

THE ANALYSIS OF HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION
THROUGH A NOVEL

by

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SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

October 1981
(i.e. Feb. '82)

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ABSTRACT

The primary goal of this thesis is to illustrate to the professional social scientist that the novel, represented by Terror Counter Terror, can be an extremely useful tool with which to examine the area of international hostage negotiations. Specifically, the case will be made that when a novel is written by an author with both practical experience and academic training in a given problem area, the result can be the exposure and dissection of the dynamic interaction of several variables and analytic levels at one point in time. By looking at a multiplicity of actors, motivations, and contexts which shape behavior, through the novel's devices of character, dialogue and plot, the static nature of information provided by some traditional texts in the subject area can be overcome without sacrificing hypotheses or insight.

The novel upon which this dissertation is based, Terror Counter Terror, is under the copyright protection of the author, Steve R. Pieczenik, and cannot be reproduced in whole or in part without the written consent of the author.

The primary goal of this chapter is to illustrate to the professional social scientist that the novel, represented by Terror Counter Terror, can be an extremely useful tool with which to examine the area of international hostage negotiations. Specifically, the case will be made that when a novel is written by an author with both practical experience and academic training in a given problem area, the result can be the exposure and dissection of the dynamic interaction of several variables and analytic levels at one point in time. By looking at a multiplicity of actors, motivations, and contexts which shape behavior, through the novel's devices of character, dialogue and plot, the static nature of information provided by some traditional texts in the subject area can be overcome without sacrificing hypotheses or insight.

Two recent books readily illustrate the differences inherent in these two approaches--the traditional and the "novel"--to studying hostage negotiations. Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations,¹ written by a political science professor, is an inchoate attempt to examine several political and personal issues involved in hostage negotiations. Included in the book is an analysis of one hostage episode, the Hanafi Muslim siege of three Washington, D.C. buildings on March 10, 1977,² in which the author of Terror Counter Terror was involved. From personal experience it is apparent that Professor Miller's analysis of the incident lacks a detailed, textured understanding of relevant institutional and private interests, and how the negotiation strategy ultimately devised during the siege, creatively combined an understanding of both the

terrorists as well as the varying demands of the White House and the political minion surrounding the President. Thus, the crucial issues of bureaucratic imperatives, Presidential entitlement, media manipulation and individual competency to perform under crisis, are understandably missing from the book. The reason for their absence, however, has more to do with the limitations of a traditional ex post facto interview methodology than any professional failing of the author. Professor Miller, unfortunately, depended upon interviews with many individuals who (1) had some personal or ulterior reason for being interviewed (since there was an official gag rule in effect), or (2) had little direct involvement in the management of the negotiations. It is not surprising that statements were often made which were self-serving and inaccurate.

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In direct contrast to the traditional approach, The Fifth Horseman, a best selling novel written by two journalists, portrays a highly contrived drama of a hostage negotiation involving Colonel Qaddafi and nuclear terrorism. Yet, because these authors were able to abstract known truths about their main characters and the nature of the bureaucratic contexts in which they operate, this book comes much closer than the former one does in pinpointing issues and analyzing problems involved in the management of any international crisis.

There is no doubt that from the more traditional political science text one acquires a coherent overview, and heuristic model from which to order and analyze events. What is conspicuously absent, however, is an understanding of the dynamic nature of those events; how each of the

variables interact to produce the end product. The novel, by taking license with dialogue and events, can offer such an approximation of reality. While the novel has its own structure and rules, these are not antithetical to illuminating the nature of man and events. Rather, implicit in the fiber of the novel, in general, and Terror Counter Terror in particular, are many hypotheses which are developed to illustrate man as he operates within a political context.

Moreover, the novel serves as a useful tool in which one can simulate a political reality, otherwise, unable to be duplicated in real life. The use of games or simulated exercises in analyzing military or political phenomena has been a long accepted practice in political science, having been used primarily as a means of developing heuristic models of a particular political event or problems. From this simulation, one would, then, generate alternative rules, options, or guidelines in which to understand better or manage subsequent similar problems. Terror Counter Terror can be viewed very much in that light of a political simulation, played out, not among several free players, but among a group of contrived characters, each representing a particular perspective regarding international terrorism and hostage negotiation, who, in the course of their interactions are playing out the logic of their positions, testing out certain implicit hypotheses which the author feels are germane to the issue of international hostage negotiation. Those hypotheses will be explored further on in this paper, as will its more important implications for developing a new anti-terrorist policy, a new organizational structure for managing

a terrorist crisis, and a new cadre of professional crisis managers.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the first section, a summary of Terror Counter Terror, provides the reader with the plot and character outline of the novel which will be referred to through the chapter. It should be emphasized at this point that all characters in the novel are completely fictional, and that any resemblance to people living or dead is purely coincidental. Although the fictitious political kidnapping around which the book is written seems to have some similarity with the Aldo Moro kidnapping, none is intended. The purpose of the hostage negotiator protagonist was to explore the feelings that the author and other hostage negotiators have experienced at one or another point in time during the management of a crisis. The protagonist allows the reader to experience those moments of fear, combined with the addiction for more and greater action, that is so characteristic of crisis managers. He also encounters bureaucratic impediments which may, in fact, occur before, during, or after a hostage siege. He also reflects those aspects of the bureaucratic battle which are continuously present in all administrations. Did that particular one depicted in the book occur? The impediments depicted in Terror Counter Terror are contrived so that the emotions and frustrations engendered by these events can be exposed and analyzed. Similarly, the author never met any members of the Red Brigade for reasons that are quite obvious--they are inaccessible and dangerous. However, the character of the terrorist, Barbarosa, is a compilation of characteristics of other hostage-takers with whom the author became

acquainted either during a negotiation or as a result of debriefing hostages and relatives of the hostage-taker. Thomas Rudd and Ben are representations, respectively, of a State Department "type" and a typical CIA Station Chief. Neither character is based on an actual person, but instead on a composite of traits compiled from the author's multiple, extended interactions with State and intelligence officials.

The second section discusses the novel as a unique form for exploring reality. In particular, the section details some of the benefits of the novel in understanding any given event.

The third section discusses the novel and its relationship to social science methodology. The point is made that the novel's method of studying political science phenomenon, and its end product, can be as edifying and analytical as traditional political science research. In this section several hypotheses are presented which are treated in the novel.

The fourth section presents a synopsis of U.S. anti-terrorist policy and operational capability from 1969 (the year terrorism became a major concern for the U.S.) to 1981. This background material is added to the chapter to indicate that fact and fiction have much in common. It is this author's objective that fiction be used to inform and educate the reading public to a reality--the reality of terrorism--which is not being given the serious study it deserves in the government.

The fifth, and last section, entitled Quo Vadis Domini? Where Do We Go From Here? Policy Implications and Operational Considerations, will

present the direct implications that the hypothesis generated by the novel have for developing a new anti-terrorist policy, a new crisis management capability, a different relationship with the media, and a new intelligence operations.

I. Summary of Terror Counter Terror

Terror Counter Terror begins with Carlo Tosi, President of the Christian Democratic Party of Italy, architect of the "historic compromise" with the Communist Party (PCI), and the most prominent politician since World War II, being kidnapped by the Red Brigade. If Interior Minister Raffael Paradiso, protege of Tosi, concedes to the terrorists' demand for an exchange of prisoners for Tosi's life, there is a very great chance that it might precipitate a civil war, pitting the left and right wings of the political spectrum against each other. Amidst cries for his resignation, Paradiso has to use his well-honed shrewdness to avoid the accusation that he is sacrificing Tosi to satisfy his own political ambitions. His initial decision is to maintain a strategy of no negotiations and no concessions.

Paradiso's repeated request for anti-terrorist assistance from the American government is finally, but reluctantly granted by bureaucratic sparring partners Thomas Rudd, Jr., U.S. Embassy Charge, and CIA Station Chief Larry Bennet.

Richard Baker, an internationally acclaimed hostage negotiator and crisis manager who is barely tolerated by his State Department colleagues is detailed to Rome. By assisting the Italians, Baker

recognizes a unique professional opportunity to experiment with U.S. anti-terrorist policy, with or without State Department concurrence.

Baker's presence in Rome exacerbates an already strained personal and professional relationship between Rudd and Ben. While each attempts to assert his own authority over the other, Baker becomes a convenient pawn in a dangerous bureaucratic game which pits the power and influence of the State Department against that of the CIA.

Rudd responds to Baker's defiance of orders and independence of judgment by developing a case for insubordination that culminates in Baker's recall to the States and the withdrawal of his diplomatic credentials and immunity. Ben also perceives Baker to be a direct threat to his already waning authority, an even greater bureaucratic impediment than Rudd to the resurgence of the CIA as the principal tool of American foreign policy in Italy. He carefully develops a plan to convert Baker's presence from an encumbrance to a CIA advantage--a plan which almost costs Baker his life.

Frustrated by half truths and outright lies, Baker begins an extensive investigation of the Tosi kidnapping. The more he delves into the facts, the more disturbing he finds them, and the more excited and committed he becomes to exploring two questions whose answers have been deceptively taken for granted: Who kidnapped Tosi? And why?

During the course of his investigation, Baker discovers that each of the individuals close to Tosi has a professional or personal reason for assisting the Red Brigade in his kidnapping: Dr. Helena Ponti, Tosi's

daughter; General Squillante, Director of the Carabinieri; Colonel Esposito, aide-de-camp to General Squillante; and Pizzo, Chief of the PCI (Communist Party). As the plot unfolds, Baker discovers a multiple conspiracy involving Tosi and Paradiso, Rudd and Esposito, and Ponti and Barbarosa (i.e., leader of the Red Brigade). Ultimately, Baker realizes that he has been the one who has been manipulated--a hostage to Carlo Tosi and the terrorism of his own bureaucracy.

II. Fiction Versus Reality

The novel is a particularly unique form of literature through which the political commentator can explore the problems of U.S. anti-terrorist policy and capability. The author, in full control of the "reality" he describes, can flesh out themes, counter themes, internal contradictions, and multiple motivations that exist throughout the system during an international crisis. Using a purposefully biased vantage point, the author can give priority to particular events and dominance to specific individuals in the service of explaining the interaction of variables and dealing with several levels of analysis. The author has no need to take singular or fixed point of view of the kidnapping that focuses the plot of the book, as he did when he participated in the resolution of the Aldo Moro kidnapping.

(1) The Hostage

It is extremely difficult to construct a developmental psychological model of a hostage during captivity. Most of the literature on

the topic focuses on prisoner survival techniques which prepare the potential victim for an encounter with terrorists; techniques which help a potential hostage maintain his mental stability and physical health.

Describing how any given person will, in fact, handle such obvious psychological hazards as isolation, claustrophobia, and a loss of a sense of time, is perhaps more meaningful through a composite representation of reality, as portrayed in the character of Carlo Tosi in Terror Counter Terror, than it would be through individual case histories. Since this author has interviewed approximately 50 former hostages, the novel affords the author the unique opportunity to transmit the anguish of the experience--as well as its psychological lessons--without compromising an individual's identity or violating professional ethics.

Carlo Tosi, the hostage in Terror Counter Terror, is given typical qualities of a political kidnapping target who might fare well in a hostage situation:

. . . persons of recognized worth, who have accomplished something in their lives, and who therefore are likely to have above-average qualities of intelligence and personality.

Added to this is a creative plot twist which enables Tosi to change this status from victim to terrorist. Without losing the sense of how a hostage is at first overcome by feelings of demoralization, helplessness and despair when confined to a bare, suffocating cell, Tosi is given the negotiating chips with which to manipulate and transform the situation to his advantage. Although Tosi, and the reader, experience the typical psychological states of denial, anxiety, depression, visual and auditory

hallucinations, and various psychosomatic responses to captivity, the desire to live eventually supercedes all and the reader concludes the novel with the sense that the anger induced in a hostage can be redirected as an effective weapon against one's captors. Through the use of plot, Tosi is given useful skills--advanced as essential for survival by professionals in the field of anti-terrorism--to understand the motives, needs, and operational contexts of the terrorists.

In short, Terror Counter Terror takes the profile of one type of potential kidnap target and places the victim in a typical hostage situation. In the character of Carlo Tosi, the novel describes the ongoing psychological changes that have been endured by real victims, as well as demonstrating how one particular hostage can manipulate his captivity to his eventual advantage. In the character of Carlo Tosi the reader finds a composite of the current state of knowledge of the best and the worst of captivity from the vantage point of the hostage.

(2) The Nation/State

The viability of the nation/state during a hostage siege is related as much to perception as it is to fact. After the economists are finished measuring such variables as the GNP, the value of money, and the price of gold, and the sociologists have analyzed the crime rate and worker absenteeism, it is ultimately the attitude of the citizenry and its leaders which determines whether a country moves toward stability or instability.

Witness the Aldo Moro kidnapping, when the world press, in effect,

declared a complete state of anarchy in Italy, and proclaimed the imminent demise of the Italian government. In fact, there was no evidence for such gloom and doom. The lira, perhaps the strongest indicator of political and economic stability, remained at the same levels as it was prior to Moro's kidnapping.

The author uses the novel form to explore varying perceptions of the impact of a political kidnapping on the stability of one nation. Specifically, Terror Counter Terror looks at a fragile coalition of mistrustful political opposites--the Communist Party (PCI) and Social Democratic Party--and microscopically analyzes the perceptions of each of the party's leaders when the coalition is threatened by the kidnap of Tosi. Although such a perspective is sometimes found in newspaper accounts of such an incident, the novel form enables the ongoing perceptions and attitudes of the terrorists, in this case the Red Brigade, as well as the victim government, to be woven into an intricate and ever-changing fabric. The reader is subjected to an ongoing analysis of the impact of perception on fact and fact on perception; an approach which can only be taken in an intensive ex post facto analysis and rarely finds its way into print.

(3) The Terrorist

Although there have been books which have attempted to analyze the terrorist mind, none have been able to capture the intrinsic paradox of the terrorist as hostage to the hostage. The novel allows this facet of a hostage incident to unravel. The presence of this peculiar

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phenomenon has been hinted at before but never fully dissected in all its psychopolitical ramifications. In Terror Counter Terror the hostage capitalizes on the truism that all terrorists must eventually confront-- that the terrorist is only as effective as his ability to leverage the limited power he has aggrandized through violence. So the terrorist in the novel is forced to spend much of his revolutionary activity husbanding his limited resources and eliminating perceived opponents, eventually breaking out into spasms of institutional destruction as an expression of his frustration and desperation. In short, the novel affords the author the unique construct from which he can first posit a particular problem or issue, and then spend the remainder of his pages (years) fleshing it out from a multiplicity of attitudes and levels without having to be confined to one particular perspective or time frame. The novelist can achieve the freedom of psychological inquiry and analysis that can only be hinted at in reality.

(4) Hostage Negotiator

The psychological impact of negotiating for a hostage on the negotiator has never been described in either a political science or psychiatry textbook, and yet it is perhaps one of the most important aspects of crisis management. There have been studies on stress and crisis management¹² utilizing classical psychodynamic crisis. But, only in two novels--one recently published using this author as the primary model¹³ for the hostage negotiator in The Fifth Horseman, and in this present manuscript is there any discussion of this problem. The reason for this

is partly that there is a paucity of experienced crisis managers who have dealt with terrorist situations, as well as a natural reluctance to discuss their profession.

This novel is unique in its detailed analysis of a hostage negotiator, and his transformation from a secure, self-assured, controlled and controlling intellectual in the beginning of the book to a paranoid, frightened, threatened, and threatening individual whose concerns change from the safe extrication of the hostage to personal revenge against a manipulating system. Without implying that all negotiators are similar, or would react to given stimuli in the same way, the underlying dynamics of the negotiator, Richard Baker, a man hopelessly addicted to action, find him willing to sacrifice his own life for a hypocritical cause. What drives Richard Baker? Immortality? Fame? Prestige? Fear? Depression? The novel explores all of these possible facets of the protagonist and then illustrates how this type of personality impacts on an institution, such as the State Department.

In conclusion, the novel becomes a unique vehicle by which to examine several vexing problems of studying international terrorism and hostage negotiations:

Problem 1 -- how to examine different perspectives and levels of analysis at the same time, without necessarily biasing the reader as to the validity of one or another competing interpretation. Like the Graham Allison study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Terror Counter Terror approaches one crisis from the co-interacting levels of the individual, the bureaucracy, and the nation/state.

Problem 2 -- how to assign multiple and appropriate motivations to individual characters, bureaucracies, or nation/states which are difficult to infer in reality. In a novel, the burden of resolving this problem resides in the author's ability to explore differing motivations within the context of a credible story line. In effect, the novel has its own internal validator.

Problem 3 -- how to respect the security classifications of government documents on hostage negotiation and safeguard legitimate concerns about national security, while telling a story which is believable and rich in detail. The problem of declassifying appropriate government materials for either a thesis or a work of fiction has destroyed more than a score of worthy topics. Frequently, by the time materials have been declassified, they are no longer of concern to the potential writer or reader. In Terror Counter Terror, the author addresses that problem by creating a verisimilitude of the world of international hostage negotiation without using any classified or security sensitive material. The novel's events and characters are sufficiently contrived and disguised so that the appearance of reality is maintained without sacrificing national security. For example, to the best of the author's knowledge, the Terrorist Information System described in the book, which provides terrorist profiles through a highly predictive computer model, exists nowhere in the government. Intelligence agencies directly responsible for such an assessment agree that the development of such an instrument is anywhere from five to ten years away.

Problem 4 -- how to reveal an author's prejudices and assumptions without the novel becoming either a political harangue or a sterile facsimile of objectivity. For example, the author's bias concerning the nature of bureaucracy is clearly evident from the beginning of the book. The travails of Baker versus, first, the State Department and, then, the Italian bureaucracy, makes it clear that, to this author, the individual is the most important determinant in the field of international terrorism. Once he has been co-opted by a system, his efficacy and competency markedly diminish; he no longer can serve either the system or himself.

Problem 5 -- how to overcome the limitations of survey methodology and unstructured interviews--secrecy of individuals involved in an emotionally charged and dangerous situation--and add valid insight to the understanding of the event and principal characters involved. The novel obviates the problems of distortion and reticence by assigning characteristics to individuals which either must remain constant or change only in degree and proportion to a precipitating event. Character credibility and consistency of the story line (i.e., coherence of action of the character's "rules of the game") are, again, the best internal validators for the author's assumptions which underlie the novel.

Problem 6 -- how to dissect a conspiracy theory which as applied to reality is particularly hard to examine. In any hostage situation such a theory must be entertained. The negotiator must consider the possibility that the terrorists are in collusion with the hostage and what we have, in effect, is not the classical terrorist incident, but,

instead, an extortion. Yet, most conspiracy theories are argued, retrospectively, from circumstantial evidence. Any serious non-fiction attempt at studying such a theory would find itself turning around in circles passed on from one official to the next. If the researcher's motives for exploring a conspiracy were revealed, most probably no interview would be granted. In the novel, however, such exploration can proceed unfettered by man or event. The possibility of a conspiracy is investigated by Baker throughout Terror Counter Terror, with all facets of potential conspiracies thoroughly analyzed, kept and discarded as new information is presented. It is this dissecting ability--the process of trying to understand a conspiracy--which is more easily accomplished in fiction than it is in reality. In fact, fiction is preferable, in this case, to a reality with severe limitations for review purposes.

III. The Novel As Social Science Methodology

Is the novel an unusual method of describing the personal dynamics and political forces that interact during a terrorist incident? This writer's answer is obviously no. Fictional transcriptions of political events are as dated as when the poet Homer described political subterfuge by referring to the Trojan Horse ploy in the Iliad. But, antiquity need not be invoked in order to legitimize the novel as a valid approach to the study of the human condition. We should examine, instead, those characteristics of the social sciences and the novel which make them appear so uncannily similar. In principle, they both attempt to approximate knowledge. One might even say that both the social sciences and

the novel are venues for understanding the human condition, replete with one or another methodological bias.

Dr. Eugene Webb in his edited book, Unobtrusive Measures: Non-reactive Research In The Social Sciences, summarizes the problem of trying to measure or assess a human event replete with multiple variables or prejudices:

There simply are no social science devices designed with so perfect a knowledge of all the major relevant sources of variation . . . Efforts in the social sciences at multiple confirmation yield disappointing and inconsistent results. Awkward to write up and difficult to publish, such results confirm the gravity and the risk of false confidence that comes with dependence on the social science (sic) methods.

In order to obviate this intrinsic problem of the social sciences,

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Dr. D. T. Campbell, the prominent anthropologist, suggests three basic methods of studying the human condition which would maximize understanding and minimize intrinsic bias and error: (1) the experimental design, (2) comparison of index numbers, (3) plausible rival hypotheses. The last method is the most general and least formal of the three approaches, and it is this approach which Terror Counter Terror approximates most closely. Both Campbell, Platt, and others have pointed out that the rival hypotheses approach asks about the other plausible interpretations to the initial hypothesis that are possible. In general, the number of competing hypotheses diminishes as the confidence of the data or the observer increases. Hopefully, through a process of sorting and elimination, the social scientist arrives at one hypothesis with which to explain his

findings.

A novel, in a similar vein, and particularly a political suspense thriller, cannot sustain its tension or credibility if too many plausible possibilities and motivations exist which can explain the denouement. The novelist acts as the social researcher, and presents the reader with X number of hypotheses as to who did what and why. As the characters are introduced and the plot is developed, the author narrows down the number of possible theories that can explain the particular event. In effect, the novel has to ask and answer methodological considerations which are analogous to those of the social scientist: Are the assumptions made about the characters and events reasonable? Does the data provided appear to be both valid and reliable? Are potential explanatory variables dealt with satisfactorily? Is the information that is gathered and presented sufficient to support the conclusions reached? Whether or not each of these questions have been appropriately handled in any given work of fiction or non-fiction depends on both the credibility of the researcher and the analytical skills and knowledge base of the reviewer.

For example, using the approach of the researcher, Terror Counter Terror explores some themes which are well-discussed by political and social scientists. The conservative nature of governmental institutions is one theme that runs throughout the novel, and one that runs throughout the writings of prominent social scientists such as Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, especially in their discussions of the relationship of personal power within an organization as a means of maintaining the

¹⁷
 status quo. Terror Counter Terror attempts to demonstrate that, in many ways, the State Department acts as a rational actor, trying to maximize its advantages in the field of international terrorism while minimizing its costs--even at the expense of sacrificing one of its own senior employees. The author's implied assumptions--that the State Department (as an organization) acts as a rational entity whose basically conservative nature is determined by the Hobbesian fear of social disorder and mutual destruction rather than any positive ego-gratifying motives--are assumptions that Carl Friedrich explored in his books Man and His
¹⁸ Government ¹⁹ and Rational Decision. It is an observation first made
²⁰ by Max Weber ²¹ and restated by Talcott Parsons in his discussion of general organizational behavior.

Terror Counter Terror also tries to show how conservative systems, like the State Department or the Italian government, utilize co-optation of the unruly or the maverick as the major mechanism for insuring organizational stability. Philip Selznick, in his book TVA and the Grassroots, makes a similar observation describing a process where the system engages predominantly in two forms of co-optation: formal and informal. In the former, co-optation occurs when there is a need to establish the legitimacy of authority; informal co-optation occurs when there is a need of adjustment to the pressure of changing centers of power within any given organ-
²²
 ization.

Another organizational mechanism for dealing with malcontents which is discussed throughout the novel is assimilation, a subject

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elegantly explored by Robert Michels. Michels' observations concerning the Prussian bureaucracy and its inability to tolerate distinguished personalities are as true today for the U.S. State Department as they were 100 years ago for the German government. Both systems are "spiritless and mechanical regimes, displaying a lively hostility to all true progress."²⁴

One of the most incriminating hypotheses discussed in Terror Counter Terror is the observation long made by political scientists that bureaucratization results in the complete depersonalization of human relations.²⁵ Once bureaucratic relationships become abstract and anonymous it is easy to impose basically contradictory ideologies (as had been done by the National Socialists)--the ideology of the community and the leadership principle. When that occurs, violence, repression, and terror become justified in the service of maintaining the integrity of the system; and, especially, the nation/state.²⁶ In Terror Counter Terror, both the Italians and the Americans commit acts of treason and violence against their own systems in order to preserve the overall integrity of the system.

How different are the novel's methods of studying the nature of the bureaucracy (only one of several themes explored in Terror Counter Terror) from those used by the rigorous social scientists? The answer is: not too different.

In his brilliant essay on the analysis of political behavior, Harold Lasswell addresses himself to the same methodological issues that must also concern the political novelist.²⁷ First, Lasswell recommends that the social scientist (i.e., political recorder) ask a question that

seems worthy of answering. Secondly, a procedure must be available that does not interfere with his/her work. For Lasswell, as for the novelist, the essence of the method of recording political behavior resides in the participant-observer's ability to record as accurately as possible those events that have transpired during a certain time period. He not only recommends a chronological documentation but, more importantly, a contextual interpretation of the events as they occurred and the feelings that they engendered in the observer.

That is, in fact, what the author of Terror Counter Terror has done. The essence of the narrative, plot development and characters rests on that very basic methodology espoused by Lasswell--meticulous record keeping and self-observation. This particular method of immediately recording impressions, attitudes and, most importantly, feelings, became, in fact, the very keystone of this novel--while the reality of the political events could not be reproduced either in scholarly or fiction form because of problems of confidentiality and propriety, the distillation of mixed emotions and events involved in international hostage negotiation formed the basis of the book.

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Along similar lines of inquiry, Sune Carlson suggests a system of classification based primarily on three variables (setting, personal interrelationships, communication) which help to define the parameters of political/executive behavior which was analogous to the author's approach in structuring his novel:

(1) Setting. Where did the action take place? Why was it located

where it was? What features of the setting make the political operative work the way he does? Like Carlson, this author believes that "setting," in large part, determines the nature of subsequent political behavior. The setting for Terror Counter Terror leads to some of the following questions: How does the particular setting of imposed secrecy and obligatory paranoia determine the subsequent actions of the principal characters? How does it effect their professional and personal assessments of each other and political events in general? What distortions of perception can one rightfully expect?

(2) Inter-relationship between executives/politicians and institutions. The methodological questions under this heading revolve around the issues of staff loyalty versus institutional loyalty versus policy advocacy. Relevant questions concern the interface of risk--benefit matrices: At what point is it worthwhile for any institution to abandon either a policy or personnel if it finds itself threatened? This issue is discussed in Terror Counter Terror using two differing political entities--the U.S. government and the Italian government. Each institution, as the book suggests, resolves such dilemmas according to its own mores.

(3) Techniques of communication. Conversations among politicians are rarely observed or documented. In the typical political science treatise this is dealt with by amalgamating first, second and third party remembrance of dialogue, and creating a sense of what transpired. The political scientist's ability to gather, analyze and interpret the data

collected in a fashion that mirrors reality is what separates the creative researcher from the mundane. This also distinguishes the good novelist from the hack. The novel, in effect, allows the reader to eavesdrop on a conversation as it takes place. Needless to say, little recorded information exists on what transpires between a terrorist and a hostage negotiator. None exists for hostage and terrorist.

Perhaps the most persuasive argument that the novel and the social science thesis are more similar than either mode of writing would explicitly admit lies in the bibliography offered in a standard college textbook on bureaucracy and politics edited by Robert K. Merton. The bibliography includes:

- (1) Balzac, Honore de, The Government Clerks.
- (2) Dickens, Charles, Bleak House.
- (3) Dickens, Charles, Little Dorrit.
- (4) Gogol, Nikolai, The Government Inspector.
- (5) Kafka, Franz, The Castle.
- (6) Kafka, Franz, The Trial.
- (7) Trollope, Anthony, The Three Clerks.

In summary, it becomes increasingly apparent that the novel can be used as an effective way of both analyzing and transmitting the attitudes, values, and mores inherent in any political system or event. The novel allows the author to establish a series of untested hypotheses, implicitly stated initially and later expounded and developed through the narrative, character development, twists in plots, and dialogue.

The novel tests the author's ability to recreate the semblance of reality without mirroring it exactly. The reader should leave the book in question with a richer, more sophisticated understanding of American political institutions and the phenomenon of terrorism. Given the same political phenomenon, both the novelist and the social scientist may arrive at the same conclusion, through basically similar methods; the novel, however, will ask the reader to entertain the conclusion as a possibility while the political scientist will proclaim the conclusion as the only possibility.

What, then, are the hypotheses generated in Terror Counter Terror? Well, already mentioned is the conservative, status quo oriented nature of bureaucracies which will attempt to co-opt any dissent member--whether it is the State Department, the U.S. Embassy, the Italian government, the Italian National Security Forces, or the terrorist group itself. However, beyond this point, this novel attempts to explore certain theses regarding the unique, paradoxical nature of hostage phenomena which place so many different individuals and institutions in hostage to one another in a totally unexpected role reversal.

1. The first hypothesis that Terror Counter Terror states is that in the phenomenon of international diplomacy and terrorism, the individual actor, above all else, is hostage to his own particular psychodynamics, specifically, his narcissistic entitlements and its natural companion, narcissistic vulnerabilities. Of course, this is not an original thesis. It has been thoroughly examined by Freud and Kohut

in the field of psychiatry, and by Harold Lasswell in the area of political science. It is an hypothesis, nevertheless, which deserves re-examination and exploration because it is one of the classical themes of social behavior, ranging from the Greek tragedies which reiterate the continuous refrain--Hubris Ate Nemesis (Man's Pride is His Nemesis)--to the modern twentieth century protagonist of John Updike's Run Rabbit Run, who openly and unashamedly indulges his own narcissism as an almost full-time preoccupation. In Terror Counter Terror, the protagonist Richard Baker, a hostage negotiator, becomes totally immersed in an endeavor which initially called for some technical assistance. His narcissism refuses to accept not only the limitations of the system in which he works, as well as the clear inadequacies of the Italians, but, more importantly and tragically, he is unable to accept his own limitations. He is unable to realize that no matter what he does to affect the release of the political hostage, Carlo Tosi, he becomes increasingly a victim of his own subjective needs for danger, risk and excitement than to any objective reality--so much so that he risks his life in what eventually proves to be a futile effort to extricate the hostage. As a character, Baker transforms himself from a cool, level-headed, overly controlled professional to an individual reeking with vengeance and self-delusions of grandiosity. The book demonstrates that narcissistic vulnerabilities, if allowed to remain unbridled by repeatedly ignoring the constraints of reality, will ultimately determine a character's destiny. This thesis is also explored in the behavior of two other major characters in the book: Carlo Tosi,

the hostage; and Dr. Helena Ponti, the hostage's daughter. In Carlo Tosi, the penultimate 20th century politician, described by one of his close colleagues as "shit in silk stockings," the reader sees that destiny is determined not only by the constraints of his immediate political surroundings but, once again, by his insatiable need for immortality, a need which pre-ordains him to the role of political hostage and its inevitable expression as martyr. Whatever else is required of him by his electorate, he must first of all serve himself. Similarly, Tosi's daughter, a dedicated pediatrician, is a woman who has defined her entire existence as a statement of purpose, in continuous opposition to her father. Instead of allowing herself to accept her father's limitations of character and eventually come to terms with him, she uses her rebellion as the keystone of her personal life, eventually destroying everything and everyone she engages.

2. The second major hypothesis of Terror Counter Terror is that international hostage negotiation is by nature replete with multiple, often contradictory agendas, and that the hostage negotiator never truly knows whose interests he is serving and why. The process of discovering these "layered" and interacting agendas involves personal risk, danger, and eventually violence. The book examines this hypothesis from several different vantage points. The State Department's interests are represented by two different characters, each with his own agenda, although ostensibly serving the same publicly stated policy. Douglas Wheat, the Secretary of State, expresses the institutional perspective when he sends

Richard Baker to Italy in order to assist a "worthy ally." However, his "henchman" in the field, Thomas Rudd, embassy Charge, requests Baker's presence for very personal, parochial interests, in order to check the encroaching presence of the Rome Station Chief, Larry Bennet (Ben), who, in turn, is pleased to have Baker present for a totally different reason, both personal and professional. Already, one can see that the "American interest" is manifest in three fragmented and very different directions. Baker must figure out whose interest he truly serves and why.

Similarly, the Italian Interior Minister Paradiso has requested Baker's assistance in order to help him develop an effective crisis management capability. But, Baker eventually discovers that this was not Paradiso's true motive. In fact, Paradiso needs Baker to legitimize a hidden agenda, originally developed by his political mentor, Carlo Tosi. Unwinding this labyrinth of hidden motives and truths engages the predominant part of the hostage negotiator's time and requires him to risk his life for, at best, a questionable outcome. A legitimate question can be asked as to whether this hypothesis is not merely the contrivance of the author or whether it, in fact, represents a facsimile of the real world of hostage negotiation. To answer that question, one only has to read the recent newspaper headlines in which Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga, who conducted the negotiation for Aldo Moro, was the subject of a parliamentary investigation concerning his alleged tip-off of the Vice President of the Christian Democratic Party concerning an impending arrest of his Red Brigade son.

3. The third hypothesis of Terror Counter Terror states that in an international hostage siege, where world attention is continuously riveted to the event, there are different levels of captivity which must be considered and dealt with in order to resolve the siege effectively. At the basic level is the relationship of the individual to his own personality, as discussed above, but equally important, are the varying belief systems concerning the conduct of foreign policy, or in this case, the anti-terrorist policy. The book examines, from varying perspectives, the one policy guideline that has in reality become totally reified; that is, a policy of no negotiation/no concession as an effective deterrent against future terrorists. Never before in the social sciences has that assumption been explored. However, there is no question that an entire system has been held captive to that one idea both in the past (i.e., the Nixon administration) and in the present Reagan administration. The book examines this policy hypothesis as it relates to both the State Department and the Italian government. In the book, the protagonist realizes that in order for him to achieve the necessary change of the no negotiation/no concession policy, he must deny his own system, and by placing the policy to its most severe test, the Italian government might be destabilized.

The second level of the captivity hypothesis refers to an individual's loyalty to his profession, whether it be diplomacy or medicine or both. This is a central issue in the book and one that always confronts the policymaker when he has to consider the tradeoffs between

national security and human lives. In Terror Counter Terror, the protagonist's loyalty to the State Department is directly challenged by what he considers to be inept professionals; his commitment to a morality dictated by professional medical concerns is directly challenged by violence in the form of the terrorist, and his would-be assassin. To what, then, is Baker ultimately loyal if only himself?

The third level of the captivity hypothesis states that a nation can literally be held hostage to a hostage event through the terrorists' manipulation of the media. Although this assumption became self-evident as a result of the Iran siege of 444 days, that realization had not always been apparent--certainly not in the United States or in Italy. By the direct intervention of the President into the daily management of the Iranian crisis, Mr. Carter allowed himself to be held captive by the media for the duration of the crisis. The book examines the implication of this problem for the Italians and what would happen to Italy if it allowed its top leadership to concentrate all its efforts on managing that crisis. The book shows that in the end, politicians serve their own personal needs first, even at the cost of the nation's welfare. If anyone cares to challenge that conclusion, he only has to remember President Carter's use of the Iranian hostage siege as a symbol which he felt he could manipulate into serving the goal of his re-election. His narcissistic entitlement to appear in total control and above reproach impaired his judgment. And, so he too, like Carlo Tosi, the captive in the book, failed to realize his own personal ambitions.

4. The fourth level of captivity relates to the direct relationship between the terrorist and the nation-state he seemingly holds captive. The book tries to explain how a group of individuals, dissatisfied and alienated, can immobilize an entity of far greater power by two simple principles of manipulation: strike at the most vulnerable point and affix media attention. If one ever doubts the conclusion of that hypothesis, one only has to recall the Hanafi Muslim siege, in which less than a handful of men completely paralyzed the nation's capitol for three days. Another example is the astounding escapade of the terrorist "Carlos" who assaulted an OPEC meeting and had the affrontery to kidnap several of his own financial patrons, the OPEC ministers (i.e., Libya, Saudia Arabia).

The fourth major hypothesis that is explored in Terror Counter Terror derives from this last level of analysis--the relationship of the terrorist to the symbolic theatrical event he has created. The hypothesis asserts that the terrorist becomes hostage to his own hostage and the terrorist phenomenon he has created, and that his operational options may be even more limited than those of his adversaries. This was particularly true when the stakes were raised very quickly in the Aldo Moro kidnapping and the Teheran hostage siege. In both cases, the terrorists grew to have higher stakes in keeping the hostages alive than in killing them; otherwise the terrorist would immediately lose his sole source of legitimacy--the fate of the potential victim. The irony of terrorism is that the victim eventually confers legitimacy upon the terrorist. That

legitimacy is enhanced by the heat of media attention. If the terrorist loses either the victim or media attention he, in effect, forfeits his raison d 'etre. Terror Counter Terror examines this paradox of hostage-taking and explores, in detail, the symbiotic relationship between the hostage, Carlo Tosi, and his captor, Barbarosa. Tosi, whose political destiny resides in potential martyrdom, requires captivity. Barbarosa, the terrorist, can survive only if he keeps his hostage alive.

5. The fifth major hypothesis that the novel explores is the unique phenomenon of role reversal that can arise during a hostage crisis. One only has to witness the recent siege in Iran to realize that over a one year period the United States was transformed from a superpower to humiliated supplicant, begging the Iranians for one or another concession. In contrast, a third rate Ayatollah who had fled from Iran, made a major grab for power and decided to solidify his power base using the classical scapegoating technique of blaming the U.S. for all inequities. However, a more significant transformation occurred over the course of the negotiations when the Ayatollah Khomeini, caught in the quagmire of his own ineptitude, beset by a war with Iraq, constrained by limited resources, and absent finances, almost publicly declared himself a hostage to the American hostages by allowing his subordinates to act out his own ambivalences, and thereby tear asunder the fibers of his new moral Islamic Republic. Even the President of the United States was caught in the sudden role reversal from Commander in Chief of a superpower to a field commander apologizing for the inept debacle of the failed helicopter

raid, from a shrewd politician who had manipulated public symbols through-
out his incumbency to a politician completely entrapped by the symbols
he thought that he had mastered.

In Terror Counter Terror, as in the Iranian crisis, master becomes
servant, and servant becomes master. For example, in the novel the pro-
tagonist, Baker, changes from negotiator to terrorist as a direct function
of his own narcissistic needs encountering the insurmountable frustra-
tions which threaten his life. Similarly, the terrorist Barbarosa finds
himself at the end of the book negotiating with Baker both for his own life
and that of his hotage. Other transformations--role reversals--occur
during the course of the novel which are made possible because of the
intense nature of the event, and hopefully seem possible, rather than
literary contrivances.

IV. Developing the U.S. Anti-Terrorist Policy and Hostage Negotiation Capability

Before 1971, there was no formally articulated United States policy
for hostage negotiations; the official position regarding kidnapped
U.S. diplomats viewed the incident as a local event requiring the host
government to do "whatever was necessary"³⁴ to obtain the safe release
of the hostages. Subsequent policy deliberations within the State
Department achieved no formal structure or prescription, other than to
encourage, in a somewhat lackadaisical way, a host government to make
reasonable concessions in order to effect the safe release of the hostage.
Between 1969 and 1971, the government efforts were focused on Latin

American revolutionary groups.

With the increasing rise of Palestinian terrorism in the Middle East, however, evidenced by Dr. Habash's skyjackings and Dr. Hawatmeh's civilian massacres, U.S. policy, although still informal, began to harden, viewing the granting of concessions as a capitulation to terrorists and American diplomats as "soldiers in a war of terrorism."³⁶ This hard line position became evident by March 1971, when four airmen were kidnapped from an American base in Ankara, Turkey and the host government refused to negotiate with the terrorists; a position completely supported by the United States.³⁷

The Japanese Red Army massacre of innocent pilgrims at the Lod Airport in Israel in 1972, as well as the killing of eleven Israeli athletes in the Munich Olympics by the Palestinian Black September group, reaffirmed the growing realization within the senior ranks of the U.S. government that terrorism was beginning to evolve into an orchestrated international threat both to Western democracy and the accepted ground rules for international order.³⁸ The threat was perceived specifically as a product of Palestinian extremism, attempting to insinuate itself into the balance of power through violence and terror. The senior officials reasoned, therefore, that a U.S. Anti-Terrorist policy, still not committed to paper either in a Presidential Review Memorandum or a National Security Council Memorandum, should be extremely hardline, allowing for no negotiations whatsoever with terrorists and forbidding any concessions.³⁹

It was assumed by government officials, although there was no direct

evidence for that assumption, that such a firm posture would discourage further kidnapping of U.S. officials. This posture was again invoked during the kidnapping of one Ambassador and State Department official in Khartoum, Sudan, March, 1973, both of whom were held hostage by a PLO group. President Nixon forbade any direct negotiations with the terrorists and publicly declared that the United States would never succumb to blackmail of any type. Subsequently, both men were summarily executed under
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direct orders of Arafat.

It was after this incident that the first formal organizational structures targeted on the task of countering terrorism began to take shape in the federal bureaucracy. In the State Department, an Office to Combat Terrorism was created, headed by a relatively low-ranking ambassador, and receiving only token staff and resources, insufficient to build an effective organization and capability. Simultaneously, a super agency, the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, was created, chaired by the State Department and consisting of at least ten different bureaucracies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Defense Department, a representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Federal Office for Emergency Preparedness. The stage was now set for a governmental group to develop a formal anti-terrorist policy as well as the necessary crisis management capability to handle any terrorist
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incident.

Unfortunately, another terrorist incident arose before any anti-terrorist mechanisms were in operable condition. In June 1975, three

Stanford undergraduate students (one of whom later became a MIT graduate student in Political Science) studying chimpanzee behavior under the supervision of the renowned Jane Goodall were kidnapped by Tanzanian guerrillas. They were held captive for approximately two months, during which time U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania W. Beverly Carter entered into direct negotiations with the rebels. Senior officials in the State Department were clearly annoyed at the handling of the incident and refused to provide any necessary backup support. Instead, the families of the hostages personally intervened in the negotiations and private ransom was paid. The hostages were subsequently released.

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As a result of this incident, Secretary Kissinger dismissed Ambassador Carter (who was subsequently reinstated) for having violated an unwritten understanding that an Ambassador does not enter into direct negotiations with a terrorist. The Secretary formally proclaimed U.S. policy to be one of (1) no negotiations, (2) no political exchanges, and (3) no economic ransom.

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It should be emphasized that at the time of the Tanzanian incident: (1) a clearly written, well understood anti-terrorist policy did not exist; (2) the State Department was not organizationally equipped to effectively handle a terrorist hostage siege; and, (3) official policy was being determined in the field.

This state of affairs was ordained to change through policy arising from the Presidential Review Memorandum 30 requested by the incoming Carter administration. An ostensibly new U.S. Anti-Terrorist Policy was

publicly proclaimed as follows: (1) the host government is responsible for the safety, well-being, and release of the hostage(s); (2) the U.S. Ambassador will provide the host government with whatever technical assistance is required; (3) the U.S. Ambassador will inform the host government that the U.S. does not enter into direct negotiations with the terrorist, except to discuss issues relevant to the well-being of the hostage; (4) the U.S. Ambassador will make known to the host government that the U.S. government does not pay political or monetary ransom; (5) at his discretion, the U.S. Ambassador will request that the host government invite third party intervention (i.e., the International Red Cross) in order to negotiate a hostage release if the host government refuses to negotiate with the terrorists; (6) the U.S. Ambassador will do nothing to interfere with the family members' attempts to ransom the hostage.

The inherent contradictions of a policy which on the one hand attempted to deter future terrorist incidents by announcing that no ransom would ever be paid, while at the same time made allowances for private negotiations, was to wreak havoc on the management of terrorist incidents in subsequent years. Operational confusion was created all the way from the White House to the regional bureaus which were ultimately responsible for the day-to-day management of any crisis.

Between 1976 and 1980, a new super-cabinet organization was designated to implement this contradictory policy--the Security Committee to Combat Terrorism. This newly created bureaucratic entity, also a product of PRM-30, was comprised of senior representatives from the State

Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Justice. Few, if any, of the representative officials knew or had any practical experience in dealing with hostage taking. Operational concerns were passed on to the Interagency Committee to Combat Terrorism (which replaced the Nixon Cabinet's Committee to Combat Terrorism). This new crisis management team spent most of its time (1) determining jurisdiction of operation and (2) making certain that in a real crisis no one agency would carry the brunt of the risk or decision. Thus, in the early years of the Carter administration, with anti-terrorist policy straining in different directions and the operational capability to handle a crisis no more than wishful thinking, U.S. capability in the anti-terrorist field was, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

Given this setting, one could easily predict the Government's response to the series of hostage episodes that took place between 1977 and 1981. On the policy side, the senior officials in the State Department were granting, almost as a matter of habit, greater and greater concessions in each subsequent hostage siege. On the operational side, crisis management became a euphemism for an ad hoc response to crisis consistently characterized by (a) a misunderstanding, ignorance, or indifference to the official anti-terrorist policy and its implementation and (b) an increasing emphasis on quick resolution, which translated into a desire to grant varying concessions.

Witness the first major hostage siege which the Carter administration

encountered: in March 1977, a group of Hanafi Muslims assaulted three District of Columbia buildings and held 144 people hostage, demanding concessions which included (a) the cessation of showing a commercial movie portraying the life of the prophet Mohammed, (b) an exchange of prisoners, (c) a public apology, and (d) direct access to the President. Immediate concessions granted by administration officials, including the withdrawal of the public showing of the film, led to a quagmire of protracted negotiations, and a desperate call to a tested hostage negotiator who subsequently completely restructured the negotiations and dismissed several senior officials from participation in the incident. The lessons that could have been learned from the successful resolution of the episode, including how to avoid making the President hostage to a terrorist demand, were unfortunately ignored, as testified by the handling of subsequent terrorist incidents.

A few months after being called a "madman" in the world press by Ambassador Andrew Young, President Idi Amin of Uganda held two hundred American missionaries hostage until he had effectively intimidated President Carter into publicly apologizing for the earlier insult, as well as extracting a promise of delivery of some highly prized telecommunication equipment. Once again, the administration found itself with an irreconcilable problem: how to maintain the strategic deterrence of the anti-terrorist policy while trying to salvage the hostages. When the incident had been resolved, the White House concluded, incorrectly, I believe, that it was the deployment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet toward

Uganda that had deterred Idi Amin from executing the hostages. Given so easy a cause-effect relationship, the Idi Amin episode was never fully explored or systematically analyzed. The incident also resulted in polarizing positions within the government--the State Department espoused a concessionary approach while the White House stood for a tough, no-negotiation, possible military assault posture. These two distinct approaches solidified during the subsequent years, and came to reflect the personalities of the principal officials in charge of managing these branches: on the other hand, the more passive, conciliatory Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; on the other hand, the more impulsive, aggressive National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski.

Mounting policy and operational problems crystallized on February 14, 1979, when Ambassador William Sullivan was taken hostage in Tehran for 36 hours by a group of Islamic revolutionaries. At the exact same time, Ambassador Spike Dubbs was being held hostage in a hotel room in Kabul, Afghanistan. At the time, the U.S. had no clear direction in its terrorist policy, no strategies or tactics which had been operationally tested, and no lessons learned from previous episodes. The eventual murder of Ambassador Dubbs, more than any other incident, demonstrated the lack of professional competence that existed in the administration to manage a hostage siege. Without belaboring the incident, several major mistakes were made by senior officials who panicked on the spot or who made incorrect operational judgments.

Subsequent unwillingness by the State Department to admit any

culpability in this tragedy allowed the U.S. government to continue to pursue a self-destructive course while preserving its own institutional integrity. Senior officials who had already demonstrated their ineptness were once again thrust into a scenario which allowed them to repeat their uncorrected mistakes--except this time, their mishandling of the negotiations with the Iranian government resulted in 444 days of captivity for several dozen Americans.

In conclusion, the reality of the United States government's policy and operational capability to deal with international terrorism is less than exemplary. Some of the consequences of these problems are examined in Terror Counter Terror.

Quo Vadis Domini? Where Do We Go From Here?
Policy Implications and Operational Considerations

Anti-Terrorist Policy

Terror Counter Terror illustrates the difficulties encountered by the U.S. government in both defining the objectives of an anti-terrorist policy as well as the problems implementing an effective one. Hence, it serves as no surprise to anyone that the resolution of the Iranian hostage siege represents a complete bankruptcy of a U.S. government policy that began with a statement of no negotiation/no concession to end in a complete capitulation where everything and anything, including the prestige of both the presidency and the country, were bargained away for the safe release of fifty-two hostages. ⁴⁷ This problem has already been discussed in previous sections as one arising from a poor understanding of the initial

goals of an anti-terrorist policy combined with a lack of institutional capability to implement what was, at best, a gradually shifting, if not bifurcated, policy.

In contrast, Terence Smith in a May 17, 1981 Sunday New York Times article entitled "Why Carter Admitted The Shah,"⁴⁸ argued unconvincingly that the crucial points of decisionmaking in the management of the Iranian crisis were determined primarily by the political pressures brought to bear by the "old-boy network" (including David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, John J. McCloy) upon President Carter and Secretary Vance to admit the Shah to the U.S. What Mr. Smith does not mention was the fact that despite these apparent pressures nothing else was done to prepare the U.S. government for what the President recognized⁴⁹ was the inevitable consequence⁵⁰ of admitting the Shah to the U.S.--the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. No mention was made in the article of repeated warnings by a senior State Department official to decrease the embassy staff to a skeleton crew as well as to prepare appropriate contingency plans for a prolonged hostage⁵¹ siege. Again, no mention was made of the President's and the Secretary's collective inability to understand the complicated political and psychological dynamics of international hostage-taking as described in Terror Counter Terror or their unwillingness to appreciate the dual nature of⁵² the U.S. anti-terrorist policy.

The article, ostensibly a landmark study in the decisionmaking process of the management of the Iran hostage siege, should be read as an inchoate journalistic foray into the understanding of crisis management

demonstrating a promising but clearly unfulfilled capability to fathom the psychological dynamics of political personalities and their demonstrated professional incompetence.

At present, the Reagan administration's anti-terrorist policy as publicly stated ⁵³ appears to want to deter terrorism above all else by refusing to negotiate with the terrorist and, secondly, it proclaims a capability in which the U.S. will retaliate as quickly as possible once the act of terrorism has been committed, in order to discourage any further future incidents. As constituted, this policy leaves very little room, if any, for negotiations or any other than a military option, which in the past has proven seriously wanting.

The question can then be legitimately asked, what should be the goals of a new anti-terrorist policy? The answer to this question may appear on the surface to differ very little from the Reagan administration's stated goal of deterring future acts of terrorism, except with the following significant additions:

(1) Develop a firm public posture of refusing to grant any political or monetary concessions while at the same time developing a private policy of maximum tactical flexibility--even allowing for negotiations around issues which would not compromise the national security.

(2) Saving the lives of the hostages through negotiation while at the same time making certain not to compromise the national integrity through the granting of major concessions.

(3) The U.S. government should appear and be both competent and

consistent in its handling of a terrorist episode in order to insure the support and confidence of allies as well as to raise the price for any future acts of terrorism.

(4) Develop a policy for both swift military and legal retribution in order to increase the price for any future terrorist acts.

(5) Treat each terrorist episode separately so that the U.S. government is not trapped into any one unproductive strategy or tactic.

In short, the goals of the new policy should be one of maintaining a firm U.S. posture which would deter any future terrorist goals while at the same time affording the crisis managers the maximum number of options to resolve the hostage crisis so that the national security is not impaired while at the same time the subsequent cost for committing any future acts of terrorism is not diminished. How, then, can one formulate a policy which would incorporate these goals?

(1) Refuse to state publicly what the U.S. anti-terrorist policy is. By remaining publicly silent, the professional terrorists do not really know what to expect from the U.S. government until they've committed an act of violence. For example, for years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has had an informal anti-terrorist policy, never stated publicly, which allows them to make any and all concessions to the terrorist in order to bargain for the safe release of the hostages. The FBI's concessions are publicly advertised so that all potential terrorists are clearly apprised of the FBI's conciliatory position. However, what makes the FBI an effective anti-terrorist force with an impressive hostage

negotiation record as well as a visible deterrent capability is their proven effectiveness in apprehending the terrorist, kidnapper, extortionist, after the concessions have been granted, raising significantly the cost to any future terrorists where potential incarceration has to be considered as part of the final outcome--a not very desirable goal for most terrorists who simply desire media attention and an opportunity to achieve political saliency, if not legitimacy.

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(2) Establishing a hierarchy of trade-offs for the safe release of the hostages, making certain that at no time should political, monetary, or national security be traded off. This prescription for a future policy sounds completely contradictory and quite impossible--on the surface, that is. In fact, this anti-terrorist policy when competently managed witnessed some very elegant resolutions to potentially disastrous sieges. For example, in 1972, the seizure of the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand by Palestinian terrorists who demanded the release of their comrades in an Israeli prison; instead, they received a specific amount of media coverage in return for the hostages they were holding. This trade-off of hostage lives for media exposure, later characterized as

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"the Bangkok solution," was applied in the negotiations of the 1976 Croatian hijacking of a TWA airline en route from New York to Toronto,

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finally ending up in Paris, France.

(3) Similarly, tactical flexibility, as defined by the ability to operate creatively within policy limits that proscribe major political or monetary concessions, can be achieved by allowing professional private

parties, informally sanctioned by the U.S. government to enter into negotiations with the terrorists strictly on behalf of the hostages' families. This approach was successfully attempted over a three year period when Richard Starr, a Peace Corps volunteer, was held captive by the FARC Revolutionary Unit in the jungles of Columbia. ⁶⁰ The U.S. government, with the silent consent of the Colombian, informally agreed to allow a private mediator to negotiate the safe release of Richard Starr because the U.S. government had purposefully taken a public hardline policy of no monetary concessions in order to discourage any further taking hostage of U.S. employees in Latin America. Although money was paid for Starr's release, the public impression was that the full amount ⁶¹ was paid by private benefactors and not the U.S. government. Hence, in this case, the U.S. government felt that it had maintained publicly a firm no concession policy which would discourage any further kidnappings while being able to participate, without public identification, in the negotiations for the safe release of the hostage.

(4) U.S. efforts should be made to extend military or technical assistance to the host government in order to assist in the eradication of indigenous terrorist groups. Such U.S. assistance was of paramount ⁶² importance in the successful eradication of the Tupamaros in Uruguay, left wing terrorists in Chile, and both right and left wing terrorists in ⁶³ Argentina.

(5) The U.S. should convene/organize more international legal conferences which would prescribe the greater use of extradition and

incarceration of any terrorists. In the past such conferences have failed because few countries had been effected by acts of terrorist violence and, therefore, significant differences arose over the legal definition of a "terrorist" versus a "political prisoner."⁶⁴ As the problem of international terrorism becomes increasingly widespread, more third world countries are beginning to realize that their economic viability can become seriously impaired by Western sanctions if countries such as Libya, Algeria continue to harbor and train international terrorists (such as the PLO and Japanese Red Army, respectively) and insist on calling them political revolutionaries.⁶⁵

Terror Counter Terror provides a vehicle in which this flexible policy of negotiating with the terrorist can be simulated through the interaction of Baker and Barbarosa while at the same time exploring the ramifications of these types of negotiations with respect to other policy or operational considerations such as crisis management, media manipulation and intelligence. The book explores how Baker can effectively deal with Barbarosa, if he departs from a hardline, static U.S. policy of no negotiation/no concession. Instead, through a series of subtle manipulations, he is able to extricate Tosi while at the same time ensnaring Barbarosa.

In summary, the application of the above-outlined anti-terrorist policy that is described in Terror Counter Terror is one that affords the U.S. government the greatest amount of tactical flexibility through several negotiating techniques such as "the Bangkok solution," one that allows

informal participation through private negotiations, or one that invokes a hierarchy of concessions short of endangering the national security (as was the case with the series of political and monetary concessions granted to the Iranians during the 444 day crisis). Yet an effective anti-terrorist policy should address each terrorist episode separately, mindful that the lessons derived from one do not necessarily apply to another. Emphasis should be placed instead on maintaining the image of a credible, consistently competent performance.

Crisis Management Operations

The lack of an effective institutional capability to manage a crisis, more than any other factor, has accounted for the unsuccessful outcome of any hostage siege. Specifically, the problems of bureaucratic inconsistency, jurisdictional fights, and outright incompetence, as portrayed in Terror Counter Terror through the characters of Secretary Wheat, Ambassador Evans, DCM Rudd, Station Chief Bennet, or Interior Minister Paradiso, cannot be underemphasized. Witness the recent bureaucratic haggling between Secretary Haig and National Security Advisor Richard Allen about who would preside over the area of crisis management. This is a repetition of what transpired during the Carter administration between Secretary Vance and National Security Advisor Brezezinski. ⁶⁶ Such a classic confrontation between the White House and the State Department, which eventually resonates in the marble hallways of Congress (portrayed by the character of Congressman Trotter in Terror Counter Terror), seriously impairs the organizational structure and operational capability of the

U.S. government during a crisis. No longer can one find an individual, or a group of people, with proven expertise during a crisis and a clear sense of political and operational limitations. Instead, Secretary Alexander Haig's recent floundering performance as the "man in control" while President Reagan was hospitalized and Vice President Bush was incapacitated was characteristic of the confusion--inspired by organizational procedure and personal rivalry--that seems to characterize the onset of almost all crises. ⁶⁷

Haig's quivering, unstable performance reaffirms this book's first hypothesis: that a political animal becomes hostage to his own narcissistic entitlements and psychological vulnerabilities. Unable to control his need to aggrandize personal power and bureaucratic turf, Haig unconsciously found himself distorting or fabricating a rule of presidential succession that in no way corresponded to either the Constitution or the White House system of operation during a crisis (however weakly institutionalized that system is).

A similar behavior pattern is clearly evident in the book's protagonist, Richard Baker. The only difference is that Baker becomes increasingly more controlled and competent as the stresses of a crisis mount. That was, however, his Achilles heel.

Effective crisis management requires an institutional capability totally independent of the political and bureaucratic exigencies of a four year presidency. What is required first is the commitment of an administration to develop a cadre of professional non-political crisis

managers who are carefully screened through a battery of psychological tests, physical examinations, and performance stress evaluations, much as the government already does for employees of NASA, and for those people who manufacture or guard nuclear weapons. ⁶⁸ Second, the government must provide an extensive training period, in which such courses as systems analysis, decision making, stress control, political psychology, group dynamics, and propaganda analysis are taught. This training would include, along the model of a medical or legal apprenticeship, experience in dealing with simulations of actual crises, and would be supervised at a real, ongoing crisis. Once trained, there would be ongoing evaluations, and promotions according to performance. In short, professionalism would substitute for the current ad hoc procedures by which people are (self) selected to manage crises.

The other important aspect of crisis management is a requirement that the center for managing a crisis be located wherever the President of the United States feels he would have the greatest operational leverage over the different bureaucracies involved in a crisis (including DOD, State, CIA, FBI, Justice, Energy, FAA) while at the same time being most protected from having the Presidency held hostage during a crisis as occurred during the Carter administration. Paradoxically, these requirements of having power centered near the President while at the same time being symbolically distanced from the Presidency can be fulfilled by creating within the National Security Council staff a cadre of professional crisis managers who would be directly responsible to either the President's

National Security Advisor or the Vice President who would then make all the necessary operational decisions, while, at the same time, the President is restricted to making only political decisions. It is imperative that the President not manage day-to-day crisis operations, as Jimmy Carter did during the Iran hostage siege; otherwise, he becomes hostage to the demands of crisis management and may unwittingly forfeit the authority of the Office of the Presidency.

Negotiation Strategies: Keystone of Crisis Management

By creating both the proper structure and professional cadre, one can obviate several of the bureaucratic conflicts and problems illustrated in Terror Counter Terror, including that of bureaucratic ineptness as well as the presentation of multiple, often contradictory agendas. Similarly, by exploring the operational significance of the hypothesis that major role reversals occur during a terrorist hostage siege, especially the one in which a terrorist becomes more a hostage to his hostage than does the adversary, one could quickly formulate an effective negotiation strategy (as an important part of the crisis management) where one quickly devalues the importance of the hostage, as Baker did with Tosi, in order to minimize the leverage that the terrorist has over the adversary. This particular strategy had been successfully employed in previous crises managed by the author but was summarily dismissed by the Carter administration when the author suggested that the fifty-two hostages in Iran be downplayed in their importance. Likewise, the employees of the State Department should be specifically instructed in a hostage survival course, designed

by the author, how to affect a role reversal: from being helpless and impotent as a hostage to being in control and in effect somewhat terrifying to the terrorists. Several other hypotheses illustrated in the terrorist/hostage relationship evidenced among Baker, Tosi, and Barbarosa have significant operational implications for crisis management. Included are the following negotiation strategies:

(1) Time manipulation--Tosi and Baker demonstrate, in their respective scenes, the classical techniques of delaying negotiations with Barbarosa, the terrorist, for as long as possible in order to effect the release of Tosi. This technique has now become reified by the media as the sine qua non of a successful negotiation with a terrorist. Witness the successful outcome of the Croatian hijacking of a TWA airliner where negotiations were purposefully protracted by the authorities in order to create a psychological bond of trust with the Croatian terrorists. Or, 69
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similarly, dragging out the negotiations with the FARC Unit in Colombia, over a three year period, in order to convince them that the Peace Corps volunteer held hostage was not a CIA agent and that his mother was unable to afford the astronomical sum of several million dollars demanded of the U.S. government. However, as evidenced in the final scenes between Baker and Barbarosa, time can often become the enemy of the hostage negotiator by publicly demonstrating the impotence of the government or negotiator to meet demands. This situation was particularly true during the Hanafi Muslim siege 71 when it became apparent that as time went on the leader of the hostage-taking group began to threaten seriously and abuse his hostages.

A more dramatic example of how time can prove counter-productive (if one is not conversant in manipulating it) occurred during the Iran hostage siege which eventually lasted 444 days, during which time the President was proven to be indecisive, contradictory, and incapable of managing a serious crisis. Significant damage was incurred by the United States with respect to the projection of an image of strength and competency; and, one may argue that the apparent weakness inspired or, at least, assured the Soviets that they could invade Afghanistan without a decisive reaction by the Carter administration. The crisis managers should have advised the President to place an arbitrary time schedule for negotiating with the Iranians after which he would walk away.

(2) Develop Trust and Transference--A crucial principle of hostage negotiation, depicted in several scenes between Tosi and Barbarosa, and Barbarosa and Baker, is the subtle evolution of an emotional bond that develops between the hostage and the captor, and the terrorist and the negotiator. By consciously refusing any attempts by the terrorist to dehumanize him, the hostage can and must insinuate morsels of his personal life and identity onto the terrorist so that eventually the terrorist finds himself, through the unconscious process of transference, treating the hostage as another human being. This effective alliance saved the lives of several hostages during the Israeli raid on Entebbe when Palestinian and German terrorists decided not to kill certain Jewish hostages with whom they had previously developed a relationship.

This affective phenomenon, illustrated in the final scenes between

Baker and Barbarosa, can be utilized by a skillful negotiator to create the impression that he is working on behalf of both the terrorist and himself. Its operational counterpart has been used in the hostage taking by Idi Amin of two hundred American missionaries in Uganda,⁷⁴ and in numerous domestic hostage-taking situations where the aggrieved individual seeks some symbolic redress from the hostage negotiator where the primary mechanism of manipulating the terrorists demands are more clearly based on the development of trust and the eventual transference phenomena.

(3) Divide and Conquer--A stratagem illustrated by Tosi's clever insinuations that other Red Brigade officials were conspiring with Christian Democratic members against Barbarosa. This classical technique, clearly overdramatized in the book, does generate two operational hypotheses: one, professional terrorist groups are rarely monolithic; and, two, it is possible to create dissension within such groups by attempting to create a competing power center. This was done successfully during two different episodes: (1) the Croatian hijacking of a TWA airliner, where the author was able, during the process of negotiation, to convince one of the Croatian hijackers that the leader of the group had already accomplished his goal and that subsequent actions were becoming counterproductive. In turn, that terrorist developed a consensus among his cohorts which effectively challenged the leader's pre-eminence and forced the situation to a successful resolution.⁷⁵ (2) Similarly, the Italian government was able to create enough dissension within the Red Brigade terrorist group about what should be done with the hostage, Aldo Moro,

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 that they eventually turned on one another. This led to the arrest of a significant number of the Red Brigade leaders.

(4) Reverse control of the hostage negotiation--One of the most important stratagems that results from the role reversal phenomenon is that of reversing the hostage's fate and allowing him to act as if he were the terrorist. This is also true of the hostage negotiator whose operational goal is eventually to take over the timing and demands of the negotiation, so that, in effect, he acts as if he were the terrorist and the terrorist becomes the hostage. This role reversal was successfully accomplished during the following hostage sieges: the Hanafi Muslim incident, the Croatian hijacking, the FARC kidnapping of Peace Corps volunteer Richard Starr, and Idi Amin's kidnapping of 200 American missionaries.
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There is, however, a serious problem that does arise in hostage negotiation during the phenomenon of role reversal which presents itself as the main theme of Terror Counter Terror; that is the psychological problem of identification with the aggressor, a phenomenon well described in hostages who have been kept in captivity. During this time they may develop mannerisms, attitudes, and belief systems similar to those of the terrorist's. It has been argued that this is, in effect, a psychological mechanism which protects the hostage from being completely overwhelmed by feelings of helplessness.
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A similar phenomenon occurs between the hostage negotiator and the terrorist where the hostage negotiator in a role reversal may become as ruthless, and vindictive as the terrorist and

where the methods of violence can begin to supplant the more timely, frustrating, negotiations. ⁷⁹ This occurrence is portrayed in Terror Counter Terror by the transformation of Baker from a cool, rational negotiator to a vindictive, ruthless, counter-terrorist. As of yet, this phenomenon has not occurred in any real life hostage negotiations of which the author is aware. But the only possible way to protect against something like this happening is by having that professional cadre of crisis managers who would continuously monitor individual performance.

Intelligence

Throughout Terror Counter Terror, the failure of intelligence is evident everywhere. If nothing else, the book illustrates how dangerous it is to all concerned parties when there is a paucity of credible intelligence concerning the terrorists involved as well as the modus operandi of co-workers, allies, bureaucrats, and other interested people who will invariably play a role in the resolution of a crisis. It is an axiom of crisis management, once formulated by the author and demonstrated in Terror Counter Terror, that verticle negotiations within a system are as important as negotiations between the system and adversaries. Because Ben, the Station Chief, knew both the State Department and CIA well, he was able to manipulate the crisis effectively to his advantage. In reality, that is possible but not probable. In most cases, the CIA is sorely in want of any good intelligence concerning either a terrorist group, the nation's political leaders, or the hostage. In part, the CIA has been hampered by post-Watergate restrictions on its capability to

operate overseas. However, their failing is both structural and functional, having gone through a series of major upheavals where over 800 operatives were dismissed over a two year period, and the Agency was shepherded by a leader insensitive to the poor morale within the organization, and unconcerned with the need for more and better human intelligence.
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In the field of international terrorism there is no room for an intelligence network that is wanting either in accurate data or astute analysis. Baker, in Terror Counter Terror, confronts a situation where the embassy has limited in-depth contacts with senior officials of the host government and where the Agency is unable or unwilling to penetrate terrorist organizations. For the most part, the embassy relies on political reporting gleaned from newspapers and magazines. This must change, so that there is a greater incentive within the system for political analysts to make both unusual and daring contacts. In the Aldo Moro case, our political officers refused to learn about or meet with any of the two hundred extra-parliamentary parties of both the right and the left for fear of placing
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their careers unduly on the line. There is no current operational premium for long range reporting or bucking the system, as evidenced in the intelligence failure that transpired prior to the fall of the Shah in 1979. With the proper inducements within the system (i.e., advanced promotions, preferred assignments, increased pay) the word goes out to all the political analysts to become more aggressive and creative in their reporting. The clear message should be, certainly in the field of terrorism, anticipate--don't react, act.

Similarly, the requirement is real and immediate that a newly structured organization within the CIA take charge of developing new contacts in host governments which are friendly to terrorists, particularly Libya, South Yemen, Iran, Syria. This would allow the U.S. a greater measure of certainty in knowing where, how and what potential terrorists might do. Likewise, although no Terrorist Information System, as depicted in Terror Counter Terror, exists, there is, nevertheless, an imperative need that one be developed along the lines that would allow professional crisis managers to understand the dynamics of a particular terrorist. For example, the psychological model of a typical Western European terrorists, as evidenced by Barbarosa, would have the following characteristics: highly manipulative; well-educated; usually sociopathic in nature, capable of committing egregious acts because they are rationalized as necessary for the cause; a history of unsuccessful or incomplete career attempts with a great need to assert his/her identity through an action mode which can garner sufficient media attention. He will often project his personal motives onto public causes which makes the profile of the terrorist akin to that of the politician. Such a terrorist profile clearly does not fit every type of terrorist and would vary somewhat with the locale. But for the most part, the book does approximate a model personality type without revealing any classified information. The essential questions become, however, how useful these profiles are and what should be done with them? The answers, unfortunately, are not simple. For the most part, profiles that do exist are of uneven quality

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and questionable reliability. On many occasions, the author found himself, in real life, with a profile that revealed a personality totally antithetical to the one he was confronting during the negotiations. Instead, he would spend needless hours developing a profile of his own from which he could then negotiate. A system as depicted in the book like the Terrorist Information System, easily understood, systematic in its presentation, and, most important, operationally oriented, would be of inestimable value to the U.S. government. At present, there exist different centers of intelligence collection and analysis which collate information about present terrorists from open and public sources. The information is then classified to make it appear valuable--when, in fact, it may have no merit whatsoever. Again, the solution to the intelligence problem lies in the government's commitment to developing a professional cadre of crisis managers, one of whose components would include the responsibility for collecting accurate, efficient, reliable intelligence and processing/analyzing and distributing it in a useful manner. Short of that, they are, in effect, playing against themselves during a crisis. And, that may be construed as self-delusion.

Covenant With The Media

Terror Counter Terror explores the hypothesis that high intensity media attention to a kidnapping holds the nation and the world hostage to the terrorist demand. This is a working assumption of the terrorist that makes the hostage-taking act particularly effective. It is the media coverage which leverages the image of the terrorist's power to the degree

that the actual reality of the terrorist's operational capabilities are
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 totally, and sadly, distorted. It is against this media exaggerated
 image of the terrorist that the hostage negotiator must work. It would be
 sufficient to state that the principles of media manipulation can be applied
 just as well against the terrorists as to their advantage. However, in
 order to do so one needs extensive experience as well as a healthy respect
 for the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.

Some notion of media manipulation, or more aptly phrased as "a
 covenant with the media," is hinted at in disguised form in the relationship
 between Richard Baker and John Price, the correspondent for the New York
 Times. Included in this mutually beneficial relationship is the concept
 of exchanging favors and information so that a new journalistic reality
 can be arrived at by mutual agreement. One could argue that this exchange
 model should be utilized to the advantage of both parties during a crisis.
 Rather than reporting a news story, which is later presented to the govern-
 ment official for belated reaction, an informal consortium is arranged
 where news is, in effect, created by both the government official and the
 journalist. This is, at best, a dangerous proposition for both parties,
 but in a crisis this is one of the considerations that must be made lest
 the media create an unwarranted theater of the terrorist siege--and, in
 effect, consciously or unconsciously act in collaboration with the
 terrorist. This in fact happened during the Iranian crisis when all the
 major U.S. television networks paid the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
 handsome ransom for film footage of the hostages shot during Christmas
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 and Easter.

It would be a judicious practice if the government and the press could create a formal or informal covenant which would stipulate the following points, all required in one way or another for the sole purpose of limiting the damage incurred during the crisis by the intense media attention:

1. In order to avoid tying up communication channels, the media must collectively share only one telephone line.
2. No media person can or should interview either a terrorist or a hostage during an ongoing crisis; this allows the terrorist the opportunity to procrastinate, as well as to by-pass his negotiator any time a disagreement arises.
3. Optimally, there should be a complete media blackout of the hostage-taking event during the crisis, so that the terrorist cannot have the opportunity to leverage his position or power. Failing that, there should be an agreement as to how many minutes there should be of media coverage during the event, as well as whether or not there should be a few media people at the crisis center, each representing the domestic newspapers, the media, and the international press. This way the crisis manager has better control over the amount of distortion that can arise from media coverage; vice versa, the media have a unique opportunity to contribute to the successful resolution of a crisis.

Surgical Strike Capability

Terror Counter Terror addresses itself to the need for a realistic counter-terrorist strike force. Through too many previous crises it has

usually been the military man and his "can-do" responses who has effectively intimidated the State Department, and, to a lesser degree, the Central Intelligence Agency. ⁸⁵ As described in Terror Counter Terror, many military professionals who had witnessed Delta Force in action were impressed with their vigor and enthusiasm, but disturbed with an attitude that was unable to cope with certain obvious deficiencies such as a poor command and control structure, inadequate and poor maintenance of military equipment, especially helicopters, and, improper or inadequate assault training. Without going too much further into detail, many of the crisis managers who were acquainted with the counter-terrorist assault units out of Fort Bragg were not surprised when the helicopter raid in Iran ended in tragic failure. Unfortunately, that was predictable from a strategic as well as an operational perspective.

It is important that command and control, proper training and maintenance of equipment, as well as extensive simulations of assaults on a hostage siege be implemented quickly under one command structure, preferably run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because historically it has the independent authority to represent all the military branches.

Typology of Response To Terrorists' Incidents

The wide diversity of terrorist actions, ranging from a hostage-barricade siege by a single individual to nation-state terrorism, makes it difficult to shape one government policy to adequately accommodate the divergent demands of each situation. A publicly firm posture combined with a tactically flexible operating capability, mentioned in previous

sections of this paper, only sets the stage for negotiations. Decisions regarding the conduct of those negotiations are best made when two basic questions are asked of each terrorist episode: (1) how much of a threat does the act of terrorism present to national security; and (2) what responses are required to minimize the threat, deter future acts, or save lives? The answer to these two questions for any given terrorist situation will determine the outer constraints within which negotiations can be conducted.

The first question can be viewed in terms of the impact of each of three threat levels on the hostage individual, group, or government: minimal, moderate, and extreme. A threat from a terrorist incident at the minimal level will involve an incident in which the impact is only on the immediate situation. At worst, the lives of a number of hostages are taken. A moderate threat involves limited impact on the political, economic or military life of the nation. An extreme threat involves a major, direct impact on the political, economic or military stature of the nation, either domestically or internationally.

The second question--regarding the appropriate responses to the threat--can be viewed in terms of three general approaches to the pursuit of negotiations: direct, indirect, confrontational. Direct involves face-to-face negotiations with the terrorist(s). Indirect involves influence and pressure on the host government of the country in which the incident occurs or on other governments or groups which may support the terrorist(s). Confrontational includes the use of international organizations, such as the United Nations or the Red Cross, to influence

the situation directly while at the same time the threatened government develops contingency plans for covert intelligence and military operations. The typology of threat and response can be visualized as follows:

<u>Required Response from Threatened Nation</u>	<u>Threat to National Security of a Nation</u>		
	<u>Minimal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Extreme</u>
Direct	Cuban Hijackers, Hanafi Muslim Siege		
Indirect		FARC	
Confrontational			Iran/America Red Brigade/Italy

Direct-Minimal

To illustrate: the Cuban hijackers of an airplane following the boat exodus from Cuba in 1981 is the type of terrorist situation which involves a minimal threat to national security and was handled directly. The terrorists were individuals acting on their own behalf. Although the U.S. government was concerned about retrieving the plane intact and saving the lives of the hostages, direct negotiations involving such well-known tactics as delay and the formation of an affective alliance worked to secure the release of the hostages with no cost to human life, property-- or national security. A second example of the minimal-direct type is the Hanafi-Muslim siege in Washington, D.C. in 1976 when Mr. Khoalis, leader of the group, demanded that: (1) the movie Mohammed be pulled out of circulation; (2) convicted killers of his children be released from prison and turned over to him; (3) a certain sum of money be given to him. Although the threat to national security was low, the incident was

potentially very embarrassing to the then newly-elected President Carter. The complexity of the government's response was appropriately low level, involving primarily Washington, D.C. police and the FBI. The government's policy was to extend negotiations as long as possible in order to develop a bond of trust between the negotiator and Mr. Khoalis; grant minimal concessions in order to extract out more major concessions from Khoalis (including the release of several hostages); minimize direct media interviews of Mr. Khoalis; split political and operational tasks into two different command centers, thereby protecting the integrity of the Presidency. Using these strategies successfully, 149 hostage lives were saved.

Indirect-Moderate

The kidnapping of Richard Starr, a Peace Corps volunteer, by the FARC, a communist guerrilla group operating in the jungles of Colombia, illustrates the situation comprising a moderate threat to the national security of both Colombia and the United States and calling for an indirect negotiation approach. The terrorists demanded several million dollars in ransom, a million dollars worth of farm and military equipment, and an exchange of prisoners. They also threatened to kidnap the remaining two hundred Peace Corps volunteers. The response of both the Colombian and U.S. government was moderate, involving an extensive effort of several U.S. agencies as well as Colombian and international agencies over a two year period. During this time, over one hundred people were involved in negotiating for Starr's release. The U.S. government assumed a public posture of no negotiations/no concessions. In private, however, they

encouraged and assisted Starr's mother in obtaining the necessary funds⁸⁹ to pay the ransom as well as recruiting an appropriate intermediary.

The U.S. government insisted on a low media profile and refused to withdraw the remaining Peace Corps volunteers from Colombia. The outcome of the negotiations was mixed: Richard Starr was released after two years of negotiations but relations between Colombia and the U.S. became strained. After Starr's release there was a noticeable rise in the rate of kidnappings of American and foreign businessmen in Bogota, Colombia. It is our opinion that U.S. policy was seriously compromised by the bifurcation between the U.S. government's public and private posture.

Extreme-Confrontational

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The kidnapping of Aldo Moro, the Premier of Italy in 1978, by the Italian Red Brigade, exemplifies a situation of extreme threat to the national stability of Italy which called for a confrontational approach to the problem. Although the Red Brigade demanded only an exchange of prisoners, the Aldo Moro kidnapping, more than any other terrorist act in Western Europe, posed a direct challenge to the democratic institutions of Western Europe. In response, extensive domestic, political, economic, and security measures were undertaken. Internationally, a wide range of assistance was requested. The Italian government: refused to negotiate with the Red Brigade; increased domestic security; maintained the outward appearance of business as usual; stabilized the Lira in anticipation of a possible economic panic; and entered into an informal alliance with certain newspapers in order to maintain a sense of control over the media

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coverage. Although Aldo Moro was killed by the Red Brigade, the outcome was successful: the Italian government remained stable. Because of their competent handling of the crisis and their unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists, they were able to deter future kidnapping of other major political figures.

Iran's 444 day seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran from
November 4, 1979 to January 21, 1981, ⁹² represents possibly the most serious of all forms of terrorism because one country legitimized the use of violence and terror against another nation in an attempt to destabilize it. The threat to national security resulting from such a situation is severe; in effect, it produces an undeclared state of war. The complexity of the U.S. government's response was extensive. Hundreds of people were contacted in an attempt to extricate the American hostages; an economic embargo was imposed on Iran; and a military operation was (unsuccessfully) mounted, with subsequent loss of life. Unfortunately, the U.S. government publicly announced a policy of negotiation with concomitant assertions that the U.S. government would make (if it already had not made) political and monetary concessions. As a result, the government found itself hostage to its pronouncement that the hostages' safety was paramount and that, implicitly, national security was secondary. Media attention was sought by the President who subsequently found himself paralyzed by the high intensity media coverage. The government undertook an economic embargo which further solidified resistance against the U.S. and a military operation, as mentioned, had failed. The outcome is well known; the hostages returned alive nearly fifteen months later, but the U.S. government's

ability to deter or manage future terrorist episodes was seriously impaired. Witness the spate of terrorist events that were spawned as a result of this mishandling of the Iran Siege: the U.S. Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan was mobbed and several people died; the U.S. Embassy in Libya was destroyed; and, Ambassador Diego Ascencio was kidnapped in Bogota, Colombia. It can also be argued that the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan resulted directly from a Soviet assessment that the U.S. was too weak and incompetent to retaliate.

From the above, it may seem that the typology offered has no rules for successful negotiations. This is true. Every terrorist situation involves one individual, who may or may not be backed by a group, which may or may not be backed by a government. The multiplicity of variables--ranging from the possible pathology of the individual to the political relationships of the groups to the military status of the governments--makes it difficult to provide rigid dictums for negotiation which are reassuring. The best that this typology can do is to help to place any given incident in a set of constraints which analyze the level of threat to national security the incident poses and the overall response style of the government. Once these constraints are identified, the search for negotiating tactics can begin.

Although the typology offers no firm rules for a successful negotiation, certain principles are apparent:

- (1) Direct negotiations works best when dealing directly with the individual terrorist, where the level of threat is minimal.

(2) As the terrorist threat becomes more serious, hostage negotiations must be coupled with contingency plans for multi-level international diplomacy as well as the possible use of economic sanctions and military action.

(3) The greater the threat to national security, the less a direct negotiation response will be effective, and the more the use of intermediaries is advised, whether it is an international organization, a third country, or even another terrorist group.

(4) The greater the threat to national security, the more direct negotiations merely serve to delay for the development of military and covert operations. Particularly in nation/state terrorism where the threat level is maximal and the complexity of government involvement is maximal, military actions and covert operations become paramount considerations, with negotiation simply a stalling tactic until such operations can be undertaken.

Beyond the above, competency and experience become the most important determinants for the successful outcome of a hostage episode. Since no two episodes are alike, the intangible clinical sense of crisis management becomes a determining asset in differing situations.

In conclusion, Terror Counter Terror tries to sensitize the reader to the fact that the United States is not sufficiently prepared to deal with the problems of international terrorism. It tries to serve as a useful tool in which one can simulate a political reality, otherwise unable to be reduplicated in real life.

It will take more than a bravado stance to intimidate a terrorist. What is required is a re-examination of our present no negotiation/no concession policy, our fragmented, ad hoc, bureaucratically chaotic crisis management capability, our faulty intelligence, and our "can-do" military assault force. It takes, above all else, a commitment to rectify the current inability to deal effectively with terrorist crises--even if we have to resort to fiction in order to analyze and dramatize the problem.

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