moslem coexist and cooperate in the United Nations. Both the Jihad and the Crusades are things of the past." Similarly, since the Peace of Westphalia, "Protestant and Catholic states have found it possible to coexist peacefully."[66] He even suggested that the Civil War may not have been inevitable: "Some historians think that emancipation could have been achieved peacefully if war had been avoided for ten years longer."[67]

Wright used "[t]hese bits of history" to "question whether the inconsistency of democracy and communism makes conflict between the Western and Soviet states inescapable."[68] "Historically, radical differences of religion, ideology, or institutions have tended to induce conflict. They do not, however, necessarily do so."[69] Whether they did or not depended on the policies of governments or other regulatory agencies. While the

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[65] Ibid., 194.
[66] Ibid., 195.
[67] Ibid., 196.
[68] Ibid., 195.
[69] Ibid., 196.

ideal communist society—which sought "completely subordinate the individual to the society and thus to eliminate all oppositions within it"—was a utopian ideal, democratic societies had, by "accepting human rights, freedom of association, and a multiplicity of political parties," had "institutionalized opposition."[70] Wright warned, though, that "[e]ven democratic societies must keep their internal conditions within bounds or they will become anarchies. [...] Although a society cannot exist without competition and conflict, and cannot progress without a good deal of both, it can exist without violence and war. However, even in the best regulated societies, eternal vigilance is the price of avoiding these disruptive manifestations of opposition."[71] As a scholar of war, Wright had observed a general "tendency for conflict to become total and absolute, and to split the community of nations into halves which would destroy one another in absolute war." The postwar world exacerbated the problem: "The shrinking of the modern world under the influence of new means of communication and transport, and the increasingly destructive methods of warfare culminating in the air-borne atomic bomb, have augmented this tendency, and have made war ominous for the future of civilization."[72]

Together with Bernard's article, Wright's reflections on the nature of conflict marked the beginning of a wave of similar efforts to stretch a concept that had been used primarily to analyze the behavior of groups smaller than the nation to fit the global proportions of the Cold War. One of the most notable of these was a survey commissioned by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) in the mid-1950s. UNESCO, which looked to the social sciences as an aid "to the development of better international understanding and the removal of tensions arising

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[70] Ibid., 199.
[71] Ibid., 200.
[72] Ibid., 208.

from preconceived, stereotyped ideas about foreign countries and their inhabitants," had

launched its "Tensions Project" in 1947.[73] The underlying assumption here was that

relations between nations were affected by "social tensions," and these were understood

to have psychological roots. Indeed, the preamble of the UNESCO Constitution reads,

"[S]ince wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of

peace must be constructed."[74] The Tensions Project set out to investigate "the

psychological and social bases of peace" in decidedly psychological terms, by inquiring

into the "character" of "national cultures," the "ideas" people hold of their own nation

and others, methods for "changing mental attitudes," and relations between nations

framed in terms of "international understanding" and "aggressive nationalism."[75]

At the same time, there was some recognition that the concept of "tensions" was

perhaps not quite adequate to the task: "[I]t was agreed, when the project was adopted,

that the concept of 'tension' was rather too rigid and narrow, and that to confine the study

to tensions was liable to distort the picture of social conditions as a whole." The framers

of the Tensions Project noted, for instance, that tension was not necessarily pathological:

"[P]sychologists tend to regard tensions as normal features of life, provided that they do

not go beyond a certain pitch of intensity," they wrote. "The real problem, therefore, is

not so much to remove tensions as to direct them into useful channels and to them into

constructive social ends, taking appropriate measures to control the conditions in which

they arise and the factors which affect them." The point, in other words, was not to

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[73] "Introduction: The UNESCO Tensions Project," in *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions* (Paris: UNESCO, 1957), 9.

[74] "UNESCO Constitution," UNESCO Legal Instruments, UNESCO.org, accessed August 24, 2017, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

[75] Ibid., 9.

eliminate tensions, but to control them. It fell to sociologists and social psychologists to

"reveal the conditions conducive to the development of harmonious social relations and

attitudes favourable to international understanding."[76]

And this was where Jessie Bernard came in. She had prepared a working paper,

titled "Current Research in the Sociology of Conflict," for the International Sociological

Association's (ISA) Second World Congress of Sociology, held in Liège, Belgium in

August 1953. Based on discussions at that meeting, which Bernard's paper had informed,

UNESCO's Department of Social Sciences invited the ISA "to prepare a comprehensive

critical survey of current research, both sociological and psychological, on inter-group

conflict, and an evaluation of the most useful directions to be taken by future research."[77]

The resulting book, titled, *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of*

International Tensions, published by UNESCO in 1957, included chapters by Bernard,

the British psychologist T. H. Pear, the French philosopher Raymond Aron, and the

American sociologist Robert Angell. It also included an extensive annotated

bibliography, focusing on scholarship published since 1945, prepared by the Centre

d'Études Sociologiques in Paris. The preface to the book made clear that UNESCO's

primary interest was in *international* conflict: While the first two chapters of the book by

Bernard and Pear were "general surveys of research in the field of conflict" and therefore

considered "a number of different types of conflict," the preface insisted that both led "to

a closer consideration of one particular type: conflict between nations." The urgency of

such an inquiry could be summarized in one sentence: "The danger of atomic war is ever

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[76] Ibid., 11.
[77] "Preface," *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions* (Paris: UNESCO, 1957), 6.

present."[78] The practical ambitions of the Tensions Project were modest; the symbolic

ambitions, less so: "[W]hatever the scope of the work thus carried out, and whatever its

present or future influence on actual society, it would seem to constitute the first really

international recognitions of the place of the social sciences in the contemporary world

and of the possibilities they offer."[79]

Bernard's contribution to *The Nature of Conflict* was in some ways an extension

of her 1950 essay "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?"[80] It also built upon an

article she had published in *Social Forces* in 1951, in which she criticized the

psychological conceptualization of conflict in intergroup relations.[81] This approach was

"characterized by an emphasis on subjective factors," and tended "to minimize objective

conditions and to concentrate on such phenomena as stereotypes, prejudice, hostility,

aggression, [and] threat orientation." And these phenomena psychologists understood as

"non-rational."[82] All of this amounted to the claim that " 'it's all in the mind.' "[83] Bernard

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[78] Ibid., 7.

[79] "Introduction," *The Nature of Conflict*, 31. Morgenthau favored the statesman, Wright favored Scientific Man, and UNESCO favored a rapprochement between the two; facilitating such a rapprochement was one of the aims of the Social Sciences Department: "The fact that, with very few exceptions, social scientists do not yet think as statesmen, and that statesmen are slow in adopting a scientific point of view, simply emphasizes the desirability of their 'getting together' and co-operating more closely." Ibid., 32.

[80] Just as he had referenced her 1950 essay in the introduction to *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Lewis Coser indicated in an endnote that he had read Bernard's working paper for the ISA, but had done so too late to address it in his own book: "After this work was substantially completed, we had occasion to read a paper by Jessie Bernard, *Current Research in the Sociology of Conflict* [...]. It was thus impossible to take Mrs. Bernard's paper into account adequately. Many of my views closely parallel those expressed in this paper, although there exist also a number of divergencies [sic]. The reader will find Mrs. Bernard's paper an excellent guide to past research in the area, as well as a stimulating discussion of present trends and future potentialities for research on social conflict." In Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, 159n3.

[81] Lewis Coser also noted in *The Functions of Social Conflict* that Bernard was "one of the very few sociologists who have attacked the psychologistic interpretation of conflict." Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, 165n32.

[82] Jessie Bernard, "The Conceptualization of Intergroup Relations: With Special Reference to Conflict," *Social Forces* 29, no. 3 (March 1951): 243.

[83] Ibid. Bernard challenged psychologists' assumption that intergroup relations could be understood as simply the "sum-total of interpersonal relations among group members," writing that "a thousand friendships between members of two groups—German and American scientists, for example, or a thousand love affairs between soldiers and forbidden enemy women—will not add up to friendly group

favored the sociological conceptualization of conflict instead. "Sociologically speaking," she wrote, "conflict exists between groups when there is a fundamental incompatibility in their values, goals, interests, etc., so that if one group gets what it wants, the other group cannot get what it wants."[84]

Bernard's definition of conflict resembled a zero-sum game, and so it is not surprising that she soon came to warmly embrace game theory. Indeed, she was one of the first social scientists outside of economics to do so.[85] In 1954, she took to the pages of the *American Journal of Sociology* again, this time to argue that game theory, or "the theory of games of strategy," could be the basis for the sociology of conflict she had been searching for since 1950. She had read John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, and Morgenstern himself read a draft of her article. She took the two-person zero-sum game as her model, and explained that it was the "mutually exclusive condition which renders the situation one of conflict."[86] She noted that game theory "applies only to rational behavior. It presupposes that players are

relations. Nor conversely, will a thousand quarrels between American tourists and French taxi-drivers add up to Franco-American conflict." Bernard argued that different laws governed relations at the interpersonal and intergroup levels. Ibid., 246.

[84] Bernard, "The Conceptualization of Intergroup Relations," 244. This was Bernard's own definition of conflict, taken from her 1949 study *American Community Behavior*.

[85] In a footnote, Bernard explained that when she wrote "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" she had not yet known about game theory. "My attention was called to it shortly thereafter, however, and it seemed to be in many respects an answer to the question I had raised," she wrote. She thought that "sociologists ought to be enlisted in the conceptualization of the theory," even if the mathematics of it might be daunting to non-mathematicians. "The formidable mathematical apparatus required to prove the mathematical theorems of the theory may intimidate some students. Ability to follow the difficult mathematics is not necessary for an appreciation of the theory itself, any more than ability to derive statistical formulas is necessary for an appreciation of statistical methods. In both areas, of course, mechanical and automatic application of techniques is to be avoided." Ibid., 411. Bernard here was anticipating the animating impulse behind R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa's landmark 1957 book *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*, which aimed to communicate game theory as a tool of conflict analysis beyond mathematics and economics to the social sciences more broadly. For more on Luce and Raiffa's contribution and the larger intellectual history of game theory, see Paul Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015). Bernard does not appear in Erickson's account.

[86] Jessie Bernard, "The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 5 (March 1954): 412.

attempting to 'win,' that is, to do the best they can in a world that cannot be supposed to be on their side. They follow the course of action which will get them what they want with the least cost." She understood this quality of game theory not as a limitation, but rather as ideal for her purposes, an antidote to the social psychologists' emphasis on the "non-rational" causes of conflict. "This concept of rationality at once distinguishes the sociological from the social-psychological conceptualizations of conflict," she wrote. As Bernard saw it, game theory distilled the essence of the sociological conceptualization of conflict, and would allow for the formalization of that conceptualization.[87]

Bernard's critique of the tensions model and her warm embrace of game theory both ended up in the survey she wrote for UNESCO's *The Nature of Conflict*.[88] Here, in this review of "recent research in the field of conflict as a basis for conceptual clarification," she drew a sharp distinction between the social-psychological approach and the sociological approach to conflict.[89] She expanded her critique of the tensions model in her UNESCO piece, and proposed the sociological conceptualization as an alternative to it, elaborating upon her 1954 discussion of game theory. Her basic

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[87] Bernard's evaluation of game theory, which she saw as primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive, was overwhelmingly positive: "[I]t fits human beings as they now behave. It makes no demands on human nature that present-day conditions do not make on it. It does not ask for a change in attitude, a refashioning of human nature. It does not, furthermore, involve in its application any manipulation in the sense of changing people in the direction of goals set by others. What manipulation there is, is in terms of rationality. It does not envisage an end to conflict; it accepts conflict as a continuing fact. It does not delve into the 'causes' of conflict. It might, however, conceivably help in minimizing the use of violence as a strategy in conflict." Ibid., 422.

[88] She explicitly criticized "the so-called 'tension' approach to the study of conflict." She had pointed out in her 1951 article that "the psychological conceptualization of intergroup relations" was in fact "the basic psychological premise on which the UNESCO constitution rests, namely that 'wars begin in the minds of men.' This type of statement has a specious kind of authenticity about it which sounds well until one tries to interpret it." In Bernard, "The Conceptualization of Intergroup Relations," 246. She also explicitly recommended "the theory of games of strategy as a basis for the sociology of conflict."

[89] Though she did undertake a general survey of research on conflict, Bernard noted that there were types of conflict that fell outside the scope of her study, namely "family conflict, culture conflict, crime, conflict of individuals with groups, [and] ideological conflict." Jessie Bernard, "The Sociological Study of Conflict," in *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions*, ed. Jessie Bernard et al. (Paris: Unesco., 1957), 33.

definition of conflict remained more or less unchanged: "Conflict arises when there are incompatible or mutually exclusive goals or values espoused by human beings. Both may be desirable, but both cannot be pursued simultaneously." This argued for casting research "in terms of strategy."[90] This emphasis on strategy distinguished the sociological conceptualization from the social-psychological one, which tended to see all conflict as "non-rational." According to the sociological understanding, violence and aggression, expressed in the form of war or strikes, could be viewed as "highly rational, purposive, deliberate, used coldly, even without hatred, a calculated choice based on policy or strategy."[91] Bernard went on to discuss strategy in terms of race relations, anti-Semitism, industrial relations, social and political movements, international relations, and violence, before introducing her *pièce de résistance*: "the theory of games of strategy as the basis for a modern sociology of conflict," along the lines she had suggested previously in her 1954 article.[92]

Bernard's tone throughout the essay for the UNESCO volume suggests an awareness of the impracticalities, if not absurdities, of surveying research on such a broad topic. She spoke, for example, of "[t]he difficulties inherent in delimiting the concept of conflict." For one thing, the study of conflict was not confined to sociology—Bernard surveyed developments in political science, economics, history, biology, and mathematics as well. There were also definitional challenges: "Inherent in the whole problem of conflict are such phenomena as power, leadership, the élite, control. Where

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[90] Ibid., 38.
[91] Bernard suggested that "[r]ace riots or pogroms or lynchings are perhaps more likely to be ends in themselves rather than parts of rational strategy, although it is conceivable that they may be both," though she did not justify her claim here. Ibid., 40.
[92] Ibid., 100.

does one draw the line in a discussion of conflict per se?"[93] Bernard explained that her

report could not be a treatise, for such a comprehensive account would have to go back at

least as far as the story of Cain and Abel, and it would need "to include, at a minimum,

reference to Machiavelli and Hobbes, to the Social Darwinists, to Marx, and so on." And

finally, the field she was attempting to survey did not yet exist: "One looks in vain in

classified summaries of research or in bibliographies for specialized studies on conflict as

such. They are usually parts of other projects."[94] Her contribution to *The Nature of*

Conflict is not characterized by a "giddy sense of possibility," as Stuart Chase's books

are, nor even by the more chastened belief in the redeeming powers of science to be

found in the work of Quincy Wright. Bernard concludes that "[c]onflict is itself such a

complex phenomenon—even the problem of conceptualization is complex—that neither

a social-psychological nor a sociological approach—nor an economic nor a political one,

for that matter—is adequate to cover the subject."[95] Furthermore, "no matter how good

research is, it cannot in and of itself be expected to eliminate or prevent conflict. It can

clarify the rules of the game so that we know to what degree it is inevitable or inherent in

social living; it can help to calculate costs and payoffs of strategies; it can show trends

and it can present data," she wrote. "But if some particular strategy—war, let us say, or

violence seems to one party in a conflict situation to be its best bet, even with all the

research data available with respect to the payoff, there is little likelihood that such a

strategy will not be used."[96]

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[93] Ibid., 34.
[94] Ibid., 33.
[95] Ibid., 116.
[96] Ibid., 117.

"Everything from war to choices between ice-cream sodas or sundaes"

Bernard concluded her survey of research on conflict with the assertion that the phenomenon was too complex for any single disciplinary approach to "cover" it. Conflict as a problem of knowledge seemed to present itself largely as a problem of *organization,* both the organization of existing knowledge and the organization of the social sciences themselves. This was how many social scientists who studied conflict in the late 1950s and early 1960s would come to see it. They would frequently discuss it as an object well suited for interdisciplinary collaboration, and arguments about the forms conflict knowledge ought to take were often tied to arguments for making the social sciences more interdisciplinary.

However, organizing social scientists and their knowledge around the concept proved difficult in practice, as the 1956 meeting of Northwestern University's annual Social Science Colloquium demonstrated. That year's theme was "Approaches to the Study of Social Conflict," and versions of the papers presented at the colloquium were published the following year in the second issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* established by scholars at the University of Michigan in 1957 to promote interdisciplinary work toward a "general theory of conflict." (The project of those scholars is the subject of the next chapter of this dissertation.) Colloquium co-chairmen Raymond Mack, a sociologist, and Richard Snyder, a political scientist, were responsible for introducing the event and synthesizing participants' contributions. In an introductory essay they described how they had originally envisioned the meeting, explaining that they had chosen conflict with the aim of encouraging a new kind of interdisciplinary collaboration that would go beyond "the mutual exchange of research techniques," or "methodology in

the narrow sense." They believed that interdisciplinarity should mean something more than mere tool exchange: "To the extent that the social sciences are both social in focus as well as rigorous and scientific in approach, we felt they must also offer some convergence of data and theory."[97] Even though conflict was a "problem in which the several social sciences have related interests," they noted, "there has thus far been relatively little concerted effort to pool findings, to replicate fruitful inquiries, and to integrate related concepts and theories."[98] The symposium was meant to represent a "possible pathway toward a significant convergence in social analysis"; it had been an opportunity to explore the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary social science.[99]

In his paper, the University of Michigan economist Kenneth Boulding attempted to combine organization theory and conflict theory, with a dash of systems theory. His definition of conflict was highly abstract: "We think of conflict, then, as a system of interacting systems, each party to the conflict being a system in itself, bound, however, to the other party by a system of communication, information, subjective knowledge, and behavior reactions." According to Boulding, it was difficult to distinguish between conflict and non-conflict. Or, as he put it, "The question as to what property of such a system constitutes the 'conflictual' as opposed, say, to the co-operative element is surprisingly difficult to answer."[100] Boulding did pepper the piece with numerous specific examples, and descended every so often from the dizzying heights of systems theory to attempt to clarify some matter, as when he noted that though "persons" and

[97] "Approaches to the Study of Social Conflict: Introduction by the Editors," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 105.
[98] Ibid., 105-106.
[99] Ibid., 106.
[100] Kenneth E. Boulding, "Organization and Conflict," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 123.

"organizations of persons" were both "behavior units," there are in fact "important differences between the individual person as a system and a social organization, such as a university or a corporation."[101] Overall, the essay is rather baffling to the unitiated.

The experimental psychologist Judson S. Brown of the University of Iowa contributed an article on "intrapersonal" conflict. "Intrapersonal" here refers not only to human beings, but to all "living organisms."[102] Echoing Boulding, Brown noted that it was "difficult, in many so-called studies of conflict, to discern any relationships or behavior which identify them unambiguously as experiments on conflict. Thus we are faced with the problem of trying to discuss research on conflict when we are no longer certain which experiments deal with conflict and which do not." Pushing past that problem, Brown concluded that "an experiment deals with conflict if it is a study of behavior in situations where one reactive tendency is opposed by at least one other of sufficient strength to make a discernible difference in behavior."[103] He then went on to present a "basic paradigm" "to which all intrapersonal conflicts can perhaps be reduced," represented by two intersecting vectors. (The diagrams get more complicated as the article goes on.) Brown also discussed the possibility of predicting behavior in conflict situations, as well as the three major kinds of conflict identified by psychologists: "spatial," "discrimination-induced," and "temporal."[104] It is only in the final section of the paper that Brown gets around to the subject of "Applications of the Theory to Social Behavior."[105]

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[101] Ibid., 129.
[102] Judson S. Brown, "Principles of Intrapersonal Conflict," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 135.
[103] Ibid., 136.
[104] Ibid., 140.
[105] Ibid., 151.

St. Clair Drake, a professor of sociology and anthropology at Roosevelt

University in Chicago (and co-author of *Black Metropolis*), wrote about "interethnic

conflict" as a "type of intergroup conflict."[106] Drake's contribution stands out for the

degree to which the author sought to communicate across disciplinary lines. Not only did

he take the time to explain his key terms to readers not familiar with the jargon of his

own discipline, but also he attempted to frame his discussion in terms introduced by other

symposium participants. First he presented conflict between ethnic groups in Africa as an

example of interethnic conflict, discussing this in terms of the history of colonialism and

the emergence of new nations on the continent after World War II. He then went on to

discuss the potential contributions of cultural anthropology "to a general analysis of

conflict." He pointed out that while sociologists explicitly concerned themselves with the

analysis of conflict, anthropologists did not. "Most sociology textbooks have a chapter, or

at least a long section, labeled 'Conflict.'" Anthropology textbooks never do."[107] And yet,

anthropologists' writings were "replete with descriptions of every type of conflict and

conflict situation." Drake suggested that this lack of theoretical discussion of conflict in

anthropology was actually convenient for other social scientists interested in mining this

body of knowledge. "The fact that most of the monographic literature in cultural

anthropology does not conceptualize and label the modes of human interaction in terms

of conflict, competition, etc. is not without value to those in the other behavioral sciences.

They can secure grist for their own theoretical mills without having first to shuck off the

husks of somebody else's terminology."[108] The final section of the paper presents the

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[106] St. Clair Drake, "Some Observations on Interethnic Conflict as One Type of Intergroup Conflict," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 155.
[107] Ibid., 159.
[108] Ibid., 160.

Mau Mau uprising, which was in 1956 still ongoing, as a case study in interethnic conflict, with suggestions for its resolution. Still the game interdisciplinarian, Drake noted, "I have made some attempt to relate the analysis to Kenneth Boulding's seminal paper," and used the language of systems analysis, e.g., Jomo Kenyatta's "return disturbed the equilibrium of the system."[109]

Robert Dubin, a sociology professor at the University of Oregon, wrote about industrial conflict. His paper begins with five propositions, or the components of a theory "The social structure of complex industrial societies is continuously changing"; "Conflict between groups is a fundamental social process"; "Conflict between groups becomes institutionalized"; "Resolutions of group conflict determine the direction of social change"; and "Social welfare depends upon the outcome of group conflict."[110] Dubin then used evidence from industrial relations to illustrate the theory, at once modeling theory-building and presenting a case study. Dubin took a page from Lewis Coser's *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956), asserting, "The fact of the matter is that group conflict cannot be wished out of existence. It is a reality with which social theorists must deal in constructing their general models of social behavior."[111] He noted that the thesis of his essay was "parallel to Coser's analysis" in *The Functions of Social Conflict*.

Karl W. Deutsch, an MIT political scientist, contributed an essay on "interstate" conflict. He wrote that research on this subject ought to be able to predict which conflict situations were likely to lead to war, and suggest "possible techniques for controlling or

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[109] Ibid., 166, 172.
[110] Robert Dubin, "Industrial Conflict and Social Welfare," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 179.
[111] Ibid., 184.

containing such conflict situations."[112] Deutsch was primarily interested in political

decision-making at the national level, and envisioned a research project that would "study

the flow of information by which these images of an implacable objective situation or of

an implacable domestic public opinion are being built up in the minds of the decision-

makers."[113] Deutsch's desired goal was to ensure governments' "freedom" in decision-

making, so that leaders would not be forced to choose hastily among foreign-policy

alternatives and rush to use force.

One of the major challenges Mack and Snyder encountered in their efforts to

synthesize the above contributions had to do with setting the parameters for an

interdisciplinary investigation of what had become a vexingly capacious concept. More

than anything else, the symposium seemed to highlight the obstacles to interdisciplinary

understanding. "[D]ifficulties and disagreements became quickly apparent," and "[b]oth

the papers and discussion clearly pointed to the need for a minimum common vocabulary,

for specification of the general properties of conflict, and for a workable typology."[114] In

their concluding essay, Mack and Snyder wondered whether the difficulty of the task they

had set for the symposium had more to do with the wide range of phenomena they were

attempting to subsume under a single concept, or with the organization of academic

social science in midcentury America. "Given the pervasiveness of conflict phenomena

and the diversity of approaches to inquiry," they wrote, "it is legitimate to ask whether

the apparent intellectual disorder reflects an inherently incoherent focus of social

analysis—a focus artificially created by a label—or whether the disparateness of data and

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[112] Karl W. Deutsch, "Mass Communications and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflicts," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957), 200.

[113] Ibid., 201.

[114] Ibid., 107.

interpretations is due in part to interdisciplinary compartmentalization, to academic

individualism, or to rapid growth, with its consequent inattention to direction." Either

way, this much was clear: " '[C]onflict' is for the most part a rubber concept, being

stretched and molded for the purposes at hand. In its broadest sense it seems to cover

everything from war to choices between ice-cream sodas or sundaes."[115]

Jessie Bernard, who opened the colloquium and "who among sociologists [had]

done the most to stimulate contemporary interest in the theory of social conflict,"[116]

suggested that perhaps the concept of conflict had run its course:

> Scientific concepts should probably be viewed as expendable resources. They
> arise, serve their purpose, decline, and pass off the stage. If they overstay their
> usefulness, they may come to inhibit or impede, rather than stimulate or facilitate,
> creative thinking and research. The concept of conflict may fall into this category
> of outmoded concepts; it may have outlived its usefulness. It has no clear-cut
> referent, being emotion-fraught, value-laden, fuzzy, equivocal. It confuses
> analysis. We might sharpen our thinking in the behavioral sciences if we
> discarded it entirely and replaced it with more precise, meaningful, and neutral
> concepts.[117]

And yet, just as Bernard was suggesting that social scientists might want to throw the

baby out with the bathwater, some behavioral scientists based at the University of

Michigan had already busied themselves with the development of a new science built

around this newly capacious conceptualization of "conflict." They called their project

"conflict resolution," and they deployed their ideas to challenge the purported

inevitability of the Cold War. Their efforts are the subject of the next chapter.

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[115] Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict—Toward an Overview and Synthesis," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957), 212.
[116] "Approaches," 106.
[117] Jessie Bernard, "Parties and Issues in Conflict," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 2 (June 1957): 111.

CHAPTER 2

The Peacemongers:
Peace Research and the Origins of "Conflict Resolution"

A new scholarly journal was born at the University of Michigan in the spring of 1957.

Technically, the Journalism Department published *Conflict Resolution: A Quarterly for*

Research Related to War and Peace, but it was the Economics building that housed the

fledgling journal's editorial office, staffed by a secretary, two managing editors, and the

economist Kenneth Boulding, editor in chief. The price of a single issue of *Conflict*

Resolution was $2.00; one could buy a yearly subscription for $5.50, just about what it

would have cost to fill up the tank of a '57 Chevy. An eclectic array of social scientists

lent their names to the new venture, signing on as members of the editorial board,

associate editors, or members of the sponsoring committee. Among those who vouched

for the journal were some of the leading lights of midcentury social science, including the

psychologists Gordon Allport and Otto Klineberg, the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn,

the sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and David Riesman, the political scientist Harold

Lasswell, and the pollster Elmo Roper. The long list of affiliates was notably

international: Social scientists from Norway, India, Holland, Brazil, South Africa, and

Sweden served as associate editors, and the sponsoring committee included scholars from

Burma, Indonesia, England, Japan, and France.

An opening editorial in the first issue began with a jaunty justification of the

journal's existence:

> In these days when the Malthusian multiplication of reading matter threatens to
> engulf the intellectual world, the progenitors of a new journal should put forward

some excellent reasons for adding to what seems like an overpopulated universe. We would not, indeed, be so rash as to add to the number of journals, did we not believe that a niche exists in the present scene for a new species, which might be named in Linnean terms *Interdisciplinaris internationalis.* The reasons which have led us into this enterprise might be summed up in two propositions. The first is that by far the most important practical problem facing the human race today is that of international relations—more specifically, the prevention of global war. The second is that if intellectual progress is to be made in this area, the study of international relations must be made an interdisciplinary enterprise, drawing its discourse from all the social sciences, and even further.[1]

Interdisciplinaris internationalis: An argument for infusing the study of international relations, which had been "the preserve of historians and of political scientists and of such professionals as lawyers, merchants, diplomatists, and military men," with "the ideas of sociologists, psychologists, educators, and pioneers of behavioral science."[2] According to this new approach, relations between nations were analogous to other kinds of social relations, and thus a fitting object of inquiry across the social sciences. "Our belief in the fruitfulness of an interdisciplinary approach in this area is based on the conviction that the behavior and interaction of nations are not an isolated and self-contained area of empirical material but part of a much wider field of behavior and interaction," the editorial explained. "Studies and theoretical models in any part of this wide field may have important application in other parts."[3] The study of conflict— "perhaps the key concept in international relations"—was a prime example:

> Conflict is a phenomenon which is studied in many different fields: by sociologists, by psychologists, by psychiatrists, by economists, and by political scientists. It occurs in many different situations: among members of a family, between labor and management, between political parties, and even within a single mind, as well as among nations. Many of the patterns and processes which characterize conflict in one area also characterize it in others. Negotiation and mediation go on in labor disputes as well as in international relations. Price wars and domestic quarrels have much the pattern of an arms race. Frustration breeds

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[1] "An Editorial," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 1.
[2] Ibid., 1.
[3] Ibid., 1-2.

aggression both in the individual and in the state. The jurisdictional problems of labor unions and the territorial disputes of states are not dissimilar. It is not too much to claim that out of the contributions of many fields a general theory of conflict is emerging. The isolation of these various fields, however, has prevented the building of these contributions into an integrated whole.[4]

This way of thinking—generalizing about social phenomena across disciplines and scales—was fundamental to the conflict resolution project. It was a convenient framework for interdisciplinary inquiry, and it was full of promise for social scientists looking for new ways of analyzing what they saw as an emerging global community after World War II.

The creators of *Conflict Resolution* had selected that name because "in spite of a certain clumsiness, it best expressed the theme of the enterprise." The word "peace" appeared in the subtitle, as the complement to war, and had been quite deliberately relegated to this position:

> We are all interested in peace; "peace" is a word too much abused in our day, however, and does not quite convey the center of our interest. It is clear as we look over the human experience that there are some conflicts which are fruitful and some which are not—some conflict processes which lead to resolution and integration, some which lead to disintegration and disaster. We have a practical as well as a theoretical end in view. Although we believe that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is essential for the orderly and secure growth of knowledge, we are also not indifferent to its practical uses. We prefer peace to war and the creative conflicts that move toward resolution to uncreative conflicts which lead to mental breakdown in the individual, disintegration in the family, disruption of the organization, factionalism in the political unit, and mass destruction of life and property on the international scale. Hence we take not merely conflict but conflict resolution as our focus of interest.[5]

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[4] Ibid., 2.
[5] Ibid., 2.

The problem of the prevention of global war struck them as most urgent. "Personality conflict, domestic conflict, and industrial conflict threaten us with inconvenience, with disaster, with losses. War threatens us with irretrievable disaster."[6]

This first issue of *Conflict Resolution* might be thought of as, among other things, a provocation from behavioral scientists for international relations scholars of the "realist" school. Realists insisted that conflict between nations was inevitable—or as the political theorist Hans Morgenthau put it, "the primordial social fact is conflict, actual or potential, with reason and ignorance, good and evil, right and wrong blended on both sides and with the outcome hanging in the balance."[7] According to this view, international affairs were the business of statesmen, not social scientists. On the contrary, some social scientists, including the founders of *Conflict Resolution*, argued that conflict, international or otherwise, could be framed as a problem for science to solve. For Morgenthau, the perpetual struggle between good and evil was the way of things, an unchangeable condition; for the *Conflict Resolution* group, conflict was eminently tractable, a force of nature susceptible to human control, like the power of the atom.

But the conflict resolution movement—and some proponents of the project did indeed consider it a movement—was about more than challenging international relations scholars on their own turf. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was *the* conflict with respect to which the conflict resolution movement defined itself, and in that sense, the social scientists engaged in the project accepted the reality of the Cold War. However, as I argue in this chapter, they did so in order to *challenge* that

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[6] Ibid., 2.

[7] Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 218. For an account of this divide, see Nicolas Guilhot, ed., *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

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reality. The conflict resolution movement, led by social scientists with pacifist inclinations, was a protest against the Cold War, at a time when such protest was dangerous. The language of midcentury social science, evinced in the editorial discussed above, was the idiom in which these scholars expressed their dissent.

In what follows, I will show how, beginning in the early 1950s, certain scholars came to combine varieties of pacifism and social science in order to challenge the notion that militarism and war were inevitable.[8] First, I will introduce the peace research movement that took root in the social sciences soon after World War II, out of which *Conflict Resolution* emerged. Next, I will suggest some of the ways in which this movement complicates the standard narratives in the histories of both the social sciences and the peace movement during the Cold War. Then, I will describe the intellectual ferment that resulted when peace research met the behavioral sciences at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, California in the mid-1950s. Here, aspects of the lives and works of certain social scientists will come into sharp focus, making visible some of the intellectual, political, and religious commitments that eventually found expression in the conflict resolution movement in the latter part of the decade. Peace research found a more permanent home at the University of Michigan, where peace researchers established the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957, and the

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[8] The historian Michael Sherry has labeled the period from the 1930s to the late 1960s the "age of militarization." Sherry defines militarization as "the process by which war and national security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life." The historian James Sparrow has examined how the foundations of the national state shifted from welfare to warfare during World War II, and how different groups of citizens encountered a burgeoning "warfare state," representing a dramatic expansion of the size and extension of the scope of the federal government. Another name for this formation is of course the national security state, whose ideology and institutions were created by the National Security Act of 1947. Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United State since the 1930s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); James Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in 1959.[9] The chapter concludes with a

consideration of the multiple meanings of "conflict resolution" and the symbolic power

of the conflict resolution project, both within the academic community and beyond in the

late 1950s and early 1960s.

Psychologists for Peace

On the evening of December 15, 1950, President Harry Truman appeared on

television to address his fellow Americans. The outlook for the free world seemed bleak.

In late November, American and United Nations forces fighting in Korea had suffered

heavy casualties at the hands of the Chinese, who had entered the war on behalf of North

Korea. In his speech that night, Truman announced a mobilization effort that would

increase the number of men and women on active duty and hasten the production of

military equipment. He told Americans they could expect to pay higher taxes and work

longer hours, and he scolded striking railway union members for interfering with the

movement of troops and equipment. He urged the striking laborers to set aside their

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[9] The individuals, ideas, and institutions of the "peace research" or "conflict resolution" movement have attracted the attention of a number of historians, who have produced rich and varied accounts of its history. This scholarship has profoundly shaped my own interpretation of that history. Each of these accounts analyzes peace research or conflict resolution through a slightly different lens; for a discussion of the various approaches, see the introduction to this dissertation. These works include: Cynthia Kerman, "Kenneth Boulding and the Peace Research Movement," *American Studies* 13 (1972): 149-165; Cynthia Kerman, *Creative Tension: Life and Thought of Kenneth Boulding* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974); Martha Harty and John Modell, "The First Conflict Resolution Movement, 1956-1971: An Attempt to Institutionalize Applied Interdisciplinary Social Science," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 720-758; Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Debora Hammond, *The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems Theory* (Boulder: The University of Colorado Press, 2003); Mary Lee Morrison, *Elise Boulding: A Life in the Cause of Peace* (Jefferson, NC: McFarlan & Company, Inc., 2005); Philippe Fontaine, "Stabilizing American Society: Kenneth Boulding and the Integration of the Social Sciences, 1943-1980," *Science in Context* 23 (2010): 221-265; Teresa Tomás Rangil, "Finding Patrons for Peace Psychology: The Foundations of the Conflict Resolution Movement at the University of Michigan, 1951-1971," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 48 (2012): 91-114; and Paul Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).

grievances and return to their "posts of duty," drawing a pointed contrast between these

workers and American soldiers fighting and dying in East Asia. "In the days ahead, each

of us should measure his own efforts, his own sacrifices, by the standard of our heroic

men in Korea," Truman said.[10] The next morning, he declared a national emergency,

painting a dire picture: "[W]orld conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the

forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world." The president urged citizens

to make "whatever sacrifices are necessary for the welfare of the Nation."[11]

The U.S. military called again upon psychologists, who had demonstrated their

value during World War II, to serve the new war effort. As the historian Ellen Herman

has written, "the military's response to the Korean War was to reaffirm, often quite

publicly the fundamental lesson learned during World War II: war should be treated as a

psychological struggle and laboratory."[12] Arthur Gladstone and Herbert Kelman, both

graduate students in psychology at Yale University at the time, noticed this.[13] "In recent

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[10] "Text of President's Address on 'Great Danger' Facing the Nation," *New York Times*, December 16, 1950.

[11] Harry S. Truman, "Proclamation 2914—Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, December 16, 1950," American Presidency Project, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13684.

[12] Ellen Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 130.

[13] An interest in peace, social justice, and social change had led Kelman to study psychology in the first place. In the summer of 1945, between his sophomore and junior years at Brooklyn College, an 18-year-old Kelman had attended a conference in Chicago organized by conscientious objectors who had served in Civilian Public Service camps or in prison. On the train from Chicago back to New York, Kelman sat next to Charles Bloomstein, a conscientious objector and close friend of Bayard Rustin. Bloomstein encouraged Kelman, then an English major, to channel his social concerns into the study of psychology or sociology. When he returned to college in the fall, Kelman added psychology as a second major, and was introduced by faculty mentor Dan Katz to the left-leaning Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Kelman went on to pursue a Ph.D. in psychology at Yale. He registered as a conscientious objector when the Korean War broke out, but his New Haven draft board denied him this status. He appealed the decision unsuccessfully. Shortly after he arrived in Baltimore to begin a postdoctoral fellowship at Johns Hopkins, Kelman was called up for induction. He was prepared to refuse to serve and accept a prison sentence instead, but then the grand jury considering his case ruled in his favor, and the draft board granted him the CO classification, agreeing to designate his National Institute of Mental Health fellowship as alternative service. Herbert C. Kelman, "Social Psychology and the Study of Peace: Personal Reflections," in *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict*, ed. Linda R. Tropp (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

months American psychologists have shown increasing concern over how they might

most effectively contribute to the national welfare in this time of emergency," they wrote

in a letter published in the April 1951 issue of the *American Psychologist*, the official

scholarly journal of the American Psychological Association.[14] Most discussions of

psychology's role were "concerned mainly with 'the best overall utilization of the

nation's psychologists.'" Gladstone and Kelman offered "another topic for the

consideration of psychologist's concerned with the national welfare": pacifist arguments.

Their reasoning went like this:

> The aim of the present foreign policy of the United States is, presumably, the preservation of peace. This policy is based, among other things, on certain assumptions about human behavior. Psychologists are especially competent to judge these assumptions and, hence, to help estimate the likelihood that our foreign policy will achieve peace. However, there has been little attention to the problem of evaluating these assumptions in the light of present psychological knowledge.
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> Pacifists have seemed to show more interest in this problem than psychologists. They have seriously challenged these assumptions about human behavior and have argued in terms of generally accepted psychological principles. [...] We feel that it is important for us as psychologists to examine the pacifist arguments.[15]

And examine the pacifist arguments they did, choosing four examples. First,

pacifists argued that aggression met by counter-aggression only serves to increase

aggressive tendencies on all sides. "U.S. national policy depends on certain assumptions

concerning the effects of threats and force on human behavior. If these assumptions are

wrong, a worldwide catastrophe is likely to occur. Certainly it is the duty of psychologists

to cast whatever light we can on this problem." Second, suppose the Russians and the

Chinese perceived American military preparations undertaken for defensive purposes as a

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2012), and Fischmann, Roseli. Letter of nomination of Herbert C. Kelman for the UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Prize. Accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.hottopos.com/kelman/addendum.htm.

[14] Arthur Gladstone and Herbert Kelman, "Pacifists vs. Psychologists," *The American Psychologist* 6 (1951), 127.

[15] Ibid., 127.

threat? "If we wish to avoid war with them, we must seek to understand how they see things and strive to make our own actions seem non-threatening to them. So argue the pacifists. An attempt to appear less threatening is likely to be decried as 'appeasement.' What have psychologists to say about the pros and cons?"[16] Third, pacifists argued that non-violent resistance, and not violence or the threat of violence, would bring about favorable change; what did psychologists think about that? The fourth argument was the most impassioned:

> The widespread adoption of authoritarian patterns which total war requires in civilian activities as well as in the military organization is also bound to have unfortunate effects. Habituation to taking orders, suppression (to a large extent) of the practice of free inquiry (because of the dangers of subversive thoughts and disunity), placing military expediency above all other values, a tremendous increase in control from above with a corresponding reduction in democratic participation in decision making, all are likely results. In attempting to defeat the opponent through military means the U.S. seems forced to adopt the measures of totalitarianism which it opposes so strongly. [...] World War II left behind greatly increased militarization and centralization of control in this country. How much farther in this direction can we afford to go? So argue the pacifists. It is an unspoken assumption of our national policy that after a war we will be able to discard the social patterns of authoritarianism and militarism. If this assumption is wrong, we are endangering our whole way of life rather than preserving it. What can psychologists say about this?[17]

These arguments, Gladstone and Kelman believed, were "in essential agreement with the spirit and knowledge of modern psychology." The two psychologists noted, in the final paragraph of their letter, that they were themselves pacifists, but stated that they presented these arguments, drawn from pacifist literature and discussions, "not with the intent of convincing, but for the purpose of stimulating discussion."[18] That delicate rhetorical maneuvering suggests the narrow space available for dissent during the Cold War. Gladstone and Kelman wrote here as psychologists and as pacifists, and, by

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[16] Ibid., 127.
[17] Ibid., 127-128.
[18] Ibid., 128.

rehearsing pacifist arguments and inviting psychologists to respond to them, they were

suggesting a way for social scientists to challenge the ideology and institutions of the

national security state. This was a brave move, considering that "[b]etween 1945 and the

mid-1960s, the U.S. military was, by far, the country's major sponsor of psychological

research"; during the Korean War, the social and behavioral sciences received more

funding from the Department of Defense than from all other federal agencies combined.[19]

Furthermore, this was the heyday of McCarthyism, when loyalty oaths and purges of

suspected communists and liberal dissidents curtailed academic freedom at American

universities.[20]

Gladstone and Kelman were part of the vanguard of the "peace research

movement." This was an effort by some social scientists to integrate pacifism and social

science, at a moment when social scientists are said to have been intent upon maintaining

a strict separation between facts and values; when 'objective' social science was

supposed to have been the greatest good; and when social scientists were known to have

been pressed into service for the national security state. The peace research movement

coalesced just as the American peace movement reached its nadir and domestic

anticommunism its zenith. As the historian Lawrence Wittner has written, "the promising

stirrings of the postwar peace movement collapsed under the pressure of the Cold War.

[...] The nation's peace forces grew bitter and discouraged."[21] Membership in peace

organizations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters' League

dwindled. The historian Robbie Lieberman has noted that attacks on peace activists and

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[19] Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology*, 126.
[20] Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[21] Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 212.

organizations in these days "sent the message that there was no such thing as legitimate opposition to the cold war." Because it was associated with communism and Soviet rhetoric, "peace" "continued to be viewed as subversive and suspicious."[22] Most liberals accepted the bipolar worldview and domestic anticommunism that defined the Cold War consensus.

It was in this climate that Gladstone and Kelman penned their letter, which helped catalyze the peace research movement.[23] In the fall of 1952, a small group of like-minded social scientists joined Gladstone and Kelman to form the Research Exchange for the Prevention of War. This was a kind of invisible college, allowing peace researchers to associate with one another informally; they circulated a bimonthly mimeographed bulletin, edited by Gladstone. As Kelman would later recall, "We were amateurs responding to moral issues of the day in seeking to apply our social scientific tools to problems of war and peace."[24]

Cold War Dissent

Gladstone and Kelman's letter and the movement it helped galvanize do not neatly align with the standard narrative in the history of postwar American social science.

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[22] Robbie Lieberman, *The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anticommunism, and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 1.

[23] See also Teresa Tomás Rangil, "Finding Patrons for Peace Psychology: The Foundations of the Conflict Resolution Movement at the University of Michigan, 1951-1971," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 48 (2012): 91-114. In this article, Rangil situates the conflict resolution movement within the context of the history of psychology, locating the origins of the movement in that discipline. In this chapter, I position the movement with respect to the history of the social sciences more broadly, and attend to its interdisciplinary aspirations as well as its connections with the peace movement. Another historian of the social sciences, Philippe Fontaine, has also written about the midcentury conflict resolution movement, with a focus on Kenneth Boulding's vision for the integration of the social sciences. In this chapter, I too am interested in Boulding, but as a member of a larger intellectual community, which I have attempted to reconstruct. I also delve more deeply in this chapter into the extent to which Quakerism and other forms of pacifism shaped the conflict resolution movement.

[24] Gerd Korman and Michael Klapper, "Game Theory's Wartime Connections and the Study of Industrial Conflict," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 32 (1978), 32.

According to that narrative, social scientists working in the United States after World War II enjoyed unprecedented authority and prestige, largely as a result of their wartime service. After the war, these social scientists are said to have redoubled their professional commitments to value-neutrality and objectivity, donning these epistemological virtues as a kind of armor against being branded socialist or communist, and in order to appeal to their new patrons, especially the U.S. military. They embraced scientism—or, the conviction that the social sciences should be strictly modeled after the natural sciences—and willingly served the national security state, all the while assuming a stance of moral and political detachment.[25]

Accounts of American social scientists succumbing to Cold War imperatives defined by the state abound, while accounts of social scientists challenging those imperatives are few and far between. This chapter tells such a story. It argues that a strain of dissident social science did in fact persist throughout much of the Cold War, fueled by its opposition to militarism and war—this was peace research, and its proponents sought to mobilize the social sciences for peace. The sociologist Elise Boulding, a leader of the peace research movement, described its animating impulse:

> For [...] the peace research community, I think it was a combination of intellectual and emotional indignation that the skills of social science—there is pride in craft—appeared to be so irrelevant to the construction of a peaceful world. What was there to do if we couldn't do that? The absurdity of military research really weighed heavily on us; we got the idea that somehow we were going to do peace research that would break apart the perceptions of the military reality and get policies turned around; and that that was somehow possible.[26]

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[25] Recent examples include Joy Rohde, *Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Science Research during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), and Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013).

[26] Elise Boulding oral history interview by Bret Eynon and Ellen Fishman in November 1978 in Hanover, New Hampshire, "Boulding/Elise/Oral history 1978," box 21, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

Peace researchers were persistent in their efforts to direct the attention of the powerful

and the public to what they perceived as the misallocation of intellectual resources during

the Cold War. Science could help America fight and win wars; why could it not also help

secure lasting peace between nations? From the end of World War II on, peace

researchers opposed the very image of international conflict upon which American Cold

War policies were built. Peace researchers were not integrated into the state apparatus,

and while that distance limited the influence they could wield, it also allowed them to

challenge "unchallengeable" national projects.

Meetings of the Minds

Herbert Kelman was among the 36 scholars invited by the Ford Foundation in

1954 to spend a year in residence at its new Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral

Sciences in Palo Alto, California. CASBS was a monument to midcentury modern

design, nestled in the oak tree-studded hills overlooking Stanford University. The Ford

Foundation had created CASBS as an incubator for the new behavioral sciences, in

response to a study commissioned by the foundation in the late 1940s to investigate how

it could "most effectively and intelligently put its resources to work for human welfare."

The establishment of peace was one of the areas in which the study suggested the

foundation ought to focus its efforts. "The behavioral sciences," booster Bernard

Berelson wrote, "study human behavior by scientific means; as a preliminary

approximation, they can be distinguished from the social sciences as designating a good

deal less but, at the same time, somewhat more." In addition to the traditional social

sciences—anthropology, economics, political science, sociology, and psychology—the

behavioral sciences included biology, geography, law, and psychiatry, insofar as those disciplines concerned themselves with the "behavioral aspects" of their objects of study.[27] CASBS was built to promote interdisciplinary inquiry across these disciplines. As historians of science have pointed out, the "systems approach" offered a convenient theoretical framework for such interdisciplinary work, making it possible for social scientists from different disciplines to converge around the study of the *behavior* of *systems*. The "ideal product" of midcentury social science "was a model of the structure of some kind of system, with everything from individual organisms to businesses to nations being understood as systems."[28]

Kelman arrived at CASBS eager to professionalize peace research. He came with a few issues of the *Bulletin of the Research Exchange for the Prevention of War* in hand and an idea for a more formal scholarly journal. "I was becoming increasingly convinced that, if we were to make continuing progress, we would have to involve professionals and become professionals ourselves. I felt there was a limit to how long one can go on writing programmatic articles and organizing meetings with the message that there are things that can and ought to be done, without actually going out and doing them."[29] Kelman believed that social scientists needed to be better organized in order to intervene in the world to prevent another world war. While he was in Palo Alto, he wrote an article for a special issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* on war and peace, in which he attempted to classify approaches to the subject based on the work done by the Research Exchange. He

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[27] Bernard Berelson, "Behavioral Sciences," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* vol. 2, ed. David L. Sills and Robert K. Merton (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 41-42.

[28] Hunter Heyck, *Age of System: Understanding the Development of Modern Social Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 19.

[29] Herbert Kelman, "A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace," in *Perspectives on the Behavioral Sciences: The Colorado Lectures*, ed. R. Jessor and H.C. Kelman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 252.

described "a pronounced feeling of pessimism" among social scientists concerning the present status of research in this area. "They feel that the problems are so complex and so much in need of a sophisticated interdisciplinary attack, that social science today is not capable of handling them." Peace researchers would benefit from "a clearer conception of the limits of the field, and of the relation of different research approaches to one another." With better organization, researchers would "be less likely to despair and consider the problem unmanageable, and more likely to proceed with research on the assumption that our limited and partial approaches will eventually lead up to something and fit into a larger picture."[30] CASBS proved to be an ideal setting in which to bring this vision to fruition.

At CASBS, Kelman met several social scientists who were predisposed for various reasons to find his proposal for a new journal attractive. There was the mathematician Anatol Rapoport. Born in Lozovaya, Russia (now Lozova, Ukraine) in 1911, Rapoport's childhood was riddled with experiences of war and upheaval, first World War I and then the Russian Revolution. His family left the Soviet Union in 1922, and settled in Chicago. Rapoport became an accomplished concert pianist, and, after performing all over the world, enrolled at the University of Chicago to study mathematics. He earned his bachelor's degree in 1938, and a doctorate in mathematics in 1941. He passed his oral examination the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked, and immediately volunteered for service in the Navy; they would not take him, however, on account of his nearsightedness. He contributed to the war effort instead as a civilian instructor, teaching mathematics and physics to aviation cadets at Maxwell Field in

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[30] Herbert Kelman, "Societal, Attitudinal and Structural Factors in International Relations," *Journal of Social Issues* (1955), 55.

Montgomery, Alabama. Rapoport was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the Air Force in June 1942, and was transferred to Alaska, where he served as a liaison officer between U.S. and Soviet air forces. In 1944 he was sent to India, where he was stationed as a supply and evacuation officer until the war's end. Rapoport returned to academia in 1946, first teaching mathematics at the Illinois Institute of Technology, and then joining the Committee on Mathematical Biophysics at the University of Chicago, led by the theoretical physicist Nicholas Rashevsky (who had also fled Russia during the revolution).

Rapoport's early scholarly work dealt with mathematical models of parasitism and symbiosis, but his interests extended well beyond mathematical biology. He ventured deep into philosophy with his 1953 book, *Operational Philosophy: Integrating Knowledge and Action*. In this work, he was primarily interested in "the relation between ideas and action, between what we do and what we think."[31] Operational philosophy, he explained, was a critique of scientific philosophy, and it resided in "a borderland between what logical positivists consider 'legitimate' philosophy (the philosophy of science) and poetry."[32] He warned readers that what he was attempting was risky: "I undertake to determine the conditions under which 'wild speculations' may be safely engaged in. [...] And if speculations are to be venturesome, they cannot be expected to make much immediate sense."[33] Rapoport was explicitly building upon the work of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, who, after the shock of World War I, had called for

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[31] Anatol Rapoport, *Operational Philosophy: Integrating Knowledge and Action* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1967 [1953]), ix.
[32] Ibid., ix-x.
[33] Ibid., x.

a reconstruction of philosophy. Rapoport saw himself as participating in that project, which had become all the more urgent in the atomic age:

> As this is being written (1953), everyone talks of the Third World War, and no one even dares to suggest that it will be the last. No one tells us any more how things will be after the next war. There is little talk of war aims aside from 'smashing Communism.' War has ceased in the minds of men to be something that one does to gain something. It has become something that happens to you, like a plague or an earthquake.[34]

Rapoport was observing that war had come to seem like a permanent condition by 1953, its endlessness justified by the existence of a monolithic Communist enemy. Once understood to be the product of human agency and calculation, war was now cast as a disaster resulting from the work of forces beyond human control.

Rapoport sought to deconstruct this way of thinking using his operational philosophy, which would lay bare the frameworks of thought underlying scientific formulations. "It is a sort of psychoanalysis applied to past and current systems of rationalization and has an aim similar to that of psychoanalysis: to free human thought from compulsions," he explained. "To the operational philosopher, knowledge is freedom."[35] Rapoport derived an "operational ethics" from his operational philosophy that could be brought to bear on the Cold War itself: "[I]f human conflicts are ever to be resolved or, at least, to be guided into less destructive channels, our analysis of value systems cannot stop with the recognition that they are different and often incompatible. A common denominator must be found."[36] This analysis could be applied to the "social philosophies" of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.: individualism and collectivism. Efforts on both sides to maintain the seeming incompatibility between the two had led to a state of

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[34] Ibid., 8-9.
[35] Ibid., 78.
[36] Ibid., 115.

"chronic fear," which precluded the re-examination of the values over which the Cold

War was being fought. "To examine something, you have to disengage yourself for a

while; you have to hold it off at some distance and look at it."[37] Rapoport called for a

"de-emphasis of conflict," by which he meant not denying the existence of conflict, but

rather rejecting the idea that it is "a prime mover of society."[38] "The present ideological

conflict between East and West," he argued, need not be "verbalized in terms of an

either-or question."[39] Rapoport operationalized his operational philosophy to begin to

rethink the taken-for-granted reality of the Cold War conflict.

Among those with whom Kelman and Rapoport found intellectual kinship were

Elise and Kenneth Boulding, intellectually curious social scientists and committed

Quakers. The Bouldings had come to Palo Alto from Ann Arbor, Michigan, where

Kenneth was a faculty member in the Economics Department. Kenneth and Elise (née

Elise Bjorn-Hansen) had met at a Quaker meeting in Syracuse, New York, and were

married soon thereafter, on August 31, 1941, just a few months before the bombing of

Pearl Harbor. As Quakers, the Bouldings were absolute pacifists, and they expressed their

opposition to America's entry into the war in a circular titled "A Call to Disarm."

Kenneth was asked to resign from his post at the Economic and Financial Section of the

League of Nations (based in Princeton) over the views expressed in the leaflet.[40] Elise

recalled that it was "a seditious document," and that even their local Friends Meeting felt

"uneasy" about it, as "the language was very strong for those days."[41] After leaving

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[37] Ibid., 132.

[38] Ibid., 135.

[39] Ibid., 134.

[40] Philippe Fontaine, "Stabilizing American Society: Kenneth Boulding and the Integration of the Social Sciences, 1943-1980," *Science in Context* 23 (2012), 223.

[41] Elise Boulding oral history interview, 1978. Born in Liverpool, England in 1910, Boulding studied economics at Oxford, and had his first paper accepted by the *Economic Journal*, edited by John

Princeton, the Bouldings spent a year at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, at the

invitation of its Quaker president. In 1943, Kenneth was appointed associate professor at

Iowa State College in Ames, Iowa. There, he immersed himself in the study of labor

relations, while Elise earned a master's degree in sociology. Kenneth refused military and

civilian alternative service during the war, and his local draft board granted him a 4-E

Selective Service classification—"conscientious objector opposed to both combatant and

noncombatant training and service."[42] Though he feared that being a resident alien who

had refused to fight for the U.S. would jeopardize his naturalization, as it had for many,

he did in fact become a citizen on December 13, 1948. The next year, the Bouldings

arrived in Ann Arbor, where they found a supportive community of pacifists, in the Ann

Arbor Friends Meeting and beyond. "There were lots of nonconformists in Ann Arbor,"

Elise later recalled later, referring to members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and

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Maynard Keynes, at the age of 22. He received a master's degree from Oxford, and, after a short stint at the University of Edinburgh, took a job teaching economics at Colgate University. He had crossed the Atlantic to attend an international Quaker gathering in Philadelphia—he was a devout Quaker—and had been offered the job; he accepted it because it paid better than Edinburgh did. In his memoir, the journalist Andy Rooney wrote about his encounter with Kenneth Boulding at Colgate in the early 1940s, when Rooney was a student there. Rooney described Boulding as a "Quaker iconoclast [...] who taught economics for the university and pacifism for his own satisfaction at night in meetings with students at his home." Rooney began attending Boulding's meetings. He found Boulding's pacifist views persuasive, and wrestled with his own pacifism for months after he received his draft notice. (The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 required all men between the ages of 21 and 45 to register for the draft—this was the first peacetime draft in the nation's history.) Rooney considered refusing to serve, but ultimately decided against it. "While I was an objector, I could not honestly claim to be a conscientious one." He reported for duty on July 7, 1941. Here Rooney casts Boulding in a rather unfavorable light, drawing a portrait of a stuttering "religious nut" who foisted his pacifism upon impressionable young minds. In Andy Rooney, *My War* (New York: The Perseus Books Group, 2000 [1995]), 15-18. In a 1942 lecture to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, titled "The Practice of the Love of God," Kenneth argued that patriotism and pacifism were not mutually exclusive. In fact, "our love of country becomes pure" only when we love God above all else. "American bombs, American soldiers, American tanks, American rule and American victories make America hated. For this reason the man who admits the Love of God to every corner of his soul cannot participate in war, for he must seek to express his love for his country in ways that will make his country loved." Quoted from Kenneth Boulding, "The Practice of the Love of God," William Penn Lecture 1942, Quaker Pamphlets, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.quaker.org/pamphlets/wpl1942a.html.

[42] Boulding believed the American Friends Service Committee had made an error in accepting responsibility for administering Civilian Public Service camps, which provided a legal alternative to military service for conscientious objectors during World War II. Fontaine, "Stabilizing American Society," 226.

War Resisters' International. "It took different shapes and forms, but there certainly was an extraordinary nucleation of the inventive spirit and the peacemaking spirit in that town."[43]

1949 was also the year Kenneth won the coveted John Bates Clark Medal, then awarded biennially to an economist working in the U.S. "under the age of 40 who is judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge."[44] By this time, however, Kenneth seemed to be outgrowing the discipline in which he had so distinguished himself. In his 1950 book, *A Reconstruction of Economics*, he wrote, "I have been gradually coming under the conviction, disturbing for a professional theorist, that there is no such thing as economics—there is only social science applied to economic problems. Indeed, there may not even be such a thing as social science—there may only be general science applied to the problems of society."[45] Putting this idea into practice, Kenneth began experiments in interdisciplinary inquiry, primary among them a seminar he began teaching during his first year at the University of Michigan, with funding from the Ford Foundation, called "Problems in the Integration of the Social Sciences."

Kenneth was interested not only in integrating the various disciplines of the social sciences, but also in integrating social science and ethics. His 1953 book *The Organizational Revolution: A Study of the Ethnics of Economic Organization*, part of a series on "the Ethics and Economics of Society" published by the National Council of Churches, was an attempt to do just that. In this book he tackled two problems. The first

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[43] Elise Boulding oral history interview, 1978.
[44] Boulding received the prize after Paul Samuelson (the 1947 recipient) and before Milton Friedman (1951).
[45] Kenneth Boulding, *A Reconstruction of Economics* (John Wiley & Sons, 1950), vii.

had to do with the proper relationship between social science and ethics. The second, with what he called "the organizational revolution"—"a great rise in the number, size, and power of organizations of many diverse kinds, and especially of economic organizations" during the last century. His ideas about both were beyond the pale of orthodox economics. Boulding acknowledged that he was writing both as a social scientist and as a moralist, "seeking not merely to describe but to change" moral standards and practices. Indeed, it was impossible for the social scientist to avoid moralizing. Even aspiring to scientific objectivity constituted a moral judgment. Furthermore, "[t]hings which are significant in social science are so because they are highly affected with ethical connotations." The social scientist writing about important issues, then, had no choice but to moralize. And that was not a bad thing. Just as the moralist should "understand the society on which he passes judgment, [...] the social scientist should also be a moralist, and should employ his technical proficiencies in the service of 'improvement.'" Boulding reasoned that the social scientist, who was going to "be a moralist in any case," would "be a better one, and also a less dangerous one if he admits it and spells out as clearly as he can his ethical system. A moral system is dangerous when it is hidden."[46]

When Boulding spoke of the "organizational revolution," he was speaking especially of economic organizations, but not exclusively. And here he strayed beyond economics to think more broadly about the behavior of systems. The organizational revolution necessitated the invention of new modes of inquiry. Having "some kind of theoretical 'model' as a guide to perceiving what is essential in the midst of the immense

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[46] Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), xii-xiv.

mass of subordinate detail" was crucial to studying anything at all, he explained. He proposed a theoretical model fit for the organizational age: "[I]t is possible to construct a model of an organization which embodies in somewhat abstract form the essential features of all organizations. We shall find, also, that many of the features of social organizations are also found in biological organisms." While there were of course important differences between social organizations and biological organisms, Boulding insisted that "there are enough similarities so that we are justified in regarding both biological organisms, like bacteria, mice, and men, and social organizations, like labor unions, churches, and states, as part of an inclusive groups of 'creatures' which might be called 'behavior units' or 'behavior systems.'[47]" In this text, Boulding was already doing the work of peace research as Kelman described it—that is, using the tools of social science (in this case, systems thinking) to respond to the moral issues of the day. Boulding proposed a single theoretical model that could be used not only to describe the world, but also to change it.

Reflecting much later upon her life's work, Elise said, "[F]or me and for Kenneth, the spiritual grounding for our intellectual work was very important, and that's not something you can talk about in academic settings."[48] And indeed, at CASBS both she and Kenneth worked diligently—perhaps almost feverishly—on projects that combined religion and science, while still outwardly abiding by the supposed dichotomy between the two. The Bouldings became well acquainted with another CASBS fellow, the Dutch sociologist Fred Polak, who lived with his wife in a guesthouse behind the Bouldings'

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[47] Ibid., xvii.

[48] Elise Boulding oral history interview, with Dr. Christopher Mitchell, Medford, Massachusetts, August 2004, George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Parents of the Field Project, accessed August 24, 2017, https://activity.scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/PoF/Elise_Boulding.pdf.

garden. Polak, a professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam and managing director of the

Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, was keenly interested in ideas about the future.

With a grant from the Council of Europe, he had written his two-volume book *The Image

of the Future*, a sweeping meditation on the relationship between imagined futures and

the dynamics of culture. Elise was so captivated by Polak's ideas that she learned Dutch

just so that she could translate his tome into English; she spent many a Palo Alto morning

engaged in that project. (Her translation was published in 1961.)

In his book, Polak argued that, at midcentury, all images of the future—whether

eschatological or utopian—had "been driven into a corner, and out of Time."[49] It was not

"[t]he rejection and destruction of old images of the future" that concerned Polak—that

was simply the historical process at work—but rather "the existence of a vacuum where

the images had once been." "The image of the future," he wrote, "has been snatched back

into the present and into daily life, with all its doubt, sorrow and suffering. This leaves

man standing at the edge of a bottomless abyss, facing death, destruction, chaos and

Nothingness." While existentialism certainly exemplified this view by "abandon[ing]

man to the miserable emptiness of today," that particular philosophy was a symptom, not

a cause. Polak saw this despair everywhere: "Theology, ideology, art, science, social

movements and socialism, in short the entire style and structure of our society, breathes

the spirit of this new time, this radical change in attitude toward the future." He sought to

put "his finger on the gaping wound from which the life-blood of the culture is draining

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[49] Fred L. Polak, *The Image of the Future: Enlightening the Past, Orientating the Present, Forecasting the Future – Volume Two: Iconoclasm of the Images of the Future, Demolition of Culture*, trans. Elise Boulding (New York: Oceana Publications, 1961), 13.

away—there, where the pulsing and impassioned images of the future that have always moved man and society now lie torn and still."[50]

Both Bouldings drew inspiration from Polak's work. The lecture Elise delivered at the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends in 1956 bears unmistakable traces of her collaboration with Polak.[51] There, she deployed Polak's concept of the image of the future to remind her fellow Friends of their worldly responsibility to do practical work toward the growth of the Kingdom of God on Earth. She implored them to "leap into the future, to wrest this vision [of the Kingdom of God] from its position on the horizon and pull it into the present, to make it a reality for this world." Extending Polak's theory to the realm of the divine, Elise suggested that the image of the Kingdom of God had been diminished in the minds of most believers: "In the midst of suffering, we have lost the knowledge of eternity and the vision of paradise." These had been replaced by despair. Man stood at the edge of an abyss. She blamed science fiction writers for conjuring up a "nightmare picture of the future." And she worried that neither the church nor democracy could provide much hope. "We must have something to grow towards, and our vision of the future provides the direction of growth," she said, exhorting Quakers "to live as if the Kingdom were already here." "Can we," she asked, "transform our homes and offices into advance outposts of the Kingdom?"[52] Elise wove Polak's sociology of the image into Quaker theology, using it to attempt to motivate Friends to rededicate themselves to their religion. And her suggestion

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[50] Ibid., 14.

[51] Elise delivered the William Penn Lecture to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, one of the oldest Yearly Meetings in the Religious Society of Friends, in the spring of 1956 at the Arch Street Meeting House in Philaldephia. Lectures were given yearly from 1916 to 1966; past lecturers included Norman Thomas (1917), Kenneth Boulding (1942), Bayard Rustin (1948), and Amiya Chakravarty (1950).

[52] Elise Boulding, "The Joy That Is Set Before Us," William Penn Lecture 1956, Quaker Pamphlets, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.quaker.org/pamphlets/wpl1956a.html.

that Friends' homes and offices ought to be transformed into advance outposts of the

Kingdom hints that she thought of her own work as a social scientist as part of that

project.

Kenneth Boulding too used the notion of the image to bring together social

science and spirituality, though he defined the concept of the image differently. His 1956

book *The Image* is a manifesto for a new science, which he christened "eiconics." He

invested this text with spiritual significance, writing in the preface that his sabbatical at

CASBS—"described by a perceptive Catholic priest as a retreat house for the intellect"—

had allowed him to write the book. He reported having dictated it "in uninterrupted

composition," and asked readers to forgive "a certain atmosphere of intellectual

exaltation which inevitably pervades it."[53] Later in the book, he likened himself to Moses,

having "brought the reader to Nebo, from which tantalizing glimpses of a promised land

may be obtained."[54]

Kenneth's new science of eiconics was predicated upon a new theory of

knowledge, which was in turn predicated upon the concept of the image. He argued here

that knowledge was utterly *subjective*, embedded within a knowing subject; "without a

knower, knowledge is an absurdity."[55] One had an image of one's location in the world,

not only in space, but also in time, in the field of personal relations, in nature, and in a

world of emotions. He explained that the image governs behavior, and that it is built up

through experience, which comes in the form of information-laden messages that produce

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[53] He also thanked the Ford Foundation "for daring to invest risk capital in intellectual enterprise," and noted that the groundwork for the book had been laid back in Ann Arbor, in his Seminar on the Integration of the Social Sciences." In Kenneth Boulding, Preface, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959 [1956]).
[54] Ibid., 155.
[55] Ibid., 16.

some change in the image. Because messages are mediated through a value system, there could be no facts without values. Kenneth also believed that the image could organize empirical research, by making available "a new language in which researchers in what now seem to be many different fields can communicate easily and pool their results."[56] His theory of knowledge argued for a "profound reorganization of the departmental structure of knowledge and of academic life," which he thought was already underway.

[57] Knowledge was undergoing a fundamental *restructuring*. And here perhaps was where eiconics would make its contribution: "Eiconics may be more of a contribution to this restructuring of the universe of knowledge than it is a new science in the sense in which the old sciences are sciences. If a single theoretical principle can be shown to apply over a wide area of the empirical world, this is economy in the learning process."[58] Eiconoics might offer "a general theory of the empirical world: something which lies between the extreme generality of mathematics and the particularity of particular disciplines."[59] Kenneth acknowledged that it would likely be a long while before the organization of universities would reflect this restructuring. "Until then," he wrote, "the new structures, as new intellectual structures always have done, will have to live in an underworld, an underworld of deviant professors, gifted amateurs, and moderate crackpots."[60] That vision prefigures the movement that would take shape at the University of Michigan with the establishment of *Conflict Resolution* in 1957.

The Bouldings were experimenting with new forms of social science while Quakers were grappling with their public role in the postwar world. In 1947, the Friends

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[56] Ibid., 156.
[57] Ibid., 162.
[58] Ibid., 163.
[59] Ibid., 163.
[60] Ibid., 163.

Service Council of London and the American Friends Service Committee together received the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts, since the Napoleonic Wars, "to promote the fraternity between nations."[61] In the epilogue to the 1953 book *The Quaker Approach to Contemporary Problems*, Clarence E. Pickett, recently retired from his longtime service as executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, articulated the challenge Friends faced during the early Cold War: "We American Friends must rethink our way as citizens of a country which has newly reached political, economic, and military power. [...] Can Friends keep their eyes on universal values? Can we view all men as children of God? Can we help to release the healing stream of divine love without being sucked into the battle for power?"[62] Henry J. Cadbury, who helped found the American Friends Service Committee in 1917, and served as its chairman from 1928-1934 and again from 1944-1960, contributed an essay on "Peace and War." In this time of crisis, what were Friends to do? "To define and expose the forces leading to war is part of their duty," he wrote. This meant countering "breeders of war" in whatever form they might take, such as militarism, nationalism, sovereignty, and conventional patriotism. Friends had an obligation to attempt to shape official policy and public opinion. "As men come more and more to recognize the irrationality, irrelevance, and immorality of war," he wrote, "they will come to see that not any foreign nation is ever the enemy, but that war itself is the enemy."[63]

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[61] Gunnar Jahn, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1947 - Presentation Speech," December 10, 1947, Nobelprize.org, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1947/press.html.
[62] Clarence E. Pickett, "Epilogue," in *The Quaker Approach to Contemporary Problems*, ed. John Kavanaugh (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1953), 242-243.
[63] Henry J. Cadbury, "Peace and War," *The Quaker Approach to Contemporary Problems*, ed. John Kavanaugh (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1953), 16-21.

The AFSC published a series of studies of possible ways to ease postwar international tensions.[64] The fourth of these, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence*, appeared in 1955, the year after the U.S. had detonated a hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands; the fallout from this explosion stoked international concern over nuclear testing. The authors of *Speak Truth to Power* asked why American foreign policy had grown more rather than less reliant on military power. They argued that pacifism—"whose approach to foreign policy begins with the rejection of reliance upon military power"—ought to inform academic inquiry:

> There is now almost no place in our great universities, few lines in the budgets of our great foundations, and little space in scholarly journals, for thought and experimentation that begin with the unconditional rejection of organized mass violence and seek to think through the concrete problems of present international relations in new terms. It is time there was.[65]

According to the authors, military preparedness and peacemaking—cornerstones of official American Cold War policy—were in fact mutually exclusive aims. They called for "a new basis for the resolution of the USA-USSR conflict." Quakers were uniquely positioned to help bring this about:

> We are aware that the very urgency and bitterness of the power conflict may discourage many from serious consideration of a radically new and different approach to its resolution. The cold war is, indeed, a fact with which we must daily reckon. But Quakers, who through their history have clung to the conviction that evil can only be overcome by good, are not without experience in dealing with conflict in a creative and non-violent way.[66]

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[64] The first three were *The United States and the Soviet Union* (1949), *Steps to Peace* (1951), and *Toward Security through Disarmament* (1952).

[65] James E. Bristol, Amiya Chakravarty, A. Burns Chalmers, William B. Edgerton, Harrop A. Freeman, Robert Gilmore, Cecil E. Hinshaw, Milton Mayer, A. J. Muste, Clarence E. Pickett, Robert Pickus, Bayard Rustin, and Norman J. Whitney, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* (American Friends Service Committee, 1955), v-vi.

[66] Ibid., 34.

It is difficult not to see *Conflict Resolution*, a scholarly journal that on the surface appears

to epitomize the high modern social science of midcentury America, as a response to this

call to action.

   Speak Truth to Power was published on the cusp of the revival of the American

peace movement. The year 1956 marked a turning point in the history of the American

left, the moment when "a new left seemed possible."[67] This was the year Nikita

Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin's crimes. This was also the year radical pacifists

including David Dellinger, Bayard Rustin, and A.J. Muste founded *Liberation* magazine,

with funding from the War Resisters League. "Everywhere there is ferment and motion,"

Muste observed in 1956.[68]

   That year also saw the publication of *The Power Elite* by the sociologist C.

Wright Mills. Mills argued that men in power, under the spell of what he called "military

metaphysics," had come to conceive of war as a permanent condition. He wrote:

> For the first time in American history, men in authority are talking about an
> 'emergency' without a foreseeable end. During modern times, and especially in
> the United States, men had come to look upon history as a peaceful continuum
> interrupted by war. But now, the American elite does not have any real image of
> peace—other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the
> balance of mutual fright. The only seriously accepted plan for peace is the loaded
> pistol. In short, war or a high state of war preparedness is felt to be the normal and
> seemingly permanent condition of the United States.

Under these circumstances, peace had become "a mutual fright, a balance of armed

fear."[69]

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[67] Howard Brick and Christopher Phelps, *Radicals in America: The U.S. Left since the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 85.

[68] Quoted in John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 251.

[69] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1956]), 184-185.

This ferment and motion was afoot as the first cohort of CASBS fellows returned

home, to their more regular academic routines. After CASBS, the Bouldings returned to

the University of Michigan, and Anatol Rapoport joined them there, one of the first three

faculty members appointed to the new Mental Health Research Institute in the

Department of Psychiatry. There, Rapoport began his research on war and peace, and

conflict and conflict resolution, becoming one of the first to use experimental games such

as the prisoner's dilemma as tools for research on conflict and cooperation. (He would

later become an outspoken critic of what he saw as the misuse of game theory by nuclear

strategists.) In the spring of 1956, Kenneth Boulding dedicated his ongoing faculty

research seminar, Economics 353: Problems in the Integration of the Social Sciences, to

the theory of conflict and conflict resolution. A dozen or so faculty members—from

architecture to zoology—came together every Thursday afternoon to discuss a subject of

common theoretical interest, such as competition and cooperation, growth, or

information. Students could take the seminar for credit. The announcement for the 1956

seminar explained the premise:

> The intrinsic importance of the problem of conflict in the modern world,
> especially on the international scene[,] makes the development of an adequate
> theory of conflict and conflict resolution a matter of urgency. There are signs,
> moreover, that in many different fields, especially in the social sciences, thinking
> is converging towards a general theory of conflict dynamics.[70]

A wide range of disciplines—economics, political science, psychology, industrial

relations, jurisprudence, and even biology—all looked at conflict from different angles.

The guiding assumption of the seminar was that these perspectives were complementary.

"We do not expect to find one grand integrated theory to cover everything," the seminar

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[70] "Prospectus for Interdisciplinary Seminar in Conflict Resolution," undated, box 40, Kenneth
Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

announcement explained. "We hope to uncover and encourage convergence of theoretical formulations in different disciplines, where this is taking place." The seminar had practical objectives as well: it sought "[t]o integrate the work of model builders and theoreticians with the practical experience of 'technicians' who deal with problems in conflict resolution" and "[t]o foster the development of new models for the resolution of conflict."[71]

The seminar prefigured the new journal that Boulding and his colleagues founded in 1957. It made sense to house the journal at the University of Michigan, because Boulding and Rapoport were there, along with Bob Hefner and Bill Barth, two graduate students (Hefner in psychology and Barth in sociology) who had been heavily involved in the Research Exchange for the Prevention of War. (Hefner and Barth had taken over editing the *Bulletin of the Research Exchange* from Arthur Gladstone.) With a small grant from the university, and gifts from an anonymous donor and a private foundation, the peace researchers were able to finance the journal's first year of publication. Reflecting the schism that had opened up between international relations scholars and behavioral scientists, some members of the Political Science Department vehemently objected to the new journal; *Conflict Resolution* found a welcoming home in the Journalism Department.

Along with the hospitality of Wesley Maurer, chair of that department, the sociologist Robert Cooley Angell helped the journal find its footing at Michigan. Angell came from a distinguished Ann Arbor family—his grandfather had been president of the university in the late nineteenth century, and his uncle, Charles Horton Cooley, was a prominent sociologist. Angell, a veteran of World War I, had been a professor of

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[71] "Summary of first meeting of the seminar on conflict," February 14, 1956, box 40, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

sociology at Michigan, his alma mater, since 1922. He had served as editor of the

American Sociological Review, and had presided over the American Sociological

Association in 1951. Angell, then, lent legitimacy to the nascent journal. In addition, he

brought to the project a longstanding interest in developing the field of international

sociology. He had served as director of UNESCO's Social Science Department in Paris

from 1949-1950, and helped found the International Sociological Association. He was

interested in applying the concept of "social integration," developed before World War II

for the study of American society, to what he saw as an emerging world society, by

developing "a theory of international integration."[72] Angell thought that a new basis for

the resolution of the superpower conflict needed to be found, a point he made in his 1951

presidential address to the American Sociological Association:

> The real foci of power are national stakes clustered into two political blocs. They
> are jockeying for advantage by political and military means. If this jockeying is
> not to lead to a global war or at least to a 'cold war' lasting for generations—and I
> assume that none of us wants either of these—another course of action must be
> charted.[73]

Angell believed that keeping nationalism in check, effectively enforcing international

law, and fostering tolerance of cultural differences among nations were the keys to

"peaceful coexistence."[74] He thought that the United Nations could eventually take on the

function of keeping peace between the two superpowers. And he thought that sociologists

must contribute to the creation of a world society, by encouraging successful interactions

between nations. As of 1955, Angell, like Kelman, believed that "peace-oriented

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[72] This shift is evident in the titles of his books: *The Campus* (1928), *A Study of Undergraduate Adjustment* (1930), *The Family Encounters the Depression* (1936), *The Integration of American Society* (1941), *The Moral Integration of American Cities* (1951), *Free Society and Moral Crisis* (1958), *A Study of Values of Soviet and American Elites* (1963), *Peace on the March* (1969), and *The Quest for World Order* (1979).

[73] Robert C. Angell, "Sociology and the World Crisis," *American Sociological Review* 16, no. 6 (December 1951): 749.

[74] Ibid., 751.

research" had not been as effective as it could be. "The types of research we put forward are not convincing to donors, and perhaps not even to ourselves," he wrote. Angell thought that peace researchers needed "a fresh perspective."[75]

Launching the Journal of Conflict Resolution

By late 1956, Hefner and Barth—acting as the journal's managing editors—sat together with a secretary in an anteroom attached to Kenneth Boulding's office. The first issue of *Conflict Resolution* (soon to be renamed the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*) appeared in March 1957. The contents of the first issue of *Conflict Resolution* reflect the journal's catholic approach. An article by the labor relations scholar Ann Douglas was based on a study of labor-management negotiations that came to a stalemate in collective bargaining and were referred to a government mediation agency. Douglas observed these negotiations firsthand. Her goal was to bring industrial collective bargaining to the attention of social scientists interested in small-group processes. "Out of the conference-table context in which labor and management principals periodically negotiation their contractual relationship, phenomena are wrought which seem of the utmost significance."[76] An examination of how representatives of large organizations (i.e., employers and unions) settle their differences at a table without resorting to a strike could be applicable to the settlement of international disputes, she suggested.

Quincy Wright, an eminent scholar of international law at the University of Chicago and member of the Research Exchange for the Prevention of War, contributed

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[75] Robert C. Angell, "Governments and Peoples as Foci for Peace-Oriented Research," *Journal of Social Issues* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1955): 36-41.

[76] Ann Douglas, "Peaceful Settlements of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 69.

two pieces to the first issue. In the longer of the two, "The Value for Conflict Resolution

of a General Discipline of International Relations," Wright dutifully echoed the

epistemological commitments of the founders: "[A]nalogies from every form of

conflict—party politics, industrial strife, litigation, revolution, insurrection, prize fights,

football, and chess—can throw light on the subject of international conflict. The study of

war can contribute to the study of all forms of conflict."[77] The "Current Research"

section of the journal also featured a proposal by Wright for a "World Intelligence

Center." He began by describing how the hydrogen bomb had made "the proper conduct

of international relations" more important to national welfare and the survival of the

human race than ever before, and then took up the question of how to improve the

"atmosphere" of international relations:

> The atmosphere of international relations, like the weather, is a complex of many
> factors, but students of international relations have not been so successful as
> meteorologists in analyzing these factors and ascertaining their relations. [...]
> International relations has no thermometers, barometers, humidity measures,
> charts of wind velocity, or records of precipitation.

Taking as his model a series of "Annuaire météorologiques" compiled by Lamarck,

Laplace, and Lavoisier in 1800—an allusion to Enlightenment reason—Wright proposed

the establishment of a private "center for collecting and analyzing current information on

international relations." The material would be presented "in narrative, statistical, and

graphical form in an annual publication which might be called 'The World Intelligence

Yearbook.'"[78]

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[77] Quincy Wright, "The Value for Conflict Resolution of a General Discipline of International Relations," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 4-5.

[78] Quincy Wright, "Project for a World Intelligence Center," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 94.

The political scientist Harold Guetzkow contributed an article as well. Guetzkow

had registered as a conscientious objector during World War II and studied organizations

and simulation with the likes of Herbert Simon at the Carnegie Institute of Technology

before joining the Department of Political Science at Northwestern in 1957. His article,

titled "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-nation Relations,"

"develop[ed] a theory of how groups meet their members' demands," and concerned

itself specifically "with national behaviors—be they individual or group, official or

unofficial—which constitute the external responses of peoples comprising nation-

states."[79] Guetzkow, then a fellow at CASBS, believed "that methods and propositions of

the basic social sciences may be useful in developing theories of international relations."

"Nations are a special and particularly powerful kind of group, but they are groups," and

therefore the propositions of social psychology and sociology might be useful in

interpreting and predicting their behavior. Before introducing his model, Guetzkow

struck a note of epistemological modesty, a quality that characterized the conflict

resolution movement, tempering aims that could sound quite grandiose:

> As the history of the development of models and economics and psychology
> indicates, early hypothetical systems are generally crude. They many omit many
> important features of the phenomena. Often they distort features of the process
> itself. My set of propositions may have all these limitations. But models advance
> a discipline by this very process of artificially reducing complexity.[80]

The first issue also included an article by the University of Michigan sociologist

Morris Janowitz. Janowitz's article did not align as neatly with the conflict resolution

ideology as the articles by Douglas and Wright. During World War II, Janowitz had

served as a propaganda analyst in the Department of Justice Special War Policies Unit,

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[79] Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-nation Relations,"
Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 48.
[80] Ibid., 49.

and then in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, where

his job was to analyze German radio broadcasts for the Psychological Warfare Division

at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in London. Janowitz's

article, titled "Military Elites and the Study of War," begins by calling into question the

journal's guiding assumption that a general theory of conflict is possible and desirable:

> Can war and war-making be seen as a special case of a general theory of social conflict? General theories of social conflict attempt to encompass forms as diverse as family, community, ethnic, and class conflict [...]. Clearly, the understanding of war would be a crucial test of any general theory of social conflict. Despite aspirations for generalized explanations of social conflicts, social scientists cannot overlook the highly distinctive aspects of war as a process of social change.[81]

Janowitz emphasized the distinctive aspects of war, and spent the rest of the article

discussing "the organization of political and military elites as a crucial mechanism in the

analysis of war and war-making."[82]

Additionally, Daniel J. Levinson, one of the co-authors of *The Authoritarian*

Personality, contributed an article examining the relationship between the authoritarian

personality and foreign policy. He located the psychological foundations of foreign

policy positions in individual personalities. The economist Thomas Schelling wrote about

"tacit bargaining—bargaining in which communication is incomplete or impossible" and

its application to "the problem of limited war or analogous situations," such as "limited

competition, jurisdictional maneuvers, jockeying in a traffic jam, or getting along with a

neighbor that one does not speak to." In any of these situations, the problem is the same:

"to develop a modus vivendi when one or both parties either cannot or will not negotiate

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[81] Morris Janowitz, "Military Elites and the Study of War," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (March 1957): 9.
[82] Ibid., 10.

explicitly or when neither would trust the other with respect to any agreement explicitly reached."[83]

The contributions of Janowitz, Levinson, and Schelling reflect the journal's practice of publishing articles that approached conflict from a very broad range of perspectives, even if those articles did not necessarily align with the values of peace researchers. (This might partially explain how the journal eventually came to detach itself from its origins in the peace research movement.) Yet while the journal did publish articles that adopted a range of approaches to the study of conflict, by social scientists with wide-ranging commitments, it remained grounded in the peace research movement. It had, for example, a connection to the American Friends Service Committee. William Basnight, who worked for the Information Service of the AFSC, had heard about the journal from Arthur Gladstone, who was then teaching psychology at Swarthmore College. In a letter to the journal's staff, Basnight wrote that he publicized the journal in his weekly newsletter to AFSC staff throughout the country, and requested copies of *Conflict Resolution* for AFSC regional and national offices. In his reply to Basnight, William Barth wrote that he would not be able to send sample copies of the first issue, "since our present financial situation has allowed us to print only a limited number of copies." But he thanked Basnight for his publicity efforts. "As you may know, the AFSC staff from various parts of the country have made numerous inquiries about the journal," he wrote. "In fact, we have received more inquiries of interest from your organization than from any other." Barth encouraged Basnight to send further "comments, criticisms and suggestions," noting that the editorial staff was eager to receive "the reactions of

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[83] Thomas Schelling, "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (1957), 19-36.

individuals who are active in the field of international relations, preferably not social scientists, in that part of the purpose of the journal is to communicate scientific activity and ideas to this group."[84]

The journal's existence was rather precarious during those early years. Boulding recalled that "[t]he very title [...] produced sneers, incredulity, and uneasiness."[85] They got enough money from foundations to operate for the first year, but ran out of money sometime during the second year; had it not been for a donation of $1,000, they likely would have abandoned the project altogether. In November 1958, Boulding, in his capacity as chairman of the journal's editorial board, seeking funding to keep the project going, drafted a letter and proposal to John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation. Boulding was following up on a conversation the two had had a few weeks earlier. He began by describing "the 'Conflict Resolution' group," or "the people who have been concerned with the publication of articles and with the general point of view of the Journal of Conflict Resolution." Boulding identified the focus of the group's interest as "the application of all the resources of the social sciences to the problem of internation [sic] peace. We stand somewhat apart from, though not hostile to, 'conventional' studies of international relations on several counts." What set the Conflict Resolution group apart? "In the first place," he wrote, "we are interested in quantitative methods, mathematical or quasi-mathematical models, and theoretical systems," areas neglected by conventional international relations:

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[84] Letter from William Barth to William Basnight. July 6, 1957, "Correspondence – 1961-1965 – Alphabetical – Ba-Bo," box 4, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[85] By 1960, things had turned around. Articles were flowing in, and the editorial board could focus on fund raising and developing editorial policy. Boulding, "Preface to a Special Issue," 409.

In the second place, we represent, I think, a middle position in regard to moral commitments and attitudes, between what might be called the 'establishment' and the radicals. We represent, naturally, a considerable variety of moral and political viewpoints but our principal moral commitment is to the method of the social sciences rather than to the advancement of any national interest or even political principle. In our personal capacities, we are, of course, committed to many of these interests and principles but the thing which throws us together as a group is a common hope that the methods of the social sciences can be fruitful in this field. To be more specific, I think we feel dissatisfied with the kind of work in international relations which seeks mainly to justify the existing policies, yet, on the other hand, we are not committed as a group to any alternative proposal or principle.

Boulding acknowledged the foundation's reluctance to invest in a journal, but asked for support for the "larger movement of which we are only a part." "This movement unfortunately has no name and it is perhaps more of a ground swell than self-conscious movement. Nevertheless, our very experience with the journal has made us conscious of intellectual interests in various parts of the world which coincide with our own."[86] Boulding's description of the group here suggests that the conflict resolution project was a way of uniting moral and political viewpoints—or at least accommodating them— under the umbrella of social science.

The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution

In June 1959, that project entered a new stage of its development with the founding of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, whose official mission was to promote interdisciplinary social scientific research on problems of war and peace. The Center's executive committee was made up of faculty members who held primary

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[86] Letter from Kenneth Boulding to John Gardner, November 1958, "Correspondence – 1961-1965 – Alphabetical – Ga-Gol," box 4, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. The Michigan group had become a central node in a growing network of peace research programs and centers in the United States and Western Europe. They had close ties with scholars who helped set up similar programs elsewhere, such as the ones at Washington University in St. Louis and at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, Norway.

appointments in traditional departments. Robert Angell was its first chairman. Kenneth

Boulding was a member, as was the psychologist Daniel Katz. Wesley Maurer of

Journalism had a spot on the committee. Joining them were several younger colleagues,

including Hefner and Barth, and the political scientist Inis Claude. A $65,000 gift from

an anonymous individual donor covered administrative expenses for the first three years;

the executive committee was responsible for raising additional funds from foundations

and other donors. Elise Boulding was instrumental in getting the Center up and running,

assuming the brunt of the clerical duties, such as taking notes during faculty meetings and

answering mail from all over the world that would otherwise have gone unanswered.

The Center had an ambitious agenda. Its first brochure spelled out its purpose: as

"one of the few research organizations in the world devoted to a concerted study of war

and peace," it would seek to mobilize the resources of the social sciences "in the interest

of resolving international conflicts." The founders recognized that they were encroaching

upon the traditional domain of political scientists, but suggested that they were merely

picking up where the political scientists, who "turned up a great many problems which

clearly demand the attention of social scientists in other disciplines," had left off. The

social scientists' argument went like this: the behavior of nations "cannot be isolated

from human actions and motives in general," and therefore international relations ought

to be opened up to all the disciplines that study human behavior. Some members of the

Political Science Department did object to this incursion. This tension was reflected in a

remark University of Michigan Vice President Marvin Niehuss made to the *Detroit News*:

"While the political scientists may object that the center proposes to operate in their field,

my feeling is that they have handled world affairs for a long while and it may be time to give others a try."[87]

The founders envisioned the Center performing a number of functions necessary for the creation of a new field of inquiry. It would take stock of existing research, serve as a clearing-house, and support research by scholars at the University of Michigan and elsewhere. Like the journal, the Center operated under the assumption that the study of other types of conflict could shed light on international conflict. The founders singled out research areas of particular interest, many of which had to do with images of the future. Supposing international peace did prevail, what then? What were the implications of permanent peace? How would one visualize a world without war? What would the political and economic implications of disarmament be? How would nations maintain internal cohesion in the absence of an external enemy?

The Center would host conferences and seminars—on specific themes, such as the role of theory in international relations, or with certain non-academic groups, such as peace action organizations, public opinion leaders, and foreign policy makers. It would not offer courses on international affairs, but would train young scholars through research assistantships and fellowships. The hope was that a new generation of scholars would emerge, "informed in the ways of peace and devoted to the cause of peace who will constitute an intellectual and moral resources of significant value to mankind." If all went according to plan, these scholars would "initiate a new social movement in science (as such a movement was developed in the field of race relations in the 1930's)." The brochure emphasized the novelty of the study of conflict resolution, "so embryonic and

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[87] Quoted in Allen Shoenfield, "World Peace Is Aim in New U. of M. Project," *Detroit News*, Saturday, June 27, 1959, "Historical – Clippings, Press Material 1959-1961," box 6, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

so little understood" that it would require "much face-to-face discussion" among researchers.[88]

The university news service touted the new center in a press release as "a pioneer effort to marshall [sic] the whole range of social sciences in search for a solution to the problem of world peace."[89] However, university officials were very cautious about the Center's prospects in their public statements. "This is the kind of free-wheeling enterprise a University should undertake," one member of the Board of Regents told the *Michigan Daily*, the campus newspaper. "[A] university should sometimes take risks, and this seems to be one of those times." Vice President Niehuss said the project was "intriguing, exciting and perhaps promising," but that it was "very ambitious and may not go far."[90] "The project is admittedly idealistic but it is certainly worth trying," he told the *Detroit News*.[91]

While university administrators may have had their doubts, the new center gained a number of admirers outside the university. "The record of daily events usually makes us feel as if we were on the eve of vanishing in a funnel of nuclear gas," the *Washington Post* editor Malvina Lindsay wrote in her July 16, 1959 column. Among that Thursday's front-page news items: an impasse between the Soviet Union and the Western powers over Germany's future at a foreign ministers' conference in Geneva; deadlocked

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[88] CRCR brochure, c. 1959, "Historical – pamphlets – 1960-1968," box 7, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[89] University of Michigan news service press release, June 26, 1959, in "Historical – Clippings, Press Material 1959-1961," box 6, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[90] "Regents Approve New Center to Study World Conflict," *Michigan Daily*, June 27, 1959, in "Historical – Clippings, Press Material 1959-1961," box 6, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[91] Allen Shoenfield, "World Peace Is Aim in New U. of M. Project," *Detroit News*, Saturday, June 27, 1959, in "Historical – Clippings, Press Material 1959-1961," box 6, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

negotiations between the steel industry and the steelworkers union; and record-breaking

rainfall deluging the Eastern seaboard. "Hence it seems almost in the realm of space

fiction to learn that some Americans are steadfastly and hopefully trying to develop better

tools to build peace in the world." The Americans in question were lawyers advocating

for world law through a new committee of the American Bar Association, and the social

scientists of the new Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. In Cold War America,

the possibility of a nuclear attack had become a quotidian concern, while the idea that the

world could be made more peaceful stretched the imagination. Yet Lindsay wrote that

both projects seemed to "hold much long-term promise—provided the dropping of bombs

can be staved off."[92]

The Multiple Meanings of "Conflict Resolution"

The conflict resolution movement, which in many ways exemplified the new kind

of scientific enterprise Boulding had envisioned in *The Image*, did indeed attract an

eclectic mix of deviant professors, gifted amateurs, and moderate crackpots, as revealed

by a sampling of the mail received by the Center in those early years. These letters

suggest that the Center, steadfast in its conviction that conflict was not in fact inevitable

or intractable, was a beacon for those who objected to American Cold War policy. These

letters also afford glimpses of some of the forms that Cold War dissent could take, and

they are evidence of the participation of ordinary Americans in the discursive

construction of the Cold War.[93] The *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the Center for

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[92] Malvina Lindsay, "Search for New Peace Techniques," *Washington Post*, July 16, 1959, A22.
[93] The historian Masuda Hajimu argues that the Cold War "existed not because it was there but because people *thought* that it existed." In order for the "discourse" of the Cold War to become "reality," he argues, there had to be "social acceptance and participation." Hajimu is interested in the participation of

Research on Conflict Resolution together attracted thinkers—social scientists and non-social scientists alike—who believed that conflict could and should be made into a problem of knowledge, and that science would eventually solve that problem.

John A. Aita, M.D., Ph.D. was one such believer. He was an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of Nebraska College of Medicine and a partner in a private practice in Omaha.[94] Aita had found common cause with the journal, and on February 10, 1958, he wrote a long letter to Bob Hefner expressing his anti-war sentiments and outlining a proposal for a science of peace. "From what I gather through public media, we appear at a stalemate with Russia and are possibly edging closer to war," he wrote. "Should we not include among our present and urgent interests (such as nuclear weapons, space travel and teaching more young scientists), also an energetic, scientific inquiry into the causes and prevention of war?" Aita saw war as "a worldwide public health problem," destroying and maiming, and squandering "man's energies, time, institutions and relationships." It was "one remaining great <u>disorder</u> (in the same category with several diseases, crime, poverty, earthquakes and storms) which man hasn't 'figured out' as yet." But Aita was optimistic: "As he discovered causes of tuberculosis and polio and the laws of chemistry and physics which make him master of the atom, man will someday understand and control <u>war</u>." "[C]ontinuing to passively accept war as somehow

ordinary people in the construction of the reality of the conflict. In Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 2-5.

[94] Aita's academic publications were limited to two advanced neuroscience textbooks. The psychiatrist's correspondence with the conflict resolution folks appears to have begun in January 1958, when he sent a letter to Boulding (which he spelled "Bolding"), with a short synopsis of his proposal for a science of peace. Boulding did not write back until April, and when he did, he warned Aita that he would likely have a hard time raising funds to support his endeavor: "We have found the Foundations singularly unresponsive to suggestions for doing basic research in this area." Aita had already discovered this for himself: "Since the first of the year, I, too, have written around to authorities and foundations over the country and discovered that they are peculiarly unresponsive to suggestions for doing basic research in the area of international peace."

'inevitable', 'necessary', rationalizing on and on, planning ever greater, more lavish annihilation"—this would be the utter failure of modern science.

Roy H. Albright, a Los Angeles-based engineer and graduate of the University of Michigan, was in the habit of giving back to his alma mater. He usually made small contributions to the College of Engineering, but in the winter of 1959 he wanted to earmark his donation for another cause. The University's fundraising campaign called upon alumni to support its post-Sputnik efforts to help bolster the nation's scientific prowess. Albright, however, was more interested in dampening international tensions than in projecting American power. "What can we do to reduce Chinese hatred before it flames into war? Can we reduce the fear and aggressive intents in the thoughts of Russian communist leaders?" he wrote to the fund manager. "Do you have a program which is investigating such things and will produce men who will be able to forward peace in the world? If so, kindly let me know as I'd like to show a little of my interest in such a group." The fund manager passed Albright's query along to William Barth, executive secretary of the University's new Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. Barth sent Albright a brochure, sample copies of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and an outline of the Center's current activities. Albright sent back $15. "I can see from reading the two journals you so kindly sent me that, humanly speaking, the difficulty of conflict resolution is complicated and not easy to solve," he wrote to Barth. He wondered whether the Center had contact with the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He suggested that Barth and his colleagues turn to the Bible for models of conflict resolution. "Jesus really knew how to resolve difficulties; whether it was a healing that was required, money for the surtax, or peace, he did 'all things well,'" he wrote. He also offered the example of

Daniel and the lion's den. "I hope that you will pardon my bringing religion into this, but I am of the opinion that it is through knowledge of God that the world will attain peace. My contribution, small as it is, would not have come to your fund had it not been for my interest in peace as a student of Christian Science." Barth thanked Albright for his donation and assured him that the Center did "have contact with F.O.R., United World Federalists, and similar peace action groups."

Julian Griggs of Florida was keenly interested in the project. He corresponded with Barth about marketing strategies and sent promotional letters to corporations on behalf of the Center. He even tried to interest David Lowe, producer of the television program *CBS Reports*, in doing a show on conflict resolution. (This appears not to have panned out.) Griggs encouraged the Center to hire a professional public relations firm. He and his wife donated money for the Center's fundraising activities, putting off the replacement of old home appliances and mortgage payments to do so. "Just now we want this money to go where we think there is tremendous need—into raising funds for research on the resolution of international conflicts. Life is so much more important than a new stove. We feel that the lives of scores of millions are now in jeopardy. The goal of conflict resolution research is eventually to reduce that jeopardy."[95]

One of the Center's early publicity efforts was a 13-part series of half-hour radio documentaries produced by WUOM, the University of Michigan's radio station. The series, called "Toward Peace," explored the potential contributions of the social and behavioral sciences to the solution of the problem of war. (The Center contributed $750 to the project.) Producer and host Glenn Phillips was something of a twentieth-century

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[95] Letter from Julian Griggs to William Barth, April 29, 1960, "Correspondence – Pre-1961 – Alphabetical – Gr," box 4, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

Tocqueville, traveling across America "with a valise in one hand and a tape recorder in the other."[96] He conducted interviews with social scientists during the spring of 1960, and the resulting series aired every Monday throughout the summer of 1961, coinciding with the escalation of tensions over the status of Berlin between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The program was broadcast across the United States, and abroad by the Voice of America.

Phillips was keenly interested in the question of whether a science of peace was possible. The proliferation of ever more powerful weapons of mass destruction meant that there were now "greater forces for destruction—for self-extermination—than ever before," marking the dawn of a new era in international relations. The radio host favored an optimistic outlook for the prospects of a science of peace: "Science [...] has found methods and means to wage war. Surely, science with all its undiscovered mysteries can find methods and means to wage peace." And yet Phillips did not seem fully convinced: "The sciences with which we are concerned on the program are the social and behavioral. What can they accomplish? Everything, something, anything, or perhaps nothing?" He put that question to Angell, Boulding, and Hefner, who were featured on the last program of the series, "Prospects for the Future." Boulding observed that in the last few years "a peace research of a more self-conscious nature" had emerged, undergirded by the development of the social sciences. He suggested that perhaps peace research represented the convergence of the peace movement and the social sciences:

> We've had a peace movement in the world [...] for over a hundred years, and it hasn't, as a movement, been much interested in research, especially social science research. On the other hand, we've also had the development of the social sciences, which again aren't really much older than 100 years. Up to now the

[96] Anonymous, "WUOM Produces Unusual Program Series On Social and Medical Research," *University Record* October 1960, 6.

social scientists have not been particularly self-conscious about directing their efforts towards the problem of establishing a stable peace.

Robert Hefner, who in his administrative role was probably even more acutely aware than Boulding of the constraints under which the conflict resolution movement operated, believed that the prospects for peace research and its applications depended on its ability to operate at a larger scale, which of course would require a significant investment of resources. He dreamed of peace research becoming Big Science:

> The magnitude of the job is going to be a very important point in determining how much impact peace research has. And my conception of the size of the job is that it's a very big job, perhaps something like the Manhattan Project is a fair analogy. And this kind of money—billions of dollars, perhaps—can come only, at the present time, from national sources—the United States government or such a source as this.

The position staked out by peace researchers still stood in opposition to the image of conflict on which U.S. policy was based when President Dwight D. Eisenhower left office in 1961. In his farewell address to the nation on January 17, the departing president described the all-consuming nature of "the conflict now engulfing the world":

> It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charter course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Even as he warned them about the growing power of the nation's military-industrial complex and the threats it posed to both science and democracy, Eisenhower urged Americans to prepare for a conflict that would be both acute and protracted. "A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment," he said. "Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his

own destruction."[97] The speech contains some of the central paradoxes that the likes of C. Wright Mills and the authors of *Speak Truth to Power* had identified in the mid-1950s, such as the definition of peace as a balance of armed fear, and the Cold War as an emergency with no foreseeable end. Here was Eisenhower, a decade after Truman's national-emergency proclamation, saying that the continuing Cold War was no longer a crisis but "a prolonged and complex struggle," at once urgent and open-ended. This was an image of conflict whose resolution was deferred indefinitely—precisely the image the conflict resolution movement sought to deconstruct.

On November 11, 1960, just a few days after John F. Kennedy was elected president, Bill Barth penned a letter to a writer for the *Brown Alumni Monthly* magazine. Barth wanted to call the writer's attention to the conflict resolution movement, which he described as an attempt "to interest social scientists in this country and abroad to do more research on the problem of world conflict and peace." "[W]e have become apathetic and have a growing feeling of helplessness in the face of the world around us," he wrote, seemingly referring not only to himself and his colleagues, but to all those who were grapping with feelings of powerlessness. "However, I wish to report a couple of activities that are going on here at the University of Michigan that are anything but apathetic about the world situation in social problems, etc. I fully realize at this point that it doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference in our present situation, but the fact that they exist at all is important."[98] Barth expressed his own despondency without sliding into resignation or despair, offering the mere existence of the conflict resolution group as an antidote to

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[97] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address," January 17, 1961.
[98] William Barth to Ben H. Bagdikian, November 11, 1960, "B 1960-1970," box 5, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

defeatism. And as the new decade unfolded the group would indeed attract those who were anything but apathetic about the world situation.

CHAPTER 3

Addicted to Theory, Devoted to Peace:
Anatol Rapoport and Kenneth Boulding on Conflict

In the fall of 1958, Anatol Rapoport could be found contemplating the role of "theory" in

the exact sciences and in the social sciences. In a paper delivered at the annual meeting of

the American Political Science Association in St. Louis that September, the mathematical

biologist pondered the question of whether mathematical methods were applicable to

behavioral science, and concluded that game theory seemed very promising. He made the

case that game theory, which had already made its way into economics, was relevant to

political science as well, "because its fundamental concepts are idealizations of what

political science is about, namely decisions made amid partly conflicting and partly

coincident interests of rational, calculating beings."[1] Game theory was an example of

"pure theory," the polar opposite of "meticulous empiricism," Rapoport said; "social

scientists do not often come into contact with really powerful pure theories, the kind that

grow on mathematical soil."[2] An example from physics illustrated the superiority of pure

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[1] Anatol Rapoport, "Various Meanings of 'Theory,'" *The American Political Science Review* 52 (1958): 987.

[2] Rapoport wrote that there was another kind of theoretical orientation besides the mathematical within the social sciences, embodied by sociologists such as Talcott Parsons who "undertook the task of creating a sound and consistent terminology of social science." Parsons efforts at theory construction were "directed toward selecting events and combining them in such a fashion as to make the terms applied to these combinations fruitful in the development of a social theory which eventually is to become a collection of theorems." The problem with this approach, however, is that it relied on definitions, and definitions were always "arbitrary." Theorists like Parsons asked questions such as 'What is a social action?', the type of question posed in "traditional philosophy," "where the implicit assumption is that behind each word in use there must be a reality, and that the business of the philosopher is to discover it, so that making a 'proper definition' is tantamount to establishing a truth. It has always been the curse of philosophy (until this curse was lifted by the logical positivists) to assume that entities called politics, society, power, welfare, tyranny, democracy, milieu, progress, etc., actually exist, just as cats, icebergs, coffee pots, and grains of wheat exist, and that each has an essence discoverable by proper application of reason and observation." "Cat" and "progress" were both abstractions, but the difference was that it was much easier for people to agree on

theories: "The physicist might spend thousands of years studying the behavior of ocean waves on a beach in most meticulous detail; in the end he would be no wiser than before with regard to what is essential in wave motion." Wave theory, however, conferred a "really profound understanding of waves," an understanding "quite independent of observing any real waves." Rapoport urged his audience to give pure theory a chance to discover these essences in the social world. "It goes without saying that *ultimately* the findings of theory must somehow be translated into real predictions and observations. But to demand this too soon is not wise," he wrote. "Theory, then, is like a system of credit. One has a right to demand that *somewhere* in the future there are assets to back up the transactions. But, as often as not, these assets may be in the future."[3]

By encouraging political scientists to take up game theory, Rapoport joined other mathematicians and economists who promoted the theory to scholars in the social and behavioral sciences beginning in the late 1940s.[4] Rapoport had been exposed to game theory in the late 1940s at the University of Chicago, where he was a member of the Committee on the Behavioral Sciences, formed in 1949. The Committee's ideas about the role of theory—not just game theory, but theory in general—in the behavioral sciences seem to have profoundly shaped Rapoport's own. As the historian of science Paul Erickson writes, the Committee "accorded a significant place to theory in building a

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what things in the world should be called "cat" than on what things in the world should be called "progress." In the absence of consensus on such matters, it was "futile to pass to the study of these supposed entities. Ibid., 980, 987.

[3] Ibid., 979.

[4] The most notable of these were *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944) by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern and *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey* (1957) by the mathematicians R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. In his history of game theory, the historian of science Paul Erickson writes that, because von Neumann and Morgenstern's earlier work was "technically daunting," Luce and Raiffa's book significantly widened the audience for game theory. See Paul Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).

unified science of behavior."[5] And some of the most influential "theoretical frameworks

for social interaction" among Chicago behavioral scientists were of a decidedly

mathematical bent.[6] Indeed, the Committee's "guiding philosophy" was that "common

mathematical structures" underlying "systems" at all "levels of organization"—from a

single cell to a whole society—made interdisciplinary research possible.[7] In the fall of

1955, the Chicago Committee on the Behavioral Sciences, including Rapoport,

"effectively reconstituted" itself at the University of Michigan as the Mental Health

Research Institute (MHRI).[8] Rapoport, fresh from his fellowship year at the Center for

Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences from 1954 to 1955, ran a "mathematical

models" group at the MHRI. By the time he addressed those political scientists gathered

in St. Louis in 1958, he had begun an investigation into the psychology of conflict and

cooperation through a series of experiments in game theory.

Rapoport's colleague Kenneth Boulding was also contemplating the role of theory

in the social sciences in the later 1950s (and had been for quite some time even before

that). Boulding too had been among the first class of fellows at CASBS, and he and

Rapoport—together with the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy and the neuroscientist

Ralph Gerard, both fellows that year—had established the Society for General Systems

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[5] Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made*, 167.

[6] These included *Mathematical Theory of Human Relations* (1947) by Rapoport's fellow Chicago mathematical biologist Nicholas Rashevsky and von Neumann and Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944). Erickson notes that both mathematical biology and the theory of games would be important "theory-building resources for behavioral science." Erickson, *The World the Game Theorists Made*, 168.

[7] Ibid., 170. Erickson, following the historian and general systems theorist Debra Hammond before him, writes that "general systems theory" began at Chicago with the work of the Committee on the Behavioral Sciences, whose members developed "a broader theoretical framework for integrating studies of behavior on all levels of analysis."

[8] James G. Miller, Ralph Gerard, and Rapoport were founding members of the MHRI. These three raised almost $3,000,000 for the construction of a permanent home for the MHRI, which began in the summer of 1958. The MHRI published its own journal, *Behavioral Science*. Funding for both the Chicago Committee on the Behavioral Science and the MHRI came from the Ford Foundation, the primary benefactor of the behavioral sciences.

Research in 1956.[9] Boulding penned a kind of manifesto for "general systems theory" that was published in the journal *Management Science* in 1956. "General Systems Theory is a name which has come into use to describe a level of theoretical model-building which lies somewhere between the highly generalized constructions of pure mathematics and the specific theories of the specialized disciplines," he wrote.[10] General Systems Theory did "not seek, of course, to establish a single, self-contained 'general theory of practically everything' which will replace the special theories of particular disciplines. Such a theory would be almost without content, for we always pay for generality by sacrificing content, and all we can say about practically everything is almost nothing. Somewhere between the specific that has no meaning and the general that has no content there must be, for each purpose and at each level of abstraction, an optimum degree of generality."[11] Theoretical constructions that attained this "optimum degree of generality" would enable scholars from different disciplines to communicate with one another. General Systems Theory, then, would provide a "framework of coherence" within which interdisciplinary inquiry could proceed productively. One way to organize General Systems Theory—and the one that would animate the work of Boulding and his colleagues at the University of Michigan in their study of conflict—was "to look over the

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[9] In her account of the origins and evolution of "general systems theory," the historian of science Debora Hammond tells the story of the founding of the Society for General Systems Research this way: "Early in the fall of 1954," the four fellows "sat together at lunch discussing their mutual interest in theoretical frameworks relevant to the study of different kinds of systems, including physical, technological, biological, social, and symbolic systems. According to Boulding, someone suggested that they form a society to foster interdisciplinary research on a general theory of complex systems, and thus the idea for the Society for General Systems Research (SGSR) was born." However, in a foonote, Hammond writes that while this story is oft-repeated, in fact Boulding and Bertalanffy had already discussed the possibility of before arriving at CASBS, and had even "sent out letters soliciting interest in such a venture, receiving an enthusiastic response from Rapoport among others." In Debora Hammond, *The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems Theory* (Boulder: The University Press of Colorado, 2003).

[10] Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory—The Skeleton of Science," *Management Science* 2 (1956): 197.

[11] Ibid., 197-198.

empirical universe and to pick out certain general *phenomena* which are found in many

different disciplines, and to seek to build up general theoretical models relevant to these

phenomena."[12]

These two theorists' reflections on theory call to mind other such reflections,

particularly among American sociologists at midcentury. For example, in his *Social*

Theory and Social Structure, first published in 1949, Robert K. Merton proposed the

notion of "theories of the middle range" or "middle-range theory."[13] "Middle-range

theory," Merton explained, "is intermediate to general theories of social systems which

are too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization, and change to

account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that

are not generalized at all."[14] And here he drew an analogy between sociological theories

of the middle range and well-established theories in other disciplines: "One speaks of a

theory of reference groups, of social mobility, or role-conflict and of the formation of

social norms just as one speaks of a theory of prices, a germ theory of disease, or a

kinetic theory of gases."[15] In his 1959 book *The Sociological Imagination*, C. Wright

Mills criticized what he considered to be the two dominant "styles" in postwar American

social science. These were "grand theory," which might be "merely a confused verbiage,"

exemplified by the work of the Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons.[16] And then there was

"abstracted empiricism," a style of social science that "confuse[s] whatever is to be

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[12] Ibid., 200.

[13] Suggesting the extent to which social scientists in this era discussed the subject of "theory," Merton began the chapter titled, "On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range" with this sentence: "Like so many words that are bandied about, the word theory threatens to become meaningless." In Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, 1968 [1949]), 39.

[14] Ibid., 39.

[15] Ibid., 40.

[16] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1959]), 27.

studied with the set of methods suggested for its study," as in the manipulation of data by

"public opinion" researchers.[17]

What did it mean to be a theorist at work in midcentury American social science?

According to the historian of science Joel Isaac, theory had become a legitimate mode of

social scientific inquiry by this time. After World War II, the task facing theory-minded

social scientists had been twofold: to stabilize modes of theorizing and to justify

theoretical pursuits *as scientific practice* within and across their disciplines. For Isaac, the

work of the Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons and his collaborators for the Carnegie

Project on Theory exemplifies this near-obsession with theory and conceptual schemes

that gripped the social scientific disciplines in the postwar period. The Carnegie Project

on Theory was a seminar series sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation from 1949 to

1950, out of which came Parsons's *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951).

Interdisciplinarity in the social sciences, with its roots in the interwar period, had become

a practical reality during World War II, and was well on its way to becoming an

epistemic virtue by the late 1940s. Parsons and his colleagues insisted that the unification

of the social sciences could be achieved through the construction of a comprehensive

theoretical framework for the analysis of social relations—"a general theory of action."

Extending historical accounts of the practice of theory in the physical sciences to the

domain of the social sciences, Isaac is interested in how Parsons and his ilk went about

institutionalizing this general theory as an "academic subculture," or "set of conceptual

tools and skills that would allow action theory to be learned, taught, and carried out."[18]

This way of thinking casts theory as a decidedly material activity, grounded in concrete

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[17] Ibid., 51.

[18] In Joel Isaac, "Theorist at Work: Talcott Parsons and the Carnegie Project on Theory, 1949-1951," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no. 2 (2010): 287-311.

practices; by these lights, model building comes into focus as the practical work of theory construction.[19]

The historian of science Hunter Heyck has observed that prior to 1950, few articles published in the major journals in anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology "connected their empirical findings or philosophical discourses to anything like what the coming generation would call a theory; by the 1970s, it was extraordinary for an article not to frame its discussion of empirical or experimental particulars in terms of their relevance to a particular theory or model."[20] There was a shift within the social sciences concerning what it meant to be scientific. "To the high modernists, science was the product of the organization of facts into conceptual schemes, and the progress of science was due primarily to the development of more sophisticated, elegant, and parsimonious theoretical systems, not simply the discovery of new facts," Heyck writes. "In this view, systematic theory, especially as exemplified by sophisticated formal models, was the sine qua non of a true science."[21] Heyck argues that "modeling as a practice" appealed to high modern social scientists because it held out the promise of "control." They "were intent on bringing order and control through continuous management, but they firmly believed that improvements in practice required improvements in theory. Hence, much high modern social science was abstract to the

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[19] As the historian of science David Kaiser has written of midcentury physics, "since at least the middle of the twentieth century [...] most theorists have not spent their days [...] in some philosopher's dreamworld, weighing one cluster of disembodied concepts against another, picking and choosing among so many theories or paradigms. Rather, their main task has been to calculate. Theorists have tinkered with models and estimated effects, always trying to reduce the inchoate confusion of 'out there' [...] into tractable representations. They have accomplished these translations by fashioning theoretical tools and performing calculations." In David Kaiser, *Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 8.
[20] Hunter Heyck, *Age of System: Understanding the Development of Modern Social Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 18.
[21] Ibid., 37.

point of being otherworldly while remaining instrumentalist in its orientation."[22] Heyck

concludes that "between 1925 and 1975 a new kind of social science emerged and

flourished." He characterizes this style of social science as follows:

> [T]here was a strong movement toward 'systems thinking,' modeling, and behavioral-functional analysis. This movement was very strongly correlated with an embrace of theory, especially formal theory; it was strongly correlated with mathematization and quantification; and it was strongly (though not simply) correlated with the advent of new patrons for social science. It was also strongly anti-correlated with more traditional moral philosophy and with discussion of the content of current social or political issues, both of which found little support from patrons and which were decidedly nontheoretical and nonmathematical in conception and execution.[23]

This chapter presents a complementary yet decidedly alternative way of being a

theorist within the social sciences in 1960s America. It is true that Anatol Rapoport and

Kenneth Boulding were practitioners of high modern social science *par excellence*,

embacing systems thinking, modeling, behavioral-functional analysis, and formal theory,

as well as benefiting from new patrons. However, they also embraced moral philosophy

and gave much consideration to social and political issues, all of which they aimed to

give theoretical and sometimes even mathematical expression. Isaac is interested in

theory as material practice; I am interested here in theory as a mode of dissent. And that

is precisely how Anatol Rapoport and Kenneth Boulding used theory, as I argue in this

chapter. I ask how and to what ends Rapoport and Boulding built moral and ethical

concerns into their theoretical constructions. I examine the kind of political work their

models and their status as theoreticians enabled them to do.

As the previous chapter established, Rapoport and Boulding were two prominent

theorists of the "conflict resolution movement." The historian of economics Philip

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[22] Ibid., 38.
[23] Ibid., 49.

Mirowski has written that the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, established at the University of Michigan in 1959 to promote work toward the construction of a general theory of conflict, "became known as the 'peaceniks' RAND,' providing a counterweight to the perceived hawkish tendencies and military allegiances of the denizens of Santa Monica, all the while conducting their research within essentially the same idiom."[24] Research conducted in an idiom shared by RAND analysts, but by those who opposed militarism and war—how was that possible, what did it look like, and what difference did it make?

In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter looks closely at these thinkers' methods of abstraction. First, the chapter examines each of their major theoretical works on conflict: Anatol Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates* (1960) and Kenneth Boulding's *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (1962). These books presented models of conflict—models that were built with the threat of nuclear war in mind—and expressed the wish that those models would serve peaceful ends. Both authors argued that social scientific knowledge could be used to not only defuse the Cold War but also abolish the institution of war. The chapter examines the relationship between these theoretical works (cast in the idiom of systems analysis, shared with defense intellectuals) and their authors' political engagement (opposed to the defense establishment), attending especially to the roles these theorists imagined for themselves as political actors and to how they envisioned and argued for particular configurations of knowledge and power. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the escalation of

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[24] Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 317-318.

the Vietnam War in 1965 challenged the ideas espoused by Rapoport and Boulding

earlier in the decade, leading them to and embrace other modes of dissent.

Anatol Rapoport's **Fights, Games, and Debates (1960)**

Anatol Rapoport addressed his 1960 book *Fights, Games, and Debates* "to any

serious student of human conflict on the intrapersonal, interpersonal, organization, social,

or international level."[25] The book was published by the University of Michigan Press,

and bore the imprimatur of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. Though at the

time he was making a name for himself as a game theorist with his experiments at the

University's Mental Health Research Institute, Rapoport's book ventured well beyond

game theory in its investigation of conflict. Conflict was, he recognized, an enormous

subject, "a theme that has occupied the thinking of man more than any other, save only

God and love," and on which there was a "vast output of discourse":

> It has been treated descriptively, as in history and fiction; it has been treated in an
> aura of moral approval, as in epos; with implicit resignation, as in tragedy; with
> moral disapproval, as in pacifistic religions. There is a body of knowledge called
> military science, presumably concerned with strategies of armed conflict. There
> are innumerable handbooks, which teach how to play specific games of strategy.
> Psychoanalysts are investigating the genesis of 'fight-like' situations within the
> individual, and social psychologists are doing the same on the level of groups and
> social classes.[26]

This inventory of kinds of treatments of the theme, meant to indicate the vastness of the

subject, also indicates the vastness of Rapoport's conception of it. In *Fights, Games, and*

Debates, he seems to have been most interested in how to think about, and in how others

had thought about, a subject that could be conceived so broadly. "The task here will be to

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[25] Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961 [1960]), vii.

[26] Here Rapoport was paraphrasing R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa in their 1957 primer on game theory, *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*. Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, 11.

examine not conflicts for their own interest but rather *different kinds of intellectual tools for the analysis of conflict situations,*" he wrote. "The aim is to examine and analyze three widely different modes of thought about conflict and to provoke thought in the reader, as my own thoughts have been provoked by the ideas reflected here. This book is mainly a vehicle for sharing intellectual experience."[27] On its surface, *Fights, Games, and Debates* appears to be a work of classification, but more than that, it was an invitation to readers to reflect upon the nature of knowledge and knowing.

That said, the book is also a work of classification. It argues that all forms of conflict can be categorized as one of three types: fight, game, or debate. Rapoport's thinking about conflict had shifted over time, and in the foreword to the book he reflected on this evolution. In his 1950 *Science and the Goals of Man*, he had embraced a technocratic vision of social control achieved through the extension of science to the domain of human affairs, which would bring about the end of destructive conflict. In his own words:

> I presented the scientific outlook as a model of orientation of supreme value to men, an outlook to be nurtured as a natural, internalized view of the world and to be extended beyond the domain of natural science, that is, to viewing ourselves, our aspirations, compulsions, and goals. The hope was expressed that if this comes about, many kinds of human conflicts, which now seem unresolvable, will either not arise or can be resolved or, at least, will not lead to destructive struggles.

This argument rested on the assumption "that human conflicts were predominantly manifestations of *debates,* and that violent conflicts, including wars, were, to paraphrase Clausewitz's grim comment, continuations of debates by other means." Rapoport had since come to believe "that not all conflicts are results of clashes between incompatible

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[27] Ibid., 12. Emphasis in original.

assertions."[28] And so he added the fight—a type of struggle in which "it is irrelevant or altogether impossible to express the "positions" of the opponents in words—and the game, in which opponents agree "to strive for incompatible goals within the constraint of certain rules."[29]

The main difference between the three types was the image of, and objective with respect to, one's opponent. In a fight, the opponent "must be eliminated, made to disappear, or cut down in size or importance. The object of a fight is to harm, destroy, subdue, or drive away from the opponent." In a game, however, the opponent is perceived as an equal: "The opponent speaks the same language; he is seen not as a nuisance but as a mirror image of self, whose interests may be diametrically opposed, but who nevertheless exists as a rational being. His inner thought processes must be taken into account."[30] In a debate, the opponent must be persuaded to see things differently: "The objective is to *convince* your opponent, to make him see things as you see them."[31]

Rapoport identified three "prototypes," or models of each type of conflict: Tom Sawyer's fight with Alfred Temple in *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1884), which escalates "inevitably" from "a series of maneuvers, verbal jabs, and feints" to physical violence[32]; a famous chess game between the American Frank Marshall and the Cuban José Raúl Capablanca in 1918, a kind of "drama" the game theorists had figured out how to "reduce [...] to logical analysis"; and the debate between two characters in Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* (1924): Settembrini, defender of "scientific humanism,

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[28] Ibid., vii.
[29] Ibid., viii.
[30] Ibid., 9.
[31] Ibid., 11.
[32] Ibid., 2.

individual freedom, secularism, and liberalism," and Naphtha, upholder of "the ideals of both the Catholic Church and of Communism."[33]

The book is divided into three parts, one for each type of conflict and its accompanying "framework of thought." For the analysis of fight-like conflicts, Rapoport drew primarily upon the work of the mathematician Lewis F. Richardson. Richardson's work—differential equations that could be used to mathematically model arms races and other conflict processes—had come to the attention of Rapoport and Boulding during the year they spent as fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, California. One could use the same type of equations to model electrochemical reactions in nerves, the explosion of a uranium bomb, and the spread of "epidemics," a category into which Rapoport put "outbreaks of mass violence," such as the Civil War, strikes, and race riots. "These analogies are not mere metaphors," Rapoport explained. "They are based on an underlying similarity of the *mathematical structure* of events, which affords the possibility of describing the various processes by similar types of mathematical equations. Phenomena of widely disparate content are conceptually unified by similar mathematical form."[34] The equations were undoubtedly a powerful way of modeling such processes, but, Rapoport pointed out, they made no allowance for "individual rationality" or "individual consciousness"; the "impulses and goals of the individual are lost in the equations [...], which typically describe what would happen if people did not stop to think."[35]

"Rationality"—defined by Rapoport here as calculations made in the context of decision-making—was central to game theory, the framework of thought best suited to

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[33] Ibid., 5.
[34] Ibid., 53.
[35] Ibid., 107.

the analysis of game-like conflicts. A game of strategy—such as checkers or chess—

"represents a limited portion of 'life' in which it is possible (in principle) to list all the

things that can happen."[36] The simplest game of interest to game theorists is the "two-

person zero-sum game," featuring two players "whose interests are diametrically

opposed."[37] As researchers began to investigate "more complicated cases"—games with

more than two players and non-zero-sum games—"ambiguities and difficulties" arose.

Rapoport illustrated this with the two-person, non-zero-sum game known as the

Prisoner's Dilemma, succinctly described by Rapoport:

> Two suspects are questioned separately by the district attorney. They are guilty of
> the crime of which they are suspected, but the D.A. does not have sufficient
> evidence to convict either. The state has, however, sufficient evidence to convict
> both of a lesser offense. The alternatives open to the suspects, A and B, are to
> confess or not to confess to the serious crime. They are separated and cannot
> communicate. The outcomes are as follows. If both confess, both get severe
> sentences, which are, however, somewhat reduced because of the confession. If
> one confesses (turns state's evidence), the other gets the book thrown at him, and
> the informer goes scot free. If neither confesses, they cannot be convicted of the
> serious crime, but will surely be tried and convicted for the lesser offense.[38]

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[36] Ibid., 109.

[37] Ibid., 131.

[38] Erickson writes that RAND circa 1950 was an important site for early formulations of and
experiments with the Prisoner's Dilemma game by mathematicians. R. Duncan Luce introduced Rapoport
to the Prisoner's Dilemma game when they were both fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences from 1954 to 1955. At the MHRI, from 1956 until 1960, Rapoport worked on an Air
Force research contract to study the effects of stress on flight crews. (Erickson notes that Rapoport was
"something of a rainmaker for the institute, representing the MHRI at a summer 1957 conference to plan
funding for the Air Force's new office of Scientific Research, which would centralize much of the Air
Force's R&D spending" (177).) As part of his Air Force research, Rapoport turned to the study of
"teamwork" and "cooperation" using a three-person variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the fall of
1960, having completed his work for the Air Force, Rapoport continued his game theory experiments,
receiving funding from the National Institutes of Health for his "Studies of Conflict and Cooperation in
Small Groups" through the spring of 1967. He presented his findings in these experiments in *Prisoner's
Dilemma: A Study of Conflict and Cooperation* (1965). As Erickson notes, Rapoport's experiments differed
from the game theory experiments done at RAND in two ways: they were conducted on a larger scale, and
were designed not "to 'test' possible solutions of games like PD," but rather to "explore the dynamic
processes whereby teams of individuals collectively arrived at cooperative behavior." Erickson explains the
nature of Rapoport's insights: "[I]t was precisely the *lack* of a mathematical theory of how to act in a PD
situation that made the game psychologically interesting. [...] Games like PD were more like experimental
'tools' that could permit rigorous exploration of what Rapoport called 'real psychology': phenomena
involving 'personality, intellect, and moral commitment" that could not be explained in terms of rational

The "rationality" upon which the theory of the zero-sum game was based prescribed a certain "mode of action": "First, one did the best one could for oneself under the circumstances. Second, one imputed to the opponent the same sort of motivation, and the same sort of cognition." This would result in "the maximum solution." According to the dictates of that rationality, in this situation, the prisoner ought to confess, reasoning, "no matter *what* B does, I am better off confessing. If he does confess, I would be a chump not to and take the whole rap [...]. If he doesn't confess, I stand to gain by confessing, since if I do, I won't have to take that other rap. Either way you look at it, I am better off if I sing."[39]

But Rapoport thought there was another way to look at it. What if instead of narrowly pursuing her own self-interest, each player considered which outcome would be best for both? And what if each prisoner made the "assumption of similarity," and took for granted that the other prisoner would think and act as she did?[40] By this reasoning, both should decide to confess. This was Rapoport's recommendation, which was "more difficult to accept, because our habits of thought (including definitions of rationality, etc.) are too deeply ingrained in terms of individuals and their individual interests abstracted

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means-ends calculation from self-interest alone. In this case at least, mathematics' loss was precisely psychology's gain. And throughout the 1960s, Rapoport ran with this insight, developing an extensive array of techniques for studying virtually every aspect of game-playing behavior" (180).
For more on the origins and consequences of Prisoner's Dilemma, see Philip Mirowski, *Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); S. M. Amadae, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003); and S. M. Amadae, *Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[39] Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, 174.
[40] The "assumption of similarity," Rapoport explained, was the same rationale behind cooperative efforts such as voting or getting vaccinated against smallpox.

from a more inclusive context. We have difficulty in making social values the fundamental starting point of our definition of rationality."[41]

In the Prisoner's Dilemma, if both prisoners acted "rationally"—that is, reasoned as if they were playing a zero-sum game, even though this was a non-zero-sum game— each would end up confessing and getting the most severe punishment. Rapoport made the point that this appears paradoxical only because "we have been too long accustomed to the uncritical acceptance of the laissez faire principle, namely, that a totality of individuals seeking their respective self-interests by *shortsighted* calculations actually will move toward the realization of this self-interest by the operation of economic laws derived from the assumption of a free competitive market economy."[42]

Rapoport criticized traditional game theory for taking the values of laissez-faire economics for granted, and for neglecting the realm of psychology. Still, he was not willing to dismiss it as "an empty mathematical exercise."[43] It was in fact a novel way of thinking about conflict. And it did lead, usefully, "to some genuine impasses, that is, to situations where its axiomatic base is shown to be insufficient for dealing even theoretically with some types of conflict situations." These would prompt "people who care" to "look around for other frameworks into which conflict situations can be cast. Thus, the impact is made on our thinking processes themselves, rather than on the actual content of our knowledge."[44]

In the third and final part of the book, Rapoport turned to the debate and its accompanying framework of thought, which, he said, fell outside of his own area of

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[41] Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, 131.
[42] Ibid., 177.
[43] Ibid., 240.
[44] Ibid., 242.

expertise, and which he had more or less cobbled together with "borrowed" ideas "from certain sectors of psychotherapy and cultural anthropology."[45] As Rapoport saw it, the Cold War itself was best understood not as a fight or a game, but as a debate. And so it ought to be conducted as a debate. "The object of debate, as we have defined debate, is to modify the image of the other."[46] This required empathy, and Rapoport concluded that "the technique of permissive therapy," developed by the psychologist Carl R. Rogers, was the most promising method for tapping into empathy and modifying the image of the other. By calling for empathetic understanding, he understood himself to be leaving the domain of the sciences and entering that of the arts and humanities. "[T]he foundations on which Part III rests are not scientific," he wrote in no uncertain terms. But this was the area "where my convictions are strongest, and where the conclusions are most controversial."[47] In Part III, he would "become a propagandist," a "preach[er]" of "empathetic understanding."[48]

However, conducting the Cold War as a debate was easier said than done, because "those who are considered experts in international relations (that is, those who actually engage in diplomacy or determine foreign policy) think almost exclusively in terms of power play, strategy, and maneuver."[49] Rapoport suspected that "decision-makers" on both sides of the Iron Curtain were incapable of thinking in anything other than "strategic terms." "The whole situation may be a Prisoner's Dilemma, in which it is impossible for the players to do the mutually advantageous thing, because there is nothing in their experience that allows them to make the assumption of similarity, which might solve the

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45 Ibid., 246.
46 Ibid., 273.
47 Ibid., 246.
48 Ibid., 246.
49 Ibid., 307.

dilemma to the advantage of both." Instead of making the assumption of similarity, each

side's soldiers, statesmen, and diplomats produced "frightening images" of the other.

These images were the products of a "global view" that imagined "current history as a

struggle for supremacy of two ways of life, a struggle that in effect blinds decision-

makers to the consequences of their actions in spite of the lip service paid to the necessity

of avoiding the impending holocaust."[50] While the application of "public pressure" might

stand a chance of influencing the experts for the good, that was dicey because even

though the "common people" of the world were "peace-loving," public opinion was

"seldom given coherent expression."[51]

Fights, Games, and Debates is a book that purports to be about different tools for

the analysis of conflict. And it does indeed invite readers to think differently about the

nature of conflict, war, and the Cold War. But it also invites them to think differently

about the nature of thinking, knowledge, and expertise. It enshrines modesty and empathy

as epistemic virtues. The book was widely read and reviewed at the time, and lauded by

other mathematicians and economists who worked on game theory. The economist

Thomas Schelling, then at Harvard's Center for International Affairs and at work on his

own rethinking of traditional game theory, gave the book a favorable review in the

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He praised Rapoport's

mathematical chops, describing the section on Richardson's equations as "some of the

finest methodological discussion I have seen on the relation of model-building, statistical

hypotheses, and mathematical formalism to social science." The game theory section he

deemed "the best available introduction to game theory for social scientists." (The third

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[50] Ibid., 309.
[51] Ibid., 308.

141

section, however, was "an odd one.") Schelling judged the book's "framework" to be a "fruitful failure," evidence, perhaps, that Schelling had read the book in the spirit in which Rapoport intended it—as an invitation to further reflection, rather than as an assertion of certain knowledge. On the whole, *Fights, Games, and Debates* was according to Schelling "a rich and exciting, original and ingenious contribution to the theory of conflict."[52]

The mathematician Robert Aumann penned a 12-page review for *World Politics*.[53] Aumann seemed to think that the book did not quite hang together as a whole—it struck him as "three books on three utterly different approaches to problems of conflict and cooperation." Aumann discussed only the game theory section, which he appraised as "by far the best existing popularization of game theory."[54] His review was glowing: "It is lucid, informative, and exciting; it offers significant insights into the philosophical background and consequences of theory, and suggests interesting possible new departures. [...] Urbane, witty, and sophisticated, his work is altogether a delight to read. [...] On the whole, the book cannot be too highly recommended, and I warmly congratulate Professor Rapoport for being the first to make the basic ideas of game theory available to the world at large."[55]

Oskar Morgenstern, the economist who, with the mathematician John von Neumann, helped bring game theory into being, reviewed Rapoport's book for the *Southern Economic Journal*. "[I]t is hard to imagine a social scientist who would not

[52] Thomas C. Schelling, Review of *Fights, Games, and Debates*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 335 (1961): 229-230.

[53] Aumann and Schelling would go on to share the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2005 for their work on conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis.

[54] In a footnote, Aumann added that while Luce and Raiffa's *Games and Decisions* (1957) was "more accurate and complete," it was "not a popularization," and could not "be thoroughly understood by readers with no previous mathematical training."

[55] Robert J. Aumann, "The Game of Politics," *World Politics* 14 (1962): 675-686.

profit greatly from reading this work, whether he be a newcomer to game theory or an expert in this discipline." Morgenstern gave high marks to the game theory part of the book, proclaiming it "thoroughly competent." "The exposition of this difficult matter is clear and is accessible without special knowledge of mathematics."[56] Ray Cuzzort, a sociologist writing for *Sociological Quarterly*, agreed that it was "well written and entertaining," but noted that sociologists would likely be disappointed that Rapoport had not engaged more with the sociology of conflict. But he was willing to let Rapoport off the hook for this, and "strongly recommend[ed]" the book to sociologists who had "wondered about the merits and demerits of game theory but have found highly technical descriptions too abstruse."[57]

Kenneth Boulding's Conflict and Defense: A General Theory *(1962)*

The most important thing to know about Kenneth Boulding's *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (1962) is that it grew out of its authors "conviction that, in order to develop a theoretical system adequate to deal with the problem of war and peace, it is necessary to cast the net wider and to study conflict as a general social process of which war was a special case."[58] The sought-after "general theory of conflict" was a means to an end: the prevention of war. Like Rapoport's, Boulding's book was deliberately eclectic, his "general theory" "derived from many different sources and disciplines."[59] By "general theory of conflict," he meant "an abstract model of a conflict

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[56] Oskar Morgenstern, Review of *Fights, Games, and Debates* and The Strategy of Conflict, *Southern Economic Journal* 28 (1961): 103-105.

[57] Ray P. Cuzzort, Review of *Fights, Games, and Debates*, Sociological Quarterly 4, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 172-174.

[58] Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), viii.

[59] Ibid., 2.

situation or a conflict process that applies no matter what the setting, who the parties, or

what the issues," equally applicable "to industrial conflict and strikes, international

conflict and war, family conflict and divorce, legal conflict and a judgment, race conflict

and a riot, and political conflict and an election." For the purposes of model-building, the

similarities between these kinds of conflict—the "common elements and general

patterns"— were more fundamental than the differences.[60] This search for common

elements and general patterns had to be conducted across disciplinary lines. And it just so

happened that every discipline, whether its practitioners explicitly recognized it or not,

studied conflict in one form or another:

> Economics studies conflict among economic organizations—firms, unions, and so
> , on. Political science studies conflicts among states and among subdivisions and
> departments within larger organizations. Sociology studies conflict within and
> between families, racial and religious conflict, and conflict within and between
> groups. Anthropology studies conflict of cultures. Psychology studies conflict
> within the person. History is largely the record of conflict. Even geography
> studies the endless war of the sea against the land and of one land form or one
> land use against another. Conflict is an important part of the specialized study of
> industrial relations, international relations, or any other relations.[61]

The general theory of conflict Boulding dreamed of, then, would explain a basic process

in its every manifestation, help unify the social sciences, and furnish a solution to the

problem of war.

Boulding was an economist, but *Conflict and Defense*, much like its author, could

not be slotted neatly into that discipline. Its "substance" was "not 'economics' in the

usual sense of the word: it is, I hope, a new theoretical abstraction from the general

phenomenon of conflict; it draws for its models on many of the other social sciences and

its principal application is to the theory of international relations." Boulding

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[60] Ibid., 189.
[61] Ibid., 1.

acknowledged his debts to his fellow fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the

Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) in Palo Alto from 1954-1955, to the University of

Michigan's "Conflict Resolution group," and to those who had participated in his 1956

seminar on the theory of conflict.

As in Rapoport's *Fghts, Games, and Debates*, Richardson's equations for

modeling arms races feature prominently in Boulding's book. The processes

Richardson's equations describe would already be familiar to economists (in the form of

the theory of the price war) and to political scientists (in the form of the theory of the

arms race). But economics and politics were not the only domains in which Richardson

processes could be observed: "We find the same processes, however, going on at all

levels of relationship—between union and management, between husband and wife,

between king and parliament, between president and congress, between administration

and faculty, between teacher and student, and even in the animal kingdom, between

predator and prey, parasite and host, eater and eaten."[62] And when it came to game

theory, like Rapoport, Boulding selected only "those elements and techniques" from it

that seemed "most useful" in developing his general theory.[63] But even as he used its

tools, he acknowledged that game theory had its limits. "The real world [...] is much

more complicated (or may even be in some respects simpler) than the Hobbesian universe

of the game theorist." Game theory left no room for examining concepts of "love,

affection, empathy, and community of feeling."[64]

The first nine chapters of the book were meant to build up the general theory of

conflict. The remaining chapters examine different kinds of conflict: economic,

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[62] Ibid., 25.
[63] Ibid., 41.
[64] Ibid., 57.

industrial, and international. Boulding thought the last was the most pressing, because it "threaten[ed] to put a stop to civilization and perhaps to all life on earth."[65] International conflict had become more dangerous as the range of the intercontinental ballistic missile had increased, rendering national defense obsolete now that the this projectile would be able to travel "half the circumference of the earth."[66] "Violence can now jump any boundary," he wrote.[67] "Everywhere is now accessible to everybody: there are no nooks, corners, or retreats left, and no snugly protected centers of national power."[68] Therefore, controlling conflict was now more important than ever.

Boulding built his "basic model" of international conflict on an analogy between competition of firms for a market and competition of states for territory. There was an important difference between the two, however: competition between firms was continuous, while competition between states alternates between two systems—peace or diplomacy on the one hand and war on the other. During periods of war, there was "overt conflict," and during periods of peace, "covert conflicts of threats, promises, and pressures."[69] The international system, Boulding explained, oscillated between the two, though not necessarily at regular intervals. It was important to distinguish between covert conflict that threatened to escalate into war and "that condition of genuine peace, or political integration, in which the agencies for the nonviolent resolution of conflict are adequate to maintain the system without either the threat or the actuality of war."[70] (The latter Boulding referred to as "stable peace.")

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[65] Ibid., 227.
[66] Ibid., 266.
[67] Ibid., 267.
[68] Ibid., 272.
[69] Ibid., 227.
[70] Ibid., 249.

Much of Boulding's life's work flowed from his conviction that there could be a science and technology of peace, and that conviction hinged on the analogy he drew between the "diplomacy-war international cycle" and the "boom-depression business cycle."[71] The key claim here is that, in theory, crises can be averted in either system. The fluctuations of the business cycle had once been considered "an intractable social problem," but "with increasing skill in the handling of financial institutions and in the development of general stabilization policies, liquidity crises in the sense in which they took place regularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have become vanishingly rare." Boulding attributed this mastery to "[t]he development of countercyclical instruments" such as taxes, social security, and monetary and fiscal policy. In other words, economists had helped policy makers get a handle on the economy. In theory, then, social scientists should be able to do the same for the international system. This was simply a matter of developing more sophisticated countercyclical instruments. The "problem of war" was eminently solvable if war was understood not "as something wholly unpredictable and nonsystematic" but "as a crisis in a cyclical system," akin to an economic crisis. "In economics, we have been accustomed to thinking in terms of cybernetic, or stabilizing institutions, and the exercise has been enormously fruitful," Boulding wrote. "It is not too much to hope for a similar mode of thought about war and peace."[72]

Rapoport's main argument in *Fights, Games, and Debates* was that all frameworks of thought, at least when it came to the analysis of conflict situations, had significant limits. Those limits became more visible when one considered these

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[71] Ibid., 250.
[72] Ibid., 252.

frameworks side by side, and an understanding of these limits enabled new modes of inquiry. If Rapoport emphasized the limits of knowledge, Boulding emphasized its possibilities. He concluded *Conflict and Defense* on that note: "It has been the major theme of this work to show that conflict processes are neither arbitrary, random, nor incomprehensible. In the understanding of these processes lies the opportunity for their control, and perhaps even for human survival."[73]

Rapoport and Boulding may have differed in their epistemological commitments and conclusions, but they shared the perception that the world was becoming less violent. Rapoport claimed in 1960 that overt violence was on the decline in the United States. "Sixty years ago violent industrial strife and lynchings were fairly common occurrences. I still remember the Detroit race riots of twenty years ago, and my father's generation remembers the Chicago race riots of forty years ago. Today such outbreaks are rare." He went on to assert that the mob was "no longer familiar to" Americans. "Its occasional appearance (e.g., in Little Rock in September 1957) is sufficiently rare so as to occasion nationwide concern. Our crowds, by and large, are not mobs."[74] Violence "in its overt physical form" had "practically disappeared." [75]

Boulding saw a gentling trend in the evolution of industrial relations. "As industrial relations mature, the strike often becomes ritualized," he wrote. "In many industries, strikes have become rarer and rarer as skill in industrial relations has developed, largely through the institution of grievance procedures, which release tensions bit by bit, instead of allowing them to build up." This did not necessarily mean that industrial conflict would "become a thing of the past," because "a certain basic conflict of

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[73] Ibid., 328.
[74] Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, 50.
[75] Ibid., 49.

interest" would always remain between employer and employee.[76] But "on the whole, one feels a modest optimism. Here we have an area of life in which conflict seems to have become less violent and less disruptive and in which institutions for handing it creatively have been forthcoming."[77]

Because they failed to consider, or had a tendency to dismiss, evidence to the contrary, the *perception* that the world was becoming less violent became an *assumption* that they built right into their models. In his review of Boulding's *Conflict and Defense* for the journal *World Politics,* Thomas Schelling made a similar point when he examined Boulding's claim that the intercontinental ballistic missile had rendered national defense obsolete and left no safe place on earth. "It seems a peculiarly American notion [...] that it is the 12,000-mile missile that denies that safe nook or cranny," Schelling wrote. "It was denied to the American Indian a hundred years ago, to the Poles at least three hundred years ago, and it was almost denied to the British in 1944 with short-range missiles. [...] The slave trader's rifle must have been as remorseless a pursuer as the ICBM."[78] And of course, Schelling's suggestion that this was a peculiarly *American* notion ignores the fact that the safe nook or cranny was and continued to be denied to many Americans by weapons far more mundane and far more brutal than the long-range missile.

The Ethics of Abstraction

In the same review for *World Politics*, Schelling read Boulding's book as a continuation of the project Boulding had begun with *The Image* (1957), wherein he

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[76] Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, 218.
[77] Ibid., 226.
[78] Thomas C. Schelling, "War Without Pain, and Other Models," *World Politics* 15, no. 3 (April 1963), 484.

attempted to lay the foundation for a new science that he called "eiconics." Schelling

remarked upon Boulding's intrepid generalizing in the newer book, in which Boulding

"broadened his new science to include virtually all social interaction processes—from

war to courtship, from competitive advertising to the lynx and the rabbit—that lend

themselves to a common style of systematic analysis." Schelling embraced this style of

thought in his own work, and defended it in Boulding's as "analysis that distills out of a

subject what is distinctive about it." He treated the review as an opportunity to compare

Boulding's book to Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates*, and explained that these two

authors had much in common:

> The men are colleagues at Michigan and share a number of enterprises, including
> the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. [...] The efforts of Boulding and
> Rapoport to stake out a new field of inquiry are, though different, nearer to each
> other than to any other work that I know of. Both men are fascinated by analytical
> models; both try to transcend any specific application—economics, race,
> delinquency, war, divorce, arbitration, politics. Both offer a set of concepts,
> analytical schemes, and terminology with which to build up an organized
> discipline.

But these were merely surface similarities. Schelling, who knew both men and was well

acquainted with both the Center and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, knew that

Boulding and Rapoport shared deeper affinities:

> These are men about the location of whose hearts there can be no question. Both
> are interested in peace and persuasion, suspicious of military force, sympathetic to
> disarmament and international institutions, unpersuaded that the Soviet
> bureaucracy is incorrigibly satanic, willing to explore radical approaches to peace
> and security, and devoted to peace for reasons that go beyond just the avoidance
> of war. At the same time, both are intrigued by theoretical ideas—'addicted' is
> not too strong a term. They have been fascinated by game theory, and not only
> acknowledge it but build it into their books. Most of those who have recently
> screamed against 'game theory' (outcries really directed at theory, not at game
> theory) seemed unaware that it could affect the angels too and that some were in
> fairly high fever. [...] One can nowhere find as explicit use of game theory or any
> comparably abstract theory in the published works of Herman Kahn, Albert
> Wohlstetter, or even—in his work on military policy—Oskar Morgenstern, as in
> the books of Boulding and Rapoport.

Schelling seems to be suggesting that there is a tension between devotion to peace and addiction to theoretical ideas. Why?[79]

Rapoport himself had contributed to the critique of game theory to which Schelling refers here, even if Rapoport's position was actually more nuanced than this— his was not a critique of game theory itself, but rather an objection to the *misuse* of game theory by certain kinds of people for certain purposes. In an article published in *Scientific American* in 1962, titled, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," Rapoport warned against the temptation to view game theory as a panacea. "We live in an age of belief— belief in the omnipotence of science," he wrote. Scientists themselves had done much to foster this belief. "Today, in greater measure than ever before, scientists sit at the decision makers' elbows and guide the formulation of problems in such a way that scientific solutions are possible. Problems that do not promise scientific solutions generally go unformulated." This was the spirit in which game theory had been embraced of late. "The decision makers in our society are overwhelmingly preoccupied with power conflict, be it in business, in politics, or in the military. Game theory is a 'science of conflict.' What could this new science be but a reservoir of power for those who got there fastest with the mostest?"[80] As he had done in *Fights, Games, and Debates*, Rapoport emphasized the limitations of game theory: "The value of game theory is not in the specific solutions it offers in highly simplified and idealized situations, which may occur

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[79] In his book about American nuclear strategists, the writer Fred Kaplan explains that among defense intellectuals, Schelling favored a middle way of sorts, and "appealed strongly to those who felt constrained by the doctrine of massive retaliation. His book [*The Strategy of Conflict* (1960)] reinforced the insouciance toward force that marked the insignia of the post-Eisenhower defense intellectual. But in the process Schelling tended to make limited war appear casual, too predictable, too manageable, as if national leaders really might control their moves and countermoves in war as tightly and single-mindedly as the drivers of two cars trying to pass each other on a narrow bridge." From Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 331.

[80] Anatol Rapoport, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," *Scientific American* (1962): 108.

in formalized games but hardly ever do in real life. Rather, the prime value of the theory

is that it lays bare the different kinds of reasoning that apply in different kinds of

conflict."[81]

"Game theorist" was becoming an epithet; Schelling pointed out that the label was

even more appropriate for the "angels" Rapoport and Boulding than it was for the experts

who sat at the decision makers' elbows. This was part of a larger debate about the proper

role of values in social science in which Schelling and Boulding had been engaged since

the late 1950s, when Schelling had served on an advisory committee for the Center for

Research on Conflict Resolution before it was established. He had expressed concern

then about the proposed center's politics, urging it to "cultivate deliberately a reputation

for open-mindedness." "I should be sorry to see the Center become identified with a

particular program or political point of view, and sorry to see it concerned with public

education and stimulation rather than research," he wrote. "I think the Center would be

fairly ineffectual as a propaganda organization, even if it promotes very good

propaganda, but may fill an important need if it helps to focus good research on problems

related to international conflict."[82] In his 1963 review of the two theory books, he

revisited this issue: "It is a credit to Boulding, Rapoport, and their colleagues that their

Journal of Conflict Resolution has not fallen captive to any group, methodological or

political." He did not say the same for the Center.

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[81] Ibid., 114.

[82] Thomas Schelling to Robert Hefner, September 24, 1959. Schelling and Boulding admired each other's work, but disagreed on the question of values. In 1961, Boulding sent a copy of a review he had written of Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* to Schelling, accompanied by a note: "As I think you feel yourself, there is a deep rift in fundamental values which divides us. In spite of this, however or perhaps even because of it, I feel that I have learned an enormous amount from you and I feel there has been a degree of intellectual symbiosis between us." Letter from Kenneth Boulding to Thomas Schelling, June 14, 1961, "R-S 1960-62 CRCR & Peace," box 32, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

Schelling also seemed surprised that Boulding's pacifism was not more overt in the book, whose "main application," as far as Schelling could tell, was "to military relations." "Boulding's book is almost sure to surprise those who know of him, and even some who know him, by the little comfort it will give people who would like him to 'prove' the case for some peace movement. His enthusiasm for his theory is understandably great, but his claims for policy are moderate." Schelling's reading, however, was at odds with Boulding's own framing of the book. Boulding described it as a work of "pure abstract theory."[83] That theory, he claimed, was "ethically neutral," just as "useful to the nationalist as to the internationalist, to the militarist as to the pacifist, and to the communist as to the democrat."[84] Whether he actually believed that or not, he made no such claim of ethical neutrality for himself. In fact, he hoped that this abstract social theory would bolster the peace movement, for he believed "that the intellectual chassis of the broad movement for the abolition of war has not been adequate to support the powerful moral engine which drives it and that the frequent breakdowns which interrupt the progress of the movement are due essentially to a deficiency in its social theory."[85]

Boulding insisted that peace was "researchable." There were things in the world that fell into the category of the unresearchable, such as the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. It was possible to study *belief* in the doctrine empirically, but not the doctrine itself, because science could not determine whether wine and bread become the body and blood of Christ. It was possible to study peace empirically, however, because it was a property of social systems. While existing methods for studying such systems were

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[83] Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, vii.
[84] Ibid., 329.
[85] Ibid., vii.

admittedly crude, they were improving, especially as scientists developed more sophisticated understandings of systems. All conflict systems had what Boulding called a "break boundary," a point at which there was a transition from one system to another. Maintaining peace was a matter of being able to detect when a conflict was approaching its break boundary, and then reining it in before it could get there.[86] The principle was simple: "In an international system which has the property of stable peace, it is necessary to be able to perceive movements toward war in their early stages and to reverse them before they get too far to be reversed." Boulding imagined the machinery of peace as "an information-processing system in the field of international relations which can perform somewhat the role as the Department of Commerce does in its development of national income statistics." This system would make use of a panoply of social research techniques: "statistical analysis of economic and political data," "content analysis of the world press and radio," and "the method of survey research."[87]

Boulding emphasized the "researchability" of peace when he appealed to his fellow Quakers to raise money for the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. In a fundraising letter to potential donors S. Emlen Stokes and Lydia B. Stokes, he wrote:

> The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution is essentially a center for peace research, one of the very few centers of this kind in a major university. I became convinced ten or fifteen years ago that the peace movement as it then existed was incapable of creating a world of stable peace, and that if we were indeed to achieve a peaceful world, a large intellectual effort, especially in the social sciences, would have to be mobilized. Our major intellectual resources were all going into preparation for war, and practically nothing into the understanding and what might even be called the technology of peace.

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[86] Kenneth Boulding, "Is Peace Researchable?" *Background* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1963), 73.
[87] Ibid., 74.

This was "a concern which is so much in line with the basic of interests of Friends that it only seems right that Friends should be aware of it."[88]

Boulding made similar arguments to colleagues at the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). In February 1961, he wrote to AFSC spokesman Roscoe Griffin to express his concern "about the isolation of the committee from the whole world of social science research." "Where are the young Friends today who are really trying to train themselves for the social sciences?" he asked. And just as Quakers could benefit from the social sciences, the social sciences too could benefit from Quakers. "Social science research, I think, reaches a sort of spiritual barrier which is imposed by the very sub-culture of the social sciences. This prevents it from making its full impact which, in the last analysis, has to be a moral one. It is precisely at this point that Friends could make an enormous contribution."[89]

The peace movement so far had not done much to develop "the institutions of peace," having been forced by the invention of conscription "to channel its energies mainly into the defense of its individual adherents against the governments of their own countries." And while defending conscientious objectors was important work to be sure, Boulding thought it had little to do with the achievement of world peace.[90] "Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so peace is too important to leave to the pacifists," he wrote. "It is not enough to condemn violence, to abstain from it, or to withdraw from

[88] Letter from Kenneth Boulding to S. Emlen Stokes and Lydia B. Stokes, February 2, 1965, "Correspondence – 1961-1965 – Alphabetical – Sti-Sz," box 5, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[89] Letter from Kenneth Boulding to Roscoe Griffin, February 27, 1961, "Am. Friends Service Committee Philadelphia 1960-61," box 30, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[90] Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, 333.

it. There must be organization against it; in other words, institutions of conflict control or, in still other words, government."[91]

"The crumbs from the Pentagon would feed us!"

Boulding had seen an opportunity for peace researchers to influence the "institutions of conflict control" when President Kennedy took office in 1961.[92] Liberal peace activists were heartened by the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in September 1961, and by the president's call for "general and complete disarmament" in his address to the UN General Assembly preceding the establishment of the new agency.[93] Peace researchers had even more reason to be optimistic when the Peace Research Institute, a Washington think tank, began its operations in April 1961, with James J. Wadsworth, a former ambassador to the UN, as its first president and CEO. The mission of the PRI was "to undertake and to stimulate research in all fields relevant to peace, security, disarmament, and international order."[94]

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[91] Ibid., 334.

[92] Boulding was circumspect about the role of public opinion in the peace movement. In September 1961, he wrote to Robert Schultz of the Northern California chapter of Lobby for Peace to tell him about a conversation he had had with the Norwegian sociologist and mathematician Johan Galtung of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Galtung had done a study of the anti-nuclear campaign in Norway and had found that as a result of the campaign, more people thought Norway should have a nuclear weapon. "This illustrates, I think, a great dilemma of the peace movement, that if we try to stir up people about peace we are more likely to stir up the wrong people than the right. For this reason, I have been strongly opposed to anything like an emergency peace campaign at the moment. Underlying American public opinion seems to be in such a dangerous mood that almost our only hope lies in apathy. This is a depressing conclusion for the professional stirrer-upper, but it is a reality that we must at times face." Letter from Kenneth Boulding to Robert Schultz, September 30, 1961, "R-S 1960-62 CRCR & Peace," box 32, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[93] The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency superseded and absorbed the U.S. Disarmament Administration, which had been established in September 1960. Established the following year, the ACDA was charged with advising the President, Secretary of State, and ACDA Director on matters relating to international arms control and disarmament.

[94] Press release, April 5, 1961, "Peace Research Institute Washington, D.C. 1961-3," box 38, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

Boulding served as a member of the PRI's Peace Research Advisory Council, tasked with helping to "mobilize the nation's intellectual resources in the effort to achieve a peaceful world."[95] He wrote to Wadsworth to convey his hope that the PRI would further the cause of peace research. "We have greatly felt the lack of a bridge between the peace research movement and those social scientists who are engaged in it on the one hand, and the policy maker and the responsible official on the other." He and his colleagues at the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution hoped that the PRI would be able to bridge this gap and help secure patronage for peace research. "We have had, and are still having, a hard struggle." he wrote. "But we have resolved not to give up—and the establishment of the Peace Research Institute has given us a real ray of hope!" He lamented the lack of funding for peace research, and exclaimed that even "the crumbs from the Pentagon would feed us!" "We hope you can make the nation aware of this shocking misallocation of its intellectual resources."[96]

Boulding wrote on behalf of the Center to Donald Michael, the PRI's director of planning and programs, with specific suggestions for how to bridge the gap between peace researchers and policy makers. Boulding identified two problems: the "relative absence of social scientists from the Disarmament Agency," and the lack of "free flow of ideas between the academic community on the one hand and the Disarmament Agency on the other." While peace researchers had hoped that they might influence policy through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it had not quite turned out that way. The Council of Economic Advisers, Boulding wrote, was "a very important channel of

[95] Press release, November 19, 1961, "Peace Research Institute Washington, D.C. 1961-3," box 38, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[96] Letter from Kenneth Boulding to James Wadsworth, April 11, 1961, "Peace Research Institute Washington, D.C. 1961-3," box 38, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

communication between the economics profession and the White House"; could there be

an equivalent body representing peace research? "One of the problems in the field of

peace and disarmament is, of course, that we do not really have a profession on the

outside of government which is a large and competent intellectual community." While

this community grew, Boulding thought it was "important to set up some machinery,

beyond that of contract research, for a free exchange of ideas"; the PRI seemed to be "an

ideal agency to organize this machinery."[97]

Because he wished to influence decision makers, Boulding was open to the

possibility of working with the emerging arms control community, and he expressed this

willingness privately and publicly. In January 1961, he wrote to David Riesman, with

whom he corresponded frequently, to inform him of his experience at a conference in

Washington, D.C. the weekend before, co-hosted by the Institute for International Order

and Colorado State University researchers, including Maurice Albertson. Albertson, a

professor of civil engineering and an architect of the Peace Corps, had been interested in

the work of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution since reading about it in a

column in the *Washington Post* back in 1959. Albertson considered setting up a similar

program in Fort Collins, and had pitched his ideas to the Department of Defense.

Boulding wrote of Albertson: "He seems to be not only on the side of the angels but to

have certain of the powers that be on his own side which is unusual. They are, however, a

little remote from the main centers and they may need some transfusions." Boulding and

four other social scientists who had been working with the Institute for International

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[97] Letter from Kenneth Boulding to Donald Michael, "Peace Research Institute Washington, D.C. 1961-3," box 38, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

Order to develop peace research programs gave presentations at the conference. Boulding

described the scene to Riesman:

> We had a bunch of State Department and Pentagon there and one or two
> Congressmen, on the whole they were the kind of people who sit behind the
> people who make decisions, and I thought a fairly important group. There was
> noticeable underlying tension between the arms control boys who look upon this
> fundamentally as a means of rehabilitating the good old institution of war and
> people like myself who are fundamentally interested in abolishing war. However,
> I am personally prepared to go along with the arms control boys for a long way.
> This is mainly because I think an arms control organization would represent a
> much more fundamental system change than they think.[98]

Boulding wrote to Riesman again the next month upon his return to Ann Arbor

from a trip to the West Coast. "Seminars on arms control and disarmament seem to be

springing up everywhere. This is, I think, a most encouraging sign." Boulding had given

a seminar at RAND, where he reported feeling "a little bit like Daniel in the lion's den,

but the lions were very polite (so, of course, were Daniel's lions)." He had presented his

idea that the long-range missile had rendered the concept of national defense obsolete. He

was not exactly modest in his assessment of the RAND reaction to the idea, which he

described as "one of slightly bewildered respect. The notion does not seem to arouse any

deep hostility, only a certain puzzlement as if this is a concept that people cannot quite

grasp. I get the feeling that I seem to be lecturing about relativity to a lay audience." In

the same letter, Boulding informed Riesman of local developments in Ann Arbor, writing

hopefully about the conflict resolution group but, as usual, lamenting their perpetual

penury: "A really enormous field of research seems to be opening up. The only trouble is

that the laborers are few and the financial support is almost non-existent."[99] Riesman

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[98] Kenneth Boulding to David Riesman, January 10, 1961, "R-S 1960-62 CRCR & Peace," box 32, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[99] The final item in the letter was a query: Did Riesman know a social scientifically inclined historian who would be willing to work on his own time on the problem of the 17th-century Tokugawa

expressed surprise at Boulding's receptivity to arms control. "What you say about arms

control not being entirely the work of the devil is striking, for certainly it is an effort by

many people at what Lasswell would call restriction through partial incorporation." He

requested Boulding's permission to circulate his comments in the Committee of

Correspondence newsletter, "for I think they are very helpful to that large group who

think that arms control is to be fought unequivocally, as the opposite of disarmament

rather than a round-about possible road to it."[100]

An Uneasy Alliance

A March 20, 1962 article in the *Christian Science Monitor* reported

enthusiastically on the activities of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution.

"While others labor toward the goals of making more powerful nuclear weapons and

controlling them, this professional group works zealously at what its members call

'conflict resolution.'" Boulding cuts quite a figure in the piece, at once a pacifist and an

action intellectual. "Of a vigorous and unconventional turn of mind, this professor gives

the impression more of a man of action than of a retiring scholar."[101] But the opposition

between arms control and conflict resolution that the article takes for granted was not

there all along—it had hardened over time. Boulding, as we have seen, tried to work

around it and, as we will see, Rapoport only intensified it. Both approaches were on full

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Settlement in Japan? "This seems to me to be the closest parallel that we have in history on a small scale of the problem that we face today." Boulding was interested in the transition from a stable system of feudal war to a period of no internal war. "It represents a real system break from a war system to a peace system." He added, "I find it intensely frustrating to have so many ideas and no money." Kenneth Boulding to David Riesman, February 20, 1960, "R-S 1960-62 CRCR & Peace," box 32, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[100] David Riesman to Kenneth Boulding, January 20, 1960, "R-S 1960-62 CRCR & Peace," box 32, Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[101] Dorothea Kahn Jaffe, "Peace Research Prods 'Conflict Resolution'," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 20, 1962, "Historical – Clippings, Press Material 1959-1962," box 6, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

display when arms controllers and peace researchers attempted to forge an alliance at the University of Michigan beginning in the summer of 1961.

Throughout that summer, tensions escalated between the United States and the Soviet Union over the status of Berlin. President Kennedy met Premier Khrushchev for the first time in Vienna in June; Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany that would cut off American, British, and French access to West Berlin if Western forces did not withdraw by the end of the year. Kennedy addressed the American people in a televised speech on the evening of July 25. The U.S. was ready to talk, but it would not hesitate to use force if force were used against it—it would go to war to defend its rights and commitments in West Berlin if necessary. It would defend the peace – the precarious postwar balance of power in Europe – with strength. Kennedy announced plans for a significant military buildup, and prepared the nation for the possibility of war, even nuclear war. He told them that fallout shelters would be marked and stocked, new air raid warning and fallout detection systems devised. He assured them that the national economy was strong, but that a future increase in taxes might be necessary to fund further military measures. Berlin was not yet a hotbed of war, and negotiation was still an option. The choice of peace or war, force or agreement, was Moscow's. "We seek peace, but we shall not surrender." By mid-August, the East Germans had begun building the wall that would divide East and West Berlin for the next 28 years. The confrontation culminated in a face-off between Soviet and American tanks at the diplomatic checkpoint between the two sides in late October; the situation was ultimately defused through back-channel communications between the White House and

the Kremlin. The so-called Berlin Crisis had brought the two nuclear superpowers dangerously close to war.

And so during this summer of tensions between the two superpowers a rapprochement between peace researchers and arms controllers may have seemed all the more imperative to some. The University of Michigan Faculty Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament had its first meeting on the evening of July 13, from 8:00-10:00pm. Co-sponsored by the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution and the University's Institute of Science and Technology, the seminar, which met every three weeks, drew faculty members from across the University, and was designed to bring together two groups between whom there had so far been little communication: "on the one hand, political and other social scientists interested in international relations, and, on the other, those pysical [sic] scientists, mathematicians and engineers who are interested in devising systems of arms control and inspection."[102]

Encouraged by the Kennedy administration's expression of support for disarmament and arms control initiatives, the members of the seminar began discussing plans for a symposium to be held in the fall of 1961, to which they would invite high-ranking government officials. Delayed by a year, the International Arms Control Symposium, co-sponsored by the University of Michigan and the Bendix Corporation, a major defense contractor, took place at the University from December 17-20, 1962, two months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The symposium began with a general session on the afternoon of Monday, December 17, with speeches by Victor Karpav, First Secretary

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[102] "Symposium on Models for the Resolution of International Conflict: With Reference To Both Technological Systems and Social Organization," "Research – Faculty Research Seminar on Arms Control – 1961," box 13, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

of the Soviet Embassy ("Soviet Stand on Disarmament Program"); Robert Matteson of

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ("Disarmament and the Geneva

Conference"); and Walter Reuther, president of the International Union of the United

Auto Workers ("Arms Control and the Challenge of Peace").

The symposium drew more than 300 people, including several members of

Congress (Senator Hubert Humphrey spoke); representatives of the federal government,

including the Departments of Defense and State, the Advanced Research Projects

Agency, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the ACDA, and the United States

Information Agency; representatives of at least 16 defense companies, including Boeing,

Douglas, North American, and Lockheed; staff of the UN Secratariat; academics; and

church groups, who were reportedly "most numerous". The event garnered quite a bit of

publicity. "A new alliance between industry, government, and universities was forged

here this week," the *Washington Post* announced.[103]

The international relations journal *Background* published collected reports on the

symposium in their Winter 1963 issue. One delegate, Nils Örvik of the University of

Oslo, was surprised to find peace activists and military planners attempting to

communicate with one another. "The beret-wearing 'peacemongers' representing all

kinds of peace organizations exist in most European countries, but there they usually do

not meet with the 'warmongers.' If they do, they fight. In Ann Arbor, they met, talked,

and listened."[104] But other accounts suggested that the attempted alliance between arms

controllers and peace researchers was a rather uneasy one. Another observer noted some

of the tensions between the two groups:

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[103] "Industry, Government, Schools Study Arms Race," *Washington Post*, December 23, 1962, A4.
[104] "Reviews of a Conference: The Michigan-Bendix International Arms Control Symposium," *Background* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1963): 60.

The conference was not quite a confrontation between peace researchers and military policy planners and strategists. The situation might better be described as co-presence. [...] Kenneth Boulding's remark that the meeting might be compared to the WCTU [Woman's Christian Temperance Union] getting together with the distillers to encourage moderate drinking seemed to have something to do with what was going on.[105]

Boulding spoke during a banquet dinner on one of the nights. This was later published as an article in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* titled, "The University, Society, and Arms Control." Consistent with what he had told Riesman before, Boulding expressed a willingness to find common cause with arms controllers. He argued that in fact social scientific expertise was indispensable to the task of arms control, which was, he believed, fundamentally "a problem of social systems rather than of physical systems."[106] The distinction between arms control and disarmament, he said, was "a tenuous one." The difference was a matter of degree, not of kind. If arms control meant "stopping the arms race so that we do not all make ourselves absolutely worse off," disarmament meant "the process of actively and continually reducing the amount of economic resources spent on the world war industry so that we may all be absolutely better off." Boulding believed that the first problem was actually more difficult than the second, because arms control would require international military cooperation, "a fundamental change from an uncontrolled and purely reactive system."[107]

He also argued for a strong role for universities in bargaining for arms control and disarmament agreements, and in the larger problem of establishing a stable peace. He said that universities should take on the tasks of understanding the "immensely complex dynamic processes" of the "world social system" and of establishing the international

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[105] Ibid., 50.
[106] Kenneth Boulding, "The University, Society, and Arms Control," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7, no. 3 (September 1963): 458.
[107] Ibid., 459.

system of information collection for which Boulding had been lobbying. He said that

universities could also complement the work of "operating agencies" such as the

Departments of State and Defense, which were understandably "preoccupied with day-to-

day matters and concerned with operating the existing system" to do the kind of

theoretical work Boulding thought would be necessary in order to establish stable peace.

While the operating agencies performed their "tasks," universities would perform "meta-

tasks"[108]; this division of labor would require a major reorganization not only of the

university but also of society. Boulding dreamt big:

> One would like to see [...] corresponding to every operating agency and to every division of government, and for that matter to every major segment of the business world and the economy, a corresponding research agency in the university, in close contact with a research division of the operating agency itself. The research agency in the university would be free to follow the inner dynamic of science, to develop wild ideas and intellectual mutations, and also to develop rigorous means of reality testing. The research division in the operating agency will be more properly concerned with day-to-day problems, with short-run views, and with easy and accurate answers to difficult but pressing questions. Then one would like to see these two modes of intellectual endeavor have equal social status, so that they could establish close and constant contact with each other through the circulation of personnel, through conferences and journals, and through the establishment of a common frame of communication and discourse.

In case there was any doubt that Boulding was airing some of his personal frustrations

and aspirations as an outsider with many ideas but little influence and scanty resources,

he named the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution as an example of the form these

"research agencies" within the universities might take, except with more "lines of

communication both to and from the decision-makers."[109]

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[108] Ibid., 462.
[109] Ibid., 463.

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Strategy vs. Conscience

Where Boulding saw opportunity, Rapoport saw opponents. He seems to have taken every chance he got to further develop the critique of strategic thought he had begun in *Fights, Games, and Debates* and in the *Scientific American* article. Following the International Arms Control Symposium, where Rapoport had presented his Prisoner's Dilemma research, the *Nation* published an exchange between Rapoport and the political scientist J. David Singer, titled "The Armers and the Disarmers." Singer was also affiliated with the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, and was a member of the steering committee of the faculty arms control seminar. Both were advocates of disarmament, but Singer favored an alliance between peace researchers and arms controllers while Rapoport vehemently opposed it. The two hotly debated the matter in the pages of the March 2, 1963 issue of the *Nation*.

The editors framed the debate in an introductory note: "The most immediately vexing problem facing the advocates of disarmament is that of tactics: to whom should they speak? in what terms? under what circumstances?" Singer focused his comments on the extent to which the symposium had succeeded in its goal of "improving the relationship between the 'armers' and the 'disarmers,' who more often than not are also the insiders and the outsiders respectively." Singer believed that contact between the two groups ought to be encouraged. As he saw it, "competitive, nonmilitary coexistence with the Soviet Union" was the goal; it was too risky to assume that the adversary had no expansionist tendencies, and so "there is little choice but to retain a military establishment and the panoply of people which must direct it." If one cut off contact with these people, one potentially gave up "access to views and information not often found in

published documents" and "the opportunity for reciprocal influence." Furthermore, academics ought to understand the constraints operating upon decision-makers. Singer judged the symposium a modestly successful attempt "to bring together the armers and disarmers, the insiders and outsiders, for serious debate, quiet conversation and an exchange of information and ideas."

Rapoport saw things differently. Singer divided participants into armers and disarmers, insiders and outsiders, and explained that these groups often overlapped. Rapoport divided them into two groups: "one concerned with avoiding war, the other with waging peace." The former outnumbered the latter. The war-avoiders were "concerned with tinkering with the war machine in order to keep it from exploding and at the same time to keep it serviced and ready to go. It was apparent that this group viewed war as something that *occurs*, like an earthquake or a tornado, and that the war machine can and should be designed to prevent the occurrence of this disaster with proper safety devices to guard its possessor against accidents." The peace-wagers began with "the assumption that wars do not 'occur,' but are made by men who control war machines. To those who held this view the war machine was not an insurance against a quasi-natural disaster, but an instrument of man-made disaster." They called for dismantling the war machine, not making it safer.

What of Singer's claim that peace workers should engage with strategists, so that they might reach someone who can actually influence policy? Rapoport could imagine engaging in a serious dialogue with people whose views were opposed to his own: a devout Catholic, an orthodox Communist, a laissez faire conservative. But never a military strategist. "To me the only possible motive for associating intellectually with

him would be a nefarious one—to infiltrate his world in order to destroy it. He is to me not an opponent, but an enemy. If I were to learn his language, I would do so not in order to understand him, but in order to pass for a professional, so as to get his attention. In short, in such a dialogue I would find myself in the position of a spy or of a Jesuit of the seventeenth century, or of a Communist in the darkest days of the *Stalinshchina*."

The emergence of arms control had seemed at first to present an opportunity for peace researchers to gain access to both resources and policy makers, and so the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution experimented with a collaboration with the University's Institute of Science and Technology and with the Bendix Corporation. The alliance with arms controllers proved to be an uneasy one, however. Peace researchers were invested in keeping the idea of disarmament alive. But as arms control came to displace disarmament, the two became competing worldviews. Boulding endorsed the idea of an alliance with arms controllers. They had access to power and money, and because arms control required international military cooperation to stop the arms race, it was really the more radical change. Rapoport, on the other hand, totally rejected the strategists' way of thinking. He rejected what they represented. There were those who sought to avoid war—merely to tinker with the war machine—and there were those who sought to wage peace. For Rapoport this was the distinction between arms control and disarmament.

Rapoport was a leading game theorist himself, but he despised the ways in which game theory and other theoretical tools were being used to rationalize war. His critique of strategic thinking became more strident, culminating in his 1964 book *Strategy and Conscience*. Initially he had tried "to confine criticisms of strategic thinking to the

strategists' own ground."[110] But he found that increasingly difficult. In the preface to

Strategy and Conscience, he recounts a strategist's visit to the University of Michigan.

The strategist remains nameless, but it is almost certainly Herman Kahn. During the

question period following the talk, someone asked the strategist why he and his ilk "did

not direct their talents to research aimed at averting war. Why did the 'unthinkable'

which the strategist so bravely faced, include only scenarios of massive destruction? Why

did the scheme not include other 'unthinkable' situations, for example, the consequences

of surrender?" When the strategist replied that much strategic research was in fact

directed at preventing war, Rapoport "felt engulfed in a wave of repugnance," and asked

the speaker "how he would defend himself if at some future time he were a co-defendant

in a genocide trial."[111] A number of his colleagues believed that with that question he

"had violated the standards of academic discourse," Rapoport recalled. From this

encounter he concluded that "[q]uestions of morality, while possibly crucially important

in themselves, were altogether taboo."[112]

In *Strategy and Conscience*, Rapoport explained that his intended target was not

individual strategists or even a particular group, but strategic thinking. "Strategist" was a

"social role"—"someone who at the moment conceives international problems in

strategic terms."[113] There were two types of strategists: "the abstractionists" and "the

neo-traditionalists." The neo-traditionalists were the Henry Kissingers of strategy, the

ones who were "more likely to have a background in political science, occasionally in

history or economics," and who thought about participants in international conflict not as

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[110] Anatol Rapoport, *Certainties and Doubts: A Philosophy of Life* (Black Rose Books, 2001), 136.
[111] Ibid., 130.
[112] Ibid., 131.
[113] Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 177.

"interchangeable players A and B, but specific nations, the great powers, their allies, and their satellites." They were adherents of *realpolitik*. But the abstractionists were Rapoport's main target. They were the "cool young men" of RAND and other think tanks, whose "mode of thought is largely apolitical." The abstractionists earned their names because they worked "in a context devoid of content."[114] But, Rapoport contended, their purported objectivity notwithstanding, value judgments were always built into their analyses.

Thermonuclear war was not, as the strategists insisted, something that had just befallen humanity, a stark reality to be faced stoically and contemplated dispassionately. The strategists were in fact complicit in it, planning and preparing for it, making it possible with their "convincing arguments about the necessity of possessing 'nuclear capabilities' and the 'will to use them.'" They made a virtue of their professional detachment, but in fact, Rapoport charged, in this detachment they resembled those "who planned, designed, and carried out the exterminations of the 1940's."[115] The alternative to strategic thinking was conscientious thinking. The conscientious thinker believes that power corrupts, "[a]nd this, for him, is not simply 'something to think about' in off moments, but a fundamental insight."[116]

A Beacon for the New Left

Between Boulding's ongoing quest for a science and technology of peace and Rapoport's ongoing critique of strategic thinking, it is not surprising that conflict resolution at Michigan attracted students activists in the early 1960s. The general

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[114] Ibid., 180.
[115] Ibid., 191.
[116] Ibid., 190.

orientation of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, too, suggested an appealing alternative to the brinkmanship that had brought the world so close to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as in this description of "conflict resolution" from a 1963 brochure for the Center:

> Resolving a conflict may not make it vanish.
> Literally, *resolution* implies 'loosening up again.'
> We may think of people or nations
> uncomfortably related to one another by hostile commitments
> in a structure so rigid
> that it seems capable of changing
> only by explosion.
>
> Here resolution means the loosening of these commitments
> to the point where restructuring is possible
> and violence is avoided.
>
> More flexible structures can be sought
> in which the interplay of conflicting interests
> produces its own necessary adjustments—
> without grinding, every so often, to a terrible halt.[117]

In February 1963, Todd Gitlin, future president of SDS and at the time still a senior at Harvard studying mathematics, wrote a letter to Bill Barth, then the Center's director. Gitlin's friend Tom Hayden, current president of SDS and a graduate student at Michigan writing a thesis on C. Wright Mills, was his link to the Center. "I gather that Tom Hayden has told you of my interest in coming to Ann Arbor next year; but unfortunately he wasn't terribly explicit in explaining to me how I might be able to tie in with the Conflict Resolution Center," he wrote. "What little I know about the Center, from gossip and the Journal interests me highly, but those poor shreds of insubstantial knowledge haven't told me whether, and how, I could contribute in some institutional way." Gitlin had applied to

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[117] CRCR brochure, c. 1963, "Historical – pamphlets – 1960-1968," box 7, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

the political science department for a fellowship for graduate study, and had indicated an

interest in "conflict resolution studies." He was curious about "activities and setup of the

Center," and hoped "there might be a place" for him there.[118] Barth replied and said that

he had had several positive conversations about Gitlin with Hayden and Dick Flacks,

another SDSer. He described the Center to Gitlin as a "research organization," and

highlighted ongoing projects that took social psychological and quantitative approaches

to the study of international relations.[119]

Gitlin may not have known much about the Center for Research on Conflict

Resolution, but he did know that he wanted to be a part of it. His interest in the Center

reflected the evolution of his politics as a college student. He had led Tocsin, a group of

Harvard and Radcliffe students who advocated for disarmament. Along with the rest of

Tocsin's leaders, Gitlin "devoured books and article both political and technical." His

reading list was impressively eclectic:

> Teetering between the two, I was swept up by C. Wright Mills's radical critique
> of the Cold War—his argument that 'the balance of blame' was shifting from East
> to West, in *The Causes of World War III*. Still an aspiring mathematician, if only
> by default, I was stirred by Robert Jungk's cautionary tale about the Manhattan
> Project, *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*, with its implicit call for the social
> responsibility of science. I grew partial to Gandhi. Yet moralism pure and simple
> felt lame, so I threw myself into practical Tocsin. I spent days compiling notes on
> treatises by Herman Kahn and other heavy thinkers of arms race theology.[120]

Gitlin explained that the Tocsin leadership had fashioned itself as "the student

counterpart" to their Harvard professors who advised the Kennedy administration on

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[118] Letter from Todd Gitlin to Bill Barth, February 16, 1963, "Correspondence – 1961-1965 –
Alphabetical – Ga-Gol," box 4, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[119] Letter from Bill Barth to Todd Gitlin, February 22, 1963, "Correspondence – 1961-1965 –
Alphabetical – Ga-Gol," box 4, Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Michigan) records, Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan.

[120] Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993
[1987]), 89.

foreign policy and arms control. "Tocsin deferred to professors who were lobbying for sweet reason," he wrote.

Tocsin members became more skeptical of the Kennedy administration, however, when its nuclear testing and civil defense program came to light. Gitlin felt torn between reformism and radicalism: "I read technical treatises about nuclear strategies; at the same time I read some Marx and was impressed."[121] He came to wholeheartedly embrace radical politics after a summer internship with the Washington-based Peace Research Institute brought him into the corridors of power. As a summer research fellow at the PRI, Gitlin has been assigned to assist senior fellow Arthur Waskow with a book he was working on about how the peace movement could influence government policies.[122] Gitlin accompanied Waskow to the Pentagon to interview Adam Yarmolinsky, Robert McNamara's special assistant for civil defense. "To my horror, there was a child's drawing of a battleship taped to the glass in Yarmolinsky's bookcase. A small thing, [...] yet it meant to me, somehow, that clever arguments were beside the point, that the people in power really took their games for granted." Gitlin had a revelation while listening to Yarmolinksy rationalize the civil defense program: "*Men such as this were not going to be persuaded to be sensible*. They were grotesque, these clever and confident men, they were unbudgeable, their language was evasion, their rationality unreasonable, and therefore they were going to have to be dislodged." He "left the Pentagon a convinced outsider."[123]

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[121] Ibid., 95.
[122] Waskow received a Ph.D. in American history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and was a senior fellow at the PRI from 1961 to 1963, when he helped found the Institute for Policy Studies.
[123] Gitlin, *The Sixties*, 97.

Gitlin lost his faith in Tocsin during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when he attended a speech at Harvard by the sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr., who called upon students to take action. Protest ought "to take the form of destructive criticism of a destructive system," and nothing short of "simultaneous revolutions in the United States and the Soviet Union" would remedy the current situation.[124] Tocsin, torn between the technical and the political and seduced by the prospect of proximity to power, now seemed wholly ineffectual to Gitlin. At a demonstration in Washington shortly thereafter he met "some of the SDS inner circle from Ann Arbor: Tom and Casey Hayden, Dick and Mickey Flacks."[125] He "felt [his] center of gravity shift toward SDS," and a month later, when SDS held a regional conference at the Harvard Divinity School, there was Gitlin, delivering a "little talk on 'Peace.'"[126] Soon he was attending a local weekly SDS study group, and even made a pilgrimage to Michigan: "At Tom Hayden's urging, I visited Ann Arbor for two days, met more of the SDS group, and felt the holy communion again listening to Pete Seeger's 'We Shall Overcome' in the Flacks living room. The trip clinched my decision to go to graduate school at the University of Michigan—not so much to study political science (my ostensible purpose) as to breathe the air of the SDS circle." And perhaps also to breathe the air of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, with which he seemed to share an intellectual affinity: "In a last-ditch effort to yoke my expertise to my passions, I wrote a mathematics thesis called 'Archetypical Mathematical Models in International Relations.'" Gitlin may have hoped that "conflict

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124 Ibid., 100.
125 Ibid., 101.
126 Ibid., 101-102.

resolution studies" would allow him to continue to yoke his expertise to his passions.[127]

His vaguely expressed interest in the Center and in "conflict resolution studies" at

Michigan reveals something about what the Center stood for in this moment.

Protesting Vietnam

As the prevailing image of international conflict shifted from the mushroom cloud

to Vietnam, members of the conflict resolution group became more outspoken in their

opposition to militarism and war. Boulding and Rapoport both participated in the

planning for the teach-in on Vietnam at Michigan on March 24, 1965, the first in the

nation. Marc Pilisuk, who had been a student of Rapoport's and had stayed on to teach at

Michigan after receiving his Ph.D. in 1961, also helped organize the teach-in. He and

Tom Hayden co-authored an article together in the *Journal of Social Issues* in July 1965,

titled "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and

Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems." They thanked Anatol Rapoport for review

and assistance with the manuscript, and the Center for the use of its facilities. Pilisuk and

Hayden argued that there was indeed "an informal and changing coalition of groups with

vested psychological, moral, and material interests in the continuous development and

maintenance of high levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in

military-strategic conceptions of international affairs." They believed that peace research

had the potential to strengthen a "countervailing force" against this coalition.[128] "As an

activity which institutionalizes means to support scholars who wish to devote their

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[127] Ibid., 103. That summer, just after commencement in June, Gitlin went to the SDS convention at a camp in Pine Hill, New York, and was elected president of the organization.

[128] Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems," *Journal of Social Issues* (1965), 103.

professional talents to the quest for peace, the movement is admirable," they wrote.[129]

But its ideas did not go very far:

> Each project seeks, and some find, [...] a scheme which—*if* it were enacted—would promote enduring peace. Why the plan is not enacted is usually not asked, or, if asked at all, then answered within the framework of basic assumptions which protect the status quo. The propensity of scholars seems often to be an equation of their own ability to understand ways to treat a problem with the actual resolution of the problem.[130]

If peace researchers wanted to challenge the so-called military-industrial complex, they would need to attend to the social institutions and mechanisms by which policy changes might be effected, and direct their solutions "to foci of emergent power and change within the system."[131] This meant that peace research would become "what most researchers who are justly sensitive about their scientific objectivity dread—a part of a political struggle."[132]

Boulding and Rapoport had different ways of joining the struggle. Boulding wrote a piece titled "Reflections on Protest" for the October 1965 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. "I participated in what may well turn out to have been an historic occasion," the essay began. Boulding remarked on the momentum this "movement" had gained as it spread to other campuses and culminated in a national teach-in in Washington in May. "It now begins to look almost like a national mobilization of university teachers and students," he wrote. In true Kenneth Boulding fashion, he lamented the fact that no one seemed to be "much concerned to study the effects of all this." What did Boulding want? Why, a "theory of protest," of course.[133] Such a theory

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[129] Ibid., 101.
[130] Ibid., 100-101.
[131] Ibid., 101.
[132] Ibid., 100.
[133] Kenneth Boulding, "Reflections on Protest," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (October 1965), 18.

would help protesters assess whether their actions were having the desired effect, or were in fact producing unintended consequences that might hamper the cause.

Boulding put forth seven "tentative propositions" toward a theory of protest, including the assertion that protest is most likely to succeed when "it represents a view which is in fact widespread in the society, but which has somehow not been called to people's attention." While the civil rights movement fulfilled this criterion, the peace movement did not. Education could help pave the way for a successful protest movement and for eventual social change, and so education ought to be "the task of the peace movement." There was much work to be done to counter the "image of the world in which war is a recurrent necessity" and in which "war has paid off pretty well" for America:

> We are not and never have been a peace-loving nation; we are not only ruthless and bloody but we feel no shame about it. There is nothing in our Constitution; in our national heroes, many of whom are generals; in our national origin, which came out of war; in our greatest single national experience, which was the Civil War; or in anything which contributes to our national image which makes war illegitimate in the way racial discrimination is felt to be illegitimate and inconsistent with our national ideals.

The peace movement had to radically change "the national image itself." But Boulding thought that would "take an extensive process of education and perhaps even the grim teacher of national disaster."[134]

The winning strategy, Boulding concluded, was "a strategy of limited protest and extensive education." The teach-in as a form of protest was a step in the right direction. Education and research would have to do the bulk of the work to bring about "social change toward stable peace." Americans would need to be persuaded that stable peace was possible, through examples of "peaceful coexistence" such as America's "secure

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[134] Ibid.

community" with the British and the Canadians, or between Protestants and Catholics in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. "We need to emphasize also the possible role of the United States not as a great power or as a world dominator, but as a leader in a world movement for stable peace."[135]

In an incensed op-ed published in *The Washington Post* on December 5, Boulding argued that America's excesses in foreign affairs—$50 billion a year in defense spending, the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community—was destroying the Great Society at home. "The military-industrial complex is eating the heart out of American life and seriously reducing—perhaps in the long run fatally—its potential for economic progress," he wrote. Agricultural policy, public housing, urban renewal, the educational system—everywhere there was evidence that the so-called Great Society was in fact failing. He was ready to part ways with liberal Democrats: "By this time, I am sure, I have lost all my friends, most of whom are in the Vital Center, or what I am now tempted to call the Devitalized Consensus." He had lost patience with what he perceived to be ineffectual policies, and with their problem-solving rhetoric. "Just give us time," they will say. "Our hearts are in the right place. We are very busy solving all these problems, and pretty soon they will all be solved." But by that time, Boulding worried, "[t]he Vietnamese will all be dead, the slums will be cemented over and the poor will no longer be with us. If there are any left, they will be against us."

Boulding's Manifesto called for "[o]perat[ing] in the international scene as a moderate power," which meant treating the UN as if it were a world government; making

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[135] Kenneth Boulding, "Reflections on Protest," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (October 1965), 18-20.

peace with China; letting "the poor countries work out their own problems" and not

"encourag[ing] them in arms races"; continuing detente with the Soviet Union; and

"negotiate[ing] a Rush-Bagot type of partial and incomplete disarmament for Europe."

Unsurprisingly, the Manifesto also included a plug for peace research: "We have at least

learned to listen to the economists, through the Council of Economic Advisers and the

Joint Economic Committee of Congress, and as a result we should never repeat the

disaster of the 1930s. We have yet to learn to listen to the sociologists, the

anthropologists, the psychologists, even the political scientists and international relations

men." (Note the reluctant inclusion of the political scientists and IR men, two groups that

had been a thorn in the side of the peace research movement.)

Until the escalation of the fighting in Vietnam, Boulding had been most

preoccupied by the threat of nuclear war; this was the existential threat he contemplated

regularly. He was moved to speak out against American atrocities committed in Vietnam,

but could still be found insisting in the pages of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* in

1966 that the world was becoming a less brutal place:

> [T]he long pull of history is with peace, simply because this is where the payoffs
> are. The short run dynamics of society may lead down toward war, but war is
> becoming increasingly illegitimate and costly, and one sees throughout the whole
> history of mankind a long run tendency toward 'gentling' in both personal and
> political relationships. We no longer have public executions, cruel and unusual
> punishments are reserved for the Vietnamese; duelling [sic] has been abolished,
> even the cowboy era only lasted about twenty years; personal disarmament is
> almost universal; and in personal relationships, our prime ideal is 'getting along
> with people,' and we take great pains to teach this to our children.[136]

America's conduct in Vietnam was appalling, but the "international system" was "the last

refuge of legitimated cruelty and violence"—cruelty and violence that were vestiges of a

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[136] Kenneth Boulding, "Notes on the Politics of Peace," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 1966): 30.

dying world, the world of civilization. Boulding believed that the human race was on the threshold of "postcivilization." Enabled by the accumulation of social knowledge, and efficiently organized by science, postcivilization was "a realization of man's potential," giving us "at least a chance of a modest utopia, in which slavery, poverty, exploitation, gross inequality, war, and disease—prime costs of civilization—will fall to the vanishing point."[137] The United States, being the most developed society in the world, was already in the early stages of postcivilization. There were potential traps that threatened to stall this process—war, the population explosion, exhaustion of natural resources—but with the application of human intellect to these problems, mankind could smoothly complete the transition to postcivilization.

For Boulding, nondialectical, or developmental, processes always won out over dialectical ones: "[T]he dialectical processes—important as they are in the short run, and significant as they are to those participating in them—are not the major processes of history but only waves and turbulences on the great historical tides of evolution and development, which themselves are fundamentally nondialectical."[138] "Conflict is discord, and the opposite of conflict is harmony; the words reveal the evaluational bias in the language and in the common experience," Boulding had written in *Conflict and*

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[137] (And here, Boulding resembled Norman Mailer's "liberal technologue": "They were servants of that social machine of the future in which all irrational human conflict would be resolved, all conflict of interest negotiated, and nature's resonance condensed into frequencies which could comfortably phase nature in or out as you please." Norman Mailer, *Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History* (New York: Penguin, 1994 [1968]), 16.

[138] Kenneth Boulding, *A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics and Development* (New York: Free Press, 1970), v. This was a subject Boulding and the philosopher Herbert Marcuse debated at a symposium on "Conflict in Society" in London in 1965. Marcuse had asked Boulding why he assumed "the dialectical process of society" is always malevolent, rather than neutral. Boulding explained that he did in fact think dialectical processes, or conflict processes more generally, were neutral, but that Hegelians and Marxists mistakenly assumed that such processes were benign. Hence, "the dialectic has to be tamed." Marcuse shot back: "The dialectical process is the historical praxis itself—it cannot be 'tamed' from outside or above." From Anthony de Reuck and Julie Knight, eds., *Conflict in Society: A Ciba Foundation Volume* (London, J&A Churchill, Ltd., 1966), 250-251.

Defense. And this was not merely an observation—Boulding himself shared this bias: "It is the process of conflict toward some kind of resolution which gives it meaning and which makes it good."[139]

Rapoport, on the other hand, returned in the early 1960s to the socialism, or at least the revolutionary politics, of his younger days. He privileged dialectical processes in his scholarly work and in his activism. When he wrote *Strategy and Conscience*, he had been thinking of the Cold War as "another manifestation of a confrontation of a 'thesis,' and an 'antithesis.'"[140] The escalation of the war in Vietnam led him to join the political struggle his students said peace research would have to become. In April 1966, he delivered a paper at the annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association in San Francisco in which he criticized American foreign policy.[141] "If I could achieve detachment, I could console myself with the knowledge that this, too, will pass, and that the Pentagon will eventually, possibly quite soon, share the ignominious fate of all the previous foci of naked power," he said. "But I cannot achieve detachment. I do not have much hope for the human race [...]. But I cannot resign from the species. I have children, and I do not want them to writhe in agony or to turn into automata or to repeat the atrocious lies amid which they live. Therefore, I am engaged in a struggle, which I often feel to be a hopeless one, but which I have no choice but to wage."[142]

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[139] Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, 307.

[140] Rapoport, *Certainties and Doubts*, 128

[141] The American Orthopsychiatric Association, or "Ortho," was established in 1923 by a group of psychiatrists who shared a "simple but revolutionary idea: The mental health of individuals depends on their social context." The current incarnation of Ortho, the Global Alliance for Behavioral Health and Social Justice, claims that family therapy, group therapy, and the community mental health movement had their origins in Ortho. "Our Roots," Global Alliance for Behavioral Health and Social Justice (formerly the American Orthopsychiatric Assocation), accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.bhjustice.org/our-roots.

[142] Anatol Rapoport, "My Commitment to Peace," paper presented at the American Orthopsychiatric Association 43rd Annual Meeting, April 13-16, 1966, Anatol Rapoport, 1911-2007, last modified December 4, 2009, http://anatolrapoport.net/node/5.

The Decline and Fall of the CRCR

"The quest for scientific knowledge about social conflict has a long and complex history, closely interwoven with the entire history of social science," the sociologist Clinton Fink wrote in a 1968 article in which he attempted to work through "some conceptual difficulties" that had beset efforts to construct a general theory of conflict, which had been underway in some corners of the social sciences since the late 1950s.[143] Fink considered various objections to the "generalist approach," which sought to account for all types of conflict—"interpersonal, marital, intraorganizational, community, interethnic, class, or international"—with a single theory.[144] But ultimately he cast his lot with the generalists, and recommended that social scientists "adopt the broadest possible working definition of social conflict," one that "subsumes any form of social antagonism, thus making the theory of conflict equivalent to a theory of antagonistic social relations in general."[145] Fink, it seems, was calling for a definition capacious enough to contain all the turmoil of the late 1960s. And while the desired general theory had not yet materialized in the first decade of the Center's existence, he was holding out hope that one would emerge, and confer upon social scientists the ability to tame that turmoil.

Fink was attempting to resuscitate the founding vision of the conflict resolution movement. By this point, however, that movement was already dissolving. Elise and Kenneth Boulding left Ann Arbor for the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1967. Herbert Kelman left for Harvard University in 1968, and Anatol Rapoport for the University of Toronto in 1969. Before he emigrated to Canada, Rapoport spoke at the

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[143] Clinton F. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 4 (December 1968), 412.

[144] Ibid., 413.

[145] Ibid., 456.

University of Michigan's Moratorium Day on October 15, 1969, and reflected on the

birth of the teach-in movement there before delivering another seething condemnation of

the war, and calling upon the American people to say to Nixon "obey us or get out"—if

they could do that, then the will of the people would be "as alive in the United States as it

was with people struggling for national liberation" "in 1776, 1789, 1848, and 1917." He

concluded this speech with what might be read as an extension of his critique of strategic

thinking, asking "whether those who are responsible for the Vietnams, for the plundering

of the planet, for seducing creative thought into the service of death, for erasing the

difference between truth and falsehood, for identifying global politics with a poker

game—whether people who think this way, and who in their impudent arrogance

proclaim this way of thinking to be the height of political wisdom and realism, shall be

allowed to continue to rule."[146]

Rapoport assessed the state of peace research for the *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution in a 1970 article. He seems to have reflected upon the limits and possibilites

of peace research in light of Vietnam, and to have taken Pilisuk and Hayden's friendly

critique to heart. After World War II, behavioral scientists and their patrons had had high

hopes that this new sciences would provide solutions to social problems. By successfully

presenting themselves as part of the "scientific enterprise," the behavioral sciences had

benefited from a "halo effect"—in claiming to be scientific, the behavioral sciences

associated themselves with the technical successes of the natural sciences. "Science has

been uniformly successful in 'solving problems,'" the reasoning went. "Social ills are

seen as 'problems' and it seems sensible to direct the proven tools of scientific

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[146] Anatol Rapoport, Address delivered on Moratorium Day at the University of Michigan, October 15, 1969, Anatol Rapoport, 1911-2007, last modified May 28, 2012, http://anatolrapoport.net/node/18.

investigation toward the task of coming to grips with them." But this logic had gotten ahead of itself: What behavioral scientists and their patrons often framed as social "problems" were not in fact "scientifically tractable." The behavioral sciences had won public support by promising technical accomplishments in human engineering, and had even "been enlisted in the service of business, of the military, and of technocracy." Rapoport thought that this had all been premature. The behavioral sciences had not proven themselves capable of "solving" social "problems." "[U]nderstanding a phenomenon does not automatically confer the power of controlling it," he wrote.[147] Extending "control over some portion of the world" required institutions that could apply the fruits of "pure" science. Without institutions in which theory and practice can interact, theories "remain suspended in the intellectual sphere." This was where peace research had run aground. In order to effect widespread change, peace researchers would have to figure out how to combine "knowledge-seeking and social action." After all, "natural science was born when philosophers overcame their reluctance to handle things and moved into laboratories, that is, workshops where craftsmen and artists were already busy."[148]

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[147] Anatol Rapoport, "Can Peace Research Be Applied?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14, no. 2 (June 1970), 278.
[148] Ibid., 286.

EPILOGUE
Peace Building

The Washington headquarters of the United States Institute of Peace are located at 23rd

Street and Constitution Avenue NW, across the street from the National Mall, almost due

north of the Lincoln Memorial. USIP moved from its first home (a townhouse facing

Lafayette Park) into this airy office building, with its conspicuous roof of steel and white

glass shaped into the form of the wings of a dove, in 2011. The USIP website spells out

the intended symbolism of this edifice, in case it were not obvious enough: "[S]ituated

near this country's most iconic memorials to Americans' service in war, USIP represents

a complementary part of the country's story. It stands as a living monument that

embodies and reflects America's commitment to peace." Visitors interested in viewing

American history through a "peace lens" can follow the "Peace Trail on the National

Mall," a self-guided tour that highlights "stories of key figures, institutions, and moments

in history that demonstrate America's enduring commitment to peace." For example,

seen through the peace lens, the Korean War Veterans Memorial becomes a monument to

"a combined United Nations military effort, in which American men and women joined

in action alongside 21 other countries [...] who sent troops or gave medical support to

defend South Korea's independence and affirm the international commitment to peace in

the post-World War II era." The entry on the Washington Monument notes that perched

atop USIP's own flagpole is a replica of the dove of peace weathervane George

Washington designed to adorn the cupola at his Mount Vernon estate.

All of this unsubtle symbolism makes one wonder what actually goes on within

the glass walls of USIP, an "independent" federal institute created by Congress in 1984

and "dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible,

practical, and essential for U.S. and global security." As does the fact that Stephen J.

Hadley, former National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush and member of

the board of directors of the Raytheon Company, currently chairs the USIP board of

directors.[1] While the peace researchers of midcentury might have wanted to distance

themselves from the present-day USIP, they did help bring it into being. And outwardly

at least, USIP, standing "against the authority of blood and history,"[2] might be

understood as a concrete (and glass) manifestation of the dream of the conflict resolution

movement.

In 1971, the University of Michigan Board of Regents voted to close the Center

for Research on Conflict Resolution; the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* moved to Yale,

where it continued under the editorship of the political scientist and international relations

scholar Bruce Russett. In an "epitaph" published in the journal in 1971, Kenneth

Boulding wrote that the Center had been "more than an organization. Very early, it came

to symbolize the idea that major intellectual resources should be devoted to the

establishment of a stable peace. In a world which devotes incredible resources to war and

preparation for war, it signaled the intention of at least a segment of the scientific

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[1] USIP is governed by a 15-person board: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President of the National Defense University, and 12 others appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

[2] David A. Hollinger, "Science as a Weapon in *Kulturkämpfe* in the United States During and After World War II," *Isis* 86 (1995), 441.

community to seek the knowledge essential for moving toward peace." The closing of the Center, then, meant the death of a symbol, "a symbol of man's hope for peace."[3]

Nevertheless, the peace research movement persisted. The Bouldings helped found the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) in Boulder in May 1970. Their colleague Chadwick F. Alger explained that COPRED had been a response to the events of the late 1960s: "War in Vietnam and turmoil on streets and campuses at home caused those of us gathered in Boulder to confront the irrelevance of our research to peace activists, and the gap between our educational practice and the competencies required of citizens who would act effectively for peace."[4] Peace and conflict studies programs proliferated at American colleges and universities as a result of growing opposition to the Vietnam War. For example, a graduate program in peace research was established in the fall of 1970 in the Graduate Program of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Directed by the economist Walter Isard, the program offered master's and doctoral degrees. Isard, who was at the time the executive secretary of the Peace Research Society at Wharton, told the *New York Times* that "[w]hile the area of peace research has just become recognized as a major multidisciplinary field for social science study, it is anticipated that there will be a strong demand for analysts trained in this field from existing university departments as well as from research institutes and government agencies at world, regional, national, and urban levels."[5] In 1972, the *Times* reported that more than 100 colleges and universities now offered courses, workshops,

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[3] Kenneth Boulding, "An Epitaph: The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, 1959-1971," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (1971), 279-280.

[4] Chadwick F. Alger, "Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 504 (July 1989): 118.

[5] "Graduate Studies in Peace Organized," *New York Times*, Mar 22, 1970, 33.

and conferences on "peace science."[6] By 1977, the *Times* could proclaim "peace studies" "a serious academic movement."[7] In 1978, Kenneth Boulding wrote, "I think we can claim that the peace research movement has produced a discipline, which goes by a number of different names, but is perhaps most commonly called 'conflict and peace studies.'"[8]

As the historian Mary E. Montgomery notes, Americans have been endeavoring to create "a government bureau dedicated to peace" since the eighteenth century.[9] More than 100 such bills came before Congress between 1935 and 1976. Those who supported the idea of a peace department had been encouraged by the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961, but were disappointed when it turned out this office "operated unabashedly as an arm of the Department of State."[10] The sponsors of a 1968 bill proposing a Peace Department that would house the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, and the ACDA, as well as an independent Peace Academy, created a citizen organization to support the legislation, which included the likes of Gloria Steinem and Hans Morgenthau. When the bill died, many of the members of that group lent their support to the National Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC), founded by

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[6] Joseph F. Sullivan, "Wayne College Plans a Peace-Science Course," March 26, 1972, 73.

[7] Edward Fiske, "A Vietnam Residual: Growth of Peace Studies," *New York Times*, Aug 21, 1977, 153.

[8] Kenneth E. Boulding, "Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 2 (June 1978), 342. While, much to Boulding's chagrin, the peace research movement had failed to produce the equivalent of the Keynesian revolution in economics, it had become a bona fide discipline: "There are perhaps three tests of a discipline: does it have a bibliography? can you give courses in it? and, can you give examinations in it? A fourth criterion should perhaps be added: does it have any specialized journals?" "Conflict and peace studies" met all four criteria and then some, boasting an international association as well, in the form of the International Peace Research Association, sponsored by UNESCO.

[9] Mary E. Montgomery, "Working for Peace While Preparing for War: The Creation of the United States Institute of Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 4 (July 2003), 479-496.

[10] Ibid., 480.

the psychiatrist Bryant Wedge and the sociologist James Laue.[11] Senators Vance Hartke

(a Democrat from Indiana) and Mark Hatfield (a Republican from Oregon) introduced the

George Washington Peace Academy Act in 1976. The N-PAC—with the support of

Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virgina and Senator Spark Matsunaga of Hawaii,

both Democrats—was instrumental in convincing Congress to create a commission to

study the proposal. The Education Amendments of 1978 appropriated $500,000 for a

United States Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict

Resolution.

The Commission, with Spark Matsunaga as its chairman, James Laue as its vice-

chairman, and Elise Boulding as one of its commissioners, conducted public hearings

across the country in 1980, and recommended the creation of a peace academy in 1981.

Members of Congress introduced legislation based on the Commission's report in the

1982 and 1983 legislative sessions; the bills were contentiously debated. Among the

arguments made by opponents of the proposed peace academy were that it would be

difficult for the academy to remain independent from the federal government, and that the

Soviet Union might interpret its establishment as a sign of weakness.[12] One argument in

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[11] As a graduate student in Harvard's Department of Social Relations in the early-to-mid-1960s, Laue had joined protests organized by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. After Harvard, he worked as research director for the Community Relations Service, a federal agency within the Department of Justice created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In his lobbying for a national peace academy, Laue defined peace largely as the successful application of conflict resolution techniques. Techniques developed in the "laboratory" of community relations could be applied to international conflicts as well. "The notion of peace is nice but vague," Laue told a reporter. "Linking it with peacemaking on a community level has allowed us to define what peace is. The continuous development of techniques to resolve conflicts that come up every day, at home or in school, can help bring peace between nations." Quoted from United Press International, "Case for a U.S. Peace Academy," *The Hour*, January 17, 1979, 14.

[12] Montgomery notes that in an effort to persuade the opposition to take the legislation more seriously, Representative Dan Glickman changed the name of the bill in the House. "The Committee had recommended the title 'US Academy of Peace', purposely excluding the term 'conflict resolution,' so that the word 'peace' would stand prominently alone. In Glickman's view, the word 'peace' would not be taken seriously, and he wanted not to risk the Academy being perceived as a nice, yet pie-in-the-sky, liberal idea.

favor of the academy was that it would bridge the gap between practitioners and the academic disciplines of peace studies and conflict resolution. The Commission made a pragmatic argument seemingly designed to appeal to critics: "through available training and resources, the Peace Academy would provide the United States with greater national security, by encouraging it not to rest on its military laurels." Montgomery writes that commissioners sought "to create a Peace Academy with prestige equal to the other components of the military-industrial complex."[13] Note the compromise implied here— the peace academy would represent not so much a "countervailing force" against the military-industrial complex (the role envisioned for peace research by Marc Pilisuk and Tom Hayden back in 1965), but would be part of it. The Commission presented the Academy "as an asset to American military and diplomatic institutions and policies."[14]

Senator Hatfield smuggled the proposal into the Defense Authorization Act of 1985, as Amendment 3270, "To Establish a US Academy of Peace," justifying this with the claim that a peace academy would serve national security and defense. After much debate, the amendment passed. "Academy" became "Institute." President Reagan had opposed the proposed academy but would not veto the defense authorizations, and signed the bill into law on October 19, 1984, establishing the United States Institute of Peace.

Glickman took the initiative to reattach the title reference to conflict resolution, hoping to reinforce the serious, real-world alternatives offered by this academic discipline" (p. 485).

[13] Ibid., 489.

[14] From *To Establish the United States Academy of Peace: Report of the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution to the President of the United States and the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States Congress* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), 61, quoted in Montgomery, "Working for Peace," 491.

Reagan subsequently attempted to undermine the institute through a series of administrative delays, but USIP finally opened for business on April 14, 1986.[15]

In 1985, Kenneth Boulding claimed USIP as the peace researchers' legacy, "an outcome, in large part, of the development over the last fifty years or so of what has been called the 'peace research movement' within the scientific and scholarly community."[16] But he added this caveat: "A great deal depends, of course, on the leadership and quality of the institute, something that cannot be guaranteed."[17] Elise Boulding assessed the relationship between peace research and USIP in 1992. "The US Institute of Peace (USIP), established in an atmosphere of high expectations in the early 1980s, is receiving some fairly sharp criticism from some of those who supported its formation and who are disappointed with the way it has turned out," she wrote. "The US has fought three quick but brutal high technology wars in the past decade, each against a small and poor Third

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[15] In 1992, Congress changed the law that created USIP so that it could raise private funds for the construction of a permanent home, and in 1995, the federal parcel of land on which it now sits was transferred to it.

[16] Kenneth E. Boulding, "The National Peace Academy and the Conflict Over Peace Research," *The Hundred Percent Challenge: Building a National Institute of Peace*, ed. Charles Duryea Smith (Seven Locks Press, 1985), 122. Renewed opposition to nuclear weapons in the 1980s had helped drive support for a peace academy, and made some of the language and claims of the conflict resolution movement seem relevant again. Sounding a lot like the editorial that introduced the first issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957, Milton C. Mapes, Jr., executive director of the National Peace Academy Campaign, wrote this in the winter of 1984: "[T]he advance of science, which has provided the means to destroy our civilization, may have simultaneously provided the means to destroy it. The application of the insights and techniques emerging from the work of our social and behavioral scientists to the problem of conflict has created a new field of knowledge which can best be described as the emerging social science of conflict resolution." And much like proponents of the original movement, Mapes viewed all levels of conflict as more or less analogous: Conflict resolution methods and techniques had proven their effectiveness "when utilized in conflict at every level of society." Other aspects of Mapes's rhetoric had more in common with that of the Social Science Research Council's 1945 study of techniques for the reduction of intergroup tensions. Mapes described a "conflict-ridden" American society about to succumb to strife. "[W]hen we see today the well-recorded growth of all forms of intra-societal conflict, we may well ask if both the form and structure of our society may not be threatened," he wrote. "With half our marriages destined to end in divorce, with violent crime emerging as a leading growth industry, and with personal security declining precipitously, it appears certain that our future society will be radically different from anything we have known in the past." The problems may have been different, but the proposed solution was the same: "The rapid development and dissemination of conflict resolution theory and techniques may hold immense promise for the dynamic stability of our future social structure." In Milton C. Mapes, "A Peace Academy to Build the Channels," *National Forum* 64 (1984), 37.

[17] Boulding, "The National Peace Academy and the Conflict Over Peace Research," 130.

World Country. There is little evidence that the USIP has begun to affect US policy. So what kind of farce is this US Institute of Peace?"[18]

Some of the criticism was valid, she thought. But much of it arose "from a fundamental misconception of what a federally funded institution can do, and from a lack of appreciation of the value of dialogue between national defense personnel and peace researchers." Yes, the fact that board members were presidential appointees "was an invitation to political bias which seemed less threatening in the Carter era than in the subsequent decade," but the Commission could see no way around it. Naysayers who questioned board members' "various ties with US security operations" and raised suspicions of CIA involvement had been naïve to expect "that angelic hosts of peace researchers and practitioners of nonviolence would descend on the USIP and bring about a social transformation." These critics did not appreciate the challenges of accommodating the "different professional communities concerned with peace, security and human welfare in the US": the peace research community, the arms control community, the strategic defense community, and practitioners of conflict resolution such as mediators and diplomats. There was also a fifth community, no easier to please: the peace movement. Referring to her work for the 1979 presidential commission, and for the peace research movement before that—and here she pointed out that peace research had "grown from a derided movement to an increasingly respected interdisciplinary field of social sciences with a mission to prepare a new generation with a different understanding of the international system"—Elise seemed to consider USIP a win. It could still further

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[18] Elise Boulding, "Peace Research and the US Institute of Peace," *Peace Review* 4, no. 1 (1992), 46.

the cause of peace, even if it did require certain compromises. "In the task of peacebuilding, there is room for everyone," she wrote.[19]

[19] Ibid., 47.

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